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22–350 2016

INTERVIEWS OF WITNESSES

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON

THE EVENTS SURROUNDING

THE 2012 TERRORIST

ATTACK IN BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, 2012–2016

VOLUME 6 OF 11

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the

2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi

(

Available on the Internet:

www.fdsys.gov
(II)

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina, Chairman

LYNN WESTMORELAND, Georgia

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

PETER ROSKAM, Illinois

MIKE POMPEO, Kansas

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama

SUSAN BROOKS, Indiana

ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland

Ranking Minority Member

ADAM SMITH, Washington

ADAM SCHIFF, California

LINDA SA ́ NCHEZ, California

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

PHILIP G. KIKO, Staff Director and General Counsel

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director
(III)

CONTENTS

Page

Interview of FAST Platoon Commander ................................................................ 1

Interview of Cheryl Mills ........................................................................................ 107

Interview of Jacob Sullivan .................................................................................... 455

Deposition of Bryan Pagliano ................................................................................. 789

Interview of DOD Special Operator ....................................................................... 801

Interview of Lieutenant General Michael Flynn ................................................... 907

Interview of Spokesperson, Near Eastern Affairs Bureau ................................... 1077

INTERVIEW OF

FAST COMMANDER

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, SEPTEMBER 2, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Counsel

MAC TOLAR, Senior Counsel

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel

SHANNON GREEN, Minority Counsel

LAURA RAUCH, Minority Senior Professional Staff

FOR U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

EDWARD RICHARDS, Office of General Counsel

WILLIAM HUDSON, Office of General Counsel

Colonel JOHN OSTROWSKI, Deputy, Marine Corps Legislative Affairs

Colonel DANIEL GREENWOOD, Marine Corps Liaison to the House of Representatives

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Mr. Hudson. Bill Hudson, Department of Defense, Office of

General Counsel.

Mr. Richards. Edward Richards, DOD, Office of General Counsel.

Colonel I'm the Marine Corps liaison

to the House.

Mr. Tolar. Thank you.

At this time, I want to talk to you a little bit about procedures

and how we're going to kind of do the process today.

Generally, the way the questioning proceeds is each side, the

majority and minority, will have 1 hour to ask you questions. At the

end of 1 hour -- they'll be given an opportunity to ask questions for

an hour. We'll rotate back and forth until all the questions are done.

Questions may be only asked by a member of the committee or

designated committee staff members.

Unlike a deposition or testimony, a transcribed interview before

this committee is not bound by the rules of evidence. You and your

counsel may raise objections for privilege, subject to review by the

chairman of the committee. If an objection cannot be resolved in the

interview, you can be required to return for a deposition or a hearing.

That said, members and staff of the committee are not permitted

to raise objections when the other side is asking questions.

As you can see, we have an official court reporter here today

transcribing this interview. She's taking down verbatim everything

that everybody says in this room during the interview. As such, I would

ask you to please say "yes" or "no" when responding to questions. Try

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to avoid nodding your head or saying "uh-huh" or "huh-uh" or things

like that. Does that make sense?

Captain Yes, sir.

Mr. Tolar. Perfect.

Also, I'm going to try and do my best not to talk over you when

you're responding to me, and I would ask you to do the same.

Captain Yes, sir.

Mr. Tolar. Thanks.

You're welcome to confer with your counsel at any time throughout

this interview. Just let us know if you need to do so. We'll go off

the record. We'll stop the clock and give you a chance to do so that.

We'll take breaks whenever convenient. This can be after every

hour of questioning, after a couple of rounds, whatever you would

prefer. If you feel like you need to make a head call or you need to

take a timeout, just let me know; we'll stop it, and we'll go do that.

Captain Yes, sir.

Mr. Tolar. Perfect.

I would ask that you answer all the questions in the most complete

and truthful manner possible. We will take our time, and I'll try to

go slow. I tend to talk fast, but I want to make a concerted effort

to go slow and try to ask questions very clearly. If for any reason

you don't understand what I'm saying or it doesn't make sense, just

stop and let me know.

If you honestly do not know the answer to a question or do not

remember, please don't guess. Give us your best recollection or simply

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state that you don't recall and let us know who might be able to provide

an answer to the question.

Captain Yes, sir.

Mr. Tolar. Does that make sense?

Captain Yes, sir.

Mr. Tolar. Perfect.

I'm going to ask you a few affirmation questions. I need you to

answer "yes" or "no," please.

Do you understand you have an obligation to answer questions

before Congress truthfully?

Captain Yes, sir.

Mr. Tolar. Do you understand this obligation extends to

congressional staff in an interview such as this one today?

Captain Yes, sir.

Mr. Tolar. Do you understand that a witness who knowingly

provides false testimony could be subject to criminal prosecution for

perjury or for making false statements?

Captain Yes, sir.

Mr. Tolar. Is there any reason you are unable to provide truthful

answers to today's questions?

Captain No, sir.

Mr. Tolar. Perfect. Thank you.

This interview will be conducted at the Top Secret/SCI level.

Basically, that's the end of my preamble.

Do you have anything?

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Ms. Green. No.

Captain we just appreciate you coming to talk with us.

Captain Of course.

Mr. Tolar. All right. That said, the clock on the wall does not

work. It spins around like crazy. I've got 10:06 on my watch, so let's

go use that as our starting time. We'll do the first hour, and then

we'll go from there.

[ Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

EXAMINATION

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q First of all, I previously marked exhibit No. 1 for the

record. This is a copy of the DOD timeline that we may reference or

look at during the course of the interview. You don't need to worry

about it for right now, but that's what that is.

Captain first, I want to just talk to you a little bit about

your background as a Marine and your professional military education,

et cetera. So would you tell us how long you've been a Marine?

A I commissioned in 2006, so a little over 9 years now.

Q And how were you commissioned?

A PLC program, senior and junior program.

Q What is your primary MOS?

A I'm an infantry officer, 0302.

Q Do you have any secondary or tertiary?

A I do. It's a weapons tactics instructor MOS.

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Q Okay.

If you would, please talk to me about what kind of professional

military schools and training courses you've attended in the Marine

Corps.

A So, following the graduation of PLC and my graduation from

college, I attended the basic school, where all Marine officers go.

After completing the basic school, I attended infantry officer course.

From there, I went to Third Battalion, Sixth Marines, did two tours

with them to Iraq and Afghanistan.

Following my tour with Third Battalion, Sixth Marines, is when

I moved to Norfolk and checked into Marine Corps Security Force

Regiment. At Marine Corps Security Force Regiment, I attended their

security supervisor leader course, their close-quarter combat

instructor course before receiving my first platoon.

On that first platoon, we did a refuel/de-fuel mission in

Portsmouth, Virginia. Following that, I received the platoon that we

will talk about today. With that platoon, we went through a series

of courses as a unit.

Q Check.

A After my time with FAST, I've attended expeditionary

warfare school, weapons tactics instructor course, mountain warfare

school, mountain warfare summer school, and as well as I've done a

series of schools at Expeditionary Warfare Atlantic.

Q Check.

Talk to me for a minute about what the Marine Corps Security Force

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Regiment is.

A The Marine Corps Security Force Regiment is a higher command

that's in charge of not only FAST companies in the continental United

States and overseas, but they're also in charge of Marine Corps Security

Force battalions in Bangor, Washington, and Kings Bay, Georgia.

Q Okay.

At this point, let's kind of transition and get more into the weeds

about the FAST platoon itself. What does "FAST" stand for?

A Fleet Antiterrorism Security Team.

Q All right. Talk a little bit about the mission of FAST,

how it's structured, how it's organized, those kinds of things.

A FAST mission is to provide limited-duration security to

strategic U.S. sites. It is structured. Under Marine Corps Security

Force Regiment, there's three continental United States companies:

Alpha Company, Bravo Company, and Charlie Company.

Each one of those companies is COCOM-aligned. So Alpha Company

goes to FAST Europe; Bravo Company, Yokosuka -- that's through PACOM;

and then Charlie, CENTCOM, they go to Bahrain. And then all three of

those companies also service Guantanamo Bay to do the perimeter

security mission at GTMO.

I was in Alpha Company, so I was COCOM-aligned with FAST Company

Europe. We do tours, rotating through -- the platoon had done a tour

rotating to GTMO. We had returned. And then we did our deployment

with FAST Company Europe.

Q And the regiment is located in Norfolk. Who is the parent

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commander? What's the chain of command for the regiment?

A At the time that we're talking about, it was II MEF. So

it went FAST Alpha Company, FAST Marine Corps Security Force

Regiment -- which is actually Yorktown, not Norfolk.

Q Okay.

A The company is in Norfolk. And then it was II MEF. It is

no longer structured like that, but at the time it was.

Q How is it currently structured?

A Currently, my understanding is that it goes Marine Corps

Security Force Regiment and then MARFORCOM, I believe it is.

Q Okay.

Talk to me about how many -- what's the TO of a FAST platoon?

A A FAST platoon, the commander is a captain. Generally, he

is an infantry officer, but he can be an MOS outside of it. Sometimes

you'll see other elements of the ground combat element --

Q Sure.

A -- being a commander of a FAST platoon, but generally he's

an infantry officer.

His staff sergeant is generally an infantry staff sergeant who

is his platoon sergeant, so generally an 0369. And then his three squad

leaders, again, generally have a background of an 0311, which is a

rifleman, but it could vary. Like, one of my squad leaders was a

crash-fire-rescue Marine. We had two of those.

Q How many Marines are in the company --

A Fifty Marines.

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Q Fifty Marines. Okay. Perfect.

Talk to me about what kind of communication assets you have as

a platoon.

A Organic to the platoon --

Q Check.

A -- we bring SINCGARS, radios. We bring 117s, one --

Q One set of what?

A A PRC 117, a PRC 148, and then PRC 153s. Those are the three

organic radios that we had.

Q Just very briefly, explain what each one of those is, what

their capabilities are.

A Their capability -- our capability was to be able to talk

HF, UHF, and --

Q Define that as associated with each one of the PRCs.

A Yes, sir. So PRC 153s is a UHF radio. PRC 117s, I believe

we -- we were talking primarily over VHF communication, also has

capability of talking UHF SATCOM. And then PRC 152s, VHF

communication. That's what's organic to the platoon.

Q And then, when you deploy, do you have different assets that

you take with you?

A The higher company has the ability to strap on other

communications capabilities --

Q Okay.

A -- like a satellite phone --

Q Sure.

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A Yes, sir.

Q And I'm trying to think if I caught any other acronyms along

the way.

So I'm going to try to see if we can develop for the record for

people who don't understand this lingo to be able to read it and

understand it.

A Yes, sir.

Q Thank you.

A So other weapons we had, designated marksmen had a 7.62

designated marksman rifle with an enhanced optic on it. And then

also --

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q A sniper rifle?

A Yes, sir. They are not snipers --

Q Check.

A -- but, in layman's terms, it is a sniper rifle, and they

are snipers in layman's terms.

Also, all the weapons have night-vision capabilities, and whether

that's thermal, so they can see heat signatures, or the standard IR

devices, so it's seeking out light.

Q And when you deploy your platoon for a mission, how long

typically can you sustain operations before you need to be resupplied?

What do you leave with? I mean --

A Typically, we were leaving with 3 days' worth of

sustainment.

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get on a plane?

A In this case, we were ready within 5 hours.

Q Okay. Is that typical, about what it takes to mobilize and

get all your ducks in a row?

A Yes, sir.

Q Okay.

A So generally what we are waiting on is that support

infrastructure to catch up to us. Because we have rehearsed this so

many times ad nauseam that my Marines are just executing with muscle

memory.

Q Are you familiar with the MSAUs, the Marine Corps Security

Augmentation Units, the MSG?

A A little bit, sir.

Q Do you understand enough to talk about how it differs from

your mission? And it's okay if you don't.

A No, I don't.

Q That's fine.

All right. Let's go back and let's talk about you and your FAST

platoon. Tell me again when you actually joined the FAST Company.

A I joined Alpha Company FAST in March of 2011.

Q And prior to that is when you did your MSF training or some

schools, prior to taking command of the platoon?

A Yes, sir. I believe that I attended that school in December

of 2010.

Q Okay.

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So March of 2011. So what I want to do now is talk to you a little

bit about events and training prior to September 11. So, once you took

command of your platoon in March of 2011, talk to me about any

deployments you did for training as well as whether or not you had to

respond to a real-world balloon-went-up kind of an event.

A So what I want to make clear, sir, is that in March of 2011,

that was a different Alpha 5. So --

Q A different Alpha what?

A A different platoon.

Q Okay.

A So FAST platoons, unlike many other units in the Marine

Corps, are born together, and then they depart together. So that

platoon was disassembled in June of 2011, and then I assembled the new

platoon that I then deployed with in later June, early July of 2011.

I received half the Marines in late June and half the Marines in early

July.

After I received those Marines, we started our FAST platoon

predeployment training workup.

Q What is the designator for that Alpha platoon? What number

was it?

A Fifth Platoon.

Q Fifth Platoon. Okay. All right, please go ahead.

A So, after we formed, we did something called our nonlethal

school. And so we're going -- we're learning how to use nonlethal

formations as a platoon, to how do you use the nonlethal ammunition

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correctly, how do you use the CS -- sorry, I don't know what that acronym

stands for -- and the OC spray correctly, and then get certified in

the employment of those weaponry. That's a 2-week course.

Following that, we did our nuclear, biological, and chemical

school, basically going over how to put on and off the suit properly,

how to do decontamination sites properly. Again, that's another

2 weeks.

And I brought them to a series of live-fire training ranges to

go through our initial qualifications and individual and team-level

skills, what we consider 1,000- through 3,000-level training

standards.

Upon completion of that, we deployed to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for

4 months, where we did a 4-month deployment there. One week, we would

be on the fence line doing the perimeter security mission there, which

is also a real-world training mission, if you will.

So Marines, we're patrolling, we're doing posts, post and relief.

And so Marines are basically doing on-the-job training at that point

because it's still a fairly new platoon. We're executing a real-world

mission, but we're gaining proficiency in our ability to do that

perimeter security mission.

Q Approximately, what were the window -- what window was that

4-month period?

A September to December.

Q Okay. Go ahead, please.

A When we were off the fence line, that was an opportunity

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to continue on our training to build upon from our 3,000-team-level

task up to our platoon-level training standards, going over dynamic

takedowns of buildings, live fire, training evolutions, and then just

basic infantry skills training.

Q Is there a MOUT facility at GTMO?

A There is not a designated MOUT facility, but there's an

abandoned residential housing complex that I would use as my urban

training facility.

Q Okay. Go ahead, please.

A After Guantanamo Bay, when we redeployed in December, we

continued to build our proficiency on our platoon-level training tasks.

And then, in early winter of 2012, we did our mission rehearsal

exercise.

I'm sorry. Before that, we did a company readiness exercise,

otherwise known as a CRE, company readiness exercise. And then we did

our -- and that's when Alpha Company evaluates us on all of our core

mission-essential tasks. And basically that's that continental

United States company commander saying, "I certify this platoon

commander and his platoon on their ability to execute the mission."

After I passed that training, then I move on to the regimental

mission rehearsal exercise. Same type of thing, but, at this time,

it's held at the regimental level, so there's much more oversight and

supervision by senior officers and staff NCOs.

Q Okay.

A Again, they're going through checklists of pass/fail.

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This platoon was the first platoon ever to go green, which is above

80 percent -- I'm sorry, above 90 percent on all mission-essential

tests. So this was one of the best platoons that had ever come across

Marine Corps Security Force Regiment.

Q Nice work.

A Thank you, sir.

After we completed our mission rehearsal exercise, we executed

predeployment block leave, giving the Marines the opportunity to go

home, see Mom, take care of the kids or whatever business. And then

we deployed to FAST Company Europe for what was projected to be a 6- to

7-month deployment.

Q Approximately when was that, when you deployed overseas?

A June, I believe.

Q June of 2012?

A Yes, sir. May or June.

Q Go back real quick and talk to me just briefly about what

type of nonlethal armaments and weapons you have.

A Yes, sir. So we carry the 12-gauge M500. It's a pump

shotgun, and that's capable of shooting the beanbag round, the fin

stabilizer rubber round, which is actually -- it's preferred over the

beanbag, because if the beanbag doesn't have time to open up and then

slow, it could be lethal, and so that's why we prefer the fin stabilizer.

That's shot out of the shotgun.

Out of the 203 is called a foam baton, and then also the 203 can

shoot CS crowd/riot-control chemical agents.

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We also have the Stinger ball grenades.

Q Okay.

A And then we had handheld riot-control gas, CS. And then

every Marine -- we carried enough CS that every Marine had CS on their

body armor, and then we had large cans of CS to use on crowds.

Q All right.

So it's June of 2012. You're in Rota now. Did you have any

real-world activations prior to September 11?

A Only drills.

Q Okay. And you said you deployed to Israel? Or did you do

any training prior to September 11?

A With FAST Company Europe.

Q Okay.

A With FAST Company Europe, we did a 5-week package in Israel,

mostly spanning the month of July. I had organized other training

events in Italy, in Greece. Obviously not executed because of the

contingency mission that arose, but we did execute one of those.

Q All right. So you go to Israel. You come back. It's

getting close to September here, late August, September. Did you have

any discussions about the impending anniversary of 9/11? Was that a

topic of discussion for you all?

A No, sir, it was not.

Q Okay. Was there any kind of increased intelligence threat

reporting in the days, weeks prior to September 11?

A No, sir, we had no indications or warnings.

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A Absolutely.

Q Did you believe you had all the necessary enablers, air

assets? Were they readily available to support you if you needed them?

A Absolutely. Yes, sir.

Q All right. Let's talk about September 11. Talk to me for

a minute about where you all physically were on September 11. Were

you on base? Were you --

A Yes, sir. So, when we're deployed there, all my Marines

are living in the enlisted quarters, which is right behind the company

CP. And then myself and my platoon sergeant, we are in the Navy Gateway

Inn, 250 meters up the road from the company CP.

So, that evening, I recall I was actually talking to my dad on

Skype, watching the Armed Forces Network news channel, which rotates

through news affiliates, and I think it was Fox News that night. And

all of a sudden we see a consulate building on fire. And I said

sarcastically to my father, "Well, I probability won't be in Spain

tomorrow."

As soon as I hung up with him, I got on the phone with my commanding

officer, and we had a short talk of, "Hey, are you watching the news?"

"Yeah, I'm watching the news." "Hey, when do we want to recall the

boys?" And he said something more or less in the lines of, "Make sure

you do your laundry and you got enough soap."

A couple hours later, he was calling me, telling me he was going

to go down to the commander of CTF 68, who is the higher headquarters

of FAST Company Europe, and that I needed to start getting my Marines

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together. This was around midnight, so it would be on September 12.

Start getting my Marines together at midnight on September 12.

We didn't know what was going on. And a lot of them already had SA

because they also had TVs in their room.

Q Did you initiate your recall roster --

A Yes, sir.

Q -- at midnight, more or less?

A Around midnight is when my platoon sergeant and I initiated

the recall.

Q Okay.

Mr. Richards. And that was Spanish time, just for clarification?

Captain Yes, sir, Spanish time.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Okay.

Let's back up a little bit. In terms of the Rota Naval Station,

were there any air assets typically stationed at Rota?

A No, sir. No. What we always planned upon is primarily

aircraft coming from Ramstein, because that's where the preponderance

of Air Force C-130s were. And, if necessary, we had the ability to

reach out to the C-130s that were disaggregated from the MEU if they

were in vicinity of Naval Station Europe.

Q Were there any other Marines in Rota?

A I believe that there was a Marine Corps liaison to the

Spanish. He's generally a Harrier pilot because that's the airframe

that they fly. I don't think there's any other Marines in Rota.

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Q Okay.

On September 11, were you aware that there was a Fourth

Reconnaissance Unit in Sigonella?

A Yes, sir. So that Fourth Reconnaissance element and the

other elements of recon that were part of the Black Sea Rotational Force

actually participated in the theater cooperation mission in Israel with

us. So we had done some training with them in the past, and I knew

that they were within the area of operation.

Q Do you know what their mission was in Sigonella?

A I believe that they were doing theater cooperation

missions. I believe that when we focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, the

infantry battalions that generally did those, it was kind of a void.

So you had Reserve elements going in and doing the Black Sea Rotational

Force and then doing those theater cooperation missions within the area

of operation.

Q Do you know where those Reservists came from in the States?

Were they out of Louisiana, or where they were from?

A I believe they were out of Texas.

Q Okay. And do you know if they were on any kind of alert

posture?

A I do not know.

Q Thank you.

On September 11, were you aware if DOD had any other assets in

the general AOR that could typically respond as a quick-reaction-type

force?

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A No, sir.

Q On September 11, were you aware of the protests that were

going on in Cairo?

A I believe I knew of them, sir. I believe I saw them on the

news.

Q Did what you see on the news alter your plans in any way

or your alert posture?

A Egypt is not in our area of operation. However, because

of the close proximity that it is to the countries that are in our area

of operation, it was taken into consideration that that area of the

world was getting more unrest and that our potential for a contingency

mission was escalating.

Q All right. So you said you first learned about the attack

on the SMC sometime around -- sometime the evening of the 11th. You

were talking to your dad.

A Yes, sir.

Q All right. Were you aware that that Special Mission

Compound even existed?

A No, sir.

Q When did you first learn that the Ambassador was missing?

A On the news that evening, sir.

Q Prior to midnight, you believe?

Ms. Green. Could I just clarify that all the times we're

referring to are Eastern European time, which would've been the time

that you were operating under in Rota --

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initiated your recall process?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who notified you officially that you were being mobilized?

A My company commander.

Q Okay. And what was his name?

A Major

Q And how were you notified?

A In person, face-to-face.

Q What were your specific orders at that time?

A Prepare my platoon to deploy to Libya. We didn't know where

exactly we were going, but we knew through open media sources of what

was going on on the deck.

At that time, we started to make contact with the embassy to

attempt to gain SA of what was happening and what our potential mission

would be. We started to do the Marine Corps planning process, so

intelligence preparation of the battle space and then problem-framing

to figure out what our courses of action could be.

Q Were you aware on the 12th that any other DOD assets were

being mobilized?

A My company commander told me that there was a high

probability that CIF, Commanders In-extremis, were being mobilized,

but, other than that, we did not know of anyone. Or I did not know

of anyone.

Q Okay. Do you know what their mission was going to be?

A I do not, sir.

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BY MR. CHIPMAN:

Q Can I just interject one more time? I'm going to go through

the -- "CTF" is combined task force?

A Yes, sir.

Q "COCOM" is combatant command --

A Yes, sir.

Q -- or commander? "CP" is command post?

A Yes, sir.

Q Verbal order of the commanding officer, that's what "VOCO"

means.

A "MEF" is a Marine Expeditionary Force, a three-star command?

A Yes, sir.

Q "SA" is situational awareness?

A Yes, sir.

Q And a "TO" and a "TE." The first is a table of organization,

and that's how many Marines you had assigned?

A Uh-huh.

Q And a "TE" is the equipment that you were assigned. And

you indicated you had your full complement as well as your full

equipment complement.

A Yes, sir.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A Yes, sir.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q So, I'm sorry, was CTF 68 part of NAV 4?

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I do not know what the timeline was associated with the aircraft

to pick us up. I do not know if those pilots were on a tether. I don't

know if their commander held them to some kind of timeline. I can just

speak to what my platoon was held to.

Q Understood. So you're ready to go at 5:45. The planes

arrive at 1200 noon that day.

A Yes, sir.

Q During that time you were waiting on the aircraft, what kind

of planning and mission planning were you doing or what kind of

activities were you all engaged in?

A So, at that time, we were starting to get satellite imagery

of where we thought the embassy compound was. There was a couple of

sailors that were part of the EOD team in Rota that had helped scout

out possible locations for the new embassy and that they were trying

to locate -- because we did not know where the embassy was. We didn't

know what it looked like, we didn't know what the inside of it was,

we didn't know where anything was.

And so they were pulling up satellite imagery of possible

locations where this could be. And then I was walking through with

my leadership of how we would secure it if there was enemy individuals

inside, how we would have to clear it in order to set up our perimeter

security, how we would get from the airport to the facility if we had

to drive ourselves. So we were just continuing to go over mission prep,

mission preparation.

Q Going back to the aircraft real quick, are you notified of

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the tail numbers of the aircraft that are going to get you when you're

pending movement?

A I do not know the tail numbers.

Q Okay. And what kind of aircraft came to get you?

A Air Force C-130s.

Q How many?

A Two, sir.

Q The C-130s arrive at noon. What time did you start the

load-in process?

A We started to load immediately.

The Spanish were running flight ops that day with their Harrier

squadrons, and so there was a communication barrier between the Spanish

tower operator and what needed to be accomplished in order for us to

get out the door.

Also, there was base regulations that prohibited us from loading

as quickly as we needed to, as far as, like, where ammo can be stored

on the flight line because of the net explosive value of all of my

ammunition that we were going to be bringing.

So, for us to cross the runway, we had to coordinate with the

Spanish, which took some time. For us to load our pallets of ammunition

in the back of the C-130s took additional time because we had to move

to a different spot on the tarmac. And then, after we were loaded,

which was around 1300, so about an hour after the C-130s were there,

we still did not lift off until around 1600 was when the first aircraft

took off.

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Q So you were loaded in an hour and ready to go.

A Yes, sir.

Q Why was there another delay to get off the ground?

A So we were told multiple times to change what we were

wearing, to change from cammies into civilian attire, civilian attire

into cammies, cammies into civilian attire.

There was also some talk of whether or not we could carry our

personal weapons. I was basically holding hard and fast to the point

where we were carrying our personal weapons. Like, we've got a very

violent thing going on the ground where we're going, so we're going

to be carrying something that can protect ourselves.

But, as far as what the Marines were wearing, that continually

changed, and we had to make those changes inside of the aircraft.

Q How many times did you -- you initially were dressed in your

utilities?

A Yes, sir.

Q How many times did you change out of your utilities into

civvies and back?

A So utilities, civilian attire, utilities, civilian attire.

So four. However you want to count -- four.

Q Where was this directive coming from?

A I was listening to the cranials on the C-130. So they're

coming over radio calls.

And then, also, I had a Spanish cell phone in which my company

commander was calling me, and if I wasn't receiving over the radio,

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he was echoing it over the cell phone. He was in the other aircraft.

So he was directing me to tell my Marines and my aircraft, "Hey, we've

got to change again," back and forth, back and forth.

Q Gotcha.

Mr. Chipman. I'm sorry. I didn't catch that. You said you were

listening to the cranials?

Captain So, a cranial is a helmet with a radio inside it.

Plugs into the aircraft's communication systems. And then I also had

my Spanish flip phone that we could call each other back and forth on.

Ms. Chipman. Thank you.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Do you recall when you got the final word about the

changeover in terms of uniforms? When was that resolved?

A I don't know if there was ever, like, a, "Hey, this is the

final answer," like, we are finally in civilian attire. But the last

thing that we were in was civilian attire before we went wheels up,

and I said, "Okay, well, I've just lost cell phone service, so we're

going to stay in civilian attire."

Q Do you know where that -- I mean, I know you're talking to

your company commander. Do you know who was directing him?

A I do not exactly know who my commanding officer was talking

to.

Q Do you know now who he was talking to?

A No.

Q Okay.

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Talk to me about the weapons issue, too, in terms of the personal

weapons issue. What was the discussion there?

A Well, the discussion is, when we get off an aircraft and

we are carrying weapons in a foreign country, what is the perception?

And where are we going into? Is this going to be received? What kind

of second- and third-order effects are we going to have, carrying

semiautomatic weapons in an airport? Just the perception of the host

nation and how that may matriculate into something that we didn't want

it to.

Q Were you on the first bird or the second?

A I was on the first aircraft, sir.

Q And how long after the first bird departure did the second

one leave?

A There was a 1-hour delay due to engine malfunction. We made

up the time in the air so that the lead bird only landed 30 minutes

before the tail bird.

Q So you're on that one, and is on the second one?

A Yes, sir.

Q Thanks. And you were in civvies with personal weapons?

A Yes, sir.

Q Perfect.

Do you recall how long the flight was from Rota to Tripoli?

A Four hours, sir.

Q According to DOD timeline, first bird landed at 8:56 p.m.

in Tripoli. Does that sound accurate?

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Fourth Platoon, Alpha Company. And Sixth Platoon was in Souda Bay.

So he needed to go back and take care of the larger picture.

Q But for all intents and purposes, you were in command, you

were in charge.

A Yes, sir.

Q All right.

Mr. Tolar. Let's go off the record, please.

[Recess.]

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[11:16 a.m.]

Mr. Tolar. Let's go back on the record. I have 11:16.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Captain when we broke, we were talking about your

presence in Tripoli. At this point, talk to me about, now that you're

in Tripoli, you're the platoon commander on the ground, you're in

charge, what is your chain of command now that you're in country in

Libya?

A Still through Major So what had changed on the 12th

is, at the NAVAF-NAVEUR level, we moved from being TACON to NAVEUR to

being TACON to NAVAF. Now --

Q Explain what "TACON" is.

A Tactical control.

Q Okay.

A And the commander of Naval Forces Europe and Naval Forces

Africa is the same gentleman, Admiral -- it's escaping me right now,

but it's the same admiral. It's just the staff is different. So we

would just shift over there.

So it was still me to Major Major to CTF 68, to Sixth

Fleet. And from Sixth Fleet, it just changed to Naval Forces Africa.

Q You're on the ground at the airport. Talk about your

actions at the airport prior to departure from the airport. How long

were you there, and what were you doing?

A I believe we were at the airport for about an hour. And,

after we made linkup, the rest of the time was disembarking the

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Q You said the "building." You mean the compound?

A The compound.

Q Yeah.

A -- was extremely poor. The closed-circuit television

system at the villas, at the embassy compound, had huge gaps in its

observation. So you could not see -- you could not get a good picture

of what has happening 360 degrees around you.

Q So you were able to turn that on when you got there and see

what --

A Yes, sir.

Q Okay.

A And then, also, talking the regional affairs officer, the

RSO and the ARSOs, kind of going over, hey, what were your procedures

prior to? Because I couldn't see them because they had vacated. And

they didn't have anyone monitoring the system anyways.

So the system was halfheartedly put together, and it wasn't

monitored. Basically, the whole compound was being secured by local

nationals at the main gate and the back gate. And then I don't think

that the outer perimeter was secured by the militia or the armory until

post-September 11th.

Q Do you have an appreciation of how many personnel typically

worked in the compound?

A No, because it was never at full staff when I was there.

They only had essential personnel.

The observation from overwhelming buildings and terrain on that

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compound was extremely significant, where an untrained marksman could

easily have wreaked havoc on personnel within that compound. And,

using indirect-fire weapons systems, you can use something called

direct lay, where you can line up the tube of the mortar system with

a target, if you can see it. And with the overwhelming terrain that

surrounded that compound, it was a prime target for direct-lay and

direct-fire weapons systems.

Q Did you discuss your concerns with the embassy compound with

the RSO?

A To length. Yes, sir.

Q Did you make any specific recommendations to him about what

needed to be done to improve the security there?

A I did. And I made a lot of recommendations. And what I

ended up doing is taking charge and just doing it.

This was a new compound, so there were still walls that were

unfinished. So there's huge open areas of this compound that people

could just walk over. Or trees that were hanging over the fence that

a child could climb over that there's no wire on top of.

Q Are you saying there's literally a gap in the perimeter wall

you could walk through?

A Yes, sir. So there was walls that were unfinished --

Q Okay.

A -- in this compound.

While we were there, I had force protection material brought in

from Spain -- wire, sandbags, engineer stakes. And, also, I procured,

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basically you just did it. Did you get any pushback from State? Were

they cooperative?

A They were extremely cooperative.

Q Okay.

A Whatever I needed, they facilitated if they could. If they

couldn't, they were very straightforward. And I used workarounds. I

became a master of doing more with less.

Q That's what Marines do.

Talk to me more specifically about the embassy compound and what

kind of physical improvements you made.

A So physical --

Ms. Sawyer. Could I just ask a question? We're giving you a

tremendous amount of leeway. We are now talking about the facility

in Tripoli, which --

Mr. Tolar. Let's go off the record.

Ms. Sawyer. Yeah. Well, we can go off the record; that's fine.

But, I mean, at this point in time, we are well beyond the mandate of

this committee. I don't think -- we were never in a conversation on

scope --

The Court Reporter. I'm sorry. Do you want me to take this down?

Mr. Tolar. We are off the record. Yeah.

Ms. Sawyer. I'd like to be on the record, actually.

Mr. Tolar. Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. Just back on the record.

You know, I just want the record to reflect we've allowed the

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and put that film on the residence glass.

And we also sandbagged up all the windows around the safe haven

building, and then we would sandbag up the windows around the tactical

operations center. We did not do the sandbagging around the

Ambassador's building, the chief of mission residence, or the dining

facility, out of request from the Department of State.

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were not so exposed right at the gate.

Q At some point -- and I don't recall the date -- but do you

recall a team from the FBI coming to Tripoli?

A Yes, sir. That is actually the aircraft that Major

left on, is the plane that brought them.

Q Did you work with those guys at all in any way?

A Yes. So when they conducted interviews, we would put an

outer perimeter -- because we would conduct the interviews down in the

area of the Embassy compound that was under construction. And so we

would provide them with a little additional security, give them their

space, obviously, so they could conduct their mission.

Also, whenever we had additional individuals on the deck that were

tactically proficient, like their hostage rescue team individuals that

came with those investigators, we would integrate them with our

security plan, give them an orientation of: Hey, if something happens,

this is where I need you; this is where I expect that your individuals

that aren't tactically proficient will move to so that we have

accountability of them.

So they would be read in on those procedures. But as far as like

going and conducting an investigation with them, that never happened.

I never went to Benghazi with them.

Q Approximately how many FBI personnel came in that you're

aware of?

A Four.

Q And did they bring any additional security personnel with

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them?

A The hostage rescue team.

Q Did that include the four FBI guys?

A Yes, sir. I believe so. It might have been -- it might

have been more. My interaction was primarily with the two HST agents

and then the main investigator and his assistant, who was a linguist.

Q Did they have any other type of supplemental security that

came with them?

A The HST?

Q In addition to that.

A No. Just those two individuals.

Q Did you form any kind of impression of that FBI team while

working with them?

A Extremely professional, easy to get along with, very

cooperative.

Q All right. Anything else about working with the FBI team

you want to share with us?

A No, sir.

Q Approximately how long were they in Tripoli? Or, in Libya?

A They were there for the -- they were coming and going. The

HST guys rotated out, but there was a continuous FBI presence for the

90 days that I was there.

Q And did they basically billet at the Embassy when they were

at Tripoli, to the best of your knowledge?

A Yes. I put them in one of the rear buildings because they

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had some communications equipment they had to set up. So they needed

to get away from my communication equipment and the ODA's communication

equipment.

Q Do you recall approximately when they arrived?

A I believe it was the 16th, because that is the day that Major

left.

Q And were they still there when you departed 90 days later?

A Again, they were coming and going, but yes.

Q Do you know what a FEST is -- a Foreign Emergency Support

Team?

A No.

Q In addition to investigating -- before I go there, let me

go back. You mentioned a couple of times ODA. What is an ODA.

Mr. Chipman. Is that an operational detachment?

Captain Yes, sir. Sorry, the acronym was alluding me.

Mr. Chipman. And that's a Special Forces squad-size element?

Captain Yes, sir.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Do you know where they came from?

A They were there when I got there -- when I got to Tripoli

on the 12th?

Mr. Chipman. Was the size of that element, if you can recall?

Were there four individuals?

Captain It was like four or six individuals.

Mr. Chipman. Four or six individuals.

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with our aircraft.

Q Understood.

A So it is just -- it was a very unique situation that we were

put in. And the timelines at some point seem like we were delayed in

one way or another, but Murphy always gets a vote. And Murphy got a

couple of votes that day, but all in all, the joint community came

through, and we were able to get where we needed to get to in a good

timeline.

Q In addition to investigating the events surrounding the

attacks in Libya on September 11th, 2012, this committee is also tasked

to determine what can be done to ensure attacks against American

facilities overseas are mitigated, if not prevented, in the future.

Knowing that, based on your experience of working with the State

Department, in your opinion do you think the State Department views

security, in terms of importance -- how do you think the State

Department views security in terms of importance in their daily

operations.

A So I believe a lot of things have changed. We live in a

reactive environment, and we have finite resources. And that's what

we saw on September 11th -- we had finite resources. After

September 11th, you saw a realignment of when my platoon got back, we

went to Ramstein, Germany, to be co-located with our aircraft. We

experimented with different levels of alertness, and then we did

multiple levels of drills with the Air Force to see how we can be more

proficient and get flash to bang closer so that we can get on the

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objective faster to prevent something from happening.

Also, what the team in FAST Europe has started doing, with

cooperation from the State Department, is embassy visits. So if a

facility or an embassy is seen as a high-risk area, FAST Company Europe

will go and visit. They will walk through with the defense attache,

with the RSO, and: Hey, this is how we would secure it; this is how

we would disembark from the aircraft; things that you don't think of

until they happen. So this is how we would disembark from the aircraft;

this is how we would move from the airport to the compound. If the

compound is being overran, this is our rally point where we would kind

of get ourselves together before we went and maneuvered on the enemy

and then recaptured it.

So all those things are starting to -- were starting to come

together when I was leaving, and as I have been told, they are continuing

forward progress.

Before September 11th, embassies like in Israel already allowed

us or kind of asked us to come and do those things. It was convenient

because we would already be in those locations because of theater

cooperation missions and then we would just -- we were already on the

deck in Tel Aviv, for example, so we could go visit with the defense

attache and regional affairs officer and we would war game how we would

do it.

Since September 11th, the cooperation of the State Department has

allowed us to go and do those visits all over our area of operation.

Q Do you have any specific recommendations that you feel like

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A No, sir.

Q That's all I need. Thank you.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q About done here. You were there for 90 days. Who relieved

you?

A Elements off the Fort McKinley relieved me. It was a group

I believe from 511, which is an artillery battery, and they had some

additional support from an assault amphibious vehicle company. And

they were put together as what's called a provisional rifle company.

They're not infantrymen, but they're kind of a conglomeration of other

ground combat elements, and then trained to do a perimeter security

mission.

Q Approximately how long was your turnover with those folks?

A I believe it was designed to be 3 days, but my aircraft to

extract us was delayed. So we overlapped almost by a week.

Q Are forward deployed Alpha Company elements still in

Ramstein today?

A I do not believe so, sir. I believe that during heightened

alert status, they actually go to Suda Bay and align themselves with

the C-130s -- with the Marine C-130s that are there. I'm not certain.

Q Where's there garrison billet in Europe now? Is it back

in Rota where you were?

A Yes, sir, it's back in Rota.

Q Very well.

Is there anything else that you'd like to share with Chairman

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Gowdy and this committee about your experience or something that you

think we should know?

A No, sir.

Q Thank you.

Mr. Tolar. Let's take -- I've got quarter after 12. Let's take

a 10-minute break, please.

[Recess.]

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A That is correct, ma'am. And as per FAST mission, we are

not designed as a hostage rescue force. We are not -- what was

happening on the deck on the evening of the 11th to the morning of the

12th is not within the parameters of FAST mission.

Q Right.

A A marine can do it, and a marine FAST platoon can absolutely

do it, and we are capable of doing many things. However, we are

designed to do limited-duration perimeter security.

So, in order for a FAST platoon to be effective in a place like

Benghazi, we would have had to have gone in off the indications and

warnings of things that happened in June and put up that layer of steel,

that physical indicator to our enemies that American marines are here

and don't mess with us.

Q And you mentioned in the last hour even the confusion you

had over the uniforms did not make a difference in your ability to

complete your mission. Is that right?

A Absolutely not. It did end up being a force multiplier,

though, because what we were gathering off the social media after we

had got there and then for our duration, that whenever we moved from

compound to compound we remained in civilian attire. But when we were

in the compound and on post, we were in uniform. What that did is that

told the Libyan people that they don't who's a marine and who's not

a marine, and they didn't want to mess with the marines. So it gave

everyone else Wasta.

Q But, Captain you also mentioned second and third order

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effects that could happen as a result of wearing the uniform. What

was your understanding as to why the Libyan Government may have

recommended that the marines be in civilian attire?

A Not to show that you have American marines on the deck in

the country outside of what's seen to be U.S. sovereign territory. So

the outside impression that's given of a marine force on the ground

in a foreign country is not the most welcoming presence.

Concurrently, you've got Iraq wrapping up and Afghanistan going

up. No one wants to be -- this is me kind of making up these answers

why they don't want us in uniform -- no one wants to be the next country

that's got marines coming in to do what marines do.

Q And so is it possible that the Libyan Government was

concerned about fostering further unrest by a visible sign of a foreign

military?

A I can't answer that. I don't know.

Q You mentioned in the last hour that you made recommendations

at the Embassy to improve security, and you identified some of the

concerns that you had at the tactical level in which you were operating.

Q Uh-huh.

A Prior to your arrival in Libya on September 12th, 2012, did

you have any visibility into DOD assets that may have been in Libya

to provide security?

A The only DOD assets I knew of were the advisory teams that

went in there to help identify locations of where they could potentially

set up a new Embassy. And I was made aware of the individuals that

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went on there on September 12th when we were trying to identify where

the Embassy might be so we could pull up satellite imagery and look

at it. Outside of that, I had no knowledge of DOD presence within

Libya.

Q Thank you.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Just in terms of your, I guess, not even situational

awareness, but overall awareness, kind of your window into Benghazi

and Tripoli kind of started on September 12th, 2012. Is that a fair --

A Yes, ma'am. Libya first came on my radar when I saw on open

media on Armed Forces Network that it was being attacked. That was

the first time that Libya became a blip on my radar, besides, you know,

knowing that an attack had happened in June.

Q So if there had been or to the extent there was a DOD presence

even at the Embassy in Tripoli during 2012, you just would not have

had an awareness of that presence at prior times at the Embassy in

Tripoli. Is that also a fair statement?

A I did not know of any DOD presence in Tripoli or Benghazi.

Q So you wouldn't have been aware if the Department of Defense

had had prior opportunities to make recommendations about fortifying,

amplifying, or changing security at the Embassy in Tripoli prior to --

A It would depend on what the scope of what that would have

been. I mean, if they would have brought in, like, a liaison from FAST

or requested us to come to a site survey, yes, I would been made aware

of that. If it dealt with other elements of the Department of Defense,

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it's purely speculation of whether or not based on who that

recommendation would have come from.

Q And you would not have had an awareness one way or the other

as to whether that occurred, is that true --

A Again --

Q -- earlier in 2012, prior to you being there on the 12th

of September?

A Are you saying if it would have happened? So

theoretically?

Q I'm just asking whether you -- I'm just trying to clarify

that you would not have had an awareness, one way or the other, if it

had occurred or if it had not occurred. You just simply would not have

been aware of a DOD presence, a DOD opportunity to make recommendations

about improving security at Embassy Tripoli or not. Is that --

A Well, I would have absolutely been made aware of if it had

something to do with -- something within the scope of my mission set.

Q If it had involved your FAST platoon --

A If it involved --

Q -- you certainly would have been aware?

A If it involved elements of FAST or elements from the Marine

Corps, say, for example, from the MEU, the Marine Expeditionary Unit,

I would have been made aware of it.

Things that I would not have been made aware of, for example, would

be, like, the level of which the Department is going to have its defense

attaches or a discussion of imminent marine security guards there or

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not. I probably would not have been made aware of that.

Marine security guards operate under Title 22. We operate under

Title 10. So there's just some differences in that and then how they

operate. But whether I would have been made aware or not made aware

is purely circumstantial upon what level the Department of Defense was

involved with that Embassy.

Q And you also had in a both going forward and a little bit

looking back way, had indicated that now there is a mechanism for the

FAST platoon, such as the one that you were commanding, to have an

opportunity to visit -- I think you called them embassy

visits -- embassies that are in high threat areas and make

recommendations akin to what you were able to make as of the 12th at

various embassies overseas.

A Yes, ma'am. Prior to September 11th, we had limited

participation in site visits. And the example I made was Tel Aviv.

Tel Aviv welcomed us in, gave us a walk around, and we met with the

regional security officer and went over possible courses of action if

they became threatened, like what we would do in noncombatant

evacuation, where we would put posts, things of that nature.

Now, post-September 11th, more embassies are participating in

this and being much more active so that the unknown unknowns are

discovered, and we're able to go over how to get from -- how to work

through those finite details of little things, like I brought up, like

getting equipment off the aircraft to the Embassy.

BY MS. GREEN:

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Q Okay. Shifting gears, I would just like to ask you a series

of questions about a number of public allegations related to the

attacks.

We understand that the committee is investigating each of these

allegations and, therefore, we have to ask everyone about them. You'll

see that there are a lot of these allegations, so this takes a while.

And I apologize in advance and ask you to please just bear with me.

For the most part, I'll just ask whether you have any evidence

or firsthand information to support each of the allegations. And if

you do not, we can move to the next one.

It has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton intentionally

blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One Congressman

has speculated that Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta to stand down,

and this resulted in the Defense Department not sending more assets

to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No, ma'am.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A No, ma'am.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington

Post fact checker evaluated this claim and gave it four Pinocchios,

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its highest award for false claims. Nonetheless, this allegation has

persisted.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No, ma'am.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A No, ma'am.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

the spring of 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

the spring of 2011?

A No, ma'am.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. Mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or other countries. A

bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that the CIA was not collecting and shipping arms

from Libya to Syria, and they found no support for this allegation.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

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arms from Libya to Syria?

A No, ma'am.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A No, ma'am.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound, and

there have been a number of allegations about the cause and

appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee

issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not ordered

to stand down, but that instead there were tactical disagreements on

the ground over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand-down order

to CIA personnel?

A No, ma'am.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do

you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind

the temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed the Annex

to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A No, ma'am.

Q A concern has been raised by one individual that in the

course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board,

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damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that

production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to the ARB?

A No, ma'am.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No, ma'am.

Q Let me ask these questions also for documents that were

provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials

that were provided to Congress?

A No, ma'am.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons and that he then misrepresented his own actions when

he told Congress that the CIA faithfully performed our duties in

accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship.

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave

false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

A No, ma'am.

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Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike

Morell altered the talking points provided to Congress for political

reasons?

A No, ma'am.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an

intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows

about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk

shows?

A No, ma'am.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief on the night of the attacks

and that he was missing in action.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing in action

on the night of the attacks?

A No, ma'am.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considering

flying on a second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors

to stand down, meaning to cease all operations. Military officials

have stated that those four individuals were instead ordered to remain

in place in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance in their

current location.

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A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that, quote: "There was no stand-down order issued

to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House

Armed Services Committee that there was no stand-down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi?

A No, ma'am.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives. However,

former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the former

chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review of

the attacks, after which he stated: "Given where the troops were, how

quickly the thing all happened, and how quickly it dissipated, we

probably couldn't have done more than we did," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

conclusion?

A No, ma'am.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives, but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided

not to deploy those assets?

A No, ma'am.

Ms. Green. That concludes our questions --

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BY MS. SAWYER.

Q I just had a couple of questions that I wanted to finish

with.

You had indicated early in the first hour that your role was really

at a tactical level, to make sure that your platoon was absolutely ready

to go --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- as quickly as they could be and to go wherever they were

asked to go in terms of their mission and their deployment, and that

you worked as quickly as you could and worked with your team as quickly

as you could and you were ready to go --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q -- at 5:45 a.m. Is that --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Now, at that point in time, did you have an awareness, at

5:45, if we go to that DOD timeline that you were given as exhibit 1,

and if you take a look on page 2, it indicates at 5:15 a.m., "The second

facility in Benghazi comes under mortar and rocket propelled grenade

fire."

At 5:45, when you were ready to go, were you aware that that had

occurred on the ground?

A So what I was made aware of what was being broadcasted over

open source media. The knowledge of intimate details, what

specifically was happening on the ground in Benghazi, was not made aware

to me until after the fact.

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For example, I did not know that individuals had been evacuated

from that State compound and moved to a CIA compound that was

geographically separated. I was not made aware of that evacuations

were going on via C-17.

Q So you were not being made aware in real time the night of

the attacks as to what was unfolding on the ground?

A No, ma'am.

Q Would you have expected that the individuals who were making

the decisions as to what was appropriate for your particular platoon

to do in terms of a mission would have been aware of those incidents

that night?

A The information we needed to operate, we were receiving it.

Would it have been nice to have more information? Absolutely. Can

I Monday morning quarterback all of this and say all these nice to haves?

Sure. But was I given the necessary information to execute the mission

that I was tasked to do? Yes.

Q And at the point in time that you are at the hangar ready

to load the plane and go, 5:45 is a half-hour looking at this time line,

a half-hour after the second attack. Is that accurate? Just looking

at the time lines, it says 5:15.

A Yeah. I mean, roughly. Again, what I wanted to specify

is the time lines I gave you, for example, like 9 o'clock, I think I

said -- I'm sorry -- 2100 we landed. You know, we took off at 1600.

The second plane went on behind.

These are rough time lines of an event that happened years ago

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and that I'm not looking at detailed notes, nor am I looking at detailed

sitreps. So my knowledge of these events have atrophied.

Q Captain can I just state, this is absolutely not a

criticism of you.

A I just wanted -- yes, ma'am.

Q There's information and decisions being made above your

level?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q You would not expect that you would be informed in real

time --

A Right.

Q -- about higher-level discussions, which assets to send

where --

A Right.

Q -- additional regional rifts, for that matter?

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Okay.

A And the only reason why I bring that up is that, whether

we were at the hangar ready to go at 5:45 or it was 5:50, it's minute,

because we knew the aircraft weren't going to be there for hours.

So, for example, like I instructed my marines: Hey, lay on your

packs and get some rest because it's going to be a long night. Across

from the terminal was the PX, so: Hey, if you guys forget some stuff

or you need some more tobacco or whatever, like, now is the time.

Because we knew we had time. Like, we were ready, but obviously

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there's other things that needed to catch up, that there is a -- we

can outpace our logistics very quickly, and that's why we need other

things to catch up.

Q All right. Even had the planes been there, I think,

collocated with you at the air place when you were there at, you said

5:45 or 5:50, there still was the matter of flight time.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Just the pure tyranny of distance, as they say, or the

logistics to actually get to where your mission would then be. Is

that --

A Yes, ma'am.

Q So in terms of that -- and granting that there was the attack

at 5:15 and evacuation of the first wave of folks just 2 hours later

at 7:40 a.m., and then the final Americans who had been in Benghazi

were evacuated from Benghazi to Tripoli as of 10 a.m., even had the

plane been there -- and, again, setting aside what you've very, I think,

fully explained with regard to your capabilities not being hostage

rescue -- as just a pure logistical matter putting that all together,

is there any way that you feel that you could have been there in that

timeframe?

Certainly, not before the mortar attack at 5:15. Then it's only

2 hours later to 7:40 when the first plane gets out safely. And then

I think it's a matter of 10, the second plane, at which point they're

all leaving as you guys presumably are arriving.

A So let's say I am collocated somewhere in Europe with

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aircraft and we are extremely on the dial and that everyone can tune

in to these little indicators and quickly make the decision of what

asset needs to go where.

And so we look at the beginning of the time line at 3:42 p.m. on

the 11th. So the soonest I could be there is 4 -- well, Benghazi is

a longer flight time than Tripoli. It's about an hour longer. So the

quickest I could be there would be 8 o'clock in the evening. That's

if we went right away.

That's not the case. That's never going to be the case because

there's going to have to be decisions that happen way above a

tactical-level commander of who needs to go where.

Q And with regard to any of the decisions that were made that

night, do you have any doubt that those decisions reflected the best

military judgment, based on what was unfolding in real time, by the

people authorized to make them?

A Yes, ma'am. Because if we had rushed into something -- we

need to take the tactical patience to assess the situation and make

sure that we have -- that we are assigning the appropriate asset to

accomplish the mission. And that goes with the aircraft to get us in

there, that goes with what unit that they're going to assign. So I

believe that it did happen appropriately.

Q The decisions that were made on that night were fully

appropriate?

A To my knowledge of what decisions were made, yes, ma'am.

Q Thank you very much for your patience. As I indicated, you

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know, I am an ultimate layperson. My goal here, I feel like I'm the

great canary in the coal mine. If I can understand it, hopefully the

Members, who I think have been really wanting and needing to understand,

will be able to understand.

So I appreciate your patience with my questions and, you know,

we very much appreciate your service to the country. It is invaluable.

And all of the Members, I know, are truly appreciative of that as well

as your time today. So thank you.

A Yes, ma'am.

Mr. Tolar. Are you done?

Ms. Sawyer. Yes.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Two quick follow-ups, real quick.

Again, you have never testified before Congress regarding what

happened in September 2012 in Libya, correct?

A No, sir, I've never.

Q To the best of your knowledge, has Major ever testified

before Congress regarding those same events?

A No, sir, he has not.

Q To the best of your knowledge, has anybody associated with

the FAST Company ever testified before Congress regarding those events?

A No, sir.

Q Second question: Regarding the civvy issue, were you aware

or did you believe that the Libyan Government was responsible for

requiring you to change from civvies into uniform?

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103

A No, sir. I do not know who was responsible.

Q Thank you.

And I just want you to know we understand what a burden it is for

you to be here today away from your job, away from your family. Your

testimony was very important, and we appreciate it.

On behalf of Chairman Gowdy and the committee, I want to thank

you and your family for your service to the country. Thank you.

A Thank you.

Mr. Tolar. That ends this deposition.

[Whereupon, at 1:04 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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EXHIBIT 1

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105
106
INTERVIEW OF

CHERYL MILLS

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, SEPTEMBER 3, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

PHILIP G. KIKO, Staff Director and General Counsel

CHRIS DONESA, Deputy Staff Director

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Counsel

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel

CRAIG MISSAKIAN, Deputy Chief Counsel

MAC TOLAR, Senior Counsel

CARLTON DAVIS, Counsel

SARA BARRINEAU, Investigator

KIM BETZ, Member Outreach Liaison and Counsel

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel

SHANNON GREEN, Minority Counsel

LAURA RAUCH, Minority Senior Professional Staff

DANIEL REBNORD, Minority Professional Staff

FOR MS. MILLS

BETH ANN WILKINSON

HAL BREWSTER

ADAM SCHWARTZ

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Ms. Jackson. Good morning, Ms. Mills. Again, my name is Sharon

Jackson. And this is a transcribed interview of Cheryl Mills conducted

by the House Select Committee on Benghazi. This interview is being

conducted voluntarily as part of the committee's investigation into

the attacks on the U.S. diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and

matters related to that pursuant to House Resolution 567 of the 113th

Congress and House Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

Could we have your name, please, for the record.

Ms. Mills. My name is Cheryl Mills.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Good morning, and we appreciate your

appearance here today.

And what I would like to do in the next few minutes is go over

sort of the ground rules that will apply to this interview. As you

know, everything has ground rules and we have them here too.

Ms. Mills. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. So, again, I introduced myself, but I am Sharon

Jackson. I'm with the majority staff. And the first thing I'd like

to do is go around the room and have everyone identify themselves so

we have a record of who's here.

So we'll start with the counsel that is accompanying you and work

our way counterclockwise around the room.

Ms. Wilkinson. Good morning, Ms. Jackson. My name is Beth

Wilkinson.

Mr. Schwartz. Good morning. Adam Schwartz.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. And in the back?

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Mr. Brewster. My name is Hal Brewster.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny with the minority staff.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer with the minority staff.

Mr. Jordan. Jim Jordan.

Mr. Gowdy. Trey Gowdy.

Mr. Davis. Carlton Davis.

Ms. Barrineau. Sara Barrineau with the majority staff.

Ms. Betz. Kim Betz with the majority staff.

Mr. Chipman. I'm Dana Chipman with the majority staff.

Mr. Missakian. Craig Missakian, majority staff.

Ms. Rauch. Laura Rauch with the minority staff.

Ms. Green. Shannon Green with the minority staff.

Mr. Rebnord. Dan Rebnord with minority staff.

Mr. Donesa. I'm Chris Donesa with the committee.

Mr. Kiko. Phil Kiko with the committee.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. All right. So I'll take a few minutes to

talk about those ground rules and explain how the interview will

proceed.

Generally, the way the questioning has proceeded is that a member

from the majority will ask questions for up to an hour and then the

minority staff will have the next hour to ask questions. Questions

may only be asked by a Member of Congress or a member of the staff of

the committee. We will rotate back and forth in those hour increments

until we're out of questions and the interview will then be over.

Ms. Mills. There's no hour for me?

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Ms. Jackson. You'll be doing a lot of talking today.

Ms. Mills. No, I want to ask you. Okay. That's fair.

Ms. Jackson. Yes. Unlike testimony or a deposition in Federal

court, the committee format is not bound by the rules of evidence. The

witness or their counsel may raise objections for privilege subject

to review by the chairman of the committee. If these objections cannot

be resolved in the interview, the witness can be required to return

for a deposition or a hearing.

Members and staff of the committee, however, are not permitted

to bring up objections when the other side is asking questions. So

again, your counsel can raise objections for privilege and then it would

be subject to the review of the chairman of the committee.

And I would note that we are joined by Mr. Westmoreland, who is

a member of the committee.

Ms. Mills. Hi. How are you? It's very nice to meet you.

Ms. Jackson. Our session today is unclassified. If you feel

that any question calls for a classified answer, please let us know

and we will reserve its answer until another time. We are in a

classified setting; however, the interview is going to be unclassified.

Ms. Mills. So that means if you all ask a question that might

end up implicating classified information, even though we're in a SCIF,

I shouldn't answer that?

Ms. Jackson. It is my understanding that not everybody has the

appropriate level of clearance to hear the classified information.

Ms. Mills. Okay.

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Ms. Jackson. You are welcome to confer with counsel at any time

throughout the interview, but if something needs to be clarified, we

would ask that you first make that known. Just ask that we restate

the question, repeat it, rephrase it in some way so that you understand.

Ms. Mills. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. We will also take a break whenever it's convenient

for you. Generally, we do this after every hour of questioning. We'll

take a 10-minute, 15-minute break at that time to allow everyone

to -- the minority and the majority to switch seats out for the

questioning and let everybody --

Ms. Mills. You actually change seats?

Ms. Jackson. Yes, because of the microphones for the reporters.

Ms. Mills. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. Yes. So, but during the round of questioning,

should you need anything, a glass of water, use of the facilities, to

confer with your counsel, please just let us know. We'll go off the

record, take a break and allow you the opportunity. We're going to

try and make this as comfortable as possible for you.

Ms. Mills. Thank you. I've been waiting all day for that.

Ms. Jackson. As you can see, we have an official reporter taking

down everything that is said so that we can have a written record of

this. So we ask that you give verbal responses to all questions that

are posed, yes and noes as opposed to nods and shakes of the heads,

as is human nature.

And I'm also going to give the reporter permission to interrupt

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the proceedings if we tend to talk over each other. There's a habit

that we all have of starting to give an answer before the question is

done or asking the next question before the answer is fully given. So

I'm going to try and be very cognizant of that and allow you to finish

before I go on to the next question. But if we talk too fast or

interrupt each other, the reporter has our authority to interrupt us

and tell us to slow down or one at a time.

Again, as I said, we are here in a voluntary interview, but we

do want to get a written record of your answers to the questions that

we have posed. So, again, if you need anything repeated or clarified,

please ask because we will be happy to clarify.

We ask that you give us the most complete and best answer that

you can to our questions. We understand that there has been a passage

of time and memories fade over time and that you may not remember all

of the details with the clarity that you knew them at that time. But

we do ask that you give us as much information as you can to the answers

that we have.

If you honestly don't know the answer to a question or do not

remember, it's best not to guess. But if you can't remember, just tell

us, but inform us who might have that information. If there was someone

else in the room, someone else present that might be privy to the same

information that you had at that time. But, again, we ask that you

give us the most complete answer you can to the questions that we pose.

Do you understand that you are required to answer questions from

Congress truthfully?

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Ms. Mills. Yes, I do.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Do you understand that that also applies to

questions that are asked by staff of a committee?

Ms. Mills. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Do you understand that witnesses that

knowingly provide false testimony could be subject to criminal

prosecution for perjury or making false statements?

Ms. Mills. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Is there any reason that you would be unable

to provide truthful answers to today's questions?

Ms. Mills. I hope there's none.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Well, that's the end of my preamble and the

ground rules.

Does the minority have anything that they would like to add?

Ms. Sawyer. Just briefly, we would like to welcome you here

today, Ms. Mills. We very much appreciate your willingness to appear

voluntarily and to be here so early with us. The ranking member hopes

to join us soon and will also look forward to hearing your testimony

today.

It's our understanding that your counsel on your behalf had

requested that the interview be conducted publicly, and it's also our

understanding that that request was denied. So I just wanted to give

your counsel an opportunity to comment on that if she would like. We

were not party to the conversations about it. So on behalf of the

minority members, to the extent Ms. Wilkinson would like to comment,

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we would like to give her the opportunity.

Ms. Wilkinson. I don't have any comment. We made our request.

It was turned down. I would only ask today that at the end of the day,

because this is an unclassified hearing, as was just explained to us,

that the transcript be released publicly; ask the chairman consider

that request, please.

Ms. Sawyer. And then I just want to note as we begin that the

majority is still seeking documents from the State Department and as

has been noted, there is an issue of security clearance, as we

understand it. Nonetheless, we've decided to proceed today. The

minority is fully confident that the committee will have the

opportunity to ask all of the questions it needs, and we certainly don't

believe that these factors should justify asking you to return on

multiple occasions to appear before us.

So, again, thank you, welcome, and we look forward to talking to

you.

Ms. Mills. Thank you.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. With that, we'll begin the first hour of

questioning. I see that my watch says it's about 8:17.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Ms. Mills, could you just walk us through your professional

background since law school.

A I graduated from law school in 1990. Went to Stanford Law

School. When I left Stanford Law School, I went and worked at Hogan

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11

& Hartson, which is a law firm here in town, and I worked for David

Tatel, who now sits on the D.C. Circuit, but was doing education

desegregation law, so trying to support those school districts that

were still trying to implement the promises of Brown v. Board of

Education. I was there for almost 2 years, actually, I guess a little

over 2 years.

During that time period, I ended up going to work on the

preplanning for the transition of then-Governor Clinton who was then

subsequently elected President Clinton's campaign. I worked there

from the summer of 1992, I believe -- wow, I'm so old

now. Okay -- until I went to work in the counsel's office, which

was -- that was in 1991 and then I went to the counsel's office in 1992.

I worked there until -- I was there for 7 years and then I went

from there to work at Oxygen Media for 2 years. And from Oxygen Media

I went to go work at NYU, and then I left NYU to come to the State

Department. I was at the State Department during Secretary Clinton's

tenure. And then I left and have been building businesses in Africa

as well as having a few clients that I actually provide advice or

consulting to.

Q Okay. Obviously, you met Secretary Clinton during your

White House tenure, or had you met her before?

A I met her in Little Rock, so I met her in 1991. I didn't

know her obviously -- when I met her, I didn't know her as well then

and got to know her better during the time I was in the White House

and the time that I was in Little Rock. I knew President Clinton better

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12

when I was in Little Rock.

Q Okay. Did you work on Secretary Clinton's 2008

presidential campaign?

A Yes. Yes. And I did that -- actually, I took a leave part

time from NYU and I was a consultant on her campaign. And I was on

her campaign from, I think it was 2007 and 2008, might have been just

2008, but it was in that time period I was there, correct.

Q Do you recall approximately how long you were there?

A I was there until she transitioned into the State

Department.

Q So you stayed with her campaign until you -- then she became

Secretary of State?

A She became Secretary of State. Yeah, I was a consultant

always to the campaign so I was never a full-time employee of the

campaign, but I stayed with her through the period of time where she

ultimately then made the decision to accept the offer to be Secretary

of State and then become Secretary of State.

Q And when did you become her counselor and chief of staff?

A So I came to the Department in a part-time capacity because

my objective was to replace myself and have someone else have the joy

of serving as counselor and chief of staff. So I --

Q You were unsuccessful in that endeavor?

A I was. I was. I was. Alas, here we are. So I ultimately

in about -- I decided in the spring that I would stay and so I

transitioned to being a full-time employee, I believe, in the spring,

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so like May of 2009.

Q Well, I understand how part-time employment works in the

District of Columbia, so was your time when she first became Secretary

of State until you became full time, were you a consultant to her? Were

you a part-time employee?

A So at the Department, they have different special

government employee statuses, so I was an unpaid consultant to her

during that time period. And they have different categories that they

put people in, so that's the category I was in.

Q Okay. And she became Secretary of State on the day the

President was inaugurated?

A No, the next day. I can remember that. Yeah, I think it

was the next day. So she was like, I think, the 21st, if I remember

it.

Q So you were with her from the onset of her being Secretary

of State?

A I was with her from the onset of her being Secretary of

State. I was part time obviously because I was an unpaid consultant,

but yes, I was there and tried my best to be supportive and also tried

my best to find somebody to replace me.

Q Okay. And then when was it that you went full time as chief

of staff?

A I believe I went full time in May of 2009, it would be.

Q During the time that you were the unpaid consultant at the

State Department, did you have any other employment at that time?

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A Yes, I was part time at NYU.

Q Okay. So your leave of absence had ended?

A So with NYU I was part time. I was a consultant, so I was

always part time. So NYU was stepping through a process of being able

to establish a university in Abu Dhabi, and so that was the one matter

that I was continuing to work on for the university.

Q Okay. And I just want to make sure that that I have this,

but had you --

A So I was part time at the university and I was a consultant

to the campaign and then I was still part time at the university and

an unpaid consultant in the State Department.

Q Okay.

A Does that help?

Q Yes.

A Okay, good.

Q Yes.

And how long were you at the State Department as chief of staff?

A I was there until February 1st, which I believe is her last

day in office.

Q And then --

A 2013, sorry, I should say.

Q Yes. And then did you have any role or work as a consultant

for the State Department after that time?

A Yes. I was an unpaid -- you know, the unpaid part. I was

an unpaid consultant and the Haiti Envoy, so I provided part-time

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service in our role and leadership on Haiti. So it was that transition

period to inspire that country that we were just as committed to them

as we had been.

Q And on or after February 1, 2013, then what has been your

paid employment?

A Right. So thank you. My paid employment is I have

consultants that I give -- so I advise a couple of clients and that

has been my paid income.

Q Okay. Have you had any other professional affiliation with

either former President Clinton or Secretary Clinton?

A Could you elaborate more?

Q Have you served on any boards of the Clinton Foundation or

anything like that?

A I do serve on the board of Clinton Foundation currently.

Q Okay. And had you in the past?

A Before I went into the State Department I had served on the

board of the Clinton Foundation after I had left government from a long

time ago.

Q Okay. And do you remember what those years were?

A I don't. Because I actually served on the board of the

Clinton Foundation, the Leadership Conference on Civil and Human

Rights, the National Partnership for Women and Families, and See

Forever, which is a foundation that my partner and I founded for kids

in the juvenile justice system. And I served on all of those, I think,

at a similar time and then stepped off of them when I went into the

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State Department.

Q Okay. And then have you resumed your service on those

boards after you left the State Department?

A I am on the See Forever Foundation and I am on the Clinton

Foundation board. I now also have joined the board of BlackRock, which

is a for profit.

Q Are there any other foundations or boards that you currently

serve on?

A So I have a company that is building businesses in Africa

and I sit on the board of my company, but other than that, no.

Q Okay. Are any of these boards funded by the Clinton

Foundation, or are any of the organizations on which you serve as a

board member funded by the Clinton Foundation other than the Clinton

Foundation?

A No.

Q Like See Forever or --

A Oh, no, I see what you're saying.

Q Yes.

A They are independent organizations. They are not

connected with the Clinton Foundation.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q At the beginning of Secretary Clinton's tenure at the State

Department, you said you were an unpaid consultant?

A Uh-huh.

Q Did she have a separate chief of staff during that time

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period?

A No, I was acting in that role, and I was basically an unpaid

consultant helping to try and manage her transition in, so I was

basically providing for the transitional support in. And during that

time period we were seeking to identify somebody who could actually

be a full-time partner, yeah.

Q Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Ms. Mills, we're here to talk about the attacks on the U.S.

diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, so I want to ask you about a series

of questions about the night of the attack. How did you first learn

that the U.S. diplomatic facility in Benghazi was being attacked on

September 11, 2012?

A I learned that because staff in the front office of

Secretary Clinton's office came in to say that they had just gotten

reports that there was an attack on our compound.

Q Okay.

A That was probably like late afternoon.

Q Okay. So you were in the building and in the facility and

in your office?

A Yes. The way our offices are set up, Secretary Clinton's

office is, she has two offices. She has a front office that's a big,

open area, that's the ceremonial office. There's then a back office.

It's smaller, like about half the size of this room. And then behind

that room is another office which is the chief of staff's office, which

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is supposed to make you feel good because you're connected, but it's

really teeny.

But at any rate, that's where my office was. And you could walk

through those spaces so there was an interior door that I could walk

through. And I can recall that at some point in that time period,

either the Executive Secretary or the EA came in to say that there's

an attack on -- there's an attack happening on our compound.

Q Okay. And who was the Executive Secretary at the time?

A The Executive Secretary was Steve Mull, I believe; and the

executive assistant was Joe Macmanus. And it also could've been

someone else, I mean, but it was in that -- her front office space she

also had some assistants as well. But I do recall they were passing

in saying there was an attack happening.

Q Were you in a meeting with the Secretary at the time?

A I don't believe I was in a meeting, but I do know that kind

of it was -- we learned because there were a couple of people

around -- and I can't even tell you who that was now, but I can remember

being surprised that there was an attack on our compound and asking

what's going on.

Q Okay. Because you said that they passed you a note, so were

you in --

A So they came in with something which they were reading, so

I'm assuming they were reading either an ops alert or something that

they had. So that's my best kind of today recollection of that moment.

Q Okay. Do you recall, did they hand you that piece of paper?

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A No. I remember more that they were reading from it, but

I could be wrong about that too, you know. I'm just doing my best.

Q Okay. And were you given any further details other than

there was an attack on the facility?

A Not that I recall right now. I just remember them saying

that our compound was being attacked.

Q Okay. Do you recall, was the Secretary with you at that

time?

A I don't know if she had heard before me and was hearing it

again. I just know that at the time I was learning it, she was also

there.

Q Okay. And was that in her office or your office?

A It was in her office space.

Q All right. Who else do you recall being there other than

yourself, Mr. Mull, Mr. Joe Macmanus, and the Secretary?

A So I don't know if Steve Mull or Mr. Joe Macmanus came in.

I can't tell you which one of those it was or if it was one of the special

assistants, So I want to be transparent about any memory in that regard.

I don't recall. Like, I just don't recall. I don't recall if I was

standing there talking and somebody came in or what the flow was, but

I remember being in that space at the time when I learned.

Q Okay. What did you do once you had this information?

A Well, so we all immediately tried to do the same thing:

Learn more. What's happening? How is it happening? Are we getting

any more information? And that started the process of, the Department

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has an ops, an operation center and it also has task force that mobilized

when there is a crisis. And so they tend to become the focal point

of information that is provided to the Department.

And so it is typically then that you are reaching to them or

reaching to their supervisor to ask what they're learning. And I know

that was kind of the rest of the night was trying to learn what the

operations center was learning. The rest of the night was trying to

reach out to learn if there were other places that were getting

information that might help shed light not only on what was happening

but how we could help.

Q And where is the operations center physically located?

A It's on the seventh floor. It's about 50 to 70 feet down

the hallway from the wing where the senior leadership sits including

the Secretary. It's outside the wing that the senior

leadership sits in is a hallway, It's outside,

so you have to walk outside the doors and walk about 50 feet. They

themselves also work but they have a big space

that they all operate out of.

Q Okay. And when you say the senior leadership of the State

Department, can you give us an idea of who that encompasses?

A Yes. So if you were walking down that hallway, the senior

leadership encompasses the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, who

at that time was Wendy Sherman; it encompasses the Deputy Secretary

for Management, who at that time was Tom Nides; it encompasses the Chief

of Staff's office, the Secretary's office, the staff who support the

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Secretary's office or the Executive Secretary's staff.

And then it encompasses the Deputy Secretary for the Department,

who at that time was Bill Burns, and their staff. And that is kind

of if you were walking internally the pathway, you would walk by all

of those different offices that are in that space.

Q Okay.

A They're not the only senior leadership in the Department;

they just happen to be the senior leadership that's on that wing.

Q Okay. Is there any other senior leadership on the seventh

floor?

A Oh, yes, there are. Most of the senior leadership of the

Department -- or a lot of the senior leadership of the Department is

on the seventh floor. So the Under Secretary, for Management is on

the seventh floor. I couldn't tell you all the different ones that

are there, but yes, there are.

Q Okay. So when you're talking senior leadership, are you

talking the Under Secretary level and above or --

A The Assistant Secretary or above is what we deem our senior

leadership in the Department.

Q Okay. And are there any Assistant Secretaries that are on

the seventh floor?

A There might be. I don't -- you know, I don't know the

answer to where everybody's office was, but yes is probably the answer

to that question. But I would be guessing.

Q Okay.

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BY MR. DAVIS:

Q You mentioned when you learned about the attack you were

not sure if the Secretary had heard before or if this was the first

time that she was learning about it?

A Well, so, yes, and I'm only telling you my impressions at

the time. And so I don't know if somebody had just been in the moment

before and this was a second person coming into say and this is what

we're learning, or if that was the first moment somebody had walked

in.

Q Okay. And what do you recall her reaction being?

A She was incredibly concerned.

Q Did you have any subsequent conversation with her

immediately upon her learning of that --

A I mean, her immediate reaction, which is one that I think

gets trained into you when you've been at the Department for a while

is, well, what are we hearing from ops? What are we hearing from any

of the other agencies? What are we doing to protect them? So it's,

you immediately go into thinking about the different mechanisms you

have both for information and help.

Q And how long did you remain with her after she learned this

information for the first or second time?

A I don't know. Because I know that we all started kind of

getting in motion. And it's so funny, because as I sit here, I don't

know a motion towards every single thing, but I do know we all started

trying to figure out, well, what could be done best and how we could

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actually help from this far.

Q Do you recall her giving you any specific instructions?

A I don't recall her necessarily having to give me any

specific instructions. I don't know that that would have been

something she would or wouldn't have done. If there was, I would have

done what she would have asked. In other words, if she said --

Q Do you recall her giving anybody else any instructions?

A I know she had said, "Look, we have got to get more

information. We need to get more information. We need to find out

what we can do and what support we have." I know that she obviously

placed a call to General Petraeus to learn what they might be learning.

Sorry, I'm just trying to make sure I'm being thoughtful.

Q Sure.

A And also reaching out to make sure that the White House was

aware this had happened. I think I might have also reached out to then

the National Security Council at that time around that too, if I'm

remembering right.

So there was a lot of activity to both understand what the status

of our compound was and learn from other people either what they were

or could do or what they knew.

Q So she wanted to place a call to General Petraeus?

A She did place a call to General Petraeus. I do recall that.

Q And do you know how long after this discussion that you're

having with her took place?

A I don't know how long after. I don't have a sense of time,

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but I know that was one of the first things she thought about was to

reach out.

Q And you reached out to the National Security Council?

A Yes.

Q Do you remember who specifically you --

A I don't. I likely would have reached out to Denis McDonough

because that's usually the person I spoke to. But I don't know that

that's who I reached or who I connected with.

Q Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And what different sources of information were available

to you? I mean, how did you get information about the attack?

A So typically information gets centralized when it's coming

in in a crisis situation through our operations team, just because they

have a lot of people and a lot of lines out and they are usually placing

multiple phone calls to their counterparts in other agencies as well

as in the region.

And so that's typically one of the first organs of information,

and then you have your own relationships that you might reach to, that

are in other agencies to see if there's anything that's not being

filtered into their operation centers. Just about every agency has

that and they all talk to each other in realtime.

As well as reaching out, obviously, to your post, because while

you're not trying to overwhelm them, which in crisis it's easy to

overwhelm a post, because people respond to outreach or leadership or

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others, we try to basically ask then other agencies and our post what

are they learning.

Our bureaus obviously get information in realtime a lot of times.

And by bureaus, so this bureau was the national -- I mean the Near East

Asia Bureau, so they would get information as well from people who were

at post sending them things. And that information would also get

centralized to ops and centralized to the Executive Secretary to try

and make sure people were aware.

Q Okay. So when you say that the ops center would reach out

to where the crisis was ongoing, someone would actually have been

reaching out to the people you had on ground in Benghazi?

A Ops typically would reach out to any number of places.

They're an incredible organization of people. I don't know how they

do what they do. But they would also, to the extent they had the

capacity to do that and our Diplomatic Security team also has its own

operations team which would be synced up or linked up or operating

hopefully in tandem with our main operations of the building, they would

often be able to connect with them directly. And our Diplomatic

Security team often has direct connectivity to their own agents and

their own staff that are on the ground, separate and apart from what

operations might have in terms of people.

So, like, I can remember when one of our pilots went down in Libya.

Oddly enough, there was a guy who had heard of our operations center

because he had worked as a consultant at some point for the government,

and he just dialed off and says, "I have your pilot. What do you want

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me to do with him?"

So it is the place that people think about for information, and

we were able to securely pluck him back out. But it is, I think, a

relatively central repository but also has enough tentacles out that

people connect them even in those kinds of odd situations.

Q Do you recall whether the ops center was able to establish

a direct line to Benghazi?

A I don't know if the ops center was. I'm trying to recall.

I know that it was obviously after the math, we were looking at

everything to try and understand what had happened and obviously

provide responses to the prior committee, to you all. I believe it

might have been that Diplomatic Security's operation centers might have

been in a place to do that, but I'm just trying to pull back in my memory

of what I learned after the fact as opposed to what I knew during the

time period where it was happening.

Q And you said that this affected the NEA Bureau. Do you know

if the NEA Bureau was getting any sort of like realtime information

from Libya?

A I do believe they were getting like emails from folks there

and that was kind of stating what the state of affairs were. Either

the email would say, you know, we just heard that they're under

attack -- and that might have been coming from Tripoli, obviously, as

opposed to Benghazi.

But I know they had emails that they were sharing and that the

NEA team was also sharing in the process of information gathering.

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Q Do you know if there were any direct phone calls with anyone

in Benghazi or Tripoli?

A I'm sure there would have been in Tripoli. I don't know

that for certain, but I have to believe there were, and I'm just going

on my memory now. But I have to believe that they would have been

speaking to our DCM in Tripoli, because Tripoli was obviously not the

gravamen or the site where everything was happening and so you would

feel much better reaching to them because you know that you wouldn't

be immediately disrupting everything.

Q Great. And do you know who that would have been?

A So in Benghazi at that time it would've been either the

regional security officer, if he was at the post, and it would've been

the person who becomes the acting Ambassador when the Ambassador is

not present, which is what we call the DCM.

Q Would that be deputy chief of mission?

A Deputy chief of mission, that is exactly right. Which I

am so happy if you do this because there are going to be a lot of acronyms

I've forgotten what they stand for, so it would be great, if you don't

mind.

And at that time the deputy chief of mission was a gentleman named

Greg Hicks.

Q Okay. And who would the Tripoli folks be talking to at Main

State?

A They could be talking to the operations center. They could

be talking to their assistant secretary or the deputy assistant

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secretary who was assigned to their region or their area. They could

be talking to the executive assistant -- I mean, the Executive

Secretary who runs -- who supervises the operations center. So

there's any number of communication channels that might happen in that

regard.

Q Okay. And who was the assistant secretary of NEA at the

time?

A I believe Beth Jones was the acting. I don't know that she

had been confirmed, so I think she was acting. But Beth Jones was

providing the leadership, if I remember, at that time.

Q And who was head of the ops center at that time?

A So the ops center is run -- reports up to the Executive

Secretary, who I believe at that time was Steve Mull. Is that right?

Is my memory right?

Q Yes.

A Okay. Thank you.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q Did you make any trips down to the ops center shortly after

finding out about the attack?

A I might have. I went to the ops center a lot just because

I use them a lot so I had to do a lot of sucking up to them, bringing

them cookies. But I don't know that I did or didn't. I know that at

some point we ended up having a secure call with a lot of the leadership

in the government.

And I remember that it was going to be a staff call and Secretary

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Clinton said, no, I'm coming too. And she sat in on that call when

we were engaged with folks from the White House and from other agencies,

our intelligence agencies on that secure call.

Q And the phone call you mentioned, you believe it was Denis

McDonough, because that would have been your normal practice to reach

out to him?

A It would've been my normal practice to reach him. So if

I didn't reach him, I would've spoken to whoever I reached.

Q Okay. The individual you spoke with, do you remember

whether or not he or she had previously heard about the attack, or were

you informing them for the first time?

A I just don't remember.

Q Okay.

A I don't remember.

Q Do you remember any other contents of that conversation you

had with the NSC?

A No. I'm sure it would've been just to let them know, "Look,

we have just gotten word that our" --

Q So it would've been brief. It wouldn't have been more than

a couple minutes?

A Oh, no. Yes, it wouldn't have been more than a couple

minutes, yeah. The sit conversation we had that evening, though, was

obviously longer. It was --

Q Okay. We'll get to that in a little bit.

A Oh, okay. Good. Sorry. Didn't mean to get ahead.

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BY MS. JACKSON:

Q So to follow up on a few questions from my colleague, you

primarily stayed within your office or the Secretary's office that

evening as opposed to transitioning down to the ops center?

A I don't know. The reason I'm saying that is it's not at

all implausible that I might have done that for some period of time.

But I also, when the Haiti earthquake hit, did the same thing. So I

don't know whether or not I'm remembering myself sitting in there at

this juncture or sitting there at the other juncture or both.

But there were certainly times where I would go down to the ops

center and we would be trying to learn things and we would sit there

for a little while, so we did.

But my best memory is being in our space, being in the, obviously,

the sit room meeting that we had, which was down in the ops center.

And so we were down there for a while for that particular meeting because

that meeting takes place actually inside the operations center.

But I don't remember sitting out with the folks as they were

getting information. I typically would come down and ask, "What are

you hearing?" But most of the time there's nothing new you're going

to learn because the moment they're hearing it they're trying to provide

it out.

Q Okay. And how would they provide it out to you? Would they

send emails? Would they --

A Sometimes they would send emails. Sometimes they walk down

and give a readout. Sometimes they would call you and say, "I have

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a readout from X, Y, or Z thing." So they would use multiple methods

of just communicating. Or if you happened to be in the sit room doing

the SVTCS, they would come into the SVTCS and tell you what the update

was.

Q Among the senior leadership at the Department, who was all

in and around your area managing the response?

A The night of, I think it was a little bit like all hands

on deck, and so there were a lot of folks who were trying to be helpful.

I think, in terms of who I can remember obviously being present, Steve

Mull was present; our head of Diplomatic Security was present, Eric

Bosworth; our Under Secretary for Management was present. I don't

remember whether or not our Assistant Secretary Beth Jones was present,

but I do remember her a lot. So I just don't know if it was that night

or if it was as in the days that followed.

Bill Burns was also -- I was just trying to figure out if he was

calling in or what his framework was but I know we connected with Bill

Burns as well. Our congressional affairs was present, our leadership

there. Wendy Sherman was present, but not the whole time, because she

had one other matter she was managing at the same time, if I remember

right. That's my best memory.

Q Okay. I'm going to show you some exhibits.

Ms. Wilkinson. Sharon, can we take a 20-second break?

Ms. Jackson. Sure. We can go off the record.

[Recess.]

[Mills Exhibit Nos. 1,2,3

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Were marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q All right. Let's go back on the record.

We have been joined by Congresswoman Brooks for the interview

today. She has joined us.

Ms. Mills, I have put before you three documents that have been

marked exhibits 1, 2, and 3. Exhibit 1 is an email chain that bears

document number State SCB 0058670 through -- it's a five-page email

chain. The date at the top is Tuesday, October 23, 2012, and it is

sent to you and others. The subject line is, "Forward: Update 8,

Second Evacuee Flight Is Wheels-Down In Tripoli (SBU)."

Exhibit 2 that I've put before you bears document number SCB

0060776. It is also an email chain dated Tuesday, September 11, 2012.

It is to you and others, and the subject line is, "Forward: Attack

on Benghazi. 09/11/2012."

And then Document 3 is another email chain bearing document

number 0058012, dated Wednesday, September 12, 2012. It is to you.

I see that your name is the second from the last in the "To" line. It's

to you and several others. And the subject line is, "Re: Libya update

from Beth Jones."

Let me ask you first as to these documents, have you seen them

before, as to Exhibit 1?

A So I'm going to read it if that's okay.

Q In fact, why don't we just then go off the record and take

a few moments and go through all three of them and then we'll ask

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questions about all three documents. Is that okay?

A Whatever is your preference.

Q Yeah. Let's just go off the record for a few minutes and

give you as much time as you need to review these.

[Recess.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Ms. Mills, have you had an opportunity to review exhibits

1, 2, and 3?

A I have.

Q Okay. And do you recognize these documents?

A I know they all came to me, and so they all are documents

I would've seen when I was at the Department.

Q Okay. And would they have come to you on the afternoon and

evening of September 11th and September 12th?

A All of them except for the one that's dated October 23rd

would have come in that time period.

Q You would not have seen that before --

A No, I'm just saying I wouldn't have seen the October 23rd

until October 23rd. The others I would have seen the 11th and 12th.

Q Great. Well, then let's focus on Exhibit Number 1.

A Okay.

Q On Exhibit Number 1 that is dated October 23rd, it contains

a series of emails that are the -- if I could just summarize -- and

correct me if I've summarized it wrong -- the initial alert to the ops

center about the attack in Benghazi and a series of updates after that.

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Is that a fair summary of what this document contains?

A Very fair.

Q Okay. Did you see these ops center updates on the afternoon

and evening of the 11th and on September 12th as they came in?

A I'm sure I either would've seen them or somebody would have

told me that there was a new one. So if I wasn't sitting at my computer,

I might not have seen each one as they came, but I know I would have

known about them all as they were happening.

Q Okay. And then Exhibit 2, which is a September 11, 2012,

email, at the top timed at 4:38 p.m., but the first email is at 4:22.

Do you recall if you saw that? I see that you're on the "To" list.

Would you have seen that on the afternoon of the --

A If I was on my email, I would have seen it. Though there

was a lot of time that we were sitting in conversation, so people would

have said, "Just want you to know, ops just sent out another report

and here's what they're saying, that we're going to be able to get an

open line."

So the way it works is if you're sitting at your computer, you

get it. We can't have our Blackberrys in the area where we sit because

it's -- well, like this. We have to leave it outside. So if you're

not sitting at your computer at the moment the ops alert comes then

you don't see it at that moment. But somebody else will likely -- and

certainly at this time, our specials and everybody was kind of giving

us realtime updates.

So the fact that I might not have seen it sitting at my computer

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doesn't mean that somebody didn't tell me. They told me usually in

realtime.

Q Okay. And is that the same then for Exhibit 3, which is,

the subject line is, "Libya updates from Beth Jones"?

A Yes, that would be the same in terms of how it might operate.

Q Okay. As to these exhibits, they talk about three sources

of information that was available to you and others on the 11th and

12th: Ops center, DS command center, and updates through Beth Jones.

Do you recall getting information from all three of those sources during

the duration of the attack and afterwards?

A Yes, and post. Beth Jones was actually making reports on

what the post was actually telling her.

Q And by "post," what do you mean?

A So the post is where our actual missions are located, so

in this case it would be Tripoli. And so when I say "post," it means

our Embassy in Tripoli which was relaying information that Beth Jones

was then relaying.

Q Okay. And was it your understanding that, that post in

Tripoli was getting realtime information from Benghazi?

A It was my impression they were. I don't know if that is

an accurate impression, but that was my impression.

Q Okay. Was it your understanding that the folks in Tripoli

were communicating with the security agents in Benghazi?

A That was my impression.

Q Okay. Were there other sources of information out of Libya

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that was coming in to you and others that evening?

A Not as I sit here right now that I can recall, but I think

we would have been trying to take information in from any source that

seemed to be able to shed light on our team, how they were doing, and

whether or not there was anything that could be done to help.

Q Okay. So do you recall anyone else or any other source of

information that you relied upon to keep the Secretary informed or to

make decisions -- to rely upon for decision-making that evening?

A My only pause is because obviously our whole intelligence

apparatus is not part of the State Department who likely was sharing

information with us as well, or at least that's my belief. And I don't

know how that is captured in how you look at this, because some of that

would be filtered through our operation centers as well. But that

would be the only other place that, at least in my brain, I would be

expecting that we likely would have also been getting information.

Q Okay. And these exhibits show a series of periodic updates

throughout the afternoon and evening. Does this reflect about how

often you recall getting updates?

A I feel like we were living in a constant state of update

and that sometimes the information we were getting was accurate, then

corrected, then accurate, then corrected or not. So it reflects the

fact that there was a constant stream of information and updates. I

don't know if it reflects the fact that every moment -- at least I felt

like -- we were hearing more information about what was happening.

Q Okay. Throughout the duration of the -- well, let me back

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up and ask this question first: What do you recall about the duration

of the attacks?

A I felt like it was forever.

Q How late did you stay at the State Department that night

or in the next morning?

A Until about 2:00, 2:30.

Q All right. What was the Secretary doing that night?

A She was there really late, and she was reaching out to her

colleagues, and she was providing support to our team. It was a really

hard night.

Q When you say she was communicating with your colleagues,

you've talked -- was that General Petraeus?

A He's one of the colleagues. I know she ended up speaking

to the President. Obviously not a colleague, he's her boss, but -- and

to eventually, I think, also to Tom Donilon and others. Yeah.

Q Okay. Do you recall her asking for any support or other

resources?

A That's what she was primarily doing is, what can we do? How

can we try and assure if there is a way to see what's happening, help.

I know that at some point they had over -- am I allowed to talk about

that?

Ms. Wilkinson. I would just be careful.

Ms. Jackson. Why don't you take a moment and confer with counsel.

We'll go off the record for a moment.

[Discussion off the record.]

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BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Back on the record.

A So when asking for that assistance, some of that assistance

would come from other agencies that might be able to put eyes on the

compound, that was that night, as well as reaching out. We had our

team reach out to DOD to ascertain what support they might be able to

provide, either by way of eyes-on or other support that they had.

And obviously then our normal counterparts in the building who

were colleagues and had relationships with their own intelligence

counterparts in the different agencies.

Q Okay. So this intelligence that was coming in through the

ops center, how was that coming in? Was it coming in in written form?

Were there phone calls? Were there combinations?

A I don't know how it came in because typically I was in a

place where people would tell me things. I don't live in that place

anymore. They would tell me things. And so I don't know what was the

vehicle by which they first gained that information.

I mean, ops is obviously a disseminator. So part of what they

do is once they do learn it they share it, and I don't recall saying,

"How did you get that information," or "How did it come to you?".

Q When the information first came in to you, what was your

initial impression as to the nature of the attack, what type of attack

it was?

A I didn't know. It was surprising just because our -- I

hadn't been there, and that we had not had a -- any of our compounds

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attacked, you know, like -- and what we had been experiencing in Cairo

earlier that day, where people were protesting and looked like they

might be surging against our embassy was the first time where, at least

I recalled, where our embassies were being targeted in a way where

people were protesting or angry or attacking.

Q Were there weapons used in Cairo?

A I don't know the answer to that question, because honestly,

this happened in about a 2-week period where a number of our embassies

ended up being besieged by people who were able to breach our perimeters

and get to our doors. In Khartoum they were able to do that, in Tunisia.

There was also a similar attack -- if I remember. I might be

misremembering -- in Sana'a, I know in Pakistan.

So I felt like that 2-week period we were spending a lot of our

time on the phone with governments and pleading with them to make sure

that they knew that they had obligations, they are to protect our

embassies. And a number of them were very angry with us at the time

because we have free speech, and in free speech in our country that

means sometimes people do things that they think the government should

be able to stop but we can't.

And so I do recall that period of time being one where there was

a lot of intense attacks happening on our embassies. And I can't tell

you from a weapons standpoint what everybody was doing or what they

brought to each one of those.

Q Give me a sense within this 2-week timeframe where are the

Libya attack, the Benghazi attack fell. Was it day one? Was it

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halfway through or at the end?

A It was at the beginning. It was at the beginning, yeah.

Q So you've mentioned Cairo, that happened earlier in the day.

A Yeah.

Q Were there any other attacks or were there any other

issues --

A Protests.

Q -- with your embassies overseas other than Cairo before the

Benghazi attack?

A Not that I recall, but I -- and I might be inaccurate about

that because I know there were a whole bunch of them for a period of

time and where every day my day was sitting in the SVTCS as we were

trying to figure out whether or not we were going to evacuate or not

evacuate, whether or not the governments were going to deliver people

to protect or not -- and sometimes that those could be protracted

conversations -- whether or not we could put people in or not and in

what way we could put them in.

And I remember this all starting around the period of time of the

Cairo and Benghazi matters. So my impression is, is that that was at

the beginning. I don't know if my impression is right, because

obviously, factually people can go, look, there might have been

something that happened the day before or otherwise, and I just wasn't

as cognizant.

Q Okay. So your recollection is that Benghazi was on the

front end of all of this?

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A I believe it was at the front end. That's my impression,

yes.

Q Okay, good.

Could you just walk us through what you were doing that

evening -- the afternoon and evening of the attack. You've talked

about reaching out to the national security staff or National Security

Council. Who else did you confer with within the State Department?

What other interagency partners did you speak with? Did you direct

anyone to do anything? If you could just, to the best of your

recollection, walk us through what you did.

A I don't know that I have a clear recollection of that night

anymore. I do know that I obviously was participating with my

colleagues in trying to figure out what was happening and what could

be done to secure our team. I know that Under Secretary --

Q Well, let me stop you there. Was there a core group that

you worked with? Everybody does in an agency. You have a core group

of people that you rely on or that you work with on a daily basis. Did

you have one of those?

A So what was different about crises is that you obviously

have subject matter experts that play particular roles in crises. So

in this crisis, of particular import was our Assistant Secretary for

the region, our Under Secretary and our Diplomatic Security. So those

were obviously the most critical players because they were the

connectivity to the events as they were happening.

Separate from that --

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Q I'm sorry, but can I ask a clarification. You said the

Under Secretary. It's my understanding there are six under

secretaries.

A Under secretary for Management, yes. Thank you for that.

No, I appreciate that.

Q Okay. Uh-huh.

A And then in addition, you obviously, when it's a crisis,

are working closely with the leadership of the operations center, who

is the Executive Secretary.

The Secretary herself also has staff. I had two deputies, a

deputy for policy, Jake Sullivan, and a deputy for operations, Huma

Abedin. I don't recall my deputy for operations being present. I know

that my deputy for policy was present.

Q And again, that was Mr. Sullivan?

A Yes, I think I just gave both their names, right?

Q Yes. Yes. I just want to make sure I got them straight

in my head.

A Okay. Good. Yes. I believe you all are seeing him

tomorrow. He started out as the deputy chief of staff and then he

became the head of policy.

Q Okay.

A Yeah. So at that juncture, he had, I think, both, if I

remember right. At any rate, so, and the executive assistant who

provides support to the Secretary who was a career official, Joe

Macmanus, also, I recall being relatively active and present.

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Q Okay. You stated that when the crisis occurs you pull in

those subject matter experts. And I just want to make sure I understand

correctly that those subject --

A It's not that you pull them in. They are the subject matter

experts, so they become the focal point, if you will, of both

information and advice because of their expertise.

So Beth Jones was the head of this region, and so she obviously

would have the relationships and the information. And that's why it

is not surprising for me to see emails that were directed to her from

the post, which by "post" I mean Tripoli.

Diplomatic Security were responsible for protecting our

Ambassador and our facilities. So they would also be logical conduits

both for information and for expertise about what was happening on the

ground. And the operations center, which accepts all the information,

which is run by the Executive Secretary, would also be. So it's not

that you're per se pulling them in and that's where, for better or worse,

the action is. They are the natural hubs, if you will, for activity.

Q Okay. And then the other people that you've described,

Jake Sullivan, Huma Abedin, the Under Secretary for Management, those

were people that you worked with on a more regular, day-to-day basis

on every issue?

A So the Under Secretary for Management overseas Diplomatic

Security, so he also is like a subject matter expert in that context.

Huma Abedin, I don't recall Huma Abedin being present that night. I

could be wrong about that, but that's my best recollection. Jake

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Sullivan, who was my deputy and also was the head of policy, was present

that night.

Q Okay. Since Diplomatic Security is in charge of the

security of your people and your facilities overseas, walk us through

the conversations that you had with Eric Boswell or Patrick Kennedy,

who was the Under Secretary over DS?

A So I don't remember specific conversations from that night

just because so much was happening. I remember that part of what we

were trying to learn was was there a way that we could learn what was

happening on the ground, which is why, in my memory, I thought that

Diplomatic Security was actually able to open the line as opposed to

this email, which reflects that ops was.

Q And are you referring to exhibit number 2?

A I'm referring to exhibit number 2, which is an email that

was sent by , who was at that time a special assistant

to the Secretary. And it reflects information from Scott Bultrowicz.

Scott Bultrowicz was in, if I recall correctly, Diplomatic Security.

But --

Q And just to complete the record, this email reflects that,

at the top of the page the second sentence is, "Ops is setting up a

direct line with Benghazi, so we should have more updates soon." Is

that the --

A Yes, that's the email, and it was sent from a

on behalf of the DS command center. And my best recollection was the

command center actually set it up and then connected ops into the one

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that they had set up. But I could be wrong about that.

Q Is the DS command center physically separate from Main State

building?

A Yes.

Q It's --

A It's not co-located. So the DS command center is also like

an operations center, but it is simply for the Diplomatic Security

management and issues that they have. The operations center is in Main

State. The Diplomatic Security command center is in Virginia, so just

right across the bridge from Main State.

Q Okay. And they had gotten information from one of the

Diplomatic Security agents who was on the ground in Benghazi?

A Well, that's what this email reflects.

Q Okay. Exhibit 2?

A Exhibit 2, the one we've been discussing, yes.

Q Yes. Okay.

And just to kind of finish out the exhibits that you've looked

at, if you could go to Exhibit 3 on these Libya updates from Beth Jones.

Just describe for us what this document is.

A So this document is an email chain that starts at 4:49 p.m.,

on September 11th. And it was from one of the other special assistants

to our Deputy Secretary Bill Burns, our Under Secretary for Political

Affairs; the executive assistant and special assistants, Jake

Sullivan; and Tory Nuland, who is our press spokesperson.

And it is a chain that then begins with updates that appear to

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be coming through the NEA Bureau, primarily being relayed by Beth Jones,

as I understand it, and she was then sharing this information for

circulation among the leadership and others who had a need to

participate and know how to help our team. It continues all the way

through what appears to be September 12th, the afternoon of

September 12th, East Coast time.

Q And does it seem to summarize a series of conversations that

Beth Jones had with Greg Hicks?

A That's what it appears to do.

Q Okay. And do you recall seeing it or learning this

information on the evening of the 11th and through the 12th?

A I recall learning this information. I don't know that I

would've been sitting at my computer all the time as it was coming in,

but I certainly learned this information. I would've seen it when I

got to my computer.

Q And as you reviewed this information, do you recall that

the information contained in here is accurate, as you learned it that

evening?

A I recall that this is what I learned that evening, is a

better way to say.

Q All right. You talked about that there was a

interagency -- I call it a SVTCS.

A SVTCS, okay. I call it that too.

Q Which I understand to be secure video teleconference, SVTC.

Is that your recollection of what SVTCS means?

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A Yes.

Q Do you --

A I'm going to adopt that. I tried to ban all acronyms once

I left the State Department because it's a very acronym-heavy

Department. And I realized I was saying things like, "S said that if

C did you want do this, P is going to be upset and therefore L will

never get what they need," and I thought, I should actually talk like

a normal person with all of the full names of things. So but SVTCS

works for me.

Q Okay. So describe who was on the SVTCS, why it was called,

and what happened during the SVTCS.

A So the SVTCS was called because everyone was seeking both

to exchange information and figure out how to coordinate resources to

support our team.

Q And was this something that the State Department that you

or the Secretary requested, or did the National Security Council

request it? Do you recall how it originated?

A I don't. I don't know that -- I don't. I don't. But I

know that all of us wanted to connect so I don't know if that was at

the NSC's instigation, our instigation, or at someone else's. But we

all ended up doing a SVTCS that evening. And I recall saying to the

Secretary, "We're going to do a SVTCS to try and figure out what's the

best state of information and what else we can do, and I will give you

a readout." And I recall her saying, "No, I'm coming." And that was

unusual.

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So when the SVTCS started, I think staff wasn't expecting the

Secretary to be on and she was on because she said, "These are our people

on the ground. Where else would I be."

Q Are there SVTCS with the principals or the heads of agencies

that were different than what you were setting up that night?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Are they called something else?

A Typically, if there's a SVTCS with principals they note it's

going to be with principals, mainly because they're trying to tell staff

you need to not be present or you need to be sitting in the back row.

But this was a SVTCS that we were setting up, which we knew was staff,

and so that was who was initially on the SVTCS which she joined.

Q Okay. And who from the interagency was on the SVTCS? Tell

us who you remember being there, and we understand there may be others

too.

A My best recollection is Denis McDonough. I don't know who

else was there from the other different agencies, because a lot of times

our picture wouldn't show up so it's just voices. But the SVTCS was

with us. I believe the SVTCS also obviously included the NSC. And

I can't tell you what were the other agencies, but I remember there

were other agencies that were a part of that first, small SVTCS.

Q Would there be some write-up or memorialization of what was

discussed, the tasks that were issued? Is there some documentation?

A Sometimes there might be, but typically what happened when

you were in a kind of crisis construct is they would be what are called

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due-outs, in other words assignments that different people had. And

so our agency might have a set of due-outs, another agency might have

a set of due-outs. But due-outs, I'm spelling it d-u-e and then outs.

I don't recall kind of seeing per se the due-outs. I know we

usually took our due-outs and made sure that the next time we were all

together that we would speak to them. And we ended up doing a lot of

SVTCS, obviously.

Q Great. Did you do more than one SVTCS on the night of the

11th?

A We might have. I don't remember. I remember one, but if

there was another, I'm sure I would have participated.

Q Okay. And were there SVTCS in the ensuing days?

A There were. The SVTCS in the ensuing days were not only

about Benghazi, they were also about the attacks that were happening

on our other missions and posts in other countries.

Q If you could, walk us through the SVTCS.

A Which?

Q The first one on the evening of the 11th.

A I just recall that there was reporting on what we knew;

whether or not there were any assets we could deploy that would be of

assistance, be that what people could, you know -- how to create eyes-on

or other things like that; and mainly also trying to ascertain what

the state of affairs were, because there were two attacks that night,

one that happened really in the early afternoon and then another that

happened late at night. And so there was also just trying to get

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clarity of what that was and how there could be another attack in another

location happening.

Q Okay. And was there a difference in the lethality of the

attacks or the --

A I don't know how to answer that. I mean, in both places

we lost two people, so I felt like they were both greatly --

Q What about the firepower that was used in the two separate

attacks?

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[9:40 a.m.]

Ms. Mills. In the first attack, our compound was completely

overrun. It was physically overrun with people.

In the second, it is my impression that they were being attacked

externally and that individuals who were seeking to defend were

injured. But it is not my impression that they had per se breached

the facility. That might be wrong, but that's my impression as I sit

here today.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Do you recall that mortars were used in the second attack

at --

A Yes.

Q -- the facility?

A Yes. Yes. That's right. They might have also been used

in the first one, too, so I am -- but I do remember that one of our

folks was harmed by a mortar.

Ms. Jackson. I have just been told that I am out of time for my

first hour.

Ms. Mills. Oh, okay.

Ms. Jackson. So, with that, I will suspend my questioning. How

about we take a 10-minute break?

Ms. Mills. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. Would that be all right?

Ms. Mills. Sure.

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Ms. Jackson. And then we'll do a little rearranging. You get

to keep your chair.

Ms. Mills. Oh, okay.

Ms. Jackson. We can go off the record.

[Recess.]

Ms. Sawyer. We'll go back on the record.

Ms. Mills, I wanted, before I jumped in, to give you a sense of

what I hope to cover with you, at least in this next hour --

Ms. Mills. Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. -- just to give you a sense.

I will want to jump back in and ask you a few more questions about

9/11/2012, the day of the attacks in Benghazi, the protests in Cairo

and difficulties there, and other regional issues.

I hope to then talk a bit with you about what happened in the weeks

kind of immediately following, and then, to the extent we have time,

have you clarify for us a little bit just the respective roles vis-à-vis

policymaking, vis-à-vis oversight for day-to-day management of post

at the end.

So it's an ambitious task that I've got for me, but I will

appreciate your assistance in it.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q You were asked, or you told the committee that you recall

when you first learned about the attacks that you were with the

Secretary. Did you know, prior -- at that point in time, did you know

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at that point in time that Mr. Stevens, Ambassador Stevens, was in

Benghazi that day?

A No, I didn't know he had traveled to Benghazi that day. But

that's not unusual.

Q It's not unusual for you not to have known that he was in

Benghazi that day?

A Yes. Yes. I mean, when our ambassadors travel throughout

their country, they would be relaying that to their assistant

secretary, but that's not something typically that I would be notified

or aware of.

Q And what about the Secretary? Would it have been typical

for her to know that Ambassador Stevens was in Benghazi on that day?

A I don't know that that would have been typical. If there

was some big event that was happening, so if there was something that

an ambassador was going to a different part of their country to host

something or announce something, you might know that that's going to

happen because you're doing amplification work back. And by

"amplification work," I mean other things to help announce and support

and bring attention to the diplomatic or foreign policy objective that

you're trying to achieve through that event.

But, otherwise, I don't know that it's typically the case that

you -- that she would know or be apprised in our system that so-and-so

is going to be in this part of their country.

Q And an ambassador traveling, and particularly traveling

within their country from an embassy to a post or a temporary mission

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facility, would not need to seek approval from anyone in Washington,

D.C., would they, to travel --

A Correct.

Q -- to that post?

You know, there have been some allegations that Mr. Stevens,

Ambassador Stevens, was in Benghazi that night at the direction of

someone in Washington, and often the allegation is that possibly at

the direction of Secretary Clinton.

Did you have any sense or any reason to believe that Ambassador

Stevens was in Benghazi that day at the Secretary's direction?

A No. I actually also had not heard that, but no.

Q You described and I think in a way that gave us a really

nice sense of the efforts that you and your colleagues were making to

gather information as quickly as you could, determine what resources

might be sent to help personnel on the ground. And you had described

some of the sources. And I think you initially started by describing

is there a mechanism for information, mechanisms for determining what

help.

If you can, it would be helpful -- it feels to me that if I were

in that position it would be somewhat frustrating, in the sense that

you would want, certainly, to be reaching out in all manner of

direction; at the same time, there are mechanisms, and you don't want

to interfere, necessarily, with allowing those mechanisms to operate

smoothly, efficiently, particularly in crisis.

So can you give us a sense -- I got the sense that you felt your

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role was to reach out to colleagues at your equivalent level -- that

would have been someone like Mr. McDonough -- to try to make sure that

you were gathering information from him, sharing information. So can

you kind of describe that dynamic?

A Yes.

As a general matter, the Department, because it is such an

established institution, has people who have been doing their jobs for

many, many years in many different roles. And so they have the capacity

to be experienced in something that might feel like a first time for

those of us who are only serving for a period of time as something that

has happened before and they can draw on those lessons and have built

systems that help them navigate them.

The operations center is one of the outgrowths of that -- in other

words, creating a mechanism where both information could flow but also

people could reach out from, and people who were being reached out to

would know that they were speaking for the Department as a whole and

seeking to give information to everyone in the Department as well as

the Secretary.

So it is our most established mechanism, if you will, for

information flow and for also being able to access people. So, even

if you're in the bathroom, ops will find you. And you're like, "Really,

are you outside my stall?" And they'll be like, "I'm sorry. The

Secretary is looking for you."

But they really do their jobs incredibly well. And they do them

well because part of what they do is have a very single-minded focus

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about how do we gain information and how do we disseminate information,

and that is their mandate.

Those of us who are not in operations, depends on what role we

might be playing. If you are the assistant secretary of a region, your

role is to be the conduit and decisionmaker with respect to not only

information but directions and other needs that might be present in

a particular circumstance, situation, or decision that needs to be

made.

And so the regional bureaus also operate quite succinctly in that

fashion, and you'll always see the Under Secretary for Political, who

they report up to, as well as the Deputy Secretary -- in this case,

Bill Burns -- typically in that same construct of both communication

and decisionmaking and information-sharing.

Separate from that, it is the case that certainly I enjoyed a

position that allowed me to reach to counterparts in the government

who might be in leadership roles that you can ask, "What is your

principal doing?", or you could actually reach to their principal.

And so, if there were things that either our team felt like they

needed -- you know, "I've been talking to the person at the White House,

and this is not happening" or, "I've been talking to the person at the

White House, and they want this to happen" -- you might then be able

to reach to your counterpart to either be able to provide additional

support or give additional information.

So, typically, my engagement would be to counterparts that I had

to be able to ensure that we were doing everything we could to facilitate

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the outcomes that our experts in our team knew needed to happen or that

we saw from our own experience in what was going on should be addressed.

Q And that, those mechanisms, that process, the way of sharing

information, amassing resources, certainly sounds like something that

is relied upon and used in emergency situations. It also sounds like

it could be used to describe the day-to-day running of the Department,

in the sense that the regional bureaus are responsible for oversight

and work with the posts in their region, and that's a mechanism for

information from there. Operations center is continuously gathering

information all the time about posts. And it is, I mean, accelerated,

obviously, and people are working incredibly hard in a crisis, but is

that also fair to say?

A That is fair to say. That is fair to say. I would say that

is accurate.

Q And then, just in a general sense on that night, did you

ever get the sense that anyone slowed down in their efforts to gather

information and amass resources and support or, you know, in essence,

took their foot off the gas at any point in time during the night?

A No. No. I think everyone was trying to do their very

best, and I think our security folks were particularly trying to do

their very best, not only to find our Ambassador when he couldn't be

found, but also to provide security and support for those people who

were under attack.

And I think, certainly, when you're millions of miles away, you

feel relatively helpless, but it is certainly the case that everyone

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knew that our colleagues were in danger and, if there was a way to

extricate them or support them, that that's what we needed to do.

Q If I could have you take a look just for a moment at

exhibit 1, which was introduced in the last hour and discussed, and

that was some of the reporting that came out of the operations center.

And I just wanted to get a sense from you, as these reports were

coming in -- and I understand you may not have seen them in the moment

they came in. So I want to use them just as a general gauge, not to

say that you learned this at exactly the time stamped on there, but

to get a general gauge of kind of how that was reflecting how people

were feeling and what they were doing.

So, just starting with that first thread, which is on the last

page, it seems like the potentially first -- an initial or a first report

that comes out. And it says, "Regional security officer reports a

diplomatic mission is under attack. Embassy Tripoli reports

approximately 20 armed people fired shots. Explosions have been

heard, as well. Ambassador Stevens, who is currently in Benghazi, and

four Chief of Mission personnel are in the compound's safe haven. The

17th of February militia is providing security support."

So, at this point in time, this operations cable indicates that

the Ambassador is on the compound, in the safe haven, and there is

support, security support, from the 17th of February militia on the

way.

Do you recall getting that, the initial sense about where the

Ambassador was, whether he was secure at that point in time -- granted,

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the concern about whether he would remain secure -- but what that

initial reporting looked like?

A I do remember that the initial report indicated that he was

there and that he was in a safe haven. And I think -- remember in my

own head thinking, well, what does that mean in this instance?

But I know that, at least when you first heard the first report,

you knew that they were being attacked, that they -- at least, it felt

like they were in a place where they were at least secure for the moment.

And my impression at that time was just the surprise of our

compound being attacked in the way it was, just because that was

something new for at least me. It might not have been for people who

had been at the Department for a long period of time, but, for me, it

was the first time I had really been cognizant of an instance where

our compound was actually being breached and attacked.

Q So, at that point in time, certainly, there's a sense that

the Ambassador is on the compound; still, I would assume, concern about

what might further happen at the compound in terms of compromising his

safety, compromising the safety of the other individuals there. Is

that accurate?

A Yes. Yes. I mean, I think, look, my impression at that

time was that he was on the compound with others, that he was in a safe

place. And when they said that the attack had stopped -- I'm just

telling you my own impression -- I thought, "Okay, well, that's good.

You know, now maybe people can get evacuated and we can figure out what

we need to do."

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That was my impression. And that impression obviously changed

dramatically when they said that they couldn't find our ambassador and

that we had someone who had been injured and who had then subsequently

died.

Q And do you recall roughly when that happened, the sense that

the Ambassador is missing and there has been, you know, a fatality?

A I just remember it being several hours after the first

reports, and I can't tell you exactly what time that would have been.

But I know that we had learned -- I learned that evening that

Information Management Officer Sean Smith had died, and that was kind

of shocking. I can just remember feeling shocked by that.

And, at that time, I can remember they couldn't find our

Ambassador, but there was this sense that he might be sheltering

someplace and that's the reason why he didn't know it was safe to come

out or something like. That's my impression. That might not be

accurate, but that was just my impression as I reflect back.

Q So, certainly, still hope, some optimism that the

Ambassador would be found --

A Yes.

Q -- safely. Concerns, again, that resources, any resources

available be amassed to support personnel on the ground?

A Yes. Not only resources that might be amassed but also

resources from the other facility that was there to provide support,

as well.

Q So, in terms of -- obviously, there's different avenues of

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support. Some of them are in-country --

A Yes.

Q -- as it were. So, to the extent that there were things

that you or others with you could do in terms of reaching out to people

in the Government of Libya, was that happening?

A The Secretary reached out to the government. So, too, were

others reaching out, both on the ground, if I recall, in Tripoli, and

it might have been the case that also the Assistant Secretary or her

team was doing the same thing. But, candidly, everybody was trying

to reach to whatever asset or individual or government partner who they

thought would be able to help secure our people and ensure their safety.

Q And do you recall whether you were with the Secretary when

you learned that the Ambassador could not be located?

A I don't recall if I was with her when I learned that. I

do recall learning that. I recall talking with her about that. And

I just don't know if we learned in the same moment or if I learned and

ended up speaking to her or the reverse. But I do recall having -- you

know, fretting with her and worrying about what were the different

avenues we might have to be able to locate him and whether or not enough

was being done to try to do that.

Q And when you had that discussion and you were concerned and

fretting about it and wondering if enough was being done, were there

any concrete steps that you or the Secretary then took to ensure that,

to the extent possible, everything was being done?

A Apart from, obviously, all the outreach that was going on,

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I can also remember there was a phone that the Ambassador had that was

not his phone. And so people were trying to see whether or not there

was activity associated with that phone, because if there was, it might

mean the Ambassador was someplace -- so I remember that.

I might have a mis-memory and I might be collapsing something,

so I apologize if I am, but I remember that being also one other avenue

of trying to figure out how to locate him, separate and apart from,

obviously, the outreach that was happening through DOD, the outreach

that happened through the agency that had another facility that was

there, our intel, CNSC, and how we could best both deploy and assess

what was going on.

Q And there was a discussion about a SVTCS that occurred that

evening.

A Correct.

Q Do you recall if the SVTCS -- with regard to what your

recollection is about when you had learned, was that SVTCS convened

and called at a point in time when people knew that the Ambassador was

missing and not, potentially, in the safe haven and located?

A I don't recall. I obviously knew we knew we hadn't been

in touch with our Ambassador, and so that would suggest at least an

awareness of that. But I don't know that I can tell you

contemporaneously now what my knowledge was. I don't even know if we

knew at that juncture -- I don't think I did -- that Sean Smith also

was endangered and had deceased. So I think this was in the before

period, maybe. But I'm giving you my best impression right now, and

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it's years later. So I'm doing my best, yes.

Q And whether or not you knew at that point in time when you

were in the conversation on the SVTCS that the Ambassador was missing

versus still in the safe haven and the death of Mr. Smith, did you have

any sense during the SVTCS that there was a lack of urgency about

addressing the safety of our personnel in Benghazi from anyone in the

interagency?

A Quite the opposite. It was really a conversation about

what else can be done, is anything being missed, is there any other

opportunity, asset, avenue, information that we could take or deploy.

And so it was very much almost -- I'm a military brat -- but almost

military, in terms of X, Y, Z. Have we done A, B, C in terms of trying

to step through the different avenues.

Q And do you recall whether -- you had mentioned and you

talked a little bit about the incident in Cairo, the protests in Cairo,

and the breach of the embassy in Cairo -- earlier in the day unrest

that started occurring throughout the region in that SVTCS or maybe

any other conversations at that level that night? Did any of the other

regional unrest factor into the picture? Was it discussed at all?

A Certainly in the SVTCS that we had in a 2-week period, that

was often the case, obviously, because we were running through each

one of our posts that were being threatened.

The night of the 11th, I'm confident, given that there were also

things happening in Cairo, that there would have been conversation

about was our facility secure, were our people secure. But I'm

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assuming that. I don't have a specific memory of that as I sit here

right now.

Q But, certainly, your overall recollection is that, as the

attacks were happening, as the protests in Cairo and the breach of the

wall of our embassy in Cairo was happening, that very much a part of

the conversation was the unrest in that region and how that might impact

the safety of our personnel on the ground?

A That is correct. That's correct.

Q So, moving briefly to -- you described yourself as a

military brat -- just your visibility into the military response on

the night of the attacks, did you have any kind of operational role

with regard to reaching out, giving information, talking to the

military experts who were determining how and when we could and should

respond?

A I remember the military was actually -- we did reach out

to them, and I can't tell you if it was me or someone else. But we

did reach out to them, and they were very responsive. In my mind, I

am thinking about a gentleman named Sandy Winifred, but it might have

been others. And they were very both responsive in identifying what

they could do and how they could do it.

And so my impression was one of support from DOD, and my impression

generally was one of support from all of the agencies, but some agencies

have more capacity than others.

Q Did you have any visibility into the decisionmaking that

was going on in terms of deciding what assets were potentially

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available, when and if they could deploy, how long it would take them

to get to Benghazi? Did you have any visibility into any of the

information that was coming in or the decisions that were going out?

A If that information was discussed in the SVTCS and I was

in the SVTCS, then obviously I had visibility into it. I don't remember

it per se, but I know that I would have had visibility because, being

in the SVTCS, I would have -- we would have then heard and learned and

also then shared what our own needs and observations were.

My sense was that conversation was an ongoing conversation, quite

candidly, for 2 weeks because we have so many of our embassies that

were being threatened. And so the number of times I was in conversation

with Sandy Winifred or someone else was not infrequent, because we were

often trying to understand what we could do in Tunisia, whether or not

we could get people, and what we needed to do in Khartoum, different

places where our embassies were being attacked.

On the night in question, I'm confident we would have had

conversations regarding how best they might be able to support us.

Q And do you recall, both on that night and potentially in

the days following, there being concern that there might also possibly

be an attack on the embassy in Tripoli?

A Yes. Our embassy there, I believe, had information or

there was data that suggested that they might be a target, as well.

And so part of what we were trying to do was shore up that post by sending

in additional support or asking support to stay that was there. I

cannot remember which at that juncture, but I know that we did shore

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up the support that was there.

Q And in any of the conversations that you had, did

you -- first, did you have any visibility into Secretary Clinton's

engagement with the folks who were gathering the information and making

the decisions with regard to our military assets and military response?

Did you have any visibility into that, her role there, her conversations

there?

A In a SVTCS, she was obviously -- I had visibility into her

articulating that we needed to do everything we could and what did that

actually translate to could be done.

In terms of other conversations that she may or may not have, I

don't know that I was present for all of them. But it was my experience

that she was, obviously, not only on the night of but as we were looking

down the road on other instances, frequently either calling leaders

or negotiating for our people to go in -- in one instance, we had to

do that, and they had to go in a particular way -- and also having

conversations, in some instances cajoling, in some instances demanding

that these countries protect our facilities. And that went on for

about 2 weeks, as a number of these attacks were happening.

Q Right. And so, certainly, in her role as our chief

diplomat, she was reaching out to any and all of the countries where

there were problems and, as you put it, cajoled, demanded, certainly

pressing for them to do everything they can and reminding them of their

obligation to do everything that they could to make sure that our

personnel in their countries were safe. Is that fair?

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A That's correct. And then, obviously, the White House would

have -- their own SVTCS is at a principal level, where they would

navigate and negotiate through what that means for what -- given what

permissions we might have gotten from those countries, how we could

also use our military assets, how we could use any other assets that

we might have to be able to provide support for our teams that were

on the ground.

Q And in terms of that outreach to the host nation, the --

A Yes.

Q -- country where our --

A That's fair.

Q -- why would she be reaching out to them? I mean, can you

explain to us kind of that relationship and the obligation that America

has -- I mean, the obligation that countries have, that we have,

certainly, to other countries who are here in the United States and

that, when we're in other countries, those countries have to us? Can

you just -- and how that works and helps us to operate?

A Well, I think, you know, certainly, for me, one of the more

surprising things when I came to the Department, because I

wasn't -- because I grew up in a different context, was that all of

our embassies and consulates are protected by the countries in which

they reside. So our military is not a part, typically, of the security

elements of our embassies and our consulates.

Instead, in giving agrement, which is an agreement to take an

ambassador and have a facility there, they are agreeing to abide by

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a set of conventions and rules which include the obligation to provide

security for those facilities.

So, in instances where those facilities are threatened, rather

than being able to call up to our military, unless they are collocated,

we have to call up to the host nation. And so our diplomats operate

in these countries at that invitation but also under the protection

and expectation that that nation will live up to their obligations of

protecting our diplomats and our development experts who are there.

So, when there is a breach or an attack or a potential harm on

one of our facilities, the Secretary of State's role in any

administration is to be the counterpart to ensure that that nation lives

up to the commitments they make. And sometimes that's politically hard

for the governments there, because they are going against their own

people, sometimes for a reason that might seem complicated -- which,

apparently, in this instance, was one of those -- but nonetheless that's

the commitment they made.

So you often had to cajole or demand or do all kinds of other

encouragement, because, in some ways, they might be doing that which

was very politically unpopular in their country or potentially unsafe.

And that's the Secretary's job. She has to protect her people,

and she has to ensure that they know that that's their obligation. And

if they're not going to live up to it, she has to tell them that we're

going to then take care of our people in the ways that they need to,

and they've got to figure out how to navigate that, but we're going

to send our people in to protect them.

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Q And with regard to that issue of host-nation support, you

know, one of the things the Accountability Review Board that was

convened, as required by law, to examine the attacks did note was that,

with regard to Libya and given the ongoing efforts in Libya to establish

and get a government up and running, the ultimate ability of the host

nation to provide immediate support was not what one would have wanted

on that night.

Did you get a sense, in the run-up to the attacks and the, you

know, year before the attacks, that that issue was being ignored?

A No. But I would also note that I don't know that I had a

lot of visibility into a lot of the different both weaknesses and

frailties and the issues that were leading up to the night of the attack.

But it is my impression, obviously -- because I have the benefit

of now looking at a lot of the information after the fact, the ARB and

other things -- that it was not being ignored, but there were, I think,

as the ARB found, a need for stronger security and a need for a better

protection for the folks who are on the ground. And I think that is

one of the really hard lessons learned, because I think that assessment

was a deliberate one and found that as a frailty in what happened that

night.

Q And you indicated that you certainly didn't have the

nitty-gritty information about -- and that's my term. You didn't use

it, so I apologize. You can certainly characterize it. You didn't

have the granular details about the particular security situation.

You are the chief of staff. The Secretary is, of course, one

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level higher. Did you have the sense that she had the granular details

about the security, the staffing for security in Benghazi, how many

DS agents were allocated to that post, what kind of perimeter security

they might have, how many sandbags they might put around a particular

window, how many guns they had on compound, and the details of the

relationship between the individuals in the compound and local guard

support? Did you have the sense that she had the ability, the time

to have that level of granular detail?

A I don't know that she would have had that level of granular

detail. I also know when she obviously testified she spoke to the fact

of what her knowledge was and what her understanding was, and,

obviously, she's a better spokesperson for herself than I could ever

be.

But, in terms of the level of now information that certainly we've

gleaned through the ARB and else-wise, those are things that I think

became more aware through that process. But that's not surprising

because I don't know that that's typically things that would filter

in the same way just in terms of the building's day-to-day operations.

Q Sure. And, to me, that loops back to the conversation that

we a little bit started with, which is the Department having mechanisms

both for information and help. And I asked you then whether that not

only applied in a crisis situation but with regard to the day-to-day

operation of the State Department.

So, with regard to those types of details, we have learned quite

a bit, and I assume you at least have some sense of the fact that there

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are entire bureaus dedicated to and responsible for making sure and

trying their best to understand those granular details.

You've indicated, certainly, on the night of the attacks, you felt

like Diplomatic Security did everything it could. Would Diplomatic

Security and the regional bureaus have been -- the regional bureau here

being the NEA -- kind of have been the mechanism within State to have

done the assessments in the day-to-day overall pulsing of both the

embassy in Tripoli and the temporary mission facility in Benghazi?

A Those are the two bureaus who would be closest to that

information and who would have had day-to-day engagement with

decisionmaking in those matters.

Q And, then, to the extent they were engaging with individuals

in your office, one of your deputies, who would that have been?

A So, for policy matters, that would have been Jake Sullivan.

So he would have been -- as decisions were being made about what our

policies and operations per se, when it came to policy issues, were

in Libya, it would be likely that he would be included. I can't say

he would always be included, but it would have been likely that he would

have been included in those discussions. Certainly, as discussions

were had around Libya as a policy area, he is the person who I would

have expected them to have included.

Q And what about Ms. Abiden? Would she have been someone who

would have been included in those discussions?

A I would not have expected her to be.

She would have been included in those discussions when the

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Secretary took a trip to Libya. She managed, obviously, travel and

all of the different operational elements associated with the

Secretary's travel to different places, and so she would have had

engagement on Libya when the Secretary traveled there.

But in terms of kind of the policy decisionmaking around our

mission and the issues there, I would not have expected her to. I'm

not saying she didn't; I'm just saying what my expectations are.

Q And, in answering my questions, you've focused on policy

decisionmaking. Shifting a little bit to security assessment, the

allocation of security resources, who, if anyone, in your office would

have been kind of responsible for those kind of assessments and

decisions?

A Those kinds of assessments and decisions wouldn't typically

come to my office unless there was some issue that somebody decided

to raise. As a general matter, the Under Secretary for Management

would have managed the security-related issues.

To the extent it was a larger budget matter that might mean whether

or not we were getting our budgets or not getting our budgets from

Congress, that might happen with our Deputy for Management, who had

accountability as we allocated the budget to ensure that we were

allocating our resources effectively.

Q And do you recall -- and I've moved away a little bit from

the night of the attacks.

A Okay.

Q But we are covering the other ground that I was hoping to

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cover.

A Okay.

Q Do you recall whether, in the time period from the decision

to continue the presence in Benghazi, which occurred in December 2011,

until the night of the attacks -- you said issues would only come to

you on security-related, you would expect, on security-related matters

unless there was a particular reason. Do you recall any issues related

to the temporary mission facility in Benghazi, security at the

temporary mission facility in Benghazi being raised to you, first,

between the time period of January 1, 2012, through the night of the

attacks?

A No. But that's not surprising because, obviously, we have

a lot of posts and a lot of issues, and I don't know that they would

have thought that I could have helped them anyway. But as a practical

reality, no. But it's also not surprising.

Q Right. I think Secretary Clinton has described her job as

kind of a three-hatted -- I think she says it's like being the CEO of

a company, a chief policy-maker for the United States, as well as the

face of America for the United States. So, understandably, I can't

recall -- and we've been looking at this now -- the number of overseas

posts, but I understand what you're saying.

Focusing, then, just for a moment, I said January 1, 2012,

forward. A decision was made in December 2011 to continue with the

reopening of Embassy Tripoli, to continue the presence in Benghazi and

maintain the temporary mission facility there. Do you recall that

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decision coming up through your office to you? And we can ask --

A No.

Q -- Mr. Sullivan, obviously.

A But I didn't -- it didn't. But I do recall when we were

seeking to make a determination as to whether or not we would, you know,

send an ambassador back, my recollection at that time was, because our

ambassador -- because of WikiLeaks, our ambassador was not very

welcome. And so, because I ended up engaging on a lot of the WikiLeaks

matters, I remember at that time that our ambassador had to come out.

I don't recall many of the engagement around the decision in

December of 2011 that you're speaking about with Benghazi, but it

wasn't, probably, in the same category as when our ambassador had to

come out.

Q Right. And, just to be clear for the record, you're

referring to Ambassador Cretz, who --

A Yes. Ambassador Gene Cretz, who had been the Ambassador

there. And, unfortunately, there were cables that had been shared,

and some of them, I think, were more frank than the current leadership

of the country was comfortable with.

Q And then Ambassador Stevens ultimately succeeded him as the

Ambassador.

A He did. He did not immediately succeed him. There was a

period of time between them.

Q And then, just for a moment, back to that decision in

December of 2011 to continue and maintain a presence in Benghazi, do

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you know and to the best of your knowledge, was the Secretary aware

of or involved in that discussion and decision?

A I actually don't know. She might have been, but I don't

know that. I don't believe she was, based on just what I've seen, but

I don't know that. So there might be people who would have engaged

in that conversation, but I don't know.

Q So, back to the night of the attacks, you had indicated,

you know, the work that was being done and communications with regard

to a military response. And we talked a little bit about the

Secretary's engagement with the host nation and what she was doing with

regard to trying to amass and cajole and wheedle, potentially, any

support there.

With regard to our own military assets, did you ever convey any

message that indicated that the U.S. military should not fully engage

and do whatever it could to assist our people on the ground?

A No.

Q And what about the Secretary? To the extent you had any

visibility on that, did she ever do anything to indicate that our

military should not fully engage and do whatever it could to help our

personnel?

A No. She was pretty emphatic about wanting whatever to be

done and whatever were assets that could be deployed, if that was both

effective and possible to be done.

Obviously, it was a challenging environment, given that our

compound had been overrun. And so you want to ensure that, as you also

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are thinking about who else might go in, how they are able to do that

effectively. But my observation and impression and, obviously,

engagements were around what can be done, what can be sent, and how

can that be done best. There was not any notion of not doing that to

the fullest amount that was practical, effective, and possible.

Q So, understanding that that decision about military assets

and when they're sent and which assets is not one to be made by the

State Department, it was certainly your experience that, in every

conversation and in every way, that both you and the Secretary did urge

our military to do, certainly, whatever it could in their best judgment

and with the resources that were available?

A That is my impression. And it's also my impression that

that's what they sought to do. I mean, we never felt unsupported by

them.

Q Did you ever get any sense that they were failing to also

take into account, in addition to Benghazi, other potential

problems -- the potential attack on the embassy in Tripoli, whether

there would be further unrest in Egypt or anything throughout the

region? Did they allow that to fall under the radar as they were

focused on Benghazi?

A Our military?

Q Yes.

A That's not my impression at all.

Q So they were fully aware of all of the potential

difficulties and doing everything they could to make sure that they

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were going to be able to get help to people wherever it was needed to

the greatest extent possible?

A Yes. I felt like our military were really great partners.

And I say that because they both thought about what needed to be done,

shared what could be done, helped think through what were other avenues.

I felt like they were good partners.

Q So I just want to return now to a little bit earlier in the

day and talk to you a little bit about the protest in Cairo. So if

you could just shift your thinking to a little bit before what we've

been talking about, the night of the attack and more broadly.

We've talked a little bit about it, but if you could just explain

to us a little bit, when you heard about it, what was your understanding

of why people were protesting?

A We had been dealing with incidents that were arising out

of hostility that a number of people and leaders in the Middle East

felt toward a video that had been produced by a gentleman, I believe

from Florida -- I could be wrong -- and their surprise that our

government wouldn't shut them down or in some way not allow that to

happen. Because I think there's just not a fulsome appreciation of

free speech and how our Nation operates and what those freedoms mean,

as opposed to those meaning that that's per se something our government

is trying to pursue.

And, as a result, there were a number of protests and attacks on

our facilities because of that incident. And I can even recall an

instance where there was -- and I'm not going to remember who was the

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government that said, you know, "You want us to protect your people,

and you can't even stop a video."

But there was just this sense that we had created an offense as

a nation, as opposed to as a country that has individuals who have

freedoms and rights to be able to express their views. And that meant

that our embassies became a focal point for the frustration and anger

and what they saw as our country's disrespect as opposed to the views

of an individual, and that meant our embassies were therefore besieged.

Q Do you know when -- well, if the Secretary was aware, as

well, of those protests in Cairo?

A Yes.

Q And was she also aware -- the way that you're explaining

it is that, not only with regard to the protest in Cairo but more broadly

speaking, there had been a lot of engagement with leaders throughout

the region to try to address anger they were having about -- I think

you even referenced in the first hour, you had said, "They were angry

because we have free speech." And I took that at the time to mean what

you just explained, that they don't understand, necessarily, and are

not appreciative of the fact that, because of the way in which America

honors and safeguards and values free speech, the government can't or

won't, necessarily, what they wanted, shut down a video.

Was she also aware of all that engagement?

A Yes. That was happening, obviously, throughout this. And

different embassies were affected differently by the people in those

countries based on how they were reacting. And sometimes that was what

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they were reacting to; sometimes they were reacting to something else

altogether. It was not always transparent what was the catalyst.

But, in some instances, obviously, it would be more evident than others,

based on how people positioned themselves when they were attacking our

embassies.

Q And then, just in terms of trying to situate it, not on a

kind of exact timeline but just to get a sense --

A Okay.

Q --- I mean, the protest in Cairo and then the attack on

Benghazi coincided, as well, with the anniversary -- it was

9/11/2012 -- the anniversary of the attacks on the World Trade Center

of 2001.

The concerns that were coming up, the unrest that was coming up,

did that, from the best you can recall, kind of all start on the 11th?

Had it started in the days leading up to the 11th?

A I don't remember. It might have started in the days leading

up, quite candidly. I can't remember when the video was first posted

or, actually, when people first noticed it. I don't recall that. But

I recall that, in this time window, that was one of the other factors

that was obviously affecting the security of our teams on the ground.

Q Okay.

And I'm going to show you now what we're going to mark as exhibit 4

for identification purposes.

A Okay.

[Mills Exhibit No. 4

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Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q I will give you a minute to take a look at that and read

it. I just wanted to ask you a couple questions about it. But it bears

the identification number down at the bottom of 538 --

A Are all three exhibit 4? Or am I supposed to be giving

copies? Sorry. I apologize.

Q All three are copies of exhibit 4.

A No, these are all for me.

Q As well it should be.

But it bears the document identification number 5389820. It's

a two-page document. I'm going to give you a moment to take a look

at that, and then I just want to ask you a couple of questions about

it.

A Thanks.

Q So do you recall seeing this cable around -- well, let's

first establish what it is, and maybe you can probably explain it to

me better than I can explain to you.

From my reading of it, it appears to be certainly an unclassified

SBU cable. It has the date of September 11, 2012. It's from Secretary

of State, which, you know, down at the bottom has the electronic

signature of the current Secretary, which is Secretary Clinton at the

time.

What is your understanding of what -- could you just explain what

this document is?

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A So this document is a cable that is advising our post of,

one, the fact that there has been a video released that has created

protests in Cairo; and, two, advising our post that they might want

to convene -- I think it's called an emergency action committee, but

it is our -- each post has a set of designated partners who are part

of the government, our government, to look at what they need to do to

ensure that the security status and apparatus is in place for something

that might be out of the ordinary.

This is flagging that there might be protests that are out of the

ordinary and reminding people to assess their security posture and take

any steps that they think might be necessary to ensure the security

of their facility.

Q And do you recall whether you saw this on September 11,

2012?

A I don't recall seeing this on September 11th or 12th, but

I might have. I don't recall it.

Q And do you know if the Secretary happened to have seen it?

A I don't know if she would have seen it contemporaneously

or not. I know that we were obviously on the other side of the issue,

so it might have gotten created out of the fact that we knew this was

happening in Cairo and we should be ensuring that everybody is on a

little bit of alert. But, quite candidly, our career officials would

normally operate that way, based on their long years of experience

there, and would have ensured that same action, whether or not it was

requested or not.

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Q Uh-huh.

And in what's numbered 2, in the body of the cable, it begins that

paragraph by saying, "In response to the upcoming release of a

controversial film entitled 'Muhammad's Trial,' hundreds of

demonstrators converged on the U.S. embassy in Cairo on September 11,

2012, with a number of protesters breaching the compound."

So that cable says there -- and it seems to reflect our

conversation earlier -- that the Cairo protests were in response to

a film.

A Correct.

Q What was your understanding, just in a general sense, of

kind of what that film was about?

A I genuinely never watched the film. My impression was that

it was deeply offensive to those of the Muslim faith because the faith

leader was being treated disrespectfully or being sentenced, if you

will. But I honestly never have seen the video.

Q And when you referenced the faith leader, for the Muslim

world, that would be the Prophet --

A Muhammad. Yes.

Q -- Muhammad. And so the reference to a film about

Muhammad's trial.

The rest of that paragraphs does reference Pastor Terry Jones.

You had indicated you thought there was a connection with a -- I think

you said a pastor in Florida. Is it your recollection that that was

Pastor Jones?

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A That's correct. His name is Pastor Jones. So this

refreshes my memory of his name and that, at least as I understood it,

there had already been elements of this film already on the Web that

people were seeing.

Q And do you recall whether this was the first time that Pastor

Jones had come to the State Department's attention?

A No. He had come to our attention before. I can't tell you

how long before, but he had something -- he had similarly had a video

or a -- I believe he might have been burning the Quran. I just don't

recall. But, in any event --

Q Your recollection is not bad.

A Okay, good. At some point, he had engaged in other acts

against the Muslim faith, and so he had come to our attention before.

And he had, on one prior occasion also, potentially put our teams, I

think at that time in Pakistan, but in other places at risk, and we

were concerned about the impact of his actions.

Q So, certainly, at the time this is all happening, there was

an experience with this very pastor that had previously put our people

on the ground in danger.

A Yes.

Q And this cable is an effort to alert. And how widely

distributed is this cable?

A This would go to all of our posts.

Q So all posts overseas, everywhere.

A Yes.

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Q To alert all personnel on the ground of the potential

concerns related to the film and Pastor Jones' showing support,

promotion of it. Is that fair?

A That's fair. It would go to all our posts, and it would

obviously alert them of the potential impact that it might have in

different countries.

And, candidly, over the 2 or 3 weeks after September 11, there

were a number of attacks or protests on our embassies, and they were

all over the world. They were not just in the Middle East.

Q Yeah, I recall seeing, when I saw a State Department

bulletin -- not contemporaneous, more recently -- that there even had

been an incident in London --

A In London.

Q -- at an embassy.

A Australia. Very surprising places. But that might be my

own parochial expectations of where someone might be affected.

Q And just directing your attention to the next point down,

you mentioned that there was the recommendation of post convening -- and

you explained the EAC, emergency action committee, to potentially

consider steps.

And, certainly, as I read that paragraph -- and it begins with,

"Violent extremist groups could use Pastor Jones' recent statements

and actions as motivation to target U.S. interests overseas" -- that

they're obviously reflecting here the concern that the video might be

used by extremists to encourage or, in essence, target -- encourage

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people to target U.S. facilities overseas.

A That's correct. That was the concern that this cable was

seeking to both raise and also encourage the amelioration of potential

outcomes that might be harmful to our teams.

Q And this reflected a real concern, a real concern that was

actually based on prior actual experience where there had been

personnel, U.S. personnel, put at risk because of actions deemed

offensive in the Muslim world regarding the Prophet Muhammad.

A Yes. And, indeed, in the prior incidents, we had people

who were very vulnerable. And I can, you know, recall my impression

being that there was a need to, one, create the appreciation of that,

but, two, also see whether or not there were other steps that could

be taken to limit the impact of these types of videos and their

accessibility on the Web. That's my best recollection.

Q And when you say "limit the impact," in terms of that

concern, certainly I would imagine that you all were at least beginning

to talk about and probably already had taken steps to try to find a

way to help tamp down, quell, calm the unrest in the region. Is that

accurate?

A That is accurate.

Q And what are the types of things that you were contemplating

and doing to try to accomplish that goal?

A Well, in addition to obviously trying to use our traditional

channels of diplomacy, which means that the Secretary would be reaching

out to her counterpart and we would then have everybody down the line

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reaching out to their counterpart to share that, to the extent there

was unrest that was related to the video, that this was not a reflection

of the position of the United States Government and that we wanted to

ensure that they both understood that and fulfilled their obligations

to our teams on the ground.

But we also look here at home to see whether or not there were

ways to limit the visibility of these videos on the Web or limit the

access to them so that our people on the ground were not at risk, or

that we were limiting the risk that they were under. Because we

don't -- as I said, we have to rely on the host nation. We don't have

our own security forces to protect our diplomats.

Q So, to the extent this unrest was continuing, certainly,

as of the 11th of September 2012 and in the ensuing weeks, there was

a really urgent and serious need for the government to be discussing

the video in the context of the unrest that continued -- that had been

happening and was continuing to happen, and that need was to help ensure

the safety of our personnel on the ground. Is that fair to say?

A That is fair. I mean, you know, look, I always -- I've

learned now to treat every country differently, which was a good

education for me when I went to the State Department. And so each

country might experience not only this video but anything about us

differently, and so you had to be cognizant of what were the unique

issues or concerns of each country.

But it is the case that more than one, the gravamen of the unrest

that they were seeing in their citizens toward us, there was more than

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one for whom this video had managed to be used as a mechanism to incite

their ire toward our country.

Q I think my time is up, but I just wanted to finish with just

a final question. You know, understanding that this context -- and

this has been very helpful -- and just returning to where we began,

which was more focused specifically on what you were learning, how you

were learning it, and what you were doing when you heard about the

attacks in Benghazi, with regard to that effort, the information you

were trying to gather, the work that you were trying to do, on that

night, as that was all happening, was the focus there on what happened

before the attacks?

A No. The focus there was on what could we do to secure our

people and to secure the safety of everybody who was on the ground that

night.

Q Thank you.

Ms. Sawyer. Off the record.

[Recess.]

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[10:58 a.m.]

Ms. Jackson. I have a minute or two before 11, so we are going

to go back on the record for the next hour of the majority's time. And

I believe that Congressman Jordan had a couple of followup questions

from the last hour.

Mr. Jordan. Ms. Mills, you indicated that the Ambassador didn't

need approval to travel to -- well, frankly, no Ambassador needed

approval to travel, with all their duties -- but did you know that he

was going to travel to Benghazi on September 11th?

Ms. Mills. No. And I should clarify, if I was inaccurate. I

think when Ambassadors would come home from posts, they would actually

seek to be out of their posts, but in their country they would be able

to travel around. So I apologize if I left that misimpression.

Mr. Jordan. Did Secretary Clinton know that the Ambassador was

going to travel to Benghazi and be in Benghazi on September 11th?

Ms. Mills. I don't know.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. Thank you.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay. Ms. Mills, if I could direct your attention back to

Exhibit 3 that you have before you, which is an email chain with a

subject line of: Libya updates from Beth Jones. We talked a little

bit about the sequencing and the timing of when you knew what. And

I wanted to go back to this document to see if it helped put things

in order.

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If you could go to page 3 of this document, a little more than

halfway down is a section -- an email part of this longer chain that

is Tuesday, September 11, 2012, at 5:32 p.m. from to

a whole group of people. And that update says, and I quote, "The

fighting has stopped, DCM Greg Hicks just confirmed to me. He also

confirmed one fatality, Sean Smith, a TDYer from the Hague, has died.

His body has been recovered. The five ARSOs are accounted for, but

they're still trying to find the Ambassador. The principal officer's

residence is still on fire with toxic smoke." End quote into the first

paragraph.

Does that refresh your recollection as to the time of day it was

when you would have received an update that there was one fatality

already, the Ambassador is missing, and there's fire in the principal

residence -- principal officer's residence?

A It certainly confirms for me that it means -- because I think

the SVTCS was later that evening -- I would have known that Sean Smith

was deceased. I can't tell you when I would have seen this, but

somebody would have definitely told me. So that does help me at least

understand that for the SVTCS I would have known that we would have

had one person who would have died.

Q So even if you didn't see this particular email chain,

someone would have personally come and informed you of that?

A Someone would have told me. And it certainly would be the

case if the SVTCS, when I'm thinking it was in the evening, I would

have known at that time.

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Q Okay. And then if we go up a little further, we actually

have to go back to page 2 to see that the next email chain -- the next

section of this email chain is at 6:58 p.m. from Beth Jones. But I

want to go all the way down to the bottom because the first part of

it talks about Tripoli, but the very last section of this, which is

then on page 3, it says, and I quote, "In Benghazi: Greg is working

with the COS to make sure he is aware of reports that another mob has

gathered in Benghazi and headed for the -- redacted -- compound. They

will ensure extra protection there, too."

Do you see that?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And would you have received this information if not

by email, by someone else, about that time -- about 7 p.m. on the night

of the 11th?

A I assume I would've. I don't know that. I assume I

would've.

Q Do you recall that you had both of those pieces of

information before the SVTCS, which was at 7:30 that night?

A No, I don't. But I'm sure I would have known about Sean

Smith's death. What I don't know is if I would have known that there

was yet another team on the way to -- or not team, but another group

of mobs on the way to the other compound that was there. Because my

memory was that that attack happened later in the evening. So that

is the reason why I am answering you the way I am. I thought the attack

on the second compound happened much later.

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Q And I believe it did happen in time, but I'm just asking

if you had the information that they had at least the intel that there

was going to be a follow-on attack, not that it had actually occurred.

A I can't imagine they wouldn't have told me, but I can't tell

you sitting here that I knew.

Q Okay. And so if this information came in before the SVTCS

occurred, you believe that you would have had that information before

the SVTCS?

A If I was aware of it before the SVTCS, then yes, I would

have had it before the SVTCS; yes.

Q Okay. And who all participated in the SVTCS from the State

Department?

A You know, I don't remember. I do remember that our

diplomatic security was present. So that would have been I believe

either -- I believe it would have been Eric Boswell, who was our

Assistant Secretary at that time. I believe that Pat Kennedy would

have participated, who was our Under Secretary for Management. I

believe that Jake Sullivan participated.

I know the Secretary came down, because that was a surprise for

some of the other agencies, that she was on. And I cannot tell you

who else was in the room, but I know that there were other people in

the room as well.

Q Was Beth Jones in the room?

A She likely would have been in the room. She likely would

have been.

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Q And obviously she was the one that received this information

from Greg Hicks.

A Yes, she did. Or at least the traffic would suggest that.

Q And all of these other people that you mentioned -- Eric

Boswell and Patrick Kennedy and Jake Sullivan -- they were also

recipients of the updates throughout the evening?

A Correct.

Q Okay. So --

A As was Wendy Sherman. And she might have been there, too;

I just don't recall.

Q She was the Under Secretary for Policy?

A She is. For Political Affairs.

Q Political Affairs.

A Yes.

Q Okay. So for the 7:30 SVTCS, at least one of those people

or multiple of these people would have had this information that there

was at least some intel that there was going to be a follow-on attack.

A Yes. The way I would actually, if I were being accurate

for how you expressed it, is that this -- I would have

imagined -- because often people were in meetings, so they weren't

sitting at their computer -- that our operations center or others would

print copies and often would place them at your table in the SVTCS.

So it is plausible that this might have been placed at the table

as this is the latest information; or, while we were sitting there,

somebody would walk in and say, Here's a copy of the latest information.

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So I want to make the distinction between being at your computer,

because that night most people were in motion as opposed to at their

computer. So most things are being said to people or placed down on

people's tables to answer the latest information.

Q During the timeframe of the time period of 5:30 p.m. to 7:30

p.m., from the time you would have received some sort of notification

that you had one fatality and the Ambassador was missing and the time

of the 7:30 SVTCS that night --

A 7:30, okay.

Q -- what were you doing? The Secretary called General

Petraeus. You said you had reached out, I forget to whom. But what

all were you doing? Who were you reaching out to in the interagency?

A I don't have a perfect memory of everybody who I was reaching

out to or, for that, much memory of that night, just because it was

a lot. But I do remember that once we knew there was a fatality, that

we also had to reach out in our Department to consular affairs to

understand and learn about Sean Smith's family and how to notify and

what would be then the requirements of how to step through that process

and who to notify.

So that would have been one more other activity that would have

been happening that evening. And I can't tell you at what time that

would have been, so I can't put it between your 5:30 and 7:30 period.

I know that, obviously, to get to a place where we were on a SVTCS with

the multiple different agencies that would have been represented, it

is quite plausible that I had reached out to some of those agencies

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as well, but as I am sitting here right now, I can't tell you who I

had a conversation with.

Q Well, given that the agency was affiliated with the other

facility, do you recall talking with anyone from the CIA?

A I don't. But I would have recalled them by name as opposed

to by agency. And I acknowledge that right now. So as I am sitting

here, I am trying to think there was one gentleman that I used to talk

to there whose name I'm blanking on. So I'm trying to remember whether

or not that night --

Mr. Davis. ? ?

Ms. Mills. I did talk to but not that night, to the best

of my recollection. I think I talked to later. It was another

person.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Was it Mike Morell?

A I don't think I talked to Mike Morell that night either,

but I did on other occasions talk to Mike Morell, obviously.

Q About Libya?

A Yes, yes. After this event. Obviously, prior to the

deaths of our team there, I hadn't had occasion to deal with Mike Morell.

So I don't know who else I reached out to or who else I would have

been talking to as I sit here right now. I genuinely don't have a good

recollection.

Q Did you talk to someone from DOD?

A I think I talked to Sandy Winifred. I think I said that

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earlier. And he's at DOD. I can't confidently represent it was in

this time window, but I know that I did have conversations with him

when we were trying to understand what we could do for our people.

Q Did Secretary Clinton talk to Secretary Panetta?

A I don't recall if she had a separate conversation with him.

Because they were all in real time in other ways. So I don't know the

answer to that question. She would know that. I don't know the answer

to that one.

Q They were in real time in other ways. What do you mean by

that?

A In other words, they always had regular meetings that were

going on. So to the extent that the President had had either a meeting

or otherwise they were having engagements, they might use those other

natural meetings to talk. I don't remember any that evening. I don't

know if they had had one earlier in the day or early the next day that

would have put them in a conversation. I just don't know.

Q Did Secretary Clinton request that military assets be

deployed?

A She actually on our SVTCS -- which obviously had the

presence of a number of different agencies, of which I believe DOD was

one -- said we need to be taking whatever steps we can, to do whatever

we can to secure our people.

And I can remember that someone from the White House said that

the President was 100 percent behind whatever needed to be done and

we needed to do whatever needed to be done. And that's, you know,

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that's what he would expect, but it's also what was said.

Q But in that timeframe --

A And so she was on that SVTCS and did speak to the need to

see what assets could be deployed for our team. And I believe in that

SVTCS, also DOD would have likely been a participant.

Q Do you recall who from DOD was participating?

A No. That's what I was trying to recall. But I don't.

Q Does the name Jeremy Bash ring a bell with you?

A Jeremy Bash I believe was the chief of staff at DOD. It

is quite plausible he might have been on the SVTCS, but I don't know

that so I don't want to make a misrepresentation.

Q Did you reach out to him independently of the SVTCS?

A It's quite plausible that I could have.

Q But you don't recall.

A I don't have a specific recollection, but is quite likely

that he would be my counterpart and I would reach out to him.

Q Did you -- either during the events or after the

events -- memorialize the events as they unfolded -- and your actions?

Did you keep any type of log or journal regarding that, either

personally or professionally?

A No. No. I didn't.

Q Okay. Would there be any other type of record of the calls

that you made; like did you make calls through the op center or did

they place calls for you or would you have dialed direct? Would there

be --

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A Ops would have any records that I placed through Ops. And

I acknowledge being an over-user of Ops. But I also would dial people

directly if I had their number. So it just depends on whether or not

they happen to be someone whose phone number I knew and could dial them

directly or I needed Op's assistance to be able to reach them. But

Ops does keep a log of calls that were placed.

Q Okay. So now as we've established the sequence and the

timing of events, the first notification comes in around 4:00. You

are notified by 5:30 that you have a fatality and the Ambassador is

missing. By 7:00 there is some intelligence that the other facility

may be attacked. And then you have this SVTCS at 7:30.

Before the SVTCS occurred, what other interagency assets had been

deployed or were in the process of being deployed, to your recollection?

A To my recollection, I don't know, because I can't time

sequence things the way that you're asking, only because my memory

doesn't have the timing committed to them. As I said, I do recall there

being a request for assets to get eyes on, as I would call, and that

that request was honored.

I recall after the Secretary's outreach to General Petraeus, that

to the extent there was any support that could be offered in country

from other teams that might be present, that that also was something

that was at least already

underway.

In terms of any other kind of activity or deployment or other

things, I don't have any particular recollection right now as I sit

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here, but happy to be, you know, refreshed.

Q Just to circle back for a minute; when you would receive

these updates, whether you saw the emails, someone put a piece of paper,

or came in and told you personally, would the Secretary have been

receiving that information virtually either simultaneous with you or

virtually at the same time?

A I don't know the answer to that, in terms of how she received

it that night, but typically one of the things that the staff and the

Department do a very good job of is giving the Secretary real time

information. So when it happens. The reason the special assistants

are copied on here is because they sit right outside of her office.

And so they often then can be a conduit for sharing that information

relatively quickly. And they, sadly for them, are tied to their desks.

So they are always seeing things as they arise. And so I would expect

that they would be sharing that. I can't tell you that they always

did, but that would be my expectation.

Q Other than the Secretary's trip down to the Ops Center for

the SVTCS, was she in her office from the time you were first notified

of the attack until she left the State Department that evening?

A I believe she was largely in her office space. I don't know

that she didn't maybe walk down to one of the other Deputy Secretaries

and have a conversation or something, but it is the case that at least

my memory is that she was on the seventh floor for that entire evening.

Q And monitoring the situation?

A Sure. That's why she was there. I was just saying

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physically where she was, in terms of your question.

Q And how late did she stay that evening?

A I don't remember. She was there pretty late, but I don't

remember what time she left. But, you know,

-- so they would probably be

a better reflection than I could've of what time she left.

Q Okay. When you had the SVTCS that night, who spoke on

behalf of the State Department?

A The Secretary.

Q She did? She led the discussion?

A Well, I don't know to say if she led the discussion, but

certainly it is the case that when the Secretary is on a SVTCS with

staff, then, you know, you are appropriately considerate of their

obligations and responsibilities.

So each agency was stepping through what they were doing and where

things stood. She would have spoken for our agency, and then we would

have filled in other information or responses to questions, if they

were posed, if we had the specific information.

Q So what did the military report that they were in the process

of doing? Where were they in the deployment of assets?

A I just don't know the answer to that question. I mean, as

I sit here, I don't know where -- I have a much better memory of us

than I do of others, and I just don't know the answer to that question.

Q Would there be some memorialization of this SVTCS? Were

there note takers?

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A So my experience of our SVTCS is there were

typically -- well, I said this before -- due-outs. And so there would

be assignments that typically the NSC would assign out. I don't have

any other experience of seeing anybody else's notes or a formal

write-out of the SVTCS or otherwise. Those might have happened and

I just didn't either see them or don't remember them.

Typically, what I remember is what were our due-outs; we've got

to do X, Y, and Z, and he would make sure for the next SVTCS you had

done your due-outs.

Q Okay. Was FBI on the SVTCS?

A I don't recall them. They might have been, but I don't

recall them.

Q Do you recall taking any steps to reach out to the FBI or

try and get FBI in country to respond?

A I don't know that I have a memory of the FBI being in country

in Benghazi that night -- or in Tripoli.

Q Did you take any steps to try and get FBI into Libya?

A That night?

Q Or ask that they respond. Yes.

A That night?

Q That night; or, at least get them deployed.

A I have more of a recollection of us reaching for DOD than

I have a recollection of us reaching for the FBI. That could be my

best recollection.

Q I believe that you said in the last hour that the Secretary

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reached out to the Libyan President?

A I know that she reached out to the Libyan Government.

Likely, I'm assuming that would be the President. And I know that she

reached out to press for support for our team on the ground, yes.

I don't know what time that was. I just want to be honest with

you. You're putting times because you probably have the benefit of

timelines in all the records. I don't have the same real time

recollection of how things happened in terms of time.

Q Okay. Were you an observer or a listener to her

conversation with the person from the Libyan Government she reached?

A I don't know if I was. I don't believe I was that night,

because I believe I would have been doing something else. But that's

only my guess.

Q Do you know who would have been with her that night as she

made those calls?

A Well, typically, when the Secretary makes calls to leaders,

there's always the front office staff are present. And they will

actually, if they have been asked, will take notes from that particular

conversation.

Q Okay. And so the Ops Center would have some

memorialization of that?

A It's actually not the Ops Center, it's actually -- oddly,

it's the special assistants that you have seen copied on these. It's

typically the special assistants who would be on. I'm not saying that

the Ops Center might not also have someone on, but typically it would

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be the special assistants.

Q Okay. During the SVTCS was the use of the FEST discussed?

A Not that I recall. As I understood the FEST team, which

I later came to learn, is they are a team that helps reestablish our

embassies when we have moved them out. And so I think there was a lot

of confusion around FEST teams as opposed to our Marines, who were

obviously FAST teams. It's hard to keep these separated.

And I don't recall conversations around the FEST team. That's

not to say it didn't happen -- because I know there was a lot of

conversation around FEST-- but I don't recall that happening at the

SVTCS that night.

Q Isn't FEST supposed to be a quick reaction deployment for

crisis response?

A So my understanding -- but I might be conflating two

things -- is that they are actually established -- they help you

reestablish your embassy when your embassy or your teams have

been -- aren't present.

So when you go in, they can help establish communication, they

can help assess what might be your needs operationally. That's my best

memory, but I acknowledge that I'm pulling on a pretty old memory.

Q Outside of the SVTCS was there any internal discussion about

deploying the FEST?

A I know that there was someone who had served on a FEST team

who felt like the FEST might be able to be helpful. I didn't learn

that that night. I learned that subsequent in the process of kind of

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stepping through what happened that night and how could we avoid this

ever happening again. I don't have any real-time understanding or

experience of those sets of discussions, to the extent they were

happening.

Q Do you know who made that decision that night that the FEST

should not be deployed?

A No. And didn't know that there was a decision that the FEST

shouldn't be deployed, per se. But I don't have a -- no is the answer

to your question.

Q Did you later learn that? That a decision had --

A That's what I'm trying to remember when we were going back

through all of the understandings of what had happened that night. And

I just can't pull that from my memory. But I do remember this being

one of the issues that got looked at.

Q I'm going to hand you what has been marked as Exhibit 5.

[Mills Exhibit No. 5

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And what Exhibit 5 is, for the record, is a

printout of a State Department publication describing the Foreign

Emergency Support Team, or FEST, and it's

from the State.gov Web site. If you would just take a moment to look

through that.

Are you done?

A Yes.

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Q Okay. Exhibit 5 -- and I'll quote the first sentence of

this. It says, "The FEST is the U.S. Government's only interagency

on-call, short notice team poised to respond to terrorist incidents

worldwide." It goes on to say that "the FEST deploys overseas to

advise, assist, assess, and coordinate U.S. Government crisis response

activities. The operations directed at the Department of State's

Bureau of Counterterrorism leads the FEST." And then it goes on to

talk about all the agencies.

This document also says that the FEST assisted in the aftermath

of the East African bombings, it responded to the USS Cole, and it was

also used in response to abductions in Ecuador and the Philippines.

This is different than what you've described as the FEST -- as

what it does.

A So my understanding of the FEST and what my description

speaks to is that the FEST was specifically deployed, as I understood

it, after incidents had occurred as opposed to in the moment. So at

least as I understand the FEST and the description here about how they

operated in both East Africa and Cole, that would at least be consistent

with my understanding.

What I didn't have an understanding of is that they would deploy

in the moment of a crisis. And so I think that is where your questions

are going to. And that wouldn't have been my understanding at the time.

That doesn't mean I was right or wrong; it's just telling you my own

understanding.

Q So when you and the Secretary and others were discussing

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what are our options, nobody within the State Department said, Well,

we have the FEST, we lead the FEST, we can deploy the FEST?

A So I don't know that nobody did that. So that might have

occurred.

Q Did it occur during the SVTCS?

A I don't recall a discussion of the FEST team during the

SVTCS. That doesn't mean it didn't occur simply because my memory is

however many years old and, sadly, I'm getting old, too.

But my understanding of the FEST team was that in instances,

particularly in East Africa and other places, that they come in and

are able to help navigate how you respond after an incident has

occurred, help establish communications, and help what I would say

shore up what typically has been a damaged, harmed post or location.

So that was my understanding. But my understanding obviously is

limited by my own knowledge. There are other people who are experts

who would have opined and made judgments about what should or shouldn't

be done and how it should or shouldn't be used, because they worked

at the Department and know those things certainly better than me.

Q And would one of those experts have been Patrick Kennedy,

the Under Secretary for Management?

A I would imagine so. Because I'm looking at the components

of this and I imagine that the diplomatic security probably plays a

role in this. So I do see it is really counterterrorism, and that might

have meant Daniel Benjamin, who was the head of it. But given Pat

Kennedy's long service at the Department, I would expect that he would

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be somebody who would be knowledgeable about this.

Q I want to step back for a moment to whether you contemplated

or reached out to the FBI. And I've handed what what I've marked as

Exhibit 6.

[Mills Exhibit No. 6

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q It is an email exchange from you to Steven Mull, Patrick

Kennedy, Eric Boswell on September 11th at 7:03 p.m., and the subject

line is Re: Forensic team to Benghazi.

And I'll give you a moment to take a look at that.

And for the first email of this, it's from Steven Mull to Patrick

Kennedy, you, and Eric Boswell. And it reads: "Per Cheryl's request

to me just now to ascertain whether we could arrange for a forensic

team to make it to Benghazi as soon as possible to investigate the burned

building and possibly search for any remains, we're reaching out to

FBI Ops to ask whether they would have any such resources to do so.

Will report back."

And I note that Mr. Mull's exchange to you and others is at

6:53 p.m.

Do you recall this occurring?

A I don't recall that occurring, but that does help me

understand why I don't recall myself reaching out to the FBI, either.

So I don't recall that occurring, but I am confident that in reading

this that I would have likely have asked him to do exactly what he would

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have represented -- not actually to provide protection for our people,

but to actually, hopefully, conduct an investigation that would help

us learn who attacked our people and what evidence we might glean from

that to be able to pursue them.

Q At the time that the 7:30 SVTCS occurred, were you under

the assumption or impression that a military response had already

begun?

A I can't tell you an impression that I have as I sit here

right now. My only overarching impression is that the military was

responsive as we engaged with them, but I can't tell you what I would

have thought or not thought about what was actually happening.

Q Can you elaborate on what you mean by they were responsive.

Because that could be a variety of things. Were they actually

deploying?

A That's fair. So the Secretary or others would ask for what

can be done. And they were articulating and

outlining what options might be available and what was not available,

given where they had assets currently in the region. And so when I

say responsive, it was my sense that they were collaborating in the

process of trying to ascertain what can be done to help our teams on

the grounds there in real time.

So as distinct from this email, which is post the facts of what

could be done, when I'm talking about what DOD could do in real time,

it was my impression they were looking at what they could do to actually

help in the moment of the crisis.

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Q At any point between the time that you were first notified

of the attack, until you were notified early the next morning that all

of the personnel had been pulled out of Benghazi, did you ever learn

or were you under the impression that the military was in the process

of deploying to Benghazi?

A I just honestly don't remember as I sit here now. I know

that there has been a lot of discussion around what role the military

played or didn't play or did or didn't do, but I honestly can't tell

you as I sit here right now. I can't take myself back to that night

to pull on my memory, if you will, to know what I thought about what

they were or weren't doing.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q On Exhibit 6, which is the email from Mr. Mull to you and

Mr. Kennedy and Mr. Boswell to ask you whether or not you could get

a forensic team to Benghazi, the email was sent at 6:53, the SVTCS I

believe was at 7:30. Is this something that you discussed on the SVTCS

with the other interagencies?

A I don't recall doing that.

Q Is it something that Secretary Clinton, since she was

speaking on behalf of the Department, is this something she would have

mentioned during the SVTCS?

A I don't know. I just don't recall the nature of any

conversations in that regard. That's not to say it could have occurred

and didn't occur; I'm just telling you my memory.

Q The concept here to send a forensic team to Benghazi, Mr.

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Mull says it's per Cheryl's request.

A Yes.

Q Was that your idea to send the forensics team in?

A I'd love to say yes. I don't know that one way or the other.

Q Who would you have been talking to around this time?

A I would have been talking to everyone who was kind of looking

at this crisis and how might we figure out what had happened. And

particularly once we were apprised of Sean Smith's death, would have

wanted to ensure that there was the opportunity to preserve any evidence

for how you might pursue those who did it. But I can't tell you now

that that was an independent thought of mine or that somebody gave me

that thought. I don't have a memory of it.

Q You mentioned earlier -- you said the Secretary was around

the Department most of the evening. She might have gone down the hall

to visit one of the deputies.

A Yeah.

Q Were you in the office on the seventh floor all evening as

well?

A I was there until late, yeah.

Q And what was the nature -- how frequently did you interact

with the Secretary? You mentioned you had adjacent offices. Was it

a constant information flow between the two of you or were you doing

your thing and she was doing her thing?

A So I think everybody was in a bit of an information sharing

mode. So there was even a little more more informality than you might

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have normally on a given day of people walking into each other's offices

and walking into the Secretary's office.

So my impression was there was kind of constant back and forth

of people in each other's office sharing information, trying to learn

more. That is my impression as I sit here.

Q So when you learned Ambassador Stevens was missing, is that

something you shared with the Secretary?

A I think -- I think we all learned about Ambassador Stevens

being missing. So I don't know that I had a moment where I shared that

per se, as opposed to all of us just feeling the weight of what that

meant.

Q Sure. But were you all in the same room at the same time

when that information was shared or did you learn it prior to the

Secretary learning it?

A I don't know. Because I think when I read the emails that

you all have shared with me, it suggests that there was kind of

simultaneous sharing of this information with a broad group. And so

she would have likely been getting that information at the same time,

because the special assistants are on there. I could have told her,

or anybody else who was reading these at the same time.

So my impression would be she would have been learning it at the

same time -- either I would have been in the room or I would have said

that we just got something that came across -- or her special assistants

would have

Q So you had spoken earlier about actions you had taken,

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actions the Secretary had taken when you learned that the facility was

under attack. How did that change when you learned that Ambassador

Stevens was missing?

A Well, I think what changed was trying to also ensure that

we had some way of undertaking a search for him or ways to understand

where he might be. I just recall there being -- one of the I think

security people had indicated they had left him with a phone,

So I know that there was, in addition to how do we defend and how

do we make sure we have Sean Smith's remains and we are protecting the

other team members that were on the ground, there was a concerted effort

to figure out how we could locate where Ambassador Stevens might be.

Q And what role did you play in that concerted effort to learn

where Ambassador Stevens might be?

A I don't know how to answer that, other than that night my

role was trying to facilitate what we were trying to do. And so if

that meant placing calls or gaining information or sharing information,

that would have been what I was doing that night. I don't know that

I had a particular hat on.

Q So you weren't assigned any particular roles or did you have

any particular tasks that you were assigned to carry out that evening?

A I'm sure in the due-outs there probably was something that

I was accountable for; I can't tell you that that would be. But I know

that at least that night I viewed my job as trying to make sure that

we were all doing everything we could.

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Q Sure. Did you have any conversations with the Secretary

where she said, Cheryl, I need you to call X; or, Cheryl, I need you

to assure that this occurs?

A I'm sure those kind of conversations probably happened. I

couldn't tell you what they were right now.

Q Okay. So do you recall what actions the Secretary took upon

learning that Ambassador Stevens was missing, now knowing you have a

search and rescue mission in addition to the --

A The death of Sean Smith, yes. I don't recall anything per

se. I mean, for me, I guess maybe the way to say it is the intensity

of what was happening was so much that I don't know that it could have

gotten more intense, in terms of people trying to figure out what could

be done to defend and what could be done to locate our Ambassador and

what could be done to ensure that we were not leaving anybody behind.

So I don't know that I have a sense of the Secretary doing -- what

her actions would have been, other than in one of those channels.

Q Okay.

Mr. Westmoreland. How are you?

Ms. Mills. I'm okay; thanks.

Mr. Westmoreland. Going back to your request for the FBI.

Ms. Mills. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. When you did have the video conference, was

the subject matter what the complete group needed to be doing; or, was

it okay, what all steps have already been taken?

Ms. Mills. It was both. So it was what's been done? It

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actually was what do we know -- so it starts in that way, at least in

my best recollection -- what's been done, and what needs to be done.

So I would say all of those were elements of the SVTCS that night.

Mr. Westmoreland. Don't you think a request for the FBI to almost

immediately get involved, don't you think that might have been

something that, if they had said what has been done, that would have

been some type of honorable mention -- that you had just done that?

Ms. Mills. It's quite plausible. But when I think about a lot

of the activity that night, I think about the activity to try and locate

and rescue as opposed to what my lawyer brain does sometimes, which

is what's the evidence so that we can pursue somebody and hold them

accountable.

So I don't know that night how it would have played out on the

SVTCS, but it's not implausible.

Mr. Westmoreland. And to me, that's a pretty big step for

somebody to take -- asking another agency to be able to do that.

As far as you can remember, you did that on your own and the

Secretary didn't say, Hey, Cheryl, we need to get the FBI on this and

make sure we can get in there and try to find evidence or whatever.

That was something Cheryl Mills did, not the Secretary telling you to

do that?

Ms. Mills. So I think -- if I didn't do this accurately earlier,

I don't have an impression as to how I came to that. Like I don't know

if I had that thought on my own, which does make me seem like Ms. Big

Pants -- I can understand that -- or whether somebody had said to me

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we need to make sure we're thinking through that element.

I genuinely don't know how I came to be of that mindset to reach

out to Steve Mull to ask him to take that task. But I do believe he

would have accurately reflected that I had done that. And so I'm sure

I did.

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Mr. Jordan. Ms. Mills, you mentioned kind of three tasks you had

at this 7:30 SVTCS: what do we know, what has been done, what else

needs to be done. In the "what do we know" category, what was discussed

there?

Ms. Mills. So let me to do two things just before I answer that.

That's my impression of how the evening went -- in other words,

everybody going around the room saying what the current status of

affairs, and then the next thing being what needs to be done and what

has been done. That's my impression. I don't know -- there wasn't,

like, an agenda that said, you know, A, B, or C.

Mr. Jordan. I got it.

Ms. Mills. Okay.

In terms of what had been done, at least as I understood it, each

agency --

Mr. Jordan. Not what had been done. Well, I guess they sort of

overlap. What do we know.

And so let me ask specifically, did anyone talk about the fact

that this was a terrorist attack at that 7:30 meeting?

Ms. Jackson. And, if I may, if you could go back to exhibit 1,

starting at the third page, the bottom of the third page, that email

exchange that starts at 6:06 p.m. and goes to the next page, on the

subject line, "Update 2: Ansar al-Sharia Claims Responsibility for

Benghazi Attack (SBU)." So, just to --

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Ms. Mills. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. -- help give you a timeline of --

Ms. Mills. That's good. Because you know my memory is frail.

I'm sure we would have discussed the fact that this piece of

information had been shared with us. I also, for some reason, recall

that it also then got withdrawn or that somebody suggested that it

wasn't accurate. But I don't remember that happening in realtime; I

remember that happening sometime later. And by that, I mean the Ansar

al-Sharia credit claim.

Mr. Jordan. So did both of those happened at this 7:30 meeting?

Ms. Mills. No, I don't believe that -- I don't believe so, but

I don't have a specific recollection as I sit here right now. In fact --

Mr. Jordan. Let me ask you this.

Ms. Mills. -- if Ms. Jackson had not directed my attention back

to this, I don't know that I would have been able to pull that from

my own memory.

Mr. Jordan. Was the video brought up at the 7:30 meeting?

Ms. Mills. I don't know, because what I don't know is whether

or not we would also would have talked about what was happening in Cairo

and done a roundup of is everything happening in Cairo.

Mr. Jordan. I mean, you had sent this message to every single

post we had around the world literally less than an hour or, I guess,

slightly more than an hour before this meeting --

Ms. Mills. The cable you mean?

Mr. Jordan. The cable, yes. And so it seemed likely, if it was

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important enough to send out, you were concerned about it, that it would

have been brought up. So I guess, was it brought up? And if so, who

brought it up?

Ms. Mills. So I don't know the answer to your question.

Mr. Jordan. Either one?

Ms. Mills. Right.

Mr. Jordan. Okay.

Ms. Mills. Because my memory doesn't -- I don't have a memory

of the discussion around the cable or the video, though both of those

could have been things that came up that night.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Just to follow up along those lines, correct me if I'm wrong,

but what I heard you say was that the video was associated and affiliated

with the protests that were in Cairo and then protests at other

embassies after Benghazi, but the video was not affiliated or

associated with the attack in Benghazi that night?

A So it wasn't that clean, primarily because we didn't know

why people were attacking per se, because you didn't always know what

different people's motivations might be. So, because there had been

this earlier attack on our embassy in Cairo --

Q Was it an attack, or was it a protest?

A Protest. That's exactly right.

Q Okay.

A That's an excellent clarification. We didn't end up having

people start attacking our embassies until after.

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Q So any follow-on attacks didn't occur until after Benghazi

occurred?

A To the best of my memory, but if I'm inaccurate, you should

give me a document that helps me be more accurate. But my impression

that evening was that, given how much had already happened in Cairo,

there was a sense of the beginning of confrontations towards our

embassies because of unrest in the region, and that unrest might flow

from what they saw as a position that they thought our government might

have been taking, which it wasn't, around this video or that we weren't

doing enough with respect to it.

Q Just one last question regarding the response that evening.

You know, we've talked about military response, we've talked about FBI,

we've talked about a variety of different things.

What was the discussion within the State Department of assets that

you could deploy, that the State Department could deploy to Benghazi

to either assist in the defense of your people there or in the recovery,

the search for the Ambassador? Did you --

A So, that night, we were assessing what assets we had on the

ground at that time, which included assets that were in Tripoli, and

whether or not they should or should not go into Benghazi. That's my

best recollection, as separate and apart from how we could mobilize

the host nation to do its job, as well as the teams that had been engaged

to protect our consulate.

That's my best recollection. If there's a document or so that

shows more, then I wouldn't quibble with it, but that's my best

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recollection.

Mr. Jordan. Sharon, could I --

Ms. Jackson. Yes.

Mr. Jordan. Just to be clear, was the fact that Ansar al-Sharia

had claimed responsibility and that it was a terrorist attack, was that

or was that not discussed at the SVTCS meeting, the 7:30 SVTCS meeting?

Ms. Mills. I don't recall, but I have to imagine it was. But

I don't know that.

Mr. Jordan. So you think it was?

Ms. Mills. Well, I don't know that, because you're asking my

memory. And so, in my memory, I don't remember it, but I'm confident

that, given that it would have been information that would have been

provided, that that would have been one of the things that would have

been discussed. But I'm not telling you that from a memory; I'm telling

you that based on what the information was.

Mr. Jordan. And so, then, moving to the video, was the video

discussed, just again to be clear, was the video discussed at the 7:30

SVTCS?

Ms. Mills. Again, I don't have a memory one way or the other.

Mr. Jordan. All right. So you're confident that the terrorist

issue was brought up, but you don't know at all --

Ms. Mills. Well, I'm confident that this would have been one of

the kind of lay-downs that they would have put on our desk when we would

have sat down in the SVTCS.

Mr. Jordan. Okay.

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Ms. Mills. So you would have then been able to read it, and I'm

sure people would have then spoken about it. And so that just helps

me understand how we typically operated.

Mr. Jordan. Okay.

Ms. Mills. So I'm kind of relaying from our operational

protocols.

Mr. Jordan. But in the previous hour with Ms. Sawyer's

questions, you said you had talked to some head of state or some foreign

leader, "How can we protect your people when this video is out there?",

that you could recall a conversation you had with some head of state --

Ms. Mills. So, not my conversation. I recall that in the

conversations that our teams were having --

Mr. Jordan. Yes.

Ms. Mills. -- I remember that one of the things that got reported

back was --

Mr. Jordan. And when was that? Was that --

Ms. Mills. That was after. So this was when we a number of

different --

Mr. Jordan. So after the attacks? Several days after?

Ms. Mills. After the attack in Benghazi --

Mr. Jordan. Okay.

Ms. Mills. -- but not after attacks that were happening in

Khartoum, Tunis. There were a number of countries

where -- Sana'a -- where people were breaching our embassy walls. And

I can remember that one of the conversations reported out from someone

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who was a leader in the region --

Mr. Jordan. Was this the day after? Several days after? Do you

know?

Ms. Mills. I would have said it's days after, but I don't know

that for a fact.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. Thank you.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q I want to move forward a few days, because I've got several

other topics that I had hoped to cover in this hour.

Given the deaths of, ultimately, four U.S. Government personnel

who at that time were all being described as State Department employees,

was the Secretary asked to appear on one or more Sunday news shows?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And who asked? Did the network ask? Did it come

from the White House?

And I would like to reflect that we are joined by Congressman

Cummings at this time.

A I don't know who would have asked, because I don't know how

our media -- you know, I'm imagining they would just have just sent

it in to our media affairs. But I don't know how to answer that

question.

Q But you believe the request came from the networks as

opposed to the White House?

A I recall that there was discussion about whether or not the

Secretary was available to go on the Sunday shows.

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Q And were you part of those discussions?

A I was part of some of those discussions, yes.

Q Who else was part of those discussions?

A I don't know for certain, but I would have said, obviously,

our assistant secretary for press. So I would have said Toria Nuland.

But that might be more my expectation as opposed to the reality.

Q Would Jake Sullivan have been involved?

A Quite plausibly he could have been involved, as well. I'm

just trying to --

Q Philippe Reines?

A Yes, he would have -- Philippe, who also worked in the Press

Affairs, would have been involved in that, as well.

Q And the Secretary herself?

A Oh, certainly. You would never send her --

Q You would not volunteer her.

A -- onto a program without that being a decision that she

ultimately decided she wanted to make. Correct.

Q Did you or others, to your knowledge, reach out and have

any conversations with the White House or other agencies that were

involved? Two of the deceased were contractors with the Agency. Were

there any type of --

A About her appearing on the Sunday shows?

Q Her or someone else in lieu of her.

A I know that whether or not she would or would not appear

on the Sunday shows was a discussion that we would have likely had with

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the White House. Because we would not have said "yes" or "no" to the

Secretary going onto shows without actually our media coordinating in

that particular regard. So that --

Q Who at the White House would have been consulted?

A So, typically because I always was dealing with the

NSC and, in that regard, Denis McDonough, my counterpart would have

been there, though I don't know that I actually had a lot of conversation

on this issue. So it might have been more likely that was a

conversation happening with their media team, which was, I believe,

led by Ben Rhodes in the White House.

Q Since the Secretary didn't appear, who made the decision

that she wasn't going to appear?

A Well, she would always decide what she would do, if she was

going to go on a show or not go on a show.

Q Okay. Were there recommendations that she took from you

and others, such as Philippe Reines, Jake Sullivan, others?

A No. Candidly, the Secretary was so focused on what had

happened to our team and what was happening in the region that I don't

know that there was a moment's thought about it. She didn't often go

on the shows. And she was, understandably, very concerned about how

we support our teams and the losses that we had incurred.

Q Do you know where she was on Sunday?

A No.

Q Okay.

How did you learn that Ambassador Rice was going to appear on the

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shows?

A I think I would have probably learned that by email or

somebody indicating that they were putting somebody out on the shows

and it was going to be Ambassador Rice.

Q Do you recall whether Secretary Clinton met with Ambassador

Rice on the Friday after the attacks and before the Sunday shows?

A She had a standing meeting with Ambassador Rice on Friday

mornings. So if Ambassador Rice was available and in town for her

standing meeting, they would have had their standing meeting.

Q Do you recall whether Ambassador Rice attended the

return-of-remains ceremony on that Friday?

A I believe she did, but I could be wrong.

Q So, if she was there, she would have been in town and they

would have kept their standing meeting?

A They would have kept their standing meeting if she was in

town. And I would have expected that she -- that that would have been

a meeting that did occur. That's my best --

Q So, if the Secretary's schedule showed that they were have

a meeting that day, it would have occurred?

A Yes, unless there was some other crisis or otherwise need,

and then there would be an after-action schedule that would have

reflected that change.

Q And did you sit in on those meetings?

A Sometimes.

Q Okay. Do you recall being there that Friday?

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A I don't recall being there, but I don't know that I wasn't.

Q Okay. Would there have been any memorialization or notes

taken of their meetings?

A No. They just basically had a meeting and kind of went over

things where they talked.

Q Do you have any recollection that they discussed what

Ambassador Rice was going to say on the Sunday talk shows?

A I don't recall her ever having indicated that, certainly

to me. And, given all the fervor that happened after the fact, I would

have imagined it. But I don't know that.

Q Let me turn quickly to the Accountability Review Board.

And I don't know that I will get through all of my questions on that,

but I'll try and get as many as I can.

What role did you -- you know what? Let me back up. I can do

another subject, I think, in a shorter amount of time.

What intelligence products did the Secretary review regarding

intelligence or security of overseas posts on a regular basis? Did

she read -- did you have daily intelligence reports from within the

State Department? Did she read any other reports from the intelligence

community on a regular basis?

A I know she got regular reports, intelligence reports, each

day that were brought in. Some of them were ones that we would get,

some were not, so I don't know that I could speak to what it is that

she would regularly see. I don't recall regularly seeing --

Q Did you read those?

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A No. Some of them were ones that -- or were not ones that

I would see. That's correct.

Q Okay. Did you read any intelligence reports on a regular

basis?

A I read a lot of intelligence reports. They typically would

be related to issues that I might be immediately handling. And if there

was some reason why someone thought I needed to have a particular bit

of information that was unrelated to something I might be immediately

handling, someone would come, typically, and bring the document. And

they sit with you while you read it, and then they would take it.

Q Was there something within the State Department called the

"overnight"?

A I believe so.

Q Did you read that on a regular basis?

A No.

Q Did the Secretary?

A I don't know the answer to that question, because she got

a package every morning that she would -- and they would basically come

and sit for about a half-hour and go through intelligence and give her

a briefing and step her through all the information. So I would imagine

that that would be part of what they would be sharing with her.

Q

A

-- during the time period we were there,

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they

would do a briefing with her every morning.

Q

A

Q

A

Q On or about August 17th of 2012, there was an information

memo to the Secretary regarding the deteriorating security situation

in Libya. Did you see that document?

A Not at the time, but I have seen it since.

Q Okay. Do you know if the Secretary saw it at the time?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. Who would know?

A She would know.

Q Would anyone else know or have some sort of tracking of the

document being delivered to her?

A Well, I can only infer, but I don't know -- I don't know

who or how it would have been delivered. I would just infer that a

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memo for her would likely get to her, but that's an inference as opposed

to something I know.

Q Would there be some sort of recordation of that through the

Exec Sec?

A There might be.

Q All right.

You've said that you've seen the memo since.

A I have.

Q To your knowledge, how often would that type of memo come

to the Secretary, where it's describing the deteriorating security

situation in a particular country?

A I don't know, because I don't have the spectrum of all of

the different instances where memos might arise about our teams.

Because we had teams in very tough places, so I'm sure that there

potentially would have been the case in Pakistan and Afghanistan and

Iraq, in any number of places. So I don't know how to contextualize

that for you.

Q Who would she reach out to discuss the security in country

when she would get notified in any manner?

A Security -- our experts for security were in Diplomatic

Security, which at that time was led by a gentleman named Eric Boswell.

And then they were supervised by our Under Secretary for Management,

Pat Kennedy.

Q Did Secretary Clinton have regular and routine meetings

with Assistant Secretary Boswell?

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A She had weekly meetings with her assistant secretaries, in

which he was one of them. And she also had daily meetings where Under

Secretary Kennedy was a part of them.

Q A daily meeting with Under Secretary Kennedy?

A So it was our senior team meeting, and he was one of the

12 or 15 people in the -- probably 12 people in the senior team meeting.

Q And you'd go around the table and everybody would report

in on different matters and update the Secretary on what was hot or

needed her consideration?

A Yes. "Hot" is an interesting word, but, yes, it is the case

that people would give updates on their matters. And sometimes they

were very mundane, and so we would look at that person like, "Really,

are you keeping us here longer for that?" But, as a general matter,

it was everybody giving updates from their areas.

Q Did she have any other meetings with Under Secretary Kennedy

that were one-on-one?

A Well, she would have one-on-one meetings from time to time

with any of our under secretaries and assistant secretaries. But if

you're asking whether or not there was a standing one-on-one meeting,

I'm not familiar with a standing one-on-one meeting.

Q Okay.

Given everything that was happening in the Arab Spring in 2011

and 2012, did she have any specialized group that she pulled together

and met with regularly about issues that were occurring in the Middle

East or as a result of the Arab Spring?

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A I'm sure on the policy side there were conversations and

meetings like that that were occurring. But if you're asking on the

security side, she would have likely relied on the experts that we had

both in the region and in our department for information in that regard.

Q And on the security side, that was led by Under Secretary

for Management Patrick Kennedy?

A Well, so Diplomatic Security was actually led by Eric

Boswell, but Eric Boswell reported to Under Secretary for Management

Kennedy. He had a broader span of accountability than just the

Diplomatic Security apparatus.

Ms. Jackson. I think I may only have a minute or 2 left. I will

look to the Members to see if they have any questions.

Mrs. Brooks. I have a couple of questions just on security.

Were you aware of IED attacks on our facility in Benghazi that

had occurred prior to the attack in September?

Ms. Mills. I don't think so. I saw that after the fact as we

were looking through, obviously, what had occurred. I don't remember

having contemporaneous knowledge, but it is quite plausible that Under

Secretary Kennedy could have raised that at one of our, you know,

meetings. But I don't have a memory of that.

Mrs. Brooks. Were you aware that a British ambassador -- that

there had been an assassination attempt on his life in June of 2012?

Ms. Mills. No.

Mrs. Brooks. Were you aware that in June of 2012 a group of 20

armed Ansar al-Sharia members stormed the Tunisian consulate in

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Benghazi in June of 2012?

Ms. Mills. I didn't have any awareness of that, correct.

Mrs. Brooks. Do you know if the Secretary was aware of any of

these incidents?

Ms. Mills. I don't know. The one that I would say, obviously,

there would have been visibility is when something happens to one of

our facilities. And so you mentioned an IED attack on our facility,

and that might have been raised to her attention.

I don't know that, and that's why I'm saying my best recollection

would be that would be one that I would expect that, if there was

visibility, that would have potentially been something Under Secretary

Kennedy might have raised at one of our daily meetings. But I don't

have a specific recollection of that.

Ms. Jackson. And I believe, then, we are at --

Mr. Westmoreland. Can I --

Ms. Jackson. Oh, I'm sorry. Go ahead. I believe the minority

might cede us a couple more minutes. Thank you.

Mr. Westmoreland. Who would you say was the Ambassador's boss?

Who did he answer to?

Ms. Mills. So the Ambassador's boss, which is always an area of

contention with our ambassadors -- so the Ambassador is in a unique

role. They obviously are the representative of our country in the

country, and so that means that the President is their boss. They

obviously work at the State Department; that means the Secretary is

their boss. And the Assistant Secretary believes that they are an

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extension of their region, and that means the Assistant Secretary

believes they are their boss.

And effective ambassadors manage to make all of those people

believe they are their boss.

Mr. Westmoreland. You were asked about the security issues at

the compound. I think the way it was phrased, was the Secretary aware

of any of the granular things about security, I guess; you know, does

a door need to be reinforced or sandbagged or whatever.

But as far as deteriorating security in the whole area and what

is going on, if the Ambassador was going to make a request for additional

security, if he thought he had three different bosses -- maybe the

President, the Secretary, or the Under Secretary -- who do you think

he would have made that appeal to?

Ms. Mills. Because it would have been an operational element,

they would have made that appeal in two ways: one, to their assistant

secretary. That would be my first expectation to whom they would be

sharing that information with. And they also had counterparts called

regional security officers, who would, to the extent it was

security-related, be making that through their counterpart in

Diplomatic Security.

So I would've expected that in both of those channels you would

see information flowing about that need. I might be wrong, but that's

what I think they would be doing.

Mr. Westmoreland. So if an ambassador had concerns about the

safety of his facility and the people there working under him, the only

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channel he would have had to go through was the Under Secretary of

Security?

Ms. Mills. Well, no, that is not their only channel. I mean,

that is the luxury of being an ambassador; you do have multiple channels

you can lever. But if you are asking what was the practice that I

observed in the Department for how they raised this type of issue, the

practice would be to raise it with the Assistant Secretary.

Mr. Westmoreland. And who would that have been?

Ms. Mills. That would have been Beth Jones.

And then they would have raised it through their Diplomatic

Security channels. So their regional security officer would have been

talking to his or her counterpart in Diplomatic Security for that, as

well.

So those would have been the normal channels. When I look at what

happened and how the Department operated in other instances, that's

how they typically communicated.

Mr. Westmoreland. So, since these requests were denied, it would

have been Beth Jones denying those requests?

Ms. Mills. So I don't know how to speculate in that particular

regard, because I think it would've gone through two channels. And

so it would have been dependent on what was the nature of the asset

that was being asked for.

So, to the extent it was more fencing, more people, more of those

types of things that I think are security-related, that would have

likely gone through the Diplomatic Security apparatus. And what they

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would have been seeking to leverage was what was the political situation

in context that could be offered about what was happening in that region

through their assistant secretary.

Mr. Westmoreland. So, even as these incidents mounted and the

requests kept coming in -- I'm just speaking for myself. If I was an

under secretary or in the defense, I may have gone to the Secretary

and said, "Look, we've got this ambassador that keeps telling us, you

know, they've had the wall breached, other ambassadors have been shot

at, you know, the Red Cross has pulled out, the Brits have pulled out,

and he's wanting extra security, and I've told him no. Is that a good

decision?" I mean, it seems to me --

Ms. Mills. I think those are the hard kind of discussions --

Mr. Westmoreland. -- that's a terribly big decision.

Ms. Mills. Well, it's also a hard decision.

I think those types of discussions do have to happen in a world

where, unfortunately, there is not limitless resources. And those

kinds of discussions also have to happen then about whether or not you

can stay or not stay. And all of those become part of the calculus

that the experts in the Department really try to balance. And I think,

on balance, they do a relatively good job, but I think it is a really

hard situation.

And I think one of the things that at least this circumstance

surfaced for me was how limited resources were for some of the needs

that people had and how to try and ensure that there was more opportunity

for more resources, given the unique challenges that diplomats face,

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because they don't have security --

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay, last part of the question. So, in your

opinion, the Secretary of State said, "It's your job, you handle it,"

or that she never knew about it?

Ms. Mills. I don't know what her level of awareness would have

been on this, primarily because one of the things --

Mr. Westmoreland. You were her chief of staff. I mean, you

would think that since you were the chief of staff, if the Under

Secretary was going to come in, surely the chief of staff would have

known -- at least, my chief of staff would have known that somebody

was coming in to make a request for something.

Ms. Mills. So what's different about the Department than,

potentially, your staff is not only the size but the expertise that

is already resident in there. And I'm not saying I don't think I'm

intelligent, but they also think that they have expertise that might

not always be present in folks who don't have the longevity and the

understanding of the scope that they might have. And that is probably

fair.

I think that, in the context of the number of security

professionals who each day make that hard judgment for diplomats and

have been doing it relatively well for years, it doesn't surprise me

that they would think that their expertise was expertise that would

probably best know how to balance it. They have to do that every time

they staff a post, they have to do that every time there's an incident

at a post, and they have to do that every time they hear about a

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threat and protect it.

But nobody's perfect. And I think that our Diplomatic Security

team at the Department is really first-rate, but I also think that,

as a practical reality, which I think some of ARB bore out, people learn

to do with less. And the question is, in a world where we have our

diplomats in increasing less secure places, how do we make sure that

they have the protection that they need? And I think that's an

important consideration not only for you all, obviously, but for how

we fund and staff around the world.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay.

Getting back to my question, do you think the Secretary addressed

the situation?

Ms. Mills. Your question was do I think she knew about it, and

I can't speak to what she knew. She's already testified as to what

she knew.

Mr. Westmoreland. Well, the other question was, did anybody

ever -- were you ever made aware that somebody talked to her?

Ms. Mills. "No" is the answer to that question.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay.

Ms. Mills. Right.

Ms. Jackson. And, with that, we'll go off the record. We're

over our hour.

[Recess.]

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[12:54 p.m.]

Ms. Jackson. We will go back on the record at 12:55. And the

minority staff has ceded the next time to the majority staff, so I'm

going to continue with the questioning.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q I want to turn now to the Accountability Review Board.

A Okay.

Q And it's our understanding, based on the documents that

we've reviewed, that you have a role in selecting people to recommend

to the Secretary for the panel. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And who did you work with on that?

A I worked with Under Secretary Kennedy and Deputy Secretary

Bill Burns in identifying who might be talent that could actually serve

in this role.

I know I also made inquiries to other senior leadership in the

Department and also, I believe, to the Under Secretary for Political

Affairs, maybe our other deputy secretary. But I generally was seeking

recommendations for individuals who might be able to serve.

Q Okay. And were you leading that effort on behalf of the

Secretary?

A Certainly with respect to standing up the ARB. My

objective was based on her desire to have it set up quickly and actually

have it set up with individuals who might be of the stature and ability

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to give hard medicine if we needed hard medicine, that that was the

undertaking I did.

Q Okay. And did you and the others then come up with a list

of names?

A So the Department has names that they also have, and then

what you do is you can augment or identify other talent that might be

able to perform a particular role. So what I did was seek

recommendations from different leaders in our department for who might

be able to serve, given the kind of responsibility this particular ARB

was going to require.

Q Okay. And how many names -- did anybody -- did you reach

out to anyone to serve on the ARB?

A I reached out to Bill Burns, who I know ended up having a

conversation with Tom Pickering, who ultimately ended up becoming our

chair. I reached out to, I believe, Admiral Mullen myself. I could

be wrong about that, but I believe I did. And I reached out to, I

believe, Cathy Bertini, who had been recommended to us by the Under

Secretary of Management. And those were the individuals to whom I

reached out.

I remember that the IC recommended a gentleman named Hugh Turner,

and they volunteered that name. We had reached out to ask who their

name was going to be, and that's who they shared back. And --

Q Can you tell us about your conversation with Admiral Mullen?

A I asked Admiral Mullen whether or not he would be willing,

given that he had, I think, had just stepped down from being the Joint

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Chief, to serve on an Accountability Review Board and step through at

least what I understood was going to be the time commitment -- and I

acknowledge I was wrong; I thought it was a 60-day time commitment -- and

that if he had the time and the ability, it would be beneficial to be

able to have his expertise and his assessment for what happened in the

security-related incident that we had.

Q Did he express any reticence, just given the fact that he

was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs at the time that these events

transpired?

A It was my recollection that he was no longer serving as the

Joint Chief, but I might be wrong about that. Are you saying he

was -- because when I reached out to him, he was not the Joint Chief.

Q But he was the Joint Chiefs when the attack occurred in

Benghazi.

A Oh, I see what you're saying.

Q Uh-huh.

A I don't know that. I obviously don't recall when he stepped

down, but I knew he had recently stepped down. I don't recall having

a conversation where he expressed reticence in that regard. He might

have, but I don't remember that.

Q Did anybody else express reticence in that regard, that he

was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs when Stevens first went in as the

envoy in Benghazi and then through the time period of the attacks?

A No. I think, though, to give context, the ARB is actually

focused on the Department, and the ARB is actually focused on whether

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or not there has been a security-related incident, whether or not the

security was adequate, and then whether or not it was properly

implemented, in addition to, obviously, whether or not there is any

accountability for what did or didn't happen.

And so it is a department-based focus, if you will, with the other

piece of it that is also an area, which is the intelligence and whether

or not intelligence was assessed effectively in the context of a

security-related incident.

So it's very focused on the activities and accounts of what

happened based on the Department's assets and people and programs and

how the Department itself and how our staff performed.

Q Was there anyone that you or the others reached out to to

serve on that ARB that declined to do so?

A Oh, I'm sure there probably was, and I just don't remember

who that would be. But I'm sure there was. I'm sure --

Q You don't recall anyone that you talked to?

A No, but I'm -- I don't know that this was an assignment

anybody would have loved to do, so I'm sure there were.

Q Okay.

Did Admiral Mullen accept in that first conversation you had with

him?

A I don't recall. Because I know he had just stepped down

and he was trying to pace his own schedule and was concerned that his

schedule might not allow him the flexibility to be as committed as he

would need to be. So I don't know if that was in that first

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conversation, he needed to get back or he needed to confer with his

family or what was exactly the dynamic.

Q Okay.

Did you and the others forward only five names to the Secretary

for her consideration?

A In the end, the Secretary was presented with a panel of the

five names that were recommended, and she decided to accept all of

those.

Q Did she have any input into the members of the ARB?

A We certainly apprised her that it looked like we had a team

of five that represented a balance of those who understood diplomacy,

who understood national security, who understood what it meant to

operate in environments that were insecure, and that we thought the

balance of who we had identified met that criteria.

Her objective was could they be people who would give hard

medicine if that was what was needed. And I felt like, in the end,

that team was a team that would speak whatever were their truths or

observations to the Department so that we could learn whatever lessons

we needed to learn.

Q Okay.

Do you recall that during this process that you conferred with

Michael Morell from the CIA regarding one or more members or potential

members of the ARB?

A That's plausible. I don't recall it, but that's plausible,

because one of the members had to be from the intelligence community.

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Q But was that person appointed by the ODNI, the Office of

the Director of National Intelligence, or by the CIA?

A I don't know who actually ended up being the person who

represents the IC. But Hugh Turner ultimately ended up being

recommended through the -- to represent the intelligence community.

I just don't have a perfect recollection or knowledge of that now. I'm

sure at the time I probably did.

Q Okay.

Do you recall how it was that relevant documents were assembled

for the ARB to review?

A So, yes. The documents are collected by our Administration

Bureau. So the staff there put together the request and circulate it

to the staff in the Department to provide any documents or materials

that might be responsive, and then they are reviewed.

The Administration Bureau keeps the repository for all of those

records. The ARB was to get their documents from the Administration

Bureau directly so that there was no filter between them and the records

that they might want.

Q Okay. And who was leading that from the Administration

Bureau?

A I don't know who was the head of the Administration Bureau

in terms of that, so I don't know the answer to your question.

Q Would it have been the Assistant Secretary? Would it have

been the person in that position?

A It might have been, but I'm just telling you I don't have

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a recollection of a human being in that framework.

Q Okay. So, then, did a tasking go out to all the relevant

bureaus to collect and assemble their records and transfer them to the

Administration Bureau?

A So -- do you mean for the ARB?

Q Yes.

A So I don't know how the ARB undertook their framework, but

they were looking at records that were already being assembled in

response to a request that had already been posed to our department

by Members of Congress, as well as they had their own individual

interviews that they were conducting where they might ask for records

or materials that they felt would be relevant that they came to have

knowledge of.

I don't, obviously, know that for a fact. I just know that that

was their flexibility and that was the cooperation that was expected

by everyone.

Q Okay.

I just want to take a step back because I'm not sure I understand

how the documents were. Documents were already being assembled

because of congressional inquiries?

A Yes.

Q That came in before the ARB was instituted or stood up or

convened?

A I don't know the timing, because I don't have the timeline

in my head. And you can absolutely refresh my recollection and talk

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about that. But there were already documents being collected that were

in any way related to the incident that had happened on the night of

September 11.

Separate and apart from that, the ARB could both reach to the

Administration Bureau to be able to access any of those records that

were being collected, which would have been records regarding anything

related to the night of September 11 and 12. And they could also

initiate their own requests for documents.

Q Okay.

There have been reports out there that an individual by the name

of Ray Maxwell, at some point between September and December 2012, was

in a room in the State Department where Benghazi documents were being

assembled or reviewed or stored or something like that and that you

had an encounter with him. Did that occur?

A No.

Q None of that is true?

A Correct.

Q You never had an encounter with Ray Maxwell?

A Not of the kind he described --

Q Okay.

A -- or any kind around Benghazi.

Q Was it regarding -- did you encounter him regarding

documents for some other subject?

A No.

Q Okay.

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Was there a room where Benghazi documents were being assembled?

A So the Administration Bureau had a room where they obviously

assembled documents, and there was also a room where individuals who

reviewed documents were assembled. So both of those types of rooms

do exist, correct.

Q Okay. And so the Benghazi documents were kept in a separate

room?

A So the Administration Bureau, I can't tell you how they

managed those, because I don't have a visual of that, but they were

the actual repository and kept copies of everything, and they would

only make copies to allow other individuals to review them as opposed

to disturb their copy set.

Q Okay. And when they said "make copies," was that a hard,

physical copy or was that some sort of scanned electronic copy?

A Physical copy.

Q Physical copy?

A Uh-huh.

Q Okay.

And do you know who Ray Maxwell is?

A I do now.

Q Did you at the time?

A I'm sure I would have met Ray. I don't know that I had a

recollection, because I certainly don't have that and didn't until

after I saw some of the things that had been said. I might have had

an encounter with him when he was being hired. I don't know. Meaning,

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ensuring that he was in a place where he could be appointed or hired.

I don't know. But I don't -- I never had an encounter with Ray Maxwell

around Benghazi.

Mr. Davis. That's pretty specific, "I may have had an encounter

with him when we was hired." Why when he was hired? Why are you using

that as a potential example of when you may have encountered him?

Ms. Mills. Because for two reasons: One, one of the things that

we sought to do in the Department was to bring about greater diversity

in our administration. For better or worse, that presents a challenge

in a lot of our bureaus, because their ability to identify talent that

has expertise who might be other than white and male was limited.

And Ray Maxwell, as I understand it, based on conversations that

he'd had with others, was identified in a process whereby, because part

of our objective was to ensure that we had more diversity, he was reached

out to as an opportunity to be able to be hired.

So that's the only reason why I say that.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Now, you've stated that this location in the A Bureau was

collecting Benghazi-related documents not only for the ARB but also

for congressional inquiries?

A So they actually collect documents, so purpose-based isn't

truly as relevant for them. So the Administration Bureau is the

repository for whenever there are inquiries or requests for materials.

They are the repository of where they get collected.

And then they make copies for whoever are the experts or others

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that need to review them to determine whether or not they, A, are

responsive, and then B, if they are responsive, whether or not there

has to be any preparation of those documents for sharing, meaning

privacy and you have to redact people's phone numbers or there is a

classification associated with it. Or the document has other

agencies' equities, which means it can't go out before the other agency

reviews it and expresses what their equities might be.

Q So, irregardless of whether it's congressional or FOIA or

the ARB?

A I don't know how to -- my experience was typically, when

there were inquiries that were coming in from Congress, that that's

how they managed it. But it probably has a wider application and it's

just that I'm not as familiar with it.

Q Now, you stated earlier that the ARB could request

documents. Was that the only way in which they got documents, or were

there documents that were collected and given to them and they could

just augment what was collected?

A So their mechanisms were threefold, if I really think about

it. One, obviously, they could reach to the A Bureau and say, we want

to look at all of them or we want to look at documents of this nature.

Two, they could make requests. Three, they would ask, as our reviews

were going on of records, were there any records that were relevant

that they should be either looking at or that they should at least be

apprised of. And so that was another mechanism that they had. And

so those could be collected and provided to them if that's what they

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reached to ask for. They might have asked for that on a particular

subject matter; has anybody seen anything on this topic or that topic?

But those were the three ways that they could get it, with each

of those being avenues for them to be able to ascertain whatever

information they believed they needed, because people didn't have

visibility into how they were making those judgments.

Q For things like congressional inquiries or FOIA responses

and things, was the process the same or different?

A I don't know. I would imagine there's a lot of similarity,

but I don't know that I could answer that with confidence.

Q Okay. Such as when a congressional request would come in,

would the relevant bureaus receive some sort of memo saying, "Find us

all the records on X and turn them over"?

A The Administration Bureau did identify those offices that

they thought would likely have materials that would respond to an

inquiry and send them requests to be able to provide those documents.

Q Okay.

[Mills Exhibit No. 7

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q I'm going to hand you what I've marked as exhibit 7 and give

you a moment to take a look at it and see if you recognize this document.

Have you seen -- this letter, for the record, is a letter from

Congress dated September 20, 2012. It is to Secretary Clinton. It

is from Jason Chaffetz, who was the chairman of the Subcommittee on

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National Security, Homeland Defense, and Foreign Affairs.

And, if I may summarize it, it generally asks for the production

of records regarding the Benghazi attacks. Is that a fair assessment

of what this letter requests?

A It is a fair assessment.

Q Okay. Have you seen this letter before?

A I have.

Q Okay. And do you recall, did you see it close in time to

its receipt in September of 2012?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Who brought it to your attention?

A That I don't know. I would imagine it would've been brought

to our attention by Congressional Affairs, but I don't know that I have

a memory of someone bringing this specific document to my attention.

Q Okay. But would you say that you saw it within days of its

receipt?

A Oh, yes. Yes. That's why I said -- I saw this

contemporaneously with when it was coming in. So it would've been,

certainly, within a few days of when it came in, I would've seen it.

Q Was that something that you had requested be done?

A No, but --

Q Then let me ask this: Did you see all requests from

Congress that --

A No. And --

Q -- came to the State Department?

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A No, I didn't, thankfully, because I know you all have a lot

of business that you do at the Department. But no.

I had been managing, as you know, our response effort and

collaborating with our leadership team on Benghazi in particular, and

not only from the moment of when we lost our team there but also

afterwards and their return home and addressing the families and a whole

set of related matters. So it would've been not at all surprising to

me, or it's not surprising to me, sitting here, that this would have

been brought to my attention.

Q So you were the point person for the State Department on

the Benghazi aftermath?

A I don't know that I would say that, but I don't think it's

unfair to characterize it that way if you'd like.

Q Okay.

And when you got this letter, did you discuss it with the

Secretary?

A I don't recall discussing it with the Secretary. I might

have, but I don't recall that.

Q Do you know if she saw it? Would you have put it in --

A I don't know that she saw the request. I know that we would

have all been discussing that we had requests from -- Congress is

stepping through all of the documents that would be related to the

incident. And that's something we would have raised in the our

weekly -- I mean, our daily meeting, "We got an inquiry in this instance

about Benghazi." Because we were basically following up every day

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about what were the either security-related issues for our other posts

that were being besieged or for followup on Benghazi.

So it's quite plausible. I might have said that. It's quite

plausible our Congressional Affairs person who sits in her daily

meeting would have said that. But it would've been the case that this

would have been something that likely either would have been

articulated conceptually or articulated specifically.

Q Okay. And who was head of Congressional Affairs at the

time?

A Dave Adams.

Is that -- thank you.

Dave Adams.

Q Okay.

Other than Mr. Adams, did you have discussions with any other

members of the senior leadership regarding the congressional request?

A Oh, I could have had discussions with any number of people.

I don't know that I would have thought about it in a targeted way in

that regard. So it's quite plausible.

Q Okay.

Now, was this request, among others, the ones that were being

handled by the A Bureau?

A The A Bureau did send out the request for documents related

to this and gather the documents related to this, correct.

Q Okay. Did you or others from the seventh floor provide any

documents in response to this letter?

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A Yes.

Q Okay. What did you do? What did you and others on the

seventh floor do to --

A So the request went to -- the request went to not

only -- well, the request went to individuals who served on the seventh

floor but also went to other bureaus and departments where they

anticipated there might be staff that had, potentially, documents that

could be responsive to the request.

And so you conduct a search of your records to identify anything

that might be responsive, and then you provide those to the bureau for

their collation, copying. And then they actually then go through a

process for review.

Q Okay. And did you do that?

A I did provide documents, yes.

Q Okay. And can you describe for us the nature of the

documents that you provided?

A I couldn't. I don't even know what were my documents at

that time. In fact, even sitting here now, I couldn't even tell you

what were the documents that I would have provided, but -- I don't know.

Q How did you do that search?

A So I had my assistant search my email, and I had my own -- you

know, whatever documents or materials that we had that were responsive

to the requests, we also then would have looked through my own documents

to see what should go.

Q Like, your directory or physical documents?

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A Physical.

Q Physical. Did you keep electronic copies of documents in

a directory?

A Not on this topic.

Q You had certain file folders of various topics --

A Yeah, but I had not had occasion, really, where I had been

dealing on matters related to Libya, really, before that much. So I

don't know that I would have had anything that was related to that.

I remember doing that after when all of this started. Okay, well, now

we have congressional requests and other things. But I don't recall

having that beforehand.

Q At the time of the attack, did you set up some sort of

separate directory or repository for all things attack-related?

A Not that I recall doing. I might have, but I don't recall

doing that.

Q Do you recall whether your assistant did?

A My assistant went through my emails to provide my documents.

I don't know how she might have organized herself in that regard.

Q And all of those documents were provided to the A Bureau?

A Right. And then the A Bureau makes a judgment about copying

those to make sure that they then go to a review team. Correct.

Q Is there a particular office within the A Bureau that would

have been handling this?

A I don't know the name of the office, the sub office within

the Administration Bureau. I always thought of it as the

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Administration Bureau.

Q Okay.

Who else on the seventh floor provided documents?

A To the best of my understanding, individuals who had

documents provided them. I don't know that I could be effective at

basically litanizing who that would be, but I think everybody stepped

through the process to do that.

Q Okay.

You stated that you were organizing in the aftermath of the

attacks. Can you elaborate on how you did that, what you did?

A Well, so, after the attacks, there were a number of ongoing

attacks that were happening to our other embassies. And so we set up

a team that was each day going through and looking at what were the

threats that were happening at each post, what was the posture we needed

to take, and did we actually need to evacuate our staff or otherwise.

So that task team probably had four or five folks on it that every

day were looking at what was the status of our different embassies in

the region.

Q Uh-huh. And when you talk about these ongoing attacks,

were they attacks, or were they protests and demonstrations?

A Some were attacks, and some were protests and

demonstrations.

Q Okay.

A So some actually breached our perimeters. In Tunis, I know

they breached our perimeters. They breached our perimeters in

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Khartoum, because we had to get their Presidential guard out, and that

took a lot of cajoling. It shouldn't have, but it did. And I recall

also, I believe, in Sana'a.

But there were a number of instances where our embassies were

actually breached, and then there were a lot of protests. So it was

a mixture of both.

Q Okay. So your definition of a protest would be not

breaching the wall, and an attack would be anything that breached?

A Yeah, I think that's fair.

Q Okay.

A I think that's fair.

Q Did any of those breaches of the wall involve weapons?

A I don't know the answer to that question. I know

that -- the reason I'm pausing on that is I don't know what was going

on in Khartoum, and I know that they actually got all the way to one

of our second doors. But I don't know the answer to your question,

like, what they were using and how they were successfully traversing

each of those stops that we had before they got there.

Q Did we have any loss of life of U.S. personnel in any of

those subsequent events --

A No, we didn't.

Q -- after Libya?

A No, thank goodness.

Q Okay.

And just to go back for a moment, we had the protest demonstration

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in Cairo, then the attack in Libya, and then all of these others occurred

subsequent to Libya. Is that correct?

A That's my best memory. There might have been some that were

happening, you know, and I didn't -- but my best memory is they were

happening after.

Q Okay.

In addition to Congressman Chaffetz sending this letter in

September of 2012, he traveled to Libya in early October of 2012. Were

you aware of that trip?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And how did you become aware of that trip?

A I became aware because -- my memory is that it was

Congressman Chaffetz and one other Congressperson -- and I'm going to

blank on who that was -- wanted to travel to the region. And that

obviously involved a lot of impact for the post, when a VIP travels

to the region, and particularly when a post has undergone some of the

circumstances that our post had just gone.

So that matter, I do recall being that he wanted to travel; how

could we assist his travel so that he could travel securely and safely?

And there was a lot of concern about whether or not that was possible

or not.

Q Okay. In your role as chief of staff, would you have always

been apprised of when there was going to be a codel to an overseas post?

A No. This was more related to the fact that this matter was

one of the matters that I was actually handling. So, for example, I

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handled the Haiti earthquake. So there were a number of different

codels and matters where they wanted to travel, and there was a lot

of stress on our post at that particular time, and the ability to

accommodate them was hard. So I was apprised each time in those

instances, because it just happened to be a matter in which I was deeply

involved or providing leadership on.

So I didn't typically get codels. It would be that they were

related to a matter that I might have either involvement or leadership

on.

Q Okay. And who all did you discuss the October 2012 codel

with?

A I know that our Congressional Affairs brought the matter

to our attention. I know that Diplomatic Security and our Under

Secretary for Management as well as our Assistant Secretary were

obviously a part of conversations about how we could ensure that, if

they went, they were able to go securely and what risks that imposed.

Q Okay. Did you have any conversations with embassy

personnel?

A I don't recall having any conversations with embassy

personnel before they went. I recall having conversations with our

Congressional Affairs that were relaying conversations, I guess, that

they were having with the post. And I'm sure Diplomatic Security was

doing the same, because I'm sure everybody would be worried about

safety. But that's my best recollection right now.

Q Did you have a conversation with the charge at the time,

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Gregory Hicks?

A I had a conversation with Gregory Hicks while the codel was

ongoing, if I remember correctly.

Q And would you tell us about that conversation?

A So our Congressional Affairs had gotten reports that some

of our team on the ground felt uncomfortable in conversations that they

had been having. They had reached out before the codel went to ask

whether or not there could be representation from the Department

present, because they were concerned, given the loss of an ambassador,

that there might be accountability assessed in a way that created

exposure. And what we wanted was people to be able to feel comfortable

speaking, and we wanted our team to know that we --

Q Who had these concerns?

A So I don't know who the individuals were, because they were

expressed to me through our Congressional Affairs team. So I don't

know that I could articulate who the people were who were expressing

the concern to our Congressional Affairs.

Q Who on your Congressional Affairs team told you that?

A I know that Dave Adams was aware of these concerns and had

shared those. He's the likely person. The only other likely person

probably would have been , who was his deputy. Those

are the two people, at least in my mind, that I recall at that time.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q I'm sorry. So I want to make sure I understand correctly.

People on the ground felt uncomfortable with some of the conversations

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they were having?

A Oh, no. Thank you for asking that.

So, as I understood it, relayed through our Congressional Affairs

team, there were team members in Tripoli who felt uncomfortable, given

some of the comments that had been made in the media about the

Congressman's travel, that they might be -- they were concerned for

their own, I would say, wellbeing and whether or not they were being,

for lack of a better word, blamed, which they weren't. Or, at least,

that's my impression, that they were not.

But that concern existed, and so they wanted to understand whether

or not the Department would have representation present. And the

objective was to make them feel comfortable that they could actually

feel comfortable speaking candidly about whatever was their experience

and that they shouldn't have a fear of retribution or that they would

be blamed.

I think people are sensitive, and certainly our team was very

sensitive after they had lost an ambassador, because that hadn't

happened --

Q So you learned about this through Congressional Affairs?

A Correct.

Q Do you know who told Congressional Affairs, who from the

team on the ground in Tripoli relayed that?

A I don't have that information.

Q Would that have gone through the charge or the --

A I don't know the answer to that part of the question.

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Q Okay.

A Yeah.

Mr. Jordan. Yeah, I just want to be clear. So your

understanding is that came from people on the ground in Libya?

Ms. Mills. Yes.

Mr. Jordan. And that is actually just the opposite of what we

heard from Greg Hicks when he testified.

Ms. Mills. Uh-huh. I haven't seen Greg Hicks' testimony. I

can only tell you what is my truth.

Mr. Jordan. I'll read it to you.

Ms. Mills. Sure.

Mr. Jordan. He said, "I was instructed by lawyers from State

Department before Mr. Chaffetz visits, I was instructed not to allow

the RSO, the Acting Deputy Chief of Mission, and myself to be personally

interviewed by Congressman Chaffetz."

So my question to him was, at that hearing, "So people at State

told you don't talk to the guy who's coming to investigate?" And his

response was, "Yes, sir."

Where did that come from? Who told him not to talk personally

with Mr. Chaffetz? Or, not just him, but the RSO and the Acting Deputy.

Ms. Mills. I don't know. I'm listening to you say that L said

that, and I find that hard to believe, that our Legal Affairs would

have done that.

But I don't know the answer to your question. Because the

presence of the lawyer was to create comfort for those who felt like

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they were going to be blamed for losing an ambassador, to feel

comfortable that they could answer and talk to not only the codel but

others, to the extent those questions were being raised.

And I think people felt vulnerable at that time. And part of my

observation was, the goal should be people shouldn't feel vulnerable.

We did lose an ambassador, but everybody's on the same team and trying

to understand how and why.

Mr. Jordan. And I guess that's what I'm trying to understand.

If everyone is on the same team, why did you have to send a

representative from State Department here when you've got -- they're

all State Department personnel there?

Ms. Mills. Because there wasn't somebody from the Legal Affairs

Office there. And I think their -- I think, as I understood it -- but,

you know, like, I can only understand it through what channels I

learned -- there was concern that they were going to be placed in a

position where they might have vulnerability personally. And the goal

in having somebody from the Legal Affairs Office, or L, present was

to help them feel comfortable in that regard and, honestly, because

they wanted that, to try and make sure we were being respectful of that.

Mr. Jordan. But you don't know who the "they" is?

Ms. Mills. My impression, but I don't know --

Mr. Jordan. Because it certainly doesn't sound like it was

Mr. Hicks, who was head of --

Ms. Mills. Oh, no, I --

Mr. Jordan. -- mission at the time.

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Ms. Mills. -- don't believe it was Mr. Hicks.

Mr. Jordan. Okay.

Ms. Mills. I don't have any impression that it was Mr. Hicks.

I mean, I would've assumed that would have been a more direct request

if it would come from Mr. Hicks. I don't believe it would've been him.

Mr. Jordan. Okay.

Ms. Mills. And I don't believe he felt any culpability for the

loss of our ambassador. I think this was much more related to our

security teams on the ground and that raw feeling that people have when

somebody just died and you know it was your job to protect --

Mr. Davis. You mentioned that there were two Members of

Congress --

Ms. Wilkinson. Excuse me. Could you just let her finish her

answers instead of stepping on her answers? I know you want to get

all your questions in, but just let her finish the sentence.

Mr. Davis. Sure.

Were you finished?

Ms. Mills. Yeah. I'm good. Thanks. I appreciate it.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q You mentioned that there were two Members of Congress who

were going out to Tripoli?

A I believe -- my recollection when I was told about it was

that there were going to be a couple of Members who were traveling or

wanted to travel, but I'm not confident that's accurate.

Q Okay. Do you know if a lawyer accompanied the second

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Members trip out to Tripoli?

A Oh, I didn't know there was a second Members trip. My

understanding was of the -- my impression was that there was going to

be a trip where individuals were traveling together.

Q Okay. Well, I'll just tell you that there were trips.

A Okay. Thanks.

Q There was the Jason Chaffetz trip, which we've been talking

about.

A Okay.

Q Two days later, there was a separate trip by a Member of

the Senate.

A Okay.

Q Are you aware whether a representative of the L accompanied

that Member out to Tripoli?

A So I wasn't -- I don't know that I had a cognizance or

recollection of that second trip. Obviously, you just told me. But

I also don't know -- I thought L's lawyer ended up traveling separately,

but maybe he traveled on the same trip with Representative Chaffetz.

Q There are periods in country overlapping --

A Okay, got it.

Q -- with L and Mr. Chaffetz.

A Sure.

Q So when I say traveling on the same trip, I mean being there,

accompanying Mr. Chaffetz. Was a representative of L

accompanying -- it was actually Senator Corker who went the second

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time.

A Okay. I didn't realize that. Thanks.

I don't know. I don't know the answer to your question. My

impression was that at least the concern got expressed in the context

of the first trip that was getting ready to be undertaken, and I,

candidly, thought there was one trip, so obviously that's --

Q So the --

A -- a part of my own memory blip.

Q So the concern was only around Mr. Chaffetz's trip and not

Senator Corker's trip?

A Well, I wasn't aware there was a second trip. So my

impression was there was a concern around what I thought were Members

who were going to be traveling and not just one.

Q Okay.

A But it might have been always that only Congressman Chaffetz

was traveling. But it was my impression that there was going to be

a codel that was going to have more than one Member on it. Because

I remember part of the discussion about how to secure the space and

other things like that was about more than one principal.

Q But since there were two trips, wouldn't it have been

prudent to second a second representative of L on the second trip, as

well, if concern was coming from the ground?

A So, two things, or at least my impression. My impression

that this concern, I think, has a little bit to do with proximity and

a little bit to do with people's experience. That's my best

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impression. So I don't know how to answer yours, other than it got

requested. And, certainly, when our team, who has just experienced

what they have, say that they feel vulnerable or would like to have

somebody from the Legal Affairs Office present, that's something that

we would try to respond to, because it's a tough situation.

Mr. Jordan. Were there any other congressional trips where

someone was sent along with the congressional -- and I understand this

is a unique situation, certainly. But were there any other trips where

this was the practice?

Ms. Mills. I don't know the answer to that question, because I,

obviously -- like I said, my visibility into different trips would have

been Haiti, more likely, or this one. So I don't have the same

familiarity.

Mr. Jordan. Again, Mr. Hicks' testimony was this was the first

time in his experience, 20-some years all over the world, where he saw

someone -- he was told by lawyers at State that this guy was to be at

every meeting and be a part of this. First time in his experience it

had happened. And it is certainly even different from, as Carlton

pointed out, from just the second visit, which happened a few days

later.

Ms. Mills. I obviously can't speak to Mr. Hicks' experience. I

know that we hadn't lost an ambassador over 25 years, and I don't know --

Mr. Jordan. I understand --

Ms. Mills. -- whether or not in his experience --

Mr. Jordan. I understand that situation --

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Ms. Mills. -- he had had that before or not.

Mr. Jordan. -- but all I'm saying is, it's only time.

Ms. Mills. So I don't know how to answer that question. I can

only answer from my knowledge base.

Mr. Jordan. Tell me about the person who went.

Ms. Mills. As I understood it, the Legal Affairs Office sent,

I think, a junior officer, but I might be wrong about that. It is my

impression that he was a junior lawyer in --

Mr. Jordan. Did they select him, or --

Ms. Mills. -- L.

Mr. Jordan. -- did you?

Ms. Mills. My recollection is that L basically was making

recommendations about who they could afford to have go at that time

period. So that's my best memory.

Mr. Jordan. Do you know Mr. at all, ? My

understanding --

Ms. Mills. I came to meet him -- I came to know him subsequent

to his travel out into the region, primarily because he ended up being

one of the lawyers who was also responsible for helping to review and

assess documents. And so I met him more through that process than I

had met him at that time. I didn't know him at that time.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q When you say he was part of the review and assessment of

documents, what role did he play with that?

A As I remember it, the L had more than two or three attorneys

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who had responsibility for reviewing documents for production, and I

believe he was part of that team. He might not have stayed on that

team because he had other assignments, but he was on that team, I

thought, in the beginning.

Q Okay.

We've talked about Congressional Affairs Office as well as the

Legal Advisor. Those are two separate entities within the State

Department; is that correct?

A They're two separate bureaus, that's correct.

Q Okay. And the Congressional Affairs Office has lawyers

assigned to it; is that correct?

A I don't know.

Q Okay.

A I mean, I think of the Legal Affairs Office as the one

operating legally, so -- but there probably are lawyers who are a part

of Congressional Affairs. But I would imagine they would still have

to be part of L if they were operating as lawyers.

Q So was there any reason why, to your knowledge, that lawyers

from Congressional Affairs was not sent, as opposed to the Legal

Advisor?

A Well, I don't know that I would've known that there were

lawyers in Congressional Affairs who had that role until you just said

that. So I would have expected -- so I don't know how to answer your

question other than my expectation would have been that Legal Affairs

would have made that judgment.

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Q Okay.

You know, we never got to your conversation with Mr. Hicks while

the congressional -- the codel was over there. Would you relate that

conversation to us, please?

A Yes.

Congressional Affairs relayed that there were concerns that had

been raised by our team on the ground about their engagement with

Congressman Chaffetz and that, in point of fact, there had been no

representation present from the Department.

Congressional Affairs called me. I called Greg Hicks to say I

just received a report that indicated that some of your team is upset

based on their engagement that they had with Congressman Chaffetz and

that they were upset because they also did not have representation there

from the Department.

Mr. Hicks relayed that he did not have any concerns. He felt like

his experience was one that was positive, and he did not -- he was

unaware that his team had relayed any of those concerns. I asked would

he then check, because his relaying of that at least allayed my

concerns. And he said he would check. And I said I appreciated that.

So that was my experience of that call.

Mr. Westmoreland. Excuse me. Can I interrupt just to clarify

something?

Ms. Jackson. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. I'll be real quick.

Ms. Mills, so they brought this to your attention?

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Congressional Affairs came to you with this --

Ms. Mills. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- over feeling vulnerable that a Member of

Congress was coming on a codel over there?

Ms. Mills. No. No, this was actually now once they were there

and they had actually had an engagement.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay.

Ms. Mills. So not before. The before was what their worrying

was. Yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. But it came to the height, I guess, to you,

being the Secretary's chief of staff --

Ms. Mills. And if you knew how lowly sometimes my job was, you

wouldn't say that.

Mr. Westmoreland. Well, I understand, but --

Ms. Mills. But, yes.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- they felt vulnerable.

Why wouldn't the vulnerability of the people that were afraid for

their lives, having gone through, you know, the breach and all the other

things going on in Benghazi, their vulnerability, why wouldn't that

have risen to the same level in the State Department as somebody being

concerned about a Member of Congress asking questions? That's

confusing to me.

Ms. Mills. Sure. I don't know that I can allay your confusion.

I can only tell you what happened.

I think there's two different circumstances. One is a

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circumstance where you have a set of experts who are making those kinds

of judgments every day about security and how to balance those issues.

The second is actually a crisis management matter, where, as a practical

fact, I ended up having a lot of responsibility in the aftermath of

how those are being managed.

So when we had a congressional codel going to our post and it ends

up putting pressure on our post, not because they're Congress but just

because any VIP in a situation where a post is undergoing challenges

introduces stress into that post, Haiti or here, that would get raised,

and they did raise it to me.

I don't know that I would have thought to say to them, "And, by

the way, why didn't you raise any of these others?" That just wasn't

something I had visibility in to be able to do that.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. So I just want to be clear. Your testimony

is there were two sets of communications. There was this communication

that came --

Ms. Mills. Before.

Mr. Jordan. -- before the visit by Congressman Chaffetz --

Ms. Mills. Correct.

Mr. Jordan. -- that folks on the ground -- we don't know who they

are, but some of your people on the ground in Libya were concerned

that -- "blame" I think is the word you used -- that there could be

blame going around and that they thought it appropriate to have someone

else there from Main State.

Ms. Mills. I don't know that they used the word "blame." That's

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my impression of what the worry was. But their worry was that they

were going to be potentially placed in a situation where they might

be held accountable for the loss of the Ambassador.

Mr. Jordan. Communication from your folks in Tripoli to

Congressional Affairs, Congressional Affairs to you.

Ms. Mills. That's my best understanding, yes.

Mr. Jordan. And then you discussed that with your folks and you

decide Mr. is going to accompany Mr. Chaffetz.

Ms. Mills. So, actually, this was also shared with the Legal

Affairs Office. So the Legal Affairs Office thought one way to

ameliorate that consideration and concern was having a lawyer present,

which I agreed with. Because the goal was just to make them feel

comfortable, as opposed to have them feel uncomfortable or that they

couldn't engage in a set of conversations that hopefully would be

beneficial.

Mr. Jordan. Okay.

Second communication is after -- actually, during the visit of

Mr. Chaffetz, when there is a meeting that takes place that Mr.

is not allowed to be in based on security clearance.

Ms. Mills. Okay.

Mr. Jordan. Is that accurate?

Ms. Mills. I don't know the accuracy of the security clearance

element. My impression was that there was a meeting that he was not

permitted to participate in.

Mr. Jordan. Yeah. This is what Mr. Hicks testified to in the

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committee.

Ms. Mills. I have no reason to know differently.

Mr. Jordan. Okay.

And then he says that he got a phone call from you. He was

asked -- Mr. Hicks says, "A phone call from a senior person, generally

speaking, is not considered to be good news." "And what did Ms. Mills

say to you?" "She demanded a report on the visit." "Was she upset

by the fact that this lawyer was not permitted to be in this meeting

because he didn't have the requisite clearance level to be in that

meeting?" And Mr. Hicks' response was, "She was upset."

So fill me in.

Ms. Mills. Well, I'll fill you in in two ways. One, I don't know

that it's about that meeting. So I don't know what are all the

different engagements that happened when the Congressman was there.

Because, obviously, what I learned was that there were some encounters

that members of the team on the ground felt uncomfortable with, and,

more particularly, they also felt like we had indicated that there would

be representation present and that had not occurred. And so we had,

in some ways, failed them.

My goal in calling Mr. Hicks was to learn, one, was his team really

upset, because that was what was being reported; and, two, was

everything okay. My impression from him was that he was unaware that

there might be members of his team that were upset but that he felt

like in his engagement things were fine. And that allayed my concerns,

based on his representations that he felt fine.

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Mr. Jordan. Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Circling back to the ARB just for one final topic, Admiral

Mullen testified that he talked to you prior to Charlene Lamb's

appearance in October 2012 before the Oversight and Government Reform

Committee. Did that conversation take place?

A I don't recall it, but I would have no reason to believe

that he wouldn't be accurate about that.

Q Okay. He related that he told you that Charlene Lamb was

not going to be a good witness for the State Department. Does that

ring a bell with you?

A No, because if I was aware of that, I might have been

thoughtful about that in all the ways of which -- how we could best

communicate information. But I don't dispute that. I'm sure that if

that's his memory that he would be accurately reflecting what he

recalls.

Q Did you meet with people prior to their testifying before

Congress?

A Yes. Before the first set of testimony, we met and people

read their statements that they were going to be giving and help be

able to step through what it was that at least they were going to be

communicating on they understood to have happened.

Q And who were those people?

A There were four people who testified at that hearing. It

would've been those four people, but I can't tell you that I remember

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all four of them.

Q Was it Patrick Kennedy?

A Did Pat testify at the first hearing?

Q Yes.

A I'm sorry. I'm asking for your help.

Q ?

A definitely testified, correct. And I met with .

Q Mark Thompson?

A No, I don't remember meeting with Mark Thompson. I don't

remember Mark Thompson. Is he a member of the Department of State?

Q Yes.

A I don't remember meeting with Mark Thompson.

Q And so you went through their statements. What else did

you talk to them about?

A I don't know that -- what they ran through with their

statements, we also obviously wanted to ensure that they had the best

opportunity to be able to articulate what it was that they knew and

what it was that they understood as their experience of the situation.

Q Okay. And who was with you in that meeting?

A Congressional Affairs was present in that meeting.

Q Was that Dave Adams?

A It was Dave Adams or . I don't know who else

would have been present, but there were others present. I just don't

recall.

Q Okay. And did you do prep before subsequent hearings?

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A That's the first hearing that I recall us having actually

a meeting. I don't know with subsequent hearings, because things

happened so fast, how those different preparations were happening. I

know Congressional Affairs did prep, and we certainly prepped the

Secretary before she did. But I don't know that I could tell you in

realtime how each time, when people were going up, whether or not they

got the same amount of time, just because there was so much going on.

Q Do you know whether these people that we've been talking

about, Patrick Kennedy and Mark Thompson and Eric Boswell, were

interviewed by the ARB panel?

A I don't know all the people the ARB interviewed. I think

they gave an interview list, but I haven't gone through that to refresh

my recollection, so I don't know.

Q So you don't know whether your meeting with them would have

been before or after they may have met with the ARB?

A I don't know for certain. If you would ask me to give an

impression, I would have thought ours would have been before, but I

don't know that for sure. So I don't know.

Q Did you meet with anyone before they met with the ARB panel?

A Well, so I don't know who everyone the ARB panel met with,

but, I mean, I engaged with everybody in the Department on a pretty

regular basis. So it's certainly the case that I would have met with

people in the course of responding to or addressing or handling this

matter, to the extent there was a reason that I would have been meeting

with them.

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Q Did you meet with them regarding their meeting with the ARB

panel?

A No.

Q Okay.

You've described yourself as the point person on the aftermath

of Benghazi, and we've talked about how that included visibility with

Congress and the codel going over and meeting with people to go over

their testimony or their prepared statements before they came to

Congress and testified. Does that also include other -- let me ask,

were you the point --

A Well, so I just want to make sure I -- because you've said

a number of things in what you just said.

Q Yeah.

A So the first time we had our team going up to testify about

what happened, that is the occasion where we sat and heard their

statements as they stepped through what they understood. After that,

people testified regularly, or went up more regularly, so there wasn't

really the opportunity to do prep or otherwise. I'm not saying they

didn't have prep, but I don't think I had the occasion to be able to

always participate in any of those things. So I don't have a memory,

other than that first one, with respect to that.

Q Okay. And that would have been in October of 2012?

A It would have been whenever -- it would've been in the

lead-up to the time or the date that they actually testified.

Q Okay.

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I'm going to hand you what I'm marking as Exhibit 8.

[Mills Exhibit No. 8

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q For the record, this is document number SCB0045770. It's

an email exchange from Cheryl Mills dated November 13, 2012, at

3:02 p.m., to "H" and Philippe Reines. And the subject line is "Re:

How are the hearings going?"

You've had a chance to read this?

A Yes.

Q Do you recall this?

A I recall -- I don't know that I recall this email, but I

recall this moment.

Q Okay. Tell us about this moment.

A One of the challenges in interagency is everyone taking

accountability for what are their areas and not seeking to suggest that

things that were in their accountability were in other areas.

My experience in this context was there was a lot of back and

forth, which was involving the intelligence community, about what was

or wasn't known. And there was an effort to suggest that the Department

had been apprised of things it hadn't, by leaving a misimpression in

the way in which things were characterized.

And so my outreach was not only to, I believe, the individuals

in the intelligence community -- but I could not tell you who;

sorry -- as well as the White House to say, people are trying to

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indicate State had information that they themselves didn't have, and

this should be one team as opposed to people trying to suggest

otherwise.

Q So "some of our colleagues" does not refer to anybody within

the State Department?

A Correct.

Q Okay.

You've described yourself as the point person on the Benghazi

aftermath --

A Well, you keep saying that, but I've embraced that.

Q Well, just as you were the person for Haiti?

A Sure. I embrace that. That would be, I think, a fair

characterization.

Q Okay. So did that encompass things like going over the

public messaging that was going out regarding Benghazi?

A So we had a whole team who actually did that quite well.

And so "no" is the short answer. They would be part of making sure

that we were, obviously, coordinated and understood what they were

going to be saying and doing --

Q But you coordinated with them?

A -- but typically our communications was led by Toria Nuland,

and then she would reach to other members of the Department for what

she needed and how she actually would communicate different elements.

Q Okay. And you made sure that you put in place the document

assembly and review and response group and delegated that out to others?

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A So the A Bureau has a process that they

actually -- sorry -- the Administration Bureau has a process that they

step through, and that process actually entails both a review and then

actually a preparation for production.

What I thought to do was augment that process for it by asking

our senior leadership to give people who could be 100-percent dedicated

to the review. Because review at the Department can be a very long

process. And, typically, when the Administration Bureau had people

reviewing, people come for 2 or 3 hours out of their day, and they go

back and do the rest of their day work. And because the Secretary

wanted the documents to be produced as quickly as possible, I asked

for the senior leadership to give us people who could be 100-percent

dedicated.

So that meant there were more people added to the effort than what

might have been typical. But it is the case that that was the ordinary

process that they would step through -- first a review and then a

preparation of the documents that were reviewed that are defined to

be responsive to be produced.

Q And was that still in place when you left in February, that

level of intensity?

A I think that level of intensity, I don't know that it was

continued into the next administration. I don't have visibility of

that.

Q Okay.

Mrs. Brooks. Sharon, a couple questions on that.

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Ms. Jackson. Yes.

Mrs. Brooks. Can you share with us who was on then the

coordination team?

Ms. Mills. Yeah. So there's two elements. Primarily, because

we were getting a lot of media and other inquiries where people were

inclined to answer without knowing all the best information, so you

then have to correct a misstatement, the coordination team was designed

to do two things: one, ensure that the best information that had been

gleaned could be shared; and, two, that people had visibility to the

kinds of inquiries, media inquiries and others, that were coming in

so that we weren't saying things inaccurately or, more often, saying

things based on what one person said as opposed to what the whole record

would show or what if you talked to four or five people you might learn.

And so the goal was to try to be coordinated in ensuring that we

were responding more accurately or at least as accurately as we could

in those time periods.

Mrs. Brooks. And who was on the team?

Ms. Mills. The coordination team were made up of individuals who

were from the bureaus that had, if you will, expertise. So from DS,

NEA, and L -- sorry -- Legal Affairs. We also had, obviously, members

from Press Affairs there. We had members from Congressional Affairs

on that team, as well.

I'm sure I'm missing others because I had asked the senior

leadership to dedicate people to the effort of responding to not only

the documents but also responding to information that we were

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getting -- requests we were getting. But those would have been a lot

of the likely offices that had representatives that were present. And

they would switch people in and out if they needed to, but the goal

would have been to try to keep as many people the same as possible.

Mrs. Brooks. And so, roughly, how large was it? How many

people?

Ms. Mills. Oh, it probably had about, I don't know, 6 to 10 people

maybe.

Mrs. Brooks. And did they meet on a regular basis?

Ms. Mills. We did a call in the morning and a call in the evening

in the beginning, particularly given all the inquiries that we had,

or at least that's my recollection. That tapered off eventually as

things got less hectic, and so probably it would be, like, a call a

day. But that's my best recollection.

Mrs. Brooks. And is that the group that would have looked through

all documents before they were turned over, whether to Congress or the

ARB?

Ms. Mills. There's a subset of them that would have been a part

of that but not all of them, because the media and other people,

obviously, weren't.

But the goal of having them be part of that was to be able to make

sure that when a particular assistant secretary said, "Well, this is

what happened," they could say, "Well, that's not what looks like when

you were looking through all of the other materials or information.

What looks like happened is X," so that you could be more accurate in

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your communications.

Mrs. Brooks. Were you and/or Jake Sullivan part of reviewing

documents?

Ms. Mills. So the A Bureau actually steps through that process,

and then the review teams do that. The documents that I would see were

documents where the team had looked through them and thought that there

was a subset that I should see. Those typically meant that they were

sharing new information, new facts, or other information that they

thought it was important for the senior leadership to know.

I didn't have the capacity or the ability to review the documents

they were producing. I acknowledge I was probably pushing pretty hard

for them to get them out the door because our goal was to try to do

that.

Mrs. Brooks. Did that happen on nights and weekends?

Ms. Mills. Yes. People were working pretty hard. I think it's

fair to say people worked hard.

Mrs. Brooks. Did you review those on nights and weekends?

Ms. Mills. So I don't recall having occasions where I had to,

per se, review on a night or weekend, though I was there often. And

any of the documents that would have been brought to me were a subset

of them, so they were typically things I could flip through and return

to them.

Mrs. Brooks. Did you make any decisions on any documents that

should not be turned over?

Ms. Mills. No.

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Mrs. Brooks. Okay.

Mr. Jordan. Could I --

Ms. Jackson. Uh-huh.

Mr. Jordan. If we've got time, can we go back to the ARB?

I want to be clear. So you prepped Charlene Lamb before she

testified in front of the Oversight Committee?

Ms. Mills. No. So what Charlene Lamb did was go through her

testimony. So, basically, each person had written their testimony

that they were going to give, and what they did then was read that

testimony. And I participated when she sat and read that. So if you

want to define that as prep, yes, but I want to be accurate about what

I did.

Mr. Jordan. You reviewed her testimony before she testified in

front of Congress.

Ms. Mills. She gave her testimony beforehand, that's correct.

Mr. Jordan. To you and to others at State Department.

Ms. Mills. Yes. Yes, that's accurate. There were at least

four or five folks there.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. Well --

Ms. Mills. That's correct.

Mr. Jordan. -- Admiral Mullen, co-chair of the ARB --

Ms. Mills. He wasn't present for that.

Mr. Jordan. Understand. But he interviewed Ms. Lamb a couple

days -- not he, but the ARB interviewed Ms. Lamb, I think, 2 days before

she testified in front of Congress.

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Ms. Mills. Okay. I didn't know that.

Mr. Jordan. At the hearings, Mr. Mullen indicated to us that he

had given you a phone call. He called it a heads-up phone call about

Charlene Lamb.

Ms. Mills. Uh-huh.

Mr. Jordan. And he said that he felt she was not going to be a

good witness, wasn't going to reflect well on the Department.

Do you recall that phone call?

Ms. Mills. I don't, but I'm sure, if he said he did it, it

happened. But I don't recall that phone call.

Mr. Jordan. Okay.

Was there anything in the selection process where you had talked

to Admiral Mullen where you would indicate to them we'd like to be kept

informed, we'd like to be given heads-up, we'd like to sort of know

how things are going, in the process of this ARB?

Ms. Mills. No.

Mr. Jordan. No communication like that at all?

Ms. Mills. Well, so, if your question is when they were getting

set up, please keep us informed, no. The direction to them was, please

step through this as quickly as you can.

Mr. Jordan. Was there anything you relayed to Admiral Mullen

that would maybe compel him or make him think it was the right thing

to do to give you a heads-up about an individual he thought was going

to reflect poorly on the Department?

Ms. Mills. I don't know that there would have been. I mean, I'm

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glad he would have made that call because, obviously, our goal was to

try to give accurate information out and have people be able to speak

to what happened. But I don't know that there would have been.

Mr. Jordan. But did you --

Mr. Gowdy. I think, on that point, if I may, you said you were

glad that he called.

Ms. Mills. Uh-huh.

Mr. Gowdy. From our perspective, there are neither good nor bad

witnesses; there are witnesses. And if she is in possession of facts

that Congress might be interested in, she's a witness we need to hear

from.

So why would you be glad that he gave you a heads-up?

Ms. Mills. So I'm doing a counterfactual, because, obviously,

as you all now know, I didn't remember the call.

My objective always is for the Department to be able to -- and

by "the Department," I mean the staff in the Department. Sometimes

I refer to it the wrong way -- but for staff to be able to give

information that's accurate and clear and that helps people understand

the truth of the matter.

If someone believes that we are going to put a witness forward

that's not going to be accurate, clear, or give the truth of the matter,

I don't think we should do that. I think our obligation to Congress

and to the public is to make sure we're giving accurate, clear

information that's truthful.

And I think that's why, if there was any reason he had a

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reservation that fell into that category, I would want to know that.

Because I would never want the Department to put up someone who was

not accurate, clear, and truthful.

Mr. Gowdy. But why is it Admiral Mullen's job -- because I keep

hearing the word "independent" in connection with the ARB. Why is it

his job to protect the reputation of the Department, as opposed to being

his job to make sure that he hears from witnesses who have actual access

to facts?

Ms. Mills. I can't speak to the answer to your question, and I

don't know that that was his job. But I do think that --

Mr. Gowdy. Which was not his job?

Ms. Mills. Well, you said why was it his job to do the following

things. I don't know that any of those were his job.

My point was, I think that we have an obligation to tell the truth

and to bring people forward who are going to do that. And if anybody

has a reservation about that, I would always want to know that. Because

I don't have perfect information, and if there is a reason someone

believes that we would be putting forward a witness that wouldn't give

Congress or the public accurate information, then I -- that's our

obligation. We have to do that the best we can.

Mr. Gowdy. Which is exactly why I asked Admiral Mullen in that

very hearing, "Were you concerned that she would give inaccurate

testimony?" And he said, "No."

Ms. Mills. Oh, okay.

Mr. Gowdy. That was not his concern at all. His concern was that

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she would give accurate testimony.

And so I guess I'm trying to square that with the word

"independent" in connection with the ARB. When you have someone who's

supposed to be independently looking at a fact pattern and they take

time to call, not on the issue of veracity, but on the issue of

appearance and advise not to send that witness, do you think that calls

into question his objectivity?

Ms. Mills. I would never call into question his objectivity

because I've had the experience of him, and he was, not only as the

Chief of the Joint Chiefs but also through the ARB process, someone

who called it like he saw it and also felt that there needed to be

accountability for what had occurred. So my experience of him is very

much that of someone who has been raised in a tradition of being truthful

and straightforward and hard-hitting if he needs to be.

I can't speak to the other context. Obviously, I didn't have it.

And, obviously, Charlene Lamb testified because she was the person who

was in the role that would have gleaned the information and would have

been able to share back what were the assessments and judgments made

on how to balance the security needs that were being heard. And so

she struck me, in the end, as the witness that should testify.

Mr. Jordan. Were there any other members of the ARB who gave you

a heads-up or any type of contact to you in the course of their

investigation?

Ms. Mills. In the course of their investigation, we had one

briefing where they stepped through where they were in their

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process -- and, by that, the other person who was briefed was the

Secretary -- that they stepped through where they were in their process

and that they anticipated being on time and what their own assessments

were, but that they had not come to conclusions yet about

accountability. So this was basically a briefing before they had

stepped through their accountability elements.

And then, as they were preparing their report, they reached out

to say, "We have a draft of the report." They shared that draft with

me. I shared back my observations of instances where there were issues

or facts that I thought were relevant for their consideration. They

took them, or they didn't. Ultimately, they had to make that

judgement.

Mr. Jordan. So you reviewed the draft before it went public,

before it was released?

Ms. Mills. Well, the draft before it went to -- ultimately, it

goes to the Secretary --

Mr. Jordan. Right.

Ms. Mills. -- and then it actually gets -- we made a

determination to release it. ARBs are not always released publicly,

but the Secretary had said she wanted to release this one publicly.

Mr. Jordan. And can you tell me the extent of edits that you

and/or the Secretary made to the report?

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[2:02 p.m.]

Ms. Mills. The Secretary didn't. And the Secretary did not, at

least to my knowledge, review a draft.

Mr. Jordan. So Secretary Clinton didn't review it; you just

reviewed it.

Ms. Mills. I reviewed the draft. That's correct.

Mr. Jordan. All right. And were there -- you said there was

some suggestions. So what were the edits, what were the changes that

you asked the ARB to make?

Ms. Mills. I can't tell you what were the different issues now,

because that's obviously too long away. But basically what I stepped

through was, if there was information that we had that didn't seem to

be reflected there, I would flag that. If there were other reactions

or observations I had, I would share that. And that's what I would

have done.

Mr. Jordan. So I just want to be clear. First, you reviewed it.

Second, you said there are changes that need to be made, and you gave

those changes to the ARB. Is that right?

Ms. Mills. No.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. Well, then tell me what's right.

Ms. Mills. Okay. I reviewed it, and I identified areas where

I either saw that there was, from my perspective, based on where I was

sitting, information that wasn't present, information that might be

different, or other factors that I thought were relevant for their

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consideration in deciding what went in the document. And they then

made their own judgment.

Mr. Jordan. Well, that sounds like changes.

Ms. Mills. I certainly --

Mr. Jordan. So you suggested changes?

Ms. Mills. I certainly made recommendations for places where I

thought there were inaccuracies or misstatements or other information

that might not be fully reflective of what the information was that

was there. I certainly made those, yes.

Mr. Jordan. You reviewed it, and you recommended changes. It

was up to them whether they implemented the changes or included them

in the --

Ms. Mills. Yes. Recommended changes or flagged areas where I

thought there might be inaccuracies.

Mr. Jordan. Change this, delete that, that kind of -- that kind

of --

Ms. Mills. No.

Mr. Jordan. I just want to be clear.

Ms. Mills. Oh. Thank you.

Mr. Jordan. All right?

Ms. Mills. I appreciate that.

Mr. Jordan. You recommended changes. Then what happened? Did

they do it or not?

Ms. Mills. So some they took probably, and some they didn't. My

impression is that --

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Mr. Jordan. Why is there a "probably" there? I mean, the final

report -- you didn't look at the final report? The Secretary looked

at it.

Ms. Mills. I did look at the final report, but what I didn't have

is an errata sheet and say, "Oh, that's not there. Oh, that is there."

I didn't do that, so that's why I don't have a frame of reference.

Mr. Jordan. You reviewed it, you recommended changes, and then

you and Secretary Clinton were satisfied with the product, the work

product, of the ARB when it was finally released.

Ms. Mills. So Secretary Clinton did not review it, and Secretary

Clinton did not participate in that process. The report is going to

Secretary Clinton. So I probably can't be clearer than just to say

that really directly. It's going to her. So she does not participate

in that process, because the report is going to her.

Mr. Jordan. So you reviewed it --

Ms. Mills. So she doesn't have to review a report that's coming

to her.

Mr. Jordan. Got it.

You reviewed it, you recommended changes. So all that happened,

and whether they implemented them or didn't implement them, you then

presented that final product to the Secretary.

Ms. Mills. The ARB did.

Mr. Jordan. The ARB did.

Ms. Mills. The ARB basically took into account whatever other

adjustments they made, and they presented their final product.

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Mr. Jordan. So did you discuss with Secretary Clinton the

recommended changes that you -- the changes you recommended to the ARB,

did you discuss those with Secretary Clinton before -- you know, did

you discuss those before they actually did the final report?

Ms. Mills. No, I don't recall discussing those with her. What

I do recall is that they had made determinations around personnel, and

I recall one of them being surprising to me, and I told her that I was

surprised that they had made a conclusion about one particular

individual.

Mr. Jordan. Did you ask for the draft before the final copy went

to Secretary Clinton, or did Admiral Mullen, Ambassador Pickering, and

the ARB offer to give you the draft before it went --

Ms. Mills. They shared the draft with us. Correct.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. And was that understood right from the get-go

that that would be the process? So when you called Mr. Mullen --

Ms. Mills. I don't know. That's a fair question. I don't know.

I don't know that I had any expectation one way or another, but I did

review the draft when it came to me.

Mr. Jordan. And how did you convey the recommendations for

change to the ARB? Did you put that in writing? Did you just tell

them in a meeting? Was it over the phone? How was that done?

Ms. Mills. I believe I met with and shared my thought

processes around that, but I could have also had conversations with

the chair, Ambassador Pickering --

Mr. Jordan. Ambassador Pickering.

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Ms. Mills. -- or Admiral Mullen.

Mr. Jordan. Did you get -- I just want to be clear again here.

Ms. Mills. Sure.

Mr. Jordan. You reviewed it. You made recommendations for

changes. Was that a back-and-forth process, or was it one time?

"Here's the changes I recommend. Okay, Admiral Mullen, Ambassador

Pickering, you go work on it. And the next step is Secretary Clinton.

Or the next step is back to me; we may want to look at this again."

Ms. Mills. No. We didn't look at it again. Correct.

Mr. Jordan. One time.

Ms. Mills. Yes.

Mr. Jordan. While those recommendations were pending, let's

say, and made to the ARB, were there conversations back and forth

between you and members of the ARB and/or staff of the ARB about how

those changes were coming?

Ms. Mills. I remember having engagements with about

the changes, not about how per se they were coming. But it was quite

plausible that could have happened. I just don't remember that.

Mr. Jordan. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. And I believe you -- oh, are you finished? I'm

sorry.

Mr. Jordan. One last question. When the chairman hands you one

last question, you take that, and then you stop.

Ms. Mills. Take it.

Ms. Jackson. It didn't come my way, so I didn't have to ask it.

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Mr. Jordan. Who selected to serve on the ARB?

Ms. Mills. She was recommended by Deputy Secretary Burns. She

had been his chief of staff. She also, I thought, was a good

recommendation in the sense that Deputy Secretary Burns is

well-respected and well-regarded in the building. He's the most

senior foreign service officer. And she, in being his chief of staff,

when she reached to people, when she did that, people responded.

And so lending her to -- she wasn't his chief of staff, I think,

at that time. She was going to another bureau. But lending her to

this effort meant that the staff in the Department, who had enormous

respect for him but also for her, would be responsive on behalf of the

ARB.

Mr. Jordan. One last one. Any recommendation that you gave that

comes to mind that they didn't implement?

Ms. Mills. I don't have a recollection of what they did or didn't

implement.

Mr. Jordan. Nothing comes to mind, like, this was important and

they didn't do it? Nothing comes to mind?

Ms. Mills. No. No. Nothing comes to mind. That's correct.

Mr. Jordan. All right. Thank you.

Ms. Jackson. We'll go off the record then.

[Recess.]

Ms. Sawyer. And we'll go back on the record.

Ms. Mills, thanks again for your patience in answering all our

questions.

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We're going to try to just work through a few clarifying things

as quickly as we can. And, again, we've deferred some of our questions.

We want to make sure that, you know, certainly, the Members who are

present have every opportunity to ask you every question they want and

need. And, certainly, we have questions on behalf of our Members, as

well, but we will try to keep it moving along.

Ms. Mills. Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. Because, obviously, there is some overlap in the

subject matters that we would want to cover.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So I just wanted to return for a moment, you had been asked

about an August 17th information memo, and it was described as covering

the deteriorating security situation in Libya.

Can you just briefly explain what an information memo -- what is

the purpose of an information memo?

A So information memos in the Department are designed to share

current learnings, current updates, and current understandings based

on the circumstances that the drafter is preparing. So they're not

action memos, which we also have, which is asking for a set of whatever

other requested action to be taken. They are designed to actually give

people visibility into whatever matter it is that is the subject of

the information memo.

So, in this case, the information memo was designed to share about

the political and security situation that was happening on the ground

there in Libya.

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Q And, again, at the very beginning of our conversation, we

talked about formal mechanisms. There's obviously informal

mechanisms. But would an information memo fall within the category

of a kind of formal mechanism to make sure that information is getting

shared up appropriate channels to appropriate people, you know, to the

right stakeholders?

A Yes. That is the purpose of the information memorandum.

And the Department has a number of different both channels and kinds

of memoranda that they prepare, and that is exactly the purpose of that

one.

Q And you mentioned "action memo." If one were seeking

concrete action, would -- I mean, by its name -- it sounds like a

ridiculous question, even me asking it -- by its name, it sounds like

that is the mechanism that one would invoke to ask for particularized

action.

A Yes. So that is the purpose of an action memorandum.

Part of the Department's framework is to try to make things simple

and clear, not only because, obviously, different people come and go

but also because you want to ensure that you know how to segregate and

pay attention to materials that are coming through your inbox.

And so an action memoranda means that there's been a request for

action to whoever is the recipient of that particular memoranda,

meaning it's addressed to them, not that they were copied, but they

were the person to whom it was addressed.

Q So an action memo could be addressed to, for example, the

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Under Secretary of Management, Mr. Kennedy.

A Yes.

Q And he would then be the person who would be being asked

to take the action, and he would have the authority, himself, to take

the action, presumably.

A Presumably, people are good about directing the action memo

to the people who actually have the authority to undertake the action.

It's not always perfect, but that's typically what the intention would

be in an action memo.

Q And I believe you said that you had seen the August 17

information memo. I don't recall if you felt you had seen it around

that timeframe or if you learned about it later after the attacks.

A I learned about it later after the attacks.

Q Did you ever see in that same timeframe an action memo?

A No, not an action memo related to Benghazi.

Q Thank you for clarifying.

A Sorry.

Q And when I said "that timeframe," I was, you know,

referring --

A Relating to the incident.

Q -- to kind of the information memo and that August

timeframe.

Do you recall, with regard to an action memo, seeing one anytime

prior to that -- and just to keep the timeframe from January 2012

onward -- an action memo relating to Libya or Benghazi?

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A I do not.

Q And at any time prior to the attacks, did anyone relay to

you a recommendation that the United States depart, withdraw its

presence from Benghazi?

A No.

Q One of the other subjects that was discussed in some of the

prior rounds was, on the night of the attacks, kind of the role of,

consideration of deploying and using the FEST assets. And, to the

extent you know and to the best of your knowledge, where is the FEST

asset located? Is that a U.S.-based resource? Is it forward-deployed

somewhere else? I mean, you know, forward-deployed before they're

going to go somewhere else. I'm not a military brat or expert.

A We won't hold that against you.

Q Thank you.

A So my understanding of FEST teams is they are created for

the purposes of being deployed when there's been an incident. And so

they would be pulled from assets that we have here, or if there was

assets particularly in a region that could be used to augment it, those

would be pulled together, and the FEST team would be deployed.

Q And, then, on that night and in the conversations you've

had and, certainly, information that's in the public domain, among

other places, an unclassified Department of Defense timeline that

Congress certainly has had since, I believe, November of 2012 --

A Okay.

Q -- there's reference to other military assets, including

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the Commanders In-extremis Force. Are you familiar with that force

at all?

A I'm not, but I -- I shouldn't say that. I'm not right now,

as I sit here, just because I don't remember all of the different assets

and teams that might be able to have been deployed or were deployed.

At the time, I might have been more familiar, but right now I couldn't

tell you that.

Q And when you are describing FEST, one of the first things

you did was make sure that you were distinguishing between "FEST" and

"FAST."

A Yes.

Q And you referenced "FAST" as a Marine --

A So my understanding of "FAST" teams were Marines

deployments that would actually provide and augment support for

different posts.

And we had a FAST team that, I believe, was either in Tripoli or

was deployed to Tripoli right afterwards. My memory is not great in

that regard, but I do remember that there was a FAST team there. And

we made the determination that they needed to stay for a period of time

longer than what might have been the initial expectation. That's my

best memory.

Q So the FAST team asset was something that was being

considered and, it sounds like from your recollection, actually was

part of the response at some point in time to what was going on in Libya?

A That's my best memory. If there's a document that says

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otherwise, please let me know, but that's my best memory.

Q Okay.

And, then, do you recall whether there was other discussion about

U.S. special operation forces that were based in the United States and

their potential deployment and role on the night of the attack?

A Well, what I more remember is people inquiring of DOD what

assets were closer in the region as opposed to from the U.S., though

I'm sure part of the U.S. would have been part of that analysis too.

But, on the night when things were happening, I remember discussion

around what was available in the region that might in any way be

time-relevant to being able to provide security for our folks.

Q And, from your perspective, as you're being told about it,

as you're hearing the conversations, there's a discussion about

potential assets that might be closest available, was it your sense

that these were significant forces that we were trying to amass to do

what we could in Benghazi?

A It was my sense that we were trying to amass whatever we

could. And when I think of what our capacities are, I tend to think

massively, but there's because I've seen our forces operate that way.

So that might be more my impression and overlay of what I would expect

because of what I know their capacities are.

Q So, from my perspective as a layperson, was it your sense

that basically everything was on the table that was a possibility and

it was all being considered with considerable thought and seriousness

and people were certainly taking seriously that they wanted to get

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whatever they could get to Benghazi?

A Absolutely everything was on the table. And, like I said,

obviously, the President made that clear too, and that was important.

My impression was that we really had a lot of support from the

interagency, who I felt like were very not only just humanly empathic

but operationally committed to doing what needed to be done to try and

secure our folks and get them out of there.

Q And then just to wrap up -- and I wanted to mark and give

you an exhibit that we're going to mark as exhibit 9 for the record

and for identification purposes.

[Mills Exhibit No. 9

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And as you're taking a look at this, I'll just let you know

this is a document that is posted on foxnews.com.

And when you were discussing the FEST, you mentioned Ambassador

Benjamin in particular. And if you could just remind me who Ambassador

Benjamin is, what his role --

A Ambassador Daniel Benjamin was the coordinator for

counterterrorism in the Department. And the CT Bureau would have been

the operational department that would have made assessments and

decisions with respect to the deployment, as I understand it, of the

FEST assets.

Q And this document, exhibit 9, indicates in its top line,

"Latest from the STATE DEPARTMENT: Counterterrorism Bureau was NOT

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cut out of the decision making on 9/11 (Benghazi)."

And then, two lines down, it indicates it's a statement by former

coordinator for counterterrorism Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, posted

apparently May 6 or submitted May 6 of 2013.

And then I just want to direct your attention, in the second

paragraph, there's a description. And it says, "After the attack, the

first question to rise that involved the CT Bureau was whether or not

the Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) should be deployed."

It explains a little about the team, and it goes on to say, and

I just would quote, "The question of deployment was posed early, and

the Department decided against such a deployment. In my view, it was

appropriate to pose the question, and the decision was also the correct

one," end quote.

In terms of his roles and responsibilities, would he be the right

person to be able to evaluate, even just looking back and making an

evaluation, as to whether that was right decision or not?

A Yes. That was his role.

Q And I think his statement, you know, obviously speaks for

itself here, but he is stating that it was considered early and, in

his view, the decision was also the correct one.

Did you ever have a conversation with him about this?

A I might have had a conversation after all of the events and

the facts when this FEST matter came up, post all of the events. But

I don't recall having any kind of contemporaneous conversations as

decisions were being vetted around what should or shouldn't be assets

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that were deployed.

Q And then one of the things you were describing to us about

potential deployment of FEST and the ways in which it's sometimes

brought in, it sounded like it could possibly have also been useful

here.

So, you know, in the next paragraph, even after the attacks in

Tripoli, I think Ambassador Benjamin explains, and I quote, "After

Benghazi, such a deployment would have had little positive impact and

might well have complicated the difficult situation of U.S. personnel

on the ground in Libya," end quote.

So it appears from this statement that he's also considered,

looked back, assessed it, and his evaluation is that both on the night

of the attack and in the aftermath of the attacks the appropriate

decision was to not deploy the FEST team. Am I, you know, understanding

that accurately?

A Yes, you're accurately characterizing his statement.

Q And he never indicated to you or you never heard him indicate

anything differently than what's -- heard that he had indicated

anything differently than what's represented here?

A That's correct.

Q Another part of the discussion in the last few hours, a few

times there was an effort to talk about protests in contrast to attacks.

And you were first asked that question in the context of what was going

on in Cairo, and you were asked to clarify whether you thought Cairo

was a protest or an attack. And I think at that point in time you

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indicated Cairo was a protest.

A little later, you were asked to further define it. My

recollection was you were asked, so what distinguishes a protest from

an attack is the breach of a compound wall? Do you recall that?

A Yes.

Q And you generally agreed with that proposition, that what

distinguishes a protest from an attack is the breaching of a compound

wall.

A Certainly as I've been using it or we've been using it in

the conversations that we've been having. I don't know that that

stands up to a technical definition. But, in my frame of reference,

that's what I've been distinguishing in my head.

Q So, using that definition -- we looked at a cable earlier,

in the first time I spoke with you, that indicated that the wall in

Cairo had been breached. So, using that definition, what was happening

in Cairo was not a protest, it was an attack. Is that true?

A Yes, that would be accurate.

I don't have perfect memory of each one of the posts and what was

happening. I have the memory that there were a number of them that

were being attacked or that there were protests outside of and that

we were deeply worried about the safety of our teams, and so we were

spending an inordinate amount of time trying to ensure that we had the

best strategies for keeping our teams safe.

Q Understood. And I actually didn't ask you to walk through

that exercise with me in order to try to have you define for us

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concretely what really is a protest versus an attack --

A Okay.

Q -- but to try to get a sense of whether or not these are

somewhat fluid concepts.

A They are. I think that's very fair.

I think that, also, the fear always with protests is that people

will overrun our embassies. And so, a lot of times in the 2 weeks or

3 or 4 weeks after what had happened in Benghazi, there would be massive

protests that would sometimes be a mile away or 2 miles away, and they

were headed toward our embassies, and we would be getting these reports,

and we wouldn't know whether or not they would stop at our embassy wall

or whether or not they would keep going.

And so part of our objective was to try to be forestalling the

potential for people to confront the opportunity to make that decision

through our efforts with the host nation, through our efforts with our

own augmenting as we could, and through whatever other resources we

might have to try and protect our teams on the ground.

Q And you were indicating in that explanation that, you know,

there were concerns a group would be amassing or a mob would be amassing.

You know, one of the other things that we have heard -- and I don't

know if it was reflected in your experience and knowledge at the

time -- is that, in particular in that region of the world, there also

is easy access to weapons.

A Yes. And it is the case that particularly in a number of

the places where our embassies were experiencing more serious threats,

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breaches, harms, the access to uncontrolled weapons, be that in Sudan

or in Tunisia or in Yemen, in Egypt, was prevalent.

Q And it seems to me that, in considering one of the risks

of a large group, a mob, a protest is the fact that I think there

were -- it was reported as hundreds, at least, of people in Cairo.

Certainly, in any group, it's impossible to know the makeup of that

group. Is that accurate?

A Correct.

Q So you could have a group that had individuals who were

gathering to engage in what might be at one end of that spectrum as

a peaceful protest as well as individuals in a group that people would

characterize as being there for far more nefarious

purposes -- extremists, for example.

A Yes, that's correct. I think often in protests there are

different elements and different elements are arriving for different

reasons, and you don't have a way to assess who is falling into which

side of that equation.

And so part of our objective was to try and create perimeters and

support so that, to the extent any of the most nefarious elements could

hide within what might appear to be a peaceful protest, we had the best

opportunity to ensure they didn't do harm to our teams.

Q And so, thinking about what was happening throughout the

region at that point in time, was it possible for you all to know, with

regard to any of the unrest that was happening, what the makeup in any

particular country was of individuals who were coming to our facilities

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and engaging in a range of activity, from protesting to breaching the

wall to tearing down the -- in Cairo, the flag was removed. In other

places, there were people amassing at our embassies with black flags.

Was it possible for you to be able to tease out with certainty

what the makeup of any of the groups in any of those countries was?

A No. And that's what made it so fearful, right? Because

we didn't know. We just knew there were people, there were many, and

they were amassing, and that our embassies are not built for if there

is going to be a massive show of force against them. They're built

to withstand a certain number hours of life.

And so our goal is always to try to extend the perimeter that would

have to be breached if they were coming for our embassy. And so that's

what we would do, whether or not it was going to ultimately end up being

a peaceful protest or one that was not peaceful. We would react

similarly.

Q And so I wanted to show you what we're going to mark as

exhibit 10 for identification purposes.

[Mills Exhibit No. 10

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q This is a document that we obtained from opensource.gov,

and you may be able to explain for us exactly what that is. I know

what it is from my understanding as an outsider to the State Department.

But, just for identification purposes, it's a two-page document.

It indicates up at the top, "Unclassified, but for official use only."

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And the title line is, "Video: Ansar al-Sharia Statement on U.S.

Consulate Attack in Benghazi." It's got a date down below of "12

September 12," which I assume is 2012. It's right below that title

line.

First, can you explain what Open Source is?

A Open Source is a -- I don't know that I can perfectly explain

it, but it is a location from which information that has been gathered

in nonclassified ways can be shared for others to be able to access.

Q And do you happen to recall whether you -- well, this, as

I understand it, there's a -- just to describe it for the record, there's

a bit of block. It looks like, if you were actually online, you could

click on the video.

A Right.

Q And then there's text. And the, you know, first full

paragraph explains that this is a 5-minute 1-second video that starts

with a caption that reads, "Statement by the Ansar al-Sharia Brigade

on the Incident at the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi."

So my understanding of what this is is that, if we were looking

at the video, it would be in Arabic and this is the translation.

A This would be -- at least my understanding would be the same

as yours, that this would be actually an English version of what was

being said in the video.

Q So, down at the bottom of the page there, of the first page,

that paragraph, the last paragraph, the second sentence there says,

"Our Prophet, God's prayer and peace be upon him, has been assaulted

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and derided by some people in the United States and other countries.

There, there is an American pastor who is known for his animosity to

Islam and Muslims, supported by some of the Copts in Diaspora."

That discussion there, would it be your understanding that that

is a reference to -- we spoke, when I first spoke to you, about a film

and Pastor Terry Jones. Would that, from your perspective, be a

reference to that video of Pastor Jones?

A That would be my assumption.

Q And then, on the next page -- and I'll just direct your

attention to the last two paragraphs, the one that begins, "So, deriding

Islam and the master of the sons of Adnan [Prophet Muhammad], prayers

and peace be upon him, must be dealt with sternly. What is important

is that it was a popular uprising in which all Libyans participated

in support of the religion of the Lord of all creation, and in support

of the master of all messengers, may the best of prayers and salutations

be upon our Prophet."

Right there, you know, it indicates that there was a popular

uprising. And this is Ansar al-Sharia.

And so, you know, we were just talking about the fact that whenever

there is a group or a protest, you know, it's hard sometimes to tease

out the elements. Do you recall hearing at any point that night that

Ansar al-Sharia -- first, I think you mentioned that you had heard that

they had taken responsibility or admitted responsibility.

A Correct. I had heard that Ansar al-Sharia had taken

responsibility and said that they were the ones who had breached and

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caused the incident in our embassy.

And then I subsequently understood -- and I can't tell you in time

when it was. I don't believe it was the same night, but it might have

been -- that they were withdrawing the credit that they were claiming

for attacking our folks.

Q The very next paragraph gets toward that point, and it

begins with, "The Ansar al-Sharia Battalion did not participate in this

popular uprising as an independent entity." Then they go on to say

they were fulfilling a duty to their religion. And I think the

second-to-the-last sentence, "Rather, it was a spontaneous and popular

uprising in response to what the West did," end quote.

So do you recall hearing, in conjunction with them walking back

or, you know, denying that they were the primary actors, that they

acknowledged or they claimed that there had been a spontaneous and

popular uprising that they had participated in, at least?

A I don't know if I recall that at the time. I know there

was a lot of confusion around whether or not what had happened that

evening was spontaneous, whether or not it had been a dedicated attack,

and whether or not Ansar al-Sharia was or wasn't stating or overstating

their engagement and involvement. And I just remember feeling angry

about Ansar al-Sharia just because it was such an incredible thing to

have done, particularly in this country.

Q And you acknowledged that there was, certainly, confusion.

And I think in your answer you acknowledged that there could be many

purposes for posting this kind of a message.

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In terms of clearing up that confusion, kind of figuring out what

this meant in the context of what had happened in Benghazi, kind of

who had perpetrated the attacks and why, who within the U.S. Government

would take lead to really do that, both gathering of information and

assessment?

A Well, because in the end this ended up leading to the death

of four Americans, our Department of Justice and our FBI would become

the long-term partners in seeking to bring people to justice for the

deaths of our colleagues.

But I would also say that it is the case that each agency who had

any involvement or equities would obviously be seeking to do their very

best to learn what had happened and how it had happened and how it might

not again.

Q Uh-huh. And so that would include the State Department,

and that would include --

A It would include the State Department. It would include

our intelligence teams, because often, when you are in other countries,

part of what you rely on is the intelligence that you're able to glean.

Those would be the two agencies, at least for me, that would be

front and center who would be assessing that. But everybody would be

looking at, to the extent they had equities or things that they were

supposed to be doing, how they did them, be that DOD in assessing what

they would or could have done, the NSC in making those same assessments.

Everybody would have done their best to basically ensure that they

understood what had taken place and how they could have acted any

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differently or better.

Q And this translation on Open Source, that would be certainly

an authoritative source to be able to rely upon the actual translation

here. There would be no reason to doubt that this was

translated inaccurately --

A Oh, I wouldn't doubt the translation. I don't know whether

or not Ansar al-Sharia properly should or did do all the things that

they represent, but the translation would be the best translation that

could be done.

Q So it would be an accurate representation of what Ansar

al-Sharia said, whether or not those facts, in the end, proved

completely true or not.

A Right. It would be an accurate reflection of what they

said.

Q And to the extent there was conversation in the SVTCS about

Ansar al-Sharia and the potential role of Ansar al-Sharia that night,

did you have any reason to believe that the intelligence community and

then ultimately the FBI and the DOJ would not have been gathering

information that would include if they believed, if the notion was that

Ansar al-Sharia was potentially involved, statements from/posted by

Ansar al-Sharia shortly following the attacks?

A They would have taken this into account.

Q So it would have been part of the initial assessment being

made by a whole host of folks who were responsible for figuring out

the who and the why of the attacks in Benghazi.

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A Yes. It would have been taken into account, not only for

those seeking to understand what had happened and how you might bring

people to justice, but our intelligence community would have been

incorporating this information into their best understandings of the

intelligence regarding what had occurred.

Q Now, one of the things that has been very clear in the past

3 years is that there has been exhaustive examination of and the parsing

of exact words that were used in the immediate aftermath of the Benghazi

attack with regard to how that attack was described in the press to

the American people. You described, I think quite well, a process that

seems -- you called it "confusing" at one point. You just said it was

confusing to try to suss out all the details.

You know, given the fact that, in the aftermath, I presume -- and

you've described all the efforts that were going on that night,

certainly, to gather information by you and your colleagues. I presume

that was happening throughout every agency.

Given the fact that information was still being

gathered -- presumably you didn't have all the facts yet. In my mind,

there's always going to be then a risk, as the facts are evolving, if

you're going to go out and speak publicly about it, there's going to

be a risk that some of those initial assessments, some of those initial

facts prove false.

So how did the State Department work to try to, you know, take

that into account, to advise people that there's a risk that we can

be wrong here?

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A This is the most challenging thing, I think, for big

institutions to do well, because it's hard to always get all of the

information in a way that allows you then to make a clear assessment,

one, because information flows through people, and their perspective

of what happened, without the benefit of everything else, sometimes

means they don't have the full picture, but they have a definitive

picture and a piece of it.

At the Department, part of what we tried to do was to be taking

into account all the information that was coming from multiple

different sources. So, on the night involved, it was trying to ensure

that that information was flowing in a way that our operations center

was seeing it, because that presented a place for centralization of

information, but not perfectly because there were all these other

channels that were happening.

And so part of it is trying to figure out how you can hold all

those things and how you can ensure there is visibility and clarity

so that you make the best judgment. And I think that's a

government-wide challenge. The Department is no different. As

terrific as people are there and as hard as they work, it's a complicated

thing to do well, because if you don't have every piece of information,

then you might make a judgment one way that you would make differently

if you had one other piece.

Q Given the difficulty of doing that, given the risk -- I

mean, there is some risk if you go out and you try to give an

assessment -- well, one question: Given that you do know that there's

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that risk, did you take steps, you and your colleagues, to make sure

that when you spoke about it you made Congress and the American people

aware that the facts were still being gathered, there was an

investigation ongoing, that these assessments may evolve and change

over time?

A That was our intention, and that's what we sought to do.

I'm not sure if we did it perfectly every time, but we did our best

to indicate that information was fluid and our ability to understand

what occurred was fluid, and so we could only give what we knew in a

particular moment, which might evolve once there was more and better

information or more time to be able to distill what information was

there.

That was certainly our intention and certainly our best effort,

to try and get out the information we had the best we had it at the

time.

Q And, given the risk that it might change, and even if the

best efforts, you know, in good faith prove that some of the facts and

some of the early assessments were wrong, given the risk that you then

may be subject to intense criticism, sometimes maybe seven or eight

congressional investigations, there must be an -- I mean, there must

be some -- in that kind of balancing the risk and putting information

out there that isn't completely known, there must also be a tremendous

value or a reason to want to be able to do that.

So could you just help us understand kind of why it was that, at

the time that information was -- what's the value to doing that, the

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value to informing Congress, your partners, the value to informing the

American people, the value potentially to informing other governments

that we work with throughout the world?

A My belief is that -- and this is mine -- that, in the end,

most people want the best for a country who are working in our country,

whether or not they are working in government or whether they're in

the public. They want to believe we're the best, and they want the

best out of us. And that means we have to try hard to deliver that,

and that also means we have to own up when we don't.

But when something like the loss of four individuals happens, the

public wants to know why, and they want to know that they're safe. The

public wants to understand whether or not we're putting people in harm's

way and, if we are, for what value. And those who serve in government,

whether or not they serve in the Congress or in the executive branch,

want the same.

And part of why we did our best, and an imperfect best, to try

and share information as we learned it and to share what we understood

was so that that process could be an evolution and a participatory one.

That does mean you are sometimes subject to criticism. It does

mean there are times where people, properly and improperly, call you

to task. But you have to do it because you have to every day believe

that the only way we get better is by trying.

Q And as you all were trying, making your best efforts to

achieve those goals, was there ever an effort to conceal facts, distort

the truth, in order to spin a particular political narrative?

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A No. And I say that because I -- look, I'm the most

nonpolitical person that ended up playing political roles, which is

always the kind of irony of my life. But I say that recognizing now,

after having been in government twice, that that's a hard concept and

that not everybody embraces that. And I accept that very deeply,

because I've obviously been around government a long time.

But I do think people genuinely want to -- who serve want to serve,

want to do a good job, and want the approval of others who they're

serving. I don't think they are trying to do that poorly. I think

they're trying to do that the best they can.

Q So I wanted to return to a part of the subject that we left

off the last round of questioning, which had to do with your engagement

with the Accountability Review Board. And I just wanted to start with

the place we left off with regard to their final product, the draft

report that they sent to you.

You indicated that they shared the draft with you; you recalled

submitting some comments. Was there a further back-and-forth with

anyone about any particular comments you had made or any particular

suggestions?

A There absolutely might have been, so I'm not trying to say

that there wasn't a dialogue. My impression is that I had my thoughts;

I shared those thoughts. And, obviously, they had to make their own

determinations in the end, because they had the benefit of information

that I wouldn't have, just as I might have had information that had

not yet surfaced to them, though I would hope that that would have been

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very little. But, in the end, they had to submit the report that they

believed was the report the Secretary should get. And that's what they

did.

Q And, to the extent you can recall, would you have

characterized the things you suggested they change, concrete changes,

as minor edits? Major edits? Were you asking them to revisit and

change any of their factual findings, first?

A No. The reason why I keep saying -- I believe there was

an instance where there might have been something that they had

inaccurately described about either department operations or

something. So that's just the only one, actually, that stands in my

head, because I remember thinking, well, that will stand out as maybe

not a comprehensive understanding of how -- because it's an easily

understandable thing. And that might have been a drafting error, that

might have been something else.

That's the only thing in my head, and I can't even tell you what

it was. But that's my best recollection of the kinds of things that

I was sharing.

Q The one thing you did mention that I recall was that you

were surprised there were some recommendations contained in the

classified --

A I was surprised by -- I was surprised by one of the personnel

recommendations.

Q And did you ask them to do anything differently with regard

to that recommendation?

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A I asked why that recommendation had been made. Like, it

wasn't transparently obvious to me in the draft why that recommendation

would have been made.

Q And the bottom-line recommendation -- and, again, that's

information not in the public domain --

A Right.

Q -- the specificity of that, so I don't want to go into the

details. I just want to know, at the end of the day, had you asked

them to do something different with regard to the bottom-line

recommendation?

A I asked why they were making the recommendation and that

the report needed to be transparent about that recommendation.

They had a reason that came out of their interviews that they did

with the individual. But that was not a reason that, at least in my

memory, was transparent in their initial draft. And, because the

person was junior, it was an odd -- it struck me as unusual that that

person would have been deemed accountable in the context of the role

that this gentleman played.

Q And, in that final version, had they made more apparent

their rationale or had they satisfied you that the recommendation they

were making was explained?

A I just don't remember. And I obviously don't have access

to the final report to look. I don't remember now. But I do remember

I was surprised by that and expressed my surprise.

Q Were there any particular criticisms of the Under Secretary

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for Management, Patrick Kennedy, that you asked them to remove?

A Oh, no.

Q Anything at all about the role of the Under Secretary for

Management, Patrick Kennedy, that you asked them to change in any way?

A No.

Q Did you ever, in that process, attempt to exert influence

over the direction of the ARB's investigation?

A No.

Q Did you ever try to -- did Secretary Clinton ever try to

exert influence over the direction of their investigation?

A No.

Q You were asked some questions about both your role in terms

of helping collect and coordinate responses to, you know, requests for

information, it sounded like, from a whole host of folks -- Congress,

you know, the press presumably, probably the Secretary at times, other

colleagues.

A Uh-huh.

Q In a broad-brush kind of way, in your role, whether it be,

you know, helping to collect or helping to review, did you in any way,

yourself, remove any document that was relevant to or related to the

attacks in Benghazi and destroy that or prevent it from getting to the

Accountability Review Board or Congress or to the Secretary or whoever

had asked you for the information?

A I did not.

[Mills Exhibit No. 11

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Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q I am going to show you what's been marked -- we're marking

as exhibit 11 -- and I'm going to show you this, because I don't want

to belabor the point overly, but this was a specific allegation that

we've already spoken about about Mr. Maxwell. But the allegation -- I

think, you know, there are a number of allegations embedded within this.

And I think the one way in which you responded was, you know, just by

saying you had not seen Mr. Maxwell, as far as you could remember, at

a document review and particularly this document review session.

You know, in the article, Mr. Maxwell says that he was told, you

know, that one purpose for reviewing documents was to, quote, "go

through these stacks and pull out anything that might put anybody in

the [Near Eastern Affairs] front office or the seventh floor in a bad

light."

And, you know, setting aside this particular instance and whether

there was a basement review process going on, did you ever give anyone

any instruction that they should pull out anything that might put

anybody in the NEA front office or the seventh floor in a bad light?

A I did not.

Q Did you ever instruct anyone to pull out documents that

might put Secretary Clinton -- paint her in a bad light?

A I did not.

Q Did you instruct anyone to in any way kind of remove or

destroy or scrub documents that might not reveal the full and complete

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story about what happened in Benghazi?

A I did not.

Q Did anyone ever come to you -- you were kind of the point

person for the Department on making a lot of these wheels go around.

Did anyone come to you at the time or any time after and express concern

to you internally that there had been efforts, that there had been

orders to flag, remove, scrub, destroy documents that might look

damaging to the State Department?

A No, they did not. And the A Bureau keeps a copy of

everything, so they are the repository that holds everything. So there

are only then copies made for review. So, no, that didn't happen, and

the complete repository always stayed with the A Bureau. It never

left.

Q So if anyone were going to propose or think about doing this,

it's a pretty high-risk gambit, because ultimately the A Bureau is going

to have the master copy --

A That's exactly right.

Q -- and if documents are scrubbed, there's going to be an

evidentiary trail. Is that accurate?

A Correct.

Q And, certainly, you knew that at the time; is that correct?

A Yes. But, also, that's how the Department processes its

document requests, so I think that is something that has been their

practice, at least as I understand it.

Q Just a very brief question for you. You were asked a number

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of questions about a codel that involved Congressman Chaffetz. A

letter about that codel went from Senator Grassley on the Senate side

and on the House side from House Oversight Chairman Issa to the

inspector general asking for an investigation of that incident. Were

you aware of that?

A No, but -- "no" is probably the short answer to that

question.

Q So you don't know whether there was an inspector general

investigation? You wouldn't know what the outcome of that

investigation was?

A I don't as I sit here.

Q But, presumably, if there was and it was requested by

standing committees of the House, certainly anyone on one of those

standing committees would have knowledge of whether there was an

inspector general report and its outcome?

A I would assume so. Was there? Sorry. I know I'm not

supposed to ask you questions.

Ms. Sawyer. So we're just going to go off the record so I can

talk to the Congressman for a second.

Ms. Mills. Okay. I'm not going to go anywhere. I'm going to

sit right here in my chair.

Ms. Sawyer. Don't run away from us yet.

Ms. Mills. I won't go anywhere.

[Discussion off the record.

Ms. Sawyer. So, again, thank you. I think that was, you know,

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a very helpful clarification for me.

I know the ranking member had a few questions for you, as well.

And then we will, you know, conclude this round for us and turn it back

over to our colleagues.

Ms. Mills. Thank you.

Mr. Cummings. Ms. Mills, thank you very much for being here. We

all do appreciate your cooperation. We really appreciate it.

Ms. Mills. Thank you.

Mr. Cummings. All right. I just have a few questions.

Did you ever get the sense or impression that Secretary Clinton

was not fully engaged in the crisis response with regard to Benghazi?

Ms. Mills. No. Quite the contrary; she was very engaged. And

I think, as I said maybe a little bit earlier, it took some people aback

when she even decided to go to a staff-level SVTCS because she was deeply

concerned about and engaged in what needed to be done to secure our

team and hopefully bring them to safety.

Mr. Cummings. I take it that around the time that -- and, by the

way, I'm sorry. I had to go back to Baltimore and then come back and

then go back, and I'm going to go back --

Ms. Mills. Thank you for --

Mr. Cummings. We've got --

Ms. Mills. -- taking time to be here.

Mr. Cummings. In Baltimore, we have all kinds of little crises

going on, so I apologize.

Ms. Mills. I used to live in Dundalk.

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Mr. Cummings. All right.

Ms. Mills. They always had crises.

Mr. Cummings. So you had an opportunity to be in contact with

her, I guess, constantly after she found out what was going on.

Ms. Mills. Yes, that evening. She was there late that evening,

and I was too.

Mr. Cummings. And what was demeanor like?

Ms. Mills. She was very concerned. She was also very determined

that whatever needed to be done was done. And she was worried. She

was worried not only about our team on the ground in Benghazi but worried

about our teams that were on the ground in Libya and our teams on the

ground in a number of places, given what we had seen unfold in Egypt.

Mr. Cummings. Did she seem uncertain as to how to respond?

Ms. Mills. No. She was very -- she was very certain. And,

indeed, when we said it was going to be a staff SVTCS, which was our

diplomatic way of saying that maybe she shouldn't be attending, she

said, "I'm coming." And so we tried to make sure the rest of the

interagency knew ahead of time that she was going to be on, but we were

unsuccessful, so they were surprised when she sat down.

Mr. Cummings. So were you surprised by that?

Ms. Mills. I'm not surprised, because that's her approach.

She's a person who steps in and leads. She's someone who, when there

is accountability, takes it. So I wasn't surprised. But I know that

it can sometimes be intimidating to other staff that there is a

principal present.

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And what she really was communicating that night is, "I'm here

because I want my team safe. I'm not here because I'm here for any

other reason than trying to get their safety. And whatever we need

to do to do that I want to do."

Mr. Cummings. Well, one thing that is often overlooked is the

fact that Secretary Clinton, like others in the Department, lost

members of her team who were part of the State Department family. Can

you share with us on a more personal level what that meant to her?

Ms. Mills. I think she was devastated. Ambassador Stevens was

someone she had a lot of confidence and respect for. And his guidance

and his way was a compelling one. And the notion that he had been

murdered, I think, was something that all of us thought was unbearable,

but I think she particularly felt the pain of that.

She also felt the pain of the loss of other Americans that were

there that night, whom she didn't have a personal relationship with

but who she knew were there because they were trying to further our

own interests. And so she felt very strongly about claiming all of

them, even at a time where there was ambiguity about how that should

or shouldn't be done, but also in honoring their service and what they

had done.

And, in the days afterwards, she spent time reaching out to our

team in Tripoli, constantly trying to determine if they had what they

needed, constantly trying to remind people that, while we all have jobs,

people are fragile and you have to remember the fragility of people

and their humanity and you have to give respect to that.

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And she made herself consistently present to people on her team

because she wanted them to know that, as hard as this was, this was

something that required us all to bear witness, to learn, and to try

to be the very best we could in those moments.

Mr. Cummings. You spoke of the Tripoli -- or talking to the folks

in Tripoli. Did you have this -- the next day, I think it was. Did

you talk to her about that before she did that?

Ms. Mills. She said she wanted to talk to the team on the ground

there.

She also shared that she really wanted to ensure that the

President made calls to our teams not only there but in other locations

where they were experiencing challenges, and that happened over the

next week or so, because she thought it was important that they knew

that the country appreciated and stood with them and cared deeply about

not only the loss but what they were continuing to live in in the moment,

which was a lot of uncertainty.

Mr. Cummings. That's all I have for the moment.

Ms. Sawyer. So thank you.

We'll go off the record and take a break.

[Recess.]

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[3:38 p.m.]

Ms. Jackson. All right. We are going to start hopefully our

final hour. I think it should be our final hour.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q Ms. Mills, when did you first learn that Secretary Clinton

did not want to use an official government email account?

A Secretary Clinton had her own email account from when she

was a Senator. And when she came --

Q Was that a personal one or an official one?

A She used a personal one as a Senator, an AT&T one, if I

recall. And when she came into the State Department, she continued

to use her personal email address.

Q Okay. When she was a Senator, did she have an official

government account?

A I don't know. I didn't work for her when she was a Senator,

so I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Okay.

When did she change her personal email address from the AT&T one

to the clintonemail.com one?

A I believe that happened sometime in March. I only say that

because I know that we had to change email addresses where we emailed

her, and that's the time period that I remember that happening, sometime

in March.

Q Did she discuss this with you, or did she just inform you

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what she was going to do?

A I recall she was going to be using her personal email account

because it gave -- like what she said -- her the convenience to be able

to email her family and friends as well as email about work. And so

what she's articulated is probably the best recollection I would have

at that time, yeah.

Q Did you offer any opinion or try and dissuade her from doing

that?

A I don't recall that I did or that I didn't. I knew that

there had been a prior Secretary who had used a personal email, so I

don't know that I had a thought process around that one or way or the

other. I might have, but I can't take myself back to that moment.

Q And did you know that in January, February, March of 2009?

A Yes.

Q And how did you know that?

A I understood that because Secretary Powell, at least as I

understood it at the time -- there were others in the Department who

were familiar with that, as well. And I might have learned it in other

ways, too. But I do know that I was aware that he was one of the people

who had used a personal email account.

Q And is that information that you sought out?

A No. Quite candidly, I don't know that I really thought much

about email at that time. I know everyone does now, but I don't know

that I did.

Q Okay. Who at the Department knew that?

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A I don't know. Because -- I don't know how to basically take

myself back to that moment.

Q Uh-huh. Did Patrick Kennedy know?

A I don't know. I don't know, like, how to recreate a time

period where that wasn't something I was focused on. So I don't know.

Q Well, who was at the Department at the time that Secretary

Powell was there that you interacted with on a regular basis?

A Well, there were lots of folks who were obviously -- look,

the Department is filled with career and noncareer officials.

But my impressions was that that was something he had done. He

had recommended that when -- when there were -- all the Secretaries

met that read his book. I knew it was in his book. Because that was

one of the things we were doing also as you come in, is learning about

other people's experiences.

But I can't tell you -- I can't tell you that I have a cognizant

moment of how that information was transparent to me.

Q Okay.

Was anyone consulted about Secretary Clinton exclusively using

a personal email address for her work?

A I don't recall that. If it did happen, I wasn't part of

that process. But I don't believe there was a consultation around it,

or at least there's not one that I'm aware of -- maybe I should better

answer that way -- based on my knowledge.

Q So no private counsel?

A Not that I'm aware of.

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Q Okay. The general counsel for the State Department?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Okay. Anybody from the National Archives?

A Not that I'm aware of. But I can only speak to my knowledge,

obviously.

Q Sure. And anyone from the White House?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q Okay.

What was your opinion of whether it was a good idea or not?

A I don't know that I focused on it the way that I of course

now wish I had. My own observation was that, to the extent it allowed

her to be able to connect with her family and connect with work, that

is how she used it. And I don't know that I had more reflection on

it.

Q Were you aware of the Federal Records Act as a statute?

A Yes. No, I am aware of the Federal Records Act.

Q And the regulations and State Department policies that

govern the records management of the State Department?

A So I think what I have learned about the State Department

through this process is I would have anticipated that the Department

email would be maintained and so that, when she was communicating with

staff on their State accounts, that that would be something that was

maintained.

So I would have told you that at the time. I've come to learn

that that is not, obviously, the case. But that's what I would have

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told you if you were asking me at that time. That's what I at least

understood.

Q Did you use an official government account, a state.gov

account?

A I did.

Q Okay. And why did you make that choice?

A I don't know that I reflected upon it that deeply. There

was an ease in which, if you were on the system, everybody's email would

populate. But I don't know that I reflected on it other than that was

my email account so I was using it.

Q And did you have a personal email account at the same time?

A Yes, I've always had a personal email.

Q And you use that for family and friends?

A I typically use that for family and friends, that's correct.

Q Who all in the State Department was aware of the Secretary's

exclusive use of a personal email account?

A A large number of people, primarily because that's how she

communicated with her staff in the Department and she would communicate

with others outside the Department, as well. So it was certainly a

number of folks that would be aware.

Q Did it go down to the Assistant Secretary level?

A There were Assistant Secretaries that she would email.

Toria Nuland -- "yes" is the short answer. Yes.

Q Okay. Do you recall whether she could email with Jeff

Feltman or Beth Jones?

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A Yes, she could email with them. I don't know if she did,

but she could.

Q Did they have her personal email address?

A I don't know. I mean, I think at different times people

might or might not have her address.

You know, in the day, because as a practical reality she worked

in a SCIF, she couldn't email during the day because her BlackBerry

had to be locked up outside. So, when she was working during the day,

as a practical matter, it was typically the case that she would be

engaging by phone or in person.

And she's the Secretary. She gets to really rock ops. You know,

she gets to use the operations department however she wants, which means

they find anybody and everybody for her at a dime.

Q How did people get her personal email address?

A She would email them. Or if somebody wanted her email

address, they might ask myself, they might ask Huma, they might ask

, who was her assistant, for her email address. They might ask

any number of people for her email address.

Q Were the three that you've listed you, yourself; Huma;

and -- was it ?

A was her executive assistant.

Q Okay.

A Yeah.

Q Were the three of you that were primarily responsible for

deciding who would get her personal email address?

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A No. She would email people if she wanted to email. So,

no. But we would be people who would know it. But there were also

other people. People would ask Jake. They would ask, you know, Wendy

Sherman. They would ask Bill Burns. If there were people who were

aware of her email address, they would ask for it if they thought they

needed it.

Q Do you recall whether anyone ever brought it up to her that

it wasn't a good idea to exclusively use a personal email address?

A I don't have a memory of that. So I obviously can't speak

for her. Yeah.

Q Okay.

You have described before as to how the A Bureau was the repository

of documents to respond to any number of requests out there. Did the

A Bureau know that she was exclusively using a personal email address?

A I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Let me ask this. Did you ever inform them?

A I never had a conversation with the A Bureau about that,

but I wasn't frequently in a conversation with the A Bureau. So I think

the real place where information might have flown would be, obviously,

in her front office with the special assistants.

But I don't have a recollection of ever having had a conversation

with the A Bureau, and I don't know if she would have. I would be

surprised, but I don't know.

Q Did you direct anyone to tell the A Bureau to be on the

lookout for responsive records that would have been sent to or from

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her personal email address?

A No. But, obviously, if she was emailing someone to their

State accounts, those, at least as I understood it, would be captured.

Q Okay. Did you or anyone else instruct the A Bureau that

they needed to look at the other senior leader members' email accounts

to look for her records?

A So each individual was accountable for producing their

records, and so you had to produce your records, as opposed to the A

Bureau coming into your office to produce them. When they would sent

the request out, each person had to go through and produce their

records.

Q So you never relied on the IT department to go in and do

a search of records?

A I don't know that they did or didn't. And I don't know what

their capacities are. And I'm even less certain as to their capacities

today than I was when I was there.

Q Okay. And did the senior leadership have a separate IT

department?

A There is a division called POEMS. I don't know that POEMS

only deals with the senior leadership, but I know that there

was a -- well, certainly, when I had issues with my computer or my

technology, there was a unit I could call and say, "Could you please

help me?" And I don't know how to think about their relationship to

the rest of the broader IT, but it was my sense that they would try

to be responsive to us and to me. And so that made me think of them

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differently. But I don't know, if you actually looked at it in an org

chart, whether or not they were.

Q Would you please tell us about your knowledge, awareness,

or involvement in the campaign server being relocated to the

Secretary's personal use?

A I didn't have any involvement in that, so I can't.

Q Okay. Did you know that it was happening at the time?

A No.

Q Okay. When did you learn?

A I've learned subsequent to all of these matters that have

been raised.

Q Okay. And when was that?

A I don't know that I could tell you when that would have been.

Like, I don't know that I have a time window on when that was, because

I have obviously learned a lot more about all of this in the last

6 months to -- 6 to 8 months. So I don't know how to answer your

question. I don't know the answer to that.

Q Okay. Was it when the State Department contacted you about

seeking return of the Secretary's records?

A No. The server that she had during the tenure where she

was at the Department was the server that ultimately she migrated from

when she left the Department. So I don't know that it would have been

at that juncture, actually. It might have been at an earlier juncture.

Q Are we talking two different servers? I didn't quite

follow your answer.

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A Well, so, when she was at the Department, there was a server

that now is at the Justice Department that hosted all of her emails.

She left the Department in February, and, at some point, her emails

and the emails of her family ended up being hosted by Platte River

Networks. And so that transition would have happened after she left.

And the server that had hosted her emails when she was here would have

been the server in question.

Q Okay. During her tenure as Secretary of State, was there

just one server?

A To the best of my understanding, as I sit here, but I

obviously didn't have contemporaneous knowledge of that. But that is

my best understanding.

Q Okay. And do you where that server or have you subsequently

learned where that server was physically located?

A That server, as I understand it, was physically located at

her home.

Q Which home?

A Good question. Chappaqua. Her home in New York, as I

understand it.

Q And who told you that?

A I don't know the answer to who told me where the server was.

Q Did you have a conversation with Secretary Clinton about

that?

A No, I didn't. I'm trying to figure out who would have told

me where the server was. It could have been any number of folks as

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we were stepping through trying to understand the set of circumstances

that surrounded her email. But I don't know that I could tell you who

was the person --

Q Who would be in that group of names?

A Individuals that would be in that group of names might be,

certainly, her household -- one of her former households advisors,

which was Justin Cooper. Other individuals who might have -- I could

have learned that through the process of -- who else would have known

about it?

He's probably one of the more logical people I would have learned

that from, but it could have been others who had actually talked to

other people who were sharing that with me, as well.

Q And you described Justin Cooper as her household assistant?

A No. He was somebody who managed different

matters related -- he was a senior advisor to the President and a

personal assistant to the President, but he also handled a number of

their household matters.

Q Okay. And where is he these days?

A He lives .

Q Okay. And still in that same position?

A No, he does not work there.

Q Do you know where he works there?

A I don't know where Justin is working now. I believe he is

mainly consulting, but I could be wrong about that.

Q Okay.

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Have you subsequently learned who set up the server in the New

York home?

A I have subsequently learned that through reading and other

matters who, at least as I understand it -- but I don't have any

firsthand knowledge of that. My knowledge of that is obviously through

the processes that I have been participating in to learn.

Q So you never had a conversation with Secretary Clinton about

that?

A I didn't have a conversation about who set up the server

in her house with her, correct.

Q Okay. What about with David Kendall?

A Certainly with David Kendall I've had conversations.

Q About the server?

A So David Kendall is her personal counsel. I also provide

her personal counsel. And so, in the course of our conversations of

responding to requests that have come not only from Congress but that

have come from agencies about this matter, we have tried to be

thoughtful in providing the best information that we had that was

consistent with our obligations to her.

Q Okay. And did you discuss with Mr. Kendall the server?

Ms. Wilkinson. Can we go off the record a moment?

Ms. Jackson. Sure.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Jackson. We'll go back on the record. And let me withdraw

the question and ask another one.

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BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Do you know a Bryan Pagliano?

A I do know Bryan Pagliano.

Q And how do you know him?

A Bryan Pagliano provided technology advice on the

Secretary's campaign in 2008 when she ran for President. And,

subsequent to that time period, Mr. Pagliano ultimately ended up being

an employee at the Department. He was one of the Schedule C employees

that was hired during the time that Secretary Clinton was Secretary.

Q Okay. He was a Schedule C employee?

A I believe so. I might be misstating that, so don't quote

me on that, but he was certainly an employee who joined during her

tenure.

Q Okay. And what's the significance of being a Schedule C

employee?

A Am I wrong about that?

Q I don't know.

A Oh, okay. So I don't want to go all the way down a path

if I'm wrong.

Q Yeah. Yeah.

A But what I would say is he was somebody who was hired during

her tenure. And so there are a set of appointments that, as each

Secretary comes into the Department and as each administration takes

over from the prior administration, they have the privilege and

opportunity to appoint talent that they believe are going to achieve

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the goals and objectives of their administration or of that particular

department or those particular priorities and initiatives. And at

least it was my impression that he might have been in one of those slots.

Q Okay. And he was an IT person?

A He was somebody who had a technical background, that's

correct.

Q In maintaining information technology systems?

A I don't know the breadth and scope of his skills. I don't

know that I can speak to that. But I do know that he was somebody who

I would describe as somebody who had technology expertise.

Q Okay. And is that what he did for the campaign?

A For the campaign, part of his responsibilities was,

obviously, managing a lot of the technology issues, but I think he had

a broader portfolio than that.

Q And what was that broader portfolio?

A I don't know. Like, I don't if he was also doing some of

the admin or other things that might be related and bundled with kind

of dealing with technology and other things like that. So that's the

only thing. I don't know.

Q Did you have any role in his being hired at the State

Department?

A I don't have a recollection of that -- or, necessarily, I

would or wouldn't have.

It is certainly the case that, when talent was being considered,

our White House liaison would actually interview everyone. And one

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of the things that is certainly the case that Secretary Clinton sought

to do was people who she thought were talented and wanted the

opportunity to serve, to make sure that they were interviewed. And

then they would be sent to different departments for interviews. And

if the Department determined that they wanted to hire them, then that

became the way in which I would get slates to say, these people are

now getting ready to be hired.

So I would imagine he would have been in a context like that,

because that is typically how we operated.

Q During the time that he worked -- well, let me ask this

first. Do you know the timeframe that he worked for the State

Department?

A I don't. I don't think he was there in the beginning, but

I can't tell you when he arrived.

Q Okay. And did he leave contemporaneously with the

Secretary or shortly thereafter?

A I don't know. I don't know.

Q Okay. Do you know whether he played any role in maintaining

the private server that was at her New York home?

A I've come to understand that. That was not something I had

knowledge of during the time period I was at the Department.

Q Okay. And when did you first become knowledgeable of that?

A As I've been stepping through this process of providing

advice and guidance.

Q Okay.

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To your knowledge, was there any intrusion or breach of her server

during her tenure as Secretary of State?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q At any time was the server down for any reason, not

functioning?

A That might have occurred. And I just am going to give you

my best understanding. That might have occurred, obviously,

during -- there has been different weather and other things, so that

clearly could have occurred. I don't know that I had contemporaneous

knowledge, and I don't know that I have any specific knowledge right

now, but quite plausible that that could have occurred.

Q Okay.

Stepping back to Mr. Pagliano, what department did he work in when

he was at the State Department?

A I believe he was in the technology department.

Q Okay. Was that the same technology department that you

would call on when you would need assistance, or was it a different

one?

A It was a different -- I don't know that they are different

departments, but the division that I would be engaging with is called

POEMS, and he was not a part of that.

Q Did you know who he reported to?

A I don't know who he reported to. But I know he was in -- I

know he was in at least the technology department, so I would have

assumed he would report to the head of that, the CIO or the head of

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the super bureau that might have been associated with it. So those

are -- I acknowledge my assumptions.

Q Is it your understanding that when official business is

conducted via personal email that electronic records of that official

business being conducted is a Federal record?

A I am now much more sensitive to that. But, yes.

Q Were you aware of it during your tenure with the State

Department?

A I would have answered that question if you'd asked me in

my tenure at the State Department that, yes, records were records of

the work of the Department. It was my observation that that typically

is how people were also using their State Department records -- their

State Department emails. But that would have been my answer at the

time.

Q Okay. And any type of official record or Federal record

belongs to the agency; is that also your understanding?

A That's my understanding, yes.

Q Okay. And so it is not property, such as it is, of the

individual, but it's property of the agency?

A I think that, as a general matter, when you are dealing with

emails, because sometimes they have both things in them, it

does -- meaning by "both things," I mean sometimes agency matters and

sometimes personal matters, when you are in people's personal accounts,

that there can be blended materials. But, otherwise, I would certainly

say that the agency has the right to the materials that are agency

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materials.

Q And if an email is solely agency information, then it

belongs to the agency?

A That is what I understand.

Q Were you contacted in the summer of 2014 regarding Secretary

Clinton's Benghazi-related documents being discovered with her

personal email address?

A I was contacted about the Department -- that they were going

to be providing the final tranche of documents that had been collected

and that in those materials were materials that reflected her email

address.

Q Okay. And that was the final tranche of records that were

going to be produced to this committee?

A As it turns out now, to this committee, as opposed to the

prior committee for which they had been collected, as I understand it.

Q Okay. And who contacted you?

A At that time, I ended up engaging with the chief of staff

in the Department, whose name was David Wade, and their communications

partner, whose name was Jen Psaki.

Q The spokesperson for the State Department?

A She was a spokesperson for the State Department at that

time.

Q And what was relayed to you in that conversation?

A That they were anticipating that there would be potentially

media inquiries around a set of materials that they would be providing

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to Congress, and included in that set of issues was her personal email

account and address.

Q There were media inquiries?

A They were anticipating they would get media inquiries.

Q Okay. But the --

A So they were preparing for what they anticipated to be

inquiries that would come once the materials were provided.

Q But these were materials to this committee, not going to

be released via a FOIA?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A Or, at least, that is my best understanding.

Q Okay.

And did you have a series of conversations with Mr. Wade and/or

Jen Psaki?

A I know I talked to them more than once, but I couldn't tell

you if it was more than twice. But I know that I did have more than

one conversation.

Q Okay. And were you the only person they were communicating

with on behalf of the former Secretary?

A No, because this was actually a communications matter. The

other person who was with me in this communication was a gentleman named

Philippe Reines.

Q Okay. And do you recall when this occurred?

A This would have been, I think, late summer. That's my best

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memory.

Q Do you know whether the documents had already been delivered

to this committee?

A It was my impression that they were going to be delivered,

and the questions that they were posing related to matters that they

believed might be the subject of media inquiries that they would get,

and they were seeking information and understanding to be able to

respond to those. That's my best recollection.

Q And what were those questions?

A I don't know, but I know that her -- like, I don't have a

perfect memory of what were the four or five things that they thought

were going to be likely, potentially, the subject of media inquiries.

But I do believe that -- I do know that one of them was with respect

to her personal email address, which would be being made available.

Q Okay. And can you recall any of the other topics?

A No. I just said that.

Q Okay.

A Sorry.

Q Did you have meetings with any individuals at the State

Department?

A Those were the individuals that I met with.

Q That you met personally with them?

A Yes.

Q And was Mr. Reines there?

A Yes, Mr. Reines was, as was Ms. Psaki, because the

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conversation was revolving around the communications that they

anticipated her having to answer in terms of questions that she might

get related to a set of issues that they would have anticipated.

Q And what were her questions to you?

A I don't recall her having per se questions to me. But I

do recall that they were anticipating that there would be media

inquiries as a result of producing the materials, and they wanted to

ensure they had as accurate information as they could relay.

Q Okay. And was there any discussion about seeking return

of more records from the Secretary?

A Not at that time. That was subsequent to that. That was

much later.

Q When did that occur?

A That happened later in the fall, when they concluded that

the Department didn't maintain all records of the Department.

Q And who did you converse with regarding that?

A At that time, I remember, obviously, David Wade was present,

but I remember that the other participant at that time was a member

of the counsel's office, whose name is .

Q Okay. So the Legal Advisor to the State Department's

office?

A I think he's a deputy legal advisor. I believe Mary McCloud

is the Acting. But that's my best understanding.

Q And, again, was this a meeting or a telephone call?

A So I recall one meeting and a telephone call. Those are

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the things that I recall.

Q And with David Wade and the representative from the Legal

Advisor's Office?

A So the meeting, I recall, was with David Wade and the

representative from the Legal Affairs office, who had indicated that

they had learned that they didn't have necessarily comprehensive

records. And they were going to be stepping through a process to

determine how to address that with all the Secretaries.

Q And you say they learned that they didn't have comprehensive

records. How did they learn that?

A I didn't ask. I mean, I think -- I think everyone

understood that the point of electronic records is you have them, but

apparently that was not accurate.

Q Okay.

Did you disclose to them at the time that her personal email

records would be housed on her private server?

A I don't know that I had a cognizance of the private server

in that framework, so I don't know how to answer your question, because

of the way it's framed.

But at least what we indicated, once we understood the nature of

the challenge, was that we would obviously speak to Secretary Clinton

to learn how she would want to respond once they shared whatever letter

they were going to be sending so that we could best understand what

would be our approach in that regard.

Q And you said this was later. Can you give us a better idea

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of the timeframe?

A I can't tell you. I think in September or October they

would have indicated that they anticipated that they were going to be

needing to augment their records and would be making a request to do

that. I didn't actually get the request that they sent until the end

of October, and that request was actually directed to Condi Rice, but

it was sent to me, and so they then had to correct that.

Q Okay. So that would have been late October or early

November when that occurred?

A That's my best understanding. Late October -- I think late

October would have been the first letter, which would have been the

one that was for Condi Rice that came to me. And then they subsequently

would have replaced that letter, and that, I believe, would have come

within the next 30 days or so, yeah.

Q Okay.

Prior to receipt of that letter, did you have any knowledge that

they were going to reach out to other former Secretaries other than

Secretary Clinton?

A At the time, when they were explaining the challenge that

they confronted, they explained that that challenge was potentially

one that was more than just the last few years. And so they were going

to be assessing what they needed to do to ensure they had at least tried

to get as comprehensive a set of records as they could.

Q Okay. And what steps did you take after -- or, actually,

what steps did you take after you had this meeting, even before you

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got the letter, to attempt to gather Secretary Clinton's records?

A So what our objective was was to understand what was the

scope of records that they didn't have. Because if what they didn't

have was records that were -- that they had everything on the state.gov,

then it becomes a much easier exercise. But once they made clear that

it was broader than that, that their own records might not be also

reflective of just state.gov, then it became a different set of

exercises.

Q Okay. So, again, this was the fall, late October,

November, of 2014 when the State Department was aware that they did

not have virtually any of Secretary Clinton's records.

A I don't know that it's "virtually any" because, at least

as I understand it, what they would capture would be -- when she's

emailing people, they would capture people on the State records, but

they weren't always maintaining individual State records. So if you

were an employee and your records happened to be one of the ones that

they weren't maintaining or that got taped over, while they might have

at one point had those communications, they had not maintained them.

Q Okay. And when did you first learn this? Was it before

this time in late October, early November?

A So my best recollection is that I learned that sometime in

the fall because I was -- I can just remember being surprised by it.

So it would have been at the late summer or September time, October

time period, in that time period, where we gained a deeper understanding

of what the breadth of the challenge was.

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Q Describe for us the process that you went through, you and

others went through, to then identify, collect, review, and turn over

Secretary Clinton's records -- return the Federal records to the State

Department.

A After the letter came, Secretary Clinton asked David

Kendall and myself to oversee a process to ensure that any records that

could be potentially work-related were provided to the Department.

And so we stepped through that process by first reviewing her

personal email account during her tenure for all records that had

dot-gov, and that meant you could set aside a large swath of them as

records that could be provided.

Q How did you get those records? Did you or Mr. Kendall

physically have the server at this time?

A No. I know there's a lot of focus on that server. Boy.

So that server, as I understand it, doesn't contain any of her records.

So we asked Platte River to give us a PST of all of her emails

during the tenure where she was there, which they did. And we used

that PST to first search for and set aside all of the state.gov records,

then to actually do a name search of all of the officials in the

Department so that we could ensure that all the senior officials that

she would likely be corresponding with got looked at and searched for

by name, and then a review of every sender and recipient so that you

knew, if there was a misspelling or something that was inaccurate, that

you would also have that review done, as well.

And then that created the body of, I think, about 30,000 emails

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that ended up being ones that were potentially work-related, and not,

obviously, completely, but it was the best that we could do, meaning

obviously there were some personal records that are turned over, and

the Department has advised the Secretary of that.

Q Okay.

When you say "we" did this, "we" reviewed for state.gov and

things, was that you and Mr. Kendall?

A So we oversaw the process. The person who actually

undertook it is a woman who worked for me. She's an associate. Her

name is Heather Samuelson.

Q Okay. Did she have any specialized training or skills in

the Federal Records Act or identifying official records?

A She's a lawyer by training. She also had served time in

the counsel's office, so she has a set of understandings of what would

be required.

Q Okay. And by "counsel's office," the State Department's

counsel's office?

A White House Counsel's office.

Q White House Counsel's office.

A Uh-huh.

Q Okay.

What happened to the universe of the PST file once the potentially

Federal records were segregated out?

A So the potential set of Federal records, we created a thumb

drive that David Kendall kept at his office. And then the records

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themselves, that would have been the universe that they sent, Platte

River took back.

Q They took the PST file back?

A So they just removed it. So it ended up being on Heather's

system, and they just removed it. And I don't know what is the

technological way they do it, because it's a way you have to access

it, and then they make it so you can't access it anymore.

Q You said Mr. Kendall retained a copy. Did you retain a

copy?

A On Ms. Samuelson's computer there was one copy of the 55,000

pages with the 30,000 emails, and that was the copy that was retained.

Q Okay.

You also returned records to the State Department, you

personally; is that correct?

A Yes, I did.

Q Okay. What is the volume of the records that you returned

to the State Department?

A I don't know the answer to that question for two reasons,

but I returned back -- I had trip books from Haiti or other things like

that. So there were hard-copy documents that I returned back. And

then, with respect to my own emails, I gave my counsel my inbox so

that -- I mean my all-mail box for the period of time where I was in

the Department, and they reviewed it and provided the documents to the

Department.

Q And you don't know what that volume is?

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A No.

Q Okay.

Ms. Jackson. I believe perhaps our Members have some questions,

so I'm going to make sure that they have sufficient time to ask their

questions.

Ms. Mills. Thank you.

Mr. Gowdy. Ms. Mills, I'm trying to understand, was your first

being alerted a letter from Patrick Kennedy that the State Department

was not in possession of the full public record, or had you had previous

conversation with someone in the State Department?

Ms. Mills. So the conversations that I had with the Deputy

Counsel there, with David Wade, at that time it was not transparent,

but at least it was clear that they believed that there might be a need

for them to augment their records and that they were going through to

learn what they had and what they didn't have. But they were, at least

at that time, concerned that their records were not complete.

Mr. Gowdy. Did they address how they complied with either FOIA

or civil litigation requests during the time period when they were not

asking for the return of the public record?

Ms. Mills. So, in my conversation with them, that didn't come

up. So I guess "no" is the answer to your question.

Mr. Gowdy. Okay.

Did you have any conversations with Patrick Kennedy about the

return of her public record prior to receiving the letter?

Ms. Mills. My conversations were actually with the Deputy

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Counsel. And then I received a letter from Pat Kennedy.

Mr. Gowdy. So you and Mr. Kendall both, as her counsel, oversaw

the determination of what was purely private, purely public, or you

said blended, I say mixed use.

Ms. Mills. Mixed use, yes. And we had some mixed use, which also

were provided to the Department. That's fair.

Mr. Gowdy. All right. And how many were determined to be purely

personal?

Ms. Mills. I know that about half of them in the end ended up

being purely personal, if I remember correctly. So, if there were

30,000, there were would be another 30,000 that would be likely in the

personal.

Mr. Gowdy. All right. Secretary Clinton gave three categories

that would fit the description of purely personal: yoga practice,

Chelsea's wedding, and correspondence with the former President.

Those are the three she cited when she was asked about it.

Do you know, of those three categories, of the 30,000, how much

does that constitute?

Ms. Mills. No, I couldn't -- I didn't go through the 30,000. So,

no, I have no idea.

Mr. Gowdy. You didn't go through any of the personal?

Ms. Mills. So the senior associate I had was going through them,

as opposed to me going through them. So I wasn't sitting and going

through them. But I couldn't tell you that. I know that her personal,

obviously, would encompass a whole scope of things, but I couldn't tell

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you how many of them would have been in any of those categories or

another category per se.

Mr. Gowdy. Can you give me an example of a mixed-use email that

you reconciled in favor of disclosure or production?

Ms. Mills. They're all being produced up on the Web. Sure.

Some of them might be -- there's an ops alert, and then she says, do

you know where my ring is, or do you know where my dress is, or do you

know where my particular item of clothing is. There are some of those

that are being produced. Or, can someone bring me something to drink.

There are a number of them that kind of, in the context of other

matters that are being discussed, there's a personal item that actually

ends up being discussed in the context of these.

Mr. Gowdy. There were 15, 9 in whole and 6 in part, that were

not produced to the State Department from Sidney Blumenthal. Do you

know how those 15 escaped production to the State Department?

Ms. Mills. No, you know, because what we would have shared would

have been what was in her records. Just as I am not certain why he

also doesn't have some that she has. So I don't know the answer to

that. I just know that that's the fact, that I know she had some he

didn't have, and he had some she didn't have. But I can't tell you

how or why that is.

Mr. Gowdy. So you and Mr. Kendall did not personally review the

60,000. You had or hired or had an employee do that for you.

Ms. Mills. She did that, and she undertook that work, obviously,

diligently. But part of the process was to make sure that there was

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a process of both taking all the state.gov, which was about 26,000 or

27,000 of them, and then looking for the names of everybody in the

Department and in the government, as well as some Members, obviously,

and then going to review sender and recipients to ensure that everything

had been captured. So it was a three-prong process.

Mr. Gowdy. Do you know if anyone else at the State Department

had a clintonemail.com email address?

Ms. Mills. Yes.

Mr. Gowdy. Who?

Ms. Mills. Huma Abedin.

Mr. Gowdy. Was that it? Just her?

Ms. Mills. She's the only one I'm aware of.

Mr. Gowdy. Sidney Blumenthal, did you receive his memos?

Ms. Mills. I sometimes would occasionally receive his memos. I

learned in the process how prolific he was and realized I probably

wasn't receiving a lot of them. But I did receive on occasion some

of his emails.

Mr. Gowdy. Did you know who they were from when you received

them?

Ms. Mills. Typically, in the instances where I would have gotten

any of Sidney's emails, they were from Sidney. They were about a book

his kid was doing or other things as well. Or, if they were about --

Mr. Gowdy. So you got emails directly from him.

Ms. Mills. Yes.

Mr. Gowdy. I was more referencing the ones he sent to Secretary

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Clinton.

Ms. Mills. Oh. Sorry. So I often wasn't copied on those. I

apologize. What's your -- so tell me your question.

Mr. Gowdy. The ones that he sent to Secretary Clinton, were you

either copied or received a forward of those?

Ms. Mills. As it turns out, I often did not. I know that,

obviously, because I've been looking at them. But I'm sure there was

an occasion where I would have been, but a lot of them were forwarded

to other colleagues that I might not.

Mr. Gowdy. Do you know whether or not it was ever contemplated

that he would work for the State Department?

Ms. Mills. Yes.

Mr. Gowdy. And how do you know that?

Ms. Mills. Because when the Secretary was assessing whether or

not and how we could actually think about some of our transatlantic

engagements, Sidney was identified as someone that we thought could

be valuable in that process. And so I stepped through a process with

him to learn whether or not he could or could not serve. And then,

when raising that with the White House, they expressed reservations

about him. And so we didn't hire him.

Mr. Gowdy. Do you recall who specifically at the White House

raised reservations?

Ms. Mills. I don't. Unfortunately, there are a number of

non-fans of Sidney Blumenthal, so it could have been any number of

people.

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Mr. Gowdy. So the Secretary wanted to hire him, and he wanted

to work there, but it was nixed -- is that a fair word to say? -- nixed

by the White House.

Ms. Mills. I think it was fair to say that they expressed

their -- at least their opinion that that would not be a good idea,

and so we took that into account in not hiring him.

Mr. Gowdy. Okay.

You told Ms. Jackson that you recently returned records to the

Department of State.

Ms. Mills. I have returned records to Department of State.

Mr. Gowdy. And how would those records have come to be in your

possession and not the State Department's possession?

Ms. Mills. So I had copies of -- when I was serving as the envoy

to Haiti, I had copies of trip books. And those trip books I returned.

I had materials that also, when the Secretary was being -- during

the transition period before she became Secretary, they produced

transition notebooks. I don't know what they consider those, because,

obviously, they're giving them out to someone who might not get

confirmed.

But those are kinds of materials I returned, in addition to any

emails that were personal emails of mine that had any kind of

work-related matters in them.

Mr. Gowdy. What prompted your return of the public record to the

State Department?

Ms. Mills. The letter that we had received from the Department.

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Mr. Gowdy. So you viewed the letter in the fall as not just

including the former Secretaries of State but also folks who worked

with them. Or was there a separate letter?

Ms. Mills. Which letter are you speaking of? Sorry.

Mr. Gowdy. Well, which one were you --

Ms. Mills. So, I got a letter to me, Cheryl. So I was responding

to the letter to me, Cheryl.

Mr. Gowdy. When did you get the one to Cheryl?

Ms. Mills. I received that in May, maybe? March? I'm not sure,

but I received that in the spring of --

Mr. Gowdy. Of this year?

Ms. Mills. -- 2015. Correct.

Mr. Gowdy. So 6 months after Patrick Kennedy wrote you about the

return of her public record.

Ms. Mills. Yes. And my understanding is they were

asking -- they first were, at least as I understand it, asking the

Secretaries and then asking the staffs of prior administrations. But

I don't have, obviously, visibility into how broad that is or how they

were doing that.

Mr. Gowdy. Does it not strike you as at all unusual that they

would wait 20 months to ask a Secretary of State to return the public

record?

Ms. Mills. I don't know, because I don't know how they would have

been assessing it from their side. I think that --

Mr. Gowdy. Well, the reason I asked -- I don't want to interrupt

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you. Go ahead.

Ms. Mills. Oh, no. I appreciate it.

I think that, certainly, I was of the impression, so it wouldn't

surprise me if other people were as well, that the State Department's

electronic system captured records in realtime. And I think there's

been a greater learning by a broader number of individuals that that

didn't end up being the case.

Mr. Gowdy. You had earlier said a large number of people were

aware of her email arrangement, the exclusive use of personal email.

And, if that were true -- and I have no reason to doubt that it is

true -- it makes one wonder why you waited 20 months to establish that

the public record was complete.

Ms. Mills. Look, I wish more than anybody that that would have

been something that I thought about or that anybody else would have

thought about separate and apart from the Department thinking about

what their own recordkeeping abilities were or weren't. I wish I had.

I don't know that I can change what is, but it certainly is the case

that I wish I would have thought about it.

Mr. Gowdy. Well, I don't often get to say this, but Congress

actually did think to ask that question. And they wrote the State

Department and wrote the Secretary, in particular, and asked whether

she ever used personal email. Did you see that request?

Ms. Mills. I don't believe I did. I've obviously become aware

of it since I left the Department, but I don't believe so.

Mr. Gowdy. All right. Would you agree with me that that would

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have been a really good time to alert Congress --

Ms. Mills. Yes. And if I had seen that, I would have said that

the answer to the questions being posed would have required reflecting

that she has an email address and what that email address is.

Mr. Gowdy. But when I factor in your earlier testimony that a

large number of people knew and it did not appear as if there was any

effort to keep this a secret --

Ms. Mills. I would agree that a number of people knew about her

email account; that's correct.

Mr. Gowdy. Okay. And there -- I'm sure my colleagues will

correct me if I have the number wrong -- there have been seven prior

congressional investigations into Benghazi. I ought to know that

number, I've heard it so often, but I think it is seven.

Ms. Mills. Does that make you lucky number eight?

Mr. Gowdy. I don't think there's anything lucky about it.

But why did none of the previous seven inquiries prompt the State

Department to seek the return of the public record?

Ms. Mills. Well, her records were collected in the records that

were to be provided. So I think -- I can't answer for why or what

prompted different decisionmaking or questions, but there are

instances of her email being provided as responsive to requests that

had come. And so --

Mr. Gowdy. But those would have been emails that were captured

by the state.gov site.

Ms. Mills. Correct.

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Mr. Gowdy. Those would not have been emails from her server.

Ms. Mills. Correct. They would not have been emails from her

personal account. Correct.

Mr. Gowdy. And there would be no way for the ARB to have had the

benefit of the full public record when they made recommendations to

you.

Ms. Mills. They would not have had emails from her account other

than the emails that reflected her communications with staff about work

and about Benghazi, which would then be captured in the materials that

they would have had access to and would have been in the A Bureau

materials, because there were some of them in there.

Mr. Gowdy. So it's fair to say that some of these state.gov

recipients or senders would have been captured by the public record,

but there would be no reason for private email to private email to have

ever been captured.

Ms. Mills. That's accurate.

Mr. Gowdy. Okay.

And Huma Abedin used private email with which to communicate on

private email with the former Secretary of State. Did you ever use

private email with which to conduct business with the former Secretary

of State?

Ms. Mills. As a general matter, I used State email. That was

just my practice. I'm confident there are, no doubt, occasions where

I would have used my personal email -- if I was traveling, the system

were down, if I was home and I couldn't fob on or it was easier because

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I was dealing with my kids. But, as a general matter, I was a State

email user. That was my overwhelming practice.

I wasn't perfect, so I often would have personal things on the

State email, and I'm sure there are instances where I likely would have

had State on my personal. But my general practice and my body of email

scope is in the State email scope.

Mr. Gowdy. Did Mr. Blumenthal have a particular interest or

expertise in Libya?

Ms. Mills. I don't know. It was my impression that Sidney's

expertise was in transatlantic matters, but I don't know that he might

not have expertise in other areas. But I can only tell you my

impression is his areas of expertise were on the transatlantic side.

Mr. Gowdy. Did you know any of his sources of information?

Ms. Mills. No.

Mr. Gowdy. I had not -- if I had seen this article on Mr. Maxwell

before, I don't recall it. And I know you've answered it twice, so

I'm going to get in and get out quickly. He makes a lot of very specific

factual assertions.

Ms. Mills. He does.

Mr. Gowdy. Are any of the factual assertions accurate? And when

I say "any" --

Ms. Mills. I haven't read that to look at each of the factual

assertions.

Mr. Gowdy. All right. I'll give you a couple.

Ms. Mills. Well, the assertion that I know is not accurate is

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that I had an engagement with him where I even had a conversation with

him to say, what is he doing here?

Mr. Gowdy. Well, that is what I was going to ask you.

Ms. Mills. And Mr. Sullivan said, You know who Ray Maxwell is?

Like, it did not happen.

Mr. Gowdy. All right. Could it have been accurate that there

were weekend document sessions?

Ms. Mills. There were. I would imagine that people had to be

working on the weekend, and I'm sure I was there on a weekend. I don't,

obviously, have a perfect memory of each day and when it was a weekend

and when it was not, because we were working pretty hard. But it is

certainly the case that I had asked for people to be fully dedicated

to be able to try to get documents out as quickly as they can, and so

people would have been working around the clock.

Mr. Gowdy. Could it be accurate that there is something

colloquially referred to as the "jogger's entrance"?

Ms. Mills. I don't know, because I'm not familiar with the

jogger's entrance.

Mr. Gowdy. Is there a space outfitted with computers and

big-screen monitors intended for emergency planning?

Ms. Mills. We have emergency centers throughout the facility,

so, yes, there are a number of those.

Mr. Gowdy. Would there ever have been a circumstance where you

and Mr. Jake Sullivan and Mr. Maxwell would have been in the same room

together?

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Ms. Mills. Not that I recall.

Mr. Gowdy. But you recall with specificity not only did you never

tell him what he alleges -- do you recall with equal specificity that

he was not part of any document accumulation or production process?

Ms. Mills. I don't know what NEA might have had as an independent

process. He was not part of the process of the team that NEA had sent.

There was another woman who NEA had sent as their designated full-time

body, if you will. And so I would have remembered if it was an African

American man instead of a white woman. And it was a white woman who

was assigned.

Mr. Gowdy. Did the ARB interview you?

Ms. Mills. No.

Mr. Gowdy. Did the ARB interview Secretary Clinton?

Ms. Mills. No.

Mr. Gowdy. Why not?

Ms. Mills. I don't know. I can only give an impression. And

I don't know why they didn't --

Mr. Gowdy. That's fine. You can give me an impression.

Ms. Mills. Okay. Thank you.

The purpose of the ARB is to learn in a particular instance what

occurred and whether or not the security in those moments was adequate

and what should be done better, if not. And it is to write a report

to the Secretary for that.

So I am not familiar with an ARB -- and I only knew of one other

one when I was there -- where they would have interviewed the Secretary

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as opposed to actually be providing that information to the Secretary

for the purposes of making an assessment about the events. Because

they are looking at the events that happened on the ground, and

typically that involves a body of people beyond the scope of most of

the people in Washington, but it's not always the case.

So it didn't surprise me that they didn't. And I don't know that

I would have expected it one way or the other. They did brief her and

step her through what they were finding, but they did not interview

her.

Mr. Gowdy. All right. That's a fair point.

Do you view one of the goals of the ARB to be complete in its

factfinding?

Ms. Mills. I think that's the objective, is to be able to provide

as comprehensive an understanding of what happened in a particular

incident, how it was handled.

Mr. Gowdy. If there were, hypothetically, 10 eyewitnesses to an

incident, how many of those eyewitnesses would you expect the ARB to

interview?

Ms. Mills. If they were actually eyewitnesses to the incident,

if they had the ability to interview 10, I would imagine that they would

interview 10.

Mr. Gowdy. And if there were, hypothetically, a universe of

10,000 relevant documents, how many of those 10,000 would you expect

the ARB to access?

Ms. Mills. I don't know. I don't know how they would manage

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through that, because it is a large volume, so there might be a

strategy that they would have for how they assess what --

Mr. Gowdy. That came across as a trick question, and it was not

intended to be so.

Ms. Mills. Oh, okay. It did.

Mr. Gowdy. It was not intended to be so. My point being, if it

is really complete, you are going to access all of the witnesses and

all of the documents to the extent you are able to. Is that fair?

Ms. Mills. I think, certainly, that might be an approach that

someone might take, yes.

Mr. Gowdy. Okay.

Do you view past ARBs as being cumulative?

Ms. Mills. Tell me what you mean when you say that.

Mr. Gowdy. The findings and recommendations of past ARBs, do

we -- in other words, do we need to rediscover the wheel, or are past

ARB findings also to be given respect by subsequent Secretaries of

State?

Ms. Mills. Oh, now I understand. Thank you.

It was my impression that the recommendations of ARBs are supposed

to have an enduring life, meaning that the learnings that came from

those ARBs should be acted on and implemented.

But it was also my observation that there had been ARBs before

where recommendations had been made that had not been implemented. And

so part of Secretary Clinton's commitment and focus was how do we

actually make sure these recommendations are actually implemented,

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given that there are were some that had not been in the past.

Mr. Gowdy. So, in other words -- I think you and are in

agreement -- Secretary Kerry should not fail to heed the

recommendations, even though they came during a previous tenure.

Ms. Mills. Are you getting ready to get me in trouble?

Mr. Gowdy. No. No, I'm not. No. That's my last question on

it. I'm just trying to establish if they're cumulative in nature.

Ms. Mills. Yes, they are cumulative in nature.

Mr. Gowdy. Okay.

And whose job is it to make ARB-like recommendations before the

tragedy takes place? Who within the State Department is charged with

figuring out these -- because it took about 2 months to come up with

30 recommendations. That's pretty quick. And it's a big number.

So who within any State Department's job is it to come up with

recommendations with respect to safety and security before something

bad happens?

Ms. Mills. With respect to safety and security, we obviously

rely on our Diplomatic Security to provide us with the best advice and

recommendations and practices based on their expertise. And there are

likely other bureaus and departments that could contribute in that same

regard, but, certainly, when we thought of security, we think of our

Diplomatic Security officials as the experts in that space.

Mr. Gowdy. Was a trip to Libya in October of 2012 being

contemplated?

Ms. Mills. It might have been. I just don't recall. I actually

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don't recall at this moment. I'm sure there was a time where I did

know. But it might have been.

Mr. Gowdy. Let me ask you in a different way.

Ms. Mills. Okay.

Mr. Gowdy. I think you testified earlier that Ms. Abedin handled

travel arrangements for Secretary Clinton.

Ms. Mills. Yes. And they had already been, I thought, to Libya

on one trip and --

Mr. Gowdy. Yes.

Ms. Mills. Okay.

Mr. Gowdy. Did she handle travel arrangements for anyone other

than Secretary Clinton?

Ms. Mills. No. So, when we were doing trips or travel, she also

oversaw the schedule and the creation and the operations of all of those

different elements. So she was kind of the operational deputy, if you

will, for matters related to the Secretary's travel.

Mr. Gowdy. So if she were in a process of meeting and planning

in connection with a trip to Libya in the fall of 2012, it could not

have been for anyone other than Secretary Clinton.

Ms. Mills. That's correct.

Mr. Gowdy. Okay.

Ms. Mills. She typically would be handling it for the Secretary.

She would not be handling it for someone else. Or, at least, I'm not

aware of her making travel arrangements for other people other than

the Secretary.

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Mr. Gowdy. But you are not aware of a trip being discussed,

planned, otherwise contemplated for the fall of 2012.

Ms. Mills. I just don't remember it. I'm not saying that if you

had talked to me at that time I wouldn't have said, oh, yeah, I heard

they're thinking about that. I just don't remember it right now.

Mr. Gowdy. Okay.

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[4:37 p.m.]

Mr. Gowdy. Talking points that were derived at by the CIA -- I'm

sure someone will correct me if I'm wrong -- but my recollection is

that either Mr. Morell or someone else said his first iteration of

talking points was changed at the recommendation of seventh floor

principals at the Department of State. Do you know who he could have

been talking about?

Ms. Mills. No, and that's not my recollection, so that might be

shaping my answer.

Mr. Gowdy. So there was never an iteration of CIA talking points

that assigned a higher degree of culpability to the State

Department than those which became public?

Ms. Mills. That might have been the case. But if your question

is whether or not I have a recollection of Mr. Morell saying he was

changing something at the direction of the State Department, that is

what I didn't have a recollection of.

Mr. Gowdy. All right. Take Morell out of it.

Ms. Mills. Okay. Sorry.

Mr. Gowdy. Just in general, CIA talking points, an iteration

that assigned more culpability to the State Department than the

iteration that became public. Do you recall that?

Ms. Mills. So what I recall is that there was at least a lot of

discussion around the talking points and my challenge is that my

recollection is after the fact when the talking points became an issue

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as opposed to simultaneously. I don't know that simultaneously I had

a contemporaneous understanding of the different back and forths on

the talking points.

But I do know that there was always this enduring challenge, at

least from my perspective -- but I acknowledge I was sitting at the

State Department -- that the CIA seemed to have an opinion about their

actions and the propriety of how they'd been handled and the

Department's, and what they saw as what might have been a distinction

in that.

So that was my overarching impression. Separate and apart from

just the talking points, that was my overarching impression.

Mr. Gowdy. All right. Well, I want us to stick with that theme

for just a second. Susan Rice went on five Sunday talk shows, and at

least in two of them, if my memory serves, made reference to a video

that appears nowhere in the intelligence talking points. What was the

genesis of her attributing the attacks to the video?

Ms. Mills. I don't know the answer to that question. I know that

she had received preparation materials and points, and I'm assuming

that that's how she relied on them and she relied on them to relate

what she related on the program. But I don't know, because I didn't

participate in her prep or in the materials for her prep.

Mr. Gowdy. Who prepped her?

Ms. Mills. So she has a team of folks at the U.N. who are her

talent both on -- from a communications side and her deputy, who is

fabulous, a gentleman named , who would have been her primary

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partners in preparing her.

Mr. Gowdy. How would anyone at the United Nations be in a better

position to advise her on what happened in Libya than the CIA or the

State Department?

Ms. Mills. I'm sure they probably would have provided materials

so that she would have been able to speak to the issues that she did,

and so she would have been relying on materials that have been provided

to her.

Mr. Gowdy. Have you seen any materials that attributed the

attacks to the video from our intelligence agencies?

Ms. Mills. I just don't remember. I don't remember that one way

or another now. If you had asked me at the time, I could've told you

the answer to that. I don't remember that now. Like, I don't know

if there was ever an instance where there was something that somebody

said was or wasn't.

I remember that in the beginning it was much more around a

discussion of the nature of the events that night. And so that's my

memory.

Mr. Gowdy. Did you watch her performance on the Sunday talk

shows?

Ms. Mills. I did not.

Mr. Gowdy. How soon thereafter did you learn that she had

attributed it to a video and/or spontaneous reaction to a protest?

Ms. Mills. I am certain that I would have learned in the days

after that. I couldn't tell you if it was exactly the next day or the

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day after that, but I would have learned in that time window.

Mr. Gowdy. Were you then or have you ever been in possession of

any factual predicate that would support either of those, either a

protest spun out of control or the video?

Ms. Mills. As I understood the background material that had been

prepared by our intelligence community, they had given a set of points

that she was relying on. So my impression was that that was a part

of their points. That might not be accurate. That's just my

impression.

Mr. Gowdy. I think your second impression was accurate, which

is when she said video it shocked everyone, including Mike Morell and

the authors, which leads to my question: At what point does the State

Department have a duty to correct something that was falsely said?

Ms. Mills. So I don't know that I had a shock reaction because

I didn't watch her program, but in terms of what she said, I think part

of the enduring challenge -- and this is what I was speaking to

earlier is, how you make sure you're giving the most accurate

information that you have.

I don't know what was the genesis of obviously all of the different

elements that were a part of her performance. It was my distinct

impression she was using intelligence and points that had been

extracted from those that could be shared with the public to do that.

But I couldn't tell you what they were and how she reached her own

conclusions around that.

Mr. Gowdy. Okay. A couple more questions then I will turn it

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over to my colleagues.

Were you present for any phone calls that Secretary Clinton made

to any foreign leaders in the hours or days after the attacks in

Benghazi?

Ms. Mills. I might have been. I say that only because I was in

and out of the office, so it's completely plausible that I was in as

she was making a call and walked out to go do something, so it's

plausible. But I don't know that I have a specific memory of any of

the different leaders.

I do recall when she was reaching out in -- for Tunisia, because

we had a whole set of issues about how we could potentially provide

support, that I got a readout after that call. So I know I wasn't

present for that call because there were certain due-outs for that,

but I don't have a specific memory of different leaders as she spoke

to them.

Mr. Gowdy. Are you aware of any ambassadors that had Secretary

Clinton's private email address?

Ms. Mills. I don't know.

Mr. Gowdy. There was a memo, 1 year and 1 day prior to the

attacks in Benghazi. There's an email from Jake Sullivan to Secretary

Clinton, subject: "Rogers apparently" -- and the body is, "apparently

wants to see to talk Libya/weapons."

Ms. Mills. Who's Rogers?

Mr. Gowdy. We don't know. It could be Mike Rogers, who is the

former HPSCI chairman. I was going to ask you.

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Ms. Mills. Sorry. I've already revealed my ignorance.

Mr. Gowdy. Is there anyone last name Rogers that you could think

of that would want to talk to Secretary Clinton about Libya and weapons?

Ms. Mills. No, I don't know, obviously.

Mr. Gowdy. Do you know anything about Libya and weapons?

Ms. Mills. No. No. I mean, obviously, I know that one of the

concerns from a policy standpoint was that there would potentially be

loose weapons after the fall of Qadhafi and during that time period

and a desire to ensure that they didn't fall into the wrong hands. And

that is probably the breadth and scope of my weapons knowledge.

Mr. Jordan. I just want to be clear. So Heather Samuelson is

the attorney who works for you in your firm or in your part of your

business?

Ms. Mills. Yes.

Mr. Jordan. And she is the individual who was responsible for

overseeing the production of the emails that were deemed government

or mixed or private email?

Ms. Mills. So the Secretary asked David Kendall and I to

undertake that, and I asked Heather to step through the process of

actually doing the work is probably the best way to say that.

Mr. Jordan. But the search terms and the parameters and the scope

and how it was done, that was developed by you and Mr. Kindle?

Ms. Mills. She stepped through a process that we had blessed,

if you would say.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. I want to go back to the ARB, if I could.

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Just to be clear, from a few hours ago, I guess, did you request a draft

copy or did it just show up on your desk? How did you get the draft

copies?

Ms. Mills. They provided me with a draft copy. I don't have a

recollection of requesting it, but they did provide me with a copy.

What I can't answer is whether or not I would have expected that or

not expected that.

Mr. Jordan. Okay.

Mr. Cummings. Let me go off the record for a minute.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Jordan. I want to go back to, I think it's the "Come to

Jesus," number 8, I think. I think that's what it refers to when you

say --

Ms. Mills. Come to. The come-to email.

Mr. Jordan. Is that what you mean? I just assumed that it

was -- maybe that's a false assumption, but that's --

Ms. Mills. No, you're right. I'm Baptist.

Mr. Jordan. Same here. I'm not Baptist but close enough.

Ms. Mills. What are you?

Mr. Jordan. Evangelical, non-denominational. My dad has had

"Come to Jesus" meetings with me.

Ms. Mills. He's a good man. Come on over to the Baptist side.

We're good people.

Mr. Jordan. So in this email, "Had a little come-to with some

of our colleagues but folks now on board." Who are colleagues?

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Ms. Mills. So colleagues were individuals, at as least I

remember, in the intelligence community. And some of that, as I said,

related to my observation around the certain propensities to seek to

mislay responsibilities.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. And when did you have that come-to-Jesus

conversation with colleagues?

Ms. Mills. It would've been likely on the phone, probably

contemporaneous or around that time period.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. Because this email says -- it regards the

hearings, congressional hearings. And you say, just starting -- this

is to, I think, Secretary Clinton -- and to Philippe Reines. Is that

accurate?

Ms. Mills. Yes, I think so. Let me just grab it so that I have

it in front of me so that I'm being a better partner to you. Okay.

I have it.

Mr. Jordan. So are you just -- so "just starting, had to have

a little come-to-Jesus conversation with our colleagues, but folks now

on board."

Ms. Mills. Yes.

Mr. Jordan. So were these folks, these colleagues, were these

people testifying in front of that committee?

Ms. Mills. Oh, I don't know that they would have been testifying.

Those might have been two different things that were going on. She

was asking how the hearings were going, and I wasn't necessarily paying

attention because I was having another set of conversations that were

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going on.

So that's my best recollection. And I was then saying, Philippe

is up there with them. He might have better information about what's

happening up there because I had been paying attention to something

else.

Mr. Jordan. So let me just go to that. So Philippe is up there

with them. Is the "them" referencing the colleagues?

Ms. Mills. So she was asking how are the hearings going. So the

"them" is Philippe is up there with whoever is testifying at the

hearings. I didn't know what was happening other than they were just

starting because I had been involved in another matter, which was

sharing my concern that people were not being good interagency

partners. And that was something I shared a couple times.

Mr. Jordan. So the colleagues doesn't necessarily refer to them,

or does it refer to them? I mean, is it the same answer? That's what

I'm trying to figure out. It seems to me, "just starting," the

hearing's just starting, and I just had a conversation, a come-to-Jesus

conversation with people who were at the hearing, I assume testifying,

and Philippe is up there with them.

So it almost sounds like you're trying to influence in a big

degree, if it's a come-to kind of conversation, what people are going

to say in front of a congressional hearing. That's how I read it in

context.

Ms. Mills. Right. No, that's not accurate.

Mr. Jordan. All right. Then tell me what is accurate.

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Ms. Mills. So let me try to -- sorry -- do a better job. I

apologize.

So the chain starts with her asking how are the hearings going.

I hadn't been watching. The reason I hadn't been watching is because

I had been involved in a whole other set of conversations around what

I saw was people not being good interagency partners. So my answer

was the first holding answer, it's just starting. I had to have a

come-to with some of our colleagues with folks now on board was

referencing why I didn't know.

Philippe's up there. That's basically telling her, if you want

to know what's really happening in the hearings, he's present so you

can ask him. But I haven't been paying attention because I've been

involved in this other conversation.

Mr. Jordan. So based on what you just described there -- and then

I'll stop -- based on what you described there, the "Philippe is up

there with them," "them" is not referring back to colleagues? "Them"

is someone else?

Ms. Mills. So "them" is up there for whoever the hearings are

going on with. My conversations were happening with some of the

interagency team that were not testifying, correct.

Mr. Jordan. All right. Thank you.

Mr. Westmoreland. I've just got some quick yes or noes. Going

back to what the chairman asked about Ray Maxwell. Were you ever at

that room downstairs when they were going through the emails with Jake

Sullivan on a Sunday?

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Ms. Mills. Well, I don't know. That is quite possible I would

have been there on a Sunday with Jake Sullivan. But I don't recall

that, because I actually don't recall Jake Sullivan being down there

much, if at all.

Mr. Westmoreland. But you could've been in that room with Jake

Sullivan?

Ms. Mills. I could have been, I just think it's pretty unlikely

because I don't recall him being downstairs.

Mr. Westmoreland. The other thing is, did the lady, and I think

you referred to her as a white lady --

Ms. Mills. Well, as opposed to an African American man. So for

the purposes not of race but of being able to say I could tell the

difference between the two.

Mr. Westmoreland. I got you. But the white lady, was she

technically working for Mr. Maxwell?

Ms. Mills. No.

Mr. Westmoreland. So that's not a true fact either?

Ms. Mills. I didn't know there was a fact in there that said she

was working for him.

Mr. Westmoreland. Yes. It says, "Technically the office

director worked for Mr. Maxwell."

Ms. Mills. And who was the office director? Does it say?

Mr. Westmoreland. The office director who is supposedly the lady

that you were talking about --

Ms. Mills. I don't know that it -- I didn't know that there was

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an office director that -- I don't know that the person who was from

NEA was the office director, so I don't know if those two sync up in

the same way. But I also haven't read his article.

Mr. Davis. The post from NEA that you're talking about, is that

?

Ms. Mills. Yes. Yes. Is she the office director?

Mr. Davis. Go ahead.

Mr. Westmoreland. I'm just assuming she was the lady that was --

Ms. Mills. So I was just talking about the woman whose name you

just said. .

Mr. Davis. Part of your group.

Ms. Mills. Yes. .

Mr. Westmoreland. Who was the lady downstairs going through the

emails?

Ms. Mills. . So I know her name, yes. I don't know her

position.

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. But you don't know who she worked for

or whose supervision she works under?

Ms. Mills. It was my impression she worked for Liz Dibble and

so that was the Deputy Assistant Secretary, at least --

Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. Well, Mr. Maxwell just said she

technically worked under him and that he didn't know that she had been

given an assignment to be in that room going through the emails.

Ms. Mills. Okay.

Mr. Westmoreland. But and then the personal conversations he

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supposedly had with this lady, you wouldn't have any knowledge if he

had those conversations or not, right?

Ms. Mills. I wouldn't know about conversations I didn't

participate in.

Mr. Westmoreland. Sure. Thank you.

Ms. Mills. But I would know about whether or not I had

conversations with Ray Maxwell, and I didn't.

Mr. Westmoreland. No. I understand.

Mrs. Brooks. As a follow-up to what Congressman Cummings asked

you with respect to the conversations that the Secretary had with the

victim's families, I want to go to what if any conversations did she

have with survivors?

Ms. Mills. So she met with the survivors when they came back.

And at the time, what I can tell you is when we were doing outreach,

because there was a real sensitivity to the survivors' physical health,

how we step through that. She had, by the time all of them were back,

had had conversations with all of them. But I can't tell you in what

cohorts they were because they all had different states of injuries.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. I'd like for you to take a look at an email

that's dated October 30, if you could -- regarding one of the victims

in particular and see if this refreshes your memory about her

interaction with the victims. And when did you -- and did you have

any conversations with any of the survivors?

Mr. Wilkinson. So this would be number 12?

Ms. Jackson. Twelve.

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[Mills Exhibit No. 12

Was marked for identification.]

Mrs. Brooks. And so marking emails as exhibit number 12 from

October 30. And it starts on October 25, regarding a .

Ms. Mills. , uh-huh.

Mrs. Brooks. . Did you have any conversations with

?

Ms. Mills. I don't recall having conversations with

other than when they came to the Department, which would have been near

her departure time. I just remember there was a gentleman whose leg

had been deeply injured, and if is the gentleman whose leg had

been injured, I remember him being in a wheelchair and meeting him at

that time. If that's not the right person, then I've misaligned

injuries with the different individuals.

Mrs. Brooks. So did you or the Secretary have any interaction

with the survivors prior to her leaving in February of 2013?

Ms. Mills. Yes, she had. And because some of the survivors had

come back and so they had been back and they were ones who had not been

injured. So they were part of the diplomatic team and she met with

some of them. And then what she was conscious about was whenever people

were ready to be able to take a call she wanted to do that call, but

she didn't want that to be at the expense of their health.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. And do you know if this call ever happened?

Do you know if it ever --

Ms. Mills. I don't know.

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Mrs. Brooks. There were a lot of people copied, it seems, on

executing a call.

Ms. Mills. I know right. It's nice to be the secretary. You

get a lot of support.

Mrs. Brooks. Yes.

Ms. Mills. But I don't know the answer to your question.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. And then just finally, I know that at the

very beginning -- and we've asked you a lot of questions today and

obviously you have had to answer. You don't recall, "to the best of

my recollection," and so forth. You've been a lawyer for how long?

Ms. Mills. I graduated from law school sadly now in 1990.

Mrs. Brooks. Did you ever testify when you were chief of staff

before any congressional committees?

Ms. Mills. At the State Department?

Mrs. Brooks. Uh-huh.

Ms. Mills. I don't believe I had occasion to do that. It's

nothing that I remember. I think it would have stood out.

Mrs. Brooks. And I think you said that this was probably the

first crisis like this that you had dealt with; is that right?

Ms. Mills. No.

Mrs. Brooks. Oh, it's not?

Ms. Mills. No.

Mrs. Brooks. Had there been other attacks where --

Ms. Mills. Oh, now I understand what you're saying. We've had

crises.

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Mrs. Brooks. Sure.

Ms. Mills. So I had -- yeah. So WikiLeaks, and the Haiti

earthquake and the Japan tsunami. I had a lot of crises. But there

was not an instance where we had lost an ambassador ever, no.

Mrs. Brooks. A crisis of this magnitude where someone had been

lost.

Ms. Mills. Yeah.

Mrs. Brooks. And you've talked repeatedly today about the

importance of clarity and visibility and the importance of your staff

and the people of the State Department providing answers and so forth.

I'm curious, and you said early on that you never wrote your

recollection or report on this. Why not?

Ms. Mills. Primarily because I was overwhelmed. In fact, you

know, as somebody who would love to be in a place where history could

capture those things, it would be a nice thing to have. But I was

basically spending every moment of every day in motion, and so that

wasn't one of the opportunities I had.

Mrs. Brooks. And when did you leave the Department?

Ms. Mills. I left as chief of staff in February of 2013.

Mrs. Brooks. And where did you go?

Ms. Mills. I began doing consulting work and providing advice

to a set of clients and basically doing economic development in Africa.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. Did you contemplate doing a report then to

help you later on?

Ms. Mills. I didn't contemplate doing a report at that time, no.

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I have never contemplated doing a writing or a report.

Mrs. Brooks. To help your memory of the -- of your involvement

in all of this?

Ms. Mills. I didn't.

Mrs. Brooks. And everyone else's involvement?

Ms. Mills. I didn't, no.

Mrs. Brooks. Have you advised clients to ever not write reports?

Ms. Mills. No. I think I look -- you know, I experience this

as a very human tragedy. And so, I'm not a book writer. I am not

somebody who tries to make the case for history. I tend to be someone

who's a little bit more behind the scenes, both to my detriment or my

strength, whatever that might be.

But I wasn't trying to capture something for posterity. I was

trying to do the best I could.

Mrs. Brooks. Okay. Thank you.

Ms. Jackson. Let's go off the record for just a brief moment.

[Recess.]

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Ms. Mills, just some quick follow-up. You were asked a

series of questions about Secretary Clinton's use of her personal email

account during her time as Secretary.

You know, in the interim progress report that the chairman put

out in May of 2015 of this year, he said with regard to the personal

email, quote, "Ultimately this committee's interest is in ensuring all

relevant and material information related to Libya and Benghazi that

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was in the personal custody of the former Secretary of State has been

returned to the public domain."

So I want to make sure we've asked you that question clearly, and

we've gotten an answer to that question, given it is our ultimate

interest. Is it your understanding that all relevant and material

information related to Libya and Benghazi has now been provided -- that

was in the personal custody of the Secretary of State has now been

provided to the State Department?

A Yes.

Q And you explained to us that there was a review process.

You oversaw that review process. Had this inquiry come in at the time

that you were all still at the State Department, would you have

potentially been involved in the overseeing of getting it done then?

A I don't know that I would have then because I would have

obviously had a whole set of other responsibilities I was doing, so

I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Had you been involved, would you have done the same process

that you did when the request came in as her former chief of staff after

you had left?

A Yes.

Q And you felt it was as robust as it would've been had you

still been at the State Department?

A Yes.

Q I'm putting myself in the mind of the critics here, and I

can hear what they will say, which is, nonetheless, you had the

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opportunity or the review process had the opportunity to make the

decision as to what it was going to deem was purely personal in a hybrid

category of personal and work and clearly work.

At the outset of you discussing Federal records, you were

explaining that there was an obligation of every employee -- the

obligation falls to every employee to review their records and decide

what is a Federal record. So this notion of review and making these

determinations do usually fall to the employees who must determine what

a Federal record is. Is that the case?

A That's correct. Each individual has the obligation to

conduct the review and provide those materials to the department, and

that's part of the regulations that each individual has that

obligation.

Q And so I just want to give you an opportunity, to the extent

you want it, to the extent that that question is going to be raised

about, yes, that you had the opportunity then to do the review

yourselves. I've sometimes heard with regard to the ARB the notion,

it's like letting someone grade their own paper. We may hear that same

notion with regard to the review of emails to determine what qualified

as a Federal record.

So I'd just like to give you the opportunity to kind of explain

why you have assured us now that everything is back in -- that was in

the personal custody has been provided to the State Department.

A So as I just said, each individual does have that

responsibility. And I think in this instance, actually, she didn't

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undertake that review herself. She actually had other people

undertake that review on her behalf, and so it was one more step removed

than might be what the regulations are expecting, which is each

individual doing it themselves, where you might have a little bit more

subjectivity.

But this process was designed to find anything that could

potentially be work related, and she was clear about wanting to provide

that to the Department. And so that's what we undertook.

Q And the letter that I saw that went out to you as her

representative, I think as well as the letter that went out to you about

your records indicated that the records they sought were records that

might not already have been captured on the State.Gov system. I think

you've explained to us the notion that that was the belief, that these

Federal records already had been captured, would be captured.

Nonetheless, did you turn over even documents that you believed

would have already been captured?

A Yes. About more than 90 percent of the records that were

in her email were records that were to or from State.Gov

accounts -- were either to State.Gov accounts or from State.Gov

accounts. And so improperly one would have assumed that those were

already in the Department's possession.

Q And they may well have been, some of them, at least. Not

all of them, but some body of those.

A Sure. I think it's just about how adequate the

Department's recordkeeping systems are for keeping the electronic

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records.

Q So even in that regard, you erred on the side of being

overinclusive rather than under inclusive?

A Yes.

Q So would you say that that was true in every regard

with -- when you did the review, that if there was any doubt, it was

resolved in favor of producing and returning the document to the State

Department, not withholding it?

A Yes, that was her direction and so that was the approach

that we took. Obviously, the Department only wanted Federal records.

We did an imperfect job because there was more than 1,200 of them that

are personal, but her direction had been she wanted there to be as

overinclusive approach as should be.

Q Okay. I'm going to show you, as quickly as I can, what I'm

going to mark as Exhibit 13.

[Mills Exhibit No. 13

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Because this came up in the last hour and I just want to

ask you a couple of -- last few hours.

This is an excerpt from Colin Powell's book "In Life and

Leadership: It Worked for Me." When it came up, I looked at it to

see if I actually had the date. I had tried to copy the cover page,

and I unfortunately did not. But my recollection, and I have to admit

that I don't know for certainty, but I do believe it was either in 2012

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294

or in 2014 that this came out.

And you had indicated that -- and I'm going to just direct your

attention, there's an excerpt on page 109, which I did copy. Because

he there explains, and he may explain it elsewhere, but this is where

I had seen the explanation and there's a paragraph on 109, it's about

the third paragraph down.

"To complement the official State Department computer in my

office, I installed a laptop computer on a private line. My personal

email account on the laptop allowed me direct access to anyone online.

I started shooting emails to my principal assistants, to individual

ambassadors, and increasingly to my foreign minister colleagues, who

like me, were trying to bring their ministries into the

186,000 miles-per-second world," end quote.

That's where I had seen them referenced. You had been talking

about knowing that -- some other officials including Colin Powell.

And the timing of that I just wanted to make clear, particularly because

I know that you have done your best under difficult circumstances to

recall as much as you can, do you think it was this excerpt that was

your first knowledge, or do you think it was --

A I don't know if this was my first knowledge, but I was aware

of this, obviously, because we were reading and preparing for when the

Secretary transitioned to the Department. I can't tell you it's my

first, but I can tell you I was aware from having read this as well,

but I might have also learned it another way.

Q But this may have postdated her transition into the

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Department?

A It could have, yes.

Q Right.

A It could have been before. It could have been after. I

mean, I do know that I had that awareness, and my awareness was one

that when she was undertaking that, she was using hers that I had an

awareness that the Department had had a previous instance, if not more

than one, of secretaries who used their own personal mail.

Q And he described some of the folks that he would have been

emailing to, obviously principal assistants, individual ambassadors,

all of whom are his colleagues at State, so that's certainly one way

in which it would've been well known.

A Oh, yes, I do believe it was known in the Department that

he had used his personal email, that's correct.

Q And those emails, as with Secretary Clinton, would have

presumably been captured in a State system to the extent he was emailing

with someone, anyone, in the chain who had a State.Gov account?

A That's what I would have assumed.

Q He also says he was emailing increasingly with foreign

minister colleagues. Some of those emails potentially wouldn't have

been captured in the official State.Gov system; is that accurate?

A They wouldn't have been captured in the State.Gov system.

Q And then just to be completely clear, both at the time that

this excerpt, you know, Secretary Powell predated Secretary Clinton,

so both at the time he set up and installed a laptop computer on a private

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line and used a personal account and during Secretary Clinton's tenure,

the use of a personal email account was not in any way prohibited, was

it?

A That's correct. It was not prohibited.

Q And there was a concern, and certainly it's become a concern

that's been focused on now about whether Federal records -- I mean

there's always been a Federal record requirement. The ranking member,

actually, was the author of amendments to the Presidential Federal

Records Act that took into account this concern, not related to

Secretary Clinton but because it's not a one-off. It's not an uncommon

situation.

So the amendment there was to require either -- to require

assurance that it would be captured in the State system either

contemporaneously by copying or within 20 days.

A I see.

Q So even that amendment does not prohibit outright, it

assures the copying.

So this concern about copying, I think, is a valid one. And you

had said at one point kind of had you -- you wished you had thought

about it a little bit more earlier. And is that because the concern

that things that you thought were potentially being captured ended up

not being?

A Yes.

Q And did you have any sense during the entire time that you

worked with Secretary Clinton when you were chief of staff that she

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had been using a personal email account in any way to evade Federal

records requirements?

A No.

Q In any way to conceal her conduct as the Secretary of State?

A No. She emailed people on their State accounts, so she was

very -- those would be captured, or at least that's what everyone would

have assumed. So she emailed people and did her work-related

engagement with people on their State accounts.

Q One quick question on the ARB and then I just have some broad

allegations that I want and need to ask you and then we will be finished

for the day.

You were asked about whether the ARB and why the ARB may not have

interviewed Secretary Clinton. The co-chairmen of the ARB have

testified and have been asked that question, and they have indicated

to Congress both that they had unfettered access and that, as I

understand it, had they believed that they had a need and there was

evidence that the Secretary had been involved they would have

interviewed her.

Did they ever indicate -- is that a potential reason why they

would not have -- why they and, I think, the -- I don't want to misquote

the number, but a number of ARBs prior to the Benghazi ARB had not

interviewed the Secretary of State who was in office at the time when

they were doing an investigation after a significant incident at one

of our overseas posts?

A Yes. I think that ARBs were looking for the actual incident

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298

and who can give firsthand information with respect to those incidents.

Typically, the Secretary has not been involved in any of these

incidents. Was it to be a security-related incident when the Secretary

is traveling and something happened, it might be in those instances

where they would then obviously be a direct participant or eyewitness

as the chairman pointed out.

But otherwise, their objective is to try to get as close to the

ground as they can.

Q And very quickly, I want to just make sure I've asked the

question about the requests that have been made to you about your own

documents. The same question about the interest of this committee and

congressional committees doing oversight with regard to the requests

that have been made by you, both I believe a more comprehensive request

from the State Department to cover your entire tenure and then a

specific request about Benghazi or Libya related.

You know, have you at this point been able to return any documents

that were in your personal custody to the State Department?

A I have provided those materials to the State Department.

Q Okay. And then I'm going to ask you a series of

allegations. These are public allegations that have been made in the

3 years since the attacks. Many of them have been asked, and from our

perspective many of them have been answered, nonetheless they persist.

It's our understanding that they are being pursued still, even by this

committee, and I will ask you them.

What I'm looking for here is just firsthand evidence or knowledge.

403
299

Some of these questions will fall within an arena where you potentially

would have firsthand knowledge; some of them will not. I'm just going

to ask you all of them, and we can discuss any of them that your response

is that, yes, you do have firsthand knowledge; and if you do not, we'll

just move along to the next.

A Okay.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

ordered Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the

attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton

misrepresented or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Qadhafi

to his own people in order to garner support from military operations

in Libya in the spring of 2011?

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300

A No.

Q A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select

Committee on Intelligence found that the CIA was not collecting and

shipping arms from Libya to Syria and that they found no support for

this allegation.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

A I do not have any such information.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A I do not.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound, and

there have been a number of allegations about the cause of and the

appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee

issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not ordered

to stand down but that instead there were tactical disagreements on

the ground over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand down ordered

to CIA personnel?

A I don't.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

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301

decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do

you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind

the temporary delay of the CIA's security personnel who departed the

Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A I do not.

Q A concern has been raised by one individual that in the

course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board

damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that

production. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials

that were provided to the ARB?

A I don't.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A I don't.

Q Let me ask you this question for documents provided to

Congress: Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to Congress?

A I do not.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when he

told Congress that the CIA "faithfully performed our duties in

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302

accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship."

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave

false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

A I don't.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A I don't.

Q Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk

shows?

A I don't.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief on the night of the attacks

and that he was missing in action.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing in action

on the night of the attacks?

A I do not.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considering

flying on the second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors

to stand down, meaning to cease all operations. Military officials

have stated that those four individuals were instead ordered to remain

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303

in place in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance in their

current location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that there was no stand-down order issued to U.S.

military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House Armed

Services Committee that there was no stand down order issued to U.S.

military personnel in Tripoli?

A I don't.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives. Former

Republican Congressman Howard Buck McKeon, the former chair of the

House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review of the attacks after

which he stated, "Given where the troops were, how quickly the thing

all happened and how quickly it dissipated, we probably couldn't have

done more than we did."

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

conclusion?

A I could not.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could've saved

lives if the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not to deploy?

A No.

Ms. Sawyer. Ms. Mills, that concludes our questions. We truly

appreciate your indulgence starting so early and really working with

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the committee through all of our questions.

I don't know if the ranking member --

Mr. Cummings. No. I just want to say thank you also. And out

of respect for your time, I'm not going to ask any questions. I have

a lot, but it's fine. And I just want to thank you for your service.

Ms. Mills. Thank you. Thank you for taking the time to be here

today. I know all of you all have other places to be and other things

you could be doing, so I appreciate not only you being here but all

of you being here and the respect that you've showed me through this

process. I really appreciate it.

Mr. Gowdy. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 5:32 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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11/1/2016 Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST)

http://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/fest/index.htm?goMobile=0 1/1

The FEST is the U.S. government’s only interagency, on­call, short­notice team poised to respond to terrorist incidents

worldwide. At the request of, and on the behalf of the U.S. Chief of Mission, the FEST deploys overseas to advise, assist,

assess, and coordinate U.S. government crisis response activities. The Operations Directorate of the Department of

State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism leads the FEST that includes representatives from the Department of Defense,

Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other agencies, as circumstances warrant. FEST composition is flexible and

tailored to the specific incident and the needs of the U.S. Embassy and host nation. The FEST has deployed numerous

times since its inception in 1986, and can augment existing U.S. Mission and host nation capabilities with specialized

crisis response expertise such as:

• Crisis management expertise

• Time­sensitive information

• Planning for contingency operations

• Hostage negotiating expertise

• Reach­back to Washington, DC agencies

• Specialized communications capabilities.

FEST Assists in the Aftermath of East Africa Bombings

Two Foreign Emergency Support Teams were deployed to Kenya and Tanzania

immediately following the August 1998 al­Qaeda terrorist bombings of US Embassies in

Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The FESTs helped assess both emergencies and aided US

Ambassadors as they managed the aftermath of the attacks, which killed some 300

(including 12 Americans) and injured more than 5000.

FEST Responds to USS Cole Bombing

A Foreign Emergency Support Team was deployed to Aden, Yemen following a terrorist

attack against the USS Cole, which killed 17 American sailors in October 2000. The FEST

advised the US ambassador and helped her direct America's response to the attack.

FEST's secure mobile communications capability was especially valuable, since the Port of

Aden is some 200 miles from the American Embassy in Sanaa.

Smaller, "tailored" FESTs have responded to abductions of Americans in Ecuador and the Philippines. "Contingency"

FESTs were deployed to ensure safety at the Olympic Games in Athens, Greece (Summer 2004) and Turin, Italy

(Winter 2006), and in Lagos, Nigeria during a hostage­taking crisis.

In addition to the above activities, the FEST routinely provides veteran diplomatic and interagency experts to national

counterterrorism exercises, such as TOPOFF.

Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST)

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11/3/2016 Benghazi Bombshell: Clinton State Department Official Reveals Details of Alleged Document Review ­ The Daily Signal

http://dailysignal.com//print?post_id=157483 1/7

Benghazi Bombshell: Clinton State Department Official Reveals Details

of Alleged Document Review

Sharyl Attkisson / September 15, 2014

As the House Select Committee on Benghazi prepares for its first hearing this week, a former State Department diplomat is coming forward with a

startling allegation: Hillary Clinton confidants were part of an operation to “separate” damaging documents before they were turned over to the

Accountability Review Board investigating security lapses surrounding the Sept. 11, 2012, terrorist attacks on the U.S. mission in Benghazi, Libya.

UPDATE: Hillary Clinton’s chief of staЂ allegedly present at aЃer-hours document review.

According to former Deputy Assistant Secretary Raymond Maxwell, the aЃer-hours session took place over a weekend in a basement operations-type

center at State Department headquarters in Washington, D.C. This is the first time Maxwell has publicly come forward with the story.

At the time, Maxwell was a leader in the State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern AЂairs, which was charged with collecting emails and documents

relevant to the Benghazi probe.

Raymond Maxwell, former State Department deputy assistant secretary (Photo: Sharyl Attkisson)

“I was not invited to that aЃer-hours endeavor, but I heard about it and decided to check it out on a Sunday aЃernoon,” Maxwell says.

EXHIBIT 11

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He didn’t know it then, but Maxwell would ultimately become one of four State Department oЂicials singled out for discipline—he says scapegoated—

then later cleared for devastating security lapses leading up to the attacks. Four Americans, including U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens, were

murdered during the Benghazi attacks.

‘Basement Operation’

Maxwell says the weekend document session was held in the basement of the State Department’s Foggy Bottom headquarters in a room underneath

the “jogger’s entrance.” He describes it as a large space, outfitted with computers and big screen monitors, intended for emergency planning, and with

small oЂices on the periphery.

When he arrived, Maxwell says he observed boxes and stacks of documents. He says a State Department oЂice director, whom Maxwell described as

close to Clinton’s top advisers, was there. Though the oЂice director technically worked for him, Maxwell says he wasn’t consulted about her weekend

assignment.

‘Basement operation’: The Department of State in Washington. (Photo: Wayan Vota/Creative

Commons)

“She told me, ‘Ray, we are to go through these stacks and pull out anything that might put anybody in the [Near Eastern AЂairs] front oЂice or the

seventh floor in a bad light,’” says Maxwell. He says “seventh floor” was State Department shorthand for then-Secretary of State Clinton and her

principal advisers.

“I asked her, ‘But isn’t that unethical?’ She responded, ‘Ray, those are our orders.’ ”

A few minutes aЃer he arrived, Maxwell says, in walked two high-ranking State Department oЂicials.

In an interview Monday morning on Fox News, Rep. Jason ChaЂetz, R-Utah, named the two Hillary Clinton confidants who allegedly were present: One

was Cheryl Mills, Clinton’s chief of staЂ and a former White House counsel who defended President Bill Clinton during his impeachment trial. The other,

ChaЂetz said, was Deputy Chief of StaЂ Jake Sullivan, who previously worked on Hillary Clinton’s and then Barack Obama’s presidential campaigns.

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Benghazi Bombshell: Fox News Reports on Sharyl Attkisson's...

“When Cheryl saw me, she snapped, ‘Who are you?’” Maxwell says. “Jake explained, ‘That’s Ray Maxwell, an NEA deputy assistant secretary.’ She

conceded, ‘Well, OK.'”

Maxwell says the two oЂicials, close confidants of Clinton, appeared to check in on the operation and soon leЃ.

Maxwell says aЃer Mills and Sullivan arrived, he, the oЂice director and an intern moved into a small oЂice where they looked through some papers.

Maxwell says his stack included pre-attack telegrams and cables between the U.S. embassy in Tripoli and State Department headquarters. AЃer a short

time, Maxwell says he decided to leave.

“I didn’t feel good about it,” he says.

Cheryl Mills, leЃ, was Hillary Clinton’s chief of staЂ and a White House counsel who defended President Bill Clinton during his impeachment trial. (Photo:

Newscom)

We contacted Mills and Sullivan to ask about the allegations and the purpose of the described separation of documents, but they did not return calls or

emails. We reached out to Clinton, who declined an interview request and oЂered no comment. A State Department spokesman told us it would have

been impossible for anybody outside the Accountability Review Board (ARB) to control the flow of information because the board cultivated so many

sources.

‘Unfettered Access’?

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When the ARB issued its call for documents in early October 2012, just weeks aЃer the Benghazi attacks, the executive directorate of the State

Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern AЂairs was put in charge of collecting all emails and relevant material. It was gathered, boxed and—Maxwell says

—ended up in the basement room prior to being turned over.

In May 2013, when critics questioned the ARB’s investigation as not thorough enough, co-chairmen Ambassador Thomas Pickering and Adm. Mike

Mullen responded that “we had unfettered access to everyone and everything including all the documentation we needed.”

Maxwell says when he heard that statement, he couldn’t help but wonder if the ARB—perhaps unknowingly—had received from his bureau a scrubbed

set of documents with the most damaging material missing.

An attacker celebrates as buildings and cars burn at the consulate compound in Benghazi

late Sept. 11, 2012. (Photo: Getty Images/Newscom)

Maxwell also criticizes the ARB as “anything but independent,” pointing to Mullen’s admission in congressional testimony that he called Mills to give

her inside advice aЃer the ARB interviewed a potential congressional witness.

In an interview in September 2013, Pickering told me that he would not have done what Mullen did. But both co-chairmen strongly defend their probe

as “fiercely independent.”

Maxwell also criticizes the ARB for failing to interview key people at the White House, State Department and the CIA, including not only Clinton but

Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Nides, who managed department resources in Libya; Assistant Secretary of State for Political Military AЂairs Andrew

Shapiro; and White House National Security Council Director for Libya Ben Fishman.

“The ARB inquiry was, at best, a shoddily executed attempt at damage control, both in Foggy Bottom and on Capitol Hill,” Maxwell says. He views the

aЃer-hours operation he witnessed in the State Department basement as “an exercise in misdirection.”

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Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens and three other Americans were murdered in

Benghazi. (Photo: Newscom)

Sullivan did not respond to emails or to messages sent to him through his current teaching job at Yale Law School. Mills did not respond to a message

passed to her through Black Rock, a major global investment firm where she is on the board of directors. Clinton’s press oЂicer ultimately referred us to

the State Department, though none of the three currently works there.

State Department Response

A State Department spokesman, Alec Gerlach, calls the implication that documents were withheld “totally without merit.” Gerlach says: “The range of

sources that the ARB’s investigation drew on would have made it impossible for anyone outside of the ARB to control its access to information.”

Gerlach says the State Department instructed all employees to cooperate “fully and promptly” with the ARB, which invited anyone with relevant

information to contact the board directly.

“So individuals with information were reaching out proactively to the board. And, the ARB was also directly engaged with individuals and the [State]

Department’s bureaus and oЂices to request information and pull on whichever threads it chose to,” Gerlach says.

Benghazi Select Committee

Maxwell says he has been interviewed privately by several members of Congress in recent months, including ChaЂetz, a member of the House

Oversight Committee, and Rep. Trey Gowdy, R-S.C., chairman of the House Select Committee on Benghazi.

Rep. Jason ChaЂetz, R-Utah, speaks with Rep. Trey Gowdy, R-S.C., chairman of the Benghazi

Select Committee, (Photo: Newscom)

When reached for comment, ChaЂetz told me that Maxwell’s allegations “go to the heart of the integrity of the State Department.”

“The allegations are as serious as it gets, and it’s something we have obviously followed up and pursued,” ChaЂetz says. “I’m 100 percent confident the

Benghazi Select Committee is going to dive deep on that issue.”

Former Obama Supporter

Maxwell, 58, strongly supported President Barack Obama and personally contributed to his presidential campaign. But post-Benghazi, he has soured

on both Obama and Clinton, saying he had nothing to do with security and was sacrificed as a scapegoat while higher-up oЂicials directly responsible

escaped discipline.

Maxwell spent a year on paid administrative leave with no oЂicial charge ever levied against him. Ultimately, the State Department cleared Maxwell of

wrongdoing and reinstated him. He retired a short time later, in November 2013.

445
11/3/2016 Benghazi Bombshell: Clinton State Department Official Reveals Details of Alleged Document Review ­ The Daily Signal

http://dailysignal.com//print?post_id=157483 6/7

Maxwell worked in foreign service for 21 years as the well-respected deputy assistant secretary for Maghreb AЂairs in the Near East Bureau and is a

former chief of staЂ to the ambassador in Baghdad. Fluent in Portuguese, Maxwell is a Navy “mustanger,” which means he successfully made the leap

from the enlisted ranks to commissioned oЂicer.

Raymond Maxwell speaks with investigative correspondent Sharyl Attkisson in Washington. (Photo:

Courtesy Sharyl Attkisson)

Maxwell also is a prolific poet. While on administrative leave, he published poems online: allegories hinting at his post-Benghazi observations and

experiences.

A poem entitled “Invitation” refers to his placement on leave in December 2012: “The Queen’s Henchmen / request the pleasure of your company / at a

Lynching — / to be held / at 23rd and C Streets NW [State Dept. building] / on Tuesday, December 18, 2012 / just past sunset. / Dress: Formal, Masks and

Hoods — / the four being lynched / must never know the identities/ of their executioners, or what/ whose sin required their sacrifice./ A blood sacrifice

— / to divert the hounds- / to appease the gods — / to cleanse our filth and /satisfy our guilty consciences...”

446
11/3/2016 Benghazi Bombshell: Clinton State Department Official Reveals Details of Alleged Document Review ­ The Daily Signal

http://dailysignal.com//print?post_id=157483 7/7

In another poem called “Trapped in a purgatory of their own deceit,” Maxwell wrote: “The web of lies they weave / gets tighter and tighter / in its deceit

/ until it bottoms out — / at a very low frequency — / and implodes...Yet all the while, / the more they talk, / the more they lie, / and the deeper down

the hole they go... Just wait.../ just wait and feed them the rope.”

Maxwell in Algiers in 2011 as deputy assistant secretary for the Maghreb region. (Photo: YouTube

via U.S. Embassy in Algiers)

Several weeks aЃer he was placed on leave with no formal accusations, Maxwell made an appointment to address his status with a State Department

ombudsman.

“She told me, ‘You are taking this all too personally, Raymond. It is not about you,’ ” Maxwell recalls.

“I told her that ‘My name is on TV and I’m on administrative leave, it seems like it’s about me.’ Then she said, ‘You’re not harmed, you’re still getting

paid. Don’t watch TV. Take your wife on a cruise. It’s not about you; it’s about Hillary and 2016.’ “

Since retiring from the State Department, Maxwell has obtained a master’s degree in library information science.

Fox News: Hillary Clinton Aides Allegedly Witnessed Benghaz...

This is a Daily Signal special feature.

447
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 12

448
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

449
EXHIBIT 13

450
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INTERVIEW OF

JACOB SULLIVAN

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, SEPTEMBER 5, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

PHILIP G. KIKO, Staff Director and General Counsel

CHRIS DONESA, Deputy Staff Director

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Counsel

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel

CRAIG MISSAKIAN, Deputy Chief Counsel

MARK GRIDER, Deputy General Counsel

MAC TOLAR, Senior Counsel

CARLTON DAVIS, Counsel

BRIEN A. BEATTIE, Investigator

KIM BETZ, Member Outreach Liaison and Counsel

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel

SHANNON GREEN, Minority Counsel

DANIEL REBNORD, Minority Professional Staff

FOR MR. SULLIVAN

BETH ANN WILKINSON

ADAM SCHWARTZ

MARISSA DORAN

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EXHIBIT 1

709
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 2

710
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 3

711
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 4

712
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

713
EXHIBIT 5

714
This exhibit was not cleared for public release.

EXHIBIT 6

715
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 7

716
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

717
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 8

718
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

719
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 9

720
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

721
EXHIBIT 10 .

722
(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

EXHIBIT 11

723
(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

724
(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

725
(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

726
(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

727
(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

728
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 12

729
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

730
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 13

731
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 14

732
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

733
EXHIBIT 15

734
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

735
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

736
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

737
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

738
EXHIBIT 16

739
740
United States Activities in Libya

Table of Contents

Overview of United States Activities in Libya........................ 2

Political and Military Objectives and Means.......................... 5

Background ......................................................... 5

Where We Are Now ................................................... 8

U.S. Support to NATO Mission........................................ 11

Consequences of U.S. Not Participating in NATO Operations........... 13

Current and Projected Costs......................................... 14

Military Costs .................................................... 14

Humanitarian Costs ................................................ 17

Department of State Operational Costs ............................. 20

Analysis of Impact on U.S. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan....... 21

Department of Defense ............................................. 21

Department of State ............................................... 21

USAID ............................................................. 21

Description of Interim Transitional National Council................ 22

Recognition ....................................................... 22

Transition Planning ............................................... 23

Assistance ........................................................ 23

Analysis of Potential Ties to Extremist Groups .................... 24

Legal Analysis and Administration Support for Bipartisan Resolution. 25

Congressional Consultation.......................................... 26

Contents of Classified Annex........................................ 32

Importance of U.S. Military to Opposition Groups

Assessment of Opposition Military Groups

Coalition Contributions to NATO Mission

Assessment of Extremist Groups in Libya

Threat Assessment of MANPADs, Ballistic Missiles, and Chemical

Weapons in Libya

1

741
Overview of United States Activities in Libya

In his address to the nation on Libya on March 28, 2011,

President Obama presented a comprehensive explanation for why he

authorized military action as part of an international coalition

to protect the people of Libya and to enforce U.N. Security

Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973.

In the intervening weeks and months, coalition efforts have been

effective in protecting the Libyan population. The regime has

suffered numerous defeats, cities and towns across Libya have

been liberated from brutal sieges, strong sanctions are in

place, and the regime is encountering serious difficulties

raising revenues through oil sales or other means. All these

actions and outcomes are consistent with UNSCR 1973.

As the President explained, much was at stake when Qadhafi began

attacking his people and threatened to show “no mercy” to the

city of Benghazi and its population of 700,000:

“In this particular country – Libya – at this particular

moment, we were faced with the prospect of violence on a

horrific scale. We had a unique ability to stop that

violence: an international mandate for action, a broad

coalition prepared to join us, the support of Arab

countries, and a plea for help from the Libyan people

themselves. We also had the ability to stop Qaddafi’s

forces in their tracks without putting American troops on

the ground.”

The United States and its international partners acted

decisively and with unprecedented speed to mobilize a broad

coalition, secure an international mandate to protect civilians,

stop an advancing army, prevent a massacre, and establish a nofly zone. In contrast, the war in Bosnia raged for nearly two

years before the first NATO military operations took place, and

three years before NATO began ground strikes to protect the

civilian population.

The President authorized these actions for several reasons of

national interest:

• To limit the spread of violence and instability in a region

pivotal to our security interests, particularly while it is

undergoing sensitive transitions;

2

742
• To prevent an imminent humanitarian catastrophe; and

• To show the people of the Middle East and North Africa that

America stands with them at a time of momentous transition.

Beyond the specific military objectives, the President has

stated that Qadhafi has lost all legitimacy to rule and must

step down. His brutal behavior against his own population has

been catalogued by a United Nations Commission of Inquiry and

has resulted in a request for arrest warrants by the Prosecutor

of the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity.

Moreover, the Libyan government’s actions posed a significant

threat to regional peace and security. As the President noted

in his March 21 report to Congress, the Qadhafi regime’s

“illegitimate use of force” was “forcing many [civilians] to

flee to neighboring countries, thereby destabilizing the peace

and security of the region.” “Left unaddressed,” the President

further noted, “the growing instability in Libya could ignite

wider instability in the Middle East, with dangerous

consequences to the national security interests of the United

States.” The risk of regional destabilization was also

recognized by the UN Security Council, which determined in

Resolution 1973 that the situation in Libya was “a threat to

international peace and security.” Indeed, as Secretary of

Defense Robert Gates testified to Congress on March 31, “it

continues to be in our national interest to prevent Qadhafi from

visiting further depredations on his own people, destabilizing

his neighbors, and setting back the progress the people of the

Middle East have made....”

Further, the longstanding U.S. commitment to maintaining the

credibility of the United Nations Security Council and the

effectiveness of its actions to promote international peace and

security was at stake in Libya once the Council took action to

impose a no-fly zone and to authorize all necessary measures to

protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of

attack, particularly after Qadhafi’s forces ignored the UNSC’s

call for a cease fire and for the cessation of attacks on

civilians.

As President Obama noted in his March 28 speech, without

military action to stop Qadhafi’s repression, “[t]he writ of the

United Nations Security Council would have been shown to be

little more than empty words, crippling that institution’s

future credibility to uphold global peace and security.”

3

743
A growing chorus of international voices has now called for

Qadhafi’s departure, including the G8, the Contact Group

representing more than 20 countries, Russian President Medvedev,

Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, and several key African leaders

such as the Presidents of Gabon, Mauritania, and Senegal. This

growing consensus and Qadhafi’s control of less and less of

Libya indicate that his departure is only a matter of time.

During the past few weeks the situation on the ground for Libyan

civilians under threat has steadily improved. Qadhafi’s forces

were halted at the gates of Benghazi and have since been driven

back from several towns and cities across the country. The

Libyan opposition, led by a Transitional National Council (TNC),

continues to gain credibility and legitimacy and has laid out

its vision for an inclusive approach for a post-Qadhafi

political transition. For that reason, Secretary Clinton said

on June 9 that the United States believes the TNC is the

legitimate interlocutor for the Libyan people at a time when the

Qadhafi regime has lost all legitimacy to rule. Australia,

Canada, Germany, Spain, and the UAE have all made similar

statements over the past two weeks.

4

744
Political and Military Objectives and Means

The President has honored his commitment to focus the

preponderance of our military effort on the front end of

operations in Libya, using our unique assets to destroy key

regime military targets and air defense capabilities in order to

establish a no-fly zone and enable protection of civilians as

part of the enforcement of UNSCR 1973. These actions set the

conditions so that, after a limited time, command of these

operations transferred to NATO. Since that April 4 transition,

U.S. military involvement has been limited to a supporting role,

enabling our allies and partners to ensure the safety of Libyan

civilians. On the political front, the United States, with its

partners in the coalition, has also continued to employ other

elements of national power to support efforts to bring stability

to Libya and allow the Libyan people to reclaim their future.

As Secretary of State Hillary Clinton testified to Congress on

March 1, “The stakes are high. And this is an unfolding example

of using the combined assets of diplomacy, development and

defense to protect our interests and advance our values.”

Background

The crisis began when the Libyan people took to the streets in

February to demand reforms and stand up for their human rights.

Qadhafi’s security forces responded with extreme violence.

Fighter jets and helicopter gunships attacked people who had no

means to defend themselves. There were reports of government

agents raiding homes and hospitals to round up or kill wounded

protestors, and of indiscriminate killings, arbitrary arrests,

and torture as Qadhafi’s forces began a full-scale assault on

cities that were standing up against his rule. For these

reasons, the International Criminal Court Prosecutor has

requested arrest warrants for crimes against humanity for

Qadhafi, his son Saif al-Islam, and one of his intelligence

chiefs. The Prosecutor also recently announced that he has

found increasing evidence that Qadhafi was personally involved

in ordering mass rapes of Libyan women as part of his campaign

of terror.

The President responded to the growing violence in Libya on

February 25 when he issued Executive Order 13566, which imposed

significant economic sanctions on Qadhafi, his government, and

close associates. The Executive Order imposed a general freeze

5

745
on all assets of the Government of Libya that are in the United

States or are in the possession or control of U.S. persons

anywhere in the world. The President authorized the Treasury

Department, in consultation with the State Department, to

publicly designate for sanctions on additional senior Libyan

government officials, those responsible for human rights abuses

related to political repression in Libya, and those who provide

material financial support for individuals and entities whose

assets are frozen. To date, we have frozen over $37 billion

pursuant to E.O. 13566. We strongly support Senate Bill 1180

that was introduced by Senators Johnson, Shelby, Kerry, McCain,

Levin and Lieberman on June 13. This legislation would make

frozen assets available for humanitarian relief purposes to and

for the benefit of the Libyan people.

Also on February 25, the Secretary of State approved a policy to

revoke the visas held by these officials, others responsible for

human rights violations in Libya, and their immediate family

members. The Secretary of State also suspended the very limited

military cooperation we have had with Libya, including pending

sales of spare military equipment.

On February 26, the U.N. Security Council also responded to this

violence by unanimously adopting Resolution 1970, which demanded

an end to the violence, referred the situation in Libya to the

International Criminal Court, imposed a travel ban on, and froze

the assets of Qadhafi, and members of his family and inner

circle.

Rather than respond to the international community’s demand for

an end to the violence, Qadhafi’s forces continued their brutal

assault against the Libyan people. On March 1, the U.S. Senate

passed a resolution that “condemn[ed] the gross and systematic

violations of human rights in Libya, including violent attacks

on protestors” and urged that the United Nations take action to

protect civilians in Libya from attack, including by imposing a

no-fly zone.

The people of Libya appealed to the world for help. The Gulf

Cooperation Council and the Arab League called for the

establishment of a no-fly zone. Acting with partners in NATO,

the Arab World and the African members of the Security Council,

the United States pushed for the passage of U.N. Security

Council Resolution 1973 on March 17. The resolution demanded an

immediate ceasefire in Libya, including an end to the current

attacks against civilians; imposed a ban on all flights in the

country’s airspace; authorized the use of all necessary measures

to protect civilians; and tightened sanctions on the Qadhafi

6

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regime and entities it owns or controls, including the National

Oil Corporation and its subsidiaries. As his troops continued

pushing toward Benghazi, a city of nearly 700,000 people,

Qadhafi again defied the international community, declaring, “We

will have no mercy and no pity.”

At that moment, as the President explained in his speech to the

nation on March 28: “We knew that if we waited one more day,

Benghazi could suffer a massacre that would have reverberated

across the region and stained the conscience of the world.”

Stopping a potential humanitarian disaster became a question of

hours, not days. The costs of inaction would have been

profound. Thousands of civilians would very likely have been

slaughtered, a ruthless dictator would have been triumphant

precisely at a time when people across the region are

challenging decades of repression, and key U.S. allies,

including Egypt and Tunisia, would have been threatened by

instability on their borders during a critical point in their

own transitions toward a more promising future.

Consequently, the President directed U.S. departments and

agencies to rapidly help establish a no-fly zone, stop Qadhafi’s

forces from advancing on Benghazi, expand the coalition, and

respond to the humanitarian crisis in Libya.

The President made clear that our military objective, supported

by a coalition of allies and partners, would be to protect

civilians and enforce the terms of the resolution, requiring:

• That all attacks against civilians must stop;

• That Qaddafi stop his troops from advancing on Benghazi,

pull them back from Ajdabiya, Misrata, and Zawiya and other

cities, and establish water, electricity and gas supplies

to all areas; and

• That humanitarian assistance be allowed to reach the people

of Libya.

Establishing these conditions would pave the way for a genuine

political transition – of which Qadhafi’s departure is a

critical component. To bring about this objective, along with

the international community, the United States responded to this

crisis by developing, implementing, and monitoring sanctions and

freezing billions in Government of Libya assets, building a

broad international coalition focused on escalating diplomatic

pressure on Qadhafi and increasing his isolation, and initiating

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and sustaining political support for military operations. This

operation was launched just over a month after the first

significant protests in Libya, nine days after Gaddafi began

using airpower against civilians — and, most importantly, before

Qadhafi was able to overrun Benghazi with “no mercy” as he

pledged he would do.

To lend perspective on how rapidly this military and diplomatic

response came together, when people were being brutalized in

Bosnia in the 1990s, it took the international community two

years to intervene with air power to protect civilians and a

year to defend the people of Kosovo. It took the United States

and its coalition partners 31 days to prevent a slaughter in

Libya.

The United States has also helped the international effort to

provide humanitarian relief to the people of Libya, providing

almost $81 million to help those in need inside Libya and those

who have fled the violence. These funds help evacuate and

repatriate third-country nationals, care for refugees on Libya’s

borders, and deliver food and medicine. With U.S. government

funding, four non-governmental organizations (NGOs), four U.N.

agencies, and two international organizations are actively

providing assistance inside Libya. The international community

has already contributed, committed or pledged $245 million. The

U.S. government has also provided military in-kind assistance

valued at nearly $1.1 million, pertaining to the transport of

1,158 Egyptians from Tunisia to Egypt via U.S. C-130 aircraft.

Where We Are Now

An international coalition of NATO and Arab allies continues to

pursue the limited military mission to enforce U.N. Security

Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 and protect the Libyan people.

At the onset of military operations, the United States leveraged

its unique military capabilities to halt the regime’s offensive

actions and degrade its air defense systems before turning over

full command and control responsibility to a NATO-led coalition

on March 31. Since that time:

• Three-quarters of the over 10,000 sorties flown in Libya

have now been by non-U.S. coalition partners, a share that

has increased over time.

• All 20 ships enforcing the arms embargo are European or

Canadian.

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• The overwhelming majority of strike sorties are now being

flown by our European allies while American strikes are

limited to the suppression of enemy air defense and

occasional strikes by unmanned Predator UAVs against a

specific set of targets, all within the UN authorization,

in order to minimize collateral damage in urban areas.

• The United States provides nearly 70 percent of the

coalition’s intelligence capabilities and a majority of its

refueling assets, enabling coalition aircraft to stay in

the air longer and undertake more strikes.

Politically, U.S. leadership continues to play an important role

in maintaining and expanding this international consensus that

Qadhafi must step down, sending an unambiguous message to the

regime. We continue working with the international community to

enhance the capabilities of the Libyan opposition and increase

the ability to achieve political transition. After many

meetings with senior opposition members in Washington and

abroad, combined with daily interactions with the U.S. mission

in Benghazi, we have stated that the TNC has demonstrated itself

to be the legitimate interlocutor of the Libyan people, in

contrast to the Qadhafi regime that has lost all legitimacy to

rule.

The TNC has recently expanded to include representatives from

across the country as it aims to become a truly representative

body. It has committed itself to promoting a democratic

transition, and to adhering to international standards and human

rights. We continue working to facilitate greater political,

financial, and non-lethal support, to include up to $25 million

in medical supplies, rations, and personal protective gear.

Perhaps most important is determining an expedient way to

unfreeze Libyan government assets to meet pressing humanitarian

needs in a manner that is consistent with domestic legal

requirements and UNSCRs 1970 and 1973. This is an area where

the assistance of Congress is most needed and could become a

linchpin in the success of our strategy.

Coalition Objectives

At no point has the United States acted alone, instead helping

to mobilize the international community for collective actions,

and creating the conditions for others to work toward our mutual

objectives and to share the costs of these efforts. The NATO9

749
led coalition has made its dedication to sustaining this

momentum clear, recently deciding to extend Operation Unified

Protector for another 90 days after June 27th. At the June 8

meeting of NATO Defense Ministers, NATO reaffirmed the April 14th

statement of Foreign Ministers that operations would continue

“until all attacks and threats against civilians and

civilian populated areas have stopped... until the regime

has pulled back all its forces — including its snipers and

its mercenaries — away from civilian centers and back to

their bases. And until there is a credible and verifiable

ceasefire, paving the way for a genuine political

transition and respecting the legitimate aspirations of the

people of Libya.”

As the coalition continues its effort to protect Libya’s

civilian population, we are likewise escalating the political,

diplomatic, and financial pressure on Qadhafi. The results of

this effort are most tangibly demonstrated in the list of former

officials who have now abandoned him, which continues to grow.

His foreign ministers, an interior minister, ambassadors to the

United States and the United Nations, a central bank governor,

an oil minister, five Generals, and his labor minister have

defected as well. And we have again begun to see brave

protestors taking to the streets of Tripoli as well as uprisings

in the key cities of Zawiyah and Zlitan.

The escalating pressure against Qadhafi is steadily increasing

his isolation and eroding his influence, both within Libya and

worldwide. The Contact Group — representing more than 20

nations and the UN, Arab League, NATO, EU, OIC and GCC — has met

at the Foreign Minister level three times, and remains united in

the proposition that “Qadhafi, his family, and his regime have

lost all legitimacy. They must go so that the Libyan people can

determine their own future.” The G8 and an increasing number of

leaders — from Russian President Medvedev to Turkish Prime

Minister Erdogan to Senegalese President Wade — have all called

publicly for Qadhafi’s departure. Many states have expelled

Qadhafi’s diplomats; Libya’s national oil company and central

bank are prohibited from conducting normal business; and the

International Criminal Court Prosecutor has requested warrants

for several senior Libyan officials, including Qadhafi and his

son Saif al-Islam.

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U.S. Support to NATO Mission

Acting under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1973, and as part

of a multilateral coalition with broad international support,

Operation ODYSSEY DAWN (OOD) was launched on March 19, 2011, to

protect the Libyan people from Qadhafi’s forces. Responsibility

for leading and conducting this mission — now called Operation

UNIFIED PROTECTOR (OUP) — transitioned on March 31 to an

integrated NATO command, with all operations fully under NATO by

April 4. The focus of OUP is to protect civilians and civilianpopulated areas under attack or threat of attack. The mission

continues to concentrate on three elements: enforcement of a

naval arms embargo, enforcement of a no-fly zone, and actions to

protect civilians from attack or the threat of attack.

The Department of Defense is providing forces to NATO in support

of OUP. U.S. armed forces now provide unique capabilities to

augment and support NATO and coalition partner contributions.

These capabilities include the following: electronic warfare

assistance; aerial refueling; strategic lift capability;

personnel recovery and search and rescue, intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance support; and an alert strike

package. The United States is also augmenting the NATO

Peacetime Establishments at the three NATO Headquarters with a

number of additional U.S. military personnel. The additional

strike assets described above are on continuous stand-by alert

status to augment NATO and coalition forces if their capacity or

capability were to be deemed inadequate by Supreme Allied

Commander Europe (SACEUR) and those assets were subsequently

authorized for use by the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

A list of specific United States military assets is provided in

a classified annex.

As President Obama has clearly stated, our contributions do not

include deploying U.S. military ground forces into Libya, with

the exception of personnel recovery operations as may be

necessary.

As articulated at the NATO Ministerial discussions on June 8,

the decision has been made to extend the operation for another

90 days, from June 27, 2011, until the end of September 2011.

This sends a clear signal that NATO will stay the course and

will keep up the pressure necessary to bring this crisis to an

early conclusion.

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The United States and its NATO and coalition partners will keep

up the pressure on Qadhafi until the following three objectives

are fulfilled, as agreed by the Foreign Ministers in Berlin on

April 14, specifically: that the Qadhafi regime must cease

attacks on civilians; verifiably withdraw all its forces to its

bases; and allow immediate, full, safe, and unhindered

humanitarian access.

The United States is providing unique assets and capabilities

that other NATO and coalition nations either do not possess or

posses in very limited numbers — such as suppression of enemy

air defense (SEAD); unmanned aerial systems; aerial refueling;

and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)

support. These unique assets and capabilities are critical to

the successful execution and sustainment of NATO’s ability to

protect Libyan civilians and civilian populated areas from

attack or the threat of attack and NATO’s ability to enforce the

no-fly zone and arms embargo. They enable the Operation UNIFIED

PROTECTOR (OUP) commander to find, fix, track, target, and

destroy regime forces threatening and attacking civilians and

civilian populated areas.

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Consequences of U.S. Not Participating in NATO Operations

If the United States military were to cease its participation in

the NATO operation, it would seriously degrade the coalition’s

ability to execute and sustain its operation designed to protect

Libyan civilians and to enforce the no-fly zone and the arms

embargo, as authorized under UNSCR 1973. Cessation of U.S.

military activities in support of OUP would also significantly

increase the level of risk for the remaining Allied and

coalition forces conducting the operation, which in turn would

likely lead to the withdrawal of other NATO and coalition nation

participation in the operation. Furthermore, if NATO had to

terminate the operation before the recently agreed 90-day

extension (to September 27) because it did not possess the

assets and capabilities required to conduct or sustain the

operation, then NATO’s credibility would be damaged with

significant consequences for U.S., European, and global

security.

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Current and Projected Costs

Military Costs

The cost through June 3, 2011, for DoD military operations

and humanitarian assistance efforts in Libya is

$715.9 million.

DoD Libya Operations

Dollars in Millions

Sec 3(a)(7)

Estimated Cost

thru June 3,

2011

Daily Operations 313.7

Munitions 398.3

Global Lift and Sustain

1.6

Subtotal Military Operations 713.6

Drawdown of DoD Supplies

1.3

Humanitarian Assistance (OHDACA)1

1.0

Total 715.9

Of this amount, $713.6 million was used to fund military

personnel pay costs, travel and sustainment of personnel,

operating (flying hours), expended munitions, supplies,

airlift, and a small amount for lift and sustainment costs

for coalition partners supporting operations in Libya.

Presidential Determination number 2011-09, signed April 26,

2011, directed the drawdown of up to $25 million in

nonlethal commodities and services to support key U.S.

Government partners such as the Transitional National

Council in efforts to protect civilians and civilian

populated areas under threat of attack in Libya. On May

10, 2011, the Department delivered 10,000 cases (120,000

meals) of Halal Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) to Benghazi,

Libya, at a cost of $1.3 million. All remaining items

(i.e., uniforms, bullet-proof vests, binoculars, maps,

tents, and medical supplies) are scheduled for delivery to

the Benghazi port on or about June 15. The current total

cost estimate for goods and transportation is $15 million

(i.e., $6 million in goods and $9 million in transportation

1 Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid

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costs), which leaves approximately $10 million in drawdown

authority that has not been utilized

The Department of Defense’s direct contribution to

humanitarian concerns in the Libya operation as of June 3,

2011, is $1.04 million. This amount funded $0.9 million in

airlift and aviation costs to repatriate 1,158 Egyptians

from Tunisia to Egypt using U.S. C-130 aircraft, and

approximately $0.2 million in humanitarian relief supplies

that was provided for the purchase and retrofit of two

ambulances operated by the Tunisian Red Crescent Society

for the provision emergency humanitarian aid to thousands

of migrants fleeing Libya.

The total projected cost for DoD operations through

September 30, 2011, which is the end of the second 90-day

authorization by NATO, is about $1.1 billion. This

estimate assumes the current tempo of support operations

continues through September 30. Close to $300 million of

this total will be offset by lower peacetime operating

costs in the Air Force, in part as a result of the Libyan

operations. Hence the current estimate of incremental

costs through September 30 is about $0.8 billion.

DoD Libya Operations

Dollars in Millions

Sec 3(a)(8)

Estimated Cost

thru Sept 30,

2011

Daily Operations 618

Munitions 450

Global Lift and Sustain

10

Subtotal Military Operations 1,078

Drawdown of DoD Supplies

25

Humanitarian Assistance (OHDACA)2

1

Total 1,104

The Department does not plan to ask for supplemental

appropriations and will pay for these costs using currently

available Defense funds. These operating costs will be

2 Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid

15

755
offset through reductions in lower priority support

activities, and there will be some reduction to the

peacetime flying hour program in part as a result of the

Libya operation. The Department plans to replace munitions

used in the Libyan operation as part of its normal

programming and budgeting process.

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Humanitarian Costs

The U.S. Government (USG) has provided almost $81 million for

humanitarian activities in response to the conflict in Libya as

of June 3, 2011.

FY 2011 USG ASSISTANCE FOR THE LIBYA COMPLEX EMERGENCY

Implementing Partner Activity Location Amount

USAID/OFDA ASSISTANCE

Agency for Cooperation

and Technical

Development (ACTED)

Logistics and Relief Supplies Libya $25,000

ACTED Economic Recovery and Market Systems,

Logistics and Relief Supplies Libya $500,000

Danish Refugee

Council Protection, Logistics and Relief Supplies Libya $438,649

International Relief and

Development Logistics and Relief Supplies Libya $349,223

TRC Emergency Relief Supplies Tunisia $50,000

TRC

USAID/OFDA Commodities: 2,000

blankets; 40 rolls of plastic sheeting; 9,600

water containers

Tunisia $40,300

International Medical

Corps (IMC)/Merlin

10 health kits and three trauma Kits, plus

transportation Libya $357,905

IMC Health, Logistics and Relief Supplies, and

Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) Libya $2,500,000

Merlin Health Libya $483,854

Mercy Corps Logistics and Relief Supplies, WASH,

Agriculture and Food Security Libya $550,000

OCHA Humanitarian Coordination and Information

Management Libya $500,000

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WHO Health TBD $1,000,000

WFP Logistics and Emergency

Telecommunications Libya $750,000

WFP U.N. Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) Libya $750,000

TBD Emergency Relief Activities and Relief

Supplies Affected Areas $184,122

Program Support Costs $1,520,947

TOTAL USAID/OFDA $10,000,000

USAID/FFP

WFP Title II Emergency Food Assistance Libya $5,000,000

WFP Local and Regional Food Procurement Tunisia, Egypt $5,000,000

TOTAL USAID/FFP $10,000,000

STATE/PRM ASSISTANCE

IOM Evacuation and repatriation programs for

third-country nationals

Libya, Tunisia,

Egypt $27,500,000

UNHCR

Assistance and protection for Libyan

internally displaced persons as well as

refugees and migrants in Tunisia, Egypt,

Italy, and Malta

Libya, Tunisia,

Egypt $14,500,000

ICRC

Medical and surgical care, water and

sanitation facilities, protection of detainees

and conflict victims

Libya, Tunisia,

Egypt $17,700,000

WHO

Support for the Tunisian Ministry of Public

Health to respond to the medical needs of

Libyans, third-country nationals, and host

communities in Tunisia

Tunisia $300,000

TOTAL STATE/PRM $60,000,000

STATE/PM/WRA ASSISTANCE

Mines Advisory Group Conventional Weapons Destruction Libya $486,937

Swiss Foundation for Conventional Weapons Destruction Libya $470,670

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Mine Action

TOTAL STATE/PM/WRA $957,607

TOTAL USAID AND STATE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR THE LIBYA

COMPLEX EMERGENCY IN FY 2011 $80,957,607

[1] The total does not include an additional $500,000 provided by USAID/OFDA to OCHA’s Middle East Office for regional coordination.

The USG has also provided in-kind military assistance valued at

nearly $1.1 million, pertaining to the transport of 1,158

Egyptians from Tunisia to Egypt via U.S. C-130 aircraft.

The overall humanitarian situation in Libya remains relatively

stable. In the coming months, the U.S. Agency for International

Development (USAID) and the Department of State’s Bureau for

Population, Refugees, and Migration (State/PRM) project that

additional, targeted humanitarian funding may be required to

respond to unforeseen needs in Libya, particularly in areas that

are currently inaccessible. These costs will depend on the

duration and the intensity of conflict. USAID’s Food for Peace

Office (FFP) has no immediate plans for additional food

assistance to Libya but will work closely with the World Food

Program (WFP) and other partners to identify and respond to new

emergency food needs, if necessary.

On June 9, 2011, at the third meeting of the Contact Group for

Libya, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced an

additional contribution from State/PRM of $26.5 million

(included in the above table) to address humanitarian needs in

Libya and neighboring countries. The newly announced funding

will support the work of the International Committee of the Red

Cross (ICRC), the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for

Refugees (UNHCR), and the International Organization for

Migration (IOM) in the region. Funds will also support the U.N.

World Health Organization (WHO) to continue providing assistance

to the Tunisian government to meet the health needs of displaced

Libyans, third-country nationals, and Tunisian host communities.

USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) is planning

to provide up to $5 million for community groups, local media,

and, as appropriate, interim governing authorities in Eastern

Libya.

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759
Department of State Operational Costs

State Operations Account

Committed Thru

June 3

Projected

June 3 thru

EOY

Total

Projected Thru

EOY

Diplomatic & Consular

Programs-NEA 1,004,586 941,252 1,945,838

NEA (Non-Add) 996,586 941,252 1,937,838

MED (Non-Add) 8,000 - 8,000

Emergencies in the

Diplomatic and Consular

Service 1,836,205 - 1,836,205

Repatriation Loans Program

Account-Consular Affairs 45,000 - 45,000

Diplomatic Security 823,882 1,500,000 2,323,882

TOTAL, State Operations 3,709,673 2,441,252 6,150,925

Department of State Operational Costs

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Analysis of Impact on U.S. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan

Department of Defense: There has not been a significant

operational impact on United States activities in Iraq and

Afghanistan. All the forces that were briefly diverted from

other operations have been replaced, with the exception of one

Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG). That capability will be

replaced during June 2011. In some cases, forces were delayed

in arriving in Iraq and Afghanistan, but the operational impact

was mitigated by forces already supporting these operations.

Department of State: The Department has not experienced, nor

does it anticipate, any impact on its ongoing activities in

Iraq.

USAID: Developmental projects in Afghanistan and Iraq are funded

primarily through Economic Support Funds and supplemental

funding appropriated by the Congress. As of June 3, the

majority — $15 million of $20 million — of USAID assistance for

the Libya crisis was funded with the International Disaster

Assistance (IDA) account, including $10 million from USAID’s

Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) and $5

million from USAID/FFP for local and regional food procurement.

The remaining $5 million from USAID/FFP utilizes Food for Peace

Title II funds. As such, humanitarian activities in Libya have

no adverse impact on USAID activities in Iraq and Afghanistan.

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Description of Interim Transitional National Council

The Libyan opposition’s Transitional National Council (TNC) is

composed of 45 members, led by former Libyan Minister of

Justice Mustafa Abdujalil, that has been organized to

coordinate essential services and represent the Libyan people

during the current crisis. The TNC has emphasized the

importance of representing all regions and people in Libya and

even includes members from regime-controlled areas such as

Tripoli and Sebha. In addition to the larger council, the TNC

has organized a 15 person executive bureau, led by interim

Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril, to handle specific portfolios

including Foreign Affairs, Finance and Oil, Justice and Human

Rights, Education, Health and Reconstruction and

Infrastructure, among others. Currently, security conditions

do not permit the Council to fully and adequately fulfill all

of the TNC’s representational objectives, and political

disagreements exist, as they would in any open and diverse

democratic setting.

The TNC has consistently asserted that it is serving a temporary

administrative role until the regime steps down and an interim

government can be put in place to represent all of Libya. While

it has not always been clear about how long this temporary role

should continue, the TNC recognizes that elections will be

needed in a reasonable time after the collapse of the Qadhafi

regime, to provide legitimacy to a new Libyan government. The

TNC has dedicated itself to paving the way for an inclusive,

democratic process to take the place of the regime once Qadhafi

departs power. The TNC has also issued clear statements noting

its intent to respect the Geneva Conventions, its respect for

human rights, and repudiation of terrorism.

Recognition: Secretary Clinton, the State Department’s envoy in

Benghazi and other U.S. officials are engaging members of the

Libyan opposition, including the TNC, to understand their

aspirations and the steps they are undertaking to build a

democracy that reflects the will of the Libyan people. The

United States views the TNC as the legitimate interlocutor for

the Libyan people during this interim period and it is the

institution through which we are engaging the Libyan people, in

addition to our work with Libyan civil society. This is in

stark contrast to the authoritarian Qadhafi regime, which has no

constitution, does not govern by the rule of law and has lost

all legitimacy to rule. Australia, Canada, Germany, Spain, and

the UAE have all made similar statements in recent days. We are

encouraged by the steps taken by the TNC to bring Libyans

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together to plan their own future and a permanent, inclusive,

constitutional system that will protect the rights of all

Libyans.

Transition Planning: The TNC is engaged in detailed planning

for a political transition following the current conflict and

the departure of Qadhafi from power. The TNC laid out a roadmap

for an inclusive political process to take the place of the

regime once Qadhafi departs power. The roadmap, which is

predicated on preserving the unity and sovereignty of Libya,

lays out steps for drafting a constitution, convening a national

assembly and implementing an interim government. The TNC has

also focused on unifying Libya through implementing national

reconciliation mechanisms and ensuring the full participation of

areas currently under regime control. In this regard, the TNC

has shown a willingness to work with technocrats from the

regime, provided they have not participated in human rights

violations.

The U.S. envoy in Benghazi is engaged in regular discussions

with the TNC regarding its plans for a political process, its

assessment of a realistic timetable for implementation, and the

role of the international community in assisting the transition.

The TNC’s ability to affect a political transition will depend

on a favorable resolution of the current conflict and the

departure of Qadhafi from power. We believe that the TNC is

genuinely committed to fulfilling the democratic aspirations of

the Libyan people, and we support the steps it is taking to meet

this goal.

On the international stage, the TNC has been conducting

extensive outreach to build awareness of, and garner support

for, the Libyan opposition. Domestically, it has been working

closely with municipal councils to provide essential services to

the areas under opposition control, such as water, electricity

and security. The TNC has consistently declared its commitment

to protecting the human rights of all Libyans, agreed to treat

captured regime soldiers in accordance with the Geneva

Conventions and publicly rejected terrorism and extremist

influences.

Assistance: Despite pledges of assistance from a number of

would-be donors, donors still need to disburse pledges of

financial assistance to the TNC. To facilitate the vesting of

assets blocked by the United States, the Administration supports

Senate Bill 1180 that would allow the United States to

confiscate property of the Government of Libya to be used for

costs related to providing humanitarian relief to the Libyan

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people. Under this vesting authority, the President would have

the authority to decide precisely how the assets would be used,

consistent with the legislation. The President would only

disburse assets through means that meet our legal and policy

standards regarding transparent oversight of the disbursements.

The United States also supports crude oil sales from TNCcontrolled areas. On April 26, the U.S. Treasury's Office of

Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) posted a new Libya General License

and a new Statement of Licensing Policy on Libyan crude oil

sales. These actions were taken to remove sanctions barriers

under domestic law to U.S. persons' participation in certain

transactions involving oil and gas sales by the TNC. On May 25,

a U.S. oil refiner, Tesoro, announced that it had purchased the

cargo aboard a tanker chartered by the Swiss oil trading company

Vitol that had departed opposition territory in mid-April. The

tanker arrived at Tesoro’s Hawaii refinery on June 8. This

cargo is the first known cargo purchased from the Libyan TNC.

Analysis of Potential Ties to Extremist Groups: We are not

aware of any direct relationship between the TNC and al-Qaeda,

Hezbollah, the Libya Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) or any other

terrorist organization. There are reports that former members

of the LIFG, which had been initially formed as an anti-Qadhafi

group, are present in Eastern Libyan and that some of them were

fighting with opposition forces on the front lines against the

regime. During the past two years, the Government of Libya had

instituted a program to rehabilitate and release from prison

members of the LIFG who had renounced terrorism, and some of the

former LIFG members in Eastern Libya had participated in this

program. The TNC has consistently and publicly rejected

terrorism and extremist influences and we have not observed any

TNC support or endorsement of the LIFG.

In addition, the TNC has publicly declared the secular nature of

its organization. The TNC and other members of the opposition

have actively worked to open up Eastern Libya to civil society

groups for the first time in the 42 years since Qadhafi took

power. As a result, non-regime groups that had been previously

banned, including the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, have now

organized and are participating in Libyan society. From public

press reports, we understand that the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood

has declared its support for moderate Islam, emphasized the

important role of women in society-building, and formed a relief

organization in Benghazi.

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Legal Analysis and Administration Support for Bipartisan

Resolution

Given the important U.S. interests served by U.S. military

operations in Libya and the limited nature, scope and duration

of the anticipated actions, the President had constitutional

authority, as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive and

pursuant to his foreign affairs powers, to direct such limited

military operations abroad. The President is of the view that

the current U.S. military operations in Libya are consistent

with the War Powers Resolution and do not under that law require

further congressional authorization, because U.S. military

operations are distinct from the kind of “hostilities”

contemplated by the Resolution’s 60 day termination provision.

U.S. forces are playing a constrained and supporting role in a

multinational coalition, whose operations are both legitimated

by and limited to the terms of a United Nations Security Council

Resolution that authorizes the use of force solely to protect

civilians and civilian populated areas under attack or threat of

attack and to enforce a no-fly zone and an arms embargo. U.S.

operations do not involve sustained fighting or active exchanges

of fire with hostile forces, nor do they involve the presence of

U.S. ground troops, U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof,

or any significant chance of escalation into a conflict

characterized by those factors.

The Administration has repeatedly indicated its strong support

for the bipartisan resolution drafted by Senators McCain, Kerry,

Lieberman, Levin, Feinstein, Graham, and Chambliss that would

confirm that both branches are united in their commitment to

supporting the aspirations of the Libyan people for political

reform and self-government.

25

765
Congressional Consultation

The Administration has consulted extensively with Congress about

U.S. engagement in Libya. Since March 1, the Administration

has:

• testified at over 10 hearings that included a substantial

discussion of Libya;

• participated in over 30 Member and/or staff briefings,

including the March 18 Presidential meeting with

Congressional Leadership, Committee Chairs and Ranking

Members; all three requested “All Members Briefings” (two

requested by the Senate, one by the House); and all

requested “All Staff Briefings;”

• conducted dozens of calls with individual Members; and

• provided 32 status updates via e-mail to over 1,600

Congressional staff.

The list below catalogues Libya-related hearings, briefings,

calls, and other communication and consultation between Congress

and the Executive Branch from March 1 through June 15. (In

addition to what’s included below, the Intelligence Community

has provided and continues to provide frequent classified

written intelligence products on Libya and regular Libya

intelligence update briefings to Members and Committees,

numbering in the dozens of such briefings since March 1.)

June 14: Amb. Cretz provided classified briefing on Libya

to staff of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on State

and Foreign Operations.

June 10: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle

Flournoy, Lt Gen Charles Jacoby (J-5), and ODNI provided

classified briefing on Libya to SASC Members.

June 9: Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Arabian Gulf and

Maghreb Affairs, Janet Sanderson; Principal Deputy

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security

Affairs, Joe McMillan; ODNI; JS (Rear Admiral Michael S.

Rogers, Director for Intelligence, J-2 & Rear Admiral Kurt

Tidd, Vice Director for Operations, J-3); provided

classified briefing on Libya to SFRC Members.

26

766
June 2: Ambassador to Libya Gene Cretz; Principal Deputy

Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Joe

McMillan; ODNI; JS (Rear Admiral Michael S. Rogers,

Director for Intelligence, J-2 & Rear Admiral Kurt Tidd,

Vice Director for Operations, J-3); provided classified

briefing on Libya to HASC Members.

June 1: Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs,

Jeffery Feltman; ODNI; JS (Rear Admiral Michael S. Rogers,

Director for Intelligence, J-2 & Rear Admiral Kurt Tidd,

Vice Director for Operations, J-3); provided classified

briefing on Libya to HFAC Members. Other House Members

attended at the request of the Chairwoman and Ranking

Member.

May 31: ODNI; DOD (Rear Admiral Michael S. Rogers,

Director for Intelligence, J-2 & Rear Admiral Kurt Tidd,

Vice Director for Operations, J-3); provided classified

briefing on Libya to HPSCI Members.

May 13: VCJCS called Senators Lugar and Corker to provide

an update on Libya operations.

May 13: J2, J3 and OSD-P briefed staff for Majority Leader

Reid and Chairman Levin on Libya operations.

May 12: State Deputy Secretary Steinberg testified before

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Assessing the

Situation in Libya.

May 11: State DAS Janet Sanderson and Treasury DAS Daniel

Glaser briefed Senate leadership and committee staff on the

Libya vesting proposal.

May 11: State DAS Janet Sanderson and Treasury DAS Daniel

Glaser briefed House leadership and committee staff on the

Libya vesting proposal.

May 5: State Assistant Secretary Michael Posner and DAS

Tamara Wittes testified before HFAC on Transitions in the

Middle East including mention of Libya.

April 22: VCJCS called Senator Corker to provide an update

on Libya Operations.

27

767
April 19: Amb. Cretz and other State Department briefers

provide classified briefs on Libya, focused on the $25

million drawdown package, to SFRC staff and separately to

HFAC staff.

April 13: Desk officers from State provided SFRC staff

classified briefing on Libya.

April 8: RADM Rogers (J2) and RADM Tidd (J3) briefed Rep

Smith on Libya operations.

March 31: Amb. Cretz briefed Sen. Lieberman on Libya.

March 31: Amb. Cretz briefed SACFO staff on Libya.

March 31: Sec Def and CJCS testified in hearings on Libya

before HASC.

March 31: Sec Def and CJCS testified in hearings on Libya

before SASC.

March 31: State Deputy Secretary Steinberg testified before

SFRC on Assessing the Situation in Libya.

March 31: State Deputy Secretary Steinberg testified before

HFAC on Libya: Defining U.S. National Security Interests.

March 30: Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Deputy

Secretary of Treasury, Director of National Intelligence,

and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducted all

House Members briefing on Libya, the earliest available

opportunity following commencement of military operations

given the March Congressional recess.

March 30: Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Deputy

Secretary of Treasury, Director of National Intelligence,

and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff conducted all

Senators briefing on Libyan operations, the earliest

available opportunity following commencement of military

operations given the March Congressional recess.

March 29: RADM Rogers (J2) and RADM Tidd (J3) briefed

Chairman Young and Rep Dicks on Libya.

March 28: RADM Rogers (J2), RADM Tidd (J3) participated

with State and ODNI in a classified briefing to update

Congressional staff on Libya operations. All Congressional

28

768
staff who had a Secret-level clearance were invited to

attend.

March 22: State (Ambassador Gene Cretz); ODNI; DOD (Rear

Admiral Michael S. Rogers, Director for Intelligence, J-2

& Rear Admiral Kurt Tidd, Vice Director for Operations, J3); and Treasury (Acting Undersecretary David Cohen)

participated in interagency closed and open briefing to

House and Senate staff on Libya.

March 21: The President provided the Speaker of the House

of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the

Senate a report consistent with the War Powers Resolution,

which provided details regarding the mission and the

specific circumstances under which we were undertaking

military action.

March 20: VADM Gortney (Director, JS) briefed Chairman

Levin on developments in Libya.

March 19: Deputy National Security Advisor Denis McDonough

contacted Rep. Boehner, Rep. Cantor, Rep. Hoyer, Senator

Reid, Senator Durbin, Senator Kyl.

March 19: State Department's Deputy Secretary Steinberg

spoke with Kerry, Lugar, Ros-Lehtinen and Berman.

March 19: DOD USDP Flournoy called House and Senate Armed

Services Committee Chairmen and Ranking Members to provide

an update on Libya operations. USDP Flournoy also called

Senator Sessions.

March 19: Admiral Mullen called House and Senate Defense

Appropriations Subcommittee Chairmen and Ranking Members to

provide an update on Libya operations.

March 18: Deputy National Security Advisor Denis McDonough

held a conference call with bipartisan, bicameral

leadership and committee staff to discuss the President's

meeting and to answer questions.

March 18: President Obama invited Congress' bipartisan

bicameral leadership to the White House to consult on the

situation in Libya and brief them on the limited, discrete

and well-defined participation that he envisioned for the

United States to help implement the U.N. Resolution. The

White House invited House and Senate Leadership, Chairs and

29

769
Ranking of Foreign Affairs, Armed Services and Intel

committees. Members of Congress who were able to

participate included:

Majority Leader Harry Reid

Democratic Whip Steny Hoyer

Senator Carl Levin

Senator Dick Lugar

Senator Saxby Chambliss

Rep. Mike Rogers

Rep. Dutch Ruppersberger

Speaker John Boehner

Majority Leader Eric Cantor

Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi

Senator Dick Durbin

Senator Mitch McConnell

Senator John Kyl

Senator John Kerry

Senator Diane Feinstein

Rep. Buck McKeon

Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen

Rep. Howard L. Berman

March 17: All Senators briefing on Libya developments and

possible USG and international responses including

potential military options by an interagency team led by

State U/S Bill Burns, with ODNI and DOD.

March 17: U/S Burns testified in open session of SFRC on

Popular Uprisings in the Middle East, with main focus was

on Libya.

March 15: Embassy Tripoli Chargé and Acting DCM briefed

SFRC staff on Libya.

March 10: PDASD McMillan (ISA), MG Leins (J5), Col. Olsen

(J3) briefed HASC Chairman McKeon on Libya. The briefing

included the latest developments and possible military

options for Libya, including the mechanics of a no-fly

zone.

March 10: State A/S Feltman testified before the Middle

East and South Asia Subcommittee on Assessing U.S. Foreign

Policy Priorities and Needs Amidst Economic Challenges in

the Middle East, at which there were questions about Libya.

30

770
March 4: ASD Vershbow (ISA), RADM Rogers (J2) and RADM Tidd

(J3) briefed SASC Members on Libya. They provided an

update on Libya including recent intelligence. They also

discussed possible military options, including the

mechanics of a no-fly zone.

March 2: Secretary Clinton testified at SFRC hearing on

National Security and Foreign Policy Priorities in the FY

2012 International Affairs Budget, which included

discussion of Libya.

March 2: Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen testified at

HAC-D hearing on FY 2012 Defense Department Appropriations,

which included discussion of Libyan no-fly zone.

March 1: Secretary Clinton testified at HFAC hearing on

Assessing U.S. Foreign Policy Priorities and Needs Amidst

Economic Challenges, which included discussion of Libya.

March 1: State DAS Sanderson, DASD Huddleston, MG Holmes,

and ODNI provided classified brief to SFRC, SASC and

leadership staff on Libya, as well as Yemen and Bahrain.

March 1: DASD Huddleston (ISA/AF) and DAS Sanderson (NEA)

provided an update briefing on the situation in Libya to

SASC and SFRC professional staff members.

Humanitarian Assistance Briefings

USAID/DCHA (with AA Nancy Lindborg, DAA Mark Ward, D/OFDA Mark

Bartolini or DD/OFDA Carol Chan) and State/PRM (with PDAS David

Robinson or Kelly Clements) held regular conference calls with

Congressional staff to provide briefing updates on humanitarian

assistance to Libya and its borders with Egypt and Tunisia.

Beginning February 28 through June 14 there were 16 conference

calls held – initially twice weekly, then weekly, and now

periodically as needed on the following dates:

• February 28

• March 4, 8, 11, 15, 18, 22, 29

• April 5, 12, 19, 26

• May 3, 10, 17

• June 14

31

771
32

Contents of Classified Annex

Importance of U.S. Military to Opposition Groups

Assessment of Opposition Military Groups

Coalition Contributions to NATO Mission

Assessment of Extremist Groups in Libya

Threat Assessment of MANPADs, Ballistic Missiles, and Chemical

Weapons in Libya

772
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 17

773
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

774
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

775
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

776
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

777
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

778
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

779
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 18

780
EXHIBIT 19

781
EXHIBIT 20

782
783
784
785
786
787
788
DEPOSITION OF

BRYAN PAGLIANO

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, SEPTEMBER 10, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

PHILIP G. KIKO, Staff Director and General Counsel

CHRIS DONESA, Deputy Staff Director

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Counsel

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel

CARLTON DAVIS, Counsel

KIM BETZ, Member Outreach Liaison and Counsel

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director/General Counsel

FOR BRYAN PAGLIANO

MARK MACDOUGALL

SEAN G. D’ARCY

CONSTANCE D. O’CONNOR

ALSO PRESENT

ELENI M. ROUMEL, Assistant Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives

790
3

Ms. Jackson. Good afternoon, everyone. This is the deposition

of Bryan Pagliano conducted by the House Select Committee on the events

surrounding the 2012 terrorist attack in Benghazi.

This deposition is occurring under a subpoena issued by Chairman

Trey Gowdy as part of the committee's investigation into the attacks

on the U.S. diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya that resulted in

the deaths of four Americans, including Ambassador Chris Stevens.

Sir, would you state your name for the record, please.

Mr. Pagliano. Bryan Pagliano.

Ms. Jackson. And would you spell your first and last name for

us, please.

Mr. Pagliano. B-r-y-a-n, P-a-g-l-i-a-n-o.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Good afternoon, Mr. Pagliano. My name is

Sharon Jackson. I am one of the counsel with the committee's majority

staff. We're going to have everyone identify themselves for the record

that are present here today. And we are going to start with the

chairman and the members of the committee.

Mr. Gowdy?

Mr. Gowdy. Trey Gowdy, South Carolina.

Ms. Jackson. Ranking member?

Mr. Cummings. Congressman Elijah Cummings, ranking member.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. And then --

Ms. Duckworth. Tammy Duckworth, Illinois.

Mrs. Brooks. Susan Brooks from Indiana.

Mr. Pompeo. Mike Pompeo, Kansas.

791
4

Mrs. Roby. Martha Roby, Alabama.

Mr. Westmoreland. Lynn Westmoreland, Georgia.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

Mr. Schiff. Adam Schiff, California.

Mr. Jordan. Jim Jordan, Ohio.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. And then following around from Mr. Jordan,

could we have everyone else identify themselves in the room.

Sir?

Mr. Mullin. Connor Mullin on behalf of Bryan Pagliano.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer with the minority staff.

Mr. Chipman. I'm Dana Chipman with committee staff.

Mr. D'Arcy. Sean D'Arcy with Mr. Pagliano.

Ms. O'Connor. Constance O'Connor with Mr. Pagliano.

Mr. Kiko. Phil Kiko, committee staff.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I'm Susanne Sachsman Grooms. I'm with the

minority.

Ms. Roumel. Elini Roumel from the House Office of General

Counsel.

Mr. Donesa. I'm Chris Donesa with the committee staff.

Mr. MacDougall. Mark MacDougall. I'm Mr. Pagliano's counsel

for the record.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Pagliano, the committee appreciates your appearance at this

deposition this afternoon, as we continue to gather facts surrounding

the situation in Benghazi, Libya. Your relationship with Secretary

792
5

Clinton offers unique insight that is extremely valuable to this

committee.

Our questions are intended to provide a clear record that can help

inform all members and staff about specific areas that we are exploring

in our investigation.

Before we begin, I'd like to go over the ground rules and explain

how a deposition before this committee of Congress will proceed.

The way the questioning proceeds is that the majority will ask

questions first up to 1 hour, and then the minority will have an

opportunity to ask questions for an equal period of time if they choose.

We firmly adhere to the 1-hour time limit for each side.

Questions may only be posed by a member of the committee or

designated staff attorney. We'll rotate back and forth 1 hour per side

until we are out of questions and the deposition will be over.

Unlike a deposition in Federal court, the committee format is not

bound by the Rules of Evidence. You or your counsel may raise

objections for privileged or classified information subject to the

review by the chairman of the committee after the deposition has

adjourned. Members and staff of the committee, however, are not

permitted to raise objections when the other side is asking questions.

This has not been an issue that we've encountered in the past, but I

want to make sure that we're all clear and you're clear on the process.

You are welcome to confer with counsel at any time throughout the

deposition, but if something needs clarified, we ask that you make this

known. If you need to discuss something with your counsel, we'll go

793
6

off the record, stop the clock, and provide you with that opportunity.

We will also take a break whenever it's convenient for you. This

can be after every hour of questioning, after a couple of rounds, or

whatever you prefer. During a round of questioning, if you need

anything, a glass of water, use of the facilities, to confer with

counsel, please just let us know and we'll go off the record and stop

the clock. We'd like to make this process as easy and comfortable as

possible.

This deposition is unclassified. So if a question calls for any

information that you know to be classified, please state this for the

record as well as the reason for the classification. Once clarified,

to the extent possible, please respond only with the unclassified

information. If we need to have a classified session later, we can

undertake those arrangements.

There may be votes called during the course of this deposition.

If votes do occur, we will break until votes are completed and the

members return.

We encourage witnesses who appear before the committee to freely

consult with counsel. And you have counsel present today.

And, again, could we have your lead counsel state his name for

the record.

Mr. MacDougall. Mark MacDougall with Akin Gump Strauss,

Washington, D.C.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Mr. Pagliano, you can also see that we have

an official reporter here today with us taking down everything that

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7

I say, you say, and others say to make a written record of these

proceedings. So we ask that you give verbal responses to all

questions, yes and no, as opposed to nods or shakes of the head. And

I'm going to ask the reporter to feel free to jump in in case you don't

respond verbally.

Do you understand the need to respond verbally?

Mr. Pagliano. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Another thing that we should try to do is

not talk over each other so that it's easier to get a complete record.

We want you to answer our questions in the most complete and

truthful manner possible. So we will take our time and repeat or

clarify our questions if necessary. If you have any questions or if

you do not understand any questions, please let us know. We will be

happy to clarify or repeat our questions.

If you honestly don't know the answer to a question or do not

remember, it is best not to guess. But please give us your best

recollection, and if there are things you do not know or cannot

remember, just say so, and please inform us who, to the best of your

knowledge, may be able to provide a complete answer to the question.

This deposition will be under oath. You are required to answer

questions truthfully from Congress.

Do you understand that?

Mr. Pagliano. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. This also applies to questions posed by

congressional staff in a deposition.

795
8

Do you understand this?

Mr. Pagliano. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Witnesses who knowingly provide false testimony

could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury or making false

statements.

Do you understand this?

Mr. Pagliano. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Pursuant to the committee rules, the witness will

be sworn in before providing testimony during a deposition.

Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gowdy. Well, you don't have to rise, but if I could get you

to raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear or affirm the testimony you are about to

give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Mr. Pagliano. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Let the record reflect that the witness has

answered in the affirmative.

Mr. Pagliano, that is the end of my preamble. I will now ask the

minority if they have any openings remarks regarding the process to

be followed in depositions before this committee.

Ms. Sawyer. Yes, just briefly.

Mr. Pagliano, thank you for being here today. I think at the

outset you were informed that the committee believes that you have

important testimony for this committee to hear. I do believe that is

the view of the majority of the committee. However, the ranking member

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9

and the Democratic members don't actually agree with that view. We

do not believe that you have testimony relevant to the jurisdiction

of this particular committee which was voted into being to investigate

the attacks in Benghazi on September 11, 2012.

It's also the reason why we have sought for rules that would allow

for open and public debate before a subpoena would issue. We did not

get that request.

We are here today. We thank you for being with us here today,

and we will proceed and look forward to hearing from you.

Ms. Jackson. I see that the clock reads now 11 minutes after 1.

We'll get started with the first hour of questions.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Mr. Pagliano, do you acknowledge that a subpoena was issued

to you through your counsel for your testimony here today?

A Mr. Chairman, on the advice of counsel, I must respectfully

decline to answer in reliance on my rights under the Fifth Amendment

to the United States Constitution. I am not a lawyer, and I must follow

my lawyer's advice in this matter.

Q Do you also acknowledge that the same subpoena commanded

the production of documents?

A Mr. Chairman, on the advice of counsel, I must respectfully

decline to answer in reliance on my rights under the Fifth Amendment

to the United States Constitution. I am not a lawyer, and I must follow

my lawyer's advice in this matter.

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10

Q Let the record reflect that the witness has asserted his

Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.

For the record, please let me be very clear and let's get a very

clear record.

Are you declining to produce documents solely on the ground that

you believe the act of production will incriminate you?

A Mr. Chairman, on the advice of counsel, I must respectfully

decline to answer in reliance on my rights under the Fifth Amendment

to the United States Constitution. I am not a lawyer, and I must follow

my lawyer's advice in this matter.

Q Is it your intention to refuse to produce any documents in

response to the committee's subpoena solely on the ground that you are

asserting the Fifth Amendment act of production privilege and believing

that producing documents will incriminate you?

A Mr. Chairman, on the advice of counsel, I must respectfully

decline to answer in reliance on my rights under the Fifth Amendment

to the United States Constitution. I am not a lawyer, and I must follow

my lawyer's advice in this matter.

Q We will let the record reflect that witness has asserted

his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination as to answering

any questions in addition to producing any documents.

For the record, please let us be clear. Are you declining to

answer the committee's questions as to Benghazi-related issues solely

on the ground that you believe the answer will incriminate you?

A Mr. Chairman, on the advice of counsel, I must respectfully

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11

decline to answer in reliance on my rights under the Fifth Amendment

to the United States Constitution. I am not a lawyer, and I must follow

my lawyer's advice in this matter.

Q Your objection to each of these questions has been heard.

The deposition procedures of the Select Committee are those provided

for by the House in Section 4(c)(5)(b) of House Resolution 567 of the

113th Congress and renewed in Section 4(a) of House Resolution 5 of

the 114th Congress. The procedures printed in House Report 113-442

specifically provide that a witness may refuse to answer a question

only to preserve a privilege.

Does the witness or counsel wish to concisely state the nature

of the objection for the record?

Mr. MacDougall. Ms. Jackson, on behalf of Mr. Pagliano, I think

Mr. Pagliano has fully and accurately asserted his rights under the

Fifth Amendment, and I don't think any further assertion's required.

Ms. Jackson. Let the record reflect that the witness has

asserted his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and

that is the basis for his refusal to answer the committee's questions,

and his Fifth Amendment act of production privilege as the basis to

refuse to produce documents in response to the committee's subpoena.

Pursuant to the deposition procedures, the chair will rule on the

objections after questioning has adjourned for the day.

I advise the witness that the objections may be overruled.

The deposition procedures further provide that the deposition may

be reconvened if the chair overrules the objection. If the objection

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12

is overruled, the witness may be subject to recall and ordered to answer

the question or produce documents. And further refusal to answer the

questions or produce documents may be subject to sanctions, potentially

including a citation for contempt of Congress, prosecution for contempt

of Congress, and criminal liability, unless the ruling of the chair

is reversed by the committee.

Mr. Pagliano, do you understand this?

Mr. MacDougall. Let me answer on his behalf, if I may.

Mr. Pagliano has fully asserted his Fifth Amendment right. We

would object to the -- and disagree certainly with the description of

what the legal consequences are to any citizen asserting his Fifth

Amendment right.

Ms. Jackson. In order to consider the objection of the witness,

does the witness or counsel wish to explain to the committee the factual

basis or factual predicate for asserting the privilege?

Mr. MacDougall. We have no such obligation, Ms. Jackson, to

explain to the committee the basis other than the witness has fully

and accurately asserted his rights under the Fifth Amendment, and no

further explanation under governing case law is required.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. The committee will end questioning of you

for today. However, the matter will remain open and the deposition

may be reconvened in the future. The objections will be submitted to

the chair after the deposition has been adjourned for today.

And with that, we are adjourned for today.

[Whereupon, at 1:17 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

800
INTERVIEW OF

DOD SPECIAL OPERATOR

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, SEPTEMBER 22, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Counsel

MAC TOLAR, Senior Counsel

SARAH ADAMS, Investigator

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel

SHANNON GREEN, Minority Counsel

LAURA RAUCH, Minority Senior Professional Staff

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Colonel * * *

WILLIAM HUDSON

Lieutenant Colonel * * *

Lieutenant Colonel * * *

EDWARD RICHARDS

802
3

(U) Mr. Chipman. Well, let's go on the record. This is a

transcribed interview of -- please state your name.

(U) Mr.

(U) Mr. Chipman. And could you spell your last

name, please?

(U) Mr.

(U) Mr. Chipman. Conducted by the House Select

Committee on Benghazi. This interview is being conducted voluntarily

as part of the committee's investigation into the attacks on U.S.

diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and related matters pursuant

to House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress and House Resolution 5

of the 114th Congress.

(U) On behalf of the committee, we appreciate your time and

willingness to come in and talk to us today, Mr.

(U) My name is Dana Chipman, and I am a counsel on the committee's

majority staff. I will now ask everyone else at the table to introduce

themselves.

(U) Mr. Tolar. Mac Tolar with the majority committee.

(U) Ms. Adams. Sarah Adams with majority.

(U) Ms. Rauch. Laura Rauch with the minority.

(U) Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer with the minority.

(U) Ms. Green. Shannon Green with the minority.

(U) Mr. Chipman. And around the table, please.

(U) Colonel I am Colonel from the Department

of Defense.

803
4

(U) Mr. Hudson. Bill Hudson from the DOD General Counsel's

Office.

(U) Mr. Richards. Edward Richards, DOD OGC.

(U) Mr. Chipman. And the back row, please.

Lieutenant Colonel Lieutenant Colonel from

DOD.

(U) Lieutenant Colonel . Lieutenant Colonel

from DOD.

(U) Mr. Chipman. Thank you.

(U) I would like to go over the round rules and explain how the

interview will proceed. Generally, the way the questioning proceeds

is that a member from the majority will ask questions first for up to

an hour, and then the minority will have an opportunity to ask questions

for an equal period of time, if they choose.

(U) Questions may only be asked by a member of the committee or

designated staff member. At this time, I am not aware of any members

of the committee, that is Congressmen, who are intending to be here this

morning, but they may show up.

(U) We will rotate back and forth, 1 hour per side, until we are

out of questions, and the interview will then conclude.

(U) Unlike a testimony or a deposition in a Federal court, in a

transcribed interview this committee is not bound by the rules of

evidence. You or your counsel may raise objections for privilege,

subject to review by the chairman of the committee.

(U) If an objection cannot be resolved in this interview, you can

804
5

be required to return for a deposition or hearing. Members and staff

of the committee, however, are not permitted to raise objections when

the other side is asking questions.

(U) This session will be conducted at the Top Secret, Sensitive

Compartmented Information level under the Alternative Compensatory

Control Measures used for protected information.

(U) You are welcome to confer with counsel at any time throughout

the interview, and if something needs to be clarified, we ask that you

make this known.

(U) If you need to discuss anything with your counsel, we will go

off the record and stop the clock to provide you that opportunity.

We will also take a break whenever it is convenient for you. This

can be after every hour of questioning, after a couple of rounds,

whatever you prefer. During a round of questioning, if you need

anything, a glass of water, use of the facilities, to confer with

counsel, please just let us know, and we will go off the record and stop

the clock.

(U) As you can see, an official reporter is transcribing this

interview, so we ask that you give verbal responses to all questions,

yes and no, as opposed to nodding your head. I am going to ask the

reporter to jump in if you do respond nonverbally. Do you understand

that?

(U) Mr. Yes.

(U) Mr. Chipman. Also, I will try to not talk over you and ask

that you try to do the same so that we can get a clear record. I would

805
6

ask that you answer all questions in the most complete and truthful

manner possible. We will take our time and repeat or clarify our

questions, if necessary.

(U) If you have any questions or if you do not understand any of

our questions, please let us know. We will be happy to clarify or repeat

our questions. If you honestly don't know the answer to a question or

do not remember, it is best not to guess. Please give us your best

recollection, and if there are things you do not know or can't remember,

just say so, and please inform us who, to the best of your knowledge,

may be able to provide a more complete answer to the question.

(U) Do you understand that you have an obligation to answer

questions from Congress truthfully?

(U) Mr. Yes.

(U) Mr. Chipman. This also applies to questions posed by

congressional staff in an interview. Do you understand that?

(U) Mr. Yes.

(U) Mr. Chipman. Witnesses who knowingly provide false testimony

could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury or for making false

statements. Do you understand that?

(U) Mr. Yes.

(U) Mr. Chipman. Is there any reason you are unable to provide

truthful answers to today's questions?

(U) Mr. No.

(U) Mr. Chipman. Okay. That is the end of my preamble.

(U) Does the minority have anything to add at this point?

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7

(U) Ms. Rauch. Just to thank you for being here today. We

appreciate you coming here voluntarily, and we look forward to your

testimony.

(U) Mr. Thank you.

(U) Mr. Chipman. As you can see, the clock on the wall says

"currently being repaired," and so it may spin randomly from time to

time. My watch shows 10:10, so at this point, we will get started with

the first hour of questioning.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. CHIPMAN:

Q (U) Mr. we are, as a committee, extraordinarily

impressed with your actions on 9/11 of 2012. And our focus today is

to understand better, in greater detail, what we can about that tragic

day. But please understand first that this interview is not intended

to undercut what you did personally. You marched to the sound of guns

in the great tradition of American servicemen and servicewomen, and we

appreciate that greatly.

(U) We have interviewed the Diplomatic Security agents who were

there that day, as well as the GRS personnel and other employees of the

other government agency, and we want to complete that effort by talking

to you as a DOD servicemember responding on 9/11 to the Benghazi attack.

(U) I would like to start by giving you a chance to describe your

professional background. Tell us when you joined the Army, what your

initial duties were, when you went to selection, and your professional

background, please.

807
8

A (U) Yes, sir. I actually am in the Marine Corps. I joined

the Marines in January of 2002. I was stationed in Gulf Company 25,

Camp Pendleton, California, went through the invasion of Iraq, Ramadi.

(U) And then after 2005, 2006, moved up to Quantico, Virginia, to

be an instructor, infantry officer's course, the basic school, and the

MACE, the martial arts center for the Marine Corps for about a

year-and-a-half, and then I went through selection around 2007 for my

current assignment. And I actually got selected and put in a unit in

2008. I have been in that unit since 2008.

Q (U) And you served continuously since 2008 as a member of

that unit?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And that is located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And so since 2008, you have served continuously on active

duty as a member of that unit serving in a squadron level assignment?

A (U) Yes, sir, as an operator in a squadron.

Q

A (U) Yes, sir.

808
9

Q (U) And have you reviewed any other materials in preparation

for appearing before the committee here this morning?

A (U) No, sir. That was it.

Q (U) That was it. And have you had a chance to review that

narrative as well that is in the after-action report?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Mr. you were serving in Libya on September 11,

2012. What duties were you performing?

A

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q

A (U) Yes.

Q

809
10

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And were you there with any other unit

members on that deployment?

A (U) Yes, sir, my team leader.

Q (U) Your team leader. And so there were a total of two of

you?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Okay. Did you arrive together?

A (U) We did.

Q (U) And when did you arrive in Tripoli, Libya?

A (U) Late July of 2011.

Q (U) And what was the anticipated duration of that deployment?

A (U) Four-and-a-half months.

Q

A (U) We were, somewhat. There really -- the force was kind

of small, so we were having to specify who we were going to work with

and why and going through the process of getting them vetted to be a

partner force.

810
A (U) Yes.

Q (U) -- was conducting the initial auspices of a 1208 effort?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q

A (U) We did.

Q (U) -- for continuation?

A (U) Yes, sir. And we were the first unit personnel there.

Q (U) Okay. And what particular -- was this an element of the

Libyan military special operations force?

A (U) Yes, sir. The military had fallen, but these were

foreign members of the Libyan military forces. Not all special forces,

but all military.

Q (U) Okay. They were all military?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q

Q (U) Okay. So as I understand it, there were two U.S.

government facilities, at least, in Tripoli, one being the embassy

811
12

proper and one being the annex?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q

A (U) Yes, it was, sir.

Q (U) And that is where you were physically located with your

team member, your team leader?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) But you were selecting the Libyan military that you were

training or working with from the coast of Tripoli, closer to downtown?

A (U) Yes, sir. It was a former military base. It was

Qadhafi's sons' armored base.

Q (U) Got it.

A (U) Some tanks, tracks.

Q (U) And what was your supervisory chain on this deployment?

Who were you working for?

A

812
13

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And that command structure was physically located in

Stuttgart, Germany?

A (U) In Stuttgart, Germany, yes, sir.

Q

Q (U) This deployment to Libya, to Tripoli was in Title 10

status, as I understand?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And did you have any prior experience in Libya or North

Africa before this deployment in July of 2012?

A (U) Not in Libya specifically, sir, but I had been to Egypt

before that. Other than that, no, sir.

Q

A (U) Not before that, sir. I was there in a language

capacity.

813
14

Q (U) In a language capacity. So what is your Arabic language

proficiency?

A (U) Fluent, sir. As fluent as we could be locally.

Q (U) And you said you arrived in July. Was it middle of July

or early July, end of July?

A (U) Late July, sir.

Q

A

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Was that mission being conducted separate and apart from

any duties you were performing

A

814
15

Q (U) Okay. What other missions --

A (U) Some, some of them we were, and some of them we weren't.

When we were included, we were familiar with what they were doing, and

when we weren't, we were not.

Q (U) Okay. Tell us what you know of the missions, from your

own personal experience, what missions that you knew of or that you were

familiar with that they were performing in Tripoli.

A

Q In Tripoli proper?

A

815
Q (U) So as I understand it, you would, from time to time,

augment in the conduct of their mission if they needed

security for a particular movement. Is that accurate?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q

A (U) You know, I am not exactly sure, sir. It was the case

officers' main sources, and normally they were -- they were task

saturated. They had a lot of people doing a lot of different things

for that very reason, so they had plenty of case officers. They didn't

have enough GRS guys. So when we did go out, it was in support of GRS.

Q (U) Okay. And it was only the two of you, again, from the

unit who were augmenting these GRS personnel. There were no other unit

assets that were located there at the embassy in Tripoli?

A (U) No, sir, we were it.

Q

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q

816
17

A (U) Two operators again, sir.

Q

Q (U) And how frequently were you in contact with your

headquarters in Stuttgart?

A (U) Daily, sir.

Q (U) And was that typically a written situation report, was

it a -- was it a chat, Same Time chat or a mIRC chat, or was it a telephone

call?

A (U) It was both. It was normally an email of some kind and

a phone call to follow up for any additional questions.

Q (U) So you were in contact with your headquarters back in

817
18

Stuttgart. Were you other -- were you in communication with other

commands or headquarters during your time reporting from the Tripoli

embassy?

A (U) Yes, sir, we were.

Q (U) And who else were you reporting to?

A

Q

A And then SOCAF --

Q (U) Okay. So --

A (U) -- and AFRICOM.

Q

A (U) Yes, sir, we did.

Q (U) So you had a ?

A (U) We did.

Q

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U)

818
19

A (U) We didn't.

Q

A (U) No, we did not.

Q (U) You did not have?

A (U) We did not personally. We weren't -- I didn't get to

see it. It was there. They had the feed playing, but it wasn't on our

computer.

Q (U) Okay.

You just didn't have access -- you just

didn't view the feed that night --

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) -- prior to your deployment to Benghazi?

A (U) We did not, sir.

Q

A (U) Yes, sir. We left before the asset got pushed over to

cover Benghazi.

Q

A (U) Yes, sir, it was.

Q

819
20

A (U) Almost immediately, I think, sir.

Q

A (U) No, sir.

Q

A (U) No, sir, not Libyan forces.

Q (U) Okay. And how about with any Libyan militia elements?

A

Q (U) And do you recall the identity of that particular militia

group? Was it, if you can call, Feb 17 Brigade, Libyan Shield? Do you

recall?

A (U) 17 Feb, sir.

Q (U) They were the 17 Feb Brigade. And were they providing

the exterior perimeter security or were they an internal guard force

at the annex?

A (U) Exterior only.

Q (U) Exterior only?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And they were securing the annex there in Tripoli?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) And did you have any interactions during this time, Mr.

820
21

with special operations forces from other countries that may

have been working in Libya?

A (U) Yes, sir, we did.

Q (U) And these were partner nations?

A (U) They were.

Q (U) And can you identify the special operations forces with

whom you had some interaction during that timeframe?

A

Q

A (U) Only in Tripoli that I know of, sir.

Q (U) As far as you can recall, they were only in Tripoli?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Okay. We are going to transition a little bit to the

approach of the 9/11 anniversary. Mr. in your military

experience and background, do you recall any heightened concern being

communicated as the anniversary of the 9/11/01 attacks approaches each

year?

A (U) At the embassy or the annex in Libya, sir?

Q (U) And I apologize. I didn't frame that question very well,

but you have been in the military since --

A (U) 2002.

Q (U) 2002?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And so since 2002, the first anniversary of the attacks

821
22

of 9/11/01, is there heightened sensitivity to security concerns and

force protection concerns each year as that anniversary approaches?

A (U) Yes, sir, normally there is.

Q (U) And what is the nature of the communications that you

have received, in your experience, as that anniversary approaches? Are

you given special directions? Are you given special alert or warning

concerns?

A (U) If we are deployed, sir, yes, we do. If we are overseas,

it is normally announced that if you are at an embassy or whatever

outstation you are at, that everyone knows 9/11 is coming up, and it

does get a little more hectic around 9/11 most of the time.

Q (U) And do you take any particular precautions or adjust your

force protection posture as a result of that?

A (U) If able, sometimes we do, but it is more of a heightened

alert as opposed to a change in status.

Q (U) Okay. And do you recall, on this particular

anniversary, as the 9/11/2012 anniversary approached, do you recall any

particular warning that September of 2012, as the anniversary was being

approached?

A (U) Nothing outside the ordinary, sir, of a heightened alert

status, but there was no more personnel than usual.

Q (U) During your time from late July of 2012, prior to 9/11,

did you have a chance to form an opinion of the security environment

you encountered in Tripoli?

A (U) Yes, sir. I thought the security situation was good in

822
23

Tripoli. We looked at the embassy, which we regularly do when we deploy

somewhere. One of the first things that we will do, part of it is to

gain rapport with the embassy staff and State Department, is to look

at where they could possibly make things better or change security, and

it was good in Tripoli.

(U) They had the appropriate amount, we thought. Again, part of

that was going through taking pictures of doors and windows in the event

we ever had to come back for an emergency. So we did all that as well.

It looked good to me, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And was that assessment done both of the embassy

spaces and the annex spaces, or was it primarily embassy?

A (U) Mostly embassy, sir. The annex really doesn't -- and

we would do the same for the annex, obviously, but that wasn't a priority.

So they did ask us to tell

them our opinion on how the annex was laid out, and we told them, and

that was the end of it, sir.

Q (U) And again, the annex was being secured by 17 Feb Brigade,

as least as far as perimeter security?

A (U) The outside was, sir. The exterior security was.

Q (U) Okay. And then the interior security was the

responsibility of the GRS contractors?

A (U) That is right. The other group of GRS contractors, the

actual security personnel were the ones that were securing the inside

of the annex.

Q (U) Okay. All right. I know you traveled. You said from

823
24

time to time you would augment the GRS security personnel as they were

doing security for external activities to the annex. What was your

assessment of the threat environment in Tripoli outside of the U.S.

Government facilities, outside of the embassy, outside of the annex?

What was your assessment of the threat environment you encountered?

A (U) I mean, Tripoli was always -- I think there was always

a level of caution you took when you went outside the annex or the embassy

because it was in -- you couldn't call it from one day to the other.

It would be a week where it was fine and then 2 weeks where it wasn't,

so there really was no assessment until you got out there and saw how

people are acting. Day-to-day life was normal and people were walking

around, it was probably fine. If it looked like a lot of people were

staying home and the streets were relatively empty, except for militias,

there was a good chance something was going on.

Q (U) And prior to September 11th of 2012, had you ever visited

Benghazi?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) Were you aware of the official U.S. facilities in

Benghazi?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Which ones were you aware of?

A (U) The consulate and the annex.

Q (U) Okay. The consulate and the annex. And again, you were

not aware of any U.S. military personnel that were stationed in Benghazi

during the time you were in Tripoli?

824
25

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) Were you familiar with the threat environment in Benghazi

as opposed to Tripoli? Did you have any different assessment of the

threat environment in Benghazi based upon what was reported to you?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) And during the run up to September 11th of 2012, were

you aware of any security incidents that occurred over that summer,

starting with your deployment end of July or even prior to your

deployment? Were you given any orientation on security incidents that

may have occurred in and around Benghazi?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) So nothing -- nothing conveyed to you that would have

caused you to adjust your force protection posture or your security

posture over that summer timeframe?

A (U) No, sir, not in Benghazi.

Q (U) Not in Benghazi. Okay.

A (U) Our focus was Tripoli, sir.

Q (U) Fair enough. And as the 9/11 anniversary of 2012

approached, were you aware of any additional threat reporting that came

in to you either through , through your colleagues

any additional reporting that caused you any concern about

either Tripoli or Benghazi?

A (U) Before that at the incident, sir?

Q (U) Before the incident.

A (U) Not specifically, other than there was an occasional

825
26

shooting out in town, shooting up in the air, a celebration-type

shooting, which wasn't out of the ordinary. And that was going on, I

think, that night, but other than that, there was nothing,

reporting-wise, that I heard.

Q (U) There were a couple of incidents that appear to be higher

profile than normal that occurred in Benghazi over the summer of 2012.

And I am trying to figure out whether you were -- learned of any of those

incidents, the incident with a UN shooting, a UN convoy being targeted?

A (U) I think I -- I do remember something about a UN -- RPG,

something like that?

(U) Ms. Adams. Yeah, there is a British ambassador was the RPG,

and then the Red Cross was the kidnapping.

A (U) You are right. It was something like that.

BY MR. CHIPMAN:

Q (U) Were you aware of those incidents?

A (U) Yes, sir, I was.

Q (U) And as a result of those reports, did that cause you to

adjust your security posture in any way?

A (U) In Tripoli?

Q (U) In Tripoli.

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And do you know if Embassy Tripoli adjusted its

posture in any way as a result of the reports that came in and from events

in Benghazi?

A (U) I am not sure, sir.

826
27

Q (U) All right. Mr. we are going to start, and I would

like you to describe what you recall about September 11th, 2012, and

I recognize that was 3 years ago, more than 3 years ago now. You were

working in Tripoli on that day?

A (U) Yes, sir, I was.

Q (U) And were you on a normal training cycle, a daylight

training cycle?

A (U) We were, sir.

Q

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And as that day progressed, do you recall learning at

any point about a demonstration ongoing in Cairo, Egypt?

A (U) Yes, sir. It was on the news.

Q (U) Okay. So what was reported, or what do you recall

seeing?

A (U) I don't recall exactly what happened. I do remember

there being a demonstration at the embassy in Cairo. And I don't

remember exactly what it was for or what caused it, but I do remember

watching the news article about it.

Q (U) You say it was on the news. So were you given access

to a TV during your timeframe in --

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) -- Tripoli?

827
28

A (U) Absolutely.

Q (U) And so you recall this coming in on a TV feed?

A (U) Yes, sir, it was.

Q (U) Did you get any command reporting on that or reporting

from either or through your , any other

reporting about the nature of what was going on in Cairo?

A (U) There was, but I can't remember what it was particularly,

sir. They were talking about it, though.

Q (U) Okay. At some point on 9/11 did you learn of an attack

at the -- what you are calling the consulate there in Benghazi, the

special mission compound, did you learn of that attack at some point?

A (U) The one in Benghazi, sir? Yes, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And how did you learn of that?

A (U) It was through my team leader there in Tripoli. He had

texted me on my cell phone, said come down to the TOC, and then told

me that the consulate had been attacked, or was being attacked, and then

didn't know the, you know, exact specifications of the attack, but knew

it was ongoing.

Q (U) So you weren't physically located with your team leader

initially. He texted you, and then you joined him up there at the annex?

A (U) It was the end of the night, sir, I think around 9:30

local time that night, so we were getting done for the night, sending

out last emails. I had gone back, and he had stayed, and as soon as

I got back to our house where we were sleeping, he texted me and told

me to come back.

828
29

Q (U) Okay. And what was -- what was -- if you can recall,

what did that text say? Did it refer to a protest or a demonstration

or an attack?

A (U) It didn't. He told me about that once I got there. He

just said come back down to the TOC.

Q (U) Okay. And what did he tell you when you arrived back

at the TOC?

A (U) That the consulate was being attacked, the situation was,

you know, was not known at the time of the attack or who was attacking

or what was going on, but they were preparing to possibly go out to

Benghazi.

Q

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) You mentioned having access to a TV feed. Do you recall

seeing any TV reporting or any other press reporting regarding a protest

in Benghazi as you -- as you learned what was going on there?

A (U) No, sir. I went directly from there back to our house,

started putting our things together.

Q

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And what else did the team leader tell you to prepare

to do? Anything else?

829
30

A (U) Nothing, sir.

Q (U) Pretty standard battle drill?

A (U) It was pretty quick. It was probably a

minute-and-a-half, 2 minutes of him telling me what we would be possibly

doing, and that he wasn't entirely sure, so bring the kitchen sink. So

I went all the way back and prepared a couple of bags of what I thought

we may need, extra guns, kit, body armor, helmets, things like that.

Q (U) This house was located on the annex compound?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And so you went back and you prepared bags not knowing

for sure what you would expect, but you prepared the equipment that you

needed to bring with you. At some point, did you then return to the

annex to meet up with your team leader?

A (U) Yes, sir, I packed the bags pretty quickly, went back

down to the TOC area, and then got more specifics on what could be going

on and what he wanted me to do before we went.

Q (U) Okay. And when you came back to the TOC that second time

with bags packed and ready to roll, was there a meeting with annex

personnel and your team leader?

A

830
31

Q (U) Okay. And so your task from the team leader was to

identify the best four people, GRS people, to include a medic, to include

an interpreter, case officer, that you could deploy with to Benghazi

to assist?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And what was communicated to you about what was going

on in Benghazi when you came back that second time? Were you informed

the ambassador was missing?

A

Q (U) Okay. You were meeting with the team leader, and you

had the task to identify the four additional personnel that would go

with you. Was the Tripoli GRS team leader also there at that meeting?

A (U) He was. He actually requested to go, sir.

Q (U) And is this the individual known as HUSH?

A (U) In Tripoli --

Q (U) FLOUNDER?

A (U) It would be FLOUNDER, sir.

Q (U) It should be FLOUNDER?

831
32

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Checking to see if you know who you are talking about.

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) So FLOUNDER you were at this meeting with, and then who

else do you recall being at that meeting with you, your team leader,

and FLOUNDER?

A

A (U) No, he wasn't, sir. He was in Benghazi.

Q

A (U) I was fairly certain we were going if we were packing

bags when I went back, sir, and when I came back, it was confirmed when

he asked me to start looking for guys that would go that were qualified

to go. And then we got a confirmation from the chief of station that

he would like us to take that team up to Benghazi.

Q

832
33

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Was your team leader also the team leader for the response

effort overall or was it the GRS Tripoli team leader who led the response

team?

A (U) As far as I understood it, the chief of station wanted

my team leader to be the initial or main team leader and I would the

assistant team leader for the duration of the extraction.

Q

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q

833
34

A (U) No, sir, not within the short time while we were all -- we

were needing to leave immediately and there was nothing that could be

had immediately.

Q

Q (U) Okay.

A (U) It was the first call, I think, that was made, and that

was where it stopped.

Q (U) And so this was a meeting that occurred even prior to

the attack starting in Benghazi, those were just routine business?

A (U) That morning, sir, was when a case officer had met with

him. He said, "How fast can you respond?" He said, "I am not sure;

probably within 24 hours." Called back again that night and said, "We

need you right now," and he was there. He showed up.

Q (U) This was good timing, wasn't it?

A (U) It was good timing, sir, convenient.

834
35

Q (U) And so this aircraft asset was a Learjet?

A (U) Yes, sir, it was.

Q (U) And what was the capability of that, passenger capability

on that aircraft?

A (U) Fourteen, sir.

Q (U) Fourteen. So you lined up an air asset, you pushed ISR,

you inquired about the availability of supporting aircraft and told,

at least at that point, nothing was available. Did you make any

preparation for the reception on the other end in Benghazi?

A

Q (U) Okay. So you mentioned you called your militia contacts

in Tripoli. And was that 17th Feb Brigade?

A (U) That was not, sir. Libyan Shield.

Q (U) Libyan Shield?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And so the Libyan Shield contact you had in Tripoli then

was coordinating with his counterpart in Benghazi?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) So you thought that the reception on the other end of

835
36

Benghazi would be a Libyan Shield militia?

A (U) Should have been, sir.

Q (U) Should have been.

A (U) Should have been.

Q (U) Were there any other militias that you were coordinating

with in Tripoli that might have been available to assist in Benghazi?

A

A (U) Local groups or otherwise?

Q (U) Local groups or Libyan military or even foreign military

or anyone else that you were pulsing in Tripoli for assistance when you

got to Benghazi?

A (U) We had called Colonel asking if we could take

836
37

his medic with us, but they were having issues getting ahold of their

commander. Colonel was the SF commander.

Q (U) Right. So you had called Colonel asking for

permission to deploy his medic --

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) -- with your team going from Tripoli to Benghazi?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And this medic was part of that stay-behind SST element?

A (U) He was, sir.

Q (U) So as I understand it, Colonel had a total of four

personnel or six personnel?

A (U) He gave six, including himself, sir.

Q (U) Six, including himself?

A (U) I can't remember exactly.

Q (U) And one of them was a medic?

A

Q (U) I am sorry?

A

A (U) A better medic, yeah.

Q (U) And so from that call to Colonel you or your team

leader reached and spoke with Colonel about getting the medic

released?

A (U) We did.

Q (U) And what was Colonel response?

837
38

A Again, sir, they couldn't get ahold of their commander. I

am positive he wanted to go, but I think the issue was getting approval

to go.

Q

A (U) Yes, sir. I think they were working directly for SOCAF.

Q (U) SOCAF.

A (U) I think.

Q (U) And so that would have been the op center or Admiral Losey

who is in command of SOCAF?

A (U) Admiral Losey, sir.

Q (U) Okay. All right. So you had identified the four

personnel that your team leader had asked you to locate for the

deployment?

A (U) Five, including the case officer.

Q (U) Five, including the case officer. So four were GRS and

then one case officer/interpreter?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And then yourself and your fellow team member?

A (U) Yes, sir. Total of seven.

Q (U) Sorry, team leader.

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And so you were anticipating reception on the other end

by a Libyan Shield member in Benghazi. Is that accurate?

838
39

A (U) We were, sir.

Q

Q (U) Great. And so you were getting updates from HUSH in

Benghazi, GRS at the annex, at least initially. What was it -- was he

at the mission compound or was he back at the annex? Do you recall?

A (U) He was back. I could not -- I didn't get ahold of him,

obviously, when he was going to the consulate to pull everyone back to

the annex, but I did get ahold of him once he had gotten back to the

annex.

Q (U) And what was HUSH providing you in the way of situational

awareness?

A (U) We were just asking updates for wounded personnel, are

they still under attack? If so, how heavy? Small arms, small, light,

medium. So I think the issue was just trying to see the most recent

they had been attacked and how long it had been since that attack.

Q (U) So did HUSH relay that there had been attacks that were

occurring at the annex?

A (U) He did, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And he gave you the nature of those attacks,

whether it was small arms or RPG?

A (U) I think "harassing fire" was the exact verbiage.

839
40

Q (U) Harassing fire. Did he indicate the presence of any

crew-serve weapons or higher caliber weapons such as RPGs or rockets?

A (U) RPGs, sir.

Q (U) RPGs, harassing fire, was kind of the nature of the threat

that HUSH conveyed to you?

A (U) Sporadic, yes, sir.

Q (U) Sporadic. Okay. And do you recall, Mr. kind

of what timeframe these discussions were occurring? Was this, you know,

an hour after your alert, was it -- as best you can recall.

A (U) I believe the conversation that I had was when we had

gotten to the airport in Tripoli. That is around the time we found out

the ambassador was missing.

Q

A (U) Yes, sir. I think it was around that time. I can't

remember exactly the time.

Q (U) And were you informed also that there was any killed or

wounded in Benghazi?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) You learned of the identity of the one KIA?

A (U) Yes, sir, the one that they had known so far, sir, yes.

Q (U) Okay. And what were you conveyed as far as the injuries

or the wounded in Benghazi? Did you have a number of wounded you were

anticipating?

840
41

A (U) We did. I think the only thing they had at the time was

one wounded.

Q (U) But again, the five of you deployed. And what did you

have in the way of medical capability in the seven people who were

responding from Tripoli to Benghazi?

A

Q (U) Now, when you got to the airport in Tripoli, as I

understand it you would have had no longer access

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) Okay. Did AFRICOM headquarters or SOCAFRICA have any

role in planning your deployment from Tripoli to Benghazi?

A (U) No, sir.

Q

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q

841
42

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) How about the embassy itself there in Tripoli, were they

directing the deployment from Tripoli to Benghazi?

A (U) Not that I recall, sir.

Q

A (U) I know they were supportive of us going to Benghazi.

Q (U) You mentioned that you were in contact with Benghazi

base. And I suspect that was via cell phone with HUSH?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And did you have any, at that time, before leaving

Tripoli, any coordination ongoing with the special mission compound or

the consulate?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) You didn't have any -- anybody you were talking to there

that was --

A (U) At the consulate in Benghazi?

Q (U) -- at the consulate in Benghazi?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) So your sole node, your sole communications node that

you were actually getting updates from Benghazi was through HUSH at the

annex?

842
43

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Were you able to coordinate with any other U.S. military

assets prior to leaving the Tripoli airport?

A (U) No, sir. Again, we attempted to talk to Colonel

but he was having difficulty getting ahold of his commander.

Q (U) Okay. And how about any other foreign military assets?

Were you in contact with the Tunisians or the Italians or the French

or anyone else who might have been able to support you with assets,

equipment, personnel?

A

A (U) Yes, sir. We were trying to leave as quickly as

possible. So if they didn't meet the timeline, leave as quick as we

were trying to leave, then we got pushed.

Q So what drove the timeline for your deployment? Was it the

availability of the aircraft?

A

Q (U) And how long did it take from the time that the call was

843
44

made to the aircraft owner, what did he say about his ability to take

off from Tripoli to Benghazi? How long a timeframe do you recall?

A (U) I don't remember what time he said, but I know we had

got there around 11:30 or midnight, but he was ready to go when we had

gotten there. And they actually had expedited us through the airport.

We didn't go through any -- the actual airport procedures. We had

weapons and ammo, obviously.

Q (U) So you had local expediters or facilitators that enabled

you to board the aircraft more rapidly than normal --

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) -- and depart from Tripoli?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And who were those expediters? Were they arranged by

you all, by --

A (U) They were arranged by us calling our local military

contacts . There was a sheik there that was

trying to get us through the airport.

Q (U) And there was no limitation on daylight only flight ops

with this Learjet, as I understand was the limitation on the Libyan

military C-130?

A (U) Absolutely, sir. He -- I don't think they could fly at

night, but he could because he was a privately owned company. The

Learjet was privately owned.

Q (U) But your understanding was, at least with respect to the

Libyan C-130 --

844
45

A (U) Daytime, sir.

Q (U) That was limited to daytime ops?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Okay. Do you recall seeing a C-130 on the tarmac there

at Tripoli? Was it Mitiga airport?

A (U) Mitiga. I don't recall, sir.

Q (U) Okay. So your team leader led the Tripoli response team,

I think, is what you told us earlier?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Okay. Composition was the seven you have identified

already, yourself, your team leader, the case officer interpreter, and

four GRS personnel?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And you knew all of the other team members? You

knew the six besides -- obviously the five besides your team leader and

yourself?

A (U) Some better than others. I knew some of them in passing.

I worked with some more than others.

Q (U) Okay. But you had at least worked with a few of them

in Tripoli as you were providing security

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) As you drove to the Tripoli -- to Mitiga airport that

night, did you observe any ongoing protest activity as you traversed

through Tripoli to get to Mitiga?

845
46

A (U) Traffic was unusually bad for that time of night, but

I did not see any protests.

Q (U) And had you been tracking throughout the day the

demonstration or the activity at the Cairo embassy?

A (U) Not after that, sir.

Q (U) Okay. After you got your initial text from your team

leader, then you no longer had any access to updates on what was going

on in Cairo?

A (U) We would have, but that wasn't our focus at the time.

Q (U) So what drove the selection of Mitiga airport? Was it

just that is where the asset was located?

A (U) Yes, sir. We were more familiar with the personnel at

Mitiga than we were at the actual airport, sir.

Q (U) Did the Learjet have to relocate from Tripoli airport

to Mitiga to get you, as far as you recall?

A (U) I am not sure, sir.

Q (U) Do you recall roughly or as accurately as you can what

time you departed Tripoli Mitiga airport?

A (U) I think it was around midnight.

Q (U) And what is the duration of the flight time with a great

Learjet from Mitiga to Benghazi?

A (U) I think we landed 02 local time, sir.

Q (U) So about a 2-hour flight?

A (U) An hour and 45 minutes.

Q (U) An hour and 45. And as you were en route, I imagine you

846
47

didn't have any ability to do any mission planning as you were airborne

from Mitiga to Benghazi?

A

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q

A (U) Yes, it did. And we conveyed that to the GRS team lead

in Benghazi.

Q

A

Q (U) Okay. So from your understanding, initially, at least,

you would have gone straight from Benghazi airport to the annex to

reinforce HUSH and his team securing the annex?

847
48

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q

A (U) We did.

Q (U) Okay. You mentioned that you are as fluent as you can

be in Arabic, and you had an interpreter/case officer. Were the two

of you the primary language capability resident in that seven-person

element?

A (U) He was the primary language capability. I was just

listening. It is much easier than trying to speak with them. Libyan

dialect is a little bit different.

Q (U) You mentioned expecting or anticipating the linkup from

the Libyan Shield, based upon your prior coordination. When you arrived

in Benghazi, was that Libyan Shield individual present?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) Was anyone present from the Libyan armed forces or local

militia that you could liaison with upon arrival in Benghazi?

A (U) Not as soon as we landed, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And you arrived at Benina airport?

A (U) We did.

Q (U) And what was the nature of the activity ongoing at Benina

at 02 in the morning?

A (U) It was completely dead. We were the only plane that had

landed in quite some time, it looked like, and the guard actually came

out in his pajamas and asked us what was going on.

848
49

Q (U) Okay. So there was no airport personnel. This was not

a 24/7 airport?

A (U) I don't think so, sir. It didn't appear to be. Only

one individual came out to meet us once we had landed, and it was clear

that he had been sleeping before that.

Q

A (U) We did, sir.

Q (U) And what did HUSH relay at this point? This is at some

time at 02 or shortly thereafter.

A (U) A lull in fire.

Q (U) A lull in fire.

A Yes, sir.

Q (U) Did he indicate how many harassing attacks they had

sustained over the period of time?

A (U) Not specifically that I can remember, sir.

Q (U) Okay.

A (U) Just the last time of it.

Q (U) And there was a lull at some point starting at 02 or after

02. At least there was a lull when you talked to him?

A (U) Yes, sir. When I had talked to him, there had been a

lull, and no one had been attacking the annex in quite some time.

Q (U) Did you get an update on accountability of personnel from

HUSH at that time?

A (U) We did.

849
50

Q (U) And what was your understanding about the number of

personnel who remained at the consulate or the special mission compound?

A (U) I think it was 26 or 27 that they had at the annex.

Q (U) Okay. And so had anybody, any U.S. personnel remained

at the consulate or the mission compound?

A (U) Not at the consulate, no, sir, but the ambassador was

still missing.

Q

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) And so as you arrived to this lack of activity at Benina

airport, what actions did you take to try to identify support at that

point?

A

A (U) They were giving updates on reports for ISR, movement

of crowds, things like that, in relation to where we were at the airport

and the annex.

Q

850
51

A (U) No, sir, it was being conveyed.

Q (U) I am sorry.

A (U) It was being conveyed by -- just in talking to us.

Q

A (U) Not that I know of, sir. I can't remember.

Q

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) How long did that exercise take?

A (U) I don't think we actually left the airport until about

0430.

Q

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q

A

Q (U) And how did you learn that? How did you find that out?

A (U) One of the local militia had told us that he -- they

thought he was at the hospital. Reporting had indicated he was at the

851
52

hospital.

Q (U) So based upon the calls that were made to Tripoli, your

team leader had identified -- or your team leader had called somebody

in Tripoli who had called somebody in Benghazi, so there were militia

elements that showed up at the Benina airport at some point?

A

Q (U) The least of several bad options?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) So as I understand it, this was a Libyan Shield individual

in Tripoli who was vetting the affiliations of the local militia elements

that had showed up at Benina airport?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) But these local elements informed you that the ambassador

had been brought to the hospital?

A (U) They did.

Q (U) Okay. And did they indicate whether he was still alive

or whether he had been deceased?

A (U) They would not say specifically. They were being

852
53

relatively deceptive about it.

Q (U) All right. Did your contact or your team leader's

contact with the Libyan Shield in Tripoli identify anybody who was less

bad than the rest that you could trust to transport to the hospital?

A (U) The Libyan Shield commander, I think, Libyan Shield 2,

because they had numbers, Libyan Shield 1, 2, and 3. I can't remember

the exact number.

Q (U) Okay. And so was the plan then that you would go with

Libyan Shield 2 to the hospital to identify the ambassador?

A

A (U) The time specifically?

Q (U) Roughly, if you can, in that timeframe.

A (U) I can't remember exactly, sir. I want to say it was

around 0345.

Q (U) Okay.

A (U) I can't remember, sir.

Q

853
54

A (U) It was later, sir. Yes, sir.

854
55

BY MR. CHIPMAN:

Q

A (U) We did.

Q

Q (U) And how were you going to proceed? What was the nature

of your transport from Benina to the annex?

A (U) The Libyan Shield commander had several gun trucks that

we were using, as well as some Land Cruisers, to get us to the annex.

Q (U) And this is, again, Libyan Shield 2, the less bad element

of militia?

A (U) Less bad, yes.

(U) Ms. Adams. Can I interrupt really quick? Who was the Libyan

Shield that was supposed to meet you that never came? Was that 1, or

did they never give you the guy's name --

(U) Mr. There was two groups in Benghazi -- and I can't

remember the numbers that were there -- and one from Trip -- I can't

remember the exact number. I think it was 3.

(U) Ms. Adams. Okay. And so 3 is essentially who never showed

up, and then 2 finally is the one who came? I think I have the numbers

855
56

wrong, but it was a different element. It was a different number

designation.

(U) Mr. It was, yeah.

(U) Ms. Adams. Okay.

(U) Mr. And I can't -- it was groups mixed together, so

it was sort of fluid that 17 Feb and Libyan Shield -- a lot of them worked

together and they were interchangeable. So when you are talking about

1, I mean, they don't know who they're working for most of the time,

so it's hard for us to keep up with it as well.

BY MR. CHIPMAN:

Q

A (U) Not Fort Bragg, sir.

Q (U) You were not?

A (U) No.

Q (U) Okay. So did you have any idea that there were other

DOD assets that were being mobilized to respond to what was going on

in Benghazi?

A (U) We knew that one of our squadrons was getting stood up

to try and come over and help.

Q

Q Okay. Got it. Did you have any sense of the timeline those

856
57

assets -- those additional assets were operating on? Did you have any

sense of how long it would take to expect them to arrive?

A (U) Not exactly, sir. I knew the timeline that we operated

on, but I'm not entirely sure -- and I wasn't at the time -- how long

it would take me to get there.

Q (U) Fair enough. Okay. So you deployed with gun trucks and

armored Land Cruisers, I guess, to the annex?

A (U) They weren't armored, sir.

Q (U) They weren't armored. They were just --

A (U) Just regular Land Cruisers.

Q (U) -- regular Land Cruisers and gun trucks. And during your

movement from Benina Airport to the annex, did you learn of any

additional vehicles joining that convoy?

A (U) No. We got stopped along the way going to the annex by

another militia group that wanted to take us to the ambassador.

Q (U) And do you know the identity of that militia group?

A (U) No clue, sir.

Q (U) Who was navigating from the airport to the annex?

A (U) My team leader was with the Libyan Shield commander. We

all had our GPSs out in case we got split up, so each vehicle had a vehicle

commander, if you will. They all had GPSs in case something did happen.

Q (U) So who selected the route from the airport to the annex?

Was it the team leader? Was it the Libyan Shield commander?

A (U) We decided on it while we were in the plane over. We

stepped to it, sir.

857
58

Q (U) And you mentioned you had not been to Benghazi before.

Had your team leader also not been to Benghazi before on this deployment?

A (U) Neither one of us had, sir.

Q (U) Neither one, okay. You mentioned trying to raise

contacts at the Benina airport from Tripoli so that they could arrange

local Benghazi forces to show up. Did you try to contact any other

foreign military? The Italians? The Turks? Anyone else?

A (U) Not that I'm aware of, sir.

Q (U) Okay. At least from your efforts, you didn't try to

contact any forces.

A (U) No, sir.

Q

A (U) Not that I knew of, sir.

Q (U) Okay. Did you have any sense during the 2 and-a-half

hours that you spent at Benina airport that you were being prevented

from departing the airport? Could you have left at any time from 02

to 0430?

A (U) We didn't have a mode of transportation that was ours,

so we were depending on those local militias. So it took us that long

to find one that was capable of taking us out into town. Again,

initially we were trying to go to the hospital, which we were all being

told, "No, we can't take you to the hospital. We can take you to the

annex."

(U) So that fight went on for a little while, with us thinking that

858
59

he could possibly be at the hospital needing medical care. So we were

pushing hard enough to go there that it prolonged our time at the airport.

Then once we found out he was deceased, we had obviously gave that up,

and they had no problem taking us to the annex.

Q (U) Okay. And roughly the timeframe for the trip between

the airport and the annex is --

A (U) About 30 minutes drive, sir.

Q (U) And was it the Libyan Shield commander who gave your

clearance to leave the airport, or was that your team leader's decision?

How was the decision made to leave the airport to head to the annex?

A (U) I'm sure it was my team leader's decision. We all

decided -- loaded up and then left as soon as possible, once we had found

out.

Q (U) And, again, the militia force was supportive of taking

you to the annex. There was no problem that hindered your departure

from the airport once you determined you were headed to the annex?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) Okay. Mr. it's been about an hour, and I'd like

to give you an opportunity to take a break. So if we could go off the

record, please.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MR. CHIPMAN:

Q (U) We'll go back on the record. It's 11:22. And I'll begin

with the second hour of questioning.

(U) And I wanted to clear up one issue from the prior hour. I

859
60

understand there may have been somebody called the Zintanis in Tripoli,

a militia force. Is there any chance that your team leader was talking

to the Zintanis or the Zintanis were actually performing perimeter

security at the annex in Tripoli?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) Okay. So it could have been the Zintanis vice Libyan

Shield or 17 Feb?

A (U) I'm positive 17 Feb was there, but it was Zintanis as

well.

Q (U) Okay.

A (U) Yeah.

Q (U) All right.

A (U) And Libyan Shield I don't think had anything to do with

annex security in Tripoli.

Q (U) But both Zintanis and 17 Feb?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Great. Thank you.

(U) Okay. So when we closed the last hour, you had departed on

a 30-minute trip from Benina airport to the annex there in Benghazi.

When you arrived at the annex, tell us what occurred. And I'd like you

to have a chance to go through the narrative, if you want, about what

you recall occurring once -- upon arrival at the annex.

A (U) Yes, sir. Once we had gotten to the annex, we called

probably 3 minutes out, and the GRS Team Lead HUSH was actually out there

to meet us with the gate open. We didn't take any of the vehicles inside.

860
61

We exited the vehicles and walked inside.

(U) We took the Libyan Shield commander inside with us so his guys

would stay there, ultimately. Went directly to the main house where

the TOC was. I think it was Building Three. Team leader started

talking to chief of base, and I was talking to HUSH on the security

situation, wounded personnel, what did he need from us that he didn't

have already, and how we could help the security posture.

(U) Shortly after us being there, we were all sitting outside while

we were talking about this on the front patio of Building Three. We

had some sporadic gunfire over the top of Building Three, and immediately

following, the first mortar round hit. I believe it went long, hit out

in the road where our convoy had been. The gate is obviously closed

to the compound now. Next one hit short just behind Building Three on

the wall towards the warehouse. The other three or four mortars hit

directly on top of Building Three.

Q (U) Now, as a result of your experience, can you tell the

difference between a 60-millimeter mortar and an 81-millimeter mortar?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And was this the lighter 60-millimeter or the

81-millimeter, from your own experience?

A (U) The heavier, sir.

Q (U) The heavier, the 81-millimeter?

A (U) Eighty-one.

Q (U) Okay. You arrived at the annex and all seven of the GRS

or the Team Tripoli came into the annex. Again, you started talking

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with HUSH. Your team leader was talking with the chief of base. You

brought in, I think, with you six shooters total?

A (U) With the seven that came with us?

Q (U) Right. Were six of that seven shooters or all seven?

A (U) Six out of seven were.

Q (U) Six out of seven.

A (U) Yeah, the one case officer was not.

Q (U) And when you arrived and did that initial coordination

with HUSH, did he indicate, "Hey, we need some immediate reinforcements

on the roof here at the annex in overwatch or in security?" Was there

any direction about how you would augment their security posture?

A

Q

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) And he went to talk to their medic, which was --

A

A Yes.

Q

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Q (U) Okay. And their coordination had been to ascertain the

status of the wounded personnel that were there in the annex?

A

Q (U) Okay. And then with respect to the 26 or 27 other

personnel that were evacuated or that had gone to the annex from the

Special Mission Compound, some of whom were already at the annex, some

of whom came from the Special Mission Compound, where were they

physically located?

A (U) Inside Building Three. There were GRS and a couple of

State Department security guys that were on the exterior security of

Building Three, but no one was outside the walls of the annex.

Q (U) And so you arrived at roughly 0500 local?

A (U) Yes, sir. I think it was around 0445. It was just

before 0500.

Q (U) Okay. And how much light was there at that time? Was

it still relatively dark?

A (U) It was dark.

Q (U) Okay. Did you observe or hear any gunfire upon your

arrival at the annex?

A (U) Not upon our arrival, but within 5 to 10 minutes after

us being there is when those mortars came in. And prior to that there

was some sporadic AK and PK fire into the compound.

Q (U) Upon your arrival, I know you were talking with HUSH and

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the team leader was talking with the chief of base, what did you

understand about your mission as you were heading from Benina airport

to the annex? Was your mission then evacuation of nonessential

personnel?

A (U) It was nonessential personnel only prior to that mortar

attack happening.

Q (U) So what was the plan, Mr. if you can recall? Was

it to load up those nonessential personnel in that same gun truck convoy

and carry them back to the airport?

A (U) It was. We were going to take 14 personnel back with

us to the airport, let the jet take off, take them back to Tripoli. We

were going to come back to the annex and help hold up with the GRS guys

until further notice.

Q (U) Okay. So there would've been some security element

remaining at the annex, here in the annex?

A (U) Yes. The majority of those people would have stayed

there. Shooters, if you will.

Q (U) And then some security elements with the convoy heading

the nonessential personnel back to the airport?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) And, again, you would see them off in that Learjet?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) Returning from Benghazi to Tripoli?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) And then was the plan for that bird to turn and come back

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to Benghazi for a second lift?

A (U) It was not. We had not got that far into the plan, sir.

We did not make the decision for that bird to come back. We didn't know

how long we were going to have to stay at the annex. We were under the

understanding they wanted to stay. They did not want to leave. So we

were just trying to get the nonessential personnel out to get further

direction from chief of station back in Tripoli on what he wanted them

to do.

Q (U) Got it. Whose understanding or whose preference was it

that they stay, that you understood? Was that the chief of base? Was

that HUSH? Who had stated, "Hey, we're going to remain here and only

the nonessentials are leaving"?

A (U) I believe it was the chief of base that wanted to keep

some individuals there. I'm sure he was talking with the chief of

station in Tripoli, but I didn't hear the conversation.

Q (U) Okay. And, again, this was all prior to the mortar

rounds beginning?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) So your understanding at least was the plan is load up

the nonessentials, 14 or so, whatever the Learjet can carry, we'll get

them to the airport, they'll go back to Tripoli?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) Okay. And then at some point the mortar rounds and the

mortar attacks began. And if you would, please just talk us through

the actions you took or that you observed in that timeframe.

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A (U) Once the mortar round -- the first mortar round hit

outside the gate where the convoy was, we saw the vehicles driving away,

the gun trucks that were out there driving away.

Q (U) So their allegiance to their commander was overcome by

their reluctance to stick around and take mortar shots?

A (U) It was, yeah.

Q (U) Okay.

A (U) I can't remember if one had got wounded, but I do believe

later on we found out one of those guys had gotten wounded. So their

excuse was they were taking him to -- all of them were taking him to

healthcare --

Q (U) Fair enough.

A (U) -- leaving the commander behind.

Q (U) I'm sorry I interrupted. Please continue.

A (U) No, sir. Once the first mortar round hit, we moved

everybody back into the center of the house. And myself, my team leader,

the GRS Team Lead Tripoli and Benghazi both stayed near the initial

entrance, trying to make sure that there wasn't going to be a follow-on

attack after the mortars, possibly VBIEDs or suicide bombers coming

through the main gate.

(U) I can't remember the direction of the gate right now, the

cardinal direction, but there was two main gates to the compound, and

we were trying to keep eyes on both. But everybody else was still inside

the middle of the house while the mortars were going off.

Q (U) And, again, you mentioned three or four additional mortar

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strikes that occurred after the first one that was long and the second

one that was short. And what actions did you take at that point?

A (U) Once the mortar fire had stopped and machine gunfire had

stopped, it was probably between 2 and 3 minutes afterwards, we decided

to go and find out what personnel had been wounded and their status,

and hopefully get them medical care. We took a team of four guys outside

the house to go on top of Building Three to assess the casualties from

the mortar fire. That was myself, my team leader, GRS Team Lead Tripoli

and Benghazi.

(U) We move around to the backside of the house. We climb up a

ladder to get to the roof, 15 feet, somewhere thereabouts. There is

a large lip as you climb down onto the roof which made kind of a bowl

for the mortar round to hit so it caused the shrapnel to bounce around

and make it more casualty producing, which was obvious once we got up

there.

(U) Everybody was wounded, obviously, from the mortar

rounds. Two were passing away as we came up to the roof. One was a

walking wounded. He had a pretty decent injury to his arm. I think

it was his left arm. And the other individual, State Department

individual was laying on the ground missing part of his leg, and heavy

shrapnel wounds as well.

Q (U) And so at that point you evacuated the wounded as best

you could from the roof?

A

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Q (U) Correct.

A (U) -- had came up to the roof. He was at the bottom of the

ladder. We asked him to come up and help the walking wounded down and

to go back inside and get a litter to get the other wounded off the roof,

and informed him the other two were deceased.

(U) We took the deceased's personal effects, weapons, night vision

goggles, things like that, threw them off the roof, and then proceeded

with medical care on the State Department's individual that was wounded,

and then eventually moved him off the roof as well.

Q (U) At that point, what was the direction from the chief of

base? Was that when the decision was made to evacuate the annex

entirely?

A (U) We did. Once we got back, we decided that the situation

we had was untenable to stay at the compound. We didn't have enough

shooters and there were too many wounded, and we were definitely going

to lose our State Department wounded if we had stayed there much longer.

So we were pushing to get out as fast as we could.

Q (U) And who made the decision to evacuate the annex entirely?

Whose decision was that?

A (U) That was us as a whole. We had all gotten together in

a group and talked about the situation, and we all agreed, the chief

of base, both team lead for Tripoli and Benghazi, and myself and my team

leader.

Q (U) So that decision was a consensus between the chief of

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base, Tripoli GRS team lead, Benghazi team lead, and your team leader

as well?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) Okay. And so at that point, there were no vehicles to

evacuate the annex?

A (U) There was no security vehicles, no gun trucks that would

help us get to the airport. And we determined we could probably make

it with the vehicles we had inside the compound. They had two to three

up-armored vehicles, as I recall, and two or three unarmored vehicles.

So we were trying to disperse personnel inside those vehicles or figure

out numbers to fit inside the vehicles we had inside the compound. We

were going to make a run to the airport, if you will.

Q (U) Was there any resistance to evacuating the annex from

any of the OGA or CIA personnel that were there, or was it a unanimous

consensus?

A (U) Not that I recall. It was unanimous.

Q (U) Okay. And at some point, do I understand that elements

from Libyan Shield returned to assist your evacuation?

A (U) That was a little bit later, sir, after we had already

decided we were leaving without them. Our interpreter/case officer was

talking to the Libyan Shield commander we had with us about him being

on the phone since the attack happened. So we were at first concerned

maybe he caused the attack, and then realized that he was just trying

to get himself out of there after letting the interpreter listen to what

he was saying.

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(U) So he was calling his buddies back to say, "Come get me. You

know, obviously there has been some trouble. I need to get out of here."

So we were like, "Hey, look, you're not going anywhere without us.

You're going to take us to the airport, and here is why."

(U) Again, he said they would show up. He didn't give an exact

timeline. Once we had found out he was calling trying to get them back,

within 10 minutes they were at the gate.

Q (U) You say within 10 minutes later after he had called and

they returned to the annex?

A (U) Within 10 minutes of us finding out what he was doing.

He had been calling them all along --

Q (U) I see.

A (U) -- trying to get them back. But within 10 minutes of

us actually finding out what he had been doing, they showed up.

Q (U) And at that point then you had sufficient lift capability

and fire support capability for that convoy to the annex?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And what was directed about actions to prepare for the

evacuation? Were you involved in the preparation of the annex for

evacuation?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And what do you recall having occurred?

A

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Q (U) Okay. And so at some point you loaded up the deceased,

the wounded, the nonessential personnel, and all of the security

personnel into that single convoy?

A (U) We did. We lined the trucks up in order of movement.

And then everybody that was a non-shooter was in an up-armored vehicle,

and all the shooters were in thin-skinned vehicles to be able to shoot

out of the cars.

Q (U) And at that point, you convoyed back to Benina airport?

A (U) We did. Libyan Shield showed up. They gave us a lead

and rear element outside the gate. We pulled in between the two, and

they led us to the airport. And as we were leaving, chief of base set

off the destruction plan for the TOC.

Q (U) Was anyone at all left behind at the annex? Was any U.S.

personnel left at the annex?

A (U) Not at the annex, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And as far as you knew, there were no U.S.

personnel left at the mission compound either, in the consulate?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) When you arrived at Benina airport, talk me through what

happened there.

A (U) On the way back it was business as usual. The Sun was

up and there were -- the town was as it would normally be, I'm assuming.

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We get to the airport, and there are a lot of Libyan Shield militia

members waiting for us to come in, probably more people than we would

have liked because of cameras, phones, things like that.

(U) We drive directly onto the airfield right back over to the jet

and try to get the wounded State Department individual onto the jet.

We were trying to keep Lookie Loos away, obviously, but, I mean, the

airport is open. They can stand back away from the personnel fence they

had made, you know, the Libyan Shield had made, but they were trying

to look and see what was going on. So part of the effort was keeping

them away and the other part was trying to get individuals on the plane.

Q (U) As we understand, the time of the mortar attack was

somewhere around 5:15 that morning?

A (U) Thereabouts, sir.

Q (U) And how long did it take from that mortar attack until

the time you all packed up and left the annex in toto?

A (U) From the mortar attack?

Q (U) Correct.

A (U) I want to say about an hour, sir.

Q (U) About an hour?

A (U) I can't remember exactly. I know we got back to the

airport around 0730. It was about 35 -- we took a little bit longer

route back. Not sure why, probably to avoid downtown areas, but --

Q (U) And so then you loaded the wounded on that Learjet,

prepared for transport along with the other nonessential personnel for

the first lift from Benina airport back to Tripoli?

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A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And then how was the rest of the party going to proceed

from Benghazi back to Tripoli?

A (U) We were asking the pilot to come back and pick us up,

once he landed to do a turnaround and come back and take us back as well.

The problem was he would not take deceased individuals on his plane,

so a lot of the private pilots that were owned by -- you know, private

personnel would not allow more than one deceased individual on their

plane. Not sure why, but that was the readout we were getting from them.

So we were trying to find other planes that would take us at the Benghazi

airport.

Q (U) And then at some point the committee understands that

a Libyan C-130 was made available?

A

Q (U) Who was that coordination occurring between? Was that

your team leader and the Libyans at the hospital?

A (U) That was myself, my team leader, the case

officer/interpreter, and Libyan Shield commander.

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Q

A (U) We were not talking to anybody at the hospital. We were

talking to the Libyan Shield commander and said, "Hey, you need to get

him back from the hospital over to here." He was complaining that the

hospital was guarded by Ansar al-Sharia and that it wouldn't be that

easy to get him back. And we said, "We don't care. If you don't go

get him, we're going to go get him."

Q

A (U) Yes, sir, it was.

Q (U) And how do you understand that that Libyan C-130 was made

available?

A (U) I'm not entirely sure, sir. I think it was at Benina

already. I don't remember seeing it fly in, although it may have. But

I think it was the only functional C-130 they had on the eastern side

of Libya.

Q (U) And that C-130 then was provided to you all to load up

the rest of the remaining personnel at Benina?

A (U) Yes, it was. They were more than willing to take all

of us and the deceased.

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Q (U) And did the C-130 return then to Mitiga or to another

airport in Tripoli?

A (U) I think we went back to Tripoli International.

Q (U) Tell me what happened when you arrived at Tripoli

International Airport. You were in the second bird, that C-130?

A (U) We were, yes, sir.

Q (U) And what did you do or what actions did you take upon

arrival at Tripoli International Airport?

A

Q (U) The annex there in Tripoli?

A

Q (U) Were you involved in the effort to evacuate from the

embassy to the annex before you left Tripoli to head to Benghazi?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) So that all occurred after your departure?

A (U) It did.

Q (U) Okay. So you went from the C-130 back to the annex?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And did you remain in Tripoli?

A (U) We did.

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Q (U) You didn't fly onto Kaiserslautern or Ramstein, or

wherever the aircraft took off?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And how long did you remain in Tripoli?

A (U) I think October, late October, sir. I can't

remember -- the total time of my deployment was around 4 and-a-half

months. I can't remember exactly the date we left.

Q (U) When the party left the Benghazi airport to head back

to Tripoli, how many of the State Department people did you know? Did

you know the composition of that element that went from Benghazi airport

back to Tripoli that you flew with?

A (U) I had not met them before, no.

Q (U) The committee has heard that there were a couple of

individuals who may have been contractors to the State Department on

that lift from Benghazi to Tripoli. Did you know either of these

individuals?

A (U) It was a little bit of a weird situation. Once they found

out the jet was leaving, they walked up with suits and rolling suitcases

and apparently had been at the airport the entire time. Not sure their

role and where they came from, to be honest with you. They kind of came

out of nowhere. But they were there, as I understood it, at the airport

the entire time, but I'm not sure who they were.

Q (U) They were in Benghazi?

A (U) Yes, sir, they were.

Q (U) So they must have gotten there sometime between 02 and

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0730ish?

A (U) I'm not entirely sure, sir. It was a little weird, and

they never really brought it up again who they were or what they were

doing there.

Q (U) Okay. But they flew on the C-130 with you and not on

the Learjet on the first lift?

A (U) They flew on the Learjet, sir.

Q (U) Oh, they flew on the Learjet, okay.

A (U) Yeah.

Q (U) Was anybody in charge of manifesting the party that went

from Benghazi back to Tripoli? Were you performing a manifesting role?

Was anyone else in your team?

A

Q (U) And so we should be able to identify manifest from both

flights, both from the Learjet and the later 130 flight, if they exist?

A (U) Yes, sir, should be.

Q And do you know if those two personnel that showed up with

the suits and the rolling suitcases, do you know if they stayed in Tripoli

or went on to Germany when that bird later left from Tripoli to Germany?

A (U) I didn't see them after that.

Q (U) Because you were off to the annex?

A (U) We went off to the annex. And they should have been there

if they had came back and stayed at the annex, but they weren't. So

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I didn't see them again after that.

Q (U) So they didn't return to the annex with you and the rest

of that party. They either went on to Germany or went somewhere else?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And have you seen them since then?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) Okay. At any time during these events as they transpired

throughout the night of 9/11 and into 9/12, are you aware of any request

that was made to the Libyan armed forces for Libyan MiGs to respond to

these events?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) Are you aware of whether they had any operational MiGs

in Libya at the time?

A (U) They had one operational MiG at the time that I knew of.

Q (U) One operational MiG?

A (U) That I knew of, all because I'd seen it doing test

flights.

Q (U) And was that MiG located at Mitiga Airport in Tripoli?

A (U) I think it was, sir.

Q (U) Do you have any understanding or awareness of the alert

status that aircraft was on?

A (U) No.

Q F(U) rom your own background and operational experience, can

you envision where a MiG would've been any value added to the annex

defense mission?

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A (U) No, sir, I can't. It was in the middle of a populated

area. I can't see what they would've been able to do.

Q (U) Did you return to Benghazi annex at any time on a date

anytime after 9/11 of 2012?

A (U) We went back for the FBI investigation, sir.

Q (U) And tell me about what you recall from that return trip.

What was your role there?

A

Q (U) And how many security personnel assisted in their visit

to Benghazi, if you can recall?

A

Q (U) And that squadron deployed from Sigonella down to Tripoli

and then to Benghazi?

A (U) Right into Benghazi, sir.

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Q (U) So they deployed from Sigonella into Benghazi?

A (U) Yes.

Q

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And how long was the FBI on site in Benghazi?

A (U) It was that entire day. We stayed there the entire day

and came back that evening, sir.

Q (U) So you were there only during a single daylight cycle --

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) -- for the FBI to do its forensic efforts?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) And then you returned to Tripoli?

A (U) Yes, we did.

Q (U) And remained there until October?

A Yes.

Q

A (U) Yes, sir, we did.

Q (U) Okay. And did you learn anything additional that

related to the attack such as the location of the mortars or anything

else about the attack?

A (U) On the --

Q (U) On that second visit.

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A (U) On the annex, sir?

Q (U) On the annex.

A (U) We did. We were trying to find the location where the

mortars could have came from. Speculation only. But, yeah, other than

that, that's really all we did to try and find out. I know the FBI went

through and they were measuring bullet holes and which direction they

came from. We can pretty much pinpoint, if you stood on the roof, where

it came from. There was only a few buildings that could see inside the

annex, so we knew generally where those shots came from.

Q (U) Is that because you would have to be able to see inside

the annex to accurately adjust fire with the mortars?

A (U) From how accurate the mortars were, you would have to

have somebody spotting for you to say. For the one to go long, normally

what would happen is they would have to know it went long, so someone

would have to see it. So one that went long and one went short, and

it's called bracketing, so that means normally someone's calling that

bracket for you. Says, "Hey, you're long; drop 50. Hey, you're short;

add 25."

(U) So that seemed like -- and, again, the pattern, after looking

at it, as well, especially from footage shows that long, short, all on

target. So that would assume that someone had a spotter.

Q (U) When you say long and short, that typically would imply

to me as a trained mortarman that you could kind of know the location

that the mortar fire was originating, because it could've been

short-long?

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A (U) It could have, sir. We thought we knew -- there was a

horse track that was nearby around 600 to 800 meters away, and it looked

like that was the best place to shoot the mortars from and it seemed

a likely spot. They couldn't see the building itself, but they could

see the direction of the building and they could have had anything to

let them know where that building was located and trying to adjust fire

onto them.

Q (U) And, again, this would've been in the hours of darkness

that they were adjusting fire?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) So clearly they had an FO, a forward observer, a spotter

of some sort to adjust that fire. But you never could definitively

conclude where those mortars may have been positioned?

A (U) Not definitively. All speculation, sir.

Q (U) Okay. And so what's your opinion on the skill of those

who were actually employing the mortars that evening in the attack on

Benghazi annex?

A (U) I would say personally that it was probably a skilled

mortar team. It's not easy. And you, being a trained mortarman, know

how hard that would be to shoot inside the city and get something on

target within two shots. That's difficult. I would say they were

definitely a trained mortar team or had been trained to do something

similar to that.

Q

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A (U) No, sir. That's why I was kind of surprised. I had not

heard of or seen anybody or talked to anyone that had been trained on

mortars at all. So it was unusual.

Q

A (U) I did hear that, sir.

Q (U) And what's your recollection of that allegation, or what

do you know about it?

A (U) I don't know anything firsthand, sir. It was all

secondhand information. I'm not sure the conversation that was had with

Colonel but I do know that when we left they were having a hard

time getting a hold of their commander. That's the only thing I was

aware of them having. And they would not release their 18 Delta without

talking to their commander, which we understood.

Q

A (U) Admiral Losey.

Q

A (U) Colonel

Q (U) Colonel

A (U) Yes, sir.

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Q (U) Did you know him as well?

A (U) I do know Colonel

Q (U) Did you know him during your time in Tripoli?

A (U) I had known him before that as well. I worked at the

MACE in Quantico. He came by pretty often. He started the Marine Corps

Martial Arts program, so I was familiar with Colonel before that.

Q

A (U) Not that I know of, sir. I don't think that Colonel

was contacted.

Q (U) Do you know if had a doctor at the annex in

Tripoli? Were you aware of any medical personnel

stationed -- permanent personnel -- at Tripoli annex?

A (U) I know the embassy had a surgeon, like a trauma surgeon.

I can't remember their name right now off the top of my head, but all

the medically-qualified personnel at the annex were 18 Delta-qualified

GRS agents.

Q (U) To your knowledge, did the annex in Tripoli ever consider

evacuating, or was there an adequate security posture there after 9/12?

A

Q (U) You mentioned that the Zintanis and 17 Feb had the

exterior security mission for the Tripoli annex. Do you have an opinion

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about their capabilities, their effectiveness?

A (U) We had talked to them before in passing. They seemed

capable. I think they had their own equities, obviously, for keeping

us safe, but they were doing a good job of it, as far as I could tell.

I never passed them sleeping on post or anything like that.

Q (U) And how about the Blue Mountain Group? Did you ever

become familiar with somebody called the Blue Mountain Group?

A (U) The name is familiar, but I can't remember exactly.

Q (U) Okay. Did you know the leader of 17 Feb in Tripoli or

ever meet Fawzi Abu Khatif?

A (U) Again, that name sounds familiar, sir, but I can't

remember meeting him personally.

Q (U) Do you remember having formed any opinion about the

leader of 17 Feb, Mr. Khatif?

A (U) No, I don't.

Q (U) I know that you mentioned before leaving Tripoli you were

advised there wouldn't be any additional air assets available to support

you. Did you renew the request for air support upon arriving in

Benghazi?

A (U) We, again, just asked what we had available. We were

referring more to ISR and how our posture as a unit had been, knowing

that they were going to be relatively quick as well. And thinking that

we could possibly have a situation where we had to hunker down inside

of Benghazi, it would've been more likely they would've been the first

ones there.

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Q (U) When you say knowing the posture of your unit, meaning

the unit responding from Fort Bragg?

A (U) Yes, sir. We just wanted to know if they had been blown

out or not, and they had. And we had gotten informed that they were

moving to Sigonella.

Q (U) Okay. But in specific, other than that unit that was

responding from Fort Bragg, did you ever learn about a potential response

from the Commander's In-extremis Force also in Europe?

A (U) No, I did not.

Q (U) Are you familiar with the CIF or the -- it's now the

Commander's Response Force?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Q (U) And were you aware that when the team from Fort Bragg

or squadron back in Fort Bragg was alerted that there was also an alert

that extended to the CIF?

A (U) I was aware of the alert, but I did not know they were

there before that.

Q (U) You say you were aware of the alert?

A (U) I was. And that was the first time I had known where

they were located.

Q (U) Okay. But in terms of any active -- any additional air

support, whether AC-130 gunship, armed helo gunship, anything from the

Mediterranean, were you aware of any potential for additional air assets

from any other source?

A (U) No, sir. They were pretty clear that the timeline we

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were asking for couldn't be met. And I wasn't exactly sure what assets

were even available. We were, of course, asking for anything at that

point. We weren't very specific with what we wanted, and we were happy

with the ISR that we had. That was better than nothing.

Q

Q (U) But you didn't know of anything that was available in

the North Africa region that could be called to respond to assist you

in the way of air support?

A (U) No, sir.

Q (U) When you arrived in Benghazi, were you aware whether

MedEvac had already been requested, medical evacuation capability for

the wounded that were relocated from the consulate to the annex?

A (U) I knew there was already steps in place to prepare for

us to bring wounded back. I wasn't sure exactly what that was.

Q (U) And did you have any sense of the timeline for that

response effort either?

A (U) No. I assumed that would be relatively immediate

because of the -- we had the trauma surgeon there as well as the 18 Delta

that stayed back. So there was no doubt in my mind that when we got

back they would be ready for us.

Q (U) Okay. There was a statement that Secretary Panetta made

sometime after the attacks in Benghazi, and I want to ask your opinion

on this statement. And what Secretary Panetta said is, "The basic

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principle here is that you don't deploy forces into harm's way without

knowing what's going on, without having some real-time information about

what's taking place. And as a result of not having that kind of

information, the commander who was on the ground during that area,

General Ham; General Dempsey, the chairman, and I felt very strongly

we could not put forces at risk in that situation."

(U) So from your own background and your own operational experience

and perspective that night, could the CIF, the In-extremis Force, have

provided value to what was going on in that situation in Benghazi?

A (U) In the timeline that we were meeting, I don't think they

would have made it in time, sir. I mean, they obviously could have

helped, but as quick as we were in and out of Benghazi, I don't think

they could have made it. They would've had to have been sitting in the

planes ready to go when it happened, which is not likely.

Q (U) So the reality is the CIF wasn't close enough or postured

close enough to be able to respond to the situation in Benghazi on that

timeline?

A (U) I think had it been prolonged and we had stayed and tried

to defend the annex, I have no doubt that someone would have came shortly

thereafter. But we were -- I think once the decision was made for

everyone to leave as quickly as possible -- I'm not sure the decision

that was being made, but I know that -- I'm sure no one knew they could

meet that timeline of how quickly we wanted to get in and out of Benghazi.

But, again, had we stayed, no doubt that there would've been more than

one group coming to help.

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Q (U) Mr. did you ever participate in an after-action

review at some point relating to this operation?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) And do you know of any security changes or policy changes

that took effect that were directed based upon what occurred in Benghazi

or through the AAR process?

A (U) Not through the AAR process. I met individuals since

then that have had different groups stood up because of what happened

in Benghazi just throughout traveling to different embassies.

Q (U) Okay. Are there security changes from your perspective

that you would recommend based upon your experience of having gone

through this attack and responding to the attack in Benghazi? Are there

things that you would suggest that they do differently, State Department

do differently, do differently?

A (U) I think they've done a good job reacting to it. I think

all those have probably already been done.

Q

A (U) No, sir.

Q

A (U) Once we got home, sir?

Q (U) Yes.

A (U) We did not specifically for a debrief or an AAR. But

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for memorial services, things like that, we discussed things that had

happened, but wasn't an official AAR.

Q (U) Have you ever talked to the deputy CIA director, Mr. Mike

Morell, or other CIA management as part of, you know, either attending

the memorial services or as part of an AAR process after the attacks

in Benghazi?

A (U) No, sir. I spoke with him briefly at the awards ceremony

that we had at the building, but that's the only time I've spoken to

him.

Q (U) Any recommendations you might offer about how to improve

upon or collect and prepare for an attack scenario like this one that

occurred at the embassy or at the annex?

A (U) Again, sir, I think all those steps have probably been

put in place since then. Recently had one of the individuals from State

Department come to work, and I think he is in charge of all the high-risk

embassies and consulates at this point. So I think they've done or taken

appropriate action.

Q (U) You say -- I'm sorry. I missed that last -- you say

because the State Department implemented this -- you knew this

individual?

A (U) I just recently met him before I came here. He was at

work and asked to talk to me. And then he is in charge of all the

high-risk outstations or consulates and embassies, so obviously have

more oversight on what's going on because of Benghazi.

Q (U) So this individual here in Washington that has got that

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additional duty, as far as you know?

A (U) I'm not sure where he's working out of. It's probably

here. I would assume so, sir.

Q (U) Okay. Do you ever get up to Foggy Bottom to the State

Department headquarters?

A (U) Yes, sir.

Mr. Chipman. Okay. I'd like to go off the record, please.

[Discussion off the record.]

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(U) Ms. Rauch. The time is, looks like, 12:20, but I don't think

we'll take a full hour, so I think you're good to go here.

(U) Let me reintroduce myself. I'm Laura Rauch with the minority

staff. I'm joined by my colleague Shannon Green and our chief counsel,

Heather Sawyer. And on behalf of the ranking member, Elijah Cummings,

and the other Democratic Members of Congress who serve on this committee,

thank you for your tremendous service to our Nation, and thank you for

agreeing to be here today to answer our questions.

(U) And my colleague in the last couple of hours did a pretty

thorough examination of the narrative. And we appreciate that. And

so we just have a few questions for you --

(U) Mr. Okay.

(U) Ms. Rauch. -- and then we'll wrap this up pretty quickly.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. RAUCH:

Q (U) At the outset of our discussion today, you were asked

about a document, an operational narrative --

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) -- and you had -- you said that you had a chance to review

it --

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) -- recently. And I just want to confirm that it -- that

operational narrative accurately captures your experience.

A (U) It does. It was the -- yeah. It was the soonest thing

we wrote. It was within 48 hours of the actual incident, so, yeah, it

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was the freshest on our mind. Everything in there is the best it could

be timeline-wise as well.

Q (U) And so you think because of its -- because of when it

was written, it was probably one of the more accurate --

A (U) The timeline, definitely. I mean, there was definitely

more -- two or three different timelines put out over a period of time,

but we stuck to that one only because it was the first thing that was

written and it was the best timeline that we had.

Q (U) And once again, just confirming that you stand by

everything that's in it at this point?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) Very good. So setting aside -- moving on to your

operations at QRF, setting aside the obstacles that you immediately had

to deal with, such as the distance and securing a jet and other logistical

challenges that you obviously had in front of you, in your initial push

to Benghazi, was there ever a pause in your operation?

A (U) No. It actually moved pretty quickly getting to

Benghazi. The pause came after we landed. That's really the only pause

we had, and it was --

Q (U) So is it correct to say or fair to say that there was

never a moment when you and Team Tripoli weren't doing everything in

your power to get to Benghazi as quickly as possible?

A (U) No.

Q

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A (U) Absolutely.

Q A(U) nd just can you tell me, were you in continual

communications within your -- with your chain of command?

A (U) Yes. Minus being the flight over, we were.

Q (U) So except for the, you said it was a 2-hour flight,

during --

A (U) Hour and a half to 2 hours.

Q (U) -- that time is when you couldn't be in communication?

A (U) But that was the only time.

Q (U) That was the only time. Other than that, it was pretty

regular. And as they went up, did information come back down between --

A (U) It did. We had pretty much an open phone call. The

radios weren't working at the time, our secure radios, so we were using

our cell phones. But it would stay -- either I was talking or my team

leader talking.

Q (U) Okay. And you said that communication was mostly

through cell phones?

A (U) It was.

Q (U) Okay. Very good. So there's been a book published

called "13 Hours" --

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) -- by some of the members of the GRS team that served

in Benghazi. Have you had a chance to read that book?

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A (U) I've read portions of that book, yes.

Q (U) And so just portions, not all of it?

A (U) I've not read the complete book.

Q (U) Okay. So in that book, the heroics of some of the GRS

team who authored the book is showcased pretty front and center, but

many others, you and your team included, the task force -- or I'm sorry,

Team Tripoli, played a critical role in the successful evacuation of

all U.S. personnel from Benghazi. Is there anything that you would like

to address in or add to the narrative of the book?

A (U) I would say our narrative follows exactly what happened;

the book's, I probably could not say the same. The portions of the book

I read didn't seem factual after being there. Obviously, we were on

the ground in specific situations they were talking about, and the

majority of that book was not factual, because of that. And I can attest

to it, because we were there.

(U) Ms. Sawyer. Are there particular things in that regard that

stood out to you as not resonating factually with your experience on

the ground?

(U) Mr. I think the fact that some of those GRS agents

had said that they were on the roof when their friends passed away or

actions they took to secure the compound, things like that, were not

factual. I mean, there was more than one or two instances. A lot of

it wasn't based on facts, especially after having been there. The

majority of the GRS personnel I saw were the GRS team leads. The guys

that came with us and some of the ones that wrote the book were not as

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present as they said they were in the book, so I did not give much

credibility to that after I read those excerpts of things they were

writing that I was actually there for.

(U) Ms. Rauch. Okay. Well, thank you for your candor. And my

colleague, I think, had a question.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q (U) I just had a couple quick questions to follow up on some

of the discussion from the last hour. And, you know, again, we

appreciate both your candor and your willingness.

(U) From our perspective, there were obviously things that were

quite tragic that night. There were also tremendous successes. And

you've spoken, I think, very clearly about, you know, the steps that

your team took. And I think you described it kind of as how quickly

you were in and out of Benghazi and helping get all U.S. personnel -- you

confirmed all U.S personnel had been evacuated.

(U) One of the things that had come up was just with regard to

medical personnel who could help attend to the wounded.

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) And you had indicated that, I think, while you were still

in Tripoli, you had been given a sense that there was at that point in

time one already killed in action?

A (U) There was, yeah. Smoke inhalation, as we understood it,

because of the fire.

Q (U) And that had been at the consulate?

A (U) Yes, ma'am.

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Q

Q (U) And I think you indicated that there was one additional

wounded.

A (U) Yes. We were not sure the extent of the injuries or what

had happened. We assumed it was moving from the consulate to the annex.

Q (U) Did you have any under -- you said you didn't have a

strong understanding of what the extent of the injuries were. Did you

understand them to be at that point life-threatening injuries?

A (U) No, no. There were no life-threatening injuries that

we knew of. And the one that was already deceased was, you know,

obviously too late.

Q (U) And the individual who was injured at that point in time

that you had heard about in Tripoli, and to the extent you know, was

that person then ultimately successfully evacuated?

A (U) They were. I think it was as they were moving back, one

of the guys had fallen over one of the walls. They were climbing some

reasonably large walls, so I think that's what they were referring to.

No one had any bullet wounds or anything like that of that nature once

we got in there.

Q

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A (U) There were.

Q (U) But aside from the individuals who were then killed in

action, were all the other injured U.S. personnel on the ground

successfully evacuated?

A (U) Yes.

Q (U) So, you know, it was our understanding -- we've heard

some testimony about pretty tremendous, I think, medical attention that

was given. Was it your sense that the people who were there kind of

pulled together and provided what they needed in order to get everyone,

even the injured, back to Tripoli, where they got additional medical

care?

A

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Q (U) So with the exception of the individuals killed in

action, we -- we, I say that magnanimously -- you all were able to

successfully evacuate all personnel, including the wounded, to Tripoli,

where they then got life-saving care?

A (U) Yes, ma'am.

BY MS. RAUCH:

Q (U) Okay. Very good. So this is the eighth congressional

investigation into the attacks in Benghazi, and there are a number of

public allegations and a lot of speculation. While anyone can

speculate, there is only a limited universe of people who have firsthand

knowledge about what happened. We're asking about these allegations

because it's our understanding that all of these continue to be

investigated. So I have a series of allegations, some of them you will

have knowledge about, some of them won't relate to you at all, but I

just ask you to answer them as easily as possible.

A (U) No problem.

Q (U) It has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton

initially blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One

congressman has speculated that Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta to

stand down, and this resulted in the Defense Department not sending more

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assets to help in Benghazi.

(U) Do you have evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A (U) No.

Q (U) Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A (U) No.

Q (U) It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington

Post fact checker evaluated this claim and gave it four Pinocchios, its

highest award for false claims.

(U) Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A (U) No.

Q (U) Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A (U) No.

Q (U) It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton

misrepresented or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Qadhafi

to his own people in order to garner support for military operations

in Libya in spring 2011.

(U) Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Qadhafi to his own

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people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

the spring of 2011?

A (U) No.

Q (U) It has been alleged that the U.S. mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that the CIA was not collecting and shipping arms

from Libya to Syria and that they found no support for this allegation.

(U) Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping arms

from Libya to Syria?

A (U) No.

Q (U) Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya to

Syria or any other foreign country?

A (U) No.

Q (U) A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the annex to assist the special mission compound. There

have been a number of allegations about the cause and the appropriateness

of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee issued a bipartisan

report concluding that the team was not ordered to, quote, stand down,

but that instead there were tactical disagreements on the ground over

how quickly to depart.

(U) Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand-down order to

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CIA personnel?

A (U) No.

Q (U) Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do

you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind

the temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed the annex

to assist the special mission compound?

A (U) No.

Q (U) A concern has been raised by one individual that in the

course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board,

damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that

production.

(U) Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to the ARB?

A (U) No.

Q (U) Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or

scrub damaging documents from the materials that were provided to the

ARB?

A (U) No.

Q (U) Let me ask these questions for documents that were

provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from materials that

were provided to Congress?

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A (U) No.

Q (U) It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael

Morell altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks

for political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when

he told Congress that, the CIA faithfully performed our duties in

accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

non-partisanship.

(U) Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Michael

Morell gave false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress

about the Benghazi talking points?

A (U) No.

Q (U) Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A (U) No.

Q (U) It has been alleged that ambassador Susan Rice made an

intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talks show

about the Benghazi attacks.

(U) Do you have any evidence that ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk

shows?

A (U) No.

Q (U) It has been alleged that the President of the United

States was virtually AWOL as commander in chief on the night of the

attacks and that he was missing in action.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

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President was virtually AWOL as commander in chief or missing in action

on the night of the attacks?

A (U) No.

Q (U) It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks, who were considering

flying on the second plane to Benghazi, were ordered by their superiors

to stand down, meaning cease all operations. Military officials have

stated that those four individuals were instead ordered to remain in

place in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance in their

current location. A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed

Services Committee found that there was no stand-down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi.

(U) Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the

House Armed Services Committee that there was no stand-down order issued

to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi?

A (U) No.

Q (U) It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives. However,

former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the former chairman

of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review the attacks,

after which, he stated, "Given where the troops were, how quickly the

thing all happened, and how quickly it dissipated, we probably couldn't

have done more than we did."

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(U) Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

conclusion?

A (U) No.

Q (U) Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not to

deploy?

A (U) No.

Q (U) Very good. So that ends our questioning.

A (U) Okay.

Mr. Chipman.

(U) I served in your command 20 years ago. At the time, we referred

to people like you as genetically superior national assets, we referred

to the staff as locally inferior regional liabilities. I think that

your appearance here today reflects the soundness of that observation.

I think, if anything, your command has gotten better in the 20 years

since I've seen you, and I just want to thank you for your service to

the Nation, your continued service ahead, and for what you've done for

all of us.

ZI265001) (U) Mr. Thank you, sir.

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(U) Ms. Rauch. All right. Thank you very much.

(U) Mr. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:37 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

906
INTERVIEW OF

LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL

FLYNN

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, SEPTEMBER 29, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

CHRIS DONESA, Deputy Staff Director

DANA CHIPMAN, Chief Counsel

MAC TOLAR, Senior Counsel

SARAH ADAMS, Investigator

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel

SHANNON GREEN, Minority Counsel

LINDA COHEN, Minority Senior Professional Staff

LAURA RAUCH, Minority Senior Professional Staff

FOR THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

***

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Mr. Tolar. All right. Let's go on the record. This is the

transcribed interview of Lieutenant General Michael Flynn conducted

by the House Select Committee on Benghazi. This interview is being

conducted voluntarily as part of the committee's investigation into

the attacks on the U.S. diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, in

September 2012, and related matters pursuant to House Resolution 567

of the 113th Congress and House Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

General Flynn, would you please state your full name for the

record.

General Flynn. Michael Thomas Flynn.

Mr. Tolar. Thank you, sir. On behalf of Chairman Gowdy and this

committee, we appreciate your time and willingness to come in and talk

with us today. My name, again, is Mac Tolar, and I am an attorney with

the committee's majority staff. At this time, I'm going to ask

everyone in the room to go around and introduce themselves for the

record.

Mr. Chipman. I'm Dana Chipman with the committee staff.

Ms. Adams. I'm Sara Adams with the majority staff.

Ms. Rauch. And Laura Rauch with the minority staff.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny with the minority staff.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer with the minority staff.

Ms. Cohen. Linda Cohen, minority.

Mr. deputy general counsel, DIA.

Mr. Donesa. I'm Chris Donesa with the committee staff.

Mr. Tolar. Thank you all. At this time, I want to go through

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a few procedural issues, sir, before we get started.

Generally, the way the questioning proceeds, is that a member from

the majority will ask questions for an hour. At that time, the minority

staff will have an opportunity to ask questions for an hour. We will

go back and forth until we have concluded all our questions.

We will rotate -- let's see, questions may only be asked by a

member of the committee or a designated staff member. In terms

of -- unlike depositions or testimony in Federal court, a transcribed

interview by the committee is not bound by the rules of evidence. You

or your counsel may raise objections for privilege, subject to review

by the committee chairman. If the objection cannot be resolved in the

interview, you can be required to return for a deposition or hearing.

That said, members and staff of the committee are not permitted to raise

objections when the other side is asking questions.

As you can see, Catalina is transcribing verbatim everything that

we say here today. As such, we would ask you to please give verbal

responses such as yes and no to all questions. Please avoid nodding

your head or saying "huh-uh," or otherwise she is going to give me a

dirty look and make me call you out on that.

You are welcome to confer with your counsel at any time throughout

the interview. Just let us know and we will be happy to go off the

record and stop the clock and provide you with an opportunity to do

so.

We will also take breaks whenever it is convenient. This can be

every hour after questioning, after a couple of rounds, or whenever

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you prefer, just let us know.

General Flynn. Okay. Can I ask one question?

Mr. Tolar. Sure, yeah.

General Flynn. So in terms of counsel, Brenton represents DIA.

Mr. Tolar. Okay.

General Flynn. Not me. So I don't have a counsel here today.

I understand he's representing DIA just as a -- I guess as a courtesy.

Mr. Tolar. Thank you for clarifying that for the record, sir.

General Flynn. Okay.

Mr. Tolar. I would ask you to answer all questions in the most

complete and truthful manner possible. We will take our time and

repeat or clarify any questions, if necessary.

If you don't understand a question, I would just ask you to please

let us know. If you honestly do not know the answer, that's okay. Just

please don't guess. Give us your best recollection or indicate who

you think might be better poised to answer that question.

Sir, do you understand that you have an obligation to answer

questions from Congress truthfully?

General Flynn. I do.

Mr. Tolar. Do you understand this obligation extends to

congressional staff in an interview such as this one today?

General Flynn. Yes.

Mr. Tolar. Do you understand that a witness who knowingly

provides false testimony could be subject to criminal prosecution for

perjury or for making false statements?

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General Flynn. Yes.

Mr. Tolar. Is there any reason why you are unable to provide

truthful answers today?

General Flynn. None.

Mr. Tolar. This interview will be conducted at the TS/SCI level.

That is the end of my preamble.

Do you all have anything to add?

Ms. Sawyer. Not at this point. We'd just thank you for being

here today and look forward to hearing your testimony.

General Flynn. Okay. All right.

Mr. Tolar. I've got 9:06 in the a.m. Let's start the

questioning, please.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Sir, first off, I want you to talk to me a little bit about

your background in both the intelligence community as it relates to

military operations, just kind of walk us through how you got to where

you are today?

A Okay. I have 30 -- just slightly over 33 years in the Army.

I have 16 years at a place called Fort Bragg, North Carolina, so in

an organization like 82nd Airborne Division, 18th Airborne Corps, Joint

Special Operations Command. I have served overseas in the 25th

Infantry Division.

I have multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan, almost 5 years in

Iraq and Afghanistan. I have had tours as a trainer at the Joint

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Readiness Training Center, twice at the Army's intelligence center,

once as a young officer, and then I went back later on as the commander

for the Intelligence Training Brigade there. And most recently, I have

had assignments as the senior intelligence officer for the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs, senior intelligence officer or assistant director

of National Intelligence for Partner Engagement over in the DNI side,

so at the national level, and then as the Director of the Defense

Intelligence Agency, so -- and that was the sort of the culmination

of my career was the -- was my final assignment as the Director of DIA.

And you know, just accumulated, you know, a range of training

experiences, educational experiences, had the opportunity to get three

master's degrees that the government supported me on, and just other,

you know, awards and decorations that go with a typical long career

like that, so --

Q What was your billet immediately prior to taking over as

Director of DIA?

A Yeah. It was the assistant director of National

Intelligence for Partner Engagement was the title.

Q Talk more about what that is and what that entailed?

A Yeah. So I was responsible for international military and

domestic engagement, which one of the big roles was I ran the

information sharing board for the National Intelligence Community,

which is a really important, you know, component where we decide how

we are going to share intelligence with other nations and with inside

of our own intelligence community, and with inside of government.

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9

It was -- gave me -- it gave me a perspective of certainly the

international community, and probably even greater perspective of our

domestic law enforcement community, including the Department of

Homeland Security and the Department of Justice. I worked very

closely, for example, with the FBI in that role.

Q In that role, can you talk a little bit more about the IC

community in terms of our operations overseas, how that interface

occurred?

A Sure.

Q Did you implement any changes? What did you -- did you see

challenges and --

A Yeah.

Q -- are there challenges that still exist today, et cetera?

A Sure. One of the biggest challenges is information and

intelligence sharing. It still exists today. It's a cumbersome

process, sometimes for the right reasons, sometimes just because we

are -- we have a, you know, an enormous bureaucracy and a whole range

of, you know, interagency processes that get through.

So how it -- how it generally works is there are policies that

you put in place or that are already in place, and you execute those

policies to the best of your ability.

In times of crises, which seem to be, you know, damn near every

week, if not, certainly every month, you are always having to have a

crisis response meeting, and make decisions about sharing intelligence

with countries that we don't necessarily have sharing relationships

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10

with for specific things like signals intelligence or imagery

intelligence. And you are in a fairly daily contact with your

counterparts in the Department of Justice, Department of Homeland

Security, Department of Defense, and also, all of the other sort of

big intel agencies, you know, that we have in the U.S. Government.

So a pretty robust position. I was actually assigned to it as

the first ADNI partner engagement, so assistant director of national

intelligence. Jim Clapper, the current Director of National

Intelligence, created the position and asked me to fill into it and

then kind of -- and basically define it.

Q Okay. You had -- am I correct, and you had a couple of tours

at DIA early in your career?

A Yeah. I mean, I -- you know, if you consider my job, my

assignment at CENTCOM where I was the J2 at Central Command, you know,

as a military officer, you are really assigned to a joint billet in

support of the commander, but your intelligence support comes from DIA.

And, in fact, the year that I was at CENTCOM was the year that the

Department made the very significant change to align all of DIA, the

civilian structure underneath -- underneath the Defense Intelligence

Agency, the Department decided to do that, and then basically align

them with the J2.

My second time working directly for DIA was as the J2 on the joint

staff, senior intelligence officer to the chairman. That billet is

actually not a joint staff billet. That billet is a deputy director

to the DIA with an assignment to the joint staff. Not a lot of people

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11

know that.

Q How long was that tour?

A That tour -- CENTCOM was a year, and the joint staff was

1 year.

Ms. Sawyer. Mac, just for a moment, I just wanted to make sure

we had an opportunity to introduce to the witness Congresswoman

Duckworth from Illinois.

General Flynn. Hi, how are you?

Ms. Sawyer. Who is here as also a veteran of the Armed Forces.

General Flynn. Good. Super.

Ms. Duckworth. Thank you for being here, General.

General Flynn. Yeah, thanks. Thank you.

Mr. Chipman. General Flynn --

General Flynn. Thank you for your service.

Mr. Chipman. -- during your time at CENTCOM, was this when

CENTCOM was also actively managing theaters of operation in both Iraq

and Afghanistan?

General Flynn. Absolutely. Oh, yeah, yeah. And also, at that

time, CENTCOM still retained six countries in East Africa, so that

was -- that was also during the period of time when we transitioned

from some of the countries at CENTCOM, essentially, had in its AOR to

Africa Command, and that was a big deal, too. So yeah, I mean, we had

significant operations -- significant combat operations still ongoing

in Iraq and in Afghanistan.

Mr. Chipman. And by AOR, you meant CENTCOM's area of

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responsibility?

General Flynn. Yeah, yeah, sorry.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Sir, prior to joining DIA in 2012 as a Director, talk a

little bit about your background as it relates to intelligence

collection, analyst reporting with regard to Libya. What kind of

association or work did you do in Libya or about Libya?

A Sure. I would just say that, first of all, you know, the

very front side of your question, I mean, I have extensive experience

training, you know, doing the job of an analyst, the collection

management component of intelligence operations, running -- running

not only, you know, very tactical level efforts, intelligence efforts,

you know, intelligence, counterintelligence, physical security,

special security operations, intelligence surveillance and

reconnaissance, but all the way up to the national level, you know,

building out architectures for combat zones as well as for entire

theaters of operations. So I have had my hands in or have done some

of that quite a bit.

In terms of Libya, I think that the majority of my time directly

related to Libya really started when I was in Iraq, because many of

the individuals who we were after or we captured or killed were from

Libya. Many of the senior leaders of Al Qaeda were from Libya,

particularly a place called Darnah, which is in Eastern Libya, and there

is a couple of other camps in that area that, as far as I know, remain

today.

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13

So a lot of experience studying the situation in Libya as it

related to how it affected and impacted our operations in Iraq. Many

of the leaders, as I said, not only at the Al Qaeda level but -- and

I am talking about the senior Al Qaeda command and control, but also,

many of the individuals who were leading Al Qaeda in Iraq were from

Libya, and Libya was a transit point for foreign fighters coming in

at that time, you know, and this is 2004 to roughly probably 2010, you

know, we were looking at about 150, maybe 200 a month on a good month

for them, but you know, paid a lot of attention to Libya because of

what it represented in terms of the fight that we were having inside

of Iraq.

Mr. Tolar. Just spending -- go ahead.

Mr. Chipman. Just one question I will try to get the context

here.

General Flynn. Yeah.

Mr. Chipman. And so this time when you talk about capture and

kill operations with Al Qaeda operatives in Libya, this was during your

time as the J2 for the Joint Special Operations Command?

General Flynn. That is right. That is right. So when I say

that, I spent 2004 to 2007 as the senior intelligence officer for Joint

Special Operations Command, and that is exactly the timeframe, yeah.

And then I went from there to CENTCOM, and then from CENTCOM to the

joint staff. So my -- you know, so I never broke contact

with -- because I -- you know, Iraq was still the main effort at that

time for the Nation, and so I never really broke contact from the time

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I was at till I actually ended up going become to Afghanistan in

2009.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Have you ever been to Libya?

A I have not.

Q When did you report in as Director of DIA?

A It was -- I think it was 24 July 2012. I think that was

the date. July 2012.

Q If you will, once you came aboard as Director, kind of walk

me through your daily routine?

A Yeah, my daily routine was probably, you know, it started

at about 5:00 in the morning, and it would typically -- you know, it

would typically end at about 1900, you know, 2000, but you know, I had,

you know, in my home, which is part of the problem, you know, you end

up with, you know, communications systems at your home. I lived over

on Fort McNair, and so you are never out of touch. And you are just

never -- in that job, you are never out of touch.

Q Talk to me a little bit about in terms of what kind of

products you reviewed on a daily basis. Was there a morning briefing

for you? Was there a morning read book?

A Yeah.

Q Were you looking at --

A Yeah, every day, for the most part, I was pretty religious

about reading the Presidential Daily Brief. I was one of the few that

had the privilege of having access to that, and so I -- as you know,

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if I was -- if I was here in D.C., and sometimes I actually did get

pieces of it overseas or other times when I traveled, it was harder,

but I would typically, you know, after my morning normal routine of

some PT, you know, I would go out for a run, I would come in, and I

would read the PDB, and that usually would take me about 30 to

45 minutes, maybe sometimes an hour, depending on the substance that

was in that book.

That was my -- that was my typical start of the morning before

I would drive in to different meetings and updates and things like that.

Q When did you leave DIA?

A I left DIA 4 August 2014.

Q There have been several congressional inquiries regarding

the events surrounding the attacks in Benghazi. Am I correct in saying

that you've never testified before Congress in any of these inquiries?

A You are correct.

Q Were you even asked?

A No.

Q Do you find that peculiar?

A Very peculiar.

Q Why do you say that?

A Well, because I just think that as the head of one of the

intelligence agencies, I just found it stunning that -- you know, and

I was prepared to do that, but just, you know, was never asked.

Q Okay.

A And you know, I -- people go, well, why didn't you say

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something? Well, I mean, you know, I was in multiple conversations

with our leadership, but nobody ever said, hey, we want you to come

over, and nobody from -- nobody from the Hill ever said, you know,

let's -- what does DIA think?

Q Sure.

A At least not to me.

Q Yes, sir. Talk to me briefly about the mission at DIA, a

little bit how DIA fits into the intel community.

A Yeah.

Q Those kind of things.

A So two roles. One, I am the -- the DIA has its own

responsibility to run itself as an agency, so the Director is

responsible for 17,000 people, 142 countries. Things like the defense

attache system around the world is under DIA. Our real mission is to

provide really strategic indications and warnings for conflict and any

particular threats to our country around the world 24 hours a day,

7 days a week.

We have a range of capabilities. Probably the most important

capability that we have is we are one of three -- but we are one of

two of the largest all-source intelligence agencies, not only in the

United States, but in the world. So that is the DIA side.

The other -- another hat that I wore was I was the chairman of

the military intelligence board, which set standards, policies,

procedures for all of military intelligence. So essentially, I am the

senior military intelligence officer for the Department of Defense in

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that role and ran a -- you know, a very, I thought, good process with

all of the other senior intelligence leaders within the Department on

a fairly routine basis to just make sure that, you know, resources were

argued for appropriately, we understood the direction that each service

was going, and also, daily, sometimes -- sometimes daily, definitely

weekly interaction from DIA through the joint staff to the combatant

commands.

So we have 11 -- 11 four-star commands around the world. You

know, a couple of them are functional commands like Korea, but then

I include that in the 11 as a sort of a combatant command level, but

those 11 four-stars are also part of that sort of daily, you know,

interaction, frankly, and it is either -- that interaction, you know,

there is the formal processes and the meetings and the routine and the

battle rhythm that we have, but there is also just the constant

communications with VTCs, and of course, email, Tandberg sessions based

on crises that are going on around the world. And just, you know, I

mean, these last few years, I think as everybody has seen, is probably

some of the most complex times we have faced.

Mr. Chipman. Sir, you talked about an all-source intelligence

agency, and I think you meant that the CIA and the DIA are the two

all-source intelligence agencies within the intelligence community?

General Flynn. Yeah. And that -- yes. So there is a third one,

and that is the State Department. The State Department has a small,

we would call it an all-source intel agency, and they are actually -- you

know, my read of them and using them and communicating with them and

922
18

being briefed by them over the years, and they are actually pretty

effective, good professional people over there, but they are small,

very small, and they are focused on, really, the State Department;

whereas the DIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central

Intelligence Agency, you know, have large all-source intelligence

analysis capabilities, and I like to say that they are -- they should

be competitive with one another, because, frankly, our views will be

different, will be different, and the defense side, because of

the -- because of the scale of the Defense Department and the role of

the defense intelligence beyond DIA, it's much larger actually.

Mr. Chipman. Okay. And by all-source intelligence, what does

that mean?

General Flynn. All-source intelligence means you look and you

bring in every form of information that is possible to support the

intelligence assessments that you would craft for your decision makers.

So that would mean things like signals intelligence,

counterintelligence, human intelligence, imagery intelligence, open

source, multiple open sources of information, you know, that you have

that is called MASINT, which is measurements and signatures

intelligence, you know. You have all the space-based stuff, so there

is an enormous amount of intelligence that is brought together, and

the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency

have those roles and responsibilities for the U.S. Government. One

is CIA is national, and DIA would be defense.

Mr. Chipman. Thank you.

923
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BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Would you talk about DIA's mission versus military

intelligence mission? Is there overlap there? How much coordination

is done, et cetera?

A Yeah. There's a lot of overlap, and you know, sitting here

today in looking at it, and there is probably, at times, too much, but

the coordination, I think, is really -- I think the coordination is

actually pretty effective.

Now, the best coordination is not necessarily at the leader level.

The best coordination actually happens at the analytic level because

analysts just have a knack for developing their own networks inside

of the sort of the, you know, the subtext to, you know, leaders getting

together in a room and going, okay, is this what we want. The analysts

down at the engine deck, or the engine plate level, they actually have

a very effective network and they communicate very well, so that happens

more than daily. That happens on almost a constant basis, particularly

those who are paying close attention to, you know, their particular

areas of the world.

Q Talk to me a little bit about what section in DIA or group

or organization handles Libya specifically.

A Yeah. So in DIA, it would be -- today would be the MARC,

which is the Middle East Africa Regional Center. Middle East Africa

Regional Center. And you know, at the time that we are really talking

about, we had not gotten to that organizational construct yet. We

still had just what I would just call DI, defense intelligence element

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20

of our all-source component, and we had a sort of a North Africa desk,

if you will, that handled North Africa and handled specific things like

AQIM, you know, and the various other AQ networks.

Q With the rise of the Arab Spring and the Libyan revolution,

did you find that North Africa desk bumping up in resources and

personnel and things of that nature, or did you stay the course?

A Well, I tell you, no, we went through a radical basically

reorganization, and -- because what I saw in my time in combat and my

time in places like Central Command, places like the joint staff, I

found the structure of defense intelligence very cumbersome, and not

focused on providing really good connections between national and the

warfighter. So I wanted to focus more on the warfighter, and you know,

and figured if we did that, we would provide better assessments for

the, you know, for the decision makers that we had, everybody from the

chairman to the Secretary to the DNI.

And so we went through a bit of a restructuring and created what

I just mentioned a little bit earlier was this Middle East Africa

Regional Center, and that basically -- that particular one, because

there is five of them, that particular one overlapped three combatant

commands because, you know, we have Central Command that doesn't have

Israel as an example; Europe has Israel; Central Command has Egypt,

Africa Command has Africa. So this overlapping of the commands I

always saw presented problems, especially when I was at Central Command

and at the joint staff.

So what we were trying to do was create sort of umbrellas over

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21

those where they overlapped to try to make sure that we were more

seamless in what we were doing to share, talk about, assess

intelligence.

Q Did you utilize a Red Team concept for Libya?

A No, I don't -- I wouldn't say we did. I wouldn't say we

did. Our counterterrorism task force inside of DIA, I thought, had

a really good -- we called it JITFCT at the time, now it's called DCTC.

JITFCT was basically the Joint Interagency Task Force for

Counterterrorism. Now it's national -- now it's DCTC, which is Defense

Combating Terrorism Center, so we just adjusted the name, did some other

things with them, but I thought they had a very, very good read on the

situation in North Africa and the situation in Libya.

Q You talked about the challenges that the ground forces have

getting intel potentially. Do your DIA analysts have access to

operational traffic, operational information?

A Yes.

Q Did it exist prior to the attack?

A You know, I don't know. I mean, you know, if you were to

say operational traffic, if they had -- you know, I mean, if there were

military forces on the ground, they likely had -- they likely had access

to some of that reporting. They likely had access to some of that

reporting, and that would help them in their overall determination of

assessments that they were going to make.

I mean, one of the things that we're very concerned about, you

know, and still are, is the return of GTMO detainees, as an example,

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to the battlefield, and we were tracking a number of them that were

in various parts of that part of the world, and always trying to figure

out whether or not they were going to return to the battlefield, and

in some cases, they did.

Q Prior to the attack, do you have an appreciation as to how

often combatant commanders would request products from DIA?

A I would say they would get them daily. Oh, yeah.

Combatant commanders would get a DIA product daily.

Q Was that just a product you all generated on a regular basis

or was that a specific request from the combatant commanders?

A Probably a combination. I would say a combination. I

mean, you know, they would have -- they would have something

specifically that they would ask for, and, you know, and then the

machine -- the DIA system would prepare it for them, you know, a specific

question maybe on an individual for a particular weapon system or

whatever, or a particular area of their area of responsibility that

they wanted specific information, so that would be prepared as a special

product. But every day, they -- they likely saw something that was

created by the Defense Intelligence Agency, you know, system that we

had.

Q Was there a single specific daily product that DIA produced

that was disseminated throughout the ranks or was it a multitude of

things?

A It is a multitude, but specifically, we do something called

the Defense Intelligence Digest, an acronym is the DID; and then the

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other one is the chairman's briefing, so the daily chairman's briefing,

and I've always called it the most widely read intelligence product

in the world, and DIA produces that, and that -- that actually is a

set of slides at a very, very sensitive level, and it can go well above

SCI. And I have seen -- I have used them, and I have seen the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs in terms of -- you know, in the case of Admiral

Mullen, and I know that at least Chairman Dempsey have used those slides

to table-drop in meetings with the President.

So I mean, so that -- those two products, the DID, other, you know,

specialty products and the chairman's briefing, those are daily.

Q Sir, at this time, I just wanted, for the record, recognize

that Congressman Westmoreland has joined us, as well as Congressman

Schiff.

A Good. Okay.

Q Talking about -- we move on from combatant commanders.

Would the OSD or DNI or NSC or any of those organizations typically

request products from DIA?

A Yes, they would. They would see them. I mean, you know,

I don't know exactly what they -- what their sort of daily, you know,

briefing books or whatever. You know, I do know that the USDI and the

DNI both have access to the PDB, but in terms of what they -- what they

read on a daily basis, would they request products from us?

Absolutely, yeah.

Q Same goes for the Department of State?

A Department of State, absolutely.

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Q Prior to the attack, did you ever have any discussions with

anyone at the Department of State about Libya specifically?

A No, none that I can remember.

Q And in terms of the products, I assume the President's

administration would also receive something?

A Oh, yeah. I mean, you know, again, the Presidential Daily

Briefing is supposed to be an accumulation of the products prepared

by the whole of the U.S. intelligence community, and if it's a specific

product like a specific signals intelligence product because it was

some really good communications that we heard between, you know, the

president of some country talking to the president of another country,

that would be a specific SIGINT product, and that might be -- that

might, you know, get raised to the level of the President of the United

States. But mostly the products were -- normally, they were all-source

products, and those all-source products means that they are prepared

by the entirety of the intel community.

And again, back to what I talked about earlier, CIA and DIA were

the two all-source agencies. And in those all-source products, if

there is a -- if there is a difference like, you know, if there is some

other -- if somebody has a difference of opinion, so if DIA did not

agree with CIA, that either can be told by the briefer to the President

or it's stated right in the product itself.

Q So the product, especially the PDB will have counter

arguments?

A I should, it should. Yeah, any counter argument should be

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presented. If it's not, it's irresponsible.

Q Prior to the attacks in Libya, did you ever have any

discussions with Michael Vick or anyone else from the administration

about Libya?

A Michael Vickers?

Q Vickers, excuse me.

A Yeah, yeah, yeah. No. No.

Q When you came aboard at DIA, did you have a feeling that

DIA was being utilized properly based on their expertise and abilities?

A Well, I thought it was -- I felt like DIA needed a shot of

energy and a refocus on our warfighting commands. That is what I really

believed. That is where I came from, and frankly, my conversation

with -- my one conversation with Secretary Panetta early on, before

I even took over, you know, we talked about that.

So you know, my emphasis was going to be to bring a, you know,

some energy into it, retool it and focus on our warfighting commands

because the problem that I saw, certainly, and I think in the collective

sense, I saw the environment that we were operating within growing more

complex, particularly on the, you know, the Islamic radical -- the

growth of radical Islam in terms of just number of organizations that,

you know, frankly, had doubled over the time before I even took over.

In addition to what other countries were doing, what the Chinese

were doing, you know, what the Russians were up to and all the different

aspects of what we were involved in, I felt that there was this too -- for

the DIA, I felt it was too much of a Washington focus, and I saw that.

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26

I mean, I saw that in my own, you know, my own processes, my own

assignment history that I had, certainly the previous, you know,

probably 8 years.

Q You touched on, a few minutes ago, about the differences

between CIA and DIA. Kind of flesh that out a little bit more in terms

of how they go about their collection methods, or not their sources

of methods, per se, but how they do their approach to that kind of focus.

A Yeah, DIA and CIA, you know, for the most part, you know,

are supposed to have access to, for the most part, because there is

always some other sensitive, you know, intelligence sources that are

out there that are just going to be kept so sensitive, but for the most

part, DIA and CIA analysts have access to essentially what each other

has seen.

And like I said, the defense side, there is an awful lot of

intelligence just because we have people all over the world in military

formations, in operational formations, in joint task forces that

are -- that collect a lot of intelligence, and it bubbles up. So on

the CIA side, CIA may have some very sensitive HUMINT, human

intelligence operations. I mean, essentially, you know, what CIA is

supposed to be known for is as a really high end human intelligence

agency, you know, they are supposed to do that very well, so they may

have some sensitive HUMINT operations that don't necessarily get shared

because of the sensitivity.

But for the most part, I would say, you know, 90 to 95 percent

of their -- of the information and the views are certainly shared

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27

amongst each other, and that is why I think, you know, like I like to

say sometimes, I think that between the CIA and the DIA, you know, if

I were in a senior leadership position, I would want to know what

are -- you know, do we agree, do we disagree, you know, why do we disagree

if we do because the presentation of opposing views, what I call

competitive intelligence, is critical.

Q Do you typically coordinate collections efforts?

A Yes. One of the hats that I wore as the head of Defense

Intelligence Agency was I was the -- essentially, the collection

manager for the Defense Department, so we set broad, broad priorities,

you know, down at the -- down at the warfighter level they would set

very tactical, some operational priorities, but yeah. So we

would -- and then that would be based on, you know, the President sets

what is called the essentially national intelligence priorities. DNI

kind of handles those. You know, he runs that for the President, you

know, the priorities for who's the number 1 target against the United

States on down to the, you know, 184, or whatever the numbers are today,

and then we would take that and we would break that down further into

defense priorities for the kinds of things that we needed, so yeah.

Q Did you have regular meetings or phone conversations with

the Director at CIA?

A Not really. Periodically, you know, we set the national

HUMINT board together, and a phone call here and there based on what

was happening. If something was going on, you know, in the world, you

know, we would likely communicate, but some of it, you know, as long

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as my, you know, sort of the key deputies for me were my head of defense

analysis, and as long as they were talking to their colleagues over

at the Agency, over at CIA, you know, I was confident that there was

a good line of communications opened up.

Q In 2012, did you ever have a conversation with either Mr.

Morell or General Petraeus about Libya?

A No, not at all.

Q I want to talk a little bit about military capabilities.

Talk to me about -- do you all monitor military asset locations

around the world at DIA or you just rely on a document from DOD itself?

A I mean, define military assets.

Q Well, I mean, locations of military organizations, units?

A Oh, yeah, yeah, yeah. I got you. I got you. So the

defense attache systems belongs to DIA, okay, and I think there were -- I

think it's 142 countries. So defense attaches in a country, you know,

are supposed to have knowledge of where, you know, Department of Defense

assets are in that particular country. They typically do. Sometimes

if there is a Title 50 operation that is going on that is under the

purview of the CIA, they may not be privy to that.

Q As Director of DIA, did you have an appreciation of what

kind of quick response forces were readily available for hotspots

around the world --

A Sure.

Q -- if we had personnel there?

A I am very aware of what crisis response elements we have,

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call them CREs and other, you know, where we have, you know, assets

generally postured or based for quick reaction to, you know, to

emergencies, sure.

Q Do you recall what CREs were available in September of 2012?

A Well, there is always supposed to be one available to every

combatant command, so a CRE should be available to every combatant

command. You know, I don't know, because of the -- because we were

tapping into some of those crisis response elements just because of

need in places like Iraq and Afghanistan, but every geographic, so every

geographic combatant command, so AFRICOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM, specific

command, would have a crisis response element, usually part of their

special operations forces.

Q Were you tracking the military response on September 11 as

well?

A I was not. I was not. I was -- I know that I was asking

about it, but I was not tracking it specifically as to, you know, what

was happening. I think for me, it was just to -- you know, it was to

get informed about what was going on because it was as much about -- you

know, it was as much about what was happening in Libya because it

was -- it just didn't sound really that things were going, you know,

all that well with Benghazi, but there were other things happening.

So we were getting reports on, of course, the situation at Cairo.

We were getting reports on unrest around the embassy in Yemen at the

time, and then there was some other places where we began to get

concerned. And, of course, one of our -- one of our number 1 things

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30

really is always about safety of our people, probably number 1. In

fact, it is the number 1 priority, and accountability, so do we

have -- you know, do we have accountability of everybody? Are they

in a place where they are relatively safe? And then you can go from

there.

Q Okay. Subsequent to the attack, whether it was weeks and

months or whatnot, did you ever have an opportunity to go back and review

the military response in terms of the timeline, et cetera?

A Yeah. I have looked at it. I have looked at everything

on that, yeah.

Q Did -- do you have any concerns about what you saw in terms

of how we responded? For example, do you have concerns about potential

delays in the VOCO or delays in the vocal order, delays in the in-hour

establishment or delays in the air response, do you have any concerns

about something like that, what you saw?

A Yeah. So let me give you a little bit of experience first.

So I understand rapid deployment very, very well, and I understand

posturing forces for rapid deployment in times of emergency, so I have

a lot of experience here.

My principal concern, kind of in hindsight, and really even at

the time, because it was like, you know, it was -- we -- when it all

began, you didn't know how long it was going to go on, so -- so you

know, you are -- you know, you are, frankly, it's other people's

responsibilities to deploy and to decide to deploy forces, but

certainly, in hindsight, nobody really knew how long this thing was

935
31

going to last.

So I mean, you do everything you can to protect, you know, lives

of American citizens around the world. I mean, that is the nature of

why we have these rapid response forces, especially in the case of a

United States Ambassador's life who is at risk, you know, and then

subsequently he was murdered.

Q In addition to the crisis response elements that were

launched, do you believe that other elements should have been launched

or mobilized?

A I believe that we could have used a lot more imagination,

yeah.

Q Could you flesh that out for me?

A Yeah. We -- I was aware of a Predator overhead that was

about an hour out. I understand the -- you know, the use of the

Predator, what it was being used for, so I mean, just imagination, you

know, what else can you use an unarmed -- you know, it was an unarmed

Predator for, you know. And you know, I mean, I just think of how we

have to think about it.

I know we talked about using unmanned aerial vehicles in Iraq for

different purposes because when we had guys at risk. So, I mean, you

could have just flown the thing at literally treetop level over those

buildings, I mean, just to scare the -- just the scare, just to do

something. But you know, in addition to other capabilities that may

have been postured, you know, and the time-distance factors were, I

know, extensive, but you know, you do everything you can to, you know,

936
32

to protect American citizens abroad.

I mean, one of the things -- one of reasons why we do things like

we do, even though the calvary may not show up in time, is so the next

time we put people's lives in a difficult place, they know that somebody

is going to actually come for them.

Q Did we do everything we could?

A I don't -- I don't personally believe we did.

Q What else do you think should have been done?

A That is my --

Q I mean, you talked about using more imagination, but can

you give me specifics about what you think we should have done?

A I mean, I don't know. I would say anything from, you know,

putting aircraft up in the air, getting, you know, posture -- you know,

literally committing more forces, even into Tripoli, I mean, just to

show that we were not going to stand for the murder of an Ambassador.

I mean, even after it all sort of -- even after the dust settled, which

I think was like, I don't know, 5 or 6 o'clock the next morning their

time, you know.

Mr. Westmoreland. Sir, I'm Lynn Westmoreland, and thank you for

your service. I was just at Suda Bay in Crete.

General Flynn. Right.

Mr. Westmoreland. That is probably a less than an hour's flight

to Benghazi.

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Westmoreland. They are a -- basically, I guess, a depot.

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33

They have fuel ordinance, other things, but they also have a rotation

of -- is it the RJ -- the intel -- RJ --

General Flynn. Yeah, we have a small -- there is a small

footprint there, yeah.

Mr. Westmoreland. But it can carry ordinance?

General Flynn. Okay.

Mr. Westmoreland. And those planes were sitting there on the

ground.

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Westmoreland. And I inquired about how long it would

have -- how long it would take to get ordinance out of the storage bin,

I guess, and the gentleman there said probably 3 to 4 hours.

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Westmoreland. If you just requested it. I am assuming if

you were in a hurry, you could do it a little quicker than that. And

also, the fact that those planes can carry some type of ordinance. As

far as I know, they were never even contacted about what they had.

General Flynn. Yeah.

Mr. Westmoreland. Were you familiar --

General Flynn. No, I mean, I --

Mr. Westmoreland. Were you familiar with Suda Bay -- and I mean,

these military attaches, you say, would have known where all the

assets --

General Flynn. Yeah, I mean, they -- the attache is not

necessarily -- you know, I mean, that belongs --

938
34

Mr. Westmoreland. Shouldn't AFRICOM or EUCOM --

General Flynn. Yeah, I mean, those belong to combatant commands,

and if I'm not mistaken, Suda Bay is under European Command.

Mr. Westmoreland. Yes, it is.

General Flynn. And the problem was Africa Command, and I would

just tell you that, you know, I kind of explained it a little bit earlier

about from an -- I think from an operational perspective, we have to

recognize that we have disconnects between our combatant commanders.

Mr. Westmoreland. Well, if you look at --

General Flynn. And then when I say disconnects -- I'm sorry,

just to make sure I am clear on that. You know, if -- it's like the

situation we're dealing with today, you know, with the Russians in

Syria. Syria belongs to the Central Command -- Commander in terms of

its area of responsibility, parts of that region belong to Russia, or

I'm sorry, belong to European Command, you know, so there is these

overlapping things where -- you know, and I know this exists, where

they have to coordinate with different commands, and so the decisions

are then pulled back to a higher level, joint staff, Department of

Defense, because if you're going to -- if you're going to use a military

term, to chop forces from one combatant commander to another, that is,

you know, in an emergency situation, we are not that agile.

Mr. Westmoreland. You know, I don't know if that is right or not.

I think -- I don't know if Suda Bay is part of EUCOM or AFRICOM because

I know that Egypt --

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

939
35

Mr. Westmoreland. -- is part --

General Flynn. Central Command.

Mr. Westmoreland. Yes.

General Flynn. Egypt is Central Command.

Mr. Westmoreland. Yes, Central Command. And so I don't

know -- I can't remember which one it is, but I just -- I didn't know

if -- or I guess my question is, who would have known those assets were

there.

General Flynn. Well, I think that the operational leadership in

certainly our combatant commands should know where all friendly assets

are all the time, and those are -- those should be judged -- those

should be available at the various operation centers, so --

Mr. Westmoreland. Well, at least -- I mean, would it be your

opinion that at least one of these intelligence planes could have been

sent up? I mean, these are --

General Flynn. Sure. Well, we had a Predator over top.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- signal intelligence gathering planes. I

mean, that is what they're built -- they got all the stuff on it.

General Flynn. I personally, Congressman, I personally don't

think that this was an intelligence issue. I think that this is an

operational -- what you are getting at is this is an operational

decision, and number 1, is to understand where all of your capabilities

are in a time of crisis, you know; and the second part of that is -- that

understanding is knowing what are their abilities and capabilities to

be able to be employed if they had to be employed, how far could they

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36

fly? Do you need refueling capabilities? Do you need forward basing?

You know, are you going to have to make decisions that maybe a combatant

commander is not authorized to make. Maybe only it's the President

of the United States because you are going to violate somebody's

sovereign -- you know, sovereign borders.

So that is a -- those are operational decisions and operational

understanding, and I think, you know, as you guys go through this, you

know, those are questions to ask. The intelligence piece of this from

what we knew prior, you know, from really January, I think, because

that is kind of where I -- I went back and looked at the January

timeframe, 2012, up to the attack itself, and then even subsequent and

even past, you know, post the attack, what did we know. And I thought

we know -- I know we knew quite a bit about the threat. You know, the

risk decisions and the operational decisions about where things are

postured, whether they are able to respond, those are -- that's a

different part. It's not the intelligence community or --

Mr. Westmoreland. No.

General Flynn. -- DIA, you know.

Mr. Westmoreland. Well, I know, but we had just heard that

Sigonella or --

General Flynn. Sure.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- somewhere like that was the closest --

General Flynn. Sure.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- we had and it had to fly a ridiculous speed

to get --

941
37

General Flynn. Sure.

Mr. Westmoreland. -- to within an hour or two or whatever.

These asset were less than an hour away and could have been armed, in

essence.

General Flynn. Sure. Sure. I mean, that is -- those are the

kinds of things that we have to learn from this. I mean, you know,

what decisions were made. You got to -- I'm not sure what the

posture -- I don't remember what the posture of like the Eastern

Mediterranean fleet was. They may have been in the Red Sea, they made

have been in the Eastern Myth, you know, it's still tyranny of distance

in especially North Africa is significant, but not knowing the -- not

knowing how long this thing was going to last, I think, is -- has to

be part of it.

Even if it was going -- even if you knew it was going to end at

5 o'clock in the morning, you know, sort of local time, you know, what

assets are you moving to the sound of the gun, so to speak, in order

to secure a site where we knew we had casualties already, to include

a U.S. Ambassador.

Mr. Westmoreland. Yes.

General Flynn. So, I mean, again, those are sort of operational

decisions that, you know, I was not in that conversation. I would have

certainly given my two cents were I in that conversation.

Mr. Westmoreland. Thank you.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Sir, in the earlier stages of the Arab Spring, were you aware

942
38

if we had any assets on a heightened alert status?

A I mean, I would just say that every 9/11 anniversary, we

always know that there is always intelligence that leads us to believe

that the -- that these guys are going to threaten us at some point,

and sometimes they do it to deceive, but -- so as far as, you know,

assets, I think that everybody is kind of alerted.

Q People are --

A People are more alert.

Q I am talking more specifically about back in 2010 timeframe,

back in there -- 2011, excuse me. Had we ramped up or increased our

alert status as the Arab Spring took flight, so to speak? Were you

aware; do you know?

A Yeah, I think -- I think that we were. I mean, I think that

we did. In terms of just notification that, hey, this is a, you know,

a heightened period where, you know, threats are out there, they

certainly exist, and we would -- we would just warn -- you know, we

have a duty to warn, so you would warn people. You know, sometimes

it would be for, you know, for nothing maybe. Maybe it would be for

the right reasons.

Q Yes, sir. You talk about the NIPF a few minutes ago. Let's

go into that for a second. When you arrived at DIA, where in the

National Intelligence Party Framework did Libya fall; do you know?

A Yeah, I would say -- I'm guessing, and I don't want to guess.

In lower. Not in the top tier.

Q What constitutes top tier?

943
39

A What the President of the United States says.

Q Is that the top five, top 10?

A Yeah, it would be probably the top -- probably top five,

top seven really, but -- so you know, there is an abundance of resources

that look at the top five really, and I would say in one assessment

that I'm aware of, one analysis that was done, it's like 70 percent

of the resources focus on the top five targets, I think, and then the

other 30 percent focus on the next, you know, literally over 100, and

those are primarily countries with the exception of Al Qaeda and its

associated movement, so that would be in a top tier area.

Q But Libya was not top five?

A Libya as a country was not, no.

Q Do you have appreciation for what kind of key issues the

policymakers were concerned about regarding Libya?

A I think that, you know, the results of ousting Qadhafi, you

know, what was it turning into. And you know, I mean, it was, from

our assessment, I believe we saw it turning into essentially a failed

state. I mean, we saw -- our assessments were that the various

associated movements of Al Qaeda, essentially, were gaining a pretty

strong foothold. They were involved in -- you know, they were moving,

I thought, you know, one assessment I saw about movement of weapons

that were stolen out of the arsenals of the Qadhafi regime, they were

being used and sent, you know, all over Africa, and certainly into the

Middle East.

Q Sir, in the past, you talked about the politicalization of

944
40

the intelligence community. Explain what you mean by that?

A Yeah. What I mean is that, you know, you've got to be -- if

you are in the intelligence community --

Ms. Sawyer. Just to clarify. He may have testified about that

today. I didn't hear him say it earlier, so just the context of where

he made these comments.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Sir, in the past, outside of this, have you ever commented

on the politicalization of --

A Yes.

Q -- the intelligence community?

A Yeah, I talked about it in the context of we have to be

careful that we don't politicize the intelligence that goes into

leaders and --

Ms. Sawyer. I think I was asking more are these press statements,

are these statements to Congress, are they congressional briefings,

are they hearings? I am just trying to get a sense of the context,

who he said that --

General Flynn. Yeah, I think I said that -- and I have to

remember, but I think I was in the front of HASC maybe one time saying

that.

Mr. Tolar. I want to say I read it in one of his interviews or

something.

General Flynn. It may have been a --

Mr. Tolar. I don't recall the specific --

945
41

General Flynn. It may have been a press statement, recent press

statement.

Ms. Sawyer. An interview that this committee had?

Mr. Tolar. No, no, no, no, somewhere online. I was searching

the Internet, so somewhere online I found a comment where he -- that

he said this.

General Flynn. Yeah.

Ms. Sawyer. Okay.

General Flynn. But the idea is -- and this can happen down at

the tactical level, you know, if a intelligence officer, you know, he

or she is the type of intelligence officer that, you know, puts their

finger on their tongue and looks at which way the wind is blowing, you

know, what does the commander want to hear, that is an ineffective

intelligence officer as far as I am concerned.

So at the tactical level, it's very dangerous because you're

talking about, you know, lives on the line, and I've seen -- I've seen

intelligence officers at that level that do that, and good commanders

get rid of them. At the -- you know, at the level that we're talking

about here, the sort of the national level, I think we have to be careful

that we don't have senior intelligence leaders or the decision makers

looking for intelligence that supports a policy.

That is my belief. And I think that that is -- that is something

that we always have to be cautious of, and frankly, if you are in the

leadership role, if you are the decision maker and you have somebody

who you can't trust to come in and give you the -- you know, the absolute

946
42

what we know, brass tacks, you know, ugly picture, because typically

intelligence is not necessarily going to give you the, you know, the

light. It's going to give you the dark.

You know, you have to -- you have to look for other people. You

have to figure out how you're going to work with somebody like that

because they may not always necessarily be in line with what you're

trying to do politically. That's very dangerous for this country,

because when I -- what I do believe is that the intelligence system

that we have is actually, like the rule of law, is actually a strategic

advantage for this country.

As long as it's focused properly and prioritized properly and

adhered to, listened to, they don't have the use it, but they at least

got to understand that they're getting those -- is this the whole

picture, is there anything else that I'm not hearing, and I think the

leadership has to -- has to understand that and use it that way. And

you know, instead of -- because I have seen people go into different

meetings and just -- and you're like -- that is why if I'm in there,

I've always been somebody that's like, Hey, you know, before we leave,

you know, you need to know this.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Sir, do you believe that the politicalization may have

impacted or affected the IC's prioritization of assets and collections

in Libya?

A I don't know. I don't know.

Q I've got a couple of minutes left. Real quick, talk to me

947
43

briefly about DIA's role in PDB itself. What kind of input do you all

provide to the PDB?

A Quite a bit actually daily. We have people that work on

PDB staff during my time, the chief of staff or the PDB team was from

DIA, so quite a bit.

Q The chief of staff of the PDB team is from DIA?

A At that time.

Q Okay.

A At that time, yeah. I mean, those are joint billets.

Q And who gives final approval at DIA for DIA's CHOP on the

PDB?

A Well, our head of analysis, or our head of analysis would

be involved in that process, but usually, the PDB team, and there's

a head, there's a leader for the PDB team that makes decisions. And

the way that Director Clapper has organized it, the Deputy Director

for national intelligence -- I forget the exact. There's another

title part of it, is the individual who gives the final CHOP, and at

the end of the day, it's the DNI that's really responsible, but you

know, because it's a daily grind, he turns it over to one of his

deputies, and that deputy the DNI level is responsible for that.

Mr. Chipman. Congressman, anything further in our first hour?

And just to clarify, the NIPF that Mac Tolar mentioned was the National

Intelligence Priorities Framework?

General Flynn. Right, right. Yeah, National Intelligence

Priorities Framework; that is right.

948
44

Mr. Tolar. Okay. I'm going to transition into a whole another

category, so I'm going to stop here at -- I've got 10:05. Sir, let's

take a break.

Mr. Kenny. Are we off the record?

Mr. Tolar. Off the record. I'm sorry, yeah.

[Recess.]

949
45

[10:15 a.m.]

Mr. Tolar. I've got 10:15 a.m.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Sir, I want to talk about a little something different here.

I want to talk a little bit about Libya, kind of the lay of the land

prior to 9/11. So if you would, talk to me about, as the Arab Spring

developed, do you know if DIA increased their collection efforts in

Libya or anything like that, put additional focus on Libya?

A We didn't put any additional focus. I thought we had good

focus on the foreign threats, the al-Qaida threats, the al-Qaida

organizations in -- you know, in Libya and as well as North Africa.

I thought we -- I thought our focus and our -- and our posture was good.

Q As the Libyan revolution came to an end, with the capture

of Tripoli and the death of Qadhafi, was DIA tasked to provide any kind

of post-revolution analysis such as consequences of removing a

dictator, things of that nature? And you talked about the power vacuum

and --

A Yeah. I would say that I don't know if we had any specific

tasking, I don't remember, but I know that we did participate in an

assessment of the weapons flow.

Q Who's "we"?

A DIA.

Q Okay.

A You know, the outflow of weapons from Libya, because I

remember that -- seeing that specific --

950
46

Q Talk about that specifically just for a minute, please.

A Well, just the -- you know, there was real concern about

the number of weapons that were remaining in Libya post-Qadhafi and

what was going to happen to them.

Q Briefly talk about the consequences of a failed state and

what that means when you've got a power vacuum.

A It gets filled immediately by typically by bad actors. In

this case it got filled by al-Qaida for sure, specifically al-Qaida

in the Maghreb, Ansar al Sunnah I think was the other group -- or al

Ansar was the other group in the eastern part of Libya. I mean, it

just gets filled, the vacuum gets filled, and it got filled.

Q Was it your impression that Libya, especially eastern

Libya, became a haven for training camps?

A Yeah. We knew that to be the case for -- I knew that to

be the case since at least, at least 2005 from my time in Iraq.

Q Did it concern you all that the use of radical Islamists

and how they were being vetted in terms of the revolution, in terms

of their being used to overthrow Qadhafi?

A Um --

Q Let me ask that a better way.

A I don't know.

Q Was the use of radical Islamists within the vetted

revolutionaries and their role in the post revolution, did you talk

about that or measure that?

A Yeah. I think there was some -- there was some assessments

951
47

done about the -- there were assessments done about the type of people

that we were looking at to basically fill the void of not having a,

you know, Qadhafi regime in power anymore, so --

Q Did you have any concerns about the type of people who

were --

A Absolutely.

Q -- we were looking at?

A I did.

Q What were your concerns?

A My concerns were that they -- you know, could these -- were

these individuals who could truly step in and fill this void in a

reasonable way, given the really poor conditions that existed inside

of Libya. I mean, especially in the eastern side of Libya.

So, I mean, the conditions were -- you know, you had al-Qaida

elements in different places, not only in Libya, but in Algeria,

Tunisia, parts of Egypt, you know, certainly Mali, I mean, at that time.

Q But were your concerns more about capabilities to fill that

void or was it about whether or not they're really friend or foe and

that they might turn on us?

A I think it was both.

Q Okay.

A Yeah, I believe it was both.

Q I want to talk to you a little about the intervention that

the U.S. did. Were you aware or did you participate in any discussions

within the IC regarding U.S. intervention into Libya during the

952
48

revolution?

A No. I mean -- you know, I mean, I think formal ones, no,

no. Informal ones, probably a number of them, but definitely not in

any formal discussions.

Q Do you know why the U.S. decided to intervene in Libya in

the revolution?

A I have no idea. Can't sit here and tell you why, other than

to remove Qadhafi.

Q Did you ever discuss U.S. intervention with the NSC, with

Congress, with the administration writ large?

A I never did.

Q Okay. Do you have an appreciation of who in the executive

branch supported intervention versus those who did not?

A I can't sit here and tell you that I know specifically.

Q I want to talk about the lay of the land in terms of

intelligence. Earlier you made the comment that you thought we knew

quite a bit about the threat, and I just want to flesh that out a little

bit.

When you took command at DIA, what was DIA's assessment of Libya

in terms of force protection and security with regard to U.S. personnel

and facilities in Libya?

A I would say that our assessment was that the threat was

increasing, particularly in eastern Libya, that the threat to personnel

was high, certainly risk levels were high especially if you were going

to travel, and that the situation in Tripoli actually was -- you know,

953
49

I'll just phrase it as dicey. I mean, you had to be careful going

outside of sort of contained areas or areas that were generally under

the protection of our own capabilities or certainly under Libyan forces

that did exist still.

Q Sure. Prior to the attacks in Benghazi, were you aware that

the Annex in Benghazi existed?

A I was not.

Q Were you aware that the SMC, or the TMF, existed in Benghazi?

A What does the acronym stand for?

Q The consulate.

A Oh, yeah.

Q The Special Mission Compound or the --

A Yeah. The fact that we had a consulate, a presence in

Benghazi, yes.

Q So you knew about the consulate, but not the Annex?

A Did not know about the Annex.

Q Yes, sir.

A I mean, it's not surprising. I mean, it's just --

Q Were you aware of the 17th February Brigade?

A Yes.

Q And what did you know about them? Did you have an

appreciation for their capabilities --

A Yeah. I mean, we reported on them in our assessments and

what they were, you know, who they were, what they meant, you know,

how they were supposed to be, you know, sort of, you know, a response

954
50

force, if you will.

Q Do you recall when you learned about the -- you said you

knew about the consulate in Benghazi. Were you aware that the 17th

February Brigade was tasked or assigned to protect the SMC?

A Yeah. I did not know that.

Q Okay.

A I did not know that specifically, no.

Q Knowing that they were tasked to do that, did you have any

concerns about their ability to do that, to protect U.S. interests and

facilities?

A I would say in my experience working with other, you know,

indigenous security forces in other countries, you always have to be

concerned about whether or not their capability, you know, is -- whether

or not they have the capability to actually do what we need them to

do, and that's always a problem.

Q And I understand that in the big picture, but I want to know

did you have specific concerns about the 17th Brigade?

A No, no. It wasn't something that I was, you know, concerned

about.

Q At the time of the attacks, what were the operational

capabilities of the Libyan military as it existed?

A Ineffective.

Q Do you know -- well --

A In some cases, non-existent.

Q Do you have an appreciation of how much it relied on local

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51

militia?

A Quite a bit. Local militia was really -- was probably the

military.

Q How would you assess the U.S. vetting of local militia that

we relied on?

A Yeah. I can't -- you know, I don't have a good appreciation

for that. Yeah. I don't have one.

Q At the time of the attacks, do you have an appreciation of

what the Libyan intelligence capabilities were?

A The appreciation that I have is based on some of the things

that I saw in reporting, leading up to, you know, the timeframe that

we're talking about, and I think that their reporting, certainly as

I would characterize it, would be suspect. You know, it's like you

have to, you know, validate -- you would have to validate -- my

experience and my recommendation would be to validate damn near

everything that they provided.

Q I want to talk a little bit about collection now. I want

to get your assessment of the U.S. collection capability in Libya prior

to the attacks. Talk to me a little bit about OSINT, explain the

quality of OSINT collection in Libya prior to Benghazi, what forms we

had, et cetera.

A Yeah. I think open source information collection in the

world of social media was actually pretty good. I thought that we did

not leverage it sufficiently, I don't believe. I think that that's

a failure of something that we -- as I look back at it. We definitely

956
52

learned a lot from the Tahrir Square, you know, uprising and all that,

where Facebook became a real means of learning what was going on.

Q Yes, sir.

A So I think open source information collection was

actually -- we were postured for it, but I don't think we used it

sufficiently.

[Flynn Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Let's talk about the social media aspect. What you've got

in front of you, sir, is exhibit No. 1 entitled, Defense Intelligence

Graphic.

A Yeah.

Q Talk to me a little bit about this graphic and what it

represents.

A Yeah. I think, you know, it's a busy graphic, so I'll give

you kind of the 60,000-foot level. One of the things we're learning

about social media, especially in some of these countries around the

world, we're learning that they organize themselves using things like

SnapChat, Twitter, Facebook. And when I say they organize themselves,

we learned that in the Tahrir Square, where literally the volume of

social media chatter would increase, in some cases at a level that,

you know, you have to pay attention to it. You know, there's a phrase

in intelligence, you know, quantity has a quality all of its own.

So I think what you take away from this graphic, and this is

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something that I know that I sat down with our analysts and talked

about -- but we sat down directly after the fact because I wanted to

know what did -- what was happening in Twitter that would tell us

anything that was -- you know, was there a rise, was there an

organizational use of social media, to be able to understand what

was -- what was going on.

Q Are we better poised now than we were then in terms of

tracking social media and the impact on the --

A I think that we need to do a lot more. So I think we

understand that it definitely helps. I believe, and this is -- I'm

going back to when I left DIA. I don't think that enough resources

are being invested in open source collection.

[Flynn Exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Sir, what you've got in front of you now is exhibit No. 2,

and it's a DI, Defense Intelligence, report entitled, Libya Terrorist

is Now Targeting U.S. and Western Interests.

Have you seen that before, sir?

A Yes. Yep, I sure have.

Q Who would typically receive this report?

A Frankly, anybody -- anybody in the Intelligence Community,

anybody that uses intelligence, up to and including the President of

the United States.

Q Would this report ever be challenged by any other IC -- is

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54

it unusual for a report like this to be challenged in terms of its

veracity by other members of the IC community?

A Not unusual. I think that this was a good report, though.

Q Explain the characterization of this report as high

confidence?

A Yeah. So the confidence levels, and I think it's probably

explained, it should be explained on some of these papers here, but

the confidence levels, you know, high, medium, low confidence, the high

confidence report means that we have multiple sources that their

truthfulness, their veracity is high, and so the judgment by the

analysts putting this together is that they're confident that what

they're saying is pretty close to the truth.

Q Sir, in that first paragraph, bold paragraph, it refers to

al-Qaida regional nodes.

A Uh-huh.

Q Are we talking about organizations like AQIM?

A Yep. AQIM, Ansar al Sunnah was another one, I believe.

There's a couple. And I don't have all off the top of my head, but

there's more than -- there's more than two.

Q You're welcome to read this report if you'd like, but what

I want to do is just get your appreciation or your sense of what the

significance of this report is.

A Yeah. I mean, I think what you're talking about is

in -- you know, if you go through, like, some of the subparagraphs,

the bulletized things, which I'm just, you know, looking at, you know,

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55

where you talk about all of the -- what this report shows is the analysts

that put it together took an accumulation, a quantity of reporting,

and this is what all source reporting is about.

They took a quantity of reporting, you know, around the timeframe

that talks about different things, you know, you -- you know, members

of the Blue Mountain Group militia threw an IED over the wall. So we

know that that IED actually was thrown over the wall.

So, I mean, there's factual statements in here, and then there's

probably some, you know, supposition in some of what the analysts when

they make their conclusion, like the bold paragraph at the top, but

this is one that I would say is based on more fact than assumption.

Q What is the Blue Mountain Group? Do you recall?

A I don't recall.

Q That's okay.

A Yeah.

Q Let's move on.

A I don't recall.

Q That's okay.

[Flynn Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Sir, now I want to show you another document, please, and

this document is dated June 18th. It was produced by the joint staff,

J2. I guess that was a billet you previously held?

A Yep. Sure was. Yep. This is a chairman's briefing.

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56

Q Yes, sir.

A So this is when I mentioned the chairman's briefing earlier,

it's a DIA product.

Q Sir, Ms. Roby has just joined the committee, the interview.

So, again, this is -- for the record, this is exhibit No. 3. It's

entitled, Terrorism Conditions Ripe for More Attacks, Terrorists Safe

Haven in Libya. How would the sources used by J2 to produce this report

differ from what DIA might use to produce a similar report?

A No. Actually, this report would be produced with DIA. DIA

produces this report.

Q Okay.

A Now, the key judgment here is the very bottom is the J2's

assessment, because the J2 is the senior intelligence officer for the

chairman, you know, who's the principal military advisor to the

President. So you know, I always put a lot of -- I mean, the way it's

crafted with evidence, you know, with the various bullets and things

like that, and then the J2 would always put their assessment at the

bottom as to what they think, because sometimes with no time, the

chairman would only read the J2's assessment.

Q Sure. Talking about that, in the assessment, it talks

about having a permissive post-revolution security environment. I

think you've alluded to this in the past, but just talk about what that

means --

A Yeah.

Q -- the significance of that.

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A So, I mean -- and I agree with it. I mean, it's -- a

permissive environment means that they're basically unhindered, no

problems operating, freedom of movement is at will. That's what

permissive environment. So the fact that they're saying,

transnational support will increase Libyan terrorist capability in the

permissive post-revolution security environment, so that tells you

right there, you know, that their ability to operate is pretty free.

And then attacks will also increase in number and lethality as

terrorists connect with AQ associates in Libya. And that was something

that is clearly described in the product and I think is also described

in other DIA assessments.

Q Talking about that, let's --

Mr. Kenny. Sorry, Mac. Just to be clear, this exhibit 3 you

refer to, this is a single slide of a briefing? Is that correct?

Mr. Tolar. Yes. I don't --

General Flynn. No. Well, what they are, this is a -- this the

format, so the slide is the format that you might get six to eight of

these slides, and one slide might be China, one slide might be

transnational organized crime in Mexico, but what they try to do on

the slide is give you the full context.

So essentially that's a briefing on one slide. And those were

really difficult to do, and there are some great people that pull these

things together, but that -- I've seen these slides dropped at

principals committee meetings and deputies meetings over in the White

House. So the slide is a briefing in and of itself?

962
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BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Is it typical of what would go into the daily chairman's

briefing?

A Yeah. That is the -- yeah, this is an example of a daily

chairman's briefing slide. And that's a really -- that's actually a

very good slide. Now, you're -- you know, they're in color and

everything else.

Q Yes, sir.

A Yeah, that's -- that's a good slide.

[Flynn Exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q All right. Sir, now if you'd look at exhibit No. 4, which

you should have to your left, dated August 19th, this is another J2

slide entitled, "Libya: Terrorists to Increase Strength During Next

Six Months". If you take a look there at the J2 assessment again, it

talks about terrorist safe havens in Libya and it will become a broader

safe haven by the end of 2022, and more specifically it says, terrorists

to increase attacks against western interests.

A Yeah.

Q Talk about the significance of that?

A So this is a -- this is a very good slide and good

information, because this is exactly what DIA is responsible for, which

is warning. Okay? And the factors -- so your, you know, box there

where it talks factors, outlook, and assessment, we typically will do

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59

multiple factors, in this case, as I just highlighted before in the

other one, freedom of movement, popular and tribal support, command

and control, the level of training, external communications and

operations, and recruitment.

And you can see in all cases, so I look down this, in all cases

the J2, therefore DIA, assessed in all those factors, they were all

increasing and essentially going in a negative direction.

So, these are good slides. I mean, these are -- that's an entire

briefing in and of itself about the terrorist efforts inside of Libya.

Q All right. I got one more for you, sir.

[Flynn Exhibit No. 5

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q This dated September 7th, and this is a report entitled,

"Egyptian Terrorists Advancing Plotting". Again, it's a DIA product.

A Uh-huh.

Q Are you familiar with this product, sir?

A Yes, I am, actually.

Q If you notice right there in the second sentence, it refers

to the Muhammad Jamal network and its association with al-Qaida. Do

you recall the Muhammad Jamal network?

A Yes.

Q What's the significance of that network?

A Well, I mean, it's just -- it's another of the network nodes

in the wider al-Qaida movement. So it's a -- it's essentially -- it's

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an organization that goes by -- that gave itself a title based on either

a leader or some former leader, and -- you know, and they operate much

as what we've seen with al-Qaida operating in this very networked

fashion.

Q And the fact that the Muhammad Jamal network is now

associating itself with AQIM, what does that indicate to you?

A It means that they're broadening their network, they

are -- they feel empowered, they're strengthening themselves, they're,

you know, increasing their ties to each other. And they're probably

going to do some things with each other. They're probably going to

share. You know, we've seen them share intelligence, we've seen them

share funding, you know, et cetera.

Q Given the Arab Spring, you know, coupled with the Libyan

revolution, is it safe to say that the Intelligence Community was

flooded with intelligence reports such as the four we just looked at?

A Yeah. I mean, I think that what I remember looking back

at, like I said earlier on, when I kind of said take me back to January,

so this is September, so take me back to January, and I wanted to see

every single report that we had ever put together that had anything

to do with Libya.

Q Are you aware --

Ms. Sawyer. Can I just clarify on that? When you made that

request, when was that request made?

General Flynn. I think it was after Benghazi happened.

Ms. Sawyer. It wasn't before Benghazi?

965
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General Flynn. No, no. I mean, we were paying attention to

things, you know, the reporting, but afterwards, it was to basically

kind of look forensically back to see what did we miss, you know, did

we not report something. I mean, our responsibility is warning, and

did we fail to warn. That's a lesson, you know, did we -- can we learn

a lesson from this and did we fail to warn? And strategic warning.

Tactical warning is different. And I look at this, that's why

I said earlier to whatever the question was on operational activities,

you know, I felt like strategic warning was there. I mean, this slide

doesn't get any better. That's some of the best strategic warning you

can get?

Mr. Tolar. So for the record, which slide are you looking at,

exhibit number?

General Flynn. That's deposition exhibit No. 4.

Mr. Tolar. Thank you.

General Flynn. 19 August. I mean, that's a pretty good slide.

That is a slide that DIA does and is supposed to do. And I've seen

those for everything on North Korea, China, you know, you name it.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Again, we've just talked about several reports here that

appear to show a trending to the negative, to a worsening situation

in Libya. Is that correct?

A Yep. Yes.

Q Are you aware of any intelligence or reports or theories

or findings that Libya, ah, it's not that bad, it's going to turn the

966
62

corner and everything's going to get better?

A None. None that I ever saw.

Q Did you ever hear --

A No conversations that I was ever in, no.

Q Nothing?

A [Nonverbal response.]

Q Is that a yes or --

A I'm sorry. I was in none of those kind of conversations.

Q Yes, sir. All right. So we've talked about four reports

which seemed to paint a very clear picture that Libya is in dire

straights and getting worse by the day. Is that accurate?

A Yes.

Q Do you believe there was enough actionable intelligence

available prior to the attacks to either warrant ramping up security

at the consulate in Benghazi or even withdrawing U.S. personnel from

Libya?

A Yes.

Q Talk more about that.

A Well, I mean, I think that some of the attacks not only on

our own facility, but also on other foreign partners who were in that

area, and if I'm not mistaken and I -- you know, don't hold me to this,

but I think one of the countries actually left the area, left their

consulate, but there was a sufficient number of you a talks and

activities and knowledge that warranted at least a consideration to

increase security, if not just depart the area.

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63

Q Did you have an appreciation for how much security was at

the consulate at the time of the attack?

A I did not.

Q Knowing what you know now about what was there, do you have

a comment about what was there, whether or not it was adequate?

A I would just say that obviously it was --

Ms. Sawyer. Mac, I'm not sure we've ever established what he does

know now and what it's based on. I mean, I'm just not sure how he

answers that question --

General Flynn. Yeah.

Ms. Sawyer. -- knowing what he knows now about the security.

Mr. Tolar. Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. I just want to be fair to you and fair to the record.

General Flynn. Well, I mean, I -- yeah. No, I agree. I agree.

I mean, I'd be --

Ms. Sawyer. I mean, I just --

General Flynn. Yeah.

Mr. Tolar. Okay. Thank you.

Ms. Sawyer. Just to be fair to the record.

General Flynn. Yeah. Yeah, yeah.

Ms. Sawyer. I don't know what he knows now.

Mr. Tolar. Understood.

General Flynn. Given the fact that, you know, that they were able

to overwhelm with combat power the consulate, you know, shows that we

weren't prepared to level that -- the threat presented, and I think

968
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that that's obvious. The threaten ended up presenting themselves in

a much more robust way, and we were not prepared for that. That's

obvious.

I mean, with mortars and other capabilities that they used, you

know, we obviously didn't prepare ourselves to stop that level of an

attack. That's a tragedy.

Ms. Sawyer. Do you know how it was postured --

Mr. Tolar. Well, now, please.

Ms. Sawyer. Mac, we spoke --

Mr. Tolar. Right.

Ms. Sawyer. -- before this hour began about the fact that we had

both been advised --

Mr. Tolar. Right.

Ms. Sawyer. -- by the witness, understandably, that he has a

12 o'clock --

Mr. Tolar. Sure.

Ms. Sawyer. -- stop time.

Mr. Tolar. You're going to get equal time.

Ms. Sawyer. And I asked you guys to work with us in a way that

was flexible --

Mr. Tolar. Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. -- that allowed us all to get our questions in.

Mr. Tolar. Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. I can ask him these questions later or we can just

get the foundation here that brackets kind of how he knew what he knew.

969
65

Mr. Tolar. Go ahead. Go.

Ms. Sawyer. I'm happy to wait.

Mr. Tolar. Go.

Ms. Sawyer. So you're withdrawing your objection to my --

Mr. Tolar. Yes.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So did you -- were you involved ever before 9/11/2012 in

assessing the exact security assets --

A No.

Q -- environment in Benghazi?

A Nope.

Q In Tripoli?

A No, other than assessing -- I mean, if involvement is

assessing DIA's involvement to assess the intelligence, you know, to

assess the environment, that's -- if that's being involved, yeah, we

were involved in assessing the environment. I mean, you -- that's what

all these things are.

Q Right. But you had just indicated to me you had not

reviewed those prior to --

A Yeah. The tactical -- the tactical array of security

forces in Benghazi or Tripoli, I was not involved in any of that.

Ms. Sawyer. Okay. Thank you.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Given all you knew -- all that we knew about Libya at the

time, how would you rank that country in terms of being one of the most

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66

dangerous places to have U.S. personnel? I mean, should it have been

in the top five of NIPF?

A I don't. I mean, that's sort of a -- you know, that's a

very subjective judgment call. I mean, it definitely was a country

of high interest as it related to al-Qaida, because, like I said, the

members of al-Qaida leadership were from Libya, Libya was still -- we

knew were still providing training to send foreign fighters, you know,

into Syria, which was, you know, starting to really get ugly at that

time.

And there was groups there that were connecting with AQIM, Boko

Haram. I mean, you had a whole range of -- and the other part was we

were also tracking GTMO detainees, trying to figure out whether or not

they were returning to the battlefield.

So, you know, in terms of increasing it, I mean, I thought we

had -- from DIA's perspective, I thought we had sufficient analytic

focus and our counterterrorism teams networking with the other parts

of the military, I thought did a very good job of assessing the

situation.

Q You previously talked about a strategic warning and others,

I mean, IC had talked about a strategic warning. Explain briefly what

a strategic warning is.

A Okay. I mean, the best example is this thing right here,

is this slide right here. I mean, strategic --

Q Which slide, sir?

A That's exhibit 4.

971
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Q Okay.

A So strategic warning we do routinely, so we put out warning

messages routinely, every combatant command puts out a warning message

routinely based on threats, that come in across the transom, so to

speak, and -- and formally we put out threat warnings. So that's a

threat warning.

So exhibit 4 is a threat warning on a situation in Libya, and

that's, you know, mid August, 19 August. So we -- this is not a

non-standard kind of a product. This is a very standard type of product

that will come out on everything that -- all the different threats that

we face around the world.

Q Did you previously predict that the Russian encroachment

into Crimea would occur, and notify the administration accordingly?

Mr. Kenny. When?

Mr. Tolar. See what he says and then --

Mr. Kenny. Well, but this is --

Mr. Tolar. We'll ask why or when he did it.

Mr. Kenny. I mean, respectfully, I mean, this is the Select

Committee on Benghazi. You're asking whether or not the general

provided strategic warning regarding a completely wholly different

matter.

Mr. Tolar. There's a reason for it, Peter. I promise. It's

relevant. It's to show a pattern here.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Go ahead. Did you do that, sir?

972
68

A Well, I think that we provided a strategic warning about

the incursion of Russia into Crimea after -- after they had

already -- after Crimea had already -- because there was -- there was

thousands of Russian forces already in Crimea even prior to, you know,

everything that happened.

So I would say that we provided strategic warning to the

administration on what was going to happen in Crimea and, frankly, into

Ukraine.

Q Okay. I want to talk a little about it about the attack --

A And I believe that I've also -- I believe that I testified

that to the HPSCI.

Mr. Kenny. So, Mac, can I hold you to that, then? Are you going

to tie that back to --

Mr. Tolar. No. I'm going to --

Mr. Kenny. Okay.

Mr. Tolar. Well, not now, so, no.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q I want to talk about the attack now, sir. Where were you

on the take of the attack, September 11, 2012?

A I was at actually in Fort Huachauca, Arizona, at a senior

leader intelligence conference for that day, and returned the very next

day, and I was given a presentation out at Fort Huachacu, Arizona.

I was back about -- you know, I was in communications the whole

time, but left prior to the attack, if I remember my timeline right,

and returned the very next day and immediately went in to work, so it

973
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would have been the 12th. So I left -- if I remember right, it was

like a Tuesday, right? So I left on a Tuesday, I think I was back on

Wednesday.

Q Yes, sir. What was your first course of action once you

were notified of the attack?

A Basically to make sure that we had accountability and then

to get, you know, an assessment of the situation not only there, but

I wanted to know where else were -- where were embassies and consulates

where we had U.S., you know, personnel, where else was there pressure.

And right away we found out that there was a problem in Yemen.

So, you know, if I remember right, you know, there was a fair number

of embassies and consulates around the world that were under some sort

of -- you know, at some sort of security or duress levels, some not

as bad as others, but clearly in the Arab world, I think it caused

everybody to go to a much heightened level because of the -- you know,

the film that came out, the situation in Cairo, and clearly what had

just happened in Benghazi.

Q Were you given any specific tasks?

A No. No. I mean, I think I told our folks to make sure that

they -- you know, to basically -- my typical thing is let me know if

they need any help, if they need additional resources, you know, make

sure that I gave them guidance to make sure they were in touch with

the right people, you know, AFRICOM, joint staff, CIA, you know,

et cetera, just to make sure that everybody's talking to each other.

Q Was there anybody outside of DIA you were in regular

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communication with?

A Not -- I mean, not necessarily. I mean, the joint staff

probably, probably AFRICOM at the time.

Q Subsequent to the attack, did you participate in any

meetings regarding the attack?

A After?

Q Yes, sir.

A Yeah, yeah. After I went to our --

Q And just for perspective, I'm talking about in the

coming -- in the subsequent days.

A Oh. Yeah. I was involved in a couple of ETCs with the

White House for the next couple of days. They were running -- if I

remember right, they were running, I think, three a day for a couple

of days after.

Q Did you ever attend any deputy committee meetings?

A I did not, no. Wasn't asked to attend any of those.

Q Does DIA ever have a presence at a deputy committee meeting?

A Yeah, they do sometimes, and it would be in the -- usually,

like, I would go to them as the J2 at times, I would go to principals

committee meetings as the J2, and usually I would go there with the

chairman, but, yeah. DIA not typically. It would be the J2 if the

chairman would want them there or it would be USDI that would attend

those.

Q What's USDI?

A USDI is the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

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Q Okay. Did DIA conduct any post-Benghazi analytic or line

review of either the assessment produced by DIA or produced by the IC,

things of that nature?

A Yeah. I mean, I think we produced -- we actually went back

and we produced a very thorough timeline of everything, you know, from

the reporting back as far as, you know, let's just say January, and

then I think we -- if I remember right, there was a very detailed

timeline literally hour by hour, minute by minute of what we knew and

what happened and that all the different pieces and parts of it.

Q Do you recall when that document was produced?

A I don't. I don't, but I'm certain it was produced, maybe

a couple of days later, maybe a week later, I don't know, but it was

produced.

Q Did you review the video surveillance from the consulate?

A I reviewed photos of those. I didn't review the actual

video. I definitely reviewed photos.

Q Prior to September 11th, 2012, during your tours with DIA,

so to speak, were you ever involved in any other high profile attacks

that occurred against U.S. interests?

A Oh, God, yeah. I mean, in Afghanistan and Iraq,

significant attacks. We --

Q What I'm trying to get at here, sir, is if DIA engaged any

differently during those than they did in the Benghazi attack.

A Oh, no, no. I think the response that -- in these crises

moments, I think the response mechanisms are relatively the same. I

976
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mean, you know, you can light a fire under people sometimes for

different things, but I think that the people, the analysts and the

leaders that were running those analytic teams that were responsible

for those areas, I think they did what they were asked to do and they

did it in a professional way.

Q Subsequent to the attack, as the IC community and others

were doing their post-attack analysis, was DI engaged in that or do

you feel like they might have been excluded from some of those

discussions?

A I certainly was not engaged. I mean, nobody asked me for

what I thought. Personally as an agency head, I -- you know, nobody

came and said, you know, what do you think?

Q So I understand you've said -- previously said that with

regard to the inquiries conducted by the various congressional

agencies -- or committees.

A Right.

Q But I'm talking about the IC community itself?

A Yeah, no, not really. I mean, we had conversations about

everything, but I think it was still -- you know, for those couple of

days, you know, let's just say 12, 13, 14, whatever, nobody -- I mean,

you know, I will say, I guess, just thinking about it, because I don't

want to beat around the bush here, I mean, what our assessment was,

I stood by our assessment.

Q And what your assessment?

A Our assessment was that this was an attack by a terrorist

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organization networked, part of al-Qaida. You know, it was an

al-Qaida-based, you know -- I mean, because of the abundance of

intelligence that we had and I think the assessment that we made, I

think, the next day, the 12th, that is a pretty good assessment.

[Flynn Exhibit No. 6

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q That's what I want to talk to you about right now, sir.

You're looking at exhibit No. 6, dated September 12, 2012, and it's

a joint product produced by DIA and CIA.

A Uh-huh.

Q It's entitled, "Middle East and North Africa Situation

Report". Is that the product you were talking about?

A Yeah. I mean, this looks like it. I mean, we actually

produced our own as well.

Q Yes, sir. We'll talk --

A The DIA produced our own too, but, yeah. I mean, this looks

like it. I mean, you know, the suggestion here in the first sub-bullet

about the presence of armed assailants from the outset suggests this

was an intentional assault and not the escalation of a peaceful protest.

And you can see how early this one is, because it still says,

including our -- well, no. It says, Four US officials died, including

our Ambassador, and three were wounded, according to -- So, yeah. I

mean, I think this initial report, and then I know the one that DIA

created, which basically tied it to the terrorist organizations that

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74

were -- we knew were there.

Q Sir, in terms of this report, it was done in conjunction

with CIA. Is that typical to produce --

A Yeah.

Q -- joint reports?

A Yeah. I think -- I think it is. It's -- you know, CIA

would typically pull it together, but this is probably -- you know,

this is likely one that would get into the PDB, because this is a -- this

looks like a -- sort of a first report, because you can the time on

it. It's 7:00 o'clock eastern daylight time, so, you know, the

situation was still really unfolding in Benghazi.

Q When you produce a joint report, does either agency have

trumps about what the final language will be?

A If they do, that trump is -- should be at the DNI level,

should be at the DNI level. Or if there's a difference of opinion,

somehow -- difference of a judgment, that has to be stated. That

should be stated in here.

Q Okay.

A It should be stated in here, yeah.

[Flynn Exhibit No. 7

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Again, this report, and you just mentioned it, in that first

bullet, it talks about the fact that it was an intentional assault and

not an escalation of a peaceful protest.

979
75

Thinking about that, I want you to turn to exhibit No. 7, which

you were just handed. This is dated September 13th, it's a DIA report

entitled, "Possible Terrorist Involvement and Motivations Behind the

U.S. Consulate Attack in Benghazi." Do you recall this report, sir?

A Yeah, I do. I sure do.

Q And how is this report different from an intelligence note,

just in terms of what it's called, its nomenclature?

A Well, this is a -- you know, this might be part of a defense

intelligence daily, or this looks like it's a response to a request

for information on the perpetrators and motivations behind the Benghazi

attack on 11 September and an outlook on future threats, so what you

know, again kind of back to warning.

Q Is this document typically disseminated throughout the IC?

A Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. This is available to anybody that has

the right, you know, clearances that you see at the top of this thing.

Q Would anybody outside of DIA vet or proof or CHOP this prior

to DIA's issuance thereof?

A No. This would be a DIA -- this would be our belief, this

would be DIA's assessment of, you know, possible terrorist involvement

and motivations behind the U.S. consulate attack in Benghazi, as the

title says.

Q And is this, as far as you know, the first report issued

by DIA subsequent to the attack about the attacks?

A I think it might be. I don't know. You know, I don't know.

Q Given --

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A It seems to me that we might have produced something on the

12th, you know. We likely had chairman's briefings, chairman's slides

that were produced on the 12th, certainly the 13th, and then of course

this is on the 13th, so.

Q This reports uses the term in the first sentence there

of -- or the first large paragraph, moderate confidence.

A Uh-huh.

Q We previously talked about high confidence. Would

moderate confidence indicate it's better than 50 percent, or can you

equate --

A I mean, I wouldn't put a percentage on it. I would just

say that moderate confidence is a pretty good level of confidence, it's

a good -- you know, it's better than low, you know, not quite as high,

but -- but based on what we knew, and I think the evidence that the

analysts lay out here in this report, you know, when you talk about

Ansar al-Shariah likely did not direct attacks, but then you talk about

Ansar al-Shariah later on --

Q Yes, sir.

A -- where they're headquartered and -- you know, and

individuals that are part of this group, and I think that there's

something in here about -- if I remember, there's something in here

about former GTMO detainees, et cetera, so --

Q Sure.

A So, I mean, I think that there's an abundance of

intelligence that -- and previous reporting that led the assessment

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and the -- led to the conclusion.

Q And is it fair to say that the previous IC reports that

talked about those who might engage and did in fact engage, this

report's consistent with those in terms of whether it be an IQ or AQIM,

things of that nature?

A I think it's consistent, right.

Q As I mentioned, in the previous report, there was a

statement in there that said that this was an intentional assault and

did not escalate -- it was not the escalation of peaceful protests.

In this report, in exhibit 7, in the first bullet point and the

third bullet point, it talks about that stated terrorists came to assist

protesters, or it says, Libyans protested outside the U.S. consulate

in Benghazi.

That seems to conflict with the previous exhibit, which said there

was no escalation of protests. Can you explain that, sir?

A Okay. Not the escalation of a peaceful protest. Yeah. I

mean, I am not quite clear on your question you're asking me --

Q Okay. Let me --

A -- but I think what I would just say is that, you know, one

is the 12th, an immediate report right after, you know, kind of get

what's the assessment of the two -- like we talked about, the two

largest all source agencies that we have with a lot of capability, and

then this is a DIA assessment the next day.

So, the evolution of the intelligence as it was coming in and

people really taking a hard look at this thing, I think there was a

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real belief that this, in fact, wasn't necessarily because of a video,

it was because of terrorist activities in, frankly, eastern Libya that

we assessed were threatening U.S. interests -- U.S. and western

interests in eastern Libya. I believe that's kind of what this tells

me. I didn't read the whole --

Q Yes, sir.

A -- this exhibit 7. I believe that's sort of what it says.

Q And I know we're moving quickly here, sir, and if you need

me to slow down, you let me know and I'm happy to do it. But I'd like

to talk to you about exhibit No. 8 now to your left.

[Flynn Exhibit No. 8

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q It's the Defense Intelligence Note as opposed to report,

and it's entitled, "Libya: AQIM Member Participated in Attack on U.S.

Consulate". It's dated 14 September. And this one, as opposed to the

one the prior day that was medium confidence, this is one is high

confidence.

A Yeah.

Q So what's the significance of this report moving back up

to the high confidence level in terms of the veracity of it?

A Yeah. So this basically says that we believe, based on the

evidence, and probably the evidence in this case is an accumulation

of all source intelligence and then it looks like some signals

intelligence that we likely got that tied a specific individual who

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we knew was a member of a specific al-Qaida, you know, associated group

that participated in the 11 September attack against the U.S. consulate

in Benghazi.

Q So this is a high confidence report, and the very last

sentence of that first paragraph says that it was, attacked

spontaneously when protests began at the consulate. And that mirrored

the report from the prior day. And obviously I guess my question is,

we know now that that wasn't true. We appeared to get it right in the

first joint report and then we got it wrong.

Any comment on why we couldn't get that right or didn't get that

right?

A Well, I just think it's -- you know, and, again, I'm to

be -- as you're looking at intelligence and intelligence analysts are

trying to be as specific as they can without the facts and without

knowing what the facts are -- and, frankly, you know, in these

subsequent days, we had less people, we didn't have anybody there

anymore that was reporting directly from there, so you're going based

on other evidence that you're getting. Signals intelligence, maybe

some imagery, maybe some other open source that you're listening to.

So I think that, you know, this -- you know, the spontaneity and

the video, which we always have known to be, you know, radioactive with

this crowd whenever there's any kind of video or something that

goes -- that happens to a Koran or something like that, but I think

the real telling piece here is they actually tie Abu Musab al-Mansur

al-Libi, who was -- you know, who they estimate to be in that -- an

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AQIM member to the attack. So you know that's a guy that's a member

of al-Qaida.

Q Sure. All right, sir, we're going to take it another

direction real quick. I want to talk to you a little about what's

affectionately known as the talking points.

A Yeah.

Q Was DIA ever tasked to provide any talking points to either

senior military leadership and/or Congress after the Benghazi attacks?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Are you aware of the unclassified HPSCI talking points that

were produced or prepared by CIA?

A Now I am.

Q Okay. At the time, did DIA provide any language to the

HPSCI talking points?

A Not that I'm aware of, not -- I mean, they -- you know, they

could have provided it through some of our analysts or certainly through

our reporting, but, you know, the reporting's pretty clear to what we

believed, so.

Q Did you personally edit --

A I did not.

Q -- or CHOP --

A No, I did not. I did not see any talking points nor was

I asked for my, you know, expert judgment.

Q When the final talking points were released, did DIA provide

any kind of opinion about the final product after it was on the open

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market per se?

A No. I mean, nothing formal. I mean, I certainly -- when

I saw them and saw what -- how they were -- how the situation was

presented, I was, you know, I think as surprised as anybody.

Q Going back to what you said earlier, you said it sounds like

it's possible that some of your analysts down the food chain might have

participated in --

A Yeah.

Q Okay.

A Yeah. I mean, they might have. They might have -- you

know, they -- I mean, the intelligence, the documents that you've been

handing me, they're, you know, at least post Benghazi, post the attack

are pretty clear about what DIA believed.

Mr. Tolar. Okay. Let's go off the record real quick.

[Recess.]

Mr. Kenny. We will go back on the record.

General Flynn, I just want to take this moment to thank you again

for appearing before the Select Committee, take a moment to reintroduce

myself. My name's Peter Kenny. I'm counsel with the Select

Committee.

We've proceeded in a slightly unusual manner in that we deferred

an initial hour to our Republican counterparts in order that they could

ask some of the questions of you that they had intended to ask of you

today. We'd like to use our full hour now to ask some follow-up

questions, some clarifying questions based on some of the statements

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you made in the last two rounds.

And at this point, we are joined by a member of the Select

Committee, Congressman Adam Schiff is also the ranking member of the

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. And at this point

I'd like to turn it over to the congressman.

General Flynn. Okay.

Mr. Schiff. General, thank you for being here and thanks for your

many years of service to the country. Greatly appreciate it.

General Flynn. Thanks.

Mr. Schiff. I want to ask you primarily about intelligence,

but -- on the attack on Benghazi, but I want to begin more generally

by asking about your responsibilities at the time.

In the period leading up to the attack on Benghazi, you were the

head of the Defense Intelligence Agency. In that position, did you

have responsibility over operational decisions in how to respond to

the attacks in Benghazi? Were you part of the chain of command in terms

of deciding what assets could be mobilized and where they were located

and how they'd be utilized?

General Flynn. No.

Mr. Schiff. So apart from the general observations you made

earlier, you weren't really a participant in the discussions about what

resources were available, how quickly they could get there, what

utilization they might have? That was not really part of your

responsibilities at DIA?

General Flynn. That's right. That's not part of my

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responsibilities at DIA, to be part of that sort of decisionmaking

process. That was not a responsibility I had. Certainly could have

offered it.

Mr. Schiff. But you weren't tasked to?

General Flynn. No.

Mr. Schiff. Your primary responsibility at the time was really

in overseeing the intelligence workforce for the DOD all over the world?

General Flynn. Right.

Mr. Schiff. And as you're aware, there were problems not only

in Benghazi, but there were problems in many capitals --

General Flynn. Oh, yeah.

Mr. Schiff. -- throughout the --

General Flynn. Yeah.

Mr. Schiff. -- Muslim world at the time?

General Flynn. Yep.

Mr. Schiff. At that time, about how many protests were going on

around the world?

General Schiff. Well, so this is, you know, the September 11th

and then the next few days. The number that sticks in my head, and

I think I got this from one of the VTCs that the White House was having,

was that there were 93 embassies or consulates in some sort of array

of, you know, a threat or concern; I mean, not that there were

protesters, although there were protesters at other places around the

world.

Yemen was one that I definitely remember outside the U.S. Embassy

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in Sana'a. So the number that sticks in my head is about 93, and that's

embassies and consulates. So a pretty significant, pretty significant

number.

Mr. Schiff. Which means that, you know, the resources that you

had at DIA to keep track of all of those dangers to DOD personnel and

non-DOD personnel had a lot of work on their hands?

General Flynn. Yeah. I mean, definitely the defense attache

system service that we have, the individuals in it, because they're

there, they're in those countries, you know, in many cases.

Mr. Schiff. And, you know, while the violence turned deadly in

Benghazi, it had the potential to turn deadly in multiple capitals

around the world at that time?

General Flynn. Yeah, I believe it did. Yeah, you're right.

Mr. Schiff. What did you think of the DIA workforce?

General Flynn. At that time?

Mr. Schiff. Yeah.

General Flynn. Professional, exceptional, experienced, because

of the amount of years of combat that DIA employees, civilians, you

know, primarily, certainly our military workforce had had already up

till that point. So most of our -- or a large portion of our civilian

analysts actually had a lot of combat experience, particularly those

involved in counterterrorism.

Mr. Schiff. And you mentioned they were professionals. I take

it you didn't see evidence that they were trying to politicize their

work product --

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General Flynn. No.

Mr. Schiff. -- or --

General Flynn. No.

Mr. Schiff. -- feed you conclusions that you wanted to hear?

General Flynn. No. No. None at all.

Mr. Schiff. Now, I know we're all aware there's an IG

investigation now of intelligence work product in the CENTCOM.

General Flynn. Right.

Mr. Schiff. Did you have any indication -- and I don't know what

period the whistleblowers may be referring to and whether it extended

into your tenure. Did you have any indication during your tenure

that --

General Flynn. None.

Mr. Schiff. -- your analysts --

General Flynn. None.

Mr. Schiff. -- were politicizing intelligence in any way?

General Flynn. No. The analysts, I don't think that's

the -- from what I understand, what this IG is -- I've only seen really

in the media, that it's not the analysts politicizing, it's the

leadership. That's a big difference.

Mr. Schiff. And did you have any indication of that by the

leadership going on while you were there?

General Flynn. No, no. Did not. I always thought that the

assessments that I saw coming out of all the elements of Central

Command, all of their components was pretty good; didn't see

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any indications that there was anything, any differences, that there

were -- you know, like I said earlier, I don't know if you were in here,

if there was differences, the responsibility is to make sure that those

differences are shared within the community.

Mr. Schiff. Let me ask you about some of the Defense Intelligence

Agency work product at the time. I think some of the committee staff

has gone through a piece of it with you, one exhibit, No. 6, which was

from September 12. Let me ask you about another Defense Intelligence

work product of the same date. And if we could have this -- I don't

know what exhibit. We'll mark this as exhibit 9.

[Flynn Exhibit No. 9

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Schiff. This is a Defense Intelligence Report of

September 12, 2012, entitled, "Libya: Terrorists Likely Involved in

Attack on U.S. Consulate in Benghazi". Do you have a copy of that?

General Flynn. I don't. I do not have a copy.

Mr. Schiff. Okay. We'll get you a copy. We're getting you a

copy now.

General Flynn. Thank you.

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[11:30 a.m.]

Mr. Schiff. Just looking at the first bullet point on that

report, it provides, "On September 11, Libyans protested outside the

U.S. Consulate in Benghazi in response to the release of an anti-Muslim

film called, 'Innocence of Muslims, according to Egyptian Press.'

Subsequently, unidentified terrorists attacked the consulate with

mortars and rocket-propelled grenades. A separate U.S. facility in

Benghazi was also attacked, according to CIA reporting."

While this intelligence report references the Egyptian press,

they don't appear to dispute this contention that there was a protest

outside of the consulate, do they?

General Flynn. I'm not sure. I'm not following you. Where are

you looking at?

Mr. Schiff. The very first bullet point on the front page where

it says --

General Flynn. "DIA assesses with moderate confidence"?

Mr. Schiff. Well, actually I'm going to get to that, but even

above the source summary statement.

General Flynn. Okay.

Mr. Schiff. Look at literally where the first bullet is.

General Flynn. Where you're saying "On 11 September."

Mr. Schiff. Exactly. 11 September --

General Flynn. "Libyans protested outside a U.S. Consulate in

Benghazi in response to the release of an anti-Muslim film called

'Innocence of Muslims, according to Egyptian Press.' Subsequently,

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unidentified terrorists attacked the consulate with mortars, rockets,

grenades. A separate U.S. facility in Benghazi was also attacked."

Okay.

Mr. Schiff. So initially, at least in this report --

General Flynn. So that's a piece -- so as you read these, that's

a piece of evidence, in addition to -- usually like the bullets that

you see in these type of reports, you know, you see the -- sort of the

conclusionary statements up front, and then those are -- it's just

evidence that they add, you know, like you can see that one on 11

September, the next one that comes up is on 12 September, and 12

September, so it's just -- it's evidence that's an accumulation at this

time, 12 September, which would have been, you know, the day after,

and more than likely this was -- this was prepared, you know, I guess

is not early morning but probably later that afternoon as more

information was coming in.

Mr. Schiff. And that -- the bold paragraph on the cover, is that

essentially the summary of the report.

General Flynn. Yeah, that's the summary of the whole -- of all

the evidence that's presented, you know, in the report itself, yes.

Mr. Schiff. Well, if you look at the bold section of the summary

of the report.

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. Second sentence reads, "While there were no

indications of preoperational planning --

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

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Mr. Schiff. -- for this specific target before the attack --

General Flynn. Right.

Mr. Schiff. -- we estimate terrorists were planning unspecified

attacks against U.S. and Western interests and likely leveraged a

target of opportunity amidst security vulnerabilities created by

protest activity."

General Flynn. Yeah.

Mr. Schiff. So in the view of this analysis, the terrorists were

exploiting the security vulnerability of a protest.

General Flynn. Yeah. And I think if you go back and look at all

of the reporting, the accumulation of the reporting up till that point,

that it was very clear that there were threats to Western -- certainly

Western, and definitely, I think, U.S. interests leading up to that.

The way I read that sentence is that no indications of preoperational

planning for that specific event, you know, the consulate, but that

we do estimate that terrorists, and in fact, we knew that terrorists

were planning unspecified attacks.

So you know, there was a -- there was an acknowledgment that we

knew that there was attacks, threats, and potential attacks being

considered, you know. In this case, it obviously -- you know, it looks

like, at least what they're saying here, and I believe that they took

a target of opportunity.

Mr. Schiff. But General, they're also saying that part of the

target of opportunity was created by protests, and ultimately that

proved to be inaccurate, but that was the estimate of this DIA analysis

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at the time, was it not?

General Flynn. Yeah. I think that -- yeah, amidst security

vulnerabilities created by protest activity, sure, sure. I mean, I

think what they say there is pretty clear.

Mr. Schiff. And that's consistent with the overall assessment

of the IC at the time, which proved, again, later to be inaccurate,

but the belief at the time that what began as a protest was exploited

to attack the facilities and ultimately kill our people.

General Flynn. Yeah. I mean, I'm not sure if you're asking me

a question. I mean --

Mr. Schiff. Well, General, my question is, this DIA analysis --

General Flynn. Right.

Mr. Schiff. -- asserts that terrorists exploited an opportunity

created by a protest.

General Flynn. Yeah, yeah.

Mr. Schiff. And that is consistent with what other analysts in

the IC also concluded at the time, is it not?

General Flynn. Yeah. I mean, I think the whole of the

assessment, the whole of the judgment is that we are confident that

there was Al Qaeda-associated and inspired terrorists were involved

in the two attacks against U.S. facilities in Benghazi.

They took a target of opportunity to conduct those attacks. So

you know, essentially organized -- an organized terrorist movement,

which we were tracking for a long time in Libya, took a target of

opportunity and took advantage of it.

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Mr. Schiff. Exactly. And I don't think there's any dispute that

terrorists were eager to have the opportunity to attack us.

General Flynn. Al Qaeda-associated terrorists.

Mr. Schiff. Al Qaeda-associated terrorists.

General Flynn. Yeah, yeah.

Mr. Schiff. The big bone of contention, though, has been whether

there was a protest, whether there was a belief of a protest, or whether

that was made up for some political purpose, but this DIA work

product --

General Flynn. Yeah.

Mr. Schiff. -- that the analysts you believe were very

professional, believed initially that there was a protest.

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. Isn't that right?

General Flynn. There was a protest. I mean, I think there

was -- I think there was an indication that there was activity certainly

in some -- you know, however you want to define it at the -- at the

consulate, you know. I mean, you have to understand that none of these

things happened as an individual thing. This is an accumulation of

threats that we saw building up over a long period of time, and, in

fact, there were direct attacks that did occur with IEDs and hand

grenades and other, you know, certainly pieces of evidence that would

say that there was a threat, a potential threat to this facility where

certainly U.S. citizens were because they had already attacked us

there.

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So I think the -- I think the real challenge is that, you know,

protest or not, you know, that this was an associated -- this was

associated -- the protests and the attack itself was associated with

an Al Qaeda-associated terrorist organization who we had been watching

for a long time who had been up to no good, and I think that's the real

bone of contention, honestly, Congressman. I mean, I just think it

is.

Like I have said, you know, in uniform and out of uniform,

had -- had the National Security Advisor gone on national television

and just said we don't know or it could be a combination of things,

we just -- we don't have enough, you know, evidence yet to know exactly

what's going on, we wouldn't be having this conversation.

Mr. Schiff. Well, General, I think the Ambassador did say that

we're continuing to get intelligence on this and -- but you know, I

know our committee, because we asked for talking points.

General Flynn. Right.

Mr. Schiff. And the American people were eager to know what's

happened, what do we know about this.

General Flynn. Yeah.

Mr. Schiff. And --

General Flynn. You know, knowing what I know about the talking

points now, if I had ever seen those talking points, if they were -- if

somebody had floated them by me and asked me for my judgment, I would

not have given that judgment based on what those talking points say,

and I didn't see those talking points so --

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Mr. Schiff. I understand that.

General Flynn. I would have not said -- I would have not

confirmed that -- they could have still said, okay, well, we appreciate

your judgment, Flynn, but we are going to go with these talking points,

okay, that's your judgment. But I -- you know, I wasn't given a shot

at looking at them.

Mr. Schiff. And General, I'm sure that we would all had our own

separate input into what the talking points were --

General Flynn. But I'm a head of an intelligence agency, and this

is a really -- you know, this is an interesting -- it's an interesting

dynamic, I think, is what I learned from it. I mean, I learned a lot

from this. I'd have probably been far more vocal. I mean, I learned

to be -- I learned to be from this, you know, I probably had a

responsibility to say more, especially after hearing what I was

hearing.

So it's a lesson learned for me, but I -- knowing what I know about

the talking points that Susan Rice used on five Sunday talk shows, I

would have never said I agree with those.

Mr. Schiff. Well, you would agree, wouldn't you, General, that

the DIA analysis --

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. -- that I just referred to --

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. -- expresses the view that there was a protest, and

you, I think, have just said yourself --

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General Flynn. Sure.

Mr. Schiff. -- did think there was a protest going.

General Flynn. I think that that's true, but again, the

accumulation of everything --

Mr. Schiff. General, if you'll let me finish.

General Flynn. Yeah, yeah.

Mr. Schiff. So when Ambassador Rice talked about the possibility

of a protest or what appeared to have begun as a protest, that was

consistent with the DIA's analysis, the analysis of your agency, was

it not.

General Flynn. But I think that that's only -- you know, if

you're breaking the whole judgment down into percentages, I'd say

that's about 25 percent of the truth.

Mr. Schiff. Okay.

General Flynn. And that's a subjective 25 percent because

there's other parts of that judgment that aren't part of what you just

said. I mean, you can say there's a protest, you can say that there

was prior planning, that you can say that there was potential Al Qaeda

leadership that was looking at attacking Western and U.S. interests.

I mean, why not add all that into the whole talking point and just,

you know, say it -- say it like that and say we don't know.

I mean, that's what I would have rather -- you know, again,

hindsight and knowing what I, you know, saw eventually, just saying

we don't know would have been a far better answer.

Mr. Schiff. General, I appreciate that opinion. I'm not sure

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that anyone would have been satisfied with the administration saying,

After an attack that left Americans dead, that we don't know what

happened.

General Flynn. Yeah, but that's -- but see, that's a different

issue. You go on a Sunday talk show and you say that, why not just

have -- I mean, just say we don't know but as we get additional

information, we're going to get the word out, you know, as to what

happened because we lost a U.S. Ambassador.

So again, this gets back to the issue that I have with, you know,

being -- be careful what pieces of intelligence you use for what it

is that you're trying to -- the point that you're trying to get across.

Mr. Schiff. General, let me go back to the analysis, if I could.

In addition to the September 12 intelligence report that we just went

through --

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. -- I'd like to direct your attention to exhibit 7,

which was produced the following day also by the Defense Intelligence

Agency.

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. In this report, just looking at the first paragraph,

"DIA assesses with moderate confidence Al Qaeda in the Lands of the

Islamic Maghreb, AQIM, and AQIM-inspired terrorists participated in

two September 11 attacks against U.S. facilities in Benghazi, Libya,

that killed the U.S. Ambassador to Libya and three other citizens.

However, we have no indications AQIM directed the attacks in Benghazi.

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It appears the violence was opportunity-based rather than planned."

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. The next sentence reads, "While there were no

indications of preoperational planning for this specific target before

the attack, we estimate target terrorists were planning unspecified

attacks against U.S. and Western interests and likely leveraged a

target of opportunity amidst security vulnerabilities created by

protest activity."

So the following day, on September 13th, it was DIA's continuing

assessment that there was a protest that was essentially --

General Flynn. That presented a target of opportunity.

Mr. Schiff. Gave an opportunity.

General Flynn. Sure, sure.

Mr. Schiff. You are reading this as well?

General Flynn. Yeah. I mean, that judgment right there on that

13 September report, that's a good talking point. That could have been

a talking point that they could have easily put onto the -- to these

talking points that are really driving this whole, you know, issue.

Mr. Schiff. Well, with respect, General, I think the main

controversy around Ambassador Rice's comments was the fact she

mentioned a protest, and that's consistent with the DIA analysis.

General Flynn. But I understand, and I don't have the talking

points in front of me, but, you know, not tying it to Al Qaeda or

the -- because of the threat that Al Qaeda presented, I mean, you know,

even at that time, I think that the -- almost the nearly doubling of

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Al Qaeda -- of Islamic radical terrorist groups by our own State

Department that designates them, I think at that time had nearly

doubled.

So I mean, that's the issue. I mean, let's face it, that's the

real issue. Not associating this attack with Al Qaeda or an Al

Qaeda-associated group, that's really where I think, personally, I

think where the -- you know, everybody gets upset and just thinks that

we're trying to brush this off as this was just a -- an attack based

on a video.

Mr. Schiff. General, if I could direct your attention to the

third bullet on the -- on exhibit 7. Again, this refers to the press

reports of a protest in response to the anti-Muslim video. It begins,

"On September 11, Libyans protests outside the U.S. Consulate in

Benghazi in response to the release of an anti-Muslim film, according

to Egyptian press."

General Flynn. Yeah.

Mr. Schiff. The citing of this press report --

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. -- by DIA --

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. -- without any contradiction of the press report,

does that indicate to you that, in the view of the analysts, they gave

weight to this press report, is that why it would have been included

here?

General Flynn. Well, yeah, but this is a TSS/SI, so in this

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judgment here, you probably have a combination of a press report with

some sensitive intelligence, with probably -- it more than likely some

other either HUMINT intelligence or signals intelligence, so there's

a -- because of the classification, that tells me that there's a

combination of intelligence in there that's being used, one of which

is an open-source press report.

Mr. Schiff. But if they -- if they were in disagreement with this

open source, they would likely have expressed their view that they think

the press was wrong, would they not?

General Flynn. Yeah, or they wouldn't use it, yeah. Or they

wouldn't use the report. I mean, there's lot of -- you know, there's

a lot of speculation in the press.

Mr. Schiff. So the reason they did include it was they thought

there was likely some merit to it?

General Flynn. Yeah, I think so, that there -- that it's probably

consistent with reporting that they had previously seen. So if they

saw, you know, in particular, in certain open press, some are better

than others, some are more -- some are more reliable than others

actually, so -- but like I said, the classification of this bullet leads

me to believe that there's a combination of -- there's an oral sourcing

of that judgment of other -- other than just open source.

Mr. Schiff. On the beginning of the second page, it says, "We

estimate Libya-based Ansar al-Sharia did not primarily participate in

or direct the attacks against the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi based on

public statements by the group. In addition, we lack historical or

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current threat reporting indicating Ansar al-Sharia has the intent to

attack U.S. or Western interests."

Do you know whether that's still the case, whether it's still the

opinion of the DIA that Ansar al-Sharia was uninvolved in the attacks?

General Flynn. I don't. I mean, I don't know that's the case

today.

Mr. Schiff. If that's not the case and if the opposite conclusion

were more in line with intelligence community thinking, is that perhaps

one of the reasons why it would not be wise to get out on -- in the

week following the attacks and express conviction about who is

responsible?

General Flynn. Yeah. Well, Ansar al-Sharia is one group, so

there's other groups that were involved here, and so I think -- I think

part of Ansar al-Sharia, if I'm not mistaken, was that there was -- I

think some of the leadership of Ansar al-Sharia and why they were

important was because I think that there was a belief that there was

a GTMO detainee that was -- that had returned to the battlefield that

was possibly one of the leaders in Ansar al-Sharia.

So I think what they're highlighting here is, you know, looking

at the different groups that may or may not have been involved, you

know, they're just making the statement that Ansar -- it does not appear

that there's enough evidence to say Ansar al-Sharia, you know -- I won't

go into the specific because it lays it out there, did not primarily

participate in or direct the attacks against the U.S. Consulate based

on public statements by the group.

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Mr. Schiff. If you turn to the third page.

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. And the section marked, "CIA and national

Counterterrorism Center Assessments," in the second paragraph of that

section --

General Flynn. And here's the guy right here, Abu Sufian.

Mr. Schiff. -- there's a -- the beginning statement says, "The

National Counterterrorism Center assesses that new reporting supports

previous assessments that elements of an Ansar al-Sharia faction,

possibly involving former GTMO detainee, Abu Sufian bin Qumu and other

Islamic extremists with ties to AQIM probably attacked the U.S.

Consulate in Benghazi. However, NCTC still has significant

intelligence gaps and continues to lack conclusive reporting that the

attack was planned in advance."

So the CIA and NCTC, according to their assessment, believe that

Ansar al-Sharia was likely involved.

General Flynn. Yeah, yeah.

Mr. Schiff. And that there were -- and it supports previous

assessments. So was DIA at odds then with CIA and NCTC?

General Flynn. No, I think that -- you know, the precision here

is that elements. That could mean one person that was a member, a known

member of Ansar al-Sharia was involved or 10 people. So I mean,

they -- you know, their -- NCTC assesses that new reporting supports

previous assessments that elements were, you know, possibly involving

a GTMO detainee and other extremists with ties probably attacked the

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U.S. Consulate, so they're assessing that elements of Ansar al-Sharia

possibly were involved. So that's good. I mean, that's a good

judgment based on the -- I know how they pull these things together,

but they still have significant gaps, you know, that it was planned

in advance.

Mr. Schiff. Have you followed the intelligence that say who is

responsible the attacks in Benghazi up to the present? Are you

familiar with the current intelligence on who is responsible?

General Flynn. On who is responsible for what now?

Mr. Schiff. For the attacks in Benghazi on that day.

General Flynn. I mean, I would say that sitting here today, I

don't know. I mean, I don't know. I mean, I, you know, followed the

reporting, you know, until I got out, obviously, but --

Mr. Schiff. I mean, would it surprise you to learn that we're

still -- there's still big gaps in our understanding.

General Flynn. Yes, it would surprise me. It would surprise me

quite a bit, actually, very much so. I would be shocked.

Mr. Schiff. You should be shocked that there were still gaps.

General Flynn. I would be shocked. No, not that there's gaps,

but that we did not know specifically who was involved or who directed

some of it. I actually think that we have some of that information.

Mr. Schiff. And how long was it after the attacks that you left

DIA?

General Flynn. Oh, God, I was only like a few -- I was only not

even 2 months into the job, so it was almost 2 years.

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Mr. Schiff. So you left 2 years after the attacks?

General Flynn. Roughly. I mean, you know, 22 months.

Mr. Schiff. And in those 2 years before you left, did DIA reach

definitive conclusions about all those that were responsible for the

attacks?

General Flynn. I think that we reached much stronger conclusions

about the activities in Eastern Libya for sure, and who was -- you know,

who was responsible and who was -- what kind of groups were operating

there, the training that was still -- it still -- as far as I know,

still goes on today so --

Mr. Schiff. But General, you said that you would be shocked if

we didn't know, I think, quite extensively precisely --

General Flynn. Yeah, I would be. I would be. That we didn't

have some type of, you know, at least law enforcement operation going

on against some of the individuals who we knew were involved, and we

should be out there trying to capture them or detain them.

Mr. Schiff. But 2 years after the events, DIA still doesn't have

a complete understanding of who is responsible, did they?

General Flynn. Yeah, because I think for the issue that you're

talking about, for Benghazi, because it really becomes a law

enforcement issue. I mean, there's still an intelligence assessment,

and I know we're still making assessments about the Al Qaeda threat

that permeates in Libya, but I think the Benghazi situation itself is

a law enforcement issue, and that's better asked, you know, of the FBI.

Mr. Schiff. General, let me direct your attention to -- I guess

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we have to mark this as a new exhibit as well. I'm looking at a

September 17th, 2012, DIA work product. We'll mark this as

exhibit 10. Let me get you a copy of this.

General Flynn. Thank you.

Mr. Schiff. So this memo on September 17th begins, "This memo

responds to a request for details surrounding the protest at and

follow-on assault on U.S. Consulate in a separate safehouse in

Benghazi, Libya, on 11 September." And first paragraph provides after

that, "The widespread availability of arms from the former regime,

deficiencies in local security forces, and a rapidly deteriorating

operational environment allowed terrorists an opportunity to escalate

the 11 September demonstration at the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi."

So on September 17th, now we're several days ahead.

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. And in fact, this is the day after, I believe, Susan

Rice appeared on the Sunday TV shows. It was still the DIA's assessment

that there was a demonstration at the consulate in Benghazi that allowed

terrorists an opportunity to escalate and attack; is that correct?

General Flynn. I think the key word in that is "terrorists."

Mr. Schiff. But it is still the assessment of the DIA that there

was a protest at the consulate that presented the opportunity, right?

General Flynn. I think that that's fair. I mean, I think that's

what it says here, yeah, rapidly deteriorating operational environment

allowed terrorists an opportunity to escalate the 11 September

demonstration at the consulate.

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Mr. Schiff. And then, General, if I could just direct your

attention to one last exhibit. This is exhibit 1 --

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. -- which is dated September 18th. So this is now

2 days after Ambassador Rice's appearance.

General Flynn. Is that this one here.

Mr. Schiff. Yes. If you look at the orange column labeled the

"Benghazi/Libyan Events."

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. The very first on that timeline --

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. -- provides "Protests during the day in Benghazi

U.S. Consulate in Benghazi is attacked later that night."

So in September 18th, it's still the conclusion of DIA that what

began in Benghazi was a protest, and it was later hijacked essentially

by terrorists. Is that your reading of that entry as well?

General Flynn. I wouldn't say it -- state it that it was

hijacked. I think it was taken advantage of.

Mr. Schiff. Okay.

General Flynn. What is interesting about this is this is really

the first time I've really, I think, seen this one. Certainly -- or

it's been some time. You know, when you look at the line between 10

and 11 September, this -- the spike in whatever this is, I guess, is

this a Twitter? Is that what this represents?

Mr. Schiff. The social media highlights?

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General Flynn. Yeah, so elements of social media.

Mr. Schiff. Yeah.

General Flynn. It shows you that there's a spike there. You

know, that -- this is a good lesson learned is that, you know, that

spike indicates something.

Mr. Schiff. Yeah.

General Flynn. You see that little tiny spike, you know, the

scale of the paper takes away from the -- from what it is, but that's,

you know, zero is at the bottom, but then it goes up to 50,000, so you

know, you're looking at maybe 20,000 maybe, 20,000 in different words

that were being used. I mean, that's very, very telling, and then,

of course, all the other spikes that you see along the path here.

That's the -- the lesson learned here is that we got to pay really close

attention to social media.

Mr. Schiff. Yeah.

General Flynn. I mean, and this is one of the things I had asked

for so -- because I wanted to know what -- what they were doing on social

media because social media provides warnings, particularly at the

tactical level in the information age that we're in today. And I think

it's -- I think that, that little example right there is a good example

because we saw that with Tahrir Square, we saw that with Russia

incursion into Crimea, I mean, so -- so it's a real -- it's a real lesson

that we've got to take away from this. We've got to pay attention to

it.

Mr. Schiff. Thank you, General. If you look at the assessment

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that accompanies this timeline at the top left, it provides "DIA

assesses terrorist groups operating in the region have long been

targeting U.S. and Western interests in Benghazi, including the U.S.

diplomatic facilities. However, there are no indications the

terrorists had planned to attack the consulate on 11 September before

the outbreak of anti-U.S. protests that day. Rather, we assess that

the video-related protests earlier in the day served as the impetus

to launch an attack against a target of opportunity in the city that

has been a semi-permissive environment for terrorist groups since the

fall of the Qadhafi regime."

General Flynn. Uh-huh.

Mr. Schiff. So that indicates, once again, that at this point

in the timeline, it was the DIA assessment that there were no

indications that terrorists had a preplanned attack for that day, but

rather, took advantage of those protests?

General Flynn. Yeah. I think that -- the way I would sort of

synthesize that statement that you just read from that -- from this

assessment is that we don't know. We still don't have enough

information, and we just flat don't know. That's what I get out of

that, so I would -- as a guy who's looked at a lot of these things,

I would look at this and I would pay more attention to -- you know,

to the graphic and what are we learning from this type of collection.

And the actual assessment itself, I would say to whoever would brief

me on something like this, I would say, okay, so the bottom line is

we still don't really know what happened, but we do know certain things.

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We do know that it was -- that there was threats prior, we do know

that there are Al Qaeda associated groups operating in the area, we

do know that there were attacks against not only the consulate, but

other places in and around the area, we know that there were Al Qaeda

training camps in the region, in that part of Eastern Libya, so we know

that all the things that lead us to believe that there's a real potential

security problem there are all there.

So this just says we just don't know enough about whether or not

the protest was the impetus or what, you know, what happened. So the

answer -- you know, my long answer to this assessment is we just

don't -- still don't know enough, and that would have been -- that might

have been the right answer.

Mr. Schiff. And there were, you know, the professional work

product of your people, and you stand by them, right?

General Flynn. Yeah, I sure do. I sure do. I mean, you know,

the pieces of paper that I have in front of me that you guys have given

me as exhibits, I think, is very consistent, tells a very consistent

story, and I think it's -- and I think that -- but like I said, I think

that I'm surprised that we're not -- that we have not arrested or

detained or captured, you know, others, that are -- that were part of

this.

Mr. Schiff. Well, General, thank you again.

General Flynn. Yeah, thanks a lot, Congressman. Thanks for

your service, too, appreciate it.

EXAMINATION

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BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Thank you, Lieutenant General, we appreciate it. I had a

couple of questions. My colleague, Peter Kenny has a few questions.

A Okay.

Q And then hopefully we'll be able to turn it back to our

colleagues.

A Okay.

Q And then we may have a few questions at the very end.

You know, early in the first hour with my colleagues, you were

asked if you had ever testified before Congress. Later, I think there

was a broader statement from my colleague that you had not been asked

by Congress about the attacks.

A Yeah, yeah. I mean, I think that I have spoken about it.

I mean, I would have to go look at transcripts maybe, but I was never

specifically asked to come in to testify about Benghazi. This is

really the first time, other than when I was initially called by Counsel

Chipman to come in to -- to, can you answer a few questions? That's

the first time that anybody ever formally asked me anything about

Benghazi, and that was only a few months ago.

Q And by saying that, you personally were not asked.

A Right.

Q Is that meant to represent that the Defense Intelligence

Agency was not asked to participate in this prior --

A No, I think that that's fair. You know, analysts in my

organization might have been asked, you know, I mean, these

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assessments, so they might have -- there might have been some

discussion. But I think, really, what it -- what this whole thing

revolves around are these talking points, you know, and I have been

asked to look at talking points in the past on other issues.

These, these I was not asked to review, was not asked for what

I -- what I feel is an expert assessment, expert judgment.

Q So I'm going to show you what we're marking as -- I'm going

the give you both of these at once, exhibit 11 and exhibit 12 for

identification purposes.

A Okay.

[Flynn Exhibits Nos. 11 and 12

Were marked for identification.]

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q We're getting it together.

A It's okay.

Q So the first document, exhibit 11, is a letter -- on the

letterhead of the Committee on Armed Services. It's my understanding

this is now available on a publicly available Web site. It's dated

October -- gop.gov, dated October 18, 2012. It's addressed to you,

I understand, and I'm not meaning to say that that means you saw it

at the time, but it is addressed to you, is it not?

A Yeah. Yes, it is.

Q And in that first paragraph, it indicates that one of our

predecessor committees investigating the Benghazi attacks -- and I just

would point you to that second sentence. "I greatly appreciate,

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however, the DIA's cooperation with the committee's efforts,

particularly the briefing to committee staff this morning, as well as

the other briefings and assistance you have provided."

Do you have a sense of what that -- does this come as a shock to

you that DIA did brief HASC?

A No, no. I mean, this is not unusual. We had people over

on the Hill just about every day talking about, you know, every issue

on the planet, so not at all. I mean, so with these, I just did a quick

cursory of these, and no, I mean, this is -- this is, you know,

within -- within line of what DIA gets asked to do on a daily basis.

Q So any indication that certainly DIA had not been asked or

DIA had not provided information when asked would have been an inference

on your part?

A What do you mean?

Q I mean, you had indicated to us that you had -- you believed

you had never been reached out to. Well, here, obviously, is a letter

addressed to you.

A Right, right, but this is after -- yeah, this is

after -- this is October 18th, okay.

Q Right. And it is clearly about the investigation of

Benghazi.

A Sure, sure.

Q So --

A About, but I'm -- my point is on the sort of immediate

aftermath, the first few days, you know, really the rest of that week

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and then leading to the real big question, you know, or the issue in

question is the talking points.

Q So you believe that with regard to everything else, you

all -- other than the talking points and what happened, about the

talking points and how the administration talked about the attacks,

DIA did fully cooperate with Congress and answered all questions?

A I think we did. I mean, we usually did. You know, I

wouldn't say that I would know for certain, you know, 100 percent, but

I think if we're asked, we generally were pretty good about responding,

especially on formal stuff like we did here, so yeah.

Q And this seems -- I mean, I also gave you the response.

A And like he says here, "I am hopeful that in the 5 weeks

since September 11th, you have examined the actions taken by your

command in the lead-up to the Benghazi attack. Therefore, I

respectfully request you address these questions verbally or in

writing," so yeah, so -- and we did.

Q So the request was to address everything you all had done

prior to 9/11/2012, and you believe that you fully answered those

questions?

A I think so. I mean, you know, we probably, you know,

hindsight, probably could have given more detail. I mean, you know,

you see all the things that I think this committee has been provided,

you know, this particular binder, and there's probably more than that,

you know.

Q Yes. Those were binders that were actually given to this

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committee by the House Armed Service Committee, so it was

information --

A Yeah.

Q -- probably provided by your organization --

A Sure. I put it together, so I had DIA put it together

because I wanted to review everything, I want to learn lessons, I want

to see what, you know, what did we do right, what did we do wrong, how

could we, you know, do something different in the past from one

perspective. I also wanted to know what happened, and what, you know,

sort of what did we know, when did we know it, and what was provided.

Q Do you have any reason to believe that the information

you --

A So there's probably -- there's probably more than that.

There's probably a lot more than that, just because it's the nature

of intelligence and the various reports that are going to come back

and forth, so --

Q And with regard to your answer, I think, which is

exhibit 12?

A Yeah.

Q There's a signature line. It says Michael T. Flynn.

A Yeah.

Q You know, there's been allegations in the course of the

investigation that that means that someone personally reviewed and

actually signed a document. We, I think --

A Signed what document?

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Q Your letter, the letter that --

A Exhibit 12?

Q Yes.

A Yeah, I signed that.

Q Did you personally review it at the time?

A This letter?

Q Uh-huh.

A I imagine I did.

Q Okay. So you believe that was a complete answer to the

letter that had been sent to you all on October 18 and 19?

A Yeah, I think at the time, I think based on the question

that was asked, I think at the time, yeah, it was a complete answer

to the chairman's question, yeah, I do. I mean, you know -- I mean,

now -- now, there's more and more stuff out there, but I think at the

time, yeah, I do.

Yeah, like he says in his -- in his request, the number 1 part

of his statement, it says, "Excluding formal DIA analytic products,

did you or anyone at DIA formally or informally," and he goes on to

different things. So excluding the DIA analytic products, which were

many.

Q Right.

A So that's really what I'm talking about.

Q Right.

A So we're answering what -- you know, this.

Q Additional questions, in additional to the formal --

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A We're answering this without adding all the other DIA

analytic products.

Q Do you have any reason to believe they didn't have

that -- those products?

A It wasn't asked for. You didn't ask for it.

Q In these letters. Do you have any reason to believe --

A He says right there, "Excluding formal DIA analytic

products, did you or anyone at DIA formally or informally," you know,

need.

Q Do you believe this was the only communication with DIA,

they never asked for the products otherwise?

A I don't know. I don't know. I mean, I don't know. I know

that we provide daily -- you know, we have people going over to the

Hill --

Q Sure.

A -- I mean, just about every day for some reason, so you know,

I don't know. I don't know.

Q So you don't really know what materials were provided to

the House Armed Services Committee?

A I would say that every single thing that was prepared

on -- from DIA's perspective, you know, the likelihood of providing

all of that, we dropped a lot -- in fact, we dropped all of our -- I

forget the name of the system that we have that communicates, this

electronic system that communicates with the Hill, but those are

dropped on the electronic system just about every day. In fact, every

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day.

Q So those would have been provided to the Hill, both

contemporaneously with their production, as well as --

A Sure.

Q -- in any review of specific --

A To those that had access and those that had the right

clearances, yeah, sure. Sure.

Q So the, before --

A Like these types of -- these other exhibits that

you've -- you know, that you provided to me. All that -- those kinds

of things get dropped on the -- you know, I forget the name of the

electronic system that we share stuff, but it exists.

Q Right. So the standing committee with jurisdiction over

the Department of Defense, certainly have access to these products,

both in real-time as they're being produced?

A Sure, sure, absolutely.

Q And they would have had them also if there had been a

compilation of specifically intelligence products --

A Sure.

Q -- related to Benghazi, they would have had that?

A Absolutely.

Q Okay.

A No doubt.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Thank you, sir.

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A Yes.

Q We touched on, in the previous rounds, the concept or the

system you referred to as the DAT system?

A Defense attache, yeah.

Q And the DAT is the -- as we understand it, is a senior defense

official also in countries that you --

A Usually, usually, yeah, yeah. Not all the time. Not all

the time. Usually.

Q And was there a defense attache in Tripoli, to your

understanding?

A Yeah, I believe there was, actually, and I think his name

is in this letter here. Lieutenant Colonel Brian Linvill.

Q Okay. And do you know about when that office was created

within Embassy Tripoli?

A I don't know. I don't know. I mean, you know, it may

be -- it could go, you know, way back. I don't know.

Q Okay. And would the DAT, would that be staffed from DIA

resources?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So that's a DIA --

A Defense attache is a -- yeah, it's a -- you know, depending

on the priority, depending on the size of the -- you know, depending

on the size of the mission itself, the physical size of the mission,

because some of it depends on literally is there enough room for people,

so Libya would probably be a smaller team of people.

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Q Okay.

A But again, it could be anywhere from, you know, a couple,

two, three to, you know, a couple of dozen.

Q And that individual would essentially be the DIA's

representative in country. Is that also correct?

A Yeah, it would be -- yeah, yeah. The DIA, he's the defense

intelligence representative for the Ambassador -- on behalf of the

Ambassador, works to the Ambassador, and you know, they have actually

multiple bosses, but everybody works for the Ambassador.

Q So would the defense attache, would they have access to

different threads of intelligence reporting --

A Yes.

Q -- that would come in?

A Yeah.

Q So not just products produced by DIA, is that right?

A Sure. They should. I mean, if you have a chief of station

there, they're communicating with the chief of station, the senior DNI

rep in the country, so yeah, they should have. Now, they -- you know,

again, depending on their clearance, or if there's a -- like a title

50 operation or something like that going on, they may not know. They

may not be read on to certain things.

Q And would the defense attache, would they also participate

at all in the collection and production of --

A Yes.

Q -- information reports?

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A Yes.

Q You said yes. As a DIA representative in country and DIA

employee in country, would you assign credibility to the views of the

DAT with respect to their views on the security situation, for instance,

in the country, their assessments of, we discussed in the last hour,

the Libyan military, Libyan intelligence services, their --

A Yeah. I mean, sure, sure, you know, depending on their

access, their relationships with the, let's just say the Libyan -- let's

say the ministry of defense for Libya. Anybody in the ministry of

defense, which is typically who they would work with. They wouldn't

work with the intelligence service because that would be a CIA

responsibility.

They may have relationships because they're informally seeing

these people, you know, at different venues, but yeah, we would -- and

it would depend on -- excuse me, it would depend on their relationship,

you know, their knowledge, you know, was this their -- you know, was

this their first experience as a defense attache? We have some

attaches that have, you know, a huge number of years of experience,

and they get -- you know, clearly, they get more credibility on knowing

what was happening in the areas that they're in.

Q So you indicated in the last hour, I think, you may have

used or I may have heard you refer to something that is sort of a no

kidding assessment. Would the DAT be a person who you would entrust

or you would think would have that no kidding assessment of what the

conditions were in a country? And again, you described some variables

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before, but if somebody is actually on the ground in country.

A Yeah. I think that the person on the ground always

has -- you know, they have sort of, you know, the phrase, eyes on. They

have -- you know, they would have better, what I like to say, is a

fingertip feel for what is going on. But that said, the defense attache

in Libya doesn't have all the access to all the intelligence, frankly.

That always -- that does come in because we get -- we gather some

from signals intelligence, and that may be -- that may be going through

either the U.K. or it may be going through our National Security Agency,

so you know, he or she is not going to have, you know, the sort of the

strategic picture.

They -- if they're -- depending on how good they are, they might

have a view, but they're not going to always see every single thing.

I mean, I guess, I mean, whatever they assess, it's like you've got

to put it into the perspective of what they're doing at the time.

Q So at this point, I will mark exhibit 13.

A Okay.

[Flynn Exhibit No. 13

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And I'll just describe this for the record. This is a

portion of a now declassified transcript of an interview conducted

jointly by the House Committee on Armed Services and the House Committee

on Oversight and Government Reform.

A Uh-huh.

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Q This interview is conducted of the defense attache Embassy

Tripoli?

A Right.

Q The interview is dated January 31st, 2014, and the

declassified transcript was publicly available on the Armed Services

Committee Web site.

A Right.

Q So I know we're in a classified setting. We've opted to

use, for our purposes here, a declassified transcript, so I'll do my

best to help aid our discussion.

A Uh-huh.

Q The portions I'll refer you to, you'll see most of the

redactions relate to names of individuals and those sorts of issues.

And just to describe for you the first two pages there are just brief

biographical to describe the individual, and I'm going to refer and

read into the record some items on page 81 through 83.

A Okay. Okay.

Q Okay. So just for the purposes of the record, I'll begin

reading at the top of page 83. There's a question posed to defense

attache.

"Question: In your estimation, with all the dynamics at play,

was the security environment getting more tenuous or degrading, if you

will?

"Answer: I think that is a fair characterization. I mean, it

wasn't glaringly obvious that things were going south extremely in a

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precipitous manner, but there was certainly a sense that there were

problems in Benghazi. They definitely don't seem to be improving.

And it is interesting, too, a lot of us were watching closely

post-elections. The elections have happened successfully, they were

fair and transparent, what impact is this going to have?

"And you went straight from elections into Ramadan, which is kind

of the quiet period traditionally in a Muslim country, so there was

a bit of a lull, I feel, during that period. So it wasn't easy by any

stretch of the imagination or obvious to read these tea leaves, but

there was a sense that both the Libyan government and military officials

and in the international community, I think there were a series of

periodic episodes in Benghazi.

"Question: And presumably, redacted, in the course of your job,

you read and familiarized yourself with Intelligence Community's

assessment of the situation in Libya at the time; is that correct?

"Answer: That's correct. They had a read book that was

available, which I would read periodically," close quote.

And I'm going to jump ahead to the bottom of page 82, but you are

more than welcome to read the full portion. But at the bottom of 82,

the question begins: "And do you have any sense or any

recollection -- again, they declared that the IC produced hundreds of

analytic reports in the months preceding the attacks talking about the

fact that terrorists and affiliated groups had the capability and

intent to strike U.S. and Western facilities and personnel in Libya.

"Again, in the months or weeks preceding the attack, did you sense

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a particular threat or a threat trajectory?

"A particular threat?" Response.

"Question: Not a specific danger, but was the situation getting

worse in Libya?

"Answer: The general sense that I had, if my memory serves me

correct, was at the point you just characterized, there was definitely

a general sense in the east that security was becoming -- was in

greater, greater threat, it was becoming more tenuous over time. With

that being said, Tripoli wasn't necessarily the case. That seemed to

be, okay, this is a post-revolution, the government doesn't necessarily

have a monopoly on force. There are security concerns, yes, but I would

draw a distinction between the concerns we had with the east in Tripoli.

I'm not sure if that clarifies this." Close quote.

A Uh-huh.

Q And General, I'd just like to ask you, you indicated before

that your -- the credibility that you might assign to an assessment

of the view of a defense attache person on the ground in a country may

depend on their level of access. Here, at least, the beginning of

page -- at the bottom of page 81 --

A Sure.

Q -- this defense attache indicates that they had success to

routine regular cable intelligence traffic --

A Yeah.

Q -- and that they read that. Would that affect at all your

assessment of --

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A No, I mean, not -- I mean, if you're asking what he knew

or what kind of information he had access to, no. I mean, you know,

you can be in the embassy in, let's just say Tripoli, and you might

as well be, you know, in the White House in Washington, D.C. If you

can't leave the compound, you only get to -- you know what you know.

Now, what you feel is you do feel differently, because when you're

in an area like that where, you know, the threats to -- I mean, the

threats to our embassy in Tripoli -- now this is -- this is after the

Benghazi stuff, but the fact that -- I mean, what I read from that right

there, from that transcript is that, you know, that he -- he had -- he

was comfortable with what he was able to read and that the threats in

the east were -- were increasing.

Q Okay. And it may or may not be in this portion.

A From his recollection.

Q Sure. And it may not be clear here, but this defense

attache, as we interviewed, did tell us that he did personally travel

to Benghazi at least once.

A Good, good.

Q But his characterization here that it wasn't, quote,

"glaringly obvious that things were going south extremely in a

precipitous manner," do you disagree with the defense attache's

assessment that to him, his belief was that the situation wasn't, to

use his language again, not glaringly obvious that things were going

south extremely in a precipitous manner?

A Yeah, I --

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Mr. Chipman. Excuse me, you're talking about Tripoli or

Benghazi?

General Flynn. Yeah, yeah.

Ms. Adams. This seems to say only Tripoli, and says the east is

different, so that's unclear.

General Flynn. Yeah.

Mr. Kenny. You know, his statement there, he doesn't specify

which, but he does, in that sentence, reference Benghazi, so then he

makes the differentiation and --

Ms. Adams. He's established --

General Flynn. But he talks about that --

Mr. Kenny. Read the full exchange. The question is asked,

security in Libya, and he's referring to both --

General Flynn. Yeah, I mean, he basically says that the

security --

Mr. Kenny. -- locations, and he's referring --

General Flynn. I mean, he basically says the security in Libya,

particularly the east, is going in the wrong direction. That's the

gist of that -- that part of that transcript. So I don't disagree.

I don't disagree.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q He also describes a bit of a lull that occurred, and again,

this may be --

A Yeah, but you got to -- what period of time? I mean, you

know, and what is a lull. You know, no attacks?

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Q So here he's discussing post-election, so some of the

intelligence you were shown before was from June 2012, so you're

showing a series of slides from June 2012.

A Yeah.

Q Do you recall when the election occurred?

A I don't off the top of my head.

Q Okay. Does July 2012 sound about right?

A I don't remember off the top of my head when the elections

occurred.

Q Okay. My understanding is they occurred around July 7th,

2012.

A Right.

Q Which is subsequent to some of the reporting that you saw --

A Right.

Q -- earlier, you were showed earlier.

A Right.

Q So here's just a reference to the election and post-election

period.

A Yeah.

Q And views of Embassy Tripoli. Is that your understanding

as well in viewing this?

A I'm not sure what you're asking me.

Q You said you were unclear as to which time period he's

referring to. He makes a reference to the Libyan election, so

presumably, he's referring to post-election.

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A Yeah. So he's probably -- yeah, so if he's referring to

at the election period, then yeah, sure. And that's -- if I -- you

know, looking back, I mean, those -- at that time, I mean, I wasn't

personally, I didn't think the thing was going to go in the right

direction just because we knew what the threats were, but --

Q Uh-huh.

A But I -- you know, what he -- what he said sounds reasonable

to me.

Q Sure.

A I mean, again, the gist that I get out of that, this

particular exhibit is that the situation -- the security situation in

Libya was not good.

Q Correct, yeah. I think that's a fair assessment.

A Yeah.

Q I don't think anybody disputes that. There were probably

reports --

A And at the east was probably worse.

Q And there have been several reports that have documented

that.

A Yeah.

Q And I think to return to a discussion you had in an earlier

hour, because you did make reference specifically to Tripoli and

security in Tripoli here, the defense attache does seem to appreciate

that there is a difference between that was occurring in Tripoli and

Benghazi.

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A Yeah. I mean, you know, you have to look at the last couple

of years, but there has been -- there's been some significant attacks

in Tripoli. This was after Benghazi, but --

Q Uh-huh. But here it specifically says I would draw a

distinction between the two, so the defense attache -

A Sure.

Q -- perceived a difference between the two.

A Sure.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And in that regard, do you think what he told the House Armed

Services Committee was accurate?

A I think, to the best of his knowledge, I do. I think,

he's -- you know, he's given the perspective of an individual operating

in a country that, you know, is -- probably has a coastline the length

of the United States east coast. I mean, so you know, I mean, I haven't

operated in places myself, you know, to know what's going on in one

place or the other. You're really getting it from, you know,

intelligence assessments that are coming in that you're paying

attention to, and you know, you talk -- the thing about a defense attache

is part of why they're there, and this is classified. This is very

classified. I mean, because our attache system was not built on

necessarily to be an intelligence service, but it is.

So our defense attaches, we want them to collect intelligence to

provide back to this country. So they're going to -- they're going

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to get bits and pieces because it's one person, or if they have a small

team, and then their ability to get around, you know -- Libya was not

a place that you could get around in that easily. I mean, where you

go to Paris, they can go to a nice dinner and they can meet, you know,

the Russian attache or the Chinese attache. That's very helpful for

us. In Tripoli, unlikely that he was going to too many cocktail

parties.

Q Great. Thank you. We want to be respectful of your time.

A Great. Thank you. Thanks for that.

Q So that's all we have for right now. We may have some

questions after our colleagues conclude, but we will certainly try as

well, and be respectful of your time then.

A Yeah, great, great. Thank you, everybody, that's good.

I'll just hold on to these until you guys are done.

Mr. Chipman. That's fine.

General Flynn. You know, and this can be on the record while you

guys are transitioning.

Ms. Sawyer. We are off the record, and then we will go back on

so she is able to get it clearly. Let's go off the record for a sec.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Tolar. Let's go back on the record, please. Heather, do you

want to clean anything up with that last comment?

Ms. Sawyer. Oh, I just thought if he -- I certainly think if the

witness -- we did not mean to cut you off in any way.

General Flynn. Yeah, so. I'll just answer based on at the end

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of the last set of questions. I mean, the defense attache also has

a responsibility to report, in writing, cable traffic similar to what

a chief of station in a, you know, CIA officer does, may send cables

back to their headquarters. They also -- our defense attache send

reports back to DIA, and that would be worth -- those would be worth

examining.

Ms. Sawyer. And just one quick question on that.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Your analysts, in terms of their ability to, you know,

gather the information, I would assume that the information from the

defense attache and from --

A Would be included.

Q Right. Because that's, in essence, operations collection?

A Yeah. Yeah. That would be -- that would be -- those would

be seen -- you know, seen as intelligence reports, and they would be

part of the whole assessment.

Q So they certainly would be one of the important data

points --

A Yeah.

Q -- that go into the creation of a form of products that

reflect the Agency's assessments.

A And I think the system --

Q Is that accurate?

A Yes, it is accurate. And I think the system that we have

is called Hot R, is the name of the cable traffic system that we have

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in the Defense Department, Hot R.

Ms. Sawyer. Great. Thank you.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q All right. So let's drive on. I'm going to move very

quickly here --

A Okay.

Q -- in order to get you out of here, but if I'm moving too

fast, please tell me to slow down.

A Okay.

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[12:31 p.m.]

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q So the first thing, looking back at exhibit No. 9, which

was introduced to you a few minutes ago, just for the record, sir, will

you note in that first line what level of confidence this report is?

A Yeah. DIA assesses with moderate confidence.

Q Thank you, sir.

A Yeah.

Q All right. Now, sir, during your 33-year career in the

military, were you ever involved in either the planning and/or

participation of a military operation in response to a crisis?

A Yes, many times.

Q Did you do so at the company grade level?

A I did it at every single level.

Q Including the flag officer level?

A Yes. Multiple times.

Q Sir, do you believe that you have the requisite expertise

to provide an informed opinion as to whether or not a given military

operational response is appropriate?

A Yes.

Q Thank you.

[Flynn Exhibit No. 14

Was marked for identification.]

Q I want to show you -- go back to the talking points just

for a minute and talk to you real quick. I'm going to give you an

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exhibit, please, sir, and it's exhibit No. 14, and this is an email

dated September 14th, 2012.

And, sir, we'll give you a little context, because I want to talk

about something specific, but basically this is an email from a

gentleman named Ben Rhodes. Does that name sound familiar to you?

A Yes, it does.

Q Okay. And he prepared some talking points for Ms. Rice

prior to the Sunday shows. And I want you to look specifically at the

four goals that he laid out for the talking points and would you review

those very quickly, and I want you to pay particular attention to goal

number two.

A Okay.

Q You read it, sir?

A I did.

Q Given the fact that Mr. Rhodes was at the time the Deputy

NSA for Strategic Communications, does it give you pause that such a

senior official in the Intelligence Community would engage so blatantly

in the shaping of policy discussions?

A Yeah. I mean, I read that as basically telling me what I

needed to say.

Q In your mind, does that constitute --

A That's what I read that second bullet as.

Q And in your mind, does that constitute the politicization

of intelligence?

A Well, if you're looking for intelligence that supports that

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goal, I would -- and you cherry picked the intelligence to support that

goal, yeah.

Q But does that meet -- and previously you've talked about

your concerns over that.

A Yeah, yeah.

Q Does that meet with what you talked about in the past?

A Yeah, because the role that he's in, that Ben Rhodes is in,

he's a national security advisor, you know, in role, he's a deputy,

but he's still a national security advisor, so he definitely you know,

has access to every bit of intelligence that we have.

Q Okay.

A And, you know, I mean, to state a goal that shapes what it

is that we're looking for, I think, is not a good thing.

Q Moving on, sir, did you -- the DIA support the FBI

investigation on Benghazi in any way that you're aware of?

A I don't know. I don't know. You know, I mean, we have

had -- DIA and FBI have a very close working relationship, had one

certainly, so if they needed any support, we gave it to them.

Q I want to talk to you about some weapons allegations in

Libya. Are you aware of any efforts by the U.S. Government to obtain

accountability and/or positive control over weapons that existed in

Libya during the regime of Muammar Qadhafi?

A To gain accountability while he was still in power?

Q Yes, sir.

A Yeah, I do believe we did assessments on all of that.

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Q Okay.

A Yeah. So we did assessments on all of what they had, what

we believed the status of it was, to include even the military

capabilities of the Libyan armed forces that existed.

Q Are you aware of any efforts by the U.S. Government in Libya

to provide any weapons directly or indirectly to any opposition to

Qadhafi's forces?

A I am not.

Q Are you aware of any efforts by the U.S. Government in Libya

to provide any weapons directly or indirectly to any Libyan rebels or

militia?

A I am not.

Q Are you aware of any efforts by the U.S. Government in Libya

to provide any weapons directly or indirectly to any opposition to

Syrian forces?

A Yeah. I'm not. I'm not.

Q Are you aware of any efforts by U.S. Government in Libya

to provide any weapons directly or indirectly to any Syrian rebels or

militias?

A None.

Q All right. And you indicated previously -- or let

me -- for the record, were you interviewed by the ARB?

A I was not.

Q Thank you.

Do you happen to know how many attackers have been identified to

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date that you're aware of, attackers on Benghazi?

A Yeah. I am nearly certain that we have identified at least

one. Others, I'm not certain of, I don't know, but I know that we

identified one. And as far as I know, in a classified setting, that

we actually saw the guy take off from Libya and go to Turkey.

Q The fact that it's been so long and we've only identified

one --

A Yeah.

Q -- is that some kind of an intelligence failure that we can't

figure out who did this?

A I mean, like I said earlier, I'm shocked that we haven't

gotten more accountability of those that attacked this -- even to the

point of, you know, going into Libya to find some of these guys. I

mean, you know, we have -- I mean, we had a U.S. Ambassador, three

others murdered, and, you know, big deal.

Q Sir, it's been --

A So, yes, I'm concerned that we only have had, as far as I

know, that one individual. And I think that the one guy, we could have

had.

Q Sir, it's been said that context is everything when it comes

to analysis. Do you agree with that statement?

A Yeah, I do. I do.

Q Senior administration officials have stated it makes no

difference why the attacks in Benghazi occurred. However, is it fair

to say that knowing not only the perpetrators of the attack, but more

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importantly the motivations behind the attack are critical to the

analysis -- to the analysts in the IC?

A Yeah. That's you know, absolutely a part of analysis.

Hell, we train analysts to think like that --

Q What --

A -- and to analyze, you know, a range of pieces of information

to get to those kinds of judgments.

Q Who all might benefit from knowing who the perpetrators were

and why they did it?

A I mean, not only are -- I mean, from the top down, you know,

our entire -- certainly our national leadership, our counterterrorism

forces, that are trying to get after these guys, our partners that we

work with in either the region or elsewhere around the world, other

intelligence services, a lot of people.

Q Could this information potentially mitigate future threats

and/or attacks on U.S. personnel and facilities abroad?

A Yep. Absolutely. Absolutely. Yeah.

BY MR. CHIPMAN:

Q General Flynn, you mentioned that you thought we identified

one individual who may have fled to Turkey. Do you know the name or --

A I don't know. I mean, if the name came up, I'd probably

remember it, but I just remember that there was a -- that there was,

you know, some intelligence that showed an individual, I think he went

to -- literally, I think he absconded to Tripoli, if I'm not mistaken,

and then moved to Turkey pretty quickly.

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And then -- I think, you know, I'm trying to kind of go back and,

you know, because I think he ended up back in Tunisia or Algeria for

some reason. I just -- so I vaguely remember the one individual who

we believe was in the -- during the attack.

Q But it's -- you're aware of the indictment of Abu

al-Khattala?

A Uh-huh.

Q It was not Abu al-Khattala that you're referencing --

A No, I'm not. It wasn't him. It was -- it was another

individual.

Q And that was in your role still as director --

A Yeah, yeah.

Q -- of DIA?

A Yeah, yeah.

Q Okay.

A Yeah. And I may be mistaken, because I am aware of

Khattala.

Q Okay. And you had mentioned earlier that you had a

DAT -- that we had a DAT in Tripoli?

A Yes.

Q As far as you recall, were there any DIA assets in

Benghazi --

A No.

Q -- at the time of this attack --

A None.

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Q -- in 2012?

A No.

Q We're aware that the DIA has all source capability. Are

you aware of any assets that were being run by DIA DAT in Tripoli?

A I'm not. I'm not, I mean, other than, you know, if he had,

you know, I wouldn't call them a source or any -- HUMINT source, but

certainly if he had relationships with anybody in the Libyan

intelligence service, 17th Brigade that he knew, but, you know,

answering your question about was he running them, meaning was he

operating a source network, I'm not aware of that.

Q And was that typically a function of the size of the DAT

office?

A Yeah, it is. It is. I mean, it depends, but something like

that would have to be coordinated directly with the Chief of Station.

So a DAT would not do something like that, or should not do something

like that, without direct coordination with the Chief of Station, who's

also the defense -- or the national intelligence rep as well.

Q There was an extensive back-and-forth conversation you had

with Congressman Schiff before he left in the last hour, and it appeared

that he was very much focused on the fact that there was protests or

demonstration language --

A Right.

Q -- throughout in the exhibits that you were shown.

A Right.

Q And that I sensed your personal professional frustration

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that it was not the presence of that language, but the absence of other

language that you found --

A Yeah. Absolutely.

Q -- a problem?

A And that's cherry picking. I mean, let's face it. I mean,

so if I say that an al-Qaida-associated terrorist group, you know, had

intended to attack western and U.S. interests, you know, leading up

to the Benghazi attack and we knew certain leaders, and they

spontaneously took the opportunity because of a video, and you only

say -- you only say the result of the -- or the reason for the attack

was a spontaneous, you know, video, you're leaving out the other half,

the other two-thirds of the evidence.

Q Okay. So it's the omissions, not the --

A Yeah. It's absolutely.

Q -- inclusion of the protest?

A Yeah. I mean, I got that there's a protest, but absolutely.

There was protests going on in Cairo. There was a protest outside of

our Embassy in Sana'a that I'm very aware of. We were concerned that

that was going to be attacked.

Q And so your same concern by the comments by Ambassador Rice

related to the --

A Yeah.

Q -- she included the one point about a video --

A Yeah.

Q -- or a protest, but didn't include the remainder of the

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language that you thought would have shaped this more effectively?

A Right.

Ms. Sawyer. And, Dana --

General Flynn. Right.

Ms. Sawyer. -- could we just clarify?

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q What is that language specifically that she should have

included?

A I think that she should have said up front, we don't have

all the information yet. We know that there was elements of a terrorist

organization associated with al-Qaida that were part of this, we know

that we are -- you know, we know some of the leaders who we were tracking

in eastern Libya. So we know these things.

There was definitely a video that we know from previous, you know,

things that have occurred with, you know, the exposure of a Koran in

a different way, I mean, some of the things that we had already seen,

had she had said those kinds of things and, you know, at the end of

the day, we just don't know yet, we don't have you all the information,

we're going to be examining this and we'll continue to stay on this

until we actually bring to -- you know, to bear the people that actually

perpetrated this, the American public would have been just happy.

Q So can I just boil that down to, my understanding is that --

A I just said that in about 30 seconds. She could have put

that out in 30-second increments five times on a Sunday talk show on

the -- you know, on that Sunday, but she didn't.

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Q So it was the failure to use the word "terrorists"?

A The failure to assure -- well, the failure to really take

all the pieces of the puzzle that we knew at that time up until that

day, up until the day she walked onto the -- you know, into those

studios, to take all the pieces that we knew and put together as accurate

a puzzle as she could, you know, given sensitivities of intelligence,

but this was a big deal.

And a lot of this stuff, you know -- I mean, national security

advisor, she can -- and the President, they can declassify whatever

they want to bring confidence to the American people.

I mean, that -- to me, I was surprised, one -- you know, I was

not given an opportunity to look at those talking points or to give

my 2-cents on them; and two, I was surprised when she went on the Sunday

talk shows and said what she said, because I was, like, wow, that's

not the whole story.

Q Again, just to try to clarify and boil it down, it was the

failure to specifically mention that there were potential involvement

of individuals associated with al-Qaida --

A Yeah.

Q -- associated with --

A That this was a -- potentially that this was an

al-Qaida -- that al-Qaida or a group associated with al-Qaida took

advantage and attacked our consulate and murdered and tried to

kidnap -- they would have loved to have had -- they would have loved

to have had him survive.

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Q So if she had mentioned the words al-Qaida --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- and said, we believe that there was a protests and that

it was --

A This was an al-Qaida-inspired attack.

Q And there was then an inspired -- an al-Qaida-inspired

attack?

A Because we knew, because we had previous evidence that

showed that this -- that there were -- I mean, you know, the guys that

were out looking in Derna training camps, you know, with the predator,

they weren't looking, you know, for protesters.

Q And when you mentioned sensitivities of the Intelligence

Community --

A Yeah.

Q -- what -- what -- you said --

A Well, I mean, I'm just saying, you know --

Q -- you said given the sensitivities of the Intelligence

Community.

A She would have to judge, she and whoever was going to prepare

her would have to judge exactly what, you know -- you know, if she used

a name, for example, if she used an individual's name that we knew was

one of the potential people there, how did we know that.

We knew that maybe through SIGINT, we knew that through HUMINT.

So, you know, she doesn't have to say the specific name of the

individual, but she could say, we know of certain al-Qaida leaders that

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we believe are associated with this attack, and we said that. In fact,

that's come out in the -- in this stuff that you guys have handed me.

Q Yeah. We are in a classified setting, but just to

understand in general, so what she could convey, what could be conveyed

consistent with sensitivities, including sources and methods, it

sounds like you would say --

A Yeah, but, I mean, you know --

Q -- was a legitimate concern --

A -- the things that I just rattled off a few -- you know,

a minute or so ago, none of that's classified, none of it.

Q Do you think it was her decision to make at the time --

A I don't know.

Q -- as to whether that was classified or not? Would it have

been appropriate for Ambassador Rice to decide whether that

information --

A Yes, yes, and here's why: because she's the national

security advisor for the United States of America and she was going

to be the one going on television. So, I mean --

Q She wasn't the national security advisor at the time. Is

that not correct?

A Well, she was the -- what was her role?

Q She was the Ambassador to the United Nations.

A Yeah, that's right, the UN ambassador. I'm sorry. UN

ambassador. So, I mean, she -- I'm sorry. So she's got to make the

judgment about what she's going to say. If she doesn't believe what

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she's going to say, then she's the wrong person to put out in front

of the television.

Q Should she have overruled determinations of the

Intelligence Community about --

A She could have.

Q -- what was sensitive information and what was --

A Well, she could have.

Q -- in the public domain?

A Yeah, she could have. I mean, she could have, yes,

certainly. Absolutely. She could have. If she didn't -- you know,

if -- if she's going as a -- you know, I mean, does she have a mind

of her own, is what you're asking me?

Q I'm not asking you that. I actually asked a particular

question, which was, is it in her purview and is it something you would

advocate for to overrule the assessment of the Intelligence Community

as to what information --

A Yeah. She wouldn't overrule the assessment of the

Intelligence Community, because --

Q Can I just finish my question --

A Yeah. I'm sorry.

Q -- because I do want --

A Yeah.

Q -- you to answer my question fully. So --

A Yeah. Yeah.

Q Do you think it would be appropriate and in her authority,

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but more, actually, appropriate for her to overrule a determination

that the Intelligence Community had made about what particular

information was sensitive from their perspective? Do you understand

my question?

A Not really. I mean, I think that if she was handed a set

of talking points without, you know, as somebody, in fact, as the

Congressman asked me, the context or somebody asked me about the

context, if she didn't have the context of the whole situation and she

was handed a set of talking points, then I question her judgment,

because if she doesn't have that context, she's taking a very dangerous

course of action to go on national television on behalf of the

President, because that's the only reason she's going on there, she's

not going on behalf of herself, and she's going to make some statements

about, you know, the murder of an Ambassador and three other Americans

and the wounding of a few others, I mean, without having that context,

the background and seeing as much of the puzzle as possible --

Q Sure.

A -- I mean, I would have thought for a couple of days, I mean,

knowing how -- how we prepare people, that I would have prepared a lot

more and had some context instead of just being handed a piece of paper

and saying, "Okay. Here you go. Employ these."

Q And then just to be clear, so your concern with what she

said was not that what she actually said was inaccurate, it was an error

of omission of sorts?

A Yeah. I mean, I think so. I think that's probably more

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correct. I think that's more correct.

Q And you would have wanted her or whoever was --

A Yeah. I wish --

Q -- speaking to --

A Honestly, I wish I had seen those talking points. I wish

I had seen those talking points and had an opportunity to weigh in on

what I think they should have -- how it should have been caveated.

That's what I do believe that -- you know, I would not have agreed with

the talking points that she employed, as an agency director, as an

Intelligence Agency director.

Q And, again, you weren't involved in the actual crafting of

the talking points for the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence. Is that accurate?

A No. I mean, I didn't -- I mean, sometimes -- like, I had

talking points sent to me on Snowden as an example, but not -- this

one wasn't one that I was given the opportunity to make a cut on, you

know, to give my 2-cents on, huh-uh.

Q So if there's was back and forth on particular issues about

including or omitting the term "al-Qaida," you would not have known

about those conversations?

A Prior to the -- to the talk shows? Huh-uh. I mean, we

were -- it was pretty clear in our assessments. I mean, our assessment

was that this was, you know, an al-Qaida-associated group that had

conducted this attack. I mean, I think that was pretty clear. And

that never really changed.

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Q Right.

A Even though the idea that they used the protest to take

advantage of it.

Q Understood. But with regard to the specific crafting of

talking points for the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence, you would not have been aware of any --

A Now, for those, you know, because you're asking something

different than those that were prepared for Susan Rice.

Q Oh. Okay. With regard to ones for the House Permanent

Select Committee on Intelligence, were you involved in that process?

A Yeah. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I mean,

if I was, you know, maybe I was. I don't know. I don't recall that,

though.

Q Okay.

A I mean, I couldn't tell you off the top of my head if I saw

something that was going to go to the HPSCI. I don't know. I don't

remember that. But I definitely would know if I was given a shot

at looking at the ones that Susan Rice employed, you know, immediately

after the whole thing, you know, happened. So those I was not given

an opportunity to look at.

Q Thank you, Dana.

A Okay.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Real quick. Just one other thing, sir, real quick. Were

you aware -- are you aware of a CIA military force, paramilitary force

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known as Ground Branch?

A I am.

Q Do you know if they had a presence in Libya prior to the

attack?

A I do not. I do not know. I mean, I did not know at the

time, I think I do now, that they had a presence there, from what I

have seen and read.

Q Do you know if they had a presence at the time of the attack?

A I don't know.

Q Okay.

A I don't know.

BY MR. CHIPMAN:

Q When you say, General, that from what you have seen and read,

that you think they had a presence in Libya, do you have a sense of

the timing in which that presence was manifested? Was it during the

revolution? Was it prior to Qadhafi's ouster? If you can try to

bracket your recollection of the timeframe.

A Yeah. And I'm just -- I'm going based on --

Ms. Sawyer. Dana, I just want to make -- be sensitive here to

the fact that yesterday when the agency was in the room, there were

some sensitivities about whether or not this information was

information we were cleared to receive.

General Flynn. Yeah.

Ms. Sawyer. I don't want the committee certainly to be in a

position where we're soliciting information that is beyond what we're

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allowed, nor do I want to put you --

General Flynn. Sure.

Ms. Sawyer. -- in the position.

General Flynn. Sure.

Ms. Sawyer. I know you're just trying to answer a question.

General Flynn. Well, I will just say, I'll tell you from my

experience.

Mr. Chipman. Before that, my recollection was that the

sensitivity of the discussion yesterday had to do with other activities

that were going on in Libya at the time for which there may have been

a finding that provided the legal justification. I don't recall our

witness yesterday refusing to discuss the presence or absence of a

Ground Branch --

General Flynn. Yeah.

Mr. Chipman. -- element in Libya.

Ms. Sawyer. Okay.

General Flynn. Yeah.

Ms. Sawyer. I'm going to caution --

Mr. Chipman. So on that basis, I understand the caution --

Ms. Sawyer. I know.

Mr. Chipman. -- and I appreciate --

Ms. Sawyer. And the caution is in part because it's just an

agency whose equities are not represented in the room at this point

in time. So --

Mr. Chipman. No. We're simply trying to explore whether this

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witness is aware --

General Flynn. Yeah.

Ms. Sawyer. Understood.

Mr. Chipman. -- of any presence of Ground Branch assets.

General Flynn. Yeah. I am not. At that time, I'm not.

BY MR. CHIPMAN:

Q Okay.

A But the -- but I will just tell you from having been, you

know, in the counterterrorism world for a long time and been around

a lot of consulates in some really difficult places, it would be unusual

to not have CIA Ground Branch resources in some of these more dicey

places, because they provide force protection --

Q And is there --

A -- for a base chief, you know, a CIA base chief. It

makes -- you know, it's just prudent security measures that they would

provide.

Q Yes, sir, and that makes sense. And from your experience

in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, I would imagine you had some

familiarity and worked with Ground Branch assets from time to time.

A I mean, we know that there was a Chief of Base in Benghazi.

There was a Chief of Base there.

Q Correct.

A That's a -- that's a subordinate to the Chief of Station.

That's usually the case in these far-flung consulates that we have,

there's a base chief. And usually with the base chief, you'll have

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a force, protection force, sometimes two guys, sometimes five, depends

on the problems, so we know that there's a Chief of Base, the likelihood

of having a force protection force is probably pretty high.

Q And in your experience, does that Ground Branch presence

typically constitute itself primarily in a combat phase of operations

or is it a permanent enduring presence?

A It's more of the latter, yeah.

Q Okay.

A It's more of a -- it's a force protection capability

primarily for the leadership at the consulate.

Q At the station or the base?

A Yeah. The base.

Q At the base?

A The base, yeah, yeah.

Q And are you familiar with the Global Response Service, or

GRS --

A I am.

Q -- capability that the agency has?

A Yeah, yeah. I am.

Q Does that capability sometimes replace Ground Branch in

terms of providing security to the Annex or station?

A Yeah. It depends -- it does. Yes, it does. Yes, it does.

Q Is it possible that the GRS could have been the only force

protection entity as opposed to Ground Branch assets?

A I guess it's possible, yeah. It would be possible.

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Q But it's not something that you had personal knowledge of --

A No.

Q -- during your time --

A No.

Q -- at --

A No. How they were organized, no.

Q Thank you. That's all I have.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Sir, is there anything else that you think is important for

this committee to know about the attacks on Benghazi that you'd like

to share with us before you leave today?

A Yeah. No. I mean, just, you know, looking at it from the

time that it occurred till now, you know, sadly the situation's gotten

worse, far worse. It's much worse today than it was then. So you can

imagine how bad it was then where they had the ability to attack a U.S.

Consulate, you know, kill a U.S. Ambassador and other -- and other

Americans and are apparently still getting away with it, and the

situation's far worse today, you know. I mean, there was a time when

in 2009, 2010 where we were looking at, you know, 150 foreign fighters

coming into Iraq, now we're talking about 1,500 a month.

So what we know for certain with, you know, great facts, and a

lot of them, is that eastern Libya has been a hot bed of extremism

supporting al-Qaida with variations, with different group names,

different leaders for a long time in this fight we've been in. And

so to have had ourselves postured the way we were in terms of security

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and doing the kinds of things that I know that were going on, you know,

it's sad that we didn't make better decisions.

And I will tell you, I mean, as a -- as, you know -- I'm a guy

that's put together a lot of pieces of a lot of puzzles, and the pieces

of this puzzle to me are very clear, you know, when you lay out all

the evidence prior to 9/11, prior to that date, you know, that this

happened, and the evidence was clear that there was direct threats to

U.S. interests, and the primary U.S. interest was a consulate out there

that was attacked, actually.

So decisions aside of what the Ambassador did or what more force

protection was put there, I just look at this whole thing as it's just

such a calamity of errors, and then, frankly, it's like I have said,

you know, and this is really for -- Heather, for you as well, you know,

we wouldn't be here talking about this had Susan Rice employed talking

points properly. And given the entire context of what occurred, and

then, frankly, saying, you know, we just don't know enough right now.

That was only, what, 5 days, 6 days after. I mean, my God, you know.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Do you think that in her appearance, she failed to say this

assessment is initial, there's an investigation ongoing --

A I don't know.

Q -- and we need to wait?

A Yeah. I don't know. I don't know. I don't -- I don't

know that. I don't remember that specific, but only providing a

portion of what we knew, is -- is kind of the way I felt. Boy, it's

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like, wow, she just gave a -- she just gave an assessment that's not

accurate.

Q And do you think in the talking points that were given to

the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to speak to -- to

communicate with the public about what had happened in Benghazi --

A Yeah.

Q Those were given to HPSCI on September 15th.

A Okay.

Mr. Chipman. Excuse me. Can I make sure the record reflects,

were those talking points actually provided to the committee on the

14th of September?

Ms. Sawyer. The 15th of September.

Mr. Chipman. 15th? The Saturday?

Ms. Sawyer. Yes.

Mr. Chipman. Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. Yes.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Do you think that --

A So I -- you know, I wasn't provided those.

Q The ones that were --

A And I don't -- I can't sit here and tell you that I ever

saw those.

Q Would you have expected them to --

A I mean, now -- now, after the fact, I probably have seen

them.

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Q Would you have had the same expectation that you had for

any talking points for Ambassador Rice, to the extent there were being

talking points created for Congress to communicate with the public,

would you have the same expectation that it would tell the full picture,

that it would mention al-Qaida and affiliates, associations with

al-Qaida?

A Yeah. I mean, I think so. I'm not quite sure I understand

what you're asking, but I think that the broader context of -- and it

doesn't require that much more, but the broader context is that this

was not a bunch of hoodlums hanging outside of the consulate that night,

and a video came out and they got upset and they attacked. That was

sort of the message that came across, and that -- and we know that's

not the case. We knew it then.

Q So regardless --

A We knew it then.

Q -- of who was communicating, the talking points that were

being created for them --

A Yeah.

Q -- should have mentioned --

A I believe so.

Q -- the belief that al-Qaida was involved?

A Yeah. I think that there should have been more context

probably provided in those talking points, sure. Certainly, you know,

that al-Qaida was a -- you know, we believed that al-Qaida was

responsible for this thing. Yeah. I think that would have been very

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fair. And that would have helped her and, frankly, others who

are -- you know, want to pick their battles. Yeah.

Ms. Sawyer. Okay. Were you guys finished? I think Peter had

a couple.

Mr. Tolar. No, no.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Sir, I appreciate the flexibility with your schedule to

accommodate our questions today. Just one housekeeping matter. I

want to refer back to a response you gave in an earlier hour just to

help us with the timeline of the night of the attacks, or the day of

the attacks here in D.C. You'd indicated that -- were you in

Washington, D.C., when you first learned of the attacks? Was that

correct?

A I was in Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

Q So you learned of the attacks when you were at Fort Huachuca?

A Right.

Q Is that right? Okay. And to the extent that the committee

may have -- or let me ask it this way. Would there be a situation center

that would track your movements?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And would that provide us with a general sense of

your whereabouts, your movements --

A Oh, yeah.

Q -- at the accurate point in time?

A Yeah. Yeah. You can look at my -- you can look at my

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calendar, you know. It probably shows, you know, when I departed, when

I took off or when I -- when I, you know, returned from --

Q Okay. Do you recall when you landed at Fort Huachuca?

A Yeah. I think -- well, out there? I don't know off the

top of my head.

Q Early evening?

A I know I was back the next day, you know, probably

midafternoon or so, because I remember I went in and I went right into

our CT center.

Q Sure. But your departure, would that have been

midafternoon --

A Probably.

Q -- early evening?

A Yeah, probably, yeah, because I know I had some meetings

that day. I think I had a meeting that day with, like, the -- I think

I had a meeting with King Abdullah's brother, one of the royal

highnesses of Jordan, that day, if I remember right, because I -- you

know, I was still sort of in my early days of the directorship and so

I was doing various meetings with different people to, you know,

introduce myself and get a sense of what they were doing, so -- but,

yeah, yeah.

Mr. Kenny. I think we're all set. Oh, sorry.

Ms. Sawyer. We've got --

Mr. Tolar. No. Go ahead.

BY MR. KENNY:

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Q So, sir, just at this point, we do have one final matter.

And I'll just preface by saying this: our the select committee is the

eighth congressional investigation into the Benghazi attacks. On the

minority side, this is our attempt to help ensure that it is the last,

and we've been asking every witness a series of public allegations that

have been made over the course of the last few years since the attacks.

It's our understanding even though that some of these questions have

been answered by other investigations, our colleagues in the majority

continue to pursue these allegations, and that's why we are continuing

to ask about them.

Anyone can speculate about the Benghazi attacks, plenty of people

have, but only a limited universe of people really have the firsthand

knowledge, actual knowledge of what happened either before, during,

or after the attacks. So, again, what I'm asking for here is not so

much opinion, but just whether you have firsthand knowledge of some

of the matters I'm going to ask you about. If you don't, we'll just

simply move on to the next allegation. And there's about a dozens of

these, so please bear with me.

A Okay.

Q It's been alleged that the Secretary of -- that Secretary

of State Clinton intentionally blocked military action on the attacks.

One Congressman has speculated that, quote, "Secretary Clinton told

Leon Panetta to stand down," close quote, and this resulted in the

Defense Department not sending more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

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Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington

Post fact checker evaluated the claim and gave it four Pinocchios, its

highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-bay

security resources in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

spring of 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

spring of 2011?

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A None that I can remember, no.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons systems to Syrian rebels or other

countries. A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select

Committee on Intelligence found that, quote, the CIA was not collecting

or shipping arms from Libya to Syria, close quote, and they further

found that, quote, "no support for this allegation," close quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

A I do not.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A I do not.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound, and

there have been a number of allegations about the cause and

appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee

issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not ordered

to, quote, stand down, close quote, but that instead there were tactical

disagreements on the ground about how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand-down order

to CIA personnel?

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A I don't have any evidence.

Q And then putting aside whether you personally agree with

the decision to delay temporarily or think that may have been the right

decision, do you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper

reason behind the temporary delay of the CIA's security personnel who

departed the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A Well, the way you asked the question, I question the

judgment.

Q Okay. And can --

A So --

Q -- you elaborate?

A So -- because you used the word "bad." I mean, so, yeah,

there was bad judgment.

Q So which judgment specifically are you --

A Probably at every level.

Q Okay. And are you referring to some -- a person in

particular?

A I may not know specific evidence, but that's not the

question that you asked me.

Q Okay. Well, actually I asked if you had any evidence that

there was a bad or improper decision, reason behind the --

A Yeah. The evidence is -- yeah. The evidence is a dead

Ambassador and three dead -- other dead Americans and others wounded.

I mean, that's the evidence. So there was judgment calls at the ground

all the way up to the highest level. I question the bad judgment. So

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that's -- my evidence is the -- is the dead Americans and the wounded

Americans and the fact that we had to leave a country. So, yeah, I

question -- based on the evidence that I know, I question the bad

judgment.

Q Right. So just to clarify, you're referring to the

consequences of some of these decisions, the tragedy that unfolded,

not any specific evidence that there was a bad or improper reason. Is

that correct?

A There was bad judgment. That's obvious. It was bad

judgment multiple, multiple levels of the government, starting with

the guys on the ground, and that's the hardest place to be, but on up.

I just question the judgment, yeah. So based on your question and the

evidence that we know, there was obviously bad judgment.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And just to clarify, when you reference the evidence that

we know, the evidence you're talking about is the consequences, what

unfolded, not actual evidence that you had in your possession at the

time?

A Yeah. Like, I don't know why they made a particular

decision at the Annex or the consulate or at AFRICOM or back here in

the White House, but it's pretty clear that the judgment was lacking,

and clearly the decisiveness was lacking.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q A concern has been raised by one individual that in the

course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board,

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damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that

production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to the ARB?

A I don't. I was never -- no. And I have had no interaction

with the ARB at all.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department --

A Which is an amazing statement in and of itself --

Q Okay.

A -- when you think about it.

Q Well, perhaps we could explore that a little further.

A Well, why would the ARB not come and talk to the director

of one of the largest intelligence agencies in the country about -- when

everybody's questioning the intelligence? Why would the ARB not do

that? That's what you ought to ask the ARB. I mean, honestly, I

was surprised that they did not come and talk to me.

Q All right. Do you have an awareness of the individuals who

they did interview?

A I'm not. No.

Q Okay.

A I mean, I'm sure I could go get a list of them, of who they

interviewed, but, no.

Q And there was a representative from the Intelligence

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Community, or a person who represented the intel side of the House on

the ARB. Is that your understanding as well?

A I don't know. I don't know what the -- I don't know what

the makeup of the ARB was.

Q All right.

A I know who the guy in charge and the -- and sort of his

deputy.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No. No.

Q And then let me ask these questions also for documents that

were provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at

the State Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from

materials that were provided to Congress?

A No. No.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when he

told Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully performed our duties

in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship," close quote.

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave

false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

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A I do not.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A Yeah. I don't know.

Q It's been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made a, quote,

"intentional misrepresentation," close quote, when she spoke on the

Sunday talk shows about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk

shows?

A Yeah. I think the key word there is "intentionally," and

I would not be -- you know, I would not want to understand what was

in her head, but she clearly employed talking points that were -- where

there was omissions that probably could have clarified quite a bit of

this mess that we're in right now, why we're sitting here today, and

I believe that. I believed it the day that I watched her do that, and

I just couldn't believe it, couldn't believe it.

Q It's been alleged that the President of the United States

was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief," close quote, on

the night of attacks and that he was, quote, "missing in action," close

quote.

Do you have any evidence that the President was, quote, "virtually

AWOL as Commander in Chief," close quote, or, quote, "missing in

action," close quote, on the night of the attacks?

A No. No.

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Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

advanced to Tripoli on the night of the attacks were considering flying

on the second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors to stand

down, meaning cease all operations. Military officials have stated

those four individuals were instead ordered to remain in place in

Tripoli to provide security medical assistance in their current

location. A republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that, quote, "there was no stand-down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi," close quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House

Armed Services Committee that, quote, "there was no stand-down order

issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the

fight in Benghazi," close quote?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives. However,

former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, former chairman

of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review of the

attacks, after which he stated, quote, "given where the troops were,

how quickly the thing all happened and how quickly it dissipated, we

probably couldn't have done more than we did," close quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

conclusion?

A I think that -- I mean, I don't have any evidence, but my

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judgment is that we didn't do everything we could. I mean, I just think

we lacked imagination that night.

Q And you had mentioned earlier, I think tying back to --

A I mean -- I mean, I would have used --

Q -- UAVs, the unarmed vehicle --

A -- I would have used that predator, I would have used that

predator in a far different way than just trying to --

Q Okay.

A -- survey the -- you know, put a camera over the top of what

was happening. Oh, yeah. I mean, use your imagination.

Q Sure. And, again --

A I just think that people get -- you know, in a crisis, which

I've been in a lot of them, I think that people tend to get -- they

stiffen up. So, yeah, I just think that we failed to use our

imagination. I don't have any evidence about what you're asking me,

but I just think that not every single tool -- you know, we

tend -- sometimes we use a hammer to just hammer. You can do it -- you

can use it for other things too.

Q But, again, on the night of the attacks, you were not in

any operational role --

A No.

Q -- regarding this?

And, finally, do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had

military assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could

have saved lives but the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not

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to employ?

A Yeah. I don't know that. I don't know that.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So just a quick question. We've talked a fair amount today

about the talking points and Susan Rice's appearance. You indicated

right now that you actually saw her on the shows that Sunday. Is that

accurate?

A I did, yeah. Yeah.

Q And I think you said you couldn't believe it, what she had

said?

A I couldn't. I could not believe it.

Q And even now you feel pretty strongly about that?

A I do, because I was surprised that she -- you know, I mean,

I felt bad for her, because I think that she was put into a position

where she really didn't know, and that's a problem in and of itself,

but that's a different issue. But I think that she was put in a position

to employ some talking points that weren't totally accurate.

Q And feeling that strongly about it even at the time --

A Yeah.

Q -- did you take any steps to address it, to correct the

record, to bring it up with your partners in the interagency? Anything

that --

A Yeah. I let it be known. I -- you know, it was -- it

was -- you know, I let it be known.

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Q Did you raise the issue --

A I mean, I didn't write -- I mean, it was done, it was a done

deal and we were -- now it's recovering.

Q Did you raise the issue with anyone in CIA?

A No. I raised it at the -- you know, I raised it in

conversation that I had with leadership in the Intel Community.

Q And do you remember any of the people that you

contemporaneously raised it with?

A You know, it might have been -- might have been Director

Clapper, you know. I mean, I just know that it was like, wow,

what -- you know, she just -- she just, you know, really employed some

things that were not totally -- they weren't -- they weren't a lie,

they just weren't the whole -- you know, it wasn't a good contextual

set of talking points that had they been employed properly, had there

been a little bit more stated, then I think we wouldn't be here today.

Yeah. I really -- I really believe that.

Ms. Sawyer. Okay. I think from our perspective, that's all we

have for you. We do really appreciate --

General Flynn. Yeah.

Ms. Sawyer. -- all your time in coming in. By the clock up there

that isn't working, it's really only noon --

General Flynn. Yeah, I know it, I know it.

Ms. Sawyer. -- so we didn't keep you past noon, but we do

appreciate you --

General Flynn. 1:15.

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170

Ms. Sawyer. Yeah. I understand that clock is not correct, but

thank you and thank you for pushing back your departure time.

General Flynn. Yeah.

Mr. Tolar. And, sir, also on behalf of Chairman Gowdy and the

other members of the committee, we want to thank you for your time

involved here and coming in here today.

General Flynn. Yeah.

Mr. Tolar. Also appreciate your service to this country and your

family's sacrifice during your service. It's really important that

we recognize that. And thank you again.

General Flynn. Thank you.

Mr. Tolar. We're off the record.

[Whereupon, at 1:20 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

1075

INTERVIEW OF

SPOKESPERSON,

NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS BUREAU

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, OCTOBER 9, 2015
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

CRAIG MISSAKIAN, Deputy Chief Counsel

MARK GRIDER, Deputy General Counsel

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel

RONAK DESAI, Minority Counsel

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUSTIN EVERS, Senior Advisor

ALISON WELCHER, Attorney-Advisor

ERIC SNYDER

1078
3

Mr. Grider. This is a transcribed interview of Mr.

conducted by the House Select Committee on Benghazi.

This interview is being conducted voluntarily as part of the

committee's investigation into the attacks on the U.S. diplomatic

facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and related matters pursuant to House

Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress and House Resolution 5 of the 114th

Congress.

Mr. , can you please state your full name for the record?

Mr. .

Mr. Grider. On behalf of the committee, we appreciate you coming

in. I understand that you flew in. Was it today or --

Mr. . A few days ago.

Mr. Grider. A few days ago.

Mr. . Yeah.

Mr. Grider. We do appreciate your willingness to come in and talk

to us today.

As you may know, my name is Mark Grider. I'm one of the counsels

on the majority committee staff. And I'll go around and room and let

everybody introduce themselves.

Mr. Desai. Ronak Desai with the minority staff.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer with the minority staff.

Ms. O'Brien. Erin O'Brien, minority.

Ms. Welcher. Alison Welcher, State Department.

Mr. Evers. Austin Evers, State Department.

Mr. Grider. All right. Briefly, I would like to go over some

1079
4

ground rules and explain how the interview will proceed today.

Generally, the way questioning proceeds is that a member from the

majority will ask a question first for up to an answer. Then the

minority will have an opportunity to ask questions for an equal period

of time if they so choose.

Questions may be only asked by a member of the committee or a

designated staff member. We'll rotate back and forth, 1 hour per side,

until we're out of questions, and the interview will be over.

Unlike testimony or deposition in Federal court, the committee

format is not bound by the rules of evidence. The witness or State

counsel may raise objections for privilege, subject to review by the

chairman of the committee. If these objections cannot be resolved in

the interview, the witness can be required to return for a deposition

or a hearing.

Members and staff of the committee, however, are not permitted

to raise objections when the other side is asking questions. This has

not been an issue we've encountered in the past. I just want to make

sure you're clear on how the process works.

Mr. . Understood.

Mr. Grider. This session is to begin as unclassified. If any

question calls for a classified, please let us know and reserve that

answer until we move to a classified setting. In preparing for your

interview, I don't believe any of my questions will go into classified

information based on the documents that I reviewed, but if you feel

it does, please confer with counsel, and we'll handle it accordingly.

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5

You're welcome to confer with counsel at any time throughout the

interview, but if something needs to be clarified, we ask that you make

this known to me. If you need to discuss anything with counsel, we'll

go off the record and stop the clock and provide you this opportunity.

We'll also take a break whenever it's convenient for you. This

can be after every hour of questioning or after every couple of rounds.

You just let us know. You know, we usually say we'll get you coffee

and water, but this time I think all we have is water in here. But

we can go down to 205 and get some coffee if that's needed.

As you can see, an official reporter is taking down everything

you say and I say to make a written record. So we ask that you give

verbal responses to all questions, "yes" and "no," as opposed to the

nods of the head. I'm going to ask the reporter to feel free to please

jump in in case you respond nonverbally. And so I welcome her coming

in and letting us know if things are unclear in any way.

Also, one thing I need to work on is trying not to talk over each

other as you answer questions. We want you to answer our questions

in the most complete and truthful manner as possible. We'll take our

time and repeat or clarify our questions if necessary. If you have

any questions or don't understand any of my questions, please let me

know. We'll be happy to clarify or repeat.

If you honestly don't know the answer to a question or you do not

remember, it's best not to guess. Just please give your best

recollection. If there are things you don't know or can't remember,

just say so and inform us, to the best of your knowledge, who may be

1081
6

able to provide a more complete answer to our question.

All right. Do you understand that you have an obligation to

answer questions from Congress truthfully?

Mr. . I do.

Mr. Grider. This also applies to questions posed by

congressional staff in an interview. Do you understand that?

Mr. . I understand that.

Mr. Grider. Witnesses that knowingly provide false testimony

could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury or for making false

statements. Do you understand that?

Mr. . I understand that.

Mr. Grider. All right. Is there any reason you're unable to

provide truthful answers to today's questions?

Mr. . There is no reason.

Mr. Grider. All right. That's the end of my preamble.

I always like to check in with the minority to see if there's

anything they want to add.

Ms. Sawyer. No.

Thank you for being here. We appreciate your willingness to

come. We appreciate the fact that you flew -- my geography is always

bad.

Mr. . A long way.

Ms. Sawyer. A long way here. We appreciate that and your taking

the time to do so.

Mr. . Sure.

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7

Ms. Sawyer. So thank you.

Mr. . My pleasure.

Mr. Grider. Right now, the clock reflects 10 after 11.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Okay, Mr. , can you just give us a brief background

of your history, starting at the State Department, your work history?

A Sure. I started at the State Department in March of 2003

as a career Foreign Service officer. I began my diplomatic service

in Ethiopia, where I served for 2 years, and then returned to the

Department, where I worked in the State Department Operations Center,

which is the Department's 24-hour crisis response center.

I then moved to the Iran desk, where I worked Iran policy, and

then went into the Arabic language program with a plan to go to Oman,

where I would serve as the public affairs officer, but I did not quite

get there.

I volunteered to go to Iraq in 2008, where I served on a Provincial

Reconstruction Team, a PRT, from 2008 to 2009 in southern Iraq; then

returned to the United States, studied another year of Arabic;

volunteered to go back to Iraq for a second time, where I served as

the deputy spokesperson at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.

And, as no good deed goes unpunished, I volunteered to come back

to Washington and serve as the spokesperson for the Middle East Bureau,

which I did from 2011 to 2013.

After that, I entered the Department's intensive 2-year Japanese

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8

language program and did that from 2013 to 2015. And just 2 months

ago, I started at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo as the counselor for

political and military affairs, where I will serve for 3, possibly 4

years.

Q That's a very impressive background and history.

Well, so let's focus on, sort of, the 2011-2013 time period.

A Sure.

Q Can you once again clarify, what was your title and your

role?

A Sure. I served as the Deputy Director for the Office of

Press and Public Diplomacy in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. I

was also dual-hatted as the Bureau, NEA, spokesperson.

So, in that capacity, I conducted live interviews, both on the

record, background, deep background, off the record. I coordinated

our office's daily press guidance, which would feed into the State

Department spokesperson daily press briefing that happens every

afternoon. And I would advise the Assistant Secretary of State, the

Deputy Assistant Secretaries of States, office directors, other folks

in the Bureau on press and public diplomacy matters.

Q Just back up real quick. You had mentioned, sort of, the

daily press briefing that happened. Who was making those daily press

briefings during your tenure there?

A What do you mean by "who was making"? Like, who was the

person who was briefing?

Q Yes. You're saying your information flowed up to --

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9

A Oh, sure. Sure. Yeah.

So, just to clarify, each regional bureau and functional bureau

in the State Department has a press office, but, unlike embassies

overseas, you want to have centralized messaging. And so the Bureau

of Public Affairs and the State Department spokesperson, who at the

time was Victoria Nuland, she would conduct daily press briefings in

the press briefing room on the second floor of the State Department.

And so all of the bureaus, NEA included, would receive press

taskings early in the morning, questions that I think the

spokesperson's office believed might be asked at the press briefing,

things that were stories that had been covered in the news that morning

that could come up, and then we would generate talking points, working

with the various offices, working with our embassies overseas to figure

out what do we want to say about this issue or that issue.

Q To be clear, your office, NEA, they issued its own, sort

of, press statements on occasion. Is that correct?

A "Issued" -- like, do you mean "issued" meaning released in

the name of the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs?

Q Yes. I mean, not everything that you did flowed up to

Victoria Nuland. Is that --

A I mean, a lot of times -- so I guess I would respond this

way. When you're back in Washington, the primary spokesperson for the

State Department really should come from the Office of the

Spokesperson. But a lot of times, the other part of my job was, if

an ambassador overseas wants to give an interview, that the embassy

1085
10

public affairs officer, let's say in Lebanon, would send my office back

a series of talking points. And we would look at those talking points,

taking into consideration broader regional equities that a public

affairs officer in a country like Lebanon, who is only focused on maybe

Lebanon and Syria, might only be thinking about, and say, look, you

might want to say this, or you might not want to say this; the Secretary

is going to be traveling, maybe, next week, and he's going to be making

an announcement on something very similar, so we don't want to steal

his thunder. So we would clear talking points for our embassies

overseas.

Q Are you familiar with the name ?

A Yes.

Q And what was his role?

A So was a member of my staff at the time in

the office of NEA press --

Q So he reported to you?

A Yes and no. was on my staff, but he had found a

cut-out to report to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. So he

kind of reported to me at times maybe on paper, but, really, his boss

was the DAS at that stage. But --

Q He was on your staff.

A He was on my staff. Yeah.

Q And are you familiar with the name ?

A Yeah. She was the Libya desk officer at the time.

Q And what was her role?

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11

A So, in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and any other

regional bureau, each country has either a single desk officer or

multiple desk officers who work on that country's issues. And so

was, at the time, the Libya desk officer, the person who was in charge

of liaising with our diplomatic mission in Tripoli and also connecting

with the Libyan Government that had representatives here in Washington.

Q All right. Let's just talk about, sort of, information in

and then, sort of, how that information flowed out.

A Sure.

Q How did you gather your information? You know, if a speech

or documents came to you, I imagine you fact-checked those documents.

How would you gather information to see if things were accurate? Or

who was on the ground that was sort of feeding information to you or

who was in the State Department that was feeding information to you

about Libya or other Middle Eastern countries that you were --

A I mean, it would really depend on the type of information

we're talking about. I mean, as a press officer, I was constantly

getting information in from multiple sources -- for example, media

reports, translations of pan-Arab press reports from Al Jazeera or Al

Arabiya or those stations. I was also hearing from our diplomatic

missions overseas, saying, hey, you know, journalists are asking about

this. So it really depended on the specific issue.

Q So let's focus on Libya.

A Okay.

Q When you were working on the Libya issue, who were you

1087
12

getting information generally from? And we'll focus on September 11

and 12 and 13. But, just generally, if you were getting information

and they were making some type of statement about Libya, who from

Diplomatic Security or, you know, media, who were you dealing with to

sort of fact-check your information when it came to Libya?

A Well, I mean, are we talking prior to September 11?

Q Correct.

A So, at that stage, we were engaging with the mission

overseas. I was also chatting a lot with .

I'll give you an example. Probably in August 2011, I'm not sure

the exact date, but I had given an interview on CNN International

specifically about Libya. And it was after the fall of Qadhafi but

before Qadhafi had been found. And so that was an opportunity where

CNN asked for a 5- to 7-minute standup with a State Department

spokesperson. I then did the interview. But, prior to that

interview, I talked to the Libya desk officer, I think I talked to the

DAS, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, asking, okay, what are

my top-line messages, what is it that we want to convey? And so I would,

you know, put together those talking points.

You know, I would reach out to the local CNN person to see, do

you have a sense what Hala Gorani is going to ask me? You know, what

is it going to be about? And so I had sort of a sense of things. I

think the interview focused on human rights abuses by the -- I don't

know what they were called, but the Libyan freedom fighters. And so

I looked at press guidance from the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,

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13

and Labor to sort of get a little sense of what that bureau was saying

about human rights violations and things like that.

Q In light of you working -- you said State Ops in 2005? Is --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- that correct?

A Yeah.

Q Did you ever, sort of, keep those relationships, that if

you ever, you know, needed some information coming in from Diplomatic

Security, did you ever contact State Ops?

A So one of the things that I did is I asked to remain -- and

to this day, I still remain -- on the distro lists of the State

Department Operations Center's watch alerts. These are, sort of, bits

of information, unclassified information, that are generated to let

folks know that things are happening. So they might be press reports;

you know, Prime Minister Abe in Japan signed a historic agreement. Or

they might be DS, Diplomatic Security, spot reports.

So I've always kept on those, because it's a good way not only

for me to keep up to date with what is going on, but, you know, on these

spot reports, they're often cc'd to Assistant Secretaries of State.

And so, as a spokesperson, I now have a heads-up that the Assistant

Secretary of State is now thinking about this issue. It might not be

related to press, but her question might be, okay, well, what are we

going to say about this? And if I'm on that distro, that helps me do

my job better.

Q Just to clarify, how did the information flow into State

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14

Ops? Where were they getting that information from?

Let's say -- and let's just keep it focused on Libya. I don't

know if you were working on Libya in 2005, but if someone was in State

Ops and they were overseeing Libya, how were they getting information

into State Ops about Libya?

A So embassies overseas -- I mean, when you join the Foreign

Service, they try to drill into your head 202-647-1512, which was the

telephone phone for the State Department Operations Center. So, you

know, if things are happening overseas, you call into Ops. There's

a seat in the Operations Center called the editor chair, and that person

is in charge of drafting the Secretary's afternoon brief or the

Secretary's overnight brief.

And so, a lot of times, embassies overseas would feed into the

Ops Center. Sometimes the Ops Center would see something in the press,

an AP or Reuters ticker, and then call out to the embassy and say, hey,

we saw that there's a protest here, or we saw that there's a

demonstration; could you tell us more about that?

Another way is that there's a DS Command Center. I've never

worked there. I don't know a lot about it. I don't know a lot of what

happens there. But I know that the DS Command Center has a more direct

channel of communication in with the regional security officers

overseas.

Q And we're going to turn our attention to September 11. But

I just want to be clear that if you needed to, sort of, have some

fact-based information about what is actually going on on the ground,

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15

whether it be in Libya or Cairo, would State Ops be able to give you

that information?

A Not necessarily.

Q Okay.

A I mean, Ops is a clearinghouse. There aren't Libya experts

in the Operations Center. We're a bunch of generalists who are on staff

who are answering calls.

And so perhaps at the moment when I would call into the Operations

Center, folks would know exactly what is happening at that very moment;

they might know what's happening. But, generally speaking, those

aren't, sort of, the subject matter experts. They don't know the name

of this person or the name of that person.

Q Gotcha. Very good. Okay.

Let me direct your attention to what I think people have called,

sort of, the protest in Cairo. Do you recall that event?

A I do.

Q Okay. And can you tell me, sort of, your role and what you

recall from that event taking place?

A I recall that I was up quite early that morning. Because

the Middle East is some hours ahead of us, I tended to wake up earlier

and earlier every morning, because the crises, you know, were sort of

brewing for hours by the time I was up and even before I got in the

office.

So I think sometime around 5 a.m., maybe 5:30, I had looked at

my BlackBerry and saw a message from Cairo indicating that there was

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a statement that they were going to issue on the demonstrations outside

of the embassy.

Q And let me just be clear on the pronoun. You said "they"

were going to issue. And let me just make sure, who are you suggesting

when you say "they"?

A Embassy Cairo.

Q Embassy Cairo.

Q Yeah. So sometimes embassies will release press

statements for a wide range of reasons. It may be a local issue that

does not raise to the level of affecting U.S. foreign policy globally.

At that stage, it's my understanding that the folks at Embassy

Cairo felt that they wanted to get ahead of what was an increasingly

intense situation on the ground. And by issuing a statement, they

thought that that might quell any sort of concern that protesters had

about this video and things like that.

Mr. Evers. Mark, just for the sake of the record, can we get some

time/date on the record? I don't think we've talked about when

we're -- I know what you're talking about --

Mr. Grider. Fair enough. Fair enough.

Based on your recollection, do you recall -- you said you woke

up at 5 a.m. Do you recall what day that was?

Mr. . I'm pretty sure it was the morning of September 11,

but that's -- yes, that's my recollection.

Mr. Grider. Okay.

Mr. Evers. 2012.

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17

Mr. . 2012. Sorry.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Now, you were communicating about, sort of, what the

intentions of Embassy Cairo was trying to do with issuing a statement,

you know, before we just had to answer that. How did you know that?

I mean, is that just speculation, that you're saying, hey, this is what

I think they were trying to do? Or was that communicated to you, "We

wanted to get ahead of this"? I'm trying to understand the basis of

what you just stated.

A I don't remember exactly what Cairo's message was to me.

I mean, I think Cairo -- if I recall, Cairo was sending me a message,

Washington a message, to say, "We are going to issue this statement."

Q Okay.

A Why it got perhaps a little more complicated at the time

is that I did not like that statement. I did not think that was a good

statement. It sounded tone-deaf to me. And I understood the desire

to counter an increasingly hostile situation, but my thought was, we

can do exactly what you want to do, but let's just rework the statement

so it actually accomplishes what we need to accomplish.

Q And in light of talking about the statement, why don't we

go ahead and just bring up that exhibit that you're referring to.

A Okay.

Mr. Grider. Let's go off the record just to get this all

straightened out here.

[Recess.]

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18

Mr. Grider. Let's go back on the record.

[ Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Okay. I've marked a document government exhibit 1. The

document number is "C" as in "Charlie," O5390721. It's an email that

contains communications from Mr. . And we'll walk through that.

But before we focus on this, let's just go back to -- I just wanted

to bring this document out just to refresh your recollection. You were

stating that Embassy Cairo was sending a message, and you

essentially -- and correct me if I'm wrong -- you were sort of pushing

back on that message, or, as you communicated here, it was sort of

tone-deaf.

Can you explain that again, what you meant by "tone-deaf"?

A Sure. I mean, as I look at what I wrote on that Tuesday

morning, I think it's pretty self-explanatory.

And I think, first and foremost, press statements need to be

concise. The messaging needs to be very clear. And when I looked at

the statement, you know, it was 9/11, and this is a really important

day for the United States. And I recognize that there were protests

happening overseas, but the idea that we were going to issue a statement

on 9/11, even from Embassy Cairo, that first discussed the hurt feelings

of protestors just seemed not appropriate as the first sentence of a

statement.

Q Sure.

1094
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A And, you know, I completely -- as I said in my email, you

know, there are a lot of these parts that I agreed with.

Q So, based on the email -- first, let's start at the bottom

of the email.

A Sure.

Q Can you tell me who is -- you know, this is an email, I think,

that was sent from on Tuesday, September 11, 2012, at

5:26 a.m. to a number of individuals. Where would you have been on

that? NEA-Press-DL?

A I was on the NEA-Press-DL.

Q Okay.

A Yep.

Q Can you clarify for the record, who is ?

A So , at the time, was the -- his title was,

I believe, the Acting Director for Press and Public Diplomacy in the

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. But he was also sort of a senior

advisor for public diplomacy for the Bureau at that stage. But, at

this stage, he was out working at Embassy Cairo on TDY.

Q And so, with respect to -- if we go to the very first page,

on Tuesday, September 11, 2012, at 12:18 p.m., you walk through and

make specific comments or suggestions about the statement that Mr.

wanted to go ahead and send out. Is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. And why don't you walk us through -- because there's

just more than one. But let's just walk through -- you had talked about

1095
20

the 9/11, some of the other edits or suggestions that you had with

respect, or concerns that you had with respect to this statement.

A Yeah. I mean, as I wrote here, we, as I said, you know,

we condemn violence, we condemn human rights abuses, we condemn war.

But, you know, condemning the misguided efforts to hurt people's

feelings just sounded inappropriate and not becoming of a U.S.

Government statement. That was my position.

Q Okay.

In paragraph 2 of your critique -- do you mind reading that?

A Sure. Beginning with "is there"?

Q Yes.

A Sure.

"Is there any evidence this video has gone viral? I agree it's

pretty bad, but when I watched it yesterday morning there were only

1,082 hits. It's now up to 6,000. Not exactly viral. I'm happy to

debate the merits of this, but this statement seems really tone-deaf

to me."

Q Let's talk about, obviously, your opinion or thoughts about

the video. Can you explain, what were you communicating there?

A I mean, during the course of my time as NEA spokesperson,

we saw lots of religiously insensitive videos, and it was very difficult

to know which one was going to go viral, which one was going to -- I

mean, I can't remember the pastor's name from Florida, but there was

a guy, you know, whose hobby was burning Korans. And so we would

always, you know, be concerned, is this going to be the video that,

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21

sort of, ignites a real storm of protest in the region.

And so, at this point of the email, I'm asking how worried do we

really need to be about this. You know, if only 6,000 people have seen

this video, then the video really hasn't gone viral. So, you know,

at this stage, we were monitoring the impact of the video, but, you

know, 6,000 hits at that stage, for me, was not something that caused

a huge amount of concern.

Q And I just want to be clear as far as, was it a function

of the video causing concern or the video causing somewhat of a protest?

Based on your review of statement, was it more of a function

of, you know, "Hey, we're concerned about this video," or did you have

reason to believe that was sort of connecting the video to the

protest and that's what raised the concern?

A It was my understanding that they were concerned about the

video and that the statement that drafted was to try and nip in

the bud, from a U.S. Government perspective -- I mean, the idea here

would be that this statement was drafted -- or, I'm sorry, the video

was done by a random American citizen that had no connection to the

United States Government but that people protesting would look at the

United States Embassy and think, "That's America. America made that

video."

And so I think idea here was to get a statement out from

the United States Government that condemned this video, to put some

distance between the United States Government and a random video

created by a private citizen completely unrelated.

1097
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Q No, I appreciate that. So would your view -- when you read

this, you didn't believe that was conflating the issues of the

video caused the protest. He was just sort of saying, the video

happened, and then, you know, we've got a protest.

A So, at this stage, I don't remember if protests had already

begun. I just don't recall. But I think, like many of us who were

doing messaging, we wanted to get out ahead of things and see if we

could, you know, prevent demonstrations from happening. And, you

know, if a strong statement from the United States Government

condemning maybe made some protesters think, "All right, well, that

was a random American citizen, we can't really blame the United States

Government," then that was a really good idea.

Q All right. Okay.

And in your role as NEA press, were there

opportunities -- obviously -- to sort of express your objections to,

whether it be statements coming down that you disagreed with, or

factually disagreed with -- was that sort of an open policy, that you

were able to sort of say, you know, I don't agree where this factually,

I don't agree based on my assessment? Were you able to express those

thoughts?

A I certainly felt that I could. And this email is a great

example of that. I mean, I saw the email; I replied to all. I thought

that we could -- as I said, I was happy to debate the merits of this.

Q Right.

A But I felt it was important to be on the record because,

1098
23

you know, in this email, suggests that we released it for Egypt

only, but we live in a media environment where a statement that is

released overseas, you know, immediately is a global statement. So

I just wanted to make sure that we all were on the same page.

Q And so you raise your concerns. And help me here on

response back. What was your understanding of -- he stated, "We

released it for Egypt only. No need for you to do anything if it's

not affecting other missions. We have a demonstration planned here

today."

What was your understanding of that response?

A Again, my understanding was that, in line with how U.S.

embassies work overseas, where, in the name of the Ambassador or in

the name of the United States embassy, they may issue a statement that

is targeted to a situation in country, I understood that wanted

to issue the statement for Egypt only because there were demonstrations

planned for today.

Q Now, at 12:18 you gave your edits, and at 12:20 it sounds

like it had already gone out. Was that your understanding? Or, you

know, did you all have a telephone conversation? It looked like he

may have read your comments, but he sort of said, well, we've already

released it.

A Yeah. My understanding, actually, is that -- my

understanding about these times is that these are Middle Eastern times.

This was all happening -- this was not 6 hours later.

Q Fair enough.

1099
24

A So, yes, I think sort of wrote back and said --

Q It's gone. It's done.

A Yeah, it's done. Like --

Q Thanks. Okay.

What was your understanding of that sentence, "No need for you

to do anything if it's not affecting other missions"?

A Again, because press statements in one country can be easily

picked up by the media in other countries, I think was suggesting

that -- or may have been suggesting that, you know, we're doing this

for Egypt; there's nothing really for you to do unless you feel like

this statement is going to have an impact in Tunisia or Lebanon or Saudi

Arabia or somewhere else in the region. So they were communicating

that this was an Egypt-only thing and they wanted to send it out.

Q Okay. We may come back to that.

You may have answered this. How did you become aware of the

protest in Cairo? You had mentioned your email, but was it a telephone

call? Was it watching the news?

A It might have been this email. I don't recall. I just

don't recall. And it also might have been the fact that it was 9/11

and we were all thinking about what could possibly happen on a day like

today.

Q And, to your knowledge, did Cairo or State have advance

warning of the protest?

A I don't recall.

Q Do you have any belief of what prompted the Cairo protest,

1100
25

you know, based on your information that you were receiving in?

A It was this "Innocence of the Prophet" video. There were

two videos. I'm not sure if that was the first one. But it was a video

depicting the Prophet Muhammad in a negative light that I think had

appeared on Egyptian television, but I'm not quite sure.

Q And how did you form that opinion? I mean, what's the basis

of that opinion?

A I was in touch with folks who were out there in Cairo. And,

I mean, we were meeting about these videos. Again, whenever there was

a Koran burning or something that we were concerned would resonate

negatively out in the region with a connection to the United States,

we were always, sort of, keeping up with that.

Q So, I mean, number one, it was based on meetings that you

were having. And then, number two, you stated that you were in touch

with people on the ground?

A Uh-huh.

Q Okay.

All right. Let's turn your attention to the September 11th

through the 13th timeframe. Are you familiar with the attack that

occurred at Benghazi?

A I am.

Q Okay. Can you walk me through? What was your role, and

how did you find out? Just walk us through.

A So there were lots of protests happening around the region

that day. I mean, I think there was a protest in every country in NEA

1101
26

that day. So I had worked a full day. I was in the office till quite

late that evening, when I think I had heard, either from the front

office, from Beth Jones' office, that something was happening in Libya.

And so I had heard there were protests, and then, at some stage,

there was some information coming in that the compound in Benghazi was

under attack. And then, at some stage, you know, we heard that, you

know, Chris had been killed or Chris had been wounded.

And I think I had, you know, Al Jazeera on or some other pan-Arab

network. So I was watching TV but also shuttling back and forth. I

was receiving some press inquiries, but I had no information to share.

And then sometime that evening, you know, we got confirmation that

Chris had been killed. And so we were there in the office till quite

late. And then I think I went home and then came back a few hours later

and started the day again.

Q During that time, during that day, did you have an

opportunity to talk to State Ops?

A I don't believe I talked to State Ops at that stage. I just

don't think there would have been a need for me to reach out to State

Ops.

Q You said you were on the email system of State Ops. Do you

recall if there were emails from State Ops?

A I think there were watch alerts, maybe, from the DS Command

Center sort of giving updates, but I don't recall specifically.

I mean, let me say, at the time, I remembered everything very

vividly, but there was a lot happening at that stage. I mean, there

1102
27

were protests -- I mean, you see from the emails that I was up at 5

that morning, you know, and there was a lot going on at that time.

Q To your knowledge, did either Benghazi or State have advance

warnings of the attack?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Any information that the attack might have occurred, before

it began, on Twitter or Facebook?

A I wouldn't know.

Q You know, based on your review and being there on those 2

days, do you have an understanding of the reason or the reasons for

the attack? What was your basis or thought?

A I mean, I didn't know. I mean, it was a day where there

were, you know, hundreds of -- not hundreds, but there were protests

all over the region. But, you know, NEA is a volatile region. This

is a region where Al Qaeda -- and this was before the rise of ISIS,

but where Al Qaeda had a presence in a lot of difference places. So

it was just tough to know exactly, for me, what happened.

And, to be frank, you know, Chris was a friend of mine. So I

wasn't really thinking about talking points. I wasn't really thinking

about, you know, the particulars of who was responsible for this. And

I just -- it was a shock, I think, to all of us who worked in NEA that

we lost a friend.

Q I understand that. And your counsel, State counsel, did

mention that, you know, you had known him and sat next to him. So I

do understand that point, and I appreciate the relationship there.

1103
28

With respect to Cairo, it sounds like you were able to sort of

determine that there was a reason for that specific protest, based on

your earlier statement. Is that correct?

A I mean, we had a piece of information that that video had

been broadcast on Egyptian television. That was something that -- I

don't know where I got that, whether I got it from the embassy, but

that was something that was on my radar, so there was a connection there.

Q Okay. And did you have any pieces of information about what

caused the attack in Benghazi during that day?

A I didn't. But, again, there were so many demonstrations

happening. I mean, Khartoum -- I mean, there were demonstrations just

all over the region that day. So it was very tough to know -- I mean,

the entire region was just sort of engulfed in demonstrations.

Q Right, and multiple issues. But you didn't have any

specific intelligence or information on what caused the attack?

A I did not.

Q Okay.

I know you had a long day. Who were you meeting with? I mean,

were there any meetings with Victoria Nuland? Were there press

meetings? How was information -- what was you all's role, what was

NEA's role on the 11th and the 12th?

A There were lots of meetings. I don't recall meeting with

anyone from Bureau of Public Affairs, Victoria Nuland. There were

email exchanges, I think. I don't know if I had had a specific email

exchange with her.

1104
29

I met with, you know, my staff who were in the office:

and Beth Jones and I think Liz Dibble, who was the Principal

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. But --

Q And what were those meetings generally about?

A You know, what's the latest, what do we know. But, to be

frank, you know, they weren't really about my role as NEA spokesperson.

They were just, you know, me wanting to know, you know, is our friend

dead? Like, what do we do now? What happens now? I mean, what does

this mean for us as diplomats?

I mean, this, sort of, entire event was such a huge moment, I

think, for so many career diplomats who served in the Middle East, you

know, who had gone out to places to deliver schoolbooks to a place that,

you know, might be really, really dangerous. And I think all of us

who, you know, had served, you know, saw ourselves in Chris that

evening, the potential that that very same thing could have happened

to us.

Mr. Grider. I'm going to tee up another exhibit, but let's go

off the record.

[Recess.]

Mr. Grider. Let's go back on the record.

[ Exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q I've handed you government exhibit 2, "C" as in "Charlie,"

05580618.

1105
30

A Is that your number?

Q That's the document number.

A Oh, okay. Yeah, I'm not familiar with that number. Okay.

Q Have you had a chance to review through this exhibit?

A Yes.

Q Do you recall the conversations or the email exchanges?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So why don't you explain -- starting at the back of

the document, why don't you walk us through. I believe the first email

came from, perhaps, a ?

Mr. Evers. What page are you on?

Mr. Grider. On page 30, if I'm not mistaken.

Mr. Evers. I believe there's an email below it.

Mr. Grider. Yeah, there is.

Mr. Evers. But I don't believe the witness is on either of the

emails that originate on page 30.

Mr. Grider. Okay. Fair enough.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q So, based on your review of the email, as you were commenting

on information, where on the chain did you enter in, based on your

review?

A It looks like dropped me into the chain

on the second page, halfway through. So, up until that stage, I had

not seen these points.

Q Okay. So you're stating that on Monday,

1106
31

September 17, 2012, 1:59 p.m., subject "FW: Libya PG," that's when you

came into the chain. Is that your understanding?

A Yeah, that is my understanding. I don't see myself on any

of the emails. And the number of email distros are not distros that

I -- referenced in some of these previous emails are not distros that

I was a member of.

Q Okay.

So, based on reviewing this email, why don't you walk us through

each response, starting with at 1:59 p.m., where she

says, " -- per my call. Not sure we want to be so definitive.

What does A/S Jones say?"

What was your understanding of that?

A My understanding is that it was very early in the

investigation and it was tough for us to know exactly what had happened.

And I think what was saying is, do we really want to be so

definitive about the fact that these were spontaneously inspired

protests. And we were seeking clarification from the Acting Assistant

Secretary, Beth Jones.

Q Let's move forward. And if you can, sort of, walk us

through -- you know, this is an email from you, and you can walk me

through and just go ahead and read it and then tell us your thoughts

and what you meant.

A Sure.

I wrote, "The horse has left the barn on this, don't you think?

Rice was on FIVE Sunday morning shows saying this. Tough to walk back."

1107
32

And I think, by that, I meant it was maybe a foolish errand to

debate the merits of talking points when the talking points had already

been used and these things had already been said. So I think my comment

was, we can ask anybody what they think of this, but it's already been

said, so that's where we are.

Q Just to be clear, what was the rub here? Spontaneous versus

something else? What was your understanding of what was the dispute,

a factual dispute, that maybe you were suggesting that we need to walk

something back?

A I can't speak to what anyone else was thinking at the time,

but for me -- you know, early on in any crisis, when it comes to

messaging, being more general is, I think, the prudent course of action.

Because if you don't really know what's happened, you don't want to

have to go back and say, "Well, this didn't happen this way. We thought

it happened this way." But if you are general in the beginning, then

you can slowly say, "Well, as the investigation continues, we've now

learned this," and you're not going backward, you're just going

forward.

And so when I made the reference saying it's tough to walk back,

it was in response to comment, do we really want to be so

definitive? Well, we had been definitive.

Q And definitive about what? What level of specificity were

you all concerned about?

A "The current information suggests that the demonstrations

in Benghazi were spontaneously inspired."

1108
33

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q So let's move to the next email by on Monday,

September 17, 2:05 p.m. He stated, "Toria planned on walking it back

just a bit, though." What was your understanding of that?

A Reading it, I think what meant was that -- although

I don't know, but I suspect -- that Toria would be giving a daily press

briefing that day, and that was an opportunity to walk it back maybe

a little bit, to perhaps ensure that the most important message was,

"This assessment may change as additional information is collected and

analyzed and as currently available," which, for me, as a spokesperson,

was the most important part of the talking points.

Q Then we go to the next email from , stating,

"I think Rice was off the reservation on this one." What was your

understanding of her statement?

A I'm not -- I mean, I think --

Q So, first, let's just -- let's break it down.

"Reservation." What did you all mean? Because you had mentioned

that -- what was that understanding of "reservation"?

A It's perhaps not a very politically correct term.

Q Understood.

A I don't know, but I read this that probably felt that

Ambassador Rice was -- maybe she disagreed with what Ambassador Rice

1109
34

was saying, and so felt that maybe it was a bit too much to go on all

those morning talk shows saying this. But I'm not sure. She would

know.

Q You had mentioned earlier that the general principle, at

least the one that you sort of walked through in your time as a press

person, is to be more general than to, you know, pinpoint and have a

level of specificity.

If that doesn't happen -- I guess, on two occasions, one with

Cairo, it seemed like, based on your email, there was sort of a pumping

of the breaks and sort of saying, "Well, let's -- I'm not sure. Let's

take another look at this statement."

So, based on the exhibit 1, it seemed like there was a culture

of, you were more of, sort of, "Hey, let's be more conservative." And

you sort of expressed, sort of, your conservative thought process on

what was taking place, whether it be in Cairo and Benghazi. What was

going on that you felt like people were sort of moving away from your

general process of being general and then let's wait and be more

specific, in your mind, if you can answer?

Mr. Evers. I was just going to say I think you've characterized

a lot of testimony that hasn't happened. So there's a lot going on

there --

Mr. Grider. Fair enough.

Mr. Evers. -- if you want to -- do you understand the question?

Mr. . Can you be a little more specific?

Mr. Grider. Sure.

1110
35

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q Earlier, you talked about your general policy --

A Yeah.

Q -- I'm not sure if it was State's policy, and correct me

if I'm wrong -- of, just being in press, that, you know, usually, your

process is to be more general --

A Sure.

Q -- and then, as things unfold, to try to have a level of

specificity.

A Sure.

Q Based on exhibit 1 and your response to exhibit 1, it seemed

like once again you were sort of following that type of process. Would

you agree?

A That's an accurate assessment.

Q In government exhibit 2, it seems like once again you're

following that process and sort of saying, "Hey, let's stay more general

as opposed to being more specific." Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. . Well, I guess I would say this. I think that you've

accurately characterized my messaging posture as conservative. And

that is because, if we say the wrong thing first, it causes lots of

problems later, so we just want to be very careful.

So, in exhibit 1 and exhibit 2, we're really talking about two

1111
36

slightly different things -- the same conservative messaging

philosophy but two different applications.

Mr. Grider. Fair enough.

Mr. . In exhibit 1, I sort of listed my problems with this

statement --

Mr. Grider. Sure.

Mr. . -- which were not really about general versus

specific. It was about tone and tenor.

And then, in No. 2, I think this goes to more of what you're asking

me about general versus specific.

Mr. Grider. Right.

Mr. . And so --

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q And moving to your process of being a press person, general

versus specific also goes to, sort of, something that can be

substantiated and fact-based --

A Right.

Q -- correct?

A Yes.

Q So, in exhibit 1, though -- you do go to the facts in exhibit

1 about, sort of, viral and, sort of, defining -- I don't have it in

front of me, but, sort of, some concern about -- I mean, you used math

on, "Well, I'm not sure if this is viral or not viral, so I'm not sure

if we can, sort of, from a fact-based standpoint, suggest that it's

really gone viral, based on my review of the video."

1112
37

A Yeah. I mean, I --

Q Would you agree with that?

A What I was attempting to do was -- one thing that happens

in media is that statements can sometimes lead the story. There are

times where a story is not a story until somebody issues a statement,

and the statement then generates press coverage.

Q Correct.

A And so anytime the United States Government says something,

it has the potential to make the story.

And so, in this case, I was debating, you know, if this was not

a huge deal, if it had not gone viral and then there was no statement,

then perhaps it would just be best to leave it alone. So that's exhibit

1. That was my thinking there.

Q Absolutely.

I don't need a read-back, but you made a statement -- and I'm

learning more about, sort of, how press works. Sometimes you stated

that a statement by press can actually make the story, correct?

A Yeah.

Q Your process was, if we don't necessarily have all the

substantiated facts, let's be cautious on making the story so we don't

have to walk it back. Is that a correct assessment of your view?

A I mean, in exhibit 2, I wouldn't say that I was applying

a "let's not say this because we don't want to make the story." Like,

this was a story already. Like, there was no debate as to whether or

not this was a story.

1113
38

Q And when you say "this"?

A I mean Benghazi.

Q The attack --

A Yes.

Q -- in and of itself.

A Yes. Early on, on September 1 --

Q Sure. Fair enough.

A -- in Cairo, we still did not know whether this would

metastasize into something tragic.

Q Correct.

A At this stage, you know, I'm looking at this, and I'm just

thinking, do we know enough --

Q Right.

A -- at this stage to say that it was a spontaneous attack?

Q Correct.

And, with respect to Cairo, you had specific -- later, you

determined there was specific evidence of a video that possibly caused

this protest. You had mentioned that, yes, you know, it was sort of

the consensus that it was a video that caused the protest. Is that

correct?

A Yes.

Q Yeah.

In this instance, you stated that there was a bunch of information

coming in from all over. There was no one definitive reason, at this

point in time -- and this is September 17. Like Cairo, you didn't have

1114
39

anything -- you, personally, didn't have anything definitive to sort

of say, this is it, and this is what happened. Is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q And so, in light of that, some of your colleagues --

, -- would you suggest that based on this email

some of the "off the reservation" -- and then we go to

email, in which he states, "Yup. Luckily there's enough in her

language to fudge exactly what she said/meant."

So there was some concern, based on this reading of this email,

just based on the analysis, that maybe all the facts were not there.

Would you agree with that?

A I can't speak to what they were thinking, but I can speak

to what I thought at the time, which was: It was early in the crisis.

For me, it was unclear as to what the cause was. There was a video,

but Al Qaeda was rife across the region. So I did not know.

And, as a spokesperson, I just wanted us to be extra-careful about

not going down a road of saying that it was caused by this and then

having us have to walk it back later on to say, oh, well, actually,

we found out that it was something else.

Q Right.

A And by remaining more general early in the crisis, that

would give us an opportunity to be responsive, to say things, but not

to get too far out on a limb. That was my thinking.

Q To me, I mean, that seems a standard thought process. Would

you agree? Or were there other people in NEA that agreed with your

1115
40

process? It seems like, here, that other people agreed.

A It seems like everyone on the email agreed.

Q Okay.

So, with respect to this communication, were your concerns about,

sort of, I'm using the term being more "conservative," based on the

facts, were your concerns ever expressed at a higher level, to your

knowledge?

A I just don't recall. I mean, I don't recall if I -- I mean,

let me say this. I don't recall if I expressed these concerns to a

higher level. But let me explain, perhaps, why that is.

I did not generate these talking points. And I did not know that

Ambassador Rice would be going on the Sunday morning talk shows. And

so, at this stage, I don't have my hands on the steering wheel of

messaging of this issue.

So, again, when I said "the horse has left the barn," a decision

was made, at some part of the process, of which I was not a part of,

to go with these talking points.

Q And to go with this level of specificity. Is that correct?

A Yeah. I mean -- yeah. I mean, I do not recall exactly what

she said. You know, these talking points also include, "This

assessment may change as additional information is collected."

Q Sure. Absolutely. Absolutely. But it wouldn't

have -- I mean, it wouldn't have generated this type of email about

being "off the reservation on five" -- and then let's -- we go to your

email. Let's just -- "off the reservation on five networks." Can you

1116
41

just clarify what you meant by that?

A As someone who enjoys watching the five Sunday morning talk

shows and someone who is interested in politics, I'm keenly aware that,

when you go on all five morning talk shows with the same message, you

want to send a clear and unambiguous message as broadly as possible.

And so what I was suggesting was that it was -- that I agreed with

that the messaging sounded off to me, but that was further

enhanced by the fact that it was on five networks.

Q And then --

A But can I just say one other thing?

Q Sure. Absolutely.

A You know, I didn't have access to whatever Ambassador Rice

knew. And so, you know, had this exchange gone on further, it might

have included me saying, "But I don't know what they discussed." You

know, I wasn't in -- she's a member of the Cabinet, as the U.N.

Ambassador.

Q Right.

A So I don't know what she knows. And, at this stage, you

know, there were lots of things happening that were completely above

my pay grade and out of my line of sight.

Q Absolutely.

A So --

Q Absolutely. You're --

Mr. Evers. Can you let him finish?

Mr. Grider. Oh, go ahead. Yeah.

1117
42

Mr. . So I guess I just -- I want to make sure that -- you

know, I'm expressing a personal opinion about a set of talking points,

and that opinion is based on what I knew at the time, which even then

and today I recognize might not have been the entire picture. So I

just want to be clear about that.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q And so your opinion then -- I'm not sure if I understood

your last statement.

A I don't know what happened. I have no idea.

Q So even today?

A I don't know. It may sound ridiculous that I have not

studied this, but maybe because I sort of lived through part of it I

don't feel the need to -- I mean, a great example. Were you -- well,

I'm not supposed to ask you questions, but -- I was in New York on 9/11.

I watched the towers fall. I watched the planes hit. I've never read

a single book on 9/11 because I don't have to. I was there.

Q Right.

A And so --

Q Fair enough.

And I'm just asking these questions from just, you know, your

experience in handling press and handling messaging and just trying

to get clarity during that timeframe. And so, I mean, your opinion

was expressed, but, also, in some ways, you would have been somewhat

of a subject matter expert, you know, on handling press and crisis.

I think that would be fair to say, correct?

1118
43

A Yeah.

Q Okay.

Earlier, with respect to exhibit 1, it was somehow communicated

to you what the intent or the reason why the Cairo Embassy wanted to

issue a statement. And that intention was communicated to you.

A Uh-huh.

Q Or you interpreted it. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q With respect to this press statement or these statements

by Secretary Rice, the intention of why they chose to go to more

specificity versus being general, was that intent or reason ever

communicated to you?

A No, not to my recollection.

Q Okay.

Now, let's turn to the last email on this, where

responds back to you, , and . Can you read what

he states there?

A "WH very worried about the politics. This was all their

doing."

Q What was your understanding -- "WH," what is "WH"?

A I would assume it means the White House.

Q Okay. And what was your understanding of his response?

A That this was decided at the White House level, that

was probably making a reference to the fact that folks were worried

about the politics, the political optics of this, and that they were

1119
44

responsible for crafting the language of the statement.

Q And, as you stated earlier, with respect to the crafting

of language of the statement, you were not involved in that. Is that

correct?

A That is correct.

Mr. Grider. Let's go off the record for a second.

[Recess.]

Mr. Desai. Let's go back on the record. The time is

approximately 12:40.

Mr. , good afternoon. My name is Ronak Desai. I am one of

the counsels with the minority staff of the Select Committee. I'm

joined here today by my colleague Heather Sawyer and our newest member

of the team, Erin O'Brien.

On behalf of the entirety minority staff and its members, we want

to thank you for your appearance here today. I also want to thank you

for your service to our country.

Let me apologize in advance. There is a good chance we might

retread some old ground that we covered in the last hour. If we do,

please bear with me. It's just to make sure that we've garnered the

information that we need and that we've captured the full extent of

your response.

I also may ask you some questions that may have obvious answers

to you, to explain acronyms and such, but, again, that's just for the

purposes of the record to clarify the information that we need.

Mr. . Understood.

1120
45

Mr. Desai. Thank you.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. DESAI:

Q In the last hour with my colleague from the majority, I think

when he was referring you to exhibit 2 -- and if I could just have you

refer back -- when he asked you to explain your comment on the first

page of that document, "off the reservation on five networks," if I

recall correctly -- and if I don't, please correct me -- I think one

of the things that you said to explain that was, you know, from your

perspective, Ambassador Rice, when appearing on these five networks

and conveying the information that she did, had gone off message, that

she had, you know, from a press spokesman's perspective, gone off

message. Is that right?

A I'm not sure that I would expand that to include "from a

press spokesperson's perspective," but -- I would make two caveats.

Q Please.

A The first was the caveat that I made in the last hour, which

is I only knew what I knew. So she may have known far more to be able

to be that definitive -- what I felt was very definitive.

So, with the information that I was armed with at the time, her

comments, to me, felt very specific, perhaps too specific that early

on in the crisis, and that, had I been drafting talking points, I

probably would have drafted talking points that were a bit more general.

Q Okay.

And if you've answered this in the last session, again, I

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46

apologize. You weren't involved in preparing Ambassador Rice for her

appearances on the talk shows. Is that right?

A I was not involved and had no idea that she would be on the

morning talk shows. I turned on the television and saw her and thought,

"Oh, I should watch this."

Q Right. And I think what you just told me, just literally

a minute ago, was that you did not have the information that she had

with respect to what she was going to convey on the Sunday talk shows.

Is that right? That she had more information than you did at that time.

Is that correct?

A That is what I assumed. The information that I had at the

time was not a lot of information, so I would have crafted talking points

that were far more general. She gave talking points that were far more

specific, so I can only assume that she had more information than I

did.

Q Right. And you had no access to whatever information you

assumed she had before she went on those shows. Is that correct?

A That is correct.

Q Were you aware, Mr. , that on -- just to establish a

timeframe, Ambassador Rice appears on the Sunday talk shows on

September the 16th, 2012, which is a Sunday. The preceding Friday,

were you aware that the intelligence community actually prepared

talking points with respect to what happened in Benghazi, the Benghazi

attacks, which were eventually, you know, passed on to Ambassador Rice?

Were you aware of that at that time?

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47

A I was not.

Q Okay.

At this time, if I can enter into the record exhibit 3. And let's

go off the record for one second while we prepare the exhibit.

[Recess.]

[ Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Desai. Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. DESAI:

Q Mr. , I've just handed you exhibit 3, and exhibit 3

comprises two pages. The first page here is the cover sheet of the

"Report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Review of

the Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya,

September 11-12, 2012, Together with Additional Views."

The second page of exhibit 3 is "Appendix I: The Benghazi Talking

Points." And these are a copy of the talking points that the

intelligence community prepared at the request of Congress.

And have you had the opportunity to review this document --

A Just now, yes.

Q -- Mr. ?

A Yes.

Q So, if I can focus your attention to the second page, page

43 of Appendix I. And allow me to direct your attention to the middle

of the page, where it says, quote, "The final, unclassified version

of the CIA talking points, as provided to HPSCI on September 15, 2012,

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read as follows," end quote.

And just for the purposes of the record, "HPSCI" is the House

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Is that right?

A I actually don't know that acronym. That's the first time

I've heard it. So, if you're saying that's what it is, then that's

what it is.

Q Great.

So it appears that these talking points, based on that sentence

I just read to you, originated with the CIA and then subsequently went

through an interagency process. And, again, were you a part of that

process with respect to the formulation of these talking points?

A I was not.

Q So Congress requested talking points on the 14th. They go

through this process. And do you recall ever seeing these talking

points at any point between September 14 and September 16, 2012?

A I don't recall seeing these talking points.

Q Okay. So then, again, just for the purposes of the record,

I assume you didn't see any draft or any iteration of these talking

points at that time. Is that right?

A Not to my recollection, no.

Q And, at that time, then, you were not aware that CIA Deputy

Director Mike Morell actually played a significant role in finalizing

those talking points. Is that right?

A No knowledge of that.

Q Okay.

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49

If I can direct your attention, Mr. , to the actual content

of these talking points. The very first bullet, midway on page 43,

the second page of exhibit 3, reads, quote, "The currently available

information suggests that the demonstrations in Benghazi were

spontaneously inspired by the protests at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo

and evolved into a direct assault against the U.S. diplomatic post in

Benghazi and subsequently its annex. There are indications that

extremists participated in the violent demonstrations," end quote.

Do you see that first bullet point?

A I do.

Q The next bullet point makes clear, it says, quote, "This

assessment may change as additional information is collected and

analyzed as currently available information continues to be

evaluated," end quote.

And I think you said in the last session with my colleague from

the majority that, from, again, your perspective, this sentiment, this

idea, that talking points and the information that's coming in is fluid

and, as a result, the assessment may change, that, from your

perspective, I think the quote you used was, "This is the most important

part of the talking points." Is that right?

A Yes.

Q So these talking points were delivered to Congress on the

15th. As I said earlier, Ambassador Rice appears on the five Sunday

morning talk shows the next morning, on September 16, 2012, where she

is asked and spoke about the attacks in Benghazi as well as the protests

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that preceded the attacks in Benghazi.

And just to refresh my memory, you saw Ambassador Rice on those

talk shows. Is that right?

A I did.

Q And you saw her on all five of those talk shows, if I'm not

mistaken?

A That's what my recollection -- yeah, my recollection is

that I did.

Q Okay.

So, to the extent that Ambassador Rice said on those talk shows

that a protest or a demonstration took place in Benghazi, that statement

is consistent with the first bullet point I just read to you in the

intelligence community talking points, which says that there were

demonstrations in Benghazi that evolved into an attack, and that

statement was consistent with the first bullet point. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

Now, if I can turn your attention back to exhibit 2 that my

colleague in the majority handed to you in the last session. And I'm

just going to quickly walk you through this chain. And I know we've

discussed certain portions of it, but I think it would be helpful just

to start at the outset and make our way up.

So it looks like this thread begins on the penultimate page of

exhibit 2, page 31.

A Can I just say something about these talking points?

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51

Ms. Sawyer. Yes. Please.

Mr. Desai. Please.

Mr. . So this is the first time I'm seeing this document.

Mr. Desai. Okay.

Mr. . And, you know, I guess what I've said before is it

just sounded too definitive. Like, I can read this now and see "the

currently available information," "the assessment may change." And

so I understand that. My recollection of watching the talk shows is

perhaps different from -- and I'm sure Ambassador Rice was very

faithful to reading these exact talking points.

So I guess what I want to say is, my recollection, as I listened

to those and I guess as evidenced in the email about me feeling like

it was too definitive, is that it felt too definitive. As I read these

points today, you know, maybe with a lot of hindsight, I guess I can

see how "the currently available information" suggests that it is

not -- maybe the language isn't as problematic.

So I guess what I'm just trying to say is my impression at the

time was very much as I expressed it, but as I can see these talking

points now, you know, perhaps there's enough -- well, anyway. I'm

probably not being very articulate right now, but --

Mr. Evers. I'm sure they can ask you some questions with regard

to that.

Mr. Desai. Thanks for clarifying that. And I think we'll just

have a few followup questions with respect to that.

Ms. Sawyer. Yes.

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52

Mr. Desai. And my colleague may have some questions.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And, just to make clear, you know, part of why we want you

to see that document is because we have asked you a lot of questions

about exhibit 2, about a conversation, about talking points in here,

and we just are trying to have an understanding of, at the time you

were making these comments --

A Right.

Q -- kind of, what was your universe of knowledge. So, you

know, just to explain where --

A Okay.

Q -- we're coming from a little bit on that.

And so, on that front, I think what we wanted to do was just direct

your attention in that -- that's exhibit 2 -- to page 29.

A Okay.

Q And that's the email that -- it looks like it comes from

.

A Uh-huh.

BY MR. DESAI:

Q And who is Mr. ?

A He was a member of my staff.

Q Okay. Wonderful.

So we're on page 29 of exhibit 2. Mr. sends this email

out to a host of individuals. The body of the email says, quote, "This

is actually the most recent. Just saw NSS language, which I used as

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the key points here," end quote. And then, after that, a couple of

bullet points are enumerated.

So, just as an initial matter, what's the "NSS," Mr. ?

A The National Security staff.

Q And is that entity now known as the National Security

Council?

A Yes.

Q And is that entity a part of the White House?

A It's the -- yeah. It's the policy advisor for the White

House.

Q Okay. Wonderful.

So Mr. sends this out. He says that this is the most recent

version of the talking points. "Just saw NSS language, which I used

as the key points." It looks like he's drawing upon some talking

points.

Now, Mr. , if I can ask you to take a look at the key points

that Mr. sends out and the content of those key points and have

you compare those to exhibit 3 and the two bullet points --

A Yep.

Q -- and just have you compare the two sets of talking points,

the ones that are sent by Mr. at 12:36 p.m. on Monday,

September 17, 2012, with the talking points that are enumerated in the

Senate Select Committee's report that were formulated by the

intelligence community.

A And so your question is you want me to determine what the

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54

difference is between these points?

Q So you've had the opportunity to compare the two sets of

talking points. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q And do you see any differences between the two sets of

talking points with respect to especially the first and second talking

points?

A Yeah. Both points are slightly different.

Q Where is that?

A In the first point, there's a reference to the U.S. mission,

and then in exhibit 3 -- in exhibit 2, there's a reference to a direct

assault against the U.S. mission, and then in exhibit 3 there's a

specific reference to the U.S. diplomatic post in Benghazi.

And then in the second point, there's a bit more length to the

language on exhibit 3, where it says, "analyzed as currently available

information continues to be evaluated." That doesn't exist in the

talking points in exhibit 2.

Ms. Sawyer. I think it might just be on the next page.

Mr. . Oh, is it?

Ms. Sawyer. Yeah. We had the same problem.

Mr. Desai. Flip over.

Mr. . Okay. Oh, there it is. Sorry. Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. So the difference that you identified is the

description of facility.

Mr. . Yeah.

1130
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Ms. Sawyer. Is that right? In one, it was referred to as the --

Mr. Desai. The U.S. mission.

Mr. . Uh-huh.

Ms. Sawyer. And in the other, it is --

Mr. Desai. The U.S. diplomatic post in Benghazi.

BY MR. DESAI:

Q So besides that one difference with respect to the

characterization of the U.S. facility which was assaulted on September

the 11th and 12th of 2012, do you see any other differences

substantively with respect to those two sets of talking points?

A I'm just looking at the third point.

Q Please.

A No. Just a punctuation change in the third point, but

that's about it.

Q Okay.

And just to reiterate -- and I apologize, but I think -- so this

email thread -- so Mr. sends this out. This language is

actually identical to the language of the CIA-formulated talking

points. Is that correct?

A Did you say "essentially identical"?

Q With respect to the substance, except for the one difference

with respect to how the U.S. facility is characterized as a U.S. mission

versus a U.S. diplomatic post.

A Yeah. They are substantially similar.

Q Okay. And, again, at the time, you were not aware that this

1131
56

language, which was ultimately forwarded to you through this email

chain in exhibit 2, that these talking points actually originated with

the intelligence community then. Is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. And this was the first time, then, when you saw this

with these talking points when the chain was ultimately forwarded to

you, that you were seeing this specific language. Is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay.

Now, moving to the very top of the email thread, where Mr.

says, "White House very worried about the politics. This was all their

doing" -- and I understand that you don't know what was in Mr.

head, but is it possible that -- you know, there's some confusion here

because Mr. , when he sends out this set of talking points, he

says, "Just saw the NSS language, which I used as the key points here."

But the exercise that we just went through, I think what it

demonstrated was that these talking points actually came from the

intelligence community and not the NSS. Is that correct?

A Well, my understanding of the role of the National Security

staff is they are the convenors. And so it would be -- perhaps

"inappropriate" is too strong a word, but it would be unusual for a

State Department bureau press office to receive talking points from

an intelligence agency. And so, oftentimes, when it works well, all

agencies are feeding things into the National Security staff, and the

National Security staff then decides where those things go.

1132
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And so my assumption is that, if, indeed, these points came from

the intelligence community, that they were forwarded to NSS. NSS then

said, hey, , you know, here are the points for NEA, these are

the points that NEA is going to draft and then clear around the building,

and this is where we are.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And I think part of -- we're asking you to do an impossible

task, which is to try to explain to us what Mr. might have meant.

We've actually spoken to Mr. , and he has given us his assessment

as to what he meant.

Did you actually have a conversation with him at the time, that

you recall, about what specifically he meant there? Or are you today

just trying to give us your best sense based on the document?

A I mean, we talked about lots of things. I mean, we worked

together. I don't recall what we talked about at the time.

Q And I think part of the concern is that this initial email

from Mr. specifically just says, quote, "Just saw NSS language,"

end quote.

So, at the time, did you have any evidence that would indicate

that this language here was actually drafted by the National Security

staff?

A I mean, a lot of this is sausage-making. Like, we don't

know -- when NSS hands us something, I don't have a vested interest

in knowing where it came from. Like, they're the National Security

1133
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Council. They are the apex of the foreign-policy-making machine. If

they tell us these are the points, these are the points. And so --

Q And you had no reason to worry, wonder, or believe that they

had actually written the language versus someone in the intelligence

community actually writing the language. Is that a fair statement?

A Say it again.

Q I just am trying to clarify. You had no reason to, you know,

question or believe or have any opinion as to who actually wrote the

key points that were written, whether that was written by someone in

the National Security staff or written by someone else and then

circulated by them. Is that accurate?

A Yeah. It never occurred to me to actually ask the question

of who wrote the talking points. They were coming from the National

Security staff. Those were the points.

And I am assuming that -- again, the same way that I talked about

Ambassador Rice, I don't know what the points say. Someone from the

White House is telling me these are the points. Well, then, they must

know what they're talking about.

Q You know, it's a very different matter to kind of believe

that something shouldn't be quite as definitive and actually believe

that something is incorrect.

A Uh-huh.

Q When you read these key points in this document that were

being commented on, did you have any reason to believe that what was

included in that key points was actually false?

1134
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A I had no specific reason to believe that that information

was false. When I expressed an idea of wanting to -- that my own

personal opinion is that things were kept general, is that there was

so much chaos that took place on that day, and, you know, and the enemies

of the United States, namely at the time Al Qaeda -- and it would have

been Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb -- were constantly plotting and

planning against the United States. This was something that I thought

about every single day of my time in NEA. And so I just thought to

myself, couldn't it have been an Al Qaeda plot on 9/11? I mean, it

was 9/11. Like, this is the day that they all wait for.

And so, as I said to you before, it felt early. It felt too early

to say that, with the information that I had and with my experience

in having served two tours in Iraq and having seen things blow up and

all that other stuff. Like, it just felt too early to me, personally.

That's all.

Q And, in the discussion last hour, the thing you had focused

on the most as your concern about being too definitive was the notion

that it was spontaneous. Is that accurate?

And, again, just talking about the talking points, because, quite

frankly, we've talked a lot about what Ambassador Rice said, but we

haven't actually looked at what she said. We were looking --

A Right.

Q -- at these talking points. And you had identified that

portion, the "spontaneous," whether it was spontaneous or not. Was

that your key concern about what was potentially too definitive?

1135
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A Yeah. I mean, I think I understood that there were -- and

I don't know if this is -- maybe I am misremembering this, but my

recollection is that the attack included not only small arms fire but

maybe RPGs. That's what I remember. And, while every Middle Eastern

country, especially Libya at the time, was just flooded with weapons,

you know, a spontaneous demonstration might not have -- people might

not have brought RPGs to a spontaneous demonstration.

So we had four dead Americans. It just -- I don't know. And

maybe I didn't want to believe that -- you know, there are a million

demonstrations every day. People burn the American flag every single

moment of every day across the Middle East, and people don't get killed.

And Al Qaeda is a plotter and a planner, and they are a really tenacious

enemy, and, you know, I've never underestimated them.

And so I think I just saw "spontaneous" and thought, how do we

know it's spontaneous? These are bad guys. Like, they dream of

killing us.

Q And what about the belief that was expressed that what

happened in Benghazi had a connection to the video that you talked about

some? I think you said it was the "Innocence of the Prophet." I've

heard the title "Innocence of the Muslims." I don't know if that --

A Oh, okay. Sorry. So there were a number of videos that

year. There was another -- or during my time. There was another video

that we all got very worried about that ended up not being that big

of a deal. And so, yeah, maybe this was the "Innocence of the Muslims."

I just don't remember.

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Q Right.

A There were so many bad things that happened.

Q But, in terms of that belief, that what happened in Benghazi

had a connection to the anti-Islam film at the time, did you have a

sense that what was said about that was false?

A No, I had no sense that it was false.

I mean, look, I know this issue of how easily people get offended.

I mean, in Sudan, somebody named a teddy bear "Mohammed," and they

wanted to, like, stone the woman to death. And so, I mean, the level

of extremism about things like videos can absolutely prompt these

things.

But I go back to the thing that I've said all along, which is that,

for me, it was very early in the crisis, and maybe it was early for

me because I was still in shock about it all, but it just felt like,

you know -- I mean, I didn't know that these points existed, that they

were vetted through the intelligence community.

So, if that's what the IC thought, then, okay, I guess

that's -- that would have changed my -- perhaps changed my opinion,

had I known that there was an IC recommendation that, looking at all

of the intelligence at that stage, that they had determined that it

really was spontaneous. Like, I would have been like, "Okay.

All right."

Q Right.

And just wrapping it back to the notion of the phrase that she

was potentially "off the reservation" -- and I took that to mean what

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I think my colleague said, potentially, in this context, "off message."

Would it potentially have altered at least your view that she was off

the reservation with regard to what she was saying?

A Yeah. I mean, yeah. Had I known more of the process, you

know, I might have. But, look, there's another part of this, which

is that, you know, this was like an incredibly emotional time. And,

like, I'm telling you I remember things, but there are a lot of things

that I just don't remember.

And so, you know, might it have changed my opinion? It might

have. But I might have been, like, "No. Absolutely not. I don't care

what the IC says. Oh, look at this language. They're still hedging.

You know, I bet this was -- you know, this is Al Qaeda. You know, there

are extremist groups operating in Benghazi and in Libya. Like, it

might have been a demonstration, but these guys probably had a plan;

it was 9/11." So, I mean, I came with my own baggage about this issue.

Q And you used the word "baggage." I won't call it that. You

had certain opinions, but did you have any concrete evidence --

A No.

Q -- at the time --

A No evidence. Just --

Q -- to attribute it to Al Qaeda or to a particular extremist

individual or group?

A I had heard in some conversations somewhere the name of a

number of extremist groups that were operating. And so I did not

extrapolate that to mean that, because there was an extremist group

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operating in Benghazi, that they were absolutely,

100-percent responsible for planning an attack against our mission.

But I did say, well, if there were extremist organizations operating,

it is highly possible that they could have planned an event to coincide

with the attacks on 9/11. That was my thinking at the time.

Q But, again, not based on any concrete --

A No.

Q -- evidence --

A No.

Q -- you had before you.

A No. And, I mean, this is -- we do this all the time in the

Middle East bureau. I mean, there's an existential crisis every single

day. And, you know, I don't have a crystal ball, but often we're sort

of wondering, you know, what's going to happen? Are these

demonstrations going to be the ones that sort of make everybody go nuts?

So I had no -- I had learned nothing. I had no evidence to suggest

that this was not true. I just had my own gut that was telling me that

there must have been something else going on.

Q Now, again, hindsight often is very clear. Your concern

about being too definitive may have been a wise one, given I think we're

the eighth congressional investigation. Every congressional

investigation has focused very heavily on what was said on those Sunday

talk shows. But there was also tremendous clamor for the

administration to be talking about both what happened in Benghazi and

what happened in the region more broadly.

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From your perspective as a spokesperson who's always facing

outward, what is the value, even understanding that facts may

change -- these key points note that. I think if we were looking at

the Ambassador Rice transcript and actually saw what she said, I think

on every single one of the five shows she said that. But what is the

value of trying to provide as much information as you can as quickly

as you can?

A Yeah, I mean, look, we live in a 24-hour media cycle where

everybody wants the information now. And, I mean, we live in a policy

world that has evolved in the same way, in that, like, we don't really

do thoughtful, deep, analytical reporting because everybody wants a

spot report now. Everybody wants to know exactly what's happening

right now. And I recognize that that's the world that we live in, that

we can't be as deliberative. We just have to get the information out

as quickly as humanly possible, now.

So, you know, I understand that there is value -- I mean, we had

four dead Americans. People want to know what happened. They want

to know. And so, you know, the decision was made to brief and to provide

folks with what we knew. And that was the decision.

Q And do you have any reason to believe that the information

being given in these key points or by Ambassador Rice on the Sunday

talk shows was anything other than the best assessment at the time based

on the information that was available?

A No. I mean, now that I see that there was coordination with

this, it looks like this was the best assessment of the IC at the time

1140
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and that she read the talking points and that that's that.

1141
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BY MR. DESAI:

Q Mr. , speaking a bit more broadly, unlike on some of

the points that you and my colleague were just discussing, as

individuals in the government are trying to find out the truth and as

things are rapidly evolving and information is coming in and some of

it is not entirely clear, definitive, or accurate, you know, stepping

back and, again, speaking in a much broader sense, did you ever get

the impression that anyone in the government, whether it was

Ms. Nuland, her press shop, the NEA Bureau, the White House, anyone

in the U.S. Government was trying to intentionally conceal the truth

of what was happening in Benghazi?

A No.

Q And did you ever get the impression that anyone, again,

broadly speaking, in the government who was involved and had equities

with respect to what happened was trying to misrepresent the truth or

mislead the American public about what had happened in Benghazi?

A I don't believe so.

Q And you expressed in this email thread that we reviewed in

exhibit 2 about the definitive issue and some concerns you had or

preferences. And I think in the last hour you told my colleague you

expressed them, and here they were, and they were circulated.

At any point, did you ever feel as if you couldn't express how

1142
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you felt or express your opinions with respect to any of the information

concerning the Benghazi attacks?

A No.

Q And do you have any reason to believe that anyone in the

government -- again, Ms. Nuland, the State Department, the White House,

anyone with equities -- was doing anything other than his or her best

good-faith effort to determine the truth and to convey accurately with

regard to what happened in Benghazi?

A What's the first part of the question?

Q Was there anyone at any point -- do you have any reason to

believe that, you know, the State Department, the White House, the folks

that were involved in this process of conveying information to the

American public and trying to determine what happened, that they were

doing anything besides their best and operating in a good-faith manner

to convey the information accurately to the American public?

A I saw nothing that would lead me to believe that. But

you're asking me to comment on something so broad that I couldn't

possibly know what every person who was associated with this' motives

are.

So my answer is I don't believe so. But that question is so broad

that, like, I cannot know definitively if that's completely true.

Q Based on your experience.

A Based on what I saw, I saw no evidence of anybody trying

to mislead the American public as to the events of Benghazi, based on

what I saw.

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Q So, Mr. , we're approaching the end of our session,

and I would like to shift focus just a little bit. So this is, as my

colleague mentioned to you earlier during our session, the eighth

congressional investigation into the Benghazi attacks, and one of our

objectives in the minority is to ensure that it's the last

investigation.

And, as a result, we're asking every witness who appears in front

of the committee about a series of public allegations that have been

made with respect to the attacks. And it's our understanding that even

when they have been answered by previous investigations who have looked

into some of these issues, our colleagues in the majority are pursuing

some of these allegations still. And, as a result, we're going to

continue asking about them.

Anyone can speculate about the Benghazi attacks, and plenty of

people have, but only a limited universe of people are going to have

information and actual knowledge or evidence of what happened before,

during, and after the attacks.

So the way I would like to proceed is I'm going to just read out

to you what the allegation is and then ask you whether or not you have

any information or firsthand evidence about the allegation that's being

made. I am not asking you about your opinion. I am asking whether

or not you have evidence or firsthand information with respect to that

allegation.

A Okay.

Q To the extent that you may have evidence, we'll explore that

1144
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further. If not, I will just move on to the next allegation until we

have none left. There are about a dozen or so, so I ask for your

indulgence and your patience until we get to the end.

Do you have any questions before we start?

A I do not.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton

intentionally blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One

Congressman has speculated that, quote, "Secretary Clinton told Leon

Panetta to stand down," end quote, and this resulted in the Defense

Department not sending more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security in Libya. The Washington

Post Fact Checker evaluated this claim and gave it four Pinocchios,

its highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

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personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Colonel Qadhafi to his

own people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya

in spring of 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Colonel Qadhafi to his

own people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya

in the spring of 2011?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that, quote, "the CIA was not collecting and

shipping arms from Libya to Syria," end quote, and they found, quote,

"no support for this allegation," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that U.S. facilities in Benghazi

were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya to Syria

or to any other foreign country?

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A No.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound, and

there have been a number of allegations about the cause of and the

appropriateness of that delay.

The House Intelligence Committee issued a bipartisan report

concluding that the team was not ordered to stand down but that,

instead, there were tactical disagreements on the ground over how

quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand down ordered

to CIA personnel on the night of the attacks?

A I do not.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do

you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind

the temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed the Annex

to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A I do not.

Q A concern has been raised by one individual that, in the

course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board,

damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that

production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

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provided to the Accountability Review Board?

A No, I do not.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No, I do not.

Q Let me ask these questions also for documents that were

provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials

that were provided to Congress?

A No, I do not.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when he

told Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully performed our duties

in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship," end quote.

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave

false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political purposes?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made a,

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quote, "intentional misrepresentation," end quote, when she spoke on

the Sunday talk shows about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk

shows?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief," end quote, on the

night of the attacks and that he was, quote, "missing in action."

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing in action

on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considering

flying on the second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors

to stand down. Military officials have stated that those four

individuals were instead ordered to remain in place in Tripoli to

provide security and medical assistance in their current location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that, quote, "there was no stand-down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House

Armed Services Committee that there was no stand-down order issued to

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U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives.

However, former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the

former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a

review of the attacks, after which he stated, quote, "Given where the

troops were, how quickly the thing all happened, and how quickly it

dissipated, we probably couldn't have done more than we did," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Chairman McKeon's

conclusion?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not to

deploy?

A No.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q I think we're just about to the end of our questions, but

I did want to ask you a question. I'm going to, in advance, give you

every right to decline to answer it because it's not an easy question.

But I think sometimes it's hard for Members of Congress and staff in

Congress to truly understand at a personal level the impact of

congressional investigations. Obviously, sometimes they're

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necessary and some level of scrutiny is warranted. But we're now, I

think, past 4 years after the attacks. We're still investigating the

attack.

So I just -- I know that you commented a few times on the impact

at the time, that Ambassador Stevens was a friend. And so I just

wondered if you could share with us, because, you know, part of what

we hope informs the conversation is, kind of, the cost. There are

obviously monetary costs but there are human costs, as well, of

congressional investigations.

I just wanted to give you the opportunity, if you wanted, to share

anything about the impact on you, on your colleagues.

A I think, from my perspective -- and perhaps maybe why I don't

have a lot of answers for you on talking points and what I thought about

this talking point is that it really was never about the talking points.

That's the least important issue. And I mean that from, like, a

personal standpoint. It has nothing to do with politics. It's about,

you know, the service that we've rendered to our country.

And, you know, I think it's fine that Congress investigates. You

know, I don't have an opinion either way whether there should have been

this many investigations or that many investigations. I guess I just

hope that folks who are investigating this are asking bigger questions

about our diplomatic presence, what it means to be forward-deployed

as a civilian, building bridges of communication with hostile

audiences. This, for me, is, like, what Benghazi is all about.

Like, Chris Stevens was a former Peace Corps volunteer, like, our

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very best. And his example and this idea that he would have been out

there in a very difficult place is something that I think a lot of us

really relate to, because, especially for those of us who served on

PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, we did this stuff every day. And we took

off our body armor, and we walked hand-in-hand with tribal leaders.

And we told our wives back home that, oh, no, I was holding his hand,

that's a signal to everybody that he's going to protect me. And, like,

could an IED have blown up and killed me, and could there have been

an investigation as to why I wasn't wearing my PPD, why I wasn't wearing

my helmet? Yeah.

But I guess I hope that, at some stage, folks are thinking about

what we really want diplomats to do out there. Like, is it worth

delivering a bunch of schoolbooks to some 8th-graders in Basra? And

if 10 people get killed doing that, is that okay? Was that the price

of doing business? Is that the price of advancing our foreign policy

in this sliver of desert?

And, I mean, I guess my mood changed as you read me all those

questions because I kept thinking, you know -- I understand why you're

asking them, but, like, for those of us who experienced this very

personally, these things don't matter. Like, our friends died. And

I guess I hope that you, as lawyers, understand this, that, like, we're

out there, like, doing these things. We don't want thanks; we just

want understanding for the mission that we're doing.

And I think America, after Iraq and Afghanistan, understands our

men and women in uniform out there, but they still don't have a concept

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of the civilians. And we're a very small number. We don't have a

lobby. We're, you know, pinstriped diplo-weenies, I think, to some

people, especially on the Hill. But, you know, we're folks that are

out there trying to advance our foreign policy in a nonpartisan way.

And I guess I hope that that comes out.

Q Well, is certainly is our sense that, with regard to

Ambassador Stevens, he, as you put it, was one of our best, and he truly

believed in the mission that he was carrying out both in Tripoli and

in Benghazi. Was that also your sense of how he viewed his presence --

A Yeah.

Q -- in Libya?

A Yeah. I mean, I think -- and he knew Libya. And, I mean,

I just -- I often, like, go back to my own experiences when I was on

a PRT because it's the most similar experience that I can draw to,

because we went to places where there was no embassy, there was no

hardened structure. I mean, you know, I don't know what the State

Department regulations are on where you're supposed to sleep, but I

slept in a soft structure for an entire year. I am quite sure that,

like, that was not following State Department protocol. But I was on

a military base, and it was like, oh, well, you're on a military base,

you can sleep in whatever the troops sleep in.

And so, you know, I look back to my service, and I think a lot

about Chris thinking, you know, I know that tribal leader, I've always

known that tribal leader, I'm going to go out and have tea with him,

because if I can build that relationship, if I can come in there not

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with, like, a million guns and, like, an MRAP or an uparmored Humvee,

but if I just take off my vest and kiss him on both cheeks and drink

tea all day, that, like, I could actually build a relationship that

means something to both him and all of the young men who are in his

militia.

Very dangerous. Maybe you can't do that. But maybe you can.

And so I think about that. I mean, that's what it, sort of, means to

me, that, like, he knew it. And did he know it well enough? I don't

know. I guess not. Maybe because of the outcome is that he's dead,

he didn't know it well enough. I don't know.

Q Well, again, hindsight is 20/20 vision, so --

A But I think about all the risks that I took that had great

results. And I think about all of the other risks that Chris took his

entire career that also had great results. But this one didn't.

And so, I don't know. I guess I just hope that Members of Congress

see this. I mean, codels come out all the time. You know, they are

interested in what they're interested in, and I don't get a good sense

that they, sort of, have an appreciation of what we're up to out there.

And I guess I just hope that they have an appreciation for that.

Ms. Sawyer. Well, we certainly appreciate your testimony today,

as well as your service and your willingness. I think, you know, one

thing that is always hard on a transcript is, kind of, emotion does

not convey. But I think your willingness to share that information

with us and with the committee is very much appreciated.

Again, I think on behalf of the entire committee -- I don't have

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if my colleague has some additional questions for you. But, certainly,

we appreciate, as I said, both your testimony and your service and the

service of, quite frankly, all of our personnel serving overseas, those

in uniform and those who are not in uniform but also doing very important

work on behalf of this country.

Mr. . Thank you for saying so.

Mr. Desai. We can go off the record.

[Recess.]

Mr. Grider. Let's go on the record.

Mr. , I wanted to once again thank you for your time here

and your candor, your recollection. As my colleague said, on behalf

of the committee and Chairman Gowdy, we appreciate you coming in and

helping us to establish and ascertain the facts of what happened. And

that's our objective, and we really appreciate you helping us to get

to that objective.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q I think all of us want to make sure that the record is clear

with respect to even your role. And you used a few terms that -- I

just don't want your role to be diminished in any way based on your

history.

How long did you work for the State Department? What is your

total time at the State Department?

A It should be 13 years now, 2003 to 2015.

Q And prior to the State Department, did you attend law school

or go to grad school?

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A I went to law school.

Q What law school did you go to?

A I went to Suffolk Law School in Boston, Massachusetts.

Q And then after law school, did you practice, or did you go

straight to the State Department?

A I decided I didn't want to be a lawyer and I wanted to have

a grassroots experience. And so I disappointed the Middlesex District

Attorney's Office and all of my law professors by moving to rural Japan

and teaching English for 2 years.

Q Very good.

So I just wanted to clarify, you had sort of mentioned, based on,

I think, exhibit 2 and watching Secretary Rice and your views, you

mentioned the terms "gut," you know, it was in your gut --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- and maybe it was sort of a "baggage" that you had. But,

in fact, you had been in the State Department for 13 years and you had

traveled extensively, as we went over in the earlier part.

So your experience, you had 13 years -- or, at that point, it may

have been, you know, 9 years or 10 years of experience of being in PRTs

in Iraq. And so it wasn't necessarily just a gut instinct. You had

experience in, sort of, assessing protests and situations and gathering

information, the information that you received. Is that correct?

A Sure. Yes. That's correct.

Q And so, as we talked about, you know, even with respect to

Cairo, I mean, you communicated to people on the ground on occasion,

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you communicated with State Ops on occasion, you had access to media

on occasion, correct?

A [Nonverbal response.]

Mr. Evers. You're supposed to say "yes."

Mr. . Yes. That's correct. Sorry. Yes. Correct to all

those things.

BY MR. GRIDER:

Q You knew about extremist groups and how that worked, and

Al Qaeda, and, obviously, you know, your prior experience at the State

Department.

So part of your job wasn't just merely to make edits, you know,

with respect to press; it was to make an assessment based on your years

of experience. Would you say that's correct?

A That is a fair characterization.

Q And, also, in NEA, wasn't necessarily in the

press office. Is that correct?

A She was not in the press office.

Q So what was her -- her role was the NEA Libya desk, correct?

A That's correct.

Q So she would have been gathering information from Libya,

right, as the desk officer?

A That's correct.

Q Right.

And was in the press office, but he was sort of a, as you

mentioned, may have been a hybrid, a little bit of gathering information

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but also working for you but also giving information to other people.

Is that correct?

A Yeah, I think -- let me just characterize a little bit about

NEA press and, sort of, the desks, because you've asked about that.

Q Uh-huh.

A Like, the way -- I mean, each of these desks focus on very

specific issues. So the person who focuses on Libya really has no need

to know anything about Saudi Arabia.

NEA press is one of these offices that has to know everything about

the entire region. And so we are constantly collecting, constantly

talking to different folks in the various offices and desks about, well,

what's happening in Beirut today, what's happening in Tunis today.

So I would say that, yes, was reaching out to lots of people,

desks, sometimes embassies overseas.

Q But State, just the culture of State, with respect to NEA,

was a culture where we're going to hire people that are not merely,

you know, editing; we're going to bring in people that have, you know,

subject-matter experts and can access information and give their

opinions if they think things are factually correct or incorrect. Is

that your assessment?

A That would be the ideal, yes.

Q Right. And you would put yourself in that position of, you

know, having worked there 9 years at that point in time and, you know,

traveled to Iraq. Is that correct?

A I think I was well-suited to be the spokesperson of NEA,

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given my understanding of Arabic, my experience in the region, and my

management experience over a course of a career at the State and in

the private sector.

Q So I just wanted to be clear for the record, when you stated,

you know, your gut or, you know, you had baggage, it wasn't merely a

gut or baggage; it was based on training and experience over almost

a decade of actually being in the region, studying.

And so, when you stated earlier that, after watching the shows,

you just -- you stated that you just felt it was too early.

A Yeah. That's how I felt at the time when I watched the

shows.

Q And that was based on not just a mere gut instinct; it was

based on 10 years or 9 years of working in the State Department,

understanding Cairo, the region. Your assessment was it seemed too

early to make that specific statement. Is that correct?

A I think that's accurate to say. But I would also add that

there were clearly a number of variables that I had no access to or

no knowledge of at the time. And so, while I'm not trying to discount

my gut, it's also a reality of the situation that there were other

variables at the time that I just wasn't aware of that were clearly

at play.

Q Sure. Absolutely. Very good.

Now, last question. With respect to the Cairo protest, how did

you get that information, that ultimately they said it was the video?

You have communicated that you were definitive that it was the video

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at a later point. How did that --

A I believe, although I am not sure, that there was some

discussion with Embassy Cairo about the fact that the video was

referenced on an Egyptian television station, maybe some clip of it -- I

mean, perhaps not a clip if it was that offensive. But there was some

in-country nexus to that video --

Q Sure.

A -- that made folks in Cairo, along with myself and others,

concerned that we needed to be thinking about this video vis-à-vis Egypt

specifically.

Q And do you recall when you came to that conclusion, that

it was the video?

A I don't. Because, again, I think, at that time -- I mean,

at the time, one of the interesting discussions that came up was that

Al Jazeera had interviewed a number of people across the Middle East

and asked them had they seen the video, and they said, no, they had

never seen the video. I mean, that the majority of people protesting

were protesting because they heard there was a video out there.

So this, sort of, sense that everybody saw the video and they were

so outraged about it, it just ended up not -- I mean, to my

understanding, was not true. And there were throngs of people who had

a grudge against the United States that heard there was a video, in

the same way that, you know, hundreds protested in Khartoum at the

teacher who named the teddy bear Muhammad. I mean, no one ever met

the woman, no one ever confirmed that, but you had, you know, thousands

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of people that day protesting over basically hearsay.

Q Right. Correct.

And then you made a statement that, you know, based on your

training and experience, essentially you had never seen anyone bring

an RPG to a protest.

A I mean --

Q Or that would be unusual.

A I think what I said was "bringing an RPG to a spontaneous

protest."

I mean, I've been to Yemen before, and, I mean, knives, AK-47s,

RPGs. I mean, that place it armed to the teeth, and I think people

bring an RPG to the toilet sometimes.

But when I said that, I was suggesting that, if you were

spontaneously protesting, an RPG might necessarily not be the first

thing you grab next to your car keys.

Q And just to make clear, you had received information that

an RPG may have been involved in the attack at some point?

A I think, but -- I just remember people weren't just throwing

stones --

Q Right.

A -- I mean, looking at, you know, a huge fire at the compound.

So that's my recollection, but I may be misremembering.

Q Fair enough.

Mr. Grider. All right. Once again, I just want to thank you for

your time. On behalf of the committee, we appreciate you coming in.

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And I have no further questions.

Mr. . Thank you.

Ms. Sawyer. We just have to ask a few based on some foundational

stuff. Sorry, Mark, but --

Mr. Grider. That's fine.

Ms. Sawyer. I think we'll be quick. Just a few clarifying

questions.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q We went into some of your background. Obviously, the role

of gathering information for press purposes might differ from the role

of gathering information for other purposes. So I just want to get

a sense -- you've fully acknowledged that there may have been other

variables at play when you were assessing what happened that you were

not aware of. In general, what kind of other variables are you

referring to?

A Well, what I'm suggesting is that the normal process of

generating and clearing talking points is that one of my officers writes

the talking points, and then we send them around to all of the offices

in the building that have equities, and then we get that language

cleared. And that is the normal, standard, garden-variety way that

we deal with press guidance.

In this case, an issue of national significance, this was handled

far above my pay grade. And so I guess what I'm suggesting is that,

in this case, the normal procedures, for a whole host of reasons -- one

of them may be that when I generate -- I would suggest to you that when

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I have generated talking points as the NEA spokesperson, I cannot recall

a single time where I have ever spoken to the IC about talking points.

I mean, they're sort of -- we don't -- I mean --

Q But let me interrupt you for a second. If you were called

upon to give the definitive account about what happened -- I'm stepping

aside from talking points. Let's not worry about talking points. You

were asked a series of questions about what you believed happened in

Benghazi -- you, yourself, based on your experience.

So if you were called upon to give the definitive account about

what happened, would you want to know what the intelligence community

believed happened in Benghazi?

A Personally? Or are you asking me as, like, professionally,

as the NEA spokesperson?

Q Professionally, as the NEA spokesperson, if the

intelligence community had an assessment as to what happened in

Benghazi and you were being called upon to deliver that, would you want

to know what that was?

A Yes, of course. Because I would want to make sure I was

not delivering talking points -- I would want to make sure that I was

crafting talking points that were truthful to the best of our knowledge.

Q And the underlying assumption there, "truthful to the best

of our knowledge," is it fair to say that, among others, but certainly

the intelligence community is one of the bodies charged with the actual

fact-finding, determining truth or what happened? Is that accurate?

A I think that's accurate.

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Q And would it be the role of a press spokesperson, yourself

or anyone else, to substitute your judgment for that of the intelligence

community if the intelligence community had made an assessment as to

what happened in Benghazi?

A No. But can I say -- the answer is no, period. But I will

say this, that documents from the IC are often very wonky and wordy.

And so it would be a duty of mine to, not change the substance, but

to perhaps reconfigure the language in a way that was easier to the

average American's ear or eye. That doesn't mean I'm fussing with

talking points. It just means that sometimes an intelligence

assessment can read exactly like an intelligence assessment.

Q Right. Well, actually, I would say it does sound you're

fussing with talking points to make them more user-friendly. Would

that be accurate?

A Yes, but I want to make sure that you're very clear that

I am not saying I am using my own press instincts to change what the --

Q The underlying facts.

A Yes, the underlying facts. I'm just saying, you know,

let's make this sound less like an analyst came up with this and more

like this is what someone is going to say.

Q So, from your perspective, is it certainly reasonable to

rely upon the intelligence community's assessment as to what happened

in Benghazi as the baseline for discussing what happened?

A I mean, I served in Iraq. I mean, we've relied on

intelligence that wasn't correct there. I mean, I -- yes. It's a

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qualified "yes." I mean, I recognize that intelligence assessments

can be wrong. And so, if that's the IC's best assessment and that's

what they say it is, I'm willing to take that. But, in my mind, am

I also willing to accept the fact that the IC could be wrong?

If you go back to the Iraq IC determination, it was State and

Department of Energy that had their footnote where they disagreed with

the assessment. And people don't know that there was a footnote there,

but there was a footnote. There were two agencies that disagreed with

the assessment.

So I come from that experience, where, yes, I accept that when

the IC makes a ruling, we're going to go with that, but I also have

my own opinion about things.

Q And just in terms of the materials you review when you're,

you know, preparing and talking about an incident, do you routinely

read classified intelligence reports?

I know that some press people don't because they're a little

worried about -- they're very outward-looking; they don't want

spillover.

A Yeah.

Q Would your practice have been -- and we can limit it to this

time period. Were you reading the intelligence reports about what

happened in Benghazi?

A I was not.

And the firewall that you spoke of, or maybe you didn't refer to

it that way, but just, sort of, wanting to ensure that I never, as I

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did interviews quite often, that I never said something that I read

in an intelligence report, you know, intelligence reports were not a

huge part of my daily life as a press officer, mainly because, in this

case, the IC generated talking points, but in, you know, 99 times out

of 100, when we're talking about talking points about Presidential

elections and the outcome of things, it's not really the IC that

generates talking points. It's Embassy Moscow, who is going to condemn

this thing in Ukraine. It's Embassy Tokyo, who is going to applaud

the Prime Minister for doing to this. And so, as a press officer, you

don't really have to spend a lot of time in the weeds of the intelligence

community, because what we're trying to do is talk about things that

are open.

Now, I see every day when press folks talk about, you know, whether

this Russian missile launched from the Caspian landed in Iran. But

that's probably generated by the IC, not by some person, you know, who

happened to be boating on the Caspian. So I get that.

But I'm saying, for my purposes in NEA press, I didn't spend a

lot of time looking at intelligence reports, especially during this

time period.

Q Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. I think that's all I had. Did you have more?

BY MR. DESAI:

Q I guess the last question I have -- and I just want to make

sure that I've understood you correctly based on your conversation with

my colleague from the majority in the last session -- is that you're

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not trying to suggest that somehow, you know, gut feeling in any way

is a substitute, or a credible substitute, to explain or to understand

what has happened in an instance like Benghazi. Is that correct?

A I think what I'm trying to say is that I had a toolbox. I

have my gut, I have reporting in, I have open-source reporting, I have

a lot of things that I am able to use to make the determinations that

I made professionally. And I don't say that one is the prevailing tool.

Some were a hammer, some were wrenches.

And so I am saying that, at that time, given the totality of the

circumstances, I was looking at a broad range of things. And my

personal opinions were based on my work experience, my gut, the things

that I was reading, and the conversations that I was having.

Mr. Desai. Thank you so much.

We can go off the record.

[Whereupon, at 1:54 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 1

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STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

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EXHIBIT 2

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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON :

" SENATE ! 113th Congress

2d Session

S. Report

2014

113–134

REPORT

of the

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

REVIEW

of the

TERRORIST ATTACKS ON U.S. FACILITIES IN

BENGHAZI, LIBYA, SEPTEMBER 11–12, 2012

together with

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

January 15, 2014.—Ordered to be printed


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with HEARING

EXHIBIT 3

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