Todd C. Emerson, #8175 

SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC. 

444 South River Road 

St. George, Utah, 84 790 

Telephone: (435) 634-3530 

Facsimile: (435) 634-3505 

-andMichael L. Dworkin #64070 

MICHAEL L. DWORKIN AND ASSOCIATES 

465 California Street, Suite 210 

San Francisco, California 94118 

Telephone: (415) 421-2500 

Facsimile: ( 415) 421-2560 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

In the Matter of: 

Sky West Airlines, Inc. 

FDMS FAA-2012-0874; 0872; 0873; 0869; 0868; 

0904 and FAA-2013-0617; and 0619 

(Consolidated) 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

Judge: Richard C. Goodwin 

To: The Honorable Richard C. Goodwin and to all counsel of record: 

SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC. hereby makes a Motion pursuant to 14 C.P.R. Section 

13.218 and Federal Rule of Evidence 201 for Judicial Notice of the contents of the following 

publications and public records: 
I. FAA Case No. 2011NM060011/DMS No. FAA-2011-0485, FAA Case No. 

2011NM060010/DMS No. FAA-2011-0486, and FAA Case No. 

2011NM060033/DMS No. FAA-2011-0680 & 0779: 

a. Initial Decisions ofFAA-2011-0485/0486 and FAA-2011-0779, both dated 

May 2, 2013, attached hereto as Attachment Nos. I.a.(!) and l.a.(2); 

b. Sky West Post Trial Brief, dated January 22, 2013 attached hereto as 

Attachment l.b; and 

c. Sky West Witness Testimony dated October 2, 2012. As the Court and 

parties are already in possession of these transcripts they have not been 

duplicated or attached. 

1. Transcript excerpts (Page 1-4;83-182); 

ii. Under Seal Transcript (later opened) excerpts (Pages 1-33); 

2. FAA Order 2150.3B, Appendix B, Part Two- Sanction Guidance Tables, attached 

hereto as Attachment 2; and 

3. FAA Order 9550.8A, Human Factors Policy, Revised August 10, 2005, attached 

hereto as Attachment 3; 

FDMS FAA-2012-0874; 0872; 0873; 0869; 0868; 0904 and FAA-2013-0617; and 0619 (Consolidated) 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

Page 2 
4. Notice of the following documents is additionally requested, however to avoid 

duplication, these documents are not attached as they were provided in the 

Complainant's April15, 2014 Motion to Take Judicial Notice: 

a. FAA Weight & Balance Handbook, FAA-H-8038-IA, Chapter 1, Pages 1-4 

FAA's; 

b. Advisory Circular 120-27E, Pages ii, 1,5 and Appendix I, Page I; 

c. FAA Order 2150.38, Chapter 7; and 

d. FAA Order 2150.38, Appendix B, Pages B-1 to B-3 and B-12. 

D'kd thi" / f(" doy ~,J. 2014. 

'· 

Michael L. Dworkin 

Co-Counsel for Sky West Airlines 

FDMS FAA-2012-0874; 0872; 0873; 0869; 0868; 0904 and FAA-2013-0617; and 0619 (Consolidated) 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

Page 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

The undersigned hereby certifies that on this \8 th day of~\L, 2014, a true and 

correct copy of the foregoing: 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

was served as follows: 

The Honorable Richard C. Goodwin 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. 

East Building Ground Floor, 

Room El2-320 

Washington, D.C. 20590 

Email: Richard.Goodwin(al,dot.gQy 

-AndMs. Patricia Matthews, Staff Assistant 

Email: Patricia.Matthews@dot.gov 

{EMAIL and FED EX} 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue SW 

Washington, DC 20591 

Attn: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 

Wilbur Wright Building- Suite 2Wl000 

{FED EX} 

Jeffrey M. Harper 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Northwest Mountain Region, ANM-7 

1601 Lind Avenue S.W. 

Renton, Washington 98057 

Fax: (425) 227-1007 

Email: Jeffrey.Harper@faa.gov 

{EMAIL~V\cJ__ (AA\L 

FDMS FAA-2012-0874; 0872; 0873; 0869; 0868; 0904 and FAA-2013-0617; and 0619 (Consolidated) 

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

Page4 
Attachment l.a.(1) 

Initial Decisions ofFAA-2011-0485/0486 

Dated May 2, 2013 
Received 

MAY -5 lED 

SERVED: MAY 2, 2013 Michael L. Dworkin ~ & Associate~ 

~~ 1;'\)\.\r (~0\;_ - UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

\:.:"~ OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

FEDERAL AV.MTION 

ADMINISTRATION, 

Complainant, 

v. 

SKYWEST AIR:LINES, INC. 

Respondent. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) FAA Docket Nos. [To Be Assigned] 

) 

) (Civil Penalty Action) 

) 

) 

) 

) FDMS Nos. FAA-2011-0485 

) FAA-2011-0486 

) 

INITIAL DECISION 

OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE RICHARD C. GOODWIN 

Found: 1) In Docket FAA-2011-0485: 

a) Respondent violated 14 C.F.R. §§119.5(g) and 119.5(1); 

b) Complainant failed to prove that Respondent violated 14 C.F.R. §§121.693(a), 

121.693(c), and 121.693(d); and 

c) Re~pondent will be assessed a civil penalty of $750. 

2) In DocketFAA-2011-0486: 

Respondent will be assessed a civil penalty of $250. 

I. Background· 

Respondent SkyWestAirlines, Inc. ("Respondent," "SkyWest," or "the carrier"), of St. 

George, UT, is .a Part 121 regional air carrier. These proceedings all involve charges stemming 

from the carrier.' s baggage loading methods. It is asserted that those methods resulted in 
2 

inaccurate counting and weighing in violation of certain Federal Aviation Regulations ("F ARs"). 

The matters were consolidated by Orders served July 29,2011 (consolidating FAA-2011-0485 

("-0485") and FAA-2011-0486 ("-0486")) and June 20, 2012 (consolidating FAA-2011-0779 ("-

0779") into the others). 1 

In each"proceeding the same allegations were lodged against Respondent. In Docket 

-0485, Complainant Federal Aviation Administration ("Complainant") charged that Respondent 

violated the following F ARs (all in 14 CFR): section 119.5(g), for operating as a direct air carrier 

in violation of an appropriate operations specification ("op spec"); section 119.5(1 ), for operating 

under Part 121 an aircraft in violation of the carrier's op specs; section 121.693(a), by operating 

without a load manifest accurately reflecting the weight of the cargo and baggage; section 

121.693(c), in flying when the total weight of the aircraft had not been computed under approved 

procedures; and~ec.tion 121.693(d), by operating when the aircraft had not been loaded 

according to an1 approved schedule. Docket -0486 will consider the issue of civil penalty only, 

since the issue of liability has already been determined in favor of Complainant. 2 

Sky West's aircraft loading procedures are governed by the carrier's ops specs. Paragraph 

A098 of the op specs directs that loading and counting baggage be accomplished in accordance 

with Respondent's Weight & Balance Operations Manual ("Weight & Balance Manual" or 

"Manual"). Exh. C-103. 

The Mafmal contains an agency-approved Weight & Balance Program ("Program"). The 

Program defines several terms pertinent to these cases. It classifies luggage by weight ranges: a 

Standard Checked Bag ("standard bag") is defmed as any bag weighing 50 pounds or less; a 

Heavy Checked Bag ("heavy bag") weighs more than 50 but less than 100 pounds. When a 

heavy bag is checked in, Respondent's customer service agent will attach a "heavy baggage" tag 

to it. The tag usually is orange. A Planeside Loaded Bag, or Planeside Valet ("planeside bag"), 

is any bag·or item checked plane-side; such bags are placed at the door or steps of an aircraft or 

in the jetway ;,w.d subsequently placed in the aircraft cargo bin. 

r 

SkyWest's Manual requires its designated loading agent, or a ramp agent assigned to load 

the aircraft ("loading agent"), to prepare a Cargo Load Report ("CLR"). In so doing the loading 

agent manually conducts a baggage count. He or she must write the total number of standard 

bags in the CLR' s "Standard Checked" block; the heavy-bag total in the "Heavy Checked" 

block; and the total number of planeside bags in the "Planeside Valet/Service Items" block. 

Upon completion of!oading, the responsible agent also must verify the piece count of all 

standard, heavy, and planeside bags. The agent additionally is required to conduct a cargo 

weight count. 

1 The proceeding docketed as FAA-2011-0779 also had been docketed as FAA-2011-0680. I asked the parties to 

brief the consequences of this and related issues. Tr. 7-9; see Complainant's Post-Trial Brief, pp. 3-5; Respondent's 

Brief, p. 10. A separate Decision will be issued in F AA-2011-0680/0779. 2 "Order Granting in'Part Complainant's Motion for Decision in FDMS No. FAA-201 1-0486, Limiting Proceeding 

to Issue of Sanction," served December 2, 2011. This case deals with one flight Sky West bad operated on 

November 17, 20Hl from Denver, CO to Yampa Valley Airport, Hayden, CO. See discussion of penalty, Part III 

beginning on p. 7. 
3 

SkyWest uses the CLR to compute its load manifest. Toward this end, its Manual 

employs what is known as an average weights program. The average weights program assigns 

standard bags a weight of 30 pounds; heavy bags, 60 pounds; and planeside bags, 30 pounds. 

Passengers are each assigned a weight of 190 pounds in the summer and 195 pounds in the 

winter. Persopj!l1terns carried on board are assigned a weight of 16 pounds. When the CLR is 

completed it is turned over to the cockpit. The pilots then figure the load manifest from the 

number of bags times the weight assigned to each by the Manual's average weights program? 

A hearing was held on October 2, 2012, in Salt Lake City, UT. The parties have filed 

briefs and the matter now is ready for decision. 4 

Respondent denied liability and interposed affirmative defenses in -0485. 

v 

II. Discussion and Findings 

A. -0485 

This proceeding concerns three flights. All were operated with Bombardier CL-600-

2Bl9 civil aircraft. Sky West is permitted to operate these aircraft by its paragraph D085 ofits 

op specs. 

The flights will be considered chronologically by operation. 

1 • First Flight 

The frrst flight, SkyWest 4659, operated from Billings, MT to Salt Lake City, UT 

("SLC") on November 22,2010. The aircraft had the registration number N410SW. According 

to the Complaint, prior to takeoff Respondent had loaded 38 standard and two heavy bags onto 

the aircraft. The heavy bags could be recognized by their orange tag containing the word 

"heavy" (see e.g., Exh. C-2). 

The CLR, by contrast1 listed on board 40 standard and 0 heavy bags (Tr. 66-67, 77,98-

99). 

2. Second Flight 

The second flight, SkyWest 6692, left Los Angeles ("LAX") on December 14, 2010, and 

operated to its scheduled destination of San Diego. This aircraft holds the registration number 

3 Tr. 51, 77-79,91-93, 133-47; Exhs. C-102 and C-103. There are also procedures in the event a bag is loaded at 

the last minute. in that instance, so long as the flight crew assents the bag will be placed on board -- but tbe CLR 

will not be amended accordingly. Tr. 147-49. No evidence showed tbat any last-minute loading took place on any 

of tbe flights undei'!'eview. 

4 Complainant's Post-Trial Brief will be referred to as "Compl. Br." and Respondent's Brief as "Resp. Br." 

Additionally, Complainant's exhibits will begin will begin with "Exh. C" followed by tbe exhibit number; 

Respondent's exhibits will begin with "Exh. R." 
4 

N984CA. The flight operated as a United Express flight. The Complaint recites that Respondent 

had loaded 19 sta,ndard bags and one heavy bag. As in the flight discussed immediately above, 

the heavy bag had the orange "heavy" tag attached. 

The CLR listed on board 20 standard and 5 heavy bags (Exh. C-100; Tr. 45-47, 52). 

3. Third Flight 

The third flight involved in this matter, SkyWest 4800, operated between LAX and San 

Diego on December 15, 2010. This aircraft had the registration numberN411SW. SkyWest 

personnel, the Complaint asserts, loaded at LAX 43 standard, four heavy, and 12 planeside bags. 

The heavy bags a¥_ain had been marked with the telltale orange tag. 

The CLR listed 59 standard, zero heavy, and zero planeside bags on board (Exh. C-1 01; 

Tr. 49-50, 58, 104). 

Complainant asked for a civil penalty under 49 U.S. C. §46301 of$99,000, or $33,000 per 

flight (Compl. Br., p. 2). 

C. R£spondent's Testimony 

Carl Salamone was Sky West's main witness. He is a Sky West pilot who evaluated the 

flights at issue for weight and balance factors. He pointed out that the nature of the carrier's 

weight and balance program- assigning average weights to baggage and to passengers - means 

that an aircraft's takeoff weight inevitably will not exactly correspond with its actual weight. 

Yet, he stressed, any discrepancies between the two weight figures would not have affected 

aircraft performance. For the Billings-SLC flight (#4659) in -0485, the uncounted weight of60 

pounds (as computed under the carrier's average weight program) would have raised the 

aircraft's takeoff weight from the computed 46,358 pounds to 46,418 pounds. The higher figure 

was still well under the aircraft's maximum certified takeoff weight of 53,000 pounds. Mr. 

Salamone further stated that the aircraft weight and center of gravity location fell withio 

manufacturer recommendations and performance envelopes for each flight. Safety of flight was 

maintained at all times, the witness asserted (Tr. 93-95, 100-01; Exh. R-3). 

Sky West's witness testified further that the CLR created for Flight 6692, the second 

operation with which Docket -0485 is concerned, reported that the aircraft actually was heavier 

than it really was. The difference, using the average-weight calculations, was 270 pounds. Mr. 

Salamone concluded that this discrepancy had no effect on aircraft performance or safety. In fact 

the aircraft normally would have performed better in all contexts for not having the extra weight. 

Regarding the final flight in -0485, SkyWest 4800, the witness stated that the discrepancy 

between the weight of the luggage loaded and the CLR report was 120 pounds of additional 

cargo. This difference, he asserted, had no effect on aircraft safety (Tr. 102-05, Ill; Exh. R-3, p. 

9). 
5 

Mr. Salamone further defended SkyWest's actions in noting that FAA Advisory Circular 

("AC") 120-27E permits an average-weight program in preference to an actual-weight program. 

It recognizes that using actual weights on an aircraft is impractical, he said. The AC also permits 

an error of up to two percent for carriers performing bag surveys in place of using the method of 

average bag wejghts. While Sky West employs the average bag weight method, the witness 

noted that all flights charged in case -0485 would have fallen within the permitted margin of 

error (Exh. C-5; Tr. 109-12). 

The witness also stated in Sky West's defense that, while the carrier seeks absolute 

accuracy in counting and weighing, and attempts to promote safe operations to the maximum 

extent feasible, the "sheer volume" of luggage -- and "human limitation" --makes the goal, as a 

practical matter, impossible (Tr. 124-25, 167; Exh. R-5). 

Finally,ihe carrier stressed that it has taken corrective actions to assure more accurate 

weighing. It has implemented additional risk controls, it states, and has placed greater awareness 

on.this issue in training. It has utilized surveillance on its ramp personnel. Employees falling 

short of Sky West standards have been counseled and re-trained. Sky West emphasizes that it has 

highlighted to its employees the importance of this issue (see, e.g., Tr. 151-56; Exh. R-15). 

D. Findings and Conclusions 

I fmd and conclude in -0485 that Complainant proved that Sky West violated FARs 

§§ !19.5(g) and f 19.5(1). Complainant failed to prove the remaining allegations. 

1. Sections 119.5(g) and 119.5(1) 

Section 119.5(g) prohibits an air carrier from operating in violation of its op specs. 

Sky West's op specs obligate the carrier to use the procedures detailed in its Weight & Balance 

Manual for loading and counting baggage. The Manual, among other things, directs the 

carrier's desig:ri:itted loading agent to accurately prepare the flight's CLR. For each of the flights 

encompassed by Docket -0485, Sky West's CLR failed to properly reflect in the appropriate 

block the actual count of the different classes ofbaggage loaded onto the aircraft. In -0485, the 

evidence showed that: I) For Flight #4659, Sky West loading agents counted 38 standard bags 

and 2 heavy bags, but the CLR listed 40 standard bags and zero heavy bags; 2) For Flight #6692, 

carrier agents counted 19 standard bags and one heavy bag; the CLR, by contrast, logged 20 

standard and five heavy bags; and 3) Flight #4800 agents counted 43 standard, four heavy, and 

12 planeside bags, while the CLRreflected a total of 59 standard, zero heavy, and zero planeside 

bags. The failure to accurately prepare the CLR, it is concluded, constitutes a violation of 

§119.5(g). 

Sky West's actions in loading and marking the CLRs for these four flights also constitute 

a violation of FAR §119.5(1). This section prohibits Part 121 air carriers from operating in 

violation of op specs. By failing to set out for each flight accurate information on the CLRs, 

Respondent, a Part 121 air carrier, did not operate in conformance with its op specs. It thus 

violated this section. 
7 

B. Decision 

I fmd that a civil penalty of $250 per flight (including the flight with which Docket -0486 

is concerned) is0 a,ppropriate. 

The violations found were technical in nature. They had no material effect on weight 

and balance or on aircraft performance. Respondent showed that in no instance was safety of 

flight at even the slightest risk (See Tr. 84-85). 

As Respondent notes, the CLRs are not dispositive (Resp. Br., p. 12). The most 

important factor in the weight and balance context unquestionably is the load manifest. It is this 

document that is computed by the flight crew and used by them to evaluate how their 

calculations will affect operational safety. Complainant failed to show for any of the flights that 

Respondent failed to follow the scheme of its Weight & Balance Manual in deriving its load 

manifests (See Resp. Br., p. 7). In fact the evidence showed that Respondent's load manifest 

calculations were in accordance with its op specs and Manual instructions in every instance. 

I fmd further that just one civil penalty per flight is appropriate. To assess a civil penalty 

based on the two violations per flight found is, under the circumstances, unfair, unwarranted, and 

disproportionate to the offenses. 

The two sections violated in each instance, §§119.5(g) and 119.5(1), are not significantly 

different. The first prohibits operation as a direct air carrier in violation of op specs; the second 

prohibits operating under Part 121 in violation of op specs. The distinction between the two 

provisions for the present purposes is inconsequential. As such, penalizing Respondent for both 

violations would be unjustified. I note that the agency's civil penalty guidelines, FAA Order 

2150.3B, take a similar stance: they advise that "[w]hen a single instance of noncompliance 

results in multiple violations of general and specific regulations involving the same or similar 

conduct, the FAA ordinarily does not compound the sanction ... " (Exh. C-6, p. 7-10). Under 

these circumstances, one civil penalty -in a minimal amount of $250 per violation - suffices. 

In sum, I find that the civil penalty appropriately accounts for the factors the statute and 

agency policy directs in fixing the assessment. 

All arguments by both parties have been carefully considered. Those not explicitly 

discussed are rejected or dismissed as mooted by this Initial Decision.' 

5 Certain evidence in this proceeding has been sealed. See Order Sealing Certain Exhibits and Transcript Portion, 

served November 2, 20!2, and Order Unsealing Transcript Pages, served January 17, 2013. However, this Initial 

Decision does not reference any of the evidence remaining under seal; as such, no part of the J.D. is subject to seal, 

and it may be freely disseminated in its entirety. 
8 

Sky West Airlines, Inc. is hereby assessed a civil penalty of $750 in Docket FAA 2011-

0485 and $250 in Docket FAA 2011-0486 for violations ofF AR §§ 119.5(g) and 119.5(1) as 

discussed herein. The remainder of the charges in Docket FAA-2011-0485 are dismissed.• 

Richard C. Goodwin 

Administrative Law Judge 

Attachment- Service List 

6 This decision may be appealed to the Administrator of the FAA. The notice 1

of appeal must conform to sections 

13.210, 13.21l(e) and 13.233 of the Rules of Practice, which require that a notice of appeal!) be filed not later than 

I 0 days (plus an additional five days if mailed) from the service date of this decision, and 2) be perfected with a 

written brief or memorandum not later than 50 days (plus an additional five, if mailed) from the service date of this 

decision. The notice of appeal and brief or memorandum must either be a) mailed to the Federal Aviation 

Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC 20591, Attn: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430, 

Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2Wl 000, or b) delivered personally or via expedited courier service to the Federal 

Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2WIOOO, Washington, 

D.C. 20591, Attn: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430. A copy of the notice of appeal and brief or memorandum also 

must be sent to agency counsel. Service upon the presiding judge is optional. 
9 

SERVICE LIST 

ORIGINAL & ONE COPY 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, DC 20591 

Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 

Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2W10001 

ONE COPY 

Todd C. Emerson, Respondent's Representative 

Director - Government and Legal Affairs 

Sky West Airlines 

444 South River Road 

St. George, UT 84790 

TEL: 435-634-3530 

FAJ(: 435-634-3505 

Michael L. Dworkin, Respondent 's Counsel 

465 California Street, Suite 210 

San Francisco, CA 94104 

TEL: 415-421-0250 

FAX: 415-421-2560 

Robert Spitzer, Complainant's Counsel 

Attorney, Office of the Regional Counsel 

Northwest Mountain Region, ANM-7 

Federal Aviation Administration 

1601 Lind Avenue, S.W. 

Renton, W A 98057 

TEL: 425-227-1417 

FAX: 425-227-1007 

FDMS Nos. FAA-2011-0485 

& FAA-2011-0486, 

(Civil Penalty Actions) 

1 Service was by U.S. Mail. For service in person or by expedited courier, use the following address: Federal 

Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2WIOOO, Washington, 

DC 20591; Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430. 
Attachment l.a.(2) 

Initial Decisions of FAA-2011-0779, 

Dated May 2, 2013 
RECEIVED 

MAY 0 6 ZOJ;j 

SKYWEST-LEGAL 

SERVED: MAY 2, 2013 

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, 

Complainant, FAA Docket No. [To Be Assigned] 

v. (Civil Penalty Action) 

SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC. 

Found; 

Respondent. FDMS Nos. FAA-2011-0779 

INITIAL DECISION 

OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE RICHARD C. GOODWIN 

a) Respondent violated 14 C.F.R. §§ll9.5(g) and 119.5(1); 

b) Complainant failed to prove that Respondent violated 14 C.F.R. §§121.693(a), 

121.693(c), and 121.693(d); and 

c) Respondent will be assessed a civil penalty of $250. 

I. Preliminary Issue 

a. Background 

On July 28, 2011 the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA" or "Agency") transmitted 

to the Hearing Docket Clerk' Case No. 2011NM0600332

• The case was docketed as FDMS1 Document was transmitted to "Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430, Hearing Docket, Federal Aviation 

Administration, ... " 2 The case was receipted by Hearing Docket on July 28, 20 II. 
2 

2011-0779. On August 29,2011, case FAA- 2011-0779 was 'assigned' to the undersigned by a 

document captioned "Notice of Assignment of Proceeding. "3 

On July 19, 2011 4 a transmittal of Case No. 2011NM060033 was sent to the FAA 

Hearing Docket. The July 19, 2011 transmittal was docketed as 2011-0680. 

Case No. 2011NM060033 was thus transmitted to the FAA Hearing Docket twice and 

assigned two separate FDMS docket numbers. 

On October 4, 2011 the Chief Administrative Law Judge issued a document captioned 

"Notice of Assignment of Proceeding under other FMDS Docket and Closure of this FDMS 

Docket". The document contained no language 'assigning' the case to an ALJ5

. The document 

identified the duplicitous docketing and stated " ... Accordingly, that docket is herebl closed." 

The document failed to specifY which of the three docket numbers was to be closed . 

Since the document dated October 4, 2011 in FDMS FAA-2011-0680 was unassigned 

and the language unclear, we asked the parties to brief the consequences of this and related 

issues. Tr. 7-9; see Complainant's Post-Trial Brief, pp. 3-5; Respondent's Brief, p. 10. 

b. Discussion 

By Order dated June 20,2012, cases FAA 2011-0779 and FAA-2011-0680 were 

consolidated with two other cases 

7 and set for hearing. 

Notices of Assignment (NOAs) are not required in FAA cases, although they are not 

prohibited as they fall under the authority of an administrative law judge to regulate the course of 

a proceeding8

. Jurisdiction of an ALJ arises as a consequence of the filing of a Complaint by an 

FAA attorney, not the issuance of an NOA9

. All DOT ALJs have jurisdiction over cases where a 

Complaint has been filed by the Agency. An ALJ may have authority over a case without the 

issuance of an NOA10. 

3 The document reads: "This proceeding (heretofore designated as Case No. 2011NM060033) has been assigned 

to Administrative Law Judge Richard C. Goodwin. All future pleadings and other communications regarding this 

proceeding shall be served on the Judge, the FAA Hearing Docket, and the other persons on the attached Service 

List." 

4 The Facsimile Message coversheet is dated June 19, 2011. The Fax date stamp is '07/1912011' in two places 

throughout the eight (8) page document. 5 The document reads: "By notice served August 29, 2011, this proceeding-designated as Case No. 

2011 NM060033 and docketed in the Federal Docket Management System (FDMS) as FAA20 11-0779-was assigned to Administrative Law Judge Richard C. Goodwin. The same 

proceeding was previously docketed in FDMS as FAA-20 11-0680 but was not transmitted to this 

office. Accordingly, that docket is hereby closed." 6 According to the Disposition entry in Office of Hearings 'Case Tracking System' both dockets FAA-20 11-0779 

and FAA-2011-0680 were administratively closed on 10/04/2011 and have remained closed since that date. 7 SkyWest Airlines FAA 2011-0485 and Sky West Airlines FAA 2011-0486. 

8 14 C.F.R. § 13.205. 

9 Jd and 14 C.F.R. §13.208. 

10 See also Lightning Aircraft Corporation, F AA-20 11-1124, "Order of Chief Administrative Law Judge Granting 

Motion to Dismiss Request for Hearing and Assessing A Civil Penalty", served February 17, 2012. Appeal 

dismissed FAA Order No. 2012-7, FDMS No. FAA-2011-1124 served July 9, 2012. 
3 

The document dated October 4, 2011 is unclear. The October 4, 2011 document did not 

assign the case to a specific ALJ. There was a duplicate filing of 20 11NM060033. The October 

4, 2011 document was not an adjudication on the merits of docket 2011NM060033 or a 

Dismissal of2011NM060033. The language 'closing' the docket was not an adjudication on the 

merits and therefore not res judicata as to the merits of the case. The matters will be 

consolidated. 

We proceed to consideration of the merits of the underlying Case No. 2011NM060033, 

docketed as FAA-2011-0779 and FAA-2011-0680. 

II. Background 

Respondent Sky West Airlines, Inc. ("Respondent," "Sky West/' or "the carrier"), of St. 

George, UT, is a Part 121 regional air carrier. These proceedings all involve charges stemming 

from the carrier's baggage loading methods. It is asserted that those methods resulted in 

inaccurate counting and weighing in violation of certain Federal Aviation Regulations ("F ARs"). 

The matters were consolidated by Orders served July 29, 2011 (consolidating F AA-20 11-0485 

("-0485") and FAA-2011-0486 ("-0486")) and June 20, 2012 (consolidating FAA-2011-0779 ("-

0779") into the others ). 11 

In each proceeding the same allegations were lodged against Respondent. In Docket 

-0779, Complainant Federal Aviation Administration ("Complainant") charged that Respondent 

violated the following PARs (all in 14 CPR): section 119.5(g), for operating as a direct air carrier 

in violation of an appropriate operations specification ("op spec"); section 119.5(1), for operating 

under Part 121 an aircraft in violation of the carrier's op specs; section 121.693(a), by operating 

without a load manifest accurately reflecting the weight of the cargo and baggage; section 

121.693(c), in flying when the total weight of the aircraft had not been computed under approved 

procedures; and section 121.693( d), by operating when the aircraft had not been loaded 

according to an approved schedule. 

SkyWest's aircraft loading procedures are governed by the carrier's ops specs. Paragraph 

A098 of the op specs directs that loading and counting baggage be accomplished in accordance 

with Respondent's Weight & Balance Operations Manual ("Weight & Balance Manual" or 

"Manual"). Exh. C-1 03. 

The Manual contains an agency-approved Weight & Balance Program ("Program"). The 

Program defines several terms pertinent to these cases. It classifies luggage by weight ranges: a 

Standard Checked Bag ("standard bag") is defmed as any bag weighing 50 pounds or less; a 

Heavy Checked Bag ("heavy bag") weighs more than 50 but less than 100 pounds. When a 

heavy bag is checked in, Respondent's customer service agent will attach a "heavy baggage" tag 

to it. The tag usually is orange. A Planeside Loaded Bag, or Planeside Valet ("planeside bag"), 

is any bag or item checked plane-side; such bags are placed at the door or steps of an aircraft or 

in the jetway and subsequently placed in the aircraft cargo bin. 

11 The proceedings docketed as FAA-2011-0485 and -0486 are the subject of another !D. 
4 

SkyWest's Manual requires its designated loading agent, or a ramp agent assigned to load 

the aircraft ("loading agent"), to prepare a Cargo Load Report ("CLR"). In so doing the loading 

agent manually conducts a baggage count. He or she must write the total number of standard 

bags in the CLR's "Standard Checked" block; the heavy-bag total in the "Heavy Checked" 

block; and the total number of planeside bags in the "Planeside Valet/Service Items" block. 

Upon completion of loading, the responsible agent also must verify the piece count of all 

standard, heavy, and planeside bags. The agent additionally is required to conduct a cargo 

weight count. 

Sky West uses the CLR to compute its load manifest. Toward this end, its Manual 

employs what is known as an average weights program. The average weights program assigns 

standard bags a weight of 30 pounds; heavy bags, 60 pounds; and planeside bags, 30 pounds. 

Passengers are each assigned a weight of 190 pounds in the summer and 195 pounds in the 

winter. Personal items carried on board are assigned a weight of 16 pounds. When the CLR is 

completed it is turned over to the cockpit. The pilots then figure the load manifest from the 

number of bags times the weight assigned to each by the Manual's average weights program. 

12 

A hearing was held on October 2, 2012, in Salt Lake City, UT. The parties have filed 

briefs and the matter now is ready for decision. 13 

Respondent denied liability and interposed affmnative defenses in case -0779. The issue 

of penalty will be discussed and determined for all three matters in section III following. 

III. Discussion and Findings 

a. -0779 

This matter involves one flight. The Complaint states that on February 15, 2011, 14 

Sky West operated Flight 4451 from SLC to Casper, WY. At SLC the carrier loaded one heavy 

bag- marked with a "heavy bag" tag- but the CLR listed zero such bags (Tr. 105; Exh. C-1). 

The agency preferred the same five charges as in -0485 (see Initial Decision ("l.D."), p. 

3). It asked for a civil penalty under 49 U.S.C. §46301 of $33,000. 

b. Respondent's Testimony 

Carl Salamone was SkyWest's main witness. He is a SkyWest pilot who evaluated the 

flights at issue for weight and balance factors. He pointed out that the nature of the carrier's 

12 Tr. 51, 77-79, 91-93, 133-47; Exhs. C-102 and C-103. There are also procedures in the event a bag is loaded at 

the last minute. In that instance, so long as the flight crew assents the bag will be placed on board -- but the CLR 

will not be amended accordingly. Tr. 147-49. No evidence showed that any last-minute loading took place on any 

of the flights under review. 

13 Complainant's Post-Trial Brief will be referred to as "Compl. Br." and Respondent's Brief as "Resp. Br." 

Additionally, Complainant's exhibits will begin will begin with "Exh. C" followed by the exhibit number; 

Respondent's exhibits will begin with "Exh. R." 14 The Complaint recites the date as February 11, but at the hearing the agency amended it to February 15. Tr. 12. 
5 

weight and balance program- assigning average weights to baggage and to passengers - means 

that an aircraft's takeoff weight inevitably will not exactly correspond with its actual weight. 

Yet, he stressed, any discrepancies between the two weight figures would not have affected 

aircraft performance. 

Respecting the flight considered in -0779, Mr. Salamone stated that the discrepancy 

claimed would have resulted in a weight difference of30 pounds (if the heavy bag had been 

counted as a standard bag} or 60 pounds (if the heavy bag had not been counted at all). Either 

situation would not have affected aircraft performance. The safety of flight would have suffered 

no compromise at all, he said (Tr. 1 05-07). 

Mr. Salamone further defended SkyWest's actions in noting that FAA Advisory Circular 

("AC") 120-27E permits an average-weight program in preference to an actual-weight program. 

It recognizes that using actual weights on an aircraft is impractical, he said. The AC also permits 

an error of up to two percent for carriers performing bag surveys in place of using the method of 

average bag weights. While Sky West employs the average bag weight method, the witness 

noted that all flights charged in case -0779 would have fallen within the permitted margin of 

error (Exh. C-5; Tr. 109-12). 

The witness also stated in SkyWest's defense that, while the carrier seeks absolute 

accuracy in counting and weighing, and attempts to promote safe operations to the maximum 

extent feasible, the "sheer volume" ofluggage -- and "human limitation" -- makes the goal, as a 

practical matter, impossible (Tr. 124-25, 167; Exh. R-5). 

Finally, the carrier stressed that it has taken corrective actions to assure more accurate 

weighing. It has implemented additional risk controls, it states, and has placed greater awareness 

on this issue in training. It has utilized surveillance on its ramp personnel. Employees falling 

short of Sky West standards have been counseled and re-trained. Sky West emphasizes that it has 

highlighted to its employees the importance of this issue (see, e.g., Tr. 151-56; Exh. R-15). 

c. Findings and Conclusions 

I find and conclude in -0779 that Complainant proved that Sky West violated F ARs 

§§ 119.5(g) and 119.5(1). Complainant failed to prove any remaining allegations. 

i. Sections 119.5(g) and 119.5(1) 

Section 119 .S(g) prohibits an air carrier from operating in violation of its op specs. 

Sky West's op specs obligate the carrier to use the procedures detailed in its Weight & Balance 

Manual for loading and counting baggage. The Manual, among other things, directs the 

carrier's designated loading agent to accurately prepare the flight's CLR. For the flight 

encompassed by Docket -0779, SkyWest's CLR failed to properly reflect in the appropriate 

block the actual count of the different classes of baggage loaded onto the aircraft. The agents' 

count was one heavy bag; the CLR showed zero such bags (I.D., pp. 3-4). The failure to 

accurately prepare the CLR, it is concluded, constitutes a violation of §119.5(g). 
6 

SkyWest's actions in loading and marking the CLRs for these four flights also constitute 

a violation of FAR§ 119.5(1). This section prohibits Part 121 air carriers from operating in 

violation of op specs. By failing to set out for each flight accurate information on the CLRs, 

Respondent, a Part 121 air carrier, did not operate in conformance with its op specs. It thus 

violated this section. 

ii. Sections 121.693(a), (c), and (d) 

Subsection (a) of §121.693 requires a load manifest to contain the weight of the cargo 

and baggage. Subsection (c) compels the use of "approved procedures" in computing the total 

weight of the aircraft. Section 121.693(d) requires that the load manifest contain evidence that 

the aircraft was loaded according to an approved schedule which insures that the center of 

gravity is within approved limits. Construing these subsections together, as principles of 

statutory construction dictate, indicates that a carrier's load manifest will pass muster if it has 

been compiled using approved procedures, and that the method used insures that the center of 

gravity is within limits. The evidence shows that Sky West followed these mandates. 

Complainant, it is concluded, failed to prove that Respondent violated any of these provisions. 

As noted earlier, Sky West computes its load manifest from its CLR using its Manual's 

average weights program (see I.D. p. 4). The carrier's op specs require loading procedures to 

follow the Manual (LD., p. 3). The load manifest, then, used approved procedures to compute 

the weight of the baggage. No violation of §§121.693(a) and (c) thus could be proven. Nor was 

a § 121.693( d) violation proven; no evidence tended to demonstrate that the approved method 

failed to insure that the center of gravity was within approved limits. Indeed, the evidence 

suggested that the aircraft weight and center of gravity location fell within manufacturer 

recommendations and performance envelopes for every flight under review (LD., pp. 4, 5). 

IV. Penalty 

a. Factors 

Complainant is obligated to consider the following factors when determining an 

appropriate civil penalty amount: (1) the nature and circumstances of the violation; (2) the extent 

and gravity of the violation; (3) the respondent's degree of culpability; (4) the respondent's 

history of prior violations, if any; ( 5) the respondent's ability to pay the civil penalty; ( 6) the 

effect on the entity's ability to stay in business; and (7) other matters as justice may require. See, 

e.g., Folsom's Air Service, Inc., FAA Order No. 2008-11 (November 6, 2008), 2008 WL 

4948488, p. 11. The determination weighs whether the violation was inadvertent or deliberate, 

the private or public character of the violation, and the attitude of the violator. The agency also 

considers the respondent's size, particularly in determining the offender's ability to absorb the 

sanction. The principal elements in this analysis are the nature of the respondent's conduct and 

the totality of the circumstances. Eastern Air Center, Inc., FAA Order No. 2008-3 (January 28, 

2008). Finally, the civil penalty should provide sufficient incentive to deter the respondent and 

similarly-situated entities from future violations. Folsom's Air Service, Inc., !d., p. 20. 
7 

b. Decision 

I find that a civil penalty of $250 per flight is appropriate. 

The violations found were technical in nature. They had no material effect on weight 

and balance or on aircraft performance. Respondent showed that in no instance was safety of 

flight at even the slightest risk (See Tr. 84-85). 

As Respondent notes, the CLRs are not dispositive (Resp. Br., p. 12). The most 

important factor in the weight and balance context unquestionably is the load manifest. It is this 

document that is computed by the flight crew and used by them to evaluate how their 

calculations will affect operational safety. Complainant failed to show for any of the flights that 

Respondent failed to follow the scheme of its Weight & Balance Manual in deriving its load 

manifests (See Resp. Br., p. 7). In fact the evidence showed that Respondent's load manifest 

calculations were in accordance with its op specs and Manual instructions in every instance. 

I fmd further that just one civil penalty per flight is appropriate. To assess a civil penalty 

based on the two violations per flight found is, under the circumstances, unfair, unwarranted, and 

disproportionate to the offenses. 

The two sections violated in each instance, §§119.5(g) and 119.5(1), are not significantly 

different. The first prohibits operation as a direct air carrier in violation of op specs; the second 

prohibits operating under Part 121 in violation of op specs. The distinction between the two 

provisions for the present purposes is inconsequential. As such, penalizing Respondent for both 

violations would be unjustified. I note that the agency's civil penalty guidelines, FAA Order 

2150.3B, take a similar stance: they advise that "[w]hen a single instance of noncompliance 

results in multiple violations of general and specific regulations involving the same or similar 

conduct, the FAA ordinarily does not compound the sanction ... " (Exh. C-6, p. 7-10). Under 

these circumstances, one civil penalty- in a minimal amount of $250 per violation- suffices. 

In sum, I fmd that the civil penalty appropriately accounts for the factors the statute and 

agency policy directs in fixing the assessment. 

All arguments by both parties have been carefully considered. Those not explicitly 

discussed are rejected or dismissed as mooted by this Initial Decision. 15 

V. Wherefore, the above case having come for hearing, testimony having been heard and 

considered, post-hearing Briefs having been considered, it be and is ORDERED as follow: 

a. I fmd and conclude that Notices of Assignment (NO As) are not required in FAA 

cases. 

b. The original docket number for this case is FAA Docket 2011NM060033. 

15 Certain evidence in this proceeding bas been sealed. See Order Sealing Certain Exhibits and Transcript Portion, 

served November 2, 2012, and OrderUnsea1ing Transcript Pages, served January 17, 2013. However, this Initial 

Decision does not reference any of the evidence remaining under seal; as such, no part of the J.D. is subject to seal, 

and it may be freely disseminated in its entirety. 
8 

c. FAA Docket 2011NM060033 was docketed as FAA-2011-0680 and FAA-2011-

0779. 

d. The Order of the Chief Administrative Law Judge dated October 4, 2011 was not 

an assignment and or/ an adjudication on the merits ofF AA Docket 2011NM060033. 

e. FAA-2011-0680 be and is hereby consolidated and merged with FAA-2011-0779. 

f. Sky West Airlines, Inc. be and is hereby assessed a civil penalty of $250 in Docket 

F AA-2011-0779 for violations ofF AR §§119.5(g) and 119.5(1) as discussed 

hereinabove1 6 

~?"==--~o~..,...i;=-"=-......_· ~+---- Administrative Law Judge 

Attachment - Service List 

16 This decision may be appealed to the Administrator of the FAA. The notice of appeal must conform to sections 

13.210, 13.211 (e) and 13.233 of the Rules of Practice, which require that a notice of appeal I) be filed not later than 

I 0 days (plus an additional five days if mailed) from the service date of this decision, and 2) be perfected with a 

written brief or memorandum not later than 50 days (plus an additional five, if mailed) from the service date of this 

decision. The notice of appeal and brief or memorandum must either be a) mailed to the Federal Aviation 

Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC 20591, Attn: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430, 

Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2WIOOO, or b) delivered personally or via expedited courier service to the Federal 

Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2WIOOO, Washington, 

D.C. 20591, Attn: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430. A copy of the notice of appeal and brief or memorandum also 

must be sent to agency counsel. Service upon the presiding judge is optional. 
9 

SERVICE LIST 

ORIGINAL & ONE COPY 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, DC 20591 

Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 

Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2Wl000 1 

ONE COPY 

Todd C. Emerson, Respondent's Representative 

Director- Government and Legal Affairs 

Sky West Airlines 

444 South River Road 

St. George, UT 84790 

TEL: 435-634-3530 

FAJ(: 435-634-3505 

Robert Spitzer, Complainant's Counsel 

Attorney, Office of the Regional Counsel 

Northwest Mountain Region, ANM-7 

Federal Aviation Administration 

1601 Lind Avenue, S.W. 

Renton, WA 98057 

TEL: 425-227-1417 

FAX: 425-227-1007 

The Honorable Richard C. Goodwin, Administrative Law Judge 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. (El 1-310) 

Washington, DC 20590 

TEL: 202-366-2139 Attorney-Advisor 

202-366-5121 Staff Assistant/Paralegal 

FAJ(: 202-366-7536 

FDMS No. FAA-2011-0779 

( Civi I Penalty Action) 

1 Service was by U.S. Mail. For service in person or by expedited courier, use the following address: Federal 

Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright Building-Suite 2WIOOO, Washington, 

DC 20591; Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430. 
Attachment l.b 

SkyWest Post Trial Brief 

Dated January 22, 2013 
Todd C. Emerson, #8175 

SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC. 

444 South River Road 

St. George, Utah, 84790 

Telephone: (435) 634-3530 

Facsimile: (435) 634-3505 

-andMichael L. Dworkin #64047 

MICHAEL L. DWORKIN AND ASSOCIATES 

465 California Street, Suite 210 

San Francisco, California 94118 

Telephone: (415) 421-2500 

Facsimile: (415) 421-2560 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

In the Matter of: 

SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC. 

FAA Case Nos.: 2011NM060010, 

2011NM060011, 2011NM060033 

(Consolidated) 

DMS Nos. FAA-2011-0465; -0486; 

and 0680/0779 

POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Judge: Richard C. Goodwin 

Introduction 

This consolidated matter concerns five flights over a three-month period from November, 

2010 to February, 2011, in which the numbers of bags offloaded from each of the respective 
flights did not conform to the numbers of bag reflected on the flight crew copies of the Cargo 

Load Report (CLR). Safety of flight was neither affected nor compromised, as any weight 

discrepancies were nominal and had no effect whatsoever on the weight and balance, or 

performance and handling, of the aircraft. 

Specifically, the FAA has alleged: 

On November 17, 2010, Sky West operated Flight 6573 on a flight from Denver, 

Colorado (DEN) to Hayden, Colorado (HDN), carrying among other things, 3 heavy bags, but 

only counted and/or recorded 1 in its Cargo Load Report ("CLR") (FAA Case No. 

2011NM060010/DMS No. FAA-2011-0486); 

On November 22,2010, Sky West operated Flight 4659 from Billings, Montana (BIL) to 

Salt Lake City, Utah (SLC) and carried 38 standard bags and 2 heavy bags, but counted and/or 

recorded 40 standard bags in its CLR (FAA Case No. 2011NM060011/DMS No. FAA-2011-

0485); 

On December 14,2010, Sky West operated Flight 6692 from Los Angeles, California 

(LAX) to San Diego, California (SAN) and carried, among other things, 19 standard bags and I 

heavy bag, but the CLR listed 20 standard bags and 5 heavy bags (2011NM060011/DMS No. 

FAA-2011-0485); 

On December 15, 2010, Sky West operated Flight 4800 from LAX to SAN, loading 43 

standard bags, 4 heavy bags and 12 planeside valet bags, but the CLR listed 59 standard bags 

(20 11NM060011/DMS No. F AA-2011-0485); and 

On February 11,2011, Sky West operated Flight4451 from SLC to Casper, Wyoming 

(CPR), and the CLR neglected to list 1 heavy bag (2011NM060033/DMS No. FAA-2011-

0680/0779). 

For these alleged violations, the FAA contends that Sky West violated its Operations 

Specifications (OpSpecs), in violation ofF AR's 119.5(g)1 and (1)2

; operated flights without load 

1 119.5(g) -No person may operate as a direct air carrier or as a commercial operator without, or 

in violation of, an appropriate certificate and appropriate operations specifications. No person 

FAA Case Nos.: 2011NM060010, 2011NM060011, 2011NM060033 (Consolidated) 

DMS Nos. F AA-2011-0465; -0486; and 0680/0779 

POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Page2 
manifests accurately reflecting the weights of cargo and baggage, in violation ofF AR 

121.693(a); operated aircraft when the total weights were not computed under approved 

procedures, in violation of FAR 121.693(c) and operated aircraft which had not been loaded in 

accordance with an approved schedule, in violation of FAR 121.693(di and seeks the 

assessment and imposition of$165,000 in civil penalties (or $33,000 per flight). 

Sky West contends that the alleged violations have not been proven

4 and that even if such 

is the case, the proposed sanction is excessive, unwarranted and unreasonable. 

To keep these allegations in their proper perspective, during this very same period of 

time, Sky West operated some 120,000 flights and carried some 5-6 million items of baggage, all 

without incident. 

As do many US-certificated air carriers, Sky West utilizes an average weights program to 

govern the loading and computation of weight and balance of its aircraft.' Sky West's Weight 

may operate as a direct air carrier or as a commercial operator in violation of any deviation or 

exemption authority, if issued to that person or that person's representative. 

2 119.5(1)- No person may operate an aircraft under this part, part 121 of this chapter, or part 135 

of this chapter in violation of an air carrier operating certificate, operating certificate, or 

appropriate operations specifications issued under this part. 

3 121.693 - The load manifest must contain the following information concerning the loading of 

the airplane at takeoff time: 

(a) The weight of the aircraft, fuel and oil, cargo and baggage, passengers and crewmembers; 

(c) The total weight computed under approved procedures; and 

(d) Evidence that the aircraft is loaded according to an approved schedule that insures that the 

center of gravity is within approved limits. 

4 An Order Granting in Part Complainant's Motion for Decision was issued in FDMS No. FAA2011-0486, as to the issue of liability in that matter involving Sky West Flight No. 6573 on 

November 17, 2010. That flight was allegedly operated with 3 heavy bags on board, while only 

2 had been recorded on the CLR, the issue of sanction has not been resolved. 

5 Under Paragraph A098 of its Operations Specifications ("OpSpecs") Sky West is authorized to 

utilize average weights for passengers, carry-on personal items, planeside loaded items and 

checked baggage. Average weights for planeside-loaded items and standard bags are 30 pounds 

FAA Case Nos.: 2011NM060010, 2011NM060011, 2011NM060033 (Consolidated) 

OMS Nos. F AA-2011-0465; -0486; and 0680/0779 

POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Page 3 
and Balance (W &B) Manual instructs aircraft loading personnel to write the total number of 

standard checked bags, heavy bags and planeside valet bags loaded onto aircraft on the CLR. 

SkyWest's W&B Program, upon which the W&B Manual has been based, is incorporated into 

Sky West's FAA-issued Operations Specifications (OpSpecs). 

Complainant has asserted that if the numbers of bags listed in the flight crews' CLR 

copies do not match the number of bags unloaded from the aircraft, there is a presumption that 

Sky West loaded baggage into the aircraft in violation of its W &B Program and Manual. 

Complainant asserts that this presumption extends to the preparation and accuracy of the 

load manifests. In other words, if the CLR's do not accurately reflect the numbers of bags 

loaded into the aircraft, the load manifests are inaccurate and in violation of the OpSpecs and 

applicable FAR's. Sky West disagrees with this presumption, and denies that it violated its 

OpSpecs or the applicable FAR's. 

It is the load manifest itself that is controlling. SkyWest's OpsSpecs specifically permit 

last minute changes to cargo with the concurrence of the flight crew. 6 There is no specific 

requirement that the crew copy of the CLR be amended. It is quite conceivable that crews could 

have permitted last minute changes and have incorporated those changes in the preparation of the 

per item and for heavy checked bags, 60 pounds per item. Pursuant to said OpSpecs, Sky West 

has published its FAA-Approved Weight & Balance Operations Manual, SP4100 (hereinafter 

"W&B Manual'). Although assigned a 60-pound average weight, heavy checked bags are 

defined as luggage heavier weighing over 50 pounds, but less than 100 pounds. 

6 Pursuant to Sky West's Operations Specifications, CLR's are created in duplicate, one copy 

goes to the flight crew and the originating station retains one copy. In cases where last minute 

changes are necessary, the flight crew and loading agents verbally discuss any changes to weight 

and balance. The Pilot in Command (PIC) will either authorize or refuse the change and then 

make the necessary change to the load manifest without needing to change the CLR. The CLR 

copy maintained by the Station Operation will be modified. The modified copy is retained until 

the end of the day. Complainant's Exhibit C-103- Chapter 4, page 16, Standard Procedures 

4100, Section 11, Aircraft Loading, (B) Last minute changes. See also, Hearing Transcript 147-

149:1-4. 

FAA Case Nos.: 2011NM060010, 2011NM060011, 20llNM060033 (Consolidated) 

DMS Nos. FAA-2011-0465; -0486; and 0680/0779 

POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Page4 
load manifests without having amended their copies of the CLR's. Absent some evidence that 

the flight crews used inaccurate information contained in their copies of the CLR' s to prepare the 

load manifests, Complainant's case must fail. 

Case No. 2011NM060011, DMS No. FAA-2011-0485 

This case involves three separate flights: Flight 4659 on November 22, 2010, from 

Billings, Montana to Salt Lake City, Utah; Flight 6692 on December 14, 2010 from Los Angeles, 

California to San Diego, California; and Flight 4800 on December 15, 2010 from Los Angeles, 

California to San Diego, California. 

Flight 4659 contained a CLR that accounted for two heavy bags as standard bags7

, which 

in the worst instance would have created a 60-pound disparity in aircraft weight under the W &B 

Program. 8 This would have had no effect on the weight and balance or the performance of the 

CRJ-200 aircraft utilized for that flight. 9 During the course of its investigation, the FAA did not 

speak with the flight crew or the agent(s) who loaded the aircraft nor did it obtain the departing 

station's copy of the CLR or otherwise submit any evidence that the flight crew improperly 

calculated the load manifest. 10 The load manifest was not even introduced into evidence. 

7 Under Sky West's W&B Program, standard bags and planeside valet bags are assigned a 30 

pound weight and heavy bags (those weighing over 50 pounds and less than 100 pounds are 

assigned a 60 pound weight. 

8 This assumes that the weights reflected in the CLR' s were incorporated into the Load Manifests 

for each of these flights. However, Complainant has failed to introduce the Load Manifests and 

has failed to adduce any evidence that the Load Manifests incorporated the alleged CLR errors or 

that the Load Manifests were in any way inaccurate. 

9 Hearing Transcript 79:12-16;98:2-11;100:15-22;101:10 

10 Hearing Transcript 80:11-19- The FAA did not produce any witnesses so Sky West could not 

determine if Agents asked the flight crew whether there was a last minute passenger change and 

if the PIC gave permission to replace to replace two heavy bags with two standard bags. 

FAA Case Nos.: 2011NM060010, 2011NM06001 I, 2011NM060033 (Consolidated) 

DMS Nos. FAA-2011-0465; -0486; and 0680/0779 

POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Page 5 
Flight 6692 involved a CLR that listed one standard bag and four heavy bags that were 

not on the aircraft. In the worst instance, the aircraft was 270 pounds lighter than represented on 

the CLR, which if true, might have marginally improved aircraft performance. 11 The FAA did 

not speak with the flight crew or obtain the departing station's copy of the CLR or otherwise 

submit any evidence that the flight crew improperly calculated the load manifest. 12 The load 

manifest was not introduced into evidence. 

Flight 4800 involved a CLR listing 59 standard bags, when 4 should have been listed as 

heavy bags and 12 should have been listed as planeside/valet. Planeside valet bags are given the 

same weight as standard bags, so there was no net change in aircraft weight. Surprisingly, if 

these very same bags had been kept in the cabin, they would have been assigned an average 

weight of only 16 pounds. 13 reducing aircraft weight by 168 lbs., more than eliminating the 120-

pound difference that the FAA alleges was not counted. 14 Again, the FAA did not speak with the 

flight crew or the personnel who loaded the aircraft, nor did it obtain the departing station's copy 

of the CLR or otherwise submit any evidence that the flight crew improperly calculated the load 

manifest. 15 The load manifest was not introduced into evidence. 

Case No. 2011NM060010, DMS No. FAA-2011-0486 

This case involves Flight 6573 on November 17,2010 from Denver, Colorado to Yampa 

Valley, Hayden Colorado. A heavy bag that was offloaded was not listed on the CLR. The FAA 

did not produce any evidence as to whether this was a recording error or the product of a last 

"Hearing Transcript 102:13-22; 103:1;111 :13-22 

12 Hearing Transcript 50:8-1 0;52:8-10;53: 1-22 

13 Hearing Transcript 91-93 

14 Complainant alleges the load manifest accounted for four heavy bags as standard. 

15 Hearing Transcript 55:12-22;56:1-3 

FAA Case Nos.: 2011NM060010, 2011NM060011, 2011NM060033 (Consolidated) 

OMS Nos. FAA-2011-0465; -0486; and 0680/0779 

POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Page 6 
minute addition that the flight crew had allowed. Had it been a last minute change, no change 

would have been required to have been made on the crew copy of the CLR. 

It is unknown whether the alleged heavy bag was counted as a standard bag. Hence the 

weight discrepancy could have been as low as 30 pounds but not more than 60 pounds. Once 

again, the load manifest was not introduced into evidence. 

Case No. 2011NM060033, DMS No. FAA-2011-0680/0779 

This case involves Flight 4451 on February 15, 2011, from Salt Lake City, Utah to 

Casper, Wyoming. The FAA alleges that there was one heavy bag on the flight but none was 

listed on the CLR. The FAA did not speak with the flight crew or personnel who loaded the 

aircraft nor did it obtain the departing station's copy of the CLR or otherwise submit any 

evidence as to whether the flight crew allowed the heavy bag to be loaded at the last minute 

(which would not require a modification of the CLR). The load manifest was not introduced into 

evidence. 

It is unknown whether the alleged heavy bag was counted as a standard bag. Hence the 

weight discrepancy could have been as low as 30 pounds but not more than 60 pounds. Once 

again, the load manifest was not introduced into evidence. 

In none of these cases did Complainant offer any evidence that the flight crews 

improperly calculated the load manifests using incorrect CLR' s or that the load manifests were 

other than completely correct. 16 As such, Complainant's case fails. 

16 Hearing Transcript 36:11-18 

FAA Case Nos.: 2011NM060010, 2011NM060011, 2011NM060033 (Consolidated) 

DMS Nos. FAA-2011-0465; -0486; and 0680/0779 

POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Page7 
Argument 

Preface 

Complainant seeks a total sanction of$165,000 in the consolidated cases, or $33,000 per 

flight for something that Complainant concedes does not affect safety of flight and for which 

Complainant's allegations may be baseless. 17 

During the three-month period which this consolidated matter covers, Sky West operated 

some 120,000 flights and carried some 5-6 million items of baggage, all without incident. 

As SkyWest's pilot and expert18 Carl Salamone testified, computation of takeoff weight 

under an average weights program, may not exactly correspond to the actual weight of the 

aircraft; 19 aircraft weight and center of gravity and aircraft performance for each of the five 

flights fell within manufacturer's recommendations and requirements, 20 and even had there been 

weight discrepancies between the actual bags loaded versus what was listed in the CLR's (and 

further assuming, solely for the sake of argument, that the baggage weights accounted for in the 

CLR's had been incorporated into tbe load manifests (for which the Complainant offered no 

proof), there would have been no effect on aircraft performance or safety of flight and the 

aircraft would have remained within its operating limitations21 Moreover, Under FAA Advisory 

Circular 120-27E, Average Weight Programs, which acknowledges that using actual aircraft 

17 FAA Inspector McKenna testified that the load manifest could have been correct. (Transcript 

35:10-11 and 37:18-22). Also, see Complainant's Post-Trial Brief at p. 12: "Complainant 

concedes that there were no actual safety consequences to Respondent's operation ... 

Complainant does not allege that some actual harm occurred ... or that the operating limitations 

of the aircraft were actually exceeded .... " 

18 Hearing Transcript 107:18-108:8 

19 Hearing Transcript 93:9-94:2 

20 Hearing Transcript 94:3-95:20 

21 Hearing Transcript 104:14107:2 

FAA Case Nos.: 2011NM060010, 2011NM060011, 2011NM060033 (Consolidated) 

OMS Nos. F AA-2011-0465; -0486; and 0680/0779 

POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Page 8 
weights are impractical, a 2% tolerance is deemed acceptable. With the exception of Flight 4800 

(FDMS No. F AA-2011-0485) all flights were within the 2% tolerance. Even with any alleged 

CLR errors, and assuming solely for the sake of argument that any CLR errors had been 

incorporated into the aircraft weight calculation in the load manifest, the aircraft would have 

nonetheless met the AC guidance or accepted industry standards. 22 

In the course of its investigations of these matters, the FAA failed to: 

- speak with the subject flight crews and the personnel who loaded the aircraft to 

determine ifthere were any last minute changes where the flight crew had authorized addition(s) 

or removal(s) of baggage23 such that a modification of the flight crew copies of the CLR's were 

not necessary 

24 

; 

-inquire whether the originating station had on file the only CLR' s required to be 

amended. While Complainant argues in its Post-Trial Brief that the "record is devoid of any 

evidence that any of these [authorized last minute changes] took place on any of the flights at 

issue,"25 the originating stations discard amended CLR's at the end of the day,26 which the FAA 

inspectors could have obtained; and most importantly, 

-demonstrate any correlation between the baggage count contained in the flight crew 

copies of the CLR' s and the aircraft weights listed in each of the load manifests. 

22 More specifically discussed, infra. 

23 Hearing Transcript 50:8-10;52:8-10;53:1-22 (Flight 6692); 55:12-22;56:1-3 (Flight 4800); 

80:11-19 (Flight 4659); 36:11-18 (Flight 4451). The Complainant did not provide any evidence 

or testimony that the FAA investigated with the flight crews of Flight 6573 whether there was a 

last moment baggage change. 

24 Complainant's Exhibit C-103- Chapter 4, page 16, Standard Procedures 4100, Section 11, 

Aircraft Loading, (B) Last minute changes. 

25 Complainant Post-Trial Brief, page 8, paragraph 1 

26 Hearing Transcript 144:3-22;145:1-10 

FAA Case Nos.: 2011NM060010, 2011NM060011, 2011NM060033 (Consolidated) 

DMS Nos. FAA-2011-0465; -0486; and 0680/0779 

POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Page 9 
Specific Issues before the Court 

I. Double Docketing ofDMS Nos. 0680 and 0779: 

On October4, 2012, Chief Administrative Law Judge Ronnie Yoder, noting the 

double-docketing of FAA Case No. 2011NM060033 under two DMS numbers (0680 & 0779), 

assigned DMS 0680 to Judge Richard Goodwin and issued an Order apparently "closing" DMS 

0779. As Judge Yoder did not assign 0779 to any other Judge, it can be presumed he assigned it 

to himself. 

Had Judge Yoder intended to keep DMS 0779 open, he could have recalled DMS 0680 

from Judge Goodwin, combined 0779 and 0680, and then returned both cases to Judge Goodwin. 

Instead, Judge Yoder dismissed DMS 0779. 

Counsel for Respondent was unable to find any case law on point. As this is a procedural 

concern, not one of substance, Respondent submits to the Court's discretion in resolving any 

outstanding concerns. 

2. Complainant Has Failed to Meet its Burden of Proof: 

Complainant has alleged that Sky West violated its Operations Specifications (in violation 

ofF AR's 119.5(g) and(!); operated flights without load manifests accurately reflecting the 

weights of cargo and baggage (in violation of FAR 121.693(a)); operated aircraft when the total 

weights were not computed under approved procedures (in violation of FAR 121.693(c)); and 

operated aircraft which had not been loaded in accordance with an approved schedule (in 

violation of FAR 121.693(d)27

). 

To prove Sky West violated the FAR's cited, Complainant must show that Sky West 

loaded bags in a way not authorized by the W &B program incorporated into its OpsSpecs, 

resulting in the flight crew incorrectly calculating the aircraft's W&B, and then operating the 

27 All pertinent FAR's are cited and quoted supra. 

FAA Case Nos.: 2011NM060010, 2011NM060011, 2011NM060033 (Consolidated) 

DMS Nos. FAA-2011-0465; -0486; and 0680/0779 

POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Page 10 
flight with an incorrect load manifest. To this end, Complainant has submitted several CLR's 

that do not reflect the number of offloaded bags. 

Complainant suggests that because the flight crew copies of the CLR's did not properly 

reflect the baggage in the aircraft cargo area, then it must be presumed that the load manifests 

were incorrect. This presumption is shaky, at best. 

It is the load manifest that is controlling as there is no specific requirement that the crew 

copy of the CLR be amended to reflect last minute changes. Absent some evidence that the 

flight crews used inaccurate information contained in their copies of the CLR's to prepare the 

load manifests, Complainant's case must fail. 

Complainant would have the Court believe that the use of CLR data is the sole means of 

generating a load manifest. However, Complainant's Exhibit C-1 02, Sky West's Customer 

Service Procedures, provides that the CLR is not the only information used to calculate the load 

manifest. Complainant did not introduce a single load manifest, testimony on how the flight crew 

calculated weight and balance, or more importantly, the Station Operations copies of the CLR' s. 

If the flight crew allowed for a last minute change, the departing stations' copies of the CLR' s 

would have been the only correct CLR's amended per Exhibit C-102. 

3. Complainant Failed to Prove that Sky West Operated Aircraft in Violation of its 

Operations Specifications 

Sky West's W &B program is incorporated into its operations specifications. The W &B 

program requires that Sky West personnel mark the number of standard, heavy and planeside 

loaded bags in the appropriate block of the CLR and then provide it to the flight crew who, 

unless there are last minute changes, use the CLR to calculate the aircraft's W &B and create the 

load manifest. The program allows for last minute changes-i.e. loading and unloading of cargo, 

after the CLR has been completed, provided the PIC has communicated with the designated 

loading agent about the newly requested weight discrepancy and has given authorization for the 

change. Accordingly, there may be instances in which the flight crew copies of the CLR's may 

not reflect the numbers of bags, but the originating stations' will. 

FAA Case Nos.: 2011NM060010, 2011NM060011, 2011NM060033 (Consolidated) 

DMS Nos. FAA-2011-0465; -0486; and 0680/0779 

POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Page 11 
Complainant's allegations that Sky West operated in violation of its OpSpecs is based 

solely on the flight crew copies of the CLR' s. However, this does not mean that the load 

manifests were incorrect or that the flights were in violation of the OpSpecs. Again, the best 

evidence would have been the load manifests and some evidence as to how the load manifests 

were prepared and what information was utilized to compute aircraft weight and balance. 

Chapter 4, page 16 of Sky West's Standard Procedures 4100, Section 11, Aircraft 

Loading, Subsection (B), states that the designated aircraft loading agent may load or unload 

baggage after the CLR has been completed and supplied to the flight creW'8 provided the change 

in weight is communicated to the PIC who in turn has given his or her approval for the change. 

This section does not require that the flight crew's copy of the CLR be amended, so a last minute 

change could produce some prima facie discrepancy between the flight crew's copy of the CLR 

and the number of bags offloaded from the aircraft.29 

While the Ops Specs clearly provide for operating flights with a bag count that is not 

represented on the flight crew's CLR, none of the FAA inspectors spoke with the Sky West 

loading personnel, departing station personnel or the flight crews responsible for computing 

weight and balance to prepare the load manifests, nor did they review the operation station's 

copy of the CLR copy. 

The FAA did not ask flight crews how they calculated weight and balance, and 

specifically, whether they had authorized any last minute changes and calculated weight and 

balance using a verbally amended CLR, resulting in an accurate load manifest30 As the CLR' s 

submitted by Complainant are not dispositive, the FAA provided absolutely no evidence to 

28 So long as engine one is not operating. 

29 Hearing Transcript 147:8-22;148:1-22;149:1-4) 

30 Hearing Transcript 37:18-22;36:11-18 (Agent McKenna);50:8-10;52:8-10;53:1-22;55:12-

22;56:1-3;51: 14-19 (Agent Huymh); 78:10-13;80:11-19 (Agent Gehring) 

FAA Case Nos.: 2011NM060010, 2011NM060011, 2011NM060033 (Consolidated) 

DMS Nos. FAA-2011-0465; -0486; and 0680/0779 

POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Page 12 
suggest the load manifests were incorrect.3

t In fact, Complainant has admitted in its Post-Trial 

Brief that the load manifests could have been correct. 32 

There is no evidence to suggest that the flight crews on these five flights calculated the 

load manifests using incorrect weight and balance information, that the aircraft were loaded other 

than pursuant to authorized procedures set forth in Sky West's OpsSpecs, that the flight crews did 

not correctly calculate weight and balance data, or that Sky West operated aircraft in any manner 

contrary to its OpsSpecs. 

Complainant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there were any 

violations of Sections ll9.5(g),(l) or Sections 121.693(a), (c), and (d). 

4. The Sanction Sought in these Cases is Inappropriate and Unwarranted by the 

Facts 

While Sky West contends that no violations occurred, the sanctions sought by 

Complainant are unreasonable and should be reduced. It is important to note that Complainant 

does not attempt to justify its proposed penalties by applying evidence to the sanction guidelines. 

Each flight is simply assigned the same penalty, with no consideration of the myriad differences 

between those flights. Instead, Complainant runs through a rote recitation of familiar cases and 

simply expects this court to give it deference in the penalty it has selected- without bothering to 

show the math on how $33,000 per flight was calculated. It drops the thirteen factors set forth in 

Warbelow in a footnote without explaining how any of these factors moved the proposed 

sanction up, or down, by a dollar. No deference need be given to a number so arbitrarily chosen. 

Jt Other than testifying that they counted bags and compared their count to the CLR's received 

from the flight crews, Agents McKenna (Hearing Transcript 3 7: 18-22), Huymh (Hearing 

Transcript 54: 14-19;60: 19-22;61: 1-11) and Gehring (Hearing Transcript 80: 11-19) did not 

provide any testimony suggesting that the flight crews used incorrect baggage counts when 

calculating weight for flight planning purposes. 

32 Complainant Post-Trial Brief, page 7, states that corrections to the load manifest might have 

been made to correctly reflect each aircrafts' loading. 

FAA Case Nos.: 2011NM060010, 2011NM060011, 2011NM060033 (Consolidated) 

DMS Nos. FAA-2011-0465; -0486; a.'ld 0680/0779 

POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Page 13 
Although Complainant is quick to argue that Sky West has the means to pay its proposed 

penalty, it does not, and cannot, argue that its demand is remotely proportional to the alleged 

technical, non-safety, violation. Take a moment to consider that in 2011, Sky West Inc. (Express 

Jet and Sky West Airlines) reported a net loss of$27.8 million33 • By itself, Sky West Airlines 

operated 602,000 flights with a profit of $58 million- or $96 per flight. Thus, in order to pay 

the $165,000 in total penalties for alleged miscounted bags, Sky West would have to operate 

I, 719 flights. This penalty, which the FAA readily admits is based on non-safety and technical 

violations, is draconian and needs more justification than "we get deference." No, the FAA has 

the burden of showing that its penalty is fair, reasonably calculated and specifically tied to the 

underlying facts. It has not done that here. Instead it has ignored SkyWest's efforts to mitigate 

and blown past the maximum allowable penalty by alleging multiple violations, based on the 

same set of underlying facts. 

a. Nature, Circumstance, Gravity and Extent of the Alleged Violation 

Sky West strives for baggage count and aircraft weight and balance accuracy and its 

efforts to control risks associated therewith are ongoing and a top priority. However, the aircraft 

ramp is a very difficult work environment-it is busy, noisy, exposed to the elements and there 

are other factors that come into play that can alter and limit human performance. 34 Human 

limitations on the process ofloading and counting baggage on aircraft can make it impossible to 

ensure 100% accuracy. 

35 

33 Sky West respectfully requests that the Administrative Law Judge take judicial notice of 

Sky West's Form 10-K, for the year ended December 31, 2011, on file with the Securities and 

Exchange Commission (SEC), and specifically, pages 1-6, 39, 40, 45, 46 and 65 thereof, which 

are attached hereto as Appendix A to this Post-Trial Brief. Under Federal Rules of Evidence 

("FRE'') 201, Courts may take judicial notice of contents of documents filed with an 

administrative agency, FindWhat Investor Group v. FindWhat.com (11th Cir. 2011), 658 F. 3d 

1282, 1297, fu 15. 

34 Hearing Transcript 118:2-9 

35 Hearing Transcript 124:11-22;125:1 

FAA Case Nos.: 2011NM060010, 2011NM060011, 2011NM060033 (Consolidated) 

DMS Nos. F AA-2011-0465; -0486; and 0680/0779 

POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Page 14 
True, improper aircraft loading can cause a hazard. But that is simply not the case here. 

The aircraft weight and balance and performance calculations remained well within FAAapproved manufacturer limits as it had been calculated for each flight. 36 Safety of flight was 

never at risk. 

Moreover, computation of takeoff weight under an average weights program does not 

exactly correspond to the actual weight of the aircraft. 37 Complainant has long recognized this 

and has fully acknowledged that the use of actual baggage and passenger weights is impractical, 

which is why the FAA allows for an average weight programs contemplated in AC120-27E. 

Under the AC, the FAA has recognized that there is no implicit or automatic danger caused by 

small discrepancies between the aircraft weight specified in the load manifest and the actual 

weight of the aircraft. 

Because using actual weights is impractical, AC120-27E allows for an average weights 

program wherein a 2% tolerance or 2% error is allowable.38 Of the five flights at issue in this 

case, only one was outside of the permitted 2%, although not by much.39 

b. Degree of Culpability 

Sky West handles an estimated 23 million bags per year;40 the sheer volume of manually 

handled items makes it impossible to assure absolute accuracy. 

SEALED - Which is presumably why the FAA has agreed to allow other airlines, DELTA 

specifically, to have bag counts off by as many as 20 bags on similar aircraft (Sealed Transcript 

6:9-21; 7:5-20; 10:7-22:11:1-8)- UNSEALED 

36 Hearing Transcript 94:3-16 

37 Hearing Transcript 91-94:1-2 

38 Hearing Transcript 108:9-17;109:4-22;110:1 

39 Hearing Transcript 110;111;112 

40 Hearing Transcript 123:19-22;124:1-4 

FAA Case Nos.: 2011NM06001 0, 2011NM060011, 2011NM060033 (Consolidated) 

OMS Nos. FAA-2011-0465; -0486; and 0680/0779 

POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Page 15 
Under its Human Factors Policy41 Complainant has acknowledged that it should consider 

error tolerance systems that take into consideration human limitations, and has done so for other 

airlines.42 Unfortunately, the FAA has refused efforts by Sky West to amend its approved W&B 

Program to provide for tolerance or variance for small miscounts in nature that result in slight 

differences between the actual baggage counts, the numbers of bags reported on the CLR or the 

weights reported on the aircraft load manifest.43 

Sky West had previously requested that the FAA allow it to amend its W&B Program44 to 

provide for this. Although the FAA has granted such relief to at least one other air carrier 

operating aircraft of similar size to SkyWest's CRJ-900's, the FAA, for no specified reason, 

declined to do so, evidently preferring to impose civil penalties for technical infractions having 

no adverse effect on safety. 45 

c. Attitude; Corrective Actions 

Although Complainant suggests that Sky West's corrective actions were ineffectual 

(Complainant's Brief at pp. 12-13), Sky West has always been an industry leader in compliance 

41 FAA Order 9550.8, publically available at http://www.hf.faa.gov/docs!hforder.htm 

42 Hearing Transcript 115:4-13, referencing Exhibits 4-6 

43 Hearing Transcript 112:19-22;113:1-17 

44 Exhibit R-4, Original W&B Program Amendment Proposal, dated March 2, 2011; in person 

meeting on March 3, 2011; Exhibit R-5, Follow-up letter dated March 5, 2011. Hearing 

Transcript 123:3-13. Sky West sent multiple letters, met with the FAA in-person and provided 

excerpts of Operations Manuals from other airlines that FAA had already approved for just such 

an amendment. Sky West's request sought a 60lb tolerance for the CRJ-200 and 90lbs for the 

CRJ-700/900. Hearing Transcript 115: 19-22; 116:18. The tolerance request was within the 2% 

margin specified in the advisory circular for the CRJ-200 and very close for the CRJ-700/900. 

The reason it made sense for the 700/900 is because of the approved program already in place for 

three bags. Hearing Transcript 118:10-20. 

45 SEALED- The FAA granted Delta Airlines a 20-bag tolerance, yet denied Sky West a 2-bag 

tolerance. Sealed Transcript 7-8. - UNSEALED 

FAA Case Nos.: 2011NM060010, 2011NM060011, 20!1NM060033 (Consolidated) 

DMS Nos. FAA-2011-0465; -0486; and 0680/0779 

POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Page 16 
and training. Where Sky West sees best practices used by other airlines, it incorporates those 

practices where applicable46 (and when allowed by the FAA). 

At the hearing Sky West presented extensive evidence of corrective actions taken to 

prevent and/or minimize human error in counting baggage, including, among other things, four 

years of weight and balance workshops and conferences, self-audits to ensure compliance, the 

addition of improved online CLR training courses; the introduction of focus groups with 

frontline agents to better understand where the potential for discrepancy and error exists; 

enhancing basic employee training; follow-up conference calls with contract stations to ensure 

compliance with new procedures; and issuance and dissemination of training bulletins and 

ground operations bulletins.47 

FAA's Salt Lake City, Utah, Certificate Management Office attended and participated in 

Sky West's 2009,2010 and 2011 Customer Service Training conferences focusing on weight and 

balance issues. There was never any indication from them that Sky West's training or procedures 

were anything other than adequate. 48 Sky West had monthly teleconferences with the FAA 

Certificate Management Office and a Principal Operations Inspector to ensure Sky West's 

compliance efforts were satisfactory, and again, the FAA never offered even a hint that 

SkyWest's actions were in anyway inadequate.49 

On page 13 of its Post-Trial Brief, Complainant cited 21 different measures taken by 

Sky West, claiming 14 did not work and 7 are just a "rehash [of) previous efforts known to be 

ineffectual".50 This statement calls into question the nature of the FAA's enforcement policy as 

46 Hearing Transcript 172:15-22;173: 1-15 

47 SEALED Hearing Transcript 14-30 

48 SEALED TRANSCRIPT 21:19-22;22:1-2 

49 SEALED TRANSCRIPT 26-27 

5

° Complainant's Post-Trial Brief, page 12-13 

FAA Case Nos.: 2011NM060010, 2011NM060011, 2011NM060033 (Consolidated) 

DMS Nos. FAA-2011-0465; -0486; and 0680/0779 

POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Page 17 
Sky West took extensive efforts to collaborate with the FAA to ensure that its W&B Program and 

baggage loading and accounting procedures were adequate, since the FAA is now suggesting that 

it was not enough. 5

1 Complainant's churlish comments about SkyWest's "ineffectual" attempts 

at compliance show the FAA's unrealistic expectations. On multiple occasions Sky West met and 

worked with the FAA in formulating many of these corrective actions. 

d. Compounding of Multiple Violations 

Simply adding up individual penalties for each violation can result in compounding a 

sanction in a disproportionately harsh manner for the conduct involved. 5

2 Wben a single instance 

of noncompliance resulting in multiple violations of general and specific regulations involving 

the same or similar conduct, the FAA should not compound the sanction to reflect the amount of 

sanction recommended in the table for each regulatory violation. 53 

Complainant alleges that Sections 119.5(g) and 119.5(1) are separate violations as each 

requires proof of a fact the other does not; the critical distinction being that (g) regulators 

operations as an air carrier and (!) regulates the operation of an aircraft. 

Complainant's argument is vacuous. No effort has been made to set forth the different 

elements of 1!9.5(g) versus 119.5(1) or make any meaningful distinction between the violations. 

Complainant has alleged that Sky West violated section (I) for operating an aircraft in violation of 

its Ops Specs and section (g) for operating as an air carrier in violation of its Ops Specs. 

Complainant has doubled its penalty on a truism: Sky West cannot operate as an air carrier 

without operating an aircraft. 

51 Transcript Hearing 155:2-22;156:1-7 

52 FAA Compliance and Enforcement Program. 2150.3B(6)(b). General Sanction Guidance 

53 FAA Compliance and Enforcement Program. 2150.3B(6)(c). Single Act of Noncompliance 

Resulting in Multiple Violations 

FAA Case Nos.: 2011NM060010, 2011NM060011, 2011NM060033 (Consolidated) 

DMS Nos. FAA-2011-0465; -0486; and 0680/0779 

POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Page 18 
e. Violation History 

Complainant argues that Sky West's violation history for incidents relating to miscounted 

baggage suggests that Sky West's corrective actions are ineffective and sanctions imposed to date 

have not had a deterrent effect. This argument is without merit. 

As elicited above and as set forth in the FAA Human Factors Policy, transporting 

millions of bags every year will inevitably and unescapably result in a miss-counted bag (and 

unfortunately a lost bag just when you need it). The FAA has attended and participated in 

Sky West's annual Customer Service Training conferences and has had monthly teleconferences 

with Sky West in effort to minimize any such occurrences. It is patently unfair for the FAA to tell 

Sky West that its training is adequate when conducted, and inadequate when the trained 

employees make a simple mistake. 

While the degree of hazard is de minimis, and the act of miscounting cannot be avoided, 

Sky West continues to show its attitude of compliance by taking steps to control an 

uncontrollable risk. 

Ironically, the violation history shows, in the past, Complainant took a reasonable 

approach to a miscounted bag, settling for penalties that were 67% less than those proposed here. 

Now Complainant comes with treble penalties and no other justification than "this has happened 

before." But Complainant has shown no commonality in the alleged violations. Sky West has 

more than 10,000 employees and is regularly handled by Delta Airlines and United Airlines. 

Complainant has not alleged that a single employee involved here was also involved in any prior 

violation. It points to no common member of management. It gives no credit in its penalty 

calculation for the massive amounts of energy and resources that Sky West has dedicated to 

achieving a perfect bag count. No matter what measures Sky West takes, human error will 

always exist. But in order to drastically elevate a penalty on violation history alone, 

Complainant should at least show the same humans were involved. 

FAA Case Nos.: 2011NM060010, 2011NM060011, 2011NM060033 (Consolidated) 

DMS Nos. FAA-2011-0465; -0486; and 0680/0779 

POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Page 19 
f. Due deference 

Complainant requests substantial deference in the civil penalty it seeks, however, such 

deference should no longer be assumed as automatically owed. When Congress passed and the 

President signed into law the Pilot's Bill of Rights (PBR), Public Law 112-153, removed was 

special statutory deference to the FAA. While specifically, PBR relates to National 

Transportation Safety Board reviews ofF AA actions and the instant case is before the 

Department of Transportation, generally, the legislative and executive branches have made it 

clear that there are some limitations to due deference. With the disproportionate and draconian 

penalties demanded here, Sky West's only recourse is to petition this court for relief-- and as 

such, this court should decline Complainant's invitation to cede its power to determine a 

reasonable penalty. 

Conclusion 

In each of these cases, there is no evidence of lack of training or proficiency on the part 

of Sky West or its employees. Sky West has promulgated extensive procedures for the loading 

and accounting of baggage in its aircraft. Sky West has been an industry leader in training its 

employees-training of which Sky West is very proud and which the FAA attended and 

participated in. 

There is also no doubt that the flights were conducted with the utmost levels of safety and 

that there was no compromise in same. 

Assuming that the baggage counts contained in the crew copies of the CLR' s were used 

to compute load and balance and the load manifest (for which the FAA has produced not one iota 

of evidence 

In all the subject flights there are two possible explanations, either: 

1. A violation of the FAR's occurred when Sky West loading agents miscounted 

bags while loading a Sky West flight and incorrectly filled out the CLR which the flight crew 

used to calculate the aircraft's W &B, as alleged by Complainant; or 

FAA Case Nos.: 2011NM060010, 2011NM060011, 20!1NM060033 (Consolidated) 

DMS Nos. F AA-2011-0465; -0486; and 0680/0779 

POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Page 20 
2. There was no violation ofF ARs because the Sky West Pilot in Command (PIC) 

simply authorized a last minute change of the cargo loaded on the aircraft after the CLR had 

already been provided to the flight crew. 

The later situation is not a violation of the FAR's as Sky West's OpsSpecs clearly provide 

that a modification of the flight crew's CLR is not necessary if the PIC gives authorization to 

load or unload bags after verbally communicating any weight and balance changes with 

designated loading agent. 5

4 

If not the latter situation and the CLR's in fact contained errors, these cases all involve 

the simple inescapable and undeniable 5

5 factor of human error. 

In conclusion, Complainant has failed to meet its burden of proof to show that Sky West 

operated in violation of its OpsSpecs. Sky West did not violate the cited FAR's and the complaint 

should be dismissed with prejudice. 

In the alternative, if the Court determines that the presence of an incorrect CLR in the 

flight crew's possession creates a presumption of incorrect load manifests in violation of 

OpsSpecs, Sky West submits that the $33,000 per violation civil penalty is umeasonable and 

excessive. 

To the extent that these incidents were the product of simple human error, no civil 

penalty, small or large, is going to prevent recurrence. 

Should the Court determine that a sanction is required, Respondent request that it be 

reduced for those reasons set forth above. 

54 Complainant's Exhibit C-103- Chapter 4, page 16, Standard Procedures 4100, Section 11, 

Aircraft Loading, (B) Last minute changes. (Engine one cannot be operating). 

55 FAA Order 9550.8, Human Factors Policy 

FAA Case Nos.: 2011NM060010, 2011NM060011, 2011NM060033 (Consolidated) 

DMS Nos. FAA-2011-0465; -0486; and 0680/0779 

POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Page 21 
DATED this 22nd day of January, 2013. 

Michael L. Dworkin 

Co-Counsel for Sky West Airlines 

FAA Case Nos.: 2011NM060010, 2011NM060011, 2011NM060033 (Consolidated) 

DMS Nos. F AA-2011-0465; -0486; and 0680/0779 

POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Page 22 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 23'd day of January, 2013, a true and 

correct copy of the foregoing: 

POST-TRIAL BRIEF 

was served as follows: 

The Honorable Richard C. Goodwin 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. 

East Building Ground Floor, 

Room E12-320 

Washington, D.C. 20590 

{FED EX} 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue SW 

Washington, DC 20591 

Attn: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430 

Wilbur Wright Building- Suite 2W1 000 

{FED EX} 

Jeffrey M. Harper, Esq. 

Robert Spitzer, Esq. 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Northwest Mountain Region, ANM-7 

1601 Lind Avenue S.W. 

Renton, Washington 98057 

Fax: (425) 227-1007 

{FED EX} 

CAITLIN M. MILLER 

Legal Assistant 

FAA Case Nos.: 2011NM060010, 2011NM060011, 2011NM060033 (Consolidated) 

DMS Nos. F AA-2011-0465; -0486; and 0680/0779 

POST TRIAL BRIEF 

Page 23 
Attachment 2 

FAA Order 2150.3B, Appendix B, Part Two 

Sanction Guidance Tables 
(10) ENGINEERING AND MANUFACTURING VIOLATIONS. 

Large Business Concern: 

Maximum $18,750-$25,000 

Moderate $10,000-$18,749 

Minimum $2,000-$9,999 

Small Business Concern or Individual (for violations covered under 49 

U.S.C. § 46301(a)(5)(A): 

Maximum $8,250-$11,000 

Moderate $4,400-$8,249 

Minimum $1,100-$4,399 

Small Business Concern or Individual (for violations covered under 49 

U.S.C. § 4630l(a)(l)(A) or (B) but not under 49 U.S.C. § 46301(a)(5)(A): 

Maximum $850-$1,100 

Moderate $650-$849 

Minimum $500 $649 

d. Pending compliance or corrective action; injunctive relief. For many kinds of 

violations, there may be circumstances where the FAA should not allow the offending entity to 

continue to operate or to continue in business. Examples include a certificate holder that does not 

allow an FAA inspector to inspect the holder's operation or facilities, or an unapproved 

manufacturer that produces aircraft parts in violation of 14 C.F.R. § 21.303. In that circumstance, 

suspension of an entity's certificate or other approval, pending compliance or corrective action, 

or injunctive relief against an entity that does not hold an FAA approval, would be appropriate. 

In egregious circumstances revocation of the entity's certificate or other approval may be 

warranted. Such action or relief may be considered in addition to the assessment of a civil 

penalty as recommended in the following tables. 

Furthermore, amendment or modification of a certificate or approval may be appropriate 

in the circumstance where a definitive part of the offending entity's operation can be safely 

excluded from the operational approval. An example is an approved aircraft parts manufacturer 

that makes multiple kinds of parts, but has quality control problems for only one kind of part. 

Such action may be considered in addition to the assessment of a civil penalty as recommended 

in the following tables . .-------~ 

Part Two- Sanction Guidance Tables 

Index 

Printed from Summit Aviation's Digital Aviation Reference Library, 9/18/2012 

Page 8 
I. U.S. Air Carriers, U.S. Commercial Operators, Part 125 Operators, and Part 129 Operators. 

Fig. B-1-a. Maintenance Manual 

Fig. B-1-b. A/W Directive 

Fig. B-1-c. Operations Specifications 

Fig. B-1-d. Facilities and Equipment 

Fig. B-1-e. Maintenance and Inspection Organization 

Fig. B-1-f. Training Program 

Fig. B-1-g. Maintenance or Aircraft Paperwork 

Fig. B-1-h. Performance of Maintenance 

Fig. B-1-i. SFAR36 

Fig. B-1-j. Records and Reports 

Fig. B-1-k. Dispatch and Flight Release Rules 

Fig. B-1-1. Operation ofunairworthy aircraft 

Fig. B-1-m. Provisions specific to passenger-carrying 

Fig. B-1-n. Provisions specific to flight deck crew 

Fig. B-1-o. Other provisions 

Fig. B-1-p. Operations at airports requiring slots 

2. Personnel of Air Carriers, Commercial Operators, and Part 125 Operators. 

Fig. B-2-a. Maintenance, including inspection 

Fig. B-2-b. Inspection 

Fig. B-2-c. Records and Reports 

Fig. B-2-d. Flight operations 

Fig. B-2-e. Other provisions applicable to individual certificate holders 

Fig. B-2-f. Other Air Carrier Personnel 

3. Individuals and General Aviation- Owners, Pilots, Repair Stations, Pilot Schools, 

Maintenance Personnel. 

Fig. B-3-a. Owners and Operators Other Than Required Crewmembers 

Fig. B-3-b. Repair Stations 

Fig. B-3-c. ID Plate Violations 

Fig. B-3-d. Part 141 Pilot Schools 

Fig. B-3-e. General Aviation Maintenance Personnel 

Fig. B-3-f. Student Operations 

Fig. B-3-g. Flight Instructors 

Fig. B-3-h. Other Violations 

Fig. B-3-i. Weather Operations 

Fig. B-3-j. 14 C.F.R. 91.13(a), Careless or reckless operation so as to endanger (independent 

violation) 

Fig. B-3-k. Passenger operations 

Printed from Summit Aviation's Digital Aviation Reference Library, 9/18/2012 

Page 9 
Fig. B-6-c. Operations 

7. Violations of Noise Provisions. 

Fig. B-7 -a. Aircraft Noise (14 C.P.R. part 91, subpart I) 

8. Violations of Pilot Records Improvement Act (PRIA). 

Fig. B-8-a. PRIA 

9. Engineering and Manufacturing Violations. 

Fig. B-9-a. APIS Holders, including production under type certificate 

Fig. B-9-b. Production Certificate Holders 

Fig. B-9-c. Designees 

Fig. B-9-d. Technical Standard Order Authorization (TSOA), Letter of Design Approval, and 

Letter of Acceptance Manufacturers 

Fig. B-9-e. Replacement or Modification Parts Manufacturers 

Fig. B-9-f. All Production Approval Holders 

Fig. B-9-g. TC or STC Holder; Manufacturers and Alteration Entities 

Fig. B-9-h. All persons, including designees 

10. Aircraft Owner/Operator Registration Violations. 

Fig. B-10. Registration 

11. All individuals and entities: Failure to Surrender Certificate, Authorization, or Other 

Approval. 

Fig. B-11 

1. U.S. AIR CARRIERS, U.S. COMMERCIAL OPERATORS, PART 125 OPERATORS, 

AND PART 129 OPERATORS. 

Fig. B-1-a. Maintenance Manual Civil Penalty Certificate Action 

(1) Failure to maintain current manual Minimum Up to 7-day suspension 

(2) Failure to provide adequate Moderate to Maximum 

instructions and procedures in manual 

(3) Failure to distribute manual to Minimum to Moderate 

appropriate personnel 

( 4) Release of aircraft without required Moderate to Maximum Up to 7 -day suspension 

equipment 

Fig. B-1-b. AIW Directive Civil Penalty Certificate Action 

(1) Failure to comply Moderate to Maximum 

Printed from Summit Aviation's Digital Aviation Reference Library, 9/!8/20 !2 

Page 11 
Fig. B-1-c. Operations Specifications Civil Penalty Certificate Action 

(1) Exceed inspection or overhaul time Moderate Up to 7 -day suspension 

limitation 

(2) Operation contrary to ops specs- Minimum 

technical noncompliance 

(3) Operation contrary to ops specs - Moderate to Maximum 

likely potential or actual adverse effect on 

safe operation 

Fig. B-1-d. Facilities and Equipment Civil Penalty Certificate Action 

(1) Failure to provide adequately for Maximum Indefinite Suspension unti 

proper servicing, maintenance, repair, or proper serv1cmg, 

inspection of facilities and equipment maintenance, repair and 

inspection of facilities and 

equipment is provided to 

Revocation 

Fig. B-1-e. Maintenance and Inspection Civil Penalty Certificate Action 

Organization 

(1) Failure to provide or maintain a Maximum Indefinite Suspension unti 

maintenance and inspection organization an appropriate maintenanc 

and inspection organizatio 

is provided to Revocation 

Fig. B-1-f. Training Program Civil Penalty Certificate Action 

(1) Failure to have training program Maximum Indefinite Suspension unti 

compliance to Revocation 

(2) Failure to maintain training program Moderate to Maximum 

(3) Failure to train personnel adequately Moderate to Maximum 

Fig. B-1-g. Maintenance or Aircraft Civil Penalty Certificate Action 

Paperwork 

(1) Incomplete or unsigned release Minimum to Maximum 

(2) Failure to revise ale data after repair Moderate to Maximum 

I Fig. B-1-h. Performance of I Civil Penalty I Certificate Action 

Printed from Summit Aviation's Digital Aviation Reference Library, 9/18/2012 

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Maintenance 

( 1) By unauthorized person 

(2) Failure to perform or improper 

maintenance 

Fig. B-1-i. SFAR 36 

(1) Failure to comply- second offense 

Fig. B-1-j. Records and Reports 

(1) Deliberate violation 

(a) Intentionally false or fraudulent 

entry, reproduction, or alteration in record 

or report 

(b) Other 

(2) Failure to make accurate mechanical 

interruption summary report 

(3) Failure to make available report of 

major alteration or repair 

( 4) Failure to make accurate mechanical 

reliability report 

(5) Failure to make required entry in 

aircraft I o g 

(6) Failure to make available pilot record 

(7) Failure to make available load 

manifest 

(8) Failure to monitor and record enroute 

radio communication 

Fig. B-1-k. Dispatch and Flight Release 

Rules 

(1) Any violation of subpart U of 14 CFR 

part 121 

Fig. B-1-1. Operation of unairworthy 

aircraft 

Maximum 

Moderate to Maximum 

Civil Penalty Certificate Action 

Maximum 

Civil Penalty Certificate Action 

Revocation 

180-day Suspension to 

Revocation 

Moderate to Maximum 

Moderate to Maximum Indefinite Suspension to 

Revocation 

Moderate to Maximum 

Minimum to Maximum 

Moderate to Maximum Indefinite Suspension to 

Revocation 

Moderate to Maximum Indefinite Suspension to 

Revocation 

Moderate to Maximum 

Civil Penalty Certificate Action 

Moderate to Maximum 

Civil Penalty Certificate Action 

Pnnted from Summ1t A vmtwn's Digital Aviation Reference Library, 9/18/2012 

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(I) Technical non-conformity to TC; no Minimum 

likely effect on safe operation 

(2) Non-conformity to TC that may have, Moderate to Maximum 

or has, adverse effect on safe operation 

(3) Release of aircraft without required Moderate to Maximum Up to 7-day suspension 

equipment 

Fig. B-1-m. Provisions specific to Civil Penalty Certificate Action 

passenger-carrying 

(I) Boarding, or serving alcoholic Maximum 

beverage to, a person who appears to be 

intoxicated 

(2) Failure to brief passengers Moderate Maximum 

to 

(3) Failure to ensure seat and belt for each Maximum 

passenger 

(4) Operation w/o operable public address Maximum 

system 

(5) Failure to store baggage properly Moderate 

Fig. B-1-n. Provisions specific to flight Civil Penalty Certificate Action 

deck crew 

(I) Use of crewmember with expired Minimum to Moderate 

medical certificate 

(2) Failure to make flight deck seat Maximum 

available to authorized emoute inspector 

(3) Use of unqualified crewmember Maximum 

( 4) Flight and Duty Time violation Moderate 

Fig. B-1-o. Other provisions Civil Penalty Certificate Action 

(I) Improperly Returning Aircraft to Maximum 

service 

(2) Illegal carriage of controlled substance Revocation 

with knowledge of carrier, that is, 

knowledge of, or involvement in, conduct 

by top management personnel 

(3) Use of unqualified personnel other Maximum 

Printed from Summit Aviation's Digital Aviation Reference Library, 9118/2012 

Page 14 
[ than flight deck crewmember 

Fig. B-1-p. Operations at airports Civil Penalty Certificate Action 

requiring slots 

(1) Operation without a reservation from Moderate 

ATC 

(2) Operation with a reservation, but at the Moderate 

wrong time 

(3) Use of international slot for domestic Moderate 

flight 

( 4) Use of aircraft not meeting criteria in Moderate 

14 C.F.R. § 93.123(c)(2) in commuter slot 

2. PERSONNEL OF AIR CARRIERS, COMMERCIAL OPERATORS, AND PART 125 

OPERATORS. 

Fig. B-2-a. Maintenance, including Civil Penalty Certificate Action 

inspection 

(1) Performing maintenance without Maximum 

certificate, rating, or authorization 

(2) Performing maintenance that exceeds 30- to 45-day Suspension 

limitations 

(3) Failure to perform maintenance 30- to 120- day Suspensioj 

properly 

Fig. B-2-b. Inspection Civil Penalty Certificate Action 

(I) Failure to make required inspection 30- to 60-day Suspension 

(2) Making improper inspection 30- to 120-day Suspensior 

(3) Improper release of aircraft to service 30 to 60-day Suspension 

( 4) Releasing aircraft for service without 30 to 60-day Suspension 

required equipment 

Fig. B-2-c. Records and Reports Civil Penalty Certificate Action 

(I) Failure to make entry in aircraft log 15- to 60-day Suspension 

(2) Failure to make entry in worksheet 15- to 30-day Suspension 

(3) Failure to make entry in other 15- to 30-day Suspension 

maintenance record 

Printed from Summit Aviation's Digital Aviation Reference Library, 9/18/2012 

Page 15 
Attachment 3 

FAA Order 9550.8A 

Human Factors Policy 

Revised August 10,2005 
Human Factors Policy 

FAA Order 9550.8A 

[Rev: August 10, 2005] 

I. PURPOSE. This order establishes policy, procedures, and responsibilities for incorpornting 

and coordinating human fuctors considerations in Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) prog:rams 

and activities to enhance aviation safety, capability, efficiency, and productivity. 

2. DISTRIDUTION. This order is distributed to the division level in Washington, regions, 

and centers with a limited distribution to all field offices and facilities. 

3. CANCELLATIONS. This order supercedes FAA Order 9550.8 dated October 27, 1993, 

which is canceled. 

4. EXPLANATION OF CHANGES. This order clarifies the meaning of human fuctors 

considerations, provides the background for the human factors approach, and establishes basic 

policy and responsibilities for incorporating human factors in agency functions. 

5. DEFINITlONS. 

a. Human Factors. Within the FAA, human factors entails a multidisciplinary effort to 

generate and compile information about human capabilities and limitations and apply that 

information to equipment, systems, fucilities, procedures, jobs, envirorunents, training, staffing, and 

personnel management for safe, comfortable, and effective human performance. 

b. Appendix I, Human Factors Study Areas, provides a list of elements that further 

identey the scope of human fuctors coru1iderntions for study, analysis, and resolution. 

c. Appendix 2, Definitions, provides descriptions of other key terms used in this order. 

6. BACKGROUND. 

a. The human factor bas been widely recognized as critical to aviation safety and 

effectiveness. In the July 1988 report entitled "Safe Skies for Tomorrow," the U.S. Congress Office 

of Technology Assessment concluded that long-term improvements in aviation safety will come 

primarily from human fuctors solutions. Further, such solutions will be established through 

consistent, long-term support for human factors research and development, analysis, and the 

application of human fuctors information. Subsequent to the Office of Technology Assessment 

report, Congress enacted the Aviation Safety Research Act of 1988 (PL !00-591) calling for the 

FAA to augment its research effort in human factors and ensure coordination with other agencies 

performing such research. These assessments and directions resulted in the FAA's emphasizing 

new and coordinated efforts in the area of human fuctors with the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration, Department of Defense, and a multitude of professional aviation and technical 

groups whose members include pilot and controller unions, airframe and parts manufucinrers, as 

well as major airlines_ One product of such efforts includes the "National Plan for Civil Aviation 

Human Factors n which outlined a coherent national agenda aimed at achieving progress toward 

safety and productivity goals, increased coordination, funding, and long-term, hlgh level 

Page 1 
management support in government and industry. Subsequent to establishing the National Plan, the 

application of human factors research and engineering has gained continued attention and emphasis 

in aviation certification, regulation, operations, and acquisitions. 

b. Benefits derived from this systematic approach to human factors research and 

engineering include: 

l} Increased personnel efficiency, effectiveness, and productivity; 

2} Improved system performance and usability; 

3) Reduced operations and maintenance costs; 

4) Increased availability of objective data in formulating FAA policies, standards, 

regulations, and business case and investment decisions; and 

5) Enhanced aviation safety. 

7. SCOPE: This order establishes a policy to foster an integrated human factors program that 

meets FAA long and short range needs covering both research and engineering applications. The FAA 

Human Factors Policy Order" supports regulation and operation of the National Airspace System by 

providing an agenda for the conduct and institutionalization of human factors activities relative to 

achieving regulatory goals and objectives, executing researcli and development programs, facilitating 

Capital Investment Plan acquisitiOIJS, and responding to operational mission performance requirements. 

8. OBJECTIVES. The human factors-oriented approach is to: 

a. Con<luct the planning, reviewing, prioritization, coordination, generation, and 

updating of valid and timely human factors infonnation to support agency needs; 

b. Develop and institutionalize formal procedures that systematically incorporate 

human factors considerations into agency activities; and 

c. Establish and maintain organizational infrastructure that provides the necessary 

human factors expertise to agency programs and activities. 

9. HUMAN FACTORS COORDINATING COMMITTEE. This order prescribes the 

organization, composition, fimctioos, and responsibilities of an intra-FAA committee to coordinate 

the generation, distribution and application of human factors information through a representative 

Human Factors Coon:iinating Committee as stated in Appendix 3, Human Factors Coordinating 

Committee. The committee will serve to enhance the identification of human fuctors requirements, 

facilitate the integration of human factors into activities within the agency, promote the 

improvement of existing policies and processes, and monitor the efficacy of human factors efforts 

within FAA. 

10. HUMAN FACTORS POLICY. Human factors shall be systematically integrated into the 

planning and execution of the functions of all FAA organizational elements and activities associated 

with National Airspace System acquisitions and operations. 

FAA organizations shall emphasize human factors and usability considerations to enhance system 

performance and capitalize upon the relative strengths of people and machines. These 

considerations shall be integrated at the earliest phases ofF AA projects and incorporated within the 

processes fur fulfilling OMB Exhibit 300 requirements. The FAA's Human Factors Policy Order is 

Page 2 
achieved through a human-rentered emphasis in operations, research, applications, and infrastructure 

support resulting in safe and effective human-system interfaces. Program managers shall employ 

hlln1aii factors research and engineering best practices to acquire systems that require minimal 

staffing, provide cost-effective training, allow efficient operation and maintenance, and are 

operationally suitable within the intended environment 

Human performance shall be integrated into procedure development, system performance 

evaluation, rulemaking, system acquisitions (including business and administrative systems), 

architecture engineering, and other activities within the agency. 

Human factors considerations and human-system performance data shall be an integral element of 

and incorporated into activities and decisions related to mission analyses and mission need 

statements, performance baselines and measures, safety risk management analyses, investment 

analyses and reports, requirements documents, progrnm plans, source selection criteria, design 

reviews, test and evaluation plans and reports, implement:ation plans, and post-deployment 

assessment plans and reviews. 

FAA organiV!tions shall cause to be available for their programs the essential information required to 

integrate human fucto;:s considerations appropriately and successfully, inter alia: 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

• 

How human fuctors research and engineering is organized and accomplished (e.g., personnel 

and funding resources; organization, roles, and relationships; human factors plans or road 

map; roles, content, and purpose ofhumao fuctors working groups) 

Quantitative human performance measures and criteria 

Human factors risks and means/methods to mitigate them 

Life cycle costs and benefits including staffing and training 

Analytical methods and technical tools to conduct human factors activities 

Conventions, guidelines, and stanrlards needed to apply human fuctors 

Measures, databases, and related information on human-in-the-loop operational performance 

Results from human-in-the-loop analyses, modeling, simulations, demonstrations, and 

Lessons learned about addressing human factors in FAA programs (e.g., in requirements, 

investment analysis, research, analysis, design, specifications, statements of work, source 

selection criteria, test and evaluation, post-deployment assessment} 

fuc research and engineering programs and applications. 

11. RESPONSIBILITIESll.l AU FAA Organization§: 

To ensure that human factors are systematically included in FAA endeavors, Assistant and 

Associate Administrators, Executive Directors, and Air Traffic Organization Vice Presidents shall 

establish and assign responsibilities to accomplish the policy and objectives cited in Paragraphs 8 

(Objectives) and 10 (Human Factors Policy) within their organizational purview, to include: 

a. Execution. Conduct activities to: 

Apply human fuctors information and methods to FAA system acquisitions, operations, 

Page 3 
certification, and regulatory activities in the promotion of civil aviatio!L 

Ensure operational human performance constraints and enhancements are routinely 

incorporated in mission analysis and capability/requirements determination processes, life 

cycle cost and benefit analyses, risk assessments, system operational performance 

specifiCations, system baseline measurements, solicitation package preparation and soun;e 

evaluation, system critical operational issues and criteria (as wei! as measures of 

effectiveness and measures of performance), operntionaf test and evaluation plans, program 

reviews, post-contract activities, program implementation, and post-dep!Dyment 

assessments. 

Acquire necessary human performance information by means of the research, 

engineering, and development processes. 

Assess the supportability and affordability ofhuman t'eSOt1r= requiremet1ts (e.g., staffmg 

and training) to meet plam for the future N AS architecture and systems. 

Implement error prevention and mitigation strategies to emphasize human error reduction. 

• fntegrate human factors into fault tree analyses and other risk management techniques for 

operation and maintenance activities. 

Assess and report on usability so as to identify and enable resolution of human factors 

issues throughout a product's lifecycle, to include coordinating with appropriate 

authorities on issues related to accessibility and accommodation for people with 

disabilities and special needs. 

b. Human Factors Coordinator. Designate a Human Factors Coordinator who will 

perform, direct, or assist in: 

Serving as the organization's representative to the Human Factors Coordinating 

Committee 

Defining human factors risks and mitigation plans during mission analysis, investment 

analysis, and requirements determination. 

£dentif'ying human-system interfuces and computer-human interfaces for market surveys, 

trade studies, and prototypes. 

Preparing and updating human factors portions of acquisition and engineering 

management plans, procurement packages, test and evaluation plans, performance 

measures and criteria, and data collection efforts. 

Developing and analyzing operational scenarios, human-system modeling, and humanin-the-loop simulations for operators and maintainers. 

• Reviewing and assessing human factors concepts and designs (e.g., in requirements 

reviews, system reviews, product reviews, change proposals). 

• Coordinating human fuctors engineering efforts and user working group activities. 

Coordinating human factors in training development, integrated logistics support, safety, 

configuration management, and other system engineering functions. 

c. System Engineering. Establish mechanisms to incorporate human factors risk 

considerations in system engineering plans, products, functions, and activities at the product, 

service area, and National Air.space System architecture leveL 

d. Safety Management System. fnc!ude human factors considerations in safety 

management system plans, programs, projects, functions, activities, and risk assessments. The 

Page 4 
necessary components to inco<porate human factors into the definition, development, 

implementation, and monitoring of safety management system risks include: 

• The scope of human factors areas of interest 

• Tools and techniques used, and their frequency of use 

• Data and databases used, and their quality and availability 

• Metrics and measures used, and how they are scored 

• Slm:ldards and conventions used, and compliance with them 

• Principles and guidelines applied, and how widely they are followed 

• Policy and processes implemented, and to what degree they are executed 

• Lessons learned and best practices followed, and how consistently they are employed 

e. Program Performance Measurement. Establish mechanisms by which to continllOUSly 

improve the human fuctors program across the stakeholders, customers, internal business processes, 

and learning and growth pcrspectives using program performance measures and tools such as the 

human factors balanced scorecard approach. 

f.. Processes and Procedures. Establish and apply: 

• Processes and procedures that systematically identifY the human fuctors expertise essential 

to applying human flctors to acquisition, operations, certification., and regulatory activities. 

Mechanisms by which agency long range planning initiatives il1COl]XlGlte forecasts with a 

human dimension. 

g. EdUOtlion and Training. Support, participate in, and conduct 

• Managerial and executive level awareness training for human fuctors. 

Program management team and engineering staff technical training for management of 

human fuctors in acquisition and operations. 

Operational level human fuctors fumiliarization training. 

Academic-fndustry-Govemment coordination and technology transfer on the application of 

human factors. 

Professional training and education for human fuctors coordinators and support employees 

on topics and issues related ro the human fuctors discipline. 

h. Staffing, Facilities, and Funding. Plan and conduct resource activities to ensure: 

• Accessibility of human fuctors specialists for analysis, design., evaluation., and 

implementation activities throughout the agency. 

• Availability of human factors quality control personnel for oversight, direction, and support. 

• Adequate funding for human fuctOIS technical support. 

Sufficiency of funding for human pert"onnance research, engineering, and data collection 

projects. 

• Availability of sufficient research subjects and access to facilities so as to ensure the 

scientific validity of approved research and studies. 

11.2 Humm Factors Rese:trck 8Jid Engiueering Division. The Human Factors Research and 

Engineering Division enhances the safety and efficiency of the National Airspace System by 

managing human factors aviation research for the agency, coordinating activities for the human 

fuctors ''community of practice" across the agency, and providing human fuctors support to research 

Page 5 
and engineering activities within the Air Traffic Organization Operations Planning service area and 

other organizational elements as appropriate. 1be Program Director for Human Factors serves as 

the principal advisor on human factors research and engineering to the Administrator, the Air 

Traffic Organization Chief Operating Officer, and the Federal Acquisition Executive. The 

functions of the Human Factors Research and Engineering Division are organized as follows: 

l. Principal advisor and focal point to the FAA Administrator, Air Traffic Organization Chief 

Operating Officer. and the Federal Acquisition Executive on human factors agency research and air 

traffic management engineering. 

a. Acts as the human factors focal point within and outside the agency for FAA human factors 

research management, human fuctors policy, and broad Air Traffic Organization human factors 

engineering applicatioru;. 

b. Provides recommendations and advice on human factors research and engineering to the FAA 

Administrator, Air Traffic Organization Chief Operating Officer, and Federal Acquisition 

Executive as required 

c. Provides human factors guidance, direction, sporu;orship, and representation to internal and 

external, national and international FAA work groups, committees, symposia, and conferences. 

d. Ensures human fuctors are integrated in other FAA organizations' activities as appropriate. 

IL Manages FAA Human Factors Research.. Engineering, and Development Program. 

e. Serves as Human Factors Research Program Manager and provides strategic, budgetary, and 

technical direction for agency resource Research, Engineering, & Development planning and 

executioa 

f Performs technical quality assurance for human factors research. 

g. Ensures coordination and integration between research and application areas (i.e., acquisition, 

certification, regulation, and standards). 

h. Serves as primary interfuce on human fuctors for Research, Engineering, & Development air traffic 

management and safety programs with domestic and international agencies such as Department of 

Defense, National Aeronautical Space Administmrion, and Enrocontrol. 

J. Serves as the Designated Federal Official for the Research and Development Advisory Comnrittee 

Subcommittee on Human Factors. Also, provides human fuctors progrannnatic support to Research 

and Development Advisory Committee Subcommittee on Aircraft Safety, and Subcommittee on Air 

Traffic Services. 

III. Conducts support activities for the human factors ~community of practice" across the agency. 

J. Chairs, directs, and orchestrates activities of the FAA Human Factors Coordinating Committee 

as set forth under Appendix } (Human Factors Coordinating Committee) of this order. 

Page 6 
k. Coon:linates for the agency the communication, evaluation, advice, and support foc the human 

facron; community of prnctice on strategic planning, risk management, and organizational 

infrastructure requirements and capabilities for human fuctors activities and expertise. 

L Supports education, training, and professional development programs to meet the human facton; 

community of practice needs. 

m. Advises and provides research and engineering assistance, consultation, or augmentation to 

agency programs for human facton; products and services. 

n. For Air Traffic Organization, assesses and supports development of quantitative measures, 

analytical methods., conventions and guidelines, technical tools, data and database availability, 

human perfO!TI1:lilre criteria, life cycle costs, human-in-the-loop analyses, and "lessons learned" for 

human fuctors research and engineering applications. 

o. For Air Traffic Organization, serves as clearinghouse, quality assurance, and document control for 

human fuctors policy and standards. 

IV. Provides human factors rese:m:h and engineering support to activities within the Air Traffic 

Organization OperatimJS Planning (ATO-P) service area and other organizational elements as 

appropriate. 

p. Serve as a member of the A TO-P sponsored System Engineering Council to ensure 

incorporation of human factors considerations in NAS Enterprise Architecture developments 

and modifications and to enhance human-system integration in other system engineering 

endeavors. 

q. Ensures human factors is coordinated and integrated in Air Traffic Organization Operations 

Planning service area planning, analysis, development, and implementation activities. 

r. Provides human factors research and engineering support to Air Traffic Organization 

Operations Planning activities. 

s. Provides human factors leadership and services in support of other Air Traffic Organizatioru as 

required. 

tLJ Checklist for Human Factors Research and Engineering. Appendix 2, Organizational 

Checklist for Human Factors Research, Applications, and Infrastructure Support, provides an 

outline of key items for tailoring and review within all FAA organizations. 

Administrator 

Page 7 
APPENDIX l 

HUMAN FACTORS STUDY AREAS 

I. Allocation of Function: Assigning those roles/functions/tasks for which the human or 

equipment perfonns better while enabling the human to maintain awareness of the operational 

situatiO!L 

2. Anthropometries and Biomechanics: Accommodating the physical attributes of its user 

population {e.g., from the I st through 99th percentile levels). 

3. em (Computer-HuiBliD Interaction): Employing effective and consistent user dialogues, 

interfaces, anrl procedures across system functions. 

4. Communications and Teamwork: Applying system design considerations to enhance 

required user communications and teamwork. 

5. Culture: Addressing the organizational and sociological environment into which any change, 

including new technologies and procedures, will be introduced. 

6. Displays and Controls: Designing and arranging displays and controls to be consistent with 

the operator's and maintainer's tasks and actions. 

7. Documentation: Preparing user documentation anrl technical manuals in a suitable format of 

information presentation, at the appropriate reading level, and with the required degree of 

technical sophistication and clarify. 

8. Environment: Accommodating environmental factors (including extremes) to which the 

system will be subjected and understanding the associated effects on human-system 

performaoce. 

9. Functional Design: Applying human--centered design for usability and compatibility with 

operational anrl maintenance concepts. 

!0. Human Error: Examining design and contextual conditions (including supervisory and 

organizational influences) as causal fuctors contributing to human error, and consideration of 

objectives for error-tolerance, error prevention, and error correction/recovery. 

II. Information Presentation: Enhancing operntor and maintainer performance through the use of 

effective and consistent labels, symbols, colors, terms, acronyms, abbreviations, formats, and 

data fields. 

12. Information Requirements: Ensuring the availability anrl usability of information needed by 

the operator anrl maintainer for a specific task when it is needed, and in a form that is directly 

usable. 

13. UO Devices: Selecting input and output (I/O) methods and devices that allow operators or 

maintainers to perform tasks, especially critical tasks, quickly and accurately. 

I 4. KSAs (Knowkdge, Skills, Abilities): Measuring the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) 

required to perform job-related tasks, and determining appropriate selection requirements for 

users. 

15. Operational Suitability: Ensuring that the system appropriately supports the user in 

performing intended functions while maintaining interoperability and consistency with other 

system elements or support systems. 

16. Procedures: Designing operation and maintenance procedures for simplicity, coru;istency, and 

ease of use. 

I 7. Safety and Health: Preventing/reducing operator and maintainer exposure to safety anrl health 

hazards. 

18. Situational Awareness: Enabling operators or maintainers to perceive and understanrl 

Page 8 
elements of the current situation, and project them to future operational situations. 

19. Special Skills and Tools: Minimizing the need for special or nnique operaror or maintainer 

skills, abilities, tools, or characteristics. 

20. Staffing: Accommodating constraints and efficiencies for staffing levels and organizational 

structures. 

21. Training: Applying methods to enhance operator or maintainer acquisition of the knowledge 

and skills needed to interfu.ce with the system, and designing that system so that these skills 

are easily learned and retained_ 

22. Visual! Auditory Alerts: Designing visual and auditory alerts (including error messages) to 

invoke the necessary operator and maintainer response. 

23. Workload: Assessing the net demands or impacts upon the physical, cognitive, and decisionmaking resources of an operatO'!" or maintainer using objective and subjective performance 

measures. 

24. Work Spa~: Designing adequate work space for personnel and their tools or equipment, and 

providing sufficient space for the movements and actions that personnel perform during 

operational and maintenance tasks under normal, adverse, and emergency conditions. 

Page 9 
APPENDIX2 

DEFINTIONS 

Human Factors Engineering. Human factors engineering entails the application ofhmnan fuctors 

considerations concurm:1t with ot!= engineering disciplines during the analysis, design, development, 

testing, and fielding of a system, service, or fucility in which human performance is essential in meeting 

safety and capability objectives. 

Human Factors Research. Human fuctors research entails the scientific a£quisition of information 

about human capabilities and limitations related to hardware, softw.rre, fucilities, procedures, jobs, 

organizations, environments, training, staffing, errors, situational awareness, workload, personnel 

management, decision support tools, and other perfonnance implications in which the human is a 

component in meeting safety and capability objectives. 

Hwnan-Centered. The roncept and strucinred process of roncept and requirements definition, 

design, development, and implementation that identifies the user as the focal point of the effort for 

which procedures, equipment, facilities, and other components serve to support numan capabilities 

and compensate for human limitatioru;; sometimes also called "user-centered.n 

Human-System Integration. The roncept and processes associated wiili optimizing total system 

perfonnance via fully incorporating human fuctors considerations (including manpower levels, 

personnel attributes, training, safety and occupational health, ergonomics and human engineering) 

in program defmition, analysis, design, development, testing, and implementation. 

OMB Exhibit 300 Requirements. The analyses, information, and documentation associated with 

OMB Circular ll, Part 7, Exhibit 300 requirements and all attaelnncnts necessary to initiate, 

baseline, develop, and manage a program effectively and efficiently. 

System Acquisitions. System acquisitioru; enrompass functions related to all FAA major and nonmajor acquisitions including developmental items, non-devc!opmcntal items, commercial-off-ilieshclf pmcuremcnts, research and technical services, hardware and software acquisitions, and 

facilities. 

Svstem Ooerations. System operations encompass all functions related to the operation, 

maintenance, and regulation of the National Airspace System under the purview ofF AA. 

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APPENDIX2 

ORGANIZATIONAL CHECKLIST FOR HUMAN FACTORS RESEARCH, 

APPLlCA TIONS, AND INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT 

The following checklist items support ilie implementation and compliance with this order: 

For Research: Plan, review, and prioritize human factors research which suppo;1S the organization's 

needs. 

• 

• 

Are human factors efforts responsive and synchronized to your organizational needs in a timely 

basis? 

Arc you provided with an adequate strategy to conduct human factors efforts at the appropriate 

location (e.g., contractor, laboratory)? 

Are human factors efforts cormnunicated and coordinated across other Rese:aoch, Engineering & 

Development efforts and with organ.i.zations outside the FAA to maximize leveraging? 

Docs the proper mix exist between short-tenn vs long-tcnn, in-house vs extra-mural., and contract 

vs university to satisfY specific human factors requirements? 

Are mechanisms adequate to transfer and apply information generated from human factors 

research to organizational functions? 

For Applications: Develop and institutionalize fonnal mechanisms that systematically incorporate 

human fuctors considerations into the organization's activities. 

Arc human resource conslraints and human-system perfotmancc considerations identified early in 

organization program activities? 

Are human resource impacts of the program identified? 

Do system operational performance specifications (including system integration requirements) 

consider human fuctors? 

Is human performance for the prog:rnm/project quantitatively measured? 

Is human performance and usability an explicit item in contract/vendor evaluation criteria and 

contract award? 

Have analyses been done and data been made available to address human performance? 

Docs user involvemeut in the program/project follow a structured, performance data-driven 

strategy? 

Do critical operational issues and criteria in requirements and testing reflect human performance 

in operational tenns? 

• Do life cycle costs reflect total human resource commitments? 

Has the system been stressed to its performance limits (including human-in-the-loop analysis)? 

• Do program/project decisions use human performance data? 

Are human performance issues and "lessons learned" captured for subsequent applications? 

For Infrastructure S!lJ)J)Ort: Establish and maintain the infrastructure that provides the organization 

with the necessary human fuctors expertise and capabilities. 

• Are human fuctors experts available and involved? 

Is there appropriate representation and coordination of organizational human fuctors efforts? 

Is there continuity of human fuctors effort? 

Are there adequate funds for required human factors tasks? 

• Are the appropriate human fuctors tools, techniques, and technical capabilities available? 

Does training provide the proper !eve! of human fuctnrs awareness/understanding? 

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• Do policies, processes, and procedures enhance the coosideration of human performance? 

Are job aids and pmctitioner tools available to support and apply human fuctocs considerations? 

For Prognun Reviews: 

Are sufficient human fucrors resources available to ensure the program's success? 

• Is the responsibility for human factors centrally directed for coordination and efficiency? 

Is human fuctors el<pC!i:ise integral to the team decision making and processes? 

• Is human fuctocs integrated into system engineering activities? 

Are human factors issues regularly rnised and resolved in progtamlpmject delibcrations, 

functions, activities, and decisions? 

• Are system requirements, specifications, and evaluations replete with operator and maintainer 

performance parameters? 

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APPENDIX3 

HUMAN FACfORS COORDINATING COMMITTEE 

The Human Factors Coordinating Committee shall continue in force to facilitate FAA 

human fuctors endeavors constructively and enhance the use of human factors 

infonnatio!L Composition and functions of the Human Factors Coordinating Committee 

are as follows: 

I. Organization. The committee shall be organized as a steering and coordinating 

body that is facilitated by temporary or permanent subcommittees or working groups as 

required. 

2. Composition. The oommittee shall be sponsored and chaired by the FAA Human 

Factors Research and Engineering Program Director. The composition of the Human 

Factors Coordinating Committee will be as deemed necessary to promote and support the 

execution and implementation of human factors best practices within the FAA and to 

ensure the best interests of the government. Under the provisiQns of Paragraph II 

(Responsibilities) of this order, candidate organizations shall each designate one member 

(or more if necessary} who shall have the authority to represent that organization in 

human factors matters. A recording secretary shall be appointed by the committee for the 

purpose of preparing minutes of the meetings. The Human Factors Coordinating 

Committee shall encourage participation in its activities by others with significant human 

factors responsibilities. Candidate organizations include: 

- Air T mffic Organization SeiVice Areas 

-Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety 

- Associate Administrator for Airports 

- Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation 

- Assistant Administrator for Information Services 

- Assistant Administrator for Region and Center Operations 

- Research Development & Human Factors Laboratory, William I. Hugbes 

Technical Center 

- Human Resources Research Division, Civil Aeromedical Institute, Office of 

Aerospace Medicine 

- Aeromedical Research Division, Civil Aeromedical Institute, Office of 

Aerospace Medicine 

J. Functions. The Human Factors Coordinating Committee shall function as an 

intra-FAA committee to coordinate human fuctors infOrmation, matters, and activities 

among fue executives, associate administrators, and assistant administrators and their 

organizations. Specific fimctions of the Human Factors Coordinating Committee are to: 

a. Enhance the identification of human factors research requirements and tbe 

coordination of research results; 

b_ Foster the dissemination and exchange of human factors information 

among agency organizations; 

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c. Facilitate the integration ofhwnan factors into procedure development, 

system perfonnance evaluation, rulemaking, system acquisitions, and other activities 

within the agency; 

d. Identity the need for changes to existing policies, processes, research 

programs, regulations, or other human factors-related activities and programs; and 

e. Monitor the efficacy of human factors efforts and programs within FAA. 

4. Administration., The HFCC shall develop internal operating procedures that 

define the frequency of meetings, the structure and relationship of working groups and 

subconunittees, and the processes and procedures by which its activities are to be carried 

out. 

5 _ Responsibilities. 

a. The Chairperson. The chairperson shall be resporu;ible for: 

( l) Ensuring that the functions of the committee are accomplished; 

(2) Establishing agenda, schedules, and locations for meetings; 

(3} Reviewing committee documentation prior to publication or 

distribution; and, 

(4) Ensuring appropriate representation, organization, documentation, 

and administration to support the committee_ 

b. Committee Members. Committee members shall be responsible for. 

(I) Supporting subcommittees, working groups, and other means of 

coordinating hmnan factors program activities within and across their organizations; 

(2) Supporting their respective human factors research and 

engineering programs within titeir organizations; 

(3) Monitoring their respective human factors research requirements 

development processes within their organizations; 

(4) Providing information, brief"mgs, and documentation to the 

committee on human factors matters within their organizations; 

( 5) Attending committee meetings or designating an alternate if 

attendance is not possib !e; and 

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(6) Participating in committee and other activities such as workshops, 

seminars, and human factors research and engineering program reviews, as appropriate. 

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