The Secret Service Has 

Taken Action to Address 

the Recommendations of 

the Protective Mission 

Panel 

November 10, 2016 

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DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS 

The Secret Service Has Taken Action to Address the 

Recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel 

November 10, 2016 

Why We 

Did This 

Inspection 

As directed by Congress in 

the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2016, we 

reviewed the Secret 

Service’s actions to address 

the PMP’s 

recommendations. 

Specifically, we reviewed 

changes made by the Secret 

Service to training, staffing, 

technology, operations, and 

its organizational structure. 

What We 

Recommend 

We are making five 

recommendations to further 

the Secret Service’s progress 

in addressing the PMP’s 

recommendations. 

For Further Information: 

Contact our Office of Public Affairs at 

(202) 254-4100, or email us at 

DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov 

What We Found 

Following the September 19, 2014 White House fence 

jumping incident, the Secretary of Homeland Security 

established the Protective Mission Panel (PMP) to 

undertake a broad independent review of the United 

States Secret Service’s protection of the White House 

Complex. The PMP made 19 recommendations in its 

December 2014 unclassified report. 

The Secret Service has clearly taken the PMP’s 

recommendations seriously, which it has demonstrated by 

making a number of significant changes. Specifically, it 

has improved communication within the workforce, better 

articulated its budget needs, increased hiring, and 

committed to more training. Using funding appropriated 

for PMP initiatives, the Secret Service has also begun 

enhancing security and refreshing technology at the White 

House Complex. However, fully implementing many of the 

PMP’s recommendations will require long-term financial 

planning, further staff increases, consistent re-evaluation 

of the initiated actions’ effectiveness, and a multi-year 

commitment by Secret Service and Department of 

Homeland Security leadership. 

Secret Service Response 

The Secret Service concurred with our recommendations 

and is taking steps to address them. 

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'~`~`~"° S~`~a 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Depaxtment of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

November 10, 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Joseph P. Clancy

Director

United States Secret Service

FROM: John Roth ~~~~

Inspector General

SUBJECT: The Secret Service Has Taken Action to Address the

Recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel

Attached for your action is our final report, The Secret Service Has Taken Action

to Address the Recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel. We

incorporated the formal comments from the United States Secret Service in the

final report.

The report contains five recommendations aimed at improving the Secret

Service's implementation of the Protective Mission Panel's recommendations.

Your office concurred with all recommendations. Based on information

provided in your response to the draft report, we consider recommendations 1

through 5 open and resolved. Once your office has fully implemented the

recommendations, please submit a formal closeout letter to us within 30 days

so that we may close the recommendations. The memorandum should be

accompanied by evidence of completion of agreed-upon corrective actions and

of the disposition of any monetary amounts. Please send your response or

closure request to OIGInspectionsFollowup(a,oi~.dhs.~ov.

Consistent with our responsibility under the Inspector General Act, we will

provide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight and

appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will

post the report on our website for public dissemination.

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Anne L. Richards,

Assistant Inspector General, Office of Inspections and Evaluations, at

(202) 254-4100.

Attachment
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Table of Contents 

Background .................................................................................................... 1
 

Results of Review ............................................................................................ 1
 

Actions Underway or Nearing Completion .............................................. 2
 

Actions Planned and Initiated ................................................................ 5
 

Three PMP Recommendations Require Ongoing Engagement with 

External Partners and Flexibility.......................................................... 13
 

Actions Taken to Implement One Recommendation Do Not Fully Align 

with the PMP’s Conclusions ................................................................. 14
 

Appendixes 

Appendix A: Objective, Scope, and Methodology ................................. 17
 

Appendix B: Secret Service Comments to the Draft Report................... 18
 

Appendix C: PMP Recommendations, Status, and Summary of the Secret 

Service Response ............................................................. 24
 

Appendix D: Secret Service’s Organization for Protecting the White House 

Appendix E: Office of Inspections and Evaluations Major Contributors to 

Complex .......................................................................... 38
 

This Report...................................................................... 39
 

Appendix F: Report Distribution ......................................................... 40
 

Abbreviations 

APT administrative, professional, and technical 

CIO Chief Information Officer
 

EA/BD Emergency Action and Building Defense
 

MBB mission-based budget
 

OIG Office of Inspector General
 

OPO Office of Protective Operations
 

PMP Protective Mission Panel
 

PPD Presidential Protective Division
 

RAP Resource Allocation Plan
 

RTC James J. Rowley Training Center
 

UD Uniformed Division 

WHC White House Complex
 

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Background
 

The United States Secret Service protects the President and the Vice President, 

as well as their families and visiting foreign dignitaries; it also safeguards the 

Nation’s financial infrastructure and payment systems.1 As part of its mission, 

the Secret Service protects the White House Complex (WHC), defined as the 

White House mansion and the grounds within the fence line, the Eisenhower 

Executive Office Building, the U.S. Department of the Treasury building and 

annex, 1724 F Street, Winder Building, and the New Executive Office Building. 

On September 19, 2014, an intruder jumped over the North Fence of the WHC 

and entered the White House before Secret Service personnel could apprehend 

him. Following this incident, the Secretary of Homeland Security established 

the Protective Mission Panel (PMP), requesting that its members undertake a 

broad independent review of the Secret Service’s WHC protection. The PMP 

completed its review on December 15, 2014, making 19 recommendations in 

an unclassified report.2 We reviewed the Secret Service’s progress in 

implementing the 19 unclassified PMP recommendations.3 

The Secret Service concurred with all 19 recommendations and, in early 2015, 

began implementing actions to respond to them; efforts are ongoing, with some 

future actions stretching through fiscal year 2022 and beyond. A list of the 19 

PMP recommendations, their status, and a summary of the Secret Service’s 

response are included in appendix C. 

Results of Review 

The Secret Service has clearly taken the PMP’s recommendations seriously, 

which it has demonstrated by making a number of significant changes. 

Through these changes, the Secret Service has improved communication within 

the workforce, better articulated its budget needs, increased hiring, and 

committed to more training. Using funding appropriated for PMP initiatives in 

the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, the Secret Service has begun 

enhancing security and refreshing technology at the WHC. However, just as the 

PMP recognized “many of the recommendations will be difficult,” we concluded 

that fully implementing many of the PMP recommendations will require long1 The Secret Service also provides lifetime protection for former Presidents, their spouses, and 

their children (while minors); it protects the Vice President and the Second Family for a period 

of time after leaving office. 

2 A number of additional PMP recommendations contain classified material and are included in 

a classified report. 

3 We will address the Secret Service’s implementation of the classified recommendations in a 

classified report. 

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term financial planning, consistent re-evaluation of the initiated actions’ 

effectiveness, and a multi-year commitment by Secret Service and Department 

leadership. 

Because of these challenges, it is too early to know definitively whether the 

planned initiatives will result in the desired outcomes. For example, many 

actions to expand training depend on staff increases, and continually 

refreshing technology will require sustained funding and proactive research 

and development. The organizational changes made to date, albeit substantial, 

are not yet far-reaching enough for an organization the PMP called “starved for 

leadership.” In addition, the Secret Service’s ability to engage and learn from 

Federal partners and international allies, as recommended by the PMP, could 

be sidelined by protective mission demands. Finally, although the Secret 

Service has communicated management priorities and prioritized Special 

Agents’ protective work, it needs to evaluate its missions and capabilities 

holistically to consider realigning priorities and possibly shedding what the 

PMP identified as “collateral missions.” 

Actions Underway or Nearing Completion 

In response to three PMP recommendations, the Secret Service has nearly 

completed actions to fulfill one recommendation and has developed plans for 

completing two others. First, the Secret Service provided a platform for 

employees to communicate ideas that contribute to their mission, but 

managers need training on encouraging, valuing, and responding to employee 

feedback. Second, the Secret Service has developed and submitted to DHS a 

mission-based budget (MBB) for FYs 2018 through 2022. Finally, the Secret 

Service is working with the National Park Service and other stakeholders on 

plans to construct a new outer fence surrounding the WHC. 

The Secret Service Created a Platform for Employee Input, but Managers 

Need More Communication Training 

To create more opportunities for the workforce to provide input on their 

mission, in October 2015, the Secret Service created the SPARK! platform for 

two-way communication between the workforce and leadership on Secret 

Service policies and issues. As of July 2016, 88 percent of the workforce had 

engaged in SPARK!, 478 discussions were active on the platform, and the 

Secret Service had implemented 23 initiatives suggested and discussed on 

SPARK!. These initiatives include: 

• establishing field-based training coordinators; 

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•	 temporarily assigning newly graduated Special Agents to the WHC 

with Uniformed Division (UD) Officers, which allows for integrated 

training and mitigates UD staffing shortfalls; 

•	 developing an investigative “re-integration” training program to ease 

Special Agents’ transition from protective assignments to investigative 

positions in the field; 

•	 deploying SR-16 rifles to UD Officers; and 

•	 adding useful administrative applications to Secret Service 

smartphones. 

In March 2015, through an external consulting firm’s focus groups and 

surveys, Secret Service leadership solicited employee viewpoints to 

comprehensively assess work/life balance. Leadership has begun to address 

the challenges identified through the assessment. For example, in September 

2015, to address perceptions that career progression processes were not 

consistent or transparent, the Secret Service defined the Special Agent career 

progression path more clearly. In FY 2017, the component intends to 

implement career progression plans for administrative, professional, and 

technical (APT) personnel. The Secret Service also intends to address workforce 

dissatisfaction with the low level of family support by implementing a child care 

subsidy program for qualified employees in the first quarter of FY 2017. 

Finally, according to Secret Service managers, the component’s internal 

communications became “more frequent and substantive.” For example, the 

Director’s video messages and direct communication initiatives, such as the 

“State of the Secret Service” address, “town hall” meetings at field offices, and 

attendance at UD roll calls, have received positive feedback. 

To expand communication training for managers, the Secret Service began 

offering a course, “Enhancing Workplace Communication,” but as of July 2016, 

only 11 employees had taken the course. Such low participation falls short of 

satisfying the PMP recommendation to “train managers to encourage, value and 

respond” to employees’ feedback on their mission. 

We recommend that the Director of the Secret Service: 

Recommendation 1: Require all supervisors to complete the course, 

“Enhancing Workforce Communication” or a comparable training option on 

workforce communication. 

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Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

The Secret Service concurred with all five of our recommendations and is 

taking steps to address them. Appendix B contains a copy of the Secret 

Service’s management comments in their entirety. We also received and 

incorporated technical comments as appropriate. Based on the Secret Service’s 

response to our draft report, we consider all recommendations resolved and 

open. 

A summary of the Secret Service’s written response and our analysis of the 

response follow each recommendation. 

Secret Service Response to Recommendation 1: The Secret Service 

concurred with the recommendation. According to the Secret Service, the Office 

of Training will evaluate available training modules on this subject for online 

delivery and examine the feasibility of incorporating communication training 

into existing courses required for all first-line supervisors. The Secret Service 

expects to complete actions in response to this recommendation by September 

30, 2017. 

OIG Analysis: The Secret Service’s planned actions are responsive to 

recommendation 1. We consider the recommendation resolved; it will remain 

open pending our review of records and documentation detailing evaluations 

the Office of Training plans to complete. 

The Secret Service Has Developed a Mission-based Budget 

The Secret Service made its first attempt to develop an MBB for the FY 2018– 

2022 Resource Allocation Plan (RAP), which it sent to the DHS Chief Financial 

Officer in April 2016. Rather than incrementally increasing the prior year’s 

base budget, the component assessed future mission needs to operate 

optimally and determined the funding required to meet those needs. RAP 

funding requests include: 

•	 increased staffing levels determined by staffing allocation models that 

incorporate regular training, minimal overtime, and minimal leave 

restrictions; 

•	 Operational Mission Support initiatives to enhance and refresh 

protective measures at the WHC; and 

• operational training enhancements to improve readiness. 

A Secret Service official said the efforts of the Secret Service Office of the Chief 

Financial Officer in developing the MBB were “extraordinary,” and as a result, 

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in FY 2018, the Secret Service will submit its first MBB. According to its 

documents, the Secret Service has much of the infrastructure needed to 

support the MBB, but the process will require further development and 

revision, as well as updated information and systems to automate the MBB 

process. 

The Secret Service Has Taken Action to Replace the White House 

Complex Outer Fence 

The Secret Service and the National Park Service have evaluated the design 

options for a new fence around the WHC and have proposed plans to the 

relevant planning commissions. They can choose a contractor and begin 

installation of the new fence once the plans are approved. The Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2016, provided $8.2 million, available for 2 years, to replace 

the fence. The construction is scheduled to begin in FY 2018, depending on 

several external approvals and processes. 

Actions Planned and Initiated 

The Secret Service has taken action or plans to act on 14 PMP 

recommendations related to staffing, training, technology, leadership, and 

organization. However, fully implementing changes and resolving underlying 

issues will require a multi-year commitment and depend heavily on adequate 

funding and staffing. Further, some initiated or proposed actions have not yet 

resulted in desired outcomes. The Secret Service has increased hiring, but still 

struggles with staff retention; to date, this has generally meant small net gains 

in employees. Although training has been enhanced, it continues to be 

hindered by low staffing levels and high operational demands on the workforce. 

To update and enhance technology, the Secret Service has empowered and 

professionalized the relevant offices and committed funding to technology 

refreshes and pursuing new technology. The Secret Service has also 

reorganized key budget and technology functions, emphasizing expertise and 

leadership experience, but has not similarly elevated civilian leadership in the 

human resources function. Finally, the Secret Service has not yet found the 

ideal structure or placement in the component for the UD. 

Significant Efforts to Increase Staffing Are Challenged by Retention Issues 

Sufficient staffing is crucial to continued progress in implementing the PMP’s 

recommendations, but it is an elusive goal. Although the Secret Service has 

improved recruitment, increased hiring, and streamlined promotion and 

rotation processes, it continues to struggle retaining employees. Staffing 

shortages negatively impact work/life balance and have been given as a 

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primary reason for departures. Without substantial and maintainable staffing 

increases, the Secret Service will not reach the PMP’s recommended training 

targets or boost morale. 

The Secret Service has made a significant effort to identify staffing needs, 

modernize recruiting, streamline hiring, and prioritize retention. For example, 

the Secret Service: 

•	 designed and is validating staffing allocation models for UD Officers, 

Special Agents, and APT personnel; 

•	 established a National Recruitment Strategy that details the staffing level 

growth needed to successfully carry out its mission; 

•	 in FY 2015, began developing new hiring and recruiting initiatives; 

•	 from October 2014 through June 2016, hired 342 UD Officers and 402 

Special Agents; and 

•	 in April 2016, introduced seven retention initiatives, and by July 2016, 

had implemented four initiatives. 

Although it has worked to augment its workforce and made a steadfast hiring 

push, the Secret Service has not realized substantial staffing increases. The 

PMP recommended that the Secret Service add 200 UD Officers at the WHC 

and increase the Presidential Protective Division (PPD)4 by 85 positions. 

Although the Secret Service hired 402 Special Agents between October 2014 

and June 2016, it lost 420 Special Agents through attrition. However, PPD was 

able to increase its staff by 77 Special Agents partially by reassigning Special 

Agents from other divisions.5 During the same period, the Secret Service hired 

342 UD officers but lost 312 officers through attrition. Because it had more 

than 130 UD recruits in training in July 2016, the Secret Service expects to 

increase the number of UD Officers at the WHC by the end of FY 2016. 

Low Staffing Levels and High Operational Demands Hinder Efforts to 

Provide More and Better Training 

The Secret Service has shown commitment to training by: 

•	 elevating the training function to an executive level directorate; 

•	 planning and pursuing enhancements to infrastructure at the James J. 

4 PPD Special Agents protect the President and the First Family. The division’s Special Agent in 

Charge is ultimately responsible for WHC operations and security and the safety of its 

occupants. 

5 Secret Service Special Agents in the field can be assigned to investigative work, as well as 

temporary protective details and operations nationwide and abroad. Special Agents may be 

assigned to the PPD after several years of service. 

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Rowley Training Center (RTC); 

•	 increasing RTC staff; and 

•	 assessing training needs and setting at least minimal annual training 

targets for its protective personnel. 

Also, as indicated in the FY 2018–2022 RAP, the Secret Service is factoring 

training levels proposed by the PMP into workforce staffing allocation models 

and future staffing-related funding requests and requesting funding for 

enhanced operational training. 

To address the PMP’s recommendations on training deficiencies and needs, the 

Secret Service has made efforts to train more staff and conduct more integrated 

training so WHC teams understand their roles in responding to threats. The 

number of UD personnel who received training increased significantly from FY 

2014 to FY 2015, primarily because the Secret Service initiated a new 

integrated training course “Emergency Action and Building Defense” (EA/BD) 

and tried to prioritize mission in-service training. In addition, in FYs 2015 and 

2016, the Secret Service conducted intra- and interagency tabletop and joint 

training exercises. These opportunities for integrated training are a good start, 

but there is still lack of regular, recurring tabletop exercises and training 

courses or even plans for future courses that truly incorporate all WHC teams. 

Despite its efforts, the Secret Service has not yet been able to sustain the 

increased training the PMP recommended. After a significant increase in FY 

2015, as of July 2016, the number of UD Officers the Secret Service trained 

decreased. Also, as of July 2016, the majority of UD personnel completing 

EA/BD training were recruits going through initial academy training. Table 1 

shows the varying numbers of UD personnel who received mission in-service 

and EA/BD training from FY 2014 through July 2016. 

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Table 1: Mission In-service and Emergency Action and Building Defense 

Training for UD personnel, FYs 2014–16 (as of July 2016) 

Mission In-service Training FY 2014 FY 2015 

FY 2016 

(as of July 

2016) 

Number of UD Officers who received 

mission in-service training 26 647 70 

EA/BD Training FY 2014 FY 2015 

FY 2016 

(as of July

2016) 

Number of UD Officers who received 

EA/BD training 0 635 18 

Number of UD recruits who received 

EA/BD training 0 157 126 

Total number of UD Officers and UD 

recruits who received EA/BD training 0 792 144 

Source: Secret Service data 

The Secret Service has also been hampered in its efforts to increase “fourth 

shift”6 training for PPD Special Agents. Although fourth shift training improved 

in FY 2016 — according to training officials, “40 people instead of zero” can 

now participate in these training classes — the level is less than robust. 

Fluctuations in operational tempo and priorities exacerbated by insufficient 

staffing can preclude training. When the tempo is high, such as during a 

presidential campaign, staff must work many overtime hours and may not have 

time to train. According to a PPD official, fourth shift training in FY 2016 was 

affected by presidential campaign demands, protective travel, and Special 

Agents having to fill in for UD staff. Secret Service officials repeatedly 

attributed the inability to achieve PMP-recommended training levels solely to 

staffing issues. The continuing serious shortfalls in the number of UD Officers, 

Special Agents, and APT personnel support this explanation. 

6 In 1985, the Secret Service added a fourth shift to the three-shift protective rotations for 

Special Agents in PPD and the Vice Presidential Protective Division. Special Agents rotate into 

the fourth shift to participate in training and then rotate to the normal three-shift protective 

rotation. 

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In FY 2016, some specific factors also limited regular training for UD Officers 

and PPD Special Agents, including: 

•	 protective events, such as National Security Special Events7 and 

presidential campaign activities;
 

•	 “Candidate Nominee Operations Section Training,” during which RTC 

employees prepared more than 1,000 Special Agents for temporary 

assignments or events associated with the presidential campaign — an 

addition to routine training and “a massive undertaking” by RTC 

employees; and 

•	 increased basic training for newly recruited UD Officers and Special 

Agents, which diminished the RTC’s ability to conduct other training. 

The PMP also reported concerns with Secret Service’s antiquated systems for 

managing the organization. For example, the Secret Service does not yet have 

an automated system to adequately manage, schedule, and track training 

requirements. Like other DHS components, it is transitioning to a new system. 

DHS is managing this transition and has asked components not to update or 

modernize existing training management systems. Although circumstances 

beyond its control have delayed the transition, the Secret Service expects the 

new system to be available in November 2016. The Secret Service also plans to 

identify other necessary tools, such as an online system to schedule classroom 

facilities. 

The challenges to successfully implementing the PMP’s training-related 

recommendations are significant, and they must be overcome. The Secret 

Service needs to make continuing innovative training a non-negotiable priority. 

We recommend that the Assistant Director for Office of Training: 

Recommendation 2: Expand training programs that regularly and 

consistently integrate all teams working at the White House Complex. 

Secret Service Response to Recommendation 2: The Secret Service 

concurred with the recommendation. According to the Secret Service, it is not 

able to conduct integrated, dynamic training in an operationally authentic 

environment, such as a mock White House. The Office of Training is developing 

design options and cost estimates to secure funding for the construction of 

7 The Secret Service is the lead Federal agency for developing and implementing operational 

security plans for events of national significance that the Secretary of Homeland Security 

designates as National Special Security Events. Examples of such events include presidential 

inaugurations, presidential nominating conventions, major sports events, and major 

international meetings. 

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such a facility and is planning to begin construction in FY 2018, pending on 

the availability of funding. The Secret Service expects to complete actions for 

the new training venue by September 30, 2020. 

The physical and staffing infrastructure at the RTC also needs to be enhanced 

to implement such training programs. In addition, to increase the time 

dedicated to training, the Secret Service needs to continue increasing the 

number of Special Agents and UD Officers. In the near term, the Secret Service 

will conduct and track smaller scale training exercises that integrate Special 

Agents, UD Officers, and others. The Secret Service expects to complete actions 

to allow increased training in the existing venue by September 30, 2017. 

OIG Analysis: The Secret Service’s ongoing and planned actions are responsive 

to the recommendation 2. The recommendation is resolved, but will remain 

open pending our receipt of documentation and records detailing the training 

efforts described in the Secret Service’s response. Also, in its corrective action 

plan, the Secret Service should update OIG on planned schedules to conduct 

smaller scale training exercises that integrate Special Agents, UD Officers, and 

others and provide records if such exercises took place. 

The Secret Service Dedicated Personnel and Funding to Technology 

To achieve its mission to protect the President and Vice President, their 

families, and the WHC, the Secret Service must invest in cutting edge 

technology and drive research and development. At times in the past, the 

Secret Service’s organizational structure and processes hindered its ability to 

carry out these tasks. For example, Special Agents on rotational assignments, 

rather than subject matter experts, led the Office of Technical Development 

and Mission Support; there was no central authority for information technology 

(IT) purchases; and the Secret Service paid for technology upgrades out of its 

operating budget, from which funds could be reprogrammed. 

Since FY 2015, the Secret Service has made organizational changes to empower 

and professionalize the offices responsible for reviewing its technological 

footprint and procuring new technology. In addition, the Secret Service has 

dedicated funding to refresh technology and actively pursue new technology it 

can adapt to its mission. In FY 2015 and FY 2016, the Secret Service: 

• made a non-law enforcement professional subject matter expert the 

head of the Office of Technical Development and Mission Support; 

• established and assigned IT responsibilities to a non-law enforcement 

professional subject matter expert Chief Information Officer (CIO); 

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•	 gave the CIO final approval authority for IT purchases across the 

component; 

•	 developed life cycle refresh schedules, which did not previously exist; 

and 

•	 worked with partners to develop technology to counter unmanned aerial 

vehicles, enhance camera systems, and update weapons. 

Progress in the technology realm will depend on the Secret Service’s 

commitment to changes made in FY 2015 and FY 2016, as well as ongoing and 

planned actions for FY 2017 and beyond. Future Secret Service leaders must 

ensure that subject matter experts continue to fill the positions of Chief 

Technology Officer and CIO and make certain other priorities do not erode 

funding for technology programs. 

The Secret Service Has Professionalized Leadership but Needs to Further 

Evaluate Its Organizational Structure 

Director Clancy has shown strong commitment to fully implementing the PMP 

recommendations. Most significantly, the Secret Service has realigned key 

parts of its organization to emphasize strategic planning, professional expertise 

in budget and technology functions, and leadership experience. Appendix C 

details the leadership changes between January 2015 and July 2016 that 

promote specialized expertise. Secret Service officials gave high marks to the 

organizational changes to date, believing leadership has improved and the 

component is headed to “a better place.” 

However, according to officials, the Secret Service needs to make two other 

organizational changes. First, a non-law enforcement professional with 

specialized expertise should be in charge of the Secret Service’s Office of 

Human Resources, rather than a Special Agent, as was the case at the time of 

our review. Because Special Agents rotate through executive leadership 

positions, Secret Service managers said having a subject matter expert rather 

than a law enforcement official at the helm offers greater continuity. Rotating 

Special Agents through this and other business-related positions can hinder 

operations. Between FY 2014 and July 2016, the Secret Service’s Office of 

Human Resources went through two Assistant Directors and five Deputy 

Assistant Directors. Such frequent changes in leadership, as well as the 

absence of human resource-specific skill sets on top, do not benefit operations. 

Second, the Secret Service should work on the organizational structure for 

managing WHC security, which involves elements of the Office of Protective 

Operations (OPO), primarily PPD and the UD. (Appendix D outlines the roles of 

these offices.) As the PMP reported, this structure for protecting the WHC and 

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the President is “particularly complex.” Although the PMP did not make specific 

recommendations, it suggested that “more thought needs to be given” to this 

organizational structure. 

In July 2015, the Director modified the structure of the UD and PPD to give the 

UD Chief more operational control and “to enhance communications within the 

UD ranks and clarify areas of responsibility and accountability.” But UD and 

PPD officials said more changes are necessary, adding that there are no easy 

solutions. According to these officials, the Secret Service struggles to find the 

right structure for operational flexibility, full information sharing, and more 

streamlined communication. For example, the UD Chief reports to the OPO 

Assistant Director and attends Executive Resources Board8 (board) meetings, 

but does not have a vote on the board. The PPD Special Agent in Charge, who 

has an immense operational responsibility, also reports to the OPO Assistant 

Director, but does not have an opportunity to attend board meetings. Not being 

able to vote and participate in meetings means leaders charged with the Secret 

Service’s most important mission are not fully involved in decision making and 

information sharing. In July 2015, when he changed the organization, Director 

Clancy said he would review it in 1 year. The Director should review the UD’s 

and PPD’s relationships and involvement to ensure the organizational structure 

supports the best possible protection of the WHC. 

In general, the Secret Service has strengthened its efforts to adequately staff 

and train its employees, provide them with professional technology and human 

resources support, and communicate more effectively. The Secret Service has 

also made the disciplinary process more transparent and consistent, revived 

dormant leadership development programs, and is improving its strategic 

planning. When the 2016 presidential campaign ends, the Secret Service 

should be able to mitigate staffing shortages, which should improve morale and 

allow for more training. The Secret Service should continue its reforms and 

regularly review and evaluate its progress. 

We recommend that the Director of the Secret Service: 

Recommendation 3: Ensure that leadership in the Office of Human Resources 

has specialized expertise and is not working in the office on a rotational basis. 

8 The Executive Resources Board comprises the Director, Deputy Director, Chief Operating 

Officer, each directorate’s leader (Assistant Director or Chief), and the UD Chief. The board 

meets three times per week in various forms. Meetings include discussions of high level 

projects, decisions on changes, briefings on sensitive operational topics, and voting. 

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Recommendation 4: Determine the optimal arrangement, organizationally and 

operationally, to promote streamlined communication, full information sharing, 

and inclusive decision making about the security of the WHC and protection of 

the First Family. 

Secret Service Response to Recommendation 3: The Secret Service 

concurred with the recommendation. According to the Secret Service, in August 

2016, the Director announced the decision to search for an experienced civilian 

executive to take over the Office of Human Resources. The Secret Service has 

completed its search and narrowed the list of candidates for this position. The 

Secret Service expects to complete actions that will bring an executive-level 

professional to the Office of Human Resources by March 31, 2017. 

OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the recommendation. 

This recommendation is resolved; it will remain open pending our receipt of 

documentation showing that leadership in the Office of Human Resources has 

specialized expertise and is not working in the office on a rotational basis 

Secret Service Response to Recommendation 4: The Secret Service 

concurred with the recommendation. According to the Secret Service, through 

a July 2015 organizational change, the UD Chief assumed operational 

command for the daily protective activities of UD personnel. For the Office of 

Protective Operations to fully examine and evaluate the results of this change, 

the reorganization and related policy need time to mature. The Secret Service 

plans to determine whether more changes are needed to improve 

communication, information sharing, and inclusive decision making by March 

31, 2017. 

OIG Analysis: We consider these actions responsive to the intent of 

recommendation. This recommendation is resolved, but open, pending our 

receipt of documentation detailing how the Office of Protective Operations 

evaluated and determined whether additional changes to the current structure 

for protecting the WHC and the First Family are warranted. 

Three PMP Recommendations Require Ongoing Engagement 

with External Partners and Flexibility 

The PMP asserted the Secret Service is insular and does not regularly learn 

from its external partners. To address PMP recommendations to engage with 

Federal and international partners, the Secret Service hosted more table top 

and joint training exercises for special events, National Special Security Events, 

and topics of interest for the broader Federal law enforcement community. It 

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also sought to obtain periodic, outside assessments of the threats to and 

strategies for protecting the WHC. Finally, the Secret Service engaged foreign 

protective services through events, such as protectee travel overseas and visits 

by foreign dignitaries to the United States. For example, in FY 2015 and FY 

2016, the Secret Service: 

•	 conducted 31 intra- and interagency tabletop and joint training
 

exercises;
 

•	 delivered training to 1,441 external Federal personnel in FY 2015, a 180 

percent increase over FY 2014; 

•	 collaborated with another Government entity to develop protocols for 

countering unmanned aerial systems threats and conduct mission 

analysis of its protection protocols; 

•	 provided 14 training sessions and briefings for international partners, 

such as the International Law Enforcement Academy in Thailand, 

International Law Enforcement Association in El Salvador, and Brazilian 

law enforcement planning security for the Summer 2016 Olympics in Rio 

de Janeiro; and 

•	 coordinated with international partners for the United Nations General 

Assembly and the 2015 Papal visit. 

However, the Secret Service has not yet implemented plans to evaluate these 

partnerships, nor has it established regular exchanges of knowledge with 

international organizations. In addition, staffing constraints limit joint training 

and exercises, as well as partner outreach beyond specific protective events. 

Leading the Federal protective force community, obtaining periodic outside 

assessments, and coordinating with international partners will require 

sustained support from Secret Service leadership and the flexibility to carry out 

these actions while meeting protective mission demands and responding to 

unexpected events. 

Actions Taken to Implement One Recommendation Do Not 

Fully Align with the PMP’s Conclusions 

In its report, the PMP strongly advised the Secret Service to “evaluate precisely” 

how the component’s various missions, for example its investigative mission 

and cyber capabilities, “fit in and support the primary protective mission” 

rather than distract from it. The PMP was concerned that the Secret Service’s 

focus areas may be so broad that its primary protective mission suffers. For 

this reason, the PMP recommended that the Secret Service communicate its 

priorities and align its operations accordingly. 

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The Secret Service has expanded its efforts and initiatives to communicate 

management priorities, such as increasing staffing, providing more training, 

and improving morale. Further, Secret Service officials explained that the 

component is already prioritizing Special Agents’ protective work. For Special 

Agents in field offices, the highest priority is acting as a surge force for 

protective assignments. In addition to working on protective assignments, these 

Special Agents conduct intelligence work and provide cyber support for 

protective assignments. Work by Special Agents that indirectly supports the 

component’s protective mission, such as conducting background checks on 

new and current staff to maintain workforce integrity, is also a priority. 

Secret Service managers also explained that most of the component’s 

operational activities are mandated by statute, Executive Order, or regulation 

and cannot be abolished without changing the current law. However, similar to 

the PMP, we concluded that the Secret Service would benefit from a datadriven, analytical approach to evaluating its current missions and capabilities. 

At the time of our review, the Secret Service had just begun to develop a new 

model to evaluate domestic field offices’ size and effectiveness and planned to 

evaluate other operations and capabilities to determine whether it could realign 

priorities or possibly shed “collateral missions.” Because it has not yet 

undertaken a comprehensive evaluation, the Secret Service has not yet fully 

responded to the PMP’s advice on this issue. 

We recommend that the Director of the Secret Service: 

Recommendation 5: Complete a comprehensive evaluation to determine 

whether all the Secret Service’s current missions and operational engagements 

benefit the primary protective mission. 

Secret Service Response to Recommendation 5: The Secret Service 

concurred with the recommendation. According to the Secret Service, three 

reviews assessing this issue are in progress. Once the analysis is complete, the 

Secret Service can evaluate the best ways to prioritize the protective mission 

and enhance integration of the investigative mission. The Secret Service plans 

to complete a comprehensive evaluation of its integrated mission by April 30, 

2017. 

OIG Analysis: The Secret Service’s ongoing and planned actions are responsive 

to the recommendation. We consider the recommendation resolved; it will 

remain open pending our receipt and review of the completed comprehensive 

evaluation examining whether the Secret Service’s current missions and 

operational engagements benefit the protective mission. 

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Conclusion 

In most cases, the initial changes, proposed improvements, and funding 

appropriated for PMP initiatives should address the security challenges the 

PMP identified in its report and lead to more effective protective operations and 

organizational management. However, some of the actions the Secret Service 

has initiated to address the PMP’s findings may not fully resolve problems with 

staffing, training, and management of the organization in the near term. The 

Secret Service must remain committed to these reforms. 

We reviewed the Secret Service at the peak of the presidential election cycle 

when the operational tempo, demands on its workforce, and focus on the 

protective mission were remarkable. Yet, in such a demanding time, Secret 

Service managers continued to implement, monitor progress on, and develop 

PMP-related initiatives. 

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Appendix A 

Objective, Scope, and Methodology 

DHS OIG was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 

107−296) by amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. We conducted 

this review, as directed by Congress in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 

2016, to evaluate the actions the Secret Service has taken or plans to take to 

implement the PMP recommendations and determine whether these actions 

meet the intent of the PMP’s findings and recommendations. 

On September 19, 2014, an intruder jumped over the North Fence of the WHC 

and entered the White House before Secret Service personnel could apprehend 

him. Following this incident, the DHS Secretary established the PMP, 

requesting that its members undertake a broad independent review of the 

Secret Service’s WHC protection. The PMP completed its review on December 

15, 2014, making 19 recommendations in an unclassified report. We reviewed 

the Secret Service’s progress implementing the 19 unclassified PMP 

recommendations. (We will issue a second, classified report on the status of the 

PMP’s classified recommendations.) 

To achieve our objectives, we collected and reviewed Secret Service 

documentation to verify actions taken and planned since December 2014 to 

address the PMP’s findings and recommendations. We also interviewed Secret 

Service senior officials responsible for strategy, staffing, training, technology, 

budget, communication, and protective operations at the WHC. 

We conducted this review between February and July 2016 under the authority 

of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to the Quality 

Standards for Inspection and Evaluation issued by the Council of the 

Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. 

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Appendix B 

Secret Service Comments to the Draft Report 

 
 

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Recommendation 11: The Actions taken 

Secret Service should • October 2015, implemented SPARK!, a 

create more opportunities crowdsourcing communication platform, which 

for officers and agents to allows two-way communication between the 

provide input on their workforce and leadership and facilitates making 

mission and train its mid- suggestions, sharing ideas, and finding solutions 

and lower-level managers • March to April 2015, contracted a consulting 

to encourage, value and service to perform Work/Life Integration 

respond to such feedback. Assessment 

• In December 2015, began offering “Enhancing 

Workplace Communication” training course 

• FY 2015-2016, used a variety of communication 

platforms, including: 

 Video messages delivered to employees 

 More information accessible on the intranet 

 Narrated Power Point presentations explaining 

changes 

 More direct emails to all employees 

 Use of “Frequently Asked Questions” messages 

to encourage communication 

Actions ongoing or planned 

• Continue to conduct executive-level meetings with 

operational personnel at all levels of the 

organization and use more “town hall” interactive 

meetings 

• Expand “Enhancing Workplace Communication” 

training course 

• Continue using internal surveys for employees to 

obtain feedback and seek improvements 

PMP Recommendation Summary of Secret Service Response 

Appendix C 

PMP Recommendations, Status, and Summary of the Secret 

Service Response 

Partially Resolved 

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Milestones Identified 

PMP Recommendation Summary of Secret Service Response 

Recommendation 7: The Actions taken 

outer fence that surrounds • August 2015, completed installation of interim 

the 18 Acres must be anti-climb measures around the entire perimeter 

replaced to give Secret of the WHC 

Service personnel more • September 2015, design contract awarded. 

time to react to intrusions. • October 2015, began preliminary fence design 

• April 2016 to May 2016, presented preliminary 

concepts for the new fence to the Commission of 

Fine Arts (CFA) and National Capital Planning 

Commission (NCPC) 

• May 2016, money forwarded to Army Corps of 

Engineers for Engineering Validation Study 

• June 2016, CFA preliminarily approved the plan to 

upgrade the White House fence 

Actions ongoing or planned 

• July 2016, information presentation to CFA and 

NCPC on Phase 2 – Treasury building and 

Eisenhower Executive Office Building 

• Fall 2016, CFA and NCPC Concept Review for 

Phase 2 

• 1st Quarter FY 2017, independent threat review 

and validation 

• 1st Quarter FY 2017, construction contract 

• 2nd Quarter FY 2017, full-scale fence mock-up 

• 3rd Quarter FY 2017, final stakeholder approval 

for White House grounds fence 

• 4th Quarter FY 2017 and Quarters 1–4 of FY 

2018, purchase materials and services and begin 

construction 

Recommendation 10: The Actions taken 

Secret Service needs to • December 2014, established procedures that 

present a zero-based or encourage the lifecycle planning and continuity of 

mission-based budget that management 

will provide sufficient • July 2015, Human Capital Plan (FY 2015–2019) 

resources to accomplish its submitted to Congress; attempted to align staffing 

mission, beginning resources with Secret Service mission 

immediately by working requirements to guide short and long-term hiring 

within DHS to adopt a • November 2015, analyzed data on domestic and 

workforce staffing model. foreign travel to project costs more accurately 

• November 2015 to April 2016, approved the MBB 
 

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

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Implementation Plan, developed Financial 

Management Data Collection Systems and 

decision package templates, ranked and 

prioritized decision packages, and submitted FY 

2018–2022 RAP to the DHS Chief Financial Officer 

Actions ongoing or planned 

• Continue to monitor and evaluate the MBB 

budgeting process 

• Continue to refine workforce staffing models and 

require a third party validation for staffing 

allocation models 

In Progress 

• Staffing 

PMP Recommendation Summary of Secret Service Response 

Recommendation 1: The 

Secret Service should be 

staffed at a level that 

enables it to provide a 

true Fourth Shift for 

training to its protective 

forces, and to ensure that 

Uniformed Division 

officers are in training

for no less than 10% of 

their time. 

Actions taken 

Staffing 

• July 2015, prepared Human Capital Plan (FY 2015 – 

FY 2019), which: 

 Was developed through application of staffing 

allocation models designed to ensure that the 

workforce is “properly trained” 

 Estimates workforce to grow from 6,350 

personnel in FY 2015 to 7,600 in FY 2019 

 Emphasizes the necessity of fourth shift training 

for Special Agents in protection and at least 10 

percent of mission-readiness training for UD 

personnel 

• April 2016, submitted FY 2018–2022 RAP to the 

DHS Chief Financial Officer. This document: 

 Specifies FYs 2018–2022 staffing levels required 

to ensure employees receive “a predictable 

schedule of training, overtime levels are 

minimized and regular leave restrictions are 

avoided” 

 Explains that the funding for the outlined staffing 

levels will enable the Secret Service to increase 

the level of mission-critical training 

 Estimates workforce to grow to 8,225 in FY 2022 

• Developed National Recruitment Strategy for FY 

2016–2020 as a basis for strategic recruitment 
 

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initiatives 

•	 In FY 2015, allocated 37 additional positions to the 

RTC to keep pace with increased training demands 

*For more initiatives on hiring/retention, see “Actions 

taken” for Recommendations 4 and 5. 

Training 

•	 February 2015, separated training functions from 

human resources area and established Office of 

Training as a separate directorate to focus on 

enhancing training 

•	 April 2015, RTC began tracking weekly attendance 

for training events 

•	 FY 2015, began adding training sessions for Special 

Agents assigned to PPD and Vice Presidential 

Protective Division, as well as UD members from the 

WHC and Special Operations Branch 

•	 FY 2016, the Office of Training created the Regional 

In-Service Training Section at RTC 

Actions ongoing or planned 

Staffing 

•	 Plans to validate staffing allocation models through 

a third party starting in August 2016 

•	 Develop human capital performance measures and 

report them on a quarterly basis 

* For more initiatives on hiring/retention, see “Actions 

ongoing or planned” for Recommendations 4 and 5. 

Training 

•	 Plans to publish a catalogue of available training 

courses 

•	 Plans to solicit field-based training coordinators and 

trainers 

•	 Fully transition to the DHS-sponsored Performance 

and Learning Management System by the end of FY 

2016 

•	 Maintain or improve upon the current 40-hour 

annual training target for UD staff (40 hours 

represents about 2.2 percent of time spent training 

versus 10 percent identified in PMP 

Recommendation 1) 

Recommendation 4: The Actions taken: 

Uniformed Division force 

should be increased, as 

• FY 2015, began to improve the hiring process. (*For 

the initiatives on hiring, see “Actions taken” for 
 

 

 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

quickly as can be 

appropriately managed,

by an initial 200 

positions, and the

Presidential Protective 

Division should be 

similarly increased by 85 

positions. Additional

analyses and, likely,

future increases will be 

necessary. 

Recommendation 5.) 

• FY 2015, brought Special Agents from the Office of 

Investigations to the WHC to temporarily fill UD 

Officer posts 

• As of July 2016, increased UD staff at the WHC by 

44 members and 131 recruits in active training 

• As of July 2016, added 77 Special Agents to PPD 

• FY 2016, initiated a requirement for newly 

commissioned Special Agent graduates to complete 

2-week protective assignments at the WHC 

• FYs 2015–2016, began implementing retention 

programs 

 UD Retention Bonus Program (more than 1,000 

UD participants) 

 Student Loan Repayment Program (122 approved 

participants as of July 2016) 

 Tuition Assistance Program ($1.5 million funded 

for FY 2016) 

 Senior Special Agent/Senior Resident Agent 

Program (156 participants as of July 2016) 

• FY 2016, received approvals for temporary 

measures aimed at augmenting staffing: 

 Received a Dual Compensation Reduction Waiver 

from the Office of Personnel Management to reemploy retired Secret Service Special Agents and 

UD Officers without reducing their retirement 

annuity for 2 years 

 Through the authority of the DHS Secretary, 

waived the yearly overtime cap of $35,000 for all 

eligible employees 

Actions ongoing or planned 

• Continue the preceding initiatives 

• Begin implementing planned retention initiatives 

 1st quarter FY 2017, Child Care Subsidy 

Program 

 FY 2017, APT Career Progression Plan 

• Continue to work with DHS, Office of Personnel 

Management, and Congress on initiatives requiring 

legislative action, such as UD Officers stepcompression table, lost leave payback, and increase 

of the current max-out cap9 

 

9 “Max-out cap” refers to the annual earnings limitations put in place through 5 U.S. Code 

5547, the Code of Federal Regulations, and congressional mandates prohibiting most General 

Schedule employees from receiving a salary above those limitations, currently $160,300. 

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• Training 

PMP Recommendation Summary of Secret Service Response 

Recommendation 2: The Actions taken 

Secret Service should •	 FY 2015, initiated EA/BD training course for UD 

implement integrated personnel, including recruits; training includes 

training focused on practical exercises integrating response from 

ensuring that all teams Emergency Response Team members and UD 

at the White House know Officers at the WHC 

their roles in responding •	 June 2015, managed National Capital Region 

to specific threats. tabletop exercise to identify gaps at the strategic 

level for critical incidents in the National Capital 

Region and at the WHC; representatives from all 

Secret Service directorates and 16 external law 

enforcement partners participated 

•	 FY 2015, expanded mission in-service training for 

UD officers and training for PPD Special Agents; 

continued to offer these training opportunities in FY 

2016 when staffing allowed 

•	 January 2016, reorganized RTC to identify 

efficiencies in and between various branches and 

sections and facilitate more effective crossfunctional relationships 

•	 FY 2016, initiated a requirement for newly 

commissioned Special Agent graduates to complete 

a 2-week protective assignment at the WHC, 

exposing them to daily WHC operations and 

providing integrated training with UD Officers 

•	 FY 2015, began offering regular Service Rifle 

familiarization courses for Special Agents and UD 

personnel 

Actions ongoing or planned 

•	 Continue to manage integrated tabletop sessions 

and practical exercises for all applicable Secret 

Service protective operational units and partners in 

the National Capital Region. 

•	 Plans to review and evaluate Special Agent and UD 

member mission in-service courses in FY 2016 

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Recommendation 3: The 

Secret Service should 

train in conditions that 

replicate the physical

environment in which 

they will operate, and 

conduct full joint

exercises of Uniformed 

Division, Special

Operations Division,

Presidential Protective 

Division, and JOC [Joint

Operations Center]

personnel. 

Actions taken 

• FY 2015, the RTC began work to incorporate a fullscale Building Defense Training Facility 

• July 2015, awarded a contract for a feasibility study 

for the Building Defense Training Facility and an 

update of the RTC master plan 

• March 2016, signed a contract with the NCPC for 

preliminary approval submission 

• April 2016, the feasibility study was completed and 

the RTC master plan was being updated 

Actions ongoing or planned 

• FYs 2017–2018, anticipated approval of master plan 

by NCPC; design and construction of the Building 

Defense Training Facility to begin 

• Technology 

PMP Recommendation Summary of Secret Service Response 

Recommendation 6: The Actions taken 

Secret Service must do • April to December 2015, put professional subject 

more to ensure that its matter experts in key positions and re-aligned 

Office of Technical personnel and assets to optimize the Technical 

Development and Mission Development and Mission Support and CIO 

Support proactively directorates 

reviews and refreshes its • Prepared spend plans for FY 2016 and identified 

technological footprint. funding necessary for securing critical facilities and 

The Service should venues in FY 2017 

continue to receive • May 2016, expanded deployment of SR-16s and 

dedicated funds for began offering Service Rifle Familiarization courses. 

technology, both within • Some actions taken are classified 

its own budget and 

within DHS Science & Actions ongoing or planned 

Technology’s budget, to • Pilot deployment of Electronic Control Devices 

accomplish these tasks. (Taser X2). 

• Chemical Detection Field Experiments Project with 

DHS Science and Technology Directorate to develop 

prototype man-portable chemical agent detection 

systems 

• Identification of technology for less lethal 

engagement of intruders and aggressors 

• Exploration and integration of unmanned aerial 

vehicles detection and tracking technology 
 

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•	 Deployment of next generation presidential 

limousine 

•	 Some ongoing or planned actions are classified 

• Leadership and Organizational Issues 

PMP Recommendation Summary of Secret Service Response 

Recommendation 5: The 

Secret Service needs a 

reformed, 

professionalized 

recruiting, hiring,

promotion and rotation

process that puts the

most talented, capable 

individuals in place as

efficiently as possible. 

Actions taken 

• FY 2015, began to enhance and change recruiting 

and hiring processes: 

 Initiated the SUPER Interview, during which an 

applicant listens to a job briefing, discusses 

security issues, and completes both self- and 

competency-based assessments 

 Expanded use of Entry Level Assessment Centers 

to accelerate the hiring process and allow 

candidates to complete hiring steps, such as 

testing, SUPER interview, security paperwork, 

fingerprinting, and polygraph exams more 

efficiently 

 Developed and implemented the Applicant 

Coordinating Center by creating a team of 

specialty experts and a process to facilitate 

applicant movement through critical parts of the 

hiring process 

 Published the Special Agent Career Progression 

Guidelines on September 1, 2015, which explain 

the career progression plan and facilitate more 

predictable transfer cycles 

 Improved the Special Agent Re-assignment 

Committee process by increasing transparency, 

clarity, and certainty on how the quarterly 

reassignment process cycle works throughout the 

year 

 Assessed and updated the Special Agent Merit 

Promotion Plan from GS-14 to GS-15 to facilitate 

career development for Special Agents 

 Increased use of social media in recruiting 

Actions ongoing or planned 

• Develop a new entry-level, computer-based, 

competency exam for UD applicants 

• Designing a psychological assessment for entry-level 

Special Agent and UD officer applicants 

• Continue efforts to hire APT personnel and develop 
 

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an APT personnel career track 

• Continue to review UD positions to identify duties 

that may be performed by non-law enforcement 

personnel; as of July 2016, six positions held by UD 

members approved for conversion to administrative 

positions 

Recommendation 9: The 

Secret Service needs to 

promote specialized 

expertise in its budget,

workforce, and 

technology functions. 

Actions taken 

• January 2015, Director announced impending 

leadership changes in the Secret Service 

management team and made the following changes 

to promote specialized expertise in budget, 

workforce, and technology functions: 

 February 2015, appointed a non-law 

enforcement professional to lead the newly 

established Secret Service Office of the Chief 

Financial Officer 

 July 2015, appointed a non-law enforcement 

professional appointed to lead the newly 

established Office of the Chief Operating Officer 

 April 2015, appointed non-law enforcement 

professionals to lead the newly established Office 

of Strategic Planning and Policy and Office of 

Technical Development and Mission Support 

 December 2015, appointed a civilian to lead the 

newly established Office of CIO 

 April 2016, appointed a civilian Director of 

Communications 

• May 2015, reorganized the functions of the Office of 

Human Resources to give priority to recruiting and 

hiring staff; focused a newly created Talent and 

Employee Acquisition Management Division on 

recruiting and hiring 

• October 2014–April 2016, hired 157 personnel to fill 

APT positions; of these 6 were GS-15 and Senior 

Executive Service personnel 

Actions ongoing or planned 

The Secret Service did not have additional plans at the 

time of our review. 

Recommendation 15: Actions taken 

Secret Service leadership • FY 2015, established the Office of Strategic 

needs to give its Planning and Policy to assist in developing 

priorities and reforms organizational strategic planning, policy, and 

sustained attention, ensure completion of relevant efforts 

holding the agency • As detailed in “Actions taken” for Recommendation 

accountable through to 
 

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their completion. 9, the Director made significant changes to the 

Secret Service organizational structure to facilitate 

accomplishing reforms 

• April 2015, established a monthly reporting process 

to update the Director on progress toward 

implementing PMP recommendations 

Actions ongoing or planned 

• September 2016, expect a draft report from a third 

party contracted to perform an independent 

validation study of organizational change efforts, 

which will assess the demonstrated or expected 

effectiveness of reforms and recommend any needed 

modifications 

• Facilitate additional changes to organizational 

structure, as required 

Recommendation 16: The 

Secret Service needs to 

implement its

disciplinary system in a 

consistent manner that 

demonstrates zero 

tolerance for failures 

that are incompatible 

with its zero-failure 

mission. 

Actions taken 

• In 2013, established the Office of Integrity and 

published the Table of Penalties (pre-dating the PMP 

recommendations). To improve transparency of its 

disciplinary system, published two Annual 

Discipline Reports (for 2014 and 2015) on the 

Secret Service’s intranet. The reports include: 

 Annual statistics and analysis of the Secret 

Service’s disciplinary program 

 An overview of disciplinary actions taken by 

deciding officials 

 Trends in misconduct and offenses 

 Analysis of results 

• In March 2015, the Director sent a memorandum 

on misconduct reporting procedures, stating that all 

employees are required to report any activities that 

violate the Secret Service standards of conduct or 

negatively impact the mission of the Secret Service. 

Actions ongoing or planned 

• The Office of Integrity plans to publish a monthly 

report for Secret Service’s top leadership 

documenting all pending and completed disciplinary 

and adverse actions 

Recommendation 17: Actions taken 

Front-line supervisors • November 25, 2015, established Unusual Protective 

need to hold their forces Events and Incident Reporting Protocols to ensure 

accountable for operational-level analysis and evaluation of 
 

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Department of Homeland Security 

performance by protective operations, as well as consistent records 

constantly testing of unusual events and protective incidents 

readiness. •	 FY 2016, another Government entity evaluated 

Protective Detail Training programs of instruction as 

part of continual review of protection tactics, 

techniques, and procedures 

•	 FY 2015, trained Joint Operations Center personnel 

to better leverage the center’s critical incident 

response capabilities 

•	 April 2016, collaborated with another Government 

entity to conduct a mission analysis of protection 

protocols 

Actions ongoing or planned 

•	 Plans to develop scenario-based readiness testing 

from updated UD policies and to enhance on-thejob training programs 

•	 Developing module within Protective Threat 

Management System to document, report, and 

evaluate Unusual Protective Events; following 

evaluation, supervisors can develop readiness tests 

to counter incidents 

Recommendation 19: The Actions taken 

Secret Service needs to •	 July 2014, re-established Senior Executive Service 

establish a leadership Candidate Development Program 

development system that •	 October 2015, published policy on a Leader 

identifies and trains the Development Program for all Secret Service 

agency’s future managers employees, in partnership with DHS 

and leaders. •	 FY 2015-2016, provided opportunities for personnel 

to participate in continuing education and 

leadership programs, such as the Naval 

Postgraduate School Executive Leaders Program, 

Naval War College, Department of Defense Senior 

Service School, and National Intelligence University 

 

Actions ongoing or planned 

•	 Communicate the Leader Development Program’s 

requirements, expectations, and course availability 

to employees 

•	 Seek restoration of funds for the law enforcement 

leadership training once received through Johns 

Hopkins University 

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• External Engagement 

PMP Recommendation Summary of Secret Service Response 

Recommendation 12: The 

Secret Service needs to 

lead the federal 

protective force 

community. 

Actions taken 

• FY 2015 through July 2016, conducted 31 intraand interagency tabletop and joint training exercises 

• Coordinated five National Special Security Events 

• FY 2015, increased external training 180 percent 

over FY 2014 

• Delivered presentations on a behavior-based 

approach for protective intelligence, threat 

assessment, and targeted violence prevention to 

more than 3,500 personnel 

Actions ongoing or planned 

• Expand and cultivate partnerships that can 

positively impact the protective and investigative 

missions 

• Continue to conduct intra- and interagency tabletop 

exercises 

Recommendation 13: The Actions taken 

Secret Service should • September 2015 and April 2016, collaborated with 

receive periodic, outside another Government entity to develop security 

assessments of the protocols 

threats to and strategies

for protecting the White • Additional external assessments conducted are 

House compound. classified 

Actions ongoing or planned 

• Proposed a working group with the White House 

Military Office to develop various assessments 

• Additional ongoing or planned assessments are 

classified 
 

 

 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Recommendation 14: The 

Secret Service needs to 

resume participation in 

international fora with 

comparable protective 

services of friendly

nations. 

Actions taken 

• December 2015, presented information to the 

International Law Enforcement Academy in 

Thailand. 

• March–June 2015, Papal site survey teams 

• FYs 2015–2016, met with and/or provided training 

to security officials from Israel, Germany, Canada, 

Republic of Korea, Romania, Brazil, Portugal, The 

Netherlands, Palestinian Territories, and Spain 

• May 2016, conducted training for the International 

Law Enforcement Association in El Salvador 

• Invited foreign security services to participate in 

Secret Service-hosted training sessions and 

divisional briefings on current intelligence-related 

trends and tactics 

Actions ongoing or planned 

• Establish an internal working group to evaluate the 

effectiveness of current practices for sharing 

intelligence with international partners 

• Determine the feasibility of conducting regularly 

scheduled information sharing events with 

international organizations 

Insufficient Progress 

Summary of PMP Finding 

and Recommendation 

Summary of Secret Service Response 

Summary of the PMP’s 

discussion leading to

Recommendation 8: The 

Secret Service needs to 

evaluate how its various 

mission areas and 

operational capabilities

fit with and support the

primary protective

mission. 

Actions ongoing or planned 

• FY 2016, began developing domestic office footprint 

using cost, work, and performance data 

• Director, Deputy Director, and Assistant Director of 

the Office of Investigations routinely evaluate the 

need to establish, close, resize, or consolidate field 

offices 

• Incorporate the statistical data from annual 

performance metrics to show evidence that the 

Secret Service prioritizes protective mission and 

protection-related investigations 

www.oig.dhs.gov 36 OIG-17-10 
 

www.oig.dhs.gov 37 OIG-17-10 

 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Recommendation 8: The 

Secret Service needs to 

clearly communicate

agency priorities, give

effect to those priorities

through its actions, and

align its operations with

its priorities. 

Actions taken 

• December 2014, Director’s memo to senior officials 

communicated priority areas for inclusion in the FY 

2017–2021 RAP, including: 

 Increase staffing 

 Deliver more training 

 Improve morale 

 Improve communications between senior officials 

and staff 

 Enhance WHC security 

 Identify 2016 presidential campaign/election 

protection needs 

• February 2016, Director’s memo to senior officials 

communicated the same priorities for inclusion in 

the FY 2018–2022 RAP and stated that protection 

and investigations were priority mission areas 

• February 2016, Director delivered The State of the 

Secret Service Address, discussing progress on 

management priorities such as increasing staff, 

improving morale, providing more training, and 

improving communications 

Actions ongoing or planned 

• Continue benchmarking communications 

capabilities to peer organizations 

• Update the Strategic Plan 

• Continue issuing the Director’s priority memos 

Beyond the Secret Service’s Control 

PMP Recommendation Summary of Secret Service Response 

Recommendation 18: The 

next director of the 

Secret Service should be 

a strong leader from

outside the agency who

has a protective, law

enforcement or 

prosecutorial, or military 

background and who can 

drive cultural change in 

the organization and 

move the Secret Service 

forward into a new era. 

DHS and the President appoint the Director of the 

Secret Service; on February 18, 2015, Joseph Clancy 

was appointed as the Director of the Secret Service. 
 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 

 

 

Appendix D 

Secret Service’s Organization for Protecting the White House 

Complex 

OPO is mainly responsible for protecting the WHC, the President, the First 

Family, the Vice President, the Second Family, and all former Presidents, Vice 

Presidents (for a limited term), and their spouses. OPO also protects qualified 

presidential and vice presidential candidates, visiting foreign leaders, and other 

designated protectees. In addition to the WHC, OPO is responsible for security 

at the Naval Observatory and approximately 500 foreign missions. The OPO 

Assistant Director manages the following three entities with primary 

responsibility for protecting the WHC and its occupants. 

Presidential Protective Division 

PPD Special Agents provide the President’s and First Family’s personal 

protection. The division’s Special Agent in Charge is ultimately responsible for 

the operations and security of the WHC and safety of its occupants. 

Uniformed Division 

The UD performs day-to-day security operations at the WHC. UD Officers from 

the White House Branch carry out their protective responsibilities through a 

network of fixed security posts, and foot, bicycle, vehicular and motorcycle 

patrols. The UD also includes the Naval Observatory Branch, Foreign Missions 

Branch, and the Special Operations Branch. In addition, the UD performs 

security operations outside of Washington, DC, at temporary protective sites 

and National Security Special Events. The UD Chief also has a direct 

operational command and control for the daily protective activities undertaken 

by the UD. 

Special Operations Division 

The Special Operations Division provides specialized operational and tactical 

support for the Secret Service’s protective missions. The division manages and 

coordinates the activities of Secret Service Special Agents and specialized UD 

personnel, such as Emergency Response Team Officer Technicians and Canine 

Unit Officer Technicians, Counter Assault Team, and Counter Sniper Unit, 

which provide tactical response to unlawful intrusions and other protective 

challenges to the White House and its grounds. 

www.oig.dhs.gov 38 OIG-17-10 
 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

 

 

Appendix E 

Office of Inspections and Evaluations Major Contributors to 

This Report 

John Shiffer, Chief Inspector 

Tatyana Martell, Team Lead 

Elizabeth Kingma, Lead Inspector 

Amy Tomlinson, Lead Inspector 

Kelly Herberger, Communications Analyst 

LaDana Crowell, Independent Referencer 

www.oig.dhs.gov 39 OIG-17-10 
 

 

 

 

 

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

Department of Homeland Security 

Appendix F 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

U.S. Secret Service Office of Professional Responsibility 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees 

www.oig.dhs.gov 40 OIG-17-10 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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