1 NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0075n.06 F iled: Janu ary 24, 2008 No. 06-4665 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT BRANDEN E. OVERSTREE T, P laintif f-App ellant,

v. MACK INDUSTRIES , INC.; STEVE KEM P ; T IM WEI DRIC K ; J OHN DO E; BOB H AW KINS; TIM DA VI S; and CO NCR ET E V AUL T A ND S EW AGE SYST E MS INSTALL ERS UNION, Local 20, De fend ant s- App e lle e s. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP PEA L F RO M THE U NI TED STATES DIST RI CT CO UR T F OR THE NO RT HER

N D ISTRIC T OF OHI O

Be for e : N OR RI S, G IBBO NS, and R OG ER S, C ir c uitJudg e s. J U LI A SM I THG I BB ON S, C ir c uit Judge. P l ai n t i ff -ap p el l ant B rande n E. Over street br oug ht the ins tant hy

br id § 30 1 a c tio n und e r t he L a bo r Mana g e me nt R e la tio ns Ac t ( “ L MRA ” ) a g a ins t defe ndants-appe llees Mack I ndustries, I nc. (“Mack” ), C oncre te Vault and S ewa g e S y stems I nstallers Un ion , L oc a l 20 (t

he “ Un ion ”), and cert a in n a me d in div idu a ls b oth kn ow n a nd un kn ow n. He a lso

a sse rt e d v ari ou s st a te law cl aim s. F oll ow ingdis c ov e ry , th e dis tr ic t c ourt g ra nte d th e de fe nd a nts ’ mot ion s for su mma

ry jud g me nt, c on c lud ing that Ove rs tr e e t’ s hy br id § 301 a c tio n w a s n ot f ile d w ith in the six -month statute of limitations. The d i s t rict cour t dismi ssed Over street’ s remainingstate-law claims without prejudice, de clining to e x erc ise jurisdiction ove r those claims in light of its dismissalOv e rst

re e t v . M ac k In du str ie s, In c . e t al

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The c ourt g rante d the motion of counsel for appellant to wa ive ora l argument. I nitially , the 1 mot ion wa s den ie d, bu t the c ourt re c on sid e re d it su a s

po nte , and g rante d it or ally at argument, afte r counsel for

appellant indicated he wa s ill and could not appea r. Consequently , the cour t hear d argument only

from appe llee. 2 of the only

pending fede ral c laim. On appea l, Overstre et ar g ues that summary j u dg ment was inap p ro p ri at e bec ause: (1) the district court fa iled to consider the doc trine of e quitable tolling, the application of which would rende r his suit timely filed; (2) the district c ourt err ed by failing to gr ant his Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) motion reque sti n g t h at the summary judgme nt order be held in abeyance pe nd ingfu

rt he r d isc ov e ry ; and (3 ) dis pu te d issu e s of ma te ri a l fa c t pre c lud e su mma ry jud g me nt i n th is

case . Havingrevie wed the pa rties’ brie fs and the a

pplicable law , and having had the be nefit of or al argument, we rejec t Over street’ s second a nd third arguments on the basis of the district cour t’s order 1 g ra nti ngdefe nd ants ’ m oti on s f or summa ry jud g me nt. Th e re fo re , w e a dd re ss o nly Ov e rs tr e e t’ s f

ir st argument: that the district court should have c onsidered the doctrine of equitable tolling. I. Th e re le va

nt f a c ts a re no t in dis pu te
. Ov e rs tr e e t’ s su it ari se s fr om Ma c k’ s de c isi on to t e rm inate his employ

ment on September 27, 2004. U nder the terms of the Collective B arg aining Ag ree ment (“CB A”) g overninghis employ ment with Mack, Ove rstree t had the rig ht to f ile a g rieva

nce w ith the Un ion and c ha lle ng e his te rm inatio n. Ov e rs tr e e t neg le c te d to do so , h ow e ve r, and ins te a d, on

Ap ri l 7, 2005, filed the instant hy brid § 301 ac tion ag ainst Mack, the Union, and c er tain individual repr esentatives of ea ch.Ov e rst

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Al tho ug h Ov ers tr e e t do e s n ot r a ise the iss ue on a pp e a l, t he re is a n a rgume nt t hat th e date 2 of a c c ru a l a s to Ma c k sho uld be the date on wh ic h its ter min a tio n de c isi on be c a me fi na l and , a s to the Union, the date on which the Union de cl i n ed t o p u rsue Overstre et’s g rieva nce f urther. T he 3 Following discovery , the def endants moved f

or summary

judgme nt. Overstre et filed a motion purs ua nt t o F e d. R. C iv. P. 56 (f

) re qu e sti ng that the dis tr ic t c ourt re fr a in fr om ru lin g on de fe nd a nts ’ motions pending fur

ther discove ry . The district cour t denied the r equest an d grante d summary judgme nt i n fa vor of de fenda nts, concluding that Over street’ s hy brid § 301 ac tion was time-bar red. Over street timely

appea led. I I

. Th is c ourt

re vie ws the g ra

nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt de novo

. DiCarlo v. Potter , 358 F.3d 408, 41 4 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 4) . Summa

ry jud g me nt wi ll be a ff

ir me d if “ the ple a din g s, de po sit ion s, ans we rs to interrog atories, a

nd admissions on file, toge ther with the a ffidavits, if any , show that there is no g enuine issue a s to any

materia l fac t and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law

. ” Fe d

. R

. C i v . P. 56(c). I f, on the other hand, “a rea sonable jury

could re turn a ve rdict for the

n o n - mo v in g p arty , ” s u mm ar y ju d g me n t f

o r th e mo v in g p arty is in a p p r opriate. An de rso n v . Li be rty Lobby, Inc. , 47 7 U. S. 24 2, 24 8 (1 98 6)

. I n re vie wi ng the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on , thi s c ourt dr aws a ll justifiable infere nces in fa vor of the non- moving pa rty
. Ma tsu sh ita Ele c . I

nd us . Co ., Ltd

. v . Ze nit h Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). III

. Over street doe s not challeng e the district court’s finding that his cause s of ac tion ag ainst the Union and Mac k acc rued on Septe mber 27, 2005, or that his f iling of a lawsuit on April 7, 2005—more than six months a fter the acc rual date—re nders his suit untimely filed. See D elCostello v. Int’l Bhd. 2Ov e rst

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part ies hav e no t i ncl ud ed a copy of t he C BA in th e reco rd, andth ey di sagree as to whe th er t he C BA require d Over street to file his g rieva nce w ithin three or five day s of his te rmination. Even assuming Ov e rs tr e e t is c or

re c t th a t he ha d f

ive da y s to fi le a

g ri e va nc e wi th t

he Un ion , h is f

a ilure to do so resulted in ac crua l of his cause s of action no later than Oc tober 2, 2004. Whether O verstre et’s c a us e s o f a c tio n a c c ru e d o n Se pte mbe r 2 7 o r O c tob e r 2 , 20 04 , ho we ve r, make s n o d if fe re nc e fo r t

his appea l beca

use the latest point at w hich he could have timely filed his a ction was Apr il 2, 2005, five day s befor e he f

iled suit in di strict court. Mack corre ctly notes that the di strict court’s failure to addre ss the i ssue arises from the fact 3 that Over street did not raise it until he reque sted to f ile a sur- reply

brief inc luding it – a r equest that was de nied. We choose to e x amine the issue on the me rits rather than to decline to r eview it as not proper ly prese nted to the district court. 4 of T e am ste rs , 462 U.S. 169- 70 (1983) (apply ing six -month statute of limit ations provided in § 10(b) of the National L abor Relations Act to hy brid § 301 actions broug ht under the L MRA). I nstead, he argues that the district court should have applied t he doctrine of equitable tolli ng and held his ac tion timely filed. Specifica lly , he ar g ues that t wo circ umstances ope rate d to toll t he runningof the statute. 3 F ir st, a s to Ma c k, Ov e rs tr e e t c la ims that th e Un ion ’s un ilate ra l de c isi on to i nte rced e on his behalf with Mack’ s CEO would have “ cause [d] any rea sonable pe rson to believe that action was be ing taken to cha lleng e [his] just cause ter mination.” We have r eco gn i z ed that the limitations period applicable to an employ ee’ s hy brid § 301 claim ag ainst his or her e mploy er i s t o l l ed whi le that employ ee pur sues re medies provided in the CB A as a m ea n s o f re s olving the pa rties’ dispute. See, e.g., Robinson v. Cent. Brass Mfg. Co. , 9 87 F .2 d 1 23 5, 12 42 -4 3 ( 6th Cir . 1 99 3) . Fund a me nta l f a ir ne ss requ ir es s uch a rul e becau se an emp lo y ee is requ ir ed to ex hau st any rem edi es av ail abl e un der t he C BA p ri o r to filing suit in fede ral c ourt. Id. a t 12 39 ; s e e a ls o G a r r is h v . I n t’ l U n io n , U n it e d Auto., Aerospace& Agric. Imple ment W orkers of Am. , 417 F.3d 590, 594 ( 6th Cir. 2005).Ov e rst

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5 I n th e c a se be fo re us , h owever, it is un dis pu te d th a t O ve rs tr e e t di d n ot p ur su e any of his contra c tu a l r e me d ie s. Rather, he claims that the informa l, ext ra- contra ctual ac tion he alleg es the Union too k o n h is b e ha lf

se rv e d to tol l th e statut e of lim itatio ns a

pp lic a ble to h is c a

us e of a ction a g a ins t Mack. Putti ng aside the question of whether a union’s attempt to utilize e x tra-c ontrac tual means of resolving an employ ee’ s g rieva nce w ould justi fy

applicati o n o f the equitable tolling doctrine, Over street’ s argument fails at a more basic level. That i s, at t he same time he arg ues t hat t he Union’s conduct de la

y e d h is a b il it y to r e s o lv e h is d is p u te w it h M a c k , h e a c kn o w le d g e s th a t h e n e ither

r e qu e s t e d t h e U n i o nt a k e t h e s e s t e p s n o r h a d an y k n o w l e d g e t h a tt h e U n i o nw a s d o i n g s o . In

c on c e din g a s mu c h, it d e fi e s lo g ic fo r h im a lso to c la im that he c on du c te d h ims e lf reas ona bly in de lay ingthe fi lin g of his hy br id § 301 a c tio n b a se d o n in fo rm a tio n o f w hic h h e wa s ig no ra nt. Thus , even if he could pr ovide leg al authority to support his posit ion that a union’s u t i l ization of ex tracontra ctual methods for

resolving an employ ee’ s g riev an ce could toll the statute of limitations , the fac t s of this case would not support application of such a rule he re. A ccor dingly , the district court

corr ectly conclude d that his suit aga inst Mack is time-barr ed. Over street ne x t contends that the statute of limit ations as to his ca u s e of action ag ainst the Un ion wa s tol le d by the Un ion ’s fa ilure to n oti fy him of the re qu ir e me nt t

hat he fi le a

g ri e va nc e wi thi n five da y s of his termination to p re s er v e h is rights unde r the CB A. This argument also fails. As an initial matter, a union member is g ener ally responsible for

knowing the contents o f his collective barg aining ag ree ment. Robinson, 9 8 7 F. 2 d at 1 2 4 3 (c i t i n g Shapiro v. Cook United, Inc

. , 762 F.2d 49, 51 (6th Cir. 1985)). More over, this cour t has reje cted a

n argument identical to that pre sented he re:Ov e rst

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6 Plaintiff argues that the de fenda nts never told him that there was a thirty -day deadline to submit his gr ievanc e to arbitration, and that he never rea d the collec tive barg aining ag ree ment. This argument is one t h at s i m p l y relies on his own ig noranc e of the expre s s ed ter

ms of his own collective ba rg aining ag ree ment without any other ind ic a tio n th a t th e un ion or the c omp any po ssi bly mis le d th e pla int if f o r f ra ud ule ntl y concealed some thing f

rom the plaintiff. Unde r these c ircumstance s, it is clear that his ig no ra nc e do e s not co ns tit

ute du e dil ig e nc e to dis c ov e r the op e rativ e fa c ts of his claims. Sh ap iro , 762 F.2d at 51. L ike t he plaintiff in Sh ap iro , Over street of fer s only an alleg ation—disputed by the defe ndants—that he was never informed of his rights unde r the CB A. Our pr ece dent makes clea r t h at a p l ai ntiff’s fa ilure to lear n of his or her

rig hts under a c ollective bar g aining ag ree ment

c an n o ts e r v e t o t o l l t h e s t a tu t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s f o r a h yb r i d § 3 0 1 a c t i o n a g a i n s t a u n i o n . A c c o r d i n g l y, the district court c orre ctl y conclude d that Over street’ s suit aga inst the Union is ti me-ba rre d.

I V. As to the rema ining two is s u es , t h e dis trict court opinion quite ade quately addre sses them and our issuanc e of a

rea soned opinion would serve no jurisprudential purpose . Acc ording ly , we aff irm based on the r easoningof the district cour t in its order gra n t i n g d ef endant’ s motions for summary judgme nt. V. F or the re a so ns pr ov ide d, we a ff ir m the dis tr ic t court ’s or de r g ra nti ng su mma

ry jud g me nt t o the def endant.