JPRS-TND-88-012

21 JUNE 1988

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Nuclear

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43
Nuclear Developments

JPRS-TND-88-012 CONTENTS 21 JUNE 1988

CANADA

Commons Holds Hearings on Nuclear-Powered Submarines 1

Veterans' Group Opposition [Paul Koring; Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 4 May 88] 1

York University Center Support [Paul Koring; Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 6 May 88] 1

Disarmament Center Opposition [Paul Koring; Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 11 May 88] 2

MP Asks IAEA To Study Safety of Fermi II Plant

[Windsor THE SATURDAY WINDSOR STAR, 23 May 88] 3

Ontario Asks Ottawa To Examine Fermi II Plant Safety [Windsor THE WINDSOR STAR, 2 May 88] 3

Study on Safety of Ontario Nuclear Power Plants Released

[Linda McQuaig; Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 19 Apr 88] 4

Ontario Hydro Directors Grappling With Tritium Sales Issue

[Windsor THE WINDSOR STAR, 12 May 88] 5

Ontario Offers Site for International Experimental Reactor

[Robert Sheppard; Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL, 6 May 88] 5

Uranium Producers Concerned at U.S. Duty Threat [Vancouver THE WEEKEND SUN, 2 Apr 88] 6

Activists Protest Eldorado Nuclear Waste Dump [Windsor THE WINDSOR STAR, 11 Apr 88] 7

EAST EUROPE

BULGARIA

Thrust for Safe Development of Nuclear Power

[Moscow EDONOMICHESKOYE SOTRUDNICHESTVO STRAN-CHLENOVSEV, 1987] 8

Kozloduy Unit 5 Goes Into Operation

[V. V Kononenko, V. Matyash; Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKIYINDUSTRIYA, 7 Jan 88] 11

Kozloduy AES Reports Production Figures

[Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, 29 Jan 88] 12

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Contribution to Nuclear Power Development

[Moscow EKONOMICHESKOYE SOTRUDNICHESTVO STRAN-CHLENOV SEV, 1987] 12

HUNGARY

Finnish, Hungarian Nuclear Power Firms To Exchange Operating Data

[Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 1 Jun 88] 16

LATIN AMERICA

ARGENTINA

Financial Obstacles Threaten Continuity of Nuclear Plan

[Sergio Crivelli; Buenos Aires LA PRENSA, 3 May 88] 18

Advantages, Disadvantages of Nuclear Accord With Brazil

[Miguel J. Culaciati; Buenos Aires LA PRENSA, 25 Apr 88] 19

Country To Help Turkey Get Nuclear Technology

[Atilla Atakan; Istanbul HURRIYET 25 May 88] 20

Foreign Financing Sought for Nuclear Program [Buenos Aires TELAM, 31 May 88] 21

Bariloche Institute Trains Future Nuclear Engineers

[Daniel Arias B.; Buenos Aires CLARIN, 20 Mar 88] 21

CNEA Announces Scholarship Plan [Buenos Aires CLARIN, 17 Mar 88] 22
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 JUNE 1988 2

BRAZIL

Nuclebras Head Proposes 4 More Nuclear Plants

[Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, 18 May] • 23

Angra I Nuclear Plant Operation Delayed [Brasilia Radio Nacional da Amazonia Network] 23

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

BANGLADESH

Energy Minister Addresses Atomic Energy Officials

[Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER, 23 Apr 88] 24

INDIA

Pakistani Nonproliferation Proposal 'Dismissed' [Delhi Domestic Service, 14 Jun 88] 24

Gandhi Views Nuclear Capability [Delhi Domestic Service, 8 Jun 88] 24

PAKISTAN

Indian Charges on Nuclear Program Rejected [Islamabad Domestic Service, 14 Jun 88] 24

Spokesman Denies 'Secret' Nuclear Pact With Iran [Islamabad Domestic Service, 14 Jun 88] 24

Nuclear Techniques Boost Farm Produce

[Mahmud Akhtar Faruqui; Karachi DA WN, 14 May 88] 25

SOVIET UNION

Soviet Assisted Electrification of Afghanistan Noted

[Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, 9 Feb 88] 27

Power Station Parts Shipped to Vietnam

[Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, 20 Feb 88] 27

Cuban AES Construction Progress Report

[Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, 23 Jan 88] 27

General Claims U.S. Military Aid to Pakistan Encourages Nuclear Ambitions

[F Gontar; Moscow LENINGRADSKAY'A PRAVDA, 16 Feb 88] 27

Anti-Nuclear Stance Described [V. Umnov; Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 27 Jan 88] 29

Black Market Trade in Nuclear Fuel [S. Guk; Moscow IZVESTIYA, 6 Feb 88] 31

Windscale Reactor Accident Discussed [A. Lyutyy; Moscow PRAVDA, 15 Feb 88] 32

WEST EUROPE

BELGIUM

Questions Remain Open In Mol Nuclear Scandal

[Michel Balthasart; Brussels LE VIF/L'EXPRESS, 25-31 Mar 88] 35

FRANCE

Nuclear Fuel Cycle Industry at End of 1987

[M. Barron; Paris REVUE GENERALE NUCLEAIRE, Jan-Feb 88] 36

TURKEY

Argentina To Help Acquire 'Nuclear Technology'

[Atilla Atakan; Istanbul HURRIYET, 25 May 88] 39

UNITED KINGDOM

Trade Unions Council Policy on Nuclear Power Told

[Martin Whitfield; London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, 3 May 88] 39
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 CANADA

Commons Holds Hearings on Nuclear-Powered

Submarines

Veterans' Group Opposition

51200030 Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in

English 4 May 88 p A10

[Article by Paul Koring with Canadian Press]

[Excerpt] Ottawa—A fleet of nuclear-powered, hunterkiller submarines would draw Canada into a destabilizing, first-strike war strategy, a group of veterans opposed

to the most expensive arms purchase in Canadian history said yesterday.

The Veterans Against Nuclear Arms told the House of

Commons committee on defence that "acquiring nuclear-powered submarines will draw Canada into a strategy

which makes a first nuclear strike the preferred option in

certain circumstances."

The group based its argument on the contention that the

first-strike option figures increasingly in U.S. strategic

planning.

The 10 or 12 hunter-killer submarines that the federal

Government is proposing to buy from either Britain or

France would have to be operationally integrated with

the undersea fleets of other North Atlantic Treaty Organization navies, the veterans argued.

The length of Canada's coastline and the key Arctic

gateways for Soviet submarines make joint operations a

necessity, the group said in a written submission presented by Captain Raymond Creey, a retired Royal

Canadian navy aviator and destroyer captain.

The veterans' group also lampooned the suggestion that

a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines will allow Canada

to assert its sovereignty in disputed Arctic waters. Washington doesn't accept Canadian claims that the Northwest Passage is an internal and not an international

strait.

"Canadian submarines are not going to be wheeling

around like under-ice police cars picking up vagrants,"

the group said.

It also argued that communicating with submerged submarines requires special low-frequency radio networks

that would be uneconomic to duplicate for such a small

fleet.

"It's a delusion to think that any affordable (Canadian)

force of defensive vessels, submarines included, can be

sufficient in number to search out all missile-firing

submarines that may be in the vast Canadian areas-

...There is no point in the navy suggesting it can protect

the country. It cannot," Capt Creey said.

The group argued, "Other than to maintain a threatening

presence, the submarine is limited to locating, shadowing and destroying. The game is not worth the risk, the

possibility and consequence of error being too high;

coercion under the Arctic ice must be through diplomatic channels."

York University Center Support

51200030 Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in

English 6 May 88 p Al3

[Article by Paul Koring]

[Excerpts] Ottawa—A fleet of nuclear-powered, hunterkiller submarines would free Canada to pursue a naval

strategy independent of the United States or North

Atlantic Treaty organization, Robert Byers, of York

University's Centre for International and Strategic Studies, said yesterday.

In testimony to the Commons standing committee on

defence, Mr Byers said Canada needs to develop a

maritime strategy "capable of operating independently

in a high-threat maritime environment."

Mr Byers criticized last year's defence white paper, the

centre-piece of which was the purchase of a fleet of

nuclear-powered submarines, for its assumption that

"Canada's long-term maritime interests will remain

compatible with those of NATO."

But he supported the proposed acquisition ofthe fleet of

10 or 12 submarines, priced at $8-billion, on the grounds

that they offered Canada a powerful and independent

capacity to project sea power and ensure Canadian

sovereignty.

"It would be imprudent to acquire naval assets on the

assumption of long-term military interdependence with

either American or NATO maritime forces," said Mr

Byers.

Although he said continued cooperation with the allies

was important, he stressed the value of independent

operation.

After his testimony, Mr Byers added that he believed

Canada also should develop an independent communications network for the fleet. Extremely low-frequency

radio communications are required to reach submerged

submarines, and Mr Byers said his information was that

the cost of such a network was not included in the

Government's estimates for the submarine program.

The committee also received a surprise submission, yet

to be made public, from a Canadian firm, ECS Power

Systems of Ottawa, which is developing a design for a

low-powered reactor that can be inserted into conventional diesel-electric submarines to recharge their batteries. The system is designed to give conventional submarines the extended underwater, and under-ice, capability
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 CANADA

for which the Government chose nuclear-powered submarines to assert Canadian sovereignty claims in the

Arctic. The new ECS Power Systems submission claims

an improved version of its system, currently being

tested, overcomes the extremely low power output that

initially would have restricted submarines to very low

speeds.

However, the Government already has narrowed the

field to either the British Trafalgar or French Rubis/Amethyste submarines and is expected to select one before

summer. Defence sources said the ECS submission is

extremely unlikely to change that.

The Canadian Maritime Industries Association, representing Canada's 20 major shipyards and more than 80

other companies, pressed the committee to recommend

that all of the submarines be constructed in Canada.

Both Britain's Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering

Ltd. and SNA Canada Inc., the Canadian unit of the

French builders, have indicated that the first one or two

submarines should be built in Europe to keep costs down

and allow for delivery by 1995.

James Clarke, president of the association, told the

committee that Canadian shipyards could deliver the

first vessel by the end of 1996.

Disarmament Center Opposition

51200030 Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in

English 11 May 88 p A4

[Article by Paul Koring]

[Text] Ottawa—Canadians are naive if they assume a

multi-billion-dollar fleet of nuclear-powered submarines

will be able to enforce Ottawa's disputed claim to Arctic

waters, the House of Commons defence committee was

told yesterday.

"It is a naive assumption that Canadian submarines

could compel the U.S. Navy to respect Canada's Arctic

claim," John Lamb, a director of the Canadian Centre

for Arms Control and Disarmament, said.

Although the federal Government's plan to purchase 10

or 12 nuclear-powered subs from either Britain or France

would give Canada's navy its first-ever capability to

patrol beneath the Arctic ice, the privately financed

centre suggested that "for political reasons," Ottawa

would still be constrained from challenging "American

incursions."

Washington refuses to accept Canada's contention that

the Northwest Passage is a territorial, rather than international, strait. Defence Minister Perrin Beatty has

argued that the under-ice capability of nuclear-powered

submarines would allow Canada to assert its sovereignty—which is disputed only by the United States—in

the Arctic.

Senior Canadian military officials claim the U.S. Navy

already informs Ottawa when its submarines transit

Canadian-claimed waters. However, they also acknowledge that Canada possesses no independent means of

checking.

Mr Lamb suggested that Canadian submarines operating

in the same area would necessitate fuller disclosure from

the U.S. Navy. However, that enforced cooperation,

"rather than contributing to Canadian independence-

...could result in closer and closer Canadian integration,

as a junior partner, in U.S. naval operations in the

North," he said.

The centre also heaped scorn on the notion that 10 or 12

nuclear submarines would actually provide any real

presence in the Arctic. "If, as seems certain, only one

nuclear submarine would routinely be in the Arctic at

any given time, (the fleet) would provide Canada with an

extremely marginal deterrent."

The defence white paper, published last year, envisions

submarines giving Canada a three-ocean operating capability. Even when all of the vessels are delivered—some

time in the next century—usual nuclear-powered submarine operating patterns will mean that one third of them

will be in port or refit, one third in transit and therefore

only three or four boats on station to be spread among

Canadian sectors in the Arctic, Atlantic and Pacific

Oceans.

The centre's submission also claimed that the Government had fudged cost and nuclear non-proliferation

issues raised by the hunter-killer submarine fleet.

"It is time to take off the rose-tinted glasses and take a

long, hard, look at what these subs are really going to cost

Canadians, whether they are the best use for our limited

defence dollars and whether a program whose sustainability must be questioned should be launched at all," Mr

Lamb said.

The Government plans to select either the British Trafalgar or French Rubis/Amethyste submarines before

summer. Government claims that the program will cost

$8-billion had drawn widespread skepticism from naval

experts outside Canada.

The centre also said that current proposals to enter into

bilateral agreements with either France or Britain to

safeguard the nuclear-weapons grades of fissionable

material which will result from the submarine reactors

are inadequate. Although Canada has an enviable record

of subscribing to international nuclear safeguards, the

centre said bilateral arrangements will "devalue

Canada's own credibility as an active and respected

proponent of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty."

"One only need think of India's recent leasing of a

nuclear submarine from the Soviet Union," Mr Lamb

said. Before the nuclear-submarine program was
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 CANADA

launched, "Canada would have undoubtedly have had

some strong words to say to Moscow and New Delhi

about this. Today we'd be laughed out of the room."

Ontario Asks Ottawa To Examine Fermi II Plant

Safety

51200031 Windsor THE WINDSOR STAR in English

2 May 88 p A3

/9604

MP Asks IAEA To Study Safety of Fermi II

Plant

51200027 Windsor THE SATURDAY WINDSOR

STAR in English 23 May 88pA5

[Text] Ottawa—MP Herb Gray (L-Windsor West) is

asking an affiliate of the UN to investigate the safety of

the Fermi II nuclear plant.

The move comes after Secretary of State for External

Affairs Joe Clark rejected the Liberal House leader's

request for a binational review of the Monroe, Mich.,

plant.

In a letter to the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA), Gray has asked for a study of the plant's

operation and a report on its findings to U.S. and

Canadian governments.

The IAEA, based in Vienna, Austria, was established in

1957 with the goal of increasing the contribution of

atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.

The automous body, which reports to the UN General

Assembly, has operational safety review teams which do

evaluations of the overall safety of nuclear plants.

Canada and the U.S. are among the 112 members of the

IAEA. Gray has asked Clark and U.S. Ambassador

Thomas Niles to support his request that the body

review Fermi II.

He said it is unclear whether both countries have to ask

for such a review before the IAEA can become involved.

Fermi II's troubled history has aroused concerns that an

accident at the plant could jeopardize the lives of Essex

County residents.

Gray said he will continue to push for a binational

review of the plant by the International Joint Commission, even if his request to the IAEA is accepted.

[Text] Ottawa—Ontario Solicitor General Joan Smith

has asked the federal government to examine the safety

of the Fermi II nuclear plant and the adequacy of the

U.S. regulatory system that allowed it to operate at full

power.

Smith previously downplayed concerns about Fermi's

safety, and opponents ofthe Monroe, Mich., plant regard

her latest move as a minor victory.

"It's one more step ahead in the fight," said MP Steven

Langdon (Essex-Windsor, NDP).

In a letter to Energy Minister Marcel Masse, Smith said

residents of Essex County are concerned that the nearby

plant suffers from design weaknesses and construction

defects. Problems which beset the plant during its startup phase have raised questions about the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission's decision to allow it to operate

at full power, the letter adds.

Such concerns should be "examined by appropriate

federal agencies and, if warranted, necessary action

taken," the letter concludes.

In a second letter to Lynwood Martin, chairman of Essex

County Citizens Against Fermi II (ECCAF), Smith says

she will monitor the Fermi situation closely.

Smith's department is responsible for emergency procedures in Essex County in the event of an accident at the

plant. Her latest actions follow a meeting she had several

weeks ago with ECCAF.

In her letter to Masse, Smith says the questions raised

about Fermi lie within federal jurisdiction.

Federal Environment Minister Tom McMillan has

expressed concerns about Fermi's safety, but Ottawa has

not yet intervened.

Last month External Affairs Minister Joe Clark rejected

requests for a binational review of the plant.

The Canadian Atomic Energy Control Board (AECB)

has found no reason to question the plant's safety or the

effectiveness of U.S. nuclear regulators.

07310 /9604
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 CANADA

Study on Safety of Ontario Nuclear Power Plants

51200026 Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in

English 19 Apr 88 p A4

[Article by Linda McQuaig]

[Text] A Chernobyl-style nuclear accident is impossible

in Ontario, but other types of serious nuclear accidents

could happen here, according to a Government-commissioned study on the safety of nuclear power plants.

The study, by University of Toronto geographer Kenneth Hare, harshly criticizes the provincial Government

for not implementing a plan to deal with such an

emergency.

"It is urgently necessary that a formal nuclear emergency

planning branch be created within the Ministry of the

Solicitor-General, and all the preparedness provisions of

the plan be affected," Mr Hare wrote in his report.

"At present," he noted, "Ontario is not ready for a severe

accident."

Mr Hare said that although a formal Nuclear Emergency

Plan was published in 1986, it has not been implemented.

At a news conference yesterday following the release of

the report, Mr Hare said he believes the Ontario Government should implement the 1986 plan immediately.

"It is absolutely absurd that this hasn't been done," he

said.

The report also calls for an overhaul of Ontario Hydro's

operational safety system.

Mr Hare said that the organizational structure of

Hydro's nuclear program appeared to be "excessively

complex, with some ambiguities as regards responsibilities.

"There is confusion in settling the status of temporary

operating instructions at the stations," the report said.

The one-man commission was established by the Liberal

Government in December, 1986, following the Soviet

Union's Chernobyl nuclear disaster. That accident killed

31 people and spread large volumes of radioactive materials into the environment.

Mr Hare told reporters that the circumstances that

caused Chernobyl could not happen at an Ontario power

plant, in part because Hydro's CANDU reactors are of a

better design and in part because human error would be

less likely.

"I just cannot imagine Ontario Hydro executives behaving like that," Mr Hare said, referring to what he said

verged on "the human folly" involved at Chernobyl.

Although he ruled out a Chernobyl-type accident, Mr

Hare said "some other types of serious accident may

occur." Serious nuclear accidents affecting the public

could occur, although he said that such serious accidents

were "exceedingly unlikely."

The geographer also said that Hydro's nuclear-power

workers do not appear to run a greater risk than the

general public of dying from cancer.

In fact, cancer mortality among the Hydro radiation

workers is only two-thirds that of the general public, the

report said.

However, Mr Hare cautioned that it is too early to see

the long-term effects of latent cancers.

In the report, he called for more study of a possible

increase in lymphoid leukemia in people under 25 years

of age living near nuclear installations.

Studies in England have suggested there may be such a

link, Mr Hare noted, but there have been no comparable

studies in Canada.

The report, called the Safety of Ontario's Nuclear Power

Reactors, said that there was no evidence that the

normal operation of Hydro's reactors has caused, or will

cause, harmful effects to either the workforce or the

public.

"But vigilance is required," the report concludes.

In another section, the report calls for changes in the

relationship between Ontario Hydro and the Atomic

Energy Control Board, the regulatory agency that sets

safety conditions for the public and nuclear workers.

Mr Hare called for a more formal relationship between

Hydro and the regulatory body and clearer documentation of all regulatory decisions.

The report said that "the basis of decisions taken by the

board is nor always clear. A more explicit procedure is

needed for full public accountability."

Mr Hare called for an increase in the regulatory body's

membership, to include appointments of experts in

socio-economic and environmental areas.

The report said that the most serious problems at Hydro

power reactors to date have involved pressure tubes in

which fuel is located.

Leaks form these tubes have been detected 23 times, and

a pressure tube ruptured suddenly at the Pickering A

reactor in August, 1983.

07310
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 CANADA

Ontario Hydro Directors Grappling With Tritium

Coipc Issue

51200033 Windsor THE WINDSOR STAR in English

12 May 88 p D13

So far, only two of the potential takers are Canadian

companies, small lighting manufacturers in Bedford,

N.S., and Peterborough, Ont, that supply remote airfields and are eyeing the new DEW-line contracts in the

Arctic.

[Text] Toronto (CP)—Within a few weeks, Ontario

Hydro will be producing a radioactive byproduct that is

a thousand times more valuable than gold.

But even though the substance—tritium—could fetch

the utility nearly $30 million a year in new revenue and

spin off new-wave technology, the directors of the provincial Crown corporation are concerned about the

political fallout of entering into these kinds of deals.

Tritium is a byproduct of Candu reactors used by

Ontario Hydro and sells on the industrial and pharmaceutical research markets for $15,000 a gram. It is also

used in the production of hydrogen bombs.

As far as radioactive isotopes are concerned, tritium is a

relatively benign substance. If ingested, a very small

quantity can be fatal. But its rays do not penetrate the

skin as other radioactive particles do and its main

attribute is that it glows in the dark, unstintingly, for at

least 20 years.

This means it is an increasingly attractive commodity for

illuminating watches, exit signs, remote runways and

airplane corridors and for a variety of medical research,

including AIDS treatment, where it is used as an internal

tracer to track the effect of the disease in the body.

Ontario Hydro is expected to begin production of marketable tritium later this month at its new $124-million

tritium extraction facility at nearby Darlington. It will

become by far the largest of only two non-military

sources of tritium in the world.

But Hydro's board of directors has been grappling with

the issue of selling tritium for several months and has

still not come to a decision. One senior executive says the

big concern is what this kind of business dealing will do

to Hydro's image and that "is a big offset."

Donald Anderson, director of Hydro's marketing arm of

its technology and isotope sales, says he hopes there

might be a board decision by the end ofthis year but the

matter is fraught with political ramifications.

Anderson's group has identified at least nine major

industrial and research users of the product and say that

within 5 years they expect to be able to sell Hydro's

entire annual production, about 2.5 kg or $30-million

worth.

Anderson says, however, his group has been approached

by other, more innovative types, including a cellular

phone company that wants low-maintenance lighting for

phone booths on remote stretches of highway.

Hydro's hesitation to give the go-ahead may just be an

example of corporate caginess. More than half the projected sales of Hydro's tritium—or about $300-million

worth over the next 15 years—would come by supplying

a prestigious international project on new fusion technology that the federal government and Hydro have

already committed themselves to supporting in various

ways.

An outgrowth of a superpower summit in 1985 between

U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail

Gorbachev, the multi-billion-dollar research project

begins this month in West Germany. It involves scientists from the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan,

the European Community and now Canada as a late

joiner and part of the European contingent.

The community has already requested Ontario Hydro

tritium for at least the start-up phase of the project,

internal Hydro documents show. And the federal government tacitly encouraged that by promulgating export

regulations for tritium late last year.

In Ontario, Premier David Peterson's Liberal government has also been politically schizophrenic about tritium sales and fusion research.

/9604

Ontario Offers Site for International Experimental

Reactor

51200032 Toronto THE GLOBE AND MAIL in

English 6 May 88 pp Bl, B2

[Article by Robert Sheppard]

[Excerpt] The Ontario Government has quietly offered

to provide a "host site" for an experimental nuclear

reactor that is being developed as part of a superpower

agreement by international scientists.

The offer was made in January in a letter from Ontario

Premier David Peterson to Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, in which Canada is urged to push for the reactor

as a potential boon to the country's technological development. The letter was obtained by THE GLOBE AND

MAIL.
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 CANADA

If Ottawa takes up the challenge, it will place Canada in

competition with Finland and West Germany. The two

countries have already offered to accommodate the

experimental, $5-billion-plus reactor, which is described

as the world's "next major step" in fusion energy development.

If successful, the initiative would almost certainly

heighten the politics of nuclear concern in Ontario and

perhaps even highlight some of the Peterson Government's inconsistencies on the subject.

Three years ago, Mr Peterson campaigned against completing the last phase of Ontario Hydro's nuclear station

at Darlington, only to change his mind once his Liberal

Party formed the Government.

Moreover, this fusion project by the superpowers, known

as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor, will require an estimated $300-million worth of

tritium fuel, a byproduct of heavy water reactors such as

the Candu, which Ontario Hydro is to begin processing

shortly at its new Darlington plant.

The European Community, one of four partners in the

ITER program, along with the United States, the Soviet

Union and Japan, has already asked Ontario Hydro to

provide some small amounts of tritium for the initial

research stage, which is getting under way in West

Germany.

However, the Crown corporation has not yet agreed to

the request because, among other things, it is conscious

of the local controversy surrounding the new tritium

facility and is waiting for approval from the province,

according to internal Hydro documents, released under a

freedom of information request.

Canadian scientists involved in the project have noted as

well that the host country is expected to provide an extra

10 percent of the construction cost, which means that a

combined federal-provincial share would amount to

about $250-million during the 10-year period.

Mr Peterson is clearly enthusiastic about the possibility

of playing host for the ITER project, which contrasts

somewhat with his Government's approach to date on

financing fusion research projects in Canada.

Ontario haulted its contributions to the Canadian

Fusion Fuels Technology Project 2 years ago when the

first 5-year phase ended.

It subsequently encouraged Ontario Hydro, which manages the project on behalf of itself, Atomic Energy of

Canada Ltd. and interested businesses, to approach the

Premier's Technology Council for money.

But after 16 months of trying, this has not been forthcoming, despite repeated entreaties that the money is

needed and would help lever up the industry research

portion, project manager Donald Dautovich said in an

interview.

The Canadian fusion group is providing research and

manpower for the first stage of the international fusion

project that is getting under way in West Germany.

Under an agreement with the European Community, to

be signed next month, Canada is providing 10 percent

(about $4-million) of the EC contribution in the design

stage ofthe fusion reactor. China has also been invited to

participate.

A decision on who will host the project is not expected

until 1991 at the earliest.

/9604

The Peterson letter of 11 January, which was obtained

from another source, argues that Canada's involvement

in the international fusion program "will establish longterm benefits for our technology development, research

engineering and high-tech manufacturing industries."

The Premier is offering Ontario Hydro's Bruce, Lennox

and Wesleyville energy centres as possible sites for the

experimental reactor and notes that building it would

provide an estimated 11,000 jobs during a 10-year

construction period and about $1-billion in federal and

provincial tax revenue over the life of the project.

"In addition to providing the site, Canada can make

important contributions to this project in research and

engineering, tritium fuel handling technology, manufacturing of components and the provision of tritium fuel,"

Mr Peterson wrote.

Uranium Producers Concerned at U.S. Duty

Threat

51200028 Vancouver THE WEEKEND SUN in English

2 Apr 88pH5

[Text] Toronto—Canadian uranium producers threatened by the passage of a U.S. law penalizing imports of

the metal say the protectionist rumblings are worrying

them.

"I guess the Senate's approval is certainly an expression

of an attitude that we take seriously," said David Smith

of Eldorado Resources Ltd., Canada's second-largest

uranium producer.

The U.S. Senate voted Wednesday in favor of legislation

imposing a sliding scale of penalty duties during the next

12 years on utilities that use foreign uranium to meet

more than 37.5 per cent of their needs.
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 CANADA

One senator called the move "a stab in the back of

Canada" while another said the decision could create

difficulties for the free-trade accord between the two

countries.

The trade agreement, which still requires the approval of

Parliament and Congress, eliminates all barriers to uranium trade as part of a broader effort to lift tariff and

non-tariff trade barriers between the two countries.

Canada annually supplies about one-third of U.S. uranium needs worth an estimated $200 million to domestic

producers.

"We can't really do anything about it," said Don Somers,

a vice-president with Canada's largest producer, the

Saskatchewan Mining Development Corp.

"We continue to monitor the situation and, if there's an

opportunity for us to clarify any misunderstanding,

we're prepared to do so."

Until 1980, the U.S. industry was the world's largest, but

its production has dropped by as much as two-thirds

since then in the face of stiff Canadian competition.

The large Canadian deposits of uranium are of a higher

grade than U.S. supplies, which makes Canadian uranium cheaper to produce.

In Washington, meanwhile, Congress decided Thursday

to drop from a trade bill a provision that would have

required the U.S. to retaliate against trading partners

who unfairly block U.S. competition.

The provision would have required the U.S. to retaliate

against countries running consistent trade surpluses with

the U.S. because of unfair barriers. The president had

opposed the provision.

On Friday, the U.S. announced that beginning July 1 it

will eliminate duty-free imports on products.

Activists Protest Eldorado Nuclear Waste Dump

51200029 Windsor THE WINDSOR STAR in English

U Apr88pD7

[Text] Toronto (CP)—About 100 protesters demonstrated outside Eldorado Resources Ltd.'s nuclear waste

dump near Oshawa on Sunday, chaining its gates and

threatening further action if it isn't closed.

The group, which included environmental activists, local

politicians and residents of the town of Port Granby,

gathered outside the Port Granby Waste Management

and Water Treatment Facility on the shores of Lake

Ontario, about 70 km east of Toronto.

"It is shameful and wrong" that the dump—ordered

closed 12 years ago—is still open and leaking poisons

into the lake, said John Veldhuis, president of a Port

Granby group that organized the protest.

The Atomic Energy Control Board, which ordered the

dump closed in 1976 because radioactive substances

were leaking into the lake, will meet this month to hear

residents' concerns about the dump.

Police watched the protest Sunday, but did not interfere

when the demonstrators locked two heavy chains around

the main gates leading into the facility.

The dump contains 300,000 cubic meters of contaminated soil dumped during the last 30 years by Eldorado,

said Greenpeace spokesman John Willis.

"Four and a half million people drink that water (from

Lake Ontario)," said Veldhuis. "They're not going to

keel over and die tomorrow, but it's not going to enhance

their health either."

Veldhuis said although Eldorado has taken some action

to lessen the problem, residents and environmentalists

remain concerned.

07310 07310
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 EAST EUROPE

BULGARIA

Thrust for Safe Development of Nuclear Power

51000025b Moscow EKONOMICHESKOYE

SOTRUDNICHESTVO STRAN-CHLENOV SEV in

Russian No 9, 1987pp 72-77

[Article by Ivan Pandev, chairman of the Committee for

Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy of the Council of

Ministers of Bulgaria: "For the Safe Development of

Nuclear Power in Bulgaria"]

[Text] The dynamic economic growth ofBulgaria under

conditions of a lack ofintrinsic power supplies required

the resolution of the chief issue of the development of

power engineering—the choice ofpower sources and types

offuture electric-power plants. As a result of profound

study ofthe problem with the aid ofSoviet scientific and

planning organizations, the concept of utilizing nuclear

sources of electric power was devised. The Bulgarian

Communist Party [BCPJ Central Committee Plenum

held in 1969 on the power equation gave the "green light"

to nuclear-power engineering. The high power efficiency

of nuclear fuel and the minimal effect of nuclear power

plants on the environment and the populace were decisive

factors.

The construction of the first VVER-440 [water-cooled

water-moderated power reactor] power unit of the Kozloduy AES [nuclear electric power plant] was begun on

the shore of the Danube River in 1970. One pledge of

success was the fraternal assistance of the USSR in its

planning, construction and equipping. The first power

unit went into service on 4 Sep 74 on the 30th anniversary ofsocialist Bulgaria. A four-unit complex of VVER440s was completed in 1982. Expansion ofthe Kozloduy

AES is envisaged with the construction of another two

WER-1000 power units. The first "thousander" will go

into operation this year. The sixth power unit ofthe AES

will be built in 1989.

The building of a second AES with four WER-1000

power units, which should enter service in the 1990s, has

been begun in the city of Belena on the Danube. With its

start-up, the share of electric power obtained from AESs

in Bulgaria will be 60 percent of the total. New areas for

AES construction in the country's interior with a regard

for the development of nuclear-power capacity after the

year 2000 are being studied. Preliminary planning

research is being conducted on building the first nuclear

heating-supply plant for the capital with two AST-500

(USSR standard design) power units.

In accordance with the CEMA member countries' program for the development of nuclear-power engineering

to the year 2000, Bulgaria is planning to achieve an

overall installed AES electric-power capacity of about

9,000 MW [megawatts].

The Kozloduy AES currently provides 1/3 ofthe electricpower production of the country. Domestic experience

in operating reactors (35 reactor-years) has confirmed

the reliability ofthe VVER-440 power units. The average

capacity utilization factor for the four power units is

equal to about 80 percent and exceeds the world average.

The proven advantages of nuclear-power engineering in

our country brought about the resolution of the 13th

BCP Congress for its priority development to the year

2000.

Legislative Steps

The rapid development of nuclear-power engineering

and the widespread application of ionizing radiation in

industry, medicine, agriculture and science have brought

about the necessity of a series of state measures to

achieve high safety in the utilization of nuclear power for

peaceful purposes.

In 1985 the National Assembly adopted the Law on the

Utilization of Nuclear Power for Peaceful Purposes,

which abrogated the Ukaz on State Monitoring of

Nuclear Safety (1980) that was in effect at the time.

The law defines the basic principles for the use of nuclear

power and regulates the most important issues of management of this activity and its state monitoring, regulates civil responsibility for damage from accidents at

nuclear structures, envisages a number of administrative

sanctions, etc.

This law expressed the consistent peaceful foreign policy

ofthe country. It is stipulated in Article 1 that "Nuclear

power in the People's Republic of Bulgaria is used for

peaceful purposes alone." In accordance with the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty that has been signed

by 130 states of the world, the use of nuclear power to

produce such weapons or other nuclear explosive

devices, as well as any means of mass destruction, is

strictly forbidden.

The protection of the life and health of people and the

environment has fundamental significance in the use of

nuclear power in Bulgaria—a principle that is also paramount and high-priority in the resolution of nationaleconomic and other problems. At the same time, the law

defines the social and economic policies of our country

in this area and the sweeping tasks of monitoring.

The execution of a unified state policy in the use of

nuclear power has been charged to a department created

especially for this purpose—the Committee on the Use

of Nuclear Power for Peaceful Purposes (KIAEMTs) of

the Council of Ministers.

It is developing concepts and programs for the long term

and coordinating the activity of ministries, departments

and organizations in this realm as well as scientific and

assimilation activity; defining the requirements for the
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 EAST EUROPE

safe utilization of nuclear power and monitoring their

observance; confirming the procedure for accounting

for, storing and shipping nuclear materials; substantiating criteria and requirements for the training, qualifications and capability of key personnel in this sphere; and,

coordinating work on monitoring pollution of the environment with radioactive substances.

An all-embracing system ofstate monitoring that is being

implemented by KIAEMTs through the Inspectorate for

the Safe Utilization of Nuclear Power, which issues

special permission for this activity, has been created to

execute the law. Monitoring the observance of the stipulated requirements extends to all organs, organizations

and officials.

In view of the great potential danger of the widespread

use of nuclear power, the law envisages appropriate

sanctions and fines for violations of the requirements,

and a special section titled "Crimes in the Use of

Nuclear Power for Peaceful Purposes" has been introduced into the Criminal Code.

The committee, taking into account contemporary international norms, works constantly to improve existing

standard documents and to develop new ones.

Steps To Increase Safety

Improving the safety and reliability of operative AESs

and those under construction occupies the center of

attention of the government and all ministries and

departments that are related to this problem.

The operating part of the Kozloduy AES, consisting of

four VVER-440 power units, is built according to plans

that reflect safety concepts in accordance with the standards documentation in effect at the time. The earthquake in Branch in 1977 which reached 5-6 in the area

had no seismic effect on the first and second power units

of the AES. Notwithstanding this, the natural disaster

became the grounds for the development of a joint

Soviet-Bulgarian plan that envisaged a number of measures to ensure nuclear and radiation safety under conditions of enhanced seismic indicators reaching 7 on the

Medvedev-Schopenheuer—Karnik (MSK-64) scale. Special hydraulic shock absorbers were delivered and

installed according to plan to reinforce the equipment in

the first and second loops along with relief valves for the

volumetric compensators, a system of seismic monitoring and protection and seismic-resistant batteries and

other equipment and devices. The main circulation

pumps will have to be replaced with more reliable ones.

A whole set of operations to raise the reliability, safety

and economy ofthe power units is executed each year in

conjunction with the anti-seismic measures. A system for

emergency water supply has been put into operation, a

reservoir for the long-term storage ofspent nuclear fuel is

being built and the reliability of the electric-power system, water-treatment regimen, radiation-dosage monitoring at the AES etc. are being improved.

Along with these national steps, Soviet and Bulgarian

collectives have developed additional joint plans that

envisage enhancing the safe operation of reactor vessels

over a planned work period; tightening the monitoring of

the state of the reactor metals and vessels and other

equipment and pipelines in the primary loop; and,

replacing instruments, equipment and apparatus that

has exceeded guaranteed working life, as well as a whole

set of organizational measures.

A separate plan concerns the reconstruction ofthe power

units at the Kozloduy AES. A strengthening of the

reliability of existing safety systems is being achieved via

redundancy in their autonomous equipment, modernizing monitoring and control systems, improving fire

safety and raising the reliability of fire-protection systems, better preparing of operating personnel at all levels

etc.

The first power unit with a WER-1000 reactor in the

CEMA member countries is being built in Bulgaria. Its

technical solutions correspond fully to all currently existing standard technical documentation. The safety systems envisage ensuring the localization ofthe maximum

possible planned accident. Three autonomous systems of

each type are envisaged. The power unit is rated for a

new seismic area ofcategorization—7 on the MSK-64

scale—with a probability of once in 10,000 years and 6

once every hundred.

A protective dome of prestressed concrete has been built

at this power unit and is intended, aside from the

localization of accidents, to protect the reactor and the

primary loop from outside influences (aircraft crash

etc.). A fundamentally new technology—large-slab

assembly—was utilized in its construction.

Particular attention in unit assembly is being devoted to

the quality of construction and the installation of equipment as the foundation of operational safety. The unwavering observance of the requirements of planning documentation, standards, construction rules and norms

and technical safety conditions is systematically monitored at each stage with the participation of Soviet

specialists.

The accidents at the Three Mile Island AES in the

United States in 1979 and the Chernobyl AES in 1986

have led to the implementation of a broad range of

measures and programs to improve engineering solutions, AES management and the training of operational

personnel. The quantity of measures to educate the

populace to bring radiation exposure to a minimum in

the event of nuclear accidents has been increased.
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 10 EAST EUROPE

Despite the fact that radioactive pollution of the environment has never occurred over the whole course of

operation of the reactors at the Kozloduy AES, the

development of an automated information system for

outside dosimetric monitoring (AIS VDK) was begun in

1987. It will constantly monitor the radiation levels

around the AES automatically by remote control, simultaneously creating a database. The system is adaptive

and the amount of data accumulated depends on the

situation.

In the event of a planned or hypothetical accident

associated with the discharge of radionuclides into the

atmosphere, the AIS VDK will determine the degree of

danger to the surrounding population, the time it will

take for the radioactive cloud to reach populated points

in the area and around the AES and the appropriate steps

that are must be taken to protect the populace and

agriculture. In addition, the system will measure and

record meteorological parameters and atmospheric stability.

The AIS VDK will monitor the averting of radioactive

discharges and will propose solutions, and in the event of

discharges will evaluate the degree of danger and the

anticipated increase in radioactive water, soil and food

products.

A forecast on the dosage load of AES personnel and the

population will be developed using the capabilities

described.

Aside from this, the system will provide for:

—automatic diagnostics for the equipment complex;

—visual display of information for making rapid decisions (displays, mimic panels, the printout of accident

logs, real-time information);

—with the aid of standard interfaces (input/output),

expansion of both the volume and types of measurements and the information-processing equipment.

The International Aspect

The proposals of the USSR government at a special

session of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy

Agency] General Conference are an important step in

creating an international regimen for the safe development of nuclear power. The ideas implicit in it were

discussed, developed and put into practice with the

support of the socialist countries and a number of

developing and developed capitalist countries within the

framework of the IAEA.

A Convention on Real-Time Announcement in the

Event of Nuclear Accidents, a Convention on Aid in the

Event of Nuclear Accidents or a Radiation Emergency

Situation and a Convention on the Physical Protection

of Nuclear Materials were prepared, coordinated and

signed. These documents have laid the foundation of an

international treaty and legal system for the safe development of nuclear power. All of the conventions were

ratified by the State Council of Bulgaria, which designated KIAEMTs as the authorized organ answering for

the fulfillment of the obligations for their application.

In fulfilling the resolutions of the special session of the

IAEA General Conference, an international group of

experts, including representatives of Bulgaria, prepared

an expanded program whose aim was the creation of

scientifically grounded criteria, approaches and steps to

raise nuclear and radiation safety. The program for 1987

includes 79 measures in all realms of the safe utilization

of nuclear power. Authorized Bulgarian business and

scientific organizations have been acquainted with the

program, and they have been offered the selection of

what measures a vested interest in participating in. On

this basis, KIAEMTs will determine the participation of

Bulgarian specialists in the program, as well as the

application of the results obtained.

The program will make it possible to make topical

nuclear-safety standards and to continue the discussion

of their voluntary adoption by the IAEA member countries as compulsory.

The IAEA information system on AES incidents, in

which Bulgaria takes an active position, is being reinforced and expanded.

Bulgaria also participates in the IAEA programs on

research and analysis associated with safety. Specialists

from the corresponding scientific institutes, with the aid

of computer programs, are conducting thermohydraulic

and thermomechanical analyses of the behavior of

nuclear fuel in various accident modes. Computer work

is being done for this purpose both in our institutes and

at the IAEA computer center. A programming collective

of specialists in that realm has been created in accordance with the IAEA program to evaluate reliability and

risk. It is researching probable evaluations of AES safety

and evaluating the risk of the uses of nuclear power for

peaceful purposes.

Collaboration Within the Framework of CEMA

The international interaction ofthe fraternal states in the

CEMA Standing Commission on Collaboration in the

Realm of Using Nuclear Power for Peaceful Purposes

plays an important role in reinforcing the regimen ofsafe

development of nuclear power.

A program for the development of a Unified Set of

Technical-Standards Documentation on the safety and

reliability of nuclear-power engineering is included in

the Comprehensive Program for the Scientific and Technical Progress of the CEMA Member Countries [CP
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 11 EAST EUROPE

STP] in the third priority area—the rapid development

of nuclear-power engineering. KIAEMTs is coordinating

the participation of the Bulgarian organizations in this

program.

The USSR delegation to the Commission has prepared a

proposal on the tasks of collaboration that stem from the

new requirements for the safe utilization of nuclear

power for peaceful purposes, as well as from the IAEA

agreements. These topics were discussed at the Intergovernmental Commission to Coordinate Collaboration in

the realm of production and mutual deliveries of AES

equipment, which implements the overall coordination

of interaction in the third priority area ofthe CP STP. A

number of detailed programs in the development of

nuclear-power engineering have been supplemented with

safety issues as a result.

An agreement on collaboration has been signed between

the USSR State Committee for Safety in the Atomic

Power Industry and KIAEMTs. The conclusion of such

agreements with authorized organs of the other CEMA

member countries lies ahead.

Society displayed uneasiness with radiation and a desire

to evaluate its dangers for the first time after Hiroshima.

The accident at Chernobyl reminded us of the terrible

forces concealed in the power of the atom. That is why

ensuring safety in the peaceful utilization of nuclear

power requires broad international collaboration.

COPYRIGHT: Sovet Ekonomicheskoy Vzaimopomoshchi Secretariat

12821

Kozloduy Unit 5 Goes Into Operation

51000001d Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKA YA

INDUSTRIYA in Russian 7 Jan 88 p 3

[Article by V. Kononenko and V. Matyash, special TASS

correspondents for SI: "A 'Millionaire' at the Bend ofthe

Danube"; first paragraph is SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA

INDUSTRIYA introduction]

[Text] Out of the shrouds of smoke forming from the

direction of the Danube, the main wing of the fifth

power unit of the Kozloduy AES suddenly appears as a

myriad oflights. On the threshold of the new year, when

the first cold weather arrived in Bulgaria, it began to

generate current to the country's unified power system.

This is the first 1000-megawatt power unit outside the

USSR. It is still operating in accordance with a comprehensive testing program, which is being carried out in the

spacious unit control room, where two shifts—Bulgarian

and Soviet operators—constantly keep immediate track

of hundreds of instruments.

The foundation of the Kozloduy AES was laid in 1974-

1975, when construction began on its first two power

units, and six years later—two more type VVER-440

units. As a result, the plant's power reached 1760 megawatts. Bulgaria, which in 1944 produced only 311 million kW-hrs of electrical power, came close to the mark

of 40 billion kW-hrs per year, rising into the ranks ofthe

highly developed countries which have mastered the

peaceful atom.

When the new "millionaire" of Kozloduy comes up to

the planned power, which is expected by early spring, it

will provide about 10 percent of all the electric power

generated in the People's Republic of Bulgaria. This is

approximately equal to half ofthe every-day needs ofthe

country's population.

Has a respite arrived for power engineers? We asked this

question of Georgiy Dichev, director of the Kozloduy

AES.

"We anticipate the possibility of a gradual withdrawal to

planned repair and renovation of some low-efficiency

capacities which have already been operating for several

decades," he said. "According to the plan, the sixth unit

of the AES at Kozloduy should be put into operation in

1989, and beginning in 1991, with an interval of two

years, four more units of the AES being constructed in

Belene are scheduled to be put into operation. By the end

of the century, the proportion of AES-generated power

should constitute half of its production in the country. It

must, however, be noted that increasing the capacities

alone will not provide the national economy with power

to the proper extent. Control must be exerted over its

utilization.

It is now possible to speak ofthe Bulgarian experience in

AES construction and operation. Ofwhat does it consist?

"For us the fifth 'millionaire' power unit is of key

importance," says G. Dichev. "Our specialists, over 600

of whom have been trained in the USSR in the last few

years, were able to construct and develop it. This unit

meets the highest world standard. It has an automated

control system, new in principle, which differs favorably

from its predecessors in design and has reliable protection. In the course of its construction, however, a few

'bottlenecks' appeared, which are by no means entirely

connected with the innovative nature of the plan. For

example, the mechanism of equipment delivery has not

yet been adjusted. For many months now, we have been

waiting for new transducers for the reactor protection

control system to arrive from the USSR Ministry of

Instrument Making, Automation Equipment and Control Systems. This can have an adverse effect on the

schedule for taking the power unit to the planned capacity. The ministry itself, however, decided to replace the

existing instruments with new ones. So far there has not

been a single meeting of specialists to exchange experience in operating the WER-1000 units."
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 12 EAST EUROPE

It is no secret that after the accident at the Three Mile

Island AES (United States) and at the Chernobyl AES,

world apprehension about developing nuclear power

engineering intensified. What are the views on this

among the Bulgarian Atomic Energy directors and how

does the population of Kozloduy and Belene react to the

appearance of the new power units?

"I remember a statement made by Hans Bleeks, general

director of MAGATE [International Atomic Energy

Agency], at the European Nuclear Congress in 1986, who

said that nuclear power is not a whim that we can

dismiss. It is a reality, with which we must live, now and

in the future," answered G. Dichev. "If we speak of the

danger of AES for the environment and the population,

it is much less than a TES, for example, represents. In the

14 years of operation of the nuclear units at Kozloduy,

the traces of radioactive products constitute, on the

average, from 0.1 to 1.0 of the permissible medical

norms. For example, a TES, equal in power to the fifth

power unit, emits 17-20-fold more radioactive dust into

the atmosphere, since any fuel contains various isotopes.

Furthermore, we have no alternative, since the country

does not have substantial raw material resources. As far

as the mood ofthe population is concerned, it is better to

ask about this at the Kozloduy community people's

council," advised G. Dichev.

We stopped in there, and received convincing confirmation of the director's words. They showed us sealed

vessels with samples of the ground waters and the

Danube waters and samples of plants, fish, meat and

milk taken during the two years up to the start ofthe AES

construction. Completely fresh samples are kept alongside. It turned out that there were no differences between

them.

All the local inhabitants know of the results of these

measurements, and they are not alarmed about the effect

ofthe AES on the environment. At the same time, all the

collocutors emphasized the fact that, after the accident at

Chernobyl, serious measures had been taken to raise

technological and work discipline at the AES, and additional protective measures had been carried out.

12151

Kozloduy AES Reports Production Figures

51000001c Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKA YA

1NDUSTRIYA in Russian 29 Jan 88 p 3

[Article: "The AES Gathers Power"]

[Text] Sofia, 28 Jan 88—(TASS)—High technological

and labor discipline, optimum operating conditions and

the reliable work of the power units—that is what today

characterizes the situation at the first Bulgarian nuclear

power AES, Kozloduy. Some 1.1 billion kilowatt-hours

of electric power were produced for the opening here in

Sofia of the national conference of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Important work cycles were completed in

scientific-technical improvement of systems for radiation protection, monitoring and full use of nuclear fuel.

Guarantee tests at the fifth power unit with the planned

power of 1000 megawatts—the first "record-breaking

worker" outside the USSR—were made successfully. In

accordance with their results, the reactor, still operating

at halfits capacity, bill begin to generate 1000 megawatts

this spring. Therefore, the nuclear river of the Kozloduy

AES, constructed with the technical cooperation of the

Soviet Union, will flow into the unified power system of

the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

The major power complex in Bulgaria was developed in

less than three decades. Now each inhabitant ofthe NRB

has an average of 5,105 kilowatt-hours of electric power

a year. With respect to electric power per capita, Bulgaria

stands among the ranks of such developed European

states as Austria, Belgium, England, France and the

FRG.

12151

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Contribution to Nuclear Power Development

51000025a Moscow EKONOMICHESKOYE

SOTRUDN1CHESTVO STRAN-CHLENOV SEV in

Russian No 9, 1987 pp 15-22

[Article by Czechoslovak Commission on Atomic Energy

Chairman Stanislav Havel: "The Development of

Nuclear Power: The Contribution of the CSSR"]

[Text] Intensifying the national economy of the CSSR

requires an acceleration ofscientific and technical development based on the full inclusion ofCzechoslovak organizations in the realization of the Comprehensive Program of Scientific and Technical Progress ofthe CEMA

Member Countries to the Year 2000 (the CP STP),

efficient structural changes in production, a rise in the

quality ofplanning and management and the more effective application oftheir economic tools. The output of a

sufficient quantity ofpower and its economical and rational utilization is one ofthe most important conditions of

the development of the national economy and society

overall.

Nuclear power is the sole realistically accessible source of

power able to provide for the further progress of the

CSSR and a number of other CEMA member countries

along with the incorporation of their scientific and

technical achievements. The rapid development of

nuclear-power engineering is thus included as the third

priority area of the CP STP. It was prepared at the
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 13 EAST EUROPE

CEMA Committee on Scientific and Technical Collaboration and at periodic conferences of authorized representatives of the countries, while international collectives of scientists and specialists were convened on

individual problems.

The activity of this collective in the third priority area

was eased to a certain extent by the fact that it had at its

disposal a Scientific and Technical Forecast for the

solution of the fuel and power problems of the CEMA

member countries to the year 2000 and the longer-term

future that had been developed over 1981-84. This was

the first program document of CEMA in this realm for

the period beginning in 1990 and containing a section

devoted to nuclear-power engineering. A Program for the

Construction of Nuclear Electric Power Plants and

Nuclear Heating Supply Plants in the CEMA Member

Countries to the Year 2000 with a regard for the possibility ofsupplying them with nuclear fuel and the essential equipment was also being created concurrently in the

CEMA Committee on Collaboration in the Realm of

Planning Activity. It was later approved by the 42nd

CEMA Session.

The CP STP is one ofthe principal long-term policy and

economic measures whose implementation will have a

decisive influence on the realization of the the overall

strategic line ofthe CEMA member countries—the transition onto the path of intensive development. The CP

STP encompasses the whole innovative cycle of science—technology—production—application. It can be

accelerated only through the consistent unification of

scientific, technical, production and economic collaboration with efficiency in the entire process, including

providing for the recoupment of funds allocated in

specific phases. The active development of direct ties

among interested organizations whose contract and legal

basis should lead to flexibility in interaction and an

enhancement of the obligatory nature of it is also envisaged.

The lead organization—the organizer and coordinator of

the work on a problem—is the chief link in scientific and

technical and production cooperation in the course of

the fulfillment of the CP STP. It resolves extremely

complex and qualitatively new tasks:

—providing technical and economic substantiation for

the work and a detailed program of collaboration across

the whole innovation cycle;

—establishing direct ties with the crucial executors and

co-executors of specific operations;

—developing proposals for employing results based on

specialization and production cooperation;

—preparing draft contracts, agreements and the like.

The lead organizations are thus allotted broad rights and

should make full use of them under the appropriate

conditions.

The Policy: Realization of the CP STP

The third priority area contains 17 problems that can be

grouped into four sections:

—developing and raising the production efficiency of

electric power based on the construction of AESs

[nuclear electric power plants] with water-moderated

water-cooled power reactors (WER);

—utilizing nuclear power for heating supply;

—developing equipment for fast-neutron reactors (BNR)

and new types of reactor installations for power-process

operation (high-temperature reactors) and thermonuclear fusion;

—further enhancing the reliability and safety of nuclear

power sources.

Czechoslovak organizations are taking part in solving all

of these problems. Their vested interest in specific

subtopics stems from national-economic requirements,

the capabilities of the scientific research base and the

efficiency ofparticipation in international collaboration.

Detailed programs were signed in 1986 and 1987.

On the problem of "Raising the Utilization Efficiency of

Nuclear Fuel," Czechoslovak organizations will take part

in realizing the four-year fuel program for the VVER440, the achievement of a high degree of fuel burn-up

and the utilization of all of the possibilities of boosting

the capacity of these reactors, as well as the incorporation of a three-year fuel operating period for the VVER1000, thesubstantiation of possibilities for power shunting and a whole set of calculations in experiments in

physics and thermal physics, including AES safety.

Some of this work will be done on Czechoslovak experimental equipment—a zero-power light-water reactor

(LR-0) at the Nuclear Research Institute (NRI) in the

city of Rzhezh.

The CSSR will participate in testing and incorporating

improved fuel-element assemblies (TVS) for the VVER440 and WER-1000 reactors, creating sectional TVSs

and inspection jigs and analyzing the possibilities for

introducing four- and five-year operating periods for the

fuel in the WER-440 and WER-1000 reactors at AESs.

The Scientific Research Institute for Nuclear Electric

Power Plants (Nil AES) will execute the functions of

coordinator in resolving this problem from the CSSR.
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 14 EAST EUROPE

The CSSR has a particular vested interest in implementing the problem of "Improving the Equipment and Technology of its Production and Developing Diagnostics and

Metals-Condition Monitoring Systems," since it has

become a manufacturer and supplier as well as a consumer of AES equipment.

The CSSR is participating actively in improving individual assemblies of VVER-440 and WER-1000 reactor

installations (for example, modernized step drive for the

control rods of the VVER-1000), in researching the

radiation resistance of reactor materials in special heating chambers, changing their properties in static and

cyclic loading, developing technology for annealing reactor bodies for prolonging their service lives and the like.

Much attention is being devoted to systems for diagnostics and for monitoring the state of reactor equipment as

one of the most important conditions for safe and

reliable AES operation. The Skoda concern is the coordinator of the work.

The goal of collaboration on the problem of "Creating

and Incorporating Effective and Reliable Automated Control Systems for AES Technological Processes and the

Corresponding Equipment" is to raise the economy,

reliability and safety of AESs. Production specialization

and cooperation of the countries is envisaged in the

development and production of individual technical and

program equipment. Organizations from several sectors

are taking part in the coordination work, and the coordinator is the Elektromont enterprise.

The development ofthe problem of "Raising the Maneuverability Properties of AESs" (the Energoproyekt enterprise is the coordinator for the CSSR) will assist in

resolving important issues of the electric-power system.

The problem of "Improving Industrial Methods of Construction" contains a number of topics on the technologies

and methods for AES construction. Czechoslovak organizations are participating actively in the quest to optimize

technological design solutions for individual construction

elements and in creating progressive technologies, new

special AES structural elements and means of mechanization in this realm. The work is being coordinated by

Energoproyekt.

The implementation of the problem of "Improving the

Organization and Execution of AES Repairs" envisages

the creation of the appropriate equipment to conduct

repairs as well as diagnostics. The program contains 55

targets, and Czechoslovak organizations are taking part

in resolving the majority ofthem. The coordinator is the

Nil AES.

This same institute is the CSSR coordinator on the

problem of "Developing Measures and Means for Reconstructing and Eliminating AESs after their Service Lives

are Completed."

The CSSR has an immediate vested interest in specialization in the production of selected process equipment

(press, burning installations, the bitumization and

cementization of radioactive waste, transport containers

and the like), and moreover in deliveries both for the

needs of the CSSR and those of the other CEMA

member countries.

"The Development of Technologies and the Creation of

Equipment for Processing, Transporting and Interring

Radioactive Waste (RAO)" relates to selected technologies and process equipment, including standard schemes

for handling RAO at AESs and its compression, combustion, transport and interment. The coordinator is the

NRI. The production and incorporation ofsome types of

equipment for the needs of the CSSR has begun.

The solution of a number of problems is envisaged

through collaboration in nuclear heating supply: creating

process equipment for nuclear heat and electric power

plants (ATETs), nuclear heating supply plants (AST) and

for heat extraction from AESs; developing and incorporating safe systems for releasing heat from nuclear power

installations; and, assimilating new methods for the

efficient transporting of heat at long distances.

An agreement on collaboration in scientific and technical and planning work in the realm of ATETs and AST

for the production of process steam and for the needs of

power and heat generation was concluded in 1985. The

coordinators of the work in this area are the Skoda

concern and the Energoproyekt enterprise.

The goal of the work on the problem "Creating Equipment for Fast-Neutron Reactors" is the development and

subsequent production of special fittings for AESs with

FNR-type reactors.

This year, authorized organizations in the CSSR and the

USSR are approving product ranges and fittings deliveries from the CSSR for BN-800 power units constructed

in the USSR. The Sigma concern is the coordinator of

the work.

There have been many years of collaboration between

the departments for nuclear-power engineering in the

USSR and CSSR on the problem of "Creating Research

Installations for the Realization of Various Technological

Concepts in the Realm of Controlled Nuclear Fusion."

The detailed program of interaction approved at the

50th Session of the CEMA Standing Commission on

Collaboration in the Realm of the Peaceful Use of

Nuclear Power corresponds to the interests and capabilities of Czechoslovak organizations. The coordinator of

the work in the CSSR is the Nil [Scientific Research

Institute] of Plasma Physics.

An agreement on the problem of "Developing and Implementing a Set of Measures to Increase AES Reliability

with a Regard for their Operating Experience" is proposed for signing at the end of 1987. A program prepared
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 15 EAST EUROPE

by the Soviet lead organization Nil [Ail-Union Nil] AES

is currently being discussed. The Czechoslovak side has

also developed proposals for it. The coordinator is the

NRI.

The adoption of an agreement and detailed program on

the problem of "Creating Modern Programs and Equipment for Training Key Personnel for Nuclear Power

Engineering" is anticipated this year. The Coordinator

of this work in the CSSR is the Nil AES.

The proposed Czechoslovak obligations will be fulfilled

within the framework of the state plan.

A draft program of collaboration on the problem of

"Developing a Unified Set of Standards and Technical

Documentation in the Realm of Nuclear Power Engineering" proposed by the Soviet lead organization of USSR

Gosatomenergonadzor [State Committee for Safety in

the Atomic Power Industry] is being considered. The

experience of Interatomenergo will be utilized therein.

The CSSR coordinator is the NRI.

A Solid Foundation for the Obligations of the CSSR

The government of the CSSR is devoting especial attention to fulfilling obligations stemming from the tasks of

the CP STP. Favorable conditions for their resolution

have been created by the appropriate governmental

decrees. Those responsible for the fulfillment of the

assignments of the CP STP have been designated: the

members ofthe CSSR government that are the chairman

of the Czechoslovak Atomic Energy Commission

(CAEC) and the chairman ofthe Czechoslovak Academy

of Sciences.

A Governmental Commission on Nuclear Power Engineering headed by the deputy chairman of the government has also been created and will regulate issues

associated with CSSR participation in work in the third

priority area of the CP STP, including problems of

specialization and cooperation in producing equipment

for AESs.

An intersector working group under the chairman of the

CAEC that includes deputy ministers from the interested

sectors has been created for the preparation of quality

materials on the participation of the CSSR in realizing

the CP STP.

The rules for establishing direct ties between CSSR

organizations and those of the other CEMA member

countries, as well as the CP STP Guiding Principles for

the CSSR, have also been approved by decree of the

CSSR government.

The task is being posed of how better to utilize the

conditions that have been created for the more complete

fulfillment of the tasks ahead. CSSR proposals on the

program for the third priority area of the CP STP had

been developed as early as the first half of 1986, and

after their careful consideration they were distributed to

the CEMA Secretariat, the USSR State Committee on

Science and Technology, the USSR Ministry of Power

and Electrification and the USSR State Committee on

Nuclear Power.

They have also been sent additional material substantiating the participation of the CSSR in solving certain

problems, as well as information on our productive base,

deliveries, experimental equipment, jigs, the results of

research and the like.

We have at the same time proposed mutual consultations with the Soviet organs under whose purview the

lead organizations on CP STP problems fall. A number

of them have already been held in the form of bilateral

and multilateral negotiations. These consultations have

helped in the solution of some problems and the discussion of Czechoslovak proposals. In the majority of cases,

the Soviet lead organizations have adopted them and

included them in the detailed programs of collaboration.

Much effort has been applied to preparing and realizing

the third priority area of the CP STP by international

and national organizations, and especially by the Soviet

lead organizations and problem coordinators that are

charged with the major portion ofthe executive activity,

in the time that has elapsed since its signing.

More than a few issues requiring immediate resolution

have arisen along with the positive results in this preparatory period.

First of all, the intersector coordination of problems is

not always sufficient. Some lead organizations are

inclined to limit their substance, especially in those

instances where it goes beyond the bounds of their

authority. The Gidropress OKB [special design bureau],

the lead organization on the problem of "Improving

Equipment and its Production Technology," has proposed being limited just to work on reactor installations,

referring to the fact that the remaining equipment falls

under the purview of other Soviet organizations.

Second, the agreements concluded before the 41st

(Extraordinary) CEMA Session encompass only the stage

of scientific and technical interaction, and supplements

to them concerning production and applying the

achievements of scientific and technical progress have

yet to be prepared. This relates to the newly signed

agreements as well. In the majority of cases, their

detailed programs do not define the production stage of

collaboration, and certain topics are frequently accomplished via reporting or the manufacture of experimental

models or prototypes. The future manufacturers and

consumers are insufficiently involved in the work.

Third, the conclusion of legal agreements (contracts)

between the interested organizations is proceeding too

slowly. Concrete negotiations on financing the work and

providing for recouping the funds invested in research
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 16 EAST EUROPE

and development of the production base have not yet

been conducted. Some lead organizations and organs of

CEMA are proposing the application of the principle

that is still in use: "Each finances that part of the work

that he has decided to fulfill himself." This method,

however, provides no incentives for organizing the accelerated solution of problems and reduces the obligatory

nature of the fulfillment of the work.

Enhanced attention must be paid to these issues in light

of the decisions of the CEMA Session (42nd Session).

The third priority area of the CP STP is a program of

collaboration to the year 2000. The gradual supplementing and elaboration of the programs and the technical

and economic parameters of the equipment in them in

accordance with world achievements is therefore essential.

The development of nuclear-power engineering and the

construction of AESs and ASTs is determined by the

level of the corresponding metallurgical, machinebuilding, electrical-equipment, construction and building-industry base. Problems of economics, nuclear

safety, environmental protection, personnel training

and, last but not least, the management and preparation

of construction, including planning, creating and operating individual links in this system, must be systematically resolved along with technical and technological

issues.

The third priority area of the CP STP should be considered as a unified whole, taking into account the comprehensive nature of its content. Its principal problems

must be elaborated and supplemented. This is the principal task of the intergovernmental commission as a

coordinating organ in this realm. This role can be

successfully fulfilled only with the assistance of CEMA

organs and working in close contact with the lead organizations and coordinators of some problems, to whom

should be rendered effective methodological aid, and

through the members of the intergovernmental commission have an effect on the corresponding national organs

and organizations.

The chief designer of the Gidropress OK.B and the

general planner of Atomteploelektroproyekt (ATEP)

[Nuclear Heating and Electric Power Supply Planning

Institute] play important roles in ensuring the comprehensive nature of the innovation cycle and the link of

AES research, development, production and operation.

Only with their direct assistance can the results of

problem solutions in the third priority area of the CP

STP be taken into account in design and planning

documentation. In my opinion, it would be expedient

that this function of the Gidropress OKB lead organization be united with the function of chief designer and

that this be fully utilized to take into account contemporary technical solutions in the overall scheme of nuclear

power installations. It would also be sensible to include

ATEP in the incorporation of the results of CP STP

fulfillment as a general AES planner.

The application of practical achievements in providing

for the safe, reliable and economical operation ofAESs is

of no little importance. These issues were included in the

problem "Developing and Implementing a Set of Measures to Increase AES Safety with a Regard for their

Operating Experience." It would be expedient if the

study of this problem were begun immediately and

proposals and requirements for increasing nuclear safety

be incorporated right in the plans, designs and construction of the AES. Essential herein is coordinating the

activity of the various CEMA organs engaged in these

problems.

The future manufacturers and consumers of new articles

and technologies must also be involved in the fulfillment

of individual assignments under the CP STP as early as

the stage of scientific and technical collaboration in

order that the consistency of the whole innovation cycle

is not violated. In order to ensure its comprehensiveness,

a closer unification of the third priority area of the CP

STP with the program of construction of AESs and ASTs

in the CEMA member countries to the year 2000 with a

regard for supplying them with nuclear fuel and the

essential equipment would be expedient. The fulfillment

of this program depends on the solution of many problems envisaged by the CP STP. Such a consistent unification could strengthen the concrete and real nature, as

well as the compulsory nature, of these two adopted

documents.

The formulation of detailed programs of collaboration is

currently basically coming to a close. The government of

the CSSR has created favorable conditions for including

Czechoslovak scientific research and production organizations in implementing the problems of the CP STP.

The consistent fulfillment ofthe obligations ofthe CSSR

will serve as a benefit for the development of the

Czechoslovak economy and the whole socialist community.

COPYRIGHT: Sovet Ekonomicheskoy Vzaimopomoshchi Secretariat

12821

HUNGARY

Finnish, Hungarian Nuclear Power Firms To

Exchange Operating Data

51002449 Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMATin Finnish

Uun88p27

[Text] An agreement to exchange information on operating experiences of the [Finnish] Loviisa nuclear power

plant and a [Hungarian] plant located in Paksi is to be

signed next week in Budapest. Earlier this spring, Imatran Voima (IVO) International, the firm's export unit,
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 17 EAST EUROPE

concluded a consultation agreement with the Paksi

nuclear power plant, according to which IVO will participate in a computer-based project management in

Hungary.

The new pact is to be signed during the final day of

President Mauno Koivisto's official state visit to Hungary in June, said Heikki Kauppi, chief of IVO International's section for CEMA countries, on Tuesday [31

May]. According to the agreement for continued cooperation, information on operating experiences is to be

exchanged between the Loviisa and Paksi power plants

for the mutual benefit of both firms.

Great amounts of various materials, thousands of workers and tens of thousands of documents are required for

designing and constructing of nuclear power plants. To

monitor all this, Imatran Voima has developed computer-based methods. Currently the joint project in Paksi is

being conducted based on IVO experiences, and it is

succeeding well. Several Finns are serving rotating work

assignments in Paksi.

Located some 50 kilometers from Budapest, the Paksi

nuclear power plant has four Loviisa-type 440 megawatt

units. In addition, construction has started on a second

1,000 megawatt unit. The 1,000 megawatt units being

constructed in Paksi are in type similar to the pressure

reactors IVO built in Finland with Atomenergoexport.

/12232
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 LATIN AMERICA 18

ARGENTINA

Financial Obstacles Threaten Continuity of

Nuclear Plan

51002024a Buenos Aires LA PRENSA in Spanish

3 May 88 p 9

[Article by Sergio Crivelli]

[Text] The president of Argentina is prepared to give his

explicit political backing to the Argentine nuclear program, now threatened by possible paralysis because of

budget cuts. The head ofCONEA [National Commission

for Atomic Energy], Emma Perez Ferreira, brought the

chief executive up to date on the situation's gravity,

telling him that without foreign financing for local work,

construction of the Atucha II power plant and the

Arroyito heavy water plant would have to be halted.

"Without foreign funding," explained CONEA's chair,

"we can't continue this work. And if the budget cuts

become a reality, I don't think we can continue. The

president knows this, and he is very well aware that it is

worth the effort we are making to get funding from

abroad. He is prepared to back the initiative, that is, to

give his explicit political support to the nuclear plan. But

if the cuts force us to give up that attempt, we will have

to stop work, although that will be painful both to us and

to the president."

Despite repeated stories to the contrary, Dr Perez Ferreira stated that the budget was still open on the atomic

energy issue at the time news reports were coming out

about lack of interest on the part of foreign banks in the

projects now in progress—Atucha II and Arroyito. She

said that funding had been guaranteed by the suppliers

for materials of foreign origin used in these projects.

Brodersohn Calls for Efforts

While the secretary of finance, Mario Brodersohn, is

calling for an "effort"—that is, a decrease in their budget

allocations—the CONEA officials estimate that they

need $ 100 million more than what was allocated in order

to make the Atucha II investment efficient. They do not

consider it possible that they will receive those additional funds, and they fear that the funds already allocated, about 1.7 billion australs (in December 1987

values), may be cut.

This amount includes personnel costs, operating

expenses—75 percent of which will be recovered by the

plant's operation—foreign loans and the still not completed amortization of the Embalse plant, as well as the

costs of keeping the entire Commission running.

Construction of the Atucha II plant and of the Arroyito

heavy water plant in Neuquen—the latter project is

already 90 percent complete—has not been halted,

although some difficult problems have had to be overcome. Both projects were begun with nothing but funding from the treasury in sight as a source of financing for

the local work.

Credits for foreign materials and components were guaranteed by the suppliers, but last year when the treasury

had to allocate resources to pay Argentine contractors, it

gave CONEA 25 percent of the funds in cash and 75

percent in debt payment bonds.

This led to some difficult negotiations which delayed the

construction work, making the investment inefficient.

Given these circumstances, CONEA decided to take

steps to raise foreign funds for local work as well, since

the Federal Republic of Germany, to mention just one

instance, is interested in the completion of Atucha II,

because the reactor to be used is of German origin.

"But if the cuts in the 1988 budget become a reality,"

said Emma Perez Ferreira, "it is useless to negotiate this

funding, for we can't ask other people to make an effort

that we are not prepared to make ourselves."

The United States and the Bomb

According to the CONEA head, the economic difficulties

cited by the executive branch in financing the nuclear

plan do not contain any intention of changing Argentina's present nuclear policy, as some sectors have suggested. She further described it as "a big mistake" to

attribute to the foreign ministry any opposition to the

autonomous strategy Argentina has pursued to date in

the nuclear field because of opposition on the part of the

United States.

"The Ministry of Foreign Relations is an extremely

strong advocate of maintaining our nuclear policy," said

Dr Perez Ferreira, "as it sees very close at hand the

interest which our products arouse abroad and the

possibilities arising from this interest. Moreover, since

Ambassador Richard Kennedy's last visit about a month

and a half ago, it has become fairly clear that the United

States is beginning to understand our point of view and

the fact that we want to have the complete fuel cycle, but

without ever imagining that we might use our nuclear

program for military purposes."

For years U.S. diplomacy has been putting pressure—in

vain—on Argentina to sign the Tlatelolco and Nuclear

Non-Proliferation Treaties. During the transition from

the military regime to the democratic government,

Washington had hopes that the Argentina refusal would

disappear, but to its surprise it found that the position of

the San Martin Palace had not changed. This is so

because our government authorities feel that the NonProliferation Treaty is in violation ofthe principle ofthe

legal equality of states, while in the Tlatelolco Treaty

there is no reciprocity; it requires some countries like
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 19 LATIN AMERICA

Argentina to open up all their facilities for inspection,

while others, such as the United States and the Soviet

Union, are exempt from such control.

Moreover, Argentine officials say it takes the necessary

precautions in its transfers of nuclear technology to other

countries. Countries which purchase Argentine technology can not use it for military purposes, as all such sales

are placed under safeguards.

Why There Is No Bomb

As far as Dr Perez Ferreira is concerned, the option of

Argentina using nuclear technology for military purposes

has never arisen, for one quite practical reason, among

many other possible reasons: the uselessness of building

an extremely limited number of bombs, compared with

the enormous arsenals already existing. She added: "I

believe that if Argentina had already had the bomb or if

it had been in the process of obtaining it when the

Falklands War began, we would not be telling this story

now."

Despite the logical validity of this reasoning, the constant pressures from the United States to minimize

Argentina's autonomy as much as possible have been

impossible to conceal. For this reason, the hypothesis of

an interest that goes far beyond the non-proliferation

problem, and is related to competition for the growing

nuclear technology market, gains plausibility. The

CONEA chair agreed that she does not rule out the

possibility that the United States may be claiming to be

suspicious about Argentine intentions in order to

weaken our nuclear program and thus to avoid the rise of

a new competitor.

Out of Service

One ofthe components ofthe recent energy crisis was the

fact that the Atucha and Embalse plants were both out of

service, presumably because of maintenance defects

attributable to budget limitations. In the case of Atucha

I, CONEA's explanation emphasizes that after 14 years

in operation, all its nuclear and conventional systems

were given an extremely thorough check. The state ofthe

latter systems delayed the plant's startup for about a

month longer than had been planned, beginning the

preliminary task of increasing power at the end of

December 1987. Then a fuel channel cap which not been

properly tightened came off, spilling 50 tons of heavy

water in the reactor's container. Decontaminating the

container and cleaning the water took from 22 December

to 19 April. The accident occurred before the fission

process had begun.

At Embalse, on 9 April an unexpected event occurred: a

major frequency surge on the line because of the entry

and exit of big industrial consumers. This phenomenon,

caused by the fact that, for the first time, other plants

located between Embalse and the consumers were out of

service, caused a strong increase in pressure in a heavy

water circuit, the breakage of equipment and a change in

the chemical composition of the water, with consequent

delays in getting the plant operating again.

According to the authorities, in neither case should these

events be blamed on a deterioration in the level of

maintenance. Of course, such a suspicion did gain credence now that the nuclear plan is facing its greatest

financial difficulties since it has become practically the

sole instance of technological continuity and progress in

Argentina over the course of the past 3 decades.

7679

Advantages, Disadvantages of Nuclear Accord

With Brazil

51002024b Buenos Aires LA PRENSA in Spanish

25 Apr 88 p 8

[Article by Miguel J. Culaciati]

[Text] When, writing in LA PRENSA on 17 September

1979 and on 20 May 1980, the author of this article

proposed a nuclear agreement with Brazil, he was suspected of responding to "dark designs" by the then

chairman of the CNEA [National Commission for

Atomic Energy], Admiral Castro Madero, and the same

group of nationalistic officials that in one way or another

continues to direct Argentina's nuclear policy.

At that time I went to Brazil on my own behalf and met

with officials of the Brazilian Atomic Energy Commission, who certainly had a much clearer concept of what

nuclear cooperation between our two countries should

be.

Later, realizing that a bilateral context would not be

sufficient to ensure nuclear progress in Latin America,

much less nuclear safety and the non-proliferation of

nuclear facilities, I proposed the creation of a South

American Nuclear Organization in the style of what the

Europeans did some years ago under the name of Euratom, suggesting that this regional organization might be

named Sudatom.

This proposal was presented at two worldwide congresses on nuclear law, and was endorsed enthusiastically

by the United States embassy as a suitable means of

improving the safeguard system, which is of such concern to that nation, given the possibility that one of the

more turbulent Latin American states might build an

atom bomb.

The CNEA has always rejected the possiblity of creating

a regional organization and to date has favored bilateral

accords by means of which it thinks it may be able to

place its theoretical exports of Argentine technology to

Latin America, and at the same time avoid control ofthe

peaceful use of our nuclear facilities.
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 20 LATIN AMERICA

The nuclear officials of the process, extravagant administrators of an enormous budget, the origin of almost $20

billion of our foreign debt, rejected this proposal, just as

today their Radical Party successors continue to refuse

to ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the

Tlatelolco Treaty.

While the agreement with Brazil is a step forward, it will

not be adequate so long as it is restricted to the small

scope of a bilateral pact, and it certainly will not help

give us access to modern and economical nuclear technologies. Nor will it keep us from continuing to be

suspected of using nuclear energy for military or paramilitary purposes.

Furthermore, both Brazil and Argentina are going

through difficult times, in which the possibility of major

social upheavals can not be totally eliminated.

What would happen if in the midst of a crisis nuclear

facilities were to fall into the hands ofterrorists or ifthey

were used by irresponsible political groups?

Moreover, our past record in international politics and

our alignment with nations suspected of encouraging the

most dangerous forms ofterrorism, such as Libya, Cuba,

Nicaragua, and more recently Mozambique, make us

suspect as possible exporters of nuclear components or

facilities that could end up in the hands ofthese governments, posing a grave international threat.

The president, counseled by his advisers from the CNEA

and the MRE, has nicknamed the Brazilian pact the

"New Tlatelolco," forgetting that our country was the

principal promotor of the "old" and only Tlatelolco

Treaty which we then refused to ratify, claiming that if

we did so the developed countries might learn something

new from our nuclear technology.

Tlatelolco can only provide security and peace for Latin

America by attaining its much desired and sought for

goal of making Latin America an area free from nuclear

arms. At this time nuclear weapons could be freely

stationed in any country which did not sign that excellent treaty.

Many benefits may be derived from nuclear cooperation

with Brazil, a nation which has also made excessive and

unproductive investments in its "Nuclear Plan" in association with our KWU [Kraftwerk Union] partner

(Siemens).

Still, we should not lose sight of the fact that nonproliferation treaties subjected to adequate diplomatic

handling would open up for us the doors of much more

modern and economical technological sources in vast

areas of the nuclear field.

For in the end, what do the countries that possess atom

bombs want? They simply want us to submit to international inspections that will guarantee the peaceful use

that we talk about so much.

If we really are not trying to make nuclear weapons, what

is the point ofthis expensive subterfuge which in the end

leads us to the same dependency, since 90 percent of

both the Brazilian and Argentine nuclear enterprises are

subject to international supervision?

Only some projects already attempted here in times of

past madness, such as the nuclear submarine engine,

might be a halfway logical reason if we didn't already

know that if in the hypothetical event that we actually

managed to build it, we wouldn't have anyone to whom

to sell it, nor would it be of any use without nuclear

missiles capable of firing while the submarine was submerged.

So while on one hand the accord with Brazil is good

news, on the other it unfortunately confirms the fact that

the diplomats of both nations are too immature to join

with the developed world, and that they are still keeping

on with the same voluntarist policies that have brought

these nations to disaster, impoverishing their peoples.

We should also ask ourselves what the Chileans will

think about this, as they may feel threatened by this

nuclear agreement. And what about the Cubans who

could easily turn to their Soviet patrons, if they haven't

already done so, asking them to send some missiles, just

in case....

7679

Country To Help Turkey Get Nuclear Technology

NC3105081488 Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish

25 May 88 pp 3, 15

[Atilla Atakan report: "Diplomacy With Argentina on

Nuclear Technology"]

[Text] Buenos Aires, (HURRIYET)—Although the

United States has come out against Turkey's sale to

Pakistan of components used in the production of

nuclear arms, reports say that Argentina's new ambassador to Ankara, Adolfo Saracho, a former head of Argentina's nuclear energy commission, will try "to help

Turkey acquire nuclear technology."

Argentina is well-advanced in nuclear technology. Its

decision to appoint Adolfo Saracho as its new ambassador to Turkey has made the U.S., USSR, and FRG

diplomatic missions in Buenos Aires uneasy. They

believe that Turkey's acquisition of nuclear technology

would be disadvantageous. Adolfo Saracho made a significant contribution to the 3 May signing of an agreement between Turkey and Argentina for "cooperation

between the two countries in nuclear technology." The

new ambassador arrived in Ankara yesterday.
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 21 LATIN AMERICA

Prior to his departure from Argentina, he told HURRIYET: "We would like Turkey to learn about the technology Argentina has acquired during the past 20 years. We

can help Turkey build reactors and nuclear power plants

in the future. Our objective is to help Turkey develop its

nuclear technology, without depending on any country

or bloc."

Noting that Argentina objected to any interference by

the superpowers in its work in nuclear energy, Adolfo

Saracho noted that Argentina made it a condition that

nuclear technology be used passively and for peaceful

purposes. He said: "I know my task is difficult. Due to its

proximity to countries which cooperate with Argentina,

such as India, Iraq, Algeria, Romania, Yugoslavia, and

Albania, Turkey is a very important country."

Foreign Financing Sought for Nuclear Program

PY3105211888 Buenos Aires TELAM in Spanish

1540 GMT 31 May 88

[Excerpt] Buenos Aires, 31 May (TELAM)—CNEA

President Emma Perez Ferreira has announced that

efforts are being made to get financing from Switzerland

and the FRG to continue building the Atucha II nuclear

plant and the Arroyto heavy water plant.

She also said that the current CNEA budget is similar to

its 1987 budget and that the possibility of getting foreign

financial aid was accounted for in the current budget.

She made these comments at the conclusion of the

celebration marking the 38th CNEA anniversary and

"Atomic Energy Day." She added that the funds provided by the national treasury are not enough to continue with the Atucha II and Arroyito plants.

She said the projects will not stop ifforeign financial aid

is obtained. In this regard she added: We either get

foreign financial aid to make a good investment to

continue the projects, or we will have to stop them.

In a speech during the ceremony at CNEA headquarters,

she said the current budget is not as large as in the past,

but we must be aware of the serious economic crisis

affecting our country.

She concluded by saying that the recent energy crisis

clearly showed the vulnerability ofthe national electrical

system and the important role played by the CNEA

nuclear plants.

Bariloche Institute Trains Future Nuclear

Engineers

51002024c Buenos Aires CLAR1N in Spanish

20 Mar 88 p 8

[Article by Daniel Arias B.]

[Text] Argentina's top engineers graduate from Bariloche. They are exhausted when they leave, for the academic demands on them are fierce. But they also graduate with jobs in sight: the training given at the Balseiro

Institute produces people familiar with extremely

diverse areas, and each graduate carries a seal of intellectual quality from the CNEA [National Commission

for Atomic Energy].

Two consecutive decades of university deterioration

have left the CNEA alone in the vanguard in research

and the teaching of pure and applied sciences. Our few

high-tech industries know this. They literally pursue

these graduates.

This is quite significant in a country where young

engineers drive cabs while dreaming of moving up the

ranks in the management bureaucracy in any business,

resigned in advance to spending their lives outside of

engineering. Strangely, the only program that to some

extent grants immunity against frustration, the Bariloche

program, doesn't have many students enrolled; the average student either isn't aware of it or thinks that a

nuclear engineering degree would trap him in terms in

jobs in Argentina's lagging nuclear program.

That is untrue: a nuclear engineer is by definition a

generalist, a sort of multispecialist capable of coming to

grips with problems of very diverse natures, both in

conventional engineering and in what is, strictly speaking, nuclear engineering.

In an economy marked by severe upswings and downturns, a broad engineering background is the best possible training to have in order to avoid slipping or falling

in one's career. It has been possible to acquire this

background in the south for the past decade. And it is

free, for anyone who survives the admission requirements (which are quite stringent, of course) gets a

scholarship, housing, supplies, books, a computer, and

the use of equipment that leaves the outdated labs of our

university system back in the Stone Age. And still the

prejudice against ultraspecialization means that the Balseiro Institute's Nuclear Engineering Department

awards fewer degrees than the market can absorb.

A World Apart

The CIN [Nuclear Engineering Department] was set up a

decade ago as part of the CNEA's contradictory and

off-and-on effort to make itself self-sufficient in nuclear

technology, using as a basis the extensive educational

experience of the Balseiro Institute, which had been

training the best South American physicists since the

1950s. The unusual feature of the Balseiro educational

system is at the very heart of its success: the professor

and the student are both full-time professionals to whom

the CNEA devotes great attention so that one will teach

and the other will learn, and both will do research. The

students can live on the campus of the CAB [Bariloche

Atomic Center] which, in addition to housing and meals,

provides very well equipped labs, a research reactor, a

particle accelerator, one computer per person, an up-todate library, clean air, hills, woods, lakes, and almost
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 22 LATIN AMERICA

total freedom from pollution, crowds, and bureaucrats.

Included in the package is something truly rare: a teaching faculty dedicated to research.

It's hard to believe all this exists in the south. It is one

thing to learn from someone who transmits knowledge

generated by third parties, and something quite different

to learn from a creator of original knowledge. In the

latter case, teaching and learning become highly personal

and serious matters: the pace of study is more or less

heroic, and the demands leave little time for rest. But in

exchange, the people here live casually. Almost everyone

in this world apart at the CAB addresses everyone else

familiarly and wears running shoes (when it isn't snowing).

The students play tennis in the tennis courts, organize

movie parties, play music, climb mountains, ski, love

each other, hate each other, throw big parties, and look

like absolutely normal people until you read the posters

they put up complaining about the stinginess of their

scholarships, in which they illustrate their points using

complex computer-generated graphics.

All this is a tiny sample of what some people are calling

"chip imperialism." Computers are part of the air that

people breathe in the Balseiro Institute; there is roughly

one PC per student, and many really powerful computers

like the Micro-Vax and Vax. All this equipment means

that they can deal with almost everything by computer,

in addition to the two areas that are specially devoted to

computers. The use of computer models and simulators

is so intensive, extensive and invasive that the most

stubborn professors growl that the thing is becoming a

problem because the students end up thinking that their

mathematical representations of reality are reality.

The young men and women naturally design their own

software or do hands-on work on the existing software to

improve it, and they attain such an intuitive grasp of

systems engineering that they end up excelling in a field

that is unknown to the graduates ofspecifically computer

departments. This is starting to be recognized, not just

here but in Brazil as well.

CIN students may specialize in four major conventional

engineering areas: thermohydraulics, mechanics, control

and materials, and fuels.

In the first group there are people skilled in designing

turbines (something which Argentina now has to

import). The second group includes some very rare

creatures who are able to design components by using

computer mechanics systems, something only poorly

understood in Argentina. In the third group are people

capable of operating all sorts of production plants,

ranging from petrochemical to aeronautical facilities.

The fourth category includes metallurgists and advanced

ceramicists, as well as experts in composite materials. All

of them form a brain pool which is, unfortunately, quite

an exception in our country. Every time the Swedes, the

Germans or someone else lure a graduate away, our

country loses $50,000 in what was spent on his or her

education. Specialists in conventional areas devote

themselves to neutron work, to radiological protection

and to nuclear safety (areas quite internal to the CNEA),

although "of necessity they have to become despecialized," as one student commented, saying that an expert

in industrial safety in nuclear plants, transplanted to the

chemical industry "gets old and out of date."

The CIN is not a nursery for brainy aristocrats. It is a

small educational lifesaver for a country experiencing

enormous difficulties in science and technology. Like the

Balseiro in physics, like the CAB in research, this department is a sample of the nation that is possible, one that

is more capable and independent than the real nation,

and also more attentive to its gray matter resources.

People wishing to enter the CIN should request applications from the Bariloche Atomic Center, Balseiro Institute, 8400 Bariloche, Rio Negro province. In the Buenos

Aires area information may be obtained by calling 701-

2333. Applicants must have the equivalent of 2 years of

passing grades in related fields, and be willing to undergo

a very strict selection process that includes tests in

physics, mathematics and chemistry, to be taken during

the first 2 weeks of July. The application deadline is 30

April.

7679

CNEA Announces Scholarship Plan

51002024a Buenos Aires CLARIN in Spanish

17 Mar 88 p 41

[Text] The CNEA [National Commission for Atomic

Energy] has announced a scholarship plan for graduate

programs in physics and in nuclear engineering at the

Balseiro Institute, which is affiliated with the CNEA and

with Cuyo National University.

To be admitted to this prestigious center located in San

Carlos de Bariloche, applicants must meet the following

requirements: they must be a native or naturalized

citizen of Argentina, have passed, before 31 July, courses

in linear algebra, analytic geometry, differential and

integral calculus of several variables, mechanics, heat,

electricity, sound and optics in any science or engineering department of any university in Argentina, or have

completed a teaching certificate program in physics or

mathematics.

The scholarships cover housing, meals, laundry

expenses, complete medical care, and two round-trip

fares per year.

Duration

The master's program in physics lasts for 3 and 1/2 years

and the nuclear engineering program for 4 years. Afterwards, a dissertation must be approved for the student to

be awarded a doctoral degree in physics or in nuclear

engineering.
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 23 LATIN AMERICA

The applicants selected, based on an entrance exam to be

taken during the first 2 weeks in June in Buenos Aires,

will begin their studies on 1 August 1988.

Interested persons who meet the requirements must also

present a medical certificate attesting to their good

health. Additional information and registration forms

may be obtained from the Balseiro Institute, Bariloche

Atomic Center (Cod. 8400), San Carlos de Bariloche,

Rio Negro. Telephone: 33604/22646/23065. Telex:

80723 CAB AR.

7679

BRAZIL

Nuclebras Head Proposes 4 More Nuclear Plants

PY1905235588 Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO

PAULO in Portuguese 18 May 88 p 10

[Text] Nuclebras President Licinio Seabra has proposed

the construction of four more nuclear power plants at a

cost of $7.7 billion. Seabra submitted this proposal to the

Senate CPI [Congressional Investigating Commission]

that is investigating the causes of the cesium-137 accident in Goiania in October last year.

Seabra assured the commission that the construction of

four nuclear power plants, just as the three in Angra dos

Reis, "would not entail any danger of a nuclear accident" because of the great technological progress in this

field and because the public is currently trained for

emergencies. Seabra argued that the country "will have

to face the reality of the year 2010."

Angra I Nuclear Plant Operation Delayed

PY2505140788 Brasilia Radio Nacional da Amazonia

Network in Portuguese 1000 GMT 25 May 88

[Text] Furnas Chairman Camilo Pena has said the

operation of the Angra I nuclear plant has been delayed

once again. Furnas is suing the American Westinghouse

company and is demanding compensation for damages

caused by a malfunction in the Angra I power generator.

According to Camilo Pena, Angra I will be operational in

December, not in September as originally scheduled.
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA 24

BANGLADESH

Energy Minister Addresses Atomic Energy

Officials

51500171 Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER in

English 23 Apr 88 p 3

[Text] Savar. (Dhaka), Apr 22—Energy and Ministerial

Resources Minister A. B. M. Ghulam Mostafa said on

Thursday that the government had taken steps to establish a nuclear power plant in the country, reports BSS.

He said necessary measures would be taken to install

Rooppur Nuclear Plant to materialise the government's

objective.

Mr. Mostafa was addressing the scientists and officials of

Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission at the installation ceremony of newly elected office bearers of the

association of scientists at the Atomic Energy Commission auditorium at Savar, according to a government

handout.

The Energy Minister said that Bangladesh Atomic

Energy Commission was formed in 1973 with an objective to utilise atomic power for peace.

With the increasing demand of atomic power the commission had so far established Atomic Energy Centre,

Dhaka, Atomic Energy Centre for Medicine and

Research Centre to extract mineral resources from sands

of the seashore at Chittagong and the Atomic Power

Research Organisation at Savar. Besides, one Nuclear

medical centre had been established under the commission.

Mr. Ghulam Mostafa urged the scientists to ensure

maximum utilisation of the limited resources to make

the country prosperous in all respects. He said, training

facilities for the scientists at home and abroad would be

increased. He also stressed on special budget allocations

for scientific research which would be helpful to improve

the quality of research work in the country.

/06662

INDIA

Pakistani Nonproliferation Proposal 'Dismissed'

BK1406075088 Delhi Domestic Service in English

0730 GMT 14 Jun 88

[Text] India has dismissed the renewed Pakistani proposal for bilateral nuclear nonproliferation as a propaganda ploy. Speaking at the third special UN General

Assembly disarmament session last night, the Indian

envoy, Mr C. Ghare Khan, said the so-called proposals

by Islamabad are only meant to conceal reality. He said

the fact remains that Pakistan is very close to acquiring

nuclear weapons, if it has not done so already. Mr Ghare

Khan said nuclear nonproliferation cannot be a bilateral

matter between India and Pakistan, when the whole

neighborhood is bristling with nuclear weapons. He

referred to the prime minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi's 22-

year plan to do away with atomic weapons and said if

Pakistan is serious, they should address themselves to

that instead of engaging in futile propaganda gimmicks.

Gandhi Views Nuclear Capability

BK0806162688 Delhi Domestic Service in English

1530 GMT 8 Jun 88

[Text] The prime minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi, has said

that India need not sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty [NPT] because it has not made the bomb.

Addressing a press conference in Bonn at the end of his

3-day visit to West Germany, Mr Rajiv Gandhi said that

we have demonstrated our will not to make a nuclear

weapon. We have had the capability for some time now,

but we are very clear that we do not want to go down that

road. He said that India feels that the NPT discriminates

between nuclear-weapon countries and nonnuclearweapon countries.

PAKISTAN

Indian Charges on Nuclear Program Rejected

BK1406160888 Islamabad Domestic Service in Urdu

1500 GMT 14 Jun 88

[Text] Pakistan has rejected Indian allegations that Islamabad's nuclear program is weapons oriented. Ahmad

Kamal, Pakistan's UN envoy, told the General Assembly's special disarmament session that there is not a shred

of truth to those assertions. He referred to a Carnegie

Endowment report, which noted that India had collected

100-200 kg of plutonium, which could be used to manufacture 12-40 nuclear weapons.

Ahmad Kamal reaffirmed Pakistan's determination to

establish tension-free, good-neighborly relations with all

its neighbors. He called on India to test Pakistan's

gesture of friendship. Referring to India's claims of

peaceful intentions in the nuclear field, the Pakistani

envoy said they must be made concrete through a treaty.

Spokesman Denies 'Secret' Nuclear Pact With

Iran

BK1406160588 Islamabad Domestic Service in Urdu

1500 GMT 14 Jun 88

[Text] According to a Foreign Office spokesman, Pakistan has not signed any secret nuclear pact with Iran.

Denying reports published in certain foreign newspapers

on the existence of such an agreement, the spokesman

said that no Pakistani scientist has visited Iran's nuclear

plant in Bushehr in recent years, nor has any Iranian

nuclear expert received advanced training in Pakistan.

He added that there is no question of a secret agreement,

as Iran is one ofthe countries that has already signed the

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and its nuclear facilities are subject to international safeguards.
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 25 NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

Nuclear Techniques Boost Farm Produce

51004726 Karachi DAWN (Supplement) in English

14 May 88 p III

[Article by Mahmud Akhtar Faruqui]

[Text] Nuclear techniques offer the fascinating prospects

of raising and preserving plentiful crops and fruits.

Thanks to the enterprise and ardour of the agricultural

scientists, the techniques have been gainfully employed

on a global scale to give a marked fillip to farm productivity.

At home, an outstanding success in recent years has been

the evolution of NIAB-78, a high yielding cotton variety

at the Faisalabad-based Nuclear Institute for Agriculture

and Biology. NIAB-78 has added 1.55 million and 1.38

million bales during 1986-87 and 1987-88 respectively to

the total produce, signifying a financial gain of Rs2,950

million and Rs3,600 million!

Approved for general cultivation in 1983, NIAB-78

stands unrivalled as the country's highest yielding cotton

variety and has won wide acceptance in the Punjab and

upper Sind alike.

Nuclear Techniques

The important applications of isotopes and nuclear

techniques in improving the efficiency of water and

fertilizer, evolution of improved varieties of crops, preservation offruits, etc. are seen to offer a fascinating field

for adventurous experimentation in an area which is of

fundamental importance to the country. Realising this

quite early, the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission

(PAEC) chalked out a programme for establishing

research centres equipped with the best radiation facilities and staffed with highly trained agriculturists and

radiobiologists. Three full-fledged research establishments at Tandojam, Faisalabad and Tarnab have been

engaged in extensive and intensive research to improve

agricultural products of economic importance and to

solve outstanding problems confronting the country's

farmer.

Over the years, the research and development effort has

been crowned with some notable successes and over 13

varieties ofwheat, rice, cotton, mungbean, chickpea, and

potato with improved characteristics as regards yield

and resistance to disease and commonplace pests, have

been successfully released for large scale cultivation in

different regions of Pakistan.

Following are better crop varieties at PAEC centres:

Cotton (NIAB-78): High yielding, heat tolerant, matures

early. Increased production due to this variety was 1.55

million bales in 1986-87 and 1.38 million bales in

1987-88 (est.).

Wheat (Jauhar 78): High yielding better quality grain.

(Sind 81): high yielding resistant to rust. (Sarsabz): high

yielding, genetic versatility.

Rice (Kashmir basmati): Early maturing, cold tolerant.

(Sahdab): better yield extra long grain.

Chickpeas (CM72): Resistant to blight disease.

Mungbeans (NIAB Mung 28): Short statured, uniform

maturity.

Besides NIAB-78, three outstanding improved varieties

of wheat—Jauhar-78, Sind-81 and Sarsabz—have

yielded richer dividends for the planters and are most

popular in the province of Sind. Wheat being the central

theme of the country's self-sufficiency programme, the

development Jauhar-78, Sind-81 and Sarsabz, marks

PAEC's significant role in advancing the Green Revolution. The Atomic Energy Agricultural Research Centre,

Tandojam, where the three wheat varieties have been

evolved has also developed novel wheat germ plasm

(consisting of more than 250 new strains) which is being

used nationally and internationally in vigorous plant

breeding programmes.

Kashmir Basmati, an early maturing dwarf variety of

rice suited to higher altitudes and colder climates, has

also been evolved in PAEC labs and cultivated in Swat,

Azad Kashmir and Hazara while Shadab, a high yielding

non-aromatic fine grain rice variety, is expected to

substantially boost rice production in the province of

Sind. A blight-resistant variety of chickpea, CM-72,

introduced in 1983 has also shown results by stabilising

the previously uncertain market for this crop. In addition, five mungbean varieties and a potato variety have

been profitably cultivated.

The PAEC scientists have also demonstrated that reclamation of non-productive saline soils is possible by

applying a biological technique based on the use of

Kallar grass. It has also been established that wheat, rice,

etc. can be safely and effectively disinfested by gamma

irradiation while the shelf-life of some fruits can be

extended appreciably by exposure to gamma rays.

It has now been established that atomic radiations

(mainly gamma rays) readily induce hereditary changes

(mutations) some of which are stable and lead to new

traits manifested also in subsequent generations. This

effect can be taken advantage of in evolving new varieties of crops with higher yields, better resistance to

disease and pests, and greater response to fertilizer

application.

Radioactive isotopes can also be used as tracers, as in

medical applications, in order to follow the pathways of

synthesis of different compounds in the plants, the mode

of absorption and distribution of nutrients under various

soil environment and the uptake of nutrients form the
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 26 NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

leaves. The mode of action of growth regulators and the

effects of pesticides on plants can also be explored

through labelled compounds.

'Sterile Males'

The control offield crop pests and stored food pests is of

great economic importance to farmers and consumers

alike. The application of atomic radiation and radioisotopes has opened up new possibilities for the effective

eradication of these pests through the 'sterile male'

technique. This technique enables one to eradicate specific species of insects harmful to field crop by releasing

a large number of sterilized male insects in the natural

population; the method obviously does not affect the

beneficial insects.

Radiation can also eliminate all sorts of stored grain

pests without leaving any undesirable residual effects on

the commodity thus treated; this method complements

and improves upon the preservation of grain by fumigation or spray of insecticides. Further with the use of

radioisotopes, the biological habits of insects, such as

their range of movement, hibernating tendencies, etc.

can be studied by releasing labelled insects and recovering them later at other locations.

Nuclear techniques have thus proved to be of great value

in agricultural research: they enable the research scientist

to make a two-pronged attack on the problem, viz. the

evolution of better and more productive varieties of

plants as well as the preservation of the harvested

products. The progress on this front in the country is

gratifying.

/12232
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 SOVIET UNION 27

Soviet Assisted Electrification of Afghanistan

Noted

SWOOOOle Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKA YA

INDUSTRIYA in Russian 9 Feb 88 p 1

[TASS article: "Helping Friends"]

[Text] The route toward the southern border was taken

yesterday morning by a brigade to assist Afghanistan—

rural electrification workers of Mari Oblast. They are

starting construction of a high-voltage power transmission line for the friendly neighboring country.

Assistance in electrifying the northwest province of

Afghanistan is one of the points of the agreement concluded several months ago on direct patron relations

between Mari Oblast and the province of Badgis.

The agreement was officially ratified and continued the

long-standing ties between the oblast and the provinces

of Afghanistan. There were over 20 points in the agreement. It specified that agricultural equipment, cotton

seeds and fertilizer, electrical tools and sporting goods be

supplied to Badgis.

12151

Power Station Parts Shipped to Vietnam

5100000IfMoscow SOTSIALISTICHESKA YA

INDUSTRIYA in Russian 20 Feb 88 p 1

[Article: "For Our Vietnamese Friends"]

[Text] The last hydroturbine for the Chian Electric

Power Plant in Vietnam will be shipped by the Leningrad Metal Plant Association in the second quarter, not

in the third, as was planned.

This is one of the most important points in the commitments of the turbine builders, who developed a competition for a worthy greeting for the 19th All-Union CPSU

Conference.

Cuban AES Construction Progress Report

51000001g Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA

INDUSTRIYA in Russian 23 Jan 88 p 3

[TASS article: "Safety Is Guaranteed"]

[Text] Cien Fuegos, Cuba—22 (Jan 88)—(TASS)—The

collective of construction workers of the first nuclear

electric power plant, Juragua, erected with the assistance

of the USSR, is faced with important and crucial tasks

this year. Today the plan for construction ofthe first two

reactors of the AES has already been over half fulfilled.

Implementation of the plan has arrived at a stage characterized by a growing level of complexity in the construction and installation work. Also slated for this year

is the laying ofthe second section of the AES, consisting

of the third and fourth reactors, each of which will make

it possible for the country to save 600,000 tons of oil a

year, reported Julio Trujillo, chief of construction for the

Juragua AES, in an interview with a TASS correspondent.

"Ensuring the quality of work at the country's major

power project is a priority task," he emphasized, "and

each one of our multi-thousand-member collective realizes it. Adherence to all the standards, ensuring the safe

operation of the AES in the future, is monitored with

maximum strictness. The state and international commissions who visit the construction site regularly have

come to this conclusion. Hans Bleeks, general director of

the International Atomic Energy Agency (MAGATE),

expressed his authoritative opinion concerning this during a recent stay here. On the basis of his familiarity with

a number of nuclear electric power plants operating in

other countries," said Julio Trujillo, "I can confirm that

the Juragua AES will be one of the safest."

12151

General Claims U.S. Military Aid to Pakistan

Encourages Nuclear Ambitions

18070076 Moscow LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA in

Russian 16 Feb 88 p 3

[Article by Major General F. Gontar, candidate of military sciences, USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences:

"Project 706"]

"The purchasers, who were having great difficulty with

power supply in South Vietnam, asked us to accelerate

the machine output," says T. M. Lamm, chief engineer.

"Because ofthe shortage of electric power the enterprises

there have to work in rotation. The start-up of the

electric power plant will in many ways solve the

problem."

12151

[Text] A couple of days ago in Belgium a large scandal

broke out in connection with the fact that containers of

nuclear materials were illegally sent to Pakistan from the

Center for Nuclear Research in the Belgian city of Mol

where an enterprise is in operation for enriching uranium by the gas centrifuge method. This dangerous

"leakage of nuclear technology" was announced at a

press conference in Brussels by the Belgian Minister of

External Relations Leo Tindemans.
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 28 SOVIET UNION

This is one of many examples in which Islamabad

through illegal tricks acquires from Western countries

equipment, technology and materials necessary for manufacturing nuclear weapons. Thus as early as 1976-1979

equipment, important components, parts and technical

documentation for gas ultracentrifuges were secretly

shipped from West European countries (the Netherlands, the FRG, Great Britain) to Pakistan. The basis of

these in the Scientific Production Atomic Center of

Kahut (30 kilometers east of Rawalpindi) a plant was

constructed for obtaining both "arms" uranium (containing more than 90 percent of the isotope 235) and for

producing slightly enriched uranium for atomic electric

power stations (containing up to 5 percent ofthe isotope

235).

According to an announcement in the WASHINGTON

POST published last summer, at the gas centrifuge plant

in Kahut the level of enrichment ofthe uranium exceeds

90 percent, which makes it possible to use it in charges

for nuclear weapons. According to the estimates of

American experts, the quantity of uranium enriched this

way that has already been produced in Kahut is "sufficient for manufacturing only a few atom bombs."

Another example. In the middle of last year the NEW

YORK TIMES announced that during 1982-1983 the

Pakistani company Aftab Brazers made four secret deliveries of ultramodern computer equipment and oscilloscopes from the United States through Hong Kong.

These are used in Pakistan in designing explosive components and detonators for atomic bombs.

According to announcements in the foreign press, in

1986 Islamabad managed to acquire from the United

States a large batch of special ultrarapid electronic

devices—Krytons, which were delivered to the atomic

center of Kahut and were already used there when testing

explosive devices intended to be used with nuclear

ammunition.

Quite recently the West German magazine DER SPIEGEL published an article exposing the firms Muchem

and Transnuclear for illegal sale of enriched uranium to

Pakistan.

The aforementioned and also other cases revealed in

recent years ofsecret purchases by Pakistan of materials,

equipment and technology for atomic production show

clearly that Islamabad authorities are persistently creating a scientific industrial base that is capable of producing their own nuclear weapons. This is shown also by the

fact that in the region of Kundian they have created the

second atomic center in Pakistan in which they are

constructing a radiochemical plant for extracting plutonium from heat discharging fuel cores that are used in

nuclear reactors.

With the startup of this plant Pakistan will have the

possibility of extracting on an industrial scale plutonium

obtained during the operation of atomic electric power

stations. At the present time in the region of Kayachi

there is an AES with a capacity of up to 140,000

kilowatts. Construction is being conducted on the second

station with a capacity of up to 90,000 kilowatts in the

region of Kundian, which will also operate on natural

uranium. Under certain conditions for the operation of

nuclear reactors of these atomic electric power stations it

is possible to obtain plutonium from them (containing

more than 90 percent of isotope 239) that is suitable for

use in nuclear weapons. Practical work for creating

individual components of nuclear ammunition is concentrated in the nuclear center of Kahut, in the Institute

of Nuclear Science and Technology in the city of Nilor

and also at the defense complex in Vakh where they have

created a subdivision for developing a nuclear charge.

On the whole one can draw the conclusion that Pakistan

has created a closed technological cycle that is capable of

producing nuclear ammunition on a limited scale. This

was unequivocally announced by President Zia-ul-Haq

who, in an interview with TIME magazine, admitted

with impressive candor that his country has the potential

to produce nuclear weapons. Clearly reacting to international appeals to halt efforts to create an atom bomb,

Zia-ul-Haq defiantly stated: "When you have the technology that Pakistan has you can do with it what you

want to." Incidentally, the information to the effect that

Pakistan has created a production base for manufacturing nuclear charges is also confirmed by data from

American intelligence. Referring to statements of highly

placed workers, the UPI in November of last year

announced that Islamabad "definitely has a real nuclear

device."

It would seem that everything is clear. The Islamabad

leadership, having refused to sign the Nuclear Weapon

Nonproliferation Agreement, is doing everything to fully

complete its work for arranging series production of the

"Islam" nuclear bomb, which has been under way in

Pakistan since 1976 under a program with the code name

"Project 706." As we know, the goal ofthis program is to

provide for equipping the Pakistani armed forces with

nuclear weapons.

Attention is drawn to the fact that the American administration, in spite of Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, continues to render it large-scale military and economic

assistance. While during 1981-1986 the amount of this

assistance was $3.2 billion, in keeping with the new

agreement, during the next 6 years Islamabad will

receive $4 billion worth of military and economic assistance. The majority of this astronomical sum will go for

paying for deliveries of the most modern American

offensive arms. They include the F-16 fighter bomber,

which is a nuclear arms carrier, the latest Abrams M-l

tanks, Cobra fire support helicopters, self-propelled and

towed 155- and 203.2-mm howitzers, military ships,

radioelectronic equipment, and other of the latest means

of armed combat.
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 29 SOVIET UNION

With American assistance Pakistan has actually become

its own kind of immense arsenal for the Pentagon in the

south of the Asian continent. And this is done to bypass

the "Simington Amendment" which prohibits granting

military and economic assistance to countries that are

developing their own nuclear weapons. Washington's

hypocritical position can be seen here. In words the

American administration has been in favor of observing

the Nuclear Weapon Nonproliferation Agreement,

regarding it, as President Reagan assures us, as a "cornerstone of American policy," but in fact the United

States by granting Islamabad mass military assistance is

actually encouraging its nuclear ambitions which are

directed toward possessing nuclear weapons.

A quite natural question arises: why is Washington so

generously supplying Pakistan with modern arms and

rendering it large-scale military and economic assistance

directed toward unrestrained militarization of the country which contributes, essentially, to the creation of a

dangerous nuclear arsenal in this country?

There can only be one answer to this question. The ruling

circles ofthe United States regard Pakistan as one ofthe

major springboards for their imperialist strategy with the

goal of exerting direct military pressure on the states of

South and Southeast Asia and countries adjacent to the

region of the Persian Gulf. In the Pakistan arena Pentagon strategists intend to keep constantly in their sight

this immense region ofthe planet which includes also the

Indian Ocean zone. Essentially the White House prefers

to sacrifice the principle of "nonproliferation of nuclear

weapons" if only it can keep Pakistan in its sphere of

unlimited influence. Here one can clearly see Washington's desire to break apart the existing alignment of

forces in South Asia to the detriment of India, which has

been following an independent foreign political course.

By transforming Pakistan into a source of constant

tension in the region, including its territory in the "zone

of responsibility" of American rapid deployment forces

and closing its eyes to the creation of nuclear weapons in

this country, the ruling circles of the United States are

contributing to the destabilization of the system in the

countries of South Asia and the region of the Persian

Gulf and creating an explosive situation there. All this

cannot but cause legitimate concern and alarm among all

those who value peace on our planet.

11772

Anti-Nuclear Stance Described

Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAY A PRAVDA in Russian

27 Jan 88 p 2

[Article by V. Umnov: "Chain Reaction: Fear of the

Unknown—What It Turns Into and the Consequences";

first paragraph is letter to the editor; second paragraph is

comment by I. K. Dibobes, laboratory head of the

Institute of Applied Geophysics]

[Text] "Guided by a sense of citizen's responsibility, we

request that work on the construction of the Krasnodar

Nuclear Electric Power Plant be ceased. This problem

must be thoroughly examined, in consideration of public

opinion."

"The problem is submitted for discussion prematurely.

A commission has been set up and specialists are examining all the variants of further development of the

power system in the Northern Caucasus. Public opinion

must not be fired up. We will be having talks in a month,

when the decision will be made."

The decision was made.

It was an unprecedented case: the recently begun construction ofthe Krasnodar Nuclear Electric Power Plant

at the end of last year came to a halt. It was decided to

seek a new site for the AES.

This happened after complaints flowed in to the

country's Ministry of Atomic Power from the Kuban

citizens about the construction that had begun. We

received one of them. "There are many alarming and

contradictory rumors circulating about the problem.

They arise because of lack of information. Investigate

them!" Vera Neronova, a student from Kuban University, asked the editors.

This happened after the Minister of Atomic Power

entrusted the Atomenergoproyekt Institute with preparing material for the newspaper SOVETSKAYA

KUBAN, explaining to the public that only the AES

could solve the problem of the region's power independence.

The explanation for the public had already been handed

over for typing, when it became known: the construction

had ceased.

Nevertheless, atomic workers continue to think even

now that there was no mistake. Only the elementary

illiteracy of the authors of the letters on problems of

nuclear power caused the purely instinctive fear, which

was impossible to disregard in this situation. Taking this

into consideration, the present leaders of the kray came

out decisively against the construction of the AES—just

as decisively as had the former leaders, two years earlier,

insisted on directly the opposite.

This, however, was before Chernobyl.

Before Chernobyl, it was not only advantageous—it was

even prestigious—to have a nuclear plant. In addition to

the power independence, it also guaranteed increased

attention being paid to the "nuclear region," specialized

employment, housing, and social, cultural and every-day

facilities. Georgia and Azerbaijan achieved the construction of AES. Others, in the words of R.G. Minasyan,
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 30 SOVIET UNION

chief specialist of the technical division of Atomenergoproyekt, even resorted to unfair shuffling: if the conditions were not appropriate, they could be substantiated

on paper. True, competent commissions discarded the

proposals that were too persistent.

Krasnodar Kray was also among the applicants. It was

successful. Atomenergoproyekt took on the work. The

work was not simple: not far away was the Caucacus

biosphere preserve, rich Kuban fields just a stone's

throw away from the health resort areas.

But then the whole world began to talk about Chernobyl.

Then the chairman of the krayispolkom made a speech

on local television against construction of the AES. His

speech was already supported by public opinion....

Does it turn out that the cause of everything was only

public opinion, which, after the Chernobyl tragedy,

could simply not help but be heeded? The case of the

Krasnodar AES, perhaps, is the first evidence of this.

But—it is not the only one. "Could a nuclear plant really

be constructed in our republic, where earthquakes occur

almost every month?"—they write from Armenia. They

are now writing to the Ministry of Atomic Power from

the Ukraine, from Belorussia, from all the countries. The

two dozen AES in operation and almost all of those

under construction are bitterly disputed by local residents. It is a chain reaction....

I think that this situation is not surprising today. We

have also read about "antinuclear" demonstrations in

other countries, and about the referendum in Austria,

which decreed that no AES at all could be constructed,

and also about the dangers linked with this in the United

States.

No, I cannot agree with I. K. Dibobes: open and competent discussion is not only not premature, but on the

contrary, is obviously late.

What is surprising here is: technical progress has never

managed to avoid arguments, and with the responsibility

that is involved today in each step of it, it simply cannot

by-pass controversy—moreover with the widest audience.

I am convinced: under the conditions of the development of democratization, arguments are not in themselves terrible. It is uncertainty, hesitancy and ignorance

that are terrible. Literally: "I do not know—therefore I

am afraid."

The development of technical progress (throughout

time) has aroused resistance only where it has not been

accompanied by the development of the technical literacy of the population.

Therefore, it is likely that the decision on stopping

construction of the AES in Krasnodar is not the end, but

the beginning of the great work that still remains to be

done. After, all the arguments so far have not even gone

beyond the bounds of offices.

Do the residents of Krasnodar know that the shortage of

electric power in the Northern Caucasus will by the year

2000 be over 8 million kilowatts? Do they know about

the supplementary safety measures that have been

worked out for AES by specialists and MAGATE [International Atomic Energy Agency] since Chernobyl (not

only worked out, but already being introduced at all the

plants)? Do they know that precise adherence to these

measures eliminates any random chance?

It is unlikely. The information gleaned from SOVETSKAYA KUBAN is too one-sided. The kray directors only

had the word: "We do not want the AES!" On the

construction of which, incidentally, 25 million had

already been spent. Who will take the responsibility for

this? There is one hope: the site will be used.

The citizens ofthe Kuban, however, have not so far been

issued the final decisions. Today they do not even know

if they have a choice.

Theoretically, they do. Instead of one AES or GRES in

Krasnodar Kray, 20 GES can be constructed. Or 1000

"wind turbines." Or 100,000 solar batteries. There is

even a plan to locate the AES close to the shore area on

floating platforms. Or to concentrate all the country's

atomic power between the 58th-60th parallels—natural

cooling, abundance of water, a thinly populated locality.... A practical solution to the problem of superconductivity, which makes power transmission over great

distances economically expedient in the near future, is

approaching. What, then, are the Krasnodar citizens to

choose?

Now they want to construct a GRES here: it is customary, much-tested and, the main thing, without serious

consequences....

It remains to be hoped that this time the decision made

will actually be the optimal one. This must be explained

to the people—with every calculation in hand. Because,

really, the decision made is taken on trust, today, and

tomorrow can also arouse doubt in someone. Because

this is the way our century is—an ordinary iron, if not

turned off in time, can become the cause of great

calamities. And the subject is by no means just an iron....

"A GRES, of course, is not a panacea," feels Vladimir

Fedorovich Galich, head engineer of the Division of

Radioactive Contamination Monitoring of the State

Committee on Hydrometeorology and Environmental

Control. "Those same Krasnodar citizens can be shown

letters from Ekibastuz, from KATEK—during the season, pasturing sheep wear down their teeth, mothers

cannot dry their infant's diapers outdoors—they turn
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 31 SOVIET UNION

yellow from the acidic emissions, everything is covered

with a layer of ash. The nuclear plants, however, under

normal conditions are ecologically almost harmless.

All this must be known—and not only this.

What does each one of us, non-specialists, remember

(even on the secondary school level) simply about

nuclear power? Indeed, what about non-specialists, if

many Chernobyl professionals, in the first few days after

the accident, sometimes did not know how to behave:

they had to make others adhere to safety measures.

Get together today 10 senior classmen and ask: who will

go to work at an AES? Perhaps one will agree, and his

parents will talk him out of it. We are afraid so. In

France, for example, school children go on excursions to

AES. And after the Chernobyl accident, the 17-year-old

son of a shift chief at a plant said to his father: "After

everything that I have seen and heard, I will go into

nuclear power engineering." He knows, and therefore he

is not afraid.

They say: "After Chernobyl...." But it is really clear, even

to a non-specialist: Chernobyl is by no means a tragedy

of technical progress. Indeed, can there be a tragedy in

progress? The tragedy is irresponsibility, lack of system

and simple ignorance.

It is time to turn the conversation to that—to the state of

our literacy, not only the moral, but also, so to speak, the

"educational", readiness to discuss ways to develop

technical progress, and to the fact that not only the plan

for a nuclear plant, but any large plan which can have a

global influence on the environment (let us recall the

bend in the rivers or Kara-Bogaz) must be studied and

discussed—widely, in a democratic way, but correctly

and argumentatively.

Only in this way can the "chain reaction," which, after

the arguments concerning what happened at the Krasnodar AES, atomic workers fear (and not without foundation), be stopped.

12151

Black Market Trade in Nuclear Fuel

51000002 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian

6 Feb 88 p 6

[Article prepared by S. Guk: "Nuclear Raw Material on

the Black Market: How the International Underground

Syndicate Avoids the Existing Bans"; first paragraph is

IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] The West German daily ZEIT published extensive

documentation on "Nuclear Corruption on a World

Scale," showing how Western firms dealing with nuclear

raw material, like drug dealers, are using secret channels

through which fissionable materials leak into the Third

World countries. The business, which yields enormous

profits, threatens uncontrolled distribution of nuclear

weapons. We are publishing brief excerpts.

The bans established by the International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) represent, in the words of a former

official ofit, a net with large mesh: "Sharks get tangled in

it, but piranhas pass freely through it."

In 1975 the FRG concluded an agreement with Brazil on

deliveries of reactors and systems to enrich nuclear raw

material. Such technology, designed for peaceful use of

nuclear power, is without a doubt also suitable for

military purposes.

In the Western countries, fissionable materials are subject to rigid international and national control. Smart

operators from underground business, however, have

found loopholes even here. A. Rosnagel from the FRG, a

specialist on atomic energy and a lawyer, in his recently

published book, "Using Nuclear Power for Non-Peaceful

Purposes," showed how raw material, each gram of

which, one would think, is most strictly accounted for,

can be involved in thefts.

The inspectors visit the enterprises where the fissionable

materials are stored at least once every six months. They

check the expense book and inspect the remainders. The

measuring apparatus, however, is imperfect: it gives

"permissible" discrepancies of up to 1.5 percent of the

existing reserves. A firm having, for example, 2,500

kilograms of plutonium oxide, after the routine inspection can fearlessly set aside up to 30 kilograms of

"uncounted" raw material. Some 17.5 kilograms are

enough to manufacture one atomic bomb.

According to the estimates of American scientists, in the

United States alone, from 1945 to 1978, over four tons of

highly-enriched uranium and plutonium disappeared—

an amount sufficient to manufacture hundreds of atomic

bombs.

In order to sell the "uncounted" nuclear raw material on

the international market, it must be hidden and then

taken out of the country. In the unanimous opinion of

experts, nuclear waste storage sites are ideal for concealment: the inspection authorities trace only the "circulation" made by the nuclear raw material and have

absolutely no interest in the wastes. The recent scandal

connected with the secret dealings in nuclear raw material, into which the West German firms Nukem and

Transnuklear proved to have been drawn (IZVESTIYA

reported this—S.G.)—is graphic confirmation of this.

Hundreds of the drums used to transport nuclear wastes

can be carried across the border without any particular

problem. It is enough to fill out, as necessary, the

documents, in which the load will be inaccurately designated, or something different will be indicated on it: the

authorities inspect the invoices, and not the contents of

the drums.
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21 June 1988 32 SOVIET UNION

Companies specializing in illegal transports of nuclear

raw material have long been in operation, not only in the

FRG, but also in the United States, South America,

Japan and Australia. The Third World countries, wishing to obtain fissionable materials to create their own

atomic bombs, can do this without any particular trouble. It is enough to resort to the services of the black

market, where the Mafia of the international "atom"

dealers rules. Illegal trade in enriched fissionable materials is growing in parallel with the construction of units

to enrich and reduce nuclear raw material in the developed Western countries.

12151

Windscale Reactor Accident Discussed

51000001a Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Feb 88 p 7

[Article by A. Lyutyy, PRAVDA special correspondent:

"Alongside the Nuclear Devil: What Happened at Windscale in October 1957 Has Long Been Cloaked in

Secrecy"; first paragraph is PRAVDA introduction; last

two paragraphs are TASS report of 14 Feb 88]

[Text] After putting on a safety helmet made of orange

plastic and being taken up in a special elevator, cautiously, carefully, we step onto the roof of a gigantic

cube, almost 30 meters high. The roof is made of

extremely strong concrete, three meters thick. Here and

there, heavy round plugs made of cast iron have been

entrenched in it. These are air-tight valves, and by

opening them scientists, by means of remote-control

manipulators, check the state of the "patient" within.

The "patient" is a still unquieted atom. Just a little over

thirty years ago, human error brought it out of its

obedient state. It was incited to rebellion, showing its

terrible force. That was a fire in reactor No. 1 of the

Windscale nuclear complex in northwest England. The

fire was then successfully extinguished and the atom was

contained in the concrete sarcophagus ofthe reactor, but

the consequences of the tragedy proved so great that

more than one decade will still be spent in eliminating

them.

Even then, Windscale posed the question: is man capable

of being intelligently in charge of nuclear power? The

question was not posed by chance. After all, reactor No.

1 was in operation during the war, producing plutonium

for Great Britain's nuclear weapons.

On the roof of the reactor that was damped down soon

after the fire thirty years ago, the English escorts try to

show, in every way, and even with a certain deliberate

efficiency: the tragedy was long ago, there is nothing

more to fear, and the nuclear fuel remaining in the cube

will in time be safely removed. There are no particular

grounds for trusting them—we were not even provided

with radiac instruments. All the same, we were somewhat reminded of the unseen killer called "radiation."

Approaching the edge of the roof, we saw below, next to

the hermetically sealed entrance to one ofthe pipes along

which air had once been fed to the reactor, someone's

rubber boots and clothing. Our escorts explained: with a

view to safety, the workers performing the cleaning

operations in the air outlets leave their special overalls

and footwear in the reactor area, dressing in clean

garments before they leave.

Having come down from the roof, we looked around

outside Windscale Reactor No. 1 and the nearby Reactor

No. 2, with the same design, which had also been

damped down thirty years ago. Next to the reactors were

two identical 130-meter pipes made of concrete, their

shape reminding one of an aircraft dispatcher tower.

Once, jets of air, cooling the graphite core ofthe reactors,

had been ejected along them into the atmosphere.

Strictly speaking, our visit to the nuclear complex, which is

now called Sellafield, was to a certain extent also historical.

For the first time, the English authorities permitted Soviet

journalists not only to visit the area ofthe complex, but also

to look at Windscale Reactor No. 1.

Windscale. For many Englishmen this word has been

shrouded in a cloak of secrecy, and has subconsciously

summoned up alarm. What took place here in October

1957 engendered a mass of questions, guesses and even

legends, more than once splashed across the pages of

newspapers and books and on television and movie

screens. In its time the movie "The Medusa Touch,"

featuring Richard Burton and Lino Ventura, was hushed

up. The film told of the supernatural powers of a former

scientist, played by Burton. By tensing up his brain, he

could, with beams of mental energy, bring down passenger planes, set fire to motor vehicles and destroy

churches and temples. At the end of the film, finding

himself in critical condition in a hospital, the hero

explains the reason for his mysterious abilities, by writing out on a sheet of paper, painstakingly, with a trembling hand, just one word—Windscale.

This, however, is mysticism. Here is what really happened. 1945. Nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Washington lets a nuclear genie out of a bottle. In

London, meanwhile, they make no attempt to make their

American allies listen to reason. On the contrary, they

decide to enter into the nuclear race as quickly as

possible. As early as December 1945 the government of

Prime Minister Attlee made the decision on accelerated

construction of plutonium production capacities. As if

scoffing at concepts of beauty, they select for this a site in

a picturesque corner of the county of Cumbria, seven

miles from the Scottish border. In the course of three

years—from 1947 to 1950—a reactor to process uranium into plutonium is constructed at rapid rates. This

unit is called Windscale Reactor No. 1. A few months

later, an analogous No. 2 reactor is put into operation.

Both are put into service for a military-industrial complex.
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 33 SOVIET UNION

Windscale reactors Nos. 1 and 2 were among the first

such units in the entire world. There was much that was

unknown and untested, and individual malfunctions and

errors seemed to be inevitable. There might not have

been any, however, if such a furious pace had not been

assigned for plutonium production. The former head of

the British Atomic Energy Authority, Mark Baker,

recently acknowledged that at the initial stage of operation of the Windscale reactors, "they cut corners on

questions of safety in a way that would be simply

inadmissible today." Warnings about the impending

calamity, directed even to the head of the government,

were ignored. The tragedy was essentially inevitable, and

it happened.

On 8 October 1957 the temperature in reactor No. 1 rose

sharply. The operators lost their heads—they could not

control the process. The grid overheated and the fuel

began to flow out and burn. Clouds ofradioactive smoke

poured out of the reactor pipes. The contamination of

the site began.

According to just the official documents, the plant workers received a dose of radioactive irradiation 150 times

that of the permissible norm. Radioactivity in nearby

areas exceeded the safe level by a factor of 10. The

radiation cloud hung not only over the northern part of

England and Scotland, but also over a considerable part

of Northern Europe. Only two days after the start of the

fire did the government circulate a disgracefully short

report, from which it followed that no "evidence...of any

danger to people" had been detected. It was affirmed

that the radioactive cloud "posed no threat and in any

case had already been dispersed by wind over the sea."

This was a lie, if only because for a radius of 200 miles

around the complex the consumption ofmilk had quietly

been forbidden. The contents of thousands of milk cans

were dumped into underground wells and into the sea.

Only on the fourth day, on 12 October, was the fire in

reactor No. 1 successfully extinguished. In the opinion of

specialists, Windscale was very lucky: the reactor did not

explode, which would have entailed a catastrophe on an

immeasurably large scale.

To this day about 17 tons of partially burned or molten

nuclear fuel lie on the bottom of the reactor. Several

more tons are trapped in the ducts of the air blowthroughs and in the waterways. Their openings connecting with the combustion chamber were walled up with

concrete. It is thought that the reactor, insulated from

the atmosphere, poses no threat. All the same, although

the radioactivity of what is left in its womb constitutes,

in the evaluations of specialists, only one hundredth of

what it was at the time ofthe fire, it is difficult to predict

the behavior ofthe "prisoner." For three decades, it has

been cautiously approached as fuel. Only in the next few

years will the cleaning-up operations begin.

Specialists assume that, with respect to the scale and

extent of radioactive contamination, the accident at

Windscale is second only to Chernobyl. At that time, in

1957, no one was killed, neither at the control board of

the reactor, nor in the area adjacent to it. Several years

later, the count ofvictims began. The first was a little boy

from a local village, Simon Boyd, who died in 1960 of an

acute form of leukemia. According to the data of the

National Council of Radiological Protection, the number of those who died from radioactive irradiation has

reached 33 persons today. The plant workers deny that

the Windscale fire is to blame for this. However, when

we asked Jim Jones, an engineer of the Atomic Energy

Authority, to comment on the data of the council, the

response was significant: "We are in no position to prove

that it was not the accident that caused their death."

Here are a few words on the political aspect of the

Windscale incident. At the beginning of this year, in

connection with the expiration of the limitation period,

the government archives for 1957 were declassified.

Among them were documents pertaining to the actions

of the cabinet of Prime Minister Macmillan. Immediately after the accident it was revealed that in order to

save its own political face and "special relations" with

the United States, the government at that time concealed

the true scale of the tragedy. For example, Macmillan

personally censored the report of a special commission

on the causes and consequences of the accident, and the

ministers were ordered to hold their tongues. "It is

simply shameful that the government did not trust its

own people," declared Robin Cook, a Labor Member of

Parliament, on this subject.

The succeeding governments did not trust their own

people either. Even the conservative press notes with

irony that the Soviet Union took only a few days to tell

the truth about the accident at Chernobyl, but it took the

British government a whole thirty years. Indeed, has the

whole truth been told? After all, part of the documents

were not even made public.

It was revealed that Macmillan's actions were based on

the attempt to reduce to the minimum the criticism

within the country. The Prime Minister was afraid that if

all the circumstances of the incident were made public,

and if the malfunctions, errors and incompetence of the

service personnel at Windscale were told, Washington

might regard this as a divulgence of nuclear secrets and

refuse to share such things with London—which was

very necessary. After all, at that time the English hydrogen bomb was being developed.

Today the Sellafield complex (it includes, along with the

two idle Windscale reactors, a chain of operating reactors for gas-cooling of Calder-Hall) is filling the orders of

the War Department. Located quite close to it are naval

shipyards, where British nuclear submarines are produced.

It would be incorrect, however, to say that the functions

of Sellafield today are wholly subordinated to military

interests. The complex also benefits the people from a
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 34 SOVIET UNION

practical standpoint. The Calder-Hall reactors mentioned, put into operation in 1956, provide electric

power to the county of Cumbria. Chemists, physicists

and metallurgists are seeking ways to use nuclear power

in various spheres of modern production. We went

through these clean laboratories, filled with bright, modern equipment. In one of them we were shown mechanical manipulators, by means of which the wastes in

Windscale reactor No. 1 will be purified. A special robot

has been acquired for this purpose. Work will begin as

early as this year. It may go on to the end ofthis century.

This is what Vernon Eldred, one ofthe leading figures of

British nuclear power engineering and director of the

Windscale Nuclear Laboratory, said (the laboratory's

task includes preparing work on cleaning the suppressed

reactor and a number of research investigations):

"Chernobyl was a terrible event for all of us, but at the

same time it showed the amazing boldness of your

people. From the standpoint of organization, the work to

overcome the accident was performed very well. The

whole world is also grateful to the USSR because you

made known the necessary facts and presented them to

MAGATE [International Atomic Energy Agency] quite

quickly. You, of course derived a great deal for yourselves from this tragedy. It was in our common interests

to act so that this sort of thing would not be repeated.

Nuclear power safety must be increased."

Inevitably, the conversation turned on the fate of this

sector.

"When the accident happened to you in Chernobyl,"

said V. Eldred, "we here, in Sellafield, were literally

bombarded with telephone calls. After all, up until then

we were the only plant in the world where there had been

a fire in a reactor. Let's face it—Chernobyl was not good

publicity for nuclear power engineering."

Eldred was right in his own way. But it is hardly

Chernobyl alone that is to blame for the difficulties that

British nuclear power engineering is now experiencing.

These difficulties were to quite some extent intensified

by Windscale and the discovery of the truth about the

circumstances of the 1957 tragedy. Now, in many cities

in England one can see demonstrations by members of

the Greenpeace organization and other associations

speaking out for the dismantling of nuclear power plants.

"Mankind," thinks V. Eldred, "has no other course but

to continue to use nuclear power. As before, this is the

cheapest method of obtaining electric power. In addition, even despite the incidents known, it is still the

safest. Reserves of coal and oil are not unlimited. Some

countries are obtaining more than half of their electric

power at nuclear electric power plants. In France, for

example, this proportion is even 76 percent. I am against

wholesale demands to shut down nuclear electric power

plants. I am for, in sensible proportions, combining the

use of nuclear power with the use of other types of

energy. Society's alarm is understandable. Therefore, the

task of specialists is to sharply raise the level of safety

and to make nuclear reactors practically 100 percent

reliable."

Sellafield is located in a fantastically beautiful place—on

the shore ofthe Irish Sea, severe in its cold majesty. The

complex stands in a depression, surrounded on various

sides by low mountains. The plant represents a combination of the artificial, still not completely comprehended, with the natural, given to us by the land itself.

This is the way it is for nuclear power engineering. Many

of us, when turning on the television, the radio, a lamp,

sometimes do not think about the fact that the atom with

its majesty helps us to enjoy these conveniences. When,

however, we learn about Chernobyl or Sellafield, the

atom represents a monster that will destroy us if we do

not destroy it. It would seem that the answer to the

question: can the atom exist with man?—lies in the

people themselves.

When the Number Was Up....

London, 14 Feb 88—(TASS)—-Only minutes separated

the British nuclear submarine Resolution, with Polaris

missiles on board, from a catastrophe, the scale of which

is difficult to imagine, reports today's OBSERVER. The

Resolution is one of the oldest ships ofthis class—it was

in the docks of the navy base in the Bay of Faslane

(Scotland), when the nuclear reactor cooling system

unexpectedly failed. As a result, the reactor housing

began to heat up precipitously, threatening to cause an

explosion with powerful radiation emission. Only due to

the prompt actions of two mechanics, who were able to

switch on the emergency cooling system rapidly, was it

possible to put the reactor operation under control. As

the OBSERVER reports, this dangerous incident took

place last month, and the 13,000-population of the

adjacent areas were not even notified of the threat of

catastrophe. Today the Resolution has again gone to sea

for "duty patrol."

According to the testimony of experts, the explosion of

the submarine's nuclear reactor could cause fatally dangerous contamination in an area of up to 2,000 square

miles.

12151
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 WEST EUROPE 35

BELGIUM

Questions Remain Open In Mol Nuclear Scandal

51002447 Brussels LE VIF/L'EXPRESS in French

25-31 Mar 88 pp 24-26

[Article by Michel Balthasart]

[Text] What does the boycott of the European Parliament's investigating committee by the Belgian Government mean? That any discussion ofthe "hidden face" of

the nuclear industry should be avoided? LE VIF/L'EXPRESS will reopen the issue as often as necessary.

"The waste products have disappeared? So what? Is it

not the objective of the processing center to make waste

products disappear?" These "good words" from Norbert

Van de Voorde, former director of the Waste Department at the Mol Nuclear Power Center [CEN], did not

bring a smile to the members of the European Parliament's committee investigating the "Transnuklear"

affair. The latter have nothing but harsh words to

describe the attitude of the Belgian Government which

has purely and simply decided to boycott the committee.

As a matter offact, very precise instructions to this effect

were given to the departments involved. "That means

that there is indeed something to hide in this affair,"

stated Anne-Marie Lizin, a socialist member of the

European Parliament, protesting the absence ofthe CVP

[Flemish Christian Socialist Party of Belgium] member

of parliament on the committee during the interview

with Van de Voorde.

The "Transnuklear" affair has undoubtedly gotten

"stuck." In the FRG, eight individuals have been

indicted. The leaders of the Hanau and the Nukem

plants have resigned. One of them committed suicide in

prison. Moreover, the Bonn government has decided to

close the Nukem plant and a decision was also made to

dissolve Transnuklear.

None of that has happened in Belgium: no indictments,

no resignation at the top ofCEN, no closing measures. It

is true that Van de Voorde was dismissed, but it is harder

and harder to understand on what grounds, because his

protestations of innocence are not countered by any

specific legal accusation. His assistant, who was also

dismissed for corruption, had to be reinstated and is still

working at Mol.

The investigations are at a standstill: the High Supervisory Committee was refused permission to interrogate

the main witnesses; the searches were carried out late;

and the most persistent rumors continue to circulate on

the "protection" enjoyed by certain individuals involved

in the affair. The Nuclear Security Service—which is

currently pursuing its investigation—has turned in

reports to the Ministry of Justice which have not been

made public. Firmin Aerts, secretary ofstate for energy,

has been made aware ofsome ofthe conclusions reached

by the High Supervisory Committee, but he is keeping

them to himself. Questions such as the one concerning

the frequent presence at the Doel nuclear power station

of Bretag, Transnuklear's henchman, were not examined. In such a context, the boycotting of the European

investigating committee by the Belgian Government

takes on a particular significance. The "CEN-Transnuklear" issue really seems to have been "locked up."

And yet, this bad serial, which undermines the international reputation of Belgium and worries the electricity

producers, has not come to an end. Indeed, every day

new information comes out to confirm the serious

"mistakes" found in the management of the Mol power

station. "Mistakes" which the lack of developments

makes it impossible to trivialize.

While continuing to turn the affair into a "community"

issue, to talk of a "plot" led by the "cowboys" ofthe IRE

[Institute of Radioelements], the Mol union members

are adding their stone to the structure of accusations.

According to them, "a series of questions relative to

personnel security and to the techniques used at Mol had

already been raised in 1984." In fact, they said, the

"waste product" service was regularly taken advantage

of by CEN and the general management limited itself to

recording the profits without carrying out too much

control. Still in terms of controls, Michel Bemong (a

Christian trade unionist) noted that at Mol a metal

detector was supposed to prevent materials from leaving

CEN, but that visitors were not submitted to it!

The absence ofrigor, the receptiveness to corruption, the

disorganization of the services, the lack of resources: all

the elements which formed a "favorable background"

for the development of the Transnuklear affair in Belgium are still there. They can be found in all the private

sectors ofthe nuclear industry. As soon as the notions of

"trade" and "competition" appear, slippage is possible.

This is true in the—little known—sector of the nuclear

medical industry.

Several private transportation companies occupy this

sector: Eufrex, Securicor, Chartier, Van Osselaer, etc.

Some of the products they transport from producers

(IRE, in Fleurus; the Amercham, Techlandcompanies,

etcetera) to users (hospitals, doctors, etc) are not very

dangerous. But others are more delicate. Among the

latter: "generators," in the form of special packaging

surrounding a leadcontainer holding radioactive substances (iodine 123 and assimilated products).

In Belgium, the least radioactive product, no matter

what its life expectancy may be, is subject to specific

regulations. It must be registered, followed without interruption, and every intermediary must fill out detailed

forms which are under the control of the Ministry of

Public Health.

But those precautions, those regulations do not at all

prevent the existence of some "abnormalities." In principle, when a driver delivers a generator to a hospital he
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 36 WEST EUROPE

must get a signed receipt. In practice, some receiving

services refuse to accept products bearing the nuclear

insigna and send the delivery person to the relevant

departments. "If the latter are closed," explained a

member of a transportation company, "it often happens

that the receipt is not signed or that it is signed by the

driver. Conclusion: generators are regularly abandoned

in hallways, with no particular supervision."

Such practices are caused by trade imperatives. Competition in the market ofsubstance transportation is tough.

As a matter of fact, the establishment by IRE of its own

company ("Transrad"), linked to the Depaire transportation company (80 percent SNCB), has begun to cause a

great deal of commotion. In such a context, the temptation to "break" prices by any means, and thus to take

risks, is very great. Some people are already talking

about the possibility of "pirate" transportation carried

out with sub-contracts by non-accredited firms.

In fact, all the elements of a "favorable terrain" for the

development of a new problem are once again present.

All the more so as the relevant agency of the Public

Health Service is short on personnel.

Security requirements in nuclear matters have evolved

and the structure of administrations has not been

adapted. Today, generators must be transported in

armored vehicles, protective shields must be installed

behind the driver's seat, etc. Twenty years ago, it happened that plutonium—an extremely delicate product!—

was taken from the site of Eurochemic in Dessel to the

Federal Republic of Germany in a simple Citroen ID

belonging to Transnuklear. Special containers (bird

cages) capable of holding 4 kilograms of plutonium were

installed above the gasoline tank! Such incredible things

would, of course, no longer be allowed today.

Van de Voorde himself also complained about the logistics: "In 1982," he told members of the European

Parliament, "we asked for subsidies to set up a really

operational installation. But we did not get anything. We

were a small department suffering from a lack of personnel and money." In fact, everything is happening as if

people were only now beginning to measure the real cost

of the nuclear "magic." Will the addition, when it is

done correctly, really be bearable?

8463

FRANCE

Nuclear Fuel Cycle Industry at End of 1987

81192813 Paris REVUE GENERALE NUCLEAIRE in

French Jan-Feb 88 pp 48-50

[Article by M. Barron, assigned to the Cogema General

Directorate: "French Nuclear Fuel Cycle Industry at End

of 1987"]

[Text] The author notes the satisfactory operation offuel

cycle installations in 1987, emphasizes the high level of

exports in this field, and points out the large investments

made to create or expand factories and plants. He also

mentions the programs undertaken to recycle uranium

and plutonium.

An article published in the September-October 1986

issue of REVUE GENERALE NUCLEAIRE gave a

general description of the French nuclear fuel industry.

In its essential aspects, the general structure of this

industry has not undergone significant changes since

then.

The situation of the nuclear fuel market in which it

operates remains relatively difficult. The worldwide

nuclear program slowdown that began several years ago,

continues, and the Chernobyl plant accident of May

1986 contributes to this situation.

The uranium market remains depressed and production

volume has not increased. This volume is still slightly

lower than consumption, which eventually could lead to

stock reductions and better market balance.

Today, the nuclear fuel industry is characterized by

several major features.

I. Satisfactory Installation Operation

In the area of natural uranium production, mines and

ore processing plants have operated satisfactorily.

The Cogema group, which since 1986 includes the Compagnie Francaise de MOKTA, produced 7,600 tons of

uranium concentrate in 1987, of which 2,800 tons in

France and 4,800 tons abroad.

At the same time, Total Compagnie Miniere (TCM)

produced 550 tons in its Nord Massif Central and Sud

Massif Central divisions, and marketed 870 tons.

Overall, this represents more than 20 percent of the

world's production.

Given the situation of the natural uranium market,

productivity efforts have been made to reduce production costs. In the past, Cogema had built some improvements and installations, and these are now bearing fruit.

In turn, TCM-France has taken technical measures

<Ah:.-b considerably reduced ore processing costs at its

Ben.h; !ene mining division.

The two companies also continued their prospecting

operations, but reoriented them toward regions that are

most promising and close to current exploitations. In

particular, Cogema acquired a significant position in

Canada through its Cogema-Canada subsidiary.

The fabrication of fuels for pressurized water reactors is

carried out by Societe Franco-Beige de Fabrication de

Combustibles (50 percent Uranium Pechiney, 25 percent
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 37 WEST EUROPE

Framatome, and 25 percent Cogema), which has three

plants, the most recent of which is located at the Pierrelatte site, and was completed in 1987. With a production

capability of 1,500 tons per year, this installation is in a

foremost position in the world.

The operation ofthe La Hague and Marcoule reprocessing plants has been very satisfactory. During March

1987, these two plants exceeded their nominal monthly

production levels, for light water fuels at La Hague, and

for operating the MAR 400 unit at Marcoule.

The 2000th ton of used fuel from ordinary water reactors

was reprocessed at the La Hague plant on 6 November

1987. Processing ofthis type of fuels began in 1976, and

the cumulative figure reached 1,000 tons 38 months

later. The next 1,000 tons required only 22 months.

These results are part of a steady progress in installation

performance, and have been achieved under perfect

conditions of safety and respect for the environment.

Production at the Eurodif uranium enrichment plant

was slightly higher in 1986 to reach a level close to its

normal capacity. It has operated under good conditions

thanks to a design based on an industrial process which

is essentially static except for its compressors, and which

is therefore highly reliable. Scheduled deliveries were

made to customers' satisfaction.

The same is true for the Pierrelatte high enrichment

isotopic separation plant, which has operated with

remarkable consistency and has fulfilled its established

production programs.

In May 1987, in the presence of its French and foreign

customers, Comurhex celebrated the delivery of its

100,000th ton of uranium, which amounts to 4 billion

tons of petroleum equivalent, representing 13 years of

Saudi oil production.

II. Maintaining High Exportation Level

In 1986, 43 percent of the Cogema group's revenues,

amounting to more than Fr9 billion, were derived from

exportations. The greatest share of the exports, for 51

percent of the company's revenues, came from enrichment.

Although the 1987 results are not yet known, they will

undoubtedly be similar to those of 1986.

In order to penetrate the American market, Cogema,

Framatome, and Uranium Pechiney recently reached an

agreement with Babcock and Wilcox to manufacture fuel

assemblies in the United States. The objective of this

joint business, the Babcock and Wilcox Fuel Company,

will be to fabricate fuel elements for pressurized water

reactors and to sell in the United States and Canada fuel

assemblies and associated services.

This agreement will also provide access to the American

market for the facilities installed to carry out the French

program for nuclear power generation. It includes the

creation of a unit installed in the United States, 51

percent of whose capital will be held by Babcock and

Wilcox, and 49 percent by a company composed of

Cogema's and Framatome's American subsidiaries, each

of which will hold 40 percent, and of Uranium Pechiney's subsidiary, which will hold 20 percent.

In engineering, SGN and Cogema Inc, Cogema's American subsidiary, created Numatec Inc to develop their

end-cycle activities in the United States.

The know-how acquired by Cogema's engineering companies in the design and construction of reprocessing

plants, places them in a favorable position. That is why

Japan chose to rely on French knowledge to design a

reprocessing plant with a capacity of 800 tons per year,

which will be located at Rokkasho-Mura in the north of

Japan. Agreements were signed on 30 April 1987 by

Societe Generale Pour les Techniques Nouvelles, acting

for AEC and Cogema and on its own behalf, with the

Japanese company JNFS, for the technology transfer

contract, and with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and

SGN for engineering. The transfer agreement covers

primarily the fuel chop-and-leach and dissolution technology, and the technique for uranium and plutonium

separation. It amounts to 28 million yen, or Frl.2

billion.

The engineering contract signed by Mitsubishi Heavy

Industries and SGN covers a basic design study; it

amounts to 12 billion yen, or Fr516 million. It will

probably be followed by a detailed project study plan,

and subsequently by support extended to the Japanese

companies during the construction and start-up phases.

It should be noted that in the past, Japan has signed a

large number of contracts in the nuclear fuel area, from

which Cogema derives Fr2 billion per year. The Japanese have in fact already relied on French industry, as

SGN did in order to build a small reprocessing plant at

Tokai-mura. Lastly, in the area of computer-aided production, SGN has signed a contract with China National

Building Material and Equipment Import and Export

Corp., which for SGN is a "first" in China, and which

represents the fruits ofits diversification policy in exportation.

Under the guidance of the industrial leader Uranium

Pechiney, the group's companies signed several agreements in 1987 as part of the European program for

developing a prototype reactor for controlled thermonuclear fusion.

In addition, CERCA has completed the first 45 percentenriched uranium core for JAERI's JJR2 Japanese

research reactor.
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 38 WEST EUROPE

Lastly, 55,000 of the 105,000 tons of UF6 delivered by

Comurhex between 1969 and the end of 1987 were for

exportation, and 16 different countries representing 30

percent of the world market are its customers.

III. Large Investments

As we know, between 1973 and 1982 France built the

Eurodif isotopic separation plant in cooperation with

several foreign countries, most of them European, for a

total investment of Fr23.8 billion; the construction was

carried out by Ussi (now Ussi Ingenierie) as prime

contractor.

In 1986, with the expanded capabilities of the La Hague

reprocessing plant, Cogema had the world's largest operations. This capability, which is currently 400 tons of

light water fuel per year, will be increased to 1,200 tons

in 1989 and to 1,600 tons in 1992. At its completion, this

program will have spread over 15 years, representing an

investment of the order of Fr50 billion current. The

following figures will give an indication of the installation's magnitude:

Earth moving

Concrete volume

Length of stainless steel piping

Number of computers

Number of work hours at the site

Number of engineering hours

5,000,000 m

3

1,000,000 m

3

1000 km

25

56,000,000

25,000,000

A considerable innovation effort has been accomplished

compared to the present plant. Significant technological

breakthroughs have been implemented in order to

achieve ambitious productivity objectives, while respecting high safety standards. These breakthroughs have

been primarily in processes, preventive maintenance,

personnel protection, as well as monitoring and control.

In the area of computerization, the La Hague plant was

equipped with an integrated management and information distribution system, the Haguenet network, which

was inaugurated on 19 January 1988. This is currently

the largest network in Europe.

Progress at the end of November 1987 can be illustrated

by the following figures:

Cumulative commitments

Cumulative disbursements

Fr32.5 billion

Fr26.2 billion

Wanting to retain its leading position in the profession,

this year Comurhex started an investment program

which will allow it to deliver up to 14,000 tons of U per

year as UF6. This work essentially covers the purification installations at the Malvesi plant, one of the key

fabrication steps, since it brings the uranium to the

required purity.

This additional 20 percent capacity will shortly give

Comurhex all the flexibility and efficiency it needs to

face a growing international market that is still very

demanding in terms of schedules and services.

IV. A Program of Current Interest: Uranium and

Plutonium Recycling

The reprocessing of used fuel from pressurized water

reactors makes it possible to dispose of plutonium and

uranium that is still slightly enriched but which has not

been consumed. Plutonium represents about one percent

of the reprocessed material; as we know, this is a fissile

element just as uranium 235, and its qualities make it a

fuel of choice for breeder reactors, which until recently

had digested almost all the available material.

But in coming years, the construction of new reprocessing capabilities will produce an increasing quantity of

plutonium, whose cumulated amount is estimated at 100

tons in 1995 and 200 tons in the year 2000.

At the same time, a slowdown in breeder reactor programs will reduce the amount of Pu that we can expected

to provide, which is now estimated at a maximum of

about 35 tons.

This plutonium can be used in fuel assemblies for light

water reactors, where it will replace uranium 235 to form

MOX fuels. Many studies on this type of fuel have been

conducted since 1950, and during the 1960's many

experiments were carried out in various European countries, in France among others.

Given the encouraging results and considering the knowhow acquired in fabricating breeder reactor fuels based

on mixed oxides, EDF decided in 1985, following a

thorough study, to recycle in light water reactors the

plutonium available after meeting breeder reactor needs.

Beginning in 1987, the program includes loading a ninth

of the Bl reactor core at the Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux

plant, authorized on 13 October 1987 and started on 9

November. This operation will be repeated in 1988.

Between 1989 and 1993, four to six loads per year will be

inserted in the 900 MW reactors ofthe contract program.

After 1993, the opening of a manufacturing plant named

MELOX will lead to the marketing of 10 to 15 reloads

per year, and to gradually provide MOX fuels for the

water reactors of foreign customers.

This plant will complete the industrial facilities already

built to recycle reprocessed uranium at the Pierrelatte

unit and at Comurhex's Pierrelatte plant.
JPRS-TND-88-012

21 June 1988 39 WEST EUROPE

We might point out that the corresponding commercial

structures had already been built with the Commox GIE

(economic interest group) for selling MOX fuel rods, and

the Urep GIE (Cogema-Comurhex) for marketing chemical transformation services for reprocessed uranium.

The French nuclear fuel industry was thus able to adapt

to a market stamped by the slowdown in nuclear power

generation programs.

The situation upstream in the cycle has caused it to take

appropriate measures, while remaining prepared for the

future. On the other hand, the cycle's downstream stages

made room for interesting developments, both in fuel

recycling and in reprocessing, where significant investments are underway.

It has also demonstrated great vitality, and its experience

places it at the international level in a position verified

by the success it has encountered in exportation.

11023

TURKEY

Argentina To Help Acquire 'Nuclear Technology'

NC3105081488 Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish

25 May 88 pp 3, 15

[Atilla Atakan report:

Nuclear Technology"]

"Diplomacy With Argentina on

[Text] Buenos Aires, (HURRIYET)—Although the

United States has come out against Turkey's sale to

Pakistan of components used in the production of

nuclear arms, reports say that Argentina's new Ambassador to Ankara, Adolfo Saracho, a former head of

Argentina's nuclear energy commission, will try "to help

Turkey acquire nuclear technology."

Argentina is very advanced in nuclear technology. Its

decision to appoint Adolfo Saracho as its new ambassador to Turkey has made the U.S., USSR, and FRG

diplomatic missions in Buenos Aires uneasy. They

believe that Turkey's acquisition of nuclear technology

would be disadvantageous. Adolfo Saracho made a significant contribution to the signing on 3 May of an

agreement between Turkey and Argentina for "cooperation between the two countries in nuclear technology."

The new ambassador arrived in Ankara yesterday.

Prior to his departure from Argentina, he told HURRIYET: "We sould like Turkey to learn about the technology Argentina has acquired during the past 20 years. We

can help Turkey build reactors and nuclear power plants

in the future. Our objective is to help Turkey develop its

nuclear technology, without depending on any country

or bloc."

Noting that Argentina objected to any interference by

the superpowers in its work in nuclear energy, Adolfo

Saracho noted that Argentina made it a condition that

nuclear technology be used passively and for peaceful

purposes. He said: "I know that my task is difficult. Due

to its proximity to countries which cooperate with

Argentina, such as India, Iraq, Algeria, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania, Turkey is a very important

country."

UNITED KINGDOM

Trade Unions Council Policy on Nuclear Power

Told

51500173 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in

English 3 May 88 p 9

[Article by Martin Whitfield: "TUC Backs Nuclear

Power With Safeguards"]

[Text] The TUC has rejected calls to phase out nuclear

power after an 18-month inquiry by a review committee.

But the 50-page report by the inquiry team calls for

tighter conditions for the continued operation of nuclear

power stations, including a complete overhaul of waste

management policy.

The study, published today, is to be sent to all unions

before being debated at the TUC conference in September. It is expected to be opposed only by hard-line

opponents of nuclear power, such as Mr Arthur Scargill,

the president of the National Union of Mineworkers.

Mr Fred Jarvis, general secretary of the National Union

of Teachers and chairman ofthe review body, said strict

regulations had to be enforced, and he attacked the

Government's plans to privatise the electricity supply

industry.

"We believe that privatisation is one of a combination of

circumstances that must be removed ifthe industry is to

be allowed to go forward," he said.

The review committee called for:

—A re-examination of the economics of spent fuel

reprocessing.

—Mandatory public inquiries into all nuclear accidents.

—Tighter restrictions on permitted radiation doses to

workers and the public.

—Strengthening the regulation of the industry by the

Health and Safety Commission.

—Better international controls.

"The potential hazards are not confined by national

boundaries, so it is essential that maximum international

regulation is enforced," said Mr Jarvis.

08309