1

 The Hon. Ross A. Walters, Chief Magistrate Judge, United States District

Court for the Southern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 01-3527

___________

William C. Edmund, *

*

Plaintiff, *

*

v. * On Appeal from the

* United States District Court

* for the Southern District

MidAmerican Energy Company; * of Iowa.

MidAmerican Energy Holding *

Company; Jack Alexander, *

*

Appellees. *

___________

Submitted: June 13, 2002

Filed: August 5, 2002 (Corrected: August 7, 2002)

___________

Before WOLLMAN, RICHARD S. ARNOLD, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

William Edmund appeals a decision of the District Court1

 granting summary

judgment in favor of MidAmerican Energy Company, MidAmerican Energy Holding
2

Company, and Jack Alexander on Mr. Edmund’s claim of sex discrimination. Mr.

Edmund contends that he first was demoted and then was passed over for a promotion

because of his sex, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000e–2000e-17, and the Iowa Civil Rights Act of 1965, Iowa Code §§

216.1–216.20. We affirm.

I.

We commend the District Court for its thorough recitation of the facts, which

we summarize here. Mr. Edmund has been employed by MidAmerican Energy

Company and its predecessor company, Iowa-Illinois Gas & Electric Company, for

more than thirty years. J.A. 421. In 1995, Mr. Edmund became Manager of

Compensation in the human resources department of the Des Moines office, reporting

to David Levy, Vice President of Human Resources and Information Technology.

J.A. 142, 414. In May 1996, Jack Alexander took over Mr. Levy’s responsibilities

as manager of the human resources department, and, in November of that year, he

formally acquired Mr. Levy’s old title of Vice President of Human Resources and

Information Technology. J.A. 134. In both capacities, Mr. Alexander maintained

direct supervisory authority over the entire human resources department, including

Mr. Edmund. Id.

When Mr. Alexander took over responsibility for the human resources

department from Mr. Levy, Mr. Levy cautioned him that “if he wanted compensation

to go in a new direction, Bill Edmund would not be the best person to lead those

changes.” J.A. 415. In about May 1996, Phil Linder, Mr. Alexander’s supervisor,

complained to Mr. Alexander about Mr. Edmund’s resistance to a corporate decision

to discontinue certain loans to former employees of Iowa-Illinois. J.A. 145, 195.

Around the same time, Mr. Alexander also received complaints that Mr. Edmund

relied too much on electronic means of communication. J.A. 145-46, 149, 191-92.
3

In 1997, Jodi Stevens, a payroll supervisor who reported to Mr. Edmund,

complained to Mr. Alexander that Mr. Edmund did not understand “what was going

on in payroll.” J.A. 147. Ms. Stevens’s successor, Michele Book, complained that

Mr. Edmund was not accessible, overused e-mail, and failed to provide strategy to the

payroll department. J.A. 147-48, 153. In 1997-98, John Capello, a senior vice

president for marketing and sales, informed Mr. Alexander that Mr. Edmund did not

understand what Mr. Capello wanted in terms of a new compensation and salary

structure for the marketing and sales group. J.A. 148-49. As a result, Mr. Capello

hired an outside consultant, David Camner, to assist in developing the plan. Id.

Mr. Camner provided Mr. Alexander with his impressions of various people

within human resources, including Mr. Edmund. J.A. 149-51. With the caveat that

his assessment was “anecdotal information based on insufficient information and may

not be accurate,” Mr. Camner stated that Mr. Edmund had “[g]ood analytical skills

but [was] less effective at understanding the ‘big picture.’” J.A. 355. Mr. Alexander

did not show the report to Mr. Edmund. J.A. 150.

Senior Vice President and General Counsel John Rasmussen complained to Mr.

Alexander that Mr. Edmund was resisting the upgrade of a particular senior attorney’s

position, an upgrade that Mr. Rasmussen and other senior officers of MidAmerican

desired. J.A. 161-62, 416. Russ White, Manager of General Services, and Alan

Wells, Senior Vice President for Finance and Chief Financial Officer, also

complained to Mr. Alexander regarding Mr. Edmund’s resistance to their attempts to

upgrade certain employees. J.A. 162-63. Mr. Wells complained that Mr. Edmund

was a “roadblock” who did not provide constructive solutions. Id. at 162. Ron

Stepien, President of MidAmerican, told Mr. Alexander that he no longer wanted to

meet with Mr. Edmund regarding compensation issues because he believed Mr.

Edmund was overly technical and failed to solve problems. J.A. 163, 419-20.
4

In 1998, Mr. Rasmussen informed Mr. Alexander that he and Mr. Stepien had

concluded that they did not want Mr. Edmund to testify for the company before the

Iowa Utilities Board regarding a requested rate increase because they did not believe

that Mr. Edmund could persuasively and credibly articulate the company’s position.

J.A. 186, 417. Mr. Alexander had recommended that Mr. Edmund be the company’s

witness. J.A. 186.

In 1998, Sue Rozema, Vice President of Financial Services, asked Mr.

Alexander to replace Mr. Edmund on a committee that she oversaw because, she said,

he had been “obstructionist and negative” in a committee meeting. J.A. 199. Charles

Snider, one of Mr. Edmund’s subordinates, complained to Mr. Alexander that he

thought that a report that Mr. Edmund had prepared—analyzing compensation within

the human resources department and recommending only two positions, including Mr.

Edmund’s own, for an upgrade—was biased. J.A. 310, 314-16.

Mr. Alexander did not conduct any performance reviews for employees in the

human resources department until April 1998. J.A. 148, 363, 367, 371. On April 29,

Mr. Alexander gave Mr. Edmund a “leadership skills assessment,” or performance

review, that was mostly negative and mixed and included various of the complaints

that Mr. Alexander had received. J.A. 371-72. Mr. Alexander criticized Mr. Edmund

as “too reactionary,” “resistant to change,” not “proactive,” and lacking leadership

skills. Id. Prior to the review, Mr. Alexander had not communicated the complaints

about Mr. Edmund to him. J.A. 424.

On November 1, 1998, Mr. Alexander was promoted to Senior Vice President

of Energy Delivery, and his supervisory responsibility over human resources ended.

J.A. 134. On that date, Keith Hartje took over as head of human resources. J.A. 134,

275. Mr. Hartje became dissatisfied with Mr. Edmund’s work in bringing together

MidAmerican’s compensation system with the system of CalEnergy Company, a

company with which MidAmerican planned to merge in early 1999. J.A. 286. In
5

December 1998, a committee was formed to develop the compensation and benefits

system for the merged company. J.A 286. Mr. Hartje appointed Maureen Sammon

to be head of the committee, id., and Mr. Edmund was not placed on the committee.

J.A. 264-65.

On January 28, 1999, Mr. Hartje made a written evaluation of Mr. Edmund’s

performance, noting that he was perceived as “reactive,” “resistant to change,” and

without strategic thinking skills. J.A. 388-92. He concluded that, following the

merger, Mr. Edmund would be demoted from manager of compensation to senior

compensation analyst, a position that, he determined, would make the best use of Mr.

Edmund’s technical and analytical skills. J.A. 392. On the basis of his appraisal of

Mr. Edmund’s performance and the concerns of MidAmerican’s senior management

regarding Mr. Edmund, Mr. Hartje concluded that Mr. Edmund was not the right

person for the job. J.A. 280-81.

Mr. Hartje told Mr. Alexander of his decision to demote Mr. Edmund a week

or ten days before he informed Mr. Edmund of the decision. J.A 288. He testified

that he made the decision on his own, not at the request of or due to the influence of

Mr. Alexander. Id.

In early February 1999, Mr. Hartje removed the responsibility for

MidAmerican’s payroll function from Mr. Edmund and gave it to Jodi Bacon because

she had been involved in converting the payroll system to a new computer system.

J.A. 205-07, 293.

On March 12, 1999, Mr. Edmund was demoted. Duke Vair, a human resources

representative with MidAmerican’s merger candidate, CalEnergy, was given Mr.

Edmund’s former position. J.A. 280-81. In May 1999, after about a month and a half

as manager of compensation, Mr. Vair resigned and left MidAmerican. J.A. 346. Mr.

Hartje appointed Maureen Sammon, who had a master's degree in business
6

administration, J.A. 301, and two years of experience within the human resources

department but no experience regarding compensation or payroll, to replace him. J.A.

291. Ms. Sammon was appointed to be Manager of Compensation and was given the

title of Manager of Compensation, Benefits, and Human Resources Information

Services. J.A. 290. Mr. Edmund was not considered for the position. J.A. 291.

When Mr. Alexander became head of the human resources department, the

department consisted of ten men and twenty-nine women. During his tenure, five

men were demoted and one was hired. Over that period, six women were promoted

and five others were hired, while one was fired. Of those individuals who reported

directly to Mr. Alexander when he took over as head of human resources, two were

women and four were men. When he left, five were women and two were men.

Appellant’s Brief at 2-3.

II.

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Anderson

v. Franklin County, 192 F.3d 1125, 1131 (8th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is

proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and, when the evidence is

viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Bailey v. United States

Postal Serv., 208 F.3d 652, 654 (8th Cir. 2000), the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Mr. Edmund contends that the decision to demote him from Manager of

Compensation to Senior Compensation Analyst and the decision not to consider him

for a promotion once Mr. Vair resigned (to the position filled by Ms. Sammon)

discriminated against him on the basis of sex. Although both decisions were made

by Mr. Hartje, the only person Mr. Edmund alleges acted with discriminatory intent

is Mr. Alexander. Mr. Edmund argues that Mr. Alexander, not Mr. Hartje, in fact

made the decision to demote him, and that Mr. Alexander both provided distorted
7

information to Mr. Hartje and failed to support plaintiff when others complained

about him, thereby causing Mr. Hartje not to consider him as a viable applicant for

the position filled by Ms. Sammon.

We evaluate Mr. Edmund’s claims under the burden shifting framework of

McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973), and Texas

Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981). Under

this framework, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case

of unlawful discrimination, after which the defendant has the burden of articulating

a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its action, following which the plaintiff has

the burden of producing sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable factfinder to

conclude that the defendant’s asserted reason is not the true, legitimate reason but a

pretext for discrimination. We bear in mind that “[t]he ultimate burden of persuading

the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff

remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Id. As the District Court noted, citing Hamer

v. Iowa Civil Rights Commission, 472 N.W.2d 259, 263-64 (Iowa 1991), and as no

party disputes, claims brought under the Iowa Civil Rights Act are analyzed in

essentially the same fashion.

At the outset, we note several potential problems with Mr. Edmund’s prima

facie case. First, there is the issue of Mr. Alexander’s role in the allegedly

discriminatory decisions. Regarding the demotion decision, Mr. Edmund cites the

testimony of Mr. Vair and the testimony of Sally Stetson, a recruiter whom Mr.

Alexander contacted, to argue that Mr. Alexander, not Mr. Hartje, made the decision

to demote him and that the decision was made in October 1998, not in January 1999.

Although this evidence does provide support for Mr. Edmund’s theory regarding Mr.

Alexander’s involvement, it is not, as the District Court noted, helpful to Mr.

Edmund’s case. “That Alexander planned to replace Edmund with Vair, another

male, because a stronger compensation manager was wanted is not evidence of

gender bias and is inconsistent with pretext.” J.A. 114 n.2. Regarding the failure-to-
8

promote decision, which was made by Mr. Hartje six months after he took over as

head of human resources department, Mr. Edmund asks us to hold that a reasonable

factfinder could determine that Mr. Hartje’s seemingly independent assessment of Mr.

Edmund was “rooted in the opinions and perceptions” of Mr. Alexander. Appellant’s

Brief at 34.

Despite these somewhat dubious propositions, we will assume, as did the

District Court, that Mr. Edmund has met his prima facie burden regarding both

demotion and failure to promote. We agree with the District Court that the

defendants have met their burden of articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory

reason for their decisions, namely that Mr. Edmund did not possess the qualities they

looked for in a manager of the combined compensation systems of MidAmerican and

CalEnergy to the degree that Mr. Vair and Ms. Sammon did. Thus, the question is

whether Mr. Edmund has raised sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to determine

that the defendants’ asserted justification was pretextual.

The District Court concluded that Mr. Edmund presented insufficient evidence

to infer that Mr. Alexander acted with discriminatory motive and, therefore, that Mr.

Edmund presented insufficient evidence to conclude that any of the defendants

discriminated against him on the basis of sex. Mr. Edmund raises several challenges

to that conclusion.

First, Mr. Edmund argues that the District Court failed to give sufficient weight

to his statistical evidence of discrimination, which he argues “is admissible as

probative circumstantial evidence of pretext to be considered with all other evidence

of pretext.” Appellant’s Brief at 17. But there was no dispute as to the admissibility

of the evidence, only as to its probative weight. Thus, this argument has little force.

Regarding the weight of the statistical evidence, the District Court looked

closely at the evidence concerning each of the employment decisions made during
9

Mr. Alexander’s tenure. As to the hiring of five women, the Court determined that

the evidence indicated that Mr. Alexander was not a primary decisionmaker for two.

For the other three, the Court determined that the evidence indicated that an outside

search firm and other management employees were involved in the decisions, though

the final decisions were made by Mr. Alexander. Regarding the hiring of one man,

the Court determined that Mr. Edmund did not provide evidence for his claim that

Mr. Alexander actually preferred a woman for the position. Concerning the

promotion of six women, the Court concluded that the evidence indicated that five

of the promotions were made by or recommended by persons other than Mr.

Alexander. Regarding the demotion of three men, the Court concluded that the

evidence indicated that two were for performance reasons. The Court also stated that

Mr. Edmund did not provide evidence regarding the number of women fired. J.A.

115-17.

Mr. Edmund quibbles with parts of the District Court’s analysis. Citing to

pages 176-77 of the Joint Appendix, he asserts that Mr. Alexander admitted in his

deposition that he made the decision to approve the transfer of Judy Bohrofen.

However, nothing on these pages so indicates. He does assert, correctly, that there

was some evidence that Mr. Alexander was considering (and may have preferred) a

female candidate to the one male candidate ultimately hired. J.A. 425, 165-66 He

also asserts that the Court erred in stating that he had failed to provide the number of

women fired during Mr. Alexander’s tenure, when in fact he had stated that one

woman was fired. J.A. 64, 424-25. These minor discrepancies hardly call into

question the District Court’s conclusion.

Mr. Edmund also argues that the District Court erred in concluding that he

failed to provide evidence that any of Mr. Alexander’s personnel decisions were

illegitimate or discriminatory. He argues that Mr. Alexander allegedly made a

discriminatory decision to promote Tama Lea Bence to a position for which she was

ultimately determined to be unqualified. However, Mr. Edmund does not point to any
10

evidence that she ever was in fact determined to be unqualified, and Mr. Alexander

denied making the decision. Despite stating that “the records of the company clearly

demonstrate that [Mr. Alexander] was the only person who approved that promotion

as demonstrated by his signature on the appropriate forms,” Appellant’s Brief at 20,

Mr. Edmund does not direct us to any company records or forms. 

Finally, Mr. Edmund notes that the District Court erred by not discussing the

change in composition of the sex of the employees who reported directly to Mr.

Alexander over the course of his tenure. Nor did the Court discuss the composition

by sex of the candidates available for the positions he ultimately filled. This

statistical evidence, he argues, provides further information from which a jury could

conclude that Mr. Alexander had a bias in favor of hiring women. However, the fact

that the District Court did not choose to mention these particular additions to Mr.

Edmund’s statistical argument does not mean that they were not considered. The

small samples involved make these statistics even less convincing than those for the

entire human resources department.

None of Mr. Edmund’s arguments regarding the probative value of his

statistical evidence is particularly compelling. As the District Court explained, “a raw

numerical gender breakdown of a handful of individual, dissimilar employment

decisions, the outcomes of which are more favorable to one gender, does not

reasonably or logically lead to the conclusion that the decision maker has a gender

bias or that a particular employment decision was motivated by gender.” J.A. 120.

See Bogren v. Minnesota, 236 F.3d 399, 406 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that statistical

evidence “in and of itself, rarely suffices to rebut an employer’s legitimate,

nondiscriminatory rationale for its decision . . .”) (citing Bullington v. United Air

Lines, Inc., 186 F.3d 1301, 1319 (10th Cir. 1999)) . We agree with the District Court

that this evidence “does not pass beyond speculation to the realm of reasonable

inference.” J.A. 125.
11

Regarding the numerous complaints filed by many different individuals

concerning Mr. Edmund’s work performance, Mr. Edmund contends that he produced

evidence contradicting the substance of the complaints. For example, he contends

that rather than being a “roadblock,” as several members of upper management

thought, he was in fact creative and innovative. Regarding the complaints of Ms.

Stevens and Ms. Book, Mr. Edmund asserts that he resolved any issues between them

and that he supported payroll employees. He also asserts that Mr. Alexander agreed

that the payroll department did not require his attention to details. Regarding the fact

that senior management did not want to use him as a witness, he notes that he was

used as a witness on other occasions. Regarding complaints that he was selfinterested, he argues that he was misperceived. Regarding his reputation for being

unwilling to push the status quo or to furnish creative ideas, he argues that he has

provided examples in which he has been innovative. He argues, moreover, that Mr.

Alexander’s failure to stand up for him in the face of these various complaints is

further evidence of discrimination.

These arguments are without merit. Indeed, Mr. Edmund’s arguments

misconstrue our role in deciding this case. His evidence must do more than merely

raise doubts about the wisdom and fairness of the opinions of him held by his

superiors and his fellow employees. It must create a real issue as to the genuineness

of those perceptions. “Title VII does not prohibit employment decisions based upon

. . . erroneous evaluations.” Lee v. Minn., Dep't of Commerce, 157 F.3d 1130, 1135

(8th Cir. 1998) (internal citation omitted). Employers are free to make employment

decisions based upon mistaken evaluations, personal conflicts between employees,

or even unsound business practices. Federal courts do not sit as “super personnel

departments reviewing the wisdom or fairness of the business judgments made by

employers, except to the extent that those judgments involve intentional

discrimination.” Cronquist v. City of Minneapolis, 237 F.3d 920, 928 (8th Cir. 2001)

(internal citations omitted).
12

Mr. Edmund contends that by providing examples in which individuals who

complained about his performance also supported him and praised his performance

in other contexts, he has raised a question of the genuineness of the complaints and

thereby generated sufficient evidence of pretext to submit the issue to a jury. For

example, he notes that Mr. Levy made the decision to promote him to Manger of

Compensation, and gave him positive evaluations and raises. He argues that Mr.

Stepien had too little contact with him to draw any general conclusions. He asserts

that other senior officers thought well of his performance. None of these arguments,

however, suffices to allow a reasonable inference that Mr. Alexander’s influence, if

any, in the employment decisions concerning Mr. Edmund was discriminatory on the

basis of sex. Other than simply attributing gender bias to Mr. Alexander, Edmund

does little to establish a reasonable basis for inferring that the numerous complaints

lodged against him were anything but genuine, regardless of their accuracy, which is

an issue that we need not determine.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s grant of summary

judgment.

A true copy.

Attest: 

 CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.