### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-05-00345- CR

Le ona r do M ar ti ne z , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 403RD JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. 30410 30, H ONO RAB LE BRENDA KENNEDY , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N
A jury found appellant L eonar do Martinez g uilty of the off enses of ag g ravated sexual assault of a child, indece ncy with a child by contac t, and indece ncy

with a child by

exposure. See Te x. Pe n. Cod e Ann. §§ 21 .1 1 (in de c e nc y wi th a ch ild ), 22 .0 21 (a )( 1) (B ) ( a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult of a c hild) (West 2003 & Supp. 2005). Mar tinez ar g ues that the cour t’s char g e per

mitted the jury to convict him of ea ch off ense w ith less than a unanim o u s v er dict and that this err or re quires
reve rsal. Mar

tinez also asserts that h i s ri gh t against double jeopa rdy was violated a

nd that the district court er

red in e x cludingtestimony that the victim may have been molested by an alter native pe rp e tr a tor . We wi ll a ff

ir m th e jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
. BACK GR OUND The jury hear d evidenc e that on Marc h 26, 2004, eig ht-y ear -old L .Z
. told her mother t h at M ar t i n ez h ad s ex u al l y ab u s ed h er . M ar t i n ez i s t h e h u s b an d o f L
. Z. ’s co u s i n , R o s i e P ra d o . L
. Z.2

testified that the abuse happene d on more than one occa sion when s h e stay ed over night at her
c ou sin ’s a pa rtme nt. L .Z . te sti fi e d th a t sh e sle pt on the fl oo r in he r c ou sin ’s ro om, and that sh e wo uld sometimes wake up in the middle of the ni g ht with her panties pulled down and Ma rtinez doing “ bad thi ng s” to h e r. L .Z . tes tif

ie d tha t some tim e s Mar

tin e z wo uld

pe ne tr a te he r a

nu s and that, o the r t ime s, M ar t i n ez wo u l d

t o u ch h er gen i t al s an d h er an u s . L et i ci a G o m ez , L
. Z. ’s m o t h er , t es t i fi edt h at L
. Z. tol d h e r t hat Ma rt ine z wa s p la c inghis pe nis “ be hin d he r” anu s a nd that he wa s to uc hin g he r “ pr ivate part” and her

anus. Gomez te stified that, following L .Z .’s outcry , she ca lled the police to re port the inc ide nt. Dr. B eth Naue rt, a pe diatrician a nd the medica l direct o r o f t he Child Assessment Prog ram, a

clinic that conduc ts medical ex aminations for children who are suspected of having been phy sically

or sexually

abused, inter

viewed L .Z . about t he abuse. Naue rt testified that L .Z . told her about multiple tim es that Mar tinez abused her, inc luding a time w hen Martinez put his hand in L .Z .’s vag ina, another

time when Mar

tinez put what was either h i s fi n ger o r his penis in her mouth, and
ano the r t ime wh e n M art ine z pe ne tr a te d h e r a nu s. Al ia Al sa fa r, a forens ic in te rv ie we r w iththe Ce nte r f or Chi ld P ro te c tio n ( fo rm e rl y the Chi ldr e n’ s A dv oc a c y

Ce nte r) , a lso in ter vi ewed L .Z . a nd te sti fi e d a

bo ut t he inc ide nts of

a bu se that L .Z . descr ibed to her. A lsafar testified that L .Z . told her about how Ma rtinez “had put his thing in h e r b a c k a

nd ma de he r t ou c h h is thin g wi th h e r h and , a s w e ll as tou c he d he r m idd le pa rt wi th h is hand.” When a sked by

the State how many

times these i n ci d en t s occur red, A lsafar

replied, “ She didn’t indicate the e x act a mount of times, but did t ell me it happene d a lot, or more tha n once.”3 On J une 14, 2004, the St at e i n d icted Mar tinez on one count of ag g ravated sexual
a ssa ult of a c hil d, on e c ount o f ind e c e nc y wi th a c hil d by c on ta c t, and on e c ount of ind e c e nc y

wi th a child by

exposure. Count one, alleg ing a g g ravated sexu al as s au lt, contained two par ag raphs alleg ing that Martinez, on or about January 1, 2004,
did then and there knowing ly and int entionally cause the penetration of t he anus of [L .Z .], a child y oung er tha n 14 y ear s of ag e and not his spous e, by the sexual org an o f th e s a id L e o n ar d o M arti n e z, did t h e na n d t h e r e kn o w i n g l y

an d i n t e n t i o n a l l y

c a u s e t h e an u s o f

[L
. Z
. ], a c h i ld y oung er tha

n 14 y ear s of ag e and not h i s s p o use to contac t the sexual orga n of the s a id L e o n ar d o M arti n e z. Count two, alleg ing inde cenc y with a child by

contac t, co n tained thre e par ag raphs a lleg ing that Martinez, on or about January 1, 2004,
d id th e nan d th e r e in te n ti o n a ll y an d kn o w in g ly e n g a g e in s e xu a l c o n ta c t w it

h [L
. Z
. ], a child y oung er th an 1 7 y ear s of ag e and not the spouse of the said L eonar do Mart ine z, b y

the n a nd the re tou c hin g the anu s of the s a id [L .Z .] w iththe int e nt t o ar o u s e an d

g r a ti f y th e s e xu a l d e s ir e o f

s a id L e o n ar d o M arti n e z, d id th e nan d th e r e in te n ti o n a ll y an d kn o w in g ly e n g a g e in s e xu a l c o n ta c t w it

h [L
. Z
. ], a child y o u n g e r

th an1 7 y e ar s o f

a g e an d n o t t h e s p o u s e o f

th e s a id L e o n ar do Mart ine z, b y

the n a nd the re tou c hin g the g e nit a ls o f t he sa id [L .Z .] w iththe int e nt t o ar o u s e an d

g r a ti f y th e s e xu a l d e s ir e o f

s a id L e o n ar d o M arti n e z, did the n a nd the re , w ith the int e nt to ar ou se and g ratif y his se xua l de sir e , k

no wi ng ly and intentionally

eng ag e in sexual contact by causing[L .Z .], a child y oung er tha n 17 y e ars of a g e and no t th e sp ou se of

the sa id L e on ard o Ma

rt ine z, to tou c h th e g e nit a ls o f th e s a id L e o n ar d o M arti n e z. Count three, alleg ing inde cenc y with a child by

exposure, contained thr ee pa rag raphs a lleg ing that Martinez, on or about January 1, 2004,4

did the n a nd the re wi th t

he int e nt t o a

ro us e and g ratif y the se xua l de sir e of

sa id L eonar do Martinez, inte n t i o n al ly and knowing ly

expose to [ L .Z .], a child y oung er than 17 y ear s o f age and not the spouse of the said L eonar do Martinez, any part of the g enitals of the said L eonar do Martinez, the said L eonar do Martinez then and ther e kn ow ingthat th e sa id [L .Z .] w a s p re se nt, did the n a nd the re wi th t

he int e nt t o a

ro us e and g ratif y the se xua l de sir e of

sa id L eonar do Martinez, knowing ly and intentionally cause [L .Z .], a child y oung er tha n 17 y e ars and

no t th e sp ou se of

the sa id L e on ard o M art ine z, to e xpos e he r a nu s, did the n a nd the re wi th t

he int e nt t o a

ro us e and g ratif y the se xua l de sir e of

sa id L eonar do Martinez, knowing ly and intentionally

cause [L .Z .], a child y oung er tha n 17 y ear s and not the spouse of the said L eonar do Martinez, to expos e any part of he r g e nit a ls. Martinez pleade d not guilty to eac h offe nse. During t ri al , h e vig orously denied abusing L .Z . in any

way . On direc t examination, he testified: Q : S i r , d i d

yo um o l e s tt h a tg i r l , [ L
. Z
. ] , i nan y w ay? A: No, sir.
On c ros s-e x ami natio n, Mart ine z state d th a t he “ ne ve r t ou c he d h e r” and re pe a te dly

de nie d b oth contac ting a

nd penetr ating L .Z .: Q: I sn’t it true, Mr. Mar tinez, that y ou put y our penis in [L .Z ’s] anus on numerous oc c a sio ns ? A: I t’s not true. Q: I sn’t it true y ou touched he r on her vag ina with y our hand on r epeated oc c a sio ns ? A: Ab so lut e ly

no wa y , ma ’a m. Q: I sn ’t it tru e y ou

ma de he r t ou c h y our p e nis ?5

A: Of c ours e no t, m a ’a

m. Q: And isn’t it true that y ou exposed [ L .Z .’s] ge nitals and y our own g enitals in her prese nce? A: Of c ourse not, ma’ am.
I n addition to denying the alleg ations, Martinez’s t rial st rate g y appar ently

included sug g esting that the co mplainant’s brother may have be en the a ctual per petrator. Howe ver, the district court did not allow any testimony

to that effe ct, so the jury

hear d no evidenc e implicating the vic tim ’s br oth e r i n th e c ri me s.

The jury found Mar

tinez guilty

on all three counts of the indictment, and punishment
was a ssessed at f

ifty -seve n y ear s’ confinement for c ount one, twenty y ear s’ conf

inement for c ount two, and twenty

y ear s’ conf

inement for c ount three. This a ppeal f ollowed.
DI SCU SSIO N I n three issues on appea l, Martinez contends that: (1) the char g e permitted the jury to convict him of ea ch off ense w ith less than a unanimous verdic t; (2) t h e m u l t i p l e convictions violated his rig ht a g ainst double jeopar dy ; a nd (3) the trial court err ed in excluding e vidence that the complainant may

have be en abuse d by

her br other. Jury unan im ity

I n his first issue on appea l, Martinez contends that the charg e of the court pe rmitted the jury to convict him of ea ch offe nse with le ss than a unanimous ver dict and that this err or re quires
re ve rs a l. T he Te xas Con sti tut ion re qu ir e s a unanim ou s ver dic t in fe lony c ri min a l ca se s. Te x. Con st.6

art
. V, § 1 3; T e x. Cod e Cr im. Pr oc . A nn . a rt . 3 6. 29 (a ) ( Wes t Su

pp . 2 00 5) . A llo wi nga

jur y to c ho os e from seve ral sepa

rate acts, e ach of

which is a violation of a speci fi c s t atut e, without requiringthe jury to ag ree on wh i ch act was c ommitt ed violates the una nimity require ment. Ngo v . S

tat e , 175 S.W. 3d 73 8, 74 7- 48 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ); Fran c is v . S tat e , 3 6 S. W.3 d 1 21 , 1 24 -2 5 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 2000). How ever , allowing a jury to c hoose betwee n alternative theories of how an of

fense was committed does not run afoul of t he unanimous-ve rdict re quirement. Ma rti ne z v . S tat e , 129 S.W .3d 10 1, 10 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ); Kitc he ns v . S tat e , 823 S.W .2d 256, 258 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). I f an indictment a lleg es d i ff er ing me ans of c ommitt ing a n offe nse, a tria l court does not er r by char g ing the jury in the disjunctive. J on es v . S tat e , 184 S.W. 3d 91 5, 92 2 n .6 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 2006, no pet.). I

n a naly z in g a jur y -cha rge is su e, t he re vi ewi ng cou rt fi rst deci des wh e the r e rr or e xists
. Ngo , 175 S.W .3d at 743. Then, if e rror exis ts, the court ana ly

zes that error

for ha rm. Id
. Whe the r the

c har ge was e rro ne ous The State c onced e s th at the par ag raphs of the cour t’s char g e per

taining to the of

fense s of indec ency

with a child by

contac t and indece ncy

with a child by exposure violate the re quirement of jury unanimity . Howeve r, the State disput es whether there i s err or i n the parag raph of the cour t’s char g e re g ardingthe re maining of fense , ag g ravated sexual assault of a c hild. Th e c ourt ’s c ha

rg e to t he jur y re a d, in r e le va

nt p art : [I ]f you be lie ve fr om t

he e vid e nc e be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t th a t th e de fe nd ant, L e on ard o M art ine z, o n o r a bo ut t he 1s t da y of Janu ary , 2 00 4, in t

he County of

Tr a vis , and State of Texas, did t hen and the re know ingly or intentionally

cause the penetrat ion of

the anu s o f [L .Z .], a

c hil d y oung e r t

ha n 1 4 y e ars of

a g e and no t hi s7

spouse, by the s exual org an of the said L eonar do Martinez, or if y ou believe f rom the evidenc e beyond a reasonable doubt that the def endant, L eonar do Martinez, did then and ther e knowing ly

or intentionally

cause the anus of [L .Z .], a child y oung er tha n 14 y ear s of age and not his spouse, to contactthe sexual org an of the said L eonar do Martinez, y ou will find the defe ndant g uilty of the off

ense of Agg ravated Sexual Assault of a Child . . . . (Emphasis adde d).

Martinez argues that t h e i n struction allowed the jur y to return a

non-unanimous verdic t. Accor ding to Martinez, penetr ation and contact are separate and dis tinct acts. He c ontends that it is poss ible that only some of the juror s may

have be lieved beyond a re asonable doubt that he was guilty

of pene tration, while other jur ors m ay have be lieved beyond a re asonable doubt that Martinez was guilty

o f co n t act. Theref

ore, Ma rtinez reasons, the jur

y could have found Mar

tinez g uilty of ag g ravated sexual assault without ag ree ing on the specific act that he committed. Ag g ravated sexual assault is defined in sec tion 22.021 of the pena l code: (a) A per son commits an offense : (1) if the per son:

. . . . ( B ) i n t e n t i o n a l l y o r

kn o w i n g l y: (i) cause s t h e p en et ra t i o n o f the a nus or fe male sexual org an of a c hil d b y any me ans ; (ii) cause s the penetr ation of the mouth of a child by the sexual orga n of the a ctor; (iii) cause s the sexual org an of a ch i l d to contact or

penetr ate the mouth, anus, or sexual org an of a nother pe rson, including the actor ; or8 (iv) cause s the anus of a chil d to contact the mouth, anus, or sexual org an of a

nother pe rson, including the ac tor; and

. . . . (2) if:

. . . . (B ) the victim is y oung er tha n 14 y ear s of ag e.
Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 22.021.

I n Vi c k v . S tat e , 991 S.W .2d 830 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999), the court of criminal
a pp e a ls e xpla ine d th a t:
Article 22.021 i s a co n duct-orie nted offe nse in which the le g islature cr iminaliz ed very specific conduct of

sever al diffe rent ty

pes. A l s o , t h e statute expressly and impliedly separ ates the se ctions by “or,” which is some indication that any one of the proscr ibed conduc t provisions constitut es an o ffe nse. A more compelling de mon str a tio n o f l e g isl a tiv e int e nt i s r e fl e c te d in the sp e c if ic c on du c t pr oh ibi te d in the fo ur se c tio ns a

pp lic a ble to thi s ca se . Se c tio n ( i) pr oh ibi ts p e ne tr a tio n o f a ma le or fe male child’s a

nus or the sexual org an of a fema l e child. The foc us is on penetr ati o no f

th e c h il d ’ s g e n it a l a

r e a . So me w h a t r e late d

is s e c ti o n( ii ) , w hich pr oh ibi ts p e ne tr a tio n o f t he c hil d’s mouthby

the de fe nd ant’ s se xua l or g an. B oth section (i) and section (ii) conce rn pene tration of the c hild, one focusingon the g e nit a l are a , a

nd the oth e r on the mouth. I n c on tr a st, se c tio ns (i ii) and (i v) a dd re ss penetr ation and contact o f an other in a se x ual fa shion, by the sexual org an or a

nus of the c hil d. Th e statut e c ri min a lize s ma ny ty pe s o f s e xua lly

a ssa ult ive c on du c t w ith a child. Ye t, eac h section usually entails diffe re n t an d s epar ate a cts to commit the va ri ou s, pr oh ibi te d c on du c t. T his sp e c if ic ity re fl e c ts the le g isl a tur e ’s int e nt t o se pa ra te ly a nd di st in ctl y cri mi nal iz e any

actwhi ch co ns ti tu tes th e prosc ri be d c on du c t. A n o ff en s e is co mp l et e wh en a pe rs o n co m m i t s an y o n e of t h e pr o s cr i b ed ac t s . In su m, A rt . 2 2. 02 1 is a

c on du c t- ori ente d s ta tut e ; it us e s th e c on

jun c tiv e “ or ” to distingui s h

a n d s epar ate diff

ere nt conduct; and its various sec tions specifica lly define se xua l c on du c t in

wa y s th a t us ua lly

re qu ir e dif

fe re nt a nd dis tin c t a c ts t o c omm it. These c onsiderations lea d us to conclude that the L eg islature intended that eac h separ ately descr ibed conduc t constitutes a separ ate statutory offe nse.The State a lso a rg ues that Martinez is confusing the issue of jury unanimity

with the issue 1 of ele ction. We disag ree . When an indictment char g es a sing le offe nse and the evidenc e shows that two or more acts fulfill a ll the elements of the char g ed offe nse, the State is r equire d to e lect which act it will rely

upon to se cure a conviction, provided that the acc used makes a motion for elec tion. Se e Sc og ga n v . S tat e , 799 S.W. 2d

67 9, 68 0 n .3 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 90 ); Mo or e v . S tat e , 143 S.W .3d 30 5, 31 2 ( Te x. Ap p. —Wa c o 2 00 4, pe t. re f’ d)
. Th e ru le re g ard ing e le c tio n is no t a pp lic a ble in t his case , howeve r, bec ause w e ultimately conclude that the indictment alleg ed multiple offe nses. See Bran tle yv . S tat e , 48 S.W .3d 318, 322 n. 1 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, pet. re f’d)
. We also note that eve n if Martine z s h o u l d h av e re quested a n elec tion in thi s case , our analy sis of the jury

unanimity

issue would not chang e. As the c ourt observe d in Ngo : A r e qu e st f

or an e le c tio n, ho we ve r, is no t a pr e re qu isi te fo r i mpl e me nti ngTe xas’ c on sti tut ion a l and

statut or y re qu ir e me nt o f j ur

y un anim ity
. An e le c tio n s imp ly lim its the numbe r o f s pe c if ic of fe ns e s th a t th e jur

y may c on sid e r d

ur ingits deliberations. Appellant’s failure to reque st an election means that the j ury may be ins tr uc te d o n s e ve ra l di ff

e re nt c ri min a l a c ts in the dis jun c tiv e , b ut i t w ill sti ll be instructed that it mus t unanimously ag ree on one spec ific cr iminal act. As the State c or re c tly po int s o ut, one of

the purp os e s o f r e qu ir ingan e le c tio n is “ to e ns ur e un anim ou s ve rd ic ts, that is, a ll of the jur or s a g re e ing that one s pec if ic in c id e n t, w h ic h c o n s ti tuted th e o f f e n s e c h ar g e d

in th e in d ic tm e n t, o c c u r

r e d [. ]” B ut t he c on ve rs e is not tr

ue . Th e fa ilure to r e qu e st a n e le c tio n d oe s n ot e lim inate a def endant’ s rig ht to a unanimous verdict. Ngo v . S tat e , 175 S.W .3d 738, 748 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (interna l citations omit ted). 9 Id . at 832-33. Our

rea ding of Vick

leads us to conc lude that, on the re cord in this case , penetr ating the c hil d’ s anu s and c on ta c tin g the c hil d’ s a nu s mu st b e c on sid e re d s e pa rate and dis tin c t of

fe ns e s. Th e State argue s th a t both pe ne tr a tio n an d co nta c t re su lte d f ro m th e same inc ide nt, and that in orde r for

any juror to find that Mar

tinez pene trated the victim’s a nus, that juror must have
nece ssarily

found that Mar

tinez also contacted the victim’s anus. I n other words, befor e Mar tinez could penetr ate the victim, he must have first conta cted he r and, the ref ore, the offe nse of c ontact wa s subsumed in the offe nse of pe netration. Se e Ba rn es v . S tat e , 165 S.W. 3d

75 , 8 8 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin 110

2005, no pet.); He nd

rix v . S tat e , 15 0 S.W. 3d 83 9, 84 8 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th D ist .] 20 04 , p e t. ref ’d). Th e State ’s argume nt m ig ht h a ve me ri t in a c a se in w hic h th e re is e vid e nc e of on ly a sing le ac t, and that sing le ac t involves penetration. Se e Pa tte rso n v . S tat e , 1 5 2 S. W. 3 d

8 8 , 9 2 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ); He nd

rix , 1 5 0 S
. W
. 3 d a t 84 8; see als o F ra nc is , 36 S.W .3d at 128 (Johnson, J ., concur ring ) (“ The indi ct m en t against appellant contained one count of indec ency with a child, alleg ing two kinds of c ontact on the same date. T he indictment w as valid on its face ; if both ty pes of conta ct occ urre d at the same time, they would comprise a s ingle act.” ). In this case, howe ver, there was e vidence of more tha n one ac t involving contac t, and those a ct s did not alway s involve penetr ation. L .Z .’s mother testified that L .Z . told her that the a buse happe ned “mor e than one time.” L .Z . al s o te s ti f

ie d th a t th e a

b u s e h a p p e n e d o n mo r e th an o n e o c c a s io n , an d th a t th e abuse w as “diffe rent sometimes”: Q: Th is h a

pp e ne d mo re tha

n o ne tim e , r ig ht? A: Ye s. Q: Was it the same e ve ry tim e , o r w a s it

dif fe re nt s ome tim e s? A: Di ff e re nt s ome tim e s. Q: Ok ay . So me tim e s d id s ome thi ngoth e r t ha n th e mid dle pa

rt be ingin t

he bu tt happen? You can answe r y es or no to that. Do y ou know the answ er, or are y ou a f r a i d t o s ay? A: Can y ou repe at the question? Q : Y e s . So me ti me s d id s o me th in g h a p p e n o th e r th an th e mi d d le p art o f [M arti n e z] be ingin t he bu tt?11

A: Ye s.

. . . . Q: We w ill g o s low , o ka y . D id [M art ine z’s ] hand tou c h a ny pa rt s of [L .Z .] th a t it shouldn’t have touche d? A: Ye s. Q: Di d it

tou c h th e he art ? A: No. Q: Di d it

tou c h [L .Z .’ s] mid dle pa rt ? A: Ye s. Q: An d wa s t h e hand of [Martinez] moving or

not moving whe n it touched the mi d d le p art o f

[L
. Z
. ]? A: M o v i n g. Q : D id th e h an d s o f

[M arti n e z] t o u c h th e b u tt o f [L
. Z
. ]? A: Ye s. Q: W as i tm o v i n g o r n o tm o v i n g? A: I twa s m o v i n g. Q: Di d th e ha

nd — a ny pa rt of the ha nd g o in sid e of

[L .Z .’ s] mid dle pa

rt ? A: No. Q: Di d a

ny pa rt of the ha nd g o in sid e of

[L .Z .’ s] butt? A: No.
Th is tes ti mony

is e vid e nc e that Ma

rt ine z co nta c te d o r p e ne tr a te d L .Z ., or did bo th, on se pa rate
occa sions.12 Alia Alsafa

r, a f oren s ic interview er w ith the Center for Child P rotec tion, testified that L .Z . told he r that the a

bu se “ ha pp e ne d on mor e tha

n one oc c a sio n, ” and that so me tim e s th e a bu se involved penetr ation: Q: Did y ou ask [L .Z .] whether or not the thingy that was in her

back w as something t h a tw e n ti n s i d e o r

o u t s i d e h e r

b o dy? A: Ye s. Q: An d w hat di d s he say to t hat? A: She told me it went inside her bac k.
Alsafa r also testified, howeve r, that L .Z . indicated that on other occa sions the abuse did not involve penetr ation: Q : T h e th ir d

g e n e r a l a r e a th a t sh e ta lk e d a

b o u t w a s th e d e f

e n d an t — o r

[M arti n e z] touching her middle pa

rt with his hand? A: Ye s. Q: What di d s he sp e c if

ic a lly te ll you a bo ut t hat? A: She pointed to her own va g ina and state d he put his whole hand on this part, or she re fer red to it as her

middle part, inside her

clothes but outside her va g ina.
Other e vidence of conta ct sepa rate from pene tration included the te stimony of Dr. Wil liam Carter, a licensed psy cholog ist, who r eviewe d L .Z .’s ca se history . Carter testified about the consistency

and ver acity

of the de tails in L .Z .’s outcry . One of the statements L .Z . mad e in her outcry that Carter

testified to wa s “s o m eone touc hing he r butt.” “Touc hing” implies contact, and not nece ssarily

penetr ation.I n acc ordanc e with Ngo , we e mphasize that it i s not error to submit the sepa

rate offe nses 2 of c on ta c t and

pe ne tr a tio n “ dis

jun c tiv e ly .” Ra the r, the e rr or “ is i n f a ili ngto i ns tr

uc t th e jur

y that it must be unanimous in deciding which one (or more) of the [ two] di sjunctively submitt ed off

enses it found appellant c ommitt ed.” Ngo , 175 S.W .3d at 749. 13 Consist ent with the evidenc e we ha v e r e v ie w e d , th e St a

te a r g ued in closing

—contra ry to i ts c ur re nt p os iti on

on a pp e a l—t hat th e re wa s e vid e nc e of mor e tha n on e a c t: “ An d w he n [di d it happen]? More than one time. She has alwa y s said it happened mor e than one time.” Be cause there was e vidence of m ultiple acts of ag g ravated sexual assault in this case,
some of which only

involved contac t and not penetr ation, we c annot conc lude from this rec ord that the offe nse of c ontact wa s subsumed in the offe nse of pe netration. W e hold that the par ag raph of the c ourt ’s c ha

rg e in st ruct in g the jur

y on a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult wa s e rr on e ou s. Th e re is a 2 “re asonable possibili ty ” that the ve rdict wa s not unanimous—that some m em b er s of the jury
c on vic te d M art ine z of the of fe ns e of pe ne tr a tin g the vic tim ’s anu s d ur inga pa rt ic ula r e pis od e wh ile other juror s convicted him of the of fense of conta ctin g the victim’s anus at a nother time. See Fran c is v . S

tat e , 36 S.W .3d at 125.
Whether th e error requires rev ersal

Havingconcluded t h at the ag g ravated-sexual-assa ult charg e fa iled to require jury
un anim ity , a

nd be c a us e the Sta

te ha s c on c e de d th a t bo th i nd e c e nc y -w ith -a -c hil d c ha rg e s f a ile d to require jury

unanimity , we now addre ss w hether the char g e err or reg arding all three offe nses re quires
reve rsal of Ma

rtinez’s conviction. We will address the of fense s toge ther. The de g ree of har

m from cha

rge er ro r requiring reve rsal depe nds on whether the ap p el l ant preserve d the er ror by objection. Mi dd

le ton v . S tat e , 1 25 S.W. 3d

45 0, 45 3 ( Te x. Cr im.Martinez asser ts that the charg e error is a “structural error,” and thus should not be subject 3 to a har mless error

analy sis. W e disag ree . A structura l e rror is a “def ect a ffe cting the fra

mework within which the trial proc eeds, r ather than simply

an er ror in t h e trial proc ess itself.” Arizona v. Fu lm ina nte , 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991). The court of criminal appea ls has held that structura l error s are “fe dera l constituti onal err ors labele d by the United States Supreme Court a s such.” Johnson v. Sta te , 169 S.W .3d 223, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). The Supreme Court has f ound structura l error only in a “very limit ed class of cases”: the total de privation of counse l at trial, lack of an impartial trial judg e, the unlaw ful exclusion of members of the de fenda nt’s rac e fr om a g rand jury , the denial of the rig ht to self-re prese ntation at trial, the denia l of the rig ht to a public trial, a nd an instruction that e rr on e ou sly

low e rs the burd e n o f p ro of fo r c on vic tio n b e low the “ be y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t” standard. Johnson v. United States , 520 U.S. 461, 468-69 (1997). The court of c riminal appea ls has expressly held that “[j] ury

char g e er ror is not structura l error

and ther efor e must b e revie wed f or harm.” Tre v ino v . S

tat e , 1 0 0 S
. W
. 3 d 2 3 2 , 2 4 1 ( T e x . C r i m . A p p . 2 0 0 3 )
. W e ar e b o u n d b y Trevino unless and until a hig her c ourt tells us otherwise. 14 App. 2003). Where , as her e, the a ppellant fa iled to object, we will not reve rse for j ury -cha rg e er ror
un le ss t he re c or d s ho ws “ e g re g iou s h arm ” to t he de fe nd ant. Bl uit t v . S

tat e , 1 3 7 S. W. 3 d

5 1 , 5 3 ( T e x. 3 Cr im. Ap p. 20 04 ); Al

ma nz a v . S

tat e , 686 S.W. 2d 15 7 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 85 ). Er ro rs that r e su lt i n
e g re g iou s h a rm

a re tho se that a ff

e c t “ the ve ry ba sis of the c a se ,” “ de pr ive the de fe nd ant o f a va lua ble rig ht,” or “ vitally

aff ect a defe nsive theory .” Hutch v . S tat e , 922 S.W .2d 166, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 96 ). I n mak ing an eg re g iou s har m det e rm inatio n, re vie wi ng c ourt s ass e ss the de g re e of ha rm in light of the entire jury

char g e, t h e state of

the evidenc e, including the conteste d issues and we ight of probative evidenc e, the arguments of counsel, and all other rele vant information re veale d by the
rec ord as a

whole. El lis on v . S

tat e , 86 S.W .3d 226, 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Havingrevie wed the entire recor d, we find no eg reg ious harm. Martinez ar g ues that there was e g reg ious harm during the State’s closing argument, when the State explained to the jury the dif fe re nc e be tw e e n p e ne tr a tio n a nd c on ta c t in the c ha

rg e pa ra g ra ph on a g g ra vate d s e xua l a ssa

ult
. At one point, the prosec utor stated, “I f y ou decide y es on either one of those se g ments, y ou are g oing15

to c ome ba c k to the fi rs t ve rd ic t f or m, a nd y ou are g oin g to put g uil ty in the re , a nd y ou are g oin g to sign it, an d

th e ny o uar e g o in g to g o b a c k to th e th ir d

p a g e . ” T h e n , w h e nd is c u s s in g th e d if f e r ent offe nses in the charg e parag raphs on indece ncy with a child, the prosecutor st ated, “ I f y ou find any of tho se to be tr

ue , the n y ou g o to the la st v e rd ic t f or m, a nd y ou pu t g uil ty .” I n n e ith e r i ns tanc e did the State re min d th e jur

y tha t it ne e de d to re a c h a

un anim ou s v erdic t on

wh ic he ve r o ff

e ns e it b e l i e v e d M a rt i n e z t o b e g u i l t y. We do not believe t h e prose cutor’s c omments rise to the level of e g reg ious harm prese nted in Ngo . I n Ngo , the j ury was repeatedly told, by both the prosecutor and the j udg e, that it need not re ach a

unanimous verdict. See Ngo a t 75 0- 51 . H e re , th e jur y wa s n e ve r e xplic itl y

tol d t h at i t s v er d i ct n ee d

n o t b e un an i m o u s an d , i n fa ct , wa s i n s t ru ct edi nt h e l as tp ar agr ap h o f t h e c h ar ge that its verdict “must be una nimous.” See H

utch , 922 S.W .2d at 170 (a bsent contra

ry evidenc e, cour

t presumes jury

followed lawprovided by char g e). T h e s t at e o f t h e e v i d en ce , i n cl u d i n g co n t es t edi s s u es, also persuades u s t h at t h e c h ar ge
err or did not cause eg reg ious harm. The State introduc ed suff icient evidence supporting ea ch of the separ ate a cts in the cha

rg e. This evidenc e, which is not contested by Martinez on appea l, included
ex t en s i v e t estimony

by the complainant, he r mother, a nd two witnesses who intervie wed the complainant and te stified in gr eat de tail about the alleg ed abuse
.

F ur the rm or e , dur ing tr ia l Mar tin e z did no t ar g ue that he wa s g uil ty of so me of the a c ts
a lle g e d bu t no t ot

he rs . Rathe r, Mart ine z’s de fe ns ive the or y wa s th a t he did

no t c omm it anyof the acts the S t at e char g ed him with. He did not attempt to draw a distinction between c ontact and penetr ation in the aggra v at ed sex ual assault alleg ation, nor did he attempt to draw distinctions16

betwee n the sepa

rate acts in the indece ncy alleg ations. Martinez’s trial strate g y left the jury

with an
a ll- or -n oth ingde c isi on

wh e n e va luatin g e a c h c ount in the c ha rg e —f or e xamp le , e ith e r h e wa s g uil ty of ag g ravated sexual assault, or he wa s not. The cha rg e er ror would not ha v e i mpacted the jury ’s resolution of this issue.

Finally , unlike in Ngo , wher e two of the offenses were mutually exclusive, see Ngo , 175 S.W .3d at 751-52 (de fenda nt could not have c ommitt ed both o ri gi n al t heft of c redit ca rd and
rec eived same cr edit car d from som eone else who had st olen i t), none of the acts in this case we re mutually exclusive. For ex ample, it was possible for Martinez to both contact and pe netrate the vic timon se pa rate oc c a sio ns and , in

fa c t, t he State pr e se nte d s uf

fi c ie nt e vid e nc e of

e a c h a c t. Unlike the cha

rg e er ror in Ngo , the char g e err or in this case did not g o to “the ver y b a s i s o f t h e c a s e , ” “ d e p r i v e t h e d e f e n d an t o f a v a l u a

b l e r i g h t , ” o r “ v i t a l l y a f

f e c ta d e f e n s i v e t h e o r

y” to a deg ree that Texas courts her etofore have c onsidered eg reg ious harm. See Ngo , 175 S.W .3d at 7 5 0
. W e c o n cl u d e, t h er ef o re , t h at M ar t i n ez d i d

n o t s u ff er egr egi o u s h ar m as a r es u l to f t h e c h ar ge
err or. We overr

ule his first issue.
Do uble je opa r dy

I n his second issue, Mar

tinez contends that the jury could have found that Mar tinez committed both ag g ravated sexual assault by contac t and indece ncy with a child by contac t, and that this would constitut e multipl e punishment in violation of the Double J eopar dy Clause. Se e Il lin ois v. Vitale, 44 7 U .S. 41 0, 41 5 ( 19 80 ); Cervantes v. S tate, 815 S.W .2d 569, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 91 ); Barnes , 165 S.W .3d at 87. We first note that Mar tinez did n o t m ake a

double jeopar dy objection at trial. The ref ore, the fac e of the trial re cord must clea rly show a double je opardy17

violation before we may

addre ss this i ssue. Se e Lan gs v . S tat e , 1 83 S.W. 3d 68 0, 68 7 (T e x. Cr im. A p p . 2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Go nz ale z v . S tat e , 8 S. W. 3 d 6 4 0 , 6 4 3 ( T e x. Cr im
. A p p . 2 0 0 0 ) )
. The c ourt of
c ri min a l a pp e a ls h a s h e ld t

hat: [W]he n s e pa

rate the or ie s f

or an o ff e ns e are iss ue d to the jur

y dis jun c tiv e ly , a

do ub le jeopar dy violation is not clea

rly appar ent on the fa ce of

the re co rd i f o n e of the th e o r i e s c h ar g e d

w o u l d n o tc o n s t i tu t e a

d o u b l e j e o p ar dy

v i o l a t i o nan d

t h e r e is su ff ic ie nt e vid e nc e to s up po rt that va lid the or

y . Th e fa c t tha t the jur

y ’s ve rd ic t c ou ld have r elied on a the ory

that would viola t e t he Double Jeopardy Clause, is not sufficie nt to show a

constitutional viol ation clea rly appar ent on the fa ce of

the re cord.
Id
. I n th is c a se , it is not c le arl y a

pp are nt on the fa c e of the re c or d th a t th e re wa s a do ub le jeopar dy violation. L .Z
. testified at trial to multi ple instance s of sexual abuse, and not a ll inst ance s involved the same c ondu ct
. Specifica lly , L .Z . testified that Martinez: (1) pe netrated her anus; (2) touched her anus; (3) touc hed her vag ina; (4) made her touc h his penis; (4) place d his penis in her
mouth; and

(5 ) expo se d his pe nis to he r. B e c a us e the re is ev ide nc e of

e a c h o f t he se se pa rate a c ts, valid theories f

or the multiple convictions exis t that do not violate double jeopa rdy . For example, if the jury found that Martinez contac ted L .Z .’s anus unde r the a g g ravated-sexual-assa ult charg e, the j u r y c o u l d h a v e s e p ar a t e l y f

o u n d t h a tM art i n e z c o n t a c t e d

L
. Z
. ’ s v a g i n a

u n d e r t h e i n d e c e n c y- b ycontac t char g e. I n order

to preva il on a double jeopar dy claim, the evidenc e must show that the two offe nses at issue nec essari l y arose from “one act whic h could be subjec t to two differe nt interpre tations.” Oc ho a v . S tat e , 9 82 S.W. 2d

90 4, 90 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ); Martinez v. State, 161 S.W .3d 697, 705 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. g rante d). Mar tinez has not demonstrated thatPe rs on s a c c us e d o f c ri me s ar e g ua ra nte e d a mea

nin g fu l oppo rt

un ity to p re se nt a

c omp le te 4 defe nse by

the Six th and Four

teenth Amendme nts to the United States Consti tution. Crane v. Kentucky , 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). The se same amendments also g uara ntee a criminal def

endant the rig ht to confront the witnesse s ag ainst him. Sh e lby v . S tat e , 8 19 S.W. 2d

54 4, 54 6 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1991). We c onclude that Martinez prese rved err or on this iss ue by : (1) informingthe trial cour t 5 of the substance of the evidenc e soug ht to be admitted; a nd (2) infor

ming the tr ial court of the leg al g rounds for the admission of the evidenc e. Se e W ill over v. State , 7 0 S. W. 3 d 8 4 1 , 8 4 5 n . 4 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2002) (“Whicheve r party complains on appea l a bout the trial judg e’s a ction must, at the ear liest opportunity , have done eve ry thing ne cessa

ry to bring to the judge ’s attention the evide nce rule in question and its prec ise and prope r application to the evidence in question.”). 18 his c on vic tio n o f i nd e c e nc y wi th a c hil d b y c on ta c t w a s b a se d o n th e same c on du c t un de rl y inghis conviction for ag g ravated sexual assault of a c hild. Hu tc hin s v . S tat e , 9 9 2 S. W. 2 d

6 2 9 , 6 3 3 ( T e x. A p p . — A u s ti n1 9 9 9 , p e t. r e f

’ d )
. T h e r e f

o r e , h e h a s f

a il e d to s h o w a d o u

b le je o p ar dy

v io lati o n . We
overr ule Martinez’s sec ond issue.
Alter native perpetr ator e vidence

I n his third issue on appeal , Martinez asser ts that the district court’s exclusion of

“ a lte rn a tiv e pe rp e tr a tor

e vid e nc e ” vio la te d h is r ig ht t o p re se nt a c omp le te de fe ns e and

his ri g ht t o
c on fr on ta tio n. Mar ti ne z atte mpt e d to pr e se nt e vid e nc e that L .Z .’ s b ro the r, F .Z ., ha d s e xua lly

4 molested her. Ma

rtinez’s attorney

informed the district c ourt that this evidence was ne cessary to: (1) prese nt his theory that L .Z .’s brother was the actua l pe rpetrator; and (2) discredit the testimony of L .Z .’s mother by

alleg ing that she was testify ing ag ainst Martinez in order to protec t her son from prosec ution. The district c ourt sustained the State’s objection to this evidence. When the c ourt made its final ruling on this issue, Martinez’s attorne y noted his objection. 519 Evidentiary

ruling s rar ely

rise to the level of denying the fundame ntal constitutional rig ht to prese nt a meaning ful defe nse. Po tie r v . S tat e , 68 S.W .3d 657, 659 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). A trial cour

t’s ru l i n g excluding evide nce ma y rise to the leve l of a c onstitut ional violation if the ruling excludes oth er wi s e rele vant and r eliable e vidence which “f orms such a vital portion of the
case that exclusion eff

ectively prec ludes the defendant from prese nting a defe nse.” W

ile yv . S tat e , 7 4 S
. W
. 3 d

3 9 9 , 4 0 5 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 2 ). R ega rd i n g “a l t ern at i v e p er p et ra t or evide nce, ” a l t h o u gh
a de fe nd ant has th e rig ht t o atte mpt to e sta bli shhis inn oc e nc e by

sh ow ingthat so me on e e lse committed the crime, he still must show that his proffe red e vidence reg ardingthe alleg ed alter native perpe trator is suf

ficient, on its own or in c ombination with other evidenc e in the re cord, to show a nexus between the c rime cha rg ed and the alleg ed “a lternative pe rpetrator.” Id
. Even thoug h evidentiar

y ruling s are ordinarily revie wed for an abuse of discretion,

se e W e ath e rre d v . S

tat e , 15 S.W .3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), we re view constit u t i onal iss ue s de novo
. Se e Lill

yv . V irg ini a , 52 7 U. S. 11 6, 13 7 ( 19 99 ); Cam po s v . S tat e , 186 S.W .3d 93, 96 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 20 05 , n o p e t.) ; D a v is v . Stat e , 1 6 9 S. W. 3 d 6 6 0 , 6 6 5 ( T e x. Ap p. —A us tin

20 05 , p e t. g ra

nte d) ; W ils on v . S tat e , 1 51 S.W. 3d

69 4, 69 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 20 04 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; Mu tto ni v . S tat e , 25 S.W .3d 300, 304 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2000, no pet.). But see Mi lle r v . S

tat e , 36 S.W .3d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (apply ing abuse- of-discr etion standard of re view to ca se in which rig ht to present complete defe nse wa s impli cate d).

Ba sed on our revie w of the rec ord, Martinez has failed to de monstrate the r equire d
n e x u s b e t w e e n L
. Z
. ’ s b r o t h e r an d t h e c r i m e c h ar g e d
. A tt h e c o n c l u s i o no f L
. Z
. ’ s t e s t i m o n y, Martinez’s attorne y

examined her on voir dire about her brother. The attorne y first asked L .Z . if her20

br oth e r e ve r did any “ ba d thi ng s” to he r. L .Z
. re pli e d, “ No .” Th e a tto rn e y the n a sk e d a bo ut a tim e when L .Z . was y oung er a nd she would “pla

y doctor” with her older

brother. L .Z
. testified that her brother w ould play

the doctor a

nd L .Z . would play

the pa t i en t
. L
. Z. testified that, one time, her broth e r p la c e d a p la y s te th o s c o p e o nh e r

c h e s t t o c h e c k

o nh e r h e art. L
. Z
. te s ti f

ie d th a t n o thing inappropriate happe ned: Q: So w he n y ou

we re pla y ing do c tor , did y our br oth e r e ve r l oo k at any oth e r p art s of y our body

that wer e injured? A: No. Q: Whil e y ou are pla

y ing do c tor any oth e r t ime , d id your b ro the r e ve r t ou c h y ou in an y wa y t h at wa s a l i t t l e b i twr o n g? A: No.
L .Z . also testified that her brother tr ied to hug her, but that he did nothing else to her: Q: And when he hug g ed y ou, did he rub y our hea d? A: (Nods neg atively

). Q: Did he rub your ea

r? A: No. Q: Did he tickle y ou? A: (Nods neg atively

). Q: Did he rub your che st somehow? A: He jus t hu g g e d me . T hat’ s a ll. Q: Was it for a long time or a little time?21

A: A little tim e. Q: Did he say

any thing whe n he hug g ed y ou? A: No.
L e ti cia Go me z, L .Z .’ s mo the r, wa s a lso e xami ne d o n v oir dir e a bo ut t his inc ide nt. Gomez te stified that the y ear befor e L .Z . made the a lleg ations ag ainst Martinez, she was c oncer ned that her son wa s inappropriately touching L .Z . Gomez testified t hat s he was conce rned be cause her old e r d a ug hte r, N. Z ., tol d h e r t

hat F .Z . w a s to uc hin g L .Z . d ur ing the ir do c tor -p a tie nt pla y se ssi on s. Howeve r, Gomez also testified that she no long er be lieves any thing inappropriate ha

ppened be tween her c hildren. Martinez’s attorne y also examined on voir dire Belen Pra do, L .Z .’s aunt, about the incident. Prado testified: Q: J ust so I ’m clea

r, did [L .Z .’s mother] ever indicate to y ou that she thoug ht that he r son wa s the pe rp e tr a tor of thi s se xua l a bu se a g a ins t [L .Z .] th a t oc c ur re d la st y ear , or wa s that a sepa

rate issue? A : T h a t w a s a

s e p ar a te is s u e . T h a t i s an o th e r th in g th a t h a

p p e n e d thr e e y e ar s [a g o ], and that ha pp e ne d in Ar lin g ton , T e xas. Q: So to be clear , t his does not have — you are not saying that y ou believe that L e on ard o M art ine z is i nn oc e nt o f t he se c ha rg e s? A: That’s rig ht.
I n ruling that evidenc e about the inc ident betwee n L .Z . and her brother w ould not be admitted, the district court stated:22

Well, I don’t find that incident t o be relevant. I t is not in the s ame time and pla ce of this incident, and it is not de scribing any thing inappropriate that this Court can see
. I t is only hug g ing he r fr om behind, and the sister didn’t think that was a ppropriate
. There was no c riminal conduct de scribed, no intimate be havior de scribed, a nd it has nothing to do with what we are here on.
We conclude that e x cluding this e vidence did not violate Martinez’s rig ht to pr esent
a complete defe nse. The proff ere d evidenc e fails to e stablish a connec tion between L .Z .’s brother
and the a bu se L .Z . a lle g e d. Any

su g g e sti on

that L .Z .’ s b ro the r w a s an a lte rn a tiv e pe rp e tr a tor is “ bo th meag er a nd speculative.” See W

iley , 7 4 S. W.3 d at 40 6. “ I t is no t su ff ic ie nt f or a de fe nd ant m e re ly to offer up unsupported spec ulation that a nother person may have done the crime. Such speculative blaming intensifie s the g rave risk of jury confusion, and it invites the j ury to rende r i ts finding s based on emot i o n o r prejudice.” Mi c ha e lwic z v . S tat e , 186 S.W .3d 601, 617 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, p et
. re f’ d ) ( qu o t i n g United States v. Mc Veigh , 153 F.3d 1166, 1191 ( 10th Cir. 1998)). Righ t to confrontat

ion Mart ine z al so argue s th a t e xclu din g the e vid e nc e a bo ut L .Z .’ s bro the r p re ve nte d h im from cr oss-examining L .Z .’s mother a bout whether

her te stimony

was biase d ag ainst Martinez in an eff ort to protect he r son from pr osecution.

The Confrontation Cl ause of the U.S. Consti tution guar antee s a def endant the r ight to cross-e x amine witnesses. Crawf ord v. W ashington , 5 41 U. S. 3 6, 42 (2 00 4) ; Delaware v. V an Ar sd all , 4 75 U. S. 6 73 , 6 78 (1 98 6) ; Car ro ll v . S tat e , 916 S.W .2d 494, 496-97 (T ex . C rim. App. 19 96 ). A de fe nd ant may c ro ss- e xami ne a wi tne ss on any su bje c t “ re a so na

bly c a lc ulate d to e xpos e a motive, bias[,] or intere st for the witness to testify .” Car ro ll , 916 S.W .2d at 497. Howe ver, the23

trial court ha s considera

ble di scre tion in determining howand whe n bias may be prove d, and what collater al evidenc e is materia l for that purpose
. Di hn Tan Ho v . S tat e , 1 7 1 S. W. 3 d

2 9 5 , 3 0 4 ( T e x. App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 2005, pet. re f’d) . The trial c ourt has the discr etion to limi t the scope of cr oss-exami n at i o n t o avoid har assment, pre judice, conf

usion of the issues, enda ng eringthe witness, and the injec tion of cumulative or collater al evidenc e. Va n A rsd all , 4 75 U. S. at 67 9; Stu lts

v . S tat e , 2 3 S. W.3 d 1 98 , 2 04 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1 4t h Di st .] 20 00 , p e t. r e f’ d) . Co ur ts mus t examine e ach case on an individual ba sis to deter mine whether the Confrontation Clause demands the admissibilit y

of ce rtain evide nce. Lop e z v . S tat e , 18 S.W .3d 220, 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). I n making this deter

mination, the court should balanc e the pr obative value of the e vidence soug ht to be introduce d ag ainst the risk its admission m ay entail. Id . at 222. During voir dire, L .Z .’s mother testified: Q: You sure don’ t want to see your son g et in any trouble, do y ou? A: Of c ours e no t. Q: You would protec t y our son from g etting into some kind of t rouble, wouldn’t y ou? A: Th a t’ s r ig ht. This particular

testimony

was only rele vant to the ex tent evidenc e that L .Z .’s brother may have be en an a lternative p erp et ra t o r wa s releva nt. Be cause we have alr eady conclude d that Martinez failed to e stablish a nexus between L .Z .’s brother and the a cts alleg ed, we also conc lude that evidenc e of L .Z .’s mother’s de sire to protec t her son is not probative of any issue rele vant to the
case . Admitting the testimony would risk confusing the j ury about an irrele vant issue. Ther efor e,24

excluding the testimony

did not violate Martinez’s ri gh t t o confr ont and cr oss-examine L .Z .’s mother. We overr

ule Martinez’s third issue.

CO NC LU SION Havingoverr

uled all of Mar

tinez’s issues on appea l, we a ffirm the judg ment of the dis tr ic t c ourt
.

Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pemberton Affir med Filed: June 9, 2006 Pub lis h