Reducing Gun Violence 

Research Report 

The St. Louis 

Consent-to-Search Program 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Justice Programs 

NOV. 04 

National Institute of Justice 
This and other publications and products 

found at: 

of the National Institute of Justice can be 

National Institute of Justice 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij 

Office of Justice Programs 

Partnerships for Safer Communities 

www.ojp.usdoj.gov 

U.S. Department of Justice 

Office of Justice Programs 

810 Seventh Street N.W. 

Washington, DC 20531 

John Ashcroft 

Attorney General 

Deborah J. Daniels 

Assistant Attorney General 

Sarah V. Hart 

Director, National Institute of Justice 
NOV. 04 

Acknowledgments 

The authors gratefully 

acknowledge the assistance of many individuals 

who made this research 

possible and helped to 

improve it, especially: 

Sgt. Simon Risk (ret.), 

Capt. Joe Richardson, 

Sgt. Terry Sloan, 

Sgt. Bob Heimberger, 

Sgt. Tom Malacek, and 

Maj. Lawrence O’Toole 

from the St. Louis 

Metropolitan Police 

Department; and George 

Burruss of Southern 

Illinois University– 

Carbondale, Bruce Jacobs 

of the University of Texas– 

Dallas, Steve Mastrofski 

of George Mason 

University, and Phil Cook 

of Duke University. 

Lois Felson Mock was the 

NIJ Program Manager for 

this grant. Her oversight 

was integral to the 

successful completion of 

this project. 

Reducing Gun Violence:


The St. Louis Consent-to-Search Program


Findings and conclusions of the research reported here are those of the 

authors and do not reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. 

Department of Justice. 

This research was sponsored by the National Institute of Justice, U.S. 

Department of Justice, under grant number 95–IJ–CX–0067. 

NCJ 191332 
ST . L O U I S C O N S E N T - T O - S E A R C H P R O G R A M 

Foreword 

This Research Report is part 

of the National Institute of 

Justice’s (NIJ’s) Reducing Gun 

Violence publication series. 

Each report in the series describes the implementation 

and effects of an individual, 

NIJ-funded, local-level program designed to reduce 

firearm-related violence in a 

particular U.S. city. Some studies received cofunding from 

the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Community 

Oriented Policing Services; 

one also received funding 

from the Centers for Disease 

Control and Prevention. 

Each report in the series describes in detail the problem 

targeted; the program designed to address it; the problems confronted in designing, 

implementing, and evaluating 

the effort; and the strategies 

adopted in responding to any 

obstacles encountered. Both 

successes and failures are discussed, and recommendations 

are made for future programs. 

While the series includes impact evaluation components, 

it primarily highlights implementation problems and 

issues that arose in designing, conducting, and assessing the respective programs. 

The Research Reports should 

be of particular value to anyone interested in adopting a 

strategic, data-driven, problemsolving approach to reducing 

gun violence and other crime 

and disorder problems in 

communities. 

The series reports on firearm 

violence reduction programs 

in Boston, Indianapolis, St. 

Louis, Los Angeles, Atlanta, 

and Detroit. 

iii 
ST . L O U I S C O N S E N T - T O - S E A R C H P R O G R A M 

Contents 

An Innovative Gun Recovery Program .....................................1

Program Phases and Results...................................................7

Evaluating a Changing Program .............................................13


Implementation Problems .....................................................15


Implications for Community Policing .....................................19


The Promise of Consent Searches ........................................23

Notes .....................................................................................25

v 
S T . LOUIS CONSENT-TO-SEARCH PROGRAM 

Scott H. Decker and Richard Rosenfeld 

An Innovative Gun Recovery 

This report is based on 

“From Problem Solving to 

Crime Suppression to 

Community Mobilization: 

An Evaluation of the 

St. Louis Consent-toSearch Program,” final 

report by the authors to 

the National Institute of 

Justice, 2001, available 

at http://www.ncjrs.org/ 

pdffiles1/nij/grants/ 

188291.pdf. 

About the Authors 

Scott H. Decker, Ph.D., 

is Curator’s Professor of 

Criminology and Criminal 

Justice at the University 

of Missouri–St. Louis. 

Richard Rosenfeld, Ph.D., 

is professor and chair of 

the Criminology and 

Criminal Justice Department at the University of 

Missouri–St. Louis. 

Program 

In 1994, facing an epidemic of 

violent crime, St. Louis instituted an innovative program 

to reduce its alarmingly high 

gun violence rates among 

youths. The idea for the program came from a community meeting of residents and 

police. During the meeting a 

woman complained about a 

house where teenagers were 

known to possess guns. When 

police arrived, the children ran 

into the house. Officers at the 

meeting told the woman there 

was nothing they could do because there was no legal way 

to get in and not enough information to obtain a search warrant. She then asked a single 

question that changed everything: “Why don’t you just 

knock on the door and ask 

that mother if you can search 

the house?” 

The officers realized that the 

woman was right. Thus, the 

Consent-to-Search program 

was born.1 

The program involved police 

knocking on doors in highcrime areas and asking parents of high-risk youths for 

permission to search their 

homes for guns that their 

children might have hidden. 

Any guns found were confiscated, with no followup prosecution. Parents and young 

people who requested help 

were referred to agencies or 

community-based groups that 

offered appropriate services. 

Program success and 

shifts 

The Consent-to-Search program emerged during the 

national epidemic of youth 

violence in the late 1980s 

and early 1990s.2 (See 

“Homicides and Other Violent Crime in St. Louis.”) In its 

first year, police confiscated 

402 guns from juveniles. They 

encountered remarkable 

cooperation within the communities that were most 

affected by gun violence. 

The program won national 

recognition. It was covered 

widely in the media, nominated for a prestigious award, 

and reviewed by a congressional committee. In October 

1995, the National Institute of 

Justice funded an evaluation 

of the program to assess its 

effectiveness and determine 

its applicability to other cities. 

1 
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / NOV . 04 

As a strategic problem-solving 

approach to reducing gun 

violence by getting guns out 

of the hands of juveniles, 

Consent-to-Search appeared 

destined to become a model 

community policing initiative. 

This situation changed abruptly in December 1995, when 

the chief of police who had 

established Consent-to-Search 

stepped down. Over the next 

several years, local government decisions resulted in 

the program starting and 

stopping twice—each time 

with a different format and 

set of objectives. The program was terminated in 

August 1999. 

Lessons learned 

The Consent-to-Search story 

offers valuable insights about 

H OTHER VIOLENT C ST. LOUIS 

After falling for several years, national homicide rates of persons between 14 and 24 years old 

escalated rapidly after 1985, peaking in 1993. By the early 1990s, guns were readily available to 

children in many cities through street corner markets.a 

The homicide increase in St. Louis during the late 1980s and early 1990sb was concentrated 

black males ages 20–24. More than 97 percent of these deaths involved firearms.c 

The levels of criminal violence have been sharply higher in St. Louis than in most other cities, 

although the demographic patterns of risk are quite similar to other cities.d Changes in St. Louis 

homicide rates over the past 30 years correspond closely with national rates,e which suggests 

that interventions shown to be effective in St. Louis might be promising candidates for broader 

adoption. 

a. American Psychological Association, 

vol. 24 of Crime and JusLaw and Contemporary Problems 59 (1996): 197–220 (hereinafter “Consent to Search and Seize”). 

d. See Jones, M., and B. Krisberg, 

OMICIDES AND RIME IN 

among African-American adolescents and young adults. By the early 1990s, the city’s homicide 

rate reached 380 per 100,000 for black males ages 15–19 and an astonishing 600 per 100,000 for 

Notes 

Violence and Youth: Psychology’s Response: Volume I: Summary Report of the 

American Psychological Association Commission on Violence and Youth, Washington, DC: 1993. 

b. Cook, P.J., and J.H. Laub, “The Unprecedented Epidemic in Youth Violence,” in Youth Violence, 

tice: A Review of Research, ed. M. Tonry and M.H. Moore, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. 

c. Rosenfeld, R., and S. Decker, “Consent to Search and Seize: Evaluating an Innovative Youth Firearm Suppression Program,” 

Image and Reality: Juvenile Crime, Youth Violence, and Public Policy, Washington, DC: 

National Council on Crime and Delinquency, 1994. Also see Snyder, H., and M. Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 

A Focus on Violence, A Statistics Summary, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1995, NCJ 153570. 

e. Rosenfeld and Decker, “Consent to Search and Seize.” 

2 
S T . LOUIS CONSENT-TO-SEARCH PROGRAM 

reducing youth gun violence. 

These insights are especially 

significant for community 

policing as it tries to gain a 

toehold in the traditional culture of policing and institutional responses to crime. 

The original Consent-to-Search 

program was based on the 

standard community policing 

approach of responding to a 

problem identified by citizens. 

By drawing citizens into the 

process of identifying and 

confiscating illegal firearms, 

officers relied on community 

expertise—a central tenet of 

problem-solving policing.3 For 

example, officers in the first 

phase of the program believed 

that its success depended on 

scrupulous adherence to the 

promise of no prosecution. 

They were willing to ignore 

evidence of all but the most 

serious crimes in return for 

access to the homes of juveniles with firearms. This view— 

that arrest opportunities are 

worth trading for the chance to 

get guns out of kids’ hands— 

is essential to this type of 

intervention’s success. 

Consent-to-Search can be 

viewed as a variant of both the 

aggressive order maintenance 

and targeted deterrence 

strategies.4 The intervention 

sent a signal that juvenile 

firearm possession poses 

great risks, threatens public 

order, and will not be tolerated by the police or the community. The success of such 

an effort depends heavily on 

the quality of the interaction 

between the community and 

law enforcement. 

But a central theme of the 

story is the difficulty of sustaining law enforcement 

innovations in the face of 

strong organizational resistance and weak external 

support. It is not enough to 

have a good idea for an intervention, or even to have a 

good working intervention. 

Problem-solving initiatives 

must build support at all levels within the police department. They must also be 

anchored within the community, by design and through 

partnerships and routine contact. Programs that do not 

establish these elements are 

vulnerable to changes in leadership, policy, or other influences that may counteract or 

shut down the intervention. 

Communities seeking interventions to reduce gun violence, especially among 

youths, might consider using 

consent searches as part of a 

comprehensive gun recovery 

strategy. (See “Gun Recovery 

Strategies—Consent-to-Search 

in Context.”) 

...a central 

theme of the 

story is the 

difficulty of 

sustaining law 

enforcement 

innovations 

in the face 

of strong 

organizational 

resistance and 

weak external 

support. 

3 
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / NOV . 04 

GUN R S —CONSENT-TO-S CONTEXT 

Police use seven tactics to recover firearms and potentially reduce gun violence: 

■ Search warrants ■ Pedestrian stops ■ Arrests 

■ Gun buybacks ■ ■ Gun turn-in campaigns 

■ Consent searches 

mix of complementary tactics to be effective in reducing illegal firearm use. Communities considering gun violence reduction strategies may want to carefully balance factors of risk, outcome, and 

costs (see exhibit 1). 

Risk. 

ple, search warrants and arrests generally identify high-risk offenders who pose a danger to officers. Because consent searches target individuals considered to be at risk for involvement in crime, 

either as victims or offenders, they are likely to have a greater crime-reduction payoff than pedestrian or traffic stops—while posing less risk for police. 

Probability of gun seizure. A second criterion for choosing a gun recovery intervention is the probpedestrian stops are deemed the least likely to get guns, they account for the majority of gun seizures a 

Search warrants, gun buybacks, and gun turn-in campaigns have a high yield in firearms but account 

for only a fraction of the guns recovered by the police. Guns recovered through buybacks and turnin campaigns are the least likely to have been involved in crime. 

Crime reduction and social costs. Another consideration is whether the removal of guns through a 

given tactic or set of tactics results in a net reduction in crime. Search warrants and arrests usually 

are executed because an offense has occurred or is imminent; therefore, they are most likely to 

reduce criminal activity in the near term. All of the other tactics, including consent searches, are 

less likely to identify an individual involved in crime during gun seizure or in the near future. 

and some traffic and pedestrian stops have this potential if officers are trained to look for firearms.b 

But traffic and pedestrian stops can have substantial social implications. A major complaint about 

U.S. law enforcement is the alleged use of racial profiling to stop minorities in proportions far greater 

than their representation in the population. Thus, traffic and pedestrian stops generate distrust of 

the police for many Americans. 

ECOVERY TRATEGIES EARCH IN 

Traffic stops 

As each tactic has something to contribute to illegal firearm recovery, the police should employ a 

A gun recovery intervention should first consider the level of risk for each strategy. For examability that a gun will be found. Those efforts most likely to yield guns—search warrants and gun 

buybacks—are the most dangerous and least dangerous tactics, respectively. Although traffic and 

because of the sheer volume of these stops—literally thousands per year. 

Tactics that have an immediate effect on crime have an intuitive appeal. Search warrants, arrests, 

4 
ST . L O U I S C O N S E N T - T O - S E A R C H P R O G R A M 

Search warrants, arrests, and consent searches exact more moderate social costs because, although these tactics are invasive, the perceived crime-control benefits offset their intrusiveness. 

police-citizen cooperation and therefore have a low social cost. 

Collaboration. A final dimension for comparing these strategies is whether a collaborative partner 

is needed. Activities that rely on collaboration between police and the community—such as consent searches—are more difficult to execute than those that the police can perform themselves. 

Nonetheless, consent searches based on police-citizen collaboration have proved to be an effective, relatively low-risk tactic to recover illegal firearms from juveniles. 

Sources,” Journal of Criminal Justice 

The Kansas City Gun Experiment, 

of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 1995, NCJ 150855. 

Exhibit 1. Impact of gun recovery tactics 

Level Probability Difficulty Crime 

of risk of getting of getting reduction Social Collaboration 

from subject a gun a gun impact Cost ($) cost required 

Search warrants High High High High High Medium No 

Arrests High Medium Medium High Medium Medium No 

Medium/Low Low Low Low Low Medium/High No 

Pedestrian stops High Low Low Low Low High No 

Consent searches Medium/Low Medium Medium Medium Medium Low 

Gun buybacks Low High Low Low Medium Low 

Gun turn-in 

campaigns Low High Low Low Low Low No 

Gun Recovery Strategies (continued) 

When done in close partnership with the community, consent searches may actually increase 

Notes 

a. See Burruss, G.W., and S.H. Decker, “Gun Violence and Police Problem Solving: A Research Note Examining Alternative Data 

30(6) (Nov./Dec. 2002): 567–574. 

b. See Sherman, L., J. Shaw, and D. Rogan, Research in Brief, Washington, DC: U.S. Department 

Traffic stops 

Yes 

Yes 

5 
ST . L O U I S C O N S E N T - T O - S E A R C H P R O G R A M 

Program Phases and Results


In its earliest stage, Consentto-Search was a police problem-solving tool directed at 

one of St. Louis’s most serious crime problems. In its 

later stages, however, the program fundamentally changed. 

To evaluate the program in the 

face of the major changes that 

occurred in 1996 and 1998, 

researchers divided it into 

three phases that correspond 

to the changes in operational 

philosophy and approach used 

by police (see exhibit 2.) This 

made it easier to identify the 

effects of program changes. 

(See exhibit 3 for a timeline 

depicting pivotal events and 

program changes.) 

Phase I—Problem 

Solving/Aggressive 

Order Maintenance 

The St. Louis Consent-toSearch program in Phase I 

Exhibit 2. St. Louis Consent-to-Search program phases 

Phase I Phase II Phase III 

Problem Solving/ Crime Targeted Intervention/ 

Aggressive Order Control/ Attempted Community 

Maintenance Suppression Mobilization 

Program goals and methods 

Orientation ■ Problem solving ■ Crime control ■ Community policing ■ Aggressive order maintenance ■ Suppression ■ Community mobilization 

Tools ■ Consent searches ■ Search warrants ■ Consent searches ■ Arrests ■ Referrals 

Sources of ■ Community meetings 

search target 

information 

■ Police ■ Police ■ Intelligence ■ Police Information Record 

System 

■ Gang unit 

■ Intelligence 

Objectives ■ Respond to citizens’ concerns ■ Make arrests ■ Seize weapons ■ Seize weapons from juveniles ■ Seize weapons ■ Make referrals ■ Notify parents ■ Gain intelligence ■ Involve a community partner ■ Refer parents to assistance ■ Serve warrants ■ Notify parents 

Program process ■ Home visits ■ Warrants ■ Home visits ■ Consent requests ■ Consent requests 

7 
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / NOV . 04 

combined two proven aspects 

of community policing: problem solving and aggressive 

order maintenance. In its first 

full year of operation, the program enjoyed spectacular success, especially in three areas: 

citizen cooperation, the targeting of locations that were 

likely to yield guns, and the 

confiscation of firearms. Of 

citizens who were approached, 

98 percent consented to a 

search. This degree of cooperation is quite remarkable, 

given the historic pattern of 

distrust between the police 

and the black community in 

St. Louis.5 

Cases in this phase were initiated mostly by citizens who 

identified homes to search. 

The program was operated 

by the Mobile Reserve unit, a 

squad without a specific geographic assignment that responds to pockets of crime 

and violence throughout the 

city. Training was conducted 

within the unit. Officers involved in this phase attributed 

its early success to its low-key 

approach.6 Two officers and a 

Mobile Reserve sergeant visited the residence in question, 

spoke with an adult resident, 

and requested permission to 

search the home for illegal 

weapons. 

In 1994, the Mobile Reserve 

unit conducted between 5 and 

30 searches each night the 

program was in operation. 

Guns were found in half of 

Exhibit 3. St. Louis Consent-to-Search program timeline 

Police Chief resigns 

Program suspended 

Program reinstated

Program reinstated

Program terminated 

1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 

Phase I Phase II Phase III 

Program initiated 

NIJ evaluation begins

Program suspended

Program reinvented

Problem Solving/ Crime Control/Suppression Targeted Intervention/ 

Aggressive Order Maintenance (June 1996–March 1998) Attempted Community 

(Sept. 1993–Dec. 1995) Mobilization 

(Nov. 1998–Aug. 1999) 

8 
S T . LOUIS CONSENT-TO-SEARCH PROGRAM 

the homes searched; an average of three guns were 

seized per household. Anecdotal evidence indicated 

strong support for the program among adults in neighborhoods that experienced 

high levels of gun violence. 

One parent even offered to 

sign several predated forms 

so that the police could return 

at any time; another wanted 

to give police a key to her 

house so they could search 

while she was at work. 

An innovative feature of the 

program was the use of a 

“Consent to Search and Seize” 

form to secure legal access to 

the residence (see exhibit 4). 

Residents were assured that 

the sole purpose was to confiscate illegal firearms possessed by juveniles and that 

by providing written consent 

to search, they would not be 

charged with illegal possession of a firearm. 

Phase II—Crime 

Control/Suppression 

One month after the police 

chief who founded the 

Consent-to-Search program 

resigned, his successor suspended the program. In early 

1996, the lead evaluator met 

with the new commander of 

the division housing the 

Mobile Reserve unit. The 

commander was unaware of 

the program’s accomplishments; researchers showed 

him a newspaper article to 

convince him. He agreed to 

resume the program, but only 

in a new form. The Phase II 

program had a different set of 

objectives and procedures. 

The primary goal of consent 

searches changed from seizing 

guns to arresting offenders. 

The changes were drastic: the 

department abandoned the 

problem-solving approach of 

removing weapons from juveniles through consent in favor 

of traditional crime control and 

suppression. Arrests, search 

warrants, and intelligence 

gathering replaced the original 

goals of consent, no arrests, 

and referrals for services. 

Consent searches were relegated to a marginal role as 

more aggressive tactics— 

especially search warrants— 

received top priority. The new 

lieutenant in charge of the 

Mobile Reserve unit explained 

the shift in philosophy: “Why 

only get a gun with a consent 

search, when you can get a 

gun and a criminal with an 

arrest or search warrant?” 

The program received little 

support from members of the 

newly constituted Mobile 

Reserve unit. No training was 

provided; many in the unit 

9 
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / NOV . 04 

Exhibit 4. The Consent to Search and Seize form 

were unaware of the program. The pledge of no prosecution was removed from 

the consent-to-search form. 

After 9 months of warranted 

searches that yielded relatively few guns, the program was 

discontinued, although it was 

not officially terminated until 

12 months later. 

Phase III—Targeted 

Intervention/Attempted 

Community Mobilization 

In January 1999, the Consentto-Search program was 

reestablished as a result of 

support from the U.S. Attorney’s Office,7 the availability 

of Federal funding,8 and continued national and local attention to youth firearm violence, 

which kept pressure on the 

police department to do something about guns in the hands 

of juveniles. 

Phase III operated differently 

from the earlier phases. Moved 

from Mobile Reserve to the 

Intelligence unit, the program 

was conducted on an overtime basis. Officers were 

10 
S T . LOUIS CONSENT-TO-SEARCH PROGRAM 

trained and program activities 

were documented. The original consent-to-search form 

with promise of no prosecution was restored. Participating 

officers were chosen because 

they had served in Phase I 

and were committed to the 

policy, elements not present 

in Phase II. This link to Phase I 

lent credibility to the new 

initiative. 

A hallmark of Phase I was its 

reliance on community input 

as a major source of target addresses for consent searches. 

In contrast, Phase III relied primarily on internal police data 

sources to select juveniles 

who had been arrested or 

mentioned in a field incident 

report. 

Another new element in 

Phase III was a formal partnership with a coalition of 

African-American churches 

called the African-American 

Churches in Dialogue. This 

group was formed to present 

a unified voice and leadership 

regarding social issues affecting the black community in 

St. Louis. The police requested the group’s help with referrals from consent searches, 

and the group also agreed to 

counsel parents and youths. 

The officers were relieved to 

have somewhere to refer distraught or desperate parents. 

Program results 

Gaps in data resulting from 

programmatic changes and 

operational lapses constrained 

the evaluators’ ability to measure overall program impact. 

However, program changes 

and some outcomes were 

documented. 

Phase I. The comparative success of the Phase I approach 

as a means of gaining parental 

consent and seizing illegal 

guns from juveniles is evident 

from the nearly total rate of 

parental compliance and the 

high number of guns seized 

(see exhibit 5). 

Phase II. Guns seized in this 

phase were largely from 

search warrants and arrests, 

as consent searches were not 

used. During the approximately 9 operational months of 

Phase II, only 6 percent as 

many guns were recovered 

as during the 12 operational 

months of Phase I. 

Phase III. Despite some favorable features, Phase III did not 

match the achievements of 

Phase I. Granting of consent 

fell by nearly 50 percent, and 

the number of guns seized 

remained nearly 90 percent 

below Phase I levels. This 

phase was heavily police driven, which may account for the 

11 
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / NOV . 04 

much lower level of compliance by parents or guardians 

than in Phase I. As the police 

assumed greater responsibility for determining where to 

search, relying on neighborhood sources less, they met 

with more refusals and recovered significantly fewer guns 

from youths.9 

Another factor that also could 

have affected the number 

of illegal firearms seized in 

Phase III is that overall levels 

of youth firearm violence had 

fallen in St. Louis and other 

large cities during that period 

(1998–99). There may have 

been fewer illegal firearms in 

the community. 

Exhibit 5. St. Louis Consent-to-Search program results 

Phase I Phase II Phase III 

Consent given 98% Not applicable 42% 

Hit rate (percent of 

searches netting a gun) 50% Not applicable <25% 

Program duration 18 months 9 months 9 months 

Guns seized 510 31 29 

Community partner Parents and neighbors None Clergy 

12 
S T . LOUIS CONSENT-TO-SEARCH PROGRAM 

Evaluating a Changing Program


The Consent-to-Search program evaluation suffered from 

implementation lapses and 

changes in program design 

and execution. Phase I records were lost;10 to evaluate 

that phase, researchers interviewed police about their recollections and relied on the 

public record. Phase II data 

sources were activity logs, 

ride-alongs, observations, and 

interviews. Phase III sources 

were police records, reports, 

interviews, and ride-alongs. 

Researchers tried unsuccessfully to convince the police to 

concentrate on a few highcrime neighborhoods, employing similar neighborhoods as 

controls. Otherwise, the 

team argued, the impact of 

the program on firearm violence would be diluted and 

difficult to measure. However, the police preferred a 

problem-solving approach 

that focused on high-risk 

youths rather than high-risk 

areas.11 This made an outcome evaluation infeasible. 

Process evaluation 

obstacles 

Ideally, a process evaluation 

would identify the attributes 

of individuals, the program 

components, and the community characteristics associated with a high level of citizen 

compliance with police search 

requests and with a high ratio 

of firearm confiscations to 

searches. But researchers 

faced major challenges in collecting such process data because of the changing nature 

of the program. For example, 

■ Targets of searches were 

determined by different 

sources in each phase and 

thus were not comparable 

throughout the program 

phases. 

■ Degree of compliance could 

not be a process measure 

since searches in Phase II 

were warrant searches, not 

consent searches. 

■ Phase III introduced a community partnership element 

not present in the other two 

phases. 

13 
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / NOV . 04 

Impact evaluation 

obstacles 

To measure program impact, 

a model outcome evaluation 

of the Consent-to-Search 

program would have pursued 

three objectives: 

■ Determine whether the program reduced youth firearm 

possession, i.e., did youths 

rearm after their guns were 

confiscated? 

■ Determine whether confiscation of guns threatened 

the personal security of 

young people, i.e., did they 

believe that without a gun 

they were more at risk to 

become victims of violence? 

■ Measure the program’s 

effect on the level of community safety, including 

firearms crime and victimization in neighborhoods. 

Ideally, juveniles whose 

homes were searched would 

have been contacted and 

interviewed regarding their 

rearming and sense of personal security. Because 

evaluators could not determine the effectiveness of 

Consent-to-Search in meeting 

the first two objectives, they 

could not evaluate the program’s impact on community 

safety. 

14 
S T . LOUIS CONSENT-TO-SEARCH PROGRAM 

Implementation Problems


Despite the intuitive sense 

Consent-to-Search made for 

a city with very high rates 

of youth violence, the program could not be sustained 

because of fundamental deficiencies in how it was implemented and maintained. 

Attempts in Phase III to correct some of these problems 

were insufficient, although 

Phase III did raise awareness 

of the program within the 

department and among other 

law enforcement and city 

agencies. 

Why the program 

ended 

The Consent-to-Search program’s demise is rooted in 

six broad areas. 

Uncommitted leadership. A 

distinctive organizational culture is required to encourage 

and sustain favorable attitudes 

about problem-solving initiatives among police officers. 

Strong leadership is especially needed. After the first chief 

left, the St. Louis Police Department had no organizational commitment to either 

problem solving or community 

policing. The prevailing departmental philosophy from early 

1996 into 1998 was that consent searches were ineffective and too soft on offenders. 

Departmental leadership 

placed a higher priority on 

taking offenders rather than 

guns off the streets. 

Officer resistance. The toughest impediment to implementing and sustaining problemsolving initiatives is officer 

resistance. Even in police 

departments that encourage 

problem-solving strategies, 

organizational support for an 

intervention such as Consentto-Search can be precarious. 

For example, an ongoing 

issue throughout the program 

was whether it constituted 

“real police work.” Some officers viewed the program as a 

community relations exercise 

with little impact on crime. 

Program isolation. Problemsolving or community policing 

initiatives are often handled 

by a single police unit or division, as opposed to across 

the department. Subunit 

autonomy helps to insulate 

15 
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / NOV . 04 

officers from the traditional 

norms and procedures of 

“real police work,” i.e., making arrests, investigating 

crimes, pursuing offenders.12 

The drawback is that subunit 

autonomy can lead to unit 

isolation, which works against 

integrating innovations into 

the department’s mainstream. 

In this case, the Mobile Reserve unit’s isolation prevented other captains and 

lieutenants from accepting 

program goals and methods. 

Lack of training. Without a formal training manual, program 

description, and documentation of past achievements, an 

innovation cannot diffuse 

throughout the department. 

What training existed was 

limited to the unit, which insulated the program from routine inservice training and 

adoption by the department 

as a whole. 

Absence of followup. The 

final blow to Consent-to-Search 

was the apparent inability of 

the Phase III community 

partner (the African-American 

Churches in Dialogue) to follow up on referrals received 

from the police. The evaluation 

team was unable to document 

a single case of followup. This 

breakdown created a dilemma 

for some officers and fueled 

others’ cynicism about police 

involvement in this type of 

intervention. 

Lack of institutional memory. 

The St. Louis Police Department kept few records of 

Consent-to-Search until the 

program’s last year. No entries 

were made in the confiscated 

firearms logs regarding method of confiscation. Such 

records would have documented the effectiveness of consent searches compared with 

other confiscation methods. 

In the absence of documentation, officers could legitimately question the veracity 

of the program’s early reputation for success. As noted 

previously, failure to establish 

outcome measures made 

program evaluation difficult, 

if not impossible. 

16 
S T . LOUIS CONSENT-TO-SEARCH PROGRAM 

A unique legacy 

Where in the inventory of 

innovations is the Consentto-Search program best 

situated? Perhaps the best 

known police problem-solving 

partnership—and a good 

benchmark—is the Boston 

Gun Project’s Operation 

Ceasefire program.13 The success of that intervention 

hinged on the broad array of 

constituents who embraced 

the program, the continuous 

review of data to assess program progress, and the close 

linking of the program to 

review findings. These 

Operation Ceasefire characteristics were absent from 

Consent-to-Search. 

However, the program’s extraordinary achievements in 

Phase I give it a unique status 

among gun violence interventions. Coupling this success 

with the program’s failures 

makes Consent-to-Search a 

potent example of the difficulties in program implementation that policymakers and 

practitioners must bear in 

mind. Even the most successful program will face 

challenges. 

17 
S T . LOUIS CONSENT-TO-SEARCH PROGRAM 

Implications for Community


Policing 

Problem-solving policing works 

best if police take their cues 

from the community. When 

Consent-to-Search lost that 

connection, gun seizure levels fell substantially below 

the levels achieved in Phase I 

when the community was 

involved. It is not unusual for 

a police department to return 

to the philosophy and tactics 

that were the backbone of 

law enforcement activity for 

most of the 20th century. 

Such a reversion is more likely if an innovation was never 

routinely implemented or 

institutionalized. 

Past research shows that failure to develop a constituency, 

lack of support from community residents, and officer resistance have been the main 

impediments to community 

policing efforts.14 The St. 

Louis Consent-to-Search program’s experience, it seems, 

was not unique in this regard. 

In Phase I, these impediments 

were absent and the program 

enjoyed considerable success. 

However, each of these three 

impediments played a role in 

the program’s difficulties in 

Phases II and III. 

Absence of a 

constituency 

Probably the greatest reason 

for Consent-to-Search’s overall failure was the program’s 

lack of a constituency, either 

internally within the police 

department or externally 

among city or community 

leadership or the citizenry. 

Internal. Problem-solving 

innovations cannot survive 

without internal proponents 

who have sufficient prestige 

and influence to protect them 

from internal and external 

challenges. For the Consentto-Search program to have 

survived the first police chief’s 

resignation, supporters within 

the department’s leadership 

and rank-and-file officers 

would have been necessary. 

None came forward until 

Phase III. 

Community and parental. 

As critical as internal constituencies are, external constituencies are even more 

important. Participation by 

community groups willing to 

work with law enforcement 

is difficult to achieve in highcrime communities where 

19 
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / NOV . 04 

The presence 

of the police 

on their 

doorsteps 

seemed to 

indicate or 

reinforce to 

many parents 

that a 

problem 

existed and 

that they 

should 

cooperate. 

tension between residents 

and police can run high. 

Phase I’s success in gaining 

consent to enter a home may 

have been due to a program 

emphasis on officer civility, 

but it also may reflect parental 

concern for their children’s 

safety and well-being—in 

effect a parental constituency. 

The presence of the police on 

their doorsteps seemed to 

indicate or reinforce to many 

parents that a problem existed and that they should cooperate. Phase I was the only 

phase to exploit this intangible factor. Phase II ignored 

this element, and Phase III 

restored it only partially. 

Lack of community 

support 

Phase I achieved significant 

community cooperation in 

providing information about 

homes to target for searches; 

however, these sources 

were not recruited as active 

participants—as an advisory 

board or support group, for 

example. Had neighborhood 

groups been strongly committed to the program, it might 

not have been suspended and 

redesigned. Isolation of the 

program in a small police unit 

that was not neighborhood 

based also worked against 

developing a community constituency. Such constituencies 

are best developed through 

sustained contact between 

officers and citizens. 

Phase II made little to no effort 

to involve the community. 

During Phase III, the community partner did not follow up 

on police referrals for services. 

This unanticipated development reveals the difficulties in 

forging effective partnerships 

between law enforcement 

and community organizations 

during problem-solving experiments. What went wrong is 

unclear. One implication is 

the need to review how community partnerships function 

in problem-solving initiatives 

and whether the partners 

have the requisite skills and 

commitment. 

Overcoming officer 

resistance 

Even though only officers with 

a demonstrated commitment 

to the program participated in 

Phase III, few of them believed 

that the program would lead 

to lower levels of violence 

among juveniles. Most felt 

that adolescents could obtain 

illegal firearms easily. Some 

acknowledged the possibility 

that the program could reduce 

20 
S T . LOUIS CONSENT-TO-SEARCH PROGRAM 

youth violence if they got the 

“right” guns at the “right” 

time, but that prospect was 

considered unlikely, given the 

large pool of available firearms 

in a city with high levels of 

firearm violence. 

What broke down the resistance of these Phase III officers was the return to working 

with the community, augmented by training and internal support. This led to an 

increased understanding of 

consent searches’ deterrent 

effect. 

What works 

In Phase I, Consent-to-Search 

depended on city residents 

and organizations (block 

groups, Neighborhood Watch, 

parents) to determine which 

homes to search. Communitybased selection of search targets seems to have secured 

greater cooperation and, ultimately, more guns. Perhaps 

residents have a more intuitive sense or better knowledge of which juveniles are 

likely to be harboring illegal 

guns. 

However, the researchers 

believe that Phase III’s more 

coordinated approach is the 

best model for this type of 

program because it enjoyed 

greater support from police 

officers. Most officers saw 

value in such elements of the 

program as— 

Problem solving. Officers 

valued using problem solving to address youth violence and other issues, 

especially assisting with 

non-law enforcement problems such as housing code 

violations, school problems, 

and unemployment. 

Referral. Officers believed 

that the relatively modest 

crime-reduction effects of 

weapon seizure should have 

been complemented by 

other interventions. Frustrated by their inability to 

address underlying conditions, they appreciated 

having local clergy as community partners to whom 

they could refer parents 

and their children. 

Deterrence. Many Phase III 

officers simply sought a 

safer community for youths. 

They were not as concerned with the target of 

the consent search—the 

guns—as they were with 

the message sent to parents and guardians in the 

community. 

Intelligence gathering. Most 

officers felt that consent 

Communitybased 

selection 

of search 

targets 

seems to 

have secured 

greater 

cooperation 

and, 

ultimately, 

more guns. 

21 
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / NOV . 04 

searches provided an opportunity to gather information that otherwise would 

have been unavailable. They 

interacted more supportively 

with residents and observed 

the family circumstances of 

many juveniles. 

Improved police image. 

Some officers hoped that 

residents would see them 

in a different light, more as 

partners than opponents. 

Although evaluators had no 

objective measure of this 

perception, they noted that 

some parents who were 

skeptical at the doorstep 

were cooperative by the 

end of the search. 

For those seeking to implement gun recovery programs, 

Consent-to-Search sheds 

light on what works in this 

type of community policing 

response to gun violence if 

approaches from Phases I 

and III are combined: 

■ Use community sources to 

identify where to search. 

■ Place a higher priority on 

seizing guns than on prosecuting some young people. 

■ Emphasize deterrence and 

referral to social services. 

■ Train officers and ensure 

departmental support. 

■ Secure and maintain 

community participation 

and support. 

■ Establish procedures 

for recordkeeping and 

evaluation. 

22 
S T . LOUIS CONSENT-TO-SEARCH PROGRAM 

The Promise of Consent Searches


The consent search intervention has the potential to be 

part of a broader repertoire 

of tools the police can use 

to reduce firearms violence. 

Hundreds of guns were 

seized under the auspices of 

Consent-to-Search, and the 

police made many referrals 

to youth-serving agencies. 

An irony of the Consent-toSearch program is the evaluators’ finding that Phase III was 

more successful in the eyes 

of police officers than Phase I, 

despite lower gun recovery 

levels. Poorer results in Phase 

III may be mitigated by other 

factors. From the officers’ 

viewpoint, more is at stake 

with this type of program than 

how many guns are taken. 

Convinced that seizing firearms alone does not adequately address youth gun 

violence, police preferred the 

community partnership and 

neighborhood targeting characteristics of Phase III. They 

also recognized the aggressive order maintenance and 

deterrent effects of searches, 

which sent a message to the 

community that illegal guns 

in the hands of juveniles will 

not be tolerated or ignored.15 

Consent searches 

today 

St. Louis still grapples with 

high rates of violence, especially homicide, aggravated 

assault, and robbery. In 2000, 

the city became a test site 

for a National Institute of Justice program called Strategic 

Approaches to Community 

Safety Initiative (SACSI). At 

each SACSI site, the U.S. 

Attorney, local decisionmakers, and a research partner 

collaborate to reduce crime. 

Researcher participation ensures that strategies will be 

based on real data, such as 

the finding that homicides in 

St. Louis are concentrated in 

10 neighborhoods. 

In 1998, St. Louis established 

a program based on the Boston model to address violent 

crime by focusing on the 

city’s “hot spots.” The program 

includes consent searches 

conducted by a trained team 

using the original tactics developed in 1993. The presence of a powerful external 

constituency—in this case, 

the U.S. Attorney—combined 

with police department support has helped integrate 

23 
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / NOV . 04 

consent searches into routine 

policing. Teaming with community groups that have a 

stake in program success has 

completed the advocacy network needed to sustain the 

program. 

In 2002, St. Louis became part 

of Project Safe Neighborhoods 

(PSN), a national initiative to 

reduce gun violence in America.16 Like SACSI, Project Safe 

Neighborhoods fosters partnerships of Federal, State, and 

local law enforcement and 

community-based groups. 

One aspect is based on the 

premise that many youths are 

“career” offenders or victims 

(or both). Police follow up on 

emergency room gunshot and 

stab wound victims to prevent 

retaliatory violence and repeat 

victimization. Followup may 

include consent searches. 

Consent searches may also 

be integrated into another 

PSN program that will tackle 

gun violence in schools and 

among juveniles. 

Thus, within the context of 

coordinated programs rooted 

in the community, consent 

searches have become a valuable element of a comprehensive gun violence reduction 

program. 

A final observation 

The Consent-to-Search experience shows that although 

problem-solving initiatives 

can be quite effective, they 

are relatively fragile. An innovative problem-solving intervention must rest on an 

established network of support among local justice professionals, elected officials, 

police leadership and field 

officers, and the community. 

The challenge is to sustain 

internal and external support 

for consent searches as part 

of a broader community 

mobilization to reduce 

firearms violence. 

24 
S T . LOUIS CONSENT-TO-SEARCH PROGRAM 

Notes 

1. See Bryan, B., “Soft Sell of Searches 

Nets Police 3,900 Guns,” St. Louis 

Post-Dispatch, April 10, 1995: 13a 

(hereinafter “Soft Sell of Searches”). 

2. Cook, P.J., and J.H. Laub, “The 

Unprecedented Epidemic in Youth 

Violence,” in Youth Violence, vol. 24 

of Crime and Justice: A Review of 

Research, ed. M. Tonry and M.H. 

Moore, Chicago: University of 

Chicago Press, 1998. 

3. See Goldstein, H., “Improving Policing: A Problem-Oriented Approach,” 

in Thinking About Police: Contemporary Readings, ed. C. Klockars and S. 

Mastrofski, New York: McGraw Hill, 

1991; and Goldstein, H., New Policing: Confronting Complexity, Research in Brief, U.S. Department of 

Justice, National Institute of Justice, 

Washington, DC: 1993, NCJ 145157. 

4. See Kennedy, D., “Pulling Levers: 

Getting Deterrence Right,” National 

Institute of Justice Journal (July 1998): 

2–8; and Kelling, G., and C. Coles, Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order 

and Reducing Crime in Our Communities, New York: Free Press, 1996. 

5. The Consent-to-Search program’s 

constitutionality was an issue for 

some local observers, but there are 

some legal precedents supporting 

this approach. Federal courts have 

ruled that the property of children 

can be searched with consent from 

their parents or guardians. For example, see U.S. v. Rith, 164 F.3d 1323 

(10th Cir. 1999); and U.S. v. Ladell, 

127 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 1997). 

6. Officers deliberately avoided confrontational or intimidating behavior. 

See Bryan, B., “Soft Sell of Searches.” 

Also see Decker, S., and R. Rosenfeld, 

“From Problem Solving to Crime 

Suppression to Community Mobilization: An Evaluation of the St. Louis 

Consent-to-Search Program,” final 

report, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of 

Justice, 2001, NCJ 188291: 6. Available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/ 

nij/grants/188291.pdf (hereinafter 

“From Problem Solving to Crime Suppression to Community Mobilization”). 

7. The U.S. Attorney heard about the 

Consent-to-Search program at a 

national conference and returned to 

St. Louis only to find that the idea 

had developed there years before. 

He used his leverage to ensure its 

reinstatement. 

8. Funds were allocated from the 

Local Law Enforcement Block Grant, 

which also elevated the need for 

accountability—use of Federal funds 

to pay officer overtime to conduct 

consent searches required development of a system for reporting activity. 

9. Because in many cases parents 

were absent or no one was home, 

results may underestimate the number of parents who might have permitted searches. See Decker, S., and 

R. Rosenfeld, “From Problem Solving 

to Crime Suppression to Community 

Mobilization”: 15. 

25 
REDUCING GUN VIOLENCE / NOV . 04 

10. Ibid.: 8.

11. Ibid.: 12. 

12. See Van Maanen, J., “Kinsmen in 

Repose: Occupational Perspectives 

of Patrolmen,” in The Police and Society: Touchstone Readings, 2d ed., 

ed. V. Kappeler, Prospect Heights, IL: 

Waveland Press, 1999. 

13. See Kennedy, D., A. Piehl, and A. 

Braga, “Youth Violence in Boston: Gun 

Markets, Serious Youth Offenders, 

and a Use-Reduction Strategy,” Law 

and Contemporary Problems 59 

(1996): 147–196; and Kennedy, D., A. 

Piehl, A. Braga, and E. Waring, Reducing Gun Violence: The Boston Gun 

Project’s Operation Ceasefire, Research Report, Washington, DC: U.S. 

Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, 2001, NCJ 188741. 

14. See Sadd, S., and R.M. Grinc, 

Implementation Challenges in 

Community Policing: Innovative 

Neighborhood-Oriented Policing in 

Eight Cities, Research in Brief, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

Justice, National Institute of Justice, 

1996, NCJ 157932. 

15. Deterrence was also a critical 

factor in the Indianapolis Directed 

Patrol Project. See McGarrell, E.F., S. 

Chermak, and A. Weiss, Reducing 

Gun Violence: Evaluation of the 

Indianapolis Police Department’s 

Directed Patrol Project, Research 

Report, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of 

Justice, 2002, NCJ 188740. 

16. For more information on 

Project Safe Neighborhoods, see 

http://www.psn.gov. 

26 
The National Institute of Justice is the 

research, development, and evaluation 

agency of the U.S. Department of Justice. 

NIJ provides objective, independent, 

evidence-based knowledge and tools 

to enhance the administration 

of justice and public safety. 

NIJ is a component of the Office of Justice 

Programs, which also includes the Bureau 

of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice 

Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice 

and Delinquency Prevention, and the 

Office for Victims of Crime. 
DOJ/NIJ *NCJ~191332* 

NOV. 04 

U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice ProgramsNational Institute of Justice Washington, DC 20531 Official BusinessPenalty for Private Use $300 

PRESORTED STANDARD 

POSTAGE & FEES PAID 

PERMIT NO. G–91 

MAILING LABEL AREA (5” x 2”) 

DO NOT PRINT THIS AREA 

(INK NOR VARNISH)