[Cite as State v. Fleetwood, 2020-Ohio-5492.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

STATE OF OHIO 

 Appellee 

 v. 

DORSHAWN C. FLEETWOOD 

 Appellant 

C.A. No. 29465 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. CR 2018 11 3960 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: December 2, 2020 

 

CARR, Presiding Judge. 

{¶1} Appellant, Dorshawn Fleetwood, appeals the judgment of the Summit County 

Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms. 

I. 

{¶2} On December 17, 2018, the Summit County Grand Jury indicted Fleetwood on one 

count of burglary, one count of kidnapping, two counts of aggravated vehicular assault, two counts 

of violating a protection order, one count of unlawful restraint, one count of operating a vehicle 

under the influence of alcohol or drugs (“OVI”), and one count of driving under suspension. 

Fleetwood pleaded not guilty to the charges at arraignment. 

{¶3} Fleetwood ultimately entered into a written plea agreement with the State. 

Fleetwood pleaded guilty to an amended count of trespass into a habitation, two counts of 

aggravated vehicular assault, one count of violating a protection order, and one count of OVI. The 

remaining charges were dismissed. The trial court imposed a total prison sentence of six years. 
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{¶4} On July 2, 2019, Fleetwood filed a pro se motion for leave to file a delayed appeal. 

Fleetwood’s initial appeal was dismissed for failure to file a brief. Thereafter, this Court granted 

Fleetwood’s motion to reinstate his appeal and appointed appellate counsel. Fleetwood now raises 

one assignment of error. 

II. 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ENGAGE IN A MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE 

WITH APPELLANT FLEETWOOD REGARDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 

RIGHTS HE WAS WAIVING BY ENTERING GUILTY PLEAS TO SEVERAL 

COUNTS OF THE INDICTMENT, AND MISINFORMED HIM OF ONE OF 

THOSE RIGHTS, THEREBY RENDERING HIS PLEAS NOT KNOWINGLY, 

INTELLIGENTLY, AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED. 

{¶5} In support of his sole assignment of error, Fleetwood contends that the trial court 

failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C) when it “essentially paraphrased” his constitutional rights at 

the plea colloquy. Fleetwood maintains that the trial court should have inquired as to “whether 

[he] understood [each] right, before going on to the next right.” This Court disagrees. 

{¶6} Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) provides that a trial court in felony cases must “address[] the 

defendant personally” and inform the defendant of his or her constitutional rights prior to accepting 

a plea of guilty or no contest. Specifically, the trial court is required to: 

Inform[] the defendant and determin[e] that the defendant understands that by the 

plea the defendant is waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against 

him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the defendant’s 

favor, and to require the state to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable 

doubt at a trial at which the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself 

or herself. 

Id. 

{¶7} “Because Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) deals with the waiver of constitutional rights, strict 

compliance with the rule is required.” State v. Jordan, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27690, 2015-Ohio-
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4354, ¶ 5, citing State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, ¶ 18. Under the strict 

compliance standard, a trial court is not required to use the exact language of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) 

“so long as the trial court actually explains the rights to the defendant.” Veney at ¶ 27, citing State 

v. Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus. This Court reviews matters 

of whether the trial court strictly complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) de novo. State v. Owens, 9th 

Dist. Summit No. 25174, 2010-Ohio-4635, ¶ 7. 

{¶8} In support of his assignment of error, Fleetwood notes that the high court in Ballard

observed that “the best method of informing a defendant of his constitutional rights is to use the 

language contained in Crim.R. 11(C), stopping after each right and asking the defendant whether 

he understands the right and knows that he is waiving it by pleading guilty.” Ballard at 479. 

Notably, however, the Supreme Court went on to say that the “failure to so proceed will not 

necessarily invalidate a plea.” Id. The Supreme Court stressed that the “underlying purpose” of 

Crim.R. 11(C) “is to convey to the defendant certain information so that he can make a voluntary 

and intelligent decision whether to plead guilty.” Id. “[W]hile it is recommended that a trial judge 

stop after naming each constitutional right and ask if the defendant understands that right, the 

failure to do so will not necessarily invalidate a plea.” State v. Holt, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21835, 

2004-Ohio-3252, ¶ 11, citing Ballard at 479-480. “[I]f the record shows that the trial court 

engaged in a meaningful dialogue with the defendant which, in substance, explained the pertinent 

constitutional rights in a manner reasonably intelligible to that defendant[,] then the court’s 

acceptance of a guilty plea is to be affirmed.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Holt at 

¶ 9. 

{¶9} A review of the record here reveals that Fleetwood’s assignment of error is without 

merit. Fleetwood signed two forms that explained the rights he would be waiving by pleading 
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guilty to the various charges against him. Defense counsel represented to the trial court that he 

had spent “significant time” with Fleetwood going over the terms of the plea negotiations prior to 

Fleetwood signing the written plea agreement. At the plea hearing, the trial court outlined the 

possible penalties Fleetwood could face upon entering guilty pleas. The trial court then informed 

Fleetwood of all the constitutional rights that he would be waiving and asked, “[d]o you understand 

that?” Fleetwood responded in the affirmative. Although stopping and addressing Fleetwood after 

each right would have been the best practice, the trial court’s failure to do so does not invalidate 

the plea, given that that the trial court engaged in a meaningful dialogue with Fleetwood that 

allowed him to understand the rights he would be waiving by pleading guilty. See Holt at ¶ 9. 

{¶10} To the extent that Fleetwood asserts that he was misinformed of his appellate rights 

when the trial court informed him that he was “waiv[ing] [his] right to appeal in this case[,]” we 

note that any issues in this regard were not prejudicial as Fleetwood was in fact able to challenge 

the validity of his plea on appeal. See generally State v. Gegia, 157 Ohio App.3d 112, 2004-Ohio2124, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.) (holding that a defendant who pleads guilty waives the right to challenge 

any action taken by the trial court up to that point in the proceeding, unless it impacted the knowing 

and voluntary character of the plea). 

{¶11} Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court failed to comply with 

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). The assignment of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶12} Fleetwood’s sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Summit 

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 
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 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period 

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to 

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the 

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 DONNA J. CARR 

 FOR THE COURT 

TEODOSIO, J. 

SCHAFER, J. 

CONCUR. 

APPEARANCES: 

NICHOLAS SWYRYDENKO, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and JACQUENETTE S. CORGAN, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.