U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

National Institute of Justice

Jeremy Travis, Director

continued...

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFF ICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS

BJA NI J OJJDP BJS OVC

October 1998

Issues and Findings

Discussed in this Brief: An NIJfunded comparative study of the

criminal behavior of gang members

and nongang at-risk youths in three

urban and suburban communities.

Additional data from a fourth site

were gathered with funds provided

by the Ohio Office of Criminal Justice

Services through formula funding

from the Office of Juvenile Justice

and Delinquency Prevention.

Key issues: Youth-gang-related

crime has been growing for years,

but little data existed about the

extent and precise nature of crimes

committed by gang members. This

study explored the differences between the criminal behavior of youth

gang members and nongang, but

similarly at-risk, youths. The research

suggests important implications for

preventing involvement in and intervening in youth gang activity.

Key findings: The report corroborates

other recent longitudinal and crosssectional studies that suggest gang

membership increases the likelihood

and frequency that members will

commit serious and violent crimes.

● The research shows that gang

members in each of the survey sites are

much more likely to sell drugs than

nongang at-risk youths. Of those

youths who sell drugs, gang members

reported doing so more frequently,

having fewer customers, making more

money from the sales, and relying

more on out-of-state suppliers than

nongang youths who sold drugs. Both

gang members and at-risk youths reported that gangs do not control drug

trafficking in their communities.

● Most significantly, the research

found that contrary to popular belief,

youths can resist overtures to join a

gang without serious reprisals from

members. The majority of respondents who knew individuals who had

Comparing the Criminal Behavior of

Youth Gangs and At-Risk Youths

by C. Ronald Huff

For years, observers have noted that youthgang-related crime has been growing, but a

picture of the extent and precise nature of

crimes committed by gang members is only

now beginning to emerge. Are gangs really

responsible for increases in crime or are

youths who grow up in very difficult circumstances but do not join gangs committing just

as many crimes?

This study explored the differences between the criminal behavior of youth gang

members and nongang, but similarly atrisk, youths. The research revealed that

criminal behavior committed by gang

members is extensive and significantly exceeds that committed by comparably atrisk but nongang youth.1

 Furthermore, the

research suggests important implications

for preventing involvement in and intervening in youth gang activity.

A gang is described as a well-defined

group of youths between 10 and 22 years

old. Most research on youth gangs in the

United States has concluded that the most

typical age range of gang members has

been approximately 14–24, though researchers are aware of gang members as

young as 10 and that in some areas (e.g.,

southern California where some Latino

gangs originated more than 100 years ago),

one can find several generations in the

same family who are gang members with

active gang members in their 30s.

By all accounts, the number of youth

gangs and their members continues to

grow. For example, one recent nationwide

study found 58 percent of the jurisdictions

surveyed reported that they have active

youth gangs.

There are an estimated 23,388 youth

gangs with 664,906 members in all 50

States.2

 These numbers are probably conservative estimates3

 because many jurisdictions deny, often for political and

image reasons, that there is a problem,

especially in the early stages of youth

gang development in a community.4

Responding to the growing magnitude of the

problem, the National Institute of Justice

(NIJ) sponsored a research project that

focused on the nature and extent of youth

gang behavior in Denver and Aurora (a large

suburb of Denver), Colorado, and Broward

County in south Florida. In addition, a companion study, underwritten by a research

grant from Ohio’s Office of Criminal Justice

Services (with funds provided by the Office

of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention),5

 explored the criminal behavior of gang

versus nongang youths in Cleveland, Ohio,

and the nature and extent of criminal

behavior committed over time by a sample

of leaders and hardcore members of youth

gangs in Columbus, Ohio, dating to 1986.

Denver, Aurora, and Broward County were

selected for this study because: (1) they provided emergent, rather than chronic, gang

environments and opportunities to study

gang formation at an early stage of development; (2) they comprised a combination of
2

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Issues and Findings

continued...

central cities and suburbs, providing an

opportunity to assess differences within and

across metropolitan areas; and (3) they are

demographically diverse, as are the racial

and ethnic compositions of the youth gangs

in these areas.

Youth involvement in crime

Exhibit 1, compiled from interviews

with gang members in Denver, Aurora,

Broward County, and Cleveland, shows

how deeply they are involved in specific

types of criminal behavior.

While results vary from one region to another, the overall picture that emerges is

that gangs engage in a wide array of criminal behaviors, including those involving

weapons and violence. These data include

only what gang members said about their

own criminal behavior. The same general

patterns emerged, but at much higher levels, when gang members were asked about

other members’ behavior.

Self-reported criminal behavior varies

across sites and across regions for many

reasons. With respect to this study, there

refused to join a gang reported that

those individuals suffered no consequences for their refusal. Reprisals

suffered by those youths who resisted

overtures to join a gang were often

milder than the serious assaults endured by youths during their gang

initiation. This finding provides an important component for gang prevention programs for at-risk youths.

● The study found a clear and consistent pattern regarding initial gang

involvement and age at first arrest.

Across all sites, researchers found that

the median age at which youths began hanging out with gangs was approximately 13 years old. The median

age for joining the gang was about

14 years old. The age of first arrest

mirrored the age at which youths

joined their gangs (14 years old).

● Data from the Ohio study suggest

that gang members’ criminal careers

begin with property offenses (e.g.,

auto theft, burglary) and progress

within 1.5 to 2 years to drug-related

crimes and violent crime. The data

suggest that an important opportunity exists for aggressive intervention

during the early years of gang

involvement.

● While many gang members and

nongang, at-risk youths who sell drugs

indicated they would not give up drug

selling for less than $15 per hour, a

significant number of them said they

would accept far lower wages—not

much more than is currently being

paid in fast-food restaurants—if they

could obtain a sufficient number of

work hours per week.

● Gang members are much more

likely than nongang members to

possess powerful and highly lethal

weapons.

● The criminal behavior committed

by gang members is extensive and

significantly exceeds that committed

by comparably at-risk but nongang

youths.

Target audience: Criminal and juvenile court officials, probation/parole

officials, education administrators,

youth workers, police and drug enforcement officials, State and local

legislators and elected officials,

researchers, and policymakers.

Exhibit 1: Type of Criminal Behavior in Which Gang Members Report

Being Involved

Aurora Broward Co. Cleveland Denver

N=49 N=50 N=47 N=41

Guns in School 53.1% 46.0% 40.4% 46.3%

Knives in School 50.0 58.3 38.3 37.5

Concealed Weapons 87.8 84.0 78.7 88.1

Drug Use 49.0 76.0 27.7 51.2

Drug Sales (School) 26.5 34.0 19.1 38.1

Drug Sales (Other) 75.0 58.0 61.7 64.3

Drug Theft 31.9 44.9 21.3 23.1

Drive-by Shooting 51.0 68.0 40.4 50.0

Homicide 12.2 20.0 15.2 19.5

Auto Theft 44.9 67.3 44.7 61.9

Theft-Other 59.2 80.0 51.1 52.4

Assault Rivals 81.6 94.0 72.3 71.4

Assault Own Members 31.3 40.0 30.4 26.2

Assault Police 28.6 22.0 10.6 31.0

Assault Teachers 26.5 16.3 14.9 26.8

Assault Students 58.3 66.0 51.1 53.7

Mug People 26.5 52.0 10.6 33.3

Assault in Streets 42.9 56.0 29.8 52.4

Intimidate/Assault Vict/Wit 39.6 46.0 34.0 47.6

Intimidate/Assault Shoppers 31.3 42.0 23.4 40.5

Shoplifting 57.1 62.0 30.4 45.0

Check Forgery 4.1 18.0 2.1 4.8

Credit Card Theft 12.2 46.0 6.4 9.5

Sell Stolen Goods 44.9 70.0 29.8 52.4

Bribe Police 12.2 10.0 10.6 11.9

Burglary (Unoccupied) 26.5 64.0 8.5 42.9

Burglary (Occupied) 8.3 34.0 2.1 14.6

Arson 12.2 12.0 8.5 14.3

Kidnapping 6.1 4.0 4.3 9.5

Sexual Assault/Molestation 4.1 4.0 2.1 0.0

Rape 2.0 4.0 2.1 0.0

Robbery 14.3 30.0 17.0 26.2
3

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

T Study Design and Method

he information presented in this

discussion is based on confidential interviews with youth gang members and

nongang, at-risk youths in Denver and

Aurora, Colorado; Broward County,

Florida; and Cleveland, Ohio. The interviews averaged approximately 1.5 hours

each and were conducted in neutral (and

safe) locations. Also, a longitudinal tracking study of 83 key leaders and hardcore

members of Columbus, Ohio, youth

gangs was conducted to determine the

pattern of their criminal careers over time.

Selecting the samples. The target

samples for each site in Denver, Aurora,

Broward County, and Cleveland included

50 gang members and 50 nongang,

at-risk youths.

No single definition of “gang” enjoys consensus and there is significant variation

across sites and law enforcement jurisdictions regarding their operational definitions of “gang.” For this research, the

gang samples were composed of individuals who passed two screening criteria:

(1) the youths were perceived to be gang

members by local law enforcement and

social service agencies, and (2) the youths

admitted they were currently active or

previously active in a known youth gang.

The samples were drawn from multiple

referral sources, primarily social service

outreach organizations operating community-based programs. This procedure has

been used by many other researchers because no universal definition of “gang”

exists and no single definition is accepted

by all law enforcement jurisdictions.

The samples of nongang, at-risk youths—

defined as individuals who were regarded

by referral sources as being at risk of joining a gang but not having done so yet—

were also drawn from multiple referral

sources, primarily social service agencies

and schools. Individuals were also asked

directly whether they were currently active

or formerly active in a gang.

Final gang samples included only individuals

who personally acknowledged current or

former gang membership and those for

whom researchers had multiple sources corroborating their gang membership. The final

nongang, at-risk samples included individuals who were regarded by referral sources as

being at risk of gang membership and individuals who were initially referred as gang

members but who later denied gang involvement and for whom no independent corroboration of gang membership existed. The

final samples for the Colorado and Florida

study included 140 completed interviews for

the gang sample and 145 for the nongang,

at-risk sample. The Cleveland samples consisted of 47 completed gang interviews and

49 completed nongang, at-risk interviews.

Although sample attrition was very low (6 to

7 percent for the gang samples and 2 to 3

percent for the nongang, at-risk samples),

there was one problem with the final

samples. The referral agencies—perhaps not

surprisingly—concentrated on working with

younger clients and more female clients than

generally found in gang populations. These

agencies and their referral sources may perceive that their chances of successful prevention/intervention are better with younger

clients and females. Despite the best efforts

of the research team, the study’s at-risk

samples were younger and more female than

the gang samples. Only the Cleveland data

revealed no statistically significant differences

between gang members and nongang members for key attributes and variables, primarily

due to the researchers’ greater knowledge of

both the gangs and the social service agencies’ policies in that city at the time of this

study. Therefore, only the Cleveland data

concerning gang/nongang comparisons are

presented in this discussion. Results from the

Cleveland study, it should be noted, are also

reflected in the findings from the other locations, although the final samples were not

sufficiently comparable for scientific purposes.

Characteristics of the samples. For the

Colorado and Florida sites, the gang members averaged 18 years of age and had

completed the 10th grade. In Cleveland,

gang members’ average age was 16, and

they had completed the 9th grade. Nearly

9 in 10 were male in all locations. African

Americans comprised 50 percent of the

overall gang sample; 25.3 percent were

European-Americans (white); 16.1 percent

were Hispanic-Americans; 1.1 percent

were Asian-Americans; and 7.5 percent

were of mixed racial heritage. Only 4 in 10

lived in a 2-parent family, and most of the

others had little or no contact with their

missing parent.

By comparison, the nongang, at-risk youths

referred to the project averaged 15 years of

age; about 7 in 10 were males; 73.7 percent were African Americans, 11.3 percent

were European-Americans, 9.3 percent

were Hispanic-Americans, 0.5 percent were

Asian-Americans, 0.5 percent were Native

Americans, and 4.6 percent were of mixed

racial heritage. On average, they had completed nine grades of education. Slightly less

than 4 in 10 had grown up with both parents, and most of the others seldom or

never saw their missing parent.

Finally, for the Columbus tracking study,

three former members of the Columbus

Division of Police gang unit in 1986 were

asked independently to list the key leaders

and hardcore members of the city’s gangs

in that year and assess their involvement

in their respective gangs. The three lists

were compared and consolidated by including only names that appeared on all

three lists as either leaders or hardcore

members. This yielded an initial list of 97

names. Subsequently, complete records

were identified for 83 of these individuals

and their official criminal histories were

then tracked for this study.
4

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

are some age variations in the samples

across sites and some differences

across specific gangs with respect to

the types of crimes they commit. Previous research on gangs has consistently found that there are topologies

of gangs and that the criminal behaviors committed by the members of different gangs vary. With respect to such

behaviors as drug sales and drug use,

the national data produced by DUF

(Drug Use Forecasting) studies reveals

significant variation across sites and

regions also.

Do gang members commit more crimes

than their at-risk peers, or are the various forces that affect youths living in

similar circumstances so compelling

that criminal behavior is unrelated to

the existence of gangs in these areas?

Consider the following data from

Cleveland, where the gang and at-risk

samples were scientifically comparable

by age, gender, race/ethnicity, education completed, work during the past

year, and whether they grew up in a

two-parent family.

As exhibit 2 shows, gang members

are far more likely to commit certain

crimes, such as auto theft; theft; assaulting rivals; carrying concealed

weapons in school; using, selling, and

stealing drugs; intimidating or assaulting victims and witnesses; and participating in drive-by shootings and

homicides than nongang youths, even

though the latter may have grown up

under similar circumstances.

Drug sales. Gang members in all four

sites are extensively involved in drug

sales, especially cocaine and marijuana (see exhibit 3). The types of

drugs sold vary from one region to

another. The comparative data from

Cleveland showed gang members sell

significantly more cocaine than do

nongang youths. Across the four sites

studied, the relationship between race

and whether a gang member sold drugs

was statistically nonsignificant.

Researchers asked both gang and

nongang interviewees about the dynamics of their drug sales, including how

Exhibit 3: Types of Drugs Gang Members Report Selling

Aurora Broward Co. Cleveland Denver

N=49 N=50 N=47 N=41

Crack Cocaine 57.1% 38.7% 65.9% 63.4%

Powder Cocaine 24.5 51.0 26.1 41.5

Marijuana 57.1 73.5 48.9 62.5

PCP 6.3 14.3 4.3 12.2

LSD/Mushrooms 18.4 38.8 2.1 25.0

Heroin 6.3 17.0 4.3 14.6

Crystal Meth. 10.2 14.6 4.3 9.7

Exhibit 2: Comparison of Gang and

Nongang Criminal Behavior

(Cleveland)

Crime (p1) Gang Nongang

N=47 N=49

Auto Theft (***) 44.7% 4.1%

Assault Rivals (***) 72.3 16.3

Assault Own Members (*) 30.4 10.2

Assault Police (n.s.) 10.6 14.3

Assault Teachers (n.s.) 14.9 18.4

Assault Students (n.s.) 51.1 34.7

Mug People (n.s.) 10.6 4.1

Assault in Streets (*) 29.8 10.2

Theft-Other (***) 51.1 14.3

Intim/Assault Vict/Wit (***) 34.0 0.0

Intim/Assault Shoppers (*) 23.4 6.1

Drive-by Shooting (***) 40.4 2.0

Homicide (**) 15.2 0.0

Sell Stolen Goods (*) 29.8 10.2

Guns in School (***) 40.4 10.2

Knives in School (***) 38.3 4.2

Concealed Weapons (***) 78.7 22.4

Drug Use (**) 27.7 4.1

Drug Sales (School) (n.s.) 19.1 8.2

Drug Sales (Other) (***) 61.7 16.7

Drug Theft (***) 21.3 0.0

Bribe Police (n.s.) 10.6 2.0

Burglary (Unoccupied) (*) 8.5 0.0

Burglary (Occupied) (n.s.) 2.1 2.0

Shoplifting (n.s.[.058]) 30.4 14.3

Check Forgery (n.s.) 2.1 0.0

Credit Card Theft (n.s.) 6.4 0.0

Arson (*) 8.5 0.0

Kidnapping (n.s.) 4.3 0.0

Sexual Assault/Molest (n.s.) 2.1 0.0

Rape (n.s.) 2.1 0.0

Robbery (*) 17.0 2.0

1 Level of statistical significance: *p<.05;

**p<.01; ***p<.001; n.s. = no significant

difference.

Exhibit 4: Gang and Nongang Descriptions of the Nature of Their Drug

Selling (Cleveland)

Responses (p1) Gang Nongang

N=47 N=49

Median frequency (***) Daily Daily2

Median earnings/week (*) $1,000 $675

Median customers/week (**) 30 80

Median percent of earnings kept for own drug use (n.s.) 0 0

Percent of drug sources, local (**) 31.9 50.0

Percent of drug sources, foreign (**) 26.1 12.5

Percent of drug sources, gang (**) 21.7 18.8

Median wages/hour required to stop selling (n.s.) $15 $17

1 Level of statistical significance: *p<.05; **p< .01; ***p<.001; n.s. = no significant difference.

2 Based on subsample who do sell drugs (n = 11).
5

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

of “hanging out” with a gang (often called

the “gang wannabe” stage) before a youngster is arrested for the first time? The findings across all four sites were remarkably

consistent, as shown in exhibit 5.

Based on the survey sample taken at

the four sites (in three States), youngsters generally begin hanging out with

gangs at 12 or 13 years of age, join the

gang at 13 or 14 (from 6 months to a

year after they first hang out with the

gang), and are first arrested at 14.

Young adolescents are most vulnerable to the seduction of gang membership at a time when physiological,

sociological, and psychological factors,

including a strong need for peer acceptance, are acting upon them.

Gang resistance and consequences. Many young people believe

they will be physically punished if they

refuse an offer to join a gang. At the

same time, schools and other social

organizations across the country have

launched gang resistance education and

training programs. Therefore, it seemed

important to ask gang interviewees

whether they knew of individuals who

refused to join the gang and, if so, the

consequences of their refusal.

frequently they sell drugs, how much

they make each week, how many customers they have each week, how much

of their profits is spent on their own

drug use, the location of their drug

source, and (if known) the type of organization that sells them their drugs.

They also asked a “tipping point” question: How much would the interviewee

need to make in legitimate wages (per

hour) to stop selling drugs? The data

from Cleveland in exhibit 4 are comparable to the findings in the other sites.

Many gang members sell drugs, often

daily. The majority of at-risk youths

reported that they do not sell drugs.

Those who sell, however, do so on a

daily basis. Gang members reported

earning about $1,000 per week from

only 30 customers, while nongang

youths earned about $675 per week,

based on an estimated 80 customers.

Gang members sell more expensive

and profitable drugs and are better

connected to nonlocal sources than

nongang drug traffickers. Neither gang

nor nongang drug sellers reported using their profits to buy drugs, except in

Broward County, where gang members

spent 20 percent of their earnings and

nongang interviewees spent 5 percent

of their profits to buy drugs.

Both gang members and at-risk youths

reported that it would require average

wages of $15 to $17 an hour to get

them to stop selling drugs. While this

figure reflected the median, it should

be noted that about 25 percent of those

sampled would accept wages of about

$6 to $7 per hour—not much more

than many fast-food restaurants pay

today. They are tired of living with

the fear that accompanies drug sales.

However, as these young people often

pointed out, it is difficult for them to

find full-time work with one employer.

It is also true, of course, that once one

has a criminal record, it is more difficult to obtain regular employment.

Nevertheless, the evidence shows that

drug sales are not controlled by gangs

nor do drug sales represent an organized, collective gang activity. Quite to

the contrary, research over the past 12

years suggests that most drug sales by

gang members are individual or smallclique activities, rather than collective

gang efforts.6

Guns. Interviewees were also asked

about gun ownership among the members of their gang or (for nongang youths)

their peers. In all four sites, nearly 75

percent of gang members acknowledged

that nearly all of their fellow gang members own guns. Even more alarming, 90

percent of gang interviewees reported

that gang members favor powerful, lethal

weapons over smaller caliber handguns.

Between 25 and 50 percent of nongang

youths said their peers own guns, and

about 50 percent stated that their friends

owned powerful, lethal weapons. The

gang/nongang differences were statistically significant across all four sites—

that is, gang members are significantly

more likely to own guns and more likely

to own powerful, lethal weapons.

From “wannabe” to first arrest.

How long does it take from the initial stage

Exhibit 5: Age At First Association With Gang To Age At First Arrest

Aurora Broward Co. Cleveland Denver

N=49 N=50 N=47 N=41

1st Association 13.1 13.3 12.9 12.4

Joined Gang 14.2 14.3 13.4 13.5

1st Arrest 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0

Exhibit 6: Gang Resistance and Consequences (Percent)1

Aurora Broward Co. Cleveland Denver

N=49 N=50 N=47 N=41

Know Someone Who Refused to Join 59.2% 72.0% 71.7% 65.9%

Consequences: Physical Harm 6.1 16.0 12.1 17.5

Consequences: Nothing 36.7 34.0 66.7 30.0

1 Interviewees were asked, “Do you know someone who refused to join a gang?” They were then

asked, “Do you know the consequences of that refusal to join?” The disparity in the percentage

figures above reflects the interviewees’ lack of knowledge of the consequences for some youths

who refused to join a gang.
6

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

As exhibit 6 shows, reality differs

dramatically from the intuitive beliefs

held by many young people—consistently across all four sites. Clearly, the

cost-benefit ratio favors gang resistance, especially if one resists politely,

without “disrespecting” the gang or

its members.7

 In instances in which

youths resisted gang overtures and suffered physical reprisals, their injuries

were seldom serious. Media accounts

of gang killings and serious assaults

on youths who refuse to join the gang

paint an exaggerated picture. The reality is quite the opposite.

Another finding tips the scales even

further in favor of resisting gang

membership. The most common initiation ritual reported in all four sites

involves gang members assaulting

(“beating in” or “jumping in”) the new

recruit to prove that he is “tough,” “can

take it,” and “has heart.” Thus, youths

who respectfully refuse to join a gang

face very good odds that nothing serious

will happen to them;8

 on the other hand,

those who join a gang usually suffer

serious physical assault as an initiation

rite. In addition, data indicate that gang

involvement significantly increases

one’s chances of being arrested, incarcerated, seriously injured, or killed.

These factors must be presented to

youths who may be attracted by the

glamour and excitement of gang life.

Tracking gang leaders and

hardcore members

The final component of this study focused on the nature and magnitude of

the criminal behavior of 83 individuals

who in 1986 were key gang leaders and

hardcore gang members in Columbus,

Ohio. Researchers examined their arrest

histories (from 1980 to 1993) to see if

their gang involvement triggered their

criminal career. Very few arrests occurred prior to the mid-1980s (when

gangs emerged in Columbus), but thereafter the frequency and seriousness of

gang members’ criminal behavior accelerated dramatically, as shown in exhibit 7.

The great majority of these arrests

occurred in the 7-year period between

1985 and 1992. An important positive

correlation exists between when these

individuals joined gangs and when

their arrest histories accelerated. The

correlation coincides with the data

presented in exhibit 5. It is important

to note that they were arrested for violent offenses (37 percent), property offenses (29 percent), drug offenses (18

percent), weapons offenses (6 percent),

and other offenses (10 percent). Arrests began to decline in 1992, based

on the following factors:

● Incarceration. Serving jail time

temporarily halts new arrests.

● Death. At least 7 of the 83 gang

leaders had already died. Coroner’s

records for six of them indicated that

all died violent deaths (five by gunshots, one by strangulation).

● Law enforcement reorganization.

Like many other communities, Columbus experienced a surge in the crack

cocaine market during the mid-1980s,

prompting the police to consolidate the

gang enforcement unit with the narcotics

bureau. Police resources were scarce,

and it was perceived that many gang

members were selling drugs. As a result,

less attention was paid to newly developing gangs, and more intelligence and enforcement activity was directed toward

narcotics trafficking, most of which was

not gang related.9

Finally, the study sought to determine

whether these gang leaders committed

more serious offenses over time or

whether their first offenses were serious.

This information is important in assessing the developmental stages of gangs

and in developing appropriate prevention, intervention, and suppression

strategies. For all four of Columbus’s

major gangs, evidence showed a clear

progression in serious offenses, based

on a time series analysis of when each

gang’s arrests peaked for property

crimes, drug offenses, and violence.

Exhibit 8 illustrates this pattern for

each of the four gangs separately and

for an aggregate “progression window”

for the four gangs combined.

These data suggest a progression in

gang crime from property offenses

to violent crimes and drug-related

Exhibit 7: Total Arrests for 83 Gang Leaders and Members (Columbus)

50

40

10

0

30

20

80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93

Frequency of Arrest

Year

Enforcers

Crips

Dozen Cousins

Freeze Crew
7

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

crimes. The progression takes about

1.5 to 2 years, depending on the specific gang and first offense. The data

also mirror the close connection between drug trafficking and violence,

especially since the mid-1980s.10

Policy implications

Education and prevention. Youths who

join gangs tend to begin as “wannabes” at

about age 13, join about 6 months later,

and get arrested within 6 months after joining the gang. By age 14 they already have

an arrest record. This underscores the urgent need for effective gang-resistance

education programs and other primary and

secondary prevention and intervention initiatives directed at preteens, especially

those prone to delinquent and violent

behavior.11

Resisting overtures. Young people

can refuse to join gangs without substantial risk of physical harm. Moreover,

they are far better off to resist joining

gangs than to expose themselves to

the beating they are likely to take upon

initiation and the increased chances of

arrest, incarceration, injury, and death

associated with gang membership.12

Windows of opportunity for intervening. Because prevention programs

will not deter all youths from joining gangs,

it is also important to address the brief

window of opportunity for intervention that

occurs in the year between the “wannabe”

stage and the age at first arrest. It is vital

that intervention programs that target gang

members and successfully divert them

from the gang are funded, developed,

evaluated, improved, and sustained.13

A second opportunity to intervene

occurs between the time gang members

are first arrested for property crimes and

their subsequent involvement in more

serious offenses. This period, which lasts

about 1.5 to 2 years, affords a chance

to divert young offenders from the gang

subculture before they further endanger

their own lives and victimize other

citizens. Gang members are more likely

than their nongang peers to sell higher

profit drugs, underscoring the need

for prevention and early intervention

programs designed to divert “wannabes”

before they become hooked on illegal

earnings. Successful intervention at this

stage (with, for example, prosecutorial

diversion programs targeting first-time,

gang-involved property offenders) can

still save lives (of both offenders and victims) and save society the enormous cost

of arresting, convicting, and incarcerating serious offenders.

While many gang members and nongang,

at-risk youths who sell drugs indicated

they would not give up drug selling for

less than $15 per hour, a significant number of them told researchers they would

accept far lower wages—not much more

than is currently being paid in fast-food

restaurants—if they could obtain a sufficient number of work hours per week.

Employers often split job slots into parttime jobs that offer few or no fringe benefits, a widespread practice within the

fast-food industry.

Early warning signals. Data suggest

that gang members are especially likely to

commit the crimes highlighted in exhibits

1 and 2. A sudden increase in these

crimes may serve as a “distant early

warning signal” that the community

needs to consider local gangs in the context of its overall crime problem. Crimes

that are especially worth monitoring

closely (and can realistically be monitored) include auto theft, bringing weapons to school, and drive-by shootings.14

Weapons. Gang members are likely

to possess powerful and highly lethal

weapons, although many gang members are not old enough to legally drive

a car. Efforts to reduce the number of

illegal weapons possessed by youths

and adults should be emphasized to

reduce gun-related crimes.15

Notes

1. Longitudinal cohort studies in Denver; Rochester,

New York; and Seattle have provided extensive data

that demonstrate the relationship between criminal

behavior and gang membership. Youths are more

involved in delinquent and criminal behavior while

active in gangs than either before they join or after

they leave gangs. See Esbensen, Finn-Aage, and

David Huizinga, “Gangs, Drugs, and Delinquency in

a Survey of Urban Youth,” Criminology 31 (1993):

565–589; Thornberry, Terence P. et al., “The Role

of Juvenile Gangs in Facilitating Delinquent Behavior,” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency

30 (1993): 55–87; and Battin, Sara R. et al., “The

Contribution of Gang Membership to Delinquency

Beyond Delinquent Friends,” Criminology 36

(1998): 93–115.

2. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Highlights of the 1995 National Youth Gang

Survey, Fact Sheet #63, Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention, 1997; also see Curry, G.

David, Richard A. Ball, and Scott H. Decker, in

“Estimating the National Scope of Gang Crime From

Law Enforcement Data,” Gangs in America (2nd edition), Huff, C. Ronald, editor, Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 1996: 21–36.

3. Estimates range as high as 1.5 million gang members in the United States. See Knox, G.W., “The

1996 National Law Enforcement Gang Analysis Survey,” Journal of Gang Research 3, (1996): 41–55.

4. For a more detailed discussion of the stages that

communities often go through, see Huff, C. Ronald,

Exhibit 8: Progression in Seriousness of Offenses (Columbus)

Gang N Arrests Peak Prop. Peak Drugs Peak Viol.

Crips 25 219 1988 1989 1989

Freeze Crew 19 227 1988 1989 1989

Enforcers 14 154 1987 1990 1989

Dozen Cousins 9 105 1987 1989 1989

Progression from Property Offenses to Drug Offenses: +1.75 Years

Progression from Property Offenses to Violent Offenses: +1.50 Years

Progression from Drug Offenses to Violent Offenses: -0.25 Years
8

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

editor, Gangs in America (1st edition), Thousand

Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 1990.

5. The Ohio sites were originally proposed as part

of the NIJ study, but the willingness of Ohio’s Office of Criminal Justice Services to fund the additional study permitted researchers to include five

sites in the overall research instead of only three.

6. Klein, Malcolm W., The American Street

Gang: Its Nature, Prevalence, and Control, New

York, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995;

Fagan, J.E., “Gangs, Drugs, and Neighborhood

Change,” in Huff, C. Ronald, editor, Gangs in

America (2nd edition), Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 1996: 39–74; Decker,

S.H., and B. Van Winkle, Life in the Gang:

Family, Friends, and Violence, New York, New

York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

7. Over the past 12 years of interviewing gang

members, the author has developed a gang-resistance strategy anchored in the cognitive dissonance

theory of psychology—which postulates the difficulty of accepting two competing ideas at the same

time. Gang members, who generally state that they

love their mothers dearly, frequently recognize that

they have disappointed them by their criminal behavior. Youths attempting to resist gang involvement might tell gang members that they respect

them and might like to join the gang, but that their

mother disapproves, and they do not want to show

disrespect to her. Gang members in overwhelming

numbers told researchers that they would not join

the gang if they could make that decision again,

and they do not want their siblings to join gangs.

They may recognize in retrospect that the youth, in

respecting his mother’s wishes, is doing what they

themselves wish they had done.

8. Even when gang members reported that the

consequences of gang resistance were physical

in nature, they indicated that these nearly

always resulted in only minor injuries.

9. Although many youth gang members sell drugs,

youth gangs do not control drug markets in the

United States and do not account for most drug

sales in major urban areas. For a useful and concise discussion of street gangs and drugs, see

Klein, Malcolm W., The American Street Gang.

10. For an extensive discussion of related

issues, see Zimring, Franklin E., et al., “Guns and

Violence Symposium,” Journal of Criminal Law

and Criminology, 86 (1996):1–256.

11. For an overview and assessment of appropriate intervention and prevention strategies,

see Goldstein, Arnold P., and C. Ronald Huff,

editors, The Gang Intervention Handbook,

Champaign, Illinois: Research Press, 1993;

Klein, Malcolm W., The American Street Gang:

Its Nature, Prevalence, and Control; Spergel,

Irving A., The Youth Gang Problem: A Community Approach, New York: Oxford University

Press, 1995; Tonry, Michael, and David

Farrington, editors, Building a Safer Society:

Strategic Approaches to Crime, Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1995; and

Sherman, Lawrence W. et al., Preventing

Crime: What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s

Promising, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department

of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 1997.

12. The mortality rate among the study sample

of 83 Columbus gang leaders and hardcore

members far exceeds the expected death rate

for adolescent males of comparable ages.

13. The key to developing successful intervention programs is to conduct rigorous evaluations that carefully assess what works for whom

and under what circumstances.

Findings and conclusions of the research reported here are those of the author and do not

necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

NCJ 172852

The National Institute of Justice is a component of the

Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the

Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice

Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency

Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

BULK RATE

U.S. POSTAGE PAID

DOJ/NIJ

Permit No. G–91

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

Washington, DC 20531

Official Business

Penalty for Private Use $300

This research was conducted under

NIJ grant #91–IJ–CX–K013 and by the

Ohio Office of Criminal Justice Services/Office of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention grant #91–JJ–

C01–0682 by C. Ronald Huff, Ph.D.,

Director and Professor in the School of

Public Policy and Management and

Director of the Criminal Justice Research Center at Ohio State University.

14. For additional discussion of crimes that

appear to be especially related to gangs

and crimes that the media often mistakenly

attribute to gangs, see Klein, Malcolm W.,

The American Street Gang.

15. Recent successful projects to reduce gun violence occurred in both Kansas City and Boston.

See Sherman, Lawrence W., James W. Shaw, and

Dennis P. Rogan, The Kansas City Gun Experiment, Research in Brief, Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Department of Justice, National Institute of

Justice, 1995 and Kennedy, David M., Anne M.

Piehl, and Anthony A. Braga, “Youth Violence in

Boston: Gun Markets, Serious Youth Offenders,

and a Use-Reduction Strategy,” Law and Contemporary Problems 59 (1996): 147–196.