[Cite as State v. Alexander, 2018-Ohio-1198.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 105969

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE 

vs. 

CALVIN L. ALEXANDER

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT:

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case Nos. CR-13-579939-A and CR-13-580048-A 

BEFORE: E.T. Gallagher, P.J., Stewart, J., and Blackmon, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 29, 2018 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Mark Stanton 

Cuyahoga County Public Defender 

BY: Jeffrey Gamso 

Assistant Public Defender 

Courthouse Square, Suite 200 

310 Lakeside Avenue 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Michael C. O’Malley 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

BY: Anthony Thomas Miranda 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

The Justice Center, 8th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.: 

{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Calvin L. Alexander, appeals from the trial court’s 

judgment denying his pro se motion to “nullify the judgment entry of convictions.” He 

raises the following assignment of error for review: 

The trial court committed error when it denied Mr. Alexander’s motion 

without appointing counsel to represent him and without explanation. 

{¶2} After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we affirm the trial 

court’s judgment. 

I. Procedural History

{¶3} At a single hearing held in March 2015, Alexander entered into a plea 

agreement with the state in Cuyahoga C.P. Nos. CR-13-579939-A and CR-13-580048-A. 

In Case No. CR-13-579939-A, Alexander pleaded guilty to one count of having weapons 

while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2), with a forfeiture specification; 

and one count of drug trafficking in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), with forfeiture 

specifications and a one-year firearm specification. The remaining counts of the 

indictment were nolled. 

{¶4} In Case No. CR-13-580048-A, Alexander pleaded guilty to four counts of 

aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01(A)(1), with one-year firearm 

specifications; two counts of kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(2), with 

one-year firearm specifications; and one count of having weapons while under disability 

in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(2). The remaining counts of the indictment were nolled. 
{¶5} At a single sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Alexander to an 

aggregate 12-year prison term. In Case No. CR-13-579939-A, Alexander was sentenced 

to one year in prison for having weapons while under disability and one year in prison for 

drug trafficking. The sentences were run concurrent to each other, but consecutive to a 

one-year prison term imposed on the firearm specification attached to the trafficking 

offense. 

{¶6} In Case No. CR-13-580048-A, Alexander was sentenced to a total of 11 years 

in prison. The trial court ordered the 11-year prison term to run concurrently with the 

sentence imposed on the underlying offenses in Case No. CR-13-579939-A, but 

consecutive to the one-year prison term imposed on the firearm specification in Case No. 

CR-13-579939-A. 

{¶7} Alexander did not file a direct appeal from his convictions and sentence. 

Instead, Alexander filed a pro se motion to discharge his convictions in March 2015, 

alleging that his speedy trial rights were violated. In September 2015, the trial court 

denied Alexander’s motion. 

{¶8} In May 2017, Alexander filed a pro se “motion to nullify judgment entry of 

conviction and discharge defendant.” In the motion, Alexander argued the judgment 

entries of conviction in Case Nos. CR-13-579939-A and CR-13-580048-A contain 

deficiencies and fail to comply with the mandatory requirements of Crim.R. 32. 

Because of the alleged deficiencies, Alexander sought vacation of his convictions and 

sentence, asserting that the judgment entries of conviction are void. 
{¶9} In June 2017, the trial court denied Alexander’s motion without a hearing. 

{¶10} Alexander now appeals from the trial court’s judgment. 

II. Law and Analysis

{¶11} In his sole assignment of error, Alexander argues the trial court erred by 

denying his motion to nullify the judgment entries of conviction without appointing 

counsel to represent him and without explanation. 

{¶12} “Where a criminal defendant, subsequent to his or her direct appeal, files a 

motion seeking vacation or correction of his or her sentence on the basis that his or her 

constitutional rights have been violated, such a motion is a petition for postconviction 

relief as defined in R.C. 2953.21.” State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 160, 679 

N.E.2d 1131 (1997), syllabus. Thus, for the purposes of this appeal, we construe 

Alexander’s pro se motion to nullify the judgment of his convictions as a petition for 

postconviction relief. 

{¶13} This court reviews the trial court’s decision granting or denying a 

postconviction relief petition for an abuse of discretion. State v. Kent, 8th Dist. 

Cuyahoga No. 94562, 2010-Ohio-6368, ¶ 8, citing State v. Gondor, 112 Ohio St.3d 377, 

2006-Ohio-6679, 860 N.E.2d 77, ¶ 45. A trial court is not obligated to hold a hearing on 

a petition for postconviction relief if the record and the petition fail to show that the 

defendant is entitled to relief. State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99357, 

2013-Ohio-2706, ¶ 14, citing State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 714 N.E.2d 905 

(1999). 
{¶14} Pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(A)(2), when no direct appeal is taken, a petitioner 

must file his or her petition for postconviction relief no later than 180 days after the 

expiration of the time for filing the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction. Here, 

Alexander was sentenced in March 2015, but his motion to nullify was not filed until May 

2017, well beyond the time limit for filing a timely petition for postconviction relief. 

Consequently, the trial court would generally have no jurisdiction to consider his untimely 

petition for postconviction relief. State v. Schultz, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85430, 

2005-Ohio-6627, ¶ 11. 

{¶15} In this case, however, Alexander’s untimely petition asserts that his 

sentences are void because the judgment entries of conviction in Case Nos. 

CR-13-579939-A and CR-13-580048-A are defective. In State v. Boswell, 121 Ohio 

St.3d 575, 2009-Ohio-1577, 906 N.E.2d 422, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a 

reviewing court has an obligation to recognize void sentences, vacate them, and order 

resentencing. Id. at ¶ 12. Relying on Boswell, this court has stated: 

[P]resumably, [the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision] means that a trial court, 

confronted with an untimely or successive petition for postconviction relief 

that challenges a void sentence, must ignore the procedural irregularities of 

the petition [and vacate the sentence if necessary]. 

State v. Meincke, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96407, 2011-Ohio-6473, ¶ 13, quoting State v. 

Holcomb, 184 Ohio App.3d 577, 2009-Ohio-3187, 921 N.E.2d 1077, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.). In 

these circumstances, appellate courts, including this court, have addressed the merits of 

otherwise untimely petitions to determine if any alleged errors rendered the defendant’s 

sentence void. See State v. Bandy, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 101785 and 101786, 
2015-Ohio-1033, ¶ 11; State v. Arios, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104821, 2017-Ohio-656, ¶ 

15; State v. Brown, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 16CA3770, 2017-Ohio-4063, ¶ 29. 

{¶16} On appeal, Alexander argues the judgment entries of conviction in Case 

Nos. CR-13-579939-A and CR-13-580048-A are “fatally defective and void” because 

they fail to specify “(1) the fact of conviction, (2) the verdict, (3) that the court gave him 

an opportunity to present mitigating evidence, (4) that the court gave him an opportunity 

to allocute, or (5) that the court informed him of his appellate rights, or that he requested 

an appeal and appointment of counsel for that appeal.” 

{¶17} Crim.R. 32(C) provides that “[a] judgment of conviction shall set forth the 

fact of conviction and the sentence.” The purpose of Crim.R. 32(C) is to ensure that a 

defendant is on notice concerning when a final judgment has been entered, and the time 

for filing an appeal has begun to run. State v. Lester, 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 

2011-Ohio-5204, 958 N.E.2d 142, ¶ 10. 

{¶18} In this case, a review of the judgment entries of conviction demonstrates that 

in each instance, the trial court memorialized Alexander’s guilty pleas and set forth his 

prison sentence in detail. In addition, each entry contains the judge’s signature, and the 

clerk of court’s time stamp. 

{¶19} Alexander does not dispute that the trial court sufficiently set forth his 

sentence in each journal entry. However, without expounding, Alexander broadly 

complains that the entries did not contain “the fact of the conviction or verdict.” 
Although Alexander’s position is vague, it appears he is arguing that the mere notation 

that Alexander pleaded guilty is not enough to satisfy the requirement of Crim.R. 32(C). 

{¶20} This court rejected a similar claim in State v. Rogers, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 99246, 2013-Ohio-3246. In Rogers, this court held that by stating in its journal 

entry that the defendant had entered a plea of guilty, the trial court satisfied the 

requirement that a judgment set forth “the fact of conviction.” Id. at ¶ 19, citing State v. 

Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163. See also State v. Taylor, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104313, 2016-Ohio-8057, ¶ 8. 

{¶21} Following the clear precedent of this court, we find the trial court satisfied 

the requirement that a judgment set forth “the fact of conviction” by stating in each 

journal entry that Alexander “plead guilty” to the offenses specified therein. Contrary to 

Alexander’s position, the trial court was not also required to make a specific finding of 

guilt or render a guilty verdict in order to comply with Crim.R. 32(C). Rogers at ¶ 17. 

{¶22} With respect to Alexander’s remaining challenges to the contents of the 

judgment entries of conviction, we recognize that Crim.R. 32(A)(1) requires a trial court 

to “afford counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant and address the 

defendant personally and ask if he or she wishes to make a statement in his or her own 

behalf or present any information in mitigation of punishment.” Similarly, Crim.R. 

32(B) requires the trial court to advise a defendant of his or her right to appeal the 

conviction. 
{¶23} Alexander does not assert that the trial court failed to comply with Crim.R. 

32(A)(1) and 32(B) at the time of his sentencing hearing. Instead, Alexander argues his 

sentences are void because the judgment entries of conviction do not contain statements 

by the court that it afforded Alexander allocution and advised him of his appellate rights. 

Alexander, however, has failed to direct this court to any controlling legal authority to 

suggest the trial court was required to reflect its compliance with Crim.R. 32(A)(1) and 

32(B) in the respective judgment entries of conviction. In fact, this court has 

consistently recognized that no duty exists under Crim.R. 32 to state in a sentencing entry 

that the defendant was advised of his right to appeal. State ex rel. Locke v. Friedland, 

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106330, 2018-Ohio-180, ¶ 8. Accordingly, we find the trial 

court had no obligation to memorialize the Crim.R. 32(A)(1) and 32(B) notifications in 

the judgment entries of conviction. 

{¶24} Next, Alexander asserts that his purported sentence is void due to the trial 

court’s failure to order a presentence investigation. He contends that the trial court’s 

inaction “prevented him from receiving a sentence of community control and violated his 

rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 

(2000), and its progeny.” We are not persuaded by Alexander’s argument. Crim.R. 

32.2, governing presentence investigations, mandates that such reports are required only 

in instances when the court imposes community control sanctions or probation. Because 

Alexander was sentenced to prison, there was no requirement that the court order a 

presentence investigation report. 
{¶25} Finally, Alexander argues the trial court committed reversible error by 

denying his motion to nullify without affording him the assistance of counsel. In the 

context of postconviction proceedings, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that “[a]n 

indigent petitioner has neither a state nor a federal constitutional right to be represented 

by appointed counsel in a postconviction proceeding.” State v. Crowder, 60 Ohio St.3d 

151, 152, 573 N.E.2d 652 (1991), citing Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S.Ct. 

1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987); State v. Taylor, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102020, 

2015-Ohio-1314, ¶ 9. Accordingly, the trial court was not required to appoint Alexander 

postconviction counsel. 

{¶26} Based on the foregoing, we find the record and petition do not identify an 

error that would render Alexander’s sentences void. Accordingly, the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for postconviction relief without holding a 

hearing. 

{¶27} Alexander’s sole assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶28} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellees recover from appellant costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to the common pleas court to carry this 

judgment into execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE 

MELODY J. STEWART, J., and 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR