Background to “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions 

in Recent US Elections”: The Analytic Process and Cyber 

Incident Attribution

6 January 2017
1

Background to “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US 

Elections”: The Analytic Process and Cyber Incident Attribution

“Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections” is a declassified version of a highly 

classified assessment that has been provided to the President and to recipients approved by the 

President. 

 The Intelligence Community rarely can publicly reveal the full extent of its knowledge or the precise 

bases for its assessments, as the release of such information would reveal sensitive sources or 

methods and imperil the ability to collect critical foreign intelligence in the future.

 Thus, while the conclusions in the report are all reflected in the classified assessment, the declassified 

report does not and cannot include the full supporting information, including specific intelligence and 

sources and methods.

The Analytic Process

The mission of the Intelligence Community is to seek to reduce the uncertainty surrounding foreign 

activities, capabilities, or leaders’ intentions. This objective is difficult to achieve when seeking to 

understand complex issues on which foreign actors go to extraordinary lengths to hide or obfuscate their 

activities. 

 On these issues of great importance to US national security, the goal of intelligence analysis is to 

provide assessments to decisionmakers that are intellectually rigorous, objective, timely, and useful, 

and that adhere to tradecraft standards. 

 The tradecraft standards for analytic products have been refined over the past ten years. These 

standards include describing sources (including their reliability and access to the information they 

provide), clearly expressing uncertainty, distinguishing between underlying information and analysts’ 

judgments and assumptions, exploring alternatives, demonstrating relevance to the customer, using 

strong and transparent logic, and explaining change or consistency in judgments over time. 

 Applying these standards helps ensure that the Intelligence Community provides US policymakers, 

warfighters, and operators with the best and most accurate insight, warning, and context, as well as 

potential opportunities to advance US national security. 

Intelligence Community analysts integrate information from a wide range of sources, including human 

sources, technical collection, and open source information, and apply specialized skills and structured 

analytic tools to draw inferences informed by the data available, relevant past activity, and logic and 

reasoning to provide insight into what is happening and the prospects for the future. 

 A critical part of the analyst’s task is to explain uncertainties associated with major judgments based 

on the quantity and quality of the source material, information gaps, and the complexity of the issue. 

 When Intelligence Community analysts use words such as “we assess” or “we judge,” they are 

conveying an analytic assessment or judgment. 

 Some analytic judgments are based directly on collected information; others rest on previous 

judgments, which serve as building blocks in rigorous analysis. In either type of judgment, the 

tradecraft standards outlined above ensure that analysts have an appropriate basis for the judgment. 
2

 Intelligence Community judgments often include two important elements: judgments of how likely it 

is that something has happened or will happen (using terms such as “likely” or “unlikely”) and 

confidence levels in those judgments (low, moderate, and high) that refer to the evidentiary basis, 

logic and reasoning, and precedents that underpin the judgments.

Determining Attribution in Cyber Incidents

The nature of cyberspace makes attribution of cyber operations difficult but not impossible. Every kind of 

cyber operation—malicious or not—leaves a trail. US Intelligence Community analysts use this 

information, their constantly growing knowledge base of previous events and known malicious actors, and 

their knowledge of how these malicious actors work and the tools that they use, to attempt to trace these 

operations back to their source. In every case, they apply the same tradecraft standards described in the 

Analytic Process above. 

 Analysts consider a series of questions to assess how the information compares with existing 

knowledge and adjust their confidence in their judgments as appropriate to account for any 

alternative hypotheses and ambiguities.

 An assessment of attribution usually is not a simple statement of who conducted an operation, but 

rather a series of judgments that describe whether it was an isolated incident, who was the likely 

perpetrator, that perpetrator’s possible motivations, and whether a foreign government had a role in 

ordering or leading the operation.
This report is a downgraded version of a more sensitive assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the more sensitive 

assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.

TOP SECRET//HCS-P/SI-G//ORCON/NOFORN/FISA

This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified 

assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.

Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in 

Recent US Elections

ICA 2017-01D | 6 January 2017
This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified 

assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.

This page intentionally left blank.
This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified 

assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.

i

Scope and Sourcing

Information available as of 29 December 2016 was used in the preparation of this product.

Scope 

This report includes an analytic assessment drafted and coordinated among The Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA), The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and The National Security Agency (NSA), which 

draws on intelligence information collected and disseminated by those three agencies. It covers the 

motivation and scope of Moscow’s intentions regarding US elections and Moscow’s use of cyber tools 

and media campaigns to influence US public opinion. The assessment focuses on activities aimed at the 

2016 US presidential election and draws on our understanding of previous Russian influence operations. 

When we use the term “we” it refers to an assessment by all three agencies.

 This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment. This document’s conclusions are 

identical to the highly classified assessment, but this document does not include the full supporting 

information, including specific intelligence on key elements of the influence campaign. Given the 

redactions, we made minor edits purely for readability and flow.

We did not make an assessment of the impact that Russian activities had on the outcome of the 2016 

election. The US Intelligence Community is charged with monitoring and assessing the intentions, 

capabilities, and actions of foreign actors; it does not analyze US political processes or US public opinion. 

 New information continues to emerge, providing increased insight into Russian activities. 

Sourcing

Many of the key judgments in this assessment rely on a body of reporting from multiple sources that are 

consistent with our understanding of Russian behavior. Insights into Russian efforts—including specific 

cyber operations—and Russian views of key US players derive from multiple corroborating sources.

Some of our judgments about Kremlin preferences and intent are drawn from the behavior of Kremlinloyal political figures, state media, and pro-Kremlin social media actors, all of whom the Kremlin either 

directly uses to convey messages or who are answerable to the Kremlin. The Russian leadership invests 

significant resources in both foreign and domestic propaganda and places a premium on transmitting 

what it views as consistent, self-reinforcing narratives regarding its desires and redlines, whether on 

Ukraine, Syria, or relations with the United States.
This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified 

assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.

ii

Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in 

Recent US Elections

ICA 2017-01D

6 January 2017

Key Judgments

Russian efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential election represent the most recent expression 

of Moscow’s longstanding desire to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order, but these 

activities demonstrated a significant escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of effort 

compared to previous operations.

We assess Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US 

presidential election. Russia’s goals were to undermine public faith in the US democratic process, 

denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency. We further assess 

Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump. We 

have high confidence in these judgments.

 We also assess Putin and the Russian Government aspired to help President-elect Trump’s 

election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her 

unfavorably to him. All three agencies agree with this judgment. CIA and FBI have high confidence 

in this judgment; NSA has moderate confidence.

 Moscow’s approach evolved over the course of the campaign based on Russia’s understanding of the 

electoral prospects of the two main candidates. When it appeared to Moscow that Secretary Clinton 

was likely to win the election, the Russian influence campaign began to focus more on undermining 

her future presidency.

 Further information has come to light since Election Day that, when combined with Russian behavior 

since early November 2016, increases our confidence in our assessments of Russian motivations and 

goals.

Moscow’s influence campaign followed a Russian messaging strategy that blends covert 

intelligence operations—such as cyber activity—with overt efforts by Russian Government 

agencies, state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or “trolls.” 

Russia, like its Soviet predecessor, has a history of conducting covert influence campaigns focused on US 

presidential elections that have used intelligence officers and agents and press placements to disparage 

candidates perceived as hostile to the Kremlin.

 Russia’s intelligence services conducted cyber operations against targets associated with the 2016 US 

presidential election, including targets associated with both major US political parties.

 We assess with high confidence that Russian military intelligence (General Staff Main Intelligence 

Directorate or GRU) used the Guccifer 2.0 persona and DCLeaks.com to release US victim data 
This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified 

assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.

iii

obtained in cyber operations publicly and in exclusives to media outlets and relayed material to 

WikiLeaks. 

 Russian intelligence obtained and maintained access to elements of multiple US state or local 

electoral boards. DHS assesses that the types of systems Russian actors targeted or 

compromised were not involved in vote tallying.

 Russia’s state-run propaganda machine contributed to the influence campaign by serving as a 

platform for Kremlin messaging to Russian and international audiences.

We assess Moscow will apply lessons learned from its Putin-ordered campaign aimed at the US 

presidential election to future influence efforts worldwide, including against US allies and their 

election processes.
This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified 

assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.

iv

Contents

Scope and Sourcing

Key Judgments

Contents

i

ii

iv

CIA/FBI/NSA Assessment: Russia’s Influence Campaign Targeting the 

2016 US Presidential Election

Putin Ordered Campaign To Influence US Election

Russian Campaign Was Multifaceted

Influence Effort Was Boldest Yet in the US

Election Operation Signals “New Normal” in Russian Influence Efforts

1

2

5

5

Annexes

A: Russia—Kremlin’s TV Seeks To Influence Politics, Fuel Discontent in US

B: Estimative Language

6

13
This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified 

assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.

Russia’s Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US 

Presidential Election
This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified 

assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.

1

Russia’s Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US 

Presidential Election

Putin Ordered Campaign To Influence US 

Election

We assess with high confidence that Russian 

President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence 

campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential 

election, the consistent goals of which were to 

undermine public faith in the US democratic 

process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her 

electability and potential presidency. We further 

assess Putin and the Russian Government 

developed a clear preference for President-elect 

Trump. When it appeared to Moscow that 

Secretary Clinton was likely to win the election, the

Russian influence campaign then focused on 

undermining her expected presidency. 

 We also assess Putin and the Russian 

Government aspired to help President-elect 

Trump’s election chances when possible by 

discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly 

contrasting her unfavorably to him. All three 

agencies agree with this judgment. CIA and 

FBI have high confidence in this judgment; 

NSA has moderate confidence.

 In trying to influence the US election, we assess 

the Kremlin sought to advance its longstanding 

desire to undermine the US-led liberal 

democratic order, the promotion of which 

Putin and other senior Russian leaders view as 

a threat to Russia and Putin’s regime.

 Putin publicly pointed to the Panama Papers 

disclosure and the Olympic doping scandal as

US-directed efforts to defame Russia, 

suggesting he sought to use disclosures to 

discredit the image of the United States and 

cast it as hypocritical.

 Putin most likely wanted to discredit Secretary 

Clinton because he has publicly blamed her 

since 2011 for inciting mass protests against 

his regime in late 2011 and early 2012, and 

because he holds a grudge for comments he 

almost certainly saw as disparaging him.

We assess Putin, his advisers, and the Russian 

Government developed a clear preference for 

President-elect Trump over Secretary Clinton. 

 Beginning in June, Putin’s public comments 

about the US presidential race avoided directly 

praising President-elect Trump, probably 

because Kremlin officials thought that any 

praise from Putin personally would backfire in 

the United States. Nonetheless, Putin publicly 

indicated a preference for President-elect 

Trump’s stated policy to work with Russia, and 

pro-Kremlin figures spoke highly about what 

they saw as his Russia-friendly positions on 

Syria and Ukraine. Putin publicly contrasted the 

President-elect’s approach to Russia with 

Secretary Clinton’s “aggressive rhetoric.”

 Moscow also saw the election of Presidentelect Trump as a way to achieve an 

international counterterrorism coalition against 

the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). 

 Putin has had many positive experiences 

working with Western political leaders whose 

business interests made them more disposed 

to deal with Russia, such as former Italian 

Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and former 

German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder.

 Putin, Russian officials, and other pro-Kremlin 

pundits stopped publicly criticizing the US 

election process as unfair almost immediately 
This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified 

assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.

2

after the election because Moscow probably 

assessed it would be counterproductive to 

building positive relations. 

We assess the influence campaign aspired to help 

President-elect Trump’s chances of victory when 

possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton and 

publicly contrasting her unfavorably to the 

President-elect. When it appeared to Moscow that 

Secretary Clinton was likely to win the presidency 

the Russian influence campaign focused more on 

undercutting Secretary Clinton’s legitimacy and 

crippling her presidency from its start, including by 

impugning the fairness of the election. 

 Before the election, Russian diplomats had 

publicly denounced the US electoral process 

and were prepared to publicly call into 

question the validity of the results. ProKremlin bloggers had prepared a Twitter 

campaign, #DemocracyRIP, on election night in 

anticipation of Secretary Clinton’s victory, 

judging from their social media activity.

Russian Campaign Was Multifaceted

Moscow’s use of disclosures during the US election 

was unprecedented, but its influence campaign 

otherwise followed a longstanding Russian 

messaging strategy that blends covert intelligence 

operations—such as cyber activity—with overt 

efforts by Russian Government agencies, statefunded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid 

social media users or “trolls.”

 We assess that influence campaigns are 

approved at the highest levels of the Russian 

Government—particularly those that would be 

politically sensitive.

 Moscow’s campaign aimed at the US election 

reflected years of investment in its capabilities,

which Moscow has honed in the former Soviet 

states.

 By their nature, Russian influence campaigns 

are multifaceted and designed to be deniable 

because they use a mix of agents of influence, 

cutouts, front organizations, and false-flag 

operations. Moscow demonstrated this during 

the Ukraine crisis in 2014, when Russia 

deployed forces and advisers to eastern 

Ukraine and denied it publicly.

The Kremlin’s campaign aimed at the US election 

featured disclosures of data obtained through 

Russian cyber operations; intrusions into US state 

and local electoral boards; and overt propaganda. 

Russian intelligence collection both informed and 

enabled the influence campaign.

Cyber Espionage Against US Political 

Organizations. Russia’s intelligence services 

conducted cyber operations against targets 

associated with the 2016 US presidential election, 

including targets associated with both major US 

political parties. 

We assess Russian intelligence services collected 

against the US primary campaigns, think tanks, and 

lobbying groups they viewed as likely to shape 

future US policies. In July 2015, Russian 

intelligence gained access to Democratic National 

Committee (DNC) networks and maintained that 

access until at least June 2016. 

 The General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate 

(GRU) probably began cyber operations aimed 

at the US election by March 2016. We assess 

that the GRU operations resulted in the 

compromise of the personal e-mail accounts of 

Democratic Party officials and political figures. 

By May, the GRU had exfiltrated large volumes 

of data from the DNC.

Public Disclosures of Russian-Collected Data.

We assess with high confidence that the GRU used 

the Guccifer 2.0 persona, DCLeaks.com, and 

WikiLeaks to release US victim data obtained in 
This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified 

assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.

3

cyber operations publicly and in exclusives to 

media outlets. 

 Guccifer 2.0, who claimed to be an 

independent Romanian hacker, made multiple 

contradictory statements and false claims 

about his likely Russian identity throughout the 

election. Press reporting suggests more than 

one person claiming to be Guccifer 2.0 

interacted with journalists. 

 Content that we assess was taken from e-mail 

accounts targeted by the GRU in March 2016 

appeared on DCLeaks.com starting in June. 

We assess with high confidence that the GRU 

relayed material it acquired from the DNC and 

senior Democratic officials to WikiLeaks. Moscow 

most likely chose WikiLeaks because of its selfproclaimed reputation for authenticity. Disclosures 

through WikiLeaks did not contain any evident 

forgeries.

 In early September, Putin said publicly it was 

important the DNC data was exposed to 

WikiLeaks, calling the search for the source of 

the leaks a distraction and denying Russian 

“state-level” involvement.

 The Kremlin’s principal international 

propaganda outlet RT (formerly Russia Today) 

has actively collaborated with WikiLeaks. RT’s 

editor-in-chief visited WikiLeaks founder Julian 

Assange at the Ecuadorian Embassy in London 

in August 2013, where they discussed renewing 

his broadcast contract with RT, according to 

Russian and Western media. Russian media 

subsequently announced that RT had become 

"the only Russian media company" to partner 

with WikiLeaks and had received access to 

"new leaks of secret information." RT routinely 

gives Assange sympathetic coverage and 

provides him a platform to denounce the 

United States.

These election-related disclosures reflect a pattern 

of Russian intelligence using hacked information in 

targeted influence efforts against targets such as 

Olympic athletes and other foreign governments. 

Such efforts have included releasing or altering 

personal data, defacing websites, or releasing emails.

 A prominent target since the 2016 Summer 

Olympics has been the World Anti-Doping 

Agency (WADA), with leaks that we assess to 

have originated with the GRU and that have 

involved data on US athletes. 

Russia collected on some Republican-affiliated 

targets but did not conduct a comparable 

disclosure campaign. 

Russian Cyber Intrusions Into State and Local 

Electoral Boards. Russian intelligence accessed 

elements of multiple state or local electoral boards.

Since early 2014, Russian intelligence has 

researched US electoral processes and related 

technology and equipment. 

 DHS assesses that the types of systems we 

observed Russian actors targeting or 

compromising are not involved in vote tallying. 

Russian Propaganda Efforts. Russia’s state-run 

propaganda machine—comprised of its domestic 

media apparatus, outlets targeting global 

audiences such as RT and Sputnik, and a network 

of quasi-government trolls—contributed to the 

influence campaign by serving as a platform for 

Kremlin messaging to Russian and international 

audiences. State-owned Russian media made 

increasingly favorable comments about Presidentelect Trump as the 2016 US general and primary 

election campaigns progressed while consistently 

offering negative coverage of Secretary Clinton.

 Starting in March 2016, Russian Government–

linked actors began openly supporting 

President-elect Trump’s candidacy in media 
This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified 

assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.

4

aimed at English-speaking audiences. RT and 

Sputnik—another government-funded outlet 

producing pro-Kremlin radio and online 

content in a variety of languages for 

international audiences—consistently cast 

President-elect Trump as the target of unfair 

coverage from traditional US media outlets 

that they claimed were subservient to a corrupt 

political establishment. 

 Russian media hailed President-elect Trump’s 

victory as a vindication of Putin’s advocacy of 

global populist movements—the theme of 

Putin’s annual conference for Western 

academics in October 2016—and the latest 

example of Western liberalism’s collapse.

 Putin’s chief propagandist Dmitriy Kiselev used 

his flagship weekly newsmagazine program 

this fall to cast President-elect Trump as an 

outsider victimized by a corrupt political 

establishment and faulty democratic election 

process that aimed to prevent his election 

because of his desire to work with Moscow.

 Pro-Kremlin proxy Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, leader 

of the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of 

Russia, proclaimed just before the election that 

if President-elect Trump won, Russia would 

“drink champagne” in anticipation of being 

able to advance its positions on Syria and 

Ukraine.

RT’s coverage of Secretary Clinton throughout the 

US presidential campaign was consistently negative 

and focused on her leaked e-mails and accused her 

of corruption, poor physical and mental health, and 

ties to Islamic extremism. Some Russian officials

echoed Russian lines for the influence campaign 

that Secretary Clinton’s election could lead to a war 

between the United States and Russia.

 In August, Kremlin-linked political analysts 

suggested avenging negative Western reports 

on Putin by airing segments devoted to 

Secretary Clinton’s alleged health problems.

 On 6 August, RT published an Englishlanguage video called “Julian Assange Special: 

Do WikiLeaks Have the E-mail That’ll Put 

Clinton in Prison?” and an exclusive interview 

with Assange entitled “Clinton and ISIS Funded 

by the Same Money.” RT’s most popular video 

on Secretary Clinton, “How 100% of the 

Clintons’ ‘Charity’ Went to...Themselves,” had 

more than 9 million views on social media 

platforms. RT’s most popular English language 

video about the President-elect, called “Trump 

Will Not Be Permitted To Win,” featured 

Assange and had 2.2 million views.

 For more on Russia’s past media efforts—

including portraying the 2012 US electoral 

process as undemocratic—please see Annex A: 

Russia—Kremlin's TV Seeks To Influence 

Politics, Fuel Discontent in US.

Russia used trolls as well as RT as part of its 

influence efforts to denigrate Secretary Clinton. 

This effort amplified stories on scandals about 

Secretary Clinton and the role of WikiLeaks in the 

election campaign.

 The likely financier of the so-called Internet 

Research Agency of professional trolls located 

in Saint Petersburg is a close Putin ally with ties 

to Russian intelligence. 

 A journalist who is a leading expert on the 

Internet Research Agency claimed that some 

social media accounts that appear to be tied to 

Russia’s professional trolls—because they 

previously were devoted to supporting Russian 

actions in Ukraine—started to advocate for 

President-elect Trump as early as December 

2015.
This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified 

assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.

5

Influence Effort Was Boldest Yet in the US 

Russia’s effort to influence the 2016 US presidential 

election represented a significant escalation in 

directness, level of activity, and scope of effort 

compared to previous operations aimed at US 

elections. We assess the 2016 influence campaign 

reflected the Kremlin’s recognition of the 

worldwide effects that mass disclosures of US 

Government and other private data—such as those 

conducted by WikiLeaks and others—have 

achieved in recent years, and their understanding 

of the value of orchestrating such disclosures to 

maximize the impact of compromising information. 

 During the Cold War, the Soviet Union used 

intelligence officers, influence agents, forgeries, 

and press placements to disparage candidates 

perceived as hostile to the Kremlin, according 

to a former KGB archivist.

Since the Cold War, Russian intelligence efforts 

related to US elections have primarily focused on 

foreign intelligence collection. For decades, 

Russian and Soviet intelligence services have 

sought to collect insider information from US 

political parties that could help Russian leaders 

understand a new US administration’s plans and 

priorities.

 The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)

Directorate S (Illegals) officers arrested in the 

United States in 2010 reported to Moscow 

about the 2008 election.

 In the 1970s, the KGB recruited a Democratic 

Party activist who reported information about 

then-presidential hopeful Jimmy Carter’s 

campaign and foreign policy plans, according 

to a former KGB archivist.

Election Operation Signals “New Normal” in 

Russian Influence Efforts

We assess Moscow will apply lessons learned from 

its campaign aimed at the US presidential election 

to future influence efforts in the United States and 

worldwide, including against US allies and their 

election processes. We assess the Russian 

intelligence services would have seen their election 

influence campaign as at least a qualified success 

because of their perceived ability to impact public 

discussion.

 Putin’s public views of the disclosures suggest 

the Kremlin and the intelligence services will 

continue to consider using cyber-enabled 

disclosure operations because of their belief 

that these can accomplish Russian goals 

relatively easily without significant damage to 

Russian interests. 

 Russia has sought to influence elections across 

Europe.

We assess Russian intelligence services will 

continue to develop capabilities to provide Putin 

with options to use against the United States, 

judging from past practice and current efforts.

Immediately after Election Day, we assess Russian 

intelligence began a spearphishing campaign 

targeting US Government employees and 

individuals associated with US think tanks and 

NGOs in national security, defense, and foreign 

policy fields. This campaign could provide material 

for future influence efforts as well as foreign 

intelligence collection on the incoming 

administration’s goals and plans.
This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified 

assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.

6

Annex A

Russia -- Kremlin's TV Seeks To Influence Politics, Fuel Discontent in US*

RT America TV, a Kremlin-financed channel operated from within the United States, has substantially 

expanded its repertoire of programming that highlights criticism of alleged US shortcomings in democracy 

and civil liberties. The rapid expansion of RT's operations and budget and recent candid statements by RT's 

leadership point to the channel's importance to the Kremlin as a messaging tool and indicate a Kremlindirected campaign to undermine faith in the US Government and fuel political protest. The Kremlin has 

committed significant resources to expanding the channel's reach, particularly its social media footprint. A 

reliable UK report states that RT recently was the most-watched foreign news channel in the UK. RT 

America has positioned itself as a domestic US channel and has deliberately sought to obscure any legal ties 

to the Russian Government. 

In the runup to the 2012 US presidential election in November, English-language channel RT America --

created and financed by the Russian Government and part of Russian Government-sponsored RT TV (see 

textbox 1) -- intensified its usually critical coverage of the United States. The channel portrayed the US 

electoral process as undemocratic and featured calls by US protesters for the public to rise up and "take 

this government back." 

 RT introduced two new shows -- "Breaking 

the Set" on 4 September and "Truthseeker" 

on 2 November -- both overwhelmingly 

focused on criticism of US and Western 

governments as well as the promotion of 

radical discontent. 

 From August to November 2012, RT ran 

numerous reports on alleged US election 

fraud and voting machine vulnerabilities, 

contending that US election results cannot 

be trusted and do not reflect the popular 

will. 

 In an effort to highlight the alleged "lack of 

democracy" in the United States, RT 

broadcast, hosted, and advertised thirdparty candidate debates and ran reporting supportive of the political agenda of these candidates. 

The RT hosts asserted that the US two-party system does not represent the views of at least one-third 

of the population and is a "sham." 

 

* This annex was originally published on 11 December 2012 by the Open Source Center, now the Open Source 

Enterprise.

Messaging on RT prior to the US presidential election 

(RT, 3 November)
This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified 

assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.

7

 RT aired a documentary about the Occupy 

Wall Street movement on 1, 2, and 

4 November. RT framed the movement as a 

fight against "the ruling class" and described 

the current US political system as corrupt and 

dominated by corporations. RT advertising 

for the documentary featured Occupy 

movement calls to "take back" the 

government. The documentary claimed that 

the US system cannot be changed 

democratically, but only through "revolution." 

After the 6 November US presidential 

election, RT aired a documentary called 

"Cultures of Protest," about active and often 

violent political resistance (RT, 1-

10 November).

RT Conducts Strategic Messaging for Russian Government

RT's criticism of the US election was the latest facet of its broader and longer-standing anti-US messaging 

likely aimed at undermining viewers' trust in US democratic procedures and undercutting US criticism of 

Russia's political system. RT Editor in Chief Margarita Simonyan recently declared that the United States 

itself lacks democracy and that it has "no moral right to teach the rest of the world" (Kommersant, 

6 November).

 Simonyan has characterized RT's coverage of 

the Occupy Wall Street movement as 

"information warfare" that is aimed at 

promoting popular dissatisfaction with the US 

Government. RT created a Facebook app to 

connect Occupy Wall Street protesters via 

social media. In addition, RT featured its own 

hosts in Occupy rallies ("Minaev Live," 10 April; 

RT, 2, 12 June). 

 RT's reports often characterize the United 

States as a "surveillance state" and allege 

widespread infringements of civil liberties, 

police brutality, and drone use (RT, 24, 

28 October, 1-10 November). 

 RT has also focused on criticism of the US 

economic system, US currency policy, alleged 

Wall Street greed, and the US national debt. Some of RT's hosts have compared the United States to 

Imperial Rome and have predicted that government corruption and "corporate greed" will lead to US 

financial collapse (RT, 31 October, 4 November). 

RT new show "Truthseeker" (RT, 11 November) 

Simonyan steps over the White House in the 

introduction from her short-lived domestic show 

on REN TV (REN TV, 26 December 2011) 
This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified 

assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.

8

RT broadcasts support for other Russian interests in areas such as foreign and energy policy.

 RT runs anti-fracking programming, 

highlighting environmental issues and the 

impacts on public health. This is likely 

reflective of the Russian Government's 

concern about the impact of fracking and 

US natural gas production on the global 

energy market and the potential challenges 

to Gazprom's profitability (5 October).

 RT is a leading media voice opposing 

Western intervention in the Syrian conflict 

and blaming the West for waging 

"information wars" against the Syrian 

Government (RT, 10 October-9 November). 

 In an earlier example of RT's messaging in 

support of the Russian Government, during the Georgia-Russia military conflict the channel accused 

Georgians of killing civilians and organizing a genocide of the Ossetian people. According to 

Simonyan, when "the Ministry of Defense was at war with Georgia," RT was "waging an information 

war against the entire Western world" (Kommersant, 11 July).

In recent interviews, RT's leadership has candidly acknowledged its mission to expand its US audience and 

to expose it to Kremlin messaging. However, the leadership rejected claims that RT interferes in US 

domestic affairs. 

 Simonyan claimed in popular arts magazine Afisha on 3 October: "It is important to have a channel 

that people get used to, and then, when needed, you show them what you need to show. In some 

sense, not having our own foreign broadcasting is the same as not having a ministry of defense. 

When there is no war, it looks like we don't need it. However, when there is a war, it is critical."

 According to Simonyan, "the word 'propaganda' has a very negative connotation, but indeed, there is 

not a single international foreign TV channel that is doing something other than promotion of the 

values of the country that it is broadcasting from." She added that "when Russia is at war, we are, of 

course, on Russia's side" (Afisha, 3 October; Kommersant, 4 July). 

 TV-Novosti director Nikolov said on 4 October to the Association of Cable Television that RT builds on 

worldwide demand for "an alternative view of the entire world." Simonyan asserted on 3 October in 

Afisha that RT's goal is "to make an alternative channel that shares information unavailable elsewhere" 

in order to "conquer the audience" and expose it to Russian state messaging (Afisha, 3 October; 

Kommersant, 4 July). 

 On 26 May, Simonyan tweeted with irony: "Ambassador McFaul hints that our channel is interference 

with US domestic affairs. And we, sinful souls, were thinking that it is freedom of speech."

RT anti-fracking reporting (RT, 5 October) 
This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified 

assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.

9

RT Leadership Closely Tied to, Controlled by Kremlin

RT Editor in Chief Margarita Simonyan has close ties to top Russian Government officials, especially 

Presidential Administration Deputy Chief of Staff Aleksey Gromov, who reportedly manages political TV 

coverage in Russia and is one of the founders of RT.

 Simonyan has claimed that Gromov 

shielded her from other officials and their 

requests to air certain reports. Russian 

media consider Simonyan to be Gromov's 

protege (Kommersant, 4 July; Dozhd TV, 

11 July). 

 Simonyan replaced Gromov on stateowned Channel One's Board of Directors. 

Government officials, including Gromov 

and Putin's Press Secretary Peskov were 

involved in creating RT and appointing 

Simonyan (Afisha, 3 October).

 According to Simonyan, Gromov oversees 

political coverage on TV, and he has 

periodic meetings with media managers 

where he shares classified information 

and discusses their coverage plans. Some 

opposition journalists, including Andrey 

Loshak, claim that he also ordered media 

attacks on opposition figures 

(Kommersant, 11 July).

The Kremlin staffs RT and closely supervises 

RT's coverage, recruiting people who can 

convey Russian strategic messaging because of their ideological beliefs.

 The head of RT's Arabic-language service, Aydar Aganin, was rotated from the diplomatic service to 

manage RT's Arabic-language expansion, suggesting a close relationship between RT and Russia's 

foreign policy apparatus. RT's London Bureau is managed by Darya Pushkova, the daughter of 

Aleksey Pushkov, the current chair of the Duma Russian Foreign Affairs Committee and a former 

Gorbachev speechwriter (DXB, 26 March 2009; MK.ru, 13 March 2006). 

 According to Simonyan, the Russian Government sets rating and viewership requirements for RT and, 

"since RT receives budget from the state, it must complete tasks given by the state." According to 

Nikolov, RT news stories are written and edited "to become news" exclusively in RT's Moscow office 

(Dozhd TV, 11 July; AKT, 4 October). 

 In her interview with pro-Kremlin journalist Sergey Minaev, Simonyan complimented RT staff in the 

United States for passionately defending Russian positions on the air and in social media. Simonyan 

said: "I wish you could see...how these guys, not just on air, but on their own social networks, Twitter, 

and when giving interviews, how they defend the positions that we stand on!" ("Minaev Live," 

10 April).

Simonyan shows RT facilities to then Prime Minister 

Putin. Simonyan was on Putin's 2012 presidential 

election campaign staff in Moscow (Rospress, 22 

September 2010, Ria Novosti, 25 October 2012). 
This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified 

assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.

10

RT Focuses on Social Media, Building Audience

RT aggressively advertises its social media accounts and has a significant and fast-growing social media 

footprint. In line with its efforts to present itself as anti-mainstream and to provide viewers alternative

news content, RT is making its social media operations a top priority, both to avoid broadcast TV 

regulations and to expand its overall audience. 

 According to RT management, RT's website receives at least 500,000 unique viewers every day. Since 

its inception in 2005, RT videos received more than 800 million views on YouTube (1 million views per 

day), which is the highest among news outlets (see graphics for comparison with other news 

channels) (AKT, 4 October).

 According to Simonyan, the TV audience worldwide is losing trust in traditional TV broadcasts and 

stations, while the popularity of "alternative channels" like RT or Al Jazeera grows. RT markets itself as 

an "alternative channel" that is available via the Internet everywhere in the world, and it encourages 

interaction and social networking (Kommersant, 29 September). 

 According to Simonyan, RT uses social media to expand the reach of its political reporting and uses 

well-trained people to monitor public opinion in social media commentaries (Kommersant, 

29 September).

 According to Nikolov, RT requires its hosts to have social media accounts, in part because social 

media allows the distribution of content that would not be allowed on television (Newreporter.org, 

11 October). 

 Simonyan claimed in her 3 October interview to independent TV channel Dozhd that Occupy Wall 

Street coverage gave RT a significant audience boost.

The Kremlin spends $190 million a year on the distribution and dissemination of RT programming, 

focusing on hotels and satellite, terrestrial, and cable broadcasting. The Kremlin is rapidly expanding RT's 

availability around the world and giving it a reach comparable to channels such as Al Jazeera English. 

According to Simonyan, the United Kingdom and the United States are RT's most successful markets. RT 

does not, however, publish audience information. 

 According to market research company Nielsen, RT had the most rapid growth (40 percent) among all 

international news channels in the United States over the past year (2012). Its audience in New York 

tripled and in Washington DC grew by 60% (Kommersant, 4 July).

 RT claims that it is surpassing Al Jazeera in viewership in New York and Washington DC (BARB, 

20 November; RT, 21 November). 

 RT states on its website that it can reach more than 550 million people worldwide and 85 million 

people in the United States; however, it does not publicize its actual US audience numbers (RT, 

10 December).
This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified 

assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.

11
This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified 

assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.

12

Formal Disassociation From Kremlin Facilitates RT US Messaging

RT America formally disassociates itself from the Russian Government by using a Moscow-based 

autonomous nonprofit organization to finance its US operations. According to RT's leadership, this 

structure was set up to avoid the Foreign Agents Registration Act and to facilitate licensing abroad. In 

addition, RT rebranded itself in 2008 to deemphasize its Russian origin.

 According to Simonyan, RT America differs from other Russian state institutions in terms of 

ownership, but not in terms of financing. To disassociate RT from the Russian Government, the 

federal news agency RIA Novosti established a subsidiary autonomous nonprofit organization, TVNovosti, using the formal independence of this company to establish and finance RT worldwide 

(Dozhd TV, 11 July).

 Nikolov claimed that RT is an "autonomous noncommercial entity," which is "well received by foreign 

regulators" and "simplifies getting a license." Simonyan said that RT America is not a "foreign agent" 

according to US law because it uses a US commercial organization for its broadcasts (AKT, 4 October; 

Dozhd TV, 11 July). 

 Simonyan observed that RT's original Russia-centric news reporting did not generate sufficient 

audience, so RT switched to covering international and US domestic affairs and removed the words 

"Russia Today" from the logo "to stop scaring away the audience" (Afisha, 18 October; Kommersant, 

4 July). 

 RT hires or makes contractual agreements with Westerners with views that fit its agenda and airs them 

on RT. Simonyan said on the pro-Kremlin show "Minaev Live" on 10 April that RT has enough 

audience and money to be able to choose its hosts, and it chooses the hosts that "think like us," "are 

interested in working in the anti-mainstream," and defend RT's beliefs on social media. Some hosts 

and journalists do not present themselves as associated with RT when interviewing people, and many 

of them have affiliations to other media and activist organizations in the United States ("Minaev Live," 

10 April).
This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified 

assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.

13

Annex B
This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified 

assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.

14

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This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment; its conclusions are identical to those in the highly classified 

assessment but this version does not include the full supporting information on key elements of the influence campaign.