alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

                                                                                                   EXHIBIT 21

                                         **NAVISTAR INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION
                                            AND CONSOLIDATED SUBSIDIARIES
                                         ----------------------------------
                                           SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT
                                               AS OF OCTOBER 31, 2002**

                                                                                                 STATE OR
                                                                                                COUNTRY IN
                                                                                                   WHICH
                                                                                                SUBSIDIARY
                                                                                                 ORGANIZED
                                                                                            ------------------
Subsidiary included in the financial
    statements, which is 100% owned:
         International Truck and Engine Corporation......................................        Delaware

Subsidiaries that are 100% owned by International
    Truck and Engine Corporation:
        International Truck and Engine Corporation Canada.................................         Canada
        Navistar Financial Corporation....................................................        Delaware

     Subsidiaries  and  corporate  joint  ventures not shown by name in the above  listing,  if  considered  in the
aggregate as a single subsidiary, would not constitute a significant subsidiary.

                                                       E-24
```
#### § 1210.60 What definitions apply to this subpart?

Terms used in this subpart have the same meaning as in 30 U.S.C. 1702.
```

[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 186 (Wednesday, September 25, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Pages 59080-59081]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-23367]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[Public Notice 8482]

Culturally Significant Objects Imported for Exhibition 
Determinations: ``Delacroix and the Matter of Finish''

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given of the following determinations: 
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the Act of October 19, 1965 
(79 Stat. 985; 22 U.S.C. 2459), Executive Order 12047 of March 27, 
1978, the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (112 
Stat. 2681, et seq.; 22 U.S.C. 6501 note, et seq.), Delegation of 
Authority No. 234 of October 1, 1999, Delegation of Authority No. 236-3 
of August 28, 2000, and, as appropriate, Delegation of Authority No. 
257 of April 15, 2003, I hereby determine that the objects to be 
included in the exhibition ``Delacroix and the Matter of Finish,'' 
imported from abroad for temporary exhibition within the United States, 
are of cultural significance. The objects are imported pursuant to loan 
agreements with the foreign owners or custodians. I also determine that 
the exhibition or display

[[Page 59081]]

of the exhibit objects at the Santa Barbara Museum of Art, Santa 
Barbara, California, from on or about October 27, 2013, until on or 
about January 26, 2014, and at possible additional exhibitions or 
venues yet to be determined, is in the national interest. I have 
ordered that Public Notice of these Determinations be published in the 
Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information, including a 
list of the exhibit objects, contact Paul W. Manning, Attorney-Adviser, 
Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State (telephone: 202-
632-6469). The mailing address is U.S. Department of State, SA-5, L/PD, 
Fifth Floor (Suite 5H03), Washington, DC 20522-0505.

    Dated: September 18, 2013.
Lee Satterfield,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Professional and Cultural Exchanges, 
Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State.
[FR Doc. 2013-23367 Filed 9-24-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4710-05-P
```
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v Kevin Blackford, Appellant.

Judgment unanimously reversed, on the law, and indictment dismissed. Memorandum: Felony complaints arising from defendant’s involvement in an armed robbery of a Niagara Falls store were filed in Niagara Falls City Court on February 13, 1975. At that time, defendant was incarcerated in the Erie County Holding Center, located in Buffalo, on unrelated charges. The following day Niagara Falls police sent a copy of the warrant which had been issued on the basis of the felony complaints to the holding center as a detainer. Defendant was transferred to the Attica Correctional Facility on March 6, 1975 after being sentenced in Buffalo City Court for violating parole. On or about March 25, 1975 a letter was reportedly mailed from the Superintendent of the Attica Correctional Facility to the Niagara County District Attorney notifying him that the facility had received the detainer. The District Attorney asserts that his office has no record of receiving this letter. Defendant was notified of the outstanding Niagara Falls City Court warrant on May 8, 1975 and on September 26, 1975 the Niagara County District Attorney received a letter from him requesting that the warrant for his arrest be withdrawn on the ground that he had not been afforded a speedy trial. The District Attorney forwarded defendant’s letter to Niagara Falls City Court following which, on November *11743, 1975, an indictment was issued charging defendant with second degree robbery and third degree grand larceny. After the denial of his timely written motion to dismiss the indictment, defendant entered a plea of guilty to the reduced charge of third degree robbery. CPL 30.30 (subd 1, par a), provides that a defendant’s motion to dismiss an indictment on the ground that he has been denied the right to a speedy trial must be granted where the People are not ready for trial within six months of the commencement of a criminal action in which a felony is charged. Inasmuch as felony complaints against defendant were filed on February 13, 1975, that is the date on which this criminal proceeding commenced (CPL, 1.20, subds 1, 16, 17; *People v Sturgis,*38 NY2d 625). Since it is clear that the People were not ready for trial as of defendant’s indictment on November 3, 1975, almost nine months after the commencement of the action, defendant’s motion should have been granted unless a sufficient amount of this delay was attributable to circumstances which would toll the running of the statutory period (CPL 30.30, subd 4; *People v Bellach,*58 AD2d 613; *People v Cahill,*54 AD2d 938). The District Attorney concedes that no time intervals are subject to exclusion and joins in defendant’s contention that the indictment should be dismissed. Upon an examination of the record, we find no circumstance warranting a denial of defendant’s motion and, accordingly, the judgment should be reversed and the indictment should be dismissed. (Appeal from judgment of Niagara County Court—robbery, third degree.) Present—Marsh, P. J., Moule, Cardamone, Dillon and Witmer, JJ.
### §2903. Authorization of transfers of title to eligible facilities

#### (a) Authorization

#### (1) In general

Subject to the requirements of this chapter, the Secretary, without further authorization from Congress, may, on application of a qualifying entity, convey to a qualifying entity all right, title, and interest of the United States in and to any eligible facility, if—

(A) not later than 90 days before the date on which the Secretary makes the conveyance, the Secretary submits to Congress—

(i) a written notice of the proposed conveyance; and

(ii) a description of the reasons for the conveyance; and

(B) a joint resolution disapproving the conveyance is not enacted before the date on which the Secretary makes the conveyance.

#### (2) Consultation

A conveyance under paragraph (1) shall be made by written agreement between the Secretary and the qualifying entity, developed in consultation with any existing water and power customers affected by the conveyance of the eligible facility.

#### (b) Reservation of easement

The Secretary may reserve an easement over a conveyed property if—

(1) the Secretary determines that the easement is necessary for the management of any interests retained by the Federal Government under this chapter;

(2) the Reclamation project or a portion of the Reclamation project remains under Federal ownership; and

(3) the Secretary enters into an agreement regarding the easement with the applicable qualifying entity.

#### (c) Interests in water

No interests in water shall be conveyed under this chapter unless the conveyance is provided for in a separate, quantified agreement between the Secretary and the qualifying entity, subject to applicable State law and public process requirements.

(Pub. L. 116–9, title VIII, §8003, Mar. 12, 2019, 133 Stat. 806.)
§ 907.7 Remedies for substantial default. ( a ) Except as provided in § 907.7(c), upon determining that events have occurred or conditions exist that constitute a substantial default, HUD may: ( 1 ) Take any action provided for in section 6(j)(3) of the Act (42 U.S.C. 1437d(j)(3));
( 2 ) Provide technical assistance for existing PHA management staff; or
( 3 ) Provide assistance deemed necessary, in the discretion of HUD, to remedy emergency conditions.
( b ) HUD may take any of the actions described in paragraph (a) of this section sequentially or simultaneously in any combination.
( c ) In the case of a substantial default by a troubled PHA pursuant to § 902.83(b): ( 1 ) For a PHA with 1,250 or more units, HUD shall petition for the appointment of a receiver pursuant to section 6(j)(3)(A)(ii) of the 1937 Act (42 U.S.C. 1437d(j)(3)(A)(ii)); or
( 2 ) For a PHA with fewer than 1,250 units, HUD shall either petition for the appointment of a receiver pursuant to section 6(j)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act (42 U.S.C. 1437d(j)(3)(A)(ii)), or take possession of the PHA (including all or part of any project or program of the PHA) pursuant to section 6(j)(3)(A)(iv) of the 1937 Act (42 U.S.C. 1437d(j)(3)(A)(iv)), and appoint, on a competitive or noncompetitive basis, an individual or entity as an administrative receiver to assume the responsibilities of HUD for the administration of all or part of the PHA (including all or part of any project or program of the PHA).
( d ) To the extent feasible, while a PHA is operating under any of the actions that may have been taken by HUD, all services to residents will continue uninterrupted.
( e ) HUD may limit remedies under this part to one or more of a PHA's specific operational areas (*e.g.,* maintenance, capital improvement, occupancy, or financial management), to a single program or group of programs, or to a single project or a group of projects. For example, HUD may select, or participate in the selection of, an AME to assume management responsibility for a specific project, a group of projects in a geographical area, or a specific operational area, while permitting the PHA to retain responsibility for all programs, operational areas, and projects not so designated.
#### § 92.63 Amendments to program description.

An insular area must submit to HUD for approval any substantial change in its HUD-approved program description that it makes and must document any other changes in its file. A substantial change involves a change in the guidelines for resale or recapture (§ 92.61(b)(4)), other forms of investment (§ 92.61(b)(6)), minority and women business outreach program (§ 92.61(b)(7)) or refinancing (§ 92.61(b)(8)); or a change in the tenure type of the project or activities; or a funding increase to a project or activity of $100,000 or 50% (whichever is greater). The HUD Field Office will notify the insular area if its program description, as amended, does not permit determinations to be made under § 92.61 (b)(4), (b)(6), (b)(7), or (b)(8), or if the level of proposed projects or eligible activities is not within the management capability demonstrated by past performance in housing and community development programs, within 30 days of receipt. The insular area will have a reasonable period of time, agreed upon mutually, to submit the necessary supporting information to revise the proposed projects or activities in its program description.
### Part A—Actions To Ensure Pro-Competitive Privatization
§ 578.39 Continuum of Care planning activities. ( a ) *In general.* Collaborative applicants may use up to 3 percent of their FPRN, or a maximum amount to be established by the NOFA, for costs of: ( 1 ) Designing and carrying out a collaborative process for the development of an application to HUD;
( 2 ) Evaluating the outcomes of projects for which funds are awarded in the geographic area under the Continuum of Care and the Emergency Solutions Grants programs; and
( 3 ) Participating in the consolidated plan(s) for the geographic area(s).
( b ) *Continuum of Care planning activities.* Eligible planning costs include the costs of: ( 1 ) Developing a communitywide or regionwide process involving the coordination of nonprofit homeless providers, victim service providers, faith-based organizations, governments, businesses, advocates, public housing agencies, school districts, social service providers, mental health agencies, hospitals, universities, affordable housing developers, law enforcement, organizations that serve veterans, and homeless and formerly homeless individuals;
( 2 ) Determining the geographic area that the Continuum of Care will serve;
( 3 ) Developing a Continuum of Care system;
( 4 ) Evaluating the outcomes of projects for which funds are awarded in the geographic area, including the Emergency Solutions Grants program;
( 5 ) Participating in the consolidated plan(s) of the jurisdiction(s) in the geographic area; and
( 6 ) Preparing and submitting an application to HUD on behalf of the entire Continuum of Care membership, including conducting a sheltered and unsheltered point-in-time count and other data collection as required by HUD.
( c ) *Monitoring costs.* The costs of monitoring recipients and subrecipients and enforcing compliance with program requirements are eligible.
### §14513. Dual tonnage measurement

(a) On application by the owner and approval by the Secretary, the tonnage of spaces prescribed by the Secretary may be excluded in measuring under this section the gross tonnage of a vessel measured under section 14512 of this title. The spaces prescribed by the Secretary shall be comparable to the spaces that could have been excluded under section 2 of the Act of September 29, 1965 (Public Law 89–219, 79 Stat. 891), as section 2 existed immediately before the enactment of this section.

(b) The Secretary shall prescribe the design, location, and dimensions of the tonnage mark to be placed on a vessel measured under this section.

(c)(1) If a vessel is assigned two sets of gross and net tonnages under this section, each certificate stating the vessel's tonnages shall state the gross and net tonnages when the vessel's tonnage mark is submerged and when it is not submerged.

(2) Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subsection, a certificate stating a vessel's tonnages may state only one set of gross and net tonnages as assigned under this section.

(Pub. L. 99–509, title V, §5101(3), Oct. 21, 1986, 100 Stat. 1924; Pub. L. 111–281, title III, §303(h), Oct. 15, 2010, 124 Stat. 2925.)

#### Historical and Revision Notes

#### Revised section 14513

Source: Section (U.S. Code) 46 App. U.S.C. 83 to 83g.

Section 14513 gives discretionary authority to the Secretary to exclude certain spaces in measuring the regulatory tonnage of a vessel, and requires the Secretary to prescribe the design, location and dimensions of the tonnage mark to be placed on the vessel. Section 14513 further provides that if spaces are excluded by the Secretary, they shall be comparable to those the Secretary could have excluded in existing law (46 App. U.S.C. 83a). Section 14513(c) provides that if a vessel's tonnage mark is below the uppermost part of the load line mark, each certificate that states the vessel's tonnages must state the gross and net tonnages when the mark is submerged and when it is not submerged.

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### References in Text

Section 2 of the Act of September 29, 1965, referred to in subsec. (a), was classified to section 83a of the former Appendix to this title and was repealed by Pub. L. 99–509, title V, §5104(b), Oct. 21, 1986, 100 Stat. 1928.

#### Amendments

2010—Subsec. (c)(1). Pub. L. 111–281, §303(h)(1), substituted "vessel is assigned two sets of gross and net tonnages under this section," for "vessel's tonnage mark is below the uppermost part of the load line marks," and inserted "vessel's tonnage" before "mark is submerged".

Subsec. (c)(2). Pub. L. 111–281, §303(h)(2), substituted "as assigned under this section." for period at end.
[No. 7380.

Decided June 22, 1908.]

#### W. H. Heinzerling, *Respondent,*v. John B. Agen, Appellant.1

Depositions — Admission In Evidence — Pbesumption as to Reasons fob Taking. Under Bal. Code, § 6028, which provides that a deposition shall not he read in evidence if it appears at the trial that the reason for taking the same no longer exists, it will be presumed that the reason continues to exist until the contrary is shown by the adverse party, and the deposition is admissible without any showing.

Appeal — Decision-—Law of Case. The decision of the supreme court on a former appeal is conclusive of the questions considered.

Appeal from a judgment of the superior court for King county, Griffin, J., entered November 30, 1907, upon the verdict of a jury rendered in favor of the plaintiff, in an action on contract.

Affirmed.

*Blaine, Tucker & Hyland*and *James B. Kinne,*for appellant.

*Gill, Hoyt & Frye,*for respondent.

1

Reported in 96 Pac. 223.

Per Curiam.

This case was before this court on a former appeal where a full statement of the facts will be found. *Heinzerling*v. *Agen,*46 Wash. 390, 90 Pac. 262. A retrial *648was had in the court below after the case was remanded, and from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant has again appealed.

A deposition taken and used at the first trial was read at the second trial, over objection, without any showing that the reasons for taking the deposition still existed, and this ruling is assigned as error. Bal. Code, § 6028 (P. C. § 992), provides that depositions shall not be read in evidence if it appears at the trial that the reasons for taking them no longer exist, but this court has held that the reasons for taking the deposition will be presumed to continue and the burden is on the adverse party to show the contrary. *Hennessy v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co.,*8 Wash. 91, 35 Pac. 585, 40 Am. St. 892. The remaining assignments are based on the denial of a motion for nonsuit, and on exceptions to instructions given, and the refusal to give instructions requested. The testimony was the same at both trials, and the objections urged against the denial of the motion for nonsuit and the charge of the court were fully considered on the former appeal, and decided adversely to the appellant. The instructions requested were embodied in the general charge of the court, in so far as they were proper or material, and finding no error in the record the judgment is affirmed.
#### Lynah *v.*Citizens and Southern Bank *et al.*

Atkinson, J.

The bill of exceptions complains: *(a)*that the court refused to allow an amendment offered by the plaintiff in error to his. answer; and *(b)*that the court overruled his motion for a new trial. Neither in the bill of exceptions, by exhibit or otherwise, nor in the exceptions pendente lite to the ruling disallowing the amendment, was. *584the amendment set forth in form or substance. It was brought up as a part of the record, having been previously filed in the office of the clerk without any order by the judge allowing it filed. The only ground of the motion for new trial was that “the court erred in refusing to allow defendant’s amendment to his answer, setting up an offset against plaintiff’s claim against defendant.” *Held:*''

August 17, 1912.

Complaint. Before Judge Charlton. Chatham superior court. July 21, 1911.

*W. B. Hewlett,*for plaintiff in error.

*Anderson, Gann & Gann*and *Adams & Adams,*contra.

*(а)*The exception to the disallowance of the amendment can not be considered. *Richards*v. *Shields,*ante, 583.

(б) The refusal to allow the amendment furnishes no ground for a motion for a new trial. *Lee*v. *McCarty,*132 *Ga.*698 (64 S. E. 997). Hence the record fails to present any question for decision, and the judgment of the trial court will stand *Affirmed.*

*All the Justices concur.*
Exhibit 32.1

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Solo Cup Company (the Company) on Form 10-K/A for the year ended January 1, 2006 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Robert M. Korzenski, as Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ Robert M. Korzenski
|Robert M. Korzenski    
|Chief Executive Officer
|                       
|October 16, 2006
DISMISSED and Opinion Filed March 28, 2013. 

# S

In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05

- 12

- 01509

- CV

JEFFERY & GERALLYNN LONGINO , Appellant s V. WILLIAM R. EGAN , Appellee
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 6 Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 006

- 2699

- 2012

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Lang

- Miers, Murphy, and Fillmore Opinion by Justice Murphy After numerous delays in obtaining the record in t his case, the time for filing appellants’
brief has expired. By postcard dated March 8, 2013, we notified appellants the time for filing
their brief had expired and directed appellants to file a brief within ten days. We cautioned
appellants that failure to file the brief and an extension motion within the time allowed would
result in the dismissal of this case. To date, appellants have not filed their brief, an extension
motion, or otherwise corresponded with the Court regarding the status of this appea l.
Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 38.8(a)(1); 42.3(b)(c)

.
121509F.P05

/Mary Murphy/ MARY MURPHY JUSTICE– 2

– 

# S

Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

JEFFERY & GERALLYNN LONGINO, Appellants

No. 05

- 12

- 01509

- CV V.

WILLIAM R. EGAN, Appellee On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 6, Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 006

- 2699

- 2012. Opinion delivered by Justice Murphy. Justices Lang

- Miers and Fillmore participating.
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, this appeal is DISMISSED

. It is ORDERED that appellee WILLIAM R. EGAN recover his costs of this appeal from appellants JEFFERY & GERALLYNN LONGINO.

Judgment entered this 28 th day of March, 2013.

/ Mary Murphy/ MARY MURPHY JUSTICE