IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

2022-NCSC-132

No. 9A22

Filed 16 December 2022

ANGELA MCAULEY, Widow of STEVEN L. MCAULEY, Deceased Employee

v.

NORTH CAROLINA A&T STATE UNIVERSITY, Employer, 

and

SELF-INSURED (CORVEL CORPORATION, Third-Party Administrator)

Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of 

the Court of Appeals, 280 N.C. App. 473, 2021-NCCOA-657, affirming an Opinion and 

Award filed by the North Carolina Industrial Commission on 28 August 2020. Heard 

in the Supreme Court on 19 September 2022.

Daggett Shuler, Attorneys at Law, by Griffis C. Shuler, for plaintiff-appellant.

Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Matthew E. Buckner, Assistant Attorney 

General, for defendant-appellee.

HUDSON, Justice.

¶ 1 This case considers whether a deceased employee’s prior timely filing of a 

workers’ compensation claim for an injury is sufficient to establish the Industrial 

Commission’s jurisdiction over a dependent’s subsequent claim for death benefits 

allegedly resulting from that injury. In accordance with the relevant statutory 
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language, pertinent legislative history, and principle of liberal construction, we 

answer this question affirmatively: an injured employee’s timely workers’ 

compensation claim establishes the Industrial Commission’s jurisdiction over that 

case, including over a dependent’s subsequent claim for death benefits. We therefore 

reverse the Court of Appeals’ ruling below and remand this case to the Industrial 

Commission.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

¶ 2 On 30 January 2015, Mr. Steven McAuley (decedent) suffered an injury to his 

back while employed by North Carolina A&T State University (defendant).1 On 11 

February 2015, decedent filed a Form 18, Notice of Accident to Employer and Claim 

of Employee. On 21 February 2015, decedent passed away, leaving behind his 

dependent widow, Mrs. Angela McAuley (plaintiff), who now contends that decedent’s 

death was the proximate result of decedent’s prior workplace injury. On 16 March 

2015, defendant filed a Form 63 and thereafter paid medical compensation through 

September 2015 while the claim was under investigation.

2

¶ 3 Within two weeks after decedent’s death, plaintiff attended a meeting with 

representatives from defendant’s human resources department to sign papers related 

 

1 Because the Industrial Commission dismissed plaintiff’s claim before any

adjudication of the merits, we do not consider the merits of plaintiff’s claim here.

2 According to Industrial Commission procedure, an employer may respond to a claim 

by filing a Form 63 to pay compensation “without prejudice” while investigating the claim. 

See N.C.G.S. § 97-18(d) (2021). 
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to decedent’s life and accidental death insurance policies. Plaintiff testified that at 

the time, she believed she was signing all the paperwork related to decedent’s death 

and the benefits to which she was entitled. Defendant’s last payment for decedent’s 

medical expenses was made on 21 September 2015. 

¶ 4 On 18 January 2018, almost three years after decedent’s death, plaintiff sought 

death benefits by filing a Form 33 Request that Claim be Assigned for Hearing with 

the Industrial Commission. On 15 May 2018, defendant filed a Form 33R Response 

to Request that Claim be Assigned for Hearing asserting that the Industrial 

Commission lacks jurisdiction to hear plaintiff’s death benefits claim because the

claim was filed more than two years after decedent’s death. Defendant also filed a 

motion to dismiss plaintiff’s death claim as time-barred under N.C.G.S. § 97-22 and 

§ 97-24.

¶ 5 On 31 October 2018, Deputy Commissioner Tyler Younts filed an Opinion and 

Award denying and dismissing plaintiff’s claim with prejudice. The Opinion and 

Award concluded that the Industrial Commission did not acquire jurisdiction of 

plaintiff’s death benefits claim because, as required by N.C.G.S. § 97-24(a), the claim

had not been filed within two years of either decedent’s accident or the last payment 

of medical compensation by defendant on 21 September 2015. On 13 November 2018, 

plaintiff appealed this Opinion and Award to the Full Commission. 
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¶ 6 On 28 August 2020, the Full Commission filed its Opinion and Award denying 

plaintiff’s claim and dismissing the claim with prejudice on the grounds that 

plaintiff’s untimely filing could not grant the Commission jurisdiction over plaintiff’s 

claim. The Full Commission reasoned that because death benefits claims made by a 

dependent are distinct from workers’ compensation claims made by an injured 

employee who is still alive, “any claims made by [decedent] for workers’ compensation 

benefits cannot serve as [plaintiff]’s ‘filing of a claim’ for death and funeral benefits.” 

¶ 7 Industrial Commission Chair Philip A. Baddour III dissented. Relying on the 

plain language of subsection 97-24(a), which merely requires that “a claim” be filed 

within the time limitation and does not distinguish between workers’ compensation 

claims and death benefits claims, the dissent would have found and concluded that 

where a deceased employee filed a Form 18 within two years of his accident at issue, 

the statute does not require his widow to file a separate death claim within two years 

of his death as a condition precedent to the widow’s right to compensation under 

section 97-38.

¶ 8 On 23 September 2020, plaintiff appealed the Full Commission’s ruling to the 

North Carolina Court of Appeals. Before the Court of Appeals, plaintiff argued that 

the Industrial Commission obtained jurisdiction over the case when decedent filed 

his Form 18 for workers’ compensation benefits, which met the two-year requirement

under N.C.G.S. § 97-24, and that therefore the Commission’s ruling should be 
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reversed. Defendant contended that the Commission correctly concluded that it 

lacked jurisdiction and that its decision should therefore be affirmed.

¶ 9 On 7 December 2021, the Court of Appeals issued a divided opinion in which 

the majority affirmed the Full Commission’s ruling. McAuley v. N.C. A&T State 

Univ., 280 N.C. App. 473, 2021-NCCOA-657. The majority disagreed with plaintiff’s 

contention that the Industrial Commission obtained jurisdiction over her claim via 

decedent’s Form 18 filing in 2015. Id. ¶ 12. Rather, the majority held that plaintiff 

did not assert a claim until the filing of her Form 33 in 2018, after the expiration of 

the two-year limitation under N.C.G.S. § 97-24. Id. The majority reasoned that 

plaintiff’s claim for death and funeral benefits arose only after decedent’s death, not 

when decedent filed the Form 18. Id. ¶ 13. Therefore, the majority reasoned, the two 

claims are separate and distinct, and the filing of the former could not establish the 

Commission’s jurisdiction over the latter. Id. The majority rejected plaintiff’s 

assertion that N.C.G.S. § 97-38 does not require a dependent to file a separate claim 

within two years. Id. ¶ 17. Because timely filing is a condition precedent under 

N.C.G.S. § 97-24, the majority reasoned that the two sections cannot be read as 

mutually exclusive provisions. Id.

¶ 10 Judge Arrowood authored a dissenting opinion in which he stated that he

would have held that a dependent is not required to file a separate claim within a

two-year period if a decedent’s initial claim satisfies that condition. Id. ¶ 19 
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(Arrowood, J., dissenting). Here, the dissent reasoned, decedent complied with the 

statute’s requirement by filing his Form 18 within two years of his injury, thereby 

invoking the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission; accordingly, the Full 

Commission erred in dismissing plaintiff’s claim for death benefits. Id. ¶ 23. The 

dissent further noted that the legislative history of N.C.G.S. § 97-24 reveals the 

legislature’s specific intent not to require “a separate claim for death benefits,” and 

that “an employee’s filing of ‘a claim’ within two years after the accident is sufficient”

to give the Commission jurisdiction over a subsequent death benefits claim. Id. ¶ 27.

¶ 11 On 10 January 2022, plaintiff appealed the Court of Appeals’ ruling to this 

Court on the basis of Judge Arrowood’s dissenting opinion. Plaintiff again contends—

consistent with the two dissents below—that the Commission erred in dismissing her 

claim for death benefits because the Commission’s jurisdiction was established by 

decedent’s timely filing of his workers’ compensation claim after the injury. 

Defendant again contends that the Court of Appeals and the Commission properly 

concluded that the Commission lacks jurisdiction because the statute requires 

separate and distinct claims for workers’ compensation and death benefits, and that 

plaintiff’s death benefits claim was untimely.

II. Analysis

¶ 12 Now, this Court must determine whether decedent’s timely workers’

compensation claim adequately invokes the Industrial Commission’s jurisdiction over 
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Plaintiff’s subsequent death benefits claim. This Court reviews the Industrial 

Commission’s conclusions of law de novo. McRae v. Toastmaster, Inc., 358 N.C. 488, 

496 (2004).

¶ 13 When a court engages in statutory interpretation, the principal goal 

is to accomplish the legislative intent. The intent of the 

General Assembly may be found first from the plain 

language of the statute, then from the legislative history, 

“the spirit of the act and what the act seeks to accomplish.”

If the language of a statute is clear, the court must 

implement the statute according to the plain meaning of its 

terms so long as it is reasonable to do so.

Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 353 N.C. 659, 664 (2001) (quoting Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman, 

349 N.C. 290, 297 (1998)). In workers’ compensation cases, “the Industrial 

Commission and the courts [must] construe the [Workers’ Compensation Act] 

liberally in favor of the injured work[er]. The Act should be liberally construed to the 

end that the benefits thereof shall not be denied upon technical, narrow, and strict 

interpretation.” Cates v. Hunt Constr. Co., 267 N.C. 560, 563 (1966) (cleaned up).

¶ 14 North Carolina’s Workers’ Compensation Act governs claims for benefits by 

injured employees against their employers. N.C.G.S. § 97-1 to -101.1 (2021). The Act 

gives the Industrial Commission jurisdiction over workers’ compensation claims 

subject to certain prerequisites. Specifically, subsection 97-24(a) establishes a time 

within which an injured employee must file a claim in order to establish the 
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Industrial Commission’s jurisdiction over his or her injury. That provision, in 

pertinent part, states:

[t]he right to compensation under this Article shall be 

forever barred unless (i) a claim . . . is filed with the 

Commission or the employee is paid compensation as 

provided under this Article within two years after the 

accident or (ii) a claim . . . is filed with the Commission

within two years after the last payment of medical 

compensation when no other compensation has been paid 

and when the employer’s liability has not otherwise been 

established under this Article.

N.C.G.S. § 97-24(a) (2021). This requirement does not constitute a statute of 

limitations, but is rather a condition precedent to the right of the employee to 

establish the Industrial Commission’s jurisdiction over the case and thereby proceed 

with his claim to receive workers’ compensation. Montgomery v. Horneytown Fire 

Dep’t, 265 N.C. 553, 555 (1965) (per curiam). 

¶ 15 Section 97-38 governs claims for death benefits upon the resulting death of an

injured employee and states, in pertinent part:

[i]f death results proximately from a compensable injury or 

occupational disease and within six years thereafter, or 

within two years of the final determination of disability, 

whichever is later, the employer shall pay or cause to be 

paid, subject to the provisions of other sections of this 

Article, weekly payments of compensation equal to sixtysix and two-thirds percent . . . of the average weekly wages 

of the deceased employee at the time of the accident. . . .

N.C.G.S. § 97-38 (2021). As properly noted by the Industrial Commission and the 

Court of Appeals, N.C.G.S. §§ 97-24 and 97-38 are not mutually exclusive. See 
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McAuley, 2021-NCCOA-657, ¶ 17. In order to seek benefits under N.C.G.S. § 97-38

from an employer after a death that results proximately from a compensable injury, 

a claim must first be timely filed under N.C.G.S. § 97-24 to establish the 

Commission’s jurisdiction over the case.

¶ 16 Here, it is undisputed that decedent’s workers’ compensation claim was filed 

within the applicable two-year period, while plaintiff’s subsequent request for 

hearing on death benefits was not. Accordingly, the dispositive question facing this 

Court is whether N.C.G.S. § 97-24(a): (1) requires a separate and distinct death 

benefits claim to be filed within the applicable two-year time period to establish the 

Industrial Commission’s jurisdiction over the matter; or (2) allows a prior timely 

workers’ compensation claim to establish the Industrial Commission’s jurisdiction 

over a subsequent related death benefits claim. In accordance with the plain 

statutory language at issue, the relevant legislative history, and the principle of 

liberal construction, we hold the latter: an injured employee’s timely workers’ 

compensation claim establishes the Industrial Commission’s jurisdiction over that 

injury, including over a dependent’s subsequent claim for death benefits allegedly 

resulting from that same injury.

¶ 17 This holding is first dictated by the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 97-24(a), 

which states, in applicable part: “[t]he right to compensation under this Article shall 

be forever barred unless (i) a claim . . . is filed with the Commission . . . within two 
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years after the accident. . . .” As noted by both the Full Commission and the Court of 

Appeals majority below, the statutory definition of “compensation” encompasses “the 

money allowance payable to an employee or to his dependents as provided for in this 

Article.” McAuley, 2021-NCCOA-657, ¶ 11 (emphasis added) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 97-

2(11) (2019)). As such, the statute’s reference to “compensation” does not distinguish 

between a claim made by an employee and a claim made by a dependent. Likewise, 

the words “a claim” do not distinguish between a workers’ compensation claim made 

by an injured employee and death benefit claim made by a dependent. Rather, the 

plain language of subsection 97-24(a) establishes that the Commission may obtain 

jurisdiction where “a claim . . . is filed with the Commission within two years after an 

accident.” See id. ¶ 22 (Arrowood, J., dissenting). If the General Assembly had 

intended this statute to distinguish between different types of claims, it could have 

done so; indeed, as noted further below, it did do so in earlier versions of this statute 

before removing the distinction through the amendment process. 

¶ 18 The dissenting opinions at the Commission and the Court of Appeals aptly note 

this lack of distinction. In his dissent from the Full Commission’s Opinion and Award,

Chair Baddour observed:

N.C.G.S. § 97-24(a) does not require that a separate death 

benefits claim be filed within two years of the death of an 

employee. It only requires that a claim be filed within two 

years after “the accident.” N.C.G.S. § 97-24(a) works in 

conjunction with [N.C.G.S.] § 97-38, which requires that 

the death be proximately caused by the original injury and 
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that the death occur within two years of a final 

determination of disability or within six years of the injury, 

whichever is later. Given the specificity of the overall 

statutory framework governing entitlement to death 

benefits, if the General Assembly desired for there to be an 

additional filing requirement for death benefit claims, the 

requirement would be included in the language of 

[N.C.G.S.] § 97-24(a). Accordingly, based upon the plain 

language of [N.C.G.S.] § 97-24(a), . . . there is no separate 

filing requirement to seek an award of death benefits under 

the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Likewise, Judge Arrowood noted in his dissenting opinion at the Court of Appeals

that “[t]he plain language of the statute does not require plaintiff to file a separate 

claim for benefits.” McAuley, 2021-NCCOA-657, ¶ 23. We agree.

¶ 19 Of course, this is not to say that a workers’ compensation claim by an injured 

employee and a death benefits claim by a dependent are the same thing. As noted by 

the Full Commission and the Court of Appeals majority, a claim for death benefits is 

a distinct claim with a distinct claimant that—by definition—cannot be brought by 

the employee who suffered the injury. It is true, therefore, that a dependent’s right 

to death benefits does not arise until the employee’s death. See Booker v. Duke Med.

Ctr., 297 N.C. 458, 466 (1979) (“[A] dependent[’s] right to compensation is an original 

right enforceable only after the employee’s death.” (cleaned up)). The distinction 

between these two types of benefits, though, does not change the fact that the 

statutory language simply refers to “a claim,” without distinguishing between the 

two. Under the plain language of the statute, once “a claim” is timely filed, the 
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condition precedent has been satisfied and the Industrial Commission’s jurisdiction 

has been invoked over the matter. An injured employee’s timely workers’ 

compensation claim for an injury thus establishes the Industrial Commission’s 

jurisdiction over a subsequent death benefits claim arising from the same injury.

¶ 20 Here, it is undisputed that “a claim” was filed with the Commission within two 

years after the accident; namely, decedent’s Form 18 claim for workers’ compensation 

was filed within two weeks of his accident. Accordingly, decedent’s claim timely met 

the condition precedent and thus invoked the Industrial Commission’s jurisdiction 

over the injury under N.C.G.S. § 97-24(a), including over plaintiff’s subsequent claim 

for death benefits arising from the same matter. This continuity of jurisdiction is 

illustrated by the Industrial Commission’s use of the same file number (I.C. No. 15-

006996) throughout its handling of this matter, whether it was considering a filing 

regarding decedent, decedent’s estate, or plaintiff. Again, this is not to say that 

plaintiff’s claim for death benefits was functionally the same as decedent’s claim for 

workers’ compensation benefits during his life. Rather, it is to say that both constitute 

“a claim” sufficient to establish the Commission’s jurisdiction over the matter in 

accordance with the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 97-24(a).

¶ 21 Second, the legislative history of N.C.G.S. § 97-24 likewise supports this 

holding. “In construing a statute with reference to an amendment, it is presumed that 

the Legislature intended either (a) to change the substance of the original act, or (b) 
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to clarify the meaning of it.” Childers v. Parker’s Inc., 274 N.C. 256, 260 (1968); 

accord. Colonial Pipeline Co. v. Neill, 296 N.C. 503, 509 (1979). “The presumption is 

that the legislature ‘intended to change the original act by creating a new right or 

withdrawing any existing one.’ ” Childers, 274 N.C. at 260 (quoting 1 Sutherland, 

Statutory Construction § 1930 (Horack, 3d ed. 1943)). “[I]f the legislature deletes 

specific words or phrases from a statute, it is presumed that the legislature intended 

that the deleted portion should no longer be the law.” Nello L. Teer Co. v. N.C. DOT, 

175 N.C. App. 705, 710 (2006).

¶ 22 Here, the legislative history includes instructive amendments. The statute 

originally established two distinct filing requirements, one for an injury and one for 

a death: “[t]he right to compensation under this act shall be forever barred unless a 

claim be filed with the Industrial Commission within one year after the accident, and 

if death results from the accident, unless a claim be filed with the Commission within 

one year thereafter.” The North Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act, ch. 120, § 24, 

1929 N.C. Pub. [Sess.] Laws 117, 127 (emphasis added). Then, as noted in Chair 

Baddour’s dissenting opinion below,

[i]n 1955, the statute was modified to allow two years 

(instead of one) to file a claim following an accident, 

however the requirement to file a separate claim for death 

benefits within one year of the date of death was 

maintained. In 1973, the General Assembly again 

amended [N.C.G.S.] § 97-24(a), but on this occasion, it 

removed the language requiring that a separate claim be 

filed for death benefits. . . . In deleting the words “if death 
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results from the accident, unless a claim be filed with the 

Commission within one year thereafter,” the General 

Assembly expressed its clear intent that a separate claim 

for death benefits is not required and that an employee’s 

filing of a claim within two years after the accident satisfies 

any condition precedent to the Industrial Commission 

acquiring jurisdiction with regard to a subsequent claim for 

death benefits . . . . Based upon the principles of statutory 

construction, . . . the deletion of the requirement to file a 

death claim within a specified period may only be 

reasonably interpreted as the General Assembly’s intent to 

remove this requirement.

(emphasis added) (citations omitted).

¶ 23 We agree: this legislative history reveals a removal of the statute’s distinction 

between the conditions precedent for a workers’ compensation claim for an injury and 

one for death benefits, thus indicating legislative intent to no longer distinguish 

between the two types of claims within the statutory requirements. This amendment 

chronology can only support the above interpretation of the statute’s plain language 

indicating that decedent’s Form 18 filing met the condition precedent for the 

Industrial Commission to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff’s subsequent death 

benefits claim.

¶ 24 Third and finally, our holding is supported by the long-standing and oftreaffirmed principle of liberal construction of the provisions of the Workers’ 

Compensation Act. As noted above, it is well established that the Act “should be 

liberally construed to the end that the benefits thereof [shall] not be denied upon 

technical, narrow[,] and strict interpretation.” Cates, 267 N.C. at 553; see, e.g., Adams 
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v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 680 (1998) (noting the same). Here, that principle 

definitively supports interpreting N.C.G.S. § 97-24(a)—consistent with its plain 

language and legislative history—as not requiring a separate and distinct claim for 

death benefits after a previous claim has already met the condition precedent to

invoke the Industrial Commission’s jurisdiction over the matter. Rather, interpreting 

the statute in accordance with the principle of liberal construction leads us to 

conclude that decedent’s timely filing of “a claim” was sufficient to invoke the 

Industrial Commission’s jurisdiction over the matter, including plaintiff’s related

claim for death benefits.

III. Conclusion

¶ 25 Section 97-24(a) establishes that the right to compensation under the Workers’ 

Compensation Act “shall be forever barred” unless “a claim . . . is filed with the 

Commission . . . within two years after the accident.” Once such a claim is timely 

filed, this condition precedent has been satisfied, and the Industrial Commission has 

jurisdiction over the matter. 

¶ 26 Here, decedent’s timely claim satisfied this condition precedent and 

established the Industrial Commission’s jurisdiction over this matter. Plaintiff was 

therefore not required to file a separate claim for death benefits within the two-year 

period in order to establish the Industrial Commission’s jurisdiction over the case, in 

which the Commission’s jurisdiction had already been invoked. Accordingly, the 
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Industrial Commission and Court of Appeals majority erred in interpreting N.C.G.S. 

§ 97-24(a) as requiring a separate and distinct claim for death benefits to invoke the 

Commission’s jurisdiction over plaintiff’s filing. The statute’s plain language, 

legislative history, and the principle of liberal construction all establish otherwise. 

Therefore, we reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the 

Court of Appeals for further remand to the Industrial Commission for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Justice BARRINGER dissenting.

¶ 27 At issue in this case is whether the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction 

under the Workers’ Compensation Act for a determination of death benefits when the 

dependent had not asserted a claim for compensation within two years of decedent’s 

death but the decedent had timely filed a workers’ compensation claim. In this case, 

plaintiff asserted a claim for compensation nearly three years after her husband’s 

death. Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 97-24(a), the Industrial Commission does not have 

jurisdiction. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

¶ 28 On 30 January 2015, Steven McAuley suffered an injury to his back while 

working at North Carolina A&T State University. He timely filed a workers’ 

compensation claim on 11 February 2015, later dying and leaving behind his wife, 

plaintiff Angela McAuley. On 18 January 2018, nearly three years after Steven 

McAuley’s death, plaintiff asserted a claim for death benefits with the Industrial 

Commission. The Industrial Commission determined that it lacked jurisdiction 

because the claim for death benefits was not timely pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 97-24(a). 

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the Industrial Commission’s opinion and award

was affirmed. McAuley v. N.C. A&T State Univ., 280 N.C. App. 473, 2021-NCCOA657, ¶ 18. Plaintiff now appeals to this Court.

I. Analysis

¶ 29 Subsection 97-24(a) states, in relevant part:
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The right to compensation under this Article shall be 

forever barred unless (i) a claim or memorandum of 

agreement as provided in [N.C.]G.S. [§] 97-82 is filed with 

the Commission or the employee is paid compensation as 

provided under this Article within two years after the 

accident or (ii) a claim or memorandum of agreement as 

provided in [N.C.]G.S. [§] 97-82 is filed with the 

Commission within two years after the last payment of 

medical compensation when no other compensation has 

been paid and when the employer’s liability has not 

otherwise been established under this Article.

N.C.G.S. § 97-24(a) (2021) (emphases added). Subsection 97-24(a) is not a statute of 

limitations. See Montgomery v. Horneytown Fire Dep’t, 265 N.C. 553, 555 (1965). 

Rather, “satisfaction of the timely-filing requirement is a condition precedent to the 

exercise of the Commission’s jurisdiction.” See Cunningham v. Goodyear Tire & 

Rubber Co., 381 N.C. 10, 2022-NCSC-46, ¶ 25.

¶ 30 As the Court of Appeals noted, “[w]hile death benefits are not specifically 

mentioned in [N.C.G.S. § 97-24(a)], the text of the statute refers to ‘compensation,’ a 

term defined in [N.C.G.S. § 97-2(11)] as encompassing ‘the money allowance payable 

to an employee or to his dependents as provided for in this Article, and includes 

funeral benefits provided herein.’ ” McAuley, ¶ 11 (first quoting N.C.G.S. § 97-24(a) 

(2017); and then quoting N.C.G.S. § 97-2(11) (2019)). Accordingly, N.C.G.S. § 97-24(a) 

contemplates “the timeliness of death claims.” Id.

¶ 31 Furthermore, subsection 97-24(a) broadly states that “[t]he right to 

compensation under this Article shall be forever barred” unless a claim is filed within
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two years. N.C.G.S. § 97-24(a) (emphasis added). Because N.C.G.S. § 97-38 is “under 

[Article 1],” the time limitation for filing a claim for death benefits under the Workers’ 

Compensation Act is governed by N.C.G.S. § 97-24(a). N.C.G.S. §§ 97-24(a), -38 

(2021). Plaintiff did not assert a claim for death benefits within the time frame 

prescribed by N.C.G.S. § 97-24(a). Therefore, she did not satisfy the condition 

precedent required by statute. Thus, the Industrial Commission does not have 

jurisdiction under the Workers’ Compensation Act.

¶ 32 This Court has previously treated death benefits as separate and distinct from 

an employee’s workers’ compensation claim. In Wray v. Carolina Cotton & Woolen 

Mills Company, an employee failed to timely file a claim for workers’ compensation. 

205 N.C. 782, 783 (1934). The Industrial Commission dismissed the employee’s claim. 

Id. However, within one month of the employee’s death, his dependents filed a death 

benefits claim. Id. This Court held that a dependent’s claim for death benefits is “an 

original right which [is] enforceable only after [the decedent’s] death.” Id. at 784. 

Several decades later, this Court reaffirmed Wray in Booker v. Duke Medical Center. 

297 N.C. 458, 466–67 (1979) (holding that a “dependents’ claim for compensation 

[does] not arise until the employee’s death . . . North Carolina[ ] treat[s] the 

dependents’ right to compensation as separate and distinct from the rights of the 

injured employee”). In reaching its decision, the majority refuses to follow, indeed 

ignores, 90 years of this Court’s precedent.
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Barringer, J., dissenting

¶ 33 Since “the dependents’ right to compensation [is] separate and distinct from 

the rights of the injured employee,” id. at 467, the dependent must file “a claim or 

memorandum of agreement” with the Industrial Commission to receive death 

benefits, N.C.G.S. § 97-24(a); see N.C.G.S. § 97-38. A dependent’s right to death 

benefits is barred unless a claim for death benefits is filed within two years of the 

employee’s death. N.C.G.S. §§ 97-24(a), -38; Booker, 297 N.C. at 467.

II. Conclusion

¶ 34 Since plaintiff in this case filed her claim for death benefits nearly three years 

after her husband’s death, her claim for death benefits is untimely pursuant to 

N.C.G.S. § 97-24(a). Therefore, the Industrial Commission does not have jurisdiction 

to hear this case and the Court of Appeals’ decision should be affirmed. Despite our 

sympathy for plaintiff, we are bound by the statutes of North Carolina and our Court’s 

long-standing precedent. Any change in the jurisdictional requirements of the 

Industrial Commission must come from the legislature. See State v. Bell, 184 N.C. 

701, 705 (1922) (“Scrupulously observing the constitutional separation of the 

legislative and the supreme judicial powers of the government, we adhere to the 

fundamental principle that it is the duty of the Court, not to make the law, but to 

expound it, and to that end to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the 

Legislature . . . .”).

Chief Justice NEWBY and Justice BERGER join in this dissenting opinion.