### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Marc h 7, 200 6

STA TE OF TENNES SEE v . SOLO MON GALL OW AY

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty

No. 04-00121 Chris Cr aft, Jud ge

No. W2005-01154-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled April 6, 2006

A Shelby CountyCriminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Solomon Galloway , of two counts of aggr av at ed ro b b er y

. T h e tri al co u rt m er ged t h e co n v i ct i o n s an d s en t en ce d t h e a p p el l an tas a R an ge I , standard of

fende r to eig ht y ear s in the Depa rtment of Corre ction. I n this appeal, the a ppellant claims that the trial court improperly enhanc ed his sentenc e in lig ht of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. C t. 2531 (2004), which re s u l t ed i n his being improperly classified a s a standar d of fe nd e r i ns te a d o f an e sp e c ia lly mit ig a te d o ff

e nd e r. Up on re vie w o f the re c or d a ndthe pa rt ie s’ br ie fs , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 App e al a s o f Rig ht ; J udgm e nt of t he Cr im ina l C our t i s A ffirm e d.

N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which G AR Y R. W ADE , P.J ., and J OS EP H M. T I PTON , J ., joined.

Ge ra ld S. Gr e e n (o n app e a l) a nd Col e ma n Ga rr e tt (at tr ia l)
, Me mph is, Te nn e sse e , fo r the app e lla nt, S o l o m o n G a l l o w a y.

Pa ul G . Su mme rs , At torne y Ge ne ra l a nd Re po rt e r; B ri a n Cl a y John so n, As sis ta nt A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, District Attorney Gene ra l ; an d M i chelle Par ks and B obby

Carter , Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.

OP IN ION

I. F ac tu al B ac kgr ound
On the nig ht of September 19, 2003, T homas Roge rs, Cornelius Stil l, and another boy named Carl os we re wa lki ng a lon g a ne ig hb or ho odstr e e t in Me mph is. Th e g ro up pa sse d tw o o the r b oy s, who wer e wa lking in the opposite dire ction. Roge rs and his friends turned a round to look back at the tw o boy s and sa w the tw o b oy s run up be hin d th e m. T he tw o b oy s p oin te d g un s a t Ro g e rs , St ill
, and Carlos a nd demande d that they lie down on the g round. Roge rs testified that one of the robbe rs was the a ppellant and that he g ot a clea r look at the a

ppellant’s fa ce. Still also testified that he-2-

re c og nize d th e app e lla nt as on e of the ro bb e rs a nd that he an d the app e lla nt we nt to the sa me sc ho ol. The robbe rs took the victims’ shoes and other items and ran to a near by house. Rog ers late r g ave a stateme nt to the police and se lected the appellant’ s photogr aph fr om a photog raphic arr ay . The appellant, who w as six teen y ear s old at t he ti me of the crimes, testified t hat he was at chur ch on the night of September 19 a nd that he did not rob the victims. The jury convicted the appellant of two counts of ag g ravated robbe ry of Rog ers.

At the sentenc ing he aring , Valda B rown Edwa rds, the appe llant’s mother, ac kn o w le d g e d that the app e lla nt h a d b e e n in juve nil e c ou rt on se ve ra l occ a sio ns du e to a lte rc a tio ns in s c ho ol. She sa id that th e app e lla nt d id n ot h a ve se ri ou s d isc ipl ine probl ems at home a ndthat he wa s sc he du le d to g raduate from Westside Hig h School in about two months. On c ross-examination, Edwards de nied that the appe llant had droppe d out of school but testified that he ha d burg larized a F amily Dollar store. The State introduced into evide nce the appellant’ s juvenile court f ile. Acc ording to the file, the appe llant was cha

rg ed in t he J uvenile C ourt of Memphis and Shelby Countywith the ag g ravated

ro bb e ry of Rog e rs a ndwa s tr a ns fe rr e d to the c ri min a l c ou rt to b e tr ie d a s an a du lt. Th e fi le a lso shows that the appe llant was adjudicated delinquent for burg larizi n g an d

v an d aliz ing a

Fa milyDollar store in 2000, when he was fourteen y ear s old.

The trial c ourt applied e nhance ment fac tor (21), tha t the appellant “ was a djudicated to have committed a delinquent act or acts as a juvenile that would constitute a felony if committed by

an adult.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 21) (2003). Ba sed upon the application of t hat factor, the trial court rule d that it could not sentence the appe llant as an e specia lly mit igated offe nder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 109(a) (2) ( providing that a def endant may

be an e specia lly

mitigated of

fende r if the court “finds m i t i gat i n g , but no enhanc ement fa ctors”) ; see a lso Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 105(a) (4) ( defining a “sta ndard of fende r” a nd providing that a standa rd off ender is not sentenced a s an espe cially

mitigated of

fende r). B ased upon the appellant’ s y outh, the trial court a pplied mitigating fac tor (6). See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-113( 6). The trial court order ed th at t he appellant serve eight y ear s, the m inimum punishment in the rang e for a Class B f

elony . See Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 112(a) (2).

II. Ana lys is

The a ppellant claims that the trial c ourt improperly applied enhanceme nt fac tor (21) in lig ht of B lakely

v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and, therefo re , t h at he is an espec ially mitigated of

fende r. As an espec ially mitigated offe nder, the appellant would be entitled to h a ve his Ra ng e I

min imu m se nte nc e re du c e d b y te n p e rc e nt, ha ve hi s re le a se e lig ibi lit y da te

re du c e d to tw e nty

pe rc e nt o f the se nte nc e , o r b oth . Se e Te nn . Co de An n. § 4 0- 35 -1 09 (b ). Th e Sta te claims that the trial court properly sentenc ed the a

ppellant. We ag ree with the State.

Appellate r eview of

the leng th, rang e or ma nner of service of a se ntence is de novo. See Tenn. Code An n

. § 4 0 -35-401( d). I n conducting its de novo review , this court considers the following fact o rs : (1) the e vidence , if any , rec eived at the trial and the se ntencing hearing; ( 2) the prese ntence report; (3) the princ iples of sentenc ing and arg uments as to sentenc ing a lternatives; (4)-3-

the nature and cha

rac teristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidenc e and inf ormation offe red by the parties on enhanc ement and mitigating fac tors; ( 6) any statement by the appe llant in his own behalf ; a nd (7) the potential for reha bilitation or trea tment. See Tenn. Co d e A n n

. § § 4 0 -35-102, -103, -210; s ee also State v. Ashby , 823 S.W .2d 166, 168 (Tenn. 1991) . The burde n is on the appellant to demonstrate the impropriet y of his sentenc e. See T enn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-401, Se nte nc ing Com mis sio n Co mme nts . M or e ov e r, if the re c or d r e ve a ls that th e tr ia l cou rt a de qu a te ly considere d sentenc ing principles and all rele vant fa cts and c ircumstance s, this court will accor d the trial court’ s determinations a pr esumption of corr ectne ss. I d. at (d); Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169.

I n B lake ly , th e Sup re me Cou rt he ld that
the “statutory maxi mum” for Appr endi [v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 1 2 0 S

. C t

. 2 3 4 8
, (2 0 0 0 ), ] p u rp o s es i s t h e m ax i m u m s en t en ce a j u d ge may impose solely

on the basis of the f

acts re flec t ed in the jury verdic t or admitted by

the def endant. In other wor ds, the relev ant “statut o ry m axim um” is not the max imum sentence a judge may i m p ose af

ter finding additional fac ts, but the max imum he may imp o s e w i t h o u ta n y

a d d i t i o n a l f

i n d i n g s

. W h e n a

j u d g e i n f

l ic ts punishment that the j ury ’s ver dict alone doe s not allow, the jury has not found all the fa cts “whic h the law make s essent i al t o the p u n i s h m e n t , ” a n d t h e j u d g e e x c e e d s h i s p r o p e r a u t h o r i t y.

Blakely , 542 U.S. at 303-04, 124 S. Ct. at 2537 (citations omitt ed). B lakely did not disput e the appropriateness of a t ri al court’s application of e nhance ment fac tor (2), w hich is based on the exis tence of a de fenda nt’s prior criminal history
, but called into question the constitutionalityof the application of the rema inder of our statutory enhanc ement fac tors without such fac ts being found by

a jury or a dmi tte d b y

a n a pp e lla nt.

Howeve r, in State v. Gomez, 163 S.W .3d 63 2
, 651 n.16 (Tenn. 2005) , petition to rehea r de nie d, (T e nn . M ay 18, 2 00 5) , o ur su pr e me c ou rt

he ld that B lake ly

do e s n ot ann ou nc e a

ne w r ule of l a w a n d th a t th e “ T e n n e s s e e Crim in a l S e n te n c in g Re f o r m A c t d o e s n o t a

u th o r iz e a s e n te n c ing proc ed u re wh i ch viol ates the Six th Amendment rig ht to jury trial.” Pursuant to Gomez, the appellant’ s relianc e on B lakely must fail and we must conc lude that the trial c ourt properly applied enhance m en t fac tor (21). G iven that the trial c ourt found an e nhance ment fac tor applica ble, the appellant c ould not be sentenc ed as a n espec ially mitigated of

fende r.

III. Conclusi on

B a se d u po n th e re c or d a ndthe pa rt ie s’ brie fs , w e a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ NORMA McGEEOGLE, J UDGE