i i i i i i



### OPIN ION No
. 04 -0 9- 00 31 5- CR Reg ino P AL AC IOS , Appellant
v . T h e STA TE of

Te xas, Appellee Fr om the 156th J udicial District Court, McMullen County , Texas

Trial Court No. M-08-0011-CR-B Honora ble Michae l Evere tt W elborn, Judge Pre siding Opinion by : Kar en Ang elini, J ustice Sitt ing: Kar en Ang elini, J ustice

Steven C. Hilbig, Just ice Marialy n Ba rnar d, J ustice Deliver ed and F iled: April 14, 2010 AFF I RMED Re g ino Pa la c ios a

pp e a ls the de nia l of

his mot ion

to s up pr e ss. We a ff

ir m. B ACKG ROUND Palacios wa s char g ed with possession of marijuana in an amount gre at er than five pounds and less than f

ifty pounds. He f

iled a motion to suppress, arguing that beca use the off

icer did not have re a so na

ble su sp ic ion

to s top the va

n Pa la c ios wa s d

ri ving , Pa la c ios wa s il le g a lly sto pp e d in04

- 09

- 00 31 5- CR

- 2- violation of the Four

th Amendment to t he Constituti on. Palacios’s motion to suppress was not hea rd as a pr etrial matter , but was instead he ard at the same time as a trial on the merits bef

ore the bench. At trial, Chief Deputy Sheriff Wil liam A insworth of the McMullen Count y S h er i ff’s De pa rtme nt t e sti fi e d a

bo ut s top pin g Pa la c ios ’s va n f or a tr a ff ic vio latio n. Ac c or din g to D e puty Ainsworth, on August 23, 2008, at 7: 30 p.m., althoug h it was not y et dar k, it had been r aining and
was c loudy . Deputy

Ainsworth testified that he was pulling onto Highw ay 16 when he saw a

black
and sil ve r v an p a ss. Ac c or din g to D e puty Ai ns wo rt h, wh e n th e ve hic le pa sse d, he “ sa w the lig hts
wer e on [but] there was no lice nse plate light
. ” S o , h e pulled the van ove r for not having a lig ht illumi nating the license plate. When the van stopped, Reg ino Palacios immediately g ot out of the van and a pproac hed De puty

Ainsworth’s patr ol car . Deputy Ainsworth then showe d Palacios that his lic e n s e p late li g h t w a s n o t w o r k in g . D e p u ty A in s w o rth b e g an qu e s ti o n in g Pa la c ios and deter mined that Palacios did not have a driver’ s license – only an expired identification card f rom I llinois – and that the van was reg istered in L are do, Texas. Deputy Ainsworth aske d Palacios whe re he wa s g oing. Pala cios re p l i ed that he wa s g oing to San Antonio. De puty Ainsworth aske d why Pa la c ios wa s o n Hig hw ay 16 if he wa s tr ave lin g to S an A nto nio fr om L are do . A c c or din g to D e puty Ainsworth, P alac ios claimed that he had first trave led t o Ba nquete to visit a frie nd, and then de cided to g o to San Antonio. Deputy Ainsworth then aske d the passeng er of the van se parately

if Palacios ha d a sk e d th e pa sse ng e r “t o g o rid ing wi th him .” Th e pa sse ng e r re pli e d that Pala c ios ha d a sk e d h im to a c c omp any

Pa la c ios on

a tr ip t o H ou sto n, but that whe n th e y g ot t o F re e r, the y

de c ide d to g o to San Antonio. Havingrec eived two diff ere nt stories, Deput y Ai n s wo rth bec ame suspicious. He
a sk e d th e pa sse ng e r i f h e ha d a dr ive r’ s li c e ns e . H ow e ve r, a ll the passe nger cou ld prod uc e wa s a Te xas i de nti fi cat io n card . A t th a t po int , b e c a us e ne ith e r P a la c ios no r t he pa sse ng e r h a d a

va lid04

- 09

- 00 31 5- CR

- 3- dr ive r’s lic e ns e , a

nd ne ith e r c ou ld p ro du c e pr oo f o f i ns ur anc e fo r t he va n, De puty Ai ns wo rt h to ld the m that the va

n wa s g oin g to be imp ound e d. De puty Ai ns wo rt h te sti fi e d that h e regula rl y impounds vehicles when a driver doe s not have a valid driver’ s license. Further , here , beca use the passeng er did not have a valid driver’ s license either, De puty Ainsworth testified that he c ould not g ive control of the van to the passe ng er. Deputy Ainsworth then ca lled State Trooper Clint Walker for

help: Ifelt like there was somethingin the van. I had gone up, and I thought it was g oing to be full of i lleg als beca

use it’s common prac tice comingthroug h here . And when Ivisually looked in the van, I

saw no one hiding in the back. So, ther e wa s only one other a lternative. D ue to the ac tions of the driver, I fe lt like there would be contra band in the van. De puty Ai ns wo rt h e xpla ine d th a t th e dr ive r’ s d e me ano r w a s n ot n or ma l: F ir st o ff , w he n you

g e t st op pe d o n a

tr a ff ic sto p, ve ry fe w pe op le wi ll i mme diate ly exit their vehic le bec ause the y know they

are supposed to stay

in it. And, y ou can se e in the video . . . wher e he immediate ly g ot out of his vehicle and me t me as if he didn’t want me to look in his vehicle. Deputy Ainsworth also questioned Palac ios’s out-of-the- way route to San A ntonio from L are do and the diffe renc es betwe en Palac ios’s and his passeng er’ s stories. Whe n T ro op e r Wa lke r a

rr ive d, he a sk e d D e puty

Ai ns wo rt

h if he c ou ld t a lk t o Pa la c ios
. De puty Ai ns wo rt h a g re e d. At

tr ia l, T ro op e r Wa lke r t e sti fi e d that Pa la c ios wa s a c tin g ve ry ne rv ou s: [P alac ios] was doingwhat we call g rooming – g rooming his hair, running his fing ers throug h his ha ir repe atedly
. He wa s pacingback a nd forth, wa s stuttering, a nd then sever al re sponses to [] questions just l ed me to be lieve that, y ou know, the manne r in whic h h e g ave his re sp on se s in dic a te d n e rv ou sn e ss o n h is p art
. L ike D e p uty

A in s w o r th , T rooper

Walker aske d Palacios and the passeng er se parately about their trip. And, as with De puty

Ainsworth, Palacios and the passenge r gave differ ent ex planations. Troope r Walker aske d Palacios if he ha d broug ht any clot h es wi t h h im for his trip. Palacios said that the04

- 09

- 00 31 5- CR

- 4- suitcase in the va

n contained his c lothing. Trooper Walker thought it odd that there was only one suitcase – the passeng er e vidently did not bring a

ny belong ings f

or the trip. Indeed, the passeng er told Trooper Walker

that he had not br oug ht any clothing, not e ven a toothbrush, f or the trip. Trooper Walker wa s then told by

Deputy Ainsworth that bec ause ne ither the drive r nor the passeng er ha d a valid driver’ s license, he was g oing to impound the ca r and a sked Troope r Walker to inve ntory the van’s contents. Trooper Walker testified that upon opening the driver’ s door to the van, he s m el led a strongodor of f abric softener . He picke d up a lar g e suitcase , which wa s sitti ng up ri g ht b e tw e e n th e se c on d row of se a ts. B e c a us e the su itc a se wa s so ft -s ide d, Tr oo pe r Wa lke r c ou ld tell that it was not full. However , when he picked up the suitca se, it was much he avi er t h an he expected a ha lf-full suitcase full of clothes to be. In the suitcase, he found five bundle s of marijuana
wr a pp e d in sh e e ts o f f

a br ic so ft e ne r, so me c lot

he s, and so me pr ob a tio n p a

pe rs be lon g ing to P a la c ios
. Palacios and the passeng er w ere then ar rested. Palacios also testified at trial. He c laimed that he did not re al i ze the suitcase c ontained marijuana – he thoug ht he was tra

nsporting “ hemp for medical treatment” for an herba list who was helping him with his arthritis. Palacios t estified that he checke d the van before leavingL are do, and the license plate lig hts were working
. Acc ording to Pala cios, Deputy Ainsworth punche d one of the lig ht bu lbs ov e r the lic e ns e plate c a us ing it to br e ak. Whe n a sk e d on c ro ss e xami natio n w he the r h is he a dli g hts we re on a t the tim e he wa s pull e d ove r, Pa la c ios c la ime d that “on ly the pa rk inglig hts ”
wer e on. At the end of

trial, Palacios’s motion to suppress was denied, and he wa s found guilty . He was then se ntence d to twenty -five year s of imprisonment.04

- 09

- 00 31 5- CR

- 5- S TA N D A R D O F REVIEW I n revie wing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply a bifurcated standar d of revie w. W

ils on v . S tate , No. P D-0307-09, 2010 WL 715253, at *3 (Tex . Crim. App. Mar. 3, 2010); Car mo uc hev . S

tate , 10 S.W .3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Although we g ive almost total defe renc e to the trial c ourt’s determination of hi storical facts, we conduct a de novo re view of the trial court’s application of t he law to those facts. W ilson , 2 01 0 WL

71 52 53 , at *3 ; Carmouche , 10 S.W .3d at 327. And, as the s ole trier of fac t during a suppre ssion hearing , the trial cour t may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony , even if that testimony

is not controverte d. Sta te
v . R os s , 3 2 S. W.3 d 8 53 , 8 55 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); see also W ilson , 2010 W L 7 1 5253, at *3. Fur thermore , we e x amine the e vidence in the light most favor able to the tria l court’s ruling
. W ilson , 20 10 WL71 52 53 , at *3 ; Sta te v . B all ar d , 987 S.W .2d 889, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). How ever , a tr ia l c ourt

ne c e ssa ri ly a bu se s it s d isc re tio n if

it r e fu se s to su

pp re ss e vid enc e that is ob ta ine d in violation of the law a

nd that is, theref

ore, ina dmissibl e under

article 38.23 of the Te x as Code of Criminal Procedure
. W

ilson , 20 10 WL 71 52 53 , a t *3 ; Er dm an v . S tate , 8 6 1 S. W. 2 d

8 9 0 , 8 9 3 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1993). D I S CUS S I ON I n h is f ir st i ssu e , Pa la c ios argue s that the tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in de nyinghis mot ion

to s up pr e ss beca use De puty

Ainsworth did not have r easona ble suspicion to pull over Palacios’s van based on an alleg ed def

ective license plate light. Acc ording to Palacios, because it was still daylight and one ha s n o leg a l duty to have his lic e ns e plate ill umi nate d b y a lig ht d ur ingda ylig ht, De puty

Ai ns wo rt h did no t hav e reas on a

ble su sp ic ion

to s top the va

n. Th e State re sp on ds that Pa la c ios ha s f a ile d to prese rve this issue for appea l be cause , during trial, when the “ fruits” of the alleg ed illeg al sea rch a nd04

- 09

- 00 31 5- CR

- 6- seizure wer e admitted in e vidence , Palacios stated that he had “no obje ction.” SeeT EX . R. A PP . P. 33.1(a)
. Be cause the trial cour

t did not rule on Palacios’s motion to suppress as a pr etrial matter , but ins te a d c arr ie d th e mot ion a lon g wi th t

he tr ia l, i n o rd e r t o p re se rv e e rr or Pa la c ios wa s r e qu ir e d to object ea ch time any

ref uted evidence wa s offe red. Se e Et hingto n v . S

tate , 819 S.W .2d 854, 858 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 91 ); Ga rza v. S tate , N o . 0 4

- 0 1

- 0 0 3 5 8

- CR , 2 0 0 2 WL 9 8 5 4 6 0 , a t * 1 ( T e x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 20 02 , n o p e t.) (n ot d e sig nate d f or pu blicati on). Pa la c ios no t on ly fa ile d to timely object to the admission of the suitcase and its c ontents, he aff irmatively

stated that he ha d no objection. Se e Swa in v . S tate , 1 81 S.W. 3d

35 9, 36 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ); J on es v . S tate , 833 S.W .2d 118, 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) . Palacios’s a ffirmative acc eptanc e of this evidenc e wa ived any err or in its admission. Se e Swa in , 1 81 S.W. 3d a t 36 8; Jones , 833 S.W .2d at 126. Moreove r, eve n if Palacios h ad p roperly prese rved this issue for r eview, w e conc lude Palacios’s fir st issue la cks merit. Subsection 547.322(f) of the Texas Transpor tation Code require s “[a] taill amp or a s ep arate lamp” to be “ constructe d and mounted to emit a white lig ht that: (1) illumi nates the r ear

license plate; and (2) makes the plate clea rly leg ible at a distance of 50 fe et from the re ar.” T EX . T RA N SP . C ODE ANN . § 5 4 7
. 3 22(f) (Ve rnon 1999). Subsec tion 547.322(g ) fur ther state s th a t “ [a] tai llamp, inc lud inga se pa ra te lamp u se d to ill umi nate a re ar l ic e ns e plate , mu st e mit
a light when a headla

mp or auxil iary driving lamp is lighted.” Id. § 547.322(g ). Thus, if a ve hicle’s headla mp or auxil iary

driving lamp is lighted, then the rea r license plate must a lso be illumi nated.04

- 09

- 00 31 5- CR

1 ... W e n ot e t h at Pal ac i os mak es mu ch of D epu t y Ai n s wor t h ’ s t es t i mon y t h at t h e v an ’ s “ l i g h t s we r e on . ” Pal ac i os argues t hat b ecause D ep ut y A i nswort h d i d no t specif i cal l y t est i f

y t hat t he van’ s head l i ght s were o n, we m ust t ake as t rue P al aci o s’ s tes t i mo ny t hat onl y hi s “ park i ng l i gh t s ” we r e t ur ned on a t t he t i me of t he s t op . H owever , a t r i al cour t may d isb e liev e a w itne ss’s t e stim o n y, e v e n if tha t t e stim o n y is no t co n tro v e rte d
. R o ss , 32 S. W
. 3d at 855
. Fur t her , wh et her t he van’ s head l i ght s o r “ p arki ng l i ght s” were o n i s no t de t erm i nat i ve i n t hi s case as subsect i o n 54 7
. 3 2 2 (g) requi res t he rear l i cense p l at e l i ght t o b e i l l um i nat ed whenever a head l am p or a u x i l i a r y d r i v i n g l a mp is ligh te d . T EX . T RAN SP . C ODE A NN . § 5 4 7 .3 2 2 (g ) (V e rn o n 1 9 9 9 ) (e m p h a sis a d d e d ); see a lso 37 T EX . A D M I N . C ODE § 2 1 .1 (a )-(b ) (2 0 1 0 ) (T e x . D e p ’t o f P u b lic S a fety, S ta n d a rd s fo r V e h ic le E q u ip m e n t) (e x p la inin g t h a t t h e sta n d a rd s o f t h e T e x a s D e p a rtm e n t o f P u b lic Sa f e t y “ du pl i c a t e t h os e of

t h e of t h e U n i t e d St a t e s t h a t ap pl y t o t h e s a me as pe c t of ve h i c l e eq u i pm e n t ” an d t h a t t e r ms d e fine d in the F e d e ra l M o to r V e h ic le S ta n d a rd s, a s a d o p te d in 4 9 C .F .R . P a rt 5 7 1 , ap p ly); see a lso 49 C. F. R. § 571. 108, S 5 .5.7 (2 0 1 0 ) (req uiri ng t ha t wh en t he p ark i ng l am p s are ac t i va t ed o n p asse ng er c ars, m o t o rcyc l es, o r m ult i p urp o se pas s en g er v eh i cl es , t r u ck s , a n d bu s es of l es s t h an 80 i n ch es ov er al l w i dt h , “ t h e t ai l l amps , l i ce n s e pl at e l amps , a n d s i de m a rk e r la m p s sh a ll a lso b e a c tiva te d ” ).

- 7- Her e, bec ause the van’s he adlamps or a ux iliary driving lamps were on at the t ime of the stop, 1 subsection 547.322(g ) re quired that its rea r license plate be illuminated. Palacios ar g ues that sec tion 547.302 of the Tra nsportation Code s h o u l d control. P ursuant to subs ection 547.302(a ), “[a] vehicle shall display eac h lighted lamp and illuminating device require d by

this c hapter to be on the vehicle: (1) at nig httime; and (2) whe n light is insufficient or
a tmo sp he ri c c on dit ion s are un fa vo ra ble so tha t a perso n o r v e hic le on

the highw ay

is n ot c le arl y discernible at a distance o f 1 , 0 0 0 feet ahea d.” T EX . T RA N SP . C ODE ANN . § 547.302(a) (Ve rnon 1999). Ac cordingto Palacios, pursuant to subsection 547.302(a ), bec ause it wa s still daylight at the time of the stop, he had no duty to have his lig hts on. A nd, beca use he did not have a duty to have his lights on, Palacios ar g ues he did not violate subsec tion 547.322(g ) by not having a func tioning
rea r license plate lig ht. We disagr ee. Whil e Palac ios may

not have ha d a duty to ha ve the lights on his va

n turned on, beca

use the lig hts on his va n w e re in fa c t tur

ne d on, su

bs e c tio n 5 47 .3 22 (g ) r e qu ir e d th a t th e va n’ s r e ar l ic e ns e plate a lso be ill umi nate d. Sub se c tio n 5 47 .3 22 (g ) c le arl y state s that a “ ta ill amp, inc lud inga

se pa rate lamp use d to illum inate a

re ar l ic e ns e plate , mu st e mit a lig ht when a headlamp or auxiliary driving la m p is li g h ted. ” T EX . T RA N SP . C ODE ANN . § 547.322(g ) (Ve rnon 1999) ( emphasis adde d).04

- 09

- 00 31 5- CR

- 8- Nowher e does subse ction 547.322(g ) state that a rear license plate need only be il luminated when the driver has a duty

to display

the lights on his vehicle
. Th e re fo re , b e c a

us e the va

n’ s r e ar l ic e ns e plate wa s n ot i llumin a te d w he n th e va n’ s li g hts
wer e on, Palac ios was violating subse ction 547.322(g ), and Deputy Ainsworth, s eeingthat the re ar license plate was not illumin at ed , h ad proba ble ca use to stop the van for

a tra ffic violation. See Mo re no v . S

tate , 124 S.W.3d 339, 346 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (“A pe ace office r’s decision to stop an automo b i l e is rea sonable unde r the F ourth Amendment whe n the offic er ha s probable cause to believe the driver committed a tra ffic of fense . An offic er’ s observation of an ac tual vio latio n o f t

he tr a ff ic laws g ive s pr ob a

ble c a us e fo r a tr a ff ic sto p. ” ); United States v. Alex ander , 589 F. Supp. 2d 777, 783 (E.D. Te x . 2008) (holdingthat the offic er ha d probable cause to stop the driver when the of

fice r obser

ved the a bsence of a f

unctional license plate lig ht on the rea r of the dr iver’s
ve hic le ); se e als o U

nite d S tates v . Co le , 444 F.3d 688, 689 (5th Cir. 2006) (“ The rule established by the Supreme Court in W

hren [ v. United States , 517 U.S. 806 ( 1996),] allows office rs to justify a stop by the oc c ur re nc e of a tr a ff ic vio latio n e ve n tho ug h thi s is no t the re a l r e a so n f or the sto p. ” ); se e als o T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . ANN . art. 14.01(b) (Ve rnon 2005) ( “A peac e office r may arr est an off

ender wi tho ut a wa rr ant f or any of fe ns e c omm itt e d in

his pr e se nc e or wi th in his vie w. ” ); T EX . T RA N SP . C ODE ANN . § 543.001 (Ve rnon 1999) ( “Any peac e off icer may arr est without warr ant a pe rson found committing a violation of this subtitl e.”) . We, theref ore, ove rrule Pala cios’s first issue. I n his second and third issues, Palac ios argues that the off icer s violated his rig hts under the Four th Amendment in conducting an inventory sear ch. These issues, how ever , are not preser ved for
a pp e llate re vie w. As dis c us se d pre vio us ly , Pa la c ios ’s a ff ir mativ e a c c e pta

nc e of the su itc a se and

its contents in evidenc e wa ived any err or he ma

y have w ith respec t to their admission in evidence. See04

- 09

- 00 31 5- CR

- 9- Swa in , 181 S.W .3d at 368; Jones , 833 S.W .2d at 126. And, eve n if he ha d objected to this evidenc e during trial, Palacios fa iled t o ar gu e in his motion t o suppress or dur ing tr ial that the offic ers improperly

impounded the vehicle or improper ly conducte d an inventory

s e a r c h
. T h e r e f

o r e , Pa lacios has fa iled to preser

ve his second a

nd third issues for appe al. Se e Swa in , 181 S.W .3d at 365. I n his final i s s u e, P alac ios argues that if we hold his second and third issues we re w aived, the n h e re c e ive d in e ffecti ve a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l be c a

us e his c ouns e l f

a ile d to mov e to s up pr e ss
e vid e n c e o b t a i n e d a s a r e s u l t o f an un c o n s t i tu t i o n a l i n v e n t o r y s e ar c h
. W e d i s a g r e e . Ev e n if Pa la c io s ’ s tr ia l c o u n s e l h a d mo v e d to s u p p r e s s e v id e n c e a s a

r e s u lt ana ll e g e d ly

im p r o per impoundment and inventory sear ch of the van, Palac ios’s rig hts unde r the F ourth Amendment we re not violated. The off

icer s first had the r ight to ente r the va n due to a lawful impoundment and then up on e nte ri ngthe va

n, ha d p ro ba

ble c a us e to o pe n th e su itc a se du e to t he intens e odor

of fa br ic softener , the ner

vous behavior of

the driver , and the c onflicting stories g iven b y t h e driver a nd passeng er. Thus, beca

use Palacios’s rig hts unde r the Four th A mendment wer e not violated, Palac ios cannot prove that his c ounsel’s failure to object pre judiced him. Se e Tho mp so n v . S tate , 9 S.W .3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (explaining that the second pr ong of the Strickland test require s
an a pp e lla nt t o a ff ir mativ e ly pr ov e pr e

jud ic e – th a t is , th e a

pp e lla nt must sh owa

re a so na ble probability that, but f

or his attorney ’s unprofe ssional e rror s, the re sult of the proce edingwould have been dif fer ent). I mpoundment of a c ar ma y be lawf ul under many

circ umstances. L aga ite v . Stat e , 995 S.W. 2d 86 0, 86 5 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 99 , p e t. re f’ d)
. F or e xamp le , re a so na ble c a us e for imp o u n d m en t ex ists under the followingscena rios: (1) whe n the vehicle has bee n used in the
c omm iss ion

of a c ri me ; (2) wh e n a

n unatte nd e d v e hic le is a

ba nd on e d, ill e g a lly

pa rk e d, or oth e rw ise04

- 09

- 00 31 5- CR

- 10- endang eringother tra ffic; ( 3) whe n the driver is inc apac itated and unable to remove the vehicle; a nd (4 ) wh e n th e dr ive r i s r e mov e d f ro m hi s a uto mob ile , p la c e d und e r c us tod ia l arr e st, and his pr op e rt

y cannot be protec ted by

any means other

than impoundment. Id. L ike wi se , h e re , th e va n w a s la wf ull y imp ound e d. Whe n D e puty Ai ns wo rt h d e te rm ine d th a t ne ith e r Pal a c ios no r the pa sse ng e r ha d a va lid driver’ s license a

nd that neither could produce insurance for the vehicle, D eputy Ainsworth had the leg al authority

to impound the vehicle and dir ect T ro oper Walker to inventory

its contents. See Ste ph e n v . S

tate , 6 77 S.W. 2d

42 , 4 3- 44 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 84 ) ( ho ldi ngtha t of fi c e r p ro pe rl y impounded car

wher e drive r had be en ar rested a nd “the only

alternative available was to let appellant’ s passeng er take possession of the car ,” but the passeng er w as unable to produce a drive r’s lice ns e ); Be na v ide

s v . S tate , 6 0 0 S. W. 2 d 8 0 9 , 8 1 1 ( T e x. Cr im
. Ap p . 1 9 8 0 ) ( e xp la in in g th a t an automobile may

be impounded whe re dr iver is place d under a rrest and “no other

alternatives are
ava ila ble oth e r tha

n impo un dme nt to insu

re the pr ote c tio n o f t

he ve hic le ” ); se e als o Ga rza v . S tate , 137 S.W .3d 878, 882 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2004, pet. re f’d) (“We note that peac e off icer s
ne e d n ot i nd e pe nd e ntl y

inv e sti g a te po ssi ble a lte rn a tiv e s to imp oundme nt a bs e nt s ome ob

je c tiv e ly de mon str a

ble evi den c e that a lte rn a tiv e s d id, in f a c t, e xist. ” ). Thus , b e c a

us e the va

n w a s la wf ull y imp ound e d, Tr oo pe r Wa lke r h a d th e ri g ht t o e nte r t he va n to be g in c on du c tin g an inve nto ry of its contents. See South Dak

ota v. Opperm an , 428 U.S. 364, 375-76 (1976). Howeve r, upon ente ri n g the van to beg in conductingan inventory of its contents, Troope r Walker immediately

detec ted a “ strong odor” of fabr ic s oftene r, which he testified is a “known cover04

- 09

- 00 31 5- CR

2 ... T h e u se o f f

a b ric so ften e r to m a sk the o d o r o f i lleg a l d ru g s is w e ll- d o c u m e n te d in d e c isio n s. See, e. g. , Uni t ed St at es v . $129, 727. 00 , 1 2 9 F .3 d 4 8 6 , 4 9 1 (9 th C ir. 1 9 9 7 ) (“ T h e ne x u s b e tw e e n fab r ic so ften e r a n d d ru g tra ff ic k ing is re c o g n iz e d to b e o f

great pro b at i ve val ue. ”); Un ited S ta te s v . D a v is , 107 F. 3d 868, 1997 W L 100919, a t * 2 ( 4t h C i r. 1 9 9 7 ) (ex p l aining that i t i s co m m o n p rac t i ce i n d r u g t r ad e to l i ne a sec ret co m p artm en t wit h d ryer she ets t o co nfuse n a rc o tics-sn iff

ing d o g s) ; Uni t ed St at es v. M endez , 10 2 F.3d 12 6 , 12 7 (5t h C i r. 1 9 9 6 ) (n o t i ng t hat co cai ne was f o und p a c k a g e d in fa b ric so ften e r a n d c o ff e e gr o u n d s) ; Uni t ed St at es v . $39, 873. 00 , 80 F. 3d 317, 319 ( 8t h C i r. 19 96) (d isc u ssin g d ru g tra ff

ic k e rs us e o f d rye r sh e e ts to m a sk sc e n t o f na rc o tics)
. 3 ... W e n ot e t hat becau s e T r oo per W al ker ha d probab l e c aus e t o s ear ch t he s ui t cas e, we nee d not r eac h P al aci os ’ s a r g u me n t t h a t t h e of f i c e r s di d n ot c on du c t t h e i n v e n t or y s e a r c h pu r s u a n t t o a po l i c y or s t a n da r di zed p ro c e d u re s.

- 11- odor to mask odors of illeg al drug s.” 2 Th e Sup re me Court ha s re c e ntl y re ite rate d that “[i]f the re is pr ob a ble c a us e to be lie ve a ve hic le c on ta ins e vid e nc e of c ri min a l a c tiv ity ,” of fi c e rs may

wi tho ut a
war rant sea rch “any are a of the vehicle in which the evide nce mig ht be found.” Arizona v. Gant , 129 S
. C t
. 1 7 1 0 , 1 7 2 1 (2 0 0 9 ) ( ci t i n g Un ite d States v. R os s , 456 U.S. 798, 820-21 (1982)) . To prove the appli ca bility

of this exception to the warra nt require ment, the State “must demonstrate that law enfor ceme nt office rs had a belief, r easona

bly arisingout of circ umstances kn o wn t o t h e seizing office r, t hat t he vehicle containe d that which by law is subject to seizure.” United States v. Buc ci , 58 2 F .3 d 1 08 , 1 17 (1 st C ir . 2 00 9) . “ Whe the r a pa rt ic ula r s e t of fa c ts a ri se s to the le ve l of

pr ob a ble
cause is a leg al deter

mination” that the appe llate cour t review s de novo. Id. Her e, the strongodor of fa bric soft en er t h at Troope r Walker de tected upon e nteringthe van, c oupled with Palacios’s nervous de meanor , and the inconsistent stories fro m P al ac i o s and the pa sseng er, g ave T rooper Wa lk e r p r o b a

b le c a u s e to s e ar c h th e s u it c a s e f o r il le g a l drug s. See Unite d S tates v . Q uiroz Hernande z , 4 8 F .3 d 8 58 , 8 64 (5 th C ir . 1 99 5) . T he re fo re , Pa la c ios ’s su it case wa s n ot s e arc he d in vio latio n o f h is r ig hts un de r t he F ourt h A me ndme nt. 3 Be cause his constituti onal ri gh ts were not violated, Pal ac i o s wa s n ot prejudice d by his trial court’s fa ilure to prese rve his sec ond and third issues on appea l. See Thompson , 9 S.W .3d at 812.04

- 09

- 00 31 5- CR

- 12- C ONCL US I ON We affir m the judgme nt of the trial cour t.

Kar en Ang elini, J ustice Pub lis h