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LIBYA: FIVE YEARS AFTER GHADAFI

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

NOVEMBER 30, 2016

Serial No. 114–238

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

(V)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESS 

Mr. Jonathan Winer, Special Envoy for Libya, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State .......................................................................... 3

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Jonathan Winer: Prepared statement ............................................................. 6

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 22

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 23

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Florida, and chairman, Subcommittee on the Middle East and 

North Africa: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 24

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas, and chairman, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and 

Trade: Prepared statement .................................................................................. 27

The Honorable Theodore E. Deutch, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Florida: Prepared statement ................................................................. 29

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 32

Written responses from Mr. Jonathan Winer to questions submitted for the 

record by the Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen ................................................... 34

(1)

LIBYA: FIVE YEARS AFTER GHADAFI 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA AND

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 11:26 a.m., in 

room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana RosLehtinen (chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and 

North Africa) presiding. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. The subcommittees will come to order. We 

will start with our opening statements. Our good friends on the 

other side are still caucusing. We have tried to wait as long as possible, but when Mr. Meadows said that he was leaving, that was 

it. We said we have got to start, time is of the essence. So we will 

do a little bit of business and hear from our witness. Thank you. 

And then we will wait for our colleagues to come back. 

So after recognizing myself, and when they come in, Ranking 

Member Deutch and Ranking Member Keating for 5 minutes each 

for our opening statements, I will recognize other members seeking 

recognition for 1 minute. We will start with that process now. We 

will then hear from our witness and, without objection, the witness’ 

prepared statement will be made a part of the record. Members 

may have 5 days to insert statements and questions for the record 

subject to the length limitation in the rules. 

Before beginning my opening statement, I would first like to take 

a moment to acknowledge the other chairman of this joint subcommittee hearing, Judge Poe, who could not be with us this morning as he continues to undergo treatment for leukemia. I know that 

all of our thoughts and prayers are with Judge Poe as he fights 

this disease, we wish him the best. I have his opening statement, 

without objection, it will be made a part of the record now. 

The Chair recognizes herself for 5 minutes. 

December 17 marks the 1-year anniversary of the Libyan Political Agreement, making this an opportune time to review the administration’s policy in Libya. While this administration first participated in the intervention in Libya in 2011, many of us expressed concern with the administration’s lack of clearly articulated objectives, a post-intervention plan, and even an explanation 

about how it fit U.S. national security interests. Many of our worst 

fears have come to fruition, as more than 5 years after Ghadafi’s 

death, Libya is embroiled in a difficult civil war that shows no sign 

2

of abatement. If anything, it has only gotten worse since the U.N.-

brokered agreement. Libya is more politically divided than ever, its 

economy is in a free fall, and terrorist groups and criminals continue to exploit the power vacuum. 

Multiple governing entities and their allied militias and armed 

forces compete for power while the U.N.-backed unity government, 

known as the Government of National Accord, remains unable to 

provide basic security and basic services to the people of Libya. 

Criminals and terrorist groups, including ISIS, al-Qaeda and so 

many others, take advantage of the chaos, securing their own territory and using Libya as a launching pad for smuggling, human 

trafficking, and terror attacks—endangering Libya’s neighbors, 

such as Egypt and Tunisia. Libya is now the main transit point for 

migrants trying to reach Europe, and with little border security or 

governance, many are rightly concerned by the potential of terrorists reaching our own shores. While reports say that forces are 

close to retaking Sirte from ISIS, we should not allow this news to 

disguise the sad reality: ISIS’ presence in Libya is far from being 

eliminated. ISIS, al-Qaeda, Ansar al-Sharia, the group responsible 

for the 2012 Benghazi attack, as well as others, all continue to 

maintain cells throughout the country. 

In a positive development, I was relieved to see the announcement last month that the Organization for the Prohibition of 

Chemical Weapons was able to remove Libya’s remaining chemical 

weapons equipment. Another welcome development, if accurate, is 

the reported killing by French air strikes of the Algerian jihadist 

known as the ‘‘one-eyed terrorist.’’ He is said to have been responsible for organizing terrorist attacks in Libya, Algeria and Mali, so 

many other places, and had funneled millions of dollars to alQaeda. France’s air strikes highlight the stakes that many outside 

actors have in Libya. Russia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and 

others, continue to support Khalifa Haftar, the former Libyan National Army general who recently claimed victory in Benghazi and 

who was just in Moscow discussing Russian military assistance. 

Reports indicate that at least four countries have Special Forces on 

the ground in Libya right now, including our own, and, in some 

cases, are assisting forces on both sides of Libya’s civil war. It is 

also worth noting that in recent months Haftar has seized many 

of the ports in Libya’s oil crescent, which is Libya’s main source of 

revenue. 

With additional violence on the horizon, potentially between eastern and western forces, Haftar’s role must be addressed in Libya’s 

political dialogue—a dialogue that should come sooner rather than 

later. Since the unity government took up residence in Tripoli in 

March, it has struggled to provide the kind of basic services and 

security that could engender the support that it needs in order to 

consolidate power. And as long as it keeps struggling in the west 

while its rival governing entities and security forces keep operating 

and making gains in the east, any chance that the current peace 

process had at succeeding will continue to be undermined. 

As we approach the 1-year anniversary of the Libyan Political 

Agreement, it is clear that the status quo in Libya is 

unsustainable, and that there must be a new and revitalized attempt at reconciling all Libyan stakeholders. 

3

I look forward to hearing from our witness on exactly how the 

administration is working to help get that peace process back on 

track, the status of our counterterrorism operation against ISIS 

and others, and what kind of changes to our Libya policy and assistance we should expect moving forward. 

And I am now pleased to yield to members for their opening 

statements. I will turn to Mr. Chabot of Ohio. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for holding 

this important hearing. Despite Libya’s obviously geopolitical importance, it has really not received the public attention that it deserves. President Obama has called his administration’s failure to 

adequately plan for a post-Ghadafi Libya the worst mistake of his 

presidency. The word ‘‘mistake’’ really doesn’t begin to capture the 

situation in Libya, which is a catastrophic failure. 

Back in August 2012, I spent the better part of a day and a half 

with Ambassador Stevens in Tripoli. This was about a month before he was brutally murdered along with three other brave Americans. Of course the administration misled the American people at 

that time by saying that this was caused by some video. And we 

also later learned that Ambassador Stevens and his people had 

sought help and better security and more protection, and that they 

were basically ignored by their higher-ups in the State Department. 

Libya’s now engulfed in not one but two civil wars, the chaos has 

spread to Mali, and now both countries have become safe havens 

for al-Qaeda and ISIS. When the so-called Arab Spring spread to 

Libya in 2011, we were told a military intervention to overthrow 

Muammar Ghadafi was essential to our national security. We were 

told by the Obama administration that we could, in effect, lead 

from behind, and the costs of intervention would largely be borne 

by our allies. And finally, we were told Libya could easily be rebuilt 

and stabilized basically on the cheap. As it turns out, none of these 

things were true and I eagerly await the administration’s views on 

these things and many others that we will question them. 

And thank you, again, for holding this hearing. 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chabot. 

Do any members wish to make an opening statement? 

If not, let me introduce our witness. I am pleased to welcome Mr. 

Jonathan Winer who serves as the State Department’s special 

envoy for Libya, as well as senior adviser for MEK resettlement. 

Thank you for your work on that. He was previously the U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for international law enforcement. 

We welcome you to our subcommittee. 

And for the record, Chairman Poe and I invited DOD officials to 

testify at our hearing, but the Department of Defense failed to respond to our invitation. Did not offer a witness. So we thank you 

for being here, sir. And we will turn to you for your opening statement, Mr. Winer. 

STATEMENT OF MR. JONATHAN WINER, SPECIAL ENVOY FOR 

LIBYA, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. WINER. You are welcome, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman Ros-Lehtinen——

4

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN. If you could put that microphone a little bit 

closer. 

Mr. WINER. Sure. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Deutch, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished 

members of the committees, I am honored by the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss U.S. foreign policy on Libya. 

Thank you. 

During my service as special envoy for Libya, our policy has centered on promoting the ability of Libyans to maintain a stable, unified, and inclusive government that can both defeat ISIL and other 

terrorist groups, and simultaneously meet the security, economic, 

and humanitarian needs of the Libyan people. 

After 42 years of Muammar Ghadafi’s erratic rule, and 5 years 

since the country cast off his shackles, Libya has made some, but 

not enough progress in reaching these goals. Libya’s post-Ghadafi 

institutions have not provided sufficient stability and opportunity 

for the Libyan people; but they have made some visible progress 

against terrorism and they still have an opportunity to move forward in securing a more functional national transitional government. Libya needs to move forward on both goals, neither objective 

is sustainable without the other. 

Since the signing of the Libyan Political Agreement in Skhirat, 

Morocco on December 17, 2015, the Government of National Accord, or GNA, led by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj has been a 

steadfast partner of the United States and the international community against ISIL. 

A year ago, before the Skhirat Agreement, ISIL was expanding 

its presence in Libya, capturing 90 miles of prime Mediterranean 

coastline around the coastal city of Sirte, a stone’s throw away 

from Europe’s southern shores. A year later the picture looks very 

different. Now, due to the bravery of GNA-aligned Libyan soldiers 

supported since this summer by the skill of U.S. forces, who have 

conducted more than 450 air strikes coordinated with our Libyan 

partners, ISIL controls just a few city blocks in Sirte. And its grasp 

on even this sliver of Libyan territory is tenuous. In Benghazi and 

in Libya’s east, ISIL and other terrorist groups in other parts of 

Libya have also been pushed back. In Benghazi and Libya’s east, 

this has been due to sustained efforts by equally brave Libyan soldiers. 

So we have seen Libyan soldiers in different parts of the country 

and with different political orientations taking on terrorism in different parts of Libya and what was a substantial presence of ISIL 

in terms of its control of territory in Libya is now all but eliminated. The gains against ISIL are real. They could also be reversible if Libyans do not come together to participate in the GNA and 

to help it perform its work for the Libyan people, and to unify 

against the common threat to all. This is true today for the transitional GNA, it will be true for the next Libyan Government that 

is formed after the country moves ahead with elections sometime 

next year, or in early 2018. 

If Libyans choose to fight each other instead of uniting, they risk 

increasing the probability that ISIL and other violent extremists in 

its mold will be back. Accordingly, we are continuing our work 

seeking to broaden support for a common political path forward to 

5

build a more capable government and to unify and professionalize 

Libya’s armed forces. We see no military solution to Libya’s political divisions; sustainable security solutions require sustainable political solutions. 

We also need to keep working with Libyans on getting oil flowing 

and stabilizing its economy. If Libya can get back to producing 

even 1 million barrels a day out of its previous 1.6 million barrelper-day capacity, it could easily provide the Libyan people the 

funds they need for food, health care, education, and other basic 

needs. Sustainable economic success, too, requires sustainable political solutions. Continuing intensive mediation to ensure the political process moves forward will be critical. Libyans will continue to 

look to the U.S. for our help as the GNA moves forward in addressing these challenges, and we must be prepared to give it. 

Ms. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, 

the U.S. Government remains deeply engaged in Libya. We have 

shared national security interests in defeating ISIL. The U.S. supports the aspirations of the Libyan people for a united, inclusive, 

and responsive national government capable of overcoming the 

country’s significant challenges and political divisions. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Winer follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Winer. 

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen had to go out. I am filling in for her at this 

time. So I will recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

Her first question would have been, and I will ask it at this time, 

please describe the various violent Islamist extremist and terrorist 

groups currently operating in Libya. Who are they? How many 

fighters does each group have? What are their goals? And anything 

else that you think would be relevant and helpful for this committee to understand. 

Mr. WINER. Sure. There are four major groups that are U.N.-designated terrorist groups that we pay attention to. It is surely not 

the entire complete list because there are local groups with different places in the spectrum of extremism who are present in the 

environment as well who we have to pay attention to, and Libyans 

have to pay attention to. Some of them are purely domestic and I 

would distinguish those from the ones that operate in a 

transnational way. 

But the four groups are: Islamic State. I have seen different 

numbers from the United States Government on how many are 

present. Prior to the Sirte offensive, the range in estimates were 

3,000 to 6,500; I have seen numbers that many. Hundreds of Islamic State fighters have been killed in the Sirte fighting. Hundreds. Difficult to get an exact number but it is in that range. 

What are the numbers today? I don’t think anyone knows. I would 

suspect they are at the lower end of that spectrum but there you 

would need to get briefings in closed session from people who are 

responsible for making those kinds of assessments. 

In addition to Daesh, you have al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, which 

maintains an independent presence. They have been present in 

Benghazi, though at this point they are down to a sliver, a tiny 

sliver of territory in Benghazi. They have been basically eliminated 

there, and it is not clear how much longer they will hold the last 

block or two where they still have a presence. There is likely alQaeda cells elsewhere in the country. 

There have been a couple of different groups calling themselves 

Ansar al-Sharia. One has been present in Darnah in the Far East. 

Another has been present in the far west of Libya, sometimes 

called Ansar al-Sharia Tunis. They have been responsible in significant part for attacks in Tunisia at the Bardo Museum and at the 

Sousse Beach area. So that is a third group. 

A fourth group, Al-Mourabitoun, is present to some extent in 

Libya. They were Algerian-based originally, and they move around 

within countries to the west and south of Libya as well. 

Those are the principal four groups. Beyond that, you get into 

constellations of militias with different types of ties. Some of whom 

disagree with and fight other Libyan militias and other Libyan 

military forces and that gets more complicated pretty quickly. The 

situation in Benghazi has been made complicated by the presence 

of some of those groups, along with people who are clearly Islamic 

State and people who are al-Qaeda in the Maghreb. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. My next question is this: 

There was a significant amount of criticism of the Bush administration for inadequately planning, shall we say, after the overthrow 

of Saddam in Iraq. Even after all that criticism, why did this adVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:56 Jan 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\113016\22863 SHIRL
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ministration fail to perhaps learn from that? And I think most people would agree there was a lack of planning for the power transition after Ghadafi and the situation that we have today. How could 

that happen and what can we learn in the future to avoid that type 

of thing from future administrations, including the current one, or 

the next administration, which will be coming in in about 2 

months. 

Mr. WINER. Mr. Chabot, it is an absolutely excellent core question and it is a question that deserves a lot of thought. I will do 

the best I can extemporaneously to respond. 

In both Iraq and in Libya, you had dictatorships that had been 

in place for a very long time. When you have dictatorships, they 

tend to live in a bubble and not to have good political feedback 

mechanisms to have institutions function in ways other than by the 

command of the dictator. 

So, in both cases, the institutions that were left following the 

military actions did not function in the absence of the authoritarian 

leader telling everybody what to do. They probably did not function 

tremendously well previously, but they certainly functioned very 

terribly afterward. So I think there needs to be a recognition any 

time one goes after a dictator that the societies, that the dictators 

have led for decades, are going to have underdeveloped political institutions. 

In the case of Libya, there are technocratic institutions that functioned very well under Ghadafi and have functioned well since. The 

National Oil Corporation functioned very well to get oil pumped, to 

keep track of oil, and to handle all elements of Libyan oil production. Central Bank, technically, is capable of functioning to move 

money for salaries, to be able to follow budgets and make payments 

in that way similarly, and to operate as other central banks do. 

The National Telecommunications and Postal Service, same kind of 

technical capacity. 

But political institutions, not so much. In politics, you have different people whose view is: I am the one who should decide, not 

that gentleman or woman over there. And no accepted agreed-upon 

mechanism for power sharing. So there have been disagreements 

pretty much nonstop on how to share power, how to deliver services at the local level, how to make the key decisions to move 

ahead. Constant negotiations and efforts to get alignment among 

the different geographies, geographical regions, the different tribes, 

the different cities, as well as the different political parties and 

ideologies. So it has made for a very, very difficult transition for 

Libya, as it did for Iraq. 

So I think anytime one is going to engage in trying to undertake 

an intervention in another country, you have to do so with a lot of 

humility, with an appreciation of risk and of uncertainty, and with 

constant review before, while you’re doing it, and afterward to be 

able to correct course as you go. You also need alignment from 

neighbors. If you have neighbors with different visions on the future engaging in a country, different regional players, for example, 

you can wind up with different domestic groups being backed by 

different regional forces, and, thereby, believing that they are going 

to be victorious as a result of having their patron. So it has been 

critical, in the case of Libya, to try and get regional players aligned 

13

with one another in support of a joint and unified solution, that is 

what we have been working on. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. My time has expired. 

The gentleman from California, Mr. Cook, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Chair. By the way, thank you very 

much for your patience with everything that is going on today. I 

wanted to just get your thoughts on the relationship with Egypt 

and the el-Sisi government. A number of years ago, going way 

back, the relationship between Libya and Egypt was strained, to 

say the least. I know that Egypt is concerned with the Sinai and 

its own economic development, but it would seem that Egypt could 

have a tremendous influence in that region there going back to historic times. Do you have any comments or thoughts on that? 

Mr. WINER. Sure. Egypt is a tremendously important actor in relationship to Libya. It has a long-shared border, a long-shared history, and Egyptian officials very much want to see a stable and secure Libya. The question for the United States as we work closely 

with Egypt—and we work closely with literally all of Libya’s neighbors across the Mediterranean, as well as on land, and with other 

regional players—is what is going to produce stability and security 

for the long term? 

As I mentioned in my testimony, we are convinced that you have 

to have a viable national government as well as viable national security forces working together in a way that is sustainable. That 

means a government that is inclusive—it can’t just be a government from the east or representing Easterners, for example—it has 

to include people from Misurata, people from Tripoli, people from 

the south. 

The United States and Egypt talk about Libya all the time; I 

have been to Cairo, I don’t know how many times in recent months, 

meeting with very senior officials. And to date, we have been able 

to achieve alignments in supporting the Libyan Political Agreement, in a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions, and even on 

stopping flows of illicit oil when they have happened. We have had 

cooperation and integration. 

There are differences in perspective in some areas. Egypt wants 

to see a very strong Libyan army, we want to see a strong Libyan 

army too. I think our focus has been on how you get that integrated across the whole country in a way that is under civilian 

rule, civilian control, but also maintains the ability to do its job 

properly. We continue to work with them on that. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman yields back. 

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. DeSantis, didn’t I hear that you 

just had an addition to your family? 

Mr. DESANTIS. That is right. 

Mr. CHABOT. A little girl? 

Mr. DESANTIS. It is a little girl. A bundle of joy. 

Mr. CHABOT. Congratulations. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Oh, no, it is tremendous. Thank you so much. 

You mentioned Ansar al-Sharia, they were widely regarded as 

perpetrating the Benghazi attacks. I know that the administration 

has indicted one individual from that. Has there been any other efVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:56 Jan 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_MENA\113016\22863 SHIRL
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forts made or actions taken to hold anyone else accountable who 

was involved with those attacks? 

Mr. WINER. The FBI has active engagement in trying to bring 

the perpetrators of those attacks to justice. The Department of 

State and every element of the Obama administration, whenever 

there is an opportunity to try and advance those investigations, 

work away at it. One of the most important things to me, as special 

envoy, when we worked on the formation of the Government of National Accord was being able to talk to the new members of the 

presidency council about this case and to say how much it matters 

to us. They said, It matters to us, Mr. Winer, at least as much as 

it matters to you. Libyans loved Chris Stevens, they knew Ambassador Stevens very well. The other three victims of that attack also 

require and deserve justice. The Libyans raise this issue with me 

when we are talking about other things, they want to see us back 

in the country and they want to see this episode brought to a close 

with justice. I have never heard any Libyan I have talked to take 

a different position. There is an emotional element to this that is 

important to the future of both countries, I thank you for raising 

it. 

Mr. DESANTIS. And just judging by your response and mentioning the FBI, am I right to assume that the response is legal/

investigatory rather than kinetic in conjunction with, say, the Department of Defense? 

Mr. WINER. The FBI has had the lead on this issue since those 

attacks took place. I personally believe that if we have the ability 

to go after terrorists in Libya, or anywhere, who have been involved in the killing of Americans, that we should exercise that. In 

the case of Libya, this administration has done so on multiple occasions. We went after and killed ISIL’s emir, who was located at 

that time in the eastern half of Libya’s coastal region. We went 

after a group of terrorists in western Libya, a very, very successful 

attack that killed a number of them. And we should be prepared 

to do that when it meets the objective test of people who are 

threatening Americans or have killed Americans. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Well, good. Well, I am glad to hear you say that. 

I think that is true and I think it has been a little frustrating with 

the Benghazi response just simply because we had identified a 

group, and I view that very much as an act of war. You know, the 

law enforcement component I get, but I think when that was done 

in the 1990s that probably wasn’t as effective. I certainly support 

the other strike that you had mentioned, I think that those were 

absolutely justified. 

Let me ask you this: Of the folks who are kind of on the ground 

in Libya, the various groups that the U.S. is working with, what 

are they seeking? Are they seeking just to put an end to a lot of 

the turmoil? Do they want a more democratic pluralistic society? 

Do they want a more Islamic-based society where you would have 

a Sharia-type system? What would you say are kind of in the mix? 

Mr. WINER. Are you talking about the terrorist groups? 

Mr. DESANTIS. No, no. I am talking about just groups that we 

are working with. 

Mr. WINER. Oh, sure. 

Mr. DESANTIS. What are their orientations? 

15

Mr. WINER. First, I think most Libyans want to see a stable, 

prosperous, secure Libya. They want good lives, like people want 

in any other country in the world. So most people in the first instance, that is what they want. It is getting there that is so hard. 

Getting the leaders to negotiate with one another, compromise with 

one another to create a unified government based on reconciliation 

that can build trust by performing. That is what most Libyans, I 

believe, want. And the many, many, many groups of Libyans, different Libyan leaders I talk to, profess to want the same thing. 

Libyans that we are working with on the battle over Sirte did not 

like and did not want to be threatened by a foreign brutal repellent 

ideology and organization that was milking Libyan resources to accrete power and to stifle all alternatives. They felt very strongly 

that that needed to be stopped. 

In Benghazi, prior to the Libyan National Army commanded by 

General Haftar coming in, there were assassinations in civil society 

that were really significantly affecting the ability of ordinary people to live. The goal is to get the forces that we have supported in 

the west, the forces that General Haftar has brought together in 

the east, and other forces, including those being put together in 

Tripoli now from people who used to work for the Libyan Army in 

the past, together to form an integrated military that is non-ideological, that is technocratic, that is impartial and neutral, nonpolitical, whose goal is to stabilize Libya and make the country safe 

for people to carry out their business and live normal, good lives 

in safety. A political agreement is going to be necessary to further 

political negotiations and discussions within the framework of the 

Skhirat agreement is going to be necessary to get there, we believe. 

And we have been working on that intensively and will continue 

to. 

Mr. DESANTIS. So is that more of an Egyptian model, then, you 

are looking forward with how their military has operated through 

the years? 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. But you can go 

ahead and answer the question. 

Mr. WINER. Yes, sir. I wouldn’t call it an Egyptian model. It 

needs to be a Libyan model. Libyans will need to have, we believe, 

a joint defense leadership at the top in some way. There can be one 

person who is in the lead and others as part of it, but it is going 

to need to be joint because it needs to knit the country together. 

You know, Egypt has had a strong, strong leadership out of Cairo 

for thousands of years, for a long, long time, out of one city. Long 

tradition in the 20th century of Egyptian military. Libya has a 

more geographically diverse population, and it is going to need to 

be something that brings people together. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Yoho, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you being 

here, and sorry for the delay. You were talking about the flow of 

oil; the operation of it, the production, and the sale operated well 

under Ghadafi, is that right? 

Mr. WINER. Yes, sir. 

16

Mr. YOHO. All right. And now it is kind of happenstance? It is 

not working as well? 

Mr. WINER. What has happened, in essence, is the different Libyan factions have shut down oil production as a means of trying to 

get their way. You could call it extortion, if you wanted to, in some 

cases but, essentially, they have simply turned off the spigots. Libyan oil flows from fields to pipes to terminals. 

Mr. YOHO. Right. 

Mr. WINER. So you can shut it off at the terminal, you can shut 

it off at the pipe, you can shut it off at the oil field. 

Mr. YOHO. And then you were talking about we need to have a 

viable national government, an inclusive government. Is that possible when you have a tribal mentality, or a country with a tribal 

mentality versus a strong arm of a leader like a Ghadafi or a Hussein in Iraq? Is that possible in that kind of a country with that 

kind of mentality? 

Mr. WINER. The aftermath of dictatorship is very hard on people 

almost anywhere it happens. In the case of Libya, Libyans need to 

come together to form a government that represents——

Mr. YOHO. Well, that is what I am asking. Is that possible? We 

have seen this story played out in Afghanistan and Iraq, and what 

I see is America trying to correct a wrong from the no-fly zone that 

we know was a mistake; a terrible mistake, and we almost repeated this again in Syria. Here we are entangled in another Middle Eastern country with not a quick resolve and I just want to see 

what your thoughts are on how do we get through this? And as a 

unity government, and I know that would be the ideal situation, 

but how feasible is that and how realistic is that? 

Mr. WINER. I believe that Libyans don’t like people from other 

countries telling them what to do. 

Mr. YOHO. I agree. 

Mr. WINER. And they don’t much like other Libyans telling them 

what to do. But they would rather be in the end, working things 

out among other Libyans than having foreigners in charge. One of 

the reasons the Islamic State has been pushed out of geographic 

control so quickly, in the scheme of things, is because Libyans, 

even the extremists in the east who invited them into Darnah, 

started saying: We don’t want them telling us what to do. We don’t 

want those people out of Iraq or Syria telling us what to do. We 

are going to be extremists, we will be local extremists; we don’t like 

other people telling us what to do. 

Mr. YOHO. Well, and that brings up another point then. If ISIS 

got a foothold in there because of the no-fly zone, because of the 

failed state, and now that we are trying to side with different militias to defeat ISIS, are we not going to create the same thing that 

we did in Afghanistan? 

Mr. WINER. Our goal is not to side with any militia. It is to help 

Libyans get together to form unified forces that are professional, 

impartial, neutral. 

Mr. YOHO. Is that possible though? 

Mr. WINER. Yes, I think it is possible. Sometimes things that are 

hard are still possible. 

Mr. YOHO. I agree. 

17

Mr. WINER. Just because something is hard does not mean it is 

impossible. 

Mr. YOHO. No, I agree with that. 

Mr. WINER. It was considered to be really hard to create a political framework in 2015 to try and bring the country together. Ultimately, we were able to work with other countries, countries with 

very different takes and perspectives on the Libyan issue throughout the region—Middle Eastern region and throughout North Africa—were able to say: Yes, we agree, this is the way forward. As 

well as western European countries, the United States, and the P5 

and the U.N. Security Council. We had an awful lot of Libyans 

aboard, too. The goal now is to try and see if we can continue to 

get Libyans together, to find further solutions to implement that 

long enough to then get a referendum on a constitution and elections in place, so that you can have the country then move forward 

on that basis, with unified national institutions. If the country 

winds up breaking up into pieces, it is going to be very bad for 

Libyans and it is not going to be good for anybody else. 

Mr. YOHO. Do you see a strong person that could be elected in 

there that people would unify right now? Or do you see it still 

going through the struggling—somebody trying to vie for the 

power, so that they are the person that can be elected? Or are they 

going to just kind of take the country over through force? 

Mr. WINER. We do not believe that any Libyan can bring the 

country together through force. We just don’t believe it. We look at 

it and say: Is it possible? Conclude it is not going to work. It will 

bring other Libyans into play against it if anyone tries to do that, 

and our partners and working on Libya, international partners, 

pretty much, conclude the same thing. It is going to be a process 

of getting there; promoting alignment, getting people to work with 

one another, preventing the efforts to commandeer resources, that 

is the ongoing work. And it is going to need to continue with some 

intensity for the foreseeable future. 

Mr. YOHO. I appreciate it. Thank you. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Ribble, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. RIBBLE. Good afternoon, I guess. 

Mr. WINER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. RIBBLE. It is good to have you here. I want to go back to the 

economy, to some of the very early statements you made. Because 

I think ultimately, I couldn’t agree more with you when you talk 

about that the citizens want an economy that functions, they want 

families that are safe, they want their children to do well. They 

really want all the same things that families around the world 

want. Can you share with us a little bit of your perspective of what 

the Libyan economy looked like under Ghadafi——

Mr. WINER. Sure. 

Mr. RIBBLE [continuing]. And what it looks like today? You 

talked a bit about oil, but what are the other economic drivers in 

the country? And then also talk to us about what those obstacles 

are. Are they religious? Is it a Sunni/Shia battle? Is it economic? 

Is it just dispirit——

Mr. WINER. Yes, sir. 

18

Mr. RIBBLE. So just kind of take us through what you see the 

economic——

Mr. WINER. Thank you for another great question. Ghadafi’s 

strength and weakness was building the Libyan economy on oil and 

almost exclusively oil. There is essentially no revenue to the government meaningfully other than oil. There are small amounts 

from telecommunications payments, that kind of thing, postal payments, some excise taxes but it is basically oil. So when the price 

of oil was high, Libya under Ghadafi socked the money away. 

When the price of oil was lower, it managed. 

In the first days after the revolution, Libya continued to pump 

as much oil as it ever did. They started fighting with one another, 

oil production went down. They then resolved things for a while, 

oil production went up to where it had been pre-Ghadafi again. So 

the reason why oil is not being pumped at an adequate level is political. It is not technical. It is not due to deterioration of the system, though Islamic State did damage some infrastructure that 

needs to be repaired, if they had complete political agreement, 

maybe they could get up to 1.2 or 1.3 million barrels a day instead 

of 1.6. They would be in excellent shape with that. So it is the failure to reach political agreements that is creating the problems. It 

is this pattern of extortion, holdups, people refusing to allow oil to 

be pumped for political reasons. That is what has to stop. It is a 

cancer threatening Libya’s future when people shut down the oil. 

Then the money from the oil has to be distributed in ways that 

ordinary Libyans throughout the country say: Our city, our town, 

our tribe, our people, our region, are being taken care of. Ghadafi 

was good at that; he wasn’t necessarily fair, he didn’t distribute it 

in a way that everybody else would have distributed it, but there 

was free education, there was low-cost health care, low cost utilities. So while there were haves and have-nots that were substantial and that played a part in the revolution, I believe, he basically 

had his Ghadafi system down. Without him acting as the leader, 

that system is broken down and you have these people shutting 

down the oil, which he never would have permitted. They need to 

get the oil pumped. There is no solution near-term other than getting oil pumped so they can generate the revenues they need to 

then distribute it by political agreement. So what we are working 

on right now, in addition to urging Libyans to allow oil to be 

pumped, and right now, there is 440,000 barrels a day that could 

be pumped from the west by a small number of people saying 

yes——

Mr. RIBBLE. Is there an effective telecommunications system in 

the country where citizens can communicate easily through the 

Internet and cell phones? 

Mr. WINER. Yes. It is not as robust as it needs to be because 

there hasn’t been investment in it in the last 5 years, and Islamic 

State, at various times, tried cutting the cords, as it were, shutting 

down elements of it, but it still exists. It could be stronger and 

needs to be stronger. 

Mr. RIBBLE. Because it is important economically for the people 

to communicate. 

Mr. WINER. Yeah. Libya needs to diversify beyond oil, but first 

it needs to turn the oil on, agree on budgets, agree on fiscal and 

19

monetary policy in light of current conditions, and reach further 

political agreements that would strengthen and build confidence 

among the Libyan people, thus shutting off the losses due to the 

parallel or black market. We are working closely with the U.S. Department of Treasury and with Libyans in trying to promote their 

agreement on those issues, as well as with IMF and the World 

Bank. 

Mr. RIBBLE. One final question. In hindsight, and I recognize 

hindsight is generally 20/20, what should the U.S. have done differently, if anything? Did we learn anything there? 

Mr. WINER. As I mentioned before, and I will repeat this core 

point, anytime that you go into a country that has been run by a 

dictator, the aftermath could be very complicated because that is 

a particular type of system. Getting to a system that is more pluralistic and more representative, which is essential for countries to 

be sustainable. There is a reason why dictators fall, eventually 

their systems rot and they no longer meet the needs of their people 

and they can’t maintain control. When you do that, you have to go 

in with humility, persistence, and commitment, you have to know 

a lot, listen a lot, be prepared to revise your initial thinking, consult with other people, and recognize that it can be a bunch of 

years. 

I worked on issues in the Americas in the 1990s in the Clinton 

years. My rule of thumb used to be that after a civil war or the 

fall of a dictatorship or anything of that nature, and military or security forces becoming discredited, no longer being in place, you 

have to think about a decade for rebuilding, not a year or 2 years, 

but a decade. That is not a very perfect rule but it is order of magnitude what I have seen now over decades of being in this work. 

The other line I sometimes use is: Don’t try to do in Baghdad what 

you would never dare try to do in Baltimore, because you know it 

wouldn’t work if you tried to do it in Baltimore. So I use the word 

again, ‘‘humility.’’ Governance is hard and the further away you 

are from a society, the harder it is. You can still help by being very 

attuned to a society and consulting and learning but it is difficult, 

painstaking work that takes time. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. Thank the gentleman. 

We want to thank you, Mr. Winer, for you testimony here this 

morning and now this afternoon. In my Democratic colleagues’ defense, their absence is not due to a lack of interest, but they had 

leadership elections, which apparently went a little longer than 

they anticipated. So their absence, of course, is excused. 

We want to thank everyone for being here. Thank you for your 

testimony. Members will have 5 legislative days to submit statements or questions or to extend their remarks. And if there is no 

further business to come before the committee, we are adjourned. 

Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the subcommittees were adjourned.] 

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