1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 47628

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

NATALIE J. MIRAMONTES,

Defendant-Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Filed: November 18, 2021

Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED

OPINION AND SHALL NOT

BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, State of Idaho, 

Bannock County. Hon. Stephen S. Dunn, District Judge. 

Judgment of conviction for possession of methamphetamine, affirmed. 

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy 

Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Justin R. Porter, Deputy Attorney 

General, Boise, for respondent. 

________________________________________________

BRAILSFORD, Judge

Natalie J. Miramontes appeals from the judgment of conviction entered on her conditional 

guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine, Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)(1). Miramontes 

challenges the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress. We affirm. 

I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Miramontes does not challenge the district court’s factual findings made in support of its 

denial of her suppression motion. Those findings are that Officers Myler and LaVallee arrived at 

Christine Evans’ residence to conduct a probationary check on Evans. After entering the residence,

Officer Myler saw another person, who was later identified as Miramontes, exiting through the 

residence’s back door, hunching over, and carrying a bag. Officer Myler ordered Miramontes to 

stop three times. The third time, Miramontes complied and dropped what she was carrying. At 
2

that point, Officer Myler ordered Miramontes to return to the residence and to identify herself and 

asked why she was at the residence. Miramontes explained she was staying with Evans in a spare 

bedroom.

Officer LaVallee collected the items Miramontes had dropped on the ground outside and 

placed those items on the washing machine in the residence. Among the items was a backpack 

and several smaller, zipped bags. When Officer Myler asked Miramontes for her identification, 

Miramontes responded it was in a pink floral print bag. Officer Myler asked Officer LaVallee to

retrieve Miramontes’ identification, and when Officer LaVallee opened a pink bag, he saw what 

appeared to be drugs and drug paraphernalia. After Officer Myler looked into the bag, she called 

the Pocatello Police Department.

Officers Myler and LaVallee detained both Miramontes and Evans until officers from the 

Pocatello Police Department, including Officer Leach, arrived at the residence. Officer Leach 

searched the bedroom in which Miramontes had been staying and found drug paraphernalia and 

drugs, which later tested positive for methamphetamine. Officer Leach also inspected the bags

which Officer LaVallee had collected from outside and found Miramontes’ identification and a 

syringe containing a dark substance in a different pink bag than the one Officer LaVallee had 

opened. Officer Leach spoke with both Evans and Miramontes, read Miramontes her Miranda1

rights, identified the items which belonged to Miramontes, and arrested her. As a result, the State 

charged Miramontes with one felony count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to 

deliver, I.C. § 37-2732(a)(1)(A). 

Miramontes pled not guilty to this charge and filed a motion to suppress, arguing Officer 

Myler unreasonably seized her outside of Evans’ residence and seeking to suppress the “[e]vidence 

obtained through this seizure.” The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion at 

which Officers Myler, LaVallee, and Leach all testified. Following this hearing, the parties 

submitted briefing, in which Miramontes argued generally that her “detention and the subsequent 

search of her purse violated the Fourth Amendment.” In support, Miramontes relied on State v. 

Williams, 162 Idaho 56, 60-64, 394 P.3d 99, 103-07 (Ct. App. 2016), in which this Court addressed 

the constitutionality of a third party’s detention during the execution of a search warrant and 

 

1

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
3

established a balancing test for determining whether such a detention violated the Fourth 

Amendment.

After reviewing the parties’ post-hearing briefing in this case, the district court held a 

second hearing to clarify the parties’ positions. In particular, the court inquired whether the State 

charged Miramontes based on the evidence found in her purse or in the bedroom in which she was 

staying, and the prosecutor responded “both.” Then, the court inquired of Miramontes’ counsel 

whether Miramontes was seeking to suppress the evidence found in both her purse and in the 

bedroom, and it noted Miramontes had not addressed in her briefing what evidence was the “fruit 

of the poisonous tree” from the alleged unlawful seizure. Miramontes’ counsel responded that “if 

there is [an] illegal seizure then things that . . . are obtained subsequent to the illegal seizure are 

supposed to be suppressed.” Further, Miramontes’ counsel stated “the difference is what they are 

allowed to do when they detain her,” acknowledged the officers could “detain her to determine her 

identity perhaps--or probably,” and framed the issue as “can they then get into her purse? Can 

they search her effects[?]”

At the conclusion of this second hearing, the district court inquired of Miramontes’ counsel 

whether he wanted “to address more fully the question of can the drugs found in the bedroom be 

a basis for this charge, even if the drugs in the purse were suppressed?” to which he responded 

affirmatively. Further, the court articulated:

The question is that even if I were to suppress the drugs they found in the purse . . . 

is the discovery of the drugs in the bedroom . . . sufficiently attenuated from the 

discovery of the drugs in the purse so as to be a proper basis for these charges, 

regardless of what was in the purse?

Following this second hearing, the parties filed supplemental briefing. In this briefing, 

Miramontes argued that neither the attenuation doctrine, the inevitable discovery doctrine, nor the 

independent source doctrine provided an exception to the exclusionary rule for the evidence 

discovered during the officers’ search of Evans’ residence.

After reviewing this supplemental briefing, the district court denied Miramontes’

suppression motion. In denying the motion, the court relied on Williams, applied the balancing 

test set forth in that case, and concluded “the detention and subsequent seizure of [Miramontes] 

was not in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.” After reaching this conclusion, the court 

found “no reason” to analyze whether “the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine” provided an 

exception to the exclusionary rule.
4

Following the denial of her suppression motion, Miramontes pled guilty to possession of 

methamphetamine and reserved her right to appeal the denial of the motion. After timely appealing 

that denial, Miramontes moved to suspend briefing in this appeal, pending the resolution of a 

petition for certiorari for the review of the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Phipps, 166 

Idaho 1, 454 P.3d 1084 (2019). In Phipps, the Court held that “officers have the categorical 

authority to detain all occupants of a residence incident to a lawful parole or probation search and 

to question them as long as the detention is not prolonged by the questioning.” Id. at 8, 454 P.3d 

at 1091. When the petition for certiorari was denied in October 2020, this appeal resumed.

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion 

to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by 

substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts 

as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a 

suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, 

weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 

127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d 

659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999). 

III.

ANALYSIS

Miramontes challenges the district court’s denial of her suppression motion. Miramontes 

does not challenge, however, what she describes as “her warrantless, suspicionless detention while 

the residence check at [Evans’ residence] was conducted.” Rather, she acknowledges that the 

Idaho Supreme Court’s ruling in Phipps that officers have “the categorical authority” to detain all 

occupants of a residence incident to a probationary search resolves in the State’s favor the issue of 

whether her detention was lawful. Phipps, 166 Idaho at 8, 454 P.3d at 1091. To the extent 

Miramontes cites legal authorities addressing whether reasonable suspicion exists to seize or detain

an individual, those authorities are inapposite because Miramontes concedes her detention was 

lawful in the context of the probationary search.

Rather than challenging her detention as unlawful, Miramontes now argues on appeal that 

“the district court erred by denying her motion where her purse was searched absent reasonable 
5

and articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing.” In support, Miramontes asserts various 

arguments including that “neither officer safety nor [Evans’] Fourth Amendment [probationary]

waiver authorized the search of [her] purses or the room in which she slept”; leaving [Evans’] 

residence out the back door . . . did not give rise to reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal 

conduct”; “[f]light is not, standing alone, a basis for reasonable articulable suspicion”; and her 

“purse was opened by law enforcement absent a warrant, absent consent, and absent reasonable 

suspicion or probable cause.” 

In response, the State argues “Miramontes failed to present to the district court any cogent

argument, backed by authority and citations to evidence in the record, regarding the allegedly 

unlawful search of her purse.” While the State acknowledges Miramontes made “the bare

assertion” that “the search of her purse violated the Fourth Amendment” in her initial brief, the 

State contends that Miramontes did not support this assertion “with any authority, argument, or 

citation to the evidence in the record.” Further, it contends that, to the extent Miramontes raised 

the issue, it “flew past” the court as indicated by the court’s statement during the second hearing 

that “the issue was not addressed in either one of [the parties’] briefs.”

Issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Fodge, 

121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). This requirement, known as issue preservation, 

limits appellate court review to the evidence, theories, and arguments that were presented below.

State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017). To be properly 

preserved for appeal, both the issue and the party’s position on the issue must be raised before the 

trial court. State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 99, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019). Recently, the Idaho 

Supreme Court has ruled that to preserve an issue for appeal, a party must do more than allege 

facts and state a conclusion. State v. Randall, ___ Idaho ___, ___, ___ P.3d ___, ___ (Oct. 5, 

2021). Rather, a party must provide “an application of the law to the facts to support the conclusion 

stated” to preserve an issue for appeal. Id.

In this case, Miramontes at least suggested she was making an alternative argument that, 

even if her detention were lawful, the subsequent search of her purse was not. For example, during 

the second hearing, her counsel stated:

The difference is what they are allowed to do when they detain her.

. . . . 
6

. . . So, they can detain her to determine her identity perhaps--or probably. 

The question, though, is can they then get into her purse? Can they search her 

effects[?]

Also, in her initial brief, Miramontes cited State v. Valdez, 68 P.3d 1052, 1056 (Utah Ct. App. 

2003), in which the court addressed whether officers could seize a third party while executing an 

arrest warrant absent facts supporting a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. In Valdez, 

officers executed an arrest warrant on Young in her residence and, while doing so, awoke Valdez,

who was also present, to ensure he did not have a weapon. Id. at 1054. After ensuring Valdez was 

not armed, the officers asked for Valdez’s identification, learned he had an outstanding warrant, 

arrested him, and discovered drugs during a search incident to arrest. Id. Affirming the trial court’s 

suppression of this evidence, the court held that the officers had the authority to detain Valdez to 

ensure “he was not in a position to harm” either the officers or Young but that “the scope of this 

detention was limited to ensuring Valdez had no weapons in his hands and was in no position to 

violently interfere with the arrest” absent reasonable suspicion he was or had been involved in a 

criminal activity. Id. at 1059. 

Relying on Valdez, Miramontes argued to the district court that it “should rule similarly to 

the [Valdez] court.” In support, Miramontes noted Officer Myler testified that she detained 

Miramontes “to control the scene and also for officer safety concerns,” “was not concerned about 

criminal activity on the premises,” “was not concerned about any violence at the time,” and 

“detained and placed handcuffs on [Miramontes] [to control] the situation because of ‘policy.’” 

Further, Miramontes noted the officers “searched [her] property without consent or warrant.” This 

argument suggests an alternative argument to Miramontes’ challenge to her initial detention; i.e.,

despite a lawful initial detention to secure the scene, Officer LaVallee did not have authority to 

search Miramontes’ purse. 

While not entirely clear, Miramontes’ citation to Valdez, recitation of the facts in this case 

as they relate to Valdez, and request that the district court “rule similarly to the [Valdez] court”

support an alternative argument that, even if Miramontes’ detention was lawful, the subsequent 

search of her purse was not. Nevertheless, the crux of Miramontes’ argument focused on the 

lawfulness of her detention under the balancing test articulated in Williams. Miramontes never 

once, during either the hearings or in her briefings, specifically argued the officers lacked 

reasonable suspicion to search her belongings, and indeed, she did not ever use the phrase 

“reasonable suspicion” in that context.
7

For example, Miramontes never argued, as she does now on appeal, that “leaving [Evans’] 

residence out the back door . . . did not give rise to reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal 

conduct” or that “[f]light is not, standing alone, a basis for reasonable articulable suspicion.” As 

a result, the district court neither made any factual findings related to nor ruled on whether the 

officers had authority to search Miramontes’ property. The absence of any such ruling is fatal to 

Miramontes’ appeal.

The appellant has the burden to obtain an adverse ruling at the trial court. State v. 

Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580, 586, 199 P.3d 155, 161 (Ct. App. 2008). This Court will not review an 

appellant’s assignment of error unless the record discloses such an adverse ruling which forms the 

basis for the claim. State v. Dougherty, 142 Idaho 1, 6, 121 P.3d 416, 421 (Ct. App. 2005). This 

principle remains true even when the trial court had actual knowledge of the issue, Huntsman, 146 

Idaho at 586, 199 P.3d at 161, and even if the issue was argued to the court. In re Estate of Hirning, 

167 Idaho 669, 679-80, 475 P.3d 1191, 1201-02 (2020) (noting appellants never asked court to 

decide issue “despite the court pleading with them to make a clear argument”). 

As Miramontes concedes, “the district court did not address the lawfulness of the search of 

[her] purse.” Accordingly, we decline to address for the first time on appeal whether the search of 

Miramontes’ property was lawful, and thus we do not address whether an exception to the 

exclusionary rule precludes suppression of the evidence discovered during the search.

IV. 

CONCLUSION

Miramontes failed to preserve for appeal the issue of whether the search of her property 

was lawful. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction for possession of 

methamphetamine.

Judge LORELLO and Judge Pro Tem HORTON CONCUR.