U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

22–624 PDF 2016

DHS IN TODAY’S DANGEROUS WORLD: EXAMINING THE DEPARTMENT’S BUDGET AND READINESS TO COUNTER HOMELAND THREATS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 16, 2016 

Serial No. 114–60 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

JOAN V. O’HARA, General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security ................. 1 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 2 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

WITNESS

Honorable Jeh C. Johnson, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 5 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

APPENDIX

Questions From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for Hon. Jeh C. Johnson .......... 51 

Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Hon. Jeh C. 

Johnson ................................................................................................................. 68 

(1) 

DHS IN TODAY’S DANGEROUS WORLD: EXAMINING THE DEPARTMENT’S BUDGET AND 

READINESS TO COUNTER HOMELAND 

THREATS 

Wednesday, March 16, 2016 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in Room 311, 

Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul [Chairman 

of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives McCaul, Smith, King, Duncan, 

Barletta, Perry, Clawson, Katko, Hurd, Carter, Walker, 

Loudermilk, McSally, Ratcliffe, Donovan, Thompson, Sanchez, Langevin, Richmond, Keating, Payne, Vela, Watson Coleman, and 

Torres. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Committee on Homeland Security will 

come to order. The committee is meeting today to examine the Department of Homeland Security’s budget and readiness to counter 

homeland threats. I now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

Almost 15 years after 9/11, the war against Islamist terror has 

entered a dark phase. New battlefields have emerged across the 

world, and our enemies are on the offensive. They are recruiting 

through retweets and crowd-sourcing their attacks. They have 

brought the conflict to our doorsteps in new and dangerous ways. 

Only months ago, in San Bernardino, we witnessed the horrible violence terrorists can inflict on our communities. Yet we were reminded in the wake of that tragedy that such radicalism is no 

match for our resolve. The American people will not submit to the 

intimidation of jihadists, and we will not allow their repressive 

world view to infest and infect our free society. 

Secretary Johnson, your team faces no small task. We are in the 

most serious threat environment since 9/11, and the Department of 

Homeland Security is on the front line. You are responsible for 

keeping threats away from our shores at a time when terrorists are 

targeting us aggressively. Just 2 weeks ago, this committee released a report showing that, since 2014, ISIS has been tied to 75 

terrorist plots against the West. One-third of those plots were 

aimed at the United States, making our Nation the group’s No. 1 

target. 

But I am alarmed that, despite these threats, the President still 

lacks a coherent vision for winning the wider war against Islamist 
2 

terror. The administration’s wait-and-see and lead-from-behind foreign policy not only allowed ISIS to create a terror incubator in 

Syria and Iraq, but it also allowed a terrorist wildfire to sweep the 

globe. Even still, the President has failed to develop credible plans 

for containing, let alone rolling back new extremist safe havens. 

If we do not win this war on offense, then our security falls to 

our defense. Much of that rests on your shoulders, Mr. Secretary. 

We have arrested, as you know, more than 80 ISIS supporters in 

the United States, and home-grown terror cases are being investigated in all 50 States. That is why I am grateful DHS is ramping 

up efforts to combat domestic radicalization. Your Department 

takes the issue seriously and has shown much-needed leadership. 

Overall, though, I am disappointed the administration is not 

doing more. Once again, the President is asking Congress to give 

him billions more for countering climate change than for countering violent extremism. Terror threats, however, are not the only 

homeland security challenge. Our borders are not secure, and they 

have become highways of illicit traffic and violence. The American 

people are demanding that Washington do its job and secure our 

territory, but time and again, they have let us down. 

The lack of a clear vision for securing the border is one of the 

administration’s greatest failings. Incredibly, in this year’s budget, 

the White House proposes cutting the number of Border Patrol 

Agents. This sends a signal to the American people that the Government is not serious about fixing this crisis. 

I hope today we will also spend time examining our cyber defenses. The effects of cyber intrusions are felt every day across 

America, from corporate boardrooms to kitchen tables. DHS has 

stepped up its efforts to secure Federal networks and to assist the 

private sector, but our country is still under daily assault, and the 

bad guys are winning. The network security is a central element 

of our National security, and today, I hope we can discuss the Department’s cybersecurity agenda and where we need to focus our 

efforts the most. 

Finally, I am concerned about the steep cuts, more than $500 

million in this year’s DHS budget, for the Urban Area Security Initiative and State Homeland Security Grant Programs that help 

first responders. Once again, the terror threat level is higher than 

it has ever been during my time in Congress. The State and local 

responders are the country’s first line of defense. We need them to 

be vigilant, trained, and equipped to stop acts of terror, so why on 

Earth would we slash their grant funding? Today, we are hoping 

for a good explanation, because I can tell you that, right now, our 

first responders don’t need us to cut their budgets; they need us to 

have their backs. 

So let me again, Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here today. 

We hope to cover a wide range of issues. I look forward to hearing 

about your plans to confront these challenges. 

With that, the Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, Chairman McCaul, for holding today’s hearing. 

Secretary Johnson, thank you for appearing today. As you know, 

this is your first time before us this Congress, and we are happy 

to see you. Today’s hearing, entitled ‘‘DHS in Today’s Dangerous 
3 

World: Examining the Department’s Budget and Readiness to 

Counter Homeland Threats,’’ invites us to take a broad look at the 

threats that we face in the United States and how the Department 

is prepared to handle them. 

Mr. Secretary, the current threat posed by foreign terrorist organizations, such as ISIL and al-Qaeda, is significant and rightfully 

receive extensive attention. However, at the same time, anti-Government and militia groups grew by one-third in 2015. In a study 

by the Triangle Center at Duke University, 74 percent of law enforcement identified anti-Government groups as the top terrorist 

threat in their jurisdiction. Last year, we also witnessed a troubled 

surge of domestic terrorist groups. 

Mr. Secretary, you have stated that we have moved to a world 

that includes the threat of terrorist-inspired attacks, where terrorists are motivated by something on the internet. Both right-wing 

extremists and foreign-inspired terrorists have used the internet to 

organize and plan attacks. For instance, just this weekend a militia 

group organized on Twitter to attend and use force at Presidential 

campaign events. 

Mr. Secretary, I want to hear from you how the Department is 

maintaining situational awareness and response capability during 

the increasingly violent Presidential campaign season. I know that 

the Department has long recognized the threat from violent extremism and, in 2015, established the Office of Community Partnerships. In its budget, the Department requests $49 million for countering violent extremism grants for emerging threats from violent 

extremism and complex coordinated attacks. To date, the Department has provided Congress with little information on how these 

grants will be distributed. I hope that contained within forthcoming 

grant guidance are instructions for some of the funding to be directed at the prevention of right-wing extremist attacks. 

Mr. Secretary, as you have stated and as both sides of the aisle 

agree, it is a State or a local cop on the street who may prevent 

the next terrorist attack. With the right-wing attacks on the rise 

and, ISIL recruiting within our borders, it is baffling that cuts to 

State and local grants preparedness programs are in the budget. As 

the Chairman said, nearly $500 million are slated to be cut under 

your budget request. I do not believe the Department’s budget 

should be focused on being balanced on the backs of first responders. 

I want to hear from you, Mr. Secretary, how you expect the proposed cuts to affect the ability of State and local response capabilities? 

Another concern is the staffing level at our Nation’s airports. The 

Federal Aviation Administration is projecting passenger growth at 

a rate of 2 percent a year, making this summer one of the busiest 

in recent years. I, along with other Members of this committee, 

continue to hear from large airports, such as the letter we received 

from the head of Atlanta Airport, that they have the infrastructure 

for many security lanes, but due to staffing shortages, they can 

only use a small number of those lanes. Given the forecast of increased passenger volume, along with underutilized checkpoints, I 

am concerned that congested screening lines will create another 

vulnerability. 
4 

So we need to hear from you, Mr. Secretary, on that. We have 

done PreCheck. It has been a good thing, but the lines are still getting longer. 

Also let me suggest that you look at the TSA behavioral detection 

program as possibility for over 3,000 people who are I would assume doing a good job, but we have yet to be provided the science 

behind the behavioral detection program that says it works. So we 

spent a lot of money doing that. If we don’t have the science, let’s 

put the men and women who are in that program in the position 

to provide relief to some of our airports. 

Additionally, I remain concerned about the Secret Service. I am 

supportive of the budget request that reflects the recommendation 

of the protective mission panel and the Office of Inspector General. 

However, I cannot stress enough that the Secret Service cannot 

enter a new chapter with an ugly cloud of a decade’s long racial 

discrimination suit hanging over its head. Sixteen years, Mr. Secretary, is far too long. Let’s put this baby to bed and get on with 

protecting and doing a job that our fine men and women do. 

Again, I don’t have to tell you about morale; OPM does its annual report. We have to do something to get the morale up. I look 

forward to your testimony. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

MARCH 16, 2016 

Today’s hearing title, ‘‘DHS in Today’s Dangerous World: Examining the Department’s Budget and Readiness to Counter Homeland Threats’’ invites us to take a 

broad look at the threats that we face in the United States and how DHS is positioned to challenge them. 

Mr. Secretary, the current threat posed by foreign terrorist organizations such as 

ISIL and al-Qaeda is significant and rightfully receives extensive attention. However, at the same time, anti-Government and militia groups grew by one-third in 

2015. In a study by the Triangle Center at Duke University, 74 percent of law enforcement identified anti-Government groups as the top terrorist threats in their jurisdictions. Last year, we also witnessed a troubling surge of domestic terrorist 

groups. 

Mr. Secretary, you have stated that we have moved to a world that includes the 

threat of terrorist-inspired attacks—where terrorists are motivated by something on 

the internet. Both right-wing extremists and foreign-inspired terrorists have used 

the internet to organize and plan attacks. For instance, just this weekend, a militia 

group organized on Twitter to attend Presidential campaign events. Mr. Secretary, 

I want to hear from you how the Department is maintaining situational awareness 

and response capabilities during this increasingly violent and volatile Presidential 

campaign season. 

I know that the Department has long recognized the threat from violent extremism and in 2015 established the Office for Community Partnerships. 

In its budget, the Department requests 49 million dollars for Countering Violent 

Extremism grants for emergent threats from ‘‘violent extremism’’ and ‘‘complex coordinated attacks.’’ To date, the Department has provided Congress with little information on how these grants will be distributed. I would hope that contained within 

forthcoming grant guidance are instructions for some of the funding to be directed 

at the prevention of right-wing extremist attacks. 

Mr. Secretary, as you have stated, and as both sides of the aisle agree, it is the 

State or local cop on that may prevent the next terrorist attack. With right-wing 

attacks on the rise and ISIL recruiting within our borders, it is baffling that cuts 

to the State and local grant preparedness grants programs are in this budget. Nearly $500 million are slated to be cut under your budget request. I do not believe the 

Department’s budget should be so focused on being balanced on the backs of first 
5 

responders. I want to hear from you, Mr. Secretary, about how you expect the proposed cuts to affect the ability of State and local response capabilities. 

Another area of concern is the staffing level at our Nation’s airports. The Federal 

Aviation Administration is projecting passenger growth at a rate of 2 percent a year, 

making this summer one of the busiest in recent years. I continue to hear from large 

airports that have the infrastructure for many security lanes, but due to staffing 

shortages, they can only use a small number of lanes. Given the forecast of increased passenger volume, along with underutilized checkpoints, I am concerned 

that congested screening lines will create another vulnerability. 

I need to hear more from you than encouragement that travelers join PreCheck. 

I need to know how you intend to tackle this problem. I am also concerned that your 

budget still requests funds for TSA’s behavioral detection program, which still has 

not been scientifically proven to disrupt terrorist activity. Additionally, I remain 

concerned about the Secret Service. I am supportive of the budget requests that reflect the recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel and the Office of Inspector General. However, I cannot stress enough that the Secret Service can not enter 

a new chapter with an ugly cloud of a decades-long racial discrimination suit hanging over its head. 

Finally, Mr. Secretary, the Department has the third-largest workforce in the 

Federal Government and faces low employee morale. You have personally committed to improving morale and workforce satisfaction. It seems as if we still cannot 

get out of the planning phase. Low retention rates are concerning, especially within 

the Border Patrol. CBP does not anticipate reaching its staffing goal in the current 

fiscal year. This has an impact on the Department’s readiness. We have a shared 

goal of moving the Department forward. By working with you and across the components, the Department should be ready to counter homeland threats. 

Chairman MCCAUL. I thank the Ranking Member. 

I realize there is a Rose Garden ceremony at 11 o’clock. Let us 

know if you need to leave at any time. 

Secretary JOHNSON. I will be sitting right here. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Let me recognize the Secretary for an opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE JEH C. JOHNSON, SECRETARY, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Secretary JOHNSON. Thank you, Chairman McCaul, Ranking 

Member Thompson, Members of this committee. The 2017 budget 

request by the President funds our vital Homeland Security missions, but it does reflect hard choices to fit within the budget caps 

agreed to by the Congress and the President last year. 

We are requesting from Congress $40.6 billion in appropriated 

funds, which is down from the $41 billion level that we currently 

have in fiscal year 2016. The top line is an increase, however, from 

$64.8 billion this year to a request of total spending authority of 

$66.8 billion for fiscal year 2017. This includes a request for an increase in various fees to support that funding at $66.8 billion, 

mostly centered around aviation security. 

I would be happy to answer questions regarding that proposed 

fee increase. We have submitted to the Congress authorization language to authorize such a fee increase. The vital Homeland Security objectives that do need to be funded and are funded in this 

budget request center around aviation security; cybersecurity; adequate funding for the Secret Service; border security and enforcement and administration of our immigration laws; the recapitalization of the Coast Guard; the funding of a long overdue, new headquarters for the Department of Homeland Security; and grants. I 

recognize that this budget request reflects a significant cut in the 

grants. Again, the budget request reflects hard choices to fit within 

the budget caps. But I do recognize and appreciate the importance 
6 

of our grant activity to fund and support State and local law enforcement and first responders. 

My top priority for the Department of Homeland Security while 

I am Secretary this last year in office is the top overall priority I 

had last year, which is management reform to more effectively and 

efficiently deliver our homeland security to the American public. 

The overarching effort here is our Unity of Effort initiative, which 

I launched 2 years ago, to have more centralized, effective, and efficient decision making when it comes to things such as budgeting 

acquisition and the like. 

I want to thank this committee for the support that you have 

provided to Homeland Security since I have been Secretary. I want 

to thank Members of this committee for the hard work that went 

into the Cybersecurity Act of 2015. I know that individual Members of this committee spent long hours working with the intelligence committees to come to a bill that passed the full Congress 

and was signed by the President. It is a good bill, and we are in 

the midst now of implementing this new law. We are meeting the 

milestones to implement this new law. One milestone occurs tomorrow, and we will meet that milestone on time. 

I appreciate this committee’s support for authorization of many 

of our activities. This committee has already voted out authorization for our Joint Task Forces on the Southern Border; for our Office of Community Partnerships, as was noted; for our CBRNE Office, the Office of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and 

Explosives detection; our Office of Policy, ramping that up. 

This committee has done a lot to authorize these various activities to improve the workings of our Department. I very much appreciate that it has been done on a bipartisan basis. We are looking 

for Congress for support for our reorganization of NPPD and to a 

more streamlined and effective and operational cyber and infrastructure protection agency. We are looking for authorization for 

our Joint Requirements Council, for acquisition reform, and for authorization for joint duty assignments within the Department of 

Homeland Security, so we are less stovepiped. 

We have our various missions, which have been noted by the 

Chairman and Ranking Member, which I remain focused on. But 

my overall goal for the Department of Homeland Security in my remaining 10 months in office is to leave it better than I found it and 

to make it a more effective and efficient place to deliver our services to the American people. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Johnson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JEH C. JOHNSON

MARCH 16, 2016 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to be here. 

The President’s fiscal year 2017 budget request for the Department of Homeland 

Security reflects hard choices to fit within the caps established by the bipartisan 

budget agreement of 2015, but, at the end of the day, it funds all of our vital homeland security missions in these challenging times. 

The President’s fiscal year 2017 budget request calls for $40.6 billion in appropriated funds (compared to $41 billion currently in fiscal year 2016) but an increase 
7 

in total spending authority to $66.8 billion (compared to $64.8 billion currently in 

fiscal year 2016). Total workforce requested is 229,626, compared to 226,157 in fiscal 

year 2016, accompanied by an overall workforce pay raise of 1.6%. 

Like this year, the President’s budget requests $6.7 billion to finance the cost of 

major disasters in FEMA’s disaster relief fund, and the ability to collect fees of 

$19.5 billion (compared to $17.1 billion this year). 

As I said before, the President’s budget request funds our vital homeland security 

missions. Our request includes: 

• $5.1 billion for transportation screening operations, including increased screening personnel, to ensure the security of our airways, a $100 million increase; 

• $1.6 billion, an increase of over $200 million, to fund our vital cybersecurity 

mission, including increased investments in the Continuous Diagnostic Mitigation program; 

• $1.9 billion for the Secret Service, which is the same as enacted in fiscal year 

2016, to protect our National leaders, fight cyber crime, and support increased 

hiring; 

• $319 million to cover costs associated with unaccompanied children and families; 

• $1.1 billion for recapitalization of the U.S. Coast Guard’s assets, including a sizable investment in the Nation’s future arctic capability; and 

• $226 million for continued investment in the construction of a future DHS headquarters at St. Elizabeths. 

MANAGEMENT REFORM

Like last year, reforming the way in which the Department of Homeland Security 

functions and conducts business, to more effectively and efficiently deliver our services to the American people, is my overarching objective for 2016. We’ve done a lot 

in the last 2 years, but there is still much we will do. There are still too many stove 

pipes and inefficiencies in the Department. 

My goal as Secretary is to continue to protect the homeland, and leave the Department of Homeland Security a better place than I found it. 

The centerpiece of our management reform has been the Unity of Effort initiative 

I announced in April 2014, which focuses on getting away from the stove pipes, in 

favor of more centralized programming, budgeting, and acquisition processes. 

We have already transformed our approach to the budget. Today, we focus Department-wide on our mission needs, rather than through component stove-pipes. 

With the support of Congress, we are moving to a simplified budget structure that 

will support better decision making across the Department. 

We have transformed our approach to acquisition. Last year I established a DHSwide Joint Requirements Council to evaluate, from the viewpoint of the Department 

as a whole, a component’s needs on the front end of an acquisition. 

We have launched the ‘‘Acquisition Innovations in Motion’’ initiative, to consult 

with the contractor community about ways to improve the quality and timeliness 

of our contracting process, and the emerging skills required of our acquisition professionals. We are putting faster contracting processes in place. 

We are reforming our human resources process. We are making our hiring process 

faster and more efficient. We are using all the tools we have to recruit, retain, and 

reward personnel. 

As part of the Unity of Effort initiative, in 2014 we created the Joint Task Forces 

dedicated to border security along the Southern Border. Once again, we are getting 

away from the stove pipes. In 2015, these Task Forces became fully operational. In 

2016, we are asking Congress to officially authorize them in legislation. 

We are achieving more transparency in our operations. We have staffed up our 

Office of Immigration Statistics and gave it the mandate to integrate immigration 

data across the Department. Last year, and for the second year in a row, we reported our total number of repatriations, returns, and removals on a consolidated, 

Department-wide basis. 

The long-awaited entry/exit overstay report was published in January, providing 

a clearer picture of the number of individuals in this country who overstay their visitor visas. It reflects that about 1% of those who enter the country by air or sea 

on visitor visas or through the Visa Waiver Program overstay. 

We are working with outside, non-partisan experts on a project called 

BORDERSTAT, to develop a clear and comprehensive set of outcome metrics for 

measuring border security, apprehension rates, and inflow rates. 

Since 2013 we’ve spearheaded something called the ‘‘DHS Data Framework’’ initiative. For the protection of the homeland, we are improving the collection and comparison of travel, immigration, and other information against Classified intelligence. 
8 

We will do this consistent with laws and policies that protect privacy and civil liberties. 

We want to restructure the National Protection and Programs Directorate from 

a headquarters element to an operational component called the ‘‘Cyber and Infrastructure Protection’’ agency. 

Finally, we will improve the levels of employee satisfaction across the Department. We’ve been on an aggressive campaign to improve morale over the last 2 

years. It takes time to turn a 22-component workforce of 240,000 people in a different direction. Though the overall results last year were still disappointing, we see 

signs of improvement. Employee satisfaction improved in a number of components, 

including at DHS headquarters. 

This year we will see an overall improvement in employee satisfaction across 

DHS. 

COUNTERTERRORISM

In 2016, counterterrorism will remain the cornerstone of the Department of 

Homeland Security’s mission. The events of 2015 reinforce this. 

As I have said many times, we are in a new phase in the global terrorist threat, 

requiring a whole new type of response. We have moved from a world of terroristdirected attacks to a world that includes the threat of terrorist-inspired attacks— 

in which the terrorist may have never come face to face with a single member of 

a terrorist organization, lives among us in the homeland, and self-radicalizes, inspired by something on the internet. 

By their nature, terrorist-inspired attacks are harder to detect by our intelligence 

and law enforcement communities, could occur with little or no notice, and in general makes for a more complex homeland security challenge. 

So, what are we doing about this? 

First, our Government, along with our coalition partners, continues to take the 

fight militarily to terrorist organizations overseas. ISIL is the terrorist organization 

most prominent on the world stage. Since September 2014, air strikes and special 

operations have in fact led to the death of a number of ISIL’s leaders and those focused on plotting external attacks in the West. At the same time, ISIL has lost 

about 40% of the populated areas it once controlled in Iraq, and thousands of square 

miles of territory it once controlled in Syria. 

On the law enforcement side, the FBI continues to do an excellent job of detecting, 

investigating, preventing, and prosecuting terrorist plots here in the homeland. 

As for the Department of Homeland Security, following the attacks in Ottawa, 

Canada in 2014, and in reaction to terrorist groups’ public calls for attacks on Government installations in the Western world, I directed the Federal Protective Service to enhance its presence and security at various U.S. Government buildings 

around the country. 

Given the prospect of the terrorist-inspired attack in the homeland, we have intensified our work with State and local law enforcement. Almost every day, DHS 

and the FBI share intelligence and information with Joint Terrorism Task Forces, 

fusion centers, local police chiefs, and sheriffs. 

In fiscal year 2015 we provided homeland security assistance to State and local 

governments around the country, for things such as active-shooter training exercises, overtime for cops and firefighters, salaries for emergency managers, emergency vehicles, and communications and surveillance equipment. We helped to fund 

an active-shooter training exercise that took place in the New York City subways 

last November, as well as exercises earlier this year in Miami and last week in Louisville, Kentucky. Last month we announced another round of awards for fiscal year 

2016 that will fund similar activities over the next 3 years. 

As I said at a graduation ceremony for 1,200 new cops in New York City in December, given the current threat environment, it is the cop on the beat who may 

be the first to detect the next terrorist attack in the United States. 

We are also enhancing information sharing with organizations that represent 

businesses, college and professional sports, faith-based organizations, and critical infrastructure. 

We are enhancing measures to detect and prevent travel to this country by foreign 

terrorist fighters. 

We are strengthening our Visa Waiver Program, which permits travelers from 38 

different countries to come here without a visa. In 2014, we began to collect more 

personal information in the Electronic System for Travel Authorization, or ‘‘ESTA’’ 

system, that travelers from Visa Waiver countries are required to use. As a result 

of these enhancements, over 3,000 additional travelers were denied travel here in 

fiscal year 2015. 
9 

In August 2015, we introduced further security enhancements to the Visa Waiver 

Program. 

Through the passage in December of the Visa Waiver Program Improvement and 

Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015, Congress has codified into law several of 

these security enhancements, and placed new restrictions on eligibility for travel to 

the United States without a visa. We began to enforce these restrictions on January 

21. Waivers from these restrictions will only be granted on a case-by-case basis, 

when it is in the law enforcement or National security interests of the United States 

to do so. Those denied entry under the Visa Waiver Program as a result of the new 

law may still apply for a visa to travel to the United States. 

Last month, under the authority given me by the new law, I also added 3 countries—Libya, Yemen, and Somalia—to a list that prohibits anyone who has visited 

these nations in the past 5 years from traveling to the United States without a visa. 

We are expanding the Department’s use of social media for various purposes. 

Today social media is used for over 30 different operational and investigative purposes within DHS. Beginning in 2014 we launched 4 pilot programs that involved 

consulting the social media of applicants for certain immigration benefits. USCIS 

now also reviews the social media of Syrian refugee applicants referred for enhanced 

vetting. Based upon the recent recommendation of a Social Media Task Force within 

DHS, I have determined, consistent with relevant privacy and other laws, that we 

must expand the use of social media even further. 

CBP is deploying personnel at various airports abroad, to pre-clear air travelers 

before they get on flights to the United States. At present, we have this pre-clearance capability at 15 airports overseas. And, last year, through pre-clearance, we 

denied boarding to over 10,700 travelers (or 29 per day) seeking to enter the United 

States. As I said here last year, we want to build more of these. In May 2015, I 

announced 10 additional airports in 9 countries that we’ve prioritized for 

preclearance. 

For years Congress and others have urged us to develop a system for biometric 

exit—that is, to take the fingerprints or other biometric data of those who leave the 

country. CBP has begun testing technologies that can be deployed for this Nationwide. With the passage of the omnibus bill, Congress authorized up to $1 billion in 

fee increases over a period of 10 years to pay for the implementation of biometric 

exit. I have directed that CBP begin implementing the system, starting at top airports, in 2018. 

In January, I announced the schedule for the final 2 phases of implementation 

of the REAL ID Act, which goes into effect 2 and then 4 years from now. At present 

23 States are compliant with the law, 27 have extensions, and 6 States or territories 

are out of compliance. Now that the final time table for implementation of the law 

is in place, we urge all States, for the good of their residents, to start issuing REAL 

ID-complaint drivers’ licenses as soon as possible. 

In the current threat environment, there is a role for the public too. ‘‘If You See 

Something, Say Something’’TM must be more than a slogan. We continue to stress 

this. DHS has now established partnerships with the NFL, Major League Baseball, 

and NASCAR, to raise public awareness at sporting events. An informed and vigilant public contributes to National security. 

In December we reformed ‘‘NTAS,’’ the National Terrorism Advisory System. In 

2011, we replaced the color-coded alerts with NTAS. But, the problem with NTAS 

was we never used it, it consisted of just 2 types of Alerts: ‘‘Elevated’’ and ‘‘Imminent,’’ and depended on the presence of a known specific and credible threat. This 

does not work in the current environment, which includes the threat of home-grown, 

self-radicalized, terrorist-inspired attacks. So, in December we added a new form of 

advisory—the NTAS ‘‘Bulletin’’—to augment the existing Alerts. The Bulletin we 

issued in December advises the public of the current threat environment, and how 

the public can help. 

Finally, given the nature of the evolving terrorist threat, building bridges to diverse communities has become a homeland security imperative. Well informed families and communities are the best defense against terrorist ideologies. Al-Qaeda and 

the Islamic State are targeting Muslim communities in this country. We must respond. In my view, this is as important as any of our other homeland security missions. 

In 2015 we took these efforts to new levels. We created the DHS Office for Community Partnerships, headed by George Selim. George and this office are now the 

central hub for the Department’s efforts to counter violent extremism in this country, and the lead for a new interagency CVE Task Force that includes DHS, DOJ, 

the FBI, NCTC and other agencies. 

Funding is included in the President’s budget request to support these counterterrorism efforts in the following key areas: 
10 

• $2 billion requested in total grants funding will prepare State and local governments to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from incidents of terrorism and other catastrophic events. These funds also include Firefighter and Emergency Management Performance Grants that support local 

first responders in achieving their missions and $50 million for Countering Violent Extremism grants for emergent threats from violent extremism and from 

complex, coordinated terrorist attacks. 

• $292 million sustains U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) targeting programs, which includes support for the National Targeting Centers (NTC) for 

passengers and cargo. The NTCs effectively target and interdict inadmissible 

high-risk passengers, cargo, and agriculture/bioterrorism threats before reaching U.S. ports of entry. And, the newly established Counter Network Program 

will expand CBP’s partnerships to exchange information and coordinate actions 

to identify, disrupt, and dismantle illicit networks and associated organizations. 

• $197.5 million to sustain inspection and enforcement efforts abroad, which include the Immigration Advisory Program, created by CBP in 2004 to prevent 

terrorists and high-risk or improperly-documented travelers from boarding commercial aircraft destined for the United States. This investment also funds 

Preclearance operations. In addition to improving CBP’s ability to protect the 

American homeland by extending our borders and preventing terrorists from 

gaining access to the United States, Preclearance relieves congestion at U.S. 

‘‘gateway’’ airports and opens up new destinations for international flights. 

• $103.9 million to purchase radiological and nuclear detection equipment, an increase of $14 million over funding appropriated in 2016, enabling the proposed 

new CBRNE Office (a combination of Office of Health Affairs and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office) and the U.S. Coast Guard, CBP, and TSA, to keep U.S. 

ports of entry safe and secure by detecting and interdicting illicit radioactive or 

nuclear materials. 

• $81.9 million sustains the BioWatch program to provide detection and early 

warning of the intentional release of select aerosolized biological agents in more 

than 30 jurisdictions Nation-wide. 

• $79.9 million sustains Infrastructure Security Compliance funding to secure 

America’s high-risk chemical facilities through systematic regulation, inspection, and enforcement under the authority of the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards. 

AVIATION SECURITY

We are taking aggressive steps to improve aviation and airport security. 

Since 2014 we have enhanced security at overseas last-point-of-departure airports, 

and a number of foreign governments have replicated those enhancements. 

As many of you know, in May of last year a Classified DHS Inspector General’s 

test of certain TSA screening at 8 airports, reflecting a dismal fail rate, was leaked 

to the press. I directed a 10-point plan to fix the problems identified by the IG. 

Under the new leadership of Admiral Pete Neffenger over the last 6 months, TSA 

has aggressively implemented this plan. This has included ‘‘back to basics’’ retraining for the entire TSO workforce, increased use of random explosive trace detectors, 

testing and re-evaluating the screening equipment that was the subject of the IG’s 

test, a rewrite of the standard operating procedures manual, increased manual 

screening, and less randomized inclusion in Pre-Check lanes. These measures were 

implemented on or ahead of schedule. 

We are also focused on airport security. In April of last year TSA issued guidelines to domestic airports to reduce access to secure areas, to require that all airport 

and airline personnel pass through TSA screening if they intend to board a flight, 

to conduct more frequent physical screening of airport and airline personnel, and 

to conduct more frequent criminal background checks of airport and airline personnel. Since then employee access points have been reduced, and random screening 

of personnel within secure areas has increased four-fold. We are continuing these 

efforts in 2016. In early February, TSA issued guidelines to further enhance the 

screening of aviation workers in the secure area of airports. 

I am particularly proud of the newly-established TSA Academy housed by the 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers in Glynco, Georgia. All new TSOs are 

now receiving 2-week training on how to screen for threats. DHS has built a fullscale representation of an airport screening station for students to use as they are 

taught how to serve the traveling public, interpret X-ray machine images, and check 

bags for dangerous materials or weapons. 

In the President’s fiscal year 2017 budget request, funding is included for aviation 

security in the following key areas: 
11 

• $3.0 billion to support 42,848 Transportation Security Officers, an increase of 

$26.9 million over fiscal year 2016, to ensure effective screening operations 

while minimizing wait times. 

• $199.8 million for transportation screening technology, enabling TSA to continue improving the capabilities of its checkpoint screening equipment throughout almost 450 airports to better protect against passenger-borne threats, an increase of $5 million. 

• $116.6 million to provide training for TSA screeners, which supports an increase of $20 million for new basic training to be provided at the TSA Academy 

located at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. 

• $84.0 million for TSA’s intelligence operations, an increase of $2.0 million to expand the number of intelligence officers to 87 in front-line facilities that will 

enhance the effectiveness of checkpoint security screening. 

• $815.3 million to support the continued deployment of Federal Air Marshals 

(FAMs), $10 million above the fiscal year 2016 levels. The Federal Air Marshal 

Service has been subject to a hiring freeze since 2011, and recently completed 

a new Concept of Operations (CONOPS) detailing a new deployment strategy 

that achieves optimal FAMs staffing to ensure its operations mitigate the maximum risk as with other TSA aviation security activities. 

CYBERSECURITY

While counterterrorism remains a cornerstone of our Department’s mission, I 

have concluded that cybersecurity must be another. Making tangible improvements 

to our Nation’s cybersecurity is a top priority for President Obama and for me to 

accomplish before the next President is inaugurated. 

On February 9, the President announced his ‘‘Cybersecurity National Action 

Plan,’’ which is the culmination of 7 years of effort by the administration. The Plan 

includes a call for the creation of a Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity, additional investments in technology, Federal cybersecurity, cyber education, 

new cyber talent in the Federal workforce, and improved cyber incident response. 

DHS has a role in almost every aspect of the President’s plan. 

As reflected in the President’s 2017 budget request, we want to expand our cyber 

response teams from 10 to 48. 

We are doubling the number of cybersecurity advisors to in effect make ‘‘house 

calls,’’ to assist private-sector organizations with in-person, customized cybersecurity 

assessments and best practices. 

Building on DHS’s ‘‘Stop. Think. Connect’’ campaign, we will help promote public 

awareness on multi-factor authentication. 

We will collaborate with Underwriters Laboratory and others to develop a Cybersecurity Assurance Program to test and certify networked devices within the ‘‘Internet of Things’’—such as your home alarm system, your refrigerator, or even your 

pacemaker. 

Last year we greatly expanded the capability of DHS’s National Cybersecurity 

Communications Integration Center, or ‘‘NCCIC.’’ The NCCIC increased its distribution of information, the number of vulnerability assessments conducted, and the 

number of incident responses. 

At the NCCIC, last year we built a system to automate the receipt and distribution of cyber threat indicators in near-real-time speed. We built this in a way that 

also includes privacy protections. 

I have issued an aggressive time table for improving Federal civilian cybersecurity, principally through 2 DHS programs: 

The first is called EINSTEIN. EINSTEIN 1 and 2 have the ability to detect and 

monitor cybersecurity threats in our Federal systems, and are now in place across 

all Federal civilian departments and agencies. 

EINSTEIN 3A is the newest iteration of the system, and has the ability to block 

potential cyber attacks on our Federal systems. Thus far E3A has actually blocked 

700,000 cyber threats, and we are rapidly expanding this capability. About a year 

ago, E3A covered only about 20% of our Federal civilian networks. In the wake of 

the OPM attack, in May of last year I directed our cybersecurity team to make at 

least some aspects of E3A available to all Federal departments and agencies by the 

end of last year. They met that deadline. Now that the system is available to everyone, 50% are actually on line, including the Office of Personnel Management, and 

we are working to get all Federal departments and agencies on board by the end 

of this year. 

The second program, called Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation, or CDM, 

helps agencies detect and prioritize vulnerabilities inside their networks. In 2015, 

we provided CDM sensors to 97% of the Federal civilian Government. This year, 
12 

DHS will provide the second phase of CDM to 100% of the Federal civilian Government. 

We have worked with OMB and DNI to identify the Government’s high-value systems, and we are working aggressively with the owners of those systems to increase 

their security. 

In September, DHS awarded a grant to the University of Texas San Antonio to 

work with industry to identify a common set of best practices for the development 

of Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations, or ‘‘ISAOs.’’ 

Finally, I thank Congress for passing the Cybersecurity Act of 2015. This new law 

is a huge assist to DHS and our cybersecurity mission. We are in the process of implementing that new law now. Just last month, I announced that we issued guidelines and procedures, required by this law, providing Federal agencies and the private sector with a clear understanding of how to share cyber threat indicators with 

the NCCIC, and how the NCCIC will share and use that information. We issued 

these guidelines and procedures consistent with the deadline set by the new law. 

Funding is included for cybersecurity in the fiscal year 2017 budget request in the 

following key areas: 

• $274.8 million for the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation program which 

provides hardware, software, and services designed to support activities that 

strengthen the operational security of Federal ‘‘.gov’’ networks, an increase of 

more than $170 million over the fiscal year 2016 enacted level. 

• $471.1 million sustains the EINSTEIN program, to continue to combat intrusions, enhance information sharing, and deploy analytical capabilities to secure 

the Federal civilian information technology enterprise. 

• The fiscal year 2017 budget request sustains ICE and USSS resources to combat cyber crime and investigate cyber criminals. 

IMMIGRATION/BORDER SECURITY

Immigration policy must be two sides of the same coin. 

The resources we have to enforce immigration laws are finite, and we must use 

them wisely. This is true of every aspect of law enforcement. 

With the immigration enforcement resources we have, ICE is focused more sharply on public safety and border security. Those who are convicted of serious crimes 

or who have recently been apprehended at the border are top priorities for removal. 

And we will enforce the law in accordance with these priorities. 

Accordingly, over the last several years deportations by ICE have gone down, but 

an increasing percentage of those deported are convicted criminals. And, an increased percentage of those in immigration detention, around 85%, are in the top 

priority for removal. We will continue to focus our resources on the most significant 

threats to public safety and border security. 

In furtherance of our public safety efforts, in 2014 we did away with the controversial Secure Communities program and replaced it with the new Priority Enforcement Program, or ‘‘PEP.’’ PEP fixes the political and legal controversies associated with Secure Communities and enables us to take directly into custody from 

local law enforcement the most dangerous, removable criminals. Since PEP was created, cities and counties that previously refused to work with Secure Communities 

are coming back to the table. Of the 25 largest counties that refused to work with 

ICE before, 16 are now participating in PEP. In 2016, we will work to get more to 

participate. 

And, because we are asking ICE immigration enforcement officers to focus on convicted criminals and do a job that’s more in the nature of law enforcement, last year 

we reformed their pay scale accordingly. Now, the pay scale for these immigration 

officers is the same as other Federal law enforcement. 

We have also prioritized the removal of those apprehended at the border. We cannot allow our borders to be open to illegal immigration. 

Over the last 15 years, our Nation—across multiple administrations—has invested a lot in border security, and this investment has yielded positive results. Apprehensions by the Border Patrol—which are an indicator of total attempts to cross 

the border illegally—are a fraction of what they to use to be. 

In fiscal year 2014, overall apprehensions by the Border Patrol increased, as we 

saw a spike in the number of families and unaccompanied children from Central 

America during the spring and summer of 2014. That year the overall number of 

apprehensions was 479,000. Across the Government, we responded aggressively to 

this surge and the numbers fell sharply within a short period of time. 

In fiscal year 2015, the number of those apprehended by the Border Patrol on the 

Southwest Border was 331,000—with the exception of 1 year, the lowest since 1972. 
13 

From July to December 2015 the numbers of migrants from Central America, especially families and unaccompanied children, began to climb again. 

In January I announced a series of focused enforcement actions to take into custody and remove those who had been apprehended at the border in 2014 or later 

and then ordered removed by an immigration court. I know this made a lot of people 

I respect very unhappy. But, we must enforce the law in accordance with our priorities. 

In January overall apprehensions by the Border Patrol on the Southwest Border 

dropped 36% from the month before. At the same time, the number of unaccompanied children apprehended dropped 54%, and the number of those in families 

dropped 65%. In February, the numbers of unaccompanied children have remained 

at this lower level. We are closely monitoring the situation on the Southwest Border 

and will not dial back our efforts, as, illegal migration traditionally increases in the 

spring. We will do all we can to prevent another summer surge in illegal crossings. 

We will continue to enforce the law consistent with our priorities for enforcement, 

which includes those apprehended at the border in 2014 or later. 

Then there is the other side of the coin. The new enforcement policy the President 

and I announced in November 2014 makes clear that our limited enforcement resources will not be focused on the removal of those who have committed no serious 

crimes, have been in this country for years, and have families here. Under our new 

policy, these people are not priorities for removal, nor should they be. 

In fact, the President and I want to offer, to those who have lived here for at least 

5 years, are parents of U.S. citizens or lawful permanents residents, and who have 

committed no series crimes, the opportunity to request deferred action on a caseby-case basis, to come out of the shadows, get on the books, and be held accountable. 

We are pleased that the Supreme Court has agreed to hear the case of Texas v. United States, which involves the new deferred action policies we announced in November 2014. 

Our overall policy is to focus our immigration enforcement resources more effectively on threats to public safety and border security, and, within our existing legal 

authority, do as much as we can to fix the broken immigration system. We’re disappointed that Congress has not been our partner in this effort, by passing comprehensive immigration reform legislation. 

Finally, we recognize that more border security and deportations may deter illegal 

migration, but they do nothing to overcome the ‘‘push factors’’ that prompt desperate 

people to flee Central America in the first place. We are prepared to offer vulnerable 

individuals fleeing the violence in Central America a safe and legal alternate path 

to a better life. We are expanding our Refugee Admissions Program to help vulnerable men, women, and children in Central America who qualify as refugees. We are 

partnering with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and non-governmental 

organizations in the region to do this as soon as possible. This approach builds on 

our recently established Central American Minors program, which is now providing 

an in-country refugee processing option for certain children with lawfully present 

parents in the United States. 

The President’s fiscal year 2017 budget request includes the following key resources for immigration and border security: 

• $7.0 billion to fund the salaries and benefits of Border Patrol Agents and CBP 

Officers. In fiscal year 2017, CBP plans to hire up to 21,070 Border Patrol 

Agents, a decrease of 300 from the 2016 enacted level, and 23,821 CBP Officers. 

• $1.4 billion to enable U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to maintain 

nearly 31,000 detention beds for individuals presenting a flight risk, a risk to 

public safety or National security, or who are subject to mandatory detention. 

• $2.0 billion sustains the Coast Guard counter-drug and alien migration interdiction operations. These intelligence-driven mission activities are critical to disrupting Transnational Criminal Organizations and securing the Southern Border. 

• $1.6 billion sustains the Coast Guard’s ports, waterways, and coastal security 

efforts. These include screening to ensure unauthorized and illicit individuals 

do not gain access to, or disrupt, key maritime transportation and commerce 

nodes. All crew, passengers, and cargo of vessels over 300 tons are screened 

prior to arrival in U.S. waters to mitigate potential risks to our Nation. 

• $319 million, a decrease of more than $370 million, to cover the costs associated 

with the temporary care and transportation of up to 75,000 unaccompanied children, along with other resources for the custody of adults with children who 

cross our borders. 

• $126.0 million for the Alternatives to Detention Program, an increase of $12 

million, to monitor 53,000 average daily participants, including families, who 

may pose a flight risk but who are not considered a threat to our communities. 
14 

The ATD program places low-risk individuals under various forms of non-detained, intensive supervision, which may include electronic monitoring. • $347.5 million for the Criminal Alien Program, an increase of $7 million, to support ICE in the apprehension and removal of both at-large and incarcerated 

convicted criminals. These resources include funding for an additional 100 officers to support the expanded implementation of PEP. • $268.4 million, an increase of $30 million that sustains the increase of 311 attorneys in the fiscal year 2016 appropriation, for ICE’s Office of Principal Legal 

Advisor, which represents the U.S. Government in removal proceedings and litigated over 400,000 immigration related cases in fiscal year 2015. • $355.7 million to maintain the necessary infrastructure and technology along 

the Nation’s borders to ensure CBP law enforcement personnel are supported 

with effective surveillance technology to improve their ability to detect and 

interdict illegal activity in a safer environment. This represents a decrease of 

$91 million from the substantial increase provided in the fiscal year 2016 appropriation. 

REFUGEES

We are doing our part to address the Syrian refugee crisis. USCIS, in conjunction 

with the Department of State, is working hard to meet our commitment to admit 

at least 10,000 Syrian refugees by the end of this fiscal year. We will do this by 

carefully screening refugees in a multi-layered and intense screening process involving multiple law enforcement, National security, and intelligence agencies across the 

Federal Government. 

SECRET SERVICE

Over the last year, Director Joe Clancy of the Secret Service has done a tremendous job reforming the agency, including hiring a chief operating officer from outside 

the Secret Service, altering the structure and management of the agency, ramping 

up efforts to hire new members of its workforce, and expanding training opportunities. In 2016 we will continue to work on areas that still need improvement. The President’s fiscal year 2017 budget requests $108.2 million to enhance White House security, an increase of $42 million, which includes support for the U.S. Secret Service’s Operational Mission Support initiative to enhance protection at fixed 

and temporary sites and includes advanced protective countermeasures. 

THE COAST GUARD

With the help of Congress, in 2016 we will continue to modernize the Coast Guard 

fleet, including all major air and surface asset lines. We propose continuing these 

investments in the 2017 budget request, and we seek an additional $150 million for 

the design of a new Polar-class icebreaker. 

Our fiscal year 2017 budget request includes $1.1 billion to support the Coast 

Guard’s air and surface fleet recapitalization, to include $240.0 million for production of four Fast Response Cutters; $130.0 million to convert Air National Guard 

C27J aircraft for Coast Guard use; $150.0 million for acquisition activities for a new 

Polar icebreaker; and $100.0 million to complete evaluation of detailed design and 

long lead time material for the lead Offshore Patrol Cutter. 

FLETC

Our fiscal year 2017 budget includes $243 million to support FLETC’s mission. 

Since 2012, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center has trained more than 

a quarter million Federal, State, and local officers and agents. At the same time, 

FLETC continually updates its curriculum to address the biggest challenges facing 

law enforcement, to include training for active-shooter situations, cyber forensics, 

and human trafficking. 

FEMA

FEMA continues to carry out its extraordinary responsibility of supporting the 

American people and communities to prepare for, respond to, and recover from various disasters. FEMA will continue to focus on efforts to enhance resilience and 

mitigation measures before disaster strikes, to prevent loss and save lives. 

Our fiscal year 2017 budget request supports the Disaster Relief Fund, grant programs, disaster preparedness plans, and training for our homeland security and law 

enforcement partners. This includes $6.7 billion to sustain relief fund levels that 

provide immediate and long-lasting assistance to individuals and communities 

stricken by emergencies and major disasters. Our 2017 budget request also includes 
15 

$365.0 million for the Pre-disaster Mitigation Fund and for flood hazard zone mapping. The administration is committed to helping communities take steps to protect 

themselves from extreme weather and other climate impacts. These investments 

build on recent progress and pursue strategies to build a more climate-resilient 

America. 

LAWFUL TRADE AND TRAVEL

We continue to promote lawful trade and travel. We will continue to pursue the 

President’s U.S.-Mexico High Level Economic Dialogue and his Beyond the Border 

Initiative with Canada. We are implementing ‘‘Single Window’’ for international 

trade, which, by December 2016, will enable the private sector to use just one portal 

to transmit information to 47 Government agencies about exports and imports, 

thereby eliminating over 200 different forms and streamlining the trade process. 

CONCLUSION

As I stated before, developing this budget request within the topline constraints 

of the bipartisan budget agreement of 2015 required difficult choices. But I am confident that the Department of Homeland Security will build upon the progress we 

have made over the past year and continue to fulfill our vital mission of keeping 

the homeland safe. 

I again thank you for the opportunity to speak here today and for your continued 

support of DHS. 

I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman MCCAUL. I thank the Secretary. I think you have improved the Department significantly. We appreciate that. 

I recognize myself for questions. I also want to thank you for discussing the authorization bills, particularly the cybersecurity bill, 

which I think was perhaps the most significant bill passed out of 

this committee in quite some time, and so I thank you for that. 

I had a question about the border. In a letter you sent to Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, dated November the 30, 2015, you 

requested a 50 percent reduction of flight hours by the National 

Guard, or the equivalent of 3,850 hours less than what was provided last year, and then a reduction in 300 Border Patrol Agents. 

So, as we look at trying to get the border more secure, can you tell 

me why you have requested a 50 percent reduction in aviation assets? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, you are referring to Operation Phalanx. This is something that the Department of Defense 

provided over the last 10 years or so, which includes flight hours 

with DOD assets. DOD began originally supporting that effort 

some years ago when DHS itself had far less capability in that regard, both in terms of people on the ground and surveillance equipment in the air. 

In the intervening years, because of the support of Congress, 

DHS is in a much better place in terms of flight hours, aerial capability, and capability on the ground. So, this past year, the Department of Defense and I did agree that we could accept less from 

DOD because of the investments that had been made over the last 

several years by DHS itself. So, overall, we are at a much better 

place in terms of total flight hours, so we accepted less from DOD, 

which represents about a 5 percent cut in flight hours from last 

year, but longer term, we are in a much better overall place. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Let me move on to another issue. The Paris 

attackers and the Garland case involved what is called dark space 

communications, an encrypted space using apps. Without the ability to see these communications, it is hard to stop it. There has 

been a lot of talk with the Apple case, obviously, in Federal court. 
16 

You at one point in time talked about that if smart people are 

in a room together, to ensure all stakeholders are represented in 

that discussion, that that could be part of the solution. As you 

know, sir, Senator Warner and I introduced a bill to form a National commission on technology and security to address this very 

important issue in their report to Congress, just as the 9/11 Commission did with solutions to this very difficult challenge to Federal 

law enforcement. 

Can you give me your opinion on that? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I agree that there needs to 

be a discussion among smart people to arrive at the appropriate 

balanced solution to the encryption problem. I think that in response to demands from the marketplace, the tech sector has gone 

pretty far down the road of encryption, not to hide criminal or terrorist activity but in response to the demands of the marketplace 

for increased security and encryption by Americans everywhere. 

That has, in fact, made it harder for us to detect terrorist activity 

and criminal activity. 

I agree that there needs to be a conversation among smart people 

representative of all the stakeholders in this debate to arrive at 

the—and I believe there is an appropriate solution to this—to arrive at it, that includes not only representatives of the law enforcement community, Federal, State and local, privacy advocates, the 

tech sector, the intelligence community. I believe we can arrive at 

that if you have the right people in the room to do that. 

So I am agreeing with the principle of what you are saying. 

Chairman MCCAUL. That is principally what the bill states. 

Last question—— 

Secretary JOHNSON. Excuse me, sir. May I have just one second 

so you can hear me? 

Chairman MCCAUL. Sure. 

[Recess.] 

Secretary JOHNSON. I apologize. I think I am in a better place. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Many of us are suffering from the same illness. 

So I think you agree conceptually with what the bill represents. 

Secretary JOHNSON. I think there needs to be a recalibration, and 

I believe that there is a solution to this problem that encompasses 

all interests. Some smart people if they come together to consider 

this issue I think can solve this issue. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Just going to the refugees, the Syrian refugee issue. We have the SAFE Act that passed the House but not 

the Senate. You testified before this committee that it is a challenge. We know that organizations like ISIS might like to exploit 

the refugee program, and then, subsequent to that, the director of 

national intelligence wrote to me in a letter indicating that, ‘‘individuals with ties to terrorist groups in Syria have attempted to 

gain entry to the United States or have already attempted to 

through the refugee program.’’ 

Let me ask you a 2-part question. No. 1, do you still agree that 

that poses a potential threat to the security of the United States? 

Let me just ask you that question first. 

Secretary JOHNSON. In all candor, I do agree that the refugee 

flow coming out of Iraq and Syria represents a potential oppor-
17 

tunity for terrorist organizations to move its members into other 

nations for potential attacks. So I agree that there is that potential, 

which is why just within the last several months we have enhanced 

our vetting for refugees. 

With that said, just the week before last, I was in Turkey, as I 

think you know. One of the places I visited was a Syrian refugee 

camp. The overwhelming number of people in that camp are 

women and children who left Syria because their homes had been 

ravaged and destroyed, and want to go back there. They are the 

victims of terrorism and violence. So I think we need to support the 

effort to resettle this population someplace else. But we are going 

to do it carefully, and we have put on a number of security enhancements to the process, which is already very cumbersome and 

time-consuming, and we are evaluating whether more is necessary, 

but my basic answer to your first question is yes, sir. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Well, let me just follow up. When I go home, 

and I talk to my local community, State representatives, you know, 

Federal law requires that the State and local governments be consulted with. When I go home, they basically tell me as you move 

the refugees in—and they are coming into the United States now— 

and as you move them in, the local communities want to know 

when you are moving them in and where for a lot of reasons, safety 

and security and maybe the safety of the refugees themselves. 

Can you tell me why this is not being done? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, as I am sure you know, the actual resettlement in the United States is principally the responsibility of 

the State Department and the State Department is supposed to be 

consulting with State governments, with local communities, local 

not-for-profit organizations. My observation, just in the State of 

Texas—and I have met communities that have embraced Syrian 

refugees in particular in Texas—is that it is going well, that the 

communities that have accepted the refugees are embracing of refugees. They are learning the language. They are getting jobs. Their 

families are relatively happy to be here. That has been my observations. I know that there is friction with Governors, which the State 

Department and I have been seeking to address, and I think we 

are in a better place now than we were, say, in December. 

Chairman MCCAUL. I would encourage you to do as much consultation as possible before they are moved into these communities. 

With that, the Chair recognizes the Ranking Member. 

Secretary JOHNSON. I am now adequately doctored up here with 

2 cups of tea, a lot of candy, Life Savers. I am good for another 6 

hours. There must be something in the air. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Secretary, I talked a little bit about the wait times that a 

lot of airports presently are experiencing and the implications for 

additional times, wait times this summer. We had Administrator 

Neffenger here before the committee recently and shared the information with him. Can you kind of give some assurance to this committee that that existing problem, as well as a future problem, is 

high on your radar screen and that this budget would not impede 

a solution to that problem? 

Secretary JOHNSON. The answer is yes. Let me say 3 things. 

First, wait times are due in significant part to increased travel. 
18 

More people are flying these days. No. 2, we have in fact applied 

a renewed focus to security at checkpoints at domestic airports. 

That is something that Administrator Neffenger and I both support, and it is something I asked him to do, in part because of the 

results of the inspector general’s tests last summer, which we all 

know about. So we made a renewed effort at aviation security, 

aviation screening, and checkpoints, which I hope and expect and 

believe that the American public supports and understands; it is 

for the protection of them. 

With regard to the workforce, as I am sure you know, Congressman, for years, we have been reducing the number of TSOs, because of risk-based security. In this budget request, we are beginning to reverse that trend. We want to stop the process of reducing 

the number and in fact start building on that so that we have more 

TSOs available to do the screening, and that will help with the 

wait times. I track wait times myself every time Pete Neffenger 

comes in to brief me, and I see the numbers going up. But I think 

it will get better over time. A lot of it is due to increased travel 

volume, which is a good thing in my view. 

Mr. THOMPSON. So you anticipate that the problem will be managed? 

Secretary JOHNSON. I anticipate that the problem will be managed. It is being managed. We are approaching the summer 

months, as you know. I am sure we will see added wait times at 

certain airports, but we are in this budget request seeking a slight 

increase in the number of TSOs, and I expect that to be a longerterm trend to deal with the screening at airports, but there has 

been a renewed focus on security, without a doubt. 

Mr. THOMPSON. I talked a little bit about Presidential campaigns, 

security. It is that time of the year. Some of us are concerned with 

the activities of people who are attending campaign events. I would 

hope that the mission for the Secret Service is maintained toward 

the protection of, particularly, individuals running for office and 

that other security responsibilities will fall to other law enforcement. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Okay. That is exactly the line they draw. 

The Secret Service, and I want to make this very clear, is responsible for the physical security of the protectee. The Secret Service 

is not responsible for removing demonstrators, removing those who 

violate the rules or are noisy, unless it represents a physical threat 

to the protectee. So, very often at these large events, as you have 

observed, there will be security provided by the event space, provided perhaps by the event organizers, but the Secret Service, you 

know, the people that the taxpayers pay for are there to provide 

physical security for the protectee. That is their job, and that is the 

limit of their jobs. It also includes magnetometers at the screening 

of the events for the physical safety of the protectee. 

But as a protectee myself, I have been in situations where there 

are protestors, demonstrators, and things get a little hot, but the 

Secret Service is there to just take care of the protectee; that is it. 

They are not there to deal with the demonstrators, unless the demonstrators present a threat to the protectee. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you, I yield back. 
19 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Chair recognizes Mr. King from New 

York. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Johnson, at the 

outset, thank you for your service as Homeland Security Secretary 

both with the Department and also the level of cooperation you 

give to this committee and the open door that you have. 

I would like to focus on the grant programs. I say this coming 

from New York, but I think it would apply to almost any urban 

area, even suburban areas throughout the country. It is high and 

when the ISIS threats are so high, we see a 45-percent reduction 

in the urban area security grants. 

From my observation, these grants have been effective. They 

have been administered in an efficient way. I am not aware of any 

particular waste or corruption or abuse of the grants. Also cities attempt to process them as quickly as possible for grant applications. 

So I would just like your observations as to what you believe the 

effectiveness of these grant programs have been now and going forward. 

Secretary JOHNSON. The budget request, Congressman, with respect to grants, again reflects hard choices to fit within the budget 

caps. I do agree that our grant activity is very important to State 

and local law enforcement, State and local first responders. I have 

seen first-hand the effectiveness of our grants that support for the 

NYPD, for example, communications equipment, surveillance 

equipment, overtime for cops, for firefighters, and active-shooter 

training. I personally attended an active-shooter training exercise 

in the New York City subway system in November with Commissioner Bratton. Active-shooter exercises right now, given the existing threat we face, are very important. So I have not only been to 

New York City; I have been to Miami to observe active-shooter 

training exercises there, and Louisville, Kentucky, to highlight the 

importance of this. So given how, as was noted, we have more and 

more reliance on State and local law enforcement to detect the next 

terrorist attack, supporting State and local law enforcement in 

their counterterrorism efforts is very, very important in my judgment. 

I support the President’s budget obviously, but I do agree that 

our grant money is very important for State and local law enforcement, State and local governments. 

Mr. KING. Thank you. I would just to add to that, in many ways, 

your local police and fire department are carrying out a Federal 

function as far as resisting terrorism. So I appreciate your testimony on that. 

As follow-up to what the Ranking Member was asking about Secret Service protection, I realize that their job is to protect the 

protectee, but planning for the conventions this summer, will Secret Service have a role in dealing with the preparation of the local 

police and with local security coordinators? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. 

Mr. KING. Or will the candidates at the convention itself, and 

again the local police departments? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. A National political convention is an 

NSSE. There is a Federal coordinator of the security of the effort. 

The planning that goes into that takes a year or more. This year 
20 

in particular, I have told the Secret Service that we should do as 

much of that advanced planning as possible. I will be particularly 

involved myself. It does involve working with State and local law 

enforcement, State and local responders for perimeter security, 

traffic patterns and the like. I think this year I want to see us— 

ensure that we are adequately prepared. 

Mr. KING. Going forward, do you think more money should be allocated just for the contingency of what might happen going into 

a Presidential year? I mean, you could be caught short this year 

just by I think—I don’t think any of us anticipated the level of interest or level of potential violence. Is there enough funding? Going 

forward, can you make a recommendation for your successor? 

Secretary JOHNSON. I believe we are adequately funded. But I 

am going to speak for myself here and not for my administration 

for a moment to say that I think that we should—I know we try 

to adequately fund the Secret Service at higher levels during election years, but there are variables to campaigns. This year, at one 

point, we had 14 candidates running for the Republican nomination, any one of whom could have requested Secret Service, and 

they may have qualified for it. But there is a huge variable there. 

I think, perhaps, and again I am speaking for myself, we ought to 

think about some sort of fund that is multi-year money that the Secret Service can draw on to deal with these variables. I think that 

is something that we and the Congress should think about for the 

future because there are some things you can’t anticipate or you 

can. But depending upon events, you could be funding at this level 

versus that level. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I would just say in conclusion, I certainly would urge the Congress to do all it can to restore 

the grant money and get cooperation as we move forward on that. 

I yield back, thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Chair recognizes Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for being here and welcome 

you back. I want to thank you as well as the hardworking men and 

women who work under your supervision at the Department of 

Homeland Security and the work that they do to protect our Nation. So I have a few questions on issues of great importance to me, 

to you, and to the country that begins with cybersecurity. I just 

want to begin by saying that I was very pleased with the administration’s Cybersecurity National Action Plan the President just now 

announced recently, which I really do believe makes even steps toward centralizing dot-gov information security, something that I 

have long called for, for a number of years now. 

Can you discuss the Department’s role in the CNAP? In particular, how will DHS interact with the new Federal Chief Information Security Officer? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, a couple of things, DHS will be involved—is involved with almost every aspect of that plan. Every 

head of Federal agencies and Departments—every head is legally 

responsible for their own systems, but having a central information 

cybersecurity officer I think is good thing. I am responsible for the 

overall security of the Federal civilian dot-gov system. I think we 
21 

are fulfilling that responsibility right now, particularly with the authorities in the new law. 

The CNAP I think puts focus on a couple of things that are important. One is education; the other is hiring a cyber workforce. 

The third and I know this is the thing that the President is very 

emphatic about, modernization of our Federal systems, some of 

which are very old, go back to the 1970s and 1980s, and so we are 

requesting a huge long-term investment in doing that. But DHS is 

involved in virtually every aspect of the plan, and we are involved 

in virtually every aspect of cybersecurity day to day as we go about 

our mission. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. I understand that the President’s National Plan of Action is actually moving away from this idea of departments and agencies procuring their own cybersecurity. Is that 

your understanding as well? 

Secretary JOHNSON. I think the idea is we would like to have a 

more strategic centralized approach to the acquisition of systems so 

that we get the best deals, and there are lessons learned across the 

departments and a consistency in how we go about this so it is not 

case by case and happenstance. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. So, continuing along that line, in your testimony, 

you point out CDM and EINSTEIN continuing to expand their 

reach across dot-gov programs like these allow departments and 

agencies to outsource important cybersecurity functions with the 

subject-matter experts in your Department. However, as you point 

out, only 50 percent of personnel are protected by E3A at the moment. Do you need more authorities to make sure agencies adopt 

these valuable resources? If not, how should we ensure that they 

are used? 

Secretary JOHNSON. I think that the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 

did a good job of addressing this. There was some doubt about the 

authority of DHS to go into other Federal agencies with an intrusion detection system, but the new law addresses that. I will say 

that there are still some lingering concerns about that in certain 

departments and agencies, but we are addressing them armed with 

this new law that you give us last year. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. 

Secretary JOHNSON. One of the things the law requires is that we 

get to 100 percent by the end of this year, and I think we are on 

track to do that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I am anxious for us to get there, and I know you 

are as well as. 

Mr. Secretary, one additional question, I know my time has expired, but 2 weeks ago the Defense Department announced that it 

would be establishing a bug bounty program to provide security research as a clear path to detect and report vulnerabilities to the 

DOD. Is this something you would support for DHS? 

Secretary JOHNSON. I haven’t thought carefully about that question, but it sounds like a good idea, yes, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Of all the places that you think would not want 

to support, DOD, in terms of being hypersensitive about security 

and the networks, to allow something like this I think is very forward leaning, very creative. I support it. I think it is a good thing, 

and I hope you would seriously consider doing something similar. 
22 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. With that, thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time 

has expired. I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Chair recognizes Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, I just want to get an idea, first, to the extent of 

the problem we are trying to address with the budget. First of all, 

how much of an increase has there been in illegal immigration 

since the first of this year? My understanding is it is up 25 percent. 

Is that accurate? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Are you referring to apprehensions? 

Mr. SMITH. Yes. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Since the first of this calendar year, it has 

remained pretty steady. I have the numbers right here if you would 

like. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Secretary JOHNSON. But as I mentioned earlier, apprehensions 

on the Southern Border in February and January have gone down 

significantly. 

Mr. SMITH. Rather than the beginning of this calendar year, I 

meant to say the beginning of the fiscal year. The first 4 months 

of a fiscal year, I understand apprehensions were up 25 percent. 

Secretary JOHNSON. The numbers, beginning October 1, were 

creeping up in October, November, December. They decreased pretty significantly in January, February. 

Mr. SMITH. Is 25 percent accurate generally? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Over the prior fiscal year, that is probably 

right, because of that increase we saw in the fall. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. Also, with the corresponding same period of 

time, were apprehensions for unaccompanied children up about 100 

percent? 

Secretary JOHNSON. I don’t know whether that is true or not. I 

don’t know about that number. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. That is my understanding as well: Apprehensions overall, 25 percent; unaccompanied children, 100 percent. No 

surprise, except that is not an encouraging trend. 

Secretary JOHNSON. The trend has been back down again in January/February to the levels it was this time last year. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. There is still, regardless, over the last year, 

the 100 percent over the corresponding same time I understand. 

But you can get back to me maybe even by the time we are finished today. 

The other subject I wanted to bring up was I was down recently 

at the border in Texas and some individuals told us that the administration’s catch-and-release program was being expanded. By 

catch-and-release, I mean individuals were apprehended and not 

put in to proceedings but just turned around and released and 

sometimes returned across the border. Is that catch-and-release 

process being expanded in your opinion? 

Secretary JOHNSON. No. I would have to disagree with that, sir. 

As I think you know, we have expanded our capability for family 

resident centers. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Secretary JOHNSON. In several locations in Texas. We have—— 
23 

Mr. SMITH. Agents are not being told just to not put individuals 

in proceedings; they are not being told just to release them. 

Secretary JOHNSON. No, that is not my understanding, and that 

is not my expectation at all. We have just this fiscal year, we have 

sent back either by the Border Patrol or ICE something like 

128,000 Mexicans. 

Mr. SMITH. But I am talking about something different. I am 

sure individuals have been returned. I am talking about—and it 

sounds to me—I would like to have you confirm it—that if an individual is apprehended, they are put in proceedings, not just released. 

Secretary JOHNSON. If an individual is apprehended, if they are 

not detained, they should be given a notice to appear and put in 

immigration proceedings. Once they are ordered removed and they 

are a priority removal, they should be removed. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Good. Last, and you probably anticipate this 

question because I ask it every time you are before this committee: 

How many thousands of individuals has the administration released who are criminal immigrants? In other words, every year, 

it is around 28,000. Every year, you say it is wrong; we are not 

going to do it anymore. We seem to continue that policy, but how 

many criminal immigrants are being released? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Congressman, since you and I have been 

having this conversation, in fiscal year 2013, the number was 

36,000. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Last year or the year before, I put in some 

reforms to the process to tighten up that decision-making process. 

Mr. SMITH. Right. 

Secretary JOHNSON. In fiscal year 2014, the number went down 

to about 30,000. In fiscal year 2015, the number is I think around 

19,000. 

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Why is it 1,000? Why are we releasing any 

criminal immigrant back into our neighborhoods? 

Secretary JOHNSON. As you know, a lot of the decisions are made 

by an immigration judge, which is part of the Department of Justice, and because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Zadvydas, 

which after a removal order gives us limited ability to hold people. 

Mr. SMITH. Those cases amount to about 2,000 of the 20,000. I 

am talking about the other 18,000, which the administration, if 

they wanted to continue to incarcerate, they could, and they still 

continue to release thousands of people. As you know, the figures 

came out a few days ago where over the last several years, hundreds of individuals have committed capital crimes who had been 

released, who didn’t need to be released. So when is the figure 

going to get down to zero and not 19,000 or whatever it might be? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, I am constrained by the decision of an 

immigration judge, and I am constrained by the law. I will tell you 

that a decreasing percentage of those released are released as the 

result of the exercise of discretion by an immigration officer. I 

would like to see that continue in that direction. I too would like 

to see that number continue to go down, and it has gone down significantly in the last 2 years. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
24 

Chairman MCCAUL. I thank you. 

The Chair recognizes Mrs. Watson Coleman. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, Mr. Secretary. It is good to see you again. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Good morning. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. I want to ask you a question about the 

Department’s decision to up the number of individuals that it plans 

to house at the headquarters from 12,800 employees to 18,000 employees and from 230 square feet per person to 155 square feet per 

person. The reason I am asking you this is because we have had 

many hearings here where the issue of chronic low morale has been 

raised. It would seem to me that reducing this sort of personal 

work space and increasing the number of people in that area might 

have a negative impact also on morale. So I am wondering why 

that decision was made and what went into making that decision. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, first of all, we have an aggressive campaign to improve the levels of employee satisfaction. I believe we 

will see an improvement in the levels of employee satisfaction this 

year because of the efforts we are making over the last 2. We are 

building, with the support of this Congress, a new headquarters in 

southeast Washington. It will be a really nice headquarters, much 

nicer than the temporary space we are in now, which, irrespective 

of the square footage, is not optimal for our headquarters personnel. I believe, aside from whatever square footage there is, that 

once we get to a new consolidated headquarters, that will also improve levels of employee satisfaction. Just being in a new modernized headquarters space where we are all better able to have secure 

communications, more conference space and the like, is going to go 

a long way. So I don’t know about—I heard you mention those 

numbers. I am not familiar with those square footage numbers, but 

I do believe and I am convinced that when we move to the new 

headquarters, that is going to do a lot for morale. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Way back when, when I was in school 

and studying issues of this nature, this whole issue of personal 

space and how you felt about your work environment kind of went 

hand-in-hand. So I was just sort-of interested in how one decided 

that this 75-square-feet reduction wouldn’t have a negative impact 

on an already sort-of fragile work environment. I do understand 

and appreciate that you have been doing a lot to try to lift morale 

and make people happy about working in the important work that 

they do. 

Secretary JOHNSON. I think moving to a sparkling new headquarters is going to do a lot for that. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. That will help. That will help, truly, 

yes. 

I wanted to talk to you a little bit more. We talked about the Secret Service and its role at these Presidential debates and who it 

is supposed to protect. But I wanted to go a little bit beyond that 

because these are major large events, and I know you speak to 

maintaining situational awareness at these major events. So as we 

are moving forward, not only in this primary season but even in 

the general election season, even up to the various conventions, 

what is it that the Department will be doing to maintain situa-
25 

tional awareness and coordinate with State and local law enforcement during this whole campaign season up to and including? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, the Secret Service is in large part a 

law enforcement agency, so a lot of what the Secret Service does 

is investigative in nature. So a lot of protection mission is in investigative in nature. The Secret Service I know for a fact works well 

with State and local law enforcement on a variety of things, including the protection mission. State and local law enforcement supports the protection mission in every place a protectee goes. I have 

seen that first-hand. This election year, that is an expanded mission. So I anticipate, particularly as we move toward the National 

political conventions, that we are going to spend a lot of time working with local law enforcement in Cleveland, working with local 

law enforcement in Philadelphia. Those are two NSSEs that we coordinate the security for every 4 years, and I anticipate that again 

happening this year. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. So will there be other personnel, other 

than Secret Service personnel, from your Department that are engaged? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes, yes. Like the General Assembly last 

year, our HSI personnel, our TSA personnel, our Coast Guard are 

all devoted toward the security of the event and other components 

of my Department. So I anticipate that happening going forward 

with the conventions and with the campaign. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. So will some of those personnel be involved in tamping down, calming down episodes at these events 

like we have seen at some already? 

Secretary JOHNSON. No, I would not put it that way. I think that 

what our personnel do to support the Secret Service is, say, magnetometer screening at events to ensure that no prohibited items are 

brought in. But in terms of dealing with demonstrators and the 

like, that is largely a private security function and a local law enforcement function. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. I have one other quick question, and it 

regards border agents, the problem you are having with recruitment and with retention. There was some information about one of 

the problems with this is that a lot of these border agent applicants 

couldn’t pass the polygraph test. So I am wondering, are you doing 

a broad recruitment, or is this a narrow—what is the problem here 

in being able to retain the workforce as you state you need and as 

you are asking for here? 

Secretary JOHNSON. We simply have not been able to hire to the 

levels that we want to hire to. So the Commissioner of CBP, with 

my encouragement has been very focused on an intense campaign 

to move—get people through that process faster. We now have a 

hiring and recruitment command at CBP. We have things called 

Hiring Hubs. We are doing a number of things to get through the 

polygraph and the vetting process quicker. This is a top priority of 

the Commissioner, and I know he is focused on it. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. This is not an issue of not enough candidates. This is an issue of the system not being able to move—— 

Secretary JOHNSON. I think that is a fair statement. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

My time is up. 
26 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Chair recognizes Mr. Duncan. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, a lot of statistics we hear about visa overstays are 

that 49 percent of all illegals in this country are people that overstayed their visa. I want to thank you for putting together this 

entry-exit overstay report put out in January. I read it with some 

interest, because it looks like you all have left out some of the visa 

overstay categories. For instance, this report is limited to foreign 

nationals who entered the United States as nonimmigrant visa 

visitors for business, IAB–1 and WB visas, or pleasure, IAB–2 and 

WT visas, through ARC ports of entry. You left out F–1 student 

visas, which is a large category of these overstays. Can we expect 

a report from your office on the anticipated number of visa 

overstays that are F–1 visa holders? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes, we should and we must get there. The 

reason that the visa overstay that you have is limited to B–1, B– 

2 visas is because that was the place where we could provide you 

with reliable information. It is based on biographic exit. With regard to nonimmigrant B–1, B–2 visas, we are now in a place where 

we can get that data on a reliable basis. 

The problem with student visas is we don’t always know how 

long the validity period is because it varies with student visas. But 

when somebody is issued a visa for tourism for a defined period 

and so that is more readily-available information. So this is, as you 

know, this has been a long-term effort. We finally got to the place 

where we could provide visa overstay information with regard to 

B–1, B–2, but I agree with you that it needs to be a work in 

progress. We are going to keep at this. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Absolutely, I think you would agree with me that 

we need to continue our efforts on an entry-exit visa system— 

entry-exit system biometrics so we know when someone enters and 

leaves the country. I notice the Visa Waiver Program numbers are 

not included in here either. You mention the challenge, and I understand that. I just hope that we will continue working on that. 

That was not the thrust of my intention this morning, but I read 

this with some interest and I applaud you for at least taking a first 

step on that. 

The Department of Defense recently released its plan for closing 

the prison at Guantanamo Bay and relocating those terrorists to 

U.S. soil. DOD visited a site in South Carolina, the Charleston 

Naval Brig, among other sites within the United States. Housing 

terrorists in the United States could potentially increase the threat 

to our homeland, including Charleston in my home State. 

So a two-part question: Has the Department conducted any analysis into the security threat that would be posed to the homeland 

in bringing these terrorists into the United States? Specifically, has 

there been any analysis conducted into the potential increased 

threat posed to communities that would house these terrorists? 

Secretary JOHNSON. With regard to that last question, I would 

have to refer you to the Department of Defense. 

From my Homeland Security perspective—I certainly support the 

closing of the facility at Guantanamo, but from my Homeland Security perspective, I would want to know 2 things. I would want to 

see a threat assessment done with respect to the surrounding com-
27 

munity for wherever we select to send some of these people in the 

United States. I would want to be sure, from a legal perspective, 

that the laws that provide for various immigration protections do 

not apply to these people. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I agree with you on that part, that our civil liberties and Constitutional rights should not apply to terrorists just 

because they are brought to United States soil in captivity. I agree 

with you on that. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, I have seen legal analysis that the immigration laws, immigration benefits would not apply to a law of 

war detainee in the United States. I would want to be sure that 

is true. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. 

The brig in Charleston has an elementary school a mile or less 

from the brig. It is a security concern. 

I think it does absolutely fall under your umbrella of jurisdiction, 

because if you bring these terrorists to U.S. soil and we are holding 

them there—right now, they are on an island. It is very hard for 

ISIS or al-Qaeda to attack that prison. But if they come to United 

States soil—and we have already seen San Bernardino and other 

terrorist attacks happen. A lot of folks believe that those cities 

themselves where those terrorists are housed could be targets 

themselves for an act of terror just because. 

Now, it could be an attempted breakout. We saw a helicopter 

land at a local prison in upstate South Carolina in a prison break. 

So these are legitimate concerns. 

The administration, this week, just yesterday, reversed course on 

a 5-year plan for oil and gas leasing in the Atlantic Ocean. They 

said in their statement they did so because of input from stakeholders, the local community and whatnot. 

Do you believe or would you not agree that it is appropriate to 

include the State Governors in the talks of moving the terrorists 

into their State? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. Because I think the administration, if 

you use precedence of oil and gas leasing in the Atlantic using 

stakeholder input, they absolutely ought to listen to the Governors 

in the State. 

So Governors have written letters to the administration voicing 

their concerns in opposition to not only bringing terrorists onto 

U.S. soil but into their individual States. Governor Haley in my 

State ought to be commended for being one of those Governors that 

say we don’t want these terrorists in our State. I think the administration should listen to the Governors, just like they listen to the 

environmentalists with regard to oil and gas leases. 

So thanks for your comments. 

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it and yield back. 

Secretary JOHNSON. If I may, I know from my experience years 

ago as General Counsel of the Department of Defense that when 

we were looking at this question we would consult Governors and 

Members of Congress that represent potential locations. 

Mr. DUNCAN. I don’t know that the administration is listening at 

this point to the Governors or the Members of Congress on this 

particular issue at this time. 
28 

I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Chair recognizes Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being here. 

Let me just throw out some questions and see if time permits 

you to answer them here or if you will have to follow up in writing. 

First of all, I want to touch base on, again, emphasizing what the 

Chairman said in his opening remarks about the UASI grants, the 

Urban Area Security Initiative grants. Those cuts, as well as cuts 

to State Homeland Security grant moneys, we are concerned about 

those. At Boston, we saw the value of those UASI grants firsthand, and we continue to utilize those effectively. Also, last September, you announced the Office for Community Partnerships initiative. The cuts in these State and local programs could indeed 

hurt the effectiveness of that effort as well. That is No. 1. 

No. 2, the long wait lines that so many airports are experiencing 

right now—we have experienced them. We are among the many 

who have experienced them, at Logan Airport, particularly with the 

influx of summertime vacations and the warm weather that is coming. It is my understanding from some of the airports that passenger-screening K–9s could help expedite this. In fact, in Logan 

Airport, they said that 2 to 4 dogs, an increase, with their efforts 

assisting with explosive detection, would greatly reduce passenger 

times. No. 2, I want to see if there could be something to address 

that as well as, if you could, the long-term solution for some of the 

staffing shortages. 

The third thing is a component, a bill that I put in with the 

Chair dealing with detection and identification and seizures of cultural properties, artifacts that are there, which fuel terrorist activities. Part of that was signed into law in February. How are you 

doing progressing with that in terms of staffing up to deal with 

that detection program? 

I will leave it with that, although I do want to—in writing, I will 

talk about some of the more local issues in New Bedford Airport 

and Hyannis Harbor with CBP people, as well as give you a thank 

you. Your staff is helping us to expedite the H–2B visa issue which, 

because of the Department of Labor concerns, is being slowed up, 

but your people have been helping us to in the overall process 

shorten that, so thank you. 

I know I gave you a lot. I apologize. 

Secretary JOHNSON. With regard to the last question about the 

artifacts law, I believe we are doing what we have to do to meet 

that law. We support that law. 

I agree with you about the effectiveness of K–9s. It is my assessment that use of K–9s—a dog’s nose is about as good a technology 

as there is. 

We are addressing wait times at the airports, but part of it is 

due to increased travel volume. We want to reverse the trend to 

downsize TSOs. Part of added wait times is simply more security. 

We have, both the TSA administrator and myself, embarked upon 

a plan to bring about more aviation security at domestic airports. 

So that is an intended—it is not an unforeseen consequence that 

we are having longer wait times, but a lot of it is due to the increased travel volume. 
29 

I do agree with the importance of UASI grants. I have seen the 

effectiveness of it myself. Given the evolution of the global terrorist 

threat, I think supporting State and local law enforcement is important. The submission you have before you for fiscal year 2017 

does reflect hard choices to fit within the budget caps. 

Mr. KEATING. Maybe we can address some of those here, hopefully. 

The Office for Community Partnerships, how is that going? 

Secretary JOHNSON. I think it is going well. 

Mr. KEATING. It is an important program. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Countering violent extremism, given the current threat environment, is, in my judgment, as important as any 

of our homeland security missions. Under the leadership of George 

Selim, we are building bridges. We are building bridges to the tech 

sector for help there. We are building bridges to philanthropies. 

I am very supportive and appreciative of the Congress’ efforts to 

help us out with grant money to do all this. There is bipartisan 

support in Congress for our CVE efforts, and I am glad to see that. 

Mr. KEATING. Great. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Chair recognizes Mr. Barletta. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I happen to Chair the subcommittee that oversees Federal buildings. The first Federal building I went into, they had 1,500 square 

feet per employee. That is a little bit more than a cubicle. So it has 

been my request and the request of the President to reduce the 

Federal footprint of Federal properties. We have done that so far. 

The agencies have complied, and, to date, we have saved $2.9 billion in the agencies that have now moved into spaces that are 180 

square feet or less per employee. 

So I appreciate Homeland Security working with us. It is going 

to be a beautiful facility. At the same time, there will be more 

money for your mission, rather than wasted space that most Americans don’t have in their day-to-day jobs. So that is a sidebar, and, 

again, I appreciate your working with the committee. 

Mr. Secretary, the 9/11 Commission taught us that, to terrorists, 

travel documents are just as important as weapons. It is the preferred method of entry into the country for terrorists. They come 

here legally and then just stay, disappear into the mainland. Nevertheless, our Government continues to fail at keeping track of who 

has entered our country and whether they have left or not. If you 

are home to an international airport, your State, you essentially 

live in a border State. 

This is a point I have consistently raised since joining this committee, and that is why I have again introduced legislation that 

makes a simple tweak to our laws. 

As we all know, if someone illegally crosses the Southern Border, 

they are unlawfully present in the United States. If someone comes 

in on a visa and then overstays their visa, they are unlawfully 

present in the United States. In fact, over 40 percent of the people 

that are here illegally didn’t cross the border illegally; they come 

on a visa, and they don’t go home. 

Yet the penalty is very different, even though both people in this 

situation have the same legal status, unlawfully present. Their sta-
30 

tus is the same, so why is the penalty different? Why doesn’t it 

make sense for the penalty to be the same, a criminal and not a 

civil offense? 

Just last month, we saw a reason why this isn’t a debate club 

argument but an issue that impacts my constituents at home. A 

Ukrainian national most likely lied to get into this country. Authorities say he came to the United States on a 3-month work visa, 

then got a tourist visa that expired in March 2013. 

He then enrolled as a freshman at a Harrisburg school just 6 

months later. He took on a false identity, a fake name. He lied 

about his age. He started school as a freshman, a 20-year-old freshman, in our schools. His ‘‘surrogate parents,’’ Stephanye McClurePotts and Michael Potts, helped enroll him with fake documents. 

The criminal complaint said that they also helped him get a Pennsylvania driver’s license under the name of Asher Potts in 2014. 

He is being charged with multiple offenses, including theft, identity theft, tampering with public records, conspiracy, and statutory 

rape. Now, his surrogate parents say he talked about attacking students at his high school. Nothing could be more chilling than the 

thought of terrorists enrolling as students. Previously, we have 

heard of terrorists taking flying lessons, but imagine them sitting 

next to your kids in algebra class. 

The fact that this has happened in central Pennsylvania shows 

how serious this is. Imagine if, instead of being a 23-year-old 

Ukrainian national named Artur Samarin posing with the name of 

Asher Potts, this man had an Arabic or Hispanic last name. That 

sure would get everyone’s attention—and this is the same thing, no 

matter what his name is—if they heard that someone overstayed 

their visa, had created false documents, joined the ROTC and 

talked about wanting to join NASA, and had allegedly made 

threats to attack students. 

Now, we have seen concrete evidence in Harrisburg. Where else 

is this happening? How many more Asher Potts are there Nationwide? My question is: How many individuals have overstayed their 

visas, falsified their identities, lied about their age, and are sitting 

in school classes today? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Congressman, a couple things. 

First, the visa overstay report that was recently released reveals 

that, with regard to those who entered on B–1, B–2 visas, year to 

year, the population of those who overstayed at any one time—that 

could be a day or a year—is somewhere around 400,000. I don’t 

have the exact number, but it is reflected in the report. 

I am going to agree with the spirit of your question. I think that, 

in this current environment, in this current threat environment, 

the potential for fraudulent travel documents is a big concern. So 

I have done a lot to support DHS’s fraudulent documents lab which 

we have. We have the capability to detect fraudulent documents. 

I also have asked our folks to, now that we have some better 

clarity on visa overstays, develop priorities for enforcement with regard to visa overstays. Right now, priority 3 in my policy reflects 

those who—I can’t remember the exact words—commit fraud of the 

system, but I have told our folks we need to develop priorities within the visa overstay population to get at this population. 
31 

I think there is a concern we should all have about fraudulent 

travel documents. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Especially if they can get into our schools, lie 

about their age. You know, there wouldn’t be a more horrific crime 

here than if you can use your imagination of what could happen. 

Don’t you think the penalties should be the same? If you cross 

the border or you overstay your visa, your status is the same, you 

are unlawfully present here. Shouldn’t the penalties at least be the 

same? 

Secretary JOHNSON. I would have to think about that a bit more. 

I am concerned about the fraudulent travel document problem because of the migration crisis we have, primarily. I understand the 

spirit of your question too. But that is my concern. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thanks. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Payne. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary, it is good to see you again. 

As you know, my district, your home, takes in the Port of Newark and Newark Liberty International Airport. The Customs and 

Border Protection Agricultural Specialists at the airport clear up to 

20,000 passengers every day. You know, the port is one of the busiest on the east coast, and the CBP Agricultural Specialists inspect 

all types of items that could harm domestic agriculture. 

Now, I am concerned that our understaffed ports lead to delays 

in our commercial lanes, as cargo waits to enter the U.S. commerce, but also creates a significant hardship for CBP Officers. 

There is a severe shortage of Agricultural Specialists at Newark 

ports of entry, in the neighborhood of 30 members. 

What is the strategy in terms of working on these issues with the 

lack of personnel? 

Secretary JOHNSON. The strategy is an aggressive plan to make 

for a more efficient hiring process through aggressive recruitment, 

a recruitment hiring command within CBP, hiring hubs, and a 

more expedited way to get through the polygraphs. 

We do have shortages in person power that are reflected around 

the country, including in northern New Jersey, and I have told the 

Commissioner that this has got to be a top priority this year to address. I believe he is addressing it. He is acutely aware of the 

shortages that you refer to. 

Mr. PAYNE. Okay. Thank you. 

Also, you know, in November 2012, DHS OIG found that, although the Department has spent $430 million on developing interoperable communications capabilities, radio users from different jurisdictions could not communicate. 

The DHS Inoperable Communications Act, which I reintroduced 

this Congress, was the first bill of 2015 out of this committee and 

signed into law last July. But the Department has failed to issue 

the mandated strategy by the January 2016 deadline and has 

rebuffed many requests to provide status briefings on this. 

When could this committee expect to receive the Department’s 

strategy to achieve interoperability? Why has it been delayed? 
32 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, Congressman, first of all, if we are not 

being responsive to Congress, that is something that I will address. 

I know from a briefing I had recently that we are in a better 

place than we were certainly in 2012 with regard to interoperability. Day to day, we are functioning much better now. There are 

still areas of needed improvement, without a doubt, but I think 

interoperability, both within DHS and across law enforcement 

agencies, is key. 

I will address the question of getting back to you with regard to 

your outstanding request, make sure that that is met. 

Mr. PAYNE. Absolutely. I mean, we all understand how crucial 

interoperability is in the event of a catastrophe or a terrorist attack 

or a natural disaster, that agencies on the ground need to be able 

to communicate with each other and also within the Department 

specifically. 

Let’s see. Well, I am running out of time, so I will yield back. 

But I hope that you, if you are going to be in Washington, that you 

vote by mail and vote for your Congressman again. 

Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Wow. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Perry. 

Secretary JOHNSON. That is a new one at a hearing. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Yeah. 

Secretary JOHNSON. I will accept the challenge. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Secretary, for being here. 

Next week, the President is making a legacy trip to Cuba. Last 

October, Deputy Secretary Mayorkas traveled to Cuba to meet with 

senior Cuban government officials, and, according to your press release, or DHS’s press release, the discussion focused on enhancing 

cooperation in Customs and Border Protection and exploring new 

areas of collaboration. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Uh-huh. 

Mr. PERRY. Now, given the Cuban government’s past activities 

related to human rights violations, counterintelligence activities, 

and subversive actions towards America, as well as the fact that 

they have lifted the visa requirement and we are seeing Cuban refugees coming through Central America and walking across the 

land border into Mexico, there are some serious questions that remain as to how DHS plans to coordinate with Cuba. 

Yet when the Oversight Committee that I chair requested information, an informational briefing, from DHS to Members on the 

DHS activities related to Cuba, DHS headquarters and CBP refused to provide briefers, saying that they have to have State Department present for such a briefing. Of course, as you can imagine, State Department saying, well, we have to have DHS present 

for such a briefing. 

So we are getting the runaround here. Is there some secrecy here 

or something I am missing? I mean, is there something that the 

Department can’t tell us autonomously, and if we have to verify it 

with the State Department, we’ll do that if they refuse to come, or 

deal with them separately? Or what is happening here? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Congressman, I will look into that for 

you—— 
33 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. 

Secretary JOHNSON [continuing]. Now that you have put that on 

my radar. 

I can tell you that, in general, we are making an effort to build 

a greater degree of law enforcement cooperation with the Cuban 

government. I think that is in our public safety interest to do. 

Mr. PERRY. Absolutely. 

Secretary JOHNSON. In terms of maritime security, law enforcement, port security, I think that is in our interest. We have been 

having those discussions. 

Mr. PERRY. The Department has always been cooperative. So I 

am concerned about this, and Members of the committee are, as 

well. Of course, this is an emerging and changing policy, and we 

want to make sure that we are involved in it, as Representatives—— 

Secretary JOHNSON. I do know that we are pretty focused right 

now on the President’s visit, which is coming next week. But I will 

look into this, and, as I hope you know by now, I believe in responsiveness to Congress. 

Mr. PERRY. I appreciate that. I do know that, so thank you. 

Recently, or at least previously, you stated in this committee that 

your position, it is your goal to get DHS off the GAO high-risk list. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. 

Mr. PERRY. I am assuming that is the same thing. I suspect your 

staff has informed you of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency’s findings and our hearings that we have had 

where literally every single thing we have examined has shown 

gross mismanagement, whether it is in the human resources information—HR IT technology system, the vehicle fleet management, 

and other areas, where we just see hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars wasted. 

I am just wondering—I know you have requested $225 million 

for St. Elizabeths. I have been out there. It is going to take a lot 

of resources, without a doubt. But you also manage the second-largest civilian fleet in the Federal Government at a cost of over $460 

million to operate. I found some unimaginable things occurring 

there. 

I am just wondering if getting off the high-risk list, GAO’s highrisk list, you know, even—there is not much asked for in improving 

your acquisition process, which was another point of contention, 

and only a minuscule fraction is devoted to that. 

So I am just wondering, as you weigh everything and try and 

prioritize with St. Elizabeths, et cetera, and the mission that you 

have got to complete, the President’s visit to Cuba, how does this 

fit in? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, as I indicated in my opening remarks, 

management reform is my top overall priority. We continue to 

make good progress with GAO. In fact, GAO has told us that they 

consider us a model agency for how you get off the high-risk list. 

Mr. PERRY. If I may interject, when they told you that, did they 

tell you that in writing? Because I don’t get that sense—no disrespect intended, but I don’t get that sense when they come to testify. 
34 

Secretary JOHNSON. I believe that they did. Because when I was 

told that verbally, I said, ‘‘Get me the piece of paper that says 

that.’’ 

Mr. PERRY. Great. As long as you are working on the hearing, 

if you can find that, as well. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Congressman, I don’t know how recent your 

last briefing from us was on our reforms that we have applied for 

HR and acquisition. If you haven’t already, I would encourage you 

to sit down with our new Under Secretary for Management, Russ 

Deyo, who is a retired Johnson & Johnson executive, who has done 

a lot already in his year to reform our HR process, our acquisition 

process. I don’t know when the last briefing you got was, but I 

think we are moving in the right direction. 

Mr. PERRY. All right. We will look forward to that. Thank you, 

Mr. Secretary. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Chair recognizes Mrs. Torres. 

Mrs. TORRES. Thank you so much. 

Good morning. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Good morning. 

Mrs. TORRES. It is nice to see you again. 

In the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, the Office of 

Community Partnership was appropriated $10 million for grants to 

extend to outside stakeholders to further its mission to counter violent extremists. 

Last week, Department of Homeland Security, the FBI, along 

with my police departments, fire departments, all got together with 

key community stakeholders. 

Is $10 million enough money to ensure that these grants are 

available for all communities across the United States? If not, I 

want to know how I can get my community in the front of the line. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Frankly, no, it is not. We originally thought 

we had 50, and when we looked at the report language, we saw 

that it was 10 for CVE and 39 for preparedness for complex attack 

situations. But the same language, which I have read myself, says 

that if you want to make a reprogramming request, make a reprogramming request. 

So I would like to see us fund our grants across the country. Ten 

million dollars doesn’t go very far, given where I think the needs 

are. So I can make a reprogramming request, which I hope Congress would honor, if I believe I need more, and I may need more. 

Mrs. TORRES. I hope that you would ask for more. Communities 

like San Bernardino that have suffered so much, it hasn’t been because of the lack of interest from the community to want to work 

and participate in being the solution to threats to our homeland. 

But, certainly, this funding, I don’t think it is enough. 

On the issue of interoperability within the radio system, you 

heard the radio conversations with our first responders as they 

were responding to San Bernardino, to the incident in San 

Bernardino. 

I have a big concern that a lot of our agencies have not upgraded 

their radio systems and have no way to encrypt their communications directing first responders to critical incidents such as the one 

in San Bernardino. What is the plan to address this critical issue? 
35 

Secretary JOHNSON. Congresswoman, interoperability is a work 

in progress. I think we have made significant progress over the last 

couple years. But interoperability is, in my law enforcement experience, crucial, and we have to be able to talk to each other within 

DHS and across law enforcement agencies. 

The active-shooter training exercise I attended in New York City 

in November was devoted—funded by DHS—was devoted principally to interoperability of communications. That is the level of 

importance that we and I attach to that. So we are moving in the 

right direction. 

Mrs. TORRES. Right. It is important for them to be able to talk 

to each other, but it is critically important for them to be able to 

encrypt those communications. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Understood. 

Mrs. TORRES. Thank you. 

I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. I thank you. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Carter. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you for being here. 

Mr. Secretary, in my district, my constituents, as you can imagine, are most concerned about securing our borders. They are most 

concerned about making certain that the people who are coming in 

here, that we know who they are and that we know whether they 

are coming here to hurt us or not. I trust, Mr. Secretary, after having interacted and gotten to know you for the past 16 months, that 

you have the same concern and share the same concern. 

So my question is this. You have expressed support of the budget 

during the time that you have been here, but the budget includes 

funding for 300 fewer Border Patrol Agents than was mandated in 

the fiscal year 2016 budget. I am just wondering, if indeed, as I believe, you share that same concern about securing our borders, how 

can you be satisfied with this budget if it includes 300 fewer Border Patrol Agents than what was mandated in the fiscal year 2016 

budget? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Two things. 

The budget submitted to you reflects hard choices to fit within 

the legally-mandated caps. 

The request reflects a considered decision to focus on technology 

and surveillance equipment at the border, given the nature of what 

we are seeing and the changing character of those crossing the border. Very often, as I am sure you know, people, particularly people 

from Central America, anticipate that they are going to be caught. 

So the key is to know where they are crossing through technology, 

through surveillance equipment, and get our personnel there in 

place to meet that surge. 

Mr. CARTER. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate that and understand 

that, but, you know, we had the opportunity on this committee to 

visit the border, and the Border Patrol Agents were telling us we 

need more boots on the ground. That is what we were hearing from 

them. Now, granted, you are correct, we do need the technology. I 

am not arguing that fact. It will and has helped us. But, again, 

they are crying out for more boots on the ground. 
36 

If I could shift gears for just a second, a couple weeks ago, on 

March 2, we had the administrator of TSA, Mr. Neffenger here. At 

that time, we talked about the Screening Partnership Program, 

something that I am very interested in. I am from Georgia, of 

course. As you are aware, the administrator for Hartsfield-Jackson 

International Airport has expressed concerns about the long waits 

and the long lines and has actually talked about perhaps utilizing 

this program. 

What I wanted to ask you—Mr. Neffenger had told us that we 

were getting cost estimates from GAO. When can we expect those 

cost estimates to be in? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Let me get back to you on that, sir. 

Mr. CARTER. Okay. 

Secretary JOHNSON. I have spent a lot of time at Hartsfield myself. Sixty-three thousand people work at Atlanta Hartsfield Airport. One of the things that I am sure you know we are focused 

on there is airport security. So the administrator has issued directives for self-assessments and the like. It is the busiest airport in 

the country, so any best practice we could bring there—but I will 

look into that issue of the report for you. 

Mr. CARTER. Okay. 

Well, one other thing, and that is I noticed in your budget you 

requested over $900 million in air passenger and airline fees. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. 

Mr. CARTER. This is a 43 percent increase. I mean, this is significant, a significant increase. 

You requested to allow TSA to increase the Passenger Security 

Fee $1 to $6.60? I mean, that is a big jump. 

Now, what we are told is that the Screening Partnership Program can potentially save up to 17 percent. Why are we not pushing this more? I mean, if it is going to save us money and you are 

still going to have oversight over it, why aren’t we pushing this? 

When we push it, why aren’t we getting more creative? As I suggested to Mr. Neffenger, perhaps you offer half of that savings to 

the airport. You still are going to realize 8.5 percent savings in 

your budget. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, first of all, aviation security is not just 

simply a matter of dollars and cents, as I am sure you appreciate. 

First and foremost, it is the protection of the American people. I 

want to know that whatever force we are providing to that mission 

is the best we have. 

The proposed increase is from $5.60 to $6.60. As I am sure you 

are aware, in 2013 Congress increased it from $5 to $5.60. We are 

asking for another increase. My view is that, rather than ask the 

American taxpayer in general to pay for aviation security, maybe 

we ought to ask a little more from those who actually use the system. 

Mr. CARTER. I understand. But I certainly hope that you look 

very carefully at the Screening Partnership Program. To me, you 

know, I want to privatize as much as we can. You are still going 

to have oversight on it. If it can save us money and still do the 

job—and I appreciate your concern for safety. We are all concerned 

for that. But, at the same time, if it can provide the safety and be 
37 

safe and effective and save money, that is what we ought to be 

going toward. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Walker. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Johnson, thank you again for being here today. At the 

lower table. So, appreciate your acknowledgment there. 

Secretary JOHNSON. I am down here with you. 

Mr. WALKER. Okay. All right. 

You mentioned the term ‘‘migration problem’’ a little earlier in 

your testimony. That is where I would like to focus a little bit. I 

have a couple questions. 

The 2017 budget request proposes to cut funding for ICE detention and removal operations, including a reduction in detention 

beds. With reduced detention capacity, what does the Department 

intend to do if there is a surge in illegal migration numbers? 

Before you answer that, I want to get this second question because I believe probably one answer would suffice both of them. 

The second question is a little bit longer, but it has a little background with question No. 1. 

The budget request recognizes that administration policies may 

continue to encourage thousands of Unaccompanied Alien Children 

to attempt to cross the border, as it requests base funding for 

75,000 UACs. According to our records, that would be a record 

number. 

This is a result of failures in removal of the UAC population to 

date. In 2014, there were a little over 1,900 that were repatriated, 

and I believe in 2014, 1,882 was the number that were sent back. 

This is a small fraction when compared to 83,337 that ICE transferred to Department of Health and Human Resources’ custody in 

the same years. 

Do you agree that the incentives established by this administration are helping to fuel potentially another surge? So can you speak 

to that as well as the surge in the illegal migration numbers from 

question No. 1? 

Secretary JOHNSON. I disagree. 

First, let me start with the detention bed issue. The request we 

have is for approximately 31,000 beds across adult space, family 

unit space. At the time we submitted the request last year, I think 

we were at about 28,000. So we don’t want to ask you for more 

than we think we need. At present—and I haven’t checked this in 

a while, but at present, I think we are at about 31,000, which is 

what we are asking for. There is a possibility of a reprogramming 

request if there is another surge. 

I disagree that our policies encourage UACs to migrate here. I 

have been very public about, if you come here and you are apprehended at the border, we will send you back, consistent with our 

laws. Just the other day, I put out a public statement about Operation Border Guardian that focuses on the return of those who 

came here as children. I said in that statement, this fiscal year we 

have sent back to Central America 28,000 people and we have sent 

back to Mexico 128,000 people. 
38 

My consistent message, since I have been in office almost, is if 

you come here illegally we will send you back, consistent with our 

laws and our values. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Secretary Johnson. That is fair. I hope 

the administration continues to augment that clear message there. 

For this fiscal year, the budget requests $49 million for countering violent extremism, including grants and efforts to prevent, 

prepare for, and respond to emergent threats from violent extremism and complex, coordinated terrorist attacks. 

Specifically looking at San Bernardino, can you draw a distinct 

line as far as how that $49 million would impact these communities in making sure they are more properly prepared for such attacks? 

Secretary JOHNSON. We are in the implementation phase now, 

but I think that the intent of Congress was that communities be 

better prepared for complex attacks of the San Bernardino type. So 

we are in the implementation phase. It is a worthwhile mission. 

As I mentioned to Congresswoman Torres, I also think that the 

CVE grant money is important for even earlier in the process, in 

case somebody is heading in the wrong direction, to encourage communities to let law enforcement know. 

So, between the 10 and the 39, I think those are two very good 

objectives. I wish we had a little more to work with. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Secretary. 

One last question. Do you feel like DHS, when it comes to examining social media, are we doing a more accurate, thorough job? 

Can you just take a few seconds to address that? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. Under my watch as Secretary, we have 

stepped up our use of social media in connection with immigration 

benefits. We have, in addition to that, something like over 30 uses 

of social media for intelligence and law enforcement purposes. We 

have had pilot programs. 

In response to a task force report that came to me, I said we 

need to expand upon this and amplify this and make this a regular 

part of our practice. So that is what we are moving toward and 

that is what we are doing. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Secretary Johnson. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Chair recognizes Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for being with us today. 

I have a question about the countering violent extremism. So, in 

the Consolidated Appropriations Act of Fiscal Year 2016, the Office 

of Community Partnerships was appropriated $10 million for 

grants to extend to outside stakeholders to further the CVE mission. 

It is still unclear how those grants are going to be administered. 

Can you fill us in on, if any, of the nuts and bolts of that? 

Secretary JOHNSON. My vision for that, Congresswoman, is that 

we have a grant application process where community organizations have the opportunity to come forward, apply for a grant, we 

scrub it carefully like we do lots of other grants, and the money be 

used for messaging in communities at the local level, for programs 

at the local level to prevent people from heading in the direction 
39 

of violence, to give people an alternative way to channel their energy. 

In my numerous CVE engagements around the country, in places 

like Minneapolis, California, Texas, I have heard over and over 

again from communities, ‘‘We need help, ourselves, in dealing with 

this issue, dealing with this problem.’’ I think it should be a National Federal Government effort to support that. 

So I want to see a competitive, efficient process for evaluating 

grant applications and supporting that. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Well, again, it is only $10 million, so I would hope 

it would be efficient. Who knows who will ask for it. 

Secretary JOHNSON. As I said earlier, I would like to see more. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. My biggest concern is, you know, there are 2 types 

of things going on, at least in my arena back in California. For example, I have a very large Muslim population in Orange County. 

So what would you see—let’s say somebody wins a grant. What 

kind of programs would you see would help that? 

That is a place that maybe people will come and get to, you 

know, because there is bigger numbers and possibilities, for example, if something is happening, versus something like this whole, 

you know, lone-wolf kind of radicalization coming from the internet 

thing that happened to us in San Bernardino, which is also just, 

like, 30 minutes away from me. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Right. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So when you say nonprofits, competitive, let’s say 

they get a grant, what kind of programs to steer people in a different direction? What would that look like, in your opinion? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Could be some form of counseling program. 

Could be some form of competition, like we are supporting now in 

colleges, for counter messages, where you encourage people to develop counter messages to focus on young people, to steer them 

away from the appeal of the Islamic State’s messages. 

It could be a variety of things, so I want to encourage a certain 

level of creativity. As the Federal Government, I don’t necessarily 

have all the answers, so I want to see these applications and see 

what kind of ideas we generate. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Can you give me—what is the time line that you 

would see for something like that, a time line of where the grant 

applications might be out and—— 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, we have money this fiscal year, 2016, 

so I want to see applications this fiscal year. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Hopefully this is a program that will continue in 2017 and 2018 and beyond. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

My last question. Your Department has established an insider 

threat program designed to mitigate the threat resulting from employees and contractors who purposefully or inadvertently commit 

security breaches. 

Can you give me an overview of that program, how it works? Is 

that program limited to the detection of abnormalities in data 

usage? Or how are you monitoring what is going on? To the extent 

you can in public, obviously. 
40 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. I am not sure whether you are referring 

to TSA at airport security or a broader program. I would have to— 

if you would allow me, I would like to take that question for the 

record and get back to you in a more informed way. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. That would be great, because I am sure that some 

of it might be something you might not want to air in public. 

Thank you. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Thank you. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Loudermilk. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. Secretary, it is a pleasure to have you here again. 

Difficult times. We are looking at a growing debt of nearly $20 

trillion, so we know that we have to address that. We know that 

we have to cut spending in certain areas. The taxpayers expect 

that. The taxpayers expect us to do these difficult things. They also 

expect us to protect them. 

This comes down to priorities and what we are going to do with 

the limited funds. I think that is where a lot of our differences lie, 

because I know your heart is to protect the American people, as 

your job has given you that, and I believe that is where your heart 

is. That is definitely where my heart is, to do with what we can. 

But, yesterday, the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 

Response, and Communications had a hearing regarding the $599 

million cuts to the FEMA terrorism preparedness grants. We had 

quite an illustrious field of witnesses that were here, including Mr. 

Jim Butterworth, who is the head of Georgia Emergency Management Agency, and the chief of the Atlanta Police Department, who 

said that these cuts would cause significant damage in their ability 

to prepare not only against terrorist activities but the other threats 

along with those, from cyber threats, natural disasters, et cetera. 

Mr. Sena, who is with the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, who was testifying on behalf of the National Fusion 

Center Association, when I asked him about it, he said that he believed that these cuts would actually cause them to have to shut 

down many of our fusion centers. That is of grave concern to me. 

Can you respond to what your thoughts are on that? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Congressman, our budget request reflects 

hard choices to fit within the caps. I will not disagree with you 

about the importance of our grant money—I have seen it myself— 

to support fusion centers, to support interoperability of communications, to support surveillance technology, to support the Atlanta police chief to pay his cops overtime, to support New York City, to 

support active-shooter training. 

Given the nature of the global terrorist threat right now, which 

must involve fusion centers, local law enforcement to help us detect 

the next terrorist attack on the country, I think our grant-making 

is important. 

I would have preferred a grant-making request for both Statelevel funding and UASI funding and the competitive grant programs at a higher level, but the budget request reflects hard 

choices, without a doubt. 
41 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Do you concur that this could cause fusion centers to actually have to close their doors? 

Secretary JOHNSON. I don’t know whether that is true or not. It 

depends on the choices people would make with the money that 

they have. But I do concur with the importance of fusion centers 

and JTTFs in general, yes, sir. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. But this would definitely have an impact on 

their operations? 

Secretary JOHNSON. A cut of that magnitude most likely would, 

yes, sir. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Just about 2 weeks ago, we passed on the 

House floor the ALERT Act, which, from a conversation earlier, I 

think you are aware of. It was a strong, bipartisan-supported bill 

I authored that actually removes some of the bureaucratic hurdles 

and obstacles that were in the way of coordinating more effectively 

between Federal agencies and local law enforcement as a force multiplier in the war on terror. Most of that was focused on these fusion centers. There was a strong CVE element as part of that, as 

well. 

Part of my concern is, if we shut down some of the fusion centers 

or if we take away enough of the funds to where they are ineffective, the impact that that is going to have on local law enforcement, 

which we are growing to a point where we see them as an extension of our ability to fight terror. 

With that in mind, is there anything that we can do within these budget caps to reduce the $599 million cut or move from other 

areas, other cost savings that we can find? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, I think that is an issue the appropriators are going to have to wrestle with. I do think the grant-making means public safety and homeland security. 

You know, separate and apart from the levels of grant-making— 

and I suspect you will agree with this, Congressman—I would encourage you to encourage law enforcement in the State of Georgia 

to continue training, active-shooter training, that is multijurisdictional and multidiscipline. In a place like Georgia, I think that 

is critical. In a place like the Atlanta metropolitan area, I think 

that is critical, given the threats that we face. 

But these are hard choices that the appropriators are going to 

have to wrestle with, sir. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Well, I appreciate that. I hope that you will 

work closely with us. Because when we look at this magnitude of 

cuts, on top of the Department of Justice suspending the revenue 

sharing through the Asset Forfeiture Program, which has already 

had an impact in my district, with the Federal and local law enforcement agencies cooperating together, now you have put on top 

a $599 million cut, so I think this could have a drastic impact. 

But I thank you. I hope we can work together to try to find a 

resolution for this. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Chair recognizes Mr. Donovan. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you again for being with us. Being the most 

junior Member of this committee, everyone asks your questions before it is time for you to actually ask a question. 
42 

Chairman MCCAUL. I used to say that, a while ago. 

Mr. DONOVAN. It is still true. 

Mr. Loudermilk was at that hearing with me yesterday, and one 

of the things that we heard—and you and I have discussed this— 

is of course you wish you had more money and of course you wish 

you didn’t have to make the cuts to the UASI money, the grant 

money. But we did hear testimony from Mayor de Blasio, who then 

went to speak with you afterward, and some of the gentlemen on 

the other panel, and the Chairman’s fire commissioner from Austin, Texas, spoke—she heads the fire association for the entire 

country—about the effects there. 

One of the things that we were hearing, and it wasn’t from you, 

but hearing from the administration of why the cuts were appropriate, one was that FEMA’s efforts—the actual quote was, 

‘‘FEMA’s successful investments in prior years made these appropriate.’’ The other was that places like New York City was sitting 

on $600 million of unspent money, so they really didn’t need it. The 

administrator for FEMA, Craig Fugate, stated that the capabilities 

built through these grants are perishable and they have to be 

maintained, so that whatever their successes were in the past will 

diminish as time goes on. They need to keep them fresh. 

As I am sure you are aware, the grants that were already allowed take time to be spent. In New York City, we certainly have 

to bid it out. We have to VENDEX vendors. We have to have— 

things like the fireboat that detects nuclear weapons in the harbor, 

it had to be designed, it had to be created, it had to be delivered. 

All of the moneys that were allocated in the last grant cycle, at 

least in New York, have already been obligated. 

So those answers to our questions that we got from other parts 

of the administration seem to be hollow at this point. Is it your 

opinion that these are just hard choices that had to be made? It 

seems like the spending level from fiscal year 2016 and 2017 are 

almost equal, or the request is almost equal. So I guess there have 

been increases in other parts of the budget that are making up the 

difference for the amount of moneys that were cut in this grant 

program. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, the requested appropriation from Congress this year is lower than the 2016 money. It is 40.6 versus 41. 

Plus, there are other places where we definitely are focused on. 

On the timing of the grant money, we had a policy in place that 

you had to spend it within 2 years. This was an issue with New 

York City, which I addressed with Mayor de Blasio and his emergency response people and others, a few Members of Congress too. 

But I expanded that to 3 years, it went from 2 to 3, to give jurisdictions more time to spend the money. 

That has meant that bleeding into fiscal year 2017, I believe, or maybe it is 2016, that is about $54 million total. So it is not a lot. 

So that certainly is not a justification for a cut of this magnitude. 

The reality is it is our best effort to make hard choices to fit within 

the budget caps. 

But it is the case that very often cities, metropolitan areas take 

a very long time to spend the money that we give them. So I would 

hope that, together, we can encourage your constituents and others 

can encourage their constituents, mayors, to spend the money fast, 
43 

efficiently, and effectively so we don’t have this problem with 

money basically turning into a pumpkin, which has happened from 

time to time. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Chair recognizes Mr. Hurd. 

Mr. HURD. I would like to thank the Chairman and the Ranking 

Member for saving the best for last. 

Mr. Secretary, I appreciate you being here. 

You commented in your opening remarks on the desire to reorganize and restructure the National Protection and Programs Directorate, which, as we all know, leads the National effort to protect 

and enhance the resilience of our Nation’s physical and cyber infrastructure. 

Can you expand on why you think that effort is necessary and 

give us a sense of what we can expect should this committee—— 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. 

Mr. HURD [continuing]. Authorize NPPD to do so? 

Secretary JOHNSON. I think that we need an agency, not just a 

directorate, an agency. A directorate is like an office. We need an 

agency focused on cybersecurity and infrastructure protection. So 

our vision is to reform, rebuild the NPPD, which is a directorate, 

into a cyber and infrastructure protection agency. Given our current threats to cyber, to critical infrastructure, I think we need an 

agency that is focused on this. That is one thing. 

Within NPPD, I want to see us restructure it so that the NCCIC, 

which is our—I don’t know if you have ever been there; it is our 

cybersecurity center—has stripped away from it some of the administrative functions, like acquisition, so that they are focused solely 

on their cybersecurity operational mission. 

But, in general, I want to see this DHS component with more of 

an operational focus in an agency like TSA, like the Coast Guard, 

like CBP, ICE. Certainly, the cybersecurity mission of the Federal 

Government warrants that, I would think. 

So that is the vision. I could give you a more detailed briefing 

on this restructuring, but that is the overall vision. 

Mr. HURD. Do we have the time to pull this off? You know, because my fear is, if we don’t do this sooner rather than later, that 

we are not going to—you know, all the experience and lessons 

learned that you and your team have gained may be lost in the 

next transition of Government. Do you think we have the time? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, I think that is an issue with our cyber 

talent and cyber experience generally. Below the political appointee 

level, we have some really talented, terrific people that I hope 

would stay in Government. As you know, recruiting good cyber talent is an issue. 

But this is a reorganization that does require Congressional authorization, and I hope Congress would respond. I think there is 

definitely a demand and a need for this Nation’s cybersecurity mission that we have that agency. 

Mr. HURD. Great. 

We have been talking about tough budget decisions. One I want 

to talk about and just get your perspective on, the National Center 
44 

for Zoonotic and Animal Disease Defense. This is dealing with 

Zika. 

You know, if there were additional funds, is this something that 

you would think is important to continue if we didn’t have to make 

that difficult budget decision? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Well, we are learning more about Zika every 

day. Within DHS, we are focused on making sure our Customs personnel know how to detect this disease at a port of entry. We are 

focused on the possibility of the Zika virus in immigration detention. We are focused on protecting our own workforce. 

There is always the possibility with an unanticipated event for 

a reprogramming request. We have broken ground on our NBAF in 

Kansas, and that is, as far as I know, on schedule. That will be 

a good thing when it is completed. 

Mr. HURD. Good copy. Thank you, sir. 

I yield back my time. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Chair recognizes Mr. Ratcliffe. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your being here with us today. I had 

unfortunately another hearing, and I had to step out. I caught the 

tail end of the Chairman asking you at the beginning of the hearing about Operation Phalanx. I wanted to follow up in that regard. 

Let me just ask you: I saw where you had a 50 percent reduction 

in the persistent aerial detection in this request versus your most 

recent prior request. Can you tell me why? 

Secretary JOHNSON. There was a 50 percent reduction in the 

level of support that DOD is providing in overall flight hours. Since 

we started that program with DOD support, DHS capability in this 

area has dramatically increased so that flight hours, Border Patrol 

capabilities have increased thanks to the support of this Congress 

dramatically the last 5, 10 years. So we are in a position to accept 

less from DOD because they needed their assets back, that has represented a reduction of about 5 percent overall in flight hours, but 

longer term, in the last couple of years, we have dramatically 

added to that capability ourselves. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Okay. I was familiar with that. I knew that it 

resulted in a reduction. I was familiar with your testimony before 

the House Appropriations Committee in that regard. The reason I 

wanted to follow up with you is I know that my Governor, Governor Abbott and one of my colleagues on the Democratic side, 

wrote you a letter back in February expressing concern over this 

issue about, given the fact that our Southern Border is not secure, 

why would we be doing less and not more? I know you talked in 

the beginning about making hard choices, but would you agree 

with me that the aerial surveillance on our Southern Border is an 

area where we should be—— 

Secretary JOHNSON. In general, I think we need more of an investment in technology for surveillance. When I ask Border Patrol 

Agents, ‘‘What do you need?’’, they are always telling me about mobile surveillance, aerial surveillance, and the like. So, in general, 

I think we need investments in that technology, and I think this 

request reflects that. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Can you just tell me, have you responded to the 

Governor and Congressman Cuellar? 
45 

Secretary JOHNSON. I think I did. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. There was a request for some explanation about 

metrics and I—— 

Secretary JOHNSON. I think I did. I try to respond to every letter 

within 10 days or so. I think I did. When is that letter dated? 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. February 1. 

Secretary JOHNSON. I hope I did. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Okay. Would you mind looking into that for me? 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes, okay. Certainly Henry and I talked 

about the issue too. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Again, I think that expresses that this is a bipartisan concern here. I am not making this a partisan issue. So I appreciate if you would follow up in that regard. 

Let me turn to a conversation that I had with Director Rodriguez 

earlier in a hearing, Director Rodriguez over at U.S. Citizenship 

and Immigration Services, about the Syrian refugee issue. In that 

exchange that I had with him, the topic related to the issue of social media as part of the vetting process, and he related that social 

media vetting was only done in cases where a red flag had been 

raised. My concern there is I think that social media vetting should 

be part of the base level of scrutiny with regard to vetting of refugees as opposed to a secondary level of scrutiny only when a red 

flag is raised, and I wanted your perspective on that. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Social media right now is done manually by 

an examiner, by a CIS officer. That is a time-consuming process. 

We do right now have a protocol for the use of social media. You 

used the phrase ‘‘red flags’’ if there are certain indicators, but that 

does not preclude the possibility that an officer in the first instance 

could consult social media, and I would not discourage that. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Okay. 

Secretary JOHNSON. But it is something that—the use of social 

media generally is something we are expanding upon in my 2 years 

as Secretary. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I know you can appreciate the point because you 

have testified about this is the expression from groups like ISIS 

that they intend to use the program to cause harm to Americans 

and to America through that, and social media being a treasure 

trove of information in some cases with regard to some of these individuals. I would really like to see it as part of our base-level scrutiny, especially when you have folks coming from countries where 

we would suspect those individuals—— 

Secretary JOHNSON. It is also true that the more and more we 

focus on this publicly, the more they are going to take their communications off-line. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. Well, my time has expired. I look forward to continuing this conversation with you at a later date. Again, I thank 

you for your service and for being here today. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Mr. RATCLIFFE. I yield back. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Chair recognizes Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, Secretary Johnson. I know some others talked about 

manning at the ports of entry. I want to follow up on that, both 

manning at the ports and then also in between the ports and Bor-
46 

der Patrol. At our ports of entry, we are seeing a constant decline 

in the manning of—we were on the verge. We literally had to kindof meet together with the business community and the local port 

director a few weeks ago. They were thinking about shutting down 

service on Saturdays at Douglas, and they are just seeing this 

bleeding in their manning, and it is impacting wait times. It is impacting potentially, obviously security. It is impacting economic opportunity, people coming over to shop, just giving up. We are hearing anecdotes about individuals going through the process to be 

hired, it taking 18 months, the vetting process, which we all agree 

we want to make sure our people are vetted, some of our constituents have been very concerned about their experience in that. My 

first bill passed into law was the Border Jobs Veterans Act, trying 

to fast-track our veterans, many of whom have already been 

through security clearances and background checks, to fill these positions. So can you just speak a little bit more about what you are 

doing? I mean, insanity is doing the same thing over and over 

again expecting a different result. This backlog is something that 

is going on now. We increased the authorization of the ports of 

entry by 2,000 a couple of years ago. You are still under that and 

I think asking for another 2,000 more. But if we can’t fill the positions, then we still have a problem. 

So what are we doing about that specifically? If a veteran is taking advantage of the Border Jobs for Veterans Act how are you implementing that? If somebody has had background check and has 

had a clearance in the military, please don’t tell me you are going 

through the same process of going through all the polygraphing if 

they have already had a background check. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Congresswoman, as I am sure you know this 

is something the Commissioner is focused on. I have heard enough 

about this and I have heard enough concern about this that it has 

now become a priority of mine. Within CBP, the Commissioner has 

put in place a separate command for hiring and recruitment to expedite this process. At the DHS headquarters level, we have reformed our acquisition—our HR process to institute policies to 

make this more expedited. It should not take 18 months, because 

in that 18 months, my guess is somebody will get another job. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Get another job, exactly. 

Secretary JOHNSON. We have instituted the creation of Hiring 

Hubs to expedite the process. I agree with your point if somebody 

is a military veteran and they have gone through the process of 

getting there, which probably includes a security clearance, there 

ought to be some way we abbreviate this process. 

So I am acutely aware of the shortages in personnel at ports of 

entry and on the border. So, before I leave office this year, I want 

to fix this problem. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you. This also impacted—I mean, we have 

had a Congressionally-mandated floor of 21,370 Border Patrol 

Agents. At the end of last year, you guys were 1,208 below that. 

This budget request you are asking for a 300-position cut. 

I mean, border security you said earlier is a high priority. Is that 

because you just can’t fill these positions so you don’t want to have 

positions authorized? Why? 
47 

Secretary JOHNSON. We are seeking 300 fewer less because we 

think that the money should be invested in technology. But we are 

also determined to hire to whatever level Congress authorizes us. 

So we still need more work to hire to the requested level of, I 

think, 21,000 or 20,070 as I recall. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thanks. Just shifting gears, I am now the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security Chair. We had our 

first hearing last week. One of the challenges and frustrations that 

we have is how we measure border security. In the old days, it 

used to be operational control. The last time we used that, it was 

at about 44 percent. Then we shifted to number of apprehensions, 

which you don’t know whether that is good or bad if apprehensions 

have gone up or down, especially if you don’t know what the denominator is. You are currently reporting your effectiveness, which 

is based on apprehensions over the number of people that you 

caught plus got away that you knew about. But we still don’t know 

the ones that we don’t know about. Clearly, the price of drugs on 

the streets would tell you there is probably a lot we don’t know 

about. When I finally asked the acting chief, ‘‘What percentage of 

the border do you think you have situational awareness of?’’, he 

said 56 percent. So can you work using better measures of effectiveness and measures of reporting to us and the American people? 

We don’t need to be hyperbolizing. We don’t need to be over- or 

under-addressing this. It needs to be based on facts. But I look at 

it as a fighter pilot: We need to know situational awareness. We 

need to know operational control, like, of what we can see, what 

can we intercept, and then how much can we just not see? These 

seemed like—I mean, it is not that complex, but will you work with 

us on coming up with better measurements to build transparency. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Yes. I agree. Within DHS, we have an initiative called Border Stat, where we are working with a Federallyfunded research center to develop more concrete metrics to measure a border security. I agree with you. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Great. Thank you. My time has expired. Thank 

you, Mr. Secretary. 

Chairman MCCAUL. The Chair recognizes Mr. Clawson. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Following up on the Congresswoman’s comments, 

in my office, we have been going back a year, a year-and-a-half, 

asking for some data on this border. Staff has been told by your 

people that they would give it, and we never see it at any level. 

You referred me to outside studies, so on and so forth. But any 

kind of summary data on how you are doing and what the return 

on investment for the American taxpayer would be wonderful. With 

your background, I know you know what that means, but the next 

set of summary data on performance from your group will be the 

first that I have seen. I just want to let you know. I wasn’t even 

going to bring that up today. I just kind of gave up after asking 

so many times. If you went back and looked at the clips, we would 

just like to see some border data on how you are doing with all the 

people, particularly since you asked for more money on capital expenditures. We get requests for capital expenditures and no operational data on how you are doing. We could probably ask until you 

are gone, and we still won’t see it. So if you will send us data— 

we don’t have anything to criticize, because we don’t get to see any-
48 

thing. We would just like to see it, just some data, please, for the 

American taxpayer. 

In my district, after 9/11, we were told by TSA to spend money 

on EDS inline inspection equipment, as you all know about. So we 

did that. We did that with the promise from TSA that we would 

be repaid. I know you know about this, Mr. Johnson, Honorable 

Mr. Johnson. So, to my knowledge, 20 airports around the country 

are owed $400 million. In my district, it is $40 million just for the 

Fort Myers airport in south Florida. We would like to get our 

money back. You all are killing us. You are killing us. You told 

us—we got it in writing. You told us to get the equipment for safety after 9/11. We bought the equipment. TSA told us they would 

reimburse us, and we never got our money. There are always requests for committee hearings and everything else. You all are killing us. I mean, don’t double-cross people. This is $40 million that 

we paid locally with the promise in writing explicit from TSA that 

it would be paid back. We would like our money back. We would 

really like our money back. We see Honorable Mr. Johnson that 

you all asked for almost $200 million for transportation screening 

technology for your current budget. I am saying: My God, you owe 

me my money, and you are spending new money without paying 

people for what you told them you were going to pay them. So we 

want to be polite, and we want to be respectable, but how long does 

it take to get our money back? So if you could let us know, we just 

want the money you all told us you would give us when we bought 

the equipment. 

Secretary JOHNSON. I just asked my CFO. 

Mr. CLAWSON. If I am missing something, you all tell me. 

Secretary JOHNSON. I just asked my CFO: What is the story? We 

need to get you a better-informed answer. I think you deserve an 

answer to your question, sir. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Yeah, I mean, we always say that the role of Government and this administration likes to say that the role of Government, this, that, and the other; it is not to double-cross folks at 

the local level. So we would really—I don’t want to make a problem 

out of this, but every time I fly home, I go through that airport, 

and the guys are saying: Where is our $40 million, Mr. Congressman? We want our $40 million. It was local money that was supposed to—you know, we don’t want to be you all’s infinite credit 

bank. Time costs money after over 10 years, you get what I am saying. 

Secretary JOHNSON. What year was this investment made? 

Mr. CLAWSON. Well, it was mandated or a directive right after 

9/11. So you are going back over 10 years now. So if my folks in 

my district are getting a little prickly on the issue, I think we have 

a right to do so. So you all give us our money back. We don’t want 

another letter saying that this has to be—the last letter we got 

from you all said: This has to compete with new investment. 

Why does my CAPEX from 10 years ago have to compete with 

new investment when you all told me you were going to pay me 

back? If I did that in the corporate world, everybody would kick me 

out as Chairman; I wouldn’t last one board meeting. You all are 

double-crossing suppliers here. We want our money back. 
49 

Secretary JOHNSON. I will get with TSA, and I will get you an 

answer. I would like to know the answer too. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Please do it. Look, we don’t want a problem. We 

just want our money like you all told us you would give it to us. 

You all are the Federal Government. We believed you. People in 

my airport have been there forever; they believed you. We want to 

believe in the Government to get stuff done. Just help us out a little bit here. It is $40 million for my airport. That is not chump 

change to me, you all. 

Final thing I wanted to say is that the lines are getting bigger, 

as you all know. That is good news in Florida because it means we 

have more tourists. So to your previous conversation, our lifeblood 

is tourism, so anything you all do to shorten the lines, extend the 

pre-hours, and that sort of thing operationally so that our businesses can hire more people and do more business, we really appreciate that. I am glad it came up today, and I appreciate you looking 

into it. 

Secretary JOHNSON. I have family who flies through that airport, 

so I hear about this from them too. 

Mr. CLAWSON. It is a good—it is a great airport. It is a well-managed airport. We are just waiting on that bottleneck in TSA. That 

is my bottleneck. The airport runs well, and we like the inspectors 

that are there. We just need more. Thanks, thanks for taking a 

look at my question. 

Secretary JOHNSON. Thank you. 

Chairman MCCAUL. Mr. Secretary, let me just say thank you for 

being here today. Thank you for your service also in a very challenging and high-threat environment. 

Pursuant to the rules, the hearing record will be open for 10 

days. 

Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:25 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(51) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MICHAEL T. MCCAUL FOR HON. JEH C. JOHNSON

Question 1. One of the stated goals of the Department’s Joint Requirements Council is to support a more operationally-efficient organization through the creation of 

a component-driven joint requirements process. 

How will DHS ensure that its components are committed to investing in joint requirements to the greatest extent possible? 

Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has recently promulgated 

2 directives, DHS Joint Requirements Council (JRC) Directive (DHS Directive 071– 

02) and the Joint Requirements Integration and Management System (JRIMS) Directive (DHS Directive 107–01), which codify the JRC and the process by which the 

Department, through the JRC, reviews and validates capability requirements, associated gaps and needs, and proposed solution approaches to mitigate those gaps. In 

addition to these directives the JRC and the Office of Program Accountability and 

Risk Management have been working closely to ensure the new requirements process and the existing acquisition oversight process are complementary. Further, the 

requirements process has been integrated into the Department’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE). As a result, the JRC and the requirements 

process are now integrated in the enterprise’s main investment pillars. 

Question 2a. Since the Department’s current acquisition management policy went 

into place in November 2008, GAO has found that several major acquisition programs lack required documentation such as acquisition program baselines, which 

contain critical cost estimates. 

What is the Department doing to ensure that all major acquisition programs complete this documentation in compliance with DHS policy? 

Question 2b. How has the Department managed these programs without such critical program information? 

Answer. As the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently testified the Department of Homeland Security has made significant progress in overseeing the Department’s acquisition portfolio. The GAO attributed that progress to Departmental 

leadership’s commitment to improve all aspects of acquisition through the Secretary’s Unity of Effort initiative. One of these major improvements has been the 

completion of acquisition documentation by the Department’s programs. In 2015, 

then-acting deputy under secretary for management directed the Office of Program 

Accountability and Risk Management (PARM), the Component Acquisition Executives (CAE), and Department’s program managers to have complete sets of acquisition documentation for the current phase each the program in accordance with Management Directive 102–01. The programs complied with this direction, and as of December 31, 2015, all active major acquisition programs had the complete set of acquisition documentation. 

Many of the Department’s programs were initiated prior to the Department’s acquisition policies being established in 2008. At the beginning of Management Directive 102–01’s implementation, only those acquisition documents for the next Acquisition Decision Event were required. Programs were not expected to return to complete acquisition documentation for earlier phases. The Department has since taken 

a different view based on recommendations of the GAO, and as stated above, in accordance with Management Directive 102–01, all programs have completed the required acquisition documentation. 

Question 3. What is the status of the Department’s efforts to track operations and 

maintenance costs for its acquisition programs? 

Answer. The Government Accountability Office recommended in its audit ‘‘DHS 

Should Better Define Oversight Roles and Improve Program Reporting to Congress,’’ 

(GAO 15–292) dated March 2015, that the Department produce operations and 

maintenance cost estimates for programs in sustainment and establish responsibility for tracking sustainment programs’ adherence to those estimates. In response, 
52 

the then-acting deputy under secretary for management, directed component heads 

to annually update operations and maintenance cost estimates and affirm the life 

span for each major acquisition program in sustainment. The chief financial officer 

(CFO), as part of the Department’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process, was directed to assess the alignment of the estimates with 

spending patterns for current services. These actions were completed and funding 

levels are addressed in the Department’s annual Future Years Homeland Security 

Program. 

Question 4a. GAO has found that many of DHS’s major acquisition programs have 

experienced cost growth from their Department-approved cost estimates. 

What steps is DHS taking to ensure that programs have accurate, reliable, and 

timely cost estimates? 

Question 4b. What is the Department doing to control costs within individual programs and across its acquisition portfolio? 

Answer. The Department has taken a very active role in overseeing our major acquisition programs. Since the beginning of October 2014, we have conducted 40 action-oriented Acquisition Review Boards of major acquisition programs and have updated the Department’s acquisition policies to incorporate best practices, recommendations from GAO and the DHS Inspector General, as well as new laws. We 

have enhanced cost estimation by realigning the cost estimation function from the 

Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management to a newly-established Cost 

Analysis Division (CAD) within the Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO). As 

a result, there is a renewed emphasis in not only supporting the Acquisition Process 

but also to provide a closer link of cost estimates to the annual Program and Budget 

Review process in order to assess the affordability of our major acquisition programs. As of January 14, 2016, the Department has successfully closed the Acquisition Documentation gap. All major acquisition programs between Acquisition Decision Event (ADE) 2A and 3 have a CFO-approved Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE), 

which will be updated annually by Component Program Management Offices. These 

updates will identify costs incurred to date and provide estimates to complete the 

remaining program as planned. With this information, the Department will have 

better insight into potential forecasted cost growth and the ability to intervene before costs are realized. In addition to the maintenance of cost estimates, the OCFO 

CAD has established a capability to develop independent cost estimates and assessments. This analysis provides DHS leadership with an unbiased assessment of a 

program’s estimated cost and where inherent risks may exist within the program’s 

LCCE. 

In addition to the progress the Department has made in overseeing our acquisition programs, the Department’s Unity of Effort initiative is making important steps 

in improving our integration. We established the Joint Requirements Council (JRC) 

to provide oversight of the Department’s requirements development processes. The 

goal of the JRC is to enhance operational effectiveness and inform the Department’s 

main investment decisions during resource allocation and the acquisition review 

process. 

Question 5. DHS’s major acquisition programs often take several years to complete, but the threats facing the homeland are constantly changing. 

What steps should DHS leadership take to help its major acquisition programs 

keep pace with these dynamic threats, particularly in the areas of aviation, border, 

and cybersecurity? 

Answer. DHS has undertaken a number of efforts under the Department’s Unity 

of Effort initiative to establish new processes and strengthen business management 

to be more adaptable in responding to evolving homeland security threats. First, the 

new DHS Joint Requirements Council, and corresponding DHS requirements process, provides a structured way for the Department to develop and assess capability 

operational requirements needed to support DHS homeland security operations. The 

Department strongly believes that conducting rigorous, repeatable, up-front analysis 

of operational needs better ensures: Acquisition programs are aligned with strategic 

and policy priorities; potential solutions are technologically feasible and fiscally informed; and acquisition programs will meet cost-schedule-performance goals. 

Second, to reinforce the new DHS requirements effort, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate has established a new research and development prioritization 

process that uses input from the requirements process as supplemented by other 

emergent DHS component capability needs to ensure DHS research and development investment is closely tied to approved emerging operational needs. In addition, 

this effort will also provide Department decision makers with greater awareness of 

existing, mature technology and potentially less mature, but promising technology, 

as part of the requirements, resource allocation, and acquisition oversight processes. 
53 

Finally, under the leadership of DHS management, significant strides have been 

made in greatly improving the oversight of DHS acquisition programs. These efforts 

have been lauded by OMB, which has recently recognized DHS as a standard bearer 

for its efforts to reduce acquisition program risk. In addition to ensuring the administrative records of all major acquisitions records are in order, that acquisition programs have traceable requirements documentation, and that programs in breach are 

either paused or canceled, the DHS Acquisition Executive has energized the Department’s Acquisition Review Board to actively engage and hold accountable the Department’s component acquisition executives for the health of the acquisition programs under their oversight. 

Question 6a. Last year, you outlined the creation of 3 new border security task 

forces. Two of them are geographically focused on the Southern Border and 1, based 

on investigations, ostensibly supports the other 2. 

Can you explain, in detail, how the Joint Task Forces have increased the ability 

of the Department to secure the border? 

Answer. The DHS Joint Task Forces (JTFs) have enhanced our ability to secure 

the border by establishing cross-component, unified operations with enhanced coordination across air, land, and maritime domains to address illicit flows and networks in designated joint operating areas. Specifically, the JTFs have improved the 

effectiveness of DHS border security operations by ensuring better coordination 

among the patrol, inspection, investigative, and regulatory elements of the Department at the operational and strategic level through coordinated joint operational activities such as JTF–W’s OPERATION ALL–IN, JTF–E’s JATT PARDESI, and JTF– 

I’s HOMECORT investigations. These coordinated joint activities derive from JTFestablished operational priorities approved by the Secretary with direct linkage to 

Department objectives and lines of effort established in the Campaign Plan. The geographic JTFs’ ability to look across the various component activities to anticipate, 

identify, and fully describe challenges in their joint operating areas significantly enhances DHS’s border security operating structure. 

Question 6b. Do you have metrics in place to help Congress determine whether 

or not this new organizational structure has merit? 

Answer. DHS has several measurement efforts under way related to our border 

security mission. In the short run, we are tracking output measures on the role of 

the JTFs. These measures include the fiscal year 2016–2017 Agency Priority Goal 

to decrease the ability of transnational criminal organizations to operate (CBP/ICE/ 

USCG). Specifically, actions by the DHS Joint Task Forces via synchronized component operations are projected to result in the disruption and/or dismantlement of 

15% of targeted transnational criminal organizations by September 30, 2017. 

In the long run, the most relevant way to assess the impact of the JTFs is to focus 

on border enforcement outcomes—including the estimated number of illegal inflows 

across the Southwest Border. As the committee knows, DHS has been working for 

years, with support from Congress, to develop more refined measures both of border 

enforcement outputs (i.e., the degree to which border enforcement makes it more difficult for migrants to cross the border illegally and deters illicit behavior) and outcomes (i.e., the number of migrants that attempt and/or succeed in crossing the border illegally). The most mature of these metrics, in use since 2014, is the Interdiction Effectiveness Rate (IER). The IER is an observation-based estimate of the share 

of illegal border crossers detected by the U.S. Border Patrol that is either apprehended or compelled to retreat to Mexico. Thus, IER is calculated as the ratio of 

apprehensions and detected turnbacks to all detected activity (apprehensions, detected turnbacks, and detected got-aways). The IER measure provides insight into 

enforcement outputs, and CBP uses IER data to inform operational decisions across 

the Border Patrol sectors. Congress and the Department may also consider changes 

in the IER as one way to evaluate the impact of the JTFs. 

Beginning in 2015, DHS also initiated a comprehensive border security metrics 

effort with the goal of establishing a scientifically defensible approach, using available data, to develop additional outcome-focused estimates of illegal border crossing 

activity. This effort, which DHS calls BorderStat, includes several metrics that are 

similar to Congressional proposals such as the Border Security Results Act (H.R. 

1417). 

The primary focus of the BorderStat analysis to date has been to develop an estimate of the total number of unauthorized immigrants successfully crossing into the 

United States between ports of entry along the Southwest Border. Future 

BorderStat research is expected to also focus on enforcement outcomes at ports of 

entry and in the maritime environment. DHS also has begun a related effort to use 

BorderStat data to examine the impact of specific enforcement strategies on illegal 

migration flows. The Department continues to refine the BorderStat methodology. 

When sufficiently mature, validated, and finalized, the BorderStat estimates will be 
54 

a direct tool that Congress and the Department can use to track and evaluate border security and the impact of DHS enforcement programs, such as the JTFs. While 

the JTF structure is intended to improve DHS border security outcomes, they are 

one of many factors, both within DHS’s control and external to the Department, that 

contribute to the level of border security. 

Question 7. The fiscal year 2017 budget requests $67 million in funds to purchase 

new CBP vehicle fleet assets. Given the problems that we have recently seen with 

vehicle fleet purchases—namely the gross mismanagement of the FPS vehicle 

fleet—how is the Department ensuring that CBP is purchasing the correct type and 

amount of vehicles to accommodate their needs? 

Answer. In fiscal year 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) established a fleet scorecard metric for incorporation into the DHS Chief Readiness Support Officer’s (OCRSO) Component Scorecard. This metric is designed to evaluate 

component progress towards required fleet right-sizing efforts which require a 10 

percent component fleet reduction by fiscal year 2019. Performance is measured on 

the percentage of reduction to a component’s fleet size against their fiscal year 2011 

baseline. The right-sizing cumulative target is derived from the DHS Fiscal Year 

2011 Vehicle Allocation Methodology Study outcomes (formally finalized in early 

2012) and uses the fiscal year 2011 Component Fleet Inventory as the baseline for 

its measurement. Further, the reduction targets were designed to be achieved 

through phased implementation. The phased implementation strategy was established and approved by former Deputy Secretary Lute to ensure operations were not 

negatively impacted as progress was achieved and to allow for vehicles to reach the 

end of their life cycles prior to disposal. DHS monitors component progress towards 

these targets on a quarterly basis and rates performance accordingly. To date, CBP 

has reduced fleet size by over 7 percent, exceeding the fiscal year 2017 target. 

As evidenced in the quarterly scorecard outcomes, from fiscal year 2011 through 

fiscal year 2015, CBP has reduced its operating motor vehicle fleet by 2,069 vehicles. In addition, CBP plans to reduce its vehicle fleet, at a minimum, an additional 

1,109 vehicles by the close of fiscal year 2016. These reductions are incorporated 

into CBP’s fleet replacement forecasts and planning. The reductions achieved to 

date result in a cost avoidance of approximately $74.5 million, since funding for the 

replacement of these retired assets will no longer be required. The referenced requested funding replaces only those assets remaining in the CBP motor vehicle fleet 

that have reached the end of their service time and are not targeted for reduction. 

In addition to fleet right-sizing, CBP improved the vehicle requirements development process to include an on-line module that directs operators to provide more 

detail related to expected vehicle mission activities. The information obtained 

through this tool is used to serve 3 primary functions. First, the on-line requirements gathering tool serves as an archive for electronic documentation as related 

to this process. Second, the on-line tool provides a formal approval workflow to ensure proper controls and authorities are exercised in the review of any submitted 

acquisition requirements. Third, the on-line tool ensures that submissions are focused on the intended mission-related use of a vehicle. Rather than offering the submitting party the option to select a make and model, the tool forces submitting parties to provide a series of mission requirements (number of passengers, canine capable, off-road capable, etc.). These attributes are then used to determine the most 

cost-effective vehicle acquisition solution to meet mission needs. The approved available vehicle solution options are held in a catalog of standardized platforms and 

packages. The catalog is reviewed annually to determine if further cost-saving opportunities can be identified and/or to make alterations in accordance with evolving 

mission requirements. These capabilities ensure headquarters oversight, approval, 

and program controls are institutional and effective. 

The fiscal year 2017 budget request of $67 million will be used to purchase approximately 1,673 replacement CBP vehicles. The acquisitions are intended to address a portion of the 9,841 vehicles that have met or will meet CBP replacement 

criteria through fiscal year 2017. The purchase of vehicles for CBP ensures personnel have the appropriate vehicle assets necessary to support on-going mission operations. Aging vehicles experience increased maintenance, repair, and operating 

costs while also realizing increased down time (time out of mission service for maintenance). Furthermore, agent/officer safety concerns may arise as vehicles become 

older and less reliable. Reductions in vehicle performance and/or reliability may result in stranding agents in remote and/or hostile locations while awaiting assistance. Awaiting vehicle assistance may leave them vulnerable to severe weather and/ 

or violent action by criminal actors along the border. 

Additionally, in fiscal year 2016, DHS is strengthening management, oversight, 

and visibility into vehicle acquisitions across the Department through updated fleet 

policy, improved data capture, acquisition plan reviews, and formal fleet manage-
55 

ment/assessment review cycles. CBP is participating in these efforts to ensure fleet 

management receives the appropriate attention and scrutiny commensurate with 

the investment. As part of this effort, CBP has evaluated their current agency fleet 

management practices, metrics, accomplishments, and on-going evolutionary steps 

towards furthering enhanced fleet management capabilities. 

Question 8a. DHS is in the process of developing a Classified screening system 

that allows them to better utilize the law enforcement data DHS component agencies collect to more effectively identify travelers and cargo of concern. 

Knowing that the specific budget details are Classified, what is the status of the 

DHS Data Framework initiative and when do you expect it to be complete? 

How will the data enhancement improve foreign fighter identification? 

Will the enhanced screening efforts be duplicative of NCTC or other intelligence 

community efforts? 

Answer. DHS is developing a system that will allow DHS components to identify 

where a person or entity has been previously encountered by another DHS entity 

and enable DHS to share information with other U.S. Government entities while appropriately safeguarding and controlling the data, while ensuring the protection of 

privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties. This system will operate at Unclassified and 

Classified levels. The first phase is for screening and vetting of people. 

Question 8b. Knowing that the specific budget details are Classified, what is the 

status of the DHS Data Framework initiative and when do you expect it to be complete? 

Answer. Among the hundreds of data sets that exist across multiple systems, 

DHS is first focusing on 20 data sets identified to be a priority for people-screening 

and vetting functions. The Data Framework initially planned to ingest the 20 data 

sets by the end of fiscal year 2020, however, the time line was accelerated with a 

goal of getting the top 20 datasets across the Department that encompass travel and 

benefits into the Framework as quickly as possible and in a manner that assures 

access to comprehensive, quality data. Additional data sets are being prioritized for 

ingest into Data Framework in and future years. The Data Framework will continue 

to ingest DHS data sets as they are created and will make them credible—using 

dynamic policy-based access controls and privacy protections—to mission users in 

both the Classified and Unclassified environments. DHS will build protections into 

the system that will allow for the identification and protection, as appropriate, of 

sensitive data in the use and sharing of data, both within, and outside of DHS. Currently, 7 of the 20 data sets are available on the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information (TS/SCI) network. 

Question 8c. How will the data enhancement improve foreign fighter identification? 

Answer. Currently, our border control and aviation security measures are enhanced by our ability to compare travel, immigration, and other information against 

disseminated and non-disseminated intelligence community (IC) information. DHS, 

through the Data Framework, is working to bring together DHS data—information 

that DHS gathers during its interactions with the public in the course of executing 

its homeland security responsibilities (e.g., benefits issuance, travel-related screening)—in both the Unclassified and Classified environments, while at the same time 

protecting the privacy and civil liberties of the public. The transfer and storage of 

DHS travel and immigration data on the Classified network via the Data Framework creates a screening and vetting capability that was not previously automated 

for the Department. 

Having DHS data on the TS/SCI network gives users the ability to conduct additional research and determine if applicants have connections to known or suspected 

terrorists via IC reporting. It can lead to the discovery of previously-unknown links 

to suspicious activity or individuals in illicit networks and enables analysts to 

proactively identify individuals associated with a threat who merit additional 

screening, investigation, or other operational actions. 

Question 8d. Will the enhanced screening efforts be duplicative of NCTC or other 

intelligence community efforts? 

Answer. The enhanced screening efforts are complementary. DHS routinely collaborates with NCTC and other IC agencies to ensure screening efforts are not duplicative and each agency’s unique data accesses are exploited to minimize 

vulnerabilities. In the conduct of its law enforcement, immigration, border, and 

transportation security missions, DHS collects an enormous amount of data related 

to the facilitation of travel and trade. This data includes but is not limited to information on international and domestic air passenger manifests, visa application data, 

border crossing data, investigative data, and international imports and exports data. 

Unique DHS authorities allow for the analysis and sharing of this data, consistent 
56 

with the purposes for which it was collected. The comparison of this data with other 

IC or U.S. Government data can lead to previously-unknown insights. 

Question 9a. The budget lists development and deployment of Advanced Imaging 

Technology (AIT)—Tier III detection capabilities as a priority of TSA’s for the upcoming fiscal year to better identify non-metallic threats to the aviation system; 

however, the committee has learned that TSA has yet to even fully proliferate Tier 

II capabilities across the system. 

Is the budget overly optimistic for Tier III development? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has fully deployed Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) Tier II capability. AIT–2s came enabled with Tier 

II, and TSA deployed the Tier II algorithm to the original AITs in 2014. The budget 

is correct in its description of Tier III development. On September 16, 2015, the TSA 

awarded a contract to L–3 Communications valued at $2,571,000 for the development of a Tier III detection algorithm. Under this contract, L–3 Communications 

will deliver the final version of the software for testing in early September 2016; 

they will provide 2 interim deliveries for TSA assessment of progress. Upon completion of Government testing and test report, TSA will make a decision regarding deployment of the AIT Tier III algorithm. 

Question 9b. Why has the advancement of AIT technology been so slow? 

Answer. AIT development is currently sole-sourced to one Original Equipment 

Manufacturer. TSA does not own AIT hardware and software data rights, and is 

solely dependent on the Original Equipment Manufacturer for the advancement of 

the technology. In addition, upgrades to AIT require successful completion of a rigorous testing and qualification process, which can take several rounds due to issues 

that result in schedule slips. TSA’s Innovation Task Force is working with industry 

to establish innovation lanes that will further mature technology, write better requirements, and allow quicker procurement and deployment of emerging technologies. In parallel, TSA is also taking steps to establish a more open future system architecture that would allow for third-party vendor participation in AIT development. 

Question 9c. Will TSA shift its focus from AIT procurement to other methods of 

detecting nonmetallic explosives, such as canines and Explosive Trace Detection? 

Answer. Canines are a valuable asset deployed in cargo and passenger aviation, 

but AIT continues to be a viable option. TSA is working closely with the Department 

of Homeland Security Science and Technology’s Apex Screening at Speed initiative 

to inform the next generation of technology, and has established an Innovation Task 

Force. The Innovation Task Force establishes a forum for collaboration with airports, airlines, and industry to demonstrate emerging capabilities in the airport environment. 

Question 10a. The budget requests funds for the development of new baggage 

screening at checkpoints. 

How will this new technology make a difference in the security of the checkpoint? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) recently submitted a 

targeted Broad Agency Announcement to help in the development of new requirements for the next generation of baggage screening systems for the checkpoint. TSA 

should see gains in security effectiveness and operational efficiencies from next generation baggage screening due to increased detection and reduced false alarms. 

Question 10b. Would resources be better spent investing in another security capability? 

Answer. Once the reviews of industry proposals are complete, TSA will use the 

input to develop the TSA requirements for the next generation systems and determine the best path forward. TSA must invest in technologies that screen accessible 

property to address the threat. 

Question 11. How is DHS working with industry to ensure innovative approaches 

to aviation security? 

Answer. Many of the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) offices collaborate with industry on innovative approaches to aviation security. TSA offices 

participate in working groups with industry associations and on committees such as 

the Aviation Security Advisory Committee and the Aviation Sector Coordinating 

Council, when working in conjunction with the Aviation Government Coordinating 

Council. Industry Engagement Managers with TSA’s Office of Security Policy and 

Industry Engagement collaborate directly with industry representatives on the development of aviation security policy. TSA Principal Security Inspectors and International Industry Representatives engage directly with industry on issues related 

to compliance with policy and alternate measures to achieve aviation security policy 

requirements. TSA conducts regular intelligence briefings with industry to raise the 

intelligence awareness within the community. 
57 

Some examples of innovative approaches to aviation security are the Department 

of Homeland Security Aviation Domain Intelligence Integration & Analysis Cell, 

which includes industry participation; feedback surveys by which industry can respond to the effectiveness of intelligence products that are provided; the policy development process, which includes industry engagement and Quarterly Airport Security Reviews with industry participation; and the Compliance Security Enhancement Through Testing program to enhance industry compliance through measures 

other than penalties. 

Further, TSA has established an Innovation Task Force. The Task Force establishes a forum for collaboration with airports, airlines, and industry to demonstrate 

emerging capabilities in the airport environment. Innovation lanes would provide an 

opportunity for industry to gather data in an operational setting to inform the evolution of technology, and understand the screening process and challenges of the 

screening environment in an effort to enhance detection, increase efficiencies, and 

improve passenger experience. 

Question 12a. The budget requests resources for the deployment of TSA canine 

teams, but does not create any new teams. 

How is DHS working to increase the use of explosives detection canine teams and 

what efforts are being done to streamline the Passenger Screening Canine program? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Explosives Detection 

Canine (EDC) teams are a proven reliable resource in explosives detection, and provide a timely and mobile response to threats involving our Nation’s transportation 

systems. The National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program, includes both 

TSA-led teams (which are all being trained to do both traditional canine screening 

as well as passenger screening) and State and local law enforcement (LE)-led teams 

(who under an Other Transaction Agreement are required to spend 80 percent of 

their on-duty time securing the transportation facility(ies) within their area of responsibility. As of March 2016, TSA is funded for 322 TSA-led teams and 675 LEled teams, for a total of 997 teams. TSA currently allocates 322 teams led by TSA 

employees that are deployed at 47 airports. By the end of 2017, all TSA-led teams 

will be certified to screen in all areas, including passengers and accessible property 

in queue. 

Question 12b. The committee has heard reports that TSA canine teams are struggling to meet certification standards. What is being done to ensure canines are able 

to meet the necessary standards for security? 

Answer. The current success rate for all TSA team evaluations for the Explosives 

Detection Canine teams and the Passenger Screening Canine teams is over 92 percent. If a team does not meet TSA standards, the team is de-certified and goes into 

remedial training until they are prepared for a re-evaluation. 

Question 13. The budget request supports new TSA Field Intelligence Officer positions at airports across the United States. How will these positions be used to connect the front-line workforce and stakeholders to the threats facing aviation and 

surface transportation? 

Answer. Field Intelligence Officers (FIOs) are assigned to major airports across 

the United States based on continuous risk evaluations. FIOs serve as Transportation Security Administration (TSA) assets in the field. FIOs draw from intelligence community partners to provide direct intelligence support, threat awareness 

briefings, and information sharing to all TSA operational field components, including the front-line workforce, and to transportation security stakeholders for all 

modes of transportation. 

FIOs provide intelligence briefings and training at the appropriate classification 

level regarding threats; terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures; known or suspected terrorist travel encounters; and other relevant current intelligence to the 

TSA airport workforce. FIOs deliver Mission Essentials and Threat Mitigation training to the screening workforce on a quarterly basis, and will continue to provide adhoc intelligence briefings on emergent threat issues to field components. 

FIOs also share relevant Classified and Unclassified intelligence and threat information with local transportation security stakeholders, as permitted by dissemination limitations and stakeholder eligibility to access Classified material. These 

stakeholders include airport and/or local law enforcement and/or security staff with 

jurisdiction at the airport, airline/carrier (passenger and cargo) security staff, rail 

security staff, pipeline security staff, and other transportation security staff (highways, etc.). Further, FIOs liaise and provide unique transportation security intelligence sharing with Federal and local partners; provide input to joint finished intelligence production in areas pertaining to transportation; participate in joint exercises and information-sharing events; and provide transportation threat briefs as 

needed. These partners include other components within Department of Homeland 
58 

Security (DHS), Department of State, and Local Fusion Centers, DHS Intelligence 

Enterprise local partners, and intelligence community representatives. 

Question 14a. As we have learned in previous hearings, our Nation’s surface 

transportation system remains a vulnerable target for attack. 

How is TSA measuring the effectiveness and deterrence value of its Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams? How has VIPR deployment changed 

to be more risk-based? 

Answer. The newly-updated Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) 

Concept of Operations (CONOPS) outlines the risk-based framework that is the 

basis for VIPR team deployment scheduling. Within the CONOPS framework, consideration is given to the risk-mitigation potential that the VIPR law enforcement 

and screening capabilities bring to each transportation mode and the visible presence that can be achieved when deploying to different locations within modes. Risk 

levels have been assigned to modes and locations and target ranges have been established for the percent of operations that are conducted within each risk level. 

Combined with scheduling principles to drive randomness and geographic dispersion, the framework seeks to optimize the value that the Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) achieves with the VIPR Program. 

Question 14b. What contribution to security do Surface Transportation Inspectors 

make? Would those resources be better devoted to additional grant funding for surface transportation entities? 

Answer. Transportation Security Inspectors—Surface (TSI–S) provide subject-matter expertise for the planning and execution of effective VIPR operations in the surface transportation domain. TSI–S duties include helping local transit systems conduct vulnerability assessments, developing security plans to have a path forward to 

remediate vulnerabilities identified in the vulnerability assessments, and identifying 

resources that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) (or other areas of 

the Federal Government) can provide to help transit systems raise their security 

baseline. 

The results of these assessments are analyzed to influence TSA policy to ensure 

that policies and programs are addressing the most critical vulnerabilities from a 

security perspective. 

Specific to the vulnerabilities identified from the assessments, Inspectors collaborate with industry on various risk mitigation activities including active-shooter 

training, improvised explosive devices awareness training, explosives mitigation 

training, and First Observer training. 

The TSI–S and grant funding are each valuable in their own specific way. Grants 

help the stakeholder to develop and implement programs and processes, while the 

Inspector force provides the continuity and oversight to the surface entities. However, once awarded and spent, the grant does not allow for flexibility, whereas Inspectors are able to shift from freight rail to mass transit to pipeline, based on 

emerging or confirmed threats. Additionally, grants do not have the ability to impact the number of entities that TSI–S impact each year. 

Question 15a. The President’s budget request funds the acquisition of 4 new Fast 

Response Cutters (FRCs). In order to complete the FRC program before full-scale 

production of the Coast Guard’s top acquisition priority, the Offshore Patrol Cutter, 

the Coast Guard should not be slowing its production of the FRC. Can the Coast 

Guard complete the FRC program before the planned full-scale production of OPCs 

if it only acquires 4 per year? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2017–2021 Capital Investment Plan, which reflects funding to acquire 6 Fast Response Cutters (FRCs) in fiscal year 2019 and fiscal year 

2020, illustrates that the U.S. Coast Guard will have all remaining 26 FRCs on contract to complete the Program of Record (58 FRCs) by the end of fiscal year 2020. 

This is prior to full-scale production of the Offshore Patrol Cutter Program in fiscal 

year 2021. 

Question 15b. If it will require an increase to 6 FRCs in future years, why does 

the Coast Guard only want 4 in fiscal year 2017? 

Answer. As illustrated in the fiscal year 2017–2021 Capital Investment Plan, the 

2017 request supports a full funding plan to put the remaining FRCs under contract 

by 2020. 

Question 15c. Is the Coast Guard not prepared logistically to accept more than 

4 in fiscal year 2017? 

Answer. Per the FRC Phase I contract, WPCs 1120–1125 have contract delivery 

dates in fiscal year 2017 and the U.S. Coast Guard is prepared logistically to accept 

these cutters. The FRC Phase II contract is structured with options to acquire 4, 

5, or 6 cutters in any given option year. 

Question 16a. This budget provides $150 million for multi-year funding to design 

a new heavy icebreaker and establish an icebreaker acquisition program. The Com-
59 

mandant has said that he believes the Coast Guard needs a fleet of 3 heavy icebreakers and 3 medium icebreakers. 

Understanding that the Coast Guard expects the cost of a single heavy icebreaker to be approximately $1 billion and the Coast Guard is looking to build 3 heavy icebreakers, how is the icebreaking mission a Homeland Security mission requirement? 

Answer. Icebreaking is one of several statutory missions of the U.S. Coast Guard 

classified as ‘‘non-homeland security’’ missions that were retained when the Coast 

Guard was transferred wholesale to DHS in 2003. In the Arctic, icebreakers may 

support the Coast Guard’s statutory missions classified as ‘‘homeland security’’ including port, waterways, and coastal security operations and law enforcement operations. 

Question 16b. Would this mission be better suited for the U.S. Navy? 

Answer. The Navy transferred their wartime icebreaking fleet to the U.S. Coast 

Guard in 1965. Since that time the U.S. Coast Guard has maintained and operated 

all Federally-owned icebreakers. 

Question 17a. Since no United States shipyard has built a heavy icebreaker in 

over 40 years, what technical and contracting challenges do you anticipate in this 

acquisition project? 

Answer. The technical challenges for the Polar Icebreaker acquisition are primarily related to size, complexity of the vessel design, and the limited number of 

heavy icebreakers being produced in the world. Special skill sets are required to design and construct a heavy icebreaker as compared to other vessels. The heavy icebreaker envisioned by the Coast Guard must possess the endurance to travel to remote areas, break up to 21 feet of ice, and operate in the harsh and dynamic conditions of the Polar Regions while being able to support multiple missions. These requirements influence size and complexity. The design of the heavy icebreaker must 

include redundant, robust, winterized, and maintainable systems and components to 

facilitate the vessel’s ability to operate independently in extreme environments and 

overcome the effects of high levels of vibration experienced during icebreaking. 

Through the pre-acquisition work underway, we are taking steps to develop a comprehensive ship specification and establish effective evaluation criteria to ensure the 

selection of the most capable shipbuilder. 

Question 17b. How is the Coast Guard going to mitigate these challenges? 

Answer. The U.S. Coast Guard will mitigate these challenges with the following 

best practices: • Conduct frequent engagements with industry to ensure requirements are producible, feasible, measurable, and affordable; • Employ an Active Risk Management process to identify issues with cost, schedule, and performance early in the acquisition process; • Establish an effective acquisition strategy and contracting method to incentivize 

industry to provide the best ship at the best price; and 

• Follow a structured and proven acquisition approach as outlined in the U.S. 

Coast Guard’s Major Systems Acquisition Manual. 

Question 18a. The Coast Guard has said in the past that it believes it needs an 

Acquisition, Construction, and Improvements (AC&I) budget of about $1.5 billion 

per year. The President’s budget, providing just over $1.1 billion for Coast Guard 

AC&I does not fully support the stated Coast Guard recapitalization needs and significantly decreases funding for acquisition from the fiscal year 2016 funded level 

of $1.95 billion. The committee fully supports the funding of the Coast Guard’s recapitalization effort and is concerned that this decrease in funding will delay delivery in cutters and limit future recapitalization needs. 

How will you ensure the Coast Guard has the cutters and aircraft it needs to be 

effective in carrying out the homeland security missions of the Coast Guard? 

Answer. Requirements across DHS are considered through the annual Resource 

Planning Process. U.S. Coast Guard recapitalization remains a top Departmental 

priority. The fiscal year 2017–2021 Capital Investment Plan reflects the Department’s commitment to the U.S. Coast Guard recapitalization, with funding programmed commensurate with increasing acquisition funding requirements over the 

next 5 years. The planned funding over this period fully supports critical acquisitions such as the Offshore Patrol Cutter and heavy polar icebreaker, and completes 

the Fast Response Cutter program of record. 

Question 18b. Although this budget indicates difficult choices, indicated by drastic 

cuts in several priority areas, in what ways is the Department helping the Coast 

Guard complete its recapitalization effort? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2017–2021 Capital Investment Plan reflects the Department’s commitment to the U.S. Coast Guard recapitalization, with funding programmed commensurate with increasing acquisition funding requirements over the 

next 5 years. Based on the funding profile in that plan the U.S. Coast Guard will 
60 

begin production on the Offshore Patrol Cutter, begin construction of the first new 

heavy polar icebreaker in more than 40 years, and complete the Fast Response Cutter program of record. 

Question 19a. Although the Coast Guard’s program of record for the National Security Cutters (NSC) calls for only 8 NSCs, The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 

2016, provided funding for the production of a ninth NSC. 

How will the acquisition of a ninth NSC affect the OPC program? Will 25 OPCs 

still be procured? 

Answer. The U.S. Coast Guard is currently conducting a Fleet Mix Analysis to 

better understand the performance impacts of the additional National Security Cutters (NSC). 

Question 19b. Given the ninth NSC, will the Coast Guard still be able to afford 

2 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) per year and accelerate the acquisition of a heavy 

icebreaker? 

Answer. Yes. The U.S. Coast Guard’s fiscal year 2017–2021 Capital Investment 

Plan reflects the procurement of 2 OPCs per year beginning in fiscal year 2021, and 

includes funding for Polar Icebreaker up through the first phase of production funding in fiscal year 2021. The NSC, OPC, and Polar Icebreaker programs all remain 

on schedule at these funding levels. 

Question 19c. What challenges does the Coast Guard face with the addition of the 

ninth NSC? Specifically, how has the Coast Guard planned for the additional costs 

related to facilities, operations, crewing, and maintenance that will result from the 

acquisition of a ninth NSC? 

Answer. The ninth NSC will require out-year investments totaling $2.5 billion 

over a 30-year life: 

These include: 

• ∼$640 million for long lead time materials and production (funded in fiscal year 

2016); 

• ∼$138 million for post-delivery activities and shore infrastructure development; 

• ∼$1.7 billion for operations and maintenance over 30 years of service life. 

The U.S. Coast Guard is in the process of conducting a full analysis of homeport 

options to include evaluation of: Mission needs, distance to primary operational 

area, work-life of crew, logistical support availability, infrastructure enhancement 

costs, and environmental impacts. Once that analysis is completed, we will have a 

much clearer picture of the cost of homeporting the ninth NSC. 

Question 19d. Does the Coast Guard plan on conducting a new Fleet Mix Analysis 

incorporating the ninth NSC into the analysis? 

Answer. The U.S. Coast Guard is in the process of conducting a Fleet Mix Analysis. The ninth NSC will be incorporated into this evaluation. 

Question 20. There have been funds requested to improving security at the White 

House, Vice President’s Residence, and several other sites in response to recent security breaches. Will these funds be enough to improve Secret Service and address 

your Panel’s recommendations to improve the Service? Are there strategies beyond 

funding that should be considered? 

Answer. The Secret Service is making steady progress in addressing known security requirements as well as emerging threats at the White House, Vice President’s 

Residence, and other permanent and temporary protective sites. A majority of the 

funding requested to address the recommendations of the independent Protective 

Mission Panel involve personnel initiatives to address staffing challenges, training 

enhancements, White House and Vice President’s Residence security infrastructure 

improvements, and protective technology upgrades. Some of these initiatives, particularly those involving construction, were granted multi-year funding and do not 

require additional funds in fiscal year 2017. Others have second year or 

sustainment needs that are included in the fiscal year 2017 President’s Budget. 

Beyond funding, over the past year the Director of the Secret Service reformed 

the agency’s command structure and implemented policies to increase transparency 

and communication between senior leaders, supervisors, and the rank-and-file 

across the agency to improve morale. By aligning operational and mission support 

functions under 2 different executives, the Deputy Director and the Chief Operating 

Officer, the Secret Service now has a structure in place that brings greater focus 

to the operational mission and business needs of the agency, recognizing the specialized skills needed to effectively manage each. The Secret Service also implemented 

the first ever Special Agent Career Progression policy, allowing employees to better 

plan and predict for themselves and their families when they should expect upcoming moves and transfers. Further, the agency published policies on promotions and 

implemented a new special agent promotion and reassignment bid process and 

schedule to increase transparency. 
61 

Question 21a. For the past few years, the levels of both Uniformed Division Officers and Special Agents have been below acceptable levels. This understaffing has 

led to a litany of issues within the Service, including a lack of ample time for officer 

and agent training, excessive overtime, low morale, and high levels of attrition. In 

order to increase its staffing levels, the Secret Service took a series of steps, including the development of an aggressive human capital plan and the hiring of contractors to help with recruiting and facilitate the on-boarding of new hires. Ensuring 

the Secret Service is properly staffed is crucial, especially considering the additional 

strain the 2016 Presidential campaign is placing on the agency’s resources. 

How does this budget request support the execution of the Secret Service’s human 

capital plan? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2017 budget supports the Secret Service’s aggressive accession plan for both Special Agent and Uniformed Division personnel, as well as 

administrative, professional, and technical staffing to achieve a net gain of 224 fulltime equivalents over the fiscal year 2016 level. Achieving this staffing level will 

enable the Secret Service to make progress towards meeting the staffing goals outlined in the Secret Service’s Human Capital Plan. 

Question 21b. How many additional Uniformed Division Officers and Special 

Agents does the Secret Service plan to hire and train in fiscal year 2017? 

Answer. The fiscal year 2017 budget supports 6,705 full-time equivalents (FTEs) 

and 6,772 positions, which is 224 FTEs and 58 positions higher than where the 

agency projected to end this fiscal year. Depending on the time it takes to on-board 

these new hires, the rate of attrition, and the impact of those factors on the budgeted FTEs, the fiscal year 2017 budget would allow the Secret Service to maximize 

its hiring efforts again next year as the agency works to keep pace with its 5-year 

Human Capital Plan. At a minimum, the Secret Service will hire 168 Special Agents 

and 192 Uniformed Division Officers in fiscal year 2017. 

Question 21c. What additional steps can the Secret Service take to increase its 

staffing to acceptable levels? 

Answer. While the Secret Service has made significant progress on its hiring 

goals, these achievements have been offset by increased attrition. As such, the retention of the existing workforce is a priority. The agency’s biggest retention effort 

to date was directed at the Uniformed Division workforce with the implementation 

of the 2-year Uniformed Division Retention Bonus Program. At the same time, the 

Secret Service is implementing a more comprehensive retention program aimed at 

all members of the workforce. Initiatives such as student loan payback, tuition assistance, and the reintroduction of the Senior Special Agent and Senior Resident 

Agent Programs were implemented in April 2016. The Secret Service also plans to 

implement a career progression plan for its administrative, professional, and technical employees, which would provide a clear road map for professional development 

and career advancement. This is in addition to the projected implementation of a 

child-care subsidy program which would apply to qualified employees with children 

13 years old or younger, or 18 years old and younger if the child is disabled. Such 

initiatives, along with further steps currently under consideration, will allow the Secret Service to achieve staffing levels consistent with the agency’s fiscal year 2015– 

2019 Human Capital Plan. 

Question 22a. In the fiscal year 2017 budget request, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) requests approximately $22.5 million for the creation of a Rapid Protection 

Force (RPF), which is designed to deploy around the country to ‘‘heightened threat 

situations.’’ In order to pay for this new force, FPS will be raising its basic security 

fee from 74 cents to 78 cents and will increase its oversight fee from 6 percent to 

8 percent. In addition, FPS will add 121 full-time equivalents (FTE) to create the 

RPF. 

Why is this RPF is even needed? 

Answer. Federal facilities and tenants remain a target of international and domestic terrorist threats. 

Today FPS builds and deploys regional and National enhanced security teams by 

pulling available personnel from across the country. Regions are taking calculated 

risks to provide personnel in support of these operations. 

The RPF will help FPS better address the current threat environment by increasing responsiveness to rapidly provide enhanced security to Federal facilities and 

personnel. The RPF will increase operational flexibility, capacity, and capability, 

and will be more effective than the current system of ad hoc teams. 

Question 22b. Given the specialized training and equipment needed for the RPF, 

how much more will it cost to create this RPF versus just hiring the additional 121 

FTEs? 

Answer. We utilized the DHS Modular Cost Standards to create the RPF, which 

is the same for all FPS activities. In essence, the creation of the RPF costs the same 
62 

as hiring and equipping an additional 121 FTEs. A mixture of new and existing Law 

Enforcement Officers is being utilized to create the RPF. New hires will be sent to 

regions where the existing Law Enforcement Officers joined the RPF. 

Question 23. The fiscal year 2017 budget request includes $39.8 million to implement the first phase of the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 

Center (NCCIC) Staffing Plan. What is the long-term staffing plan for the NCCIC, 

and how will this plan address increased demands? 

Answer. The NCCIC Staffing Plan is a 5-year strategic resource document that 

reflects comprehensive planning and analysis efforts and increasing demand for the 

NCCIC’s services. The plan identifies data-driven staffing requirements commensurate to the projected need for NCCIC products and services. The fiscal year 2017 

request implements the first phase of the Staffing Plan, providing Federal and contractor personnel to support the growth in demand for NCCIC services. The first 

phase supports additional proactive assessments (‘‘red team’’), 24×7 operational 

staffing at both our Glebe and Pensacola locations, coverage, and funds to maintain 

readiness to execute National security/emergency preparedness activities. The fiscal 

year 2017 request will also enable specialized cyber defense teams to apply capabilities from across the NCCIC, including incident response, ‘‘red team’’ penetration 

testing and cyber hunt capabilities, addressing the victim’s specific risk management requirements and supporting the proactive identification of vulnerabilities and 

threats in agency networks. 

Question 24. The fiscal year 2017 request includes $8.25 million for Automated 

Indicator Sharing (AIS) Threat Dissemination to fulfill the information-sharing requirements of the Cybersecurity Act of 2015. As you know, this committee has been 

closely following the DHS implementation of the Cybersecurity Act. Can you give 

the committee an update on this status and how these funds will be used? 

Answer. DHS met the legislatively-mandated deadline to certify that the Automated Indicator Sharing is operational. As of April 13, 13 private-sector companies 

and 5 Federal agencies are connected to the AIS system. Over 70 non-Federal entities are in the process of connecting. DHS is planning a gradual increase in the 

number of participants over the next year to address any technology issues that inherently arise in any new IT system. In fiscal year 2017, DHS requested a programmatic increase of $8.25 million for 

AIS to support expanded indicator sharing capabilities, exercises focused on indicator sharing between Government and the private sector, and additional NCCIC 

analysts to ensure appropriate enrichment and privacy and civil liberties review as 

the volume of indicators increase. More specifically, funds will be used to: • Improve the TAXII cyber threat indicator gateway, with a focus on the National 

Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS) receipt and dissemination infrastructure; improve internal data management infrastructure, and capabilities to 

transmit information; and provide the ability to tag information and provide access to the appropriate customers (e.g. by masking or locking or other means). 

Funds will be used to allow additional redundancy as indicator sharing becomes 

increasingly integral to NCPS and to the NCCIC’s efforts to secure Federal civilian agencies and help companies better secure their own networks. $3.75 million 

• Conduct exercises focused on indicator sharing between Government and the 

private sector, intended to institutionalize procedures, improve informationsharing capabilities among various partners, and demonstrate the value proposition of indicator sharing. $3 million 

• Support enrichment and privacy and civil liberties review processes. $1.5 million 

Question 25a. On February 11, the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 

Response, and Communications held a hearing on DHS’s biosurveillance and biodetection capabilities where both Drs. Brinsfield and Brothers testified on the challenges facing BioWatch and the National Biosurveillance Integration Center. Recent 

reports from the Government Accountability Office and the Blue Ribbon Study 

Panel on Biodefense highlighted the need to prioritize this issue of biological preparedness capabilities. 

What will the Department do in fiscal year 2017 to ensure these programs are 

providing a return on investment? 

Answer. DHS investments in the BioWatch Program and the National Biosurveillance Integration Center help protect against, prepare for, and support the coordinated response and recovery for biological events. Ultimately, the return on these 

investments is the insurance of a safe, secure, and resilient homeland. 

With respect to BioWatch, the Department will continue to ensure that the currently-fielded technology is operated in accordance with established guidance and 

subject to a rigorous quality assurance program. Additionally, the program will 
63 

work with interagency and DHS components involved in biodetection to leverage the 

expertise, experience, and investments of the entire community. Looking to the future, the program will benefit from the more robust acquisition policies and procedures developed by the Department in recent years. The establishment and continued development of the Joint Requirements Council serves as another example of 

processes put in place to make our investment decisions. Return on investment is 

a major consideration in making these decisions. 

The National Biosurveillance Integration Center (NBIC) has made great strides 

in recent years and the Department is committed to working with the Biosurveillance community, including those partners at the State, local, Tribal, and territorial 

level to further this work. In the coming year, NBIC will start work on the next 

iteration of its strategic plan. This process is expected to refine and hone how the 

program works with partners to evaluate needs and gaps and then works to develop 

or leverage available tools and data to enhance biosurveillance integration. As in 

years past, NBIC will work with the Department of Defense and others to leverage 

their investments in tools, technology, and data management to maximize value. 

Additionally, the Department will further explore how DHS data sets and intelligence community information can enhance and contextualize the biosurveillance 

picture. 

In fiscal year 2017, the Department will continue to evaluate and enhance 

BioWatch and NBIC to ensure these programs are contributing toward meeting the 

goals listed above. DHS will also continue to regularly assess BioWatch and NBIC 

through resource allocation decisions in its annual budget cycle. 

Question 25b. When you directed the cancellation of the BioWatch Gen–3 acquisition in April 2014, you tasked Dr. Brinsfield and Dr. Brothers to work together to 

come up with enhancements to the current BioWatch system and proposals for next 

generation technology. To date, it does not appear much progress has been made 

in this effort. What is the plan for BioWatch going forward? When can this committee expect to see outcomes from the Office of Health Affairs and Science and 

Technology Directorate? 

Answer. Since the April 2014 DHS Acquisition Decision Memorandum, DHS S&T 

and BioWatch have been collaborating to advance a plan for enhancing BioWatch 

technologies to increase coverage and speed of detection. These improvements are 

intended to advance the current ‘‘detect to treat’’ capability, which will further enable us to deploy medical countermeasures before the population is symptomatic. 

BioWatch and DHS S&T developed a Technology Road Map outlining near-term 

(1–3 years) and mid- to long-term (3+ years) BioWatch technology enhancements 

with an estimated deployment of near-term enhancements in fiscal year 2018, pending appropriate funding. 

To date, the collaboration between DHS S&T and BioWatch has resulted in: (1) 

A comprehensive needs analysis, (2) requirements development, (3) market survey 

and analysis of enhancement opportunities, (4) capability development planning, (5) 

programming, and (6) periodic programmatic reviews. 

In the late fall of 2014, DHS S&T released 5 Requests for Information (RFIs) on 

technologies that can address critical BioWatch capability gaps, and a total of 56 

responses were received and subsequently reviewed. Additionally, in the spring/summer of 2015, Sandia National Laboratories completed a Market Survey on potential 

technologies that can address identified BioWatch capability gaps. The technologies 

identified through the Market Survey were reviewed during two Focus Group meetings held in September 2015 by 18 BioWatch stakeholders (representing BioWatch 

Laboratory and Field Operations and Public Health Preparedness). The results of 

the RFIs, Market Survey, and Focus Group meetings were documented by Sandia 

National Laboratories in a final report titled BioWatch Capability Enhancement Assessment Report in December 2015. 

Throughout fiscal year 2016, BioWatch has worked with DHS leadership, in accordance with Acquisition Management Instructions, to develop the required documentation for Acquisition Decision Event 1 (ADE–1), which is scheduled for the first 

quarter of fiscal year 2017. The required ADE–1 documents, including a Mission 

Needs Statement, a Capability Development Pan (CDP), and a Rough Order of Magnitude (ROM) Cost Estimate, will be completed prior to the passage through the 

ADE–1 gate. 

BioWatch stakeholders have been continuously engaged throughout the technology enhancement process, including participation in the above-mentioned Focus 

Group meetings, as well as webinar sessions and presentations at the Institute of 

Medicine. BioWatch stakeholders have also briefed the Nuclear, Biological, and 

Chemical Industry Group (NBC–IG) on 3 occasions to ensure the commercial sector 

is aware of BioWatch technology enhancement needs and that they are briefed on 
64 

the status of acquisitions through OHA and/or Broad Agency Announcements from 

DHS S&T. 

In addition, in fiscal year 2016 BioWatch advanced the development of 2 tools contributing to situational awareness, Decision Support Tool (DST) and a Sample 

Tracking Tool (STT), with development of both tools planned in fiscal year 2017 to 

all jurisdictions, pending the availability of an appropriations act. 

Question 26. Secretary Johnson, the fiscal year 2017 budget request provides very 

little detail on the newly-proposed Regional Competitive Grant Program. 

Why would the Department propose to create a new program at the same time 

that it is proposing cuts to other seemingly similar and critical grant programs? 

Can you provide more detail to the committee about the new Regional Competitive Grant Program, who would be eligible, and how funding will be distributed? 

The fiscal year 2017 budget requests $100 million for a new Regional Competitive 

Grant Program, but the budget documents do not provide any detail about what the 

program would look like. 

Can you describe the program? 

Who would be eligible to apply and what activities would it support? 

Which regions would you expect to be the primary recipients of this funding? 

Areas with currently funded United Area Security Initiatives (UASIs)? 

Or would the funding support the sustainment of capabilities for areas that have 

not historically received significant grant funds? 

Answer. The administration is proposing to re-align $100 million from the Homeland Security Grant Program to a new Regional Competitive Grant Program which 

will target critical preparedness capability gaps at the regional level. This new program is responsive to specific National preparedness needs as identified through a 

variety of strategic assessments, including an analysis of State and regional Threat 

and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments, the annual National Preparedness 

Report, the Strategic National Risk Assessment, and other assessments of National 

risk and capabilities. 

Funding under the program will be awarded on a competitive basis, applying risk 

mitigation and project effectiveness as the primary evaluation measures. States, localities, and urban areas, including current UASI grant recipients would be eligible 

to apply. The administration expects that the most competitive applicants will be 

those who propose to work on a regional basis to address critical capability shortfalls. As with the existing preparedness grant programs, funding under the regional 

competitive program would support activities to build and sustain the capabilities 

identified in the National Preparedness Goal. 

Question 27. The Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) are being used to help S&T 

and operational components identify capability gaps and eliminate redundant programs and projects. 

Can you provide more detail about the IPTs to date and how they are working 

to eliminate redundant projects? 

Answer. In response to the Secretary’s August 2015 memo, S&T established a governance structure and operational process for the IPTs in fiscal year 2016. This included standing up 5 chartered IPTs that identified technological capability gaps in 

their respective mission areas. Based on inputs from the IPTs, the S&T Research 

Council (composed of the component IPT leads) identified the high-priority gaps determined to be most important for R&D investment across DHS. 

The fiscal year 2016 IPT process proved effective and produced results in a short 

time frame. These results are presented in a final report, which identifies 24 highpriority technological capability gaps that span all 5 IPTs. The fiscal year 2016 process also identified R&D efforts that address the highest-priority gaps. As part of this 

process, the IPTs and the S&T Research Council identified duplicative or overlapping R&D activities and recommended ways to mitigate duplication going forward. 

One way to resolve duplication is to consolidate similar or redundant R&D efforts 

into a unified or joint effort. An example of this occurred in the fiscal year 2016 

IPT process. During the Biological Threat sub-IPT meetings on Detect, Identify, 

and/or Clarify, representatives from CBP, FEMA, and USSS identified the requirement for rapid warning, identification, and characterization of biological threats in 

support of the Nation’s BioWatch program and other programmatic needs. While 

these components would field such technology for differing uses, including force protection, public safety, and decision support, the Bio Threat IPT chose to consolidate 

these otherwise independent requirements into joint projects. This resulted in improved communication among components and a more focused R&D acquisition profile. 

Question 28a. The S&T Embed Program embeds S&T program staff into operational components for both short- and long-term opportunities. 
65 

What mechanisms are in place to ensure S&T program staff is effectively communicating about these experiences with S&T? 

Answer. In December 2015, the Embed Program manager worked in conjunction 

with human capital and legal offices to develop a report construct, implement formal 

policy, and deploy a permanent reporting mechanism for all embed staff to communicate their field experiences with S&T employees. In addition, the Embed Program 

is working in harmony with the newly-implemented Integrated Product Team program management to inject the embed reports into their capability gap business 

management process. Lastly, upon return from an Embed engagement, the embedded staff is given the opportunity to present their report to the S&T staff in an open 

forum setting. To enhance this presentation method, in most cases, S&T has invited 

component operators to participate in the presentation giving their perspective to 

the Embed experience. It is the Embed Program’s vision to continue these venues 

in fiscal year 2017, with expectation of adding presentations at the participating 

component headquarters facilities. 

Question 28b. How many staff are currently embedded throughout the Department, how many more do you expect to utilize this program in fical year 2017? 

Answer. The Embed Program’s fiscal year 2016 engagement: 

1. DHS U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Technical Operations 

Center, Lorton, VA 

• 1 October–30 December 

• Mr. John Price, S&T’s First Responders Group 

2. DHS Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Headquarters, Washington, DC 

• 15 February 2015–Current 

• Dr. Keith Holtermann, S&T’s R&D Partnerships Group 

3. DHS Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, Training Research and Innovation Directorate, Glynco, GA 

• 1 April–29 July 

• Mr. James Grove, S&T’s R&D Partnerships Group 

4. Joint Interagency Task Force South, Innovation and Technology Directorate, 

Key West, FL 

• 10 March–10 June 

• Mr. James Odasso, S&T’s Capability Development Support Group. 

The Embed Program currently has 3 staff members embedded with DHS operators serving in both internal and external DHS environments. The Embed Program 

manager expects to deploy 4 more staff in fiscal year 2016 for a total of 8 deployments. The Embed Program manager plans to deploy 8 to 10 staff members in fiscal 

year 2017. 

Question 29a. Can you provide us with additional details about the Science and 

Technology Directorate’s Apex programs? 

I understand they range from border situational awareness to next generation 

first responders; can you share any outcomes thus far? 

Answer. Apex projects are cross-cutting, multi-disciplinary programs identified as 

highest priority, value, and impact programs developed based on priority needs of 

DHS components and customers. They are intended to solve problems of strategic 

operational importance to DHS. There are currently 8 Apex programs in various 

maturity states. The programs include Air Entry/Exit Re-Engineering (AEER), Border Enforcement Analytics Program (BEAP), Border Situational Awareness (BSA), 

Screening at Speed (SaS), Next Generation Cyber Infrastructure (NGCI), Real-Time 

Bio Threat Awareness (BSV), Next-Generation First Responder (NGFR), and Flood 

Awareness (Flood). Further information on these programs and outcomes to date is 

attached. 

ATTACHMENT

PROGRAM DESCRIPTIONS

• Air Entry/Exit Re-Engineering (AEER).—Identify, develop, test, and evaluate 

new concepts of operation to enhance and facilitate traveler-screening processes 

• Border Enforcement Analytics Program (BEAP).—Provides advanced computing 

and analytical solutions that enable Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s 

(ICE) Homeland Security Investigation (HSI) to effectively combine and analyze 

multiple, large disparate data sets to increase enforcement effectiveness 

• Border Situational Awareness (BSA).—Improve situational awareness to more 

effectively and efficiently deploy resources 

• Screening at Speed (SaS).—Seamless detection of threats while respecting privacy 
66 

• Next Generation Cyber Infrastructure (NGCI).—Develop and deliver advanced 

sensing technologies and network protections • Real-Time Bio Threat Awareness (BSV).—Demonstrate detection capabilities 

that create timely awareness • Next-Generation First Responder (NGFR).—Harnesses the best existing and 

emerging technologies and integrates them in a well-defined and standardsbased open architecture enabling first responders to be protected, connected, 

and fully aware • Flood Awareness (Flood).—Planned to reduce flood fatalities and property damage as well as increasing community resilience to flood disasters. 

APEX OUTCOMES

• Apex BEAP transitioned an initial ‘‘Big Data’’ solution that is now supporting 

live investigations for Homeland Security Investigation’s counter-proliferation 

unit, including the Export Enforcement Coordination Center, formed under Executive Order 13558 in 2010. These technologies enable operational personnel 

to process large amounts of disparate data and perform analytics to gain insights that were previously unattainable with ICE’s current tools and databases. The insights have led to reports, active investigations, lead packages sent 

to various field offices including overseas attache ́s, and seizures of illicit shipments. As a result of the Apex BEAP Program, ICE has engineered new business processes to take advantage of results from the system. BEAP is in the 

process of fully automating interfaces to DHS data flows and developing applications for additional ICE investigation domains. • S&T’s Apex AEER and CBP-resourced efforts to strengthen and improve operational efficiency of CBP Traveler Inspections upon arrival to the United States 

(Entry) as well develop cost-effecting Concepts of Operation to support a future 

CBP Biometric Air Exit Capability. To put this in perspective, DHS previously 

estimated Biometric Exit would cost between $3 billion–$10 billion to deploy. 

This represents less than 1 percent investment in S&T to accelerate and inform 

a multi-billion dollar DHS acquisition program. As a result, it has identified a 

number of new technically viable concepts of operation and biometric technologies that could be used to enable that acquisition. S&T asserts that the 

technology questions are now resolved. Improving current entry operations for 

CBP not only allows CBP to strengthen its inspections of international travelers, it also enables them to improve the efficiency and scalability of operations 

as the number of international travelers coming to the United States grows by 

approximately 5 percent per year. Greater efficiency also has significant benefit 

to the U.S. economy. • The NGFR Apex worked with the Integrated Justice Information Systems Institute and the Open Geospatial Consortium to investigate, develop, and test candidate architectures, components, and relevant standards for an Internet of 

Things Pilot using lightweight sensors, and to develop new or enhanced open 

standards of profiles for interfacing with these sensors. This pilot has demonstrated the development of interoperable, open standards-based solutions that 

leveraged lightweight, low-cost, and networked sensors. The results demonstrated real-time, realistic actionable information in support of incident response and management. 

ENGINES

Apex Technology Engines represent a new approach to realizing the S&T Visionary Goals. The Engines identify and share subject-matter expertise, technical solutions and tools, best practices, lessons learned, and reusable products and solutions 

on behalf of Apex and other S&T projects. Teaming and collaboration to leverage 

knowledge from the DHS enterprise and external stakeholders are core components 

of the Engine approach. 

ENGINE DESCRIPTIONS

• Behavioral, Economic, and Social Science Engine (BESS–E) provides analysis of 

the social and behavioral implications of new technologies, programs, and policies to support their research, implementation, and diffusion. 

• Communication and Networking (CN–E) provides integrated communications 

and networking solutions that ensure operability and interoperability across all 

network platforms to ensure the efficient and effective exchange of voice, video, 

and data information. 

• Data Analytics Engine (DA–E) provides expertise and tools for projects to leverage emerging storage, security, computation, and analytics technologies to cre-
67 

ate information and rapidly convert data to decisions for homeland security systems, missions, and operations. 

• Identity Access and Management (IDAM–E) provides the capability to deliver individuals and systems a digital identity, credentials, authentication, and authorization to allow the right people to securely access the right data at the 

right time. 

• Modeling and Simulation Engine (MS–E) provides expertise and a repository for 

mission-based models, as well as modeling and simulation tools. 

• Situational Awareness and Decision Support (SANDS–E) provides Apex and 

other S&T projects with assured, secure access to databases, knowledge bases, 

modeling and simulation tools, and shared situational awareness products. 

ENGINE OUTCOMES

• DA–E completed 2 social media pilots for USCIS screening and vetting of K– 

1 Visa and Syrian/Iraqi refugee populations under the auspices of the Social 

Media Task Force. USCIS is now implementing the methodology developed with 

S&T in its social media screening and vetting operations. Two additional pilots 

are planned to start later in 2016. 

• MS–E provided the USSS with subject-matter expertise and technical oversight 

for crowd ingress, egress, and emergency evaluation for the September 2015 

Papal visit. The value of the MS–E work led the USSS to express interest in 

utilizing S&T to provide modeling and simulation support to enhance the safety 

of the Republican and Democratic National Conventions, as well as the 2017 

U.S. Presidential Inauguration. The crowd analysis they will provide to the 

Presidential Inauguration will be based on an enhanced model with expanded 

capabilities. 

• MS–E established the Modeling and Simulation Lab in February 2016. A first 

of its kind for S&T, the Lab enables the Modeling and Simulation team to work 

simultaneously with other stakeholders to provide time-sensitive solutions to 

real-time security challenges, enhancing the safety and well-being of first responders and citizens alike. 

• CN–E has developed a game-changing technology. By dedicating 5 percent of 

the public TV’s digital transmission’s bandwidth to support a datacasting network, multiple video streams, text messaging, and digitized building blueprint 

files can now be securely sent wirelessly via advanced encryption to targeted 

public safety users. As a result, the City of Houston and its first responders 

used the datacasting network to securely communicate during the NCAA Men’s 

Final Four Basketball Tournament in Houston, Texas on April 1–4 2016. 

• CN–E restructured the P25 Compliance Assessment Program (CAP) that is on 

track to resolve a long-standing interoperability problem for the Nation’s first 

responders. With compliant P25 Land Mobile Radios, first responders and U.S. 

Border Patrol Agents can be assured that they will be able to communicate no 

matter what brand of radio they are issued. 

Question 29b. Are metrics are being used to measure the effectiveness of each program? 

Answer. Numerous metrics are being used to measure Apex program success and 

effectiveness. These measures are program-specific and continue to be refined. Examples of some of the diverse Apex Program metrics include: Number of technologies transitioned to customers, improved situational awareness—i.e., ability to 

increase access to data and information (communications, sensors, etc.), time savings for specific events, the extent to which a solution provides regulatory compliance, improved screening time, cost savings, and reduction in false alarms. 

Question 30a. Of the 124 aliens charged with homicide-related crimes since 2010, 

how many were released as a result of a court order? 

Of those who were released as a result of a court order, how many were released 

as a result of the alien’s home country not taking them back pursuant to the 

Zadvydas decision? 

Answer. Of the 124 aliens charged with homicide-related crimes subsequent to release since 2010, 28 were released based upon the requirements of the Zadvydas decision. Of the original population, 31 were released on bond pursuant to the order 

of a Department of Justice immigration judge. In the past fiscal year U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has significantly reduced both the number of 

criminal aliens released as well as the proportion released for discretionary reasons. 

Question 30b. Of the 124 aliens charged with homicide-related crimes since 2010, 

how many were released that did not meet ICE’s criteria for deportation? 

Answer. ICE adheres to Board of Immigration Appeals and Federal court decisions to determine whether an individual alien is removable from the United States 
68 

as a result of criminal conviction. It is important to note, however, that some homicide-related offenses (e.g., those where the offender acted negligently or recklessly 

rather than with intent to kill) may not themselves render individuals removable 

from the United States under the Immigration and Nationality Act. 

Please also note that because the 124 includes releases that took place both before 

and after the issuance of my November 20, 2014 memorandum concerning immigration enforcement priorities, ICE is unable to retroactively apply enforcement priorities in order to report on the number of those who did not meet the Department’s 

enforcement priorities. 

Question 30c. Of the 124 aliens charged with homicide-related crimes since 2010, 

how many would fall within the Priority I or II categories under ICE’s priorities for 

enforcement criteria? 

Answer. ICE is unable to statistically report on this information, and cannot 

retroactively apply to these cases the priorities outlined in the November 20, 2014 

memorandum. 

Question 31a. In fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015, how many recidivist criminal aliens have been released at ICE’s discretion and rearrested (felony or misdemeanor) since their release? 

Answer. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is currently analyzing 

the available data and will provide the information as soon as possible. 

Question 31b. In fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015 how many recidivist criminal aliens have been released as a result of a court order? 

Answer. ICE is currently analyzing the available data and will provide the information as soon as possible. 

QUESTIONS FROM RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON FOR HON. JEH C. 

JOHNSON

Question 1a. It has been nearly 3 years since the Government Accountability Office (GAO) completed its report, ‘‘TSA Should Limit Future Funding for Behavior 

Detection Activities.’’ Within the report, GAO goes so far as to state that ‘‘Congress 

should consider the absence of scientifically-validated evidence for using behavioral 

indicators to identify threats to aviation security when assessing the potential benefits and cost in making future funding decisions for aviation security.’’ As I understand it, TSA has yet to come forth with scientifically-validated evidence showing 

the security effectiveness of the program. Given the recent headlines and reality 

that this travel season is going to be above and beyond any that we have seen in 

recent years, along with the fact that TSA is in need of more TSOs to staff underutilized lanes, will you commit to taking a serious look to determine whether these 

BDOs can reallocated to aid in screening functions outside of their current roles? 

Answer. Security experts have long argued that the most effective way to diminish threats to airports and other large public spaces involves a combination of tools, 

including greater use of surveillance cameras, bomb-sniffing dogs and, in particular, 

training more security personnel in the use of behavior-monitoring techniques. 

Therefore, TSA believes that behavior detection certified officers play an important 

part in an effective security screening system. 

Question 1b. In 2013, GAO conducted an investigation on TSA’s SPOT program, 

which employs behavior detection officers to identify persons who may pose a risk 

to aviation security based on certain behavioral indicators. The report recommended 

that future funding for those activities be limited until TSA can scientifically prove 

that behavior detection activities have scientific validity. 

Please explain why TSA is requesting the same number of behavior detection officers as fiscal year 2016? 

Answer. TSA currently deploys 2,660 full-time BDOs at 87 airports. This is a reduction of 471 from fiscal year 2015. We took these cuts by re-examining our riskbased allocation and streamlining the airport management structure for BDOs. As 

history has shown, terrorists have employed a variety of means to attempt to inflict 

harm on an aircraft. TSA believes that Behavior Detection and Engagement, is a 

useful capability in light of adversaries’ continually evolving weapons, and tactics, 

and plays an important role in observing the dynamics of the checkpoint. 

Question 1c. Has TSA completed an investigation to validate the usage of behavior 

detection officers? If so, what were the findings? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) did complete an investigation to validate the usage of behavior detection officers. In August 2015, TSA 

delivered the ‘‘Fiscal Year 2015 Scientific Substantiation of Behavioral Indicators’’ 

report to Congress. The report provides evidence demonstrating that behavioral indicators can be used to identify passengers who may pose a threat to aviation security and discusses TSA’s plans to continue collecting performance data on the effec-
69 

tiveness of the behavior detection program. The evidence includes 189 scientific and 

operational references, including the 2011 study, Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques Referral Report Validation Study completed by the Department 

of Homeland Security’s Science & Technology Directorate. 

In the fall of 2014, TSA began a final effort to pilot the updated indicator protocol 

at 3 airports. The goal of the pilot was to collect operational and observational data 

in order to determine whether: (1) The protocol negatively impacted the checkpoint, 

and (2) Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs) could successfully apply this new protocol in the field. TSA assessed relevant data such as behavior detection referral frequencies, knowledge quiz scores, on-the-job training results, and feedback from 

Transportation Security Officer (TSO) focus groups. Based on this information, TSA 

concluded the pilot objectives were met. 

A third test objective is scheduled to be conducted at a total of 10 airports, in 2 

phases beginning in October 2016 and concluding in June 2017. The test is designed 

to assess the extent to which BDOs identify a subset of the substantiated indicators 

in a live environment and will use trained actors demonstrating the indicators. At 

the conclusion of the testing, TSA will evaluate the results and may consider National implementation of the new protocol in fiscal year 2018 or further testing. 

Question 1d. According to a 2013 GAO report that recommended TSA limit funding for behavior detection activities, in fiscal year 2012, the average salaries the 

lowest BDO pay band was $66,000, the highest averaging salary was around 

$97,000, yet TSA screeners, whose duties actually display tangible results are not 

making anything comparable. How can TSA justify these salaries on a program that 

hasn’t been proven effective? Answer. In 2016, F Band BDOs on average make $63,881 while G Band BDOs make on average $76,675. By comparison, the similar bands of non-BDOs make on 

average $66,160 and $77,287. Based on the conclusions of TSA’s report ‘‘Fiscal Year 

2015 Scientific Substantiation of Behavioral Indicators,’’ described above, TSA believes the Behavioral Detection and Analysis program has been shown to be effective, and remains a valuable part of TSA’s Aviation Security mission. 

Question 2a. In August 2015, TSA released its Strategic Five-Year Investment, 

which was required to make TSA procurement plans and process more transparent. 

In that plan, TSA stated 897 enhanced metal detectors would be procured with fiscal year 2016 funds, yet the budget request indicated that no enhanced metal detectors would be procured in fiscal year 2016. 

Please provide an explanation of the discrepancies between the Five-Year Plan 

and the budget justification and the Strategic Five-year acquisition plan. 

Answer. The planned procurement numbers provided in the Strategic Five-Year 

Technology Investment Plan for Aviation Security 2015 Report to Congress were 

based on the approved program documentation at the time of publication, specifically the Life-Cycle Cost estimate approved by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in May 2014. This documentation is in the process of being updated, and 

revised numbers will be published upon completion. Therefore, when developing the 

fiscal year 2017 budget request, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

chose to reflect updated requirements per the latest spend plans, which resulted in 

TSA showing 0 units rather than 897 units being planned for procurement in fiscal 

year 2016. 

Question 2b. When—between the time this Five-Year Plan was released and the 

time the budget request was created—was it decided that 0 enhanced metal detectors would be procured? 

Answer. TSA continues to prioritize its resources and projects according to the 

strength of their contribution towards fulfilling the agency’s mission to protect the 

Nation’s transportation systems from evolving threats. Because these machines remain highly reliable, and increases in unit maintenance costs throughout the service 

life of the current enhanced metal detectors are not anticipated, TSA adjusted the 

planned procurements to better align with latest spend plan requirements. Furthermore, TSA is working with DHS to develop a strategic sourcing vehicle for all DHS 

Components to procure enhanced metal detectors. 

Question 3. We have seen a rise in domestic terrorism incidents throughout the 

country, marked most recently by the events during the 40-day standoff in Oregon, 

the killing of 3 people at a Planned Parenthood Clinic in Colorado, and the execution of 9 parishioners at the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal church in South 

Carolina. These events demonstrate the marked rise in anti-Government militia and 

white supremacy groups in the United States. What CVE efforts has DHS implemented to address the threat of domestic terrorism? 

Answer. Recent events have highlighted the need for the Department’s countering 

violent extremism (CVE) approach to include efforts related to countering domestic 

terrorism. As a part of its CVE efforts, the Department provides training for law 
70 

enforcement; delivers briefings to fusion centers, law enforcement, and communities; 

conducts engagement events to inform community stakeholders of the threats posed 

by domestic terrorism and violent extremism; provides grant support to law enforcement and non-Governmental organizations; develops research to enhance DHS’s understanding of the violent extremist threat, including domestic terrorism and violent 

extremism; and develops analysis on the spectrum of domestic-based threats. In particular, DHS Intelligence & Analysis (I&A) has a team of Domestic Terrorism (DT) 

analysts whose sole focus is domestic terrorism analysis. These analysts have expertise in all of the disparate categories of domestic terrorism, such as white supremacist extremists, sovereign citizen extremists, anarchist extremists, and environmental/animal rights extremists. 

The new DHS Office for Community Partnerships (OCP) is also increasing the DT 

work of the Department. OCP has placed a full-time Regional Director for Strategic 

Engagement in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for Colorado (USACO) and partners with 

the U.S. Attorney to counter all forms of violent extremism, including domestic terrorism. Specifically, OCP and the USAO in Colorado are creating an intervention 

model that addresses all forms of violent extremism, using best practices from the 

BRAVE model, but also ensuring we address the gaps in research on the 

radicalization by domestic violent extremist groups. The intervention model will also 

overlap with existing gang intervention efforts in Denver to address white supremacist prison gang recruitment. Following the Planned Parenthood shooting in Colorado Springs, OCP and USAO are partnering with the Faith Security Working 

Group (a network of faith centers and law enforcement) to build awareness in 

churches and other faith centers, particularly with youth leaders, on how all violent 

extremist groups recruit. El Paso County Sheriff is also involved, as it has a robust 

rural engagement program. OCP and USAO are also partnering with the Aurora Police Department, which is piloting a program with its School Resource Officers, who 

will work to build curriculum that increases awareness with teachers, administrators, and students about how to be safe from recruitment by all violent extremist 

groups, as well as active shooters. Aurora has experienced the movie theater shooting, but also ISIL recruitment, so it supports an all threats approach to prevention. 

In regards to domestic terrorists and violent extremists, OCP and USACO are 

building upon existing relationships with sheriffs’ offices to begin the process of exploring community engagement and resilience strategies focused on crime prevention. Further, OCP and the USACO plan to meet with the Colorado Department of 

Corrections to learn about how to support their efforts to prevent recruitment by 

the 211 Crew white supremacist gangs in prisons. 

Question 4. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act for fiscal year 2016, the Office 

of Community Partnerships was appropriated $10 million dollars for grants to extend to outside stakeholders to further its CVE mission. It is still unclear how these 

grants will be administered. What is your vision for this new office and the new 

grant program? 

Answer. In July 2016, DHS issued the notice of funding opportunity for the new 

grant program. DHS will utilize FEMA’s Grants Program Directorate (GPD) infrastructure for awarding grants. Like the current Transit and Port Security Grant 

Program model, where FEMA GPD makes awards and conducts fiscal audits while 

the subject-matter expertise is provided by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the United States Coast Guard (USCG), OCP is involved in all aspects of the grant program relating to the grants’ subject matter, from designing the 

funding opportunity’s purpose, goals, eligible activities, and evaluation criteria, to 

providing CVE subject-matter expertise in the evaluations of applicants and collecting the performance measures for incorporation into the Department’s overall 

CVE activities. 

The overarching goal of the initiative is to prevent radicalization to violence. This 

will be accomplished by enhancing community resilience, developing non-law enforcement off-ramps for individuals being recruited or radicalized to violence; creating or amplifying counter messages to violent extremist narratives; and increasing 

the capacity of non-traditional partners. OCP will be heavily involved in evaluating 

applications and will specifically evaluate whether applicant proposed metrics are 

appropriate. The DHS CVE approach calls for several categories of metrics, including measuring the extent to which DHS activities spur CVE efforts outside of the 

Federal Government and measuring the reach of CVE activities and the increased 

resiliency of the communities reached both in person and on-line. 

Question 5. DHS has an established insider threat program designed to mitigate 

the threat resulting from employees and contractors who purposefully or inadvertently commit security breaches. 
71 

Please give an overview of how the program currently works. Is the current insider threat program limited to the detection of abnormalities in data usage or does 

it monitor other factors? 

Answer. The DHS Insider Threat Program (ITP) receives information from various sources relevant to security violations, infractions, and data spills. Once this 

information is received, the Insider Threat Operations Center (ITOC) coordinates 

with the various DHS components—both support and operational—that are involved, depending on the situation. Per standard operating procedures, the ITOC 

will conduct a thorough review of all relevant information associated with all potential insider threat incidents. If there is determined to be suspected nefarious activity, the ITOC will immediately refer the incident to the appropriate internal investigative entity for action. The ITOC retains records of both actions and coordination 

as required by the ITP-established Privacy Impact Assessment and System of 

Records Notice. The current Insider Threat Program is not limited to the detection 

of anomalies in data usage. The ITOC ingests other data sources into its business 

process beyond data collected via user activity monitoring, and plans are underway 

to expand beyond the current data ingests. 

Question 6. The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) announced a program 

to study the effectiveness of insider threat programs. How far along is S&T in the 

study and are there any preliminary results that you are able to disclose? 

Answer. The S&T Cyber Security Division’s Insider Threat project is supporting 

operational insider threat programs across Government and industry through 3 

main approaches. First, CSD is pursuing research that will enhance and complement existing capabilities to provide a more complete operating environment for 

insider threat programs. Currently, there are gaps in existing tools in this area. Additional research will assist in developing tools that can be incorporated into an operating environment without disrupting current operations. Second, CSD is developing data sets for researchers to use so they may test their tools. Currently, data 

sets are not freely available for insider threat researchers working independently. 

Small businesses and academics have to spend time and resources to generate their 

own data against which they may test their tools. S&T CSD plans to provide data 

sets to researchers, thereby removing the need to spend time and resources and limiting the duplication of efforts for researchers. Finally, CSD provides support by reviewing closed insider threat investigation case files. This review will likely provide 

information to agencies on historical trends related to insider threats, as well as 

evaluating investigative best practices. 

Question 7. In the aftermath of terrorist acts at home and abroad, information 

sharing between the law enforcement community and private sector is imperative. 

While I understand and agree that the priority after U.S. attack secure areas and 

respond to victims, we have heard from our local, State, and private partners that 

the information that DHS provides in response to these terrorist attacks is neither 

timely nor particularly informative compared to information provided by other Federal agencies. Some, especially those in the private sector who manage soft targets, 

have told us they are getting first updates and information from DHS days and 

weeks after incidents. What can DHS do to ensure that relevant information is 

being provided in a timely manner to the appropriate authorities? 

Answer. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) takes very seriously 

our mission to equip the Homeland Security Enterprise with timely intelligence and 

information to keep the homeland safe, secure, and resilient. DHS has responded 

to incidents at home and abroad, and provided critical intelligence to and information to protect the Nation and inform Federal, SLTT, and private-sector partners, 

including responding to incidents such as those in Chattanooga and San Bernardino. 

In the hours following the Paris, Brussels, Orlando, NY, and NJ attacks, I&A, in 

collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the DHS Office of 

Intergovernmental Affairs, hosted a conference call with SLTT partners, including 

fusion centers, law enforcement executives, and Homeland Security Advisors. The 

purpose of the calls was to provide an update regarding the attacks, including what 

was known regarding the time line of events, targeted locations, and tactics used. 

I&A and the FBI committed to providing additional updates for these partners as 

warranted, based upon new or updated information. We expect to continue this 

practice of informing SLTT partners within hours of significant terrorist events, foreign and domestic. 

We continuously work to overcome barriers to information sharing as we bring information into the IC, share IC information with our SLTT and private-sector partners, and facilitate the flow of information across the Department. We routinely 

share relevant information, via our field-based intelligence professionals and via Unclassified and Classified systems, as soon as it is available with our SLTT and private-sector partners, while remaining compliant with privacy and security laws and 
72 

regulations. This information may include immediate situational awareness notifications, reports, and conference calls during and after incidents, as well as more strategic analytic products that look at tactics, techniques, and procedures used during 

or lessons learned from an incident. In fiscal year 2016, I&A field-based personnel 

delivered 1,069 threat/intelligence briefings at the Unclassified/For Official Use 

Only and Law Enforcement Sensitive levels; responded to 1,091 requests for information regarding emerging incidents across the country; participated in 2,723 engagements with Federal and/or SLTTP partners; and produced 1,404 Intelligence Information Reports. 

In fiscal year 2015, we launched the Field Analysis Report (FAR), a new product 

line that incorporates views and assessments from SLTT partners with a Nationallevel perspective on State-wide, regional, and National strategic intelligence issues. 

In fiscal year 2016, we published 52 FARs. Our new data cloud initiative, the DHS 

Data Framework, will improve data sharing across DHS and the Intelligence Enterprise, and fill critical gaps across the IC. We continue to enhance our relationship 

with fusion center directors, and with our SLTT law enforcement partners through 

our support of the National Network of Fusion Centers with people, Classified systems access, training, Federal grants, and security clearances. Through enhancement of the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), DHS has worked with 

the fusion centers to create a request for information tool called HSIN Exchange. 

That tool effectively links all 78 fusion centers to one another and the Terrorist 

Screening Center which will vastly increase the speed of information exchange during critical incidents. Additionally, DHS continues to utilize the HSIN National Situational Awareness Room as a platform to exchange information in real time with 

SLTT partners during special events and following incidents such as the Orlando, 

FL shooting. DHS is also partnering with 4 fusion centers to conduct secure video 

teleconferences for private-sector partners to provide threat briefings and roundtable 

discussions on protective measures. 

Question 8a. The fiscal year 2016 refugee ceiling is 85,000, with at least 10,000 

of those individuals being Syrian. 

How many refugees has the Federal Government admitted to date this fiscal 

year? 

Answer. As of March 31, 2016, 29,055 refugees have been admitted to the United 

States. 

Question 8b. How many of those are Syrian? 

Answer. As of March 31, 2016, 1,285 Syrian refugees have been admitted to the 

United States. 

Question 8c. Do you face impediments to meeting this goal? 

Answer. The nature and location of refugee processing activities often lead to unexpected delays or cancellations, as overseas processing locations may have volatile 

security situations, host country processing limitations, or disease outbreaks. In addition, security vetting processing delays may be a potential impediment to meeting 

the stated program goals. However, the Department is working with its interagency 

partners to meet this goal, and fully anticipates that will we will be able to. 

Question 8d. What, if anything, can be done to overcome them? Please explain. 

Answer. Initiatives are underway to streamline processing and increase admissions, without compromising the security and integrity of the program, including: 

(1) Launching 2 ‘‘surge’’ operations—1 in Amman, Jordan (February–April) and the 

other in Tanzania/Uganda (April–June)—to interview large numbers of refugees 

likely to travel in fiscal year 2016, if approved; (2) detailing officers from other parts 

of USCIS to conduct and support refugee interviews while working to double the 

size of the Refugee Corps by fiscal year 2017; (3) adopting technological and procedural efficiencies; and (4) detailing personnel to address backlogs in security checks 

pending at the vetting agencies and review cases on hold for potential National security issues pending at USCIS. USCIS has also resumed interviewing refugee applicants in Lebanon. 

Question 9. Congress passed Pub. L. 113–277, the Border Patrol Agent Pay Reform Act of 2014, which was the result of negotiations between the House and Senate to address important issues to assess how applicants are chosen and retained 

for cybersecurity purposes in the Department, that bill requires you to report on 

how the Department plans to fulfill the critical needs of the Government to recruit 

and retain employees in qualified positions. Can estimate when we will receive 

these required reports? 

Answer. These reports remain a priority of the Department and we hope to have 

a finalized deliverable to Congress in the near future. We apologize for the delay 

and appreciate your patience. 

Question 10. In 2014, we saw a rise in calls for attacks on the homeland, military 

and law enforcement personnel, and other Government officials by ISIS and other 
73 

terrorist organizations. You responded by initiating Operation Blue Surge—an unprecedented deployment of Federal law enforcement officers to Federal facilities 

throughout the country. I understand that FPS has maintained that operational 

tempo since. Now, FPS is seeking authority to increase the fees it charges tenant 

agencies in order to fund a new force dedicated to these rapid deployments. Should 

we expect this surge capacity to be the ‘‘new normal’’? 

Answer. In response to these threats, FPS is building the Rapid Protection Force 

(RPF). Some of these surge tasks, along with others, will be executed by the RPF 

and dramatically reduce the stress on the current force. 

FPS’s new normal is operating in an expanded capacity to protect Federal facilities, rapidly respond to credible threats and support the recovery from high-consequence events when and where it matters. As the threat environment changes, 

so must FPS. 

Question 11. Mr. Secretary, we have had conversations about the 16-year class action lawsuit against the Secret Service. As you know, the Secret Service cannot fully 

turn the page to a new chapter on its diversity and cultural issues with this lawsuit 

hanging over its head. Mr. Secretary will you give me your commitment that you 

will seek a resolution in this lawsuit? 

Answer. I have been and remain committed to working in good faith to reach a 

fair resolution in this matter. 

Question 12. One of the primary concerns with the USSS is low morale and upper 

management. Please describe for the committee your plan address morale within 

the Service. Has any changes been implemented directly as it relates to recruitment, 

retention, and oversight of USSS management personnel? 

Answer. As part of its efforts to improve morale, the Secret Service has been 

working steadily to develop a comprehensive retention program aimed at enhancing 

morale for all employees. The agency has already implemented a retention bonus 

program for Uniformed Division officers, Tuition Assistance Student Loan Payback, 

and the reintroduction of the Senior Special Agent and Senior Resident Agent Programs. Other initiatives are in development for the larger workforce as well, such 

as child care subsidies, expanded telework and alternative work schedules, and an 

administrative, professional, and technical career progression plan. Additionally, 

legislative steps are being taken to address an Annual Leave pay-out option, Uniform Division step compression, and raising the annual pay cap. 

In addition, for special agents, a new Special Agent Career Progression Guidelines 

policy was developed to create greater balance between employees’ work/life needs 

and the critical impact personnel constraints are having on our protective mission. 

The policy, published on September 1, 2015, reflects numerous business changes designed to provide: Increased awareness and notification of expected transfer to a 

protective assignment; firm, standard time frames (6 years) for protective assignments; increased flexibility in post-protection assignments; opportunities to specialize post-protection; and a more transparent and defined career progression and 

schedule that is clearly articulated in policy. 

Question 13. Director Clancy noted in his Senate Appropriations Committee testimony late last year that the Mayorkas Report on the September 2014 White House 

incursion made clear that inadequate training of Secret Service personnel contributed to the failures evident in this incident, and that the Secret Service has implemented new training programs to address these gaps. Have USSS and/or DHS leadership assessed the effectiveness of these training programs? 

Answer. Immediately after the September 2014 incident, the Secret Service responded by designing and implementing several new courses, as well as modifying 

the existing 3-day Mission In-Service Course curriculum for Uniformed Division 

members to address issues specific to White House security. These new courses are 

provided in addition to the regular weekly scheduled courses, which include: Multiple Protective Operations Cycle Training offerings for the Presidential and Vice 

Presidential details, as well as canine, emergency services, special operations, and 

hazardous material personnel; protective detail training courses; firearms re-qualifications on a quarterly and semi-annual basis; special team candidate programs; 

and advanced skill courses. 

Additionally, a 2-week on-the-job training program has been formally implemented for special agents immediately following their graduation from basic training. This program provides new special agents with additional protective experience 

and integrated training with Uniformed Division members and Secret Service special operations teams (e.g., counter assault, counter sniper, emergency response, and 

hazardous materials teams). 

The Secret Service continually develops, assesses, modifies, and enhances operational training, to include the aforementioned courses. The USSS also trains with 

outside entities, to include joint training exercises and table-top exercises with Fed-
74 

eral, State, and local law enforcement as well as military partners. Evaluations are 

conducted on all basic training courses as well as on several advanced courses related to protective operations to identify any gaps in the curricula. 

Based on after-action reviews of the above training and personnel performance 

since the September 2014 incident, the enhanced training has been effective in preparing Secret Service personnel to meet the demands of the mission. 

Question 14a. Over the past 4 years, employees have left DHS at a rate nearly 

twice as fast as in the Federal Government overall and this trend is expected continue accelerating. The continuing stream of departures has at times hampered the 

Department’s ability to fill critical positions in areas such as cybersecurity. 

Answer. For the past 4 years, the DHS attrition rate has been between 2 to 4 

percentage points below the Government-wide attrition rate. Attrition for cyber positions tracks with the DHS overall attrition rate. The chart below identifies the Department’s attrition rate compared to the Government-wide attrition rate. Chief 

Human Capital Officer Angela Bailey would be pleased to discuss the DHS attrition 

rate and what we are doing to address morale and engagement. 

DHS Overall Attrition Government 

Year Percent Year Percent 

2012 ....................... 7.5% ....................... 2012 ....................... 11.5% 

2013 ....................... 8.6% ....................... 2013 ....................... 11.1% 

2014 ....................... 7.7% ....................... 2014 ....................... 10.9% 

2015 ....................... 7.8% ....................... 2015 ....................... 11.0% 

Question 14b. In your perspective, what is causing the Department to rank so 

poorly in both morale and retention? 

Answer. DHS’s 2015 Federal Employee Viewpoint Survey scores indicate that 

leadership (38 percent positive), performance management (38 percent positive) and 

communications (44 percent positive) are key issues driving overall morale scores. 

Percent positive represents the percent of respondents who answered ‘‘agree’’ or 

‘‘strongly agree’’ to questions related to these subject areas. We are undertaking a 

concerted effort to improve employee morale and are implementing an action plan 

focused on: 

1. Selecting and empowering high-performing leaders: 

2. Developing excellent leaders at all levels; and 

3. Enhancing communication. 

Question 14c. Are you concerned with employees’ views about the lack of management accountability? 

Answer. Yes. To address concerns about a lack of accountability for engagement, 

DHS enhanced the performance work plans of senior executives by adding an evaluation measure on engagement. I personally informed all SES of this and I am holding my direct reports accountable for efforts to improve employee engagement and 

morale. 

Question 14d. Please describe the Department’s strategy to improve the morale, 

retention, and recruitment of top talent. 

Answer. As described above, DHS has been aggressively implementing a Department-level employee engagement action plan. 

In addition to Department-level action, all component heads have executed employee engagement action plans, based on a root cause analysis of their survey data, 

at the component level and below, since local solutions are the most powerful. With 

focused action at the Department, component, executive, supervisory, and employee 

levels, we are confident that over time morale and engagement will improve. 

The Deputy Secretary and I recently completed an employee engagement listening 

tour, during which we held Town Halls, roundtables, and personally met thousands 

of our employees in duty locations across the country. Throughout my tenure I have 

made meeting with employees a top priority in order to recognize their service, express appreciation for their hard work, and answer any questions they wish to pose 

to leadership. DHS is also improving training to ensure that everyone from employees to senior leaders understands the importance of creating conditions for engagement—empowering employees in the execution of the mission, rewarding outstanding performance, and supporting employee work-life balance. 

Question 15a. Secretary Johnson, Under Secretary Deyo and Deputy Under Secretary Chip Fulghum have made improved acquisition performance one of the Management Directorate’s ‘‘Integrated Priority Areas’’ for 2015–16. 
75 

Could you cite an example of an early-stage acquisition, i.e. a program which has 

not yet completed Acquisition Decision Event IIA, which has benefitted from this 

renewed emphasis in the Management Directorate? 

Answer. FEMA’s Grants Management Modernization (GMM) Program and National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) are excellent examples where DHS senior 

leadership’s focus on improving acquisition performance has made a difference. Significant efforts were expended by the Office of Program Accountability and Risk 

Management (PARM), the Office of the Chief Information Officer, the Office of the 

Chief Financial Officer, the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer, the Joint Requirements Council, the Science and Technology Directorate and FEMA’s Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) staff to support the program management offices 

during the Need phase of the acquisition. The primary goal of these early engagements was to prepare the program offices for Acquisition Decision Event 1 and beyond by increasing the program offices’ attention to cost, schedule, and performance 

parameters, ensuring appropriate program office staffing, supporting the development of documentation, defining sound risk management and following thorough review processes, both within FEMA and at the Management Directorate level. This 

team approach to problem solving was beneficial in that it allowed for a quicker resolution of issues by all stakeholders and enabled the programs to successfully complete Acquisition Review Boards without any major issues and in a more timely 

fashion. The teams are continuing to work together to support the programs as they 

move toward Acquisition Decision Event 2. GMM and NFIP acquisition activities to 

date validate the importance of DHS senior leadership’s emphasis on improved acquisition performance. 

Question 15b. Could you cite an example of a post-ADE IIA program which has 

similarly benefitted from Mr. Deyo’s and Mr. Fulghum’s efforts? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration’s Technology Infrastructure 

Modernization is one example. This program reduces the probability of a terrorist 

attack on the transportation sector by replacing legacy vetting systems with a person-centric system. This eliminates exploitable gaps, improves enrollment and 

threat assessment methodologies, and enables the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to vet and provide credentials to more transportation populations. The 

Technology Infrastructure Modernization (TIM) System provides an integrated, endto-end solution to manage identities, credentials, and assessment results for millions 

of transportation workers, providing more accurate and timely identification of terrorist threats. TIM provides a service-oriented architecture framework, mission 

services, and service capabilities 

This program reported a schedule breach on September 4, 2014. The causal factors for the breach were: (1) Changes to the scope of the surface population; (2) late 

adoption of the TIM system in the adjudication center; and (3) challenges encountered during preparations for operational testing. Due to continuing technical challenges, the program was directed to stop all planning and development efforts related to the Surface and Aviation segments until notified by an ADM dated January 

9, 2015, thereby pausing the program. Another ADM was issued on April 10, 2015, 

directing the program to perform all necessary work to re-baseline the program and 

brief the Acquisition Review Board (ARB) on the re-baseline plan. During the planning for the ARB on September 15, 2015, it was decided that the TIM DHS ARB 

would be postponed for approximately 30 days to allow the DHS Chief Information 

Officer (CIO) to assess the proposed TIM technical approach. In October 2015, the 

DHS CIO reported that he could not support the TIM program’s technical approach 

to re-baseline the program and deliver the remaining capability. An ADM was then 

issued on November 30, 2015 directing the DHS CIO to form and lead an Integrated 

Project Team (IPT) to develop a new strategy and technical approach. This new 

strategy and technical approach will be captured in a detailed report that will be 

submitted to the Acquisition Decision Authority. 

DHS is addressing the above cost, schedule, and performance delays through an 

aggressive IPT. The results of this IPT and the recommended way ahead will be 

captured and subsequent direction provided through ARBs where ADMs will be 

issued to provide specific direction to the program and stakeholders that were designed to get the program back on track. The goal of this approach is the identification of a solution that will stay within the program’s funding profile. 

Question 16. Secretary Johnson, please provide the committee with a ‘‘Unity of Effort’’ perspective on the Department’s management of its real-property portfolio, 

from progress on the transition to St. Elizabeths, to any steps planned following the 

field-efficiency pilot studies, to how this year’s budget will enable the Federal Protective Service to contribute to your plans for reorganization of the National Protective and Programs Directorate. 
76 

Answer. A key initiative for Unity of Effort, Field Efficiencies entails the review 

of 10 regions where DHS has a large operational presence to identify opportunities 

for achieving mission requirements more efficiently. Representatives from components that operate in each of the regions collaboratively identify opportunities and 

make recommendations for how DHS can better utilize assets and share resources. 

These opportunities and recommendations are generated in regional integration 

meetings that are facilitated by the DHS Office of the Chief Readiness Support Officer. Following the regional meetings and data-gathering phase, a final report for the 

Field Efficiency recommendations will be completed in July 2016. As we have seen 

in our regional meetings thus far, we expect the recommendations will be very diverse. Some will be fairly easy to implement with minimal investment required, 

while some others may take several years and involve up-front investments. For recommendations regarding real property, we must consider the timing of lease expirations so we are working closely with General Services Administration to plan next 

steps. 

The Enhanced Headquarters Consolidation Plan also contributes to Unity of Effort by consolidating leadership, policy, management, and operations on the St. Elizabeths West Campus. The plan reduces our 50 scattered locations in the National 

Capital Region down to 6 to 8. Phase 1 of the St. Elizabeths development (USCG 

Headquarters) was completed on schedule/budget for the portions funded by Congress. Phase 2 (Renovation of the Center Building) was awarded on-budget, and construction is progressing on schedule for a late 2017 construction completion/early 

2018 move-in for the Department’s executive leadership and management. The Fiscal Year 2016 Consolidated Appropriations Act fully funds the next phases of development (Management Directorate, OHA, S&T, and DNDO). The full development of 

St. Elizabeths will save the Department $1.2 billion present value over 30 years, 

as compared to the best available commercial lease alternative. The Enhanced Plan 

delivers the goals of the original consolidation plan at a lower cost and in a shorter 

time frame than the original program of record by adopting more efficient space 

standards, implementing flexible workplace strategies and realigning the lease expirations to the development schedule. 

Question 17. Under current legal authorities and the Department’s own Acquisition Management Directive (MD–102), do you and your Chief Acquisition Officer, 

Under Secretary Deyo, have the tools you need to ensure that acquisition executives 

and program offices throughout the Department follow best practices for active management of risks to timely and cost-effective acquisition of validated operational capabilities? 

Answer. The Chief Acquisition Officer (CAO) currently has the authorities necessary to ensure that acquisition executives and program offices follow Departmental policies. The Department has policies and procedures that limit cost overruns and schedule delays. First and foremost, the Department established Acquisition Management Directive (MD) 102–01, and most recently revised the directive in 

July 2015. MD 102–01 establishes the Acquisition Lifecycle Framework (ALF) and 

the Systems Engineering Lifecycle (SELC) by which the Department governs and 

oversees its acquisition programs. Further, it establishes the Acquisition Review 

Board, as well as the roles and responsibilities of its chair (the Chief Acquisition 

Officer/Under Secretary for Management), its members (Under Secretary for Science 

and Technology, General Counsel, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Chair of the Joint 

Requirements Council (JRC), the Executive Director of the Office of Program Accountability and Risk Management (PARM), and Management line of business 

chiefs), and other acquisition stakeholders (including Component Acquisition Executives (CAE) and Program Managers). 

The ARB reviews each program’s planning and acquisition documentation in accordance with MD 102–01, at predefined milestones called Acquisition Decision 

Events (ADE). At each ADE, the CAO, supported by the ARB, determines the program’s readiness to progress to the next phase of the acquisition life cycle. 

Each major program must have an Acquisition Program Baseline (APB)—approved Acquisition Decision Authority (ADA). The baseline is informed by: (1) A 

Chief Financial Officer approved life-cycle cost estimate, (2) JRC-validated operational requirements, and (3) the program’s schedule. The APB establishes the cost, 

schedule, and performance threshold values of the program, which are monitored by 

the program, component, and headquarters through program Full Operating Capability delivery. The APB also contains a Program integrated master schedule, which 

is assessed for adequacy and realism during the ADE review and approval process. 

If a key schedule date is missed, this can trigger an inquiry into program status 

and if issues are identified, corrective action can be taken earlier to minimize the 

extent of schedule delays and cost overruns. Additionally, at each ADE, starting at 

ADE–2A, a memorandum certifying sufficiency of funding by the component’s Senior 
77 

Financial Officer is required. This certified assertion ensures the program is adequately funded as it moves through the acquisition process. Further, the Department implemented the Federal Information Technology Acquisition Reform Act 

(FITARA) through MD 102–01 requiring the Chief Information Officer to conduct 

an IT assessment and approve the IT aspects of the programs prior to ADE–2A approval. 

Inside the component-level are CAO-designated CAEs who support overseeing 

major acquisition programs. Each CAE is also responsible for component-level acquisition policy and serves as the Acquisition Decision Authority for component-level/ 

non-major acquisitions. In September 2014, the Department further defined and 

clarified the roles and responsibilities of the CAEs in the memo, Unity of Effort Acquisition Review—Component Acquisition Executive Policy. 

In certain cases, the CAO has established Executive Steering Committees (ESC), 

made up of component and Headquarters executives, to provide additional support 

to programs between the ADEs. These ESCs do not hold ADEs, instead they provide 

guidance and support throughout the life of the acquisition program, especially 

when programs begin to deviate from the defined cost, schedule, and performance 

parameters. ESC actions minimize cost overruns and schedule delays. 

In addition to the acquisition policies and procedures, as part of the Secretary’s 

Unity of Effort initiative, the Department established a Joint Requirements Council 

(JRC). The JRC provides oversight of the DHS requirements generation process, 

harmonizes efforts across the Department and supports prioritized funding recommendations. Sound, component-driven capability analysis and operational requirements generation is an extremely important first step in limiting cost overruns 

and schedule delays. The establishment of the JRC and improvements in the operational requirements development process is expected to provide a solid foundation 

on which to support follow on acquisition. The Department-approved JRC policy in 

February 2016. Through acquisition policies, oversight bodies, and review procedures DHS aggressively works to limit cost overruns and schedule delays. 

Question 18. In 2011, DHS completed a Human Capital Segment Architecture 

Blueprint as well as developed a Comprehensive Future State Plan that redefined 

the HRIT investment scope and implementation time frames. The blueprint also articulated 15 strategic improvement opportunity areas. The Department has fully implemented only 1 of these opportunity areas and has made limited progress in HRIT 

implementation. It appears these documents are merely paper exercises and do not 

have real meaning and merit. Please explain to the committee your intention to utilize these blueprints and plans and how you plan to fully implement the remaining 

14 strategic improvement opportunity areas. 

Answer. The Strategic Improvement Opportunities (SIOs) from the 2011 architecture was a roadmap from which DHS could select projects as resources were available based on then-current priorities. The original plan was too expansive and included 80 potential SIOs. These SIOs have been re-baselined and evaluated. Current program milestones are the following: 

• The Capability Analysis Study Plan (CASP) was approved by the JRC intake 

process in February. The draft HC Capability Analysis Report (CAR) was completed by the end of April. The CAR will outline future requirements for Human 

Capital and the final draft will update the HCSA Blueprint. The study was conducted by OCIO/Enterprise Architecture in conjunction with the HRIT Advisory 

Team and Human Capital subject-matter experts from OCHCO and the components. The HC CAR and HCSA Blueprint were approved by the HRIT Executive 

Steering Committee and the HC CAR was submitted to the Joint Requirements 

Council. 

• The analysis undertaken with the CAR and the re-baselining of the existing 

HCSA resulted in a reduction to 9 SIOs. These SIOs belong with a prioritized 

time line for implementation have been approved by the HRIT ESC and the 

ARB by the April 30 time line. 

The top 9 SIOs that will be the focus of planning in fiscal year 2017 are as follows: 

1. End-to-End Hiring—Talent Acquisition: Assess current systems for cost 

savings/features & benefits 

2. End-to-End Hiring—Workforce Planning: Obtain systems improvements 

and capabilities 

3. End-to-End Hiring—Security Classification/Background Investigation 

4. Learning Management: Finish current planned implementations 

5. Data Management & Sharing—Enterprise HC Reporting and Analysis: 

Automate the Time-to-Hire reporting 

6. On-boarding Process & Off-boarding Process: Implement to include identity 

based Access Life-cycle Management integration into End-to-End hiring 
78 

7. Performance Management: Implement pilot in fiscal year 2016, hold full 

implementation until fiscal year 2017 pending results 

8. HR Document Management: Identify requirements for case management 

vs. document management 

9. Payroll Action Processing: Complete with the implementation CBP on 

WebTA. 

Æ