Accessible Version

LITTORAL COMBAT 

SHIP

Knowledge of 

Survivability and 

Lethality Capabilities 

Needed Prior to 

Making Major Funding 

Decisions

Report to Congressional Committees

December 2015

GAO-16-201

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-16-201, a report to 

congressional committees

December 2015

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

Knowledge of Survivability and Lethality Capabilities 

Needed Prior to Making Major Funding Decisions

Why GAO Did This Study

GAO has reported extensively on 

LCS—an over $34 billion Navy 

program (in 2010 dollars) consisting of 

two different ships and interchangeable 

mission packages. In February 2014, 

the Secretary of Defense, citing 

survivability concerns, directed the 

Navy to assess design alternatives for 

a possible LCS replacement.

House and Senate reports for the 

National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2014 included a provision 

for GAO to analyze LCS survivability. 

Based on congressional interest, GAO 

also examined lethality. This report 

examines (1) the extent to which LCS 

survivability and lethality requirements 

are aligned with the ship’s threat 

environments and if they have 

changed, (2 and 3) and if LCS meets 

its current requirements. GAO also (4) 

assessed recent decisions pertaining 

to the Navy’s plans to address the 

Secretary of Defense’s concerns. GAO 

analyzed relevant documents and 

interviewed Navy officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO suggests Congress delay funding 

for fiscal year 2016 LCS until the Navy 

submits a completed rough water trials 

report, acquisition strategy, and backfit 

plan; and consider not fully funding 

some or all LCS procurement pending 

analysis of these documents and the 

final survivability assessments. GAO 

also recommends several actions for 

DOD. The department concurred with 

two recommendations and partially 

concurred with two others, but did not 

concur with soliciting an independent 

technical assessment of the 

Independence variant. GAO continues 

to believe that such an independent 

assessment is warranted.

What GAO Found

The lethality and survivability of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is still largely 

unproven, 6 years after delivery of the lead ships. LCS was designed with 

reduced requirements as compared to other surface combatants, and the Navy 

has since lowered several survivability and lethality requirements and removed 

several design features—making the ship both less survivable in its expected 

threat environments and less lethal than initially planned. The Navy is 

compensating for this by redefining how it plans to operate the ships. 

In 2014, the Navy conducted its first operational test of an early increment of the 

surface warfare mission package on a Freedom variant LCS, demonstrating that 

LCS could meet an interim lethality requirement. The Navy declared LCS 

operationally effective. However, the Navy’s test report stated that the ship did 

not meet some key requirements. Further, the Department of Defense’s Director 

of Operational Test and Evaluation has stated that there is insufficient data to 

provide statistical confidence that LCS can meet its lethality requirements in 

future testing or operations, and further testing is needed to demonstrate both 

variants can meet requirements in varied threat environments. 

The Navy also has not yet demonstrated that LCS will achieve its survivability 

requirements, and does not plan to complete survivability assessments until 

2018—after more than 24 ships are either in the fleet or under construction. The 

Navy has identified unknowns related to the use of aluminum and the hull of the 

Independence variant, and plans to conduct testing in these areas in 2015 and 

2016. However, the Navy does not plan to fully determine how the Independence 

variant will react to an underwater explosion. This variant also sustained some 

damage in a trial in rough sea conditions, but the Navy is still assessing the 

cause and severity of the damage and GAO has not been provided with a copy 

of the test results. Results from air defense and cybersecurity testing also 

indicate concerns, but specific details are classified. 

In February 2014 the former Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to assess 

options for a small surface combatant with more survivability and combat 

capability than LCS. The Navy conducted a study and recommended modifying 

the LCS to add additional survivability and lethality features. After approving the 

Navy’s recommendation, the former Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to 

submit a new acquisition strategy for a modified LCS for his approval. He also 

directed the Navy to assess the cost and feasibility of backfitting lethality and 

survivability enhancements on current LCS. Nevertheless, the Navy has 

established a new frigate program office to manage this program, and the Navy 

has requested $1.4 billion for three LCS in the fiscal year 2016 President’s 

budget, even though it is clear that the current ships fall short of identified 

survivability and lethality needs. GAO has an ongoing review of the Navy’s small 

surface combatant study and future plans for the LCS program. 

This report is a public version of a classified report issued in July 2015. 

Throughout this report, GAO has indicated where information has been omitted 

or redacted due to security considerations. All information in this report reflects 

information current as of July 2015 to be consistent with the timeframe of the 

classified report.

View GAO-16-201. For more information, 

contact Michele Mackin at (202) 512-4841 or 

mackinm@gao.gov.
Letter 1

Page i GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

Background 4

Survivability and Lethality Requirements Less Than Other 

Combatants, and Have Been Reduced over Time 12

Recent SUW Testing Inadequate to Determine If LCS Meets Its 

Requirements 13

The Navy Does Not Yet Fully Understand the Extent to Which 

LCS Will Meet Current Survivability Requirements 16

Compressed Time Frame for Incorporating Major Program 

Changes 23

Conclusions 26

Matters for Congressional Consideration 27

Recommendations for Executive Action 28

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 28

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 33

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 36

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 39

GAO Contacts 39

Staff Acknowledgments 39

Appendix IV: Accessible Data 40

Agency Comment Letter 40

Tables

Table 1: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Seaframes Status 5

Table 2: Comparison of Ship Survivability Levels 7

Table 3: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Seaframe and Mission 

Package Weapons Systems 8

Table 4: Independence Variant Littoral Combat Ship Performance 

in Surface Warfare Live Test Events 15

Figures

Figure 1: Examples of Small Boats 9

Contents
Figure 2: Major Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and New Small 

Surface Combatant Milestones 25

Page ii GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

Abbreviations

ABS American Bureau of Shipping

ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare

DOD Department of Defense

DOT&E Director, Operational Test and Evaluation

CDD Capability Development Document

CONOPS Concept of Operations

FAC Fast Attack Craft

FIAC Fast Inshore Attack Craft

IOT&E Initial Operational Test and Evaluation

LCS Littoral Combat Ship

MCM Mine Countermeasures

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
OPNAV Office of the Chief of Naval Operations

RAM Rolling Airframe Missile

SUW Surface Warfare

Page iii GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 
Page 1 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

December 18, 2015

Congressional Committees

In February 2014, citing concerns about the survivability and lethality of 

the Department of the Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), the former 

Secretary of Defense directed the Navy to establish a task force to 

assess design and concept alternatives for a future LCS replacement. 

The objective was to identify a ship that was more survivable—that is, 

able to avoid, withstand, or recover from damage—and more lethal—able 

to destroy enemy targets. The Navy currently has 24 LCSs (known as 

seaframes) delivered or under contract with two different shipyards 

constructing two different ship design variations. The Navy had planned 

to buy another 28 ships, for a total of 52, as well as 64 mission packages 

(the reconfigurable combinations of sensors, weapons, and aircraft that 

provide most of the combat capability that are being procured in three 

warfare areas).1 These quantities would make LCS a significant portion of the 

Navy’s surface combatant fleet, at a planned cost of at least $34 billion in 

2010 dollars. 

The former Secretary directed the Navy to not contract for more than 32 

ships, pending decisions about the potential LCS replacement, but did not 

comment on any changes to mission package quantities. The Navy’s task 

force studied concepts for a modified LCS, new ship designs, and a 

modified existing ship design. The Navy recommended procuring a 

modified version of each variant of the LCS seaframe which will have 

additional weapons and survivability features.2 The former Secretary of 

Defense approved the Navy’s recommendation in December 2014, and the Navy 

recently announced that these modified ships will be re-designated as frigates.3

Procurement of these ships is planned to begin in 2019, and the former 

Secretary of Defense also directed the Navy to report on the cost and 

 

1The Navy is procuring mission packages to conduct surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and 

mine countermeasures. 

2We have an ongoing review assessing the Small Surface Combatant Task Force Study and the 

Navy’s recommendation to modify LCS.

3

In the U.S. Navy, a frigate is a surface combatant that is smaller than a destroyer and that provides 

ship escort and anti-submarine warfare capabilities. 

Letter
feasibility of back-fitting the existing LCSs with some of the changes 

planned for the modified LCS.

We have reported extensively on concerns with the combat capabilities of 

the LCS, including survivability and lethality testing issues that had been 

demonstrated to date, and identified changes the Navy has made to its 

descriptions of LCS over time to reflect decreased expectations of LCS 

combat capability.

Page 2 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

4 House and Senate Armed Services committee reports for 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 contained a 

provision that we evaluate the survivability testing of LCS,5and based on 

discussions with Armed Services committee staff we were also asked to 

include an examination of LCS’s combat capability, which includes 

lethality. This report examines the extent to which LCS: (1) survivability 

and lethality requirements are aligned with threat environments that the 

ship is likely to face and to what degree, if any, these requirements have 

changed over time; (2) meets its current lethality requirements; and (3) 

meets its current survivability requirements. We also (4) assessed recent 

decisions pertaining to upcoming changes to the program in light of the 

former Secretary of Defense’s concerns about the lethality and 

survivability of LCS.

This report is an unclassified version of a classified report that was issued 

in July 2015.

6 Throughout this report, we indicated where information has 

been omitted or redacted due to security considerations. The information 

in this report is current as of July 2015 to be consistent with the timeframe 

of the classified report.

To identify how LCS survivability and lethality requirements are aligned 

with the expected threat environment and the extent to which they have 

changed over time, we analyzed the LCS capability development 

documents (CDD) which dictate the performance requirements for the 

 

4GAO, Navy Shipbuilding: Significant Investments in the Littoral Combat Ship Continue Amid

Substantial Unknowns about Capabilities, Use, and Cost GAO-13-530 (Washington, D.C.: 

July 22, 2013); and Littoral Combat Ship: Additional Testing and Improved Weight 

Management Needed Prior to Further Investments, GAO-14-349SU (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 8, 2014); Littoral Combat Ship: Knowledge of Survivability and Lethality Capabilities 

Needed Prior to Making Major Funding Decisions, GAO-15-361C (Washington, D.C.: July 

7, 2015) (S//NF).

5H.R. Rep. No. 113-102, at 28-29 (2013) and S. Rep. No. 113-44, at 22-23 (2013).

6GAO-15-361C.
seaframe and mission packages. LCS has two CDDs—one from 2004 

that applies only to the two lead ships (LCS 1 and LCS 2) called the Flight 

0 CDD, and one from 2010 that applies to all subsequent ships, called the 

Flight 0+ CDD. We compared both CDDs to identify areas, if any, where 

LCS requirements have changed. We also analyzed the two LCS 

warfighting concepts of operations (dated 2007 and 2011) and spoke with 

a cognizant Navy official about the pending third revision of this 

document. In addition, we reviewed relevant Navy policies stipulating 

general survivability and shock requirements for ships. To assess the 

extent to which LCS meets its current survivability and lethality 

requirements, we analyzed Navy and Director, Operational Test and 

Evaluation (DOT&E) test reports for developmental and operational test 

events and reviewed the 2013 LCS test and evaluation master plan. We 

also observed one day of the Total Ship Survivability Trial conducted on 

LCS 3 in October 2014. For our lethality objective, we assessed only the 

lethality of the core seaframe and the surface warfare (SUW) mission 

package. We reviewed the Navy’s Required Operational Capabilities and 

Projected Operating Environment for LCS Class Ships instruction, and 

also analyzed contractor-developed total ship vulnerability assessment 

reports and integrated survivability assessment reports, which were 

developed in the preliminary design phase of the program and were 

contract-required deliverables for both variants. To assess the recent 

decisions pertaining to upcoming changes to the LCS program, we 

analyzed available Navy documentation related to the future acquisition of 

a modified LCS. For each objective, we also interviewed relevant Navy 

and DOT&E officials. A more detailed description of our scope and 

methodology is presented in appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2014 to July 2015 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Page 3 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

7

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives.

 

7Although dated December 2015, the findings in this report are current as of July 2015.
The LCS consists of two distinct parts: (1) a seaframe, which is 

essentially the ship itself, and (2) a mission package, which is an 

interchangeable set of sensors, weapons, aircraft, surface craft, and 

subsurface vehicles carried on and deployed from the seaframe to 

perform three different primary missions: mine countermeasures (MCM), 

SUW, and anti-submarine warfare (ASW). LCS was initially developed to 

provide a lower-cost surface combatant with a smaller crew than other 

ships and modest combat capabilities in focused areas, compared to 

higher cost multi-mission surface combatants like destroyers. LCS is 

envisioned to operate in both littoral waters and the deep ocean in all 

theaters of operation. Early in the program, the Navy decided to forgo a 

number of traditional ship requirements in order to help reduce the costs 

and the weight and size of LCS, which in turn made the ship less robust 

in terms of weaponry and survivability than other surface combatants. 

Those decisions were validated by the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council.

Both LCS variants initially leveraged commercial ship designs, and were 

modified in accordance with established sets of technical criteria, called 

rules, that were developed by the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS).

Page 4 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

8

ABS is a not-for-profit ship classification society that provides independent 

technical assessments to ensure vessels are built in accordance with the 

applicable rules, and can also conduct periodic surveying of in-service 

ships.9 ABS was under contract with the Navy to provide technical expertise 

on the LCS program and to develop rules used in the design of LCS, but 

this contract ended in June 2012.

The Navy awarded contracts to two contractor teams that developed 

designs for the LCS seaframe reflecting different solutions to the same 

set of requirements. The Navy is procuring two distinct variants: a steel 

monohull design with an aluminum superstructure called the Freedom 

variant, and an all-aluminum trimaran design called the Independence 

variant. The Freedom variant has odd hull numbers and is being built at 

 

8LCS was designed to the ABS Guide to Building and Classing Naval Vessels and the ABS 

Guide to Building and Classing High-Speed Naval Craft rules. 

9There are 12 ship classification societies in the world that belong to the International Association 

of Classification Societies LTD.

Background

LCS Acquisition
Marinette Marine in Marinette, Wisconsin. The Independence variant has 

even hull numbers and is being built at Austal USA in Mobile, Alabama.

The Navy has contracted for 24 seaframes with equal numbers of both 

variants and has taken delivery of four to date. Twenty seaframes are 

currently covered under block buy contracts and the Navy anticipates 

funding construction of seaframes through 2016

Page 5 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

10, with deliveries 

continuing until 2020. The Navy plans to contract for two additional ships in 

fiscal year 2016 and plans to award further contracts for three LCS 

seaframes in both 2017 and 2018—though the Navy’s acquisition 

strategy for these years is still in development. Table 1 shows the status 

of the LCS seaframe procurement.

Table 1: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Seaframes Status 

Hull number Status as of June 2015

LCS 1-4 Navy has accepted delivery

LCS 5-14 Under construction at two shipyards

LCS 15-23 Under contract and Congressional funding has been received

LCS 24 Under contract; Congressional funding requested in fiscal year 2016

LCS 25-26 Under contract*; Congressional funding requested in fiscal year 2016 

LCS 27-32 Planned for fiscal year 2017 and 2018; acquisition strategy still in 

development 

LCS 33-52 Modified LCS acquisition strategy still in development

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation. │GAO-16-201

*LCS 25 and 26 are options under the block buy contracts.

The Navy requested $1.4 billion for three LCS seaframes in its fiscal year 

2016 budget request. The Navy’s plans to begin development and 

procurement of the new modified LCS are not yet known, although the 

Navy has stated that its goal is to begin procurement of the lead ships in 

2019.

Each LCS will be capable of carrying an SUW, ASW, or MCM mission 

package, as required by the circumstances. The mission packages are 

being developed in increments; the Navy plans to develop four SUW 

 

10The Navy requested funding in its fiscal year 2016 budget to procure what would have been the 

last ship in its 20 ship block buy, but has since added two further ships as options under the same 

contracts. 
increments, four MCM increments, and one ASW increment.

Page 6 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

11 The mission 

packages will provide the bulk of the combat capability or lethality for the ship. 

The Navy has 10 mission packages in its inventory and currently plans to 

buy 64 mission packages. According to Navy officials, the recent decision 

to develop a modified LCS has not changed the current end quantity of 

mission package purchases.

Survivability is the ability of a ship to avoid, withstand, or recover from 

damage. It consists of three elements: susceptibility, vulnerability, and 

recoverability.

· Susceptibility is the degree to which a ship can be targeted and 

engaged by threat weapons. Some ways of improving a ship’s 

susceptibility include avoiding or defeating a threat by using a 

combination of tactics, signature reduction, countermeasures, and 

self-defense systems. LCS uses speed, maneuverability, modern 

defensive weapons, organic systems (e.g., 57mm gun), and sensors 

to counter surface, air, and underwater threats.

· Vulnerability is a measure of a ship’s ability to withstand initial 

damage effects from threat weapons and to continue to perform its 

primary warfare mission areas. LCS design uses three different 

vulnerability scenarios that, dependent on the severity of the damage, 

allow it to

· continue to perform its primary mission;

· exit the battle area under its own power; and

· conduct an orderly abandon ship.

· Recoverability is a measure of a ship’s ability to take emergency 

action to contain and control damage, prevent loss of a damaged 

ship, minimize personnel casualties, and restore and sustain primary 

mission capabilities. The LCS seaframe provides most of the 

survivability features for the crew, including damage control and 

safety systems. For example, LCS has three redundant firefighting 

systems.

The Navy specified LCS survivability to be greater than that of auxiliary 

ships, which have a comparably low survivability level, but less than that 

 

11The Increment 1 SUW mission package included a prototype Maritime Security Module 

including two rigid-hulled inflatable boats for use by the embarked small boat crews and 

Visit, Board, Search and Seizure gear. The Increment 2 package is the same as 

Increment 1 except the Maritime Security Module is now production representative. 

Survivability
of frigates and amphibious assault ships—as shown in table 2. According 

to Navy officials, the Navy designed LCS to what they refer to as a Level 

1+ standard, meaning it had additional features beyond those of other 

Level 1 ships, including

· tailored survivability requirements for underwater shock and 

limited fragmentation and bullet armor; and

· improved ability to withstand flooding after a damage event.

Table 2: Comparison of Ship Survivability Levels 

Page 7 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

Level Description Types of ships

Level 1 Low survivability. Represents least severe environment and 

excludes need for ship to sustain operations in a battle group 

during a conflict. 

Patrol combatant and mine-warfare craft, shuttle ships, 

naval strategic sealift and material support ships, all 

other auxiliary ships/craft

Level 2 Moderate survivability. Ability to sustain operations in a battle 

group during a conflict.

Frigates, amphibious warfare ships, underway 

replenishment station ships

Level 3 High survivability. The most severe environment. Ability to 

sustain operations while taking battle damage from anti-ship 

cruise missiles, mines, and torpedoes.

Battle force surface combatants, aircraft carriers

Source: Navy documentation│GAO-16-201

Note: This instruction, OPNAVINST 9070.1, has since been replaced by OPNAVINST 9070.1A, 

Survivability Standards for Surface Ships and Craft of the U.S. Navy (Sept. 13, 2012). However, 

some Navy acquisition documentation still refers to this older instruction.

The requirements for LCS survivability are defined in the 2004 Flight 0 

CDD for LCS 1 and LCS 2 and the 2010 Flight 0+ CDD for all subsequent 

ships. The Flight 0+ CDD is more explicit than the Flight 0 CDD in terms 

of survivability requirements. An updated Navy instruction replaced the 

definitions in the table above, and changed how programs were to define 

the survivability of their ships.12

Lethality is ability of a weapon system—in this case LCS—to damage or 

destroy threats, including an enemy ship, aircraft, or missile. Lethality 

enables survivability because if LCS is able to sink or damage an 

approaching enemy vessel before it attacks, that enemy vessel may be 

 

12OPNAVINST 9070.1A requires programs to derive a minimum survivability baseline that is 

based on the program’s initial capabilities document and concept of operations, where survivability 

is considered in terms of capabilities, while the older instruction 9070.1 required consideration 

of survivability in terms of characteristics. OPNAVINST 9070.1A, Survivability Standards 

for Surface Ships and Craft of the U.S. Navy (Sept. 13, 2012).

Lethality
unable to fire at LCS. The LCS CDD defines requirements related to 

lethality and identifies specific threats that LCS is expected to be able to 

destroy and the range at which it should do so. The seaframes provide 

sensors and communications systems needed for ship operations and 

self-defense weapons for both the SUW mission and defense against 

enemy aircraft and missiles, called anti-air warfare. The SUW mission 

package augments the ship’s lethality by adding two 30mm gun mounts 

and an armed helicopter. Eventually, a surface-to-surface missile is 

planned to be added to the third increment of this mission package. Table 

3 depicts the combat system equipment carried on the seaframes and the 

weapon systems that are added with the mission packages.

Table 3: Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Seaframe and Mission Package Weapons Systems 

Page 8 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

Weapon system Core seaframe

Surface warfare mission 

package

Anti-submarine 

warfare 

mission 

package

Mine counter 

measures 

mission 

package

1 x 57mm gun System included

The core seaframe weapon systems accompany all three mission 

packages.

4 x .50 caliber crew-served machine guns System included

1 x RAM/SeaRAM anti-air warfare missile 

systema

System included

Soft-Kill Weapons System (anti-air warfare)bSystem included

2 x 30mm guns System not 

included

System included System not 

included

System not 

included

Longbow-Hellfire surface-to-surface missilescSystem not 

included

System included System not 

included

System not 

included

MH-60 helicopter armed with Hellfire missiles System not 

included

System included System not 

included

System not 

included

MH-60 helicopter armed with torpedoesdSystem not 

included

System not included System included System not 

included

Key: System included= System included. System not included= System not included.

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation.│GAO-16-201

aFor anti-air warfare, the Freedom variant carries 21 RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missiles (RAM) in a 

Mk 49 launcher; the Independence variant carries 11 RAM in a launcher called SeaRAM that is based 

on the Navy’s widely used Phalanx Close-In Weapons System.

bThis system launches radio frequency and infrared decoys and other countermeasures to protect 

the ship from anti-ship missiles.

cThis system is not yet installed on any LCS. It is planned for installation on the third increment of the 

SUW mission package, and operational testing is expected in 2019. The Navy plans for LCS to carry 

36 Hellfire missiles.

dThe LCS magazine can carry 9 MK-54 torpedoes.

LCS was designed to be able to address the threat of small boats. Figure 

1 depicts examples of two types of small boats.
Figure 1: Examples of Small Boats

Page 9 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

The Navy uses several types of testing to evaluate the weapon systems it 

develops, as required by DOD acquisition policy and statute. 

Developmental testing is typically sponsored by the program office, is 

often conducted in conjunction with the contractors, and is used to assess 

whether the system design is satisfactory and meets technical 

specifications. Developmental test events, such as combat system ship 

qualification trials, allow the Navy to verify and validate combat and 

weapon system performance. Technical evaluation is a testing activity 

used to assess the readiness of the system for operational testing. 

Operational testing includes live-fire testing, and is used to determine that 

the system can effectively execute its mission in an operational 

environment when operated by typical sailors against relevant threats. 

Operational testing is required by statute.13

The Navy has used a combination of developmental and operational testing and 

modeling and simulation to demonstrate the survivability and lethality of 

LCS. DOD granted the LCS program a waiver to relieve the Navy of the 

requirement to do full-scale survivability testing. Such waivers are 

common in shipbuilding, as it is unrealistic to use a production ship and a 

 

1310 U.S.C. § 2399.

Test Events
live test to assess certain types of damage—for example, how fire 

spreads throughout the ship. DOT&E—the agency responsible for 

approving test plans—approved a modified live fire test and evaluation 

plan that takes advantage of testing on similar components and utilizes 

historical combat data. In place of live testing, the Navy has used a 

number of surrogate tests and modeling and simulation to try to retire risk 

in these areas. Surrogate testing uses decommissioned ships (where 

available) or representative portions of ship structure, and subjects them 

to damage similar to what might be caused by threat weapons. These 

tests help inform and validate the results of computer-based modeling 

and simulation. The Navy also conducts test events to demonstrate the 

effectiveness of the ship’s weapon systems and sensors, and it has a test 

plan to demonstrate the effectiveness of each mission package increment 

on each seaframe variant.

We have reported extensively on the risks of proceeding with LCS 

procurements without the requisite knowledge provided through adequate 

testing. In 2013 and 2014, we concluded that the Navy continued to make 

further investment decisions in the seaframes and mission packages with 

an absence of key information.

Page 10 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

14 In these reports, we identified that until the 

Navy completes operational testing, the Navy could invest approximately $34 

billion (in 2010 dollars) for up to 52 seaframes and 64 mission packages that may 

not provide a militarily useful capability. We also found in 2013 and 2014 

that unknowns persist with the Independence variant given that it had not 

completed the same testing as the Freedom variant. We recommended 

that the Navy re-evaluate its business case for LCS and conduct a 

number of operational test events on both variants prior to making a 

decision to contract for more ships, including the following:

· Deploying to a forward overseas location. The Freedom variant has 

deployed overseas twice; the Independence variant has not yet 

deployed.

· Completing rough water, ship shock, and total ship survivability 

testing. Both variants have now completed rough water trials; the 

Freedom variant completed total ship survivability testing in 2014, but 

 

14GAO-13-530 and GAO-14-749.

Our Prior 

Recommendations
the Independence variant has not yet conducted this testing. Neither 

ship will complete full-ship shock trials until 2016.

· Completing initial operational testing and evaluation of the SUW 

mission package on the Freedom variant and the MCM mission 

package on the Independence variant. The Navy completed 

operational testing of the SUW mission package on the Freedom 

variant, but has not completed operational testing of the MCM mission 

package on the Independence variant.

DOD largely disagreed with these recommendations, citing the business 

imperative of not slowing down production of the seaframes. We believe 

that while the pricing of the seaframes is important, there is greater risk in 

awarding additional contracts before key knowledge is gained about the 

capabilities and operational concepts of the LCS.

· We also recommended in 2013 that the Navy report to Congress on 

the relative advantages and disadvantages of the two seaframe 

variants. We recommended that the Navy present to Congress a 

comparison of the capabilities of the two variants in performing each 

mission because we had found that the officers in the fleets—the end 

users of the ships—said that they believed there were advantages 

and disadvantages to the two designs. Congress directed the Navy in 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 to provide 

additional information on some of the risk areas we identified.

The Navy provided Congress with a report in May 2014 assessing the 

expected survivability attributes and the concept of operations for the 

ships, but in terms of comparing the two variants the Navy essentially 

suggested that since the two variants are built to the same requirements 

they perform the same way. The Navy did not present a more detailed 

comparison that would address our recommendation. We believe that 

completing this type of analysis would still be valuable to understanding 

differences in performance between the seaframes.

Page 11 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 
The Navy designed LCS with survivability and lethality capabilities that 

are not aligned with the projected operational environment in which the 

ship will operate, and over time it has lessened or removed some 

survivability and lethality requirements. The Navy’s original operational 

concept envisioned LCS as requiring less survivability and lethality 

features than other surface combatants, which would in turn make LCS 

less costly than other surface combatants. Over time the Navy has further 

reduced some survivability and lethality requirements, making LCS less 

survivable and lethal than it was initially envisioned. And, in response, the 

Navy continues to refine its operational concepts for LCS. Specific details 

about changes to these requirements were redacted from this report 

because they are classified.

The Flight 0+ CDD defines the survivability capabilities required after the 

ship takes a hit, rather than stating specific design requirements as is the 

case in the earlier Flight 0 CDD.

Page 12 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

15 There are three specific design features 

that would enhance LCS’s survivability that are identified in the Flight 0 

CDD, but not in the Flight 0+ CDD. Officials from Office of the Chief of 

Naval Operations (OPNAV), who are the resource sponsors for the LCS 

program, stated that these changes were made early on to save cost, and 

in one instance weight onboard the ship. Specific differences in 

survivability requirements between the 2004 Flight 0 and the 2010 Flight 

0+ CDDs and details about changes to LCS requirements were redacted 

from this report because they are classified.

Since 2004, the Navy has also reduced some LCS lethality requirements. 

Our analysis shows that the poor performance of some systems might 

have contributed to this decision. Additional details on these changes are 

classified.

To compensate for any gaps in the ship’s survivability and lethality 

capabilities, the Navy continues to redefine the concept of operations 

(CONOPS) for LCS.16 We reported in 2013 that the Navy had made a number 

of changes to descriptions of how the LCS might be employed and the 

 

15OPNAVINST 9070.1A sets forth a new requirement that programs derive survivability 

requirements based on capabilities. 

16The Navy has two CONOPS for LCS; one discusses how the ship will be used 

operationally, called the Warfighting CONOPS; the other, called the Platform Wholeness 

CONOPS, discusses how the ship will be maintained and supported.

Survivability and 

Lethality 

Requirements Less 

Than Other 

Combatants, and 

Have Been Reduced 

over Time
capabilities it would bring to the warfighter.

Page 13 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

17 We found that documentation 

developed early on in the program had very optimistic assumptions of where and 

how LCS could be used, as compared with more current sources, but these 

assumptions have been lessened over time. By redefining LCS 

CONOPS, the Navy can help ensure that LCS will be in harm’s way less 

frequently, which could compensate for the ship’s susceptibility and 

vulnerability without more costly materiel changes to the ship. While 

pragmatic, this approach can limit the ship’s utility in the full scope of 

potential operations and can require more capable ships to be tasked to 

defend LCS instead of performing other missions. LCS was originally 

planned to free up more costly ships to perform more complicated 

missions; partnering LCS with ships providing defensive protection limits 

the Navy’s ability to achieve these efficiencies.

Additional details on these CONOPS changes are classified.

On April 17, 2014, the Navy completed operational testing of the LCS’s 

SUW mission package, employing an Increment 2 mission package 

onboard USS Fort Worth (LCS 3). During this test, the ship and its 

embarked helicopter demonstrated that it could meet the interim 

requirement for this increment. In prior live SUW test events, LCS did not 

demonstrate that it could kill all the required targets. Specific details about 

test events and results were redacted from this report because they are 

classified.

While the April 2014 test proved successful, further testing is needed to 

demonstrate that both variants of LCS can meet all its SUW 

requirements—incremental and threshold—and in all the threat 

environments in which the ships will operate. This is due to the following 

considerations:

· LCS did not demonstrate it could meet all its requirements in these 

test events;

· Testing only demonstrated that LCS could meet its requirements in 

one operational test event and is inadequate to provide statistical 

confidence in the ship’s performance; the test environment was not 

 

17GAO-13-530.

Recent SUW Testing 

Inadequate to

Determine If LCS 

Meets Its 

Requirements
operationally stressing and the crew got extensive training and 

practice;

· Only one of the two variants were tested; and

· Meeting threshold capability will require missile integration.

These issues are discussed below.

Recent operational testing has revealed that a Freedom variant LCS was 

not able to meet all its interim lethality requirements. Specific details of 

these shortcomings were redacted because the information is classified.

DOT&E officials told us that the amount of live testing done to date on the 

LCS SUW mission package is insufficient to provide statistical confidence 

that LCS can consistently demonstrate this level of performance. The 

DOD acquisition instruction states that scientific test and analysis 

techniques—which DOT&E states includes statistically based 

measures—should be employed in a test program and provide required 

data to characterize system behavior. The amount of testing to date is 

consistent with the approved test plan, but DOT&E stated that the tests 

were constrained due to the Navy not providing the funding and 

resources to allow for further testing. Due to the limited number of live 

operational test runs, DOT&E believes the existing evidence is not 

sufficient, nor does it predict LCS’s performance in varied environments 

(e.g., bad weather) or provide sufficient confidence that LCS could repeat 

this performance in other tests. So, while there is no requirement in the 

test plan to achieve statistical confidence, as DOT&E states the sparse 

data available do not allow a strong statement about LCS’s ability to meet 

requirements in other operational scenarios.

As an illustration of this point, the same ship and crew attempted the 

same operational test event one week prior to the successful run and 

were unsuccessful before the test event was cancelled due to range 

restrictions. As such, DOT&E has not yet made its determination that LCS 

is operationally effective in performing the SUW mission because of a 

stated lack of available data to support such an assessment. The Navy’s 

operational test organization has made its determination about 

effectiveness, which is documented in its final report. Further information 

about their assessment is classified.

Page 14 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

LCS Did Not Demonstrate 

It Could Meet All Interim 

SUW Requirements

SUW Testing Inadequate 

to Provide Statistical 

Confidence in 

Performance
Further, while operational testing did demonstrate that LCS could defeat 

the interim requirement number of Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC), 

range safety considerations made this testing less operationally stressing 

than a real-world encounter. Additional information about these issues 

was redacted because it contained classified information.

This operational testing of SUW was conducted using only a Freedom 

variant LCS. While the guns are the same on the two variants and in the 

mission package, the gunfire control systems, sensors, consoles, and 

some enabling software are all different, as are the gun placements and 

ship handling characteristics. As such, testing on a Freedom variant 

cannot be used to predict performance of the SUW mission package on 

an Independence variant. The Navy will not operationally test the initial 

SUW mission package on the Independence variant until September 

2015. As shown in table 4, most of the SUW operational testing on this 

variant is in the future and program officials told us that the Navy is still 

gaining an understanding of the effectiveness of the 57mm gun weapon 

system on the Independence variant. For example, DOT&E told us that in 

a developmental test in January 2015 the LCS 2 had difficulty achieving a 

hit on a stationary target with the 57mm gun.

Table 4: Independence Variant Littoral Combat Ship Performance in Surface 

Page 15 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

Warfare Live Test Events 

Test event Date completed Notes

LCS 4 Developmental Test July and September 2014 SUW mission package 

testing. Multiple test 

engagements.

LCS 2 Developmental Test January 2015 57mm gun only. Core ship 

self defense test.

LCS 4 Developmental Test August 2015 Analysis reports pending.

Technical Evaluation August 2015 Analysis reports pending.

Initial Operational Test and 

Evaluation phase

September 2015 Analysis reports pending.

Source: GAO analysis of Navy documentation. │GAO-16-201

Additional details about Independence variant testing were redacted 

because they contained classified information.

Operational Testing 

Limited to Freedom 

Variant; None to Date on 

the Independence Variant
LCS will not demonstrate threshold lethality requirements outlined in the 

CDD until 2017, at the earliest, after the Navy installs and tests the SUW 

mission package with the Longbow-Hellfire missiles. Since LongbowHellfire has not yet been integrated with LCS, the actual performance of 

the missile on LCS remains unknown. In November 2013, the missile 

contractor demonstrated that a Longbow-Hellfire missile could be 

modified to fire vertically from a ship rather than horizontally from a 

helicopter, and the Navy continues to conduct testing with DOT&E 

including 2014 testing examining the lethality of Longbow-Hellfire against 

small boats, though this testing did not use moving sea-based targets.

A key challenge in integrating the missile with LCS is managing its weight 

and accompanying equipment on the ship, given the weight and center of 

gravity challenges on which we have previously reported.

Page 16 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

18 Further, 

software integration with the combat management system will be required. An 

analysis of the capability of this missile was redacted because it contained 

classified content.

While the Navy has conducted a variety of surrogate tests and 

simulations, it has not yet demonstrated whether LCS meets its 

survivability requirements. As a result, significant unknowns remain 

regarding the vulnerability, susceptibility, and recoverability of LCS. 

According to current plans, the Navy will not have completed its test plan 

to demonstrate the survivability of LCS until approximately 2018, at which 

point it plans to have more than 24 ships either in the fleet or under 

construction.19 The Navy has not fully demonstrated the vulnerability of the 

seaframes, the susceptibility of the ship to air threats and computer 

penetrations, or how the crew will respond to damage. If future 

survivability concerns are identified, the Navy may have to again revise 

the LCS warfighting CONOPS to compensate for these issues. This could 

also have implications on the proposed modified LCS, since they plan to 

leverage the LCS designs. The main risks pertain to the following issues:

· Vulnerability of the ships due to the use of aluminum and a novel 

hullform on the Independence variant that has not been fully tested;

 

18GAO 14-749.

19The exact acquisition strategy for the next few years is still in development.

LCS Will Not Demonstrate 

It Can Meet Full Threshold 

SUW Performance until a 

Missile Is Integrated

The Navy Does Not 

Yet Fully Understand 

the Extent to Which 

LCS Will Meet 

Current Survivability 

Requirements
· Air warfare capability;

· Cybersecurity; and

· Recoverability of the ships not fully demonstrated.

These issues are discussed below.

The two LCS variants are new ship designs, and the Independence 

variant uses an aluminum alloy and a trimaran hullform that is unlike other 

ships in the Navy’s inventory. Therefore, the Navy needed to gather 

information to characterize how these ships would react to various types 

of damage. The Navy conducted modeling and simulation activities and 

surrogate testing, including the following:

· Weapons effects tests conducted on two decommissioned Finnish 

aluminum mono-hulled fast-attack craft;

· Fire tests on representative LCS bulkheads and fire insulation;

· Underwater explosion testing of representative panels of ship 

structure;

· Testing of stress loading on representative Independence variant 

aluminum structure;

· Penetration tests of representative Independence variant structures; 

and

· Furnace testing of Independence class types of aluminum to 

determine response of aluminum to heat and stress loading.

Further, the Navy is using computer models and simulations to predict 

how LCS might react to damage. Subject matter experts in weapons 

effects, damage control, fire dynamics, and other fields will then analyze 

the model predictions of primary and secondary damage caused by 

various weapons. These experts will update and expand on the model 

predictions to determine how cascading damage and crew response to 

such damage affect mission capability. Their interpretation of the 

modeling and simulation results, coupled with lessons learned from other 

testing and real world events, forms the basis of the assessment of 

whether the LCS meets its survivability requirements.

However, the Navy still lacks robust knowledge in several vulnerability 

areas, largely related to how fire will affect the aluminum structure of both 

Page 17 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

Navy Does Not Fully 

Understand LCS 

Vulnerability, and Some 

Knowledge Gaps Will 

Remain Unresolved on the 

Independence Variant
variants, and how underwater explosions will affect the aluminum 

trimaran Independence variant. The Navy does not plan to complete its 

validation and accreditation of the models used to simulate damage until 

2017, and its technical experts will not complete their analysis and issue

their final survivability assessment reports until approximately 2018. Navy 

officials stated that until that time its technical warrant holders cannot 

certify that the two variants meet their survivability requirements and that 

no further modifications to the design or operational CONOPS are 

necessary. Navy officials further stated that these reports are typically not 

finalized until several years after delivery, and cited examples of recent 

shipbuilding programs including CVN 78, DDG 1000, LPD 17, and LHA 6. 

However, the lead LCS seaframes were delivered in 2008 and 2009 

respectively, meaning that the Navy does not expect to finalize these 

reports until approximately a decade after delivery. Additional test 

activities and simulations still remain to be done before the Navy can 

better characterize the ships’ vulnerability, and the Navy does not plan to 

fully assess some potential vulnerabilities with the trimaran hull.

The Navy still lacks knowledge of how aluminum will react to fire and 

some blast events, which it does not expect to better understand until it 

completes a live-fire test event in late 2015. The Freedom variant design 

has an aluminum deckhouse mated to a steel hull, while the 

Independence variant is entirely made of aluminum with no steel 

structure. Historically, many Navy ships have been made largely out of 

steel, though several classes—recent examples include the CG 47 

Ticonderoga class cruisers and the FFG 7 Oliver Hazard Perry class 

frigates—have utilized an aluminum deckhouse. The lower density of 

aluminum provides advantages in that it is lighter than steel, which helps 

LCS achieve its high speed requirement. However, aluminum is also 

known to lose stiffness more quickly than steel at elevated temperatures 

in a fire, and the Navy has identified that this phenomenon needs further 

study on LCS. The Independence variant uses an alloy of aluminum that 

has not been used in prior Navy ship construction, so accumulated Navy 

knowledge about how the aluminum on older ships reacts to damage 

cannot be applied wholesale to the Independence variant. In addition, 

both variants—though more so the Independence variant—use extruded 

aluminum planks—complex shapes that are formed by pushing heated 

aluminum through a die using a hydraulic press. While extrusions have 

industrial advantages, the Navy has no experience with the damage 

responses from extruded planks. One shipyard identified this as a 

knowledge gap in a 2004 report to the Navy, stating that the computer 

models it used to simulate damage did not account for the use of this type 

of structure. The Navy plans to conduct live-fire testing on a full-scale 

Page 18 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

Knowledge of the Vulnerability 

of Aluminum Incomplete
mock-up of a section of an Independence variant deckhouse in late 2015 

to help provide additional data to mitigate some of these knowledge gaps. 

This mock-up is called the Multi-Compartment Surrogate, and the Navy 

plans to test it with internal blasts, fragmentation, and fire.

The Navy has knowledge gaps related to the underwater shock 

vulnerability of the trimaran shape of the Independence variant, in part 

because of a lack of experience with the hullform in other Navy ships. 

Specifically, technical experts from the Naval Sea Systems Command 

have stated that they do not fully understand how the hull would react to 

whipping caused by an underwater explosion. Underwater explosions 

create a shock wave and a highly compressed gas bubble that expands 

and contracts. This can cause a type of vertical or horizontal flexing of the 

ship called a whipping force. The severity of this whipping force and the 

resulting damage is a function of the size of the explosion and the 

distance from the hull, among other factors, and not all shocks lead to a 

whipping response. If the whipping is significant enough, this vibration 

could cause catastrophic damage and may cause a ship to break apart. 

Naval Sea Systems Command technical experts have identified a lack of 

experimental data on the whipping response of a trimaran hullform. These 

technical experts stated that there is currently no algorithm in existence to 

model how this hull type would perform, and stated that there is no plan to 

invest in such an algorithm or a physical hull model for testing since the 

LCS CDD has no explicit requirement for LCS to survive a whipping 

response, though it does have an underwater shock requirement.

Page 19 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

20

DOT&E has stated that a case could be made that there is an inherent whipping 

requirement because LCS is supposed to be able to support an orderly 

evacuation after a mine or torpedo encounter, which would not be 

possible if the ship were to break apart.

The Navy’s existing model has successfully been used to predict the 

whipping response of other conventional Navy hullforms and is thus being 

used for LCS modeling. While Naval Sea Systems Command technical 

experts state that this model contains the requisite physics to model the 

whipping of a trimaran hullform, they also point out that it has not been 

validated for this type of analysis and that there is no test data to correlate 

the results, which is why DOT&E believes a whipping surrogate test is 

 

20Navy officials stated that many other combatants have shock hardening requirements without 

a whipping requirement. 

Vulnerability of the 

Independence Variant Hull to 

Underwater Shocks Is 

Unknown
needed. Further, the Navy has not yet conducted a Full Ship Shock Trial 

on both ships. This test—where both variants will be subject to an 

underwater explosion and assessed for damage—is planned for 2016. 

This trial should provide some test data on how the Independence variant 

responds to a shock event. Though this test will not induce severe 

whipping motions, the Navy plans to use the data to compare the results 

with its model predictions.

The vulnerability of the ship’s hulls to various sea conditions also remains 

unknown. Due to the dynamic nature of waves, the Navy cannot rely on 

modeling and simulation alone to provide an accurate assessment of a 

ship’s performance in rough seas. The Navy conducts seakeeping and 

structural loads trials to determine with instrumentation how ships will 

respond to different sea conditions. Seakeeping trials are used to 

evaluate the way a ship behaves in various sea conditions, while 

structural loads trials are used to evaluate the effect of waves on the 

ship’s structure to determine if it is adequate to withstand damage. These 

tests are planned and executed by the Naval Surface Warfare Center 

Carderock Division’s Ship Systems Engineering Station in Philadelphia.

The Freedom variant has deployed twice and as a result sailed across the 

Pacific Ocean. In addition, in March 2015 this variant completed a 

seakeeping and structural load trial in rough water to define its 

performance characteristics. The Navy started this testing in 2011 on LCS 

1, but it was suspended when a hull crack and water leak were found.

The Navy has not yet provided an analysis report or details from this 

event or the subsequent 2015 test, which Navy officials state is still being 

written.

For the Independence variant, the Navy conducted a seakeeping and 

structural loads trial event on LCS 2 in January-February 2014. In this trial 

the ship was subject to rough water conditions up to and including sea 

state 6, defined as having average waves of 8-11 feet and winds of 22-27 

knots. This test event—dubbed Phase 2—was following up on earlier 

Phase 1 testing in lower sea states that was conducted in March 2011 

and May 2012. According to the Navy, neither the final test report for the 

Phase 1 seakeeping trials, nor the final test report for the Phase 2 

seakeeping and structural loads trial for this variant, have been finalized, 

despite these trials occurring several years ago.

According to LCS program officials, the ship tested in the Phase 2 trials 

sustained damage during the testing. The Navy has not yet provided us 

with the analysis reports, stating that the report is still undergoing 

Page 20 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

Ship’s Performance in Rough 

Seas Not Fully Understood, 

with Both Variants Suffering 

Damage in Trial
revisions. Consequently, we are unable to assess the significance or 

cause of this damage. DOT&E has reported that this testing resulted in 

weld cracking to structural stanchions in the mission package bay and 

has resulted in weight limitations to the launch, handling, and recovery 

equipment for the mission packages on both LCS 2 and LCS 4—although 

they have also not seen the test reports. Officials from the LCS program 

office initially told us that part of the reason for the delay in generating 

these reports is due to a disagreement between the program office and 

the technical study team from the Naval Surface Warfare as to the cause 

of the damage, citing that they do not believe the ship was adequately 

inspected prior to the trial. The Navy later stated in its technical 

comments that there was not a disagreement, and that the Navy and the 

technical team agree that the damage identified after the trial resulted 

from quality control issues during construction, but cannot confirm that the 

damage occurred during the trial itself because no pre-trial inspection was 

conducted. As such, the current value of the data obtained as part of the 

rough water trial on the Independence variant is in question. The program 

office has not sought additional assistance from an independent technical 

authority such as a ship classification society to help analyze the data and 

determine the vulnerability of the Independence hullform. Classification 

societies are often used to assess damage to in-service ships; a similar 

analysis was conducted by ABS after USS Port Royal hit a coral reef in 

order to provide an independent review of the damage the ship sustained.

Our classified report discussed issues with the air defense and 

cybersecurity of LCS. Additional information about the performance of 

LCS in air warfare testing and results from cybersecurity testing has been 

redacted because it contained classified information.

The Navy will not be able to fully demonstrate LCS anti-air warfare 

capability until it completes two future activities: modeling in a high-fidelity 

computer simulation called the Probability of Raid Annihilation (PRA)

Testbed, and live-fire testing onboard the Self Defense Test Ship. DOT&E 

also requires “lead ship testing” which was going to occur on LCS 5 and 6 

but has now been postponed to LCS 7 and 8. The Navy needs to 

complete the testbed simulations and live-fire events to characterize 

LCS’s susceptibility to representative anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM)

threats.

· PRA Testbed: LCS anti-air warfare performance will be modeled 

through the PRA Testbed—a rigorous modeling and simulation 

environment using representative LCS combat system suite and 

Page 21 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

Air Defense and 

Cybersecurity Issues
weapons configurations. The Navy plans to use this PRA Testbed to 

conduct a full course of ASCM self-defense assessments, including 

simulations that would be costly or difficult to test with live targets. 

This testing was planned to occur in fiscal year 2016 for the 

Independence variant and fiscal year 2018 for the Freedom variant, 

but according to DOT&E officials it has slipped to 2017-2018 for the 

Independence variant and 2018-2019 for the Freedom variant.

· Self Defense Test Ship: The Navy also plans to conduct live end-toend testing against both LCS variants and also against the unmanned 

Self Defense Test Ship. This ship is remote controlled so it can be 

subjected to live-fire testing, and will be equipped with the same 

combat system equipment found on the two LCS variants. According 

to test plans, the Navy envisioned conducting Self-Defense Test Ship 

tests using Independence class equipment between fiscal year 2015 

and 2016 and Freedom class equipment in fiscal year 2016. This 

testing has slipped to fiscal year 2016 for the Independence variant 

and 2017 for the Freedom variant.

In 2014, the program office completed the Total Ship Survivability Trial 

onboard LCS 3, a Freedom variant ship. This test is an at-sea event with 

the ship’s crew in which damage from threat weapons is simulated. The 

test allows the Navy to collect information on how well the crew is able to 

use the installed fire fighting and damage control systems to control 

damage and reconstitute the ship. The Navy plans to conduct this same 

test event on the Independence variant in fiscal year 2015.

Program officials told us they were generally satisfied with the results of 

the test; we have not yet had the opportunity to review the final report, as 

it is still being finalized. This test is important as LCS’s small crew may 

limit the crew’s damage control efforts following an attack if the damage 

were severe enough or if it took a long time to combat. According to 

DOT&E, the test highlighted the existence of significant vulnerabilities in 

the Freedom class design and that much of the ship’s mission capability 

was lost because of damage caused by the initial weapons effects or from 

the ensuing fire that happened before the crew could respond. LCS 

documentation does not identify how many crew members would have to 

be lost to degrade the crew’s response capability. Further discussion on 

this topic is classified and is not included in this report.

DOT&E also stated that LCS does not have sufficient redundancy to 

recover the lost capability. For example, LCS has limited redundancy in 

its power supply systems, and DOT&E officials told us that the ship does 

Page 22 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

Recoverability of Ship 

Partially Demonstrated in 

Testing to Date
not have the ability to employ auxiliary casualty power systems like the 

crews can employ on other Navy ships to recover in the event of major 

damage. According to Naval Sea Systems Command documentation, a 

casualty power system allows the ship’s crew to make temporary power 

connections to limited equipment if the installed power connections are 

damaged, allowing this equipment to keep using the installed shipboard 

power generation systems. Such a system can facilitate keeping the ship 

afloat, extinguishing shipboard fires, propelling the ship out of a danger 

area, or in maintaining communications and a limited self-defense 

capability. LCS relies instead on separated and redundant battery backup 

power supplies and the ship build specifications indicate no casualty 

power equipment on board. A battery backup power may not enable the 

ship to operate as long as harnessing the ship’s main power generators 

would allow. Navy officials stated that modern Navy ship designs 

including DDG 1000 and LPD 17 do not use a casualty power system.

The Navy is currently planning significant changes to the LCS program 

under a compressed time frame, which provides little opportunity for 

incorporating knowledge from the results of its survivability and lethality 

assessments. The Navy completed its Small Surface Combatant Study 

and just recently provided it to us. The Navy used analysis from this study 

to decide to modify the two LCS variants to be more survivable and lethal. 

In December 2014, the former Secretary of Defense announced that he 

approved the Navy’s recommendation. The former Secretary of Defense 

further directed the Navy to provide his office by May 1, 2015: (1) an 

acquisition strategy to support the design and procurement of the new 

small surface combatant no later than fiscal year 2019 and sooner if 

possible; and (2) an assessment of the cost and feasibility of back-fitting 

the existing LCS with enhanced survivability and lethality systems. In 

addition, he also required the Navy to submit to the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense a service cost position and a plan to control overall 

program costs. The Secretary of Defense assumed a total quantity of 52 

LCS and small surface combatants, but left the decision on the final 

number and mix of ships to the discretion of the Navy. However, 

according to Navy documentation, the Navy is notionally planning on 20 

modified LCS—the costs of which have not been fully determined.

The House report on the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2015 includes a provision that we analyze the Small Surface 

Combatant Study and the Navy’s plans moving forward; we just began 

this work after receiving the Navy’s study, and we plan on issuing a 

separate report on these issues. As part of this review we will also assess 

Page 23 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

Compressed Time 

Frame for 

Incorporating Major 

Program Changes
the acquisition strategy and cost and feasibility assessments recently 

submitted to the Secretary of Defense. According to statements by senior 

Navy officials, the modified LCS will be redesignated as a frigate. An 

initial fact sheet issued by the Navy shows that these ships will still be 

able to carry either the SUW or ASW mission packages, but the Navy will 

add additional combat capability by including a towed multifunction sonar 

array, an over-the-horizon missile, and 25mm guns to the seaframes. The 

Navy is continuing to refine its plans, but initial information, including a 

recent DOT&E report, indicates that the improvements will largely focus 

on improving lethality. However, DOT&E stated that the improvements to 

the ships would not be sufficient to overcome the vulnerability features of 

LCS.

According to the Navy, modifying the LCS allows it to support the current 

industrial base with no break in production schedule. There are 20 

seaframes currently under contract with the shipyards—10 at each 

shipyard—in various stages of construction in addition to any other 

planned work at the shipyards. According to the current schedule, the 

shipyards will be building LCSs already under contract until approximately 

2019, and the Navy plans to award additional contracts before 

transitioning to the frigate. Further, Navy documentation identifies multimonth delays to almost all of the seaframes currently under construction 

at both shipyards. These late deliveries may prolong the time required for 

the shipyards to complete work under the existing LCS contracts, 

meaning that any future delays associated with the introduction of the 

modified LCS may not impact the workload in the shipyards.

As shown in figure 2, the Navy’s proposed acquisition schedule will result 

in the Navy making key program decisions without the benefit of 

knowledge gained through ongoing survivability and lethality 

assessments.

Page 24 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 
Figure 2: Major Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and New Small Surface Combatant Milestones

Page 25 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

a

The Navy has not yet finalized its acquisition strategy for ships beyond 2016.

For example, the Navy plans to determine its acquisition strategy for the 

new small surface combatant by May 2015, exercise options to begin 

upgrading current LCS ships in fiscal year 2017, and buy the lead small 

surface combatant (modified LCS) by 2019. According to this schedule, 

the Navy will need to begin estimating and planning the 2019 budget in 

2017. However, as previously mentioned, at that time, the Navy will not 

yet have completed plans to fully demonstrate the survivability of both 

variants or completed testing to demonstrate that both variants meet 

threshold lethality requirements. Unknowns about the Independence 

variant are particularly significant, as that ship has conducted less 

operational testing to date than the Freedom variant and has not yet 

deployed overseas. Nevertheless, the Navy still plans to proceed with 

equal numbers of each variant, as reflected in its 2010 block buy 

decision.
The actual lethality and survivability performance of LCS is still largely 

unproven through realistic testing, 6 years after delivery of the lead ships, 

with 2 additional ships delivered and 20 more ships under construction 

and/or under contract. The LCS program was intended to be lower in cost 

than more capable multi-mission surface combatants, and the Navy 

limited requirements for susceptibility and vulnerability to help achieve 

that end. Since the program was initially authorized and funded, costs 

have increased and the Navy has further reduced the ship’s lethality and 

survivability requirements. While current plans to protect LCS with more 

capable ships in higher-threat environments may be a more cost effective 

solution to addressing capability limitations, these changes also reflect an 

ever-shrinking set of situations in which LCS can operate without placing 

added demands on the larger combatants. Further, although the Navy 

has a significant lack of knowledge of the Independence variant’s lethality 

and survivability capabilities with no plans to seek additional analysis from 

an independent technical authority to resolve questions on its rough water 

trial report, it continues with plans to buy equal numbers of both variants.

The Navy is quickly embarking on an effort to redesign the LCS to 

address lethality and survivability concerns. This effort comprises a major 

program change. Direction from the former Secretary of Defense to 

develop an acquisition strategy for the new small surface combatant—

and to assess back-fitting some systems on the current LCS—by May 

2015 with the first ship procured in 2019 leaves little time to develop 

important knowledge about current limitations of the ships in these areas. 

Consequently, the Navy risks leaving some limitations unaddressed, and 

potentially inefficiently modifying these designs while testing continues. 

The Secretary of Defense conveyed a sense of urgency by setting this 

time frame of May 2015, only 5 months after he approved the Navy’s 

recommendation. The Navy has cited maintaining the industrial base and 

avoiding a production break as an imperative for its decision-making. Yet, 

current work in the shipyards will continue through at least 2019. Each 

shipyard currently has 10 LCS in various stages of construction—some 

having not even started construction—and most are experiencing 

schedule delays. The expedited time frame puts the Navy at risk for 

making decisions uninformed by more complete knowledge about not 

only the current LCS, but also about precisely what systems will be 

selected for the modified LCS. Importantly, the Navy will not have 

completed the survivability assessments for the two variants until 2018. 

Until that time, the Navy cannot be assured that it fully understands the 

survivability of the two ships or what capabilities might need to be 

augmented. Making premature decisions may exacerbate the situation 

Page 26 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

Conclusions
the Navy is in today—with an inventory of ships and systems that do not 

perform as initially envisioned.

At the same time, Congress is being asked to fund three LCS in fiscal 

year 2016—ships that DOD has acknowledged do not meet its needs. At 

this point, Congress must consider this funding request before the Navy 

has completed its new acquisition strategy or assessed the feasibility of 

backfitting certain upgrades onto the existing ships.

While we are making recommendations in this report, we also believe that 

the recommendations we have made in prior reports with regard to the 

LCS program still stand as reasonable actions that the Navy should take 

to improve the program.

To ensure that the Navy has provided a clear direction for the future of

the program before committing funding to construct additional ships, 

Congress should consider the following options:

1. In the near term, restrict funding for construction of the three LCS 

seaframes requested in fiscal year 2016 until the Navy submits to 

Congress and GAO:

a. An acquisition strategy for the modified LCS that has been 

approved by the Secretary of Defense;

b. The Navy’s plans to backfit the existing LCS and an analysis 

of the cost and engineering feasibility and risks of doing so; 

and

c. A completed rough water trial report for both variants.

Or,

2. Not funding some or all of the Navy’s request in fiscal year 2016 

for the three LCS seaframes given the Navy’s lack of knowledge 

of the ships’ survivability and lethality capability.

3. Further, given the uncertainties over the long term about the ship’s 

survivability and lethality and proposed changes to future ships, 

consider not fully funding the Navy’s request for future LCS ships 

beyond fiscal year 2016, pending the completion and analysis of 

the final survivability assessments for both variants due in 2018.

Page 27 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

Matters for 

Congressional 

Consideration
To ensure that the Navy has a sound acquisition approach moving 

forward, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense:

1. Ensure that the commitment to buy 20 modified LCS remains an 

affordable priority given other acquisition needs;

2. Ensure that the Navy’s acquisition strategy for the modified LCS 

does not place industrial base concerns ahead of demonstrating 

the ship’s lethality, survivability, and affordability; and

3. Require the Navy to solicit an independent technical assessment 

from an organization like a ship classification society on the 

survivability of the Independence variant seaframe and its ability 

to meet its applicable requirements.

To ensure that the program has requirements that are testable and 

measurable and to improve realism of LCS operational testing, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 

Navy to:

1. Investigate resourcing and conducting more operationally 

stressing SUW mission package testing onboard LCS, to include 

testing in a clutter environment and diverse weather and tactical 

scenarios to help ensure that the ships can operate effectively in 

their intended environment.

In the classified version of this report,

Page 28 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

21 we make a separate 

recommendation to the Secretary of the Navy related to defining a 

currently vague SUW requirement that we redacted because it contained 

classified information.

We provided a draft of this report to DOD for review and comment. In its 

written comments, which are reprinted in appendix II of this report, DOD 

concurred with two of our recommendations, partially concurred with two 

others, and did not concur with one recommendation.

 

21GAO-15-361C

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Regarding our first two recommendations, the department agreed that the 

Secretary of Defense would ensure that the Navy has a sound acquisition 

strategy moving forward procuring modified LCS and stated that the 

Secretary will ensure that industrial base concerns are balanced against 

cost, schedule and fleet requirements. Our draft report initially stated that 

the Navy was planning to buy 19 modified LCS based on our reading of 

the documentation available to us at that time. We have since updated 

our draft to reflect 20 modified LCS as recommended by the Navy. In 

addition, although DOD’s response is consistent with the intent of our 

recommendations, the department indicates that it will conduct its review 

of the Navy’s approach in advance of preparing the fiscal year 2017 

budget. Given that fiscal year 2017 budget will be submitted in only a few 

months, we are concerned that the Secretary might not have adequate 

information prior to making funding decisions for the modified LCS. For 

example, final survivability assessments for both variants will not be 

issued until 2018—after acquisition decisions for the modified LCS are 

planned. We will continue to monitor this issue as part of our ongoing 

work on the Navy’s small surface combatant.

DOD did not concur with our recommendation to solicit an independent 

technical assessment of the survivability of the Independence variant 

from an organization such as a ship classification society, stating that 

such an organization could not provide an independent look and would 

not have the technical competence to perform a threat weapon-based 

assessment of the survivability of any Navy ship. The intent of our 

recommendation was for the Navy to solicit an independent assessment 

of the structural damage sustained by LCS 2 during rough water trials—

but not necessarily to assess the ability of the ship to sustain damage 

from weapons. With that in mind, we suggested a ship classification 

society as one option, but it is not the only option. The Navy could 

contract with an independent naval architecture firm or create an internal 

independent review board to assess the damage and identify a path 

forward. We believe that ship classification societies would be a viable 

option because they are not currently involved with the LCS program or 

other Navy surface combatant acquisition programs. DOD stated that 

soliciting such an evaluation by the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS)—

a ship classification society—would not be an independent look because 

both LCS seaframe variants were originally designed, built, and classed 

to ABS standards. However, we note that the relationship between ABS 

and the Navy ended in 2012. In addition, there are 11 other classification 

societies that are members of the International Association of 

Classification Societies. This Association states that classification 

societies are independent, self-regulating, and externally audited and 

Page 29 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 
have no commercial ownership in ship construction. Classification 

societies inspect and assess the structure of ships to ensure safety and 

adherence to standards, including after a ship sustains damage. Since 

LCS 2 sustained damage and given the disagreements between the LCS 

program office and its technical authority as to the cause of this damage, 

we continue to believe that soliciting an independent third party is a 

reasonable recommendation.

DOD concurred with our classified recommendation related to defining a 

currently vague requirement and seeking Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council validation before operational testing of the remaining SUW 

mission package increments.

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation related to funding 

more operationally stressing operational tests to include clutter and 

diverse weather and tactical scenarios. DOD stated that it will provide 

sufficient test resources, but stated that it does not believe that testing 

“every aspect” of weather and tactics is necessary. We agree that it is not 

necessary to test every type of weather and tactical situation, and urge 

DOD to ensure that testing identified by DOT&E is completed as 

necessary to fully demonstrate the performance parameters that are 

included in LCS test plans.

The Navy also separately provided over 80 technical comments on our 

draft report. We reconciled the Navy’s technical comments with evidence 

we had from discussions with, and documentation from, officials from the 

Navy, DOT&E, and the Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation 

Force. We requested additional documentation to support some of the 

Navy’s comments. We incorporated the Navy’s comments as appropriate, 

such as to provide additional context in the report, but in some cases the 

Navy suggested changes or deletions that were not supported by the 

preponderance of evidence or that were based on a difference of opinion 

and not supported by fact. In those instances, we did not make the 

suggested changes. In all, we incorporated many of the Navy’s comments 

and, in doing so, found that the message of our report remained the 

same.

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and 

other interested parties. In addition, the report is available at no charge on 

the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

Page 30 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at 202-512-4841 or mackinm@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of the report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix III.

Michele Mackin

Director, Acquisition Sourcing Management

Page 31 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 
List of Committees

The Honorable John McCain

Chairman

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Chairman

The Honorable Richard J. Durbin

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations 

United States Senate

The Honorable Mac Thornberry

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Rodney Frelinghuysen

Chairman

The Honorable Pete Visclosky

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives 

Page 32 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Although this report is dated December 2015, our findings are current as 

of July 2015 to be consistent with a classified report issued in July 2015. 

To identify the extent to which Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) survivability 

and lethality requirements have changed over time, if at all, we analyzed 

the LCS capability development documents (CDD) which dictate the 

performance requirements for the ship and mission packages. We 

analyzed both the Flight 0 CDD dated 2004 and the updated Flight 0+ 

revision dated 2010, and compared both of these CDDs to identify areas,

if any, where LCS requirements might have changed. We also reviewed 

the Navy’s Required Operational Capabilities and Projected Operating 

Environment for LCS Class Ships instruction, which stipulates where LCS 

was to be employed. We analyzed the LCS build specifications for both 

variants for Flight 0 and Flight 0+. To determine the extent to which the 

warfighting concept of operations (CONOPS) continues to evolve, we 

analyzed the two LCS warfighting concept of operations (2007 and 2011) 

and spoke with an official from the Navy’s Fleet Forces Command 

responsible for developing the third revision of the LCS warfighting 

CONOPS. We attended a portion of the LCS wargame conducted in 

March 2014. We also analyzed the CDDs for other Navy surface ships to 

make comparisons with LCS requirements. We reviewed relevant Navy 

policies stipulating general survivability and shock requirements for ships, 

and interviewed Navy officials including from the Program Executive 

Office for LCS for both the seaframes and the mission packages, and 

obtained written responses from the Office of the Chief of Naval 

Operations LCS branch. We also interviewed relevant DOT&E officials.

To assess the extent to which LCS meets its current survivability 

requirements, we analyzed Navy and DOT&E test reports for both 

developmental and operational test events on LCS and reviewed the LCS 

test and evaluation master plan and the Navy’s Capstone Enterprise Air 

Warfare Ship Self-Defense test and evaluation master plan. We analyzed 

the LCS build specifications for both variants for Flight 0 and Flight 0+ 

ships, and reviewed relevant sections of the American Bureau of 

Shipping’s Rules for Building and Classing Naval Vessels, which are the 

technical rules that were used to guide development of the LCS designs.

We also analyzed the USS Independence Capabilities and Limitations 

document (2010) and the USS Freedom Combat System Employment 

Guide, as well as contractor-developed Vulnerability Analysis Reports 

and Detail Design Integrated Survivability Assessment Reports, and Navy 

instructions stipulating ship survivability requirements, including 

OPNAVINST 9070.1, 9070.1A, and OPNAVINST 9072.2A. We reviewed 

the Total Ship Survivability Trial test plan and also observed a portion of 

Page 33 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

this test conducted on USS Fort Worth. We reviewed various DOT&E 

documents, including the Early Fielding Report for LCS, and operational 

test results from anti-air warfare weapons on other ships. We also 

analyzed the Navy’s USS Independence Seakeeping and Structural 

Loads Trial Phase II report. We interviewed relevant Navy officials, 

including from the Program Executive Office LCS for both the seaframes 

and the mission packages; and Navy technical experts from the Naval 

Surface Warfare Center Carderock Division and the Naval Research Lab 

including technical warrant holders responsible for ship vulnerability and 

shock tolerances. We obtained written responses from the Program 

Executive Office Integrated Warfare Systems. We also discussed 

survivability and crew training issues with LCS Squadron One, Navy Fleet 

Forces Command, and Navy Surface Forces Pacific officials.

To assess the extent to which LCS meets its current lethality 

requirements, we limited our assessment to the lethality of core seaframe 

and the SUW mission package because the MCM and ASW mission 

bring no or little offensive capability packages and both rely on the core 

seaframe systems for self-defense. The ASW mission package will carry 

a helicopter that can drop torpedoes, but this system is a well 

characterized capability that is currently used in the fleet, so we did not 

assess the effectiveness of this system. Further, the Navy has yet to field 

a production representative ASW mission package to evaluate. To assess 

LCS’s performance, we analyzed Navy Commander, Operational Test 

and Evaluation Force reports including the SUW initial operational test 

and evaluation report, and Navy Surface Warfare Center Corona Division 

test analysis reports from LCS developmental test events and DOT&E 

reports. We reviewed the LCS Live Fire Test and Evaluation Management 

Plan, and the Navy’s 57mm and 30mm ammunition Live Fire Test and 

Evaluation Management Plans. We also analyzed the USS Independence 

Capabilities and Limitations document (2010) and the USS Freedom 

Combat System Employment Guide. We reviewed the Navy’s Damage 

Control Book for LCS 3 and the LCS 1 Repair Party Manual. We also 

interviewed relevant Navy officials, including from the Program Executive 

Offices for LCS for both the seaframes and the mission packages; the 

Naval Surface Warfare Center Corona Division; and Navy Commander of 

Operational Test and Evaluation Force. We also interviewed relevant 

DOT&E officials. We obtained written responses from the Office of the 

Chief of Naval Operations LCS branch and from the Program Executive 

Office Integrated Warfare Systems. We also reviewed the LCS 2 Special 

Trial report.

Page 34 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

To assess the recent decisions pertaining to upcoming changes to the 

program in response to the Secretary of Defense’s concerns with LCS 

lethality and survivability, we analyzed available Navy documentation on 

the proposed modified LCS. We also met with the small surface 

combatant study team. We were not provided with a copy of the study 

team’s report in time to include an analysis of that document in this report.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2014 to July 2015 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Page 35 GAO-16-201 Littoral Combat Ship 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 36 GAO-16-201 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 37 GAO-16-201 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 38 GAO-16-201 
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Michele Mackin, 202-512-4841 or mackinm@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Diana Moldafsky (Assistant 

Director), Greg Campbell, Laurier Fish, Laura Greifner, Kristine 

Hassinger, C. James Madar, Kenneth Patton, John Rastler, Amie Steele, 

Roxanna Sun, and Hai Tran made key contributions to this report.

Page 39 GAO-16-201 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contacts 

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(121284)
Appendix IV: Accessible Data

Page 40 GAO-16-201 

Ms. Michele Mackin Director

Acquisition and Sourcing Management

U.S. Government Accountability Office 441 G Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

JUN 1 9 2015

Dear Ms. Mackin:

This is the Department of Defense's response to the Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) Draft Report, GAO-l 5-316C, "LITTORAL 

COMBAT SHIP: Knowledge of Survivability and Lethality Capabilities 

Needed Prior to Making Major Funding Decisions," dated March 13, 2015 

(GAO Code 121226).

The Department acknowledges receipt of the draft report. As more fully 

explained in the enclosure, the Department partially concurs with 

recommendations 1 and 5, concurs with recommendations 2 and 4, and 

does not concur with recommendation 3.

The Department appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft 

report. For further questions concerning this report, please contact Dr. 

James Moreland, Deputy Director for Naval Warfare, at 

james.d.moreland18.civ@mail.mil or 703-614-3170.

Sincerely,

Frank Kendall

Enclosure: As stated

Appendix IV: Accessible Data

Agency Comment 

Letter

Text of Appendix II: 

Comments from the 

Department of Defense

Page 1
Appendix IV: Accessible Data

GAO DRAFT REPORT DATED MARCH 13, 2015 GA0-15-361C (GAO 

CODE 12122fi)

"LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP: KNOWLEDGE OF SURVIVABILITY AND 

LETHALITY CAPABILITIES NEEDED PRIOR TO MAKING MAJOR 

FUNDI NG DECISIONS"

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE GAO 

RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATION 1: 

To ensure that the Navy has a sound acquisition approach moving 

forward, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that the 

commitment to buy 1 modified LCS remains an affordable priority given 

other acquisition needs.

DoD RESPONSE: 

Partially Concur. The Department of Defense "viii evaluate the Navy's 

modified Littoral Combat Ship (LCS)/Frigate plan in preparation for the 

Fiscal Year 20 l 7 President's Budget submission. The Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) will 

ensure the modified LCS/Frigate Acquisition Strategy (AS) is in 

compliance with the Secretary's direction. However, the Department is 

committed to the procurement of 20 modified LCS/Frigates in the most 

affordable manner possible, in order to fulfill the Force Structure 

Assessment requirement for 52 small surface combatants.

RECOMMENDATION 2:

To ensure that the Navy has a sound acquisition approach moving 

forward, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense ensure that the 

Navy's acquisition strategy for the modified LCS does not place industrial 

base concerns ahead of demonstrating the ship's lethality, survivability, 

and affordability.

DoD RESPONSE: 

Concur. The USD(AT&L) will ensure that the Navy's AS balances 

industrial base concerns with cost, schedule, and performance risks for 

the execution of the modified LCS/Frigate program and Fleet 

requirements.

Page 41 GAO-16-201 

Page 2
Appendix IV: Accessible Data

RECOMMENDAT I ON 3: 

To ensure that the Navy has a sound acquisition approach moving 

forward, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense require the Navy 

to solicit an independent technical assessment from an organization like a 

ship classification society on the survivability of the Independence variant 

seaframe and its ability to meet its applicable requirements.

(L)DoD RESPONSE: Both LCS seaframe variants were originally 

designed, built, classed to American of Shipping (ABS) Rules. Soliciting 

such evaluation by ABS would not be an independent look. Other 

classification societies would not have equivalent rules to meet U.S. Navy 

survivability standards and any assessment would not offer the validation 

desired in the GAO recommendation. Additionally, a ship classification 

society does not have the technical competence to perform a threat 

weapon-based survivability assessment of any Navy ship; that knowledge 

resides solely within the Department.

RECOMMENDATION 4:

To ensure that the program has requirements that are testable and 

measurable and to improve realism of LCS operational testing, we 

recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Na¥] 

to fully define and seek Joint Requirements Oversight Council validation 

for the CDD requirement for LCS [REDACTED] engagements to 

language that can be used to support testing. Complete this action prior 

to operational testing of remaining SUW mission package increments.

DoD RESPONSE: 

Concur. The Department agrees that the Navy should submit for approval 

a Surface Warfare (SUW) Capability Production Document to the Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council addressing the Fast Attack Craft (FAC) 

and Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC) threats and LCS engagement 

requirements. The current Test and Evaluation Master Plan TEMP is 

approved only for testing Increment 2 of the SUW mission package, as 

well as the first increment of the Mine Countermeasure mission package. 

Testing for Increment 3 or Increment 4 of the SUW mission package has 

not yet been defined or approved by the Director of Operational Test and 

Evaluation. An update to the current TEMP will be required to document 

the needed testing and resources for an adequate operational test of the 

remaining increments, including examining performance [REDACTED] 

and long-range engagements with [REDACTED] future missile capability.

Page 42 GAO-16-201 

Page 3
Appendix IV: Accessible Data

RECOMMENDATION 5:

To ensure that the Navy has a sound acquisition approach movining 

forward, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense investigate 

resourcing and conducting more operationally stressing SUW mission 

package testing onboard LCS, to include testing in a clutter environment 

and diverse weather and tactical scenarios to help ensure that the ships 

can operate effectively in their intended environment.

Do D RESPONSE:

Partially Concur. The Department will provide sufficient test resources 

(i.e., targets and white shipping assets) to ensure the adequacy of LCS 

developmental and operational testing. The TEMP will be updated to 

adequately address the intended performance for the SUW mission 

package. Future SUW mission package testing will include testing in a

variety of operationally realistic conditions [REDACTED] and a variety of 

stressing threat target scenarios and tactics, to provide a more complete 

assessment of LCS [REDACTED] warfighting capability, while ensuring 

compliance with at sea testing range safety protocols. The Department 

does not agree that, to have a "sound acquisition approach," it must 

include a test strategy that tests every aspect of weather and tactics. 

However, testing will be conducted sufficiently to be able to assess how 

the systems will perform in their intended operating environments.

Page 43 GAO-16-201 
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