Volume 5, Number 1

Spring 2004

Contents

Dilution of Precision 

in GPS Guidance 

Simplified 1

Director’s Corner 2

in the news 8

WSTIACCourses: 

Directed Energy 11 

Sensors/Seekers 12

Weaponeering 13

Precision Weapons 14

Calendar of Events 15

WSTIAC is a DoD Information Analysis

Center Sponsored by the Defense

Technical Information Center 

WST

WEAPON SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY INFORMAT ION ANALYSIS CENTE R

IAC

Di l u t i o n o f P r e c i s i o n

i n GP S Gu i d a n c e - 

S imp l i f i e d

By Mark Scott and Robert Scott

WSTIAC

Introduction

The WSTIAC Newsletter Summer 2003 edition (Vol. 4, No.2) featured an article

on "GPS Accuracy for Weapon Guidance". The first part of this article presented

a development of a standard range error budget between a GPS (Global

Positioning System) receiver and satellite, consistent with open literature that is

based on the accuracy the system has demonstrated over time (e.g. see Parkinson

& Spilker, GPS: Theory and Applications, Vol. 1, AIAA, 1996, pp. 480-483). The

second part of this article presented a derivation of the geometric dilution of precision (or GDOP) that describes how the one-sigma ranging errors (i.e., standard

derivation), from the first part of the article, translate into horizontal and vertical

position errors as a function of the size (number of satellites) and relative geometry associated with the ensemble of GPS satellites employed in the navigation

solution. An attempt was made to simplify this GDOP development in comparison to what is found in other references; however, the derivation still turned out to

be somewhat mathematically intensive and non-intuitive. We received a number

of comments to this effect and are accordingly following up the earlier article with

this current feature article that attempts to explain GPS GDOP in a very intuitive

graphical fashion.

We would like to thank those of you who did send us your comments on the earlier article on GPS accuracy. We welcome comments and consider weapon related questions from our readers as official IAC inquiries which we do have WSTIAC resources to address (up to 4 hours of research provided at no charge to our

subscribers). Please send your comments, questions, suggestions for future

Newsletter topics, etc. to Vakare Valaitis (vvalaitis@alionscience.com). 

We are also asking you to take a few minutes of your time to fill out our reader

survey at our website: http://wstiac.alionscience.com. The first 1,000 respondents

will receive a free copy of our GPS Position Error Calculator software tool (see

page 9 of this Newsletter). 4

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
2

Ladies and Gentlemen:

I have some good news and some bad news. The good news is that the survey provided helpful feedback

regarding WSTIAC. The bad news is that the results were statistically insignificant. 

For those of you that responded, we plan to act on the changes you recommended immediately. By the time

of this reading, you should have already received your email version of the GPS error calculator. We will also

be sending out a CD ROM version. If anyone is interested in the still free versions of the calculator, please

complete the survey or send us an email at wstiac_comments@alionscience.com directly with your suggestions.

The link is http://wstiac.alionscience.com.

The thing that stands out the most regarding the user feedback is the desire to have online training and certifications. We will look into this and keep you informed. Hopefully, we can satisfy your needs in the very near

future. Directed Energy and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles seems to be consistent areas of interest. We will try to

direct future articles to these areas. If you have an area of expertise and would like to contribute an article,

please let us know. We would be happy to accommodate.

The next newsletter will be dedicated to our efforts on Comanche. As many of you know, Comanche was terminated in February 2004, in order to provide funding for the Army's other aviation needs. Our intent is to

capture the Comanche data in WSTIAC in order to leverage the Army's investment of over $6 billion for the

benefit of the Army, other DoD and other Federal Agencies. We are excited about being part of this effort.

Please call or email with any ideas or comments you may have. I can be reached at 703.933.3317 or Email

at gjgray@alionscience.com.

Thank you for your continued support

Gary J. Gray

Director

Director’s

Corner

by Mr. Gary J. Gray

WSTIAC Newsletter Spring 2004

The WSTIAC Newsletter is the current awareness publication of the Weapon Systems Technology Information Analysis Center (WST

IAC). WSTIAC, a Department of Defense (DoD) Information Analysis Center (IAC), is administratively managed by the Defense

Technical Information Center (DTIC) under the DoD IAC Program.

WSTIAC Director: Mr Gary J Gray Database Inquiries: Vakare Valaitis

703.933.3317, Email: gjgray@alionscience.com 703.933.3362 Email: vvalaitis@alionscience.com

Internet: http://iac.dtic.mil/wstiac/

All data and information herein reported are believed to be reliable; however, no warrant, expressed or implied, is to be construed as to the accuracy or the completeness

of the information presented. The views, opinions, and findings contained in this publication are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as an official Agency

position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other official documentation.
intersect in a single point, but rather in a patch (or in 3-D, an

enclosed box). The navigation solution is now ambiguous - all

that can be said is that the receiver resides somewhere within the

uncertainty region.

The dimensions of the uncertainty (or error) region are associated with the magnitude of the errors in the satellite range measurements; however, as satellites get closer together in angular

offset, the intersection of the "blurry" range circles becomes elongated (see Figure 3) resulting in larger navigation errors. This is

the GDOP effect and GPS receivers employ algorithms to

choose satellites that minimize (or at least reduce) the effects of

GDOP. Most modern receivers acquire many more than 4 satellites (up to 12, which is usually the most that are in sight at one

time) to minimize the GDOP factor (Hurn, GPS, A Guide to the

Next Utility, Trimble Navigation, 1989, pp. 43-45).

In this article we will graphically develop an expression for

GDOP and present some position error calculations based on

representative satellite geometry.

GPS GDOP -Graphical Development

We will now develop an expression that describes how the GPS

range measurement errors translate into position errors in the

navigation solution as a function of satellite geometry. This

development will be based on the geometric/trigonometric relationship between the range measurement errors and the dimensions of the position uncertainty region described in the previous

section. The dimensions of the uncertainty region represent the

"boundary" of how large the error in the navigation solution

could become. Once this boundary is established geometrically,

then the solution for position errors will be generalized to

account for the random nature of the errors in the range measurement process. This derivation of the GDOP effect strives for

conceptual simplicity by developing the position error equations

in just two dimensions and with just two satellites. Another simplifying assumption employed is that there is no clock bias in the

GPS receiver under consideration so that the development

addresses only direct range measurement errors and not timing

errors. The effects of these simplifying assumptions will be identified and generalized once the basic characteristics of GDOP

are derived. 

Let's begin by taking a closer look at the geometrical description 

3

Qualitative Description of GDOP Effects

To reintroduce the subject of GPS position errors (and for the benefit of new readers) we will repeat some of the introductory material from last summer's article that qualitatively describes the GPS

navigation solution process and the nature of the errors associated with that process. Then the new simpler development of the

GDOP effect will be presented. 

A GPS receiver determines its position by a three-dimensional "triangulation" process using one-way time-of-arrival range measurements of the signals from multiple GPS satellites. These raw

range measurements, called pseudoranges, are corrupted by the

receiver's clock bias. Measurement of pseudoranges to four or

more GPS satellites enables the navigation solution for the three

spatial coordinates of the receiver's position as well as removal of

the receiver's clock bias (see WSTIAC Newsletter, Vol. 2, No. 4,

September 2001, pp. 4-6).

Random errors in the pseudorange measurement process result in

random position errors in the GPS receiver's navigation solution.

The causes of ranging errors can be traced to several fundamental sources: satellite ephemeris (location) errors; satellite clock

errors; ionospheric and tropospheric signal delay estimation

errors; multipath errors; and receiver measurement processing

errors (Parkinson and Spilker, p. 478). These sources of ranging

errors were discussed and quantified with representative values in

last summer's Newsletter feature article (Vol. 4, No. 2, hereinafter

referred to as "last summer's article" or "the previous article"). The

typical total pseudorange measurement error was shown to be

about 5.2 m for commercial GPS receivers (that employ the

clear/acquisition code or C/A-code) and about 3.5 m for military

receivers (that employ the encrypted precision code or P(Y)-code).

Although relatively small (as indicated by the numbers just given

above), GPS receiver ranging errors are usually amplified in the

navigation solution by a geometric factor that results from the relative position of the satellites that are being ranged on. This geometric amplification of position errors (called geometric dilution

of precision or GDOP) is most easily understood graphically.

Figure 1 illustrates an idealized 2-dimensional position fix based

on the intersection of perfect range measurement circles from two

satellites. The location of the receiver is at the point where the

range circles intersect. Figure 2 illustrates a similar situation, but

here uncertainty in the satellite ranges due to errors in the measurement process result in "blurry" range circles that do not 4

Figure 1: Unambiguous position fix based on

precise GPS satellite range measurements.

Figure 2: Errors in satellite ranging

lead to uncertainty/errors in the navigation solution.

Figure 3: Decreasing angular offset between satellites yields

increasing uncertainty in the position fix known as GDOP.

WSTIAC State of the Art Report:

Antijam GPS

Contact: Ms Kelly Hopkins at 256.382.4747 or 

khopkinsalionscience.com
4

WSTIAC Newsletter Spring 2004

of the GDOP effect given in the previous section. Figure 4 illustrates the 2D uncertainty region associated with potential errors

in the range measurement process to two GPS satellites. These

two satellites are symmetrically oriented in elevation about the

vertical (z-axis) at a 45° angle. (Note that the altitude of the

weapon platform that is carrying the GPS receiver and the magnitude of the range measurement error are both greatly exaggerated in Figure 4 - on the order of 2 to 3 Mm = 2000 to 3000

km - to make the uncertainty region visible/workable.) The 45°

orientation of the satellites results in an approximately square

uncertainty region that is diagonally oriented to the z-axis. This

means that the horizontal and vertical extents of the uncertainty

region (i.e. the horizontal and vertical dilutions of precision or

HDOP and VDOP) are represented by the diagonals of the

square and are accordingly greater in magnitude than the range

measurement error itself which is related to the sides of the

square. Thus GDOP basically describes how GPS range measurement errors are projected normal to satellite lines of sight

onto the horizontal and vertical dimensions.

Satellite 2 Satellite 1

Weapon

LOS

Earth

45° z

x

6 Mm 20 Mm

Figure 4: Two dimensional uncertainty region due to ranging

errors from 2 GPS satellites.

As illustrated in the previous section, decreasing angular offset

between the satellites stretches the uncertainty region into a sort

of curved-sided parallelogram that is elongated in the horizontal

dimension (see Figure 5). Thus satellites that are closer together

yield higher HDOP which in turn yields larger horizontal position

errors. On the other hand, satellites with very wide angular offsets

result in higher VDOP and accordingly greater vertical position

errors (see Figure 6). This is why modern receivers employ many

parallel channels (typically as many as 12) and attempt to track

as many visible satellites as possible to minimize GDOP effects in

both the horizontal and vertical dimensions.

Satellite 2 Satellite 1

Weapon

LOS

Earth

80°

z

6 Mm 20 Mm x

Figure 5: Amplification of GPS ranging errors into larger

horizontal position errors due to closely spaced, high elevation satellites.

Satellite 2 Satellite 1

Erroneous GPS

Weapon Position

True Weapon Position

Earth

z

x

6 Mm 20 Mm

δρ δρ ε ε

δzw

ε ε ρm2 ρm1

 (1)

where n = satellite index = 1,2

ρ ρ δρ ρ δρ mn n n = + =−

Rather than intersecting at the true position of the weapon, the

short satellite range measurements intersect at a higher point on

the z-axis that corresponds to the error in the GPS position computation. In Figure 7, the error in the GPS position is determined

by the intersection of orthogonal line segments projected from

the ends of the short range measurements, ρm 1 and ρm 2 (it really should be determined by the intersection of circular arcs

whose radii are equal to the short range measurements and are

centered on the two satellites, as in the previous figures - this is

a linearizing approximation commonly used in GPS position

error analysis).

We are seeking an equation that translates the range errors (δρ)

4

Satellite 2 Satellite 1

Weapon

LOS

Earth

23°

z

20 Mm x

6 Mm

Figure 7: Quantitative HDOP/VDOP example: both range measurements short by range error δ ρ.

The situation in Figure 7 is that the range measurements (ρm ) to

both Satellites 1 and 2 are short by a ranging error of δρ such

that:

Figure 6: Amplification of GPS ranging errors into larger vertical

position errors due to widely spaced, lower elevation satellites.

We will now proceed to quantify HDOP and VDOP for our simple 2D geometry. Figure 7 illustrates the familiar symmetric two

satellite configuration that we have been using; however, in this

case we are specifying particular range errors instead of the "fat"

erroneous range bands of the previous figures. By this means we

will determine analytic expressions that translate the range errors

into horizontal and vertical position error components and thereby quantify HDOP and VDOP.
5

Thus, the general expression we have derived for 2D GPS position error (equation 9) confirms what is trigonometrically evident

for the simple geometry of Figure 7; i.e., range measurement

error is amplified by a factor of 1/sin ε when translated into vertical position error. A similar development for horizontal errors

would yield a factor of 1/cos ε. Less symmetric situations result

in more complicated, but conceptually similar factors. One is

tempted to equate HDOP and VDOP to such factors, but a subtlety remains to be resolved; viz., the range error δ ρ in the above

development has been treated as a deterministic quantity when in

fact it is a random variable (recall that we referred to it earlier in

this article as a standard deviation or one-sigma error).

We now return to equation 13 to account for the random nature

of δ ρ. Rather than claiming that the range errors to the two 4

w δ r

JJK into the GPS position error ( ). Assume for a moment that

w δ r

JJK is known. If this were so, we could find the range error to

each satellite by projecting w δ r

JJK onto the line-of-sight (LOS) 

from the weapon position to each satellite, via the vector dot

product (see how projecting δ zw onto the two satellite LOS

yields δρ for the range error to each satellite in Figure 7):

( )

( )

w

w

n

 (2)

where

x-component of r

z-component of r

u unit vector from true weapon position to satellite n 

 = cos

n nw n w w

w

w

n

u r u xi zk

x

z

i

δρ δ δ δ

δ δ

δ δ

ε

== +

=

=

=

+

JJK JJK JJKK K i i

JJK

JJK

JJK

K ( )

n

sin (3)

and where

elevation angle of satellite n

unit vector in the positive x direction (4)

unit vector in the positive z dir

n k

i

k

ε

ε =

=

=

K

K

K

() ()

11 1

ection

Then

cos sin (5)

Now writing equation (5) out for each satellite we have

cos sin

 

n nw nw

w w

x z

x z

δρ ε δ ε δ

δρ ε δ ε δ

= ⋅+ ⋅

= ⋅+ ⋅

22 2

1 11

2 22

w

 (6)

cos sin

or

cos sin

 (7) cos sin

or

r 

w w

x

w

x z

x

z

G

δρ ε δ ε δ

δρ ε ε δ

δρ ε ε δ

δρ δ

= ⋅+ ⋅

⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ = ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦

= ⋅ JK JJK (8)

To get this far, we have been assuming that we knew w δ r

JJK and

were using this knowledge to compute δ ρ

JK . In fact, the opposite

is true - we started out this development by considering a particular range error to both satellites equal to δ ρ

JK and wanted to

to find the resulting GPS position error, w δ r

JJK

. To do this, solve 

(8) for w δ r

JJK

:

1 (9 ) w δ δρ r G− = JJK JK

( )( )

1 1

2 2

For the particular case of Figure 7,

cos sin

cos sin

cos sin

 (10) cos 180 sin 180

cos sin cos sin

G

ε ε

ε ε

ε ε

ε ε

ε ε

ε ε

⎡ ⎤ = ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦

⎡ ⎤

= ⎢ ⎥ − − ⎣ ⎦

⎡ ⎤ = ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ −

D D

1

and

1 sin sin

2cos sin cos cos

 (11)

1 1 1 cos cos 2 1 1

sin sin

G

ε ε

ε ε ε ε

ε ε

ε ε

− ⎡ ⎤ − = ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦

⎡ ⎤ −

= ⎢ ⎥

⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦

1

2

and

 (12 ) δρ δρ δ ρ δρ δρ

⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ = = ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦

JK

Then

1 1 0 1 cos cos (13) 2 1 1

sin sin sin

w

w

w

x r zδ ε ε δρ δ δρ δ δρ

ε ε ε

⎡ ⎤ − ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ == = ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦

JJK

Or

0

 (14) sin

w

w

x

z

δ

δρ δ

ε

=

=
satellites are equal, we instead describe them as being zero

mean, uncorrelated, distinct Gaussian random variables (δ ρ1

6

WSTIAC Newsletter Spring 2004

and δ ρ2 ) of equal variance . Now equation 13 becomes: 2 σ ρ

( )

( )

1 2

1 2

1 (15) 2cos

1

2sin

w

w

x

z

δ δρ δρ

ε

δ δρ δρ

ε

= −

= +

HDOP and VDOP will relate the standard deviation (square root

of the variance) of the range errors to the standard deviations of

the horizontal and vertical position errors respectively. To determine this relationship, we find the variance of equation 15 via

the statistical expectation operator (Ε [ ]) and then take the

square root to relate the standard deviations:

{ } [ ]

{ } () ( )

{ }

2 2

2 2

2 1 12 2

2 2

2 1 12 2

2 1 2

2

2

var( )

1 = 2

4cos

1 = 2

4cos

1 = var 0 var

4cos

1 = 2

4cos

 =

w xw w x Ex

E

EE E

ρ

δσ δ

δρ δρ δρ δρ

ε

δρ δρ δρ δρ

ε

δρ δρ

ε

σ ε

≡ ≡ ⎡ ⎤ ⎣ ⎦

⎡ ⎤ − + ⎣ ⎦

⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ − + ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦

− +

2

2

1

2cos

1 (16)

2 cos xw

ρ

ρ

σ ε

σ σ ε

⋅

= ⋅

(Note: in the above development, the expectation of the product

of the two random range errors represents the cross correlation,

which is zero for uncorrelated random variables.) A similar operation on the vertical position error yields:

1 (17 )

2 sin σ σ zw ρε = ⋅

From (16) and (17) we identify

1

2 cos

 (18)

1

2 sin

HDOP

VDOP

ε

ε

=

=

for the satellite geometry of Figure 7. These are the geometrical

dilution of precision (GDOP) factors that we have been seeking

to describe the amplification of GPS range measurement errors

(considered as random variables) into statistical horizontal and

vertical GPS position errors. The GDOP factors of equation 18

exhibit the same trigonometric spreading of range error as the

deterministic example in equation 14 with the additional factor of

1 2 that accounts for the transformation from range to position 

random variables. Figure 8 is a plot of HDOP, VDOP, σxw, and σzw

as functions of ε using the P(Y)-code one-sigma range error of

3.5 m. The best horizontal accuracy occurs with low elevation

satellites while the best vertical accuracy occurs at the high

angles, consistent with the earlier graphical results. 

Comparison to Earlier Expression

As a sanity check, let's show that the more general 3D development (with clock bias) from last summer's Newsletter reduces to

equation 18 for the assumptions and geometry of Figure 7. So

from equation 23 in last summer's article, we see that 

2 2 HDOP EDOP NDOP = + (19)

where EDOP2 and NDOP2 are the first and second diagonal elements of the matrix (GT G)-1 where

1 11

2 22

3 33

4 44

1

1

 (20) 1

1

xyz

xyz

xyz

xyz

uuu

uuu G uuu

uuu

⎡ ⎤

⎢ ⎥

⎢ ⎥ = ⎢ ⎥

⎢ ⎥

⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦

and VDOP2 is the third diagonal element of the same matrix.

In regard to the elements of the G-matrix (or geometry matrix) of

equation 20, the fourth column of the matrix (the column of 1's)

is there to multiply the receiver clock bias error (see equation 16

of the previous article). With the assumption of zero receiver clock

bias, this fourth column can be deleted. The "u" elements of G are

the components of unit vectors pointing toward visible satellites

that are being tracked. With the consideration of only two satellites, rows 3 and 4 of G can be deleted. Furthermore, the consideration of only two dimensions (x and z) means that the y-components of the line-of-sight unit vectors are zero and the second

column of G can be deleted. These assumptions reduce G to the

following:

1 1

2 2

 (21) x z

x z

u u G u u

⎡ ⎤

= ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦

Some unnumbered equations on page 5 of last summer's article

define the x and y unit vector components:

cos sin (22)

sin

x

z

u

u

ε α

ε

=

=

Where

α = satellite azimuth (23)

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

ε

(deg)

HDOP

VDOP

σxw(m)

σzw(m)

HDOP

VDOP

σxw(m)

σzw(m)

Figure 8: HDOP, VDOP, and resulting (x,z) position errors for onesigma P(Y)-code range error of 3.5 m.

4
more insight into how satellite geometry influences GPS position

accuracy for weapon guidance and other applications.

Remember to fill out our survey at http://wstiac.alionscience.com

to receive a free copy of the WSTIAC GPS Position Error

Calculator software.

7

Now the azimuth of Satellite 1 along the x-axis is 90° and the

azimuth of Satellite 2 along the negative x-axis is 270° (the x-axis

pointed east in the previous article). Therefore

( )

( )

1

2

1 2

cos sin 90 cos

cos sin 270 cos (24)

sin

cos sin

 (25) cos sin

x

x

z z

u

u

u u

and

G

ε ε

ε ε

ε

ε ε

ε ε

= =

= =−

= =

⎡ ⎤ = ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ −

D

D

This is the same G-matrix that we have derived in this article in

equation 10. All that remains is to verify that the matrix manipulations from the previous article yield the same GDOP factors

that we have derived here.

From equations 22 and 23 of the previous article, the GDOP factors are extracted from the diagonal of the (GT G)-1 matrix. With

the current assumptions, this is now a 2 x 2 matrix. HDOP2 will

be the first diagonal element and VDOP2 will be the second diagonal element.

( )

2

2

2 1

2

cos cos

sin sin

2cos 0 (26) 0 2sin

1 0 1 cos

2 1 0

sin

T

T

T

G

G G

G G

ε ε

ε ε

ε

ε

ε

ε

−

⎡ ⎤ − = ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦

⎡ ⎤ = ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦

⎡ ⎤

⎢ ⎥ = ⎢ ⎥

⎢ ⎥

⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦

Therefore,

1

2 cos

 (27)

1

2 sin

HDOP

VDOP

ε

ε

=

=

The same GDOP factors are obtained with the general 3-space

solution from the previous article when the same constraints as in

the current article are imposed. 

Conclusion

Our stated goal at the outset of this article was to explain GPS

GDOP effects in an intuitive graphical fashion and to make our

earlier results on this subject more

physically/mathematically/geometrically reasonable to everyone,

without putting anyone in immediate need of extra strength

Tylenol. Trying to explain this topic clearly has left me personally

with a bit of a headache but it is my sincere hope that this 2D

development of GDOP will provide the WSTIAC community with 

About the Authors: 

Mark Scott is a Science Advisor with

Alion Science and Technology. He

received B.S. and M.S. degrees in

Electrical Engineering from Michigan

State University in 1974 and 1976

respectively. From 1977 to 1982 he was

employed by the Instrument Division of

Lear Siegler, Inc., working on tactical

avionics systems. From 1982 to 1984

he was employed by IIT Research Institute

(IITRI), performing countermeasure/counter-countermeasure

(CM/CCM) analyses on air defense radars. From 1984 to 1987

he was with Harris Corporation working on airborne data links,

after which he rejoined IITRI. (IITRI became Alion Science and

Technology through an employee buyout in December of 2002.)

His recent work experience is in the areas of radar system performance analysis, MMW radar seekers, GPS receiver guidance/navigation, EW/RF countermeasures, RF signal processing,

smart/precision weapon effectiveness analysis and instruction.

Mr. Scott is a member of IEEE, the IEEE Aerospace and Electronic

Systems Society, and the Association of Old Crows.

Robert Scott is a President's Scholar in

his sophomore year in aerospace engineering at The Georgia Institute of

Technology. Mr. Scott is interning as an

Assistant Data Specialist for the summer

of 2004 in the Systems Division of Alion

Science and Technology where he supports various WSTIAC functions and

modeling/simulations efforts.♦

Planning a Conference or Seminar?

WSTIAC can assist 

with technical support:

· Call for papers

· Announcements

· Local arrangements

· Author kits/paper selection

· Registration

· Security, meals, transport

· Exhibits, receptions

· Proceedings
8

WSTIAC Newsletter Spring 2004

the Ballistic Missile Defense System using air-launch as a method

to relieve the test constraints imposed by fixed ground launch

sites.

Missile Defense Agency Public Affairs

UH-1Y fires first weapons

The Bell UH-1Y Huey, the Marine Corps’ newest and most capable utility helicopter, fired weapons for the first time during a test

flight at the Army’s Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia Monday.

H-1 Integrated Test Team test pilots Herb Moran, of Bell

Helicopter, and Marine Corps Maj. Eldon Metzger were at the

controls for the historic first.

Weapons firing testing is being performed to evaluate the aircraft’s reaction to the stresses placed on it by weapons getting

launched or fired from it, according to H-1 Upgrades Program

system engineer Bert Frowein.

“This is the first ordnance expenditure from a brand new aircraft,”

Frowein explained, “and the most complicated testing we’ve done

so far. Flying the aircraft, navigating, working the avionics and

communicating between the mission computer and the weapons

make for the highest workload environment the pilots face.

“We’re early in the test but so far, so good,” he stated.

The routine testing makes sure the loads and vibrations are within expected limits when the weapons mounted on the aircraft are

fired, according to Frowein. By the time this portion of the test is

complete, approximately 400 2.75-inch rockets, 12,800 rounds

of machine gun ammunition, 136 flares, 104 chaff canisters and

104 decoys will have been fired on nearly 40 test flights.

As the developmental flight test continues to build towards the

final Operational Evaluation, scheduled to begin early next year,

program officials see this current testing as positive indication of

successful transition to production.

“This is proof that the Yankee can deliver,” Frowein said.

Weapons testing of the UH-1Y’s attack partner, the AH-1Z, is

concurrently being done at the Army’s Yuma Proving Ground in

Arizona.

Both aircraft recently completed their second operational assessment by Fleet operators. Results of that assessment are not

expected to be released for several months.

By 2014, the Marine Corps will have procured 100 UH-1Y Hueys

and 180 AH-1Z Super Cobras.

After remanufacture, the H-1 Upgrades aircraft will feature the

latest technology in rotor and drive train design, avionics, sensors

and weapons. They also share approximately 84 percent of their

parts, making them far more maintainable, supportable, survivable and deployable than today’s H-1 aircraft.

John Milliman, H-1 Program Public Affairs

NAVAIR PATUXENT RIVER, MD 4

Waste Not, Want Not

Converting Waste Heat Into Electricity

"Waste heat" might not be such a waste after all. The excess heat

produced in everything from microelectronics to large ship

engines is generally thought of as a problem for engineers to

solve. But a new leap in semiconductor technology funded by the

Office of Naval Research could put that troublesome heat to

good use.

Dr. Mihal Gross of ONR's physical sciences division explains,

"With this class of semiconductors, when you have a temperature

gradient you can generate electrical current. Or if you pass an

electrical current through the material, you can get a temperature gradient for cooling." An ONR-funded research group at

Michigan State University led by Dr. Mercouri Kanatzidis has

found the right combination of ultrapure lead, antimony, silver,

and tellurium for a material (called LAST) that is significantly

more efficient for high temperature power generation than existing thermoelectric materials. His work is described in the 6

February 2004 issue of Science.

"The Navy is looking at the material's power generation potential," says Gross, "We have the potential to exploit regions on a

ship or land vehicle where there is waste heat, and use it to produce electricity." Because the material can be produced in bulk,

its uses could one day include replacing today's shipboard steam

plants, which run generators, with solid state modules of LAST

that would produce electricity directly.

Funded through a Multi-University Research Initiative (MURI), the

Michigan State group has developed a fundamental understanding of the chemical properties needed to create the ideal

material with high electrical conductivity but low thermal conductivity. The secret to the new material's efficiency seems to be

in the nanostructures within it that impede the flow of heat by

introducing internal boundaries.

Office of Naval Research Public Affairs

For more information please contact Jennifer Huergo, 703-

696-0950 or email: Jennifer_Huergo@onr.navy.mil.

LONG RANGE AIR LAUNCH TARGET (LRALT)

The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) successfully conducted a

demonstration launch of a Long Range Air Launch Target (LRALT)

at 12:06 a.m. (EDT) Monday, May 3, 2004. The LRALT missile

boosted a simulated reentry vehicle from a point just south of

Midway Island to the vicinity of Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall

Islands.

The LRALT program is managed by the Missile Defense Agency

Targets and Countermeasures Directorate and developed for

MDA by the U. S. Air Force Space & Missile Command and

L3/Coleman Aerospace Corp. LRALT is based on two

Minuteman II second stages taken from deactivated assets. The

delivery system is air-extracted from a C-17 for launch on any

azimuth. LRALT was developed as a target for realistic testing of 

i n t h e n ews . . .
9

Target Identification System Nears Completion

For U.S. forces to pinpoint a military target, eight separate military systems weighing up to 60 pounds total, are needed. Air

Force researchers here have been able to combine these systems

into a single, 10-pound piece of combat gear that is expected to

be ready for production before the end of the year.

The Laser Integrated Target Identification System, developed by

the Air Force Research Laboratory’s Directed Energy Directorate,

uses laser-based technology to identify a target’s range and

“paint” a laser spot on the target that will guide munitions to it.

It is capable of spotting targets by day or night. Included is a

geolocation system to further identify an exact location and an

efficient, lightweight battery capability.

This system will be used by combat controllers from the Air Force

Special Operations Command, complementing their Battlefield

Air Operations kits, which were designed prior to Operation

Iraqi Freedom to improve the manner in which target coordinates are relayed.

According to Maj. Jeff Salter, who heads the directorate’s

Tactical Laser Systems Branch, "This is a two-year project aimed

at reducing the weight and size of equipment that a combatant

must carry in a battlefield. The overall cost of this development

effort....is around $19 million," he added.

The next step is to transition the technology to a product center

where production can begin. All of the services will be able to

use the completed system. 

Air Force Research Laboratory, Office of Public Affairs For information contact: J. Rich Garcia (505) 846-1911.

J-UCAS X-45A DESTROYS TARGET

Target confirmation, arm and cleared to release. With those

three commands from its human operator, an X-45A technology

demonstrator for the Joint Unmanned Combat Air

Systems (J-UCAS) program made aviation history by releasing an

inert (non-explosive) Global Positioning System-guided Small

Smart Bomb and hitting a ground target Sunday at the Naval

Air Warfare Center Weapons Division Range, China Lake, Calif.

This marks the first time that an unmanned aircraft has released

a GPS-guided weapon.

Once the operator authorized release and the aircraft determined it was within range, it dropped the GPS-guided 250-

pound weapon from its internal weapons bay at 35,000 ft. and

0.67 Mach (approximately 440 mph). The aircraft autonomously performed all attack maneuvers, bay door operations, and

weapon-away release sequences under human operator supervision. The bomb hit within a few feet of the target, which would

have been destroyed, had a live warhead been used.

The J-UCAS program is a joint Defense Advanced Research

n ews . . . ( c o n t)

Research Projects Agency/Air Force/Navy effort to demonstrate

the technical feasibility, military utility, and operational value

of a networked system of high performance, weaponized

unmanned air vehicles to effectively and affordably prosecute

21st century combat missions. The Boeing X-45A vehicles are

tools

for demonstrating the initial technical feasibility of the J-UCAS

concept. Boeing and Northrop Grumman are now developing

the next generation of vehicles (the X-45C and X-47B,

respectively) to demonstrate the military utility and operational

value of the J-UCAS concept. JUCAS will also employ a Common

Operating System that enables the two air vehicle types to

operate together and also interoperate with other systems within

the Department of Defense global information grid.

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

More information on the program, as well as photos of the

demonstration, can be found at

http://www.darpa.mil/j-ucas ♦

This software tool calculates horizontal and vertical position error standard deviations (onesigma errors) for commercial GPS receivers (that

employ the clear/acquisition code = C/A-code)

and military GPS receivers (that employ the

encrypted precision code = P(Y)-code). It also

shows the decrease in GPS position errors associated with the government's decision to terminate the Selective Availability (SA) function which

intentionally degraded the accuracy of commercial receivers (SA was disabled on 1 May 2000

and is unlikely to ever be reactivated). The horizontal and vertical position errors computed by

this software tool (for a given group of GPS

satellites) are a good indication of how far off

the GPS navigation solution is likely to be for a

weapon guidance application and/or other

applications.

To get your free copy of the calculator go to

http://wstiac.alionscience.com and fill out our

reader survey. ♦

GPS 

Position Error

Calculator
10

GPS -GALILEO AGREEMENT

The United States and the European Union reached an agreement covering their satellite navigation services, the U.S. Global

Positioning System, and Europe's planned Galileo system.

The U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS) is a constellation of 28

satellites and ground support facilities, used for a wide array of

economic, scientific, and military applications. The satellites

broadcast signals that can be converted into precise positioning

and timing information anywhere in the world. In 1998, the

European Union decided to pursue its own satellite navigation

system, known as Galileo, which currently is still in its development phase.

U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, European Commission VicePresident Loyola de Palacio, and Irish Foreign Minister Brian

Cowen signed the Agreement on the Promotion, Provision, and

Use of Galileo and GPS Satellite-Based Navigation Systems and

Related Applications. This historic agreement protects Allied security interests, while paving the way for an eventual doubling of

satellites that will broadcast a common civil signal worldwide,

thereby promoting better and more comprehensive service for all

users.

The agreement ensures that Galileo's signals will not harm the

navigation warfare capabilities of the United States and the North

Atlantic Treaty Organization military forces, ensures that both the

United States and the European Union can address individual

and mutual security concerns, and calls for non-discrimination

and open markets in terms of trade in civil satellite navigationrelated goods and services.

Recognizing the added benefit to civil and commercial users if the

two independent systems were compatible and interoperable, the

United States and the European Union have shared technical

analyses and information, resulting in an agreement to establish

a common civil signal. The additional availability, precision, and

robustness that will be provided by dual GPS-Galileo receivers

lays the foundation for a new generation of satellite-based applications and services, promoting research, development, and

investment that will benefit business, science, governments, and

recreational users alike. 

Office of the Press Secretary, The White House

For information on the Galileo System see 

http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy_transport/galileo/index.

htm ♦

DUSD(S&T) Announces Energy and Power

SBIR Topics

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Science & Technology)

announced the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Energy

and Power Topics for the DoD 2004.3 SBIR Solicitation. The SBIR

topics address major technical challenges to achieving advances

required in power and energy density. Among these are novel

power generation concepts, batteries with a 2-3 X increase in

power density and reduced weight/volume, maturation of high

energy density dielectrics for capacitors, high power wide band

gap devices for high temperature, high voltage operation, and

advanced thermal management. 

OSD04-EP1 Advance Cooling Designs for High Temperature

Transformers and Inductors for Power Electronics

OSD04-EP1 Advance Cooling Designs for High Temperature

Transformers and Inductors for Power Electronics

OSD04-EP2 New High Energy Density Li/Li-Ion Rechargeable/Primary

and Alternative Design Munition Batteries

OSD04-EP3 Nanostructure-Enhanced Bulk Thermoelectric Materials

OSD04-EP4 Cryogenic Power Electronics

OSD04-EP5 Lightweight Power Transformer for Shipboard Electrical

Power Distribution Systems

OSD04-EP6 Superconducting Developments for Compact Power

and Energy Systems

OSD04-EP7 High Performance Dielectric Materials for Pulse Power

Capacitor Devices

OSD04-EP8 Advanced Thermal Management Concepts Using

Designer Thermo-Fluids

OSD04-EP9 Innovative Advanced Fuel Cell Manufacturing 

DoD will begin accepting proposals on July 1, 2004. Deadline

for receipt of proposals is 6:00 a.m. EST, August 12, 2004. For

additional information visit 

http://www.acq.osd.mil/sadbu/sbir/solicitations/index.htm ♦

DTIC Established as DoD Field Activity

In a Decision Memorandum signed June 4, 2004, Mr. Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, announced his determination to

establish the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) as a DoD Field Activity. DTIC will be under the Under Secretary of Defense

for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) and will report to the Director, Defense Research & Engineering (DDR&E), Dr. Ronald

Sega. In promoting this organizational realignment in the DoD, the DDR&E has stated this action will enhance the use of DTIC scientific and technical information databases by all DoD research and engineering activities.

In pursuing this course of action for DTIC, Dr. Sega has outlined several goals for the organization that are designed to focus DTIC on

meeting the overall objective. They are:

1. Closely align technology performers (labs, product centers, non-DoD research organizations, etc.) with the scientific and technical

information providers at DTIC,

2. Facilitate an enhancement of DTIC efforts to support the USD(AT&L) "E-Business" initiatives in research and engineering,

3. Promote the exploitation of emerging information technology tools on dynamic science and technology databases,

4. Expand on the synergy of research and engineering facilities, people, and information.

DTIC oversees the management of 11 DoD Information Analysis Centers that are tasked to provide technical and analytical services

to areas of critical DoD interest. ♦
11

Directed Energy Weapons Course

Instructor: Dr. Edward Scannell, WSTIAC

Course Description: 

This one day classified short course provides an introduction to the basic principles and techniques of Directed

Energy Weapons (DEWs). The technologies behind each

type of DEW will be examined, and the critical path components will be identified and explored with respect to their

effect on future DEW development. In addition, advantages that can be achieved by employing DEWs will be

discussed, as well as the status of U.S. and foreign DE

developments and deployments. The key DEW programs

in High Energy Lasers and RF-DEWs or High Power

Microwaves will be fully described.

This short course will be of great benefit to people who

need to understand the basic concepts, technologies,

design requirements and practical applications of DEWs,

including program and business managers, political decision makers, engineers, scientific researchers and military

personnel. An undergraduate technical degree is recommended. Mathematics is kept to a minimum, but important formulas are introduced. 

Training at Your Location:

WSTIAC can conduct this course at your location to reduce

your travel time and cost. Please call Mrs. Kelly Hopkins

to discuss.

Fee:

$700.00 for government personnel; $800.00 for government contractors.

Location: Huntsville, Alabama

6 April, 27 July, 30 November 2004

Notice: WSTIAC reserves the right to cancel and/or

change the course schedule and/or instructor for any reason. In the event of a schedule change or cancellation,

registered participants will be individually informed.

WSTIAC Newsletter Spring 2004

Questions to be examined include:

iWhat is Directed Energy and what are the different

types of Directed Energy Weapons?

iWhat are the advantages and disadvantages of

each type of DEW and what are their target effects and tactical and strategic capabilities?

iHow do DEWs work and what are the critical technologies that must be developed for their eventual use in

practical systems?

iHow may threat DEW effects be countered and how

can we protect our own systems?

iWhat are the major U.S. and international DEW

programs that are being pursued?

iWhat is the prognosis for future DEW development?

About the Instructor: 

Dr. Edward Scannell is the Senior Program Manager of

the Engineering & Technical Division, Chief Scientist for

WSTIAC, and formerly Chief of the Directed Energy and

Power Generation Division of the U.S. Army Research

Laboratory. He has 30 years of experience in technical

areas related to DEWs, including: plasma physics; conventional and alternative energy sources, electromagnetic

(EM) guns, particle beam, laser, high power microwave

(HPM), and pulse power physics. 

Security Classification:

The information presented is kept at the unclassified level,

but is designated FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (FOUO) and

is export controlled. The security classification of this

course is SECRET (U.S. citizens only) to facilitate discussions.

Handout Material:

Each student will receive a comprehensive set of course

notes covering the material presented. 

For additional information, contact: 

Mrs. Kelly Hopkins, Seminar Administrator, 

at (256) 382-4747, or by e-mail 

khopkins@alionscience.com
12

Introduction to Sensors and Seekers for Smart Munitions

and Weapons Course

Instructor: Mr Paul Kisatsky, WSTIAC

Location: Huntsville, Alabama

2-4 March, 25-27 May, 17-19 August, 28-30 September 2004

Course Description: 

This 3-day short course provides an introduction to the

most commonly used sensors and seekers employed in

smart munitions and weapons (projectiles, missiles and

wide area mines). It is oriented to managers, engineers,

and scientists who are engaged in smart weapons program development and who desire to obtain a deeper

understanding of the sensors they must deal with, but who

do not need to personally design or analyze them in depth.

An undergraduate technical degree is recommended.

Mathematics is kept to a minimum, but important formulas are introduced. This course also provides an excellent

foundation for those scientists and engineers who desire to

pursue this discipline to intermediate and advanced levels. 

The course covers:

iClassification of seekers and sensors

iFundamentals of waves and propagation

iFundamentals of noise and clutter

iFundamentals of search footprints

iIntroduction to infrared

iIntroduction to radar

iIntroduction to ladar

iIntroduction to visionics

iIntroduction to acoustics

iFuture projections and interactive brainstorming

Noise and clutter, the predominant obstacles to success in

autonomous seekers, are given emphasis. The major sensor types are classified and each is discussed. In particular, infrared, radar, optical laser radar (ladar), imaging

and non-imaging, and acoustic sensors are individually

covered. Of special interest is the discussion on human

visionics versus machine recognition, since this concept is

of central importance to understanding autonomous versus man-in-the-loop sensing systems. The implications of

"artificial intelligence", "data fusion", and "multi-mode" 

sensors are also briefly discussed. System constraints,

which force tradeoffs in sensor design and in ultimate performance, are also covered. Time permitting, a projection

of future trends in the role of sensors for smart munitions will

be presented, followed by a "brain-storming" session to

solicit student views.

About the Instructor: 

Mr. Paul Kisatsky is a Senior Physical Scientist. He is a

nationally recognized expert on sensors and seekers for

smart munitions and weapons and has more than 30 years

of hands-on experience developing sensors and seekers

fielded in modern smart munitions and weapons.

Security Classification:

This course is unclassified.

Training at Your Location:

WSTIAC can conduct this course at your location to reduce

your travel time and cost. Please call Mrs. Kelly Hopkins

to discuss.

Fee:

The registration fee for this 3-day course is $950 for U.S.

government personnel and $1150 for government contractors. Contractor teams of 3 or more, registered at the

same time, are charged $950 per person.

Handout Material:

Each student will receive a comprehensive set of course

notes covering the material presented. 

For additional information, contact: 

Mrs. Kelly Hopkins, Seminar Administrator, 

at (256) 382-4747, or by e-mail 

khopkins@alionscience.com

Notice: WSTIAC reserves the right to cancel and/or

change the course schedule and/or instructor for any reason. In the event of a schedule change or cancellation,

registered participants will be individually informed.
13

Weaponeering Course 

Instructor: Professor Morris Driels, US Naval Postgraduate School

Course Description: 

This 21⁄2-day short course is based on a very successful

graduate-level weaponeering course developed by

Professor Driels and taught at the Naval Postgraduate

School(NPS), Monterey, CA. The course will provide an

overview of the fundamentals of the weaponeering

process and its application to air-to-surface and surfaceto-surface engagements. The course explains the analytical basis of current weaponeering tools known as the Joint

Munitions Effectiveness Manuals (JMEMs) produced by the

Joint Technical Coordinating Group for Munitions

Effectiveness (JTCG/ME). The JMEMs are used by all

Services to plan offensive missions and allow the planners

to predict the effectiveness of selected weapon systems

against a variety of targets. 

Training at Your Location:

WSTIAC can conduct this course at your location to reduce

your travel time and cost. Please call Mrs. Kelly Hopkins

to discuss.

Fee:

The registration fee for this 21⁄2-day course is $950 for U.S.

government personnel and $1150 for government contractors. Contractor teams of 3 or more, registered at the

same time, are charged $950 per person.

Notice: WSTIAC reserves the right to cancel and/or

change the course schedule for any reason. In the event of

a schedule change or cancellation, registered participants

will be individually informed.

WSTIAC Newsletter Spring 2004

The short course is divided into three parts. 

Part I covers the basic tools and methods used in 

weaponeering:

iThe weaponeering process

iElementary statistical methods

iWeapon trajectory

iDelivery accuracy of guided and unguided 

munitions

iTarget vulnerability assessment

Part II covers the weaponeering process for air-launched

weapons against ground targets:

iSingle weapons directed against point and 

area targets

iStick deliveries (point and area targets)

iProjectiles (guns and rockets)

iCluster munitions

iWeaponeering for specific targets: bridges,

buildings, etc.)

iCollateral damage modeling

About the Instructor: 

Professor Driels is a Professor of Mechanical Engineering

at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey,

California. He has worked with the JTCG/ME on a variety

of topics in support of the JMEMs for a number of years.

He has taught a quarter-long weaponeering course at NPS

for three years and is preparing a text book on the subject.

Security Classification:

The security classification of this course is SECRET (U.S.

citizens only) to facilitate discussions.

Handout Material:

Each student will receive a comprehensive set of course

notes covering the material presented. 

For additional information, contact: 

Mrs. Kelly Hopkins, Seminar Administrator, 

at (256) 382-4747, or by e-mail 

khopkins@alionscience.com

Part III covers the weaponeering process for ground

engagements:

iIndirect fire systems - artillery and mortars.

iDirect fire systems - infantry and armored vehicles.

iMines - land and sea.

Location: Huntsville, Alabama

20-22 April, 31 August-2 September, 7-9 December 2004
14

Training at Your Location:

WSTIAC can conduct this course at your location to

reduce your travel time and cost. Please call Mrs. Kelly

Hopkins to discuss.

Notice: WSTIAC reserves the right to cancel and/or

change the course schedule and/or instructor for any

reason. In the event of a schedule change or cancellation, registered participants will be individually

informed.

Handout Material:

Each student will receive a comprehensive set of course

notes covering the material presented. 

For additional information, contact: 

Mrs. Kelly Hopkins, Seminar Administrator, 

at (256) 382-4747, or by e-mail 

khopkins@alionscience.com

Smart/Precision Weapons Course

Instructors: Mr. Hunter Chockley and Mr. Mark Scott, WSTIAC

Location: Huntsville, Alabama

17-19 February, 30 March-1 April, 11-13 May, 13-15 July, 5-7 October, 

16-18 November 2004

Course Description: 

This 21⁄2-day short course provides a comprehensive

understanding of smart weapons and related technologies. This course is aimed at providing general knowledge about smart weapons technology

and a source of current information on selected U.S.

and foreign smart weapons, to include system

description, concept of employment, performance

characteristics, effectiveness and program status.

A variety of ground, sea and air smart/precision

weapon systems are discussed, to include fielded

and/or developmental U.S. systems such as Joint

Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), Joint Air-to-Surface

Standoff Missile (JASSM), Small Diameter Bomb,

Javelin, Line-of-Sight Anti-Tank (LOSAT), XM982

Excaliber, Extended Range Guided Munition

(ERGM), Common Missile, Tomahawk, Standoff

Land Attack Missile - Expanded Response (SLAMER), Cluster Bomb Munitions and Airborne Laser,

among others, as well as representative foreign

smart/precision weapons.

The objective of this course is to inform materiel and

combat developers, systems analysts, scientists,

engineers, managers and business developers

about smart/precision weapons, to include:

iState-of-the-art of representative U.S. and 

foreign smart weapons systems;

iEmployment concepts

iSmart weapons related systems, subsystems,

and technologies; and

iTechnology trends.

Fee:

The registration fee for this 21⁄2-day course is $950 for

U.S. government personnel and $1150 for government

contractors. Contractor teams of 3 or more, registered

at the same time, are charged $950 per person.

Security Classification:

The information presented is kept at the unclassified

level, but is designated FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(FOUO) and is export controlled. The security classification of this course is SECRET (U.S. citizens only) to

facilitate discussions.

About the Instructors: 

Mr. Mark Scott and Mr. Hunter Chockley are Science

Advisors. Each instructor has more than 25 years of

experience with weapons technology and/or

smart/precision weapons.
15

July 2004 July 2004

7-8 July 2004

Precision Strike Summer PEO Forum

Huntsville, AL

For additional information:

Email: info@precisionstrike.org.

http://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?PID=Brochure

&SID=_18N0NV2TF&MID=4NEW

12-15 July 2004

DHS: Homeland Security Technologies 2004 (USONLY)

San Diego, California

For additional information:

Email: adekleine@ndia.org

http://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?PID=Brochure

&SID=_18N0NV2TF&MID=4800

27-28 July 2004

Sensor-To-Shooter 

Arlington, VA

For additional information:

http://www.iqpc.com/cgibin/templates/singlecell.html?topic=222&event=5060

August 2004 August 2004

3-5 August 2004

AUVSI's Unmanned Systems North America 2004

Symposium

Anaheim, CA

For additional information:

http://auvsi.org/symposium/

9-12 August 2004

2004 Warheads and Ballistics Classified Symposium

Monterey, CA

For additional information:

Email: kwilliams@ndia.org.

http://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?PID=Brochure

&SID=_18N0NV2TF&MID=4480

16-19 Aug 2004

2nd International Energy Conversion Engineering

Conference

Providence, RI

For additional information:

http://www.iecec.org/

16-19 August 2004

AIAA Guidance, Navigation, and Control Conference

and Exhibit

Providence, RI

For additional information:

http://www.aiaa.org/calendar/index.hfm?cal=5&luMeetingid

=855

September 2004 ember 2004

20-23 September 2004

AIAA 3rd "Unmanned Unlimited" Technical Conference,

Workshop and Exhibit

Chicago, IL

For additional information:

http://www.aiaa.org/calendar/index.hfm?cal=5&luMeetingid

=1007

20-23 September 2004

AIAA 1st Intelligent Systems Technical Conference

Chicago, ILL

For additional information:

http://www.aiaa.org/calendar/index.hfm?cal=5&luMeetingid

=1007

20-23 September 2004

2004 Joint Undersea Warfare Technology Conference

Secret - NORFORN

Groton, CT

For additional information:

http://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?PID=Brochure

&SID=_19T0Y727P&MID=4240

21-24 September 2004

ION GNSS 2004

Long Beach, CA

For additional information:

http://www.ion.org/meetings/#gnss

21-23 September 2004

C4ISR Spectrum Conference

Dulles, VA

For additional information:

http://register.ndia.org/interview/register.ndia?PID=Brochure

&SID=_19T0Y727P&MID=4920

C a l e n d a r o f E v e n t s

Upcoming Conferences and Courses

WSTIAC Newsletter Spring 2004
16

Inside this issue

Dilution of Precision in

GPS Guidance Simplified

Director’s Corner

In the news

WSTIAC Courses

Calendar of Events

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