U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

Bureau of Justice Assistance B u r e a u o f J u s t i c e A s s i s t a n c e

B

U

L

L

E

T

I

N

Protecting Judicial Officials:

Implementing an Effective

Threat Management Process

judicial threat manager to implement an effective threat management

process.

10 Golden Rules for Effective Threat Management 

Rule 1. Recognize the Need for a Threat Management Process

Rule 2.

Rule 3.

Rule 4.

Rule 5. Establish Liaison With Other Agencies

Rule 6.

Rule 7.

Rule 8. Apply Threat Management Strategies Flexibly and

Intelligently

Rule 9. Communicate With Protectees in a Professional,

Bureau of 

Justice Assistance

Overview

A successful threat management process consists of 10 basic

elements, each integral to all the others. They compose the golden

rules of contemporary threat management and demonstrate how the

judiciary can identify, assess, investigate, and manage risks of

violence to judicial officials. Following these 10 rules will allow the

Assign Responsibility of Managing Cases to Trained Threat

Managers

Provide Training for and Establish Liaison With Protectees

and Court Staff

Create an Incident Tracking System With Well­Documented

Files

Use Consistent and Valid Threat Assessment Methods

Conduct Thorough Fact Finding

Confident, and Competent Manner

Rule 10. Manage Cases Appropriately

Domingo S. Herraiz, Director

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA 

June 2006
Rule 1. Recognize the Need for

a Threat Management Process

Courts resolve disputes. They provide a neutral arena

for judging emotionally charged controversies.

Disputants bring their quarrels before the bench. Each

wants his or her claim sustained, each requests

vindication. Most who stand before the court

ultimately accept the court’s rulings, however adverse

to their own interests. But some will not and only care

for the result that most benefits them. When these

individuals’ views clash with the court’s decision,

violence may result.

Why do courts need threat management programs?

Because angry individuals, once denied their own

sense of justice, may turn to violence for exoneration,

vengeance, or even salvation. They may direct their

anger, revenge, and fears at the officials who personify

the judicial process: the judges, prosecutors, clerks,

and others who work within the system. So it is no

coincidence when these attacks occur at the

courthouse, as the building itself symbolizes both

dispensed and desired justice. Without a competent

threat management process to identify, assess, and

manage potential threats, the justice system risks

missing any opportunity to intervene and defuse the

situation.

In addition, the number of these disgruntled

individuals appears to be growing. Reports at the

federal level show a steady increase throughout the

1990s in inappropriate communications or contacts

(IC&Cs) directed toward federal jurists. The number of

IC&Cs reported to the U.S. Marshals Service rose

from a couple of hundred a year in the early 1990s to

more than 700 in 2004. Since 1979, three federal

judges have been killed. In March 2005, a former

claimant and suspect confessed to killing a federal

judge’s husband and mother. Prior to 1979, only one

federal judge was killed.1 Clearly, a ground shift

occurred that resulted in a significant increase in the

risk to federal judicial officials.

No comparable national data have yet been compiled

on the risks to state and local judicial officials.

Informal research by the National Sheriffs’

Association (NSA) suggests that during the past 35

years, eight state or local judges have been killed.

Another 13 were physically assaulted. Three local

prosecutors were killed, four assaulted. At least 5 law

enforcement officers have been killed at local

courthouses, 27 assaulted. At least 42 court

participants have been killed at local courthouses

and 53 assaulted. In March 2005, a Fulton County,

Georgia, jail prisoner delayed his escape long enough

to seek out the judge presiding at his trial. After

overpowering a deputy sheriff, he killed the judge and

a court reporter in the courtroom, then killed another

deputy sheriff outside the courthouse.

Risks to State and Local Judicial Officials: The

❒ 

❒ 

assaulted.

❒ 

❒ 

❒ 

❒ 

❒ 

❒ 

Past 35 Years

8 state or local judges have been killed.

13 state or local judges have been physically

3 local prosecutors have been killed.

4 local prosecutors have been assaulted.

5, if not more, law enforcement officers have

been killed at local courthouses.

27 law enforcement officers have been

assaulted at local courthouses.

42 court participants have been killed at local

courthouses.

53 court participants have been assaulted at

local courthouses.

A 1999 survey of 1,029 Pennsylvania state judges

found that 51.8 percent reported being the target of

1 Calhoun, Frederick S. 1998. Hunters and Howlers: Threats and

Violence Against Federal Judicial Officials in the United States,

1789–1993. Arlington, VA: U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Marshals

Service.

2
an IC&C sometime during the previous year. In

addition, more than 25 percent of the 1,029 state

judges were physically approached, 1.2 percent were

assaulted, and—more disturbing—more than one­third

admitted that they had changed their judicial conduct

as a result of the experience. Judges compelled to

change their judicial conduct may sacrifice justice for

security. The risk extends beyond the individual jurists

and goes directly to the ability of government at the

state, local, or federal levels to ensure justice to its

citizenry. Attacks on the judiciary are assaults on the

system of justice—one of the most crucial elements

of democratic self­government. 

Rule 2. Assign Responsibility

of Managing Cases to Trained

Threat Managers

Establishing a threat assessment process must be

emphasized, rather than a threat management unit or

program, because a specific composition or quantity

of resources should be determined locally. Depending

on the size of the court, potential number of IC&Cs

that might be reported, and number of cases that

might be opened, the threat management process can

be handled by a fully staffed unit of threat managers

or by one person as a part­time collateral

responsibility. Workload should be the principal

criterion for determining the number of personnel and

resources dedicated to the process.

Whatever the size or composition, whoever is

assigned threat management responsibilities should

be trained, and the training should be refreshed

periodically. A number of organizations provide threat

management training, and there is a growing library of

research, articles, and books on contemporary threat

management that can be accessed to better prepare

staff. In addition, agencies and organizations,

including the Office of Justice Programs’ Bureau of

Justice Assistance, are reexamining concepts such as

“secure by design” to determine their role in this

crime prevention arena. 

Rule 3. Provide Training for 

and Establish Liaison With

Protectees and Court Staff

The next step in establishing an effective threat

management process is to train court staff in what to

report and how to report IC&Cs. Training staff helps

the threat manager obtain the initial facts,

unembellished by exaggeration or worry, as quickly as

possible. Although key staff like judges, prosecutors,

and chief clerks should be well trained, the majority

of reports the threat manager will receive will come

from receptionists, mail handlers, perimeter security

officers, parking lot attendants, telephone operators,

cafeteria staff, and the newsstand operator. These are

the people who deal most with the public. They are

more likely to see, hear, or receive any IC&Cs, no

matter who is targeted. Training them on what

information to report and how to report it will ensure

that the threat manager gets reports on IC&Cs in a

timely and accurate manner.

Rule 4. Create an Incident

Tracking System With 

Well­Documented Files

Controlling the flow of information requires information

management. Depending on workload, managing the

information may require something as simple as an

index card system or as sophisticated as a computer

database. The system needs to be designed to

retrieve information quickly and efficiently. It should

include not only demographics on the subject, but also

key words used by or topics of known interest to the

subject. The latter may prove crucial in identifying

anonymous subjects. At a minimum, the following

variables should be captured for each IC&C:

❒ Case synopsis.

❒ Case specifics.

❒ How the IC&C was delivered.

3
❒ Content of and exact quotes from the IC&C.

❒ Suspect’s demographics.

❒ Target’s demographics.

❒ Suspect’s motive, especially in relation to a 

court case.

With information on these variables, the threat

manager can manage current cases, cross­reference

previous cases, share information on contentious

cases or problem individuals as a case works its way

up the appellate process or across jurisdictions, and

create an institutional memory for that judicial setting.

Whatever system is created, it should be designed for

easy sharing with other agencies and jurisdictions,

ideally as part of regional and national informationsharing networks.

Rule 5. Establish Liaison With

Other Agencies

It is absolutely vital for the threat manager to reach

out beyond the courthouse to make contact with law

enforcement agencies, private security firms that

provide protective services, and other judicial entities.

The threat manager must have information flowing

from all sources, both inside and outside the

courthouse, because only through information can the

threat manager begin to fill in the pieces of the

puzzle. Information from disparate sources can link

one IC&C to another and reveal relationships,

motives, past behaviors, and previous actions of the

subject—in and out of court.

Rule 6. Use Consistent and

Valid Threat Assessment

Methods

After receiving the initial IC&C report and gathering as

many facts as are immediately available, the threat

manager must next make an initial assessment from

which to design the immediate protective response,

set a course of fact finding, and begin identifying the

most appropriate threat management strategies. A

number of experts have developed some facile

assessment tools to help the manager think through

the case. For example, there are now tools that

provide a comprehensive approach when used

together. Threat managers can apply each tool in

every assessment, as each allows the threat manager

to examine what is known from a different angle. In

combination, they provide a thorough assessment of

the entire situation. Employing all of these tools helps

the threat manager identify what is not known, thus

giving direction to the protective fact finding.

These assessment tools address four broad but

related questions. In each case, the threat manager

should always ask:

❒ What are the circumstances surrounding and

context of the IC&C?

❒ What stakes are involved, from the subject’s 

point of view?

❒ Is the subject acting like a hunter?2

❒ Is the subject acting like a howler?3

Each of these questions focuses on different aspects

of the subject’s behaviors, motive, and intentions. The

first question simply requires the threat manager to

describe the IC&C, how it was delivered, to whom it

was delivered and directed, what message it says or

conveys, and what may have prompted it. The second

question deals with what may be at stake in any court

case involving the subject. It addresses how

desperate or driven toward violence the subject feels.

The third question seeks to determine if the subject

has engaged in behaviors common to attackers or

assassins. The fourth question takes the opposite

2 Hunters are people who attack without threatening.

3 Howlers are people who threaten without ever attacking.

4
Finding

5

Protective fact finding focuses on collecting facts

accurate and complete reassessment of the potential

the target frequently has some knowledge or

suspicion about the subject and knows the details of

threat manager about the issues and motivations that

threatening to the subject. The IC&C might be a

The strategies for defusing the risk to judicial officials

confrontational acts at the opposite end. The

directly affects the subject to using the authority of

illustrates the range of threat management strategies

The threat manager should consider all of the

Nonconfrontational Confrontational

Take No

Further

Action at

This Time

Watch

and

Wait

Third Party

Contro or

Monitoring

Subject

Interview

Civil

Order

Mental 

Health

Commitment

A rest

Passive Active

Gather

Information

Refocus or

Assist

Provide Warning

or Confront

tack and asks if the subject’s behaviors compare

similarly to the way nonattackers behave.

Rule 7. Conduct Thorough Fact

concerning the circumstances of the IC&C and what

prompted it, the subject, the target’s relation to the

subject, the subject’s past behaviors, and the

subject’s current behaviors. The purpose is to gather

enough information and evidence to support an

risks and the best way to defuse them. The judicial

setting contains two valuable aspects, each of which

offers a distinct advantage to the threat manager. 

First, the target and his or her staff can be an

invaluable source of information about the subject,

the subject’s issues and motive, and the subject’s

demeanor under stress. For instance, because most

IC&Cs to judicial officials are initiated by a court case,

the case. Often, court employees have observed how

the subject behaved in court. In addition, court

records are readily available in the clerk’s office.

Reviewing the records of the case may educate the

may have prompted previous and/or future

inappropriate or even dangerous actions or behaviors.

Second, the threat manager should remember that,

from the subject’s point of view, the courts may be

defensive reaction prompted by some action or

potential action by the court. The judiciary has the

authority to take an individual’s freedom, home, and

assets. It can order an individual to stay away from

former spouses and loved ones. It can punish

expressions of contempt. People driven to

desperation often act desperately. Information for

assessing how desperate the subject may feel is

readily available from the case files, the target, the

IC&C, court staff who have dealt with the subject, and

the subject’s friends and family, as well as through

interviews with the subject.

Rule 8. Apply Threat

Management Strategies

Flexibly and Intelligently

are best conceptualized as different options arrayed

along a spectrum, where each option falls within the

range that is determined by the option’s effect on the

subject. The spectrum reaches from discreet, passive

defensive measures at one end to intrusive,

strategies run the gamut from doing nothing that

the law to restrain the suspect. The figure below

available for defusing the risk to judicial officials.

strategies, weighing the effectiveness of each given

the particular and unique aspects of the case at

Figure 1: Threat Management Strategies
hand. Each one has specific advantages and

disadvantages, and each should be used only when

certain conditions apply. The threat manager must

determine which one offers the best chance for

defusing the risk in the case at hand at that particular

moment. Once a strategy has been identified and

implemented, the threat manager should immediately

recognize that the situation has changed precisely

because a strategy has been employed. The change

requires reevaluating the case, assessment, and

strategy, which may result in using other strategies.

Rule 9. Communicate With

Protectees in a Professional,

Confident, and Competent

Manner

The threat manager should take care, by word and

deed, to reassure the target and his or her staff that

the threat manager is a professional problemsolver

and that the responses to the incidents are under

control. In implementing the appropriate protective

responses, the threat manager should never increase

the protectee’s and staff’s fears by projecting the

wrong attitude or sharing information they might

misinterpret. Frequent updates and open lines of

communication with the protectees and their staff will

help the threat manager keep them calm, attentive to

instructions, and willing to follow the threat manager’s

lead. Judges, counted on to “be in charge,” are

frequently tempted to take charge. This should be

avoided.

The threat manager should always provide some

protective response every time an IC&C is reported.

Protective responses range from providing a security

briefing at a minimum to a full­fledged protective

detail or target relocation at the maximum. The

selection of the appropriate protective response

should be directly proportioned to the assessment

and findings of any protective investigation.

Always providing some level of protective response

serves two purposes. First, it enhances the

protectee’s security. Even a security briefing reminds

the protectee to take simple precautions and be

aware of and immediately report any suspicious

incidents. Naturally, going up the scale of protective

responses adds even more security. Provided that

each response is in proportion to the threat

assessment, the results of the protective fact finding,

and the success of the threat management

strategies, the threat manager will maintain a balance

between needed security and limited resources.

Second, always implementing some degree of

protective response sends a positive signal to the

protectee. It helps underscore the threat manager’s

professionalism, competence, and concern. That

signal will help allay the protectee’s fears and give

him or her the reassurance that everything necessary

is being done.

Rule 10. Manage Cases

Appropriately

Threat management cases are seldom open and shut.

They begin when an IC&C, not necessarily a crime,

has been directed toward a protectee. But unlike

criminal cases, they have no climactic point of closing.

Even the most blatant and direct threatener can be

arrested and convicted of that crime but continue

threatening or, worse, plotting, from jail. An

anonymous subject may direct an IC&C toward a

judicial official, then never be heard from again. When

can either case be closed? Neither arrest and

conviction nor time’s cooling effects seem enough to

support case closure.

Threat management cases are not about investigating

or solving crimes. They are about managing an

6
individual’s behavior. Threat managers do not have a

caseload of crimes assigned to them. Rather, threat

managers are assigned problem individuals.

Consequently, a threat manager’s caseload is a hybrid

between a criminal caseload and a parole or

probation officer’s caseload.

Hence, it is recommended that threat managers avoid

the terminology that has been historically used when

opening or closing a threat management case.

Instead, it is preferred that cases be designated as

one of the following:

❒ Active.

❒ Inactive. 

❒ Chronic or habitual.

❒ Long term. 

These designations are best suited for handling threat

management cases.

Contemporary threat management for judicial officials

seeks to avert violence altogether. The judiciary must

expand its security from simply fortifying courthouses

and reacting to violent attacks. It needs to incorporate

an effective threat management process for defusing

the risk of violence before the violence erupts. An

effective threat management process does not infer

the ability to predict violence. Instead, it entails

establishing procedures to enable the threat manager

to identify potential problem individuals, assess the

seriousness of the risk, investigate the

circumstances, and then devise the appropriate

strategies for managing the subject. Implementing an

effective threat management process requires the

judiciary to follow the “10 golden rules.” Doing so will

further enhance the judiciary’s security.

202–616–6500

1–800–859–2687

Bureau of Justice Assistance Clearinghouse

P

1–800–851–3420

JUSTINFO

Office of Justice Programs

conclusions or recommendations expressed in this document are

7

Bureau of Justice Assistance

Information

BJA’s mission is to provide leadership and services in grant

administration and criminal justice policy to support local,

state, and tribal justice strategies to achieve safer

communities. For more indepth information about BJA, its

programs, and its funding opportunities, contact:

Bureau of Justice Assistance

810 Seventh Street NW.

Washington, DC 20531

Fax: 202–305–1367

www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA

E­mail: AskBJA@usdoj.gov

The BJA Clearinghouse, a component of the National Criminal

Justice Reference Service, shares BJA program information

with federal, state, local, and tribal agencies and community

groups across the country. Information specialists provide

reference and referral services, publication distribution,

participation and support for conferences, and other

networking and outreach activities. The clearinghouse

can be contacted at:

.O. Box 6000

Rockville, MD 20849–6000

Fax: 301–519–5212

www.ncjrs.gov

Questions/Comments: www.ncjrs.gov/App/ContactUs.aspx

Clearinghouse staff are available Monday through Friday,

10 a.m. to 6 p.m. eastern time. Ask to be placed on the

BJA mailing list.

To subscribe to the electronic newsletter 

and become a registered NCJRS user, visit

www.ncjrs.gov/subreg.html.

Partnerships for Safer Communities

www.ojp.usdoj.gov

This document was prepared by the National Sheriffs’ Association

via funding from the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice

Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions, findings, and

those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official

position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Additional Resources on

Protecting Judicial Officials

This publication was written by Frederick S. Calhoun and Stephen W.

Weston and based on the authors’ book, Defusing the Risk to Judicial

Officials: The Contemporary Threat Management Process. Mr. Calhoun

was the lead researcher and principal architect in developing the threat

assessment process used by the U.S. Marshals Service for analyzing

risks to federal judicial officials. At the request of the National Sheriffs’

Association, Mr. Calhoun also coordinated a curriculum and led a

nationwide training program on contemporary threat management for

local law enforcement. 

Mr. Weston is a 31­year veteran of California law enforcement. Since

1991, he has been the supervisor of a specialized unit responsible for

the investigation of threats against California state officials. Mr. Weston

also is on the faculty of California State University, Sacramento, in the

Criminal Justice Division.

For information about available threat management training, visit the

Bureau of Justice Assistance’s training and technical assistance web

page at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/tta/index.html. The National Sheriffs’

Association (www.sheriffs.org) and Specialized Training Services

(www.specializedtraining.com/index.htm) also provide exceptional

trainings, seminars, conferences, and home­study programs. And the

national chapter of the Association of Threat Assessment

Professionals (www.atapusa.org) holds annual conventions in

Southern California every August, while its local chapters host 1­day

seminars in various cities throughout the year. These organizations,

as well as the library of research, articles, and books on

contemporary threat management, are what will keep best practices

in the forefront and judicial officials safe.

*NCJ~213930*