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THE GROWING CRISIS IN SOUTH SUDAN

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, 

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 7, 2016

Serial No. 114–236

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH, GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Donald Booth, Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan, 

U.S. Department of State .................................................................................... 7

The Honorable Princeton N. Lyman, senior advisor to the president, U.S. 

Institute of Peace ................................................................................................. 39

Mr. Brian Adeba, associate director of policy, Enough Project ............................ 45

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Donald Booth: Prepared statement .............................................. 11

The Honorable Princeton N. Lyman: Prepared statement ................................... 41

Mr. Brian Adeba: Prepared statement ................................................................... 47

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 54

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 55

Written responses from the Honorable Donald Booth to questions submitted 

for the record by the Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in 

Congress from the State of California, and chairman, Committee on Foreign 

Affairs .................................................................................................................... 56

The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global 

Health, Global Human Rights, and International Organizations: Questions 

submitted for the record and written responses from: 

The Honorable Princeton N. Lyman ................................................................... 58

Mr. Brian Adeba ................................................................................................... 59

(1)

THE GROWING CRISIS IN SOUTH SUDAN 

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,

GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H. Smith 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SMITH. The subcommittee will come to order and good afternoon, everyone. Thank you for being here. 

On April 27 of this year our subcommittee held a hearing on 

South Sudan’s prospects for peace. An accord that appeared to have 

finally ended the civil war that broke out in December 2013 was 

reluctantly signed by both the Government of South Sudan and the 

Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition in August 2015. 

We were cautioned by Ambassador Booth at the time and I remember your testimony on April 27, Mr. Ambassador, when you 

said that these are the most significant advancements yet in implementing the peace agreement. 

But you also cautioned and said it is only a first step toward 

lasting peace—the most difficult work still lies ahead and those 

words were prophetic and certainly very, very true, especially given 

what happened in July. 

Peace was never fully established in South Sudan as a result of 

the August agreement. In fact, as we all know, fighting spread to 

areas that had not previously seen armed conflict. 

An estimated 50,000 South Sudanese have been killed since December 2013. More than 2.5 million have been displaced and 4.8 

million face severe hunger. 

According to the U.N. Mission in the Republic of South Sudan, 

or UNMISS, ‘‘gross violations of human rights and serious violations of humanitarian law have occurred on a massive scale.’’

South Sudanese women have long reported cases of sexual assault by armed forces throughout the country, sometimes in sight 

of UNMISS bases. 

This past July, between 80 to 100 armed soldiers broke into the 

Terrain compound which houses aid workers and international organizations’ staff and for several hours they sexually assaulted 

women, beat residents, murdered one South Sudanese journalist, 

and looted the facility. 

2

UNMISS did not respond to the desperate calls for help from 

residents even though their own personnel lived in the Terrain 

compound and the U.N. Mission officials say the various components of UNMISS didn’t respond to orders to mobilize from within 

the organization. 

U.N. peacekeepers were just minutes away but they refused to 

intervene despite being asked and having a robust legal mandate 

to do so. 

A contingent of South Sudanese military ultimately rescued the 

victims from other rampaging troops. The investigation by the 

South Sudanese Government is scheduled to be completed within 

days and just over the weekend our U.N. Ambassador, Samantha 

Power, had asked and has asked that there be an independent 

panel to look into what happened there. 

And there must be consequences for those who are found guilty. 

The rapidly deteriorating security and the increasingly dire humanitarian situation led me to undertake an emergency mission to 

South Sudan 2 weeks ago along with staff director Greg Simpkins. 

I have known Salva Kiir since he became First Vice President in 

the Government of Sudan in 2005. As a matter of fact, I met him 

in Khartoum only weeks after he assumed that office and I hoped 

my visit might convey to him the outrage over the murder, rape, 

sexual assault, attack on aid workers, and the precarious situation 

that his government faces. 

South Sudan is at a tipping point. The United Nations will likely 

take up a measure to impose an arms embargo if they do not see 

implementation of what looks like was an agreement over the 

weekend to deploy some 4,000 peacekeepers. 

The International Monetary Fund has strongly recommended a 

mechanism for financial transparency and that meets next month, 

likely expecting a response from South Sudan. 

Meanwhile, the House and Senate both have measures that have 

an arms embargo embedded in it as well. In Juba, we met with 

President Kiir, other members of the cabinet and his Defense Minister, Kuol Manyang Juuk, and the top members of his staff including the Chief of General Staff, Paul Malong, considered by many 

to be a major power behind the scenes. 

I emphasized to them that the widespread rape and sexual exploitation and abuse by soldiers must stop now and that perpetrators of these despicable crimes must be prosecuted in a response 

both President Kiir and Defense Minister Juuk agreed to produce 

a zero tolerance Presidential decree against rape and sexual exploitation by armed forces. 

Such a decree not only informs perpetrators that they will be 

punished for their actions but it places the government on the line 

to enforce such a decree. 

The U.N. High Commission for Human Rights has previously described the South Sudan’s Government to hold perpetrators of 

abuses accountable as ‘‘few and inadequate’’ and that, of course, 

must change. 

President Kiir also gave us a copy of a Presidential order forming 

a commission to investigate the incident at the Terrain compound. 

The results of that are due any day now. 

3

There are, however, four military officers and one civilian in custody for looting the Terrain compound. But no one has been arrested for sexual assaults, beatings or the public murder of a South 

Sudanese journalist. 

One of the victims of sexual assault at Terrain is from my congressional district. After relating horrible details of the assault by 

two soldiers she gave us the name of the soldier who ‘‘rescued her’’ 

and who might be able to provide information that could be used 

to prosecute those who attacked her at the Terrain compound and 

I conveyed that to Salva Kiir and the Defense Minister. 

As you know, Mr. Ambassador, there are about 20,000 humanitarian aid workers in South Sudan, 2,000 of whom are from the 

United States and other foreign countries. 

If there is not greater security of these humanitarian personnel 

and supplies, vital assistance will diminish at a time that it is 

needed most. The exploitation of children as child soldiers must 

stop as well. According to UNICEF, 16,000 child soldiers have been 

recruited by all sides since the civil war began in December 2013. 

Moreover, this year the U.S. State Department Trafficking in 

Persons report gave South Sudan a failing grade place it on Tier 

3, in part because of child soldiers. 

South Sudan faces the possibility again of a U.N. arms embargo, 

again, if they do not implement the deployment of the 4,000 Regional Protection Force. 

There is yet time for South Sudan to make its pivot to peace and 

good governance by faithfully implementing a comprehensive peace 

accord including and especially the establishment of a hybrid court 

signed 1 year ago. 

But time is running out. It is a very, very fluid and, unfortunately, volatile situation. The governments of the three guarantors 

of South Sudan’s peace—the United States, the UK, and Norway—

all have expressed their disgust with the South Sudanese Government and its armed opposition for not adhering to the August 2015 

peace agreement and providing to the extent it can for the security 

and the well-being of its people. 

However, expressions of disdain are not enough. This hearing is 

not only intended to examine culpability for the current situation 

but also to try to find solutions that will safeguard the future of 

one of the world’s newest nations and its citizens. 

As a guarantor of peace, the United States can and should do no 

less. 

I would like to now yield to my friend and colleague, Ms. Bass, 

the ranking member of the subcommittee. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you for your trip 

that you and Mr. Simpkins made. I know it was on very short notice but a very important delegation. So I’m glad that you did that 

and also that we are having this hearing so quickly. 

I also want to thank Ambassador Booth and Ambassador Lyman 

and I’m glad that we will be hearing your testimony today. 

I was in South Sudan in November and I went there with a 

small delegation to look at the U.N. peacekeeping mission at the 

time and that was before Machar returned and the big concern 

then was will he return and will the nation hold to the agreement. 

4

And it was shortly after President Kiir had divided up the nation 

and expanded the provinces and we were very concerned about how 

you could possibly, since that was done after the peace agreement, 

how can you hold to the peace—how can you hold to the power 

sharing that had been agreed to in the peace agreement if you’ve 

reconfigured the entire geography of the nation. 

At the time, we were concerned about what was happening with 

UNMISS then. But now, what is going on, how the violence had 

expanded and encompassed and victimized yet again South Sudanese citizens and especially the ones that are least able to protect 

themselves—women, girls, and youth. 

In response to the crisis, I joined several of my colleagues in a 

letter to President Obama outlining the severity of the deteriorating situation in South Sudan and calling on the U.S. to lead the 

way in calling for an arms embargo on South Sudan to stop the 

needless killing, endless brutality, and unconscionable impunity. 

The UNSC August 12th decision to renew UNMISS, the proposed 

revision of its mandate and inclusion of an additional 4,000 strong 

Regional Protection Force must be applauded. 

But there must also be clarification regarding the specific rules 

of engagement governing the UNMISS troops. 

I understand that the South Sudanese Government agreed to the 

additional Regional Protection Force as recently as Sunday. 

I look to Ambassador Booth to outline the next steps which must 

be taken to bring an end to the nightmare of violence not only by 

the long-term suffering citizens of South Sudan but also by the foreign nationals who, with total disregard for their personal welfare, 

seek to assist these citizens. 

Several of the questions that I have we’ll get into in the dialogue 

but I want to propose them in the beginning and, obviously, the 

central question is what more can we do. 

An arms embargo, will it really be effective? It seems as though 

there needs to be a whole international effort that’s beyond 

UNMISS and I want to know what your thoughts are in terms of 

the AU and the AU’s capacity. 

And also, in terms of UNMISS, what will their role be? Will they 

be able to intervene? Will they be able to be aggressive or are they 

just going to be in a position where, you know, they will watch 

something happening. 

I just think that this situation has reached—and we all know 

this—has reached dire proportions. I was in Nigeria a couple of 

weeks ago and it was a staff member from the State Department 

actually had just been evacuated from South Sudan and sent to Nigeria. 

So I really want to be as specific as possible. It’s important to 

understand the situation but I really want to get down to the brass 

tacks of okay, now what—what can we do—what can we do as a 

nation and what should the world do because otherwise I just don’t 

see the situation getting particularly better. 

With that, I yield. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ms. Bass. 

The chair recognizes Mr. Donovan. 

5

Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I’m going to 

yield my time so we give the witness some more time to testify. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you 

and Ranking Member Bass for calling this hearing on the growing 

crisis in South Sudan and thank all of our witnesses and particularly thank Ambassador Booth and Ambassador Lyman for being 

here today. 

I look forward to hearing from you on the deteriorating situation 

in South Sudan and as Congresswoman Bass said what we can do 

to be effective in responding. 

Like many observers, I was optimistic when South Sudan 

emerged in 2011 as an independent country. However, the civil war 

that has ravaged South Sudan since 2013 had escalated alarmingly 

since the subcommittee’s last hearing on South Sudan in April. The 

impact is devastating and the potential for even deeper crisis is 

greatly disturbing. 

Not only does South Sudan face another post-conflict reconciliation process, massive and chronic humanitarian needs, high-level 

corruption and widespread displacement of its population, but an 

increase in human rights abuses including recruiting child soldiers, 

which is extremely distressing. 

U.N. officials have asserted that targeted attacks against civilians, humanitarians and U.N. personnel in South Sudan constitute 

war crimes or crimes against humanity, and the U.N. Mission in 

South Sudan reports that civilians have been directly targeted 

often along ethnic lines. 

Forces on both sides have committed widespread violence. There 

have been more than 260 attacks on humanitarian workers in 2016 

alone, including an attack on a residence for aid workers in Juba 

in July which resulted in assaults on several Americans and the 

killing of a local journalist. 

The dangers faced by foreign aid workers could have a devastating effect on relief efforts. This is a critical time for South 

Sudan. If the current crisis cannot be brought under control and 

the violence halted, the situation will likely deteriorate further and 

could spin into complete chaos. 

I hope that the South Sudanese Government’s decision earlier 

this week to allow the Regional Protection Force to deploy will enable the beginning of real improvement in this very dire situation. 

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on what else we can 

do to support stability in that part of the world and I thank our 

witnesses again for being here and yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. We are joined by full committee Chairman Ed Royce of California. 

Chairman ROYCE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

I would just start by commending you, Chairman, for your sustained focus on the crisis in South Sudan. 

As all of you know, Chairman Smith just traveled to South 

Sudan to engage with our Embassy there and to engage with our 

other partners, and this is the fifth, I think, South Sudan-specific 

hearing that the committee has held since this crisis began. 

6

What’s unfortunate and, frankly, maddening is the underlying 

problems haven’t changed in the past 3 years. It is still a manmade crisis. It is still a crisis political in nature. 

And what does change every day is the number of innocent South 

Sudanese killed, the number displaced. Tens of thousands have 

been killed, millions have now been displaced. 

I very much appreciate the recent senior-level engagement of the 

administration, including Secretary Kerry’s trip to the region and 

Ambassador Samantha Power’s leading of a Security Council delegation to South Sudan. I was on the phone a few hours ago with 

Secretary Susan Rice on this issue. It is really unclear whether this 

high-level diplomacy can have an impact on the ground. 

One of the oddities here is that the anti-American sentiment is 

growing in Juba as of late. There is reporting today of an incident 

in which the Presidential guard deliberately opened fire on a U.S. 

diplomatic convoy traveling through the city. I understand command and control of armed forces in South Sudan is practically 

nonexistent in this situation—practically nonexistent. But there 

should never be an instance in which American diplomats are specifically targeted ever. 

After lengthy Security Council negotiations, the Security Council 

approved of the deployment of a Regional Protection Force. I met 

with the Secretary-General recently of the U.N. on this issue and 

I shared that we welcome the establishment of a force. But I know 

how difficult it is going to be moving this from concept to reality. 

It’s going to be far from easy. 

Special Envoy Booth, in your prepared testimony you explain 

that if the Secretary-General reports that the Government of South 

Sudan is impeding the new force’s deployment, the administration 

would be prepared to support an arms embargo. We’ve made similar threats in other resolutions and I’m not sure anyone in South 

Sudan takes that threat of an embargo seriously anymore. I hope 

that we will be serious in terms of implementation of it. 

Interestingly, in your prepared testimony you made no mention 

of the existing Executive order that would allow the sanction of individuals who threaten peace in South Sudan. I think that is worth 

contemplating. I look forward to hearing from you why no one had 

been added to the U.S. sanctions list in over a year. There are, 

surely, people who deserve to be on that list. If we fail to hold 

South Sudan’s political leaders on both sides accountable for the 

atrocities committed we cannot expect anything to change. 

So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce. 

Mr. Rooney. 

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, thank you for letting me sit in on your hearing. 

Mr. Ambassador, since the signing of the peace agreement in August 2015 and since the violence in July, the U.N. Security Council 

and the U.S. have both failed to implement an arms embargo, as 

you know, in South Sudan. 

The U.N. and the U.S. have both failed to sanction additional individuals that we have proof have been involved in the attacks 

against civilians and that continue to procure weapons and military equipment. 

7

Secretary Kerry, in February in the State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee, which I sit on and as well as yourself, in 

April, both told me that the U.S. is committed to holding senior officials accountable for continued cease-fire violations and human 

rights violations that undermine the terms of the peace agreement 

in South Sudan. 

You both said that the administration would be willing to implement sanctions on such individuals. But Secretary Kerry stopped 

short of endorsing an arms embargo. 

Also in August during a trip to Africa, Secretary Kerry threatened to withhold humanitarian assistance to South Sudan if leaders there continued to violate the peace agreement. 

So I’m curious to hear in your testimony why the U.S. is threatening to withhold assistance to the people of South Sudan rather 

than holding the leaders who perpetuated the violence accountable 

through sanctions and arms embargo. 

I would also like to know who exactly in the administration is 

preventing additional individuals from being sanctioned and who 

do not want to implement an arms embargo. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Rooney, thank you very much. 

I would like to now welcome Ambassador Booth. Donald Booth 

was appointed Special Envoy to Sudan and South Sudan on August 

28, 2013. He previously served as Ambassador to Ethiopia, Zambia, 

and Liberia. 

Prior to that, he was the director of the Office of Technical and 

Specialized Agencies in the Department of State’s Bureau of International Organization Affairs. 

Ambassador Booth also has served as director of the Office of 

West African Affairs, deputy director of the Office of Southern African Affairs, economic counselor in Athens, and division chief for bilateral trade affairs at the State Department. 

Ambassador Booth, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD BOOTH, SPECIAL 

ENVOY TO SUDAN AND SOUTH SUDAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 

STATE 

Ambassador BOOTH. Thank you very much, Chairman Smith, 

Ranking Member Bass and the members of the committee and subcommittee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to speak before you today. I want 

to discuss some of the tragic events that occurred over the past 2 

months. 

But without ignoring the bitter reality on the ground, I also want 

to focus most of my remarks today on the possibilities for the way 

forward. 

Chairman Smith, as you know from your visit, South Sudan is 

in a dire state. The most recent outbreak of violence in early July 

created a perilous security situation in many parts of the country. 

The humanitarian situation, as many of you have noted, is one 

of the most extreme in the world, with 4.8 million people, over 40 

percent of the population, facing life-threatening hunger, 2.5 million displaced and the economy in free fall. 

8

Serious crime is now a part of daily life for South Sudanese and 

aid workers and their supplies are targets as well. 

The violence in early July came about because neither President 

Salva Kiir nor First Vice President Riek Machar was willing to 

work with the other to implement the peace agreement or to set 

up the security arrangements that were designed to prevent a return to fighting Juba. 

We saw the moment of greatest optimism since the signing of the 

August 2015 peace agreement, the establishment in late April of 

the transitional government. We saw it shattered by the irresponsibility and ruthlessness of South Sudan’s leaders. 

Both leaders lost control of their forces during a moment of tremendous political fragility, and government soldiers engaged in 

sexual violence against civilians including the attacks on both 

South Sudanese and foreigners at Terrain Camp. 

Now, I would be remiss not to pause here and praise the work 

of Ambassador Molly Phee and her team at Embassy Juba. They 

have faced enormous hardships and real danger in doing their jobs 

and their work has been, frankly, extraordinary. 

They have, against long odds, preserved the engagement needed 

to help the people of South Sudan. They have done so despite two 

events that I know are on your minds. 

First, on the night of July 7th, just a few hours after a deadly 

encounter between government and opposition security forces in 

the same area, two vehicles carrying several of our diplomats were 

fired upon by government soldiers. 

Fortunately, because they were both armored vehicles, the occupants were not injured. Ambassador Phee confronted President 

Kiir the following day and received an apology as well as assurances that there would be a thorough investigation. 

That day, however, was also the same day that major fighting 

broke out between the government and opposition. The second 

event was much more tragic—the attack by scores of uniformed 

government security forces against the Terrain Camp where 12 

Americans and over 30 third country and South Sudanese nationals were located. 

The attack involved hours of looting, beatings, rapes and the 

murder of a prominent South Sudanese journalist, John Gatluak. 

I would like to express at this point my personal condolences to 

John’s family and to all of the survivors of the attack. 

That attack occurred toward the end of 2 days of heavy fighting 

in Juba which saw government forces drive out Machar’s security 

contingent. 

Even as shooting raged near the U.S. Embassy compounds, as 

soon as the Embassy was alerted to the attack, Ambassador Phee 

contacted South Sudanese security officials whom she believed still 

had command of their forces and the convinced them to intervene 

to rescue those under assault at the camp. 

I want to stress that Ambassador Phee did everything within her 

power and resources in those circumstances to assist those who 

were under assault at the Terrain Camp. 

In the aftermath of the attack, our priority was the care and 

evacuation of the victims and then to protect their privacy and to 

demand justice for them. 

9

My written testimony contains a thorough account of what we 

know about the awful events at Terrain Camp that day as well as 

what we are doing to ensure safety of our personnel. 

Now, I would like to focus the rest of my statement on what I 

see as the way forward or at least a way forward. First, in the 

wake of the fighting in Juba in July, a political accommodation to 

avoid further fighting and suffering remains as important as ever. 

But given that neither President Kiir nor former Vice President 

Riek Machar could prevent their security entourages from fighting, 

we do not believe it would be wise for Machar to return to his previous position in Juba. 

That said, this cannot serve as a justification for President Kiir 

to monopolize power. What is most urgently needed is creation of 

a secure space in Juba for an inclusive political process to forestall 

further violence. 

That is why we strongly support the Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s call for deployment of a Regional Protection 

Force to Juba to provide for free and safe movement throughout 

the capital. 

The RPF should proactively contribute to stability and thereby 

allow for the demilitarization of Juba. But we must be clear that 

the government will need to allow the RPF to do its job once it is 

in Juba. 

No political process can take place as long as large numbers of 

armed men and heavy weaponry remain in the capital. Stabilizing 

the security situation in Juba is only the first step. 

Any political process, to be credible and viable, must be inclusive. 

I believe what is needed is for South Sudan’s political and military 

leaders in and out of government to meet together to figure out 

how to jointly shoulder responsibility for preventing further bloodshed. 

However, this can only succeed if those currently in power are 

willing to accommodate the legitimate interests of others. The violence in early July drove out significant factions of the SPLM-inOpposition, of the Former Detainees and other political parties. 

These groups must be deterred from supporting any further violence. Thus, they must see a path for peaceful engagement. 

South Sudan’s leaders must also look ahead to the creation of a 

professional inclusive national army and other security institutions. They need to be able to articulate an agreed end state of security sector reform. 

As any international support for cantonment, or DDR, activities 

will depend among other things on the credibility of the envisioned 

security sector end state. 

The Transitional Government should then prioritize legislation, 

establishing an open consultative process for drafting and ratifying 

a new constitution under which elections will be held at the end 

of a transitional period. 

In addition, the Transitional Government should prioritize legislation regarding the African Union-led Hybrid Court for South 

Sudan. 

A recent opinion survey showed that 93 percent of South Sudanese believe there can be no enduring peace without accountability. 

We agree. 

10

What I have described is a sequence of interdependent events. 

I’m describing them as a way forward, not because it will be easy 

to implement them but because it is difficult to see any other path 

that does not lead to a future of oppressive one-party rule, renewed 

conflict or, most likely, both. 

I am not naive about the chances of these things happening. Our 

ability to influence events in South Sudan and steer its leaders to 

a more constructive behavior is limited. 

The Security Council’s permanent representatives just returned 

from a trip to South Sudan. We were pleased that the council was 

able to come to agreement with the Transitional Government on 

several key issues including the government’s consent to deployment of the Regional Protection Force and to work with the U.N. 

Mission that’s already there. 

However, we now need to see those words turned into action. If 

the Secretary-General’s report finds that the government is obstructing deployment of the Regional Protection Force or continuing to prevent UNMISS from fulfilling its mandate we are prepared to support an arms embargo in the Security Council. 

Beyond an arms embargo, we stand prepared to impose visa restrictions on individuals involved in public corruption, as official 

corruption has a long history in South Sudan and has played a direct role in furtherance of conflict in the country. 

Mr. Chairman, I would have liked to come before this subcommittee today with better news. Unfortunately, we now face a 

difficult and uncertain path for South Sudan. It is a frustrating 

and disheartening situation, particularly, of course, for South Sudanese. 

It is their future that grows bleaker by the day. With them in 

our minds I believe we must continue to press South Sudan’s leaders to give peace a chance. 

Thank you for inviting me to speak today and I look forward to 

answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Booth follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Mr. Ambassador, thank you so very much for your 

statement and your fine work. Without objection, your full statement will be made a part of the record. 

Just a few opening questions, and I do want to add my congratulations and thanks to Ambassador—the U.S. Ambassador to South 

Sudan, Molly Phee, and her staff who, under unbelievably trying 

circumstances, have been working around the clock to try to secure 

the peace, provide for access of humanitarian aid workers, which 

is one of the biggest impediments and why so many people are 

dying of malnutrition and why so many young people, especially 

children and babies, are succumbing to starvation. They are working hard and I want to thank her for her leadership as well. 

Let me ask you about the zero tolerance policy that the Defense 

Minister, when I asked him said they would do against rape and 

sexual assault. 

He made it very clear that he was going to call the President to 

try to get him to do it as well. We did meet with Salva Kiir and 

I raised it with him and he too said he would do it. 

We have called back since then, a little over a week. It hasn’t 

been promulgated yet and, of course, the mere issuance of a statement without implementation is not worth the paper it is printed 

on. 

So we are hoping that the two will go hand in hand. Good strong 

statement—hold these service members, these armed forces to account, and police, and put them behind bars when they sexually assault and rape and kill and maim. Your thoughts on that. 

Secondly, Ambassador Lyman, who as you know will be testifying on the second panel, who performed your job admirably and 

with great distinction when he was the Special Envoy, makes the 

point in his testimony that the new rapid protection force should 

not be under UNMISS, the U.N. Mission there. 

Greg Simpkins and I met with Ellen Loj, who’s the head of the 

United Nations Mission and she said they tried to get commanders 

to make the trip which is only or less than a mile away to try to 

save people who were under assault at Terrain and they wouldn’t 

go, and this isn’t the first time. 

It’s happened several times. They have the right rules of engagement. This isn’t Sarajevo all over again or UNPROFOR in the 

former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. They have robust rules of engagement in Chapter 7 powers. 

He suggested it be under a separate authority and mission. Your 

thoughts on that, whether or not that would be improvement and 

provide some additional help. 

And then the access issue—it seems to me that if, as I said, people will die if there is not humanitarian access. The huge majority 

of humanitarian workers are South Sudanese who, in a way are in 

a special category of risk—your thoughts on what we could do 

there. 

And then security sector reform—when you testified last time 

you put the agreement under four basic baskets which are mutually inclusive of each other—governance and constitutional reform, 

macroeconomic reform and transparency, security sector reform, 

and justice and reconciliation. 

21

And I think as you pointed out and as pointed out by others, the 

Hybrid Court ought to be set up. It ought to be done yesterday to 

hold people to account for acts of impunity and crimes against humanity. But the security sector reform seems like the most 

daunting challenge. 

With all the militias and the lack of chain of command that appears to be the situation there, your thoughts on the prospects of 

meaningful systemic reform of the military. 

Ambassador BOOTH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me go through those. First of all, I want to thank you for 

being such a strong advocate for the zero tolerance policy on gender-based violence and for rape other such crimes and for raising 

that at the highest levels during your visit in Juba. 

It’s certainly something that we are following up on. Unfortunately, like many commitments that are made when we meet with 

senior officials in South Sudan, the promises are not always turned 

into reality. 

But it is something that, certainly, is important and we will continue to push on that. We will let you know what success or lack 

of success we may have in that regard. 

Secondly, as regards to the Regional Protection Force, there are 

a number of reasons why IGAD proposed and we have supported 

putting the Regional Protection Force as part of the U.N. Mission 

in South Sudan. 

First of all, there is the issue of funding it, and a separate standalone force under an African Union or an IGAD flag would have 

faced problems of being funded and would have severely delayed its 

ability to be deployed. 

Doing it under the U.N. may not be always the fastest but that’s 

one of the things that I’ve been engaging on in my many trips to 

the region and talking with chiefs of defense and foreign ministry 

officials as well as other senior leaders to ensure that the three 

countries that have pledged troops to this Regional Protection 

Force—Ethiopia, Kenya, and Rwanda—would be, indeed, prepared 

to move their forces very quickly and we would be prepared to help 

them to move them quickly to do that. 

Also, this force was designed in a way that it would be under one 

commander and that commander would report to the force commander of UNMISS but would have the authority and the mandate 

from the troop-contributing countries to use that force for the very 

specific tasks of the mandate in U.N. Security Council Resolution 

2304, which is to ensure the free movement of people in Juba, to 

protect critical infrastructure including the airport and keeping it 

open, and in intervening should anyone be planning or engaging in 

attacks on the U.N., on civilians, on IDPs—a very broad mandate. 

And, again, in our discussions with the troop-contributing countries, they have assured us that the troops they would deploy to do 

this mission would have the political backing in their capitals to, 

indeed, enforce those tasks. 

So I understand the skepticism that many may have, having 

looked at other U.N. Missions. But this seemed to be the most 

practical and expedient way of getting troops on the ground who 

could actually provide a security umbrella in Juba. 

22

But as I said in my testimony, just putting those forces on the 

ground will not solve the problem. They need the cooperation of the 

South Sudanese Government and in the peace agreement and particularly in the security arrangements that followed it that were 

negotiated after the signing of the agreement in August 2015. 

There was a limitation on the number of forces that both Salva 

Kiir, the government, and Riek Machar, the opposition, could have 

in Juba and all other forces were to be at least 25 kilometers outside of the city. 

So that is at least a starting point for taking the heavy weapons 

and many of the security forces that are currently in Juba and getting them out and we would hope that the government would cooperate in further reducing the military footprint so that the citizens of Juba can feel more secure and so that there is the room 

for the political dialogue that I talked about. 

On humanitarian assistance, this is indeed a terrible situation. 

Since the outbreak of this conflict, 59 humanitarian aid workers 

have been killed, making South Sudan the most dangerous place 

for humanitarian aid workers, more dangerous than Syria, I am 

told. 

And so this is a serious problem. It is something we have engaged repeatedly on. In my many visits to Juba I have engaged 

with President Kiir, Defense Minister Kuol Manyang and others on 

this. 

We keep receiving assurances that this issue will be addressed, 

that orders are issued, that they simply need to have a specific example so they can go after individuals who might have been 

harassing aid workers or stealing aid. 

But, frankly, this has become a systemic problem. Shortly after 

the fighting in July, there was looting of many different stores in 

Juba. One was the World Food Programme warehouse, and it was 

very organized. 

A truck came with a crane, not only to loot the food but to take 

the generator from the WFP compound. 

So this, indeed, does need to investigated and people need to be 

held accountable. I think that is the only way that the message will 

get out that the government is truly serious that humanitarian aid 

workers and their supplies are meant for the people of South 

Sudan and should not be interfered with. 

But this is going to be a continued engagement and a hard slog, 

I am sure, with the government in Juba. 

On security sector reform, the peace agreement and in particular 

the security arrangements negotiated after it called for a security 

and defense sector review board to outline sort of the end state of 

the security arrangements of South Sudan—what the army would 

look like, the security services, the police, et cetera. 

That board had just begun meeting when things fell apart in 

July this year. But even under the peace agreement it was foreseen 

that it would not come to conclusions for about 18 months into the 

transitional period whereas the idea of cantoning forces and beginning a DDR process was to start prior to that. 

What I’m proposing, and I’ve said in my testimony, is that we 

really need to have an idea of what the end state is. South Sudan 

has suffered for too long as a heavily militarized state, probably 

23

understandable in that it was the product of a long liberation 

struggle—Anyanya I and Anyanya II against the government in 

Khartoum—so almost 50 years of struggle. 

But it is time that South Sudan, in order to be able to be at 

peace and to prosper needs to be a less demilitarized state. So can 

we get South Sudanese to agree on what the end state is and if 

we agree that that’s a sustainable and reasonable end state that’s 

something that then we can look to support. 

So, really, our leverage on getting a meaningful security sector 

reform is that we will not fund things if it isn’t a reasonable outcome that we are driving toward. 

And then on the Hybrid Court, again, we share frustration that 

this is moving more slowly than we would like. I have engaged numerous times and we had our legal experts engage with the African 

Union. 

We are at the verge of giving them $3.3 million to actually begin 

some of the work. We have encouraged them to move forward on 

at least establishing an office for the prosecutor so that testimonies 

and evidence can begin to be collected even before the court is established and judges can decide on who would be indicted or who 

would be looked at by the court. 

So that’s something we want to push forward. I discussed that 

also with the African Union High Representative for South Sudan, 

the Honorable President Konare, former President of Mali, who has 

been deeply engaged for the past year as well in trying to sort out 

the problems of South Sudan. 

Thank you. 

Mr. SMITH. Ms. Bass. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you again, Mr. Ambassador. 

I wanted to know if you could tell me the status of the former 

President of Botswana, Festus Mogae, and if you could, one, review 

the role he is playing and then the status of that. 

We’ve talked about humanitarian aid and I know no one wants 

to see that end, but how can humanitarian aid get to the population? 

You mentioned the World Food Programme and the theft—the 

organized theft that took place and I wanted to know if that was 

the government or the opposition. 

We have talked about an arms embargo and I mentioned that in 

my opening and I wanted to know, one, what is the position of the 

administration on an arms embargo and where are the South Sudanese getting their arms from now? 

I also wanted to mention a couple other items. 

Ambassador BOOTH. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

Let me start with question about the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, which is headed by Botswana former President, Festus Mogae. 

He was appointed by IGAD to fulfill the role as chair of JMEC. 

Now, JMEC is a committee that is made up of South Sudanese parties as well as of the members of IGAD Plus, who are both guarantors and in our case a witness of the peace agreement. 

We’re not a guarantor of the peace agreement. And he chairs 

monthly meetings of that group, and his function is to oversee the 

implementation of the agreement and where the parties get stuck 

24

in implementing he is to recommend ways forward. And if the parties are blocking implementation his recourse is to report to IGAD, 

to the African Union Peace and Security Council and to the U.N. 

Security Council, and he had done a number of reports to those 

various bodies. 

He has tackled issues such as the problem of the 28 states, the 

impasse in the seating of members of the transitional legislature 

and other elements of the agreement that the parties were unable 

to actually find a way to implement because they were not working 

in good faith with each other. 

After the events of July 8 to 11, JMEC temporarily moved its operations to Addis Ababa. They have now gone back to Juba, and 

one of the tasks that the Security Council asked JMEC to undertake is to hold a security workshop to determine the level and arming of forces that should remain in Juba, and I understand that 

President Mogae has convened a meeting which will be held on the 

22nd and 23rd of this month to look at that. 

So those are the types of activities that JMEC is doing. We are one of the major supporters of JMEC. We have contributed over $3 

million to the operation of the JMEC and we believe it is a critical 

component for successful implementation of any part of the peace 

agreement. 

It has been criticized by the government in particular for usurping government authorities. 

We do not see it that way at all. We see it as the neutral—President Mogae in particular as the chairman, as the neutral arbiter 

of implementation of the agreement. 

On humanitarian access, I just really would like to clarify one 

thing on what Secretary Kerry was expressing in the press conference in Nairobi. 

I really think what he was expressing there was not a plan to 

cut off humanitarian assistance from the United States but, rather, 

a frustration with the continued interference with the humanitarian assistance that we are providing and really trying to put 

South Sudan’s leaders on notice that they have to get serious about 

dealing with this. That was the message——

Ms. BASS. I wasn’t referencing Secretary Kerry, really. I know 

that there is concern about that here. 

Ambassador BOOTH. Yes. So, again, how do we get the humanitarian assistance delivered? It is a systemic problem and it is partly related to the criminality. 

The WFP warehouse incident, for example, occurred after opposition forces were driven from the capital so it would have to have 

been government forces that were doing that looting. 

And, again, that is the type of thing that needs to be investigated 

and some examples need to be made of people who were involved 

in that type of activity. 

Of the people that the government claims it has arrested for 

looting in the aftermath of the fighting in July it is not clear to us 

that any individuals—of those individuals particularly involved are 

being looked at for involvement in this attack. 

And then the arms embargo—what we have tried to do with the 

arms embargo, as it is a major tool, is to achieve progress toward 

peace by threatening it and we have used that on a number of ocVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:42 Nov 29, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\090716\21459 SHIRL
25

casions and we think it is one of the reasons that the government 

is seriously looking at allowing the deployment of the Regional Protection Force because they know that if there is impediments to 

that—that the United States and I know that many other members 

of the Security Council are already on record of supporting the 

arms embargo. 

But I think most importantly what they heard when the Security 

Council permanent representatives went to Juba this past weekend 

was a unanimous Security Council that was saying when we pass 

a resolution, even though some may have abstained on it, it is the 

Security Council that is speaking and so you have to take that seriously. 

And as I mentioned in my testimony, if the Secretary-General reports that there is continued obstruction of this force we are prepared to move ahead and, as we said in Security Council Resolution 2304, which we have the pen on, that there is an appended 

resolution to be voted on, which is an arms embargo resolution, 

and we are also prepared to look at other tools such as sanctions. 

I must say, though, our record in getting additional people sanctioned in the Security Council has not been good. We had what we 

thought was a very good case back about a year ago when fighting 

flared up in the Malakal area right after the signing of the peace 

agreement and the two generals who were responsible for this—

Paul Malong on the government side and Johnson Olony on the opposition side—we put their names forward for sanctioning and the 

Council—several members of the Council blocked that effort. 

So it is not—even when you think you have a very clear case it 

is not easy to get the Council to agree on that and it is—to be effective travel and financial sanctions really do need to have the backing of a broader community than just the United States. 

Ms. BASS. Did you mention who’s the primary or where’s the primary place that they get their arms from? Who is selling them the 

arms? 

Ambassador BOOTH. They seem to have mainly come from the 

former Soviet Union area but I think most of them come in through 

the gray or black market arms market. 

I don’t have specific countries that I can attach to specific arms 

platforms because obviously, the government goes to some lengths 

to keep that information to itself. 

But, clearly, it has access still to arms and——

Ms. BASS. Which is why I wonder about the effectiveness of an 

arms embargo. But anyway——

Ambassador BOOTH. Well, that’s why if an arms embargo is 

voted it has to be something that is done by the Security Council 

so that it will have the imprimatur of that body and the weight of 

the international community behind it. 

Ms. BASS. So, Mr. Chair, before I yield I just wanted to bring attention to someone who’s in the audience who was a former intern 

with me, David Acuoth, who was part of the Lost Boys and Lost 

Girls that have been living very successfully in the United States 

and is leading an effort with other Lost Boys and Lost Girls—I 

should say Lost Men and Lost Women because they are all grown. 

But we actually plan to next week introduce legislation calling 

for a program that would be run by us, by the State Department, 

26

to allow some of the former Lost Boys and Lost Girls to return to 

South Sudan. 

Those individuals who have come here, who have gotten their 

education, who have been successful and want to go back and give 

back to their country, obviously, no one would suggest that they go 

back right now. 

But given the length of time it takes to do legislation we certainly would hope if a program like that is instituted it was one 

that had been suggested before many years ago by one of your 

former colleagues that it is something that we might consider. 

So I just want to mention that and I will save my other questions 

for the next witness. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Donovan. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Ambassador, 

thank you for your service to our country. Many of the things that 

you spoke about are troubling. 

Two things I would like for you to address, if you could for us, 

is one, is the recruitment of children to fight in these battles and 

the other is the U.N. Mission and South Sudan’s inability to protect the workers that are going there on humanitarian missions. 

And the last thing, if you have a moment, is you spoke about the 

path of peaceful engagement. I was just curious about how you 

think we get there. 

Ambassador BOOTH. Thank you, Congressman. 

On child soldiers, I think the number was already read out of 

about 16,000 supposedly have been recruited during the course of 

this conflict since December 2013. 

Child soldiers had been a problem in South Sudan before this 

current conflict. It’s something that we had actually engaged very 

robustly with the Ministry of Defense prior to December 2013 on 

and which we were making actually some real progress in getting 

child soldiers out of the SPLA and even addressing those who were 

in many of the militias throughout the country. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Ambassador, what ages are we speaking about, if 

you know? 

Ambassador BOOTH. I have heard of children as young as 10 and 

12 being involved. It could be even younger, in some cases. But this 

is something that we have been constantly engaging them on. 

Now, during the height of the conflict they were recruiting both 

sides, opposition and government, and they were utilizing militias 

and many of these militias are traditional youth organizations that 

go on traditional cattle raids and there is sort of no distinction 

there in terms of age of majority, if you will. 

And so they ended up being, I think, swept into the fighting. So 

that’s part of the problem. 

But, clearly, as we look—and I talked about a security sector end 

state. Clearly, we would want to see a security sector end state 

that the government would support. They would have no place at 

all for child soldiers and we will continue to engage on that. 

The State Department last week, I think, issued a very direct 

statement condemning the use of child soldiers in South Sudan and 

the continued practice of that there. 

On UNMISS and its problems in protecting humanitarian workers, I would just like to give a little bit of context. The U.N. MisVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:42 Nov 29, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\090716\21459 SHIRL
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sion in South Sudan on December 14, 2013, the day after the trouble started in Juba, they had camps in Juba and in other towns. 

Their own bases had become the sanctuary of tens of thousands 

of South Sudanese who were fleeing ethnically-based killing and 

this was a new move, if you will, for the U.N. to actually let people 

onto their bases in such numbers. But we think it was the right 

thing to do at the time and that it saved thousands of lives to have 

that happen. 

But what has resulted is the U.N. is now saddled with somewhere between 150,000 or so people that are actually now in, if you 

will, their own facilities—their own camps—that they have to provide static protection to and in many instances they don’t control 

much of a perimeter around where their camps were and so it 

takes a fair number of troops to be able to provide that static protection. 

So this means that there are fewer troops available for moving 

out into the city and to the countryside. But we have had numerous successes. 

For example, back in April of this year Ambassador Phee worked 

very diligently with the government in Juba, the regional governor 

in then Unity State and the U.N. Mission to put in a forward base 

in Leer, which is in Unity State. 

So it was a hot spot for humanitarian needs and the humanitarian community was demanding protection there. 

And so the U.N. did go and establish a forward base there and 

that enabled humanitarians to access an area that they had not 

been able to get to for almost 2 years of the conflict. 

So we have had successes like that in some specific cases. But 

the ability of the U.N. to be able to move about the country as well 

as in Juba has been restricted by the government. 

UNMISS has had two helicopters shot down by government 

forces over the years—one before the conflict and one since—and 

when they need to fly they need to get government permission to 

fly to make sure that it is safe and the government does not always 

give that. 

So, again, I would go back to the problem is perhaps partly 

UNMISS but it is also mainly the government which has not allowed UNMISS to do all that it could do to facilitate humanitarian 

assistance delivery and that function—humanitarian assistance delivery and supporting that—is one of the four key functions that 

the Security Council has given to UNMISS. So they, clearly, understand that as part of their mandate. 

Mr. DONOVAN. And if you could just spend a moment, because 

my time had expired, just about your vision on how we get to this 

path of peaceful engagement. 

Ambassador BOOTH. Well, I think the first step is, as I said, getting Juba secured so that there is some space for a political engagement. 

Now, why would those that are sitting in Juba now who feel that 

they can implement the agreement where they are—why would 

they go forward on that. 

I think the answer to that is that they have to ensure that these 

people that have been driven out over the past 2 months and others that felt already excluded from the peace process, if they are 

28

not given a peaceful path forward, a political path forward, it is 

going to result in more widespread fighting throughout the country. 

And can this government afford that? Is that what it wants its 

legacy to be, a South Sudan that goes down with more and more 

fighting in more and more parts of the country? 

So there is going to have to be pressure on the leaders for sure. 

But, frankly, it is the only way forward that’s going to lead to 

peace, is to have this open up some political space and have this 

discussion with others. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Meadows. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Ambassador, let me come back to a question that my colleague, Ms. Bass, asked you, because your response was a little 

troubling with regards to arms and where they’re coming from and 

where they are not coming from. 

Are you suggesting in your testimony that we don’t know? Because you said it was a gray market. But we have unbelievable intelligence even in that region. So are you suggesting we don’t know 

or that you can’t say? 

Ambassador BOOTH. Congressman, what we do know I would 

have to address in a different setting than this. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. That’s fair enough. I just wanted to 

make sure we clarified because here’s my concern, Ambassador. 

I have followed Sudan and South Sudan before there was a 

South Sudan and it has been a passion for my family from a humanitarian standpoint. 

The true stories that have been told will break anyone’s heart on 

what so much has not only been done but has not been done. 

And so I appreciate you being the Special Envoy and your work 

there in a very complex and difficult situation. But what I’ve also 

come to find out is that from both sides—those who would be supportive of Sudan and those who would be supportive of South 

Sudan in a particular position—they believe that the United States 

has failed to live up to the promises that we’ve made and that we 

make threats that we don’t follow through on. 

And even some of your testimony here today would seem to underscore that, that when we talk about arms embargo or sanctions 

does it not have a chilling effect if we ask for sanctions and they 

don’t get passed by the U.N. that there is no consequences—that 

life is going to be like it always has been? 

Ambassador BOOTH. Well, first of all, on the threats and particularly the example that I gave of the two generals, even then, while 

we were trying to get them on the list we were using that as leverage to get them to stop the fighting and they were both told directly that we were going to sanction them. 

We were proceeding in New York to do so and the only way they 

could get out of this would be if they stopped the fighting. 

Well, while the sanctions committee did not approve that into the 

list, it also did have the beneficial effect of the fighting dying down 

in the same time frame. 

So cause or effect, I can’t prove it. But I think it——

Mr. MEADOWS. I think the results speak for themselves. But 

here’s the concern I have. If we make too many idle threats that 

29

are not backed up by action then ultimately what happens is the 

threat becomes irrelevant and, Ambassador, do you believe that our 

country, indeed, the State Department is using all its leverage 

points to accomplish the task at hand on dealing with the issue in 

South Sudan? Are we using every leverage point that we have? 

Ambassador BOOTH. Congressman, I think—I think we are using 

all the leverage points that we have. Some take some time to develop. Sanctions cannot be imposed even bilaterally under U.S. law 

without a rather extensive package that could hold up in a court 

of law. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Right. Right. 

Ambassador BOOTH. And so sometimes, you know, when you 

think you need to move against someone you find that the actual 

evidentiary requirements are not there. 

This is, as you mentioned, the idea of idle threats. This is one 

reason we don’t just take names up to the Security Council if we 

don’t think we can get them through. 

It is also why, for example, we often, as we have done with the 

arms embargo, we will say this will—we will move on this and we 

will put the full weight of the United States behind trying to 

achieve this if you don’t do X or Y. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, the reason I ask is because it sounds like 

you walked back a little bit Secretary Kerry’s comments here today 

and I guess why would you walk those back? 

Ambassador BOOTH. Well, I’m certainly not trying to walk back 

what the Secretary said. But our humanitarian assistance——

Mr. MEADOWS. That is what it sounded but anyway, you go 

ahead and clarify. That’s why I am asking. 

Ambassador BOOTH. Humanitarian assistance is something that 

we provide on the basis of need. It’s not something we provide on 

the basis of political——

Mr. MEADOWS. But it is something that we must prioritize. And 

so if some groups are using it inappropriately there is more need 

than there is ability, even for a very prosperous nation like the 

United States. 

And so do they understand that there is a priority for humanitarian relief? 

Ambassador BOOTH. That is something that I think——

Mr. MEADOWS. But if they don’t understand it please let them 

understand it based on this hearing. 

Ambassador BOOTH. I think it came across from what the Secretary said. It certainly is something that I’ve made very directly 

to them, that they are not the only place in the world that needs 

humanitarian assistance, that there are many other——

Mr. MEADOWS. And this comes from someone who is—my kids 

collected money in tennis cans to give to them to support. So, I 

mean, it is not out of a noncompassionate heart. 

Let me ask you one other question. I think there is a new law 

about NGOs and 80 percent of those NGOs have been having to be 

South Sudanese citizens in order—is that correct? Are my notes 

correct on that? 

Ambassador BOOTH. Yes. 

30

Mr. MEADOWS. So tell me about the implications. If that is indeed correct would that not have a chilling effect on some of the 

work that the NGOs have done and could do in the future? 

Ambassador BOOTH. This NGO law has been something that’s 

been in the making for a long time, something that I’ve engaged 

on several occasions directly with President Kiir on. 

Yes, there is a provision that says the percentage of workers of 

NGOs need to be South Sudanese. This is something that many 

countries do to try to ensure that aid workers or aid organizations 

are also hiring local staff. 

There are a number of problems with the bill that we’ve pointed 

out. A lot of them have to do, frankly, with things like excessive 

registration requirements and also very vague references to what 

is allowed and what is not allowed that allows the government to 

interpret whether an NGO is doing the right thing or not. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So let me ask, and be specific then—

this new law do you see it having the potential of providing less 

humanitarian relief to some of the most needy in the country—the 

potential? 

Ambassador BOOTH. We certainly see this law as having a potential impact on the ability of NGOs, both international and local, to 

operate. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So does the President—their President not see 

that? 

Ambassador BOOTH. Well, I’m sure that they do see that. 

Mr. MEADOWS. But they think that we are just going to go ahead 

and just go along and fund it and create a jobs program? 

Ambassador BOOTH. Well, I wouldn’t see this as a jobs program. 

I think most NGOs probably do hire more than 80 percent of their 

staff being local. I don’t think that’s——

Mr. MEADOWS. So why the need for the law then? 

Ambassador BOOTH. Well, that’s a good question and these are 

some of the issues that we have raised repeatedly over 3 years 

when this has been under consideration. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, if you could——

Ambassador BOOTH. It is a problematic law and we have made 

that very clear. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. If you could, as the Special Envoy, take to 

their very highest government officials a sincere concern from 

Members of Congress on this new law that potentially the humanitarian relief that needs to get to needy families and citizens could 

be stopped because of the unintended consequences of a new law 

and that we would ask them to reconsider. 

And with that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Meadows. 

Mr. Rooney. 

Mr. ROONEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador, you paint a very bleak picture and what we have 

talked about here today and the testimony you’ve given—we talk 

about a government that has lost control of its military from time 

to time, an opposition that’s gone—a government that has raided 

humanitarian and food aid from this country of which I sit on the 

committee which helps appropriate that money, which is why it is 

concerning to me. 

31

But as a Catholic, it is also concerning to me that this would 

happen in this day and age that we, as Americans, wouldn’t be able 

to do anything about it. 

And the only thing it seems like you’ve said that we have leverage to use is this arms embargo and we keep threatening to use 

it but we never really get there. 

And then I just noticed that maybe it might be a political thing 

to say if we use an arms embargo then we are admitting some kind 

of failure as a government. 

I hope that is not the case. I hope that it is a sincere ploy or a 

sincere intention of this government to use an arms embargo because guess what? What can it hurt if we actually do it? 

If this guy controls the government there is no opposition. He’s 

used the term over-militarization—you used that term. If that is 

true, then the only thing that we can control is how much militarization is in that country. Then what can it hurt if the United 

States does take the lead to say that enough is enough? 

We’ve got diplomatic envoys being shot at. We have got all kinds 

of crimes that we have talked about against its own citizenry. We 

have got humanitarian aid and food being seized upon. We have 

got the opposition has fled. 

We have got a government that has lost control of its own military and we keep threatening to use this arms embargo as if it is 

something that well, maybe if we say this one more time we will 

put this security force in there of 4,000 people, which I got to be 

quite honest with you—I don’t think they are going to do anything. 

I think that this is just going to keep going on and on and we 

are going to be right back here again at the next hearing talking 

about how this has failed but we might use an arms embargo 

again. 

I just want to know what will it hurt if we do it. Is it an admission by the administration that we failed in South Sudan? Is that 

the problem? 

Ambassador BOOTH. Well, Congressman, as I’ve said the—it is a 

major tool and to be effective it has to be done multilaterally, not 

by——

Mr. ROONEY. Why? Just do it. Just use the United States as the 

leader of the free world and do it and other people will follow. 

Who cares if it is unilateral? That doesn’t make any sense. We 

build coalitions all the time and people follow us because we are 

the number-one country in the world. We are the sole superpower. 

Ambassador BOOTH. Right. And because it is such an important 

tool we have used it effectively and we think we are using it effectively now to leverage a way forward for South Sudan to get it back 

to a path of peace and political dialogue. 

Mr. ROONEY. Do you believe that? Do you believe that we are 

going to create this space in Juba like you say and there is going 

to be elections and a political process and a constitution and all 

that? Do you believe that—unless we do something affirmative? 

Ambassador BOOTH. Well, something affirmative we are trying to 

do is we are trying to get this force on the ground and get Juba 

to be demilitarized and this is the leverage we are using to try to 

get there. 

32

Now, the South Sudanese may very well not cooperate with this, 

in which case, as I have said, we are prepared to move forward on 

that as well as potentially other sanctions. So——

Mr. ROONEY. Okay. I hope you do. 

Ambassador BOOTH [continuing]. Our frustration level is—we 

share it. 

Mr. ROONEY. Yes. Hey, you are on the front lines so, I mean, I 

appreciate your service. I just don’t believe that any of this stuff 

is going to work anymore. I don’t think that the security force is 

going to work. 

I think that we need to move forward with an arms embargo now 

and stop as much bloodshed and killing as we can and protect the 

food and humanitarian aid that Mr. Meadows talked about getting 

in there by however means we need to figure out how to do that 

because I think that’s the only thing that’s left to do is to help the 

people that are starving and being oppressed. 

But, trying to talk about elections and that kind of stuff, I don’t 

buy it. 

I yield back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Rooney. 

Mr. ROONEY. Mr. Cicilline. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. Ambassador, what is your best assessment of the anticipated 

timeline for the Regional Protection Forces, both troop generation 

and deployment, and how long do you expect that negotiations with 

the government will continue on the composition of the RPF? 

How long will that delay the deployment? Have any countries 

outside the immediate subregion besides Rwanda indicated that 

they might consider providing troops to the RPF? 

Ambassador BOOTH. Okay. On the time line—what I have been 

told by the military leaders in the region is that they are prepared 

to deploy the troops very quickly, within a matter of weeks, after 

there is permission from the government to go in. 

They have made it clear they are not fighting their way into 

Juba. The U.N. does not send missions to fight their way into countries. 

But if the government in Juba accepts this force and provides 

land for it to be bivouacked on, what I have been told is they are 

prepared to move the troops very quickly. 

Moving the equipment will take a little bit longer and that is 

something that they have indicated that they might need some 

help with. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Maybe I wasn’t clear, because I recognize that the 

troops are prepared to—I guess my question is what’s the length 

of time the government is likely to engage in negotiations. That is 

really the unknown piece of it. 

Ambassador BOOTH. Well, yes. I mean, there’s also questions 

about how fast sometimes countries can actually mobilize their 

troops. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Right. 

Ambassador BOOTH. In terms of that—this is what the SecretaryGeneral’s report, which should come out and will be discussed next 

week in the Council and will be about is the government really 

33

moving forward to accept this force and the message that was 

given by the Security Council visit, that Secretary Kerry gave with 

regional leaders including to the South Sudanese when we met in 

Nairobi on the 22nd of August, was a very clear message that we 

expect that this force is going to be deployed. 

It is going to be deployed as envisioned by IGAD, which is with 

the troops from those three countries who are committed to this 

mission of actually ensuring freedom of movement around Juba, 

protecting the critical infrastructure including the airport and preventing violent actions. So protecting civilians in a more robust, not 

a static, manner. 

Those troop-contributing countries have agreed to that mission. 

So we don’t want to enter into a negotiation with South Sudan on 

who the troop contributors will be, what arms they will need, how 

many of them can deploy. That is foreseen and what their mission 

will be—that is all in the resolution. 

And so that is where we get to this idea of using the threat of 

the moving on an arms embargo and potentially other sanctions if, 

indeed, the government tries to delay this. 

So far their actions have been on the one day to say yes, the next 

day to say maybe, the next day to say no and then to say well, 

probably yes again. So this is something that we are not going to 

have patience with to drag on. 

Mr. CICILLINE. So that leads to my second question, Mr. Ambassador. What influence does the United States have with the Government of South Sudan to encourage them to develop a more inclusive, transparent, and accountable approach to governance and 

what other things might we do to accelerate that process? 

Ambassador BOOTH. When I was here in April and we were actually looking at trying to help a Transitional Government to succeed, one of the pillars of the peace agreement that I mentioned 

was this idea of the economic reform and in particular strengthening the transparency of public financial management and that’s 

something that we believe needs to happen in South Sudan. 

The kleptocracy of the past must end. As I mentioned in my testimony, we are continuing to look and utilize information to utilize 

sanctions that are available, particularly travel sanctions, for corrupt practices—to send the signal that being in charge in South 

Sudan it’s not about just enriching yourself—trying to change a little bit of the mentality of those who might lead the country going 

forward. 

So a very important component—how do we get them to do it—

again, I think our main leverage is, you know, what is it they want 

from us. 

At that point, they were clearly looking for support for their 

budget, for their economy, and they have recently come out again 

and said to the international community we need $300 million from 

you this year. That’s not going to be forthcoming unless these types 

of reforms occur. 

Mr. CICILLINE. And my final question, Mr. Ambassador, is the director of the African Center for Strategic Studies has suggested 

that it may be time to put South Sudan on life support by establishing executive mandate for the U.N. and the AU to administer 

34

the country until institutions exist to manage politics nonviolently 

and to break up patronage networks underlying the conflict. 

If such an initiative were to be considered how do you think it 

would be executed given the sensitivity of the current government 

to foreign intervention and parent reticence of some of the Security 

Council toward U.N. actions perceived to threaten South Sudan’s 

sovereignty? 

It seems like that would be a very difficult initiative to move forward on. But I would love your assessment of it. 

Ambassador BOOTH. I have seen that proposal. We have looked 

at that idea. Frankly, the U.N. cannot impose this on a member 

state. 

The African Union I think certainly has absolutely no appetite 

for putting one of its member countries under an international 

trusteeship or guardianship, whatever you want to dress it up and 

call it. 

That is something that I don’t see that we would have any support for—impractical—and I don’t see how the South Sudanese 

would ever accept it. 

The visceral reaction they have had even to this—to the role of 

JMEC in overseeing implementation of the agreement as an extra 

sovereign force, the reaction that they’ve had, where the initial reaction to the joint—the Regional Protection Force was not one more 

foreign soldier—we will fight them—this is a matter of sovereignty. 

I think you get the idea of how that would be received in South 

Sudan. 

Mr. CICILLINE. Thank you. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield 

back. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Before we go to our next panel, I would 

like to just say, I make it a point to always meet with the bishops, 

the faith community, the Protestants, whatever the denominations 

might be in every country. 

Greg Simpkins and I met with Archbishop Paulino Lukudu Loro, 

had a very, very good exchange on the reconciliation aspects of 

what the church can provide and also the humanitarian assistance. 

Are we fully utilizing the faith community in South Sudan? 

Secondly, there is a Foreign Policy article, September 6th—very 

disturbing. I was briefed on it when I was in South Sudan about 

the gunning and the bullets that were sent into two of our vehicles 

as they passed by Salva Kiir’s compound by his troops. 

Thank God nobody was hurt but the State Department says we 

do not believe our vehicles and personnel were especially targeted. 

But the article’s author, Colum Lynch, points out that 50 to 100 

rounds were pumped into those two vehicles. The SUV—armored 

SUVs held laminated cards with the American flag on it and also 

the diplomatic plate number 11. 

Are we investigating this? Do we believe it was by design or by 

mistake? Even by mistake is bad enough but it was by design? 

And finally, on the sanctions, we have had sanctions for 2 

years—OFAC sanctions—the Office of Foreign Assets Control. 

They are well laid out—child soldering sanctions against persons 

contributing to the conflict in South Sudan. There are only six people on it and I wonder if you are looking at that to expand it and 

35

make it more robust in terms of those who meet the criteria so well 

laid out 2 years ago in this sanctions regime. 

Ambassador BOOTH. Well, Mr. Chairman, on your question about 

engaging with the faith-based community, yes, we do engage with 

them both within South Sudan and also the Vatican. 

We have been in touch with them on numerous occasions and 

comparing notes on South Sudan and they have also engaged. 

I think one of the senior cardinals recently went there as an emissary for the Pope and a number of the religious leaders spoke out 

during the visit of the U.N. Security Council permanent representatives this past weekend in favor of the Regional Protection Force 

being deployed and moving forward on a political process. 

So I think the faith-based community is finding its voice. We have also, through USAID, given a $6 million grant to the South 

Sudan Council of Churches to work on community-based reconciliation efforts. So we are engaging the faith-based community. 

I think in the many meetings that I have had with religious leaders in South Sudan after the outbreak of fighting in December 2013 

they showed a lot of frustration and that the leaders seemed to 

have turned a deaf ear to them. 

I think they are beginning now to, as I say, find their voice in 

unison and it may become harder going forward. 

On the July 7th firing on two U.S. vehicles that contained several U.S. diplomats, this occurred, as I mentioned, very shortly 

after similar looking vehicles that were driven by the opposition 

forces who had come into town on some mission and they were 

going back to Riek Machar’s compound area and they were driving 

in this—it is always a tense area because it’s right by the President’s compound and they tried to stop that vehicle. The opposition 

people refused to get out of the vehicles and they sped off and the 

soldiers fired at those vehicles. 

The opposition security officials in the vehicles fired back and 

killed, I believe, five government soldiers right in that very vicinity. 

So it was a very tense environment. There were a lot more soldiers out on the street after that incident and our cars came along 

and they were—it wasn’t a formal checkpoint. 

It was a lot of soldiers on the street waving them down. It was 

very dark and our vehicles have tinted glass. 

So even though for the brief time that they stopped and tried to 

show identification it is not at all clear that these soldiers would 

have been able to see it or, frankly, even understand the license 

plates. 

You are dealing, don’t forget, with an army that is primarily illiterate and so when our vehicles—according to standard operating 

procedures when they tried to open the doors of our cars—also sped 

off the soldiers opened fire, just as they had when it had happened 

with opposition vehicles and, again, shortly, again, in the same 

area shortly after that incident the country representative for 

UNESCO, an Egyptian national, was driving in the area and encountered a similar problem and because he was not in an armored 

vehicle he was actually seriously wounded. 

So, again, to say this was targeting Americans, we did not deduce that from the circumstances and the regional security officer 

working with diplomatic security back here in Washington conVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:42 Nov 29, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AGH\090716\21459 SHIRL
36

ducted an internal investigation of the events and the review of 

that report is still ongoing and we were very thankful, of course, 

that our people had the resources, that we had the fully armored 

vehicles there for them to ride around Juba. 

That is why our security protocols call for them to be riding in 

armored vehicles in most parts of town and particularly after dark. 

And in response to that incident the Embassy’s emergency action 

committee met the next morning and changed the curfew to a 

dawn to dusk so took appropriate actions to try to mitigate that. 

In terms of sanctions, let me just say yes, we share the frustration. I mentioned some of the difficulties of actually putting together packages that meet all the legal criteria. But we certainly 

will look at taking actions against those who continue to impede 

the peace process or hindering humanitarian delivery and the like. 

Ms. BASS. Yes. I just wanted to take a moment to acknowledge 

that there are several people here from Gabon who are expressing 

their concern about the elections that took place. 

I just want you to know that we see you. We read your posters. 

I know you were asked to put them down but we did see what they 

said and we also are concerned and I just wanted to acknowledge 

that your presence has not gone unnoticed. 

Mr. SMITH. And I fully concur with the ranking member and 

thank you for being here. 

I would like to now yield to Mr. Meadows. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Ambassador, let me come back with two very 

quick points. I mentioned the NGOs and technology is a great 

thing so I got some information that would suggest that even within the last few hours or few days that there has been potentially 

the shutdown of 40 NGOs and the threat, if not the reality, of seizing their assets. Are you aware of that report? 

Ambassador BOOTH. We have received reports over the past several hours of harassment of a number of NGOs, civil society organizations. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So you would say that that report could be accurate? You’re getting the same——

Ambassador BOOTH. It could be. We have to look into that and 

try to verify it. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So will you get back to this subcommittee right away on whether that is accurate or not? And I 

guess the second follow-up question to that is if it is accurate will 

you be resolute in your condemnation of saying and that we will 

not tolerate that kind of behavior if our humanitarian aid is going 

to continue? 

Ambassador BOOTH. I can assure you, Congressman, that we will 

be very direct and very strong in a condemnation of any harassment of——

Mr. MEADOWS. But seizing of assets and it is more than just harassment and so that’s my concern. And so will you commit to get 

back to this subcommittee within the next 7 business days to let 

us know what is happening on that? 

Ambassador BOOTH. Well, let me say that we will get back to you 

as soon as we can confirm——

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. Well, what is a reasonable time? If 7 

days is not reasonable what is a reasonable time? 

37

Ambassador BOOTH. Again——

Mr. MEADOWS. 14 days? 

Ambassador BOOTH. I am not on the ground. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I mean—I mean, it——

Ambassador BOOTH. 14 days—give us 14 days, yes. 

[The information referred to follows:]

WRITTEN RESPONSE RECEIVED FROM THE HONORABLE DONALD BOOTH TO QUESTION

ASKED DURING THE HEARING BY THE HONORABLE MARK MEADOWS

UPDATE ON HARASSMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN SOUTH SUDAN

There has been an uptick in reported harassment, threats, and violence toward 

South Sudanese civil society organizations (CSOs) in recent weeks and specifically 

following the September 3 meeting in Juba between CSOs and the UN Security 

Council (UNSC). The U.S. government is deeply concerned and U.S. Embassy officials have met with multiple activists to discuss this trend, and continue to follow 

up. 

Both before the UNSC arrived and immediately after they departed Juba, several 

CSOs reported receiving anonymous phone calls ordering them to shut down and 

saying their assets would be seized because of the ‘‘anti-government’’ messages they 

had been spreading. On the night of September 4, one activist received text messages from an unknown number asking for her present location. The following day, 

while she was at work, her home was visited by unidentified armed men who asked 

after her whereabouts and told neighbors that they wanted to talk to her because 

she had ‘‘talked ill of the government’’ in the September 3 UNSC–CSO meeting. 

Some CSOs believe that the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) Military Intelligence is responsible for the harassment, while others have blamed the National 

Security Service (NSS). Activists have reported that the government has made considerable effort to infiltrate civil society, including the placement of NSS officers into 

CSOs, which has severely undermined the trust networks activists rely upon to 

function in South Sudan. 

Some activists who were in the September 3 meeting have fled South Sudan out 

of fear for their safety. One civil society actor who participated in the September 

3 meeting was detained and interrogated by NSS when, on September 5, he attempted to depart Juba International Airport en route to Uganda; he was eventually 

allowed to leave. 

One activist, who did not take part in the September 3 meeting, reported that another, who also seems not to have taken part, was killed by NSS officers after a 

political argument at a cafe later on September 3. This is an unverified report from 

a single source who claims second- or third-hand knowledge of the incident. The individual who was allegedly killed was not known to the U.S. Embassy or to its contacts in Juba. It has not been possible to verify this report, as many details, including the location of the body, remain unknown or unconfirmed. The State Department continues to seek information about this case. 

Particularly concerning is the government’s use of the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Act and the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) Act as tools 

to close down CSOs. Some groups were warned verbally that they would have to 

‘‘answer’’ for ‘‘pro-West, anti-government’’ views, which they were told constituted 

banned political activity under the Acts, and as a result, the RRC would suspend 

their registrations. 

There have been reports of threats by the Government of South Sudan (GOSS) 

to freeze CSO bank assets following the September 3 meeting, although no CSO has 

reported any assets actually being frozen or seized since then. The CSO actors who 

reported harassment before and after the September 3 meeting work in advocacy 

areas, not in humanitarian assistance. However, humanitarian actors face numerous physical obstructions to access those in need of assistance, as well as taxes, fees, 

and other bureaucratic impediments imposed at multiple levels by the GOSS. While 

the reported harassment since September 3 has affected CSOs engaged in advocacy 

work, some humanitarian organizations have reported harassment by the RRC 

based on the language of the NGO and RRC Acts. 

Some CSOs report that they are working ‘‘within their own networks’’ in an effort 

to persuade the GOSS to relax its harassment and refrain from de-registration, and 

some fear that intervention on their behalf by the U.S. government or other foreign 

countries could make their security situation more precarious. Other CSOs have requested U.S. government engagement with the GOSS on opening the political space. 

38

Unfortunately, the closing of political space in South Sudan is a long-term trend. 

The State Department has registered its concern on multiple occasions in public, 

most recently in a press statement on September 10. Ambassador Samantha Power 

expressed her concerns in an official statement issued the same day. State Department officials at the highest levels previously raised concerns about the closing political space directly with the GOSS, including with President Kiir, and will continue to do so in light of this recent and troubling trend.

Mr. MEADOWS. Okay. All right. Fourteen days—we will do that. 

And the last thing is this is you talked about a political environment which is open and inclusive and yet we are hearing reports 

that potentially someone took a letter to the U.N. Security Council 

and might have been murdered after that. Would you care to comment on what’s happening since the U.N. Security Council’s visit? 

Ambassador BOOTH. Well, some of this harassment of civil society that——

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, murder is more than harassment. 

Ambassador BOOTH [continuing]. That we have been hearing 

about has been subsequent to the visit by the Security Council. But 

is something that has gone on in the past as well. We have long 

been——

Mr. MEADOWS. So how much of that are we going to tolerate——

Ambassador BOOTH [continuing]. Press freedom and freedom of 

movement for NGOs and the like. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So how much of that are we going to tolerate? 

Ambassador BOOTH. Well, it’s a matter what can we actually do 

to affect that behavior. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I will yield back. We have many leverage points. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your flexibility. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Ambassador Booth, for your leadership 

and for spending your time today with us at the subcommittee. 

Thank you. 

I would like to now invite to the witness table Ambassador 

Princeton Lyman, who is senior advisor to the President of the 

United States Institute for Peace. Ambassador Lyman served as 

U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan from March 2011 

to March 2013. 

As Special Envoy, he led U.S. policy in helping in the implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Ambassador 

Lyman’s career in government included assignments as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs, U.S. Ambassador to 

both Nigeria and South Africa and Assistant Secretary of State for 

international organizations. He also was a member of the African 

Advisory Committee to the U.S. Trade Representative. He began 

his career with USAID and served as its director in Ethiopia. 

We will then hear from Mr. Brian Adeba, who is a journalist by 

training and was previously an associate of the Security Governance Group, a think tank that focused on security sector reform in 

fragile countries. 

Over the last 3 years, his research interests have focused on 

inter linkages of media, conflict, human rights, and security. 

He supervised the coverage of the conflict zones in Darfur, South 

Kordofan, Blue Nile, and eastern Sudan for the Boston-based Education Development Center’s Sudan Radio Service Project in 

Nairobi, Kenya. 

39

Prior to this he served as project and publications coordinator at 

the think tank the Center for International Governance Innovation 

in Waterloo, Canada. Again, he is representing the Enough Project. 

Ambassador, please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE PRINCETON N. LYMAN, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE 

Ambassador LYMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

let me begin by thanking you personally for all the support you and 

the committee provided when I was Special Envoy, and you and 

Congresswoman Bass and the members of the committee continue 

to focus attention on this set of issues. It is very important and it 

is very much appreciated. 

I am not going to go over the background of the situation. I want 

to address some of the key questions that you have raised and have 

been raised in the previous exchange. 

Let me start with the peace plan itself around which all the various activities are organized. The IGAD peace plan, which was 

signed in 2015, on paper is a very comprehensive agreement. 

But it has a fatal flaw to it and that is it rests very largely on 

the willingness, ability, and commitment of the very antagonists 

who brought the country into civil war to carry out a fundamental 

political transformation. It is not in their interest to do so and 

what we have seen over the last year or so is that instead of carrying that forward they fell back into conflict. Now Riek Machar 

has been driven out of the country. Without a strong international 

oversight and administrative oversight of this program, it was not 

likely to succeed. 

The second problem that we now face is that it would be a mistake to assume that, with the accession of Taban Deng Gai to the 

Vice Presidency, we have a government of national unity. 

Taban Deng does not command the loyalty of all the various 

forces that were fighting this government and to assume that it is 

capable of carrying out a comprehensive and being inclusive would 

be wrong. It is not. 

Now we have the humanitarian crisis which the people have addressed. It is an outrageous situation that the international community, and the United States alone is spending over $1 billion a 

year—that over 60 aid workers have been killed trying to carry out 

a humanitarian program—that they have been attacked and, 

again, most recently in the Terrain hotel. 

And both sides have impeded this activity—that the international community seems to care more for the people of South 

Sudan than the leaders on both sides. That is an outrageous situation. And what it does is call into question whether the government 

has the—can claim to the rights and responsibility of sovereignty 

which goes with the claim of sovereignty. 

Recently Kate Almquist, as Congressman Cicilline mentioned, 

and myself, did an op-ed saying that there should be an international oversight administration of South Sudan. Without that, 

we did not see how this peace plan could go forward. Ambassador 

Booth has described the role of JMEC under the peace plan and 

the role of Festus Mogae. The fact is that that mechanism has no 

real authority over the parties and Festus Mogae himself has, on 

40

several reports, said that almost no progress has been made on implementing the peace process. 

Now, the proposal we made, of course, it would be extraordinarily difficult to do and Ambassador Booth indicated that. But 

here is the fundamental question and the fundamental challenge. 

The peace process is in the hands of IGAD and the African 

Union, primarily, and if they are not prepared to amend the current peace process and create a true oversight authority, which 

they will back up politically, back up by enforcing an arms embargo, by taking other measures, then that peace plan won’t work. 

Now, if they are prepared to do that, then no one needs trusteeship or anything else. But the problem is that IGAD is badly divided. They are not in agreement. They have threatened an arms 

embargo many times but never followed through. 

And as for the U.N. Security Council, we have an adage that 

guides, you know, practicality. When the Africans are divided, the 

Security Council is divided. You are not going to get sanctions past 

Russia and China unless the Africans are united and say this is 

what they want. But the Africans are divided. IGAD is divided. 

So even if the U.N. Security Council wanted to pass an arms embargo, those surrounding countries would have to implement it and 

make sure that arms weren’t sneaking through. 

So the primary attention and effort seems to me, for the African 

Union and for IGAD to decide exactly if they are in control of this 

process, how to strengthen it. 

Now, let me address this question of the 4,000 troops that are 

being added. As you pointed out, it is a question of putting these 

under UNMISS and whether they will act differently. 

It is very difficult to contemplate a U.N. peacekeeping force confronting in an armed way the forces of the host government. I do 

not think very many U.N. peacekeeping forces are prepared for 

that. I am not sure the Security Council is even prepared for it. 

So the question is, is this force really going to have the mandate 

to confront not just outliers but an attack like the Terrain hotel 

complex and go up against government forces? 

That is a very difficult thing to do and it has to be backed solidly 

by the troop-contributing countries, and by IGAD, and by the U.N. 

and if they are not prepared for that, then this force may secure 

the airport but they won’t be able to protect civilians. 

Now, the other question is the political context. Putting more 

forces into Juba without changing the nature of the peace process 

and the way it is enforced seems to me is going to have a continuation of the situation we now have. 

So I think it is critical that the U.S., the international community, and the United Nations call upon the African Union and 

IGAD to strengthen that process so there is real oversight and enforcement of the peace process with sanctions and punishment for 

those who get in the way of it. Otherwise, we won’t get the transformation we need and I think that is the great dilemma that we 

now face in South Sudan. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Lyman follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Ambassador Lyman, thank you so very much and, 

again, thank you for your prior service as Special Envoy. 

Mr. Adeba. 

STATEMENT OF MR. BRIAN ADEBA, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF 

POLICY, ENOUGH PROJECT 

Mr. ADEBA. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, members 

of the subcommittee, I want to thank you for your continued focus 

on South Sudan and for inviting me to testify. 

Impunity is entrenched in the system of rule in South Sudan. 

The horrific Terrain hotel incident is an example of that impunity. 

The country’s leaders commit horrific crimes and treat state resources like their personal property. The country’s money is captured by a few and used to wage war. 

With financial leverage on these leaders and your continued leadership and support it is possible to counter this system and the 

perverse inclinations of its leaders. 

It is possible to disrupt access to the proceeds of corruption that 

fund war and to shift the incentives of South Sudan’s leaders toward peace. 

Congress can do the following four things to have an immediate 

impact on the perpetrators of the crisis in South Sudan. 

First, Congress can make sure that the U.S. Treasury Department has the staff and the funds it needs to use more anti-money 

laundering measures. The measures can be used to target and 

freeze the assets of elite politicians and leaders in South Sudan 

who perpetuate violence, loot public coffers, and use the international financial system, including U.S. institutions, to launder 

deposits of their ill-gotten wealth. 

Second, you can ensure the administration imposes targeted 

sanctions and asset freezes on top leaders and support others who 

take these measures. 

We have had discussion about how the threat of sanctions alone 

is not inducing the change that is needed in South Sudan. So when 

we look at the recommendation, this is a call to action. 

Third, you can push for stronger enforcement of existing sanctions and asset freezes in the United States and internationally on 

the South Sudanese political elite. 

Fourth, you can pass the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. This act authorizes the U.S. President to impose 

sanctions on government officials like those in South Sudan who 

misappropriate state assets and attack anti-corruption crusaders. 

I believe these four steps can strike directly at the wallets of the 

people responsible for the suffering in South Sudan, the people who 

commit crimes and enrich themselves because they believe they 

will not face consequences for their actions. 

These leaders are more likely to support peace when they pay a 

price for war. The institutional challenges in South Sudan require 

your long-term support as well. 

I travelled to Juba this past April to analyse this very issue. 

April was a month full of hope and the past Vice President and 

main opposition leader, Riek Machar, had returned to town. 

46

People believed that the fighting would stop and the two leaders 

would work together to govern. There was hope that the critical 

governance institutions could begin to function properly as well. 

I focused my research on three key institutions—the Anti-Corruption Commission, the National Audit Chamber, and the Public 

Accounts Committee in the National Legislative Assembly. 

I found that all three were severely undercut intentionally. Toplevel politicians deprived them of the money they need to function. 

Conflicting laws prevent prosecutions of officials that have been investigated. And cronyism undermines the effort to fight graft. 

The mechanisms and institutions that could promote accountability do not have what they need to be effective. But there are 

several things Congress can do to help South Sudanese people address their institutional and systemic challenges. 

First, continue to support the people in South Sudan who fight 

for transparency and accountability. Listen to them. Stand with 

them and help them raise their voices. 

Second, ensure there is strict budget oversight for assistance to 

South Sudan. Those who command or commit atrocities and seek 

personal enrichment should not be able to misappropriate public 

funds, especially those given by Americans to support the South 

Sudanese people. 

Third, support and strengthen the institutions in South Sudan 

that can build an open and accountable government. These institutions could work much more effectively than they do today. But 

they need political, technical, and financial support. 

Most of all, they need the space to operate without undue political interference. 

A fourth institution that needs these same things is the Hybrid 

Court of South Sudan that was established in the August 2015 

peace agreement to ensure accountability for war crimes. 

Next week, on September 12, the Sentry, an initiative of the 

Enough Project, will publicly present the results of a 2-year investigation into corruption in South Sudan. 

The Sentry has documented the connection between high-level 

grand corruption and violence in South Sudan and we encourage 

U.S. policymakers to take immediate action on the findings we release. 

Your support is critical. The stakes are very high in South 

Sudan. If South Sudanese leaders face no price, no deterrent for 

their crimes from anyone, South Sudan will disintegrate. 

With your help, that can be prevented. Thank you very much for 

your efforts on South Sudan and for your tireless commitment to 

the South Sudanese people. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Adeba follows:]

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Mr. SMITH. Mr. Adeba, thank you very much for your personal 

work, your trip, which really uncovered—and you got to see those 

three institutions in particular. 

Thank you for relaying that to us. Without objection, your full 

statements will be made a part of the record. 

And, unfortunately, we do have a series of votes—well over an 

hour we expect of voting. So we will conclude here but I want you 

to know how deeply appreciative we all are on the subcommittee 

for your leadership, for your guidance and we will stay in touch 

going forward. 

In a week I look forward or so to that new report which the committee will digest and, I’m sure, utilize as we have in the past with 

those from the Enough Project. 

And Ambassador Lyman, thank you, because you did extraordinary service under very difficult situations. So thank you for that 

leadership all those years and your entire Foreign Service career. 

The hearing is adjourned and, again, I would have liked to have 

asked some questions. I will submit a few for the record. If you 

could get back to us in a timely fashion that would be greatly appreciated. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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