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i 

20–076 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–116] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES HEARING 

ON

LOGISTICS AND SEALIFT FORCE 

REQUIREMENTS 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 22, 2016 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Vice Chair 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

STEVE RUSSELL,Oklahoma 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

DAVID SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

KATHERINE REMBER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ........................................... 2 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ........................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Dilisio, F. Scott, Director, Strategic Mobility/Combat Logistics Division 

(OPNAV N42), Office of the Chief of Naval Operations ................................... 7 

Jaenichen, Paul N., Sr., Maritime Administrator, U.S. Maritime Administration ........................................................................................................................ 3 

Lyons, LTG Stephen R., USA, Deputy Commander, U.S. Transportation Command ..................................................................................................................... 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Courtney, Hon. Joe ........................................................................................... 35 

Dilisio, F. Scott ................................................................................................. 54 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 33 

Jaenichen, Paul N., Sr. .................................................................................... 37 

Lyons, LTG Stephen R. .................................................................................... 44 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.] 

(1) 

LOGISTICS AND SEALIFT FORCE REQUIREMENTS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 22, 2016. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:04 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. FORBES. Before I begin my opening statement, let me just 

say that just last night I was briefed on the Farsi Island incident 

in January involving two U.S. Navy riverine boats and was deeply 

disturbed by what I heard. I was disturbed not just by the details 

of the incident itself, but about what they imply about the training 

and materiel readiness levels of our forces on the front lines and 

about our ability to deter Iranian aggression and malicious behavior in the Middle East. 

Unfortunately, I think this administration’s policies have seriously undermined both with grave implications for our men and 

women in uniform and our national security. 

So I want to take this time to encourage my colleagues on this 

committee and throughout the rest of the House to get the briefing 

on this important topic. 

And today, the subcommittee convenes to receive testimony on logistics and sealift fleet requirements. 

I want to welcome our distinguished witnesses and thank them 

for the time and effort they expend on this most important issue. 

Gentlemen, we thank you for being with us today and for everything you do to defend our nation. 

Since its earliest days, America has been a seafaring maritime 

nation with a robust merchant marine. Today, merchant ships 

carry around 90 percent of everything with the total amount having more than tripled since 1970. This seaborne trade fuels our 

economy and creates critical links with the global commons. 

Unfortunately for our national security, however, this seaborne 

trade is being increasingly outsourced to other nations and our own 

merchant fleet is in decline. 

Between the years 2000 and 2014, our U.S. commercial fleet has 

shrunk from 282 vessels to 179, a reduction of almost 40 percent. 

This commercial fleet reduction is increasingly problematic for the 

U.S. military and specifically for the U.S. Transportation Command 

[TRANSCOM] because these vessels support the military’s mari-
2 

time lift requirements and their crews provide the manning for 

military’s mobilization forces according to MARAD [U.S. Maritime 

Administration] and TRANSCOM’s assessments. 

A reduction in the overall U.S. commercial sector has severely 

jeopardized our ability to sustain any level of prolonged military logistics support. 

Furthermore, we are perilously close to not having sufficient 

mariners to support even the initial mobilization of our Navy’s 

Ready Reserve Forces. 

Unfortunately, the administration’s fiscal year 2017 budget request accelerates this decline and weakens our military. The administration has proposed reducing funding for the Maritime Security Program [MSP] by almost 20 percent. Such a reduction will, 

in my view, undoubtedly reduce the size of our commercial fleet 

below TRANSCOM’s military requirements and reduce our military 

surge capacity. 

I look forward to better understanding the administration’s proposal, but I am determined to change this dangerous trajectory. 

Overall, I am concerned that this administration does not fully 

appreciate the connection between the health of our merchant fleet 

and our national security. Proposed changes to the Food for Peace 

program continue to hurt our farmers and our mariners. 

While these changes would have economic impacts, this subcommittee is focused today upon its harmful impact to military 

readiness and the security of our nation. 

In 1897, the first president of the Naval War College said that 

both from the military and economic view, an extensive marine 

commerce is a primal necessity to a country aspiring to be a naval 

power. In the years since, America has become the greatest naval 

power the world has ever seen. 

But we must not let further decline in either our Navy fleet or 

our maritime commerce undermine our position. 

I now turn to my good friend and colleague, the ranking member 

of the subcommittee, Congressman Courtney of Connecticut, for 

any remarks he may have to make. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CONNECTICUT, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And again, as someone who attended that briefing yesterday, I 

would join you in recommending to our colleagues that they follow 

up with the Navy to get that briefing. 

Again, I don’t want to just rehash a lot of the comments that you 

made just a moment ago because, particularly in terms of the Maritime Security Program, it is going to be, I think, an issue that our 

subcommittee is going to look at with this year’s defense bill and 

for all the reasons that you set forth. 

So again, rather than, you know, rehashing that comment, I 

guess the other issue I just would like to highlight in my opening 

remarks, and hopefully we will have a good dialogue today with an 

outstanding panel of witnesses, is the issue of maritime training 
3 

requirements, because obviously we have got a workforce issue 

here in terms of kind of refreshing an aging workforce and in terms 

of, you know, the long view. This is really critical in terms of getting that right. 

According to MARAD’s own information, the oldest ship in the 

maritime training program that, again, is critical to training this 

next generation, the TS Empire State attached to SUNY [State 

University of New York] Maritime College is 55 years old and is 

expected to end its service life in 2019. 

Again, according to MARAD, loss of this ship alone without replacement would cause a loss of 36 percent of the existing training 

ship capacity needed for mariner education, portrayed ‘‘as a major 

setback to meet the rising national demand for mariners by the 

agency in its 2017 budget request to Congress.’’ 

I want to applaud Administrator Jaenichen for his efforts to alert 

Congress to this issue. And again, we look forward to working with 

him as we put together our Seapower mark in the coming weeks 

to make sure that really we give these critical institutions the tools 

that they need to make sure that changing requirements in terms 

of what is needed out there are going to be met, because failure to 

do that is just going to create a cliff that really will ripple through 

our entire Armed Forces if we don’t get it right. 

So again, I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. I 

look forward to your testimony. 

Again, I will request that my written remarks, prepared remarks 

be admitted for the record. 

And yield the floor. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Courtney can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

Mr. FORBES. Without objection, they will be so entered. 

And now we are pleased to have such a distinguished panel with 

us today. We have the Honorable Paul N. Jaenichen, Sr., Maritime 

Administrator for the U.S. Department of Transportation. 

Thank you so much for being with us. 

Also, Lieutenant General Stephen Lyons, U.S. Army, Deputy 

Commander of U.S. Transportation Command. 

General, it is always a pleasure to see you and thank you for 

being here. 

And then Mr. F. Scott DiLisio, Director, Strategic Mobility/Combat Logistics, that is a whole mouthful to be able to say, Director, 

but thank you, for the Office of Chief of Naval Operations. 

And we, as Mr. Courtney and I told you before, we just appreciate so much your service to our country, but we also thank you 

for being with us today. 

And Mr. Jaenichen, I think you are going to start us. And we 

look forward to any remarks that you may have. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL N. JAENICHEN, SR., MARITIME 

ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. MARITIME ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. JAENICHEN. Good afternoon, Chairman Forbes, Ranking 

Member Courtney, members of the subcommittee. Thank you for 

the opportunity to discuss the U.S. merchant marine and the support it provides for our nation to meet the Department of Defense 

logistics and sealift requirements. 
4 

The U.S.-flag fleet of privately owned, commercially operated vessels, along with government-owned vessels, provide sealift surge 

and sustainment capacity to move equipment and materiel to globally project our Armed Forces and Federal agencies when needed, 

where needed, during times of conflict, humanitarian crisis, and 

natural disasters. 

Supporting these capabilities are the Maritime Administration’s 

National Defense Reserve Fleet, Ready Reserve Force, and Maritime Security Program. 

The Ready Reserve Force, or RRF, is a fleet of governmentowned merchant-type vessels that ensure our capability to rapidly 

deploy military forces and equipment or emergency humanitarian 

assistance and disaster response supplies to events that require 

intervention by the U.S. Government. 

The RRF currently consists of 46 ships selected on the basis of 

their capabilities, their readiness condition and location to meet 

Department of Defense expected surge sealift requirements. 

While the RRF has provided reliable and safe sealift to support 

military and humanitarian missions in the past, the fleet is aging. 

The average age of the fleet is currently 39 years, well above the 

normal service life of commercial vessels. 

The Maritime Administration is working closely with the Department of the Navy [DON] and DOD [Department of Defense] to 

monitor the material condition of the RRF as well as determining 

the future recapitalization requirements of the fleet. 

I would note that while we have never fully activated the RRF, 

the 78 ships that were activated in support of operations in the 

first Gulf War exceed the number of vessels that I currently have 

in the RRF fleet. 

The Maritime Security Act of 1996 established the Maritime Security Program, or MSP, which provides direct annual stipends for 

up to 60 active, commercially viable, militarily useful, privately 

owned, U.S.-flag vessels and crews operating in international trade. 

The MSP fleet ensures DOD access to U.S.-flag ships and oceanborne commerce and international trade with the necessary intermodal logistics capability to move military equipment and supplies 

in the event of armed conflict or national emergency. 

The fleet also provides critical employment for up to 2,400 qualified U.S. mariners. 

Of the 78 U.S.-flag vessels that trade internationally today 78 

currently participate in the MSP program. The number of vessels 

in the international trading U.S.-flag fleet has generally stayed 

above 100 for the past decade, reaching a peak of 106 in 2011. And 

since then, we have seen a decline to the 78 vessels, or roughly a 

26 percent drop in the last 3 years. 

The decline in this segment of the fleet is coincident with the decline of government-impelled preference cargoes, and the overall 

volume of preference cargo transported aboard U.S.-flag vessels has 

substantially decreased since 2005 when preference cargoes peaked 

due to military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

The Maritime Administration’s assessment of the civilian U.S. 

merchant mariner pools shows that the number of civilian mariners available to crew government sealift ships, when activated, 

has declined over the past decade. And the number of qualified and 
5 

experienced mariners available will likely not be adequate in the 

very near future unless we take positive action to reverse this 

trend. 

Current estimates show that we only have about 11,280 mariners 

that have the necessary U.S. Coast Guard credentials to operate 

large seagoing ships. And we greatly value those mariners who 

have recently sailed and those who have experience sailing our government-owned sealift vessels. And that current number is sufficient to activate the Federal Government-owned sealift-surge sealift fleet of 63 ships, that includes both the Maritime Administration’s RRF and the military’s Sealift Command’s surge vessels, only 

for a period of 4 to 6 months, but it is not enough for sustained 

operations. 

Further losses in the number of commercial U.S.-flag ships and 

the corresponding loss of mariner jobs and international trade will 

significantly impact our ability to crew this sealift fleet in the future. 

The Maritime Administration is taking action to address the 

issues that challenge the U.S. maritime industry through the development of a draft National Maritime Strategy. We expect to 

publish the draft strategy in the coming months, and I look forward to providing it to the committee. 

Thank you again for your time and interest in the nation’s maritime transportation capacity and capability and the opportunity to 

provide a status update for our program and discuss what may be 

a very critical juncture point for the long-term health of the international trading U.S. merchant marine. 

I look forward to any questions that the subcommittee may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jaenichen can be found in the 

Appendix on page 37.] 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Jaenichen, thank you so much for your testimony. 

General, we would love to hear any comments that you might 

have. 

STATEMENT OF LTG STEPHEN R. LYONS, USA, DEPUTY 

COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 

General LYONS. Thank you, sir. Chairman Forbes, Ranking 

Member Courtney, distinguished members of the Seapower and 

Projection Forces Subcommittee, I want to thank you for inviting 

me and my colleagues, Administrator Jaenichen and Mr. DiLisio, 

here to discuss our military sealift capability that is so incredibly 

essential to our national defense. 

It is my distinct privilege to be with you today representing the 

outstanding men and women of the United States Transportation 

Command. As this committee knows, a major strategic advantage 

of the United States is our ability to project and sustain forces anywhere at anytime around the globe. And that is dependent on a 

ready sealift enterprise. 

Our nation has been and will continue to be reliant on sealift as 

the predominant means to move military equipment and supplies 

in support of global operations. 

To accomplish this task, our nation’s strategic sealift capability 

comprises two distinct fleets. First, the government organic fleet 
6 

consisting of pre-positioned ships that are at strategic locations 

worldwide, and a CONUS-based [continental United States] fleet of 

reduced operating status vessels largely available in 5 days. 

Second is a U.S.-flag commercial merchant fleet managed by 

commercial operators engaged in daily commerce for which 

MARAD provides government advocacy. 

These two fleets, government and commercial, are inextricably 

bound together by the merchant mariners that crew both. U.S. 

merchant mariners crew our pre-positioned ships that are currently 

deployed and commercial commerce fleets day to day, and in crisis 

are called to crew our Navy sealift fleets. So without a healthy U.S. 

merchant mariner fleet, we lack the capability to deliver our military forces to war. 

As I sit here today, it is our collective assessment that our military sealift capacity, organic, commercial, and the mariners that 

crew them, is sufficient to meet our deployment surge requirements 

in accordance with our national military strategy with acceptable 

risk. 

Over the last 20 years, a series of mobility capability assessments have validated an enduring requirement of roughly 20 million square feet of roll-on/roll-off space, that is about 91 vessels, the 

ability to surge 34,000 containers, 86 petroleum tanker ships and 

a myriad of specialty ships, such ships that enable us to bring joint 

logistics over the shore to create multiple dilemmas for any adversary and multiple options for joint force commanders. 

However, despite being in good shape today, we are keenly aware 

of two trends that are cause for concern and action to ensure that 

the strategic logistics remains a competitive advantage of the 

United States. 

We share MARAD’s concerns regarding the health of the U.S.- 

flag commercial sealift industry. DOD’s emergency preparedness 

programs, like the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement, known 

as VISA, and the Voluntary Tanker Agreement provide access to 

commercial fleets. And DOT’s [Department of Transportation’s] 

Maritime Security Program provides incentives for carriers to retain the U.S. flag. 

These programs not only enable DOD to gain critical access to 

U.S. commercial vessels, but also access to global networks and the 

merchant mariners that I mentioned earlier. 

The MSP program provides ready access for up to 60 commercial 

ships and is dependent upon three legs of a stool: the first being 

government-impelled cargo, the second commercial workload, and 

the third a congressionally appropriated stipend to offset the costs 

of operating under a U.S. flag. 

We think our reliance on the commercial industry for ships and 

mariners is a cost-effective means of providing military sealift 

when compared to the cost of building an equivalent government 

capability. 

The national security sealift policy underscores our role as a 

maritime nation and clearly articulates the need for DOD to retain 

the ability to respond unilaterally to security threats. 

We appreciate MARAD’s efforts and congressional interest in 

stemming the decline of our U.S.-flag merchant fleet in order to 
7 

sustain our current capacity that is so necessary to retain our DOD 

readiness. 

The second area I will just touch on briefly of concern is the 

emergency age-out of our government organic sealift fleet. The average age of this fleet is approximately 40 years old and our first 

vessels will begin to reach their 50-year life service in 2020. 

As a result, the United States Navy is developing a sealift recapitalization plan to prevent loss of DOD’s capability to assure we 

have sealift requirements. And we appreciate Mr. DiLisio’s outstanding efforts in this area. 

Finally, I will highlight what many senior DOD leaders and the 

service chiefs have already addressed, and that is how the emergence of great-power competition changes the way we need to think 

about maintaining the competitive advantage that USTRANSCOM 

brings. 

The joint operating environment is changing rapidly and not necessarily in predictable ways as emerging adversaries will attempt 

to counter U.S. interests and contest our operations in the domains 

of cyber, space, air, and maritime in ways that we have not seen 

before. Given all of this, we are confident that our need to project 

power will not decline. 

In closing, I again want to thank this committee and my colleagues from the Navy and MARAD for your continued leadership 

at this critical time in our nation’s history. I look forward to your 

questions and ask that my written statement be submitted for the 

record. 

Sir, thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Lyons can be found in the 

Appendix on page 44.] 

Mr. FORBES. Without objection, all the written statements will be 

submitted for the record. 

And Mr. DiLisio, we are glad to have you and look forward to 

your comments. 

STATEMENT OF F. SCOTT DILISIO, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC MOBILITY/COMBAT LOGISTICS DIVISION (OPNAV N42), OFFICE 

OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 

Mr. DILISIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Courtney, distinguished members of the subcommittee, 

thanks for the opportunity to speak about the state of readiness. 

I also have not only sealift, but the Combat Logistics Force [CLF] 

and a bunch of special mission ships that do all kinds of great 

things for our nation. 

We continue to meet operational requirements while driving innovative and nontraditional solutions to global logistics. I am honored to be joined today by Deputy Commander U.S. Transportation 

Command, Lieutenant General Lyons and the Maritime Administrator, Mr. Jaenichen. We are true partners. We work very hard together, and we have worked very hard on some of these issues we 

are about to talk about. 

I want to take a brief minute and talk about someone other than 

the mariners and recognize the people of the Military Sealift Command [MSC] and the Maritime Administration. The ships and fa-
8 

cilities they operate worldwide would not work without the skilled 

operators and support people. And they create our readiness. 

The Combat Logistics Force and strategic sealift missions are accomplished by an organic fleet comprised of 122 ships. These ships 

support numerous missions, including at-sea resupply of our naval 

combatants; pre-positioning of critical unit equipment; ammunition 

and sustainment for Marine Corps, Army, and the Air Force; humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activity; towing; diving 

and salvage operations worldwide; rapid intratheater movement of 

cargo and personnel; and afloat staging capabilities. 

The Navy’s Combat Logistics Force ships resupply Navy forces at 

sea, enabling carrier strike groups [CSGs] and amphibious ready 

groups [ARGs] to operate forward and remain on station during 

peacetime and war. 

The Combat Logistics Force ships include replenishment oilers, 

T–AOs; fast combat support ships, T–AOEs; dry cargo and ammunition ships, T–AKEs. The T–AOs primarily provide fuel, but they 

are limited in their ability to provide dry cargo. T–AOEs and T– 

AKEs are multi-product ships. 

This year, we will begin recapitalizing our oilers with the award 

of the USNS John Lewis (T–AO 205) would be our newest oiler. 

The strategic sealift program provides necessary transportation 

of Marine Corps and Army combat equipment, fuel, and sustainment. The capabilities are provided to the combatant commanders 

through three methods: afloat pre-positioning, surge sealift, and 

sustainment shipping. Methods encompass 85 organic ships with 

each providing a crucial set of capabilities when called for tasking 

or activated for service. 

The pre-positioned fleet is strategically located in key areas 

based on anticipated need, ensuring ready access for contingencies. 

Doing so provides flexible, rapid response of military equipment, 

combat gear, supplies essential to sustaining initial phases of contingencies, including major combat operations. 

The Expeditionary Transfer Dock [ESD]—and Mr. Chairman, I 

promised you I would use both sets of acronyms until we are all 

comfortable with them—formerly the Mobile Landing Platform, 

MLP, joined the large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-off ships as part 

of the maritime pre-positioning force. 

The combination enables greater sea-basing capability and increased flexibility across the operational area. The ESD is a tremendously versatile ship and will act as a floating base for expeditionary operations. 

Equipped with a deployable vehicle ramp, the ESD is an intermediary transfer point for troops, equipment, and sustainment 

moved ashore by landing craft, air cushion, and, here is the other 

one, Expeditionary Fast Transport, EPF, formerly Joint HighSpeed Vessel [JHSV]. 

The EPF is designed for high-speed intratheater transport. Experimentation is revealing more potential missions to include highspeed logistics shuttle work, humanitarian assistance, theater security cooperation, and security force assistance. 

Surge ships are the second subset of sealift, and we will talk 

about that more. And I will cut my comments brief. We have talked 

a bit about the surge. 
9 

Right now, we are working with fleet commanders to complement 

both Combat Logistics Force and strategic sealift capabilities by examining innovative ways to improve capability and capacity to perform theater security cooperation missions that also enhance overall Navy combat force capability. This is done through a variety of 

adaptive force packaging. These can create cost-effective opportunities for our fleet to expand support missions and sustain global 

presence. 

We will continue to support forward presence, relieve stress on 

the rest of the force through traditional and innovative approaches. 

We will continue to rely on the CLF force to include our new ships 

that we are introducing and strategic sealift as they contribute to 

the Navy’s tenets. 

I also want to thank you for your continued support of our force. 

And thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee. Thanks. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. DiLisio can be found in the Appendix on page 54.] 

Mr. FORBES. Well, thank you so much for being with us, and for 

all of our witnesses. 

I am going to defer my questions until the end. I have a number 

that I just need to get on the record, but I want to make sure all 

of our members can get their questions in first. 

Mr. Courtney, if you don’t mind, I have one motion to make before I recognize you. 

Mr. Garamendi has joined us and we are glad to have him. And 

I would just like to make sure he can ask his questions. So I ask 

unanimous consent that non-subcommittee members be allowed to 

participate in today’s hearing after all subcommittee members have 

had an opportunity to ask questions. 

Is there an objection? 

Without objection, non-subcommittee members will be recognized 

at the appropriate time for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Garamendi, we are glad to have you with us today. 

Mr. Courtney, you are recognized for any questions you might 

have. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to the witnesses. 

Mr. DiLisio, I rode on the USNS Trenton last summer from New 

London to Rhode Island, and I just finally got straight in my head 

what a Joint High-Speed Vessel is, and then you guys changed the 

name on me. 

[Laughter.] 

So it is an EFP? 

Mr. DILISIO. EPF. 

Mr. COURTNEY. EPF, okay. Anyway, yes, that is right. 

Mr. Jaenichen, I want to again just kind of drill down a little bit 

on the Maritime Security Program because there has been obviously Congress has been sort of back and forth on this as well as 

the budget that came over. So last year we authorized $5 million per ship in our authorizing 

language for this program. The omnibus then funded about, I 

think, $3.5 million per ship. And the President’s budget comes over 

at $3.1. 
10 

Obviously, you all made pretty powerful statements about how 

critical this is, about keeping the fleet together. What is the right 

price point? And is $3.1 really too low? And if it is too low, what 

does that mean in terms of, you know, just trying to, again, keep 

this mission going? 

Mr. JAENICHEN. Congressman Courtney, I certainly appreciate 

the question. First of all, I greatly appreciate this subcommittee’s 

support for the authorization of the $3.5 which was subsequently 

approved in the consolidated appropriations of 2016, which also include the authorization for just shy of $5 million for 2017 in the 

fiscal year budget. 

At the time that was approved by Congress and signed by the 

President, the fiscal year 2017 budget was already prepared and 

was in preparation to come over to Congress to meet the President’s budget request drop to Congress on time. 

We had insufficient time to actually analyze that. If you take a 

look at the Maritime Administration’s budget, if you take a look at 

my 2016 enacted budget of $399 million, that would be an additional $90 million about because we received $210 million to support the MSP program at $3.5. That is about 22 percent of 

MARAD’s budget that was enacted. And if I compare that to the $423 in the President’s budget request, it will be a 27 percent increase because it would require an 

increase of $114 million. That was not something we were able to 

analyze at the time the budget was dropped. 

The budget was prepared based on the program of record which authorized $3.1 through fiscal year 2018. But what I will tell you 

is, as General Lyons pointed out in his opening statement, there 

are three things that the Maritime Security Program relies on. The 

first is it requires access to government-impelled cargo. Those cargoes have decreased by 75 percent since 2011, and so that has actually put downward pressure on the viability of the fleet. 

Additionally, the overcapacity in the global market. We have 

seen freight rates that are the lowest they have ever been in nearly 

several decades. The result of that is, in order for the MSP fleet 

to be viable, there is really only one place to go and that is the stipend amount to ensure that the fleet can remain viable. 

We have already pointed out that it is very vital. It is the core 

of our U.S.-flag international fleet. It is 60 out of the 78 ships that 

we have currently. We have 57 that are currently sailing in the 

program, as I pointed out in my opening remarks. That fleet is critical for national security to be able to globally project and sustain 

the Armed Forces. 

So hopefully that answers your question. 

Mr. COURTNEY. It does. So again, just so we are clear, the request that came over then was sort of a legacy request from a prior 

policy that—— 

Mr. JAENICHEN. It was the program of record at the time the 

budget was prepared. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Okay. I will take that as a green light for our 

subcommittee to revise. 

Another issue which again went sort of back and forth last year 

was the issue of the maritime academy training ships, which I 

mentioned in my opening remarks. 
11 

By our count, this issue has been studied five times going back 

to 2007 and most recently in 2015 where, you know, it is pretty 

clear that, you know, failure to act on this is going to create a hole 

in terms of training those critical positions that you talked about. 

So unfortunately, though, the 2017 budget that came over, and 

I realize you have your, you know, limitations about, you know, 

what your testimony can be, but it requests $6 million for another 

study of requirements and alternatives for training ship needs. 

And you know, I just, you know, clearly the clock is ticking here 

in terms of the age of these training ships. And every study that 

has been done I think has been a pretty powerful endorsement 

about the fact that we need to move forward. 

And again, without having you, you know, sort of get sort of 

juxtaposed to the budget that your Department sent over, if we 

don’t start—in terms of the timeframe we are in right now with 

that old ship that is coming off at SUNY Maritime in 2019, if we 

don’t start cutting some steel and creating and building a ship 

pretty soon, I mean, is it going to be too late to, you know, heelto-toe to keep at least that fleet sized where it is today? 

Mr. JAENICHEN. Ranking Member Courtney, I certainly appreciate the question. First of all, in your opening remarks you highlighted the impact of the Empire State in terms of the training capacity for the State maritime academies. It is about 36 percent. 

As you noted also, the vessel is 55 years old. It has its classification from the American Bureau of Shipping through 2019, as well 

as a certificate of inspection from the Coast Guard. 

There is a potential to be able to conduct a service life extension 

of that vessel. However, I am concerned about the cost and whether 

that is the right approach. 

We have done an estimate based on an ABS [American Bureau 

of Shipping] survey. We take a look at the deferred maintenance. 

We have also taken a look at a crew assessment. And I have also 

had my ship surveyors down onboard the ship. And then we had 

an independent organization actually evaluate what it would cost. 

And the estimated cost is $104 million to be able to do a service 

life extension on that ship. 

Normally if you had a 15-year-old ship, a service life extension 

would be about 10 years. I cannot guarantee that spending that 

amount of money would give us 10 more years on that particular 

vessel. It may give 3, it may not give any because there are so 

many unknowns with regards to when you have a vessel that old. 

I am concerned about the capacity. The study that is requested 

in fiscal year 2017 is to do an independent validation of several requirements. In addition to the requirements, are there other alternatives? 

We have done most recently last year a study that was conducted 

by Volpe [The National Transportation Center], which did a business case analysis, which took a look at the options. That is available and we can share that with the committee if desired. 

We recognize that this is a very costly program to be able to exercise and to be able to put a training ship fleet together, so that 

study is an attempt to make sure that we have done everything we 

can to take a look at what alternatives are available to do that 

independent validation. 
12 

If it were left up to me, I would try to move that up as quickly 

as I can to be able to support building a fiscal year 2018 budget 

which I have to do this summer. And so I will endeavor to do that 

if at all possible using the appropriated funding that we currently 

have. 

I greatly appreciate the support of Congress to dedicate the $5 

million to be able to do the construction design. And we fully intend to execute that money this year, as intended. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, thank you. And again, I think reading between the lines we can sort of get some direction about where we 

may want to head in a couple of weeks on this issue. 

Lastly, you know, again, this perennial question of the Jones Act 

in terms of its justification is being talked about by a lot of our colleagues in different committees and possibly in different legislation. 

Can you talk about what the impact of repeal of the Jones Act 

would be in terms of, again, the mission that, you know, the witnesses have to carry out every day? 

Mr. JAENICHEN. Thank you, Ranking Member Courtney. A repeal 

of the Jones Act, I think, would be traumatic for the U.S. merchant 

marine. And I will give you several reasons. 

Currently today, the shipbuilding construction order book has 32 

vessels on it. Twelve of those are tankers, 20 of them are articulated tugs and barges. It also includes six other type vessels. Two 

of those are roll-on/roll-off container vessels that are being built at 

VT Halter [Marine] and also some additional container vessels to 

be able to support both the Hawaii trade and the Puerto Rican 

trade. 

That ship construction that is going on in U.S. shipyards, is actually in conjunction with the other Federal shipbuilding that we do. 

If you take away the building requirement by repealing the Jones 

Act, that construction does not occur. 

And as a result, what ends up happening is the Federal Government will now incur all of the overhead costs. I very much doubt 

that we would build one of our ships for the Navy or one of our 

other Federal agencies overseas. So that overhead now comes to us, 

which would exponentially increase our costs to be able to maintain 

those shipyards viable and that industrial base which is critical. 

Our concern here is, if we ever had to ramp up, for whatever reason, that capacity will be lost and it is not something that could 

be recovered easily. 

I am also concerned about the loss of the mariner jobs. As we 

talked about earlier, we are at the very cusp of not being able to 

do. We can do the surge and we are right at the very edge of being 

able to do that. But we cannot sustain longer than 3 to 4 months 

the capability to provide logistics movement to support the Department of Defense. 

If the Jones Act goes away, we currently have 92 ships that are 

operating under the Jones Act under the U.S. flag. The total fleet 

of self-propelled vessels greater than 1,000 tons is 170; 78 are in 

the international trade and 92 in the Jones Act. That is what is 

supporting that 11,280 mariners in our mariner pool currently 

today. 
13 

Without the Jones Act, that goes away, I can’t support DOD, I 

can’t support national security. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. 

And thank you to all the witnesses. 

I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. The distinguished gentleman from Alabama, Mr. 

Byrne, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I might note for the panel that my Uncle Jack graduated 

from the Merchant Marine Academy and unfortunately, like so 

many of the men that served in World War II, he was lost at sea. 

So I know that the people that participate in this activity are not 

doing so risk free. And I appreciate every day what you do and the 

sacrifice that the people that you work with make. 

Mr. DiLisio, I want to talk to you, and I get confused by the 

acronyms, too, about the Expeditionary Fast Transport Vessel, the 

EPF. I don’t know why it is not the EFT, but it is the EPF, so I 

will get used to that. 

As I understand it, the original plan was to build 18. We have 

delivered six and six are in various phases of construction or have 

been contracted for at the very least. 

In the last 2 years, the administration has not asked for any additional of these vessels, but the Congress has gone ahead and authorized and appropriated one each year. 

So you just described that the missions that that vessel can perform have actually broadened. You have discovered more things 

that it can do. 

Talk a little bit about how important that vessel is and what you 

would be able to do if you had the full complement of 18. 

Mr. DILISIO. Thank you for the question. Most of what we are 

finding out right now is through experimentation. So there is quite 

a difference between being interested in experimental work vice 

full deployment. And as you might gather, we are into our early deployments on these ships. 

So I have really only got two ships that are in full deployment 

status and two coming. The total complement was 10, not 18. We 

had truncated the program at some point in time to 10. 

And the interesting part is they are good for 270 days a year. We 

couple about 90 days for maintenance for a ship. These ships, because they are made out of aluminum and they are fast transports, 

they have to be dry-docked every year. 

So there is a trade-off between me telling you thank you very 

much for the additional ship and then me figuring out how to blend 

in the operational costs of that across the total force. And so I pick 

up a dry dock every year for every ship I get. And so it does become 

a challenge balancing that. 

That said, I do believe over the course of the next year or so we 

are going to find that that ship is very versatile. I am sure you 

have heard some noise—news—you have heard some news 

about—— 

Mr. BYRNE. Sometimes news up here is noise. 

Mr. DILISIO. It could be. 

[Laughter.] 

That was maybe a Freudian slip. 
14 

But you have heard about some of the things we are learning as 

we operate the ship. We have taken the ship into higher sea states 

in some cases and had some cracking. We have gone and fixed 

those. So we are kind of in the infant stage with the EPF. 

I do believe that ship will grow up very fast, but there is a trade 

between every ship we add, and then how wide I can space the 

operational costs as we utilize that force. 

I hope that answers your question. 

Mr. BYRNE. It does. But expand upon the various things that you 

are finding out, even though some of it is experimental. What are 

the various new things that you are finding out that it can do? 

Mr. DILISIO. Fair enough to say that it is a large, open space. 

If you can envision the mission space of the ship being large 

enough to carry six Abrams tanks, it has got a lot of open space. 

So anything you can do in modular fashion and you can drive up 

the ramp, anything that you can put into a 20 foot by 20 foot container or a 20-foot-long container, it could be a special missions operation, it could be anything you could put in a 7-meter or 11-meter 

RHIB [rigid-hulled inflatable boat] off the side of the vessel, it 

could be anything you can fly off of the flight deck, whether that 

is manned or unmanned. And I am just kind of giving you a wide 

scope of things that are opportunities. 

And they operate all over the world. So also you could get into 

a modular form of logistics supply and delivery for other ships, 

anything that you can bring up that ramp. 

We talked a little bit about the ESD that is also in the Pacific. 

The EPF can mate skin-to-skin with that ship and reconfigure 

loads at sea, up to sea state about two-and-a-half. So if you are in 

fairly calm seas, reconfiguration at sea is now a possibility. 

We had always wanted sea-basing capability over time, and this 

gets us closer to it. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, I thank you all for what you do. We need to 

do a better job, I think we all agree on that, in supporting what 

you do. Because your support capability and your support activities 

are so very important to our ability to defend the country. So I 

know our other members of the subcommittee, we are all going to 

try to find some way to help you out. But it is a tough budget environment. 

So thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Byrne. 

The chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, Mr. Wittman, is 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank our witnesses today, Mr. Jaenichen, Lieutenant 

General Lyons, thanks so much for all of your efforts and appreciate what you do and the challenges that you meet. 

Mr. Jaenichen, I wanted to ask you—I am sorry, Mr. DiLisio, too. 

I’m not forgetting your presence here. I want to thank you, too. 

Mr. Jaenichen, I want to ask you, specifically with the Maritime 

Security Program, as you know, Congress has authorized about $5 

million per ship stipend to retain those vessels, to make sure we 

have them on standby with the necessary capacity. Yet the fiscal 

year 2017 budget request supports $3.1 million per ship. 
15 

If the Congress supports the administration’s request, then obviously there is going to be a shortfall there in creating less capacity 

than what you all project that is needed to make sure we have 

those ships available. 

So tell me what happens if Congress funds the stipend at $3.1 

million versus the $5 million per ship. 

Mr. JAENICHEN. Congressman, thank you for the question. 

First of all, I need to talk a little bit about, as I mentioned earlier, the requirement for the MSP program at its inception was 

really based on the three-legged stool that General Lyons referred 

to. Two legs of the stool have almost gone away with regards to the 

access to government-impelled cargo and also commercial cargo, 

which really leaves the stipend as the only place to go. 

In 2011, based on a 2010 baseline, MARAD conducted a study 

and we estimated that the average differential cost to operate a 

U.S.-flag vessel versus a foreign-flag vessel was about $4.6 million. 

If you progress that to fiscal year 2016 numbers, it is somewhere 

between $5 and $7 million and our average is based on a back-ofthe-envelope review of some of the assessments of the operators’ 

costs as about $6.1. 

That authorization that was provided just shy of $5 million in 

the consolidated appropriations is about the right number. The industry has told us that is the right number. 

At $3.1, I can’t guarantee that the fleet will be able to stay what 

it is currently at the ship mix and the operators that are currently 

in the fleet today. They are severely challenged. The entire global 

industry is losing money as are the operators that are participating 

in the MSP program. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Do you believe—you pointed out capacity and only 

78 ships available in the domestic fleet, 60 of those contracted 

under MSP. 

A couple of questions. With this shortfall, it seems like, to me, 

we could lose even more of those ships of the 60 that we need. So 

not only are you in a situation with current need, but even the 

surge capacity with us going down to 78 ships is now in significant 

jeopardy. 

So give me your perspective on how do we get to the right place 

in this with requesting fewer dollars per ship, knowing what that 

creates and those ships moving out of MSP, fewer ships overall 

available in MSP and only having 60 ships today. It seems like, to 

me, we have got a train wreck coming. 

Give us your perspective on what we need to do to make sure 

that that doesn’t happen. 

Mr. JAENICHEN. Thank you, Congressman. 

Just to make sure, there are 57 ships of the 78 today. We have 

approved one additional ship to come in, but it is not under U.S. 

flag yet, to replace one of the RO/ROs [roll-on/roll-off ships] that 

caught fire last summer. And we are currently reviewing essentially the requests for two additional vacancies that currently exist 

in the program. 

With regard to the program itself, that 60-ship capability is extremely important. But our challenge, as I pointed out, as I was 

answering Ranking Member Courtney’s question, the budget that 
16 

we submitted in fiscal year 2017 was based on the program of 

record at the time the budget was developed. 

There was insufficient time, as I mentioned before, to be able to 

do an assessment to get increased to the authorization that was 

provided by Congress in the consolidated appropriations for 2016. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Let me ask this, too. This isn’t only an issue about 

the number of ships, but it is also an issue of our merchant mariners. If there is not a demand there for the merchant mariners, 

then our cadre of folks that we need to take these ships to sea, to 

run them, to make sure we have that capability there, not just the 

capacity, but the capability in the merchant mariners goes away, 

too. 

Give me your perspective on where this leaves us, too, with the 

merchant mariners that we need to make sure MSP is successful. 

Mr. JAENICHEN. The real critical aspect is I need to have an active fleet that actually has the mariners that are sailing on a daily 

basis. 

We have done an estimate. In order to activate the ready surge 

capability that we have in the organic government or the government-owned fleet, we currently today have about 627 mariners that 

are keeping them in that ready-5 status that General Lyons talked 

about in his opening remarks. 

To be able to activate all of those vessels, and that includes the 

15 for Military Sealift Command and also the 2 Missile Defense 

Agency ships that I also support for special mission, requires an 

additional 1,300 mariners to be able to activate them and then 

push them out to where they need to go to be able to support that 

global projection and sustainment of our Armed Forces. 

We can do that with the current number of mariners for about 

3 to 4 months. It is that first crew rotation that is critical and that 

is what I cannot be able to guarantee at this point. 

With the number that I have today, I have a very, very small 

margin to be able to say that I can do that and surge that fleet 

completely. 

After the 4-month period, again, I can’t do that. I would need at 

least 40 more ships sailing actively under U.S. flag and the mariners there to be able to guarantee you that I can provide 

sustainment. 

We have a perfect storm coming. And the perfect storm is the 

fact that starting on the 1st of January of 2017 the International 

Maritime Organization [IMO] Standards for Watchkeeping and 

Training [STCW—Standards of Training, Certification, and Watchkeeping] come into effect. Those requirements are different. If you 

are not actively sailing today, which means that you are not actually being paid to get that upgraded license to be able to meet the 

STCW requirements, you are likely not going to do it because it is 

going to come out of your pocket. 

So in past situations where we have had to surge the fleet, we 

have actually had mariners that have come out of retirement to be 

able to do that. They will not be available to us after January of 

2017. 

And the impact is, if I were to use some of those mariners without those STCW endorsements, they do not have to allow our ships 
17 

into the ports where we potentially have to debark the equipment 

to be able to support DOD’s operations. 

So the impact is, is we are very close to not having enough mariners. And I am concerned at what happens in the future. 

It is also a very aging workforce. And I am concerned that they 

could retire on us. And again, I don’t know where that point is, but 

we are getting very close to it. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This seems to be a 

strategic catastrophe in the making. 

Mr. FORBES. I agree. 

The gentlelady from Missouri, Mrs. Hartzler, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, one of the greatest privileges that we have as Members of Congress is to get to appoint or nominate young people for 

the service academies. And I know that there is a merchant marine 

academy. I have had the privilege of sending a young lady from our 

district there. She loves it. And she and her family can’t say 

enough great things about it. 

So looking at the shortfall that you are talking about here in 

manpower, can you just give me kind of an update? I haven’t had 

the privilege yet of visiting, it is on my to-do list. But how many 

people are going through the academy, and if you think this might 

be a bright spot in helping meet these shortfalls? 

Mr. JAENICHEN. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman. 

Currently today there is about 250 in each incoming class. We 

graduate around 200 on an annual basis, 25 percent of them go on 

to active duty into one of the branches of the armed services, and 

then about the rest, 75 percent, will actually sail on our commercial fleet. 

That number today, and if I combine that with the six State maritime academies, I produce about 900 mariners a year. The only 

ones that are required to sail are the ones that go to Kings Point 

and those that receive what we refer to as a student incentive program stipend, which is $8,000, and they have about a 3-year service obligation. Those that go to Kings Point have a 5-year service 

obligation. 

I am concerned. There was a study that was completed by the 

Secretaries of Labor, Education and Transportation. That report 

was released in August of 2015. And in that we used a 2012 baseline in terms of the age demographics for the seafarers. 

We need 70,000 new mariners by 2022. Half of those are licensed 

officers. The programs that you are referring to, both Kings Point 

and the State maritime academies, are producing only about 900 

of that shortfall. So we are going to be far short of being able to 

meet that requirement that we know is coming in 2022. 

There is ample opportunity and there is great opportunity for 

those seafarers. But again, it relies on the U.S.-flag fleet. 

As I mentioned earlier, if the Jones Act were to be threatened, 

those jobs would go away. That creates a challenge for our seafarer 

workforce. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Do you see any opportunity or changes being 

made in your training and your recruitment of young people to help 
18 

make up the shortfall? So if I heard you right, you need 70,000 new 

people by 2022—— 

Mr. JAENICHEN. 2022. 

Mrs. HARTZLER [continuing]. And you are only graduating about 

900 a year. So what are some other programs that you have out 

there to try to meet the shortfall? 

Mr. JAENICHEN. Thank you. We are currently working with the 

Military Sealift Command. We are also working with the American 

Maritime Partnership. We have recognized that veterans, as they 

are leaving the services, many of them have seafaring capabilities, 

those that are operating Army watercraft, those in the Coast 

Guard, and those in the Navy. 

We are working on a military-to-mariner program because we 

think that is a way that we can potentially get the shortfall within 

the Committee on Marine Transportation System, the CMTS. We 

are working with our 27 agencies on an integrated action plan to 

be able to get to the heart of that. 

The real issue is how they get credit for the courses that they 

take over the course of their military career to be able to get a U.S. 

Coast Guard endorsement and we are currently working on that 

particular issue. 

The challenge right now is a veteran comes out, he literally has 

to start from scratch because he gets no credit for any of the experience or any of the training that he has had. So we are actually 

getting to the heart of that. 

Obviously there are other ways to do it, but we do have limited 

capacity. We are pretty much, in terms of what we are doing at 

Kings Point, we are at capacity there with regards to what we are 

able to do and the State maritime academies are at capacity as 

well. 

Obviously, the training ship fleets which supports—in order to 

get an officer’s license requires 360 days during the period of time 

that you are actually training for that endorsement. That is difficult to obtain. The State maritime academies do it through a combination of training ships sailing, typically they have 100-day 

cruises every year, and then they also have to have some commercial time. Kings Point does it by sailing commercially for 1 year out 

of the 4 years that they are taking their curriculum. 

So that actually is one of the challenges, just capacity. Obviously, 

as the fleet size has decreased, our ability to place cadets and midshipmen on those fleets is reduced as well. So I am concerned 

about our capacity to train as well as the ability to meet the demand of the future mariner workforce. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Well, I commend you for thinking outside the 

box. I think especially targeting veterans, I think, makes a lot of 

sense. And if there is any help that we can provide to helping so 

that they qualify more easily, it just makes a lot of sense and I 

know we will be here ready to help. 

Mr. JAENICHEN. Thank you, Congresswoman. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, as we mentioned to you before we started, we now have a series of votes. I think it is five votes, if I am 

not mistaken. And so if it is okay with you we are going to recess 

during those votes and then we will all come back after that time. 
19 

So we stand in recess until the completion of these votes. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. FORBES. Gentlemen, we are going to go ahead and get started, if it is okay. Mr. Courtney said that was okay with him. 

And I have a few questions. As you know, I deferred mine until 

after the other members, and then Mr. Garamendi will have his 

time for questioning. 

But General, if you could, and these are some questions we just 

need to get on the record for our transcript, but how many ships 

are required to support the Maritime Security Program? 

General LYONS. Sir, thanks for the question. TRANSCOM fully 

supports the 60 ships that are in the Maritime Security Program 

and the capability that brings. 

Mr. FORBES. In your best, professional military judgment, is 

there a sufficient analysis to underpin the 60-ship military requirement? 

General LYONS. Sir, there is. Really, over the last 20 years we 

have done several mobility capability assessment studies, all arriving at similar types of conclusions in terms of the types of vessels 

and the capability we need to surge. So yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. In your best, professional military judgment, does 

the fiscal year 2017 budget request support the 60-ship MSP requirement? 

General LYONS. Sir, it does support a 60-ship MSP requirement. 

You know, the big question alluded to earlier is, are those incentives inside that program sufficient to retain the U.S. flag. And I 

think Administrator Jaenichen addressed those earlier, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Jaenichen, TRANSCOM has indicated a military requirement of 60 ships. Once again, can you explain the impact of the fiscal year 2017 budget proposal to the MSP force structure? 

Mr. JAENICHEN. Thank you for the question, Chairman. The 60 

ships in the program, obviously when we submitted the 2017 budget, that was at the program of record at the time, which was at 

$3.1. 

My concern with regard to the fleet today is, as a result of the 

downward pressure that we have seen on their ability to get both 

commercial and the decrease that we have seen in government-impelled cargoes has put significant downward pressure on the fleet. 

The stipend amount today, I cannot guarantee that that is sufficient to keep those vessels in the program. And as we have indicated, all the three of witnesses have said, those 60 ships are important for our national security. 

And the operators themselves who have those agreements, they 

have to make financial decisions based on what they are able to do. 

And if it is losing money, then they are not going to be able to stay 

in the program. We have seen that before. They have told us that 

the reason for reflagging or to flag out of the program is because 

they can’t make it financially viable. 

Mr. FORBES. If you had to venture your best estimate based on 

the fiscal year 2017 budget and what it would do to the force structure, how many ships do you think it would reduce the structure 

by? 
20 

Mr. JAENICHEN. I can’t give you a number, Chairman, in terms 

of what it would be. I know that there could be an adverse effect; 

I just can’t tell you what that would be. 

Mr. FORBES. That is fair. 

General, what is your assessment of our U.S. mariners’ ability to 

sustain a full-scale mobilization of the Ready Reserve Force? 

General LYONS. Chairman, I think where we are today, we would 

be able to support a surge of the force. But as Administrator 

Jaenichen indicated, we are in a downward trend in the number 

of mariners. We are very, very concerned. We are right on the margin between medium and high risk to be able to mobilize that fleet. 

And of course, the bigger issue is to be able to sustain that fleet 

over a long period of time, prolonged period of time. 

So we have some serious concern. Even though today I think we 

are okay, we have some significant concerns about that capability 

in the future. 

Mr. FORBES. Could you help me in terms of surge capability and 

tell me, we could do it initially, could we sustain it over any length 

of time? And if so, what would your approximate length of time be 

that you would tell the committee? 

General LYONS. You know, Chairman, difficult to say. Enemy 

gets a vote how long the duration of that conflict, per se. Administrator Jaenichen, I think, has indicated in his mariner assessment 

that we would be able to surge the fleet and sustain it for a several 

months, but not much past that point. And I will defer to MARAD 

on that, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. If our nation loses another 200 U.S. mariners, will we have sufficient forces to even support the initial activation of the Ready Reserve fleet? 

General LYONS. Again, you know, MARAD has done a lot of work 

here. The analysis that I have seen, we have got some concerns 

about where we are in the threshold. Again, I think we would be 

able to surge the fleet initially. The ability to sustain that really 

becomes somewhat problematic for us. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Jaenichen, could you comment on that, if you 

would? 

Mr. JAENICHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have estimated 

that we need about 11,019 mariners to be able to have the capability to surge. And once we have reached that point, now, my concern is not necessarily being able to surge, but also our assessment 

is based on today. I can’t tell you what it will be 2 years from now 

or 5 years from now. And I am concerned about our ability to do 

that in the future as we take a look at the aging demographic of 

our seafaring workforce. 

So we are very close to the margin between that medium and 

high risk, as I indicated earlier, to an earlier question. 

In order to be comfortable with the number of mariners we have, 

with the STCW requirements that go into effect in January of 

2017, we need an estimate of approximately 40 more ships to have 

sufficient mariner pool that is sailing actively on a day-to-day basis 

to make sure we have the right number. 

Mr. FORBES. If we lost 200 mariners, would we be in high risk? 

Mr. JAENICHEN. We would, sir. 
21 

Mr. FORBES. General, how important is the Ready Reserve Force 

to our military’s ability to support a full-scale mobilization? 

General LYONS. Chairman, it is extremely important. In fact, 

without that Ready Reserve Force fleet, we would be unable to deliver a significant portion of combat power globally. So we are absolutely reliant upon that capability from the pre-positioned ships 

that are forward positioned, to the surge fleet, to the Ready Reserve Force fleet. Those are critical in our ability to project power. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Jaenichen, over the long term would the administration’s Food for Peace proposal increase or decrease the number 

of U.S. mariners? 

Mr. JAENICHEN. Thank you, Chairman, for the question. If we go 

back to the 25 percent reduction that occurred in 2012 when we did 

the ‘‘Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century’’ that reduced 

the food aid program from 75 to 50 percent in accordance with a 

1954 civilian cargo preference, we estimated at that time we would 

lose somewhere between 9 and 12 ships. 

We have subsequently lost 28. Now, we also recognize that that 

is coincident with all of the downward pressure on the DOD cargoes, the retrograde from Afghanistan and Iraq. So those all occurred at the same time, which is it is that total government-impelled cargo which has actually caused that. 

Our estimate for what is proposed in the fiscal year 2017 budget, we have included in that budget $25 million as a mitigating factor 

to make sure that we don’t have an adverse effect on the mariner 

pool, we will be able to maintain some ships, principally the ones 

that are principally carrying food aid cargo that are not in the 

MSP. And so $24 million of that would be dedicated to those nonMSP carriers and then a million would be dedicated to the retraining of the mariners to make sure that we have that capability. 

So we recognize that the proposal from the administration does 

have an impact on the U.S. merchant marine and we are trying to 

mitigate that with the budget request that has been submitted. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. How does the loss of mariners impact the 

military’s ability to support the Navy’s Ready Reserve Force, General? 

General LYONS. Chairman, the merchant mariner is inextricably 

linked to the Department of Defense’s ability to project force. And 

so as I indicated earlier, the predominant cargo, both equipment 

and supplies, go by sealift. And so without that merchant mariner 

capability, we don’t have a DOD surge sealift capability. 

Mr. FORBES. And Mr. Jaenichen, what is the administration’s 

plan to provide sufficient mariners to support sustained operations, 

not just the initial activation of the Ready Reserve Force? 

Mr. JAENICHEN. Thank you, Chairman, for the question. The 

Maritime Administration is currently working on a draft National 

Maritime Strategy which we hope to address. And as I indicated 

to Congresswoman Hartzler’s question earlier, we are working 

within the Committee on Marine Transportation System to put together a ‘‘Veteran-to-Mariner’’ program to try to get at the shortfalls that we are currently experiencing. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. DiLisio, will the proposed inactivation of a T– 

AOE in fiscal year 2017 increase or decrease our military readiness? 
22 

Mr. DILISIO. Mr. Chairman, our current requirement for CLF 

ships is 29. The AOE takes us at 30, so that would be losing any 

margin I have, so I will be right at the margin with 29. 

Mr. FORBES. The administration has proposed to eliminate an 

aircraft carrier, euthanize 11 cruisers, eliminate a carrier air wing, 

and now inactivate another T–AOE. Is the inactivation of the T– 

AOE driven by fiscal pressures? 

Mr. DILISIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The USNS Rainier is 

the ship we are talking about right now. And that is a financial 

trade given the 40-plus million dollars of service life extension 

work I would need to do to her to keep her in service and the 60- 

plus million dollars a year it takes to operate her. So as it turns, 

it is a $100 million proposition for one ship. The alternative ships 

are in the $40, $50 million a year range. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. Just a couple more questions and then we 

will move on. 

This is for Mr. Jaenichen and General Lyons. There are some in 

Congress that have indicated that the United States should outsource our military maritime lift capacity to other foreign nations 

and that U.S. crews should be replaced by foreign crews. Could you 

both explain the value of an organic maritime lift capability and 

why Congress needs U.S. mariners in the MSP program and the 

Ready Reserve Force? 

Mr. JAENICHEN. Chairman, thank you for the question. The first 

thing I would say is the U.S. merchant marine and the mariners 

that are part of that active workforce have always responded to the 

call. They are patriotic. They have done what is needed to conduct 

our sealift requirement. They have never failed to carry our 

requirements, equipment, supply, materials, to support the Department of Defense operations. 

I cannot say the same for foreign-flag crews. We have had several instances in which they have not gone into the theater for 

their own fear of their own safety. 

We also run the risk if you have foreign seafarers that potentially we are at the risk of some political decision by another country who those mariners potentially are national citizens to. And I 

don’t think that is a position that we want to be in going forward. 

Mr. FORBES. General, do you have thoughts on that? 

General LYONS. Chairman, yes, sir. We believe that the case for 

a U.S.-flag fleet is compelling. There is no guarantee whatsoever 

that a foreign-flag fleet will sail into harm’s way, as the Administrator said, and we have had cases of that in the past. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Garamendi, if you would be patient with me, 

one more. We have the gentlelady from Hawaii and then we will 

be right to you. 

So the gentlelady from Hawaii is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

General Lyons, can you speak to your Ready Reserve Force 

requirements and whether or not you have enough of your either 

organic mariners or commercial vessels to meet that requirement? 

General LYONS. Yes, ma’am. Today we have a capability that I 

believe is sufficient to meet the national military strategy’s requirements with acceptable risk. 
23 

The issue we face is where we will be tomorrow. We see some 

downward trends that are significant in nature, one of which is the 

health of the merchant mariner industry that we have been discussing and those mariners that not only sail our commercial vessels, but also sail our Ready Reserve Force fleet, our surge fleet 

crew, our pre-positioned equipment that is out there today. 

So we believe we are in good shape now, but we do have some 

concerns about where we are headed in that as well as the age-out 

of the organic fleet. 

Mr. JAENICHEN. Congresswoman, if I could add just a few comments. First of all, we get great support from our resource sponsor 

in the Navy. They provide us the funding to be able to maintain 

the maintenance and repair as well as the crewing dollars to be 

able to support that Ready Reserve Force in their ready status. 

My concern is we are doing that with a fleet that is 39 years old. 

So as General Lyons pointed out, we have acceptable risk today, 

but we are doing it with ships, some of the ships that I have in 

my fleet are 50 years old. We are doing the best we can. Some of 

the equipment is obsolete; it is no longer made, so we have to take 

extraordinary measures to be able to maintain the readiness of 

that fleet. 

If that fleet is called, I would like to say that I can guarantee 

every single time we will be able to do it. But as we get farther 

in time, and we have every intent to utilize the funding to be able 

to extend that service life to 60 years, I can’t guarantee you it will 

be able to be able to carry the equipment that we need. 

Several of the ships in the inventory are steamships. They are 

hard to maintain, hard to operate. And if we are surging to be able 

to support a specific operation and I have a problem on one of those 

ships that’s, you know, 40 years old, we may not be able to support 

the fight and there are potential soldiers, sailors, or marines that 

could be at risk as a result of that. 

Ms. GABBARD. Similarly, you have talked about the importance 

of the Maritime Security Program as it relates to your ability to respond and move people and logistics, et cetera. What is the fleet 

size requirement of the Maritime Security Program? 

Mr. JAENICHEN. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman. 

Sixty has been identified as the number. There has been some mobility and capability assessment, as General Lyons alluded to earlier. 

Typically, that fleet is for sustainment. It is a commercial fleet. 

The surge would actually be done by our organic assets, both with 

the Military Sealift Command with their pre-po ships and also the 

Ready Reserve Force ships that we have. 

What has happened over time is those ships in the MSP program 

are typically in commercial service. They will then become available once they are able to position themselves to be able to carry 

those sustainment cargoes. 

The 60 that is there based on the operational requirements, that 

would require a classified briefing to be able to specifically go 

through those particular movements that are required to be able to 

support the most comprehensive and most challenging scenarios 

that the Department of Defense has. But we need all 60 to be able 

to do that. 
24 

It also makes the assumption that we will have no losses. And 

we recognize that there are changes in the environment, as General Lyons pointed out in his opening comments, from the standpoint of cyber, from air and maritime defense that that may not be 

a valid assumption going forward. 

And my understanding is DOD is doing a study on the potential 

risks and what kind of numbers would require to be changed or 

added to be able to ensure we have the correct capability going forward. 

Ms. GABBARD. Assuming that you do have losses and being able 

to account for that. 

Mr. JAENICHEN. Assuming that we could have losses, that is correct, ma’am. 

Ms. GABBARD. Right, right. Okay, thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi, is 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you very much, Mr. Forbes. And thank 

you for the courtesy of allowing me to participate. 

This is the fourth hearing that I have been in in the last couple 

of months that deals with this issue. 

And Mr. Chairman, you may want to add to your record the 

hearing record of those other committees. I think it would be useful 

in that all of those committees’ hearings have all come to the same 

point, and that is that we have a national security issue here, a 

very, very serious one. 

The House Armed Services Committee usually winds up talking 

about national security and the risks that we run. This is a real 

one and it is happening in real time. 

And I thank you very much for your questions, Mr. Chairman. 

They were right on. And most of the questions I would ask, you 

have already done. 

I just maybe kind of weave this together from this hearing and 

other hearings. 

Mr. Jaenichen, is it about cargo? Is it really about cargo, that 

these ships, if they are going to be able to maintain, they have to 

have cargo? The food aid has been reduced, Ex-Im [Export-Import] 

Bank has been reduced, and the military’s been reduced. Some of 

those are policy, some of those are fortunately the wars have 

ground down a bit. 

Is it cargo? 

Mr. JAENICHEN. Thank you for the question, Congressman. In 

every situation where we have talked to an operator who has reflagged a ship, he has told us that it is the absence of cargo which 

has contributed significantly to their decision to reflag or to scrap 

those vessels. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. And we have talked extensively about the 

mariners and the average age of the mariners, licensing issues, and 

the ships that are not available for the mariners to be on. And I 

won’t go into that except that that is obviously a problem here. 

It seems to me that what we have is a government and administration that is not looking at all of the pieces of this puzzle and 

weaving them together in a way that is sensible, both for national 

security, for jobs, for the shipyards, and the like. 
25 

We know that there is a threat on the Jones Act, which testimony already on the record today about the importance of the 

Jones Act for all the pieces of this puzzle. 

We know that the USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development] is determined to cash out the commodity portion of the 

Food for Peace. We have had testimony here today about the downward pressure that that puts on the maritime industry. 

We know that at the moment the Ex-Im Bank is not operable 

and that there are problems there. And thankfully, we do not have 

the need at the moment for the military that we have had in the 

past. 

We need to get this together. 

Mr. Forbes, your hearing is extremely important, together with 

the other hearings. And I think as we go through the policy questions and the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] and as 

we talk to the Foreign Affairs Committee, we need to make it very, 

very clear that this is a national security issue. 

Your committee is on this. I know that Mr. Hunter and the Coast 

Guard Maritime Committee are also on it. 

But I think we can weave together here a very compelling argument to sustain the MSP, the Ready Reserve Force, and the mariners that go with it by pushing the Food for Peace back to $75 [million]. 

One more question. Where does the $25 million come from, Mr. 

Jaenichen? 

Mr. JAENICHEN. Congressman Garamendi, that is actually in our 

budget for the Maritime Security Program for the MARAD budget 

in 2017. It is actually included so that the total is actually $211 

[million], which is in the MSP request because it includes that $25 

million to support the administration’s proposal for additional 25 

percent flexibility. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Last year that money came from the Food for 

Peace program. Is this different this year? 

Mr. JAENICHEN. It is an identical proposal to what was in the fiscal year 2016 request, Congressman. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Was the Food for Peace program reduced by the 

25? 

Mr. JAENICHEN. It is reduced by the flexibility for an intervention that would include a potential local and regional purchase, but 

I would refer you to USAID for how they would actually execute 

that particular authorization. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. It is just very curious that instead of sending 

food and we are now taking money out of the food program and circulating it back to the MSP program. It doesn’t make much sense 

to me. 

Mr. JAENICHEN. Congressman, we are—I think you have confused it. There was a proposal at one time to be able to use the 

food aid reform and have money. This proposal is not that. This is 

just a funding in the MSP line to support the mitigation efforts. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I think we would be better off shipping food and 

keeping the mariners busy, keeping the ships busy, rather than 

providing what basically is a welfare program that may or may not 

keep the mariners busy. It depends whether those ships get laid up 

or not. 
26 

Mr. JAENICHEN. Congressman, that proposal is no longer on the 

table as under consideration. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Money is fungible and it moves. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your committee. And you are onto 

something very, very important here. 

Know that the Subcommittee on Transportation is with you to 

try to sort this out. 

Mr. FORBES. We thank the gentleman. 

And Mr. Courtney is now recognized for any questions he may 

have. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Just one quick follow-up. 

Mr. Jaenichen, you mentioned to Representative Hartzler a few 

minutes ago. Again, MARAD is going to be issuing a comprehensive maritime strategic plan shortly. Is that right? 

Mr. JAENICHEN. That is correct, Ranking Member Courtney. In 

fact, we have had that, it is in interdepartmental review now. It 

has been in OMB [Office of Management and Budget] for a while. 

I hope to be able to get that out for draft public comment, and then 

we would take those public comments and then we would finalize 

the strategy. And I am hoping to have that draft National Maritime Strategy out in the next couple of months. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And how many years has it been since the last 

plan? 

Mr. JAENICHEN. The last strategy dates back to 1936 as modified 

in 1970, so it has been a while, sir. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And how many departments did you have to run 

the traps on this? 

Mr. JAENICHEN. During my initial review, we actually started 

this process back in 2014, the first National Maritime Strategy 

symposium was held in January of 2014, we held a second in May. 

Once we got the draft done, we have shared it with the 27 agencies 

and commissions that were in the Committee on Marine Transportation System and I also provided it and got comments that we included in our draft that we provided to OMB that came from the 

majors, so Coast Guard, Department of Energy, DOD, Army Corps 

of Engineers, to ensure that we had it about right. 

And so we are in that process now to go through to get final 

interdepartmental review. 

Mr. COURTNEY. So about 80 years and 27 agencies. Again, I just 

want to salute you for your persistence in this and just tell you we 

look forward really enthusiastically for the draft. 

And I want to thank you and the witnesses for your testimony. 

Mr. JAENICHEN. Thank you, Ranking Member. 

Mr. FORBES. Well, thank you, gentlemen. 

As you remember, Mr. Courtney and I had indicated to all three 

of you that at the end we would give you whatever time you needed 

to clarify any of your remarks or to add anything to the record that 

you thought might be pertinent. 

So we will start now, and just thank you again for being with 

us. 

And Mr. Jaenichen, any closing thoughts that you have for us? 

Mr. JAENICHEN. Chairman, I would just like to talk a little about 

the importance of the MSP just one last time. If you recall, we re-
27 

authorized the MSP program out to 2025. And all of the carriers 

signed up for that program at that time. 

The world has completely changed from the time that they resigned those contracts to get out to 2025. And so that timing and 

the stipend amount that was there, we all recognize that they are 

under downward pressure, as I have already testified to. So I 

would encourage the committee to think about that as we go forward in terms of the future viabiity of the MSP. 

The second is the mariners themselves. They are a strategic national asset. That is what allows us to provide national security. If 

there were any other workforce sector that supported national security, that had experienced a 20 percent loss and reduction in the 

number of people, there would be a public outcry. 

This is a crisis in the making and we are not talking about it. 

That is one of the reasons why I greatly appreciate this committee 

for having this hearing today. 

The final one that I have is with regards to the recapitalization 

of the sealift fleet and the training fleets. We are operating old 

ships. And as a result in operating old ships, it costs more, it is 

more expensive to continue the operation and repairs. And at some 

point, we reach a limit and we are not going to be able to operate. 

The ships, if they can’t operate, if they are in the Ready Reserve 

Force, I can’t provide the requirement to provide that sealift for 

DOD. And if it is a training ship, I don’t have the capacity to train 

the mariners that we have already identified are essential to our 

future and to be able to support the Department of Defense. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

General, any closing remarks that you would like to offer us? 

General LYONS. Chairman, thank you. I think it was said today 

this is clearly a national security issue. This committee certainly 

recognizes that strategic mobility is a competitive advantage of the 

United States. 

And sir, I would just like to thank you, leadership, the entire 

committee for your work to keep our national defense strong. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. 

Mr. DiLisio, we are going to let you have the last word. 

Mr. DILISIO. That is unusual. 

[Laughter.] 

What I wanted to do, Mr. Chairman, was we have talked a lot 

about the MSP program and we talked about mariners. And certainly with my partners, everything they have told you, I agree 

with. 

What I want to remind everyone is that we have 122 organic 

ships that we did not talk about that use the same mariner pool. 

And these are organic ships like the pre-positioning ships that are 

already in place, ready to go in theater in fully operational status 

with the very same mariners onboard. 

So as what we have described as a catastrophe in the making, 

as the quality of the mariner pool begins to shrink, as the numbers 

shrink, the people that are going to be on the pointy end delivering 

Marine Corps and Army equipment is also going to be at risk. 

And I will tell you, we pick the best we can find. But 122 organic 

ships, same mariners. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. 
28 

Mr. FORBES. Gentleman, thank you all so much again for your 

service to our country and for being here today. 

And if there are no other questions, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:08 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
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MARCH 22, 2016 

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