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## German Espionage and Sabotage Against the United States inWorld War II

**Related Resources:**

> 
George John Dasch and the Nazi Saboteurs  (FBI Handout)U.S. Navy. Eastern Sea Frontier War Diary           Amagansett,  Long Island, New York Incident - June 1942            Frenchman  Bay, Hancock, Maine Incident - November 1944German B.d.U. War Diary - 26 May 1942

Source: "German Espionage and Sabotage Against the UnitedStates" *O.N.I. Review*[Office of Naval Intelligence]1, no.3 (Jan. 1946): 33-38. [declassified, formerly "confidential"].

IntroductionGerman Intelligence ServicesActivities Before Pearl HarborAfter Pearl HarborGerman Agents in the United StatesObjectives of German IntelligenceReasons for the Failure of German IntelligenceServicesBibliography for Further Information

**Introduction**

How extensive and effective were German espionage and sabotageactivities against the United States in World War II? To makegeneralizations is always dangerous, but certain broad conclusionsmay perhaps be stated at this time, subject to minor correctionsin the light of future data that may be uncovered from enemy sourcesor that is still closely held by United States or Allied agenciesfor security reasons. On the side of the enemy's activity it iswell-established that from a period before Pearl Harbor untilthe very end of the war Germany engaged in intensive efforts toobtain military, economic, and political information from theUnited States. In furtherance of this effort she recruited numeroussecret agents to operate within the United States and establishedextensive espionage networks in other countries of the WesternHemisphere. In the field of attempted sabotage the activity wasnot comparable; the failure of the large-scale mission entrustedto the eight saboteurs who landed on the East coast in June 1942appears to have discouraged further efforts in this direction.The German record of accomplishment did not measure up to theeffort expended. As far as is known there was no enemy inspiredact of sabotage within the United States during the war. On theespionage side, while Germany did from time to time obtain informationrelating to war production, shipping, and technical advances,it was almost always too late, too inaccurate, or too generalizedto be of direct military value. It is possible that in early 1942Germany did obtain some information that assisted in locatingsubmarine targets, although this has not as yet been finally determined;but on the whole, after Pearl Harbor, German espionage againstthe United States failed to produce the information required bythe High Command. This failure was due to a combination of Alliedcounter-measures and fatal weaknesses on the part of German intelligenceitself.

**The German Intelligence Services**

The secret intelligence requirements of the German [Armed Forces]High Command [O.K.W.] under the Third Reich were served by a separatebranch of the O.K.W. called the *Amt Auslands und Abwehr*(commonly referred to as the *Abwehr*) independent of thethree service commands–Army, Navy, and Air. Each of thesethree maintained its own intelligence staff for the evaluationand dissemination of information obtained from both open and secretsources; but these staffs conducted no secret intelligence activitiesthemselves. Rather they maintained liaison with the Abwehr towhich their special needs for information were made known. Theserequests the Abwehr endeavored to meet, at the same time beingengaged in the task of collecting on a world-wide scale all mannerof information which could be of interest to the High Commandor the individual services subordinate thereto.

The Abwehr was divided into three basic groups (*Abteilung*).Abt I was charged with offensive intelligence, including espionage;Abt II with sabotage and subversion; and Abt III with counterintelligenceand security. Of these our principal interest lies with Abt I.This was broken down into sections having cognizance respectivelyover military, naval, air, and economic intelligence, plus certaintechnical sections. The sections were further broken down intogeographical subsections, dealing with particular countries orareas. In addition to the headquarters organization in Berlinthe Abwehr maintained field offices in Germany and abroad staffedby Abwehr officers. In Germany and occupied countries these fieldoffices were referred to as *Abwehrstellen* (Asts) with branchesthereof called Nebenstellen (Nests); in neutral countries theAbwehr office was called a *Kriegsorganisation* (KO) andusually acted under cover of the diplomatic mission. Organizationallythe field stations reproduced the functional division at headquarters.Both headquarters and the field stations recruited, trained, anddispatched espionage agents for missions abroad. While in theorythere was a rough geographical division of responsibility betweenthe various Asts, in practice there was a great deal of overlapping.Thus while Ast Hamburg, and its subsidiary Nest Bremen, had primaryresponsibility for espionage against the United States there wasnothing to prevent Ast Cologne or KO Spain from sending an agentto this country if it happened to recruit one it believed wellfitted. This factor alone led to a good deal of confusion andinefficiency in the operations of the Abwehr. Personnel of theAbwehr included officers of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, bothactive and retired or reserve, and civilians recruited and commissioneddirectly.

Side by side with the Abwehr there existed another intelligenceagency–the Sicherheitsdienst (S.D.). Originally the securityand intelligence service of the Nazi Party, it came to play amore and more dominant role as an intelligence organ of the Reichuntil eventually it gained control over the Abwehr itself. InSeptember 1939 the S. D. was brought together with the variouspolice agencies of the State, including the Gestapo, to form theReichssicherheitshauptamt (R.S.H.A.) or Central Security Serviceof the Reich. Through one section of the latter–Amt VI–theS.D. soon developed an interest in foreign intelligence and begandispatching its own agents abroad. At first it limited itselfto political intelligence, but as the war developed it graduallyextended its interests to economic and military matters, and byJanuary 1944 was running its own espionage networks in Spain,Argentina, and elsewhere. The officials of the S.D. were virtuallyall members of the Nazi Party S.S.

As one phase of the rivalry between the Wehrmacht and the S.S.,and also because of increasing annoyance with the failure of theAbwehr, there was a long campaign by the R.S.H.A., and particularly[Heinrich] Himmler and [Ernst] Kaltenbrunner, to gain controlof the Abwehr. This was successful in the spring of 1944 whenthe Abwehr was finally taken over by the R.S.H.A. Some of itsfunctions were handed over to Amt VI and Amt IV (the Gestapo)but the majority, as well as most of the personnel, were retainedin a new section known as the Militaerisches Amt. Theoreticallyon a par with the other sections of the R.S.H.A., the MilAmt camemore and more under the domination of Amt VI; after July 20, 1944,[Walter] Schellenberg, head of Amt VI, took over the MilAmt aswell as a result of the execution of Col. Hansen, its former chief,for his part in the plot against Hitler's life. Thus during thelast year of the war the R.S.H.A. dominated the whole field ofGerman intelligence. In the earlier part of the war most of theagents met with abroad represented the Abwehr, but towards theend they were almost sure to be S.D. agents.

**Activities Before Pearl Harbor**

As early as 1936 Korvetten-Kapitaen Pheiffer, a veteran ofthe German Navy of World War I, who had returned to active dutyas an Abwehr officer in 1935, was collecting information fromthe United States of interest to the German High Command. Pheifferwas in charge of the naval section of Nest Bremen and as suchin a position to establish close contacts with the extensive Germanshipping interests centered in that port. At first he worked throughthe "Aussenhandelstelle," or foreign trade office, whereall German businessmen going overseas were registered, interviewingreturning travelers on their return for any interesting observationsthey might have made, especially in foreign ports. From, thesecasual contacts Pheiffer subsequently recruited agents for theexpress purpose of seeking information abroad. At the same timehe was enlisting the assistance of officers of the Merchant Marineboth in reporting their own observations and seeking informationfrom contacts in foreign ports whose reports they would turn overto Pheiffer. The latter has stated the German intelligence fileshad become so out of date during the 1920s and early 1930s thatwhen the period of rearmament began it was necessary to seek informationof all types from abroad–much of it by no means secret–inorder to compile up-to-date data. Nevertheless, Pheiffer was particularlyinterested in new technical developments in the fields of shipdesign, armament, and special equipment.

It was through one of his volunteer agents on the liner *Bremen*that Pheiffer made contact with the notorious Dr. Griebl, whoover a period of time supplied him with information on UnitedStates aircraft. This was also the period of Fritz Duquesne, LiliStein, Gunther Rumrich and other German agents whose activitiesin the United States and arrests have received such wide publicityas not to warrant further discussion. Suffice it to say that whilethese and other agents who operated in this country before 1939obtained information of some value to Germany, they did not succeedin obtaining vital secrets or in establishing a widespread espionagenet that was able to continue into the war years.

After the outbreak of war in Europe, and particularly afterthe fall of France, it became of increasing importance for Germanyto obtain intelligence on the nature and extent of equipment beingsent to Great Britain, data on ship sailings and the war potentialof the United States. Much of this was readily available fromthe press and other open sources in the United States to Germandiplomatic personnel. To supplement these sources and evade Britishcensorship, the Abwehr established espionage networks in Mexicoand other Latin American countries which relayed information fromthe United States to Germany by radio and other clandestine communications.

Among the most active of these was a ring in Mexico headedby Georg Nicolaus. Nicolaus, whose activities extended from 1940to his arrest in the spring of 1942, was a competent individual.He had served with distinction in the Germany Army in World WarI, spent many years in Colombia, and returned to Germany in November1938. In January 1939, he was re-commissioned in the Army andassigned to Ast Hanover of the Abwehr. Late in 1939 he was orderedto Mexico to organize an espionage network. During his 2 yearsof activity in Mexico, Nicolaus organized an extensive networkwhich maintained contact with other groups in South America andattempted to obtain information from the United States. Whiletechnical data from United States publications was extracted orphotographed and some general information obtained from contactsin the United States, again there is no evidence that Nicolauswas successful in laying his hands on any vital military secrets.He was successful in leaving behind the nucleus of an organizationwhich was able to maintain some activities throughout the war,although this was of little value to the enemy other than itsnuisance value in occupying the attention of United States counter-intelligenceagencies.

During this same period–between the outbreak of war inEurope and Pearl Harbor–the Abwehr succeeded in establishinga number of espionage networks in South America. These were centeredin Brazil, Chile and Argentina, with ramifications in other countries.Until their liquidation, two groups in Brazil, headed respectivelyby Albrecht Gustav Engels and Nils Christian Christensen, werethe most important and successful. Through organizations in Brazilitself, staffed by members of the well-entrenched German colony,information was collected on British shipping and forwarded byclandestine radio to Germany. Similar information from the RiverPlate region collected by agents in Argentina was relayed throughthe Brazil stations. The Brazil group also acted as relays forinformation of a more general nature, including intelligence originatingin the United States, forwarded by such agents as Nicolaus inMexico, Walter Giese in Ecuador, and the so-called PYL group inChile. The group also had its own contacts on ships between theUnited States and Brazil. Through use of channels along the Westcoast of South America and connections with Europe via clandestineradio and the Lati airline, these scattered but interrelated groupswere able to escape British censorship and maintain safe and reasonablyrapid contact with Abwehr stations in Hamburg, Cologne and Berlin.

During 1940 and 1941 these groups must be credited with accomplishmentswhich were probably of considerable value to Germany. Not onlydid they forward a quantity of basic economic data useful to Nazianalysis, but the shipping information supplied resulted in theloss to submarines of British and Allied ships. It is of interestthat Nicolaus, Engels, and Christensen were all sent out by GroupI (Wi) of the Abwehr (economic espionage), but as the war progressedtheir activities became more and more concentrated on naval andmaritime intelligence. In general this was the most successfulperiod of German espionage in the Western Hemisphere; after PearlHarbor the Abwehr was never able to produce intelligence on thesame scale.

**After Pearl Harbor**

The activities of these espionage groups in Latin America hadnot gone unnoticed by United States and British counter-intelligenceagencies, but prior to Pearl Harbor there was little that couldbe done about them. During the early months of 1942 active stepswere taken to correlate this information, identify those agentswho were still unknown, and persuade local police authoritiesto arrest, intern, or deport them. As a result of these effortsthe leaders of the Brazilian rings were arrested in March 1942and Germany was never again successful in establishing an effectiveespionage service in Brazil. Prior to their liquidation, however,the Brazilian groups had made strenuous efforts to obtain militaryinformation from the United States. One example was the recruitingof a Brazilian Air Corps officer, who was coming to this countryon an official mission under the auspices of our Military Attacheto visit a number of aircraft factories. Fortunately, the Officeof Naval Intelligence learned of this officer's connections shortlybefore his departure and his trip was canceled.

In most other Latin American nations, pressure from the UnitedStates succeeded in eliminating the most dangerous German agentsby mid-1942. This success was tempered by continued tolerationof active German espionage on the part of Argentina and Chile.In both countries Axis agents drew their support from large residentGerman colonies with strong local connections, from the continuanceof diplomatic relations until a relatively late date, and fromthe complaisance of local officials.

After the breakup of the Brazilian groups, the organizationin Argentina became the most important in South America. BetweenJanuary 1942 and the spring of 1945 the German espionage networkin Argentina went through a number of changes some of them forcedby the arrest or exposure of its agents, but was always able tomaintain a nucleus from which to build anew and to continue forwardinginformation to Germany.

During 1942 the dominant figure was Capt. Dietrich Niebuhr,the Naval Attaché, who had as his two principal assistantsHans Napp and Ottomar Mueller, and also enlisted the servicesof certain individuals who had escaped from Brazil at the timeof the arrests there. The activities of Niebuhr and his immediateassistants were exposed in a note handed the Argentine Governmentby the United States Ambassador late in 1942 and a reorganizationbecame necessary. This was accomplished by Gen. Friedrich Wolf,the Military Attache, and Johannes Siegfried Becker, an S.D. officersent clandestinely to Argentina from Germany in January 1943.These two had at their disposition, both for personnel and funds,agents connected with the earlier groups still at large, the facilitiesof the German Embassy, German firms, Spanish shipping circles,and Argentine nationalists. From these diverse elements Wolf,and more especially Becker who was an extremely able individual,succeeded in weaving a net which had threads running into Uruguay,Paraguay, Chile, and even Mexico, and maintained fairly regularcommunication with Germany by radio and courier.

As a result of the arrest by the British of Osmar Alberto Hellmuth,an agent on his way to Germany from Argentina, in late 1943, informationon the espionage activities of this group was furnished the ArgentineGovernment which precipitated the rupture of diplomatic relationsand the arrest of some of the most active agents. Becker survivedthis crisis. Within a couple of months he had his organizationfunctioning again and in June 1944, received assistance from Germanyin the form of two agents landed clandestinely on the coast ofArgentina from an auxiliary yawl which had crossed the Atlanticfrom the French coast. The network suffered further losses fromarrests in August 1944, but was able to continue some activitiesuntil the very end of the war.

Closely connected with the successive groups in Argentina,there existed until February 1944 an active German espionage organizationin Chile. Mention has already been made of the PYL group whichwas active before Pearl Harbor and maintained contacts in allthe West Coast South American countries as well as with the Germangroups in Brazil and Argentina. This group, under the controlof Ludwig von Bohlen, Air Attache of the German Embassy, receivedassistance from numerous individuals and firms among the largeGerman colony in Chile. As a result of information collected byUnited States counter-intelligence agencies and furnished theChilean Government by the State Department, a number of the moreactive agents of this group were arrested in the fall of 1942.Enough escaped, however, to permit von Bohlen to rebuild anothernetwork, known as the PQZ group. When von Bohlen was repatriatedlate in 1943, this group was sufficiently well-organized so thathe could leave it, as well as a large sum of money and equipment,in the hands of Bernardo Timmerman, who carried it on until hisarrest in February 1944.

To supplement both his own organization in Argentina and thePQZ group, Johanns Siegfried Becker established a Sicherheitsdienstnetwork in Chile early in 1943. This was under the leadershipof Heinz Lange, a veteran of German espionage in Brazil and Paraguay,assisted by Eugenio Ellinger, whom Becker sent to Chile in April1943. These two organizations, which worked closely together,maintained contacts in Peru and Bolivia. Most of their informationwas forwarded to Germany via Buenos Aires, although some was sentdirect via short-wave radio. As a result of widespread arrestsby Chilean police in February 1944, the espionage rings in Chilewere effectively smashed–not, however, before some of theirmembers escaped to Argentina where they continued their activities.

From the above it will be seen that the Germans succeeded inmaintaining an espionage organization in South America, and communicationsbetween it and Germany, throughout most of the war. In this theywere assisted by local elements in both Chile and Argentina, andespecially by Spanish officials and members of the crews of Spanishships who provided continuous courier facilities.

The question may well be asked, what and how valuable was theinformation these agents collected and forwarded to Germany? Thisquestion can only be answered with the reservation that we cannever be sure that we have the whole answer. We do know a certainamount. Much of the information was of a general nature relatingto industrial production in the United States, political and economictrends, labor disputes, and exports of raw materials from LatinAmerica. These data were not obtained by "Mata Haris"from secret sources but from the careful perusal of thousandsof United States publications, both general and technical, andfrom systematic contacts with Latin American individuals, bothofficial and private, who were in a position to obtain informationabout the United States. The results were not dramatic, but theyprovided the raw material which any intelligence agency needsto formulate its picture of the enemy.

Aside from this general information, there was some of moredirect naval interest. The Chilean group, especially concentratedon reporting the movements of United Nations vessels along theWest Coast, together with data on the antisubmarine equipmentand armament of both merchant and naval vessels. Late in 1943a report was sent to Germany from Chile, via Argentina, givingdetails of United States naval gunnery practice and data on certaintypes of torpedoes. This is believed to have been obtained eitherfrom Chileans who visited United States naval vessels, or fromobservations of gunnery exercises held aboard a United Statescruiser off Callao in the summer of 1943 for the benefit of thePresident of Peru and a large party of Peruvian officials. Similarly,in December 1943, one of the German agents in Chile obtained froma Chilean Air Force officer, who had spent 9 months training atthe Naval Air Station, Corpus Christi, technical details of UnitedStates aircraft construction and performance and data on navalflight instruction and training accidents.

**German Agents in the United StatesItself**

The Germans did not limit their attempts to obtain informationfrom the United States to the establishment of espionage netson the periphery. Throughout the war attempts were made to establishagents within the United States itself. Speaking generally, itcan be reported that these efforts failed. In most cases the agentswere either apprehended before they could commence activities,or their operations were sufficiently well controlled to neutralizethem. The reasons for their failure ranged all the way from carelessness–asin the case of Werner Janowski, an agent landed on the coast of[southern shore of the Gaspe Peninsula, Quebec] Canada [by *U-518]*early in November [9 Nov.] 1942, who was caught within a few hoursthrough his stupidity in throwing away a box of Belgian matchesin a hotel room and otherwise arousing the suspicions of civilians–tovoluntary surrender on the part of the agent. Two of the eightsaboteurs who landed in June 1942 gave themselves up to the FederalBureau of Investigation and thus precipitated the arrest of theothers. [On 13 June 1942, 4 agents were landed from *U-584*on Amagansett, Long Island, New York; and on 17 June 1942, 4 agentsfrom *U-202* were landed on Ponte Vedra Beach, south of Jacksonville,Florida. A subsequent military trial of the 8 captured agentsresulted in 6 death sentences, one life imprisonment and one 30-yearsentence. On the recommendation of the Justice Department, PresidentTruman granted executive clemency on condition of deportationto the two surviving agents who were deported to the AmericanZone of Germany in 1948].

Most of the cases of German espionage agents in the UnitedStates have received such wide publicity in the press that itis unnecessary to discuss them in detail. Mention of a few ofthem will serve to indicate that there were continued, if sporadic,attempts, on the part of Germany to place such agents. While thesaboteurs' and Janowski's cases were the first to attract generalattention, they were not the first agents to operate in the UnitedStates during the war. During the latter part of 1943 and early1944, the Federal Bureau of Investigation announced the arrestof four groups of agents who had been operating independentlyfor a considerable length of time. Ernest Lehmitz, Grace Buchanan-Dineen,and Wilhelm Albrecht von Rautter had all been recruited by theAbwehr in Europe between 1939 and 1941 and returned to the UnitedStates before Pearl Harbor. They surrounded themselves with afew assistants or subagents and forwarded reports in secret writingon shipping, war production, and other military information tocover addresses in neutral countries in Europe. The existenceof all these agents first became known through Allied censorship,largely because of their use of cover addresses which were alreadycompromised; and while in some cases it took long and painstakingresearch and the comparison of thousands of handwriting samplesto identify them and their confederates, their reports to Germanywere under the control of United States counter-intelligence agenciesfrom a fairly early date in their active career.

The neutralization of these agents should not be interpretedas a sign of their incompetence or that of their Germany masters–except insofar as the furnishing of the same cover addresses tovarious agents was careless. Rather the fact that Lehmitz andvon Rautter were able to live and operate in the United Statesin wartime for over 2 years without detection, must impress onewith the need for constant vigilance, while their ultimate identificationis a lesson in the relative importance of painstaking researchand checking versus more melodramatic methods of counter-intelligence.

The arrests of its agents made in 1943 and early 1944 did notdiscourage German intelligence from sending further agents tothe United States. Among the survivors of a submarine [*U-1229*]sunk off the coast of Maine in the summer of 1944 [on 20 August]was one Oscar Mantel, who was to have been landed on the Mainecoast in order to establish himself as an agent in this country.He was an experienced intelligence agent with a history of activitiesin Spain and France and he had received considerable specializedtraining for his mission. In November 1944, the R.S.H.A. triedagain. This time [on 29 November] a submarine [*U-1230*]succeeded in putting ashore William Curtis Colepaugh and EricGimpel, who made their way to Boston and New York. The formerwas a maladjusted American who had jumped ship in Lisbon and offeredhis services to the Germans, while the latter had been repatriatedto Germany from South America. Within a month of his arrival,and after spending a good share of the funds advanced him, Colepaughhad surrendered. Then as a result of the interrogation of Colepaugh,Gimpel was arrested before he could begin to discharge his mission.[They were found guilty and sentenced to death in a military trial,but President Truman subsequently commuted the sentence.] As faras is known this was the last attempt of German Intelligence tosend agents to the United States during the war; although as lateas September 1945 a German who had been trained for a missionto the Western Hemisphere, and who was attempting to reach SouthAmerica under false papers, was removed from a Spanish ship atTrinidad.

In addition to employing agents resident in the Western Hemisphere,the Germans utilized members of the crews of Spanish and Portugueseships to observe shipping in the United States ports and to reporton convoys sighted at sea. These seamen were also used to buynumerous American magazines which were then studied in Lisbonor clipped for use in Germany. From these sources, which representedexploitation of perhaps unavoidable loopholes in United Statessecurity rather than positive espionage, the Germans obtainedinformation of over-all intelligence value, but little of immediateoperational significance.

**Objectives of German Espionage**

Throughout the war the Germans sought military, political andeconomic information of any and all types, and the broad assignmentsgiven agents may well be one reason for the failure to obtainspecific data of high quality. At the same time, certain subjectsreceived special emphasis. Among these were data on aircraft productionand types, and information on anti-submarine devices. Beginningin late 1942 or early 1943 the Germans realized that the successof their submarine arm, in which they placed so much hope, wasthreatened by Allied anti-submarine devices and techniques, andinformation on these became the priority intelligence requirementand remained so until the end of the war. The information wassought from all the sources discussed above and in the neutralcountries of Europe as well. Fantastic sums were offered on theLisbon espionage market–and were sometimes paid for reportsinvented by the agents themselves. It is a source of satisfactionthat interrogation of German intelligence and naval officialsindicates that they never succeeded in getting the vital information.

**Reasons for Failure of the GermanIntelligence Services**

In conclusion one may speculate as to the reasons why the Germanintelligence services failed to produce results more in keepingwith the effort expended. The first reason seems to be over-organization,with conflicts and duplication between the Abwehr and R.S.H.A.and within the two organizations themselves. The Abwehr was furtherhandicapped by bureaucracy, lack of initiative, and corruptionon the part of many of its officers, who were lukewarm Nazis atbest and regarded a berth in the Abwehr as an opportunity to avoidservice on the Russian front. By contrast the R. S. H. A. tendedto be aggressive and imaginative, but it suffered from lack ofexperience and inability to evaluate information objectively.The personnel of both services was poorly chosen. The commenthas often been made by Allied counterintelligence agencies thatmost German agents were of low grade and quality. The fault appearsto have been with the initial recruiting and not with the training,although this was sometimes superficial.

Of course in spite of these weaknesses, the constant attentionof the Allied agencies was required to prevent the Germans fromgetting information which might have been of immense value tothem. Our experience showed that passive security measures, whileessential, are not enough. There must be constant active counter-intelligence,in the form of both research and field work and a coordinationof the two, directed toward increasing our knowledge of the enemy'sintelligence organization, methods, capabilities and personnel.

**For Further Information - A SelectBibliography:**

Bishop, Eleanor C. *Prints in the Sand: The U.S. Coast GuardBeach Patrol During World War II*. Missoula MT: Pictorial HistoriesPublishing Co., 1989. [The landing of 4 Abwehr agents on Amagansett,Long Island, New York, from *U-584*, and 4 agents on PonteVedra Beach, south of Jacksonville, Florida from *U-202*in June 1942, are described on pp. ix-x; the November 1944 landingof agents Gimpel and Colepaugh in Maine from *U-1230* isdescribed on pp. 30-31.].

Blair, Clay. *The Hunted, 1942-1945*. vol. 2 of *Hitler'sU-Boat War*. New York: Random House, 1998. [The unsuccessfulmission in August 1944 to land an agent from *U-1229*, theagent's capture after the sinking of the submarine, and the Navy'sdecision to treat him as a prisoner of war rather than turn himover to the FBI is described on p. 644. For the story of the twoagents landed in November 1944, see pp. 646-647.].

____.*The Hunters, 1939-1942*. vol. 1 of *Hitler'sU-Boat War*. New York: Random House, 1996. [For the landingof agents in June 1942, and their subsequent fate, see pp. 603-606.Also mentioned is the arrest of 14 friends and relatives of theagents, and the conviction of 10 of them. President Truman latercommuted the sentences of the friends and relatives.].Breuer, William. *Hitler's Undercover War: The Nazi EspionageInvasion of the U.S*.A. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989.[See the appendix on pp.321-324, "Espionage Agents Convictedin the United States, 1937-1945."].

____. *Top Secret Tales of World War II*. New York: JohnWiley & Sons, 2000.

Cohen, Gary. "The Keystone Kommandos." *AtlanticMonthly* 289, no.2 (Feb. 2002): 46-59. [Includes two photosof the military tribunal, mug shots of the eight prisoners aswell as short biographies, information on the execution and burialof the condemned, and an anecdote about George Dasch's later yearsand his friendship with Charlie Chaplin.].   

Conn, Stetson, Rose C. Engelman, and Byron Fairchild. *Guardingthe United States and Its Outposts*. Washington DC: Officeof the Chief of Military History, 1964. [For the June 1942 landingssee pp. 99-100.].

Dasch, George John. *Eight Spies Against America*. NewYork: R.M. McBride Co., 1959.

Farago, Ladislas. *The Game of Foxes: The Untold Story ofGerman Espionage in the United States and Great Britain DuringWorld War II*. New York: David McKay Company, 1971.

Gimpel, Erich with Will Berthold. *Spy for Germany*. London:Robert Hall, 1957.

Hadley, Michael L. *U-Boats Against Canada: German Submarinesin Canadian Waters*. Kingston and Montreal, Canada: McGill-Queen'sUniversity Press, 1985. [Includes the story of Werner Alfred Waldmarvon Janowski who landed from *U-518*in Canada on 9 Nov.1942, as well as the story of the unmanned German weather stationestablished by *U-537* in northern Labrador on 22-23 October1943.].

Hilton, Stanley E. *Hitler's Secret War in South America1939-1945: German Military Espionage and Allied Counterespionagein Brazil*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1981.

Jong, Louis de. *The German Fifth Column in the Second WorldWa*r. Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1956.

Kahn, David. *Hitler's Spies: German Military Intelligencein World War II*. New York: Macmillan, 1978. [The story ofthe November 1944 landing of two agents, including a map of theirlanding place in Frenchman Bay, is in Chapter 1, "The Climaxof German Spying in America," pp. 2-26. Useful footnotesare on pp. 553-554].

Lardner, George, Jr. "Nazi Saboteurs Captured." *TheWashington Post Magazine* (13 Jan. 2002): 12-16, 23. [Includesphotos of the eight saboteurs landed in June 1942, informationon their trial before a military tribunal, the execution of sixof them by electric chair, and the fate of George Dasch afterhis return to Germany in 1948.].

Morison, Samuel Eliot. *The Atlantic Battle Won, May 1943- May 1945*. vol. 10 of *History of United States Naval OperationsIn World War II.*Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960.[ See pp. 326-327 for brief information on the unsuccessful attemptto land Mantel from *U-1229*; and pp. 330-331 for the landingof agents in November 1944.].

____. *The Battle of the Atlantic,* September 1939 - May1943. vol.1 of History of United States Naval Operations In WorldWar II. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1947. [See p. 200 forbrief information on the June 1942 landings.].

Noble, Dennis L. *The Beach Patrol and Corsair Fleet*.Washington DC: Coast Guard Historian's Office, 1992. [See pp.8-11 for the story of the agents landed in June 1942 on Long Island.].

*The Oxford Companion to World War II*. New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1995. [See "Latin America at War"for a summary of Latin American activities not emphasizing espionage;and "Spies," which includes a section on German intelligencein the Western Hemisphere.].

Rachlis, Eugene. *They Came to Kill: The Story of Eight NaziSaboteurs in America*. New York: Random House, 1961.

Whitehead, Don. *The FBI Story*. New York: Random House,1956. [For the landing of German agents in 1942 and 1944, seepp. 199-206.].

Wighton, Charles and Gunter Peis. *Hitler's Spies and Saboteurs:Based on the German Secret Service War Diary of General Lahousen*.New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1958. [Lahousen was head ofthe Abwehr's Abt. II, which was responsible for sabotage.].

Willoughby, Malcolm F. *The U.S. Coast Guard in World WarII*. Annapolis MD: United States Naval Institute, 1957. [Thelandings of German agents is discussed on p. 46, within a chapteron the Beach Patrol.].*14 March 2002*