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### NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: CHRISTIAN GADBOIS , Debtor

. BAP No. CC

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Bk. No. 2 : 19

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- 10 187

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Adv. No. 2 : 2 1

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MEMOR AN DUM ∗ CHRISTIAN GADBOIS , Ap pell ant , v. M INTER FI ELD AIRPORT DISTRICT, Appellee

. Appeal from the United States Bankruptc y Court for the Central District of California Vincent P. Zu rzolo , Bankru ptcy Judge, Pres i d i ng

Be fore : LAF F ER T Y, SPRAKER, and FARIS , Ban krup tcy Judg es.

I N T R O DUCT ION
Debtor Christian F. Gadbois appeal s t he bankruptcy court ’s e ntry of judgment in favor of defendant Minter Field Airport District (the

“ District ” ) in his adversary proceeding against the Dis tr ict s e eking
reinstatement of a n office lease and damages for vio lation of the automatic stay

. After a half day of trial , and after Gadbois rested his case , t he District

∗ Th is d i s p o s it i on is n ot a p pro pr i a t e f or pu blic ation

. Al t h o u g h i t ma y be ci ted fo r wh a t ever pe r su as i v e val u e it ma y h a ve, se e F e d. R

. A p p

. P. 3 2

. 1 , it has n o p recedent ial

v al ue , see 9t h C i r. BA P R u l e 8 0 24

- 1

. 

# FILED

JUN 28 2023
SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT2 made an oral motion for judgment in its favor under Civil Rule 52 (c) , 1
made applicable to th is matter by Rule 7052

. The motion , as articulated by
the D istrict , was based on “ the doctrine of estoppel , ” t hat being the complete disconnect be tween Gadbois ’ bankr up tcy filings , and the

a llegations in his adversary c o m p laint. T he bankr uptcy court found that estoppel was appropriate , granted the motion , and ente red judgment in
favor of the District

. We see no error and AFFIRM.
FAC T S 2
A. SRT Helicopters and the Lease with the District
Gadbois formed S RT Heli copt ers, LL C ( “ SR T LL C ” ) in California in
2013. He was sole man ager of SRT LLC at all relevant times. The SRT L LC Statement of Information filed with the Secretary of State on April 22, 2021
discloses its principal office address a s 5215 Mint er Field, Shafter, CA
9 3 2 63

. At some point , SRT LLC created a website which identifie d it as a

“ full service helicopter compa ny based in Bakersfield, California [which] provide [s] a range of initial flight training, specialized train ing and

com mercial operations. ” On March 1, 2 0 1 8 , the Dist rict and “ SRT
H elicopters ” entered into a lease agreement en titled AGREEMENT FOR

1 U nl es s s p ec i fi e d o t her w ise, a ll ch a p te r a nd se c ti on r e f e re nces are to t h e B a nk r u p t c y C ode , 1 1 U.S.C. § § 1 0 1

– 1 5 3 2 , “ Rule ” ref erence s are t o th e Fed er a l R ules of Ban kru p tcy Pr oc edure , and “ C i vil R ule ” ref ere nces are to the Fed eral Rules o f Civil Proced ur e

. 2 We exe rcise our d is c retion to take judicial notice of documents electronically filed in the underlying bankruptcy case and adversary pro ceeding. See Atwood v. Chase M anhattan Mortg . Co. (In re Atwood) , 2 93 B.R. 227, 233 n. 9 (9th Cir . BAP 2003).3 TENANCY F ROM MONTH TO MONTH (the “ Lease ” ) for approximately 1,700 sq

. ft

. of office space

. Th e L ease , wh ich provided for rent of $600 per month, was executed by G a d bo i s as th e representative of “ SRT Helicopters

. ”
B. Th e bankrupt cy filing
Gadbois filed his individual c hapter 13 Petition on Jan u ary 9, 2019

. Ga d bois t e stified at trial that t he “ main reason ” for the filing was to stop a foreclosure on real property. He filed his related Sc hedule s A through J and
Statement of Financial Affa ir s at the same time. He amended h is P etition , S chedules , and S tatement of F inancial A ffairs four times before the court
confirmed h is plan. I n his then

- most

- recent version of his S chedul es and

statements , Gadbois stated under penalty of per jury that (1 ) he owned an entity called S RT Helic opters, LLC, (2) h e was not the sole pro p r ietor of any full

- or part

- time bus iness , and (3) he di d not perso nally own any business

- related propert y . He apparently included the Lease in his
S chedule G using a different address but did not list the D istrict as a creditor.
Based on the information that Gadbois ha d provided to date, the
court confir med his chapter 13 plan on December 7, 2020

. The pla n provide d for 100% payment to his unsecured cred itors, estimated to total $52,406.00.
C

. The District’s l itigati on against SRT LLC By April 2020, the rent under the Le ase was in arrears , and in4 December 2020, the District filed an unlawful detainer action against SRT
LL C. Gadbo is co nc ede s that the District did not learn of his personal bankruptcy fi ling until h is at t orney sent a letter to the District on January 12, 2021 , two years after the Petition was filed , and over a year after the court confirmed his plan. In February 202 1, the District obtai ned a default judgment against
SRT LLC (not Gadbois) for posses sio n an d ap p r o ximately $12,000 in damages. It filed a second complaint against SRT LLC (again, not Gadbois)
for breach of contract and obtained a second default judgment for approximately $7,500 in Marc h 2021. The Ke rn Co unty S her iff performed a
lockout in Ap ril 2021 , and the Distr ict m ov e d the personal property in the location to a storage un it. Subsequently , the District permitted Gadbois to

recover some but not all of the property

. D. Gad bois ’ p ost

- c onfirmat ion, p ost

- l ockout a m endments
Gadboi s am ended his S c hedules three times after the bankruptcy court confirmed his plan. Some of these amendments were di ametri cally
incon sistent with his prior disclosu res and materially altered his report e d
financial condition.
On July 13, 2021, approxi mately seven mont hs after plan
confirmation and three months after the lock out , Gadbois for th e first
time claimed that he owned approximately 15

- 20 categories of “ inventory and equi pment at Debtor ’ s Mi nter A irfield space ” worth $49,685. Gadb ois
did not se rve this amendmen t on the District. This am e ndment was three5 months after the District ’ s lockout and a week before Gadbois filed his adversary proceeding

. The proof of service does n ot list the District as being served with the amendment.
Later s till, on N ovember 22, 2 02 1, Gadbois claimed fo r th e first time
th at he owned “ business

- related property ” and identified additional items

o f personal property with a valu e of “ unknown. ” Again, he did not serve the amen dment on the District.
E. The adversary proceed ing and trial
1. T he adversary c omplaint
On July 21, 2021 , Gadbois filed an ad versary proceeding against the
D is trict. The compl ain t alleg ed a violatio n of the automatic stay based on

t h e District ’ s taking po ssession of the office space and p ersonal property
and for the rec overy of “ est a te property

. ” The District ti me ly answe red the

com pla int

. 2. T rial
On S eptember 15, 2022 , the parties executed a n Amended Joint Pre

Trial Stipulation for V iolation of the Automatic Stay; Recovery of Property
of the Estate (the “ JPT O ” )

. T r ial took pla ce on De cember 19, 2022. T wo
witnesses te stified and w ere cr oss
- examined : Gadbois and a represe ntative
of t he Dis tr ict

. All of the exhibits listed in the JPT O were a dmitted into
evidence pursuant to the JPTO

. Afte r G adbois r ested, t he Distri ct orally move d the bankruptcy court
for judgment under Civil Rule 52 (c) , argu ing that Gadbois “ should be6 estoppe d from taking in consistent positions to gain an advantag e. ” The
District argued that by failin g t o give it notice o f the bankruptcy fili ng and
fai ling to sch edule the assets he now alleged were property of the estate,
Gadbois should not be able to assert the opposite now , i.e., that the District
was a credi tor and that the prop erty was his p er sonally , not that of SRT
LLC

. In response to the ora l moti on, Gadb ois acknowledg ed that “ there
were mist akes made , ” that the “ dba ” was not listed properly, and that “ it took a while to properly list the contents , ” but he a rgu ed that the bankruptcy court made a f in ding w he n it confirmed the chap ter 13 plan

t hat the Petiti on was filed in good faith . Gadbois appears to have believed that such finding cleanse d all his prior activities from any infirmity

. 3
G a db ois acknowledg ed that the Lease was r ej ected si nce it was not
assumed but i nsisted that proper ty of the estate under § 541 (a) incl ude d property acquired post p etition under § 1306 and therefore the rejection was
irrelevant

. The bankruptcy court granted the motion from th e bench

. T he court
fo cu sed at the o utset on Gad bois ’ lack of credibility : [T] here are si gnifica nt and repeated s tatements that are false with regards to whether he conducts sole proprietorships, has sole proprietorships, whether he has business propertie s, whether he has a leas e
-- h e has a lease as the Debtor in this bankruptcy c ase, which i s contr adicted by his te stimony today.

3 T his argumen t was not repe ated in Gadbois ’ briefs and is waived

.7 And I don’t have a good explanation for that. What I’ve heard is he’s a busy man and he travels. Trial Tr

. , Dec

. 19, 2022 , p

. 129

- 30

. The bankruptcy court found that even without the credibility issu e, Ga d bois “ has failed to carry his bur den of proof in sho wing t hat the [L] ease was entered into with him as an individ ual, as opposed to SRT Helicopter,
LLC. ” The bankruptcy co urt co nclude d wit h its ruling th at Gadbois was

“ estopped from assert ing a claim agai nst thi s Defendant on the bas is of
termination o f th e lease. ” The bankruptcy court entered judgment in favor of the District.
Gadboi s timely appealed. J U RIS D ICTI O N
T he ba nkru p tcy co urt h a d ju r is dict i o n un de r 2 8 U.S.C. § § 13 3 4 a nd
15 7 (b ) (2)(A)

. W e h a ve j u r is d i c tio n u n der 28 U .S

. C

. § 15 8

. I S SUE
D id the bank ruptc y cour t err in granting the District ’ s motion under
Civil Rule 52 (c ) ?
S T A N DARD S OF R EVIE W
We review the bankru ptcy co urt 's findings of fact under Civi l Rule
52 (c) for clear error and its c on clusion s of law de no vo. Kuan v. Lu nd ( In re
Lund ) , 202 B.R. 127, 129 (9 th Cir. BAP 1996). Whether the automatic stay provisions of § 362(a) have been violated is a que stio n of law r eviewed de

novo. Eskan os & Adler, P.C. v. Le etien , 309 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9t h Cir. 2002).8 “ De no vo r e view requires that we c onsider a ma tter anew, as if no decision had been made previously. ” Francis v . Wallace (In re Francis) , 505
B.R. 914, 9 17 (9th Cir. B AP 2014) (citations omit ted). When we review a matter de novo, we give no deferen ce to the bank rupt c y court’s decision.
Id.
We review the bankruptcy court’s decision whether to invoke judicial estoppe l for an abuse of discretion. See Kobold v. Good Sama ri tan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1044 (9th Cir. 2016)

. Whether the bankr uptcy c ourt properly applied the judicial estop pel doctrine to the facts pr esented in the
case is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Arconic, Inc. v. APC In v. Co

. , 96 9 F.3d 945, 950 (9th Cir. 2020)

. To determine whether the bankruptcy court has abused its discretio n, we conduct a two

- step inquiry: (1) we review de novo whether the bankruptcy court “identified the correct legal rule to apply to the relief requested” and (2) if it did, we consider wheth er the bankruptcy court’s application of the legal s tandard was il logical, implausible, or without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.
United States v. Hinkson , 585 F.3d 1247, 1263 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Caviata Attach ed Homes, LLC v U.S. Bank, N.A. ( In re Caviata Attached Homes, LLC ) , 481 B.R.
34 , 44 (9 th Cir. BAP 2012) ( ci t ing Pac. Cap

. Bancorp, N.A. v. E. Airport Dev., LLC (In r e E. Airport Dev., LLC) , 443 B.R. 823, 828 (9th Cir. BAP 2011) )

.9 D ISC USS I O N
Gadbois does n ot argue that the bankruptcy c ourt er red in granting
the Civil Rule 52 (c) motion on th e bas is of “ estoppel , ” which we take to mean judicial estop p el

. He does not argue that he was prejudiced or denied due process by the sud den end to the trial

. He d oes not argue that he was surprised o r pre judiced by the court ’ s considerat ion of the ora l motio n or d id not receive an appropriate opportunity to opp o se it

. Rather, Gadbois
focu ses on the alleged failings of the bankruptcy court ’ s findings that ( 1)
“Gadbo is d id not carry his burden of proof that G a dbo is was the lessee on the subject lease in ma king its r uling that there was no violation of the
automatic sta y, ” and ( 2) “ [ the Distr ict ] was not holding property of the
Gadbois ba nkruptcy estate without applyin g any l egal standard or incorrect legal st andard for determination of prop erty of the estat e. ”
A. T he bank ruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Civil Rule 52 (c) motion based on judic ial estoppel

. While the bankruptcy court did not disc uss the specific requ irements of judicial est o ppel, we a gree t hat it applies to pr event Gadbois from

“ a sserting a claim in a legal pr oceeding that is inconsistent with a claim taken by that party in a previous proceeding

. ” New Hampshire v. Maine , 532
U.S. 74 2 , 74 9 (2001)

. “ [W] here a party assume s a c erta in po sition in a legal proceedin g, and succeeds in maintaining that posi tion, he ma y not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudic e of th e party who ha s acquiesced10 in the pos i tion form erly ta ken by him

. ” Id. Th e Supreme Court noted in
New Ham p shire t hat there a re two factors in determining whether judicial estop pel is appropriate : First, a party ’ s later position must be “ clearly inco nsisten t ” with its ea rlier position. Se cond, courts regular ly inquire whether the party has succeede d in persua ding a court to accept that party ’ s earlier position , so that judicial a cceptance of an inconsistent position in a lat er proceeding would create

“ the pe rception that e i ther the first o r the second court w as misled [.] ” Id. at 750. (citations omitted).
Both factors are easily met here. G adbois ’ bankrupt cy Schedule s and plan could not be more clear that , on the petiti on date, he was simply a W

- 2 empl oyee wh o own ed an LLC , which engag e d in a business or, at least,

own ed flight t raining eq uipment and other personal property

. The
Schedule s are replete with statements, made under penalty of perjury, tha t
SRT LLC o w ned a business w hich owned property i n clu d ing cl aims

a gainst o ther entitie s. T o change that position and assert that he persona lly owned and operated the b usiness and all of its assets as a sole prop r ietor is complete ly inconsistent with and contradicts his Schedule s , th e various
pr econfirmation amendme n ts , and his c hapter 13 plan

. Second, Gadbois asked th e bankruptcy c our t to con firm his chapter 13 plan , wh ich it did. The plan was ba sed on the Schedule s and
amendment s to that date

. The chapter 13 trustee relied on t hos e Schedule s

a nd amendments when do ing her invest igation and making her11 recommendations to the court. Many of the find ings requir ed to be mad e at confirmation would have come from the Schedule s as they existed at that
time. The plan itself had no pro vi sio n for payment of a prepetitio n or
po stpetition deb t owed to the Di strict

. It did not ass ume or even mention
the Lease. It did not account for the v alue of the b usiness assets. Had
Gad bois asserted a d irect re lationship with the D istrict , the plan w oul d
have been diff erent than the one co nfir med if for no other reason than , at
the time of confirmation , he was behind on the rent then owing to the
D istrict

. Moreov er , Gadbois has not amended (or even offered to amen d ) the plan based on his ne w position. According ly, b ased on Gad boi s ’ chan ge of p osition re gard ing the
D istrict, t he bankruptcy court , the chapter 13 trustee , and the creditors
were misled as to the basis for co nfirming the plan. New Hampshire applies ,

a nd Gadboi s is judicially estopped fro m asserting the l ater i nconsistent posi t ion.
B. Even if j udic ial estoppel did not apply, the Civil R ule 5 2 (c) motion was properly granted because Gadbois did not establish a pri ma facie case against the District. Ci vil Rule 52 (c) states: If a party has been fully heard on an issue during a

n onjury tri al and the court finds against the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment against the party on a claim or defense t hat, under the controlling law, can be main tained or defeated only with a favora ble finding on th at iss ue. The court
ma y , howe ver, decli ne t o render any judgment until the close o f12 the evidence. A judgment on partial findings must be supported by findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 5 2(a). Gadbois rested his cas e before the District made it s Civi l Ru le 52 (c )
motion ; he h ad been fully heard by that time. His claims are set forth in the JPTO : f irst, violation of the automat ic stay ; s econd, recovery of property of
the estate

. Initia lly, the filin g and prosecution of the u nlawf ul det ainer could not
i tsel f have been a v iolati on of § 3 62(a) (1) because the defendant in the complaint and throughout the proceeding s was the non

- debtor SRT LL C

. Therefore , it was not an action again st the de btor as prohibited by § 362(a) (1)

. The judg ment w as against the LLC , not a gains t Ga dbois

. T herefore, as the bankru ptcy cou rt correctly noted, the issue in both
of Gadbois ’ claims was whether the Distr ict violated § 362(a) (3) which prohibits “ a ny act to obt ain possession of property of the es tate or of
pro perty from the est at e or to exe rcise cont rol over proper ty of the estate

. ”
The District concedes that it to ok and continues to have possession of propert y but denies that it is property of the estat e. T o prevail , Gadbois was required to off er ev idence wh ich established th at t he pers on al property located in the offic e space was his personal property.
The e vidence Gadbois offered at tr ial , that the propert y then in the
p ossession of the Distric t belon g ed to him and not SRT LLC , was primarily his p ersonal t estimony. He offe red n o compr e hensive inven tory of what
was take n, no receipts showing that he , rather than the LLC , purchased the13 items, and n o suffici ent ev idence of what their value was at the time beyond hi s own general estimation at tr ial

. Gadbois co mmented at trial

a bout the app roximate value of the f l ight suits allegedly taken but nothing
else tha t would allow the bankruptcy court to enter a damages awa rd against the Di strict.
Based on what Gadbois sub m itted to the bankruptcy court , the cour t
coul d not have made a favor able fi nding on the i ssue of ownershi p of the personal property then i n the p ossession of the District

. As the bankruptcy

court made a specifi c finding that Gadbois wa s not credible, it w as appropriate that his testi mony was given l ittle to no weight

. Thus , the re

was no error by the bankruptcy court as to its entry of judg ment based on
Civil R ule 52 (c)

. C. The bank ruptcy court did not err in ruling that Gadbois faile d to carry his bu rd e n o f proof that Gadbois was t he le ssee on the subject leas e. Ga dbo is ar gu es that the ba nkruptcy court erred in i ts finding that
“Gadbois d id not carry his burden of proof that G a dbois w as the lessee on the subject lease in making it s ruling that there was no violation of the

autom atic stay

. ” We disagree.
At trial , G adboi s ma de much of the fa ct that the representativ e of the District did not do any background check n or any investigation o f Gadbois
bef ore executing the lease. In his O pening B rief , he o ffe rs no l egal support

est abl ishin g that the D istr ict had an obl igation t o d o th at or that the failure
to do that investigation suppo rted his position that he was the le ssee rather14 than SRT LLC

. But the bankruptcy court did not make a fi nding as to who

wa s the lessee ; only that Gadbo is di d not offer suf ficient evidenc e at trial t o
per m it the court to mak e a finding on the issue of fact either way

. Because
G adbois bore the burden of proof , this was fatal to his case. Further , Gadbois do e s not explain how a finding that Gad bois was
the less ee per sonall y would have le d t o a f indin g that the personal
p roperty in the office space belonged to Gadbois rather than the LLC.
Ga d bois argu es only that , because the bankruptcy court did not make
sp ec ific findings about the evidence he di d offer, th e mat ter sho uld be
remanded to th e b ankru ptcy c ourt “ for the neces sary findings. ” This argument ignores the fact that the Civi l Rule 52 (c) motion was granted
based solel y on estoppel and therefore f urther f indings would not have changed the res ul t.
D. The b ank ruptcy cou rt did not reach t he is sue of owne r ship o f the property held by the District , and thus it was not required to

“ app ly a legal standard ” for the determinati on. G adbois also argues that the bankruptcy court erred in finding that
the Distr ict “ was not holding property o f the Gadb ois bank r uptcy estate
without applying any legal standard or incorrect legal standard for
determination of property of the estate. ” T he argument is difficult t o understand. The bankruptcy cour t did not ma ke a fin ding that the District

wa s or wa s not hold ing prope r ty belo nging to Gadbo is. Gad bois had the
bu r d en of establishing that the District held prop erty of the bankruptcy15 estate

. He did not offer sufficien t evidence to permit the court to make that
fi ndi ng. Again, t his argument ignores th e fact tha t the Civi l Ru le 52 (c ) motion
was g ranted based solel y on estoppel

. Even assuming Gadbois offered

s ufficient evidence to permit the bankruptcy court to determi ne the owner of the property in the District ’ s po ssess ion, the resu lt would have been the

same. C O N C L US ION
For th ese reasons se t fort h above, w e AF FIRM

.