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S. HRG. 111–821 

THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INDEPENDENT REVIEW RELATING TO FORT HOOD 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

JANUARY 21, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

JOSEPH W. BOWAB, Republican Staff Director 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

INDEPENDENT REVIEW RELATING TO FORT HOOD

JANUARY 21, 2010

Page 

West, Hon. Togo D., Jr., Co-Chair, Department of Defense Independent Review Relating to Fort Hood ................................................................................. 5 

Clark, ADM Vernon E., USN [Ret.], Co-Chair, Department of Defense Independent Review Relating to Fort Hood .............................................................. 8 

[Annex: The Report of the DOD Independent Review ‘‘Protecting the Force: 

Lessons from Fort Hood’’ follows:] ...................................................................... 46 

(III) 

(1) 

THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF 

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INDEPENDENT REVIEW RELATING TO FORT 

HOOD 

THURSDAY, JANUARY 21, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to the notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room 

SD–G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin 

(chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 

Akaka, E. Benjamin Nelson, Hagan, Burris, Kirk, McCain, Inhofe, 

Chambliss, Thune, LeMieux, Burr, and Collins. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Gabriella Eisen, counsel; Jessica 

L. Kingston, research assistant; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter 

K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Diana G. Tabler, professional 

staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Paul J. Hubbard, and 

Jennifer R. Knowles. 

Committee members’ assistants present: James Tuite, assistant 

to Senator Byrd; Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator Lieberman; 

Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Juliet M. Beyler and Gordon I. Peterson, assistants to Senator 

Webb; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Roosevelt Barfield, assistant to Senator 

Begich; Nathan Davern, assistant to Senator Burris; Ron Carlton, 

assistant to Senator Kirk; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; 

Adam G. Brake, assistant to Senator Graham; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; and Molly Wilkinson, assistant to Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee 

meets this morning to consider the findings and recommendations 

of the independent panel appointed by the Secretary of Defense folVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:03 Jan 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63686.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
2 

lowing the tragedy at Fort Hood. The primary objective of the 

panel was to ‘‘determine whether there are programs, policies, or 

procedural weaknesses within the Department of Defense (DOD) 

that create vulnerabilities to the health and safety of defense employees and their families.’’ 

Today’s open hearing is on the panel’s unrestricted report. A restricted annex to their report titled ‘‘Oversight of the Alleged Perpetrator,’’ focuses on information which in the judgment of DOD 

could prejudice a criminal prosecution if it were discussed in public. 

We’ll have a closed session after this open hearing has concluded. 

Our witnesses this morning are Togo West, former Secretary of 

the Army, and Admiral Vernon Clark, U.S. Navy-Retired, former 

Chief of Naval Operations, who together co-chaired this independent review. We have reviewed their unrestricted report. Members have had an opportunity to review the restricted annex. We 

welcome you both. We thank you for returning to government service for this very important task. It’s a continuation of your great 

patriotism and loyalty. 

On the afternoon of November 5, 2009, an Army field-grade officer, Major Nidal Hassan, opened fire on fellow soldiers in the Soldier Readiness Center at Fort Hood, TX, killing 12 soldiers, 1 civilian, and wounding or injuring 43 others. There is information in 

the public domain indicating that this tragic and violent incident 

was preceded by a number of indicators that would seemingly raise 

questions about Major Hassan’s fitness to serve as an officer and 

Army psychiatrist. Some of those indicators were email contact 

with a radical Muslim cleric in Yemen, concerns about his expressed belief that sharia religious law took precedence over the 

U.S. Constitution, presentations that he made that for some of the 

witnesses indicated sympathy for violence, and concerns expressed 

by superiors and peers about his duty performance and his ratings. 

So there’s a connect-the-dots issue here. There are a number of 

other investigations that will examine the failure to connect those 

dots. That is not part of today’s open hearing. DOD’s inquiry is one 

of several inquiries that are or will be examining the incident. The 

President has directed a review of intelligence matters related to 

the shooting, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is conducting a review of its procedures, and a military justice investigation is ongoing. 

The review that we will consider today was a first assessment of 

the Department’s policies and procedures to identify gaps that warrant further investigation and action. Clearly there is much more 

that needs to be done. The Secretary of Defense has committed to 

tasking each Service and pertinent DOD agencies to conduct an indepth follow-on review based on the findings of this report. 

The Secretary of Defense gave this independent panel less than 

60 days to conduct a quick-look review ‘‘to identify and address possible gaps and/or deficiencies in DOD’s programs, processes, and 

procedures related to identifying DOD employees who could potentially pose credible threats to themselves or others, the sufficiency 

of DOD’s force protection programs, the sufficiency of DOD’s emergency response to mass casualty situations at DOD’s facilities, and 

the response to care for victims and families in the aftermath of a 

mass casualty situation, and, finally, the execution and adequacy 

3 

of Army programs, policies, and procedures as applied to the alleged perpetrator.’’ 

The panel completed its work and delivered its report to the Secretary of Defense on time, and that is remarkable, given the short 

period of time over the holidays that the panel was given for this 

task. This could only be done under the strong leadership of our 

witnesses, who co-chaired the independent panel. 

A copy of the report of the DOD Independent Review titled: ‘‘Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood,’’ will be included in the 

record of this hearing. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[See Annex.] 

Chairman LEVIN. The independent panel made a total of 42 findings with associated recommendations in the basic report, with an 

additional 12 findings in the restricted annex. The panel gives Fort 

Hood high marks for a quick and effective response to this incident, 

while recognizing that DOD can and should do more to prepare for 

multiple simultaneous incidents in the future. 

The panel found that some programs, policies, processes, and 

procedures were adequate, but were not complied with, and other 

policies are in need of revision to give commanders the tools that 

they need to counter internal threats as well as new threats that 

may manifest themselves in the future. 

The report produced by this independent panel gives DOD a 

blueprint for additional reviews and resulting policy changes. For 

instance, the Department will need to evaluate and update policies 

and procedures for identification of indicators of violence, clarify 

policy regarding religious accommodation, review and improve military personnel records, and refocus defense force protection programs on internal threats. 

This committee has a continuing interest in the findings, recommendations, and changes made based on these reviews. It will 

continue its oversight of DOD actions, and I assume this will be 

the first of a number of hearings into this incident, how it could 

have been avoided and how we can deter similar tragedies in the 

future. 

Before I close, I want to commend the soldiers, the first responders, the law enforcement personnel, and the health care providers 

for their prompt, professional, courageous acts that prevented an 

even greater loss of life as a result of this horrendous act. 

I would also like to insert for the record Senator Burris’ statement. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Burris follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR ROLAND W. BURRIS

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome Secretary West and Admiral Clark. I am 

again pleased with both of your taking on this most important effort to look at the 

lessons learned as a result of the tragedy at Fort Hood. The Nation, and more importantly, the families, are looking to all of us to make sense of this situation and 

provide them with answers and solutions to ensure that this type of incident does 

not occur in the future. The members of our military have performed, and will continue to perform, their duties with honor and integrity, and it is incumbent upon 

us to provide them the guidance and oversight that they deserve. 

I thank you for your testimony and your service to the Nation. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator McCain. 

4 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I join you in 

welcoming Secretary West and Admiral Clark, and I thank them 

for their continued service to their country, and I thank them and 

their staff for their work in conducting this independent examination of the tragic events last year at Fort Hood. 

I agree with the statement in your report that ‘‘the events of November 5, 2009, are first and foremost a tragedy for all involved; 

families, colleagues, and the Nation.’’ My thoughts and prayers continue for the families and friends of the victims of this terrible 

tragedy. 

I appreciate that DOD initiated this review to scrutinize itself 

with regards to organizational shortcomings that led to the horrific 

killings of 12 servicemembers, 1 Army civilian, and the wounding 

of 43 others. However, most of your report is devoted to personnel 

policies and emergency shooting response procedures. The report 

concentrates on actions and effects, rather than the motivations. 

But it was motives that led to the Fort Hood killings that should 

have been examined, whatever the political correctness implications. The panel’s effort to assist DOD and the American people to 

understand the threat to national security and to our military personnel was undermined as a result. 

We have a profound responsibility to try to prevent harm to all 

Americans, especially those who volunteer for service in the Armed 

Forces and have, as a result, become high-value targets for our enemies. I find insufficient information in this report to advance the 

identification and elimination of this threat. 

The omission in your report of adequately recognizing and addressing the specific threats posed by violent extremism to our 

military servicemembers is troubling. We owe it to our servicemembers and their families to be very candid in addressing the 

threat of violence driven by violent Islamic extremism. 

I believe General Jack Keane, the former Vice Chief of Staff of 

the Army, made the point clearly in his testimony on November 19, 

2009, when he said that: ‘‘We need to provide a service to all Muslims serving in the Armed Forces by clearly describing the threat, 

explaining the indicators of potential problems, and obliging all 

military personnel to report individuals who display these beliefs 

and actions.’’ 

I believe the information you have compiled in the restricted 

annex to this report regarding failures in the performance of officers who supervised Major Hassan during his medical education 

will help to ensure accountability and corrective measures. Much of 

this information, not surprisingly, has been leaked to the media 

and it portrays a system badly in need of reevaluation and reform. 

I expect the Secretary of the Army to move quickly to ensure accountability for the shortcomings you identified and to demand 

more from our officers and organizations. They should have the 

courage and integrity to identify substandard officers who represent potential threats to those around them. I hope you can comment today on what we can expect in this regard. 

I also believe that your findings and recommendations will have 

value in prodding DOD and the Services to take on the challenge 

of identifying the legal and regulatory barriers to information-sharVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:03 Jan 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63686.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
5 

ing called for in the report. There is an array of concerns that must 

be addressed in this regard. Concerns about individual privacy, 

threat of litigation, equal opportunity violations, First Amendment 

rights, medical privacy, including stigma from seeking treatment, 

and abuse of authority are just a few. They represent a Gordian 

Knot that has to be cut. 

What happened at Fort Hood was something more than an isolated incident, more than a random act of violence by an alleged 

perpetrator. It was a terrorist act, struck against us as part of the 

broader war in which we are now engaged. Without focusing on the 

threat posed today by violent Islamic extremism to our military 

and their families, we can’t address those vulnerabilities and correct them. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. 

Now let me call on you, Secretary West. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TOGO D. WEST, JR., CO-CHAIR, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INDEPENDENT REVIEW RELATING TO 

FORT HOOD 

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the committee, for the opportunity to testify 

before you on this important matter. I wonder if I might do one or 

two quick housekeeping things. You have from us our written opening statement. It is a joint statement by both Admiral Clark and 

by me, and we would ask you to include that in the record. 

Chairman LEVIN. It will be. 

Mr. WEST. With that, we will give a few comments, a bit of a 

roadmap to what’s in our report, although we’re aware that you 

have had a chance to look through it. I will do the first group and 

then, if you will permit, Admiral Clark will take up from there. 

Chairman LEVIN. That would be fine. Thank you. 

Mr. WEST. As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, and you also, Senator McCain, that day—November 5, 2009—was a day of tragedy, 

and we will all remember it as such. Out of that tragedy, there are 

some instructive lessons for us, and those are what we address in 

our report. 

As you pointed out, Secretary Gates was specific in what he 

asked us to do, contained both in a memorandum to us in his terms 

of reference and in his statement at his press conference. That is 

important to us because it bounds our undertaking, as did the time 

within which we were asked to complete our work, and also as did 

the fact that he had already indicated his intention to have a 

lengthier, more in-depth follow-on review of both our report and 

the issues that we raise by the Services. He has already begun the 

process of referring the report out for their follow-on activities. 

As you pointed out, we were asked to look at personnel policies, 

specifically those that pertain to our ability to make identifications 

of those who are a risk, a danger to their fellows in the Service, 

to look at how those policies, practices, and procedures allow us to 

deal with, after we have identified those threats, and look at the 

ways in which there are gaps or deficiencies—his language—that 

we need to improve upon going forward. 

6 

He also asked us to look at force protection measures with the 

same idea, not just in the Army, but across the board in DOD, and 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) procedures and regulations at the level of every Service. 

Third, to look at our preparations and our policies concerning 

preparations for mass casualty events and for responding to them. 

Finally in that group of four, to look at how we provide for the 

support of those who provide needed medical care to those who 

serve. 

The fifth assignment that he gave us was a very specifically stated one and it’s in one of the annexes to our report, and that is this: 

to examine the Army’s application of its procedures and policies to 

the alleged perpetrator. I make that distinction because he did not 

ask us to go and explain what happened, although it certainly, I 

think, would appear to all of us, you and we as well, that without 

an understanding of what happened we certainly couldn’t understand how the Army applied its policy. But our purpose, our direction, was to understand the Army’s application of its policies and 

procedures to the perpetrator. That is what is contained in our 

annex 5. 

I should say to you as part of an understanding of how we organized and prepared for this that that was, in our view, going to be 

simply chapter 5 of a report that we would submit to you today for 

review. After review, departmental lawyers concluded, and I think 

they concluded properly, that there was a great risk of interfering 

with the military justice, the criminal proceeding, and that is why 

it is submitted to you as a restricted annex. 

With that in mind, we were told not to interfere with the intelligence investigation that had proceeded, nor with the military justice, nor with the ongoing parallel FBI review, and we’ve made an 

attempt not to do so. What we did do was to organize ourselves 

into five teams, supported by personnel whom we requested and 

were assigned to us from the military departments and from OSD. 

Each of these teams looked into the specific areas that we have described in the report, submitted their report of their activities to 

us, and Admiral Clark and I and those who worked directly with 

us, took responsibility for reviewing and stating our conclusions 

and our views with respect to that. 

Our personal views are found throughout the report, but they are 

specifically called out in the executive summary, which you note we 

took the step of signing ourselves so that you would know that the 

words of the executive summary come from us, including those five 

or six recommendations that are for specific early action by the 

Secretary of Defense. Let me report that he has already taken 

some of those actions as we speak. 

We also had a board of advisers drawn from the senior ranks of 

the Department, the military ranks, whose purpose was not to lead 

a team, although two of them were team leaders, but merely to review as we went and provide an overall perspective of what we 

were looking at and how we were stating it and how it would affect 

real progress for the Department in terms of responding to what 

had happened. Their help to us was invaluable, because when you 

think about it, otherwise the Admiral had himself and me to 

7 

bounce these things bounce and forth, to discuss. The board of advisers gave us an additional group with the same broad range. 

A word or two at this point from both Admiral Clark and me 

about the actual landscape of the report. What you have before you 

has five chapters with an executive summary at the front and with 

some annexes. The first chapter is a very brief, one-page synopsis 

that we thought we could state in a public report, that is much 

more dealt with in detail in the annex, and that is about the alleged perpetrator. 

Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 are the bulk of what the Secretary asked 

us to look at. I call your attention to chapter 2, which is about the 

personnel policies, which is divided into three sections, one having 

to do with how we identify the kinds of things that can lead a person to become a danger to his or her colleagues. A second part of 

it has to do with sharing that information, getting it to the right 

place. I point out to you that in our finding 2.2 in that report we 

acknowledge a specific difficulty and that is the fact that information that is obtained in one place does not always go forward with 

a servicemember to successive assignments, thus making it difficult 

for commanders to know exactly what they’re dealing with. The 

third section in chapter 2 has to do with barriers to action. 

Three observations before I ask your permission to have Admiral 

Clark take on the description to you of other parts of the report. 

The first is this: There can never be too much preparation. In some 

ways, we could say that no matter how much preparation you’ve 

done there is more that could be done. At Fort Hood, the leaders 

had anticipated mass casualty events in their emergency response 

plans, and it showed in their responses. As you have acknowledged, 

Mr. Chairman, and as also did Senator McCain, the response was 

prompt. Within 2 minutes and 40 seconds of the first 9–1–1 call, 

first responders were on the scene of the shooting, and by first responders I mean elements of the Fort Hood security forces. Within 

a minute and a half after that, the assailant had been taken down, 

and within 2 minutes and 50 seconds after that two ambulances 

and an incident command vehicle from the post hospital had arrived to begin to dispense needed medical care. 

Lives were saved. Yet, as you have pointed out, 13 people died 

and scores others, 43, were wounded. We must prepare better, plan 

more intensively, and take the hard effort to look around the corners of our future to try and anticipate the next potential incident. 

Second, we must be attentive to today’s hazards. Today the requirement that is imposed upon us in DOD is to understand the 

forces that cause an individual to radicalize, to commit violent acts, 

and thereby to make us vulnerable from within. 

Finally, the thread through all of this is violence, how do we detect the indicators of violence, how do we share the information 

about those indicators, and then whether we have the foresight to 

act. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and with your permission Admiral 

Clark will take it from here. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Mr. West. 

Admiral. 

8 

STATEMENT OF ADM VERNON E. CLARK, USN [RET.], COCHAIR, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INDEPENDENT REVIEW 

RELATING TO FORT HOOD 

Admiral CLARK. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the 

opportunity to be with you today to talk about the work of Secretary West and myself and the group of people who worked with 

us in this effort. 

Let me make a few comments and get right to the questions. I 

know that you have questions for us, so first let me talk about force 

protection for a moment. The principal message of our review with 

regard to force protection is simply this: There are lots of policies 

on force protection inside DOD. Since September 11, we have built 

many barriers. However, existing policies simply are not optimized 

to deal with the insider threat, the evolving threat that we see 

today—and when people talk about the new threat, we’re talking 

about the insider threat. 

Now, complicating the entire force protection challenge is the diverse nature of the way DOD has evolved since September 11, 

2001. So one of our recommendations to the Secretary was that you 

have to look at the organization itself. On page 25 of the base report, you find a description of the various Under Secretaries and 

Assistant Secretaries of Defense that are charged with responsibilities for working the force protection challenge. Synchronization is 

difficult and, simply stated, no senior DOD official is assigned overall responsibility for synchronizing this policy. 

Notice, I’m not saying that one person should have all that responsibility. Neither is Secretary West. We were careful not to define the specific organization for the Secretary of Defense. Our observation is synchronization is pretty difficult the way it’s set up, 

the way it is today, and we recommend that it be looked at. The 

key point, too, is that there has to be a mechanism in place to do 

this integration, and that’s our recommendation. 

Second, the task of identifying employees who potentially could 

threaten the workforce—and I ask us to remember that the Secretary asked us to look at violence. So the question is, how do we 

identify individuals who have the potential for violent behavior. 

Certainly in our research we found that detecting a trusted insider’s intention to commit a violent act requires observation skills 

that may not be in place. This is the evolving threat. 

So there’s a requirement to understand behavioral cues and 

anomalies that would alert commanders and supervisors to know 

that such a threat exists. While DOD focuses very effectively on 

many things, there is insufficient knowledge and guidance concerning who this insider threat is: Who are these people? There is 

insufficient guidance on workplace violence and, most importantly, 

how to identify the person who has the potential to self-radicalize. 

In our view it is simply insufficient. 

The key word here is ‘‘violence.’’ Now, since our report has come 

out some have criticized us for not suggesting and talking enough 

about violent Islamic extremism. When we talk about selfradicalization, and the term appears numerous times in our report, 

we’re talking about the behaviors that create and lead to violence. 

That’s what we’re talking about. The lack of clarity for comprehensive indicators limits the commanders’ and supervisors’ ability to 

9 

recognize the potential threats. Fixing this issue will be critical to 

solving this problem in the future. 

DOD policy on prohibited activities—and I have the instruction 

here with me that talks specifically about what prohibited activities are inside the Department—this instruction in our view is too 

limited and it only addresses active and very visible participation 

in groups that may pose threats to good order and discipline inside 

the ranks. 

So we found that this lack of clarity for comprehensive indicators 

which limit commanders’ and supervisors’ ability to recognize the 

potential threats—we’re talking about people who could hurt themselves. The Secretary of Defense cited specifically, people could 

hurt themselves, for example the issue of suicide, criminal and 

gang behavior, people that are advocating supremist doctrine, family violence, evolving threats like self-radicalization—identifying 

these key indicators is critical to focusing the force on the threat. 

Let’s talk about information sharing. Secretary West addressed 

it also and let me just make a couple of points. The policies governing information exchange inside the Department and in the 

intergovernment system, in our view the policies are deficient. 

They do not support detection and mitigation of the internal threat. 

DOD and Service guidance does not provide for maintaining and 

transferring relevant information from one duty station to the 

other. Now, remember we’re doing phase one of this. As you talked 

about, Mr. Chairman, we did this review in a hurry. That’s what 

the Secretary of Defense wanted us to do. Thousands of pages of 

review, but put the spotlight on the things that the Services can 

fix in a hurry. It is our view that this internal information exchange has to be examined. 

In other words, how can commanders connect the dots if they 

don’t have some information that’s maintained at a local level and 

hasn’t transferred from one command to another. I will tell you 

that automated systems inside the Services do not allow them to 

share information on, for example, registered users and persons 

who routinely come and go from a base and may become a threat. 

So the issue of maintaining and transferring all of the relevant 

information, information that could lead to the identification of contributing factors, that’s the issue. 

Last Friday, the Secretary of Defense, in his press conference, 

stood and addressed his observations about our report. One of the 

things that I was happy to see him address was his comment that 

Secretary West and I are of the view that we have to become more 

adaptable and certainly we have to be proactive, but we have to be 

able to adapt rapidly to this changing security environment, bringing a wide and continuously evolving range of tools, techniques, 

and programs into play. 

I just want to emphasize that there’s no single-point solution for 

this evolving threat. We have to keep working at it. We need architectures and structures in place that will make that possible. 

One other point about information sharing. Certainly robust information sharing is essential. Hand in glove with that information 

sharing is the required command and control apparatus, be it systems, policy, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures, to convert this information into timely decisions and actions. 

10 

The bottom line, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: We 

have to remove the barriers, all of the barriers. We have to equip 

and enable the commanders, people in decisionmaking positions, 

their ability—Mr. Chairman, you used the phrase—to connect the 

dots. We have to get the information and thus the indicators to the 

appropriate level of people in command. 

Just a couple of comments about emergency response. Secretary 

West addressed this. Mr. Chairman, you also certainly did justice 

to the brilliance of the people at Fort Hood and their actions. Lots 

of good news related to the emergency response. 

Mr. Chairman and members, I just wanted to try to put this in 

perspective. I committed my life in service for 37 years. I created 

in those 37 years a number of lessons learned myself, and I heard 

dozens of lessons-learned reports. On the second day that our team 

was in existence, Secretary West and I got on a plane with a few 

members of our team and we went to Fort Hood. We walked the 

ground and they showed us the space where all of this happened 

and looked at the terrain. Then we sat down with General Kohn 

and his command team and they gave us this presentation that 

had been turned in a matter of a few days, their lessons learned. 

I want to tell you that I was really impressed. 

So I heard a lot of them in my 37 years and I want you to know 

that I never ever heard a better one than I heard at Fort Hood that 

day. The base personnel were ready to respond. They had trained 

at this, they had worked at it. Secretary West talked about the 

timeline response to the active shooter. It was brilliant. 

All of that said, it still could have been better, and in our review 

we found areas where it could be better. In their own lessons 

learned they identified areas where it could be better. I spoke in 

the last subject about the command and control system. They need 

a better system. General Kohn had to deal with misinformation, 

and should anybody be surprised? I don’t think so. There’s never 

been a crisis ever that there wasn’t misinformation. Being able to 

deal with it in a rapid way and being able to deal with a potential 

multiple event, Mr. Chairman, as you indicated, is critical. 

Fundamentally we believe that we can improve by providing a 

well-integrated means to gather and evaluate and disseminate the 

wide range of information that will make it possible for commanders to perform to the maximum. 

This report is about focusing on better tools for commanders. 

This report is about focusing on violence prevention, in whatever 

form that violence manifests itself. This report is about adapting 

and evolving to rapid change, sharing information, connecting the 

dots, and exercising against the most stressing and pressing scenarios that we know how to present, so that we satisfy ourselves 

that we are able to perform to the standards that we have identified ourselves. 

I want to close by just acknowledging my alignment with all the 

comments that have been made about the people at Fort Hood, the 

families that have suffered loss, and just say that the thrust of our 

work has been to do everything that we know how to do to identify 

policies, procedures, practices, and programs that can be made better, so that the U.S. Armed Forces continue to be the outstanding 

force that it is today. 

11 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. West and Admiral Clark 

follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. TOGO D. WEST, JR. AND ADM VERNON E. 

CLARK, USN (RET.) 

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the committee: We 

appreciate the opportunity to appear before you and discuss the findings and recommendations of the Department of Defense Independent Review Relating to Fort 

Hood. 

Two months ago, a gunman opened fire at the Soldier Readiness Center at Fort 

Hood, TX. Thirteen people were killed and 43 others were wounded. November 5, 

2009 will be remembered as a day of great tragedy. We extend our deepest sympathy to the families of the fallen, to the wounded, to their families, and indeed all 

touched by this tragic event. 

Following the shooting, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates established the Department of Defense Independent Review Related to Fort Hood, and asked that Admiral Clark and I lead it. We have done so and report on it today. Events such as 

the Fort Hood shooting raise questions about how best to defend against threats 

posed by external influences operating on members of our military community. The 

challenge for the Department of Defense (DOD) is to prepare more effectively for 

a constantly changing security environment. It is with that backdrop in mind that 

Secretary Gates asked us to conduct our review. 

Secretary Gates charged us to provide an independent review and assess whether 

there are programs, policies or procedural weaknesses within DOD that create 

vulnerabilities to the health and safety of our service men and women, DOD civilians, and their families. Dr. Gates asked that we take a careful look at personnel 

policies, force protection measures, emergency response procedures and support to 

our military health care providers. He asked us to evaluate the Army’s application 

of its policies, programs, processes, and procedures to the alleged perpetrator. 

We established a board of advisors with senior officers from the four Services. We 

constituted five review teams, consisting of a range of experts, who investigated the 

key tasks outlined in our terms of reference. The teams had unrestricted access to 

personnel and facilities. The teams traveled to Fort Hood as part of their review. 

Our charter directed us to focus on the noncriminal aspects of the shooting. Although Fort Hood was central to our review, our scope extended across the entire 

Department in order to gather the most significant and meaningful findings and 

recommendations. As recognized by the Secretary of Defense in stating that he intends to call upon the military departments to conduct in-depth follow-on reviews 

based on our results, areas in our report will require further study. By design, we 

limited the depth of our report in areas that will be covered in follow-on reviews. 

We recently submitted our report to the Secretary of Defense. Before discussing 

the overall report, we note that we cannot address specifics with respect to the alleged perpetrator in open session, in order to preserve the integrity of the ongoing 

military justice process. We can tell you, however, that several individuals failed to 

apply professional standards of officership regarding the alleged perpetrator. We 

recommended the Secretary of Defense forward these issues of accountability to the 

Secretary of the Army. The detailed results and findings associated with the alleged 

perpetrator are found in a restricted annex that will not be publically released at 

the present time. 

The review was much broader than the assessment of the alleged perpetrator. 

With that in mind, our report includes recommendations to strengthen DOD’s ability to prepare for and respond to potential threats. It is based upon research by our 

teams of more than 35,000 pages from over 700 documents related to departmental 

policies, programs, processes, and procedures. 

Before discussing the details of our findings, we would like to highlight some observations from the tragic events on November 5. 

First, no amount of preparation is ever too much. Leaders at Fort Hood had anticipated mass casualty events in their emergency response plans and exercises. The 

initial response to the incident demonstrated this. It was prompt and effective. Two 

minutes and 40 seconds after the initial 9–1–1 call, Fort Hood first responders arrived on the scene. One-and-a-half minutes later, the assailant was incapacitated, 

taken into custody, and remained in custody handcuffed to a law enforcement representative for the next several chaotic hours. Two ambulances and an incident command vehicle from the post hospital arrived on the scene 2 minutes and 50 seconds 

12 

later to begin providing lifesaving emergency care. Yet 13 people died; scores were 

wounded. We will prepare harder; plan more diligently; seek to envision the next 

incident. 

Second, we must be attentive to today’s hazard. Even as the role of our nation’s 

military is to confront the external threat to our country, one of the most significant 

emerging concerns in the protection of our force is the internal threat. We need to 

develop a better understanding of the forces that cause a person to become 

radicalized; commit violent acts; and make us vulnerable from within. 

Third, courage and presence of mind in the face of crisis can carry the day. It happened at Fort Hood. Courageous acts were the key to preventing greater losses that 

day. 

As our report reveals, however, these attributes alone are not enough to protect 

our force. We must exercise the foresight necessary to identify the looming menace—self radicalization and its often resultant violence—and act preemptively. 

Our review of DOD policies, procedures, and processes revealed shortcomings in 

the way DOD is prepared to deal with internal threats, and in particular, the threat 

posed by troubled and potentially dangerous individuals and groups. 

Commanders are our key assets to identify and monitor internal threats. Existing 

policies, however, are not optimized for countering these threats. The policies reflect 

insufficient knowledge and awareness required to help identify and address individuals likely to commit violence. 

While the department focuses very effectively on many things, guidance concerning workplace violence and the potential for self-radicalization is insufficient. 

DOD policy on prohibited activities is limited and only addresses active and visible 

participation in groups that may pose threats to good order and discipline. This lack 

of clarity for comprehensive indicators limits commanders’ and supervisors’ ability 

to recognize potential threats and detecting a trusted insider’s intention to commit 

a violent act requires observation of behavioral cues/anomalies. 

Complicating the force protection challenge is the diverse nature of responsibilities as they have evolved within DOD since September 11. Because no senior DOD 

official is assigned overall responsibility for force protection policy, synchronization 

is difficult. Moreover, there is a lack of DOD policy integration. This has resulted 

in a lack of a well-integrated means to gather, evaluate, and disseminate the wide 

range of behavioral indicators that could signal an insider threat. Some policies governing information exchange, both within DOD and between outside agencies, are 

deficient and do not support detection and mitigation of internal threats. The time 

has passed when concerns by specific entities over protecting ‘‘their’’ information can 

be allowed to prevent relevant threat information and indicators from reaching 

those who need it—the commanders. 

As the Secretary indicated, we see a requirement to create the ability to adapt 

rapidly to the changing security environment, which requires anticipating new 

threats and bringing a wide and continuously evolving range of tools, techniques, 

and programs into play. Robust information sharing, therefore, is essential, along 

with the accompanying command and control structure to convert active information 

gathered on potential threats into decisions and actions, including dissemination of 

the analysis and assessments to the appropriate levels of command. While leaders 

at Fort Hood responded well under the stress of a rapidly evolving crisis, we are 

fortunate that we faced only one incident at one location. Real-time information 

sharing will be critical should we face a situation of multiple events. 

While all 50 States have complied with the Federal requirements for the National 

Incident Management System, designed for a synchronized response in crises, there 

are no established milestones to define initial and full capability within DOD. The 

timelines should be evaluated; doing so could lead to an umbrella plan for emergency response and recovery and ensure interoperability with all the States. Synchronizing the DOD emergency management program with this national guidance 

will ensure the Department can integrate effectively with all partners in response 

to any and all emergencies. Using common emergency management principles, we 

can prepare our military communities to respond to emergency from the smallest 

incident to the largest catastrophe. 

The response by the Fort Hood community in the aftermath of this tragedy serves 

as a reminder of the strength, resiliency and character of our people. We were very 

impressed with them, both military and civilian. In a community where we might 

have expected the fabric of trust to fray, it remained intact and grew stronger 

through mutual support. The thrust of our effort has been to do all that we can to 

prevent similar tragedies in the future. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you both very 

much. 

13 

Let’s try an 8-minute first round. The panel found that ‘‘DOD 

policy regarding religious accommodation lacks the clarity necessary to help commanders distinguish appropriate religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or selfradicalization.’’ I think what you’re saying is that, obviously, this 

country believes in tolerance of others’ religions, but it can never 

be tolerant of violent radical views that are dressed up in religious 

garb. I think that’s that point reworded. 

I couldn’t agree with you more. Sometimes views that are clearly 

either inherently violent or promote violence are dressed up in religious clothing, and that automatically means that people who are 

sensitive to others’ religious views then are put on the defensive 

right away, or reluctant right away to point out what is underneath the claim of religion. 

So the line has to be there. Obviously, we want to continue our 

tolerance, but we have to be much harder and much more intolerant of views that are radical, promote violence, or encourage violence. 

So my first question to you is about the policy of the Department, 

which is limited to and addresses only active participation in 

groups that pose threats to good order and discipline, is far too narrow a policy because of the self-radicalization point—you don’t have 

to participate in a group that poses that kind of a threat to be a 

threat yourself. My first question is how would you—and I know 

you’re not here to provide remedies and that wasn’t your job, but 

I assume that you agree that it’s not just that that policy should 

be examined, but that in your judgment at least it’s just simply too 

limited a policy. I’m wondering whether or not, for instance, you 

would agree that communication with a radical cleric who promotes 

violence is the kind of conduct that should raise real questions. 

Would you agree with that, even though it’s not active participation 

at that point? It’s just simply communication, asking someone for 

their recommendations and views. Would you agree that that ought 

to be raising great suspicion, without getting into this particular 

case? 

Mr. WEST. Mr. Chairman, I would certainly agree. I think we 

both would. I think your larger point that this is an example of, 

we would agree with as well, and that is that, yes, in the past perhaps membership alone in a group may have been less looked upon 

than the actual act of doing things, but in this environment we 

have to look at the group. We have to understand its purposes. 

It is already considered by some that there is a tool that enables 

a commander to declare certain kinds of action, including that, a 

threat to his immediate area’s good order and discipline. But we 

think DOD can just simply strengthen the ability of commanders 

to look at and example exactly what kind of activity they are permitting and whether or not we can better define it. 

Membership in a group that has a record of active advocation of 

violence, as well as your point, communication, especially repeated 

communication—again, not referring to any particular case—with 

those who advocate violence, those are all signals that we need to 

be able to indicate in our publications and in our regulations commanders are authorized to look at and react to. 

14 

Chairman LEVIN. Even if there weren’t active participation or 

communication with radical persons who are promoting violence, 

even if there’s simply the expression of views which promote violence without any information about participation in a group or 

communication with radical extremists—if somebody gets up and 

says, ‘‘I believe that the Constitution comes in second and that my 

religious views come in first,’’ would that not be that kind of a signal which ought to indicate some real genuine concern? Would you 

agree with that? 

Admiral CLARK. I certainly do agree with it. It goes without saying that where we draw our red lines is a very, very important 

point. But you know, if you look at our history, we as a people as 

Americans have always been very careful about where we draw 

those lines. 

I so appreciate your introduction to this question by your comments about that we are a tolerant people. When I look at the DOD 

instruction here, it talks about what people can do when they’re at 

work and things that they can’t do at work, but they can do on 

their private time. What we’re suggesting is that we have to better 

understand how people go through this process from being a nonradicalized person to radicalization and what does it mean. 

So I align with your comments completely. I want to make one 

other observation, Mr. Chairman. In our report, we talk about Active Duty members of the military, but DOD is much broader than 

just the Active Duty people in uniform. We understand that when 

Americans raise their right hand and take a pledge to serve in the 

Armed Forces that there are some freedoms that they set on the 

shelf. The challenge that we’re facing here in security applies to everybody in DOD, and that includes civilians, contractors, and a 

whole other body of people. 

Then you could look at this and say, ‘‘this is not just DOD; this 

is the whole of our Nation; and the whole of government.’’ This is 

a real challenge that we face. 

Sir, you made the comment, when a shipmate hears a comment 

that’s being made that is approaching a defined red line or crossing 

a defined red line, that we must make sure our people understand 

where those red lines are. That means we must have a very effective education program and outreach program, that people understand this is about our own security and the right to self-defense 

is absolutely not in question. We have the right to do that. 

Chairman LEVIN. People should not be afraid of reporting information that they believe in their good judgment represents a potential threat to good order and discipline and to the safety of the 

country or of their own group out of fear that that might be viewed 

by some as being intolerant of religious views. We have to simply 

allow people the freedom to report something which they believe is 

a threat to their group, their country, or to the individual himself 

or herself, and not be dissuaded by the fact that the views are 

dressed in some religious garb. 

Admiral CLARK. Good order and discipline is the fabric upon 

which the greatness of the U.S. military is built, and we have to 

ensure that we do everything we know how to do to protect it. 

Chairman LEVIN. Secretary West, did you want to add anything 

to that? 

15 

Mr. WEST. No. I think the Admiral caught the point I would have 

made, which is that we are sensitive to the fact that we are talking 

about expressions and expressions in many cases that pertain to 

religion—two different hits on the First Amendment. But as he 

pointed out, when a member takes an oath of office there are some 

things as to which he or she agrees to be regulated. We believe 

that where there is a clear connection with a potential for violence 

that would cause damage to one’s fellows in the Service, this is a 

basis on which we can encourage the Department to act more clearly and more aggressively. 

Chairman LEVIN. My final question is this. You have not been 

given the charge of recommending remedies for where there are 

gaps. That’s not part of your charge, although you freely responded 

to my questions this morning and I appreciate that. Who is in 

charge of responding with remedies to your recommendations? 

What is the timetable? Does this go right up to the Secretary of Defense and has he assured you that he will consider appropriate 

remedies within a certain timetable, or is there somebody else in 

the Department that’s on the remedies side of what you’ve outlined 

here? 

Mr. WEST. The answer to your question is twofold. I’ll take the 

second first, which is: Yes, in his follow-on review he is ordering 

two sets of things. He’s in that process. I think some orders have 

gone out, but not others. One, he is going to ask a single member 

of his staff—we believe, but we don’t want to commit him—it is his 

prerogative, not ours—perhaps the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense or Security—I’m not authorized to make that statement, don’t know, but that’s our belief—to conduct a follow-on review, but each of the Services also. 

Part of their job is to take this report—he will refer it to them— 

and to provide their recommendations as to how to implement. 

That’s the answer to your second question. 

The first answer is in some ways you give Admiral Clark and me 

too much of a bye. The fact is his direction to us was to come up 

with action memo recommendations as well. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. In that case, I withdraw that comment. Are your recommendations then to be acted upon in a certain 

length, period of time? 

Mr. WEST. I’m not clear. 

Chairman LEVIN. What I’m referring to is this. You say that 

there’s inadequate clarity on the issue we’ve been discussing. The 

recommendation is a general one: Provide clarity. But it’s not the 

specific clarity. It’s just: You should provide clarity, Mr. Secretary. 

I couldn’t agree with you more, but it’s not what the new regulation should be. That’s going to be left up to the Secretary. That’s 

what I meant when I said you have not provided the specific new 

language that should be in place replacing the unclear language. 

That’s what I meant by that. 

Now, is there a timetable? 

Admiral CLARK. Yes, there is. There is a timetable, he announced 

it Friday. 

Chairman LEVIN. What is it? 

Admiral CLARK. He wants first impressions back in March and 

he wants to wrap this up by June. 

16 

If you read the language, we were very careful with our recommendations. First of all, you confirm the Secretary of Defense 

and that allows him to be the person who makes policy. We were 

very aware of the fact that at one point in our lives we were those 

people, but we’re not those people today. 

So we suggested on numerous occasions he review policy because 

we thought there were holes or weaknesses or gaps. There were 

some places that the language is slightly stronger: It’s absolutely 

clear to us that the policy is—and we say sometimes it’s inadequate. But we teed it up in a way so that they could now put that 

spotlight on it, and he’s given them the timetable. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’m going to pick up on two things you mentioned, and the first 

one I’ll be criticized for as not politically correct. But I’ll make this 

statement. If you’re around Washington and you’re in these hearings, it’s one thing. But when you go back to Oklahoma, as I do 

every week, it’s another thing. I’m always hit up with this idea, because not only—we’re talking about the Fort Hood thing now, but 

I could talk to you about Abdul Mutallab, the Christmas bomber. 

The extremist views were evident from the University College 

through London, and it goes on and on. The November 19, 2009, 

the father reports and we all know about that report. Late November, he was added to the U.S. 550-name Terrorist Identities 

Datamart Environment (TIDE) and all this stuff. 

All this stuff is stuff that we knew. That’s not in your purview, 

I understand that. But nonetheless, it’s the same. A terrorist is a 

terrorist. That’s what they do for a living: They kill people. 

I for one—I know it’s not politically correct to say—I believe in 

racial and ethnic profiling. I think if you’re looking at people getting on an airplane and you have X amount of resources to get into 

it, you need to get at the targets, not my wife. I just think it’s 

something that should be looked into. 

The statement that’s been made is probably 90 percent true, with 

some exceptions like the Murrah Federal Office Building in my 

State of Oklahoma. Those people, they were not Muslims, they 

were not Middle Easterners. But when you hear that not all Middle 

Easterners or Muslims between the ages of 20 and 35 are terrorists, but all terrorists are Muslims or Middle Easterners between 

the ages of 20 and 35, that’s by and large true. 

I think that some time we’re going to have to really—at least I’m 

going to have to have a better answer than I give the people back 

home, when people board planes or get into environments such as 

the environment that we’re dealing with with this report. 

I guess nothing more needs to be said from you guys on this. Let 

me first of all say, which I should have said first, there are no two 

people I think are more qualified to do the job that you have had 

to do than the two of you. You’ve been good friends of mine for a 

long period of time. 

Now, something we can talk about, I think, a little more, a little 

easier. Your purview was really domestic, wasn’t it? The continental United States (CONUS) was most of what you were talking 

about, was making the recommendations coming from what hapVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:03 Jan 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63686.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
17 

pened in the incident at Fort Hood. Did you look into outside the 

United States (OCONUS)? We have thousands and thousands of 

troops all over the world, and to me the threat is probably a little 

bit greater there than it would be here. 

What thoughts do you have on that, or maybe recommendations 

you could have on that, to expand what you’re doing to include 

that? 

Admiral CLARK. We certainly did, Senator. The first thing that 

comes to mind is, every base where we exist overseas, we have nonAmericans working with us on the base. What are the processes 

and the procedures for vetting these people? So we challenge it. We 

have a section in the report that talks about security clearances 

and how people gain access. 

The second thing I talked about—identifying people who could 

become a threat, one of the things we have to look at is how we 

vet people in the OCONUS environment. I would suggest to you— 

and frankly, this would probably be better, the details of this we 

might talk about in closed session. But I would suggest to you that 

it was our conviction, and we would not have put it in the report 

if we didn’t think that this was certainly a potential weakness. 

Mr. WEST. Might I add this, Senator. If we take the lesson of 

Fort Hood—and admittedly, we will talk more specifically when 

you have your closed session—we have to be reminded that the thesis on which we’re dealing here is essentially, for this whole report, 

the threat from within: the member of the military family who then 

turns against his or her fellow soldier, airman, sailor, marine, or 

coastguardsman. 

The difficulty there, whether it is OCONUS or CONUS, is that 

with the universal access card, the ID, they can enter what should 

be the safest place either here or there, the base, the post, freely. 

With our automated systems now, we don’t stop them for routine 

checks. So we can’t—or we can. Certainly one of the lessons 

learned at Fort Hood was that they have now instituted some roving checks even of those who have the credentials. 

But the place to stop them, the insider who’s the threat, is not 

at the gate. It is to identify him or her before they can get onto 

the post and do that act. That’s why all those signs that we talk 

about, all the cues and behavioral indications, even the ones that 

the chairman mentioned, are important for us to reemphasize, to 

expand and to focus on, to make sure commanders have that information. That applies both here and overseas. 

Senator INHOFE. One of the things that was discussed here by 

the chairman was when can we move this along faster. I think you 

want to do that. We want to do that. We still have some of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission that are not fully implemented and understood. So I would assume that you share those 

feelings. 

I was down at Fort Hood about 3 weeks before this incident. 

That was when we had two of our Oklahoma units that were deploying overseas and I was down there for that event. Then I went 

down afterwards for the event that took place after the tragedy. 

You had said—and I asked my staff to hand it to me so I could 

read it again. This is pretty remarkable, Mr. Secretary, when you 

said 2 minutes and 40 seconds after the initial 9–1–1 call, installaVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:03 Jan 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63686.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
18 

tion first responders arrived on the scene. One and a half minutes 

later, the assailant was incapacitated. Two ambulances and incident command vehicles from the base were there 2 minutes and 50 

seconds later. I mean, that’s really moving. 

I would recommend, and maybe you’ve already done this, that 

you find out—not always looking at what is wrong, but learn from 

what was done right. In this case, I think it would probably serve 

us well to see how they did that remarkable job. I wanted to see 

it in writing after you’d said it, because I think that’s remarkable. 

So I’d recommend you do that. 

Mr. WEST. It was remarkable, and we did think that one of our 

jobs was to find out if that was the result of good planning, courageous and fast action, was there an element of luck, and, if it was 

what we believed and what we’ve said, excellent planning and well 

executed, is there a lesson to pass across the force. 

One other thing I would add. I don’t want to overdo—let me add 

it anyway. We tried as best we could to figure out what that 

meant, the passage of time from the first shot by the assailant to 

his last. That is, the whole event, because the uncertain part was 

how quickly the 9–1–1 call got in after the first shot was fired. The 

best we can make is that the whole shooting incident was ended 

by security forces between 7 and 8 minutes after it started. 

Senator INHOFE. Were you surprised at that too, Admiral? 

Admiral CLARK. I certainly was. This kind of a panel is supposed 

to find the things that are wrong. That’s what we’re supposed to 

do. But if you notice, we lead with some very strong statements 

about what we thought was right, because we wanted it up front 

that the people at Fort Hood did a fabulous job. 

I testified yesterday and the staff reminded me that I said ‘‘fabulous’’ or ‘‘excellent’’ or ‘‘outstanding’’ 19 times yesterday. But I want 

to drive the point home. I said this was the best lessons-learned 

I’ve ever seen, and the performance of the people was brilliant. 

Were there things that could have been better? Yes. One of the reasons that it was brilliant was because of the brilliance of our people. They are so good. 

Of course, nobody had the stopwatch going on inside the room 

where he was shooting, so that’s why we don’t know the exact time, 

as the Secretary indicated, between the first shot and the 9–1–1 

call. But here’s what we do know: There were a lot more rounds 

available, and they took that shooter down and the CID agent was 

handcuffed to him in a matter of moments and was with him from 

that point on. 

Senator INHOFE. Let me commend all of them for the fine work 

they did. 

Admiral CLARK. It was incredible. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

I would take 2 seconds just to say that I disagree with your comments about Middle Easterners and Muslims and the implications 

of those comments. I wouldn’t want to say that except while you’re 

here. 

Senator INHOFE. Sure. I understand that. I expected that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Reed. 

19 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Clark, you mentioned in terms of the threat a generic 

self-radicalization that would lead to violence. There are several 

different, as you suggest, categories of this, not simply Islamic radicals, but a host of others. Is there a strategy in DOD to identify 

these potential categories and to essentially work explicitly against 

them or to at least be aware of them? 

Admiral CLARK. The first point, there are people in the public domain that have said we didn’t use the magic term, ‘‘radical 

Islamics.’’ We didn’t do it on purpose. It wasn’t because we were 

trying to be politically correct. It was because our task was to deal 

with violence and this was one of them. But I don’t know how people could read our comments about self-radicalization and not understand that this kind of radical Islamic behavior is part of that 

group. 

We said specifically though, the indicators are inadequate. Now, 

having said that, on Friday the Army published the list of 10, and 

having something out there is better than nothing. In the closed 

session, I would like to get into this in some detail. 

But to say we believe that all of the indicators related to violence 

are not static indicators. We’re living in such a rapidly changing 

world, potentially we should be considering the establishment of a 

group that focuses on this full-time. I have this whole series of 

kinds of behaviors that we are talking about—criminal, drug, domestic abuse, gang activity, supremist ideology, terrorism, school 

violence, sex crimes, sabotage, arson, cyber. We’re talking about all 

of these. 

So I trust that’s responsive to your question. 

Senator REED. It is. 

Mr. Secretary, do you have any comments? 

Mr. WEST. There is an annex to our report that discusses the 

sources of violence in some detail. It’s an example of the pieces that 

our researchers consulted. I think it’s very informative and I commend it for reading. 

I think that I agree with the Admiral’s response. Also, in our executive summary, five or six key things that we recommend to the 

Secretary that we pull out from this report is the suggestion of a 

body that will collect the indicators of violence, update them in 

light of current circumstances, events in our world, occurrences in 

our world, and then make them available on an updated basis to 

the commanders and the supervisors who need to use them to 

make their judgments. 

Senator REED. Let me again turn to the Admiral. Did you believe 

or conclude that there was adequate information coming from Walter Reed to Fort Hood with respect to the Major? Was there a problem there in terms of letters of reprimand that might have been 

issued or informal reprimands that were never fully communicated, 

so that the commanders at Fort Hood clearly weren’t able to gauge 

the seriousness of this individual? 

Mr. WEST. Senator, I wonder if you would let us discuss that 

with you in the restricted session. It’s in the annex. 

Senator REED. I appreciate that. 

There’s another issue and this, I think, can be—I’ll let you decide—discussed in public, is that, there are many indicators about 

20 

Major Hassan’s professional skills, far removed from his religious 

beliefs and his discussions, just simple competence, his ability to 

work with others, those things that are fundamental to being an 

officer in the military. Yet he was moved along. I know this question has come up. In these critical areas where there are not a surplus of individuals, such as mental health professionals, psychiatrists, et cetera, is there a double standard in terms of, had he been 

a line officer, an infantry officer, artillery officer—forget his 

radicalization, but just his simple performance, would that have 

gotten him kicked out? 

Mr. WEST. I think again, Senator, we are prepared to discuss 

that with you, but we would ask you to let us do it in the restricted 

session. 

Senator REED. I appreciate that. 

Admiral CLARK. I would say certainly the heart of what we have 

to say is in the annex. Let me make a comment. We use the term 

‘‘officership’’ in the open report. ‘‘Officership’’ was intended to mean 

more than just leadership, and it was our view that there were 

officership deficiencies. In the closed session we can talk in great 

detail about the specifics of that. 

Senator REED. Just one final question—— 

Mr. WEST. If I might, Senator, I would just add also that in our 

one-page summary discussion, in chapter 1, in the open report, we 

do mention the findings and recommendations, which had to do 

with the Army’s application of its policies to the perpetrator, but 

also the fact that there were signs that were missed and some that 

as far as we can tell were ignored. That’s in the open part of the 

discussion. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Again, part of this response is going to be training, not just commanders, but individual soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. We 

have something like that when it comes to a traditional threat, 

which is subversion and espionage, the old posters, World War II, 

‘‘Loose Lips Sink Ships.’’ That emphasis is persistent. Do you envision something like that in terms of the training elements going 

forward? 

Admiral CLARK. I mentioned just briefly, but I probably didn’t 

emphasize it well enough: There clearly has to be an outreach program here. I’m not talking about an outreach program outside the 

Department. I’m talking about inside the Department. Notice, the 

Secretary of Defense said on Friday—and we suggested that effective communication is the order of the day here. The Secretary 

started that process on Friday when he said to commanders: This 

isn’t just ho-hum—I’m paraphrasing now—ho-hum, regular day-today stuff. Commanders should have to look past the day-to-day. 

There is no doubt that a very effective training and outreach program is part of an effective solution. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Senator Chambliss. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, you have previously served our country well in your 

respective capacities and we appreciate your coming back once 

21 

again to help us deal with an issue that obviously is extremely important, at the same time extremely sensitive. So thank you for 

your continuing service. 

In your report, you suggest that the Pentagon ‘‘coordinate with 

the FBI Behavioral Science Unit and the Military Violence Unit to 

identify the indicators specific to DOD personnel, and that DOD 

should use these indicators to develop an assessment tool for commanders, supervisors, and professional support service personnel to 

determine when individuals present risks for violent behavior.’’ 

Now, my question is, don’t those tools already exist in the form 

of the Army Form 4856, which is the Army Developmental Counseling Form, and the Army Form 67–9, which is the Army officer 

evaluation report (OER)? Assuming these documents are used and 

filled out appropriately, shouldn’t we be able to identify a soldier 

who may be becoming self-radicalized as we think happened here 

and appropriately address the threat that they represent? 

Mr. WEST. I’m going to let Admiral Clark have a good long swing 

at that because of his extensive experience with OERs and the like. 

But let me say what we were trying to do here, Senator. The fact 

is that there is a very good argument that there are tools out there 

that commanders can use to make the assessments they need to 

make. The question for us, though is, are there ways to strengthen 

what they can do and have we learned anything by the incident we 

faced and will discuss with you in closed session, from this incident, about how we can shore that up? 

Frankly, things like OERs, there is a culture in the Services, all 

of them, which I think Admiral Clark can speak to better than I 

can, that doesn’t always find and report the kinds of things that 

would be better to report. For one reason, it may be because the 

information of some offense, of previous drug usage, but there has 

been a rehabilitation effort, or of some other contacts or signs, may 

have been left to the discretion of the commander as to whether to 

even keep that in the record so that it would be recorded in the 

OER. It never gets to the next commander, the next supervisor, 

and suddenly earlier signs are lost in the midst of the pass as they 

move forward. 

We need to shore that up. We said to the Secretary in our executive summary, in our five or six big recommendations: You need to 

say to the officer corps of the Nation and all the Services that, 

what you report on these OERs and on things like the Service 

School Academic Evaluation Report (SAER), which takes the place 

of the OER when they’re in Service school, you need to say that 

that matters and that it has to be accurate and, most of all, complete, so that we can make the judgments we need to make. 

Now, that’s the thrust of what we’re doing here. So, yes, reports 

exist, but they’re not being made use of in a way that fits what we 

need in these new and trying times. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. So do you think it’s a matter of further education of those supervisors that are asking the questions and making that report? 

Mr. WEST. I have an answer to that. It’s a question to me, but 

I want to get Admiral Clark involved. My answer is education, yes, 

but also making sure that the standards—and maybe that is eduVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:03 Jan 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63686.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
22 

cation—are applied. But there are also some recommendations for 

some further adjustments. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Admiral Clark? 

Admiral CLARK. I don’t know the first form that you referenced. 

I have the second forms here in front of me, so I can talk specifically to those. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. The 4856 is the Army Developmental Counseling Form, which I understand is completed once a quarter. The 

67–9 is an annual report for enlisted and officer personnel. 

Admiral CLARK. I don’t have that in front of me. But I would say 

that that form and the tools that go with that would be great if 

the person knows what the indicators are. Our review suggests 

that in the area of self-radicalization that can be very fuzzy. 

The reason we suggested the FBI is they’ve already started doing 

some work here. So we’re saying to the Secretary, don’t start from 

scratch. But also the recommendation to use every expert that we 

know how to get, because we’re looking for behavioral cues and 

their subtleties. Once those are known, I have every confidence 

that our leadership, our supervisors, will know how to deal with 

that. 

But my interpretation of that was, we were talking about an education and that’s why you have to have an outreach program that 

gets the training to the right people, so they have understanding 

of these issues. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. If I’m hearing you right with regard to what 

both of you’ve said in your statement and your answers to the 

questions thus far, we did a great job responding at Fort Hood. Our 

men and women were courageous, heroic, and did a good job. But 

with the events leading up to the incident, we have some major deficiencies. 

In fact, Admiral, you alluded to this, I think you called it ‘‘an 

evolving threat,’’ were your exact words that you said earlier. Are 

there any protections or punitive measures that are in place to detect, for example, an individual who is one of those folks that I 

would categorize as an evolving threat, who might simply join a 

branch of the military with the intention of duplicating what happened at Fort Hood? What have we got in place now or what do 

we need to do to ensure that we don’t have somebody who has 

spent the last 6 months in Yemen or 4 years ago spent 6 months 

in Yemen with the idea of ultimately coming back and having been 

trained to go in and duplicate this event? 

Mr. WEST. Or who even spent a bunch of years or a month out 

in the wilds of our country becoming radicalized in a different way 

and under different pressures. The question is the same. 

You’re right, Senator, there was no failing by those at Fort Hood 

in their response. If there were gaps, it was in us as we tried to 

prepare ourselves to identify those factors that would say this person is going to be a problem, we need to act. 

But I think your question was to the Admiral. 

Admiral CLARK. I agree completely with what Secretary West 

has said. The thrust of your question gets us to this issue of the 

identification question that I raised this point to. That identification question raises things about the manner in which we do 

checks and what’s involved there. I think it would be smart not to 

23 

inform an enemy in a public way about my particular impressions, 

and if it’s all right with you that we talk about that in a closed 

session. But affirming your comment, this is part of the challenge. 

By the way, should we not expect that they’re going to use every 

technique and scheme or maneuver that they can figure out? 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Absolutely. That’s why we have to, number 

one, get the information. But further, to your point you stated earlier, Admiral, is we have to share that information. It has to get 

in the hands of the people who are filling out those forms or who 

are making recommendations relative to an individual. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral CLARK. Mr. Chairman, can I say, since you made that 

last point, I say one more time: Get rid of the barriers, inside and 

outside of the Department, the barriers to information flow. Thank 

you. 

Mr. WEST. Mr. Chairman, I’m sorry to keep this going, but could 

I add one more thought to that? 

Chairman LEVIN. Sure. 

Mr. WEST. Here’s another problem that your questions and Admiral Clark’s response raise, Senator. That is this. Let’s take religion. The reason we have numbers and records on the representation of people of various religions in our forces is because they selfidentify. They say: This is my religion, I’m an Episcopalian, or 

what have you. What about those who, formulating a reason to 

hide their purposes, don’t disclose their religion, don’t disclose anything that will cause us to try to—this is not your term—to try to 

profile? 

It’s the indicators, the behavioral cues, that we have to rely on. 

They are our only way of getting at this in any organized and aggressive and effective way. 

Admiral CLARK. One more comment, then. So that you know, the 

alleged perpetrator was initially in the Army as an enlisted person 

and he went off and went to school. When he came into the Army 

the first time, he professed to be a member of the Islamic faith. 

When he came in as an officer, he did not declare. So all of the indicators aren’t right in front of our nose. But I have all the statistics here to talk about every brand of religion that we know about. 

The reality is that way over half of our people never ever declare 

what—they choose not to declare. So it’s not always immediately 

apparent. That’s why this is a challenge. But then really focusing 

on the behaviors, and that’s what we wanted to put the spotlight 

on. The Department in its guidance and instruction to the commanders and all the people in the field are going to go by this document, and this document doesn’t have sufficient guidance about 

self-radicalization. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Ben Nelson. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank both 

of you for your dedication and time in putting together a very wellorganized and, I think, insightful report. We appreciate it very 

much. 

So far we haven’t really talked about, let’s say, patient—or the 

evaluation process. Of course, connecting the dots requires that 

kind of an evaluation capability for it to be able to tell us anything. 

24 

In determining behavior, if you don’t have all the background perhaps you can’t establish that. 

Violence in the workplace is not unique now to the military. It’s 

part of everyday life, unfortunately, and that kind of violence isn’t 

necessarily the result of self-radicalization in the workforce. So I’m 

wondering, in connecting the dots, as you look for not only selfradicalization, do you look for other indicators in your report? 

Shouldn’t the military look for others, such as marital difficulties 

and other areas that, Admiral Clark, you identified in addition? Because self-radicalization is a subset of an overall problem when we 

talk about workforce violence, it may be that the military is unique 

in that respect because it’s not just about domestic; we also have 

to face it on our military posts around the world. 

So in connecting the dots, I think we understand that not all 

radicals will be engaging in violence and not everyone with a different idea will engage in violence. So what are other things that 

can be looked at in performance evaluations that would help us detect potential violence coming, not just from self-radicalization, but 

from others as well? 

Admiral CLARK. It’s a really great question and it drives us back 

to the guidance that’s there today. We find that there are good indicators in a lot of areas. I mentioned a number of these. It includes the two that you talked about, although our view is that the 

whole workplace side is—we tend to focus on the kind of violence 

that takes place away from the workplace, not in the workplace, 

and that’s a criticism. 

But let’s just talk about the domestic piece, for example. Earlier 

we talked about the requirement for balance. We have been dealing 

with this now for years. So we learned a long time ago that if the 

balance is incorrect we were going to have difficulty, because a domestic violence situation always has a ‘‘she says, he says’’ scenario 

ongoing. So we know how to do these things when we identify the 

behaviors. 

So you’re correct, we have them. We have the tools—— 

Senator BEN NELSON. We have the tools, right. 

Admiral CLARK. This is why we’re suggesting that perhaps we 

want to consider the establishment of an organization, a piece of 

the structure, that does this for a living, because you or I cannot 

define a solution set today and everything be perfect for the next 

3 years. It’s going to change. 

Our suggestion is we need to understand the evolving world that 

we’re facing. Let us not get sidetracked on just one little piece of 

this. The Secretary’s goal was to make the workplace a safe environment. Imagine—and Secretary West really alluded to this, when 

the alleged perpetrator—he was an officer in the military, he was 

a field-grade officer. This implies trust. He’s a medical doctor, implies more trust. He’s somebody that a person would confide in. We 

can’t have these kinds of people turning from the inside on our people and destroying the fabric of the institution and what we’re all 

about. 

So we are convinced that this then calls for the kind of investment that will ensure that we’re staying up with the adaption 

problem. This is a challenge, to be adaptive. I’m so pleased that the 

25 

Secretary of Defense addressed it straight-up on Friday and said 

we have to create a more adaptive force. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Secretary West? 

Mr. WEST. Just as an add-on, in terms of your question, what are 

some of the things that should be indicators, we have a whole list 

of recommendations. Incidentally, in our appendix C for purposes 

of being helpful to you we list all the recommendations, the findings and recommendations, and something about them, so that it’s 

easier for you to find them without having to go all through. 

At about 2.6 or so and all the way through that to 2.10 or so, 

there’s a list of things that addresses what you said. For example, 

you said what about medical? Well, so did we. We know that the 

medical indications and medical records are protected, and they 

should be. But we raise the question of whether we shouldn’t review whether there are ways to make some of that history, especially when it pertains to some things I’ve said before—drug abuse 

and the like—available on a more regular basis to those who need 

to have these indicators. 

Senator BEN NELSON. If you don’t have all the dots, you can’t 

connect them. 

Mr. WEST. Exactly. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do want to express my appreciation to you, Mr. Secretary and Admiral, for all 

your service to this country, and obviously being called back into 

service for your extraordinary work in regard to this tragic incident. 

I also want to take this opportunity to express my condolences 

to those who lost family members and loved ones during this terrible event. It was a horrific event in our Nation’s history and the 

fact that it happened at Fort Hood, a place where more people have 

deployed to fight against terrorism than any other place, is really 

heartbreaking. Our heartfelt appreciation goes to those first responders who, once informed of the situation, as you have noted, 

not only arrived quickly, but showed tremendous professionalism 

and dedication to duty and in doing so saved a lot of lives. 

I want to ask you about a couple of findings in your report. One 

is finding 3.8 of your review, which states: ‘‘DOD does not have a 

policy governing privately-owned weapons.’’ Your recommendation 

states that: ‘‘DOD needs to review the need for such a policy.’’ I 

guess my question is, can you explain what you mean by a privately owned weapons policy? 

Mr. WEST. There exists, for example at Fort Hood, which among 

other things is a popular place for hunting, so a lot of folks come 

on to hunt—so the effort to have some sort of control over guns has 

to be carefully balanced, the need to come on and use it, but also 

the security of the post. The way that works and often works at 

a number of installations is this. First of all, all weapons issued by 

the U.S. military to its personnel are locked in the armory if you’re 

enlisted or officer or what have you. They’re secured. So on the day 

of the event, the only armed person on the scene until those who 

were part of the security force arrived was the perpetrator. 

26 

The policy works this way there. If you live in the barracks, then 

your privately owned weapon must of course be owned—properly 

registered in accordance with State and Federal law and the like, 

but also need to be registered with the commander so that they 

know what’s there. If you live in the barracks, it is also secured in 

the armory. If you live in personal quarters on the base, properly 

registered with the commander, you keep them in your home. If 

you live off the base, the only requirement is that they be registered in accordance with State and Federal law, because you 

don’t have them on the base. If you bring them onto the base, previously there was no way to know when that happened if you were 

a card-carrying member of the Armed Forces, if you had your credentials. 

Now there’s going to be a requirement, and I guess there always 

was—to the same rules as anyone bringing privately-owned weapons onto base: Let us know that you’re bringing them on, right 

there at the gate. 

What doesn’t exist is any way in which bringing them on and 

concealing them, if you were a credentialed member of the Armed 

Forces, could have been detected. We really don’t have the answer 

on how to deal with that, but we do know that it is a gap in the 

protection that was accorded to those that day. 

We know one other thing. The policies vary from post to post. So 

the question we raised is simply this: Give some thought, DOD, as 

to whether you wish to have a DOD-wide policy with respect to the 

bringing and the use of private weapons on the post by those who 

are members of the U.S. military. Fairly straightforward. 

Senator THUNE. You don’t prescribe that. What you’ve just described is the policy at Fort Hood. 

Mr. WEST. Right. It varies from post to post. 

Senator THUNE. It varies from installation to installation, and 

the suggestion is simply that DOD adopt some uniform—— 

Mr. WEST. Consider, consider. 

Senator THUNE. Okay. All right, without getting into the details 

of that. 

That brings me to another question, because you have described 

the timing of the incident. News reports have indicated that it 

lasted about 10 minutes. Your report said 2 minutes and 40 seconds after the initial 9–1–1 call installation first responders arrived, 11⁄2 minutes later the assailant was incapacitated, which accounts for about 4 minutes and 10 seconds of the timeline, which 

as you said, is almost superhuman in terms of response time. It 

really is remarkable and a great credit to those who responded. 

But could we assume then that there was a time period before 

they got there, if in fact—I think you said 7 or 8 minutes. 

Mr. WEST. That was our best estimate, but for the very reasons 

you pointed out, we’re not so sure. We just stated the best estimate. 

Senator THUNE. Okay. Which is still a significant amount of 

time; I guess the question is a follow-up to the previous question. 

But if the soldiers would have been armed at the time, in other 

words allowed to carry small firearms, in your opinion could more 

lives have been saved? 

Mr. WEST. Might as well give an answer—— 

27 

Admiral CLARK. Well, they’re soldiers. If they had been carrying 

their weapons around on them, it would have been different. How 

different? How can I tell you? What would the timeline have been? 

But of course it would have been different. 

Mr. WEST. What I was hesitating about is that I thought this 

was a natural lead-in to the active shooter program as well, which 

Admiral Clark spent some time talking about. Maybe we didn’t go 

into it in detail, but the answer to your question is armed 

servicemembers could probably have done so. The difference, of 

course, is security personnel trained to take down someone in those 

circumstances differently, and in two ways. 

In the past the practice has been clear out all the innocents, 

those who are unarmed, those who are being assailed, and then 

you take down the shooter. That has been the practice for law enforcement agencies throughout the United States as well. But there 

has been the advocacy of the response to active shooter program, 

which is more and more becoming the response, which is: Train 

your security people with firearms and then go in, and as your first 

priority, take down the shooter before he or she can do more damage to those who are there. 

But the risks are obvious and that’s why the emphasis is on 

training. The FBI, who are the experts on this, have cautioned that 

you really need a carefully selected and well-trained force to do 

that. It was done at Fort Hood. 

Senator THUNE. They performed extremely well. 

Admiral CLARK. May I add one other point? My response was 

brief, almost to the point of being brusque, let me just add. It 

would have made a difference, but if I were a commander would 

that be the first thing that I did, arm all the people on the base? 

That’s not what I would do. Would it make a difference if some portion of them were armed? Of course it would. But the reason I 

wouldn’t just summarily arm everybody is because of the fact that 

it would so change the environment that we live in. I don’t think 

that’s the immediate solution to good order and discipline. 

Senator THUNE. I guess in response to that, if, in fact, there is 

going to be some consideration given to a policy, a Departmentwide policy with regard to firearms, I would hope it would not be 

more restrictive, because I do think these are soldiers. These are 

people who are trained. Clearly, if anybody would be prepared, 

probably not trained exactly in emergency response, but people who 

would be trained and prepared and equipped to effectively use a 

firearm to save other lives, it would be someone in the U.S. military. That’s my observation. 

So I have some other questions, but I’m out of time. So thank 

you all very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune. 

Senator Burris. 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, may 

I go on record as also objecting to the comment that was made by 

the distinguished Senator from Oklahoma in reference to profiling. 

I also want to commend the two distinguished public servants 

here, one of whom I’ve known since he was a freshman at Howard 

University, and to see him move through the ranks and commit all 

of this service to America is what I anticipated when I saw him as 

28 

a freshman when I was in law school at Howard, and then of 

course seeing him graduate also from Howard Law School. So, Secretary West, you have done a tremendous job for the people of 

America and we are very, very grateful to you for that. 

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Senator. Your own lifelong record of public service is quite distinguished and I consider your compliment 

that much more valuable. Thank you. 

Senator BURRIS. Admiral, I appreciate your service as well. I just 

didn’t attend school with you. 

I am really seeking to see how we get at the major problem that 

you were tasked to do. I had other questions, but the hearing has 

just provoked some other thoughts. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned 

the fact that when you take an oath of office in the military—and 

I’m just wondering whether or not there’s a different standard 

under the constitutional rights that you have after you’ve taken the 

oath of office. It’s something I may have been missing because I’ve 

never been in the military, and I just want to know whether or not 

a person who has taken an oath, there are different standards that 

they are held to, for example, the free speech article or the right 

to bear arms article, which was brought up by Senator Thune. 

Could you comment on that, please? 

Mr. WEST. I will, and then I think you’ll be interested to hear 

the views of someone who has commanded at every level and has 

had to give these instructions to his officers and those serving 

under him. 

Years ago I was the DOD General Counsel, so we tried to remain 

conversant with this for obvious reasons. I was a Judge Advocate 

General officer as well. The basic rule is stated: Servicemembers, 

whether they are officers or enlisted, who come into the Services 

are still citizens of the United States. They do not give up their 

basic constitutional rights and protections. They get to speak, especially when they’re on their own time and not in uniform, freely. 

They get to associate under the same circumstances. They are entitled, if they are accused of criminal activity while on Active Duty, 

to a trial with a number of the constitutional protections, not all, 

because, as I think Admiral Clark observed, they do agree when 

they take the oath of office to put some things, as he said, on the 

shelf. For example, when they’re in uniform they can’t just say anything they darn well please. 

I may have said it too broadly. There are lots of things you can 

add in, qualifications. But it’s just a fact of life and, frankly, when 

they’re on Active Duty in uniform they can’t just go anywhere at 

any time to do whatever they please. They are under orders. They 

are under obligations, either as officers or as noncommissioned officers, to respond as they are directed, to carry out their orders fully. 

They represent this country as well as serving it. 

Now, I’ve said that way too broadly, I’m sure. But I think it gives 

an overlay. It says yes, they don’t ever stop being citizens, they 

don’t lose their constitutional protections, but there are some limits 

that can be imposed on them under lawful military authority. 

Admiral CLARK. Secretary West said all of that like the true veteran that he is. It was absolutely perfect. I would just add that, 

so let’s say we’re having a time—it’s the political season and people 

are running for office. A member of the Armed Forces is not alVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:03 Jan 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63686.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
29 

lowed to show up there in uniform. Now, if they choose to do so— 

and I’ll use my words very carefully—they will be counseled, to be 

sure. I would say they’ll probably be part of a short but exciting 

conversation, is the way I might put it. 

There are other areas. When we’re overseas, the first thing we 

tell our sailors is: Remember, you are ambassadors of the United 

States of America. We put limits on the kind of things that we expected them to do and things that we clearly expected them not to 

do. So those are the things that we are speaking to, and certainly, 

as Secretary West said so correctly, basic constitutional rights are 

never in question. 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Admiral. 

Another general question that’s running through my mind. Now, 

in your work in this short period of time did you seek to assess 

other violent acts that may have taken place on military bases, on 

American soil or military bases, say the incident in Iraq where one 

of the soldiers supposedly snapped and killed fellow service persons? Did you look into any of that? 

Admiral CLARK. Absolutely. Team one went into great detail of 

policies across the board. They’re the group that reviewed over 

30,000 pages of instructions and policies. It was incredible. We 

called this the omnibus team. It was an unbelievable task that they 

had. They used as a frame of reference to look into these special 

cases and say, now are there weaknesses here? Because the Secretary of Defense asked us to look for weaknesses in policies, programs, procedures, and gaps. So we looked at those, and basically 

we found that—this instruction, by the way, that I hold in front of 

me has extensive detail about the questions you raise about the 

things that you can and cannot do. In other words, the prohibited 

activities are outlined here. 

But our team used those particular cases like you cited as a 

springboard and said, are the policies adequate? Fundamentally, 

what we’re reporting is that—and let me inject this thought. We 

know that you can’t legislate perfect behavior. That’s not possible. 

So the question is, are the policies fundamentally sound? The areas 

that we have put a focus on in the report, specifically this internal 

threat is the area where we see the greatest need. 

Senator BURRIS. I just wonder, gentlemen, whether or not in 

your assessment and in your report we’re trying to get at something through procedures that is almost impossible to prevent. It’s 

similar to a suicide bomber, as I would see it, a person who is willing to commit his own death. All the policies and procedures that 

we would put in place, all the corrections—for example, Mr. Secretary, if you were to have some type of procedure to go on base, 

whether or not you bring your private arms on base or not, what 

happens if the commanding officer was to have a problem? Do you 

think that the military police is going to stop a commanding officer 

at the gate and search him for his own private weapon and determine whether or not, if he’s bringing that weapon on base, if he 

is determined to make some type of violent act or statement? 

I just bring that up as a result of our attempt to try to get procedures that are going to be in the place that would seek to prevent 

someone from doing such a violent act. 

30 

Mr. WEST. That’s a very pertinent observation, Senator Burris, 

and it is exactly on point. It is why we have emphasized in our report that we can’t rely solely on stopping someone at the boundary. 

We have to have looked for the signs, for the 100-yard stare, for 

the examples of tensions or difficulties even in a personal life, and 

we can do this if they use government facilities—for the communications with extremist persons or organizations on a repeated 

basis. 

We can look for all those signs. We can look for the signs of drug 

abuse because—and I mention that so often because there is some 

literature that our team one found, incidentally, has its report in 

chapter 2. We looked for those signs—that say that past drug 

abuse, even when corrected, is often linked to later outbreaks of violence. So we have to look for what Admiral Clark discussed in his 

opening statement as the behavioral cues and indicators, and we 

must do that over the course, say, of the colonel’s service, to find 

them early enough so that it doesn’t get to the point that he brings 

his weapon onto their base in some crazed effort. 

Now that is the thrust, frankly, of the entire report, and thank 

you for getting right to the heart of it. 

Senator BURRIS. Mr. Secretary, the question is, can this and will 

this happen again? God knows we don’t want it to. But think about 

it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Burris. 

Senator LeMieux. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary and Admiral, again to add to my colleagues, thank you 

for the work that you’ve done. Thank you for your past service. 

Thank you for this service. 

I also want to extend my condolences to the families of the Fort 

Hood soldiers who were killed. We’re keeping them in our thoughts 

and our prayers. 

I want to, first of all, just state that I think we all agree, and 

your report certainly says, that this was a failure on the front end. 

We commend the first responders for their fantastic work, but this 

was a failure. I don’t want to belabor that, because I think it’s been 

talked about, Mr. Chairman. 

But there’s a Houston Chronicle article of yesterday, Richard 

Lardner and Calvin Woodward, that I’d ask be submitted for the 

record, which I think details a lot of the failures in monitoring 

Major Hassan along the way, and that something should have been 

done to prevent this. 

Chairman LEVIN. It will be made part of the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

31 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, sir. 

What I want to talk about is three things, and there are questions for you. The first one is to follow up on what Senator Thune 

was talking about concerning soldiers on the base carrying weapons. This struck me as well because I recently this past week went 

to four military bases in Florida, from Naval Air Station Pensacola, 

to Tindall, to Eglin, to Hurlbert Air Force Base. The thing that you 

notice different than going to a military base in a theater of war, 

like going to Bagram Air Force Base, is that the soldiers and the 

airmen and the sailors aren’t carrying weapons. But when you’re 

at Bagram you see half of the service men and women carrying 

their weapons. 


121ful80.eps
32 

I don’t think that this would have happened potentially at 

Bagram Air Force Base for two reasons. One is there would have 

been a huge deterrent to Major Hassan if he knew that the other 

soldiers were carrying weapons. The second thing is, if it would 

have happened, to follow up on Senator Thune’s point, that 4 minutes of time or whatever the period was where there was no first 

responder there, one of our servicemembers I am sure would have 

picked up their weapon and fired back. 

I hope that you will in your continuing work stress this to the 

Secretary of Defense, because, while I understand the Admiral’s 

point about order on the base, there is probably a sweet spot here 

where some of the folks on a base, even in the United States of 

America, should be carrying weapons, maybe where there’s going 

to be large groups gathered, I guess like where this processing center was happening. 

So I don’t know if you have any further comments on that. 

You’ve already answered Senator Thune’s question, but I want to 

make that point. Mr. Secretary? 

Mr. WEST. I have a comment, and that is this. It has happened 

overseas where people have been carrying weapons. We’ve had incidents in which a soldier has gone berserk and started shooting and 

there were weapons around him; it didn’t stop it. 

Second, let’s assume that everyone’s able to carry weapons, say 

at Fort Hood. Well then, for a committed person it wouldn’t have 

been necessary to smuggle them in to use them. 

Then third, I guess—well, no. I think first and second is enough. 

If the Admiral wants to add a third, I will let him. 

Admiral CLARK. I don’t argue with your fundamental point. I 

would just say that as a commander I realized that I was responsible for the creation of the environment. So the deployed environment is always different than the environment at home. So I think 

there are a lot of things that I could figure out how to do before 

I decided to arm every single human being on the base. 

I don’t discount at all your point about the degree of difficulty for 

a shooter. But I believe Secretary West has accurately responded. 

We have cases, to be sure, and we have been very careful not to 

define specific single-point dot solutions for these cases because, for 

starters, we did this in an extraordinarily short period of time. If 

we were going to then look at all the possible courses of alternative 

solutions for every one of the recommendations we made, we would 

have needed at least 6 months and not the short time we had. 

Senator LEMIEUX. I understand that. I’m just saying that there’s 

a general point. I used the term ‘‘sweet spot’’ for a reason, not that 

you would put a gun on every service man or woman’s side, but 

that there be some thought about this point, because I do think 

that knowing that someone is bearing arms is a deterrent. Maybe 

it hasn’t always been a deterrent, but it can be a deterrent. It certainly might have saved 13 people. We don’t know, but it might 

have saved some of them. 

The second thing is, in terms of—Senator Collins is going to 

speak in a minute and her Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs Committee, along with Senator Lieberman, has talked 

about the need for training for all servicemembers in identifying 

signs of Islamic extremism. I wonder if we don’t only need to enVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:03 Jan 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63686.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
33 

courage our servicemembers to look for these signs and report 

them, but that we need to do more than that and require it. 

I think about something that universities do. I didn’t attend the 

University of Virginia, but I understand they have a very stringent 

honor code. The honor code can be broken in two ways: one, by violating it; and the second is failing to report that someone else violated it. I wonder for your consideration, whether or not we should 

make a suggestion like that, that you have an obligation as a member of the U.S. military that if you see something that is out of line, 

to report it. There, if I feel like in my service record I’m going to 

be reprimanded for not reporting something—none of us like to tell 

on our colleagues. It’s human nature. But I also commend that to 

you as something you could consider, and if you want to comment 

on that I’d appreciate that as well. 

Admiral CLARK. I think these are the kind of questions, all in 

pursuit of potential solutions, that the Secretary would think is 

going on, without suggesting whether one is the right solution or 

not. Phase two is to do the drill-down, and they couldn’t do the 

drill-down on the whole breadth of things that we looked at 30,000- 

plus pages of directions and policies and all of that. Our job was 

to put the spotlight on the key things that they could go do in a 

hurry. It’s my understanding that’s his expectation for phase two. 

Senator LEMIEUX. The third and final point I have is, we’ve 

heard this phrase, ‘‘connect-the-dots.’’ I heard it yesterday when we 

had a Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee hearing 

with Secretary Napolitano and Director Leitner about the Christmas Day bombing attempt. That’s, obviously, the great struggle, is 

connecting the dots. You mentioned, Admiral, perhaps having some 

other special unit or division of people who would try to do that. 

That seems to be smart to me, that you have someone who’s 

going to look through all of the information, not be tasked with 

maybe other jobs, but be tasked with trying to—I don’t know if it’s 

an internal affairs function or if it’s just a function to make sure 

that someone is out there looking at these reports that are filled 

out on different service men and women. I know there’s a lot of 

people in the U.S. military. 

But we have really good technology in this country, technology 

that’s being used by the private sector. I don’t know if these reports 

are scanned. I don’t know if they’re entered on a computer. I don’t 

know if someone can use cloud computing and some of these new 

techniques to do searches. 

We’ve failed again on the almost terrible tragedy on Christmas 

Day because of a misspelling of a name and other things that failed 

in our intelligence and the way that we process, gather, and evaluate intelligence. One thing I just might commend to you in your 

further discussions with the Secretary is, if you do establish one of 

these units, talking to people in the private sector who develop this 

wonderful technology and see if it might be an aid for helping keep 

our service men and women safe. 

Admiral CLARK. May I comment? We say in the report that we’ve 

been having arguments about who owns what pieces of information. We’ve been having those discussions long enough. It’s time to 

move on. So without defining what that solution is, I don’t know 

34 

how a commander can possibly connect the dots if he doesn’t have 

all the dots in his dot kit. ‘‘Dot kit’’ may be the right term. 

But also, I bring attention to this point. We told the Secretary 

this isn’t just interagency. This is inside the Department as well. 

Challenge the assumptions on who has all of the pieces of information. The commanders will be better equipped and we know how 

brilliant they are when they’re given the tools. 

Mr. WEST. Actually, I think the organization that you’re thinking 

about that we recommended was one that’s designed to collect all 

the indicators, keep them catalogued, update them regularly, and 

make them available to commanders and those who have to make 

decisions. Your idea has, I think, to do with connecting dots on specific individuals, where those things come up. That’s an interesting 

concept and it’s not one that we necessarily focused on. Thank you 

for that. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator LeMieux. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thanks very much 

to Secretary West and Admiral Clark for the service that you’ve 

given in doing this report, and of course throughout your lives. The 

attack of November 5, 2009, was a tragedy and we’re very grateful 

for the efforts that you’ve made along with DOD personnel working 

with you in this review to ensure that such a tragedy doesn’t happen again. 

The Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee— 

and Senator Collins and I are here—has been investigating the 

Fort Hood shootings to assess the information the government had 

prior to the shootings and the actions it took in response to that 

information. I can tell you that, even at this early stage of our investigation, it’s become apparent to us that DOD’s approach to the 

threat of servicemembers who adopt a violent Islamist extremist 

ideology needs to be revised. 

Senator Collins and I sent a letter last week along those lines to 

Secretary Gates. I know there’s sensitivity on this about the other 

Muslim Americans who are serving honorably in our military, but 

I honestly think that a more focused approach, an open approach 

on Islamist extremism, will protect the overwhelming majority of 

Muslim Americans serving in the military, who are serving honorably, and will maintain the bonds of trust that are so necessary in 

a military context among servicemembers of all religions. 

It seems to me in the Fort Hood case that there were many indicators that Nidal Hassan was motivated to commit these murders 

in furtherance of his own violent Islamist extremist ideology. But 

I must say respectfully that your report only tangentially mentions 

that particular threat. In contrast, your review recommends generally that the Department ‘‘identify common indicators leading up 

to a wide range of destructive events, regardless of the individual’s 

identity.’’ 

I understand again DOD’s need to be sensitive to the religious 

beliefs of all its servicemembers and employees. But I think it’s 

also critically important, and I don’t see it in your report, as much 

as I admire so many of the recommendations you’ve made, that we 

35 

recognize the specific threats posed by violent Islamist extremism 

to our military. 

So I wanted to ask you first, how do you think the Department 

and the Services should address the specific threat of violent 

Islamist extremism and if you want to respond to my concern generally about this? I will add that I remember being disappointed, 

troubled, after the Fort Hood murders when General Casey’s first 

response described the incident as a force protection failure, which 

I suppose in one sense it was. But it was also a terrorist attack in 

my opinion. To a certain extent, the title of your report, ‘‘Protecting 

the Force,’’ continues that emphasis, as opposed to a focused emphasis on the problem we’re facing now, just as we focused earlier, 

after Fort Bragg, on the very real problem explicitly of white 

supremist extremism. 

So I welcome your response generally and particularly. 

Mr. WEST. I was the Secretary of the Army at the time of the 

Fort Bragg, Senator, and because I was given a little more leeway 

I was the one who ordered the review that occurred. We operated 

under the same constraints then that—the folks we appointed operated under the same constraints then that we operate under now. 

That is, they had an ongoing military justice investigation and in 

fact, because the victims were civilians and the acts occurred off 

post in Fayetteville, still to this day one is struck. I mean, the 

servicemembers required two civilians to kneel and shot them execution-style. 

So there were several, multiple criminal investigations, and so 

that task force that we appointed could not get into what might 

have been criminal aspects or anything that would have imperiled 

the trials. We operated under that same constraint. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay, so that’s the reason you thought you 

couldn’t be more explicit about Islamist extremism? 

Mr. WEST. What we had to say, a lot of it is in the restricted 

annex. But no, I think to your second point we had is, respectfully, 

yes, it was and yes, it is a force protection issue. That is the way 

in which it was handed to us and that is the way in which we had 

to approach it. 

In that case, it is every kind of extremism, every kind of opportunity for violence, that we, if we’re going to have this one shot, 

Admiral Clark and I, to make recommendations to DOD, have to 

be sure to cover. So yes, we went for indicators, for cues and the 

like, but we did not exclude any source of violence and we specifically did not exclude the source that comes from radical Islamic belief associated with the actions that go with it. 

Admiral Clark has some thoughts I know he wants to add. We 

talked about it more than once. So I’m going to stop here, but 

that’s my brief oversight of how we approached it. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me just, before we go to Admiral Clark, 

just follow up while I’m thinking about it, because after those heinous murders at Fort Bragg in 1995 the Army, as General Keane 

testified to us, issued a pamphlet, training materials, that are quite 

directly oriented towards supremist activities and other racial extremism, and specifically detailed some of the key indicators to look 

for in white supremists, which I thought was exactly the right 

thing to do, of course. 

36 

I guess the question now is do you think the Services should 

issue a similar type of pamphlet with the same kinds of recommendations to address the threat of violent Islamist extremism, 

because that is the reality. Of course—do you want to respond to 

that? 

Mr. WEST. Only that I think you make a good point. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay, thank you. 

Admiral, please. 

Admiral CLARK. Good to see you again, Senator. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. You too, Admiral. 

Admiral CLARK. In my opening statement I talked about violence 

and I made the point that some have indicated that we did not address the kind of violence that you’re speaking to, radical Islamic 

fundamentalism and the behavior that goes with that. The point 

that I made is, yes, we did. Because Secretary Gates wrote us a 

set of terms of reference that talked about violence in the workplace and the people, including people hurting themselves, we decided to go after it in that way. 

But we used the term ‘‘radicalization’’ and ‘‘self-radicalization’’ 

dozens of times in the report, which we intended to make clear 

we’re talking about every kind of violent behavior, including this. 

Then we go on to then specify in our recommendations—and I 

made the point about, here’s the DOD directive that talks about 

prohibited activities. Our point is this document is inadequate to 

the task when dealing with self-radicalized individuals. 

So that’s what we’re talking about. I could not agree with you 

more completely that we need the outreach program. ‘‘Outreach,’’ 

I mean we have to reach out and let people know what the positions are and where the red lines are in behaviors, and then with 

that goes all of the training that you talked to. So I made that a 

matter of my prior testimony and I’m in complete alignment with 

that view. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that clarification. In my opinion, because—of course there’s a concern about force protection generally. But because this is a unique new threat we’re facing, I think 

the more explicit we are about it the clearer it’s going to be and 

the better off we’re going to be, because, as somebody said, some 

of the regulations earlier had to do with almost Cold War scenarios, and then the obvious response to the white supremist 

killings. Now, unfortunately, we’ve had now two cases, Akbar in 

Kuwait and Hassan. Unfortunately, the way things are going, we’ll 

probably have some more. So for the protection of the force, I think 

we have to be really explicit about what this threat is. 

My time is up. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, it’s good to see you both. Thank you for your continued public service. 

Senator Lieberman, the chairman of our Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs Committee, has asked exactly the questions 

that I planned to ask, which is not a surprise because we’ve been 

working together on the whole issue of homegrown terrorism and 

the threat of Islamist extremism. 

37 

I do want to follow up a bit on the point that Senator Lieberman 

just made, because I was struck when I read the public part of your 

report by the decision to omit the term ‘‘Islamist extremism’’ from 

the public report, and it troubled me. It troubled me because it appeared to contrast sharply with the approach that DOD has taken 

in the past. Your report recommends that the Army focus on a 

broad range of motivations for violence rather than focusing on specific causes. But that’s not what the Department and the Army did 

after the racially motivated murders associated with Fort Bragg 

back in 1995. The 1995 guidance is striking because it squarely 

faces the problem, and I believe that’s why it was so effective. It 

sent a clear message that white supremists had no place among 

our troops. 

I believe we need to send a similarly clear message. Indeed, in 

1996, in response to the Fort Bragg incident—and obviously, Mr. 

Secretary, you’re more familiar with it than I since you were involved in correcting the problem at the time—but in response, commanders were specifically advised to be aware of ‘‘indicators of possible extremist views, behaviors, or affiliations.’’ They were told to 

look for specific signs, such as reading materials or the use of a 

personal computer to visit extremist sites. These signs were geared 

toward identifying white supremists within the ranks. 

What Senator Lieberman and I have suggested in our letter to 

Secretary Gates is that same kind of focus, squarely admitting 

what the problem is. So my worry is that the perception of your 

report for those who only get to read the public part will be that 

we’re not facing the problem squarely the way we did in the mid1990s, and it worked. The guidance was excellent. It involved 

training our commanders or enlisted troops, and it appears to have 

been very successful. 

So, without presuming to speak for my chairman, Senator 

Lieberman, that’s what we’re suggesting, that we squarely face this 

threat to our troops. 

So I would end what I realize has been more of a comment than 

a question by urging you to more explicitly address this specific 

threat. It doesn’t ignore the fact that there are other sources of violence. But in fact, family violence, suicide prevention, sexual assault, all extremely important priorities for us, but they are different in their nature than the threat from Islamic extremists. 

So I’d ask you to comment particularly on whether we should 

have specific training to recognize the signs of radicalization in this 

area. Mr. Secretary and then Admiral Clark. 

Mr. WEST. It’s almost impossible to have a comment, Senator. 

That was a very powerful statement, along with Senator 

Lieberman’s statement. You of course put me a little bit under the 

gun by pointing out that that’s what we did in the Army when that 

occurred. 

I won’t even spend time on the distinctions. I think there are 

some clearly. Being a white supremist carries no overtones of constitutional protections of any sort, whereas a religion is always— 

I know I’m going to be accused of being politically correct here, but 

so what—is always an area where we have to go carefully. 

For example, religious extremism, violent, aggressive religious 

extremism, is a source of threat to our soldiers, sailors, marines, 

38 

airmen, and coastguardsmen, whatever the religious source. We 

need to be careful, and we tried to be careful when we did this, to 

make sure that we turn the military’s attention inward, since the 

person that was quoted earlier as having talked about the Cold 

War, that was Secretary Gates. What he was pointing out was 

something we said, which is we have been focused on the external 

threat. Now we have to look at the internal threat, from within, 

from one of our own. 

As I said before, this is our one shot at it, Admiral Clark and 

I, and we want to make sure that we look at the indicators, and 

religious extremism, whatever its source, is an indicator, and there 

are a whole bunch of things to look at. I think that description is 

right. The fact, as you both make it, that it is Islamic religious extremism, I think it is a point worth making. I think the Secretary 

and everyone will hear it and they will react accordingly. But that 

becomes part of the history of this discussion. 

Senator COLLINS. Admiral Clark. 

Admiral CLARK. It’s so nice to see you again, Senator. It’s been 

a privilege for me to be engaged working on this task. When the 

Secretary of Defense asked me to do this, I did so because I believed it was so important. 

Let me say that within 5 minutes of it going public that I was 

going to co-chair this task force with Secretary West, my very good 

friend General Jack Keane was calling on the phone and telling me 

in great detail—I was driving down the road on my cell phone, and 

he was explaining to me how they did it. He happened to have been 

in command down there at Fort Bragg and I was commander of the 

Second Fleet and we were friends and worked together down there 

then. 

So I’ve been mindful of his point of view on this since the very, 

very beginning and was in complete alignment with it. 

To build upon my response to Senator Lieberman, I’m just going 

to give you Vern’s view here. We talked about this a lot, how do 

we shape this. If we shape this as—if the report was full of reference to radical Islamic fundamentalist activity and behavior, 

some people would have read it that it was going to be all about 

that. The Secretary of Defense clearly gave us another task. He 

gave us the task to deal with violence in the workplace across the 

board, and because he did we made the decision that we were going 

to handle it the way we have presented it, but when questioned 

about—we frankly, Senator, didn’t know how people were going to 

be able to misread the references to self-radicalization. We thought 

that that was going to be pretty clear, but maybe it wasn’t clear 

enough. 

Our focus then, and one of our primary recommendations is the 

guidance on these behaviors is inadequate, and the way you make 

it adequate is you decide what the red lines are going to be, you 

inform your people, you do everything that you know how to do— 

and that’s called training—to ensure that our people know how to 

respond. That’s what those of us who’ve had the privilege to command are charged to do. We talk about officership in the report and 

so forth. That’s what leaders do and that is what is required. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins. 

39 

I was listening to Senator Lieberman and Senator Collins with 

the suggestion that we address a specific threat, since it obviously 

is a specific threat. It is appropriate that our leaders be directed 

as to how to address that threat, just the way they were, I guess, 

in the 1990s with the white supremacists, but to make it clear and 

to make it certain that it’s not viewed as an anti-Muslim effort, but 

rather an effort to address violent extremism, radical Islamic extremism, it would be very essential, it seems to me, wise that people 

who were involved in preparing that kind of instruction include 

Muslims, because obviously that would be important in terms of 

knowledge of the threat, but also important in terms of making it 

clear that is not anti-Muslim. 99 percent of Muslims are not people 

who are engaged in these kind of activities, and to make it clear 

it’s not this kind of an effort, which I think is a legitimate effort, 

that Senator Lieberman and Senator Collins talk about. That is a 

legitimate effort to make it clear that it is not aimed at Muslims, 

but aimed at violent Islamic radical extremism, and it’s important 

that Muslims be significantly involved in that direction. 

I was wondering if Senator Lieberman or Senator Collins might 

want to comment on that suggestion. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think that’s an excellent 

suggestion. In some ways you’ve given voice to it. But it would be 

a real omission, as I hear you talk, if it wasn’t done, in other words 

if Muslims weren’t involved. 

One of the things in this fact situation that troubles me, and I 

suppose why I feel like we have to talk explicitly to one another 

about this threat, including most of all to have in the conversation 

Muslim Americans. Obviously, as Senator Levin said, 99 percent 

plus are not extremists or terrorists. 

I worry as I look at this fact situation in Hassan’s case that part 

of the reason that commanders and others who after the attacks 

at Fort Hood were spewing out to the media these signs that 

looked back and said he showed he was really turning in a very 

extremist, anti-American direction, that people didn’t voice them or 

record them because of political correctness and, even more than 

political correctness, the sensitivity that we all have about religious 

discussions. 

But the truth is, the best thing that could happen here, it’s a 

great place for it to begin, in the military, is to have a real open 

discussion about this. Of course, for it to be a real discussion it has 

to include Muslim Americans. So I think your suggestion—in other 

words, I think that if Muslim Americans had been seeing—I don’t 

know what the facts were about this—some of the things that Hassan was saying at Walter Reed, for instance, I think they would 

have been alarmed, because this doesn’t reflect what they think. 

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I think your suggestion is really an excellent one. Thank you. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, if I could just respond as well. 

I too think that your suggestion is an excellent one and it’s very 

consistent with the approach that Senator Lieberman and I have 

advocated on the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Committee. In fact, in our letter to Secretary Gates where we suggest more training, we point out that updating the approach would 

help to protect from suspicion the thousands of Muslim Americans 

40 

who are serving honorably in the U.S. military and help to maintain the bonds of trust among servicemembers of all religions and 

enhance understanding. 

So the steps that we have recommended would clearly benefit 

from the inclusion and active involvement of Muslim Americans, 

and that’s what we intended. But I also think it has benefits for 

Muslim Americans serving, so that other servicemembers have a 

better understanding of Islam. So I’m in complete accord with what 

you suggest. I think that is along the lines of what we were proposing as well. 

I would ask that we share with our two distinguished witnesses 

today the recommendations that Senator Lieberman and I have 

made in our January 13 letter to Secretary Gates, because as you 

go forward with your work it may be of value to you as well, we 

hope. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. One other thing that seems to me 

would be appropriate, and I don’t know if you’ve addressed this, 

but it’s sort of along this line: that our policies also should be very 

clear about why it is unacceptable, why it’s not allowed, prohibited, 

to have taunting or harassment of people because of their religious 

views, as, according to the public record, occurred in the Hassan 

case. 

I don’t know if that’s true and I can’t comment on your annex, 

but it seems to me this is part and parcel. Religious tolerance does 

not mean tolerance for violence and extremism. It doesn’t mean 

that, as I pointed out maybe an hour ago. That’s not what we’re 

tolerant of. But what we are tolerant of, and proud of it, is other 

people’s religious views. As part of that, it has to be importantly 

pointed out in the military that that means we do not accept 

taunts, graffiti about ‘‘ragheads’’ or what have you, about anyone’s 

religious views. I don’t know if that is part of your recommendations here, that that be clear as well in terms of guidance, but it 

seems to me it’s an important part of it. 

Admiral CLARK. Let me address it. It’s very well covered in the 

prohibited behaviors and activities. 

Chairman LEVIN. You mean currently? 

Admiral CLARK. Currently. It’s very well spelled out. So I’ve spoken only to what’s not in this document. What’s in this document 

is 100 percent right, and what we have said is this document does 

not have the piece in it regarding self-radicalized behavior. 

Mr. Chairman, I so want to appreciate the fact that you have collectively recognized the very effective and loyal service of thousands of Muslims. Somebody accused me of being politically correct. 

I don’t care. The way you said it is exactly right and I appreciate 

it. 

Chairman LEVIN. One thing to make this even more complex. 

When we talk about connecting the dots, and we have to do a far 

better job of connecting the dots—I believe that’s the greatest failure in this and the other incidents that we’ve been discussing in 

various committees—there are counter-indicating dots that complicate the work, including with Major Hassan. It’s not just those 

dots which in my view would have made folks suspicious, had they 

known about it, of what his potential was, but there are some dots 

that go in the other direction in terms of—and these are in the 

41 

public record—what his patients thought of him, which was very 

high. You have to throw those dots into the mix, too, for people who 

are going to be judging him. 

You have a record here of a number of his assessments were not 

just negative—that should have been included in the record, by the 

way; I happen to agree with you totally—but there’s also some 

highly positive, not politically correct for that reason, but positive, 

assessments of his capability. 

I just think it’s important that, since we’re trying to take a general view of this, that while it’s critically important to do a far better job of collecting dots, that we also recognize in terms of the task 

in front of us that there are some dots that are going to be in that 

mix which make it very unclear what you do with the dots which 

seem to point in one direction, because there are some dots that 

point in the other direction, even with him. They’ve not been focused on, obviously, but there are some counter-indicators here 

which are fairly clear as well. 

Finally, Admiral, you talk about reducing—‘‘eliminating’’ I think 

is your word—the barriers, get rid of the barriers to information 

flow. I think generally you’re right, and there’s barriers here which 

clearly should not be there. So I agree with your premise. Are there 

any barriers that you’d want to maintain, either privacy barriers 

or barriers—for instance, you talked about I think prior drug problem or an addiction problem which has been overcome. Some of 

that’s not passed along now. If it’s been overcome, I think there’s 

some instinct in commanders that maybe we should just let certain 

things not be passed along which would unfairly perhaps hurt 

somebody’s career path if they’ve overcome a problem. 

Are there any barriers that you might want to keep? 

Admiral CLARK. There may be, and if I were responsible for the 

policy review I would then look at all of the potential courses of action and make that kind of determination. But let me give you an 

example of the manner in which I might decide to handle the case 

you just suggested, because, as you correctly pointed out, by regulation there is some documentation that is not allowed to proceed 

from command to command. 

We could figure out how to compartmentalize information. We do 

it in the intelligence world all the time. The briefer comes into the 

room with the material that’s in the pouch, that only certain people 

get to see that information. It would be very possible to have information that might be vital to connecting the dots that is currently 

not passed, passed in a way that’s compartmented so that a select 

group of people had access to the information. 

I believe that that’s inherent in achieving the correct balance, 

Secretary West and I would not want anything that was said here 

to imply in any way that the balance between these issues isn’t— 

it’s very, very important. You have addressed it correctly. This is 

a challenge. 

One of the hallmarks of the U.S. military is we grow and develop 

people. I’ve had dozens of these interviews with people: Okay, 

you’re getting a new job, this is turning over a new leaf, this is the 

time to go get it. We’ve seen people turn their lives around. This 

is one of the great things about our institution. 

42 

So clearly these are issues that the policymakers have to come 

to grips with. Our task was put the spotlight on policies, weaknesses, gaps, and that’s what we have tried to do. I do believe that 

there may be places where barriers should be retained in some 

way. 

Chairman LEVIN. Maybe for some purpose. 

Admiral CLARK. For some purpose. 

Chairman LEVIN. Maybe in a promotion. 

Admiral CLARK. Exactly. 

Chairman LEVIN. It’s different from whether it’s a strategic 

issue. 

Admiral CLARK. Exactly. But what I’m suggesting is that people 

who are responsible for these policy decisions know what the vital 

dots look like, know where they come from. As the report says and 

I said in my earlier testimony, the time is passed for us to be having these turf wars on who owns the information. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think we couldn’t agree with you more, and 

this is a major challenge for all of us in the Senate and the House 

and our committees and, even more importantly probably, for the 

executive branch. 

Senator Lieberman, do you want to add anything? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. No, thanks. 

Chairman LEVIN. We thank you for all the work you’re doing, not 

just here but on the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 

Committtee. That committee is doing critically important work. 

We’re now going to move to a closed session of the committee. 

We’ll meet in room 222 in Russell, our committee room. In accordance with restrictions placed on access to the restricted annex, attendance will be limited to Senators and committee professional 

staff. 

We again thank our witnesses, not just for their work in this regard, but for their lifelong work on behalf of our Nation. 

The committee will stand adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

INDICATORS FOR VIOLENCE

1. Senator AKAKA. Mr. West, research into the various predictors and causes of 

violence span many disciplines and offer varying perspectives regarding why some 

people resort to violence. These range from biological, to religious, social, and political factors. The four recommendations contained in 2.1 ‘‘Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood, Report of the Department of Defense (DOD) Independent Review, January 2010’’ (Independent Review) coalesce around the identification of contributing factors of violent actions and the reporting of behavioral indicators of violent actors. How must the DOD adequately update and strengthen programs, policies, processes, and procedures that address the identification of indicators for violence without violating the civil liberties that are enjoyed by the military members 

of the Armed Forces as well as DOD civilians? 

Mr. WEST. The Department should thoughtfully consider a wide range of options 

and exercise due caution to avoid infringing on civil liberties. There are risk-assessment tools available for the Department’s consideration that would enhance DOD’s 

ability to deal with potential internal threats without compromising fundamental 

civil liberties. In particular, DOD should draw on the expertise of the law enforcement community, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which has 

developed methodologies to help understand the motivations and behaviors of violent offenders. My understanding is that the FBI has already been assisting DOD 

in understanding these issues. 

43 

We recommend that DOD continue to coordinate with the FBI Behavioral Science 

Unit, under their comprehensive analysis of military offenders project to identify behavioral indicators that are specific to DOD personnel that would be used to help 

protect against internal threats. 

We also recommend that the Department develop tools and programs that would 

educate DOD personnel about indicators of possible violent behavior and help them 

determine the risk that such behavior might occur. 

RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS

2. Senator AKAKA. Mr. West, recommendation 2.7 of the Independent Review 

states that the DOD should promptly establish standards and reporting procedures 

that clarify guidelines for religious accommodations. How must the DOD adequately 

clarify policy regarding religious accommodations to help commanders distinguish 

appropriate religious practices from those that might indicate a potential for violence or self-radicalization while balancing the civil liberties that are enjoyed by the 

military members of the Armed Forces as well as DOD civilians? 

Mr. WEST. The Department should issue clear guidance to provide a common 

source for commanders, supervisors, and chaplains to distinguish appropriate religious practices. The Department should exercise due caution to avoid infringing on 

civil liberties. Clear standards would ensure consistent mechanisms across the military departments, assisting commanders and supervisors in assessing behavior and 

initiating action, if appropriate. 

HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS

3. Senator AKAKA. Admiral Clark, healthcare providers experience traumatic 

stress and provider burnout and are stigmatized when seeking treatment for stress 

and burnout. Other career fields, such as the Chaplaincy and their support personnel, have programs that assess stress and burnout. Recommendation 5.3 of the 

Independent Review states that the DOD should review its requirement to de-stigmatize healthcare providers who seek treatment. What steps should the DOD undertake to ensure the resiliency and recovery of healthcare providers so that they 

can continue to provide members of the Armed Forces and their families with the 

best healthcare? 

Admiral CLARK. In order to ensure that healthcare providers can continue to provide outstanding care for warriors and their families as well as receive outstanding 

care themselves, DOD can take several steps to make certain that a good balance 

is being struck between health care for the warrior and health care for the provider. 

DOD’s current deployment model, for example, should be reviewed to assess whether it provides sufficient continuity of care for redeploying servicemembers while not 

delaying recovery for health care providers who have been assigned to deploying 

combat units. DOD has a number of policies in place designed to guarantee that 

U.S. military forces receive top quality care and we are looking for further ways to 

integrate these policies and properly resource them to positively affect the Department’s ability to continue delivering the best care available to all military members 

and their families. 

OFFICERSHIP

4. Senator AKAKA. Admiral Clark, the joint opening statement refers to the fact 

that several individuals failed to apply professional standards of officership regarding the alleged perpetrator and that you recommended the Secretary of Defense forward these issues of accountability to the Secretary of the Army. How should the 

DOD address what the Independent Review characterizes as the failure to apply 

professional standards of officership and to make the reflection of an individual’s 

total performance an accepted and standard practice throughout the Services? 

Admiral CLARK. The conduct of Major Hasan’s colleagues and former supervisors 

remains under review, and it would be inappropriate to comment at this time. Consistent with the recommendations of the Independent Review Panel, the Secretary 

of Defense referred issues of individual accountability to the Secretary of the Army 

for review and action as appropriate. Secretary McHugh assigned senior military 

leaders to investigate further, to assess accountability, and, as appropriate, to take 

final action. This process remains ongoing. 

44 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KAY R. HAGAN

ACTIONS NOT TAKEN BY ARMY OFFICERS

5. Senator HAGAN. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, several officers failed to comply 

with existing Army policies when taking actions regarding the perpetrator, Major 

Hassan. There were also significant discrepancies between Major Hassan’s performance in official records and his actual performance during training, residency, and 

fellowship. It seems that medical officers failed to include his overall performance 

as an officer, and instead, focused on his academic performance. 

We have to ensure that performance appraisals accurately provide a holistic overview of professional, ethical, and personal career development of all personnel. Incomplete performance appraisals prevent us from recognizing vital warning signs in 

dealing with internal threats. They also prevent leaders from being alert to psychological and emotional risk factors of servicemembers and civilians. How should Secretary of Defense Gates and Secretary of the Army McHugh ensure accountability 

for those failures by some medical officers that did not apply appropriate judgment? 

Mr. WEST and Admiral CLARK. Consistent with the recommendations of the Independent Review Panel, the Secretary of Defense referred issues of individual accountability to the Secretary of the Army for review and action as appropriate. Secretary McHugh assigned senior military leaders to investigate further, to assess accountability, and, as appropriate, to take final action. This process remains ongoing. 

6. Senator HAGAN. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, why did Major Hassan’s colleagues and former supervisors wait until after the Fort Hood incident to speak 

about the content of his extremist religious views? 

Mr. WEST and Admiral CLARK. The conduct of Major Hasan’s colleagues and 

former supervisors remains under review, and it would be inappropriate to comment 

at this time. Consistent with the recommendations of the Independent Review 

Panel, the Secretary of Defense referred issues of individual accountability to the 

Secretary of the Army for review and action as appropriate. Secretary McHugh assigned senior military leaders to investigate further, to assess accountability, and, 

as appropriate, to take final action. This process remains ongoing. 

7. Senator HAGAN. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, what did the Army’s higher authorities do when complaints were sent up the chain? 

Mr. WEST and Admiral CLARK. The conduct of Major Hasan’s colleagues and 

former supervisors remains under review, and it would be inappropriate to comment 

at this time. Consistent with the recommendations of the Independent Review 

Panel, the Secretary of Defense referred issues of individual accountability to the 

Secretary of the Army for review and action as appropriate. Secretary McHugh assigned senior military leaders to investigate further, to assess accountability, and, 

as appropriate, to take final action. This process remains ongoing. 

INTERAGENCY INFORMATION SHARING

8. Senator HAGAN. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, I agree that in order to protect 

the force, our civilian leaders and commanders in the field need immediate access 

to sensitive information regarding servicemembers’ personal contacts, connections, 

or relationships with organizations promoting radicalization and violence. I encourage the Army and the DOD at-large to adopt the recommendation of the Independent Review to increase service representation on Joint Terrorism Task Forces 

and coordination with the FBI. What suggestions and recommendations can you 

offer to facilitate enhanced cooperation and information sharing between executive 

department agencies like the FBI, National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, and the Army Secretariat? 

Mr. WEST and Admiral CLARK. Liaison and information sharing agreements already exist among the executive department agencies you mention, but they can be 

strengthened. Many of these liaison and information sharing agreements currently 

focus on antiterrorism cooperation, potentially precluding the agencies from sharing 

sensitive information pertaining to a servicemember’s propensity to commit violent 

acts. DOD should review the scope of these agreements to determine where they can 

appropriately be expanded and strengthened to enhance a commander’s ability to 

assess his or her personnel. 

We were pleased to learn that Secretary Gates approved our recommendation to 

establish a single organization within DOD to manage its participation in the Joint 

Terrorism Task Forces. We also are pleased the Secretary approved our recVerDate Aug 31 2005 16:03 Jan 24, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\63686.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
45 

ommendation to revise significantly DOD’s Memorandum of Understanding with the 

FBI. 

9. Senator HAGAN. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, what challenges do you foresee? 

Mr. WEST and Admiral CLARK. First, revising interagency agreements is often a 

time-consuming process, particularly in the case of agreements that involve multiple 

interagency partners. Second, comprehensively accounting for all existing agreements will likely also be a time-consuming process. For example, in some cases, 

each Service has a separate agreement with a particular Federal agency on information sharing. Determining where these agreements differ, what the gaps are between them, and whether it is necessary or desirable to bring them under a single 

umbrella will be time consuming. 

ENSURING THAT FORCE PROTECTION POLICIES COUNTER INTERNAL THREATS

10. Senator HAGAN. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, one of the most significant 

takeaways I got out of the Independent Review was that DOD force protection policies are not optimized for countering internal threats, and reflect a lack of awareness of the factors and indicators we have to be focused on in addressing internal 

threats. 

I agree that we need to provide commanders with comprehensive guidance and 

a full range of indicators designed to effectively identify and address internal 

threats within the U.S. military establishment. Do you anticipate challenges in the 

military departments developing such guidance and indicators? 

Mr. WEST and Admiral CLARK. We do not doubt that the military departments 

are committed to working to develop such guidance and indicators. That said, this 

is a complex undertaking, and we anticipate that it will be difficult to develop comprehensive guidance and a full range of indicators to address internal threats. The 

Department should thoughtfully consider a wide range of options and exercise due 

caution to avoid infringing on civil liberties. There are a number of recommendations that specifically address internal threats, including 2.1 (developing a risk assessment tool for commanders, supervisors, and professional support service providers to determine whether and when DOD personnel present risks for various 

types of violent behavior), 2.15 (review prohibited activities and recommend necessary policy changes), and 3.2 (commission a multidisciplinary group to examine 

and evaluate predictive indicators relating to pending violence and provide commanders with a multidisciplinary capability). It is our understanding that the Fort 

Hood Follow-On Review is addressing these recommendations to improve the Department’s capacity to protect against internal threats. 

11. Senator HAGAN. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, how will those indicators be coordinated with combatant commanders? 

Mr. WEST and Admiral CLARK. Our understanding is that the Follow-On Review 

program includes representatives from all the military departments and the Joint 

Staff, which coordinates input from the combatant commands. As such, the combatant commands have a voice in determining how potential indicators will be coordinated with them. One of our recommendations was that the Department needs to 

develop standardized guidance regarding how military criminal investigative organizations and counter-intelligence organizations will inform the operational chain of 

command, e.g. the combatant commander. We understand the final report for the 

Follow-On Review will address this specific issue. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROLAND W. BURRIS

POTENTIAL THREATS

12. Senator BURRIS. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, are there other potential internal threats that our current system has failed to identify? 

Mr. WEST and Admiral CLARK. We are not aware of other potential internal 

threats that the current system has failed to identify. However, our findings clearly 

show that DOD and Service programs that provide guidance concerning observation 

of personal behavior do not focus on internal threats. As such, one of our recommendations is to develop a list of behaviors that may be indicative of an insider 

threat and to integrate the disparate programs designed to defend against these 

threats. 

46 

13. Senator BURRIS. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, how can we identify potential 

sympathies which are counter to our national interests? 

Mr. WEST and Admiral CLARK. In the Independent Review report, we recommended DOD promptly establish standards and reporting procedures that clarify 

guidelines for religious accommodation. If requests for religious accommodation that 

compete with mission requirements were recorded and shared among commanders, 

supervisors, and chaplains, it would help establish a baseline from which to identify 

deviations within the Services and DOD. 

FAILURES TO ACT

14. Senator BURRIS. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, in your investigation, were 

there other examples of a failure to act on performance reports and passing on the 

problem? 

Mr. WEST and Admiral CLARK. The conduct of Major Hasan’s colleagues and 

former supervisors remains under review, and it would be inappropriate to comment 

at this time. Consistent with the recommendations of the Independent Review 

Panel, the Secretary of Defense referred issues of individual accountability to the 

Secretary of the Army for review and action as appropriate. Secretary McHugh assigned senior military leaders to investigate further, to assess accountability, and, 

as appropriate, to take final action. This process remains ongoing. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

RECOMMENDATIONS

15. Senator VITTER. Mr. West and Admiral Clark, in Chapter 2 of the Independent Review, when reviewing barriers and constraints on taking action, you 

state that the existing authority to address potentially violent behaviors ‘‘is likely 

insufficient if an employee represents an imminent threat.’’ However, your recommendations do not state specific changes to regulations that would enable the 

DOD and the Services to quickly adapt and address potential threats. Certainly 

identifying threats is important and critical to saving lives and preventing terrorist 

acts, but we must also prevent those threats after identifying them and cannot let 

bureaucratic polices stop us from averting terrorism. What specific policy changes 

at the company and battalion command level would you recommend to shorten commanders’ response time in dealing with an immediate threat? 

Mr. WEST and Admiral CLARK. In Chapter 4 of the Independent Review report, 

we identified several ways that the Department can better prepare its military communities to respond to emergencies, including developing a case study based on the 

Fort Hood incident to be used in installation commander development and on-scene 

commander response programs. But we also cannot discount the importance of responding to a potential threat immediately, before it becomes a violent action. Recommendation 2.1 specifically addresses updating policies and programs that would 

enable the DOD and Services to assess potentially violent behaviors. This includes 

developing a risk assessment tool for commanders, supervisors, and professional 

support service providers to determine whether and when DOD personnel present 

risks for various types of violent behavior. Recommendation 2.15 deals with reviewing prohibited activities and recommending necessary policy changes. For example, 

DOD can update DOD Instruction 1325.06, Handling Dissident and Protest Activities Among Members of the Armed Forces, by providing commanders and supervisors the guidance and authority to act on potential threats to good order and discipline. We defer to the Department on other policy changes it might identify and 

implement to improve commanders’ response times in dealing with an immediate 

threat. 

[Annex: The Report of the DOD Independent Review ‘‘Protecting 

the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood’’ follows:] 

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[Whereupon, at 12:00 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

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