SAND 98-0505/12

Unlimited Release

June 1999

ENTNEA:

A Concept for Enhancing

Nuclear Transparency for

Confidence Building in

Northeast Asia

Man-Kwon Nam 

Korea Institute for Defense Analyses 

Seoul, Republic of Korea

Sung-Tack Shin

Korea Institute for Defense Analyses 

Seoul, Republic of Korea

Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper/12

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ENTNEA: A Concept for Enhancing Nuclear

Transparency for Confidence Building in 

Northeast Asia

Abstract

Nuclear energy continues to be a strong and growing component of economic development in Northeast Asia. A

broad range of nuclear energy systems already exists across the region and vigorous growth is projected.

Associated with these capabilities and plans are various concerns about operational safety, environmental

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protection, and accumulation of spent fuel and other nuclear materials. We consider cooperative measures that

might address these concerns. The confidence building measures suggested here center on the sharing of

information to lessen concerns about nuclear activities or to solve technical problems. These activities are

encompassed by an Enhanced Nuclear Transparency in Northeast Asia (ENTNEA) concept that would be

composed of near-term, information-sharing activities and an eventual regional institution. The near-term activities

would address specific concerns and build a tradition of cooperation; examples include radiation measurements for

public safety and emergency response, demonstration of safe operations at facilities and in transportation, and

material security in the back end of the fuel cycle. Linkages to existing efforts and organizations would be sought

to maximize the benefits of cooperation. In the longer term, the new cooperative tradition might evolve into an

ENTNEA institution. In institutional form, ENTNEA could combine the near-term activities and new cooperative

activities, which might require an institutional basis, for the mutual benefit and security of regional parties. 

Acronyms and Definitions

ABACC Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear

Materials

ASIATOM Asian Atomic Energy Community

ATMS Authenticated Tracking and Monitoring System

CANDU Canadian Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor

CARENET Computerized Technical Advisory System for the Radiological

Emergency Net

CSCAP Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific

DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

ENTNEA Enhanced Nuclear Transparency in Northeast Asia

EURATOM European Atomic Energy Community

FBR fast breeder reactor

GPS Global Positioning System

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

INMARSAT International Maritime Satellite

IRMP International Remote Monitoring Project

JNC Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Institute (formerly PNC, see below)

KAERI Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute

KEDO Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization

KEPCO Korea Electric Power Company

KIDA Korea Institute for Defense Analyses

KINS Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety

LWR light water reactor

MOX mixed oxide

NEA Northeast Asia

NPP Nuclear Power Plant

NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty

PACATOM Pacific Atomic Energy Community

PHWR Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor

PNC Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation (in Japan)

ROK Republic of Korea

SNL Sandia National Laboratories

WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators

Contents

1.0 Introduction

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1.1 Goals of This Study

1.2 Background of the Nuclear Issues in Northeast Asia

1.3 ENTNEA: A Concept in Information Sharing to Reduce Nuclear Tensions

1.4 Report Structure

2.0 Regional Nuclear Industries and Potential Issues

2.1 Regional Nuclear Facilities and Industries

2.2 Potential Issues of the Regional Nuclear Industry

2.2.1 KEDO Reactors

2.2.2 Spent Fuel and Separated Plutonium Storage

2.2.3 Low-Level Waste Disposition

2.2.4 Safety Concerns with Nuclear Reactors

2.2.5 Public Acceptance of Regional Nuclear Industry

3.0 ENTNEA: A Framework for Enhancing Regional Nuclear Transparency

3.1 Basic Concept

3.2 Informal Cooperative Activities for ENTNEA

3.3 A Comparison with Precedents and Other Proposed Regimes

3.4 Methods and Support for Informal Transparency Activities

3.5 Institutional Possibilities for ENTNEA

4.0 Conclusions and Recommendations

APPENDIX: Technological Approaches for Enhancing Regional Nuclear Transparency

About the Authors

Figures 

Figure 1. Conceptual Scheme of an ENTNEA Implementation.

Figure 2. Information Flow in the Computerized Technical Advisory System for the Radiological Emergency

Net (CARENET).

Figure 3. Monthly Status of Environmental Radiation Count Rates Shown in a Korea Electric Power Company

(KEPCO) Pamphlet.

Figure 4. Status of Airborne Count Rate Measurements Shown in a Kansai Electric Power Company (Japan)

Quarterly Report on the Company Website.

Figure 5. Seaborne Application of the ATMS Tracking System to Provide Location, Safety, and Security

Information in Near-Real Time.

Figure A-1. A Solar-Powered Gamma-Ray Measurement Station near Los Alamos National

Laboratory

Figure A-2. Remote Monitoring of Spent Fuel Storage in Australia

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Tables

Table 1. Status of Nuclear Power Systems in Northeast Asia and the United States

Table A-1. Year of Entry into Force for Northeast Asian States in the IAEA Safety Conventions

ENTNEA: A Concept for Enhancing Nuclear

Transparency for Confidence Building in Northeast

Asia

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Goals of This Study

In Northeast Asia, the publicly stated consensus on economic recovery and growth urges continued development of nuclear energy

technologies to provide power for this growth. However, highly developed nuclear technical capabilities may lead to concerns about

potential proliferation of nuclear weapon capabilities. Therefore, measures to increase the transparency of nuclear activities in

Northeast Asia offer particular promise for improving perceptions of regional security while maintaining economic growth.

This report examines potential benefits of increased nuclear transparency and suggests cooperative means to realize those benefits.

We will consider measures that might be applicable to reactors and other fuel cycle facilities in South and North Korea, Japan, China,

far eastern Russia, and Taiwan. For the purpose of establishing regional interest in enhanced transparency, issues of environmental

protection and operational safety may be as relevant as material protection and nonproliferation. Considering the relatively brief

history of transparency discussions in Northeast Asia, we will look forward twenty years, which corresponds approximately to

national nuclear planning time scales.

Present and historical military tensions in Northeast Asia provide a setting in which nuclear weapon proliferation must be taken as a

serious concern. Three acknowledged nuclear powers, China, Russia, and the United States, play active roles. Two states, Japan and

South Korea, have advanced nuclear industries. Another state, North Korea, has entered into an agreement with the United States to

freeze its alleged nuclear weapon program. In addition, Taiwan operates its own nuclear power plant system. This mix makes it easy

to envision unstable dynamics. Historical tensions that might cause nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia stem from the period of

Japanese domination before 1945, the separate government of Taiwan since 1949, and the unresolved Korean armistice of 1953.

Other issues can act as potent irritants: resource scarcity, competition for markets, and the environmental consequences of rapid

economic growth.

Cooperation in peaceful nuclear activities offers substantial prospects for managing and reducing tensions that can result from

worst-case considerations of nuclear capabilities or accident scenarios. Previous studies(1,2) have discussed some of the major

challenges and identified cooperative opportunities in general. This study by the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) focuses

on more specific measures by considering regional perceptions and priorities from a South Korean perspective. We will explore these

ideas by examining current transparency measures, weighing potential benefits of expanded transparency, and suggesting mechanisms

that might provide the desired transparency. In particular, we emphasize technical means for sharing information that might be

relevant to building confidence in safety, environmental protection, and nonproliferation. 

We have benefited from many technical discussions with several staff members(3) of Sandia National Laboratories in writing this

paper.

1.2 Background of the Nuclear Issues in Northeast Asia

Rapid economic growth requires vast expansion of energy sources to power factories, light cities, and transport raw materials and

finished products. Part of this expanded power supply will be met by nuclear plants, bringing various nuclear safety and

nonproliferation issues to the fore. Large-scale nuclear industries necessarily develop a broad range of engineering capabilities that

can suggest an inherent potential for proliferation of nuclear weapons. This potential can increase tensions despite declarations of

peaceful intentions. Rapidly growing industries also introduce concerns about the consequences of unsafe operations for public health

and the environment.

Nuclear transparency as a tool for improving regional security is a relatively new concept. Previously, nuclear transparency in

Northeast Asia was limited to meeting the requirements for safeguards of nuclear materials as called for in the Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). These safeguards, under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), are

comprehensive and rigorous. The results of IAEA safeguards inspections are, however, confidential between the IAEA and the

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respective states. The purpose of this report is to suggest that additional transparency, beyond IAEA safeguards, could be useful in

improving regional security and confidence in the nonproliferation regime. 

With the 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula(4), nuclear technology became an important part of

security discussions. Both Koreas agreed not to separate plutonium or enrich uranium and the agreement includes provisions for

transparency by means of mutual inspections between South and North Korea. 

This process continued when the United States and North Korea negotiated the Agreed Framework(5) to freeze the alleged North

Korean nuclear weapon program in exchange for two light water reactors (LWRs) in 1994. More recently, several proposals(6) have

sought to institutionalize nuclear transparency and cooperation in some form under a name like ASIATOM (Asian Atomic Energy

Community) or PACATOM (Pacific Atomic Energy Community).

Nuclear reactors themselves may be a source of tension and, hence, should be examined for transparency opportunities. Concerns

involving reactors fall into two general categories: (1) material diversion for proliferation and (2) operational effects on safety and the

environment. Although the IAEA safeguards program(7) is the primary guard against diversion, additional transparency can improve

perceptions of material protection and accountancy. Moreover, operational transparency can address both domestic and international

concerns about safety and environmental protection. 

Disposition of radioactive waste and storage of spent fuel from reactors is another critical area where transparency cooperation can be

important. Known as the "back end" of the fuel cycle, these activities can raise concerns(8) about unsafe transportation, leakage into

water systems, and vulnerability to unauthorized access. Even in the absence of actual problems, perceptions of differing (or

unknown) environmental standards can occasion strong regional protests.(9) Although no nuclear industry has mastered all of the

problems associated with the back end of the fuel cycle, technical options for reducing the "back-end" concerns exist and are noted in

Section 3.2.

Environmental sampling methods may be useful for enhanced nuclear transparency. National air and water monitoring systems gather

environmental information for public safety, including radiation and toxic waste levels, some of which is not specific to a particular

site. Because the environmental measuring systems are relatively non-intrusive, these data are less sensitive and may be more

sharable. Moreover, the IAEA is starting to implement new environmental sampling techniques,(10) mainly water sampling, as part of

the Strengthened Safeguards System. Regional parties could collaborate in development and implementation of such techniques,

either for nonproliferation or environmental protection goals.

1.3 ENTNEA: A Concept in Information Sharing to Reduce Nuclear Tensions

Our approach to the security problems occasioned by nuclear industries is to reduce tensions by sharing information. Sharing selected

information can help prevent proliferation threats by raising the probability of eventual discovery of covert activities. Better

information flow can also help a country avoid responding to a nonexistent threat. Furthermore, sharing information regarding safety

and environmental concerns can reduce uncertainties when industries are actually safe and identify areas for cooperative

improvements where concerns prove to be justified.

The breadth of issues and number of industries with common problems suggest that a regional institution might offer an effective

mechanism to enact transparency measures. While ultimately we conceive of an institution, we foresee that a regional tradition of

cooperation is needed first. Therefore, we suggest various activities in information sharing that we characterize as natural steps of

enhanced nuclear transparency leading toward a regional institution. We give this institution the working name of Enhanced Nuclear

Transparency in Northeast Asia (ENTNEA). ENTNEA as an institution may be the final goal; ENTNEA as a concept may be the

overall process of preliminary activities evolving into the final institution.

Information sharing may occur through document exchanges, visits and inspections, or by technical means. These methods offer a

wide range of options to achieve various levels of transparency. The method may be selected to reflect the goals of a transparency

agreement. For instance, an initial stage might depend on simple visits to facilities and exchange of general documentation. Greater

transparency for a narrowly defined purpose, such as obtaining baseline radiation levels, might follow and could be based on

transmission of some operational data. Thus, the transparency process selects goals for tension reduction and shares information that

can help solve problems stemming from uncertainties and worst-case concerns. 

We use the term cooperative monitoring(11) for this process. In our definition, information sharing involves mutual agreement

between parties. We also stipulate in this terminology that all parties to an agreement have access to the shared data and, if technical

means are used to acquire the data, that the technology itself be sharable. Furthermore, the transparency measures considered here

must include a process to resolve discrepancies or contradictions arising from the shared data. This is the underlying procedural

process that we use when discussing enhanced nuclear transparency.

ASIATOM(12) and PACATOM(13) are alternate proposals for reducing nuclear tensions. These concepts would rely upon regional

management of critical elements of the nuclear fuel cycle. In some respects ASIATOM and PACATOM appear to be modeled upon

the EURATOM (European Atomic Energy Community) precedent; however, the goals are quite different. Whereas EURATOM

sought to build a nuclear industry in Europe in the 1950s, the ASIATOM and PACATOM concepts would attempt to establish new

controls over existing industries in Asia. By comparison, ENTNEA, by emphasizing information sharing rather than management,

may be more practical from the standpoint of political acceptability. Nevertheless, a successful ENTNEA could pave the way for

ASIATOM and PACATOM concepts in the future. 

1.4 Report Structure

In this report we summarize the nuclear industries of Northeast Asia and enumerate some areas of concern. Concerns exist at various

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levels of urgency. Some concerns seem merely hypothetical, compared to others that reflect actual experience. The variety of topics is

intended to suggest that transparency steps exist at many levels. All regional nuclear industries can be involved potentially in various

areas of concern, which include safety and nonproliferation at enrichment and reprocessing plants, reactors, spent fuel storage sites,

and waste disposition sites.

A tradition of cooperation could start with low-level concerns and build toward more critical problems in a step-by-step fashion. We

suggest an experimental, informal approach in several topic areas to develop a regional foundation in cooperation. ENTNEA, an

institution that might grow from such a series of cooperative activities, is compared to other cooperative regimes and precedents. 

Recognizing that agreements to share data and the resources to carry out such agreements cannot exist in a vacuum, we suggest some

organizational modes for supporting these efforts. Organizational mechanisms ranging from unofficial (engineering organizations) to

official (ministries) offer a variety of support and authority from which parties may select. Next, we discuss ideas about the

requirements for an ENTNEA institution, which could be a means for consolidating and expanding the transparency activities.

We conclude by noting which hypothetical activities might be discussed or implemented as starting points in the near future.

Considering the relatively brief history of transparency discussions in Northeast Asia, we will look forward in a time frame of about

twenty years, which corresponds approximately to the time scale for national nuclear planning. Appropriate official and unofficial

discussion tracks are invited to consider these suggestions.

Specific ways to acquire and share the relevant information are stated in the appendix. These technologies could support the

information-sharing requirements of the suggested activities of Section 3. Various technical and administrative approaches are

analyzed for capabilities, limitations, and, inevitably, cost and intrusiveness constraints.

2.0 Regional Nuclear Industries and Potential Issues

2.1 Regional Nuclear Facilities and Industries

The nuclear energy systems of Northeast Asia encompass many civilian nuclear reactors. The reactors of regional states are mostly

LWRs, with some pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs) and fewer fast breeder reactors (FBRs). In addition to the reactors

currently operating, many reactors are now under construction and additional reactors are in planning. Regional states are counting on

nuclear energy as a major factor in their economic growth. 

The scope of the civilian reactor complex is summarized in Table 1. For the purposes of this study, regional states in Northeast Asia

are South Korea, North Korea, Japan, China, and Russia. We include the United States as an interested party and potential cooperative

partner. North Korea is included since it will have two LWRs totaling 2000 MWe. These are currently under construction by the

Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) as stipulated in the 1994 Agreed Framework. Taiwan also could

participate in the cooperative measures of this study. Finally, we note that of Russia's large reactor system, only four small units are in

East Asia.

Japan has the most comprehensive nuclear energy system, with 53 nuclear reactors(14) providing 33% of their electricity. Over the

next dozen years, Japan hopes to increase its nuclear power capacity by 60 to 75%.(15) Energy security is an important stated goal;

(16) hence Japan has developed the full fuel cycle, including reprocessing of spent fuel to obtain plutonium.(17)

Table 1. Status of Nuclear Power Systems in Northeast Asia and the United States

Systems Operation Construction Planning

Units Power(10MWe) Units Power(10MWe) Units Power(10MWe)

United

States

110 10,437 0 0 0 0

Japan 53 4,417 2 218 2 193

Russia 29 2,124 4 360 15 902

South

Korea

12 1,032 4 540 2 200

Taiwan 6 515 0 0 0 0

China 3 227 2 120 10 940

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North

Korea

Defueled 0.5 2 200 0 0

South Korea’s nuclear industry is growing rapidly and experts expect(18) that nuclear power will provide the majority of their

electrical needs by roughly 2010. In accordance with the Denuclearization Agreement, South Korea does not have all components of

the fuel cycle. However, the South Korean industry is mature and capable of undertaking the technical lead for the KEDO reactors in

North Korea.

Although China has had nuclear weapons for three decades, nuclear power generation is a relatively recent capability. According to

reports, China plans to quadruple(19) their nuclear power output by 2003 and build many(20) more reactors over the coming decades.

In addition, China is also considering the expansion of research facilities for the plutonium fuel cycle. (21)

Taiwan has six nuclear reactors that supply one third of its electrical power. Although Taiwan is not a state party to the NPT, all of the

reactors are under IAEA safeguards. Taiwan has no plans for new nuclear plants pending solution of problems concerning disposal of

waste and storage of spent fuel. Most of Taiwan's research efforts concentrate on waste disposal and safety.

North Korea has removed the fuel from their single reactor in exchange for two large reactors under the 1994 Agreed Framework.

Those reactors will be under IAEA safeguards and are targeted for completion in 2003.

The United States is included in Table 1 as an interested observer and possible participant in any nuclear transparency activities in

Northeast Asia. With the largest nuclear power system in the world, the U.S. has no planned new construction. Nevertheless, the U.S.

nuclear industry is still competitive and leads the world in certain areas. 

Finally, the Russian system is mainly in Europe, with four small heating and electricity reactors near the Arctic Circle at Bilibino in

Siberia. Nevertheless, Russia can play a part in nuclear transparency in Northeast Asia, because it is supplying two new reactors to

China at Lianyungang and cooperating with Japan and South Korea on a waste disposal problem.

2.2 Potential Issues of the Regional Nuclear Industry

The nuclear industry in Asia is growing while the overall nuclear industry in the world has stagnated. Most Asian states pursue

development policies that place a high priority on nuclear energy as a means to meet their requirements for electrical power.

Currently, the nuclear industry in Asia represents one fourth of the world’s total nuclear power. It is expected to increase to one third

in the early 21st century. If this growth trend in the Asian industry continues, several issues regarding nuclear activities may arise. In

the following sections below we highlight those issues on which transparency cooperation may be helpful.

2.2.1 KEDO Reactors

The 1994 Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea froze the North Korean nuclear program in exchange for

two LWRs capable of producing a total of 2,000 MWe. While this landmark agreement has succeeded in its immediate goal to

neutralize a potential nuclear weapon program, it also raises several issues.

The first priority, since the Agreed Framework was a nonproliferation measure, is to assure that the LWR technology is not used for

proliferation purposes, despite IAEA safeguards. Would an additional agreement to share confidential IAEA information with

selected regional parties reduce tensions between North Korea and South Korea or Japan? Are there transparency measures

supplemental to safeguards that might reduce concerns?

The second issue is the nuclear safety issue. Normally, training operators in a new, complex technology is a major task. So far, North

Korea is reluctant to hold training in South Korean territory. Building a reactor simulator facility for training in Sinpo, North Korea,

would escalate costs and limit trainees’ exposure to procedures at actual facilities. The Gori Operation Training Center in South Korea

could provide better, far less expensive training. This is still in negotiation.

2.2.2 Spent Fuel and Separated Plutonium Storage

Fuel rods removed from a reactor, known as spent fuel, are highly radioactive and contain plutonium. Thus, spent fuel carries with it

safety and proliferation concerns. Reprocessing to separate the plutonium for future use in reactors increases the proliferation concern

during the time after the reprocessing has occurred and before the fabrication of new fuel rods.

South Korea has the problem of disposing of spent fuel from its reactors. Four LWR complexes currently are faced with the prospect

of stopping the production of electricity because of the shortage of interim storage sites for the spent fuel. In accordance with

international nonproliferation policy, South Korea does not reprocess spent fuel, which could reduce the storage problem. Currently,

South Korea is enlarging waste storage facilities and developing related technologies, but spent fuel remains a problem.

The United States also must solve the spent fuel disposition problem. The U.S. effort in spent fuel disposition is the Yucca Mountain

Project, but this has not accepted any nuclear waste yet.

Japan is faced with similar difficulties in dealing with spent fuel disposition because of a shortage of waste storage facilities. The

Japanese problem is further compounded by accidents that have damaged their technical and managerial reputation. Arguing that a

closed fuel cycle is a basic element of energy security, Japan has for years projected a future nuclear power system in which

plutonium created in LWRs would be separated and recycled as fuel.(22) Consistent with this policy, the Japanese have separated

plutonium from fuel rods withdrawn from LWRs. They have accumulated about 10.8 metric tons of fissionable material (4.6 tons

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within the country and 6.2 tons in England and France).(23) The material is under IAEA safeguards and is earmarked for eventual use

as reactor fuel. 

Regional states have expressed concern that Japan has accumulated an excessive amount of plutonium, which could be usable for a

nuclear weapons program.(24) Japanese nuclear experts are aware of this concern and have expressed interest in finding effective and

politically acceptable transparency measures to reassure their neighbors.

In response to these shared issues of spent fuel and separated plutonium, Northeast Asian systems are discussing the establishment of

a multilateral cooperative regime on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. One proposal,(25) for example, suggests regional storage of

spent fuel in Russia, under IAEA safeguards, for periods of 50 to 100 years. Discussions of a PACATOM or an ASIATOM often

feature the problem of spent fuel disposition and consider cooperative management as a potential solution.

2.2.3 Low-Level Waste Disposition

Low-level waste from a nuclear power plant (NPP) is typically contaminated protective clothing, tools, and cleaning materials. It can

accumulate rapidly in the course of routine maintenance of reactors or other nuclear facilities. Another source of low-level waste is

the decommissioning of shutdown reactors and retired nuclear submarines. This problem is a general and difficult issue for regional

states to overcome.

Taiwan has tried to dispose of its overflowing low-level waste in North Korea; South Korea has protested the lack of planning for

transportation emergencies for seaborne shipments and questioned the environmental planning of the North Korean site. Until these

safety issues can be resolved, Taiwan has put this undertaking on hold.

South Korea and Russia continue to discuss low-level waste storage in Russia; this would depend upon identifying and characterizing

sites in Russia. Some South Koreans are concerned that such a proposal has only a small chance of success, because of the special

sensitivity of nuclear waste. Therefore, South Korea still considers that it must develop and implement a waste disposal policy

internally.

Decommissioning of an aging fleet of Russian nuclear submarines has resulted in the accumulation of radioactive waste, both highand low-level. Low-level liquid radioactive waste has leaked from submarines during maintenance and decommissioning; Russia

dumped some of this radioactive waste into the East Sea (Sea of Japan) in 1993.(26) Under Republic of Korea (ROK)-Russia and

Japan-Russia agreements,(27) waste handling and storage equipment is being provided to Russia. The United States has provided

additional technical support to Russia. However, because of the Russian economic conditions, waste handling continues to be a

problem.

2.2.4 Safety Concerns with Nuclear Reactors

Despite some highly publicized incidents in the Japanese industry, most observers believe that the Asian nuclear industry operates

competently and safely. Nevertheless, Japan and South Korea are concerned about the effects of an accident, even in another country,

both as an immediate public safety threat and also as a cause to reverse public acceptance of nuclear power. 

Part of this concern is related to expansion of the newer nuclear industries. China, currently having three power reactors, is planning

to greatly expand its nuclear power system in the coming decades. North Korea is receiving two full-size NPPs, but only has

operating experience with a small research reactor. These two states face enormous training and experience challenges. Thus, in North

Korea and China, developing a "safety culture" is an important challenge. We note that China has cooperated with the IAEA and with

World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) safety teams and is acting on their suggestions. 

WANO and the IAEA both conduct valuable programs in nuclear safety, which could be expanded or supplemented by regional

activities as noted in the next chapter. 

2.2.5 Public Acceptance of Regional Nuclear Industry

Nuclear industries in Northeast Asia are growing more rapidly than in other regions of the world. For the most part, public concern

about environmental issues is increasing and public opinion over safety problems of NPPs is becoming more critical. Thus, each state

is faced with difficulty in locating new NPPs, fuel cycle facilities, and radioactive waste disposition sites. Furthermore, safety issues

are often raised regarding transportation of nuclear material, sometimes for political reasons. Without the sharing of relevant

information between the government and public, these problems cannot be resolved.

The positive side of nuclear power needs greater prominence also. The regional industry should communicate to the public the role

for nuclear power in supporting economic growth and as a means to meet greenhouse gas reduction standards. 

In the next sections we examine potential transparency measures that could address these areas of concern. A potential institution to

administer these measures might result eventually; we consider its potential contribution, as well.

3.0 ENTNEA: A Framework for Enhancing Regional Nuclear Transparency

3.1 Basic Concept

Nuclear industries in Northeast Asia could enhance nuclear transparency by sharing information related to the issues noted in the

preceding section. In sharing this information, states could (1) build confidence in their neighbors' ability to operate NPPs safely and

protect nuclear material, and (2) obtain information that would be useful in enhancing their own performance in these areas. 

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We envision a process for Enhanced Nuclear Transparency in Northeast Asia (ENTNEA) in the region to turn the above concept into

reality. While ENTNEA may ultimately result in an institution for regional cooperation, the general lack of a tradition of regional

institutions makes that an unlikely first step. As implied by the flow chart in Figure 1, developing a cooperative tradition of

individual, informal measures might form a foundation for an institution over a period of time. Moreover, the informal process could

start up gradually, each project providing the basis for the next cooperative activity. Of the various opportunity areas discussed in the

next section, probably the least exciting options would be the first to be politically acceptable. Over time, however, these various

cooperative activities might provide the basis for more comprehensive activities, such as an ENTNEA institution. 

Figure 1. Conceptual Scheme of an ENTNEA Implementation

● 

Informal information-sharing activities lead to an institution, which can 

evolve to include more comprehensive forms of cooperation.

As an institution, ENTNEA could undertake more comprehensive regional cooperation, in addition to administering the continuing

informal efforts. In the final part of this chapter, we consider what this institution might look like. The ENTNEA institution would

have to evolve in cooperation with existing international programs of the IAEA, industry groups, and governments. Depending upon

regional preferences, the institutional form of ENTNEA might perform certain analysis functions and help organize regional research

in pressing issues like waste disposition.

3.2 Informal Cooperative Activities for ENTNEA

Regional nuclear transparency activities could build a tradition of nuclear cooperation in limited and specific areas of common

interest. Informal, cooperative activities among regional states for ENTNEA could form a step-by-step approach leading eventually to

an institution. Cooperative activities could be bilateral or multilateral, with the goal of including all regional parties eventually. Initial

ENTNEA activities could be noninstitutional in format and endorsed by appropriate government agreements.

Cooperating partners for transparency could be drawn informally from technical organizations. Some of the activities might be

academic or research exchanges. Each activity would pass through discussion, experiment, refinement, and implementation phases, as

shown in Figure 1. Some activities might have specific lifetimes; longer-term activities might be absorbed by an ENTNEA institution.

Suggested candidate transparency activities are listed in this section. The order of discussion is not intended to be chronological, nor

is there a one-to-one mapping to the issues of concern.

Specific ways to acquire and share the relevant information are stated in the appendix. Various technical and administrative

approaches are analyzed for capabilities, limitations, and the constraints of cost and intrusiveness.

1. Environmental Radiation Monitoring

Enhancing nuclear safety through wide-area monitoring of environmental radiation could address concerns about reactor safety, waste

deposition, and public acceptance. There could be direct benefits to public health and emergency response in case of an accident;

communications for prompt data sharing would be key to cooperation. Research in modeling for air transport of pollution would also

be useful, but this would only require document sharing among researchers. Because environmental radiation monitoring is not

intrusive and is in the interest of public safety, this may be a feasible informal activity. 

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There are already precedents in the region of making more environmental radiation data available. In South Korea, the Korea Institute

of Nuclear Safety (KINS) is preparing an Internet-based system to acquire and distribute data from the nationwide monitoring system,

IERNet. IERNet includes 16 national monitoring posts. This data will be integrated with safety data from the Korean NPPs (acronym:

SIDS), meteorological data (acronym: REMDAS), and consequence modeling (acronym: FADAS) to form a comprehensive

emergency response system, to be known as CARENET (Computerized Technical Advisory System for the Radiological Emergency

Net).(28) The information flow is shown in Figure 2.

The regional utilities also release information in various ways. The Korea Electric Power Company (KEPCO) pamphlet in Figure 3

shows a monthly report of radiation near eight NPP sites. High and low dose rates are listed for seven; the eighth was shut down for

refueling at the time of the report. Similarly in Japan, Kansai Electric displays monthly radiation summaries on their Internet site.

Figure 4 shows highs and lows for three months at the eleven Kansai NPPs. These examples suggest that the nuclear industry may be

prepared to publish environmental radiation data and might participate in an organized effort, which could provide data in a common

format with explanatory information.

Figure 2. Information Flow in the Computerized Technical Advisory System for the Radiological

Emergency Net (CARENET).

Figure 3. Monthly Status of Environmental Radiation Count Rates Shown in a Korea Electric Power

Company (KEPCO) Pamphlet.

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2. Spent Fuel and Separated Plutonium Storage

Transparency in spent fuel and separated plutonium storage could reduce certain proliferation concerns. Because IAEA safeguards

results are protected as confidential, sharing of inspection results or other monitoring arrangements could be an important factor in

regional confidence building. The separated plutonium issue has already received some attention. In high-level talks with Japan in

1995, South Korea proposed discussions about the total amount and isotopic content of plutonium accumulated in Japan. Having been

raised at a high political level, enhanced plutonium transparency might be a promising topic for cooperation on the technical levels.

However, this might not be an initial regional activity because not all systems have separated plutonium. If consideration is expanded

to include spent fuel, then all systems might participate.

A promising technical means for enhancing spent fuel and plutonium transparency might be drawn from the International Remote

Monitoring Project (IRMP).(29) In the IRMP, movement, intrusion, and video sensors can provide dial-up information to authorized

users. This type of system could provide relatively nonintrusive means for Japan to broaden the transparency of its stocks of separated

plutonium. In exchange, other countries might offer transparency in spent fuel storage using this same technology. The appendix

offers further discussion and an example of an installation in Australia.

Figure 4. Status of Airborne Count Rate Measurements Shown in a Kansai Electric Power Company

(Japan) Quarterly Report on the Company Website.

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3. Transparency for Nuclear Reactors

International concern about reactor safety and nonproliferation compliance can be addressed by enhanced transparency. Many

transparency options exist in modern reactors, where hundreds of data channels are monitored continuously. Many of these channels

convey routine information with no sensitive content. While safety cannot be proven to a skeptical public, sharing selected

information can show that NPPs are operating within their normal design limits. Nonproliferation concerns can also be addressed by

showing that an unscheduled refueling is not occurring. 

Enhancing transparency for the KEDO LWRs would be particularly beneficial to South and North Korean relations. Transparency in

the KEDO LWRs is of great interest to South Korea, as a supplement to the IAEA safeguards that will be in place. Since the KEDO

LWRs will be South Korean model reactors, North Korea could cooperate with South Korea on operations of the reactors. As operator

and vendor, respectively, North and South Korea could ensure the normal operations of reactors and build mutual confidence through

sharing information about operations of LWRs. Exchange of data about safe operating procedures could be particularly important

during refueling, when the need to complete refueling promptly puts additional pressure on the operators. Of course, this is the time

when material diversion concerns are the highest.

KEDO already has devised a protocol through which data on reactor operations can be exchanged via sophisticated communications

systems and video images. South Korean workers in Sinpo, North Korea, are currently constructing communication systems between

KEPCO and KEDO offices in Seoul, South Korea, and the construction site in Sinpo. Once the reactors are operational, a

transparency measure could take advantage of the communications link to transmit data from the control room of LWRs in Sinpo to

the KEDO office in Seoul. The appendix examines transparency opportunities at reactors in more detail.

4. Nuclear Safety Conventions 

Nuclear safety conventions under the auspices of the IAEA address several safety and nonproliferation concerns noted above. For

example, under the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident,(30) the IAEA can provide immediate technical and

administrative response after notification of a nuclear accident. Exchange of information to show compliance with these conventions

could be a transparency measure.

Cooperation in designing and implementing an automatic notification system would strengthen the convention and be a confidence

building measure. In this case, the ENTNEA activity would supplement the existing IAEA convention, at least on a regional basis.

This is a potential area for early ENTNEA cooperation, as regional parties have signed the convention already (see the appendix).

5. Transportation Safety 

Routine operations in the fuel cycle require movement of fuel assemblies to the reactors and subsequent transportation of the spent

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fuel for storage, reprocessing, or final disposition. Both domestic and regional objections have been voiced about shipments, despite

rigorous safety processes. Therefore, nuclear material transportation safety could also be a topic of regional cooperation. Cooperative

monitoring of nuclear material transportation could enhance national programs to protect nuclear material and improve public

perceptions of safety. Exchange of near-real-time information could also aid regional response in case of an emergency or accident.

Further discussion in the appendix addresses the need to protect some parts of this data from misuse.

Recently, the Authenticated Tracking and Monitoring System (ATMS),(31) developed by Sandia National Laboratories, demonstrated

successful monitoring of a sea shipment of uranium ore from Australia to Europe. (Figure 5 shows an example of a seagoing

application.) Commercial communication systems supported frequent reporting of the shipment location and integrity as it went

halfway around the world. Application of this type of technology to future global shipments could contribute to safe transportation of

nuclear material. It could also address international concerns about the safety of these shipments.

Figure 5. Seaborne Application of the ATMS Tracking System 

to Provide Location, Safety, and Security Information in Near-Real Time

The preceding discussion briefly summarized ideas for five cooperative projects. In the appendix, we expand on this discussion and

elaborate on the process of selecting information for transparency. The criteria we use will consider the relevance of available

information to the nuclear concern, how it could be transmitted, and who might receive this information. We also attempt to evaluate

the benefits and costs of engaging in each cooperative process, including the risks associated with loss of control of data.

These ideas for cooperative activities could build a regional experience in nuclear transparency. Success with these activities could

build the rationale for an institutional cooperation. An eventual ENTNEA institution could absorb these activities, expand on them,

and have the organizational depth to undertake more ambitious activities. In the next section we compare an ENTNEA institution with

existing precedents and other proposed regimes. 

3.3 A Comparison with Precedents and Other Proposed Regimes

In the following discussion, we will compare the conceptual ENTNEA institution to ASIATOM or PACATOM concepts. All three

concepts concern regional cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, the ENTNEA concept for enhancing nuclear

transparency for confidence building differs from ASIATOM or PACATOM. ENTNEA would emphasize information sharing in

place of the regulatory or management activities that are included in the ASIATOM or PACATOM concepts. 

ENTNEA could pursue harmonious resolution of the issues arising among regional states operating nuclear plants and fuel cycle

facilities. Via information sharing, regional states could increase mutual understanding, build multilateral confidence, and resolve

issues arising from nuclear activities. Major characteristics of the ENTNEA concept would be as follows:

Cost-effective administration: One organization could administer the various informal activities noted in the previous section

more efficiently than separate processes.

● 

Regional information sharing in the fuel cycle: Transparency in reprocessing and separated plutonium storage could improve

confidence in nonproliferation regimes. Information about technical measures in spent fuel and waste storage could bring cost

and safety benefits.

● 

Analysis on selected topics as authorized by the parties: For example, staff could make periodic projections of material

accumulations and the needs for fuel cycle facilities, or they could analyze safety issues.

● 

● Organization of collaborative research on solving difficult problems like spent fuel and waste disposition in Northeast Asia.

To make the comparison clear, we will summarize existing cooperative regimes and contrast the ASIATOM/PACATOM concepts. 

Some multilateral cooperative regimes related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy are currently in operation. Such regimes are

ABACC, EURATOM, and the IAEA. ABACC (Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) may

possess some interesting features; therefore, we will discuss it in the next section as we consider organizational options for ENTNEA.

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EURATOM, which was established by treaty in 1956, includes both nuclear weapons states (the United Kingdom and France) and

non-nuclear weapon states. Formed at the dawn of the peaceful nuclear age, EURATOM promotes uses of nuclear energy and

provides an assured source of nuclear fuel to its member states. Since all EURATOM states are NPT signatories, EURATOM

performs safeguards activities in cooperation with the IAEA. EURATOM cannot be a direct model, but many things can be learned

from its experiences and applied to regional cooperation in Northeast Asia.(32) The regional management of nuclear fuel cycle

facilities may be attractive for its cost-effectiveness. However, competition for exports and technical leadership may present problems

in initiating such an institution in a region with established national industries such as Northeast Asia.

In 1996, the Council on Nuclear Energy and Disarmament in Tokyo first proposed the basic concept of ASIATOM. The main purpose

of ASIATOM would be to contribute to the expansion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to meet increasing needs for electricity.

ASIATOM would also ensure that all nuclear energy activities in the region would be carried out in a manner compatible with

internationally agreed nonproliferation requirements. Within the framework of ASIATOM, regional centers for nuclear safety, plant

operation, and for nuclear fuel cycle services (including waste storage/management, reprocessing, enrichment and regional

safeguards/inspection systems) would be created.(33)

In 1997, Robert Manning proposed PACATOM as a nuclear cooperation regime. PACATOM’s functions were stated initially as (1)

to serve as a regional safeguards regime; (2) to strengthen physical protection and safety of nuclear materials; (3) to cooperate in

monitoring radiation levels; (4) to improve safeguards standards and practices; (5) to cooperate on the storage and management of

spent fuel; (6) to establish a regional plutonium bank; and (7) to dispose of fissile materials from dismantled weapons.(34)

Continuing discussions of PACATOM under the auspices of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) have

emphasized the benefits of cooperation in the back end of the fuel cycle and reduced the emphasis on assuming safeguards

responsibilities. The CSCAP discussions have also underlined the need for a step-by-step development of cooperation, consistent with

ideas in the preceding section of this report (Section 3.2).

Some proponents of ASIATOM and PACATOM focus on regional management of facilities and nuclear safeguards. These forms of

ASIATOM or PACATOM would require a comprehensive monitoring regime and an organization for nuclear cooperation, which

might be equivalent to another EURATOM. 

From a South Korean perspective it is important that North Korea eventually would become a party to ENTNEA. North Korea will

receive two LWRs from KEDO and has developed substantial technical skill throughout the nuclear fuel cycle. Such capabilities

should be brought into the international order, even if it means structuring institutions with that goal in mind. We believe that North

Korean participation is more likely if ENTNEA emphasizes information sharing rather than regulation, safeguards, or facility

management. 

Having contrasted ENTNEA with other approaches to regional cooperation, in the next sections we will explore some organizational

aspects of the concept. The South American precedent, ABACC, may be helpful when we consider institutional possibilities for

ENTNEA.

3.4 Methods and Support for Informal Transparency Activities

Implementing informal transparency activities in the near term, while building a foundation for an eventual institution, will require

enabling agreements and financial support. Analysis of the opportunities can be categorized according to various criteria depending

upon the requirements of the parties.

First, we should make a distinction based on the number of parties. In Northeast Asia and in consideration of the issues noted in

Section 2, there are several two-sided and three-sided issues, such as decommissioning submarines in Russia and storing low-level

waste in North Korea. Therefore, bilateral and trilateral approaches may be very effective even if they are not particularly grand in

concept. 

Second, we might consider the authority level at which information sharing might occur, that is, who would organize the procedure

and receive the data. The level should be about equal to the sensitivity of the data; interactions at too low a level might amount to a

breach of security and at too high a level could be inefficient. Sharing safety information can illustrate this: For demonstrating safe

emissions, public channels and organizations such as citizen groups or academic panels could be effective. On the other hand, for

organizing emergency response in the case of a radiological emergency, the data should be confined to emergency response

authorities in order to avoid a public panic. 

Existing organizations offer great efficiency through established working relationships. A discussion of activities in an ENTNEA

concept does not suggest that existing organizations have failed in their mission in some way. Rather, this discussion may generate

regional support for expanded roles of certain organizations. For example, data sharing in support of the Convention on Early

Notification of a Nuclear Accident might be organized under the auspices of the WANO or as part of an IAEA regional technical

assistance project. 

Third, budgetary requirements are another way to categorize organizational needs. At the low end are activities like sharing radiation

monitoring reports for the purpose of refining transport models; the data is already available, so costs would be very low. Real-time

transparency in wide-area radiation monitoring could be more expensive because of the communications costs. Larger expenses

would be encountered if parties decide to standardize their systems and perform cross-calibration tests.

Enhanced transparency in nuclear material storage would involve higher expenses for monitoring technology, personnel, and

communication. At each facility some sensors and cameras, a control system, and a data acquisition computer would be required.

Installation labor, maintenance, and communications would involve substantial expenses outside of the existing budgets. 

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None of these are large expenses compared to the facility costs; however, the Northeast Asian financial crisis requires careful

justification of new projects.

3.5 Institutional Possibilities for ENTNEA

The foregoing discussion considered near-term activities in enhanced nuclear transparency of an informal nature. Now we might

consider the form of an institution for nuclear transparency that might grow out of successful regional cooperation activities. The

nature of the institution presented here is speculative, not intended to be prescriptive, and not an inevitable conclusion to a process. 

Let us consider the requirements of an institution that might have responsibility to: 

● share information on the regional nuclear fuel cycle activities

● analyze selected topics as authorized by the parties

● organize collaborative research on solving common problems 

An institutional model might be taken from the Argentina-Brazil agreement (ABACC).(35) Of course, the ABACC organization only

covers the facilities of two countries, which in total are about comparable to Taiwan or South Korea, but it does have safeguards

responsibilities in collaboration with the IAEA. ABACC might be a useful example because the organization is a purely South

American invention to suit the bilateral needs of Argentina and Brazil. The charter of responsibilities of an ENTNEA institution

would be different from that of ABACC, reflecting the information-sharing emphasis rather than safeguards.

ABACC has a central organization, permanently located in Rio de Janeiro. Although the Head and Deputy Head of its Secretariat

rotate each year between the two parties, the location remains fixed because of the need for databases and a permanent professional

staff. The permanent staff consists of about six technical and four administrative professionals, supported by a few office staff. With a

total budget of only $US 2.3M, the organization depends upon the services of roughly 50 part-time experts from the two countries,

who perform the technical work on temporary loan from their home institutions. These experts work for ABACC for brief periods (for

example, for an inspection), and then return to their normal duties in laboratories or universities.

Although the nuclear industries of Northeast Asia are much larger than those of Argentina and Brazil, an institution focusing on

information sharing and with no safeguards inspection responsibilities might be approximately of ABACC proportions. We belabor

this point to avoid the tendency to assume that an ENTNEA should resemble EURATOM or the IAEA in size, scope, or budget. 

In this kind of an institution the other ENTNEA responsibilities might fit easily. For analysis of selected topics, for example,

projections of spent fuel accumulation and storage needs, an ENTNEA could commission a panel of distinguished experts from

regional universities and laboratories. Using the ABACC model, the experts’ salaries would be contributed by their home institutions. 

Whether the informal ENTNEA activities would culminate in an institution would depend upon whether the institution satisfied

pragmatic needs and was acceptable politically. Potential evolution of an ENTNEA institution into ASIATOM/PACATOM roles

would also be determined in the future. 

4.0 Conclusions and Recommendations

This paper addresses several issues related to nuclear development, including safety, environmental protection, and nonproliferation.

The solutions suggested here center on sharing information to solve technical problems or lessen concerns about nuclear activities.

We have suggested an ENTNEA concept that would be composed of near-term, informal activities and an eventual regional

institution. The near-term activities would address specific concerns and build a tradition of cooperation. In the longer term, that

tradition might evolve into an institution, which would combine these and other cooperative activities for the mutual benefit of

regional parties.

We distinguish between the information-sharing focus of the ENTNEA concept and various precedents and alternative proposals that

emphasize regional management and control of nuclear industries. Because all regional parties already have safeguards agreements

with the IAEA, there may be no benefit in an ENTNEA institution taking over safeguards. Because the prospective parties already

have substantial nuclear industrial expertise, there also may be little benefit from ENTNEA management or ownership of facilities.

Thus, unlike a EURATOM, ASIATOM, or PACATOM concept, the ENTNEA concept addresses regional concerns through

information sharing for enhanced transparency. This would not preclude an evolution of ENTNEA to serve managerial or accounting

roles at later times.

Establishing a regional nuclear transparency institution like ENTNEA would depend upon a pre-existing tradition of nuclear

cooperation. Our initial suggestions would help build this cooperative tradition through specific, non-institutionalized transparency

activities, each of which relates to one or more specific nuclear concerns. Methodologies for these informal activities are described in

detail in the appendix.

Activities that enhance the transparency of nuclear safety may be the most practical in the near term. All regional parties strongly

endorse safety as a high concern. The following candidate transparency activities are available:

Environmental radiation monitoring—Existing national systems could form the technical basis. Cooperation could help fill

any gaps in coverage and standardize measurement and modeling. Information could flow in real time to improve emergency

response capabilities or in periodic documents to advance modeling calculations.

● 

Support for existing safety conventions—Cooperation in prompt exchange of safety and emergency data could help implement

safety conventions that many regional parties have already endorsed. New transparency measures might expand or

supplement existing WANO and IAEA programs.

● 

● Increased transparency in transportation safety—Technical cooperation could assist current activities to show the public that

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transportation is safe and help emergency response authorities protect the public in case of an accident.

Other transparency activities could include some more critical concerns. Progress might be slow, but discussion of these possibilities

would be a transparency measure of some value in itself, as follows:

Transparency at certain reactors—Issues of safety and nonproliferation might be addressed by increased transparency at

nuclear reactors. We have noted a regional trend toward sharing some basic operational data to reassure the public that

reactors are operating normally, and hence, probably with safety. A broader exchange of this data might strengthen regional

public acceptance of nuclear energy, which may be useful for economic stability.

Although IAEA safeguards are rigorously effective, regional parties might develop greater nonproliferation confidence

through certain additional transparency measures. Between North and South Korea, the measures might encompass the

KEDO light water reactors and the Ulsan heavy water reactors, for example.

● 

Transparency in spent fuel and separated plutonium—Problems with the back end of the fuel cycle are critical. Storage or

disposal of spent fuel and separated plutonium introduce environmental and proliferation concerns that could be alleviated

through information sharing. Cooperation might include solving technical issues associated with building repositories,

monitoring the environment, or showing that nuclear material is secure. The latter would involve transparency supplemental

to compliance with IAEA safeguards. Remote monitoring technologies might be especially helpful to avoid imposing

additional operational costs upon the storage site operators.

● 

In addition to near-term transparency measures, we have also outlined an ENTNEA institution that might evolve to perform useful

roles in the long term. That institution could absorb the informal activities and add new responsibilities. These might include analysis

of selected topics and organizing collaborative research on shared problems. In budget and management, the scope of the institution

might be closer to the ABACC model than the EURATOM precedent. 

The management and accounting roles that are included in the alternative institutional concepts, ASIATOM/PACATOM, might

eventually be undertaken by a regional institution. Whether an ENTNEA might evolve in that direction would depend upon future

events. We suggest that an information-sharing institution might be a necessary intermediate step before considering a regional

management institution.

APPENDIX: Technological Approaches for Enhancing Regional Nuclear

Transparency

A.1 Potential Roles for Cooperative Monitoring

Implementing agreements to share nuclear information may involve technically based cooperative monitoring.(36) Such monitoring

can strengthen existing agreements and set the stage for continued progress, as is envisioned here in the ENTNEA concept. An

agreement between two or more countries to increase nuclear transparency may bring about a temporary improvement in their

relations, but more energy must be invested to make the improvement a lasting one. Investing time and resources in cooperatively

monitoring a nuclear transparency agreement can contribute significantly to the permanence of the activity. Such an investment

signals that the activity is important and that the countries are committed to its success. Cooperative monitoring also provides a

method of documenting openly that nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes and are conducted safely. Finally, although an external

party may assume partial responsibility for monitoring for nuclear transparency, full participation by the regional parties will

strengthen the transparency activity.

Cooperative monitoring involves the collecting, analyzing, and sharing of information among parties to a transparency measure.

Technologies incorporated into a cooperative nuclear transparency activity must be sharable among all parties, and all parties must

receive equal access to the resultant data or information acquired in the system. A cooperative monitoring agreement should also

include procedures for dealing with anomalous data and false positives. Such procedures are necessary for resolving problems

constructively and are likely to involve human presence and activity.

In this appendix, we will consider many technological options for the nuclear transparency activities noted in Section 3. We will

concentrate on proven technologies that are widely available, some currently in use in the nuclear industry for internal control,

protection, and regulation. Some of the techniques have been developed for IAEA safeguards and will be suggested here to provide

transparency supplemental to safeguards. When combined with communication systems and data management capabilities, these

technologies can provide powerful tools for implementing enhanced nuclear transparency measures. 

In this appendix, we follow and expand upon an analysis methodology formulated by Richard Lincoln.(37) For each of the suggested

enhanced nuclear transparency activities we will pose the following questions and note some considerations:

What information would be relevant to the goals of the activity? Some information may be relevant but too sensitive to be

shared.

● 

● How might this information be shared? Methodological options can affect the usefulness of the activity.

Who might provide or receive the information? Some data may be suited for wide dissemination while other data may need

confidential treatment.

● 

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What are the costs and benefits of the activity? We should not overlook manpower costs in addition to actual technology costs.

Also, benefits may result from direct information as well as general confidence building.

● 

A.2 Environmental Radiation Monitoring

A.2.1 What Information Could Be Shared?

Three general types of airborne radionuclide concentration information exist within the Northeast Asia (NEA) region. A variety of

governmental and industrial organizations presently gather (1) specific nuclear facility stack airborne count rate, (2) near-facility

airborne count rate, and (3) facility-independent, or regional, airborne count rate. Most of the airborne radionuclide measurements

focus on the total gamma (high energy x ray) count rate and do not include information about the energy distribution. This

information can alert one that something out of the ordinary is occurring (the total count rate is higher than usual), but this

information cannot identify what radionuclides (radioactive isotopes) are contributing to the higher total count rate. Some of the

regional airborne concentration measurements characterize the gamma ray energy distribution as well as the total count rate of

airborne particulate sources. This energy distribution information can be analyzed to identify what specific radionuclides are

contributing to the observed total count rate. Some waterborne radionuclide concentration information is also gathered.

One initial informal experimental activity would utilize existing airborne radionuclide information from within the ROK and Japan

and supplement this information with a few new total gamma count rate measurement stations in NEA areas outside of the ROK and

Japan. These new measurement stations would be located in NEA countries that desire to join the environmental radiation

information-sharing experiment. The NEWNET type of monitoring station is a good example of the technology. (See Figure A-1.)

Developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory, the NEWNET system monitors gamma rays from airborne radionuclides with 16

stations around the laboratory and in the surrounding communities. Each station combines radiation data with local wind speed and

direction, and possibly other meteorological quantities. The entire station is solar-powered and a small radio transmitter sends the data

every four hours. Thus, the station can be placed anywhere, without concerns about availability of electricity and telephone lines.

Unique to this system is the idea of making the data available on the Internet for easy public access.

A.2.2 How Could That Information Be Shared?

The environmental radiation information can be used by emergency response personnel within the region as a warning of radiological

emergencies. This "emergency response" use places a high value on data timeliness. Automated electronic transfer of this information

is needed to support this level of data timeliness. A higher level of data confidence based on a data review or inspection process is less

important than timely availability for the purpose of emergency response support. One conceptual approach is to have both the

currently existing and the new measurement stations automatically electronically transfer the information to a common database that

is available to all emergency responders within the region. Database software could be used to provide "alarms" when count rates

increase rapidly.

The environmental radiation information can also be used to build confidence within the general public and the public

decision-makers that nuclear facilities have not released significant amounts of radionuclides to the environment. Data review by

some process that results in a time delay of a few hours or one day before release of this information is appropriate for at least the

initial informalexperiment to prevent situations such as "lightning strikes on sensors" from reducing public trust in the system. The

common database used for information transfer to regional emergency responders could be used as the basis for data review before

release of the information to the public.

Figure A-1. A Solar-Powered, Gamma-Ray Measurement 

Station near Los Alamos National Laboratory.

A.2.3 Who Could Share That Information?

In the case of the ROK, the KINS currently collects data from the country-wide environmental radiation network and has plans to

release the information to the public via the Internet. Some Japanese utility companies currently post near-site radiation data on a

monthly basis on their web sites. These examples suggest that environmental radiation data might be made available to the general

public in the future.

A.2.4 What Are the Costs and Benefits?

As much as possible, the system would incorporate existing radiation monitoring networks to minimize the additional costs of sharing

information. The new costs arising from sharing this information include the communication system, database design, maintenance

costs and the costs to establish any new measurement stations. The indirect costs of sharing this information include some potential

for the loss of control of information that could be embarrassing or could involve liability in the case of a large-scale radioactive

release. This indirect cost would be offset by the potential direct benefits of a more rapid emergency response to such a release and

the associated public health, safety, and economic benefits of that more rapid response. Rapid identification of the area of concern for

a radiological release has major benefits for the emergency responders, the public, and the agricultural industry of the region.

Potential indirect benefits include increased trust by the public and other countries, as well as providing an early indication that a

release did not come from a nearby regional facility.

A.3 Spent Fuel and Separated Plutonium Storage

A.3.1 What Information Could Be Shared?

Enhancing transparency in spent fuel and separated plutonium storage could involve sharing information to show (1) that nuclear

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material is not being moved out of the storage location without appropriate justification, and (2) that the amount of plutonium stored

is consistent with the amount separated and the amount used. Event-triggered video coverage of storage or access areas could be used

to share information to show when nuclear material is being moved out of the storage location. This information, combined with

information about why and to where the material is being moved, could increase confidence that the nuclear materials are being

moved and used for appropriate civilian applications. Material balance information (reactor irradiation history, separation, storage,

and recycling usage) could be used to increase confidence that the amount stored is consistent with appropriate civilian applications.

Material assay information that is consistent with the material balance information and appropriate civilian applications would also

contribute to increased confidence.

A.3.2 How Could That Information Be Shared?

Event-triggered video coverage of storage areas could be shared using remote monitoring techniques developed within the

International Remote Monitoring Project (IRMP). In the IRMP, motion, entry, or radiation sensors are used to trigger video camera

images. (See Figure A-2.) The resulting images can be transmitted using telephone lines (appropriate for low numbers of image

examinations) or satellite communication links (appropriate for more frequent image examinations or to support moving images, if

desired).

Figure A-2. Remote Monitoring of Spent Fuel Storage in Australia.

The spent fuel resides in casks sunk into the floor. On top of each cask are a motion detector and an

electronic fiber seal to detect opening. Video cameras on the wall record images when signaled by the

sensors that an event is happening. 

Information about why and to where the material is being moved could be shared through discussions and the exchange of documents

about fuel cycle material management plans. Material balance information could be included in the above discussions and document

exchanges. Before reprocessing, the spent fuel assemblies are discrete, numbered items; documentation can show a consistent chain of

custody. In the case of separated plutonium, which is a bulk material, the need for transparency is somewhat higher. Consistency

between the need for fuel for power production reactors, the plans for plutonium separation, and the fabrication of mixed oxide

(MOX) fuel could increase confidence that the movements of plutonium are for civilian applications.

Material assay measurements determine the isotopic content of the spent fuel and separated plutonium. In normal operation, light

water reactors create plutonium with about 24% of the 240Pu isotope. Lower abundance of this isotope could indicate the intent to

accumulate material that would be more desirable for proliferation. Assay information could be shared by experts from organizations

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like the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), who could participate in periodic cooperative measurements of the

isotopic composition of samples of stored plutonium. At a somewhat lower level of transparency, isotopic composition information

could be extracted from shared documentation that describes the isotopic composition of all materials in the storage.

A.3.3 Who Could Share That Information?

Japan is currently the only NEA country with significant storage of civilian fuel cycle plutonium. The ROK, Democratic People’s

Republic of Korea (DPRK), and China are regional countries with an interest in transparency of the Japanese plutonium stock. Some

of the information is of general interest, like the total inventory, and has been made available publicly. Other data, like the isotopic

content of the plutonium stocks, are technical and might be confined to research or regulatory agencies. Still other data, like

movement plans, are sensitive and might only be shared with emergency response authorities under terms of confidentiality.

Reciprocity in sharing information could be attained by including similar information for spent fuel storage sites throughout the

region. Again, because of the technical nature of the data, isotopic compositions could be shared between technical organizations,

while total tonnage could be revealed to the public. 

A.3.4 What Are the Costs and Benefits?

The direct costs of sharing this information include the staff time and travel costs for the visits and discussions, the documentation

preparation or review time, and the staff time for analysis. The discussion and visit activities provide some level of confidence

through consistency of multiple information sources.

The event-triggered video coverage of nuclear material storage involves some equipment (motion sensors, video cameras, and

communication links) cost and some staff time for installation and maintenance of the hardware and software. The operating costs are

primarily communication expenses and staff time to review the video images. An important objective of the initial experiments would

be to evaluate the triggering rate to help estimate the long-term operating costs. The primary benefit of the triggered video coverage is

a high level of confidence that no spent fuel or separated plutonium is being used for inappropriate applications.

A.4 Nuclear Reactors

A.4.1 What Information Could Be Shared?

Cooperatively sharing nuclear material accounting and protection information between countries could build confidence between

those countries that nuclear materials associated with the nuclear power plants were being appropriately utilized and protected from

theft or sabotage. This information sharing between countries should be considered as transparency above and beyond safeguards; it is

designed to build confidence between the countries and is not intended to meet the information needs of any agreement between a

country and the IAEA. Using nuclear transparency for confidence building between countries does not imply that IAEA safeguards

are inadequate in any way.

One potential informalactivity involves sharing reactor fuel usage information such as reactor operating power history, refueling

schedules, and fuel burn-up calculations. Another potential cooperation involves sharing reactor fuel protection information in the

form of event-triggered video coverage of the reactor and fuel storage areas.

Information to build public confidence in safety could be shared. While safety cannot be proven, demonstration that basic parameters

like temperature, pressure, and output power are within normal ranges can be helpful. Each reactor has many channels of this type of

data continuously monitored and electronically available. In fact, in Japan several channels of basic parameters go in real time to the

local city hall or environmental center for display to the local public.

In the following, we use the KEDO reactors to be built in North Korea as an example of enhanced transparency between South and

North Korea. We emphasize the nonproliferation aspects.

A.4.2 How Could That Information Be Shared?

Operating power history could be shared with real-time remote monitoring. The KEDO LWRs are of the Korean standard design,

which means that the control system is configured to allow about 200 data channels to be shared with the national regulator. Only a

small portion of these need be shared between the two Koreas for a significant enhancement of transparency. The data transfer could

be automatic by periodic telephone or by e-mail transfer.

Refueling schedules and fuel burn-up calculations could be shared with a combination of discussions, document exchanges, and visits.

Reactor fuel protection information could be shared with event-triggered video images transmitted by satellite (appropriate when

many images are transferred) or telephone lines (appropriate when a few images are transferred).

A.4.3 Who Could Share That Information?

The DPRK could offer event-triggered images of the KEDO LWR. In exchange, the ROK could offer event-triggered images of the

ROK reactors of greatest interest to the DPRK; they may be interested in the CANDU (Canadian Pressurized Heavy Water Reactor)

reactors at Ulsan. To broaden the cooperation, Japan could offer event-triggered images of a reactor or the separated plutonium

storage areas. Organizations that could be involved include KEDO, KAERI, and KEPCO in the ROK, and the Japan Nuclear Cycle

Development Institute (JNC), which is the successor to the PNC (Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation).

A.4.4 What Are the Costs and Benefits?

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The benefit of sharing reactor operating power history, refueling schedules, and fuel burn-up calculations is enhanced confidence that

the reactor fuel is being used exclusively to generate electricity. The cost of sharing this information is primarily staff time to prepare

documents for refueling schedules and fuel burn-up calculations. No additional cost, except for communications, would be incurred in

sharing some of the standard operating data, because that is a built-in capability in the Korean Standard reactor.

Sharing event-triggered video images of the reactor and fuel storage areas builds confidence in nonproliferation, but it does so

differently than by sharing burn-up calculations. That is, information is available in a more timely manner but in less detail. The costs

of sharing event-triggered video images are primarily the costs of the equipment (motion sensors, video cameras, image storage

hardware, and communication equipment) and the costs for satellite or telephone communication. Moreover, there would need to be

staff time for maintenance of the system and for reviewing the images.

A.5 Nuclear Safety Conventions

A.5.1 What Information Could Be Shared?

Nuclear safety conventions(38) that are under the auspices of the IAEA include the following: 

● Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 

● Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency

● Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

● Convention on Nuclear Safety

● Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. 

Of these five conventions, all but the last have presently entered into force.

Table A-1 indicates that the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident has full Northeast Asian participation. This

convention(39) establishes a notification system for nuclear accidents that have the potential for international transboundary release.

Such releases could be of radiological significance for another state. It requires states to report the accident time, location, radiation

releases, and other data essential for assessing the situation. Notification is to be made to affected states directly or through the IAEA,

and to the IAEA itself. All of the above countries, including the DPRK, have identified a contact point (40) for the purposes of this

convention.

Table A-1. Year of Entry into Force for Northeast Asian States 

in the IAEA Safety Conventions

Convention China DPRK Japan ROK Russia US

Convention on Early Notification of a

Nuclear Accident

1987 1986 1987 1990 1986 1988

Convention on Assistance in the Case of

a Nuclear Accident or Radiological

Emergency

1987 1986 1987 1990 1986 1988

Convention on Physical Protection of

Nuclear Material

1989 NA* 1988 1982 1983 1982

Convention on Nuclear Safety 1986 NA* 1995 1995 1996 1994

* "NA" indicates that the country has taken No Action relative to the Convention.

The World Association of Nuclear Operators(41) (WANO) represents another form of international nuclear safety cooperative

arrangement. The exchange of operating experience information is the basis of WANO’s various programs. Information and event

reports are submitted by each operating organization to its regional center, where they are reviewed for clarity and completeness and

then distributed to all WANO members using an international electronic information exchange system. WANO also facilitates

exchange visits, workshops, seminars, and peer review programs.

One potential informalexperimental activity would utilize shared environmental radiation information and would automatically

transmit an electronic alarm to pre-selected emergency evaluation and response representatives. This same information could be

transmitted to regional neighbors in a format compatible with the requirements of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear

Accident.

Another potential informalexperimental activity would share with other WANO sites operating data on a specific power reactor

component that poses an operational problem (e.g., a motor temperature or backup system availability). This could help operators

solve some technical problems in a cooperative mode.

A.5.2 How Could That Information Be Shared?

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Automated alarms require timely transmittal and could be best implemented with automatic electronic transmission over satellite links

or telephone lines. Selected individuals could even use commercial pagers as alarms. The timeliness needed for transmission of

reactor component operating data depends on the nature of the specific study. Automatic electronic transmission may or may not be

appropriate. E-mail may be timely enough for some cases, particularly for working on an engineering problem.

A.5.3 Who Could Share That Information?

Alarms associated with the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident would involve sharing information between the

regional environmental radiation monitoring stations and the regional emergency response authorities. This type of data would

probably not be appropriate for direct public release. 

Sharing of operating data on a specific power reactor component would occur between responsible component engineers (user,

manufacturer, vendor, regulator, and other users). 

A.5.4 What Are the Costs and Benefits?

The direct cost of sharing the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident information is primarily that of the

communication link. Indirect costs of sharing this information depend on the timeliness and effectiveness of the data evaluation

before sending an electronic alert to State parties and the IAEA. There is a trade-off between the need for timely notifications and the

need to avoid false alarms. The direct benefits of sharing the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident information are

primarily in rapidly identifying and focusing the area of concern for a radiological release. This rapid identification has major safety

benefits for the emergency responders and the public. Potential indirect benefits include increased trust by the public and other

countries.

The direct cost of sharing the WANO operational experience information might involve costs for special sensors (e.g., motor

temperature) and communication equipment. The benefits of sharing the operational information include more rapid resolution of the

operational issue and the furthering of regional trust and cooperation.

A.6 Nuclear Material Transportation Safety

A.6.1 What Information Could Be Shared?

Enhancing transparency in nuclear material transportation could include sharing information about the nuclear materials, the

transportation packaging, physical protection arrangements, and the transportation routes. All of this information could be shared by

discussions or document exchanges before, during, or after the shipment. Overseas shipments of nuclear materials to and from Japan

already include these processes.(42)

Some of this information and some additional information could be shared in near-real time during the shipment using remote

monitoring techniques. The physical location of the shipment, the physical protection of the nuclear material (status of a package seal,

a door switch, or a motion sensor), or safety factors (container temperature, radiation detector output, or status of a smoke detector)

can all be shared in near-real time. This information sharing can be arranged for truck, train, ship, or airplane transport and the shared

information can be monitored from a fixed location or from a mobile location.

Potential informal experiments could include both document and near-real-time remote monitoring information sharing for

international and/or domestic shipments within the Northeast Asia region. The ROK currently has domestic truck shipments of fresh

fuel. Japan has domestic truck transportation and dedicated nuclear transport ship transportation of low-level waste and spent fuel.

Japan also has international shipments of spent fuel, separated plutonium, and high-level waste, which are transported by special

nuclear material ships. Any of these nuclear material transportation operations, or other regional transportation operations, could be

used for information-sharing experiments. The Japanese international shipments already use remote monitoring for some information

elements (for example, Global Positioning System (GPS)-based location information).

A.6.2 How Could That Information Be Shared?

Discussions or the sharing of documents could be used before, during, or after the shipment to share nuclear material transportation

plans, current status, or results. 

Near-real-time sharing of the broad range of information described above involves automated electronic transfers of information

through satellite links. 

One such system, the Authenticated Tracking and Monitoring System (ATMS),(43) uses INMARSAT (International Maritime

Satellite) links to pass authenticated and encrypted data from the transportation operation to authorized recipients. The nuclear

materials transport is monitored for location and the status of the physical protection or safety sensors. The data recipients can be

anywhere in the world.

A.6.3 Who Could Share That Information?

Nuclear material transportation plans or near-real-time transportation information is of significant potential value to regional

emergency response organizations (for example, fire, police, coast guard, or nuclear material protection organizations) that are

expected to respond to a nuclear material transportation accident. Access to nuclear material transportation plans or near-real-time

information would need to be controlled for shipments that involve a risk of sabotage. This access control could be implemented with

password control and encryption software. In this case, regional emergency response organizations would be issued reception

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equipment and passwords to provide secure access to the shared information.

Less sensitive data, perhaps temperature and shipboard radiation levels, might be made available to the public on a daily basis to

reduce safety concerns. Furthermore, the transporting agency could send this information without encryption to allow all interested

parties to receive it. 

A.6.4 What Are the Costs and Benefits?

The direct costs of sharing nuclear material transportation information by discussions or documents are the staff time and perhaps

travel costs. The direct costs of sharing near-real-time information about nuclear material transportation operations include the cost of

the sensors, support equipment, and communications. 

Indirect costs of sharing nuclear material transportation information include the risk of providing information to terrorists or saboteurs

(locations, material content, or protection arrangements). Data encryption can be used to control access to sensitive information.

Information-sharing agreements would need to specify access limitations on some elements of the shared information.

The direct benefits of information sharing about nuclear material transportation operations include increasing the ability of emergency

responders to minimize any potential public health and safety impacts associated with transportation accidents. Indirect benefits

include reducing tensions and increasing trust between those responsible for the transportation operations and those exposed to

potential risks.

About the Authors

Dr. Man-kwon Nam has been a Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses for ten years and now works as a

chief of arms control studies. His major research area is arms control and verification, particularly security considerations regarding

military negotiations between South and North Korea. He is currently participating in studies related to the Four Party Talks and

inter-Korean package deals. He performed his Ph.D. research in industrial engineering at University of Illinois at Chicago, Illinois,

USA. 

Dr. Sung-tack Shin has been a Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses for seven years and now works as a chief

of special weapons studies. His major research area is non-proliferation on the Korean Peninsula, particularly nuclear control regimes.

He is currently participating in studies related to North Korea's nuclear, missiles, and bio-chemical weapons issues. He performed his

Ph.D. research in nuclear engineering at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in Troy, New York, USA.

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