UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ) BARBARA WRIGHT, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 14-cv-365 (TSC) ) LORETTA E. LYNCH, ) ) Defendant. ) )
MEMORANDUM OPINION In this civil action under Title V II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), Plaintiff Barbara Wright brings claims against the United States Bureau o f Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) for race- and sex-based hostile work env ironment. 1 Defendant has moved for judgment on the pleading s and summary judgment (the “ Motion”). Upon consideration of the Moti on, the parties’ briefs and suppl emental filings in support thereof and in opposition thereto, a nd the parties’ arguments at the November 23, 2015 motion hearing, and for the reasons set for th below, the Motion is hereby GRANTED IN PART AND
DENIED IN PART

. I. BACKGROUND Plaintiff Barbara Wright, an Afr ican-American woman, has worked as an IT manager for over 20 years. (Opp’n at 1). Over the course of her career, s he has successfully managed the updating of and transition to new te chnologies for IT systems i n both the federal government and

1 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint a lso alleges violation of the Eq ual Pay Act and retaliation in violation of Title VII. (Am. C ompl. ¶¶ 1, 7, 9-10). Plaintiff has made clear in her opposition brief and via her counsel’s repre sentations at the motion heari ng that she is no longer pursuing these claims . Accordingly, the court will grant Defendant’s Motion as to these claims.2 the private sector. ( Id. ). Plaintiff began working a t ATF in August 2001, when she was hired as a Computer Specialist in the Office of Science and Technology. (Mot. Ex. G at 000637-639). In 2008, she became Chief of the Fin ancial Systems Branch (the “Branch”) of ATF’s Office of Management, replacing Mark Dante r, a white male. (Opp’n at 6-7 ). During the time period relevant to this case, Plaintiff’ s first-line supervisor was Da vid Horn, and her second-level supervisor was Vivian Michalic , both of whom are white. (Mot. Ex. E at 000046). Danter had left his position as Branch Chief to oversee the ATF “Implementation Team” responsible for moving ATF’s inter nal financial operations syst em, which was called Financial Resources Desktop (“FReD”), over to DOJ’s new Unified Financial Management System (the “System”), which was to be use d across about twenty different D OJ sub-agencies. (Opp’n at 6-8). Plaintiff was not a member of the Implementation Team . ( Id. ). When the System went “live” in N ovember 2010, it was a “disaste r” – “[t]he financial systems that [Plaintiff] operat ed would not work,” employees an d vendors did not get paid, ATF Special Agents could not use thei r credit cards, and there were hundreds of errors, failures and glitches that needed to be fixed. ( Id. at 2). At around the same time, and despite the fact that the System was still riddled with problems, the Implementation Team headed by Danter was disbanded. ( Id. at 7). Danter began working els ewhere in the organization, in cluding on certain “special projects,” though he a lso continued to work on the Sys tem for “[a]bout a year, . . . tying up loose ends [and] mak[ing] sur e it was operational.” (Opp’n Ex. 6 at 14:1-16). Plaintiff, who was already fu lly occupied with her responsibili ties as Branch Chief, was assigned to fix all of the many e rrors with the System in addit ion to her normal responsibilities, and with less than half of the s taff that Danter had on the Imp lementation Team. (Opp’n at 7-8). As Branch Chief, Plaintiff was al so responsible for the Branch’ s Helpdesk, the workload of which increased eight-fold after t he System went live, from abo ut 200 requests per month to3 about 1,600. ( Id. at 8). Fixing problems with the S ystem was also much more dif ficult than fixing problems with the ATF-sp ecific FReD system, since doing so required Plaintiff to consult with the 19 other DOJ sub-agenci es that used the System. ( Id. at 8-9). Plaintiff describes the respons ibilities that were “heaped on h er” as “completely unrealistic,” and states that “th ere were so many major system issues . . . that [she] needed to work extraordinarily long hour s, weekends, vacations and holida ys” for about a year and a half, sometimes up to 18 hours a day. ( Id. at 9, 18). The record includes a number of emails supporting Plaintiff’s averments as to the extraordinarily long hours she worked on the System. ( See , e.g. , Opp’n Exs. 7-22). Plaintiff claims that she asked management for help and suggested solutions to problems, but that Horn, “the loudest and most voc al” member of management, rejected every suggestion she made. (Opp’n at 9). The main thrust of Plaintiff’s Title VII claims concern the bla me, yelling, humiliation, abuse and ridicule that she rece ived after she took over the re ins of the System from Danter in November 2010, when the System went live and the Implementation Team was disbanded. Plaintiff asserts that “the totality of the actions and hostile treatment taken by Defendant” from then onward “amounted to a hostile work environment.” ( Id. at 19 n.6). Plaintiff claims that she wa s subjected to constant yelling, humiliation and abuse by her two supervisors, Horn and Micha lic, who singled her out in nume rous meetings, loudly ridiculed and humiliated her, and blamed her for everything that went wro ng with the System and the failure to correct its many problems. ( See , e.g. , id. at 12-14). For example, in one January 2011 meeting, Plaintiff states that Mi chalic yelled at her, “blam[ed ] her for the problems that Mr. Danter had left behind” and “abruptly peppered [her] with d emeaning questions, interrupt[ing] her as she atte mpted to respond,” causing her to leave “the meeting in tears, with a4 headache, stressed and wondering what she could have done to ca use [Michalic] to be so mean.” ( Id. at 12-13). One contractor who worked on the System testified that he “atte nded numerous meetings where [Plaintiff] was loudly ridiculed and humiliated by either Ms. Michalic, Mr. Horn or both because of some failure in the . . . [S]ystem,” and that he was “personally embarrassed to be present when [Plaintiff] was being treated in such a loud and a busive manner.” (Opp’n Ex. 2 ¶ 6). The contractor also avers that Plaintiff “was personally demoralized by this treatment,” that “she was often tearful and disc ouraged,” and tha t “[h]er job wa s made a lot more difficult by the abusive treatment she received from Mr. Horn and Ms. Michalic.” ( Id. ¶ 7). Plaintiff points to another exa mple, when, after a series of me etings in one particular conference room, a facilities em ployee told Plaintiff and her m anagers that they could no longer use the conference room because the yelling and screaming – all of which had been directed at Plaintiff – was disruptive t o other employees sitting nearby. (Opp’n Ex. 1 ¶ 18). Plaintiff claims that she was “abused almost e very day” in this manner. ( Id. ¶ 34). As noted above, Danter continue d to work on the System for abou t a year after it went live and the Implementation T eam was disbanded. (Opp’n Ex. 6 a t 14:1-16). But despite the fact that he was present at ma ny of the meetings at which Plain tiff was berated, ridiculed and humiliated, and the fact that he h ad been in charge of the Impl ementation Team, Danter was not subjected to such harsh treatme nt. For example, Plaintiff test ified at her deposition that, while Danter was present in the meeti ng where she was yelled at so lo udly that there were complaints about the level of noise in the conference room, Horn and Micha lic’s ire was directed only at her, not Danter. (Supp. Notice Ex. 2 a t 289:17-24). Plaintiff also testified that wh ile Horn was not “warm and fuzzy” with her, he was “warm and fuzzy” with other m anagers, including Danter. ( Id. at 293:13-25).5 Plaintiff provides more specifi cs in a supplemental declaration , in which she alleges that Danter attended approximately t en meetings during which Horn an d Michalic “berated” her about problems with the Syste m. (Supp. Notice Ex. 3 ¶ 3). Forexample, less than an hour after she was first informed that she would be taking o ver the reins of the System from Danter “effective immediately,” Plain tiff attended a meeting where the personnel change was announced. ( Id. ¶ 2). “Almost instantly, Mr. H orn and other managers started yelling at [her] regarding the ongoing issues” with t he System, yet “[n]o one ra ised their voice” at Danter, who was also present at the meeting, “despite the fact that he had been responsible for the transition up to that very day.” ( Id. ). Indeed, Plaintiff states that Horn yelled at her “constantl y” in all manner of meetings where Danter was present “during the first s ix or seven months following the transition,” sometimes swear ing at her, and that Danter “wa s never talked to like this.” ( Id. ¶ 7). Plaintiff also recalls one s pecific meeting at DOJ where Michalic “berated” her in front of Danter and others, getting in her face, yelling at her and insu lting her intelligence. ( Id. ¶ 6). Plaintiff states that Danter w as not treated the same way at th at meeting, or at any other meetings. ( Id. ). Plaintiff also alleges that she started sending Michalic to Dan ter for answers after she had been yelled at three or four times “for things that Danter had done.” ( Id. ¶ 4). When Danter did not have an answer, however, “ no one got angry with him.” ( Id. ). Plaintiff recalls one specific meeting where Michalic yelled at her about something that Dante r had done during the implementation phase, after which t ime she directed Michalic to take the issue up with Danter. ( Id. ¶ 5). Michalic then turned t o Danter, who “gave some vague an swer that didn’t really address the problem,” and yet Mich alic “was fine with [the] ans wer,” despite the fact that, whenever Plaintiff responded to her questions, Michalic “was ne ver satisfied and reacted by yelling [at] and berating” her. ( Id. ).6 There is also at least some evid ence in the record indicating t hat, in addition to regularly yelling at and humiliating Plaintiff:

 Horn and two other managers “constantly walked past [Plaintiff’ s] office, followed her and questioned her whereabouts,” with Horn “typica lly stopp[ing] by her office multiple times each day” (Opp’n at 15);

 Horn improperly rejected one of her timecards without confirmin g that she was actually absent, causing her pay to be delayed for three days, which caused her stress ( id. at 16; Opp’n Ex. 1 ¶ 27 );

 Horn surreptitiously listene d in on one of her phone calls (Opp ’n Ex. 1 ¶ 26);

 Horn falsely accused her of having outside employment, which, i f true, could have been grounds for dismissal ( id. ¶ 33);

 Michalic falsely accused her of “stealing money from [another] employee’s retirement party” ( id. ¶ 16);

 Michalic stole a USB drive that she was using to store document s detailing “what was happening to [her] at work,” and that the USB drive e ventually reappeared, with certain files deleted ( id. ¶ 30);

 During a meeting about a week after the USB drive reappeared, M ichalic referenced specific words from the documents on her USB drive – such as “intrusive,” “aggressive,” “belligerent” and “management by int imidation” – in order to intimidate Plaintiff by conveying that she knew what w as on the USB drive ( id. ); and

 Similar to the disappearance and reappearance of the USB drive, a folder full of Plaintiff’s personal papers disappeared only to reappear lat er with several papers altered and replaced with copies ( id. ¶ 31). Toward the end of 2011, Plaintiff took time off from work to be with her gravely ill mother. (Opp’n at 16-17). Plainti ff claims that Michalic and Horn stated on several occasions “that they didn’t believe that an ything was wrong with [her] mo ther.” (Opp’n Ex. 1 ¶ 28). After her mother died on December 11, 2011, Plaintiff kept in regular contact with the office, especially Horn, and worked for a t least a few hours each day. (Opp’n at 16). On January 9, 2012, her first day back at the office following her bereavemen t leave, Michalic and Horn humiliated Plaintiff in a meeting by staring and smirking at he r when another ATF employee7 referenced the dedication of two e mployees who continued workin g while they were dying of cancer. ( Id. at 16-17). And at a January 31, 2012 meeting, Michalic and Ho rn falsely accused Plaintiff of misusing situationa l telework and the leave proces s, and of not sufficiently communicating with Horn during he r bereavement leave. ( Id. at 17). Plaintiff states that “[t]his c onstant ridicule, combined with unreasonable demands and unreasonable workload, caused [ her] to experience incapacitatin g stress, anxiet y, depression and insomnia.” (Opp’n at 13-14). She claims that “[t]he combinati on of the long hours and abuse,” including “being blamed for fa ilures, suffering near daily yell ing and screaming from Mr. Horn and Ms. Michalic, and being accused of not working, . . . event ually caused her to have a nervous breakdown” in March 2012. ( Id. at 18; Opp’n Ex. 1 ¶ 20, 34). A psyc hiatrist “diagnosed her with severe depression with psyc hotic symptoms,” finding that “ the progressively increasing demands placed on her [while she] was working beyond the normal reasonable expected hours made her vulnerable to an emoti onal breakdown,” as did the fact that, after the loss of her mother, she was “subjected to ha rsh verbal treatment” by her co lleagues. (Opp’n at 3, 18 ). Plaintiff subsequently went int o “leave without pay” status in or around January 2013, where she remained until her appl ication for disability retirem ent was approved in July 2015 and she separated from ATF in August 2015. ( See Mot. Exs. B-D).
II. LEGAL STANDARD 2 Summary judgment may be granted if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

2 Defendant has also moved for j udgment on the pleadings as to P laintiff’s Equal Pay Act claim ( see Mot. at 12-20) and her alleged fa ilure to exhaust administrativ e remedies as to certain discrete allegedly discriminatory actions ( see id. at 8-12). Because Plaintiff has abandoned her Equal Pay Act claim ( see supra n.1), and because the court finds that Plaintiff has adequatel y linked the allegedly unexhausted a ctions to her hostile work en vironment claim ( see infra8 P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (“[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute betwee n the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for su mmary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of materialfact.”) (emphasis in original); Holcomb v. Powell , 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Summary judgment may be r endered on a “claim or defense . . . or [a] part of each claim or defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A party asserting that a fact ca nnot be or is genuinely disput ed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particul ar parts of materials in t he record.” Fed. R. C iv. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “A fact is ‘material’ if a dis pute over it might affect the out come of a suit under governing law; factual disputes that are ‘irrelevant or unnecessary’ do not af fect the summary judgment determination. An issue is ‘genuin e’ if ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Holcomb , 433 F.3d at 895 (quoting Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248) (citation omitted). The party seeking summary judgment “b ears the heavy burden of establishing that the merits of hi s case are so clear that expe dited action is justified.” Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc., v. Stanley , 819 F.2d 294, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing Walker v. Washington , 627 F.2d 541, 545 (D.C. Cir. 1980)). In considering a motion for summary judgment, “[t]he evidence o f the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiabl e inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)); see also Mastro v.
Potomac Elec. Power Co. , 447 F.3d 843, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (“We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonm oving party and draw all reason able inferences in its favor.”)

Part III.a), Defendant’s argum ents for judgment on the pleading s are moot, and the court will treat the Motion sol ely as a motion for summary judgment.9 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods. , 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000)). The nonmoving party’s opposition, however, must consist of more than mere uns upported allegations or denials, and must be supported by affidavits , declarations or other comp etent evidence setting forth specific facts showing that ther e is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The non-movant is “required to prov ide evidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find [in his favor].” Laningham v. U.S. Navy , 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS

a. Plaintiff Has Adequately Linked The Challenged Conduct In Her Hostile Work Environment Claim Defendant argues that, because P laintiff first contacted an EEO counselor on January 20, 2012, “any discriminatory acts occurring before December 6, 201 1, forty-five (45) days before Plaintiff contacted an EEO counsel or, are untimely if they are not properly encompassed within a timely hostile work environment claim.” (Mot. at 11). Althoug h Defendant correctly states the law, the court finds that Plai ntiff has, in fact, properly enco mpassed all of her allegations of mistreatment from November 2010 onw ard within a timely claim fo r hostile work environment. While the Supreme Court has stated that “discrete discriminator y acts are not actionable if time barred, even when they are related to acts alleged in t imely filed charges,” Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan , 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002), it has also made clear that hostile work environment claims “are differe nt in kind from discrete acts” b ecause “[t]heir very nature involves repeated conduct.” Id. at 115 (citation omitted). A hostile work environment claim, t he Court has said, “is composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one unlawful employment practice.” Id. at 117 (quotation and citation om itted). The D.C. Circuit has since held that “hostile work environm ent claims are subject to a dif ferent limitations rule,” which is10 that so long as “an act contrib uting to the cla im occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environmen t may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability.” Singletary v. D.C. , 351 F.3d 519, 526-27 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The D.C. Circuit has cautioned, however, that Morgan is not “an open sesame to recovery for time-ba rred violations.” Baird v. Gotbaum , 662 F.3d 1246, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 2011). “Both incidents barred by the s tatute of limitations and ones n ot barred can qualify as ‘part of the same actionable hostile environm ent claim’ only if they are ade quately linked into a coherent hostile environment claim – if , for example, they ‘involve[] th e same type of employment actions, occur[] relatively frequently, and [are] perpetrated b y the same managers.’” Id. (quoting Morgan , 536 U.S. at 120-21); see also Morgan , 536 U.S. at 118 (excludi ng any incident that “had no relation to the [other] acts . . . or for some other re ason, such as certain intervening action by the employer, was no longer part of the same hostile environment claim”). Viewing the record evidence in t he light most favorable to the non-moving party, as is required at this stage of the proceedings, the court finds that Plaintiff has adequately linked all of her allegations of mistreatmen t at the hands of Horn and Michal ic dating back to when she took over the reins of the System from Danter in November 2010 into one “coherent hostile environment claim.” Baird , 662 F.3d at 1251 (citation omitted). F or example, the eviden ce indicates that Horn a nd Michalic’s campai gn of cruelty against Plaintiff began the very day that she took over the System in N ovember 2010 (Supp. Notice Ex. 3 ¶ 2), and that Horn and Michalic yelled at, ridicule d and humiliated Plaintiff “almost every day” from then onward. (Opp’n Ex. 1 ¶ 34). There is also e vidence indicating that, du ring this time period, Horn and Michalic made a number of false accusations regarding Plaintiff ( id. ¶¶ 16, 33); invaded her privacy by listening in on her phone calls and pilfering her pe rsonal effects ( id. ¶¶ 26, 30-31);11 and mistreated her with regard t o her mother’s illness and deat h (Opp’n at 16-17; Opp’n Ex. 1 ¶ 28), among other things. In sum, Plaintiff has sufficiently encompassed all of the mistr eatment about which she complains within a single claim for hostile work environment, a s the record indicates that the same types of challenged employm ent actions occurred relativelyfrequently and were perpetrated by the same managers – Horn and Michalic – without any intervening action by
ATF. See Baird , 662 F.3d at 1251; Morgan , 536 U.S. at 120-21. b. Plaintiff Has Adduced Evidence From Which A Jury Could Find Tha t She Was Subjected To Discriminat ory Intimidation, Ridicule And Insult In order to prevail on a hostile work environment claim, a plai ntiff must first demonstrate “that he or she was subjected to ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.’” Ayissi-Etoh
v. Fannie Mae , 712 F.3d 572, 577 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. , 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). In so doing, a plaintiff “must always pro ve that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive . . . connotations, but actually c onstituted discrimina[tion] because of” the employee’s protected status. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc. , 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (quotation marks and emphasis omitted). Defendant contends that Plainti ff has adduced no evidence showi ng that the conduct complained of was rooted in racial or gender bias, and that Pla intiff has failed to make out any “linkage between the hostile be havior and [her] membership in aprotected class,” as she “does not assert any statements or c onduct which link the alleged dis criminatory conduct to her race [and/or] sex.” (Mot. at 36-37). Plaintiff makes a number of c ounterarguments in her opposition brief. Because it is dispositive, the court will a ddress only one of these counterar guments: That the difference between how she and Danter were t reated suffices to raise an in ference of discrimination based12 on race and/or sex. ( See Opp’n at 22). Plaintiff cites Motley-Ivey v. D.C. , 923 F. Supp. 2d 222, 230 (D.D.C. 2013), for the propositi on that a reasonable jury c ould infer that the difference between the way that she and Dan ter were treated was due to her race and/or sex, since “unjustified and disproportionate disciplinary act ions” against a member of a protected class can raise an inference that the disc iplinary actions are linked to that protected class. ( Id. ).
In Motley-Ivey , the plaintiff – a female police officer assigned to the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department’s Harbor Pat rol Division – based her hostile work environment claim on the defendant’s “continuous, concer ted and pervasive” practice of i mposing on her “unjustified disciplinary action[s] ” that were dispropor tionate to the disci plinary actions imposed on her male colleagues. 923 F. Supp. 2d at 233. This included being recom mended for adverse disciplinary action for an incident in whic h she had difficulty docking a bo at, while the two male officers involved in the same incident received lesse r discipline. See id. It also included being cited and suspended for two days without pa y for leaving keys in a docked boat, despite the fact that an investigation revealed that le aving keys in docked boats was a common practice within the Harbor Patrol Division. See id. at 234

. Noting that “a patter n of allegedly undeserved, excessive, and/or disproportionate discipline can form the basi s for a viable hostile work environment claim, at least wher e the plaintiff provides credib le evidence that the alleged justification underlying that patt ern of discipline is unlawful discrimination,” the court held that the plaintiff had “adduced suffi cient evidence from which a rea sonable jury might conclude that those disciplinary actions were motivated by her gender, given the comparative discipline (or lack thereof) levied against her male colleagues .” Id. at 234-35 (emphasis added). 3

3 Defendant does not address Motley-Ivey in its reply brief.13 Here, the evidence indicates th at, while Plaintiff was berated, ridiculed and humiliated by Horn and Michalic over the many problems with the System, Dante r was never subjected to anything even resembling the sam e kind of treatment. In the co urt’s view, this evidence suffices to raise an inference of unlaw ful discrimination based on race and/or sex. In so f inding, the court notes that Danter (i) led the I mplementation Team before handin g the reins over to Plaintiff, at least arguably making him responsib le for the problems that Pla intiff was tasked with rectifying; (ii) continued to work on the prob lems with the System alongsid e Plaintiff while she was being mistreated by Horn and Michalic , at least arguably giving him s ome level of continuing responsibility for the problems t hat pervaded the system after Plaintiff took over for him; and (iii) was present at numerous meetings where Plaintiff was sing led out for humiliating ridicule by Horn and Michalic, meaning that Horn and Michalic had ample opp ortunity to treat Danter just as they were treating Plaintiff . And yet, the evidence indicat es that while Plaintiff – an AfricanAmerican woman – was grossly mistreated by Horn and Michalic, b oth of whom are white, Danter – a white man – was not. Indeed, one meeting in particular places the distinction betwee n the treatment of Plaintiff and Danter in stark relief. During the very first meeting that Plaintiff attended after taking over the reins of the System from Dan ter, “[a]lmost instantly” after the personnel change was announced, “Horn and other managers started yelling” at Plainti ff about problems with the System, yet “[n]o one raised their voice” at Danter, “despite t he fact that he had been responsible for the transition up to that ve ry day.” (Supp. Notice Ex. 3 ¶ 2). The court finds that the evidence relating to this firs t post-transition meeting, as wel l as the evidence re lating to the other meetings at which Plaintiff was mistreated while Danter was not , could lead a rea sonable jury to conclude that Horn and Michalic ’s mistreatment of Plaintiff was motivated by her race and/or gender, “given the comparative di scipline (or lack thereof) lev ied against” Danter, her14 sufficiently similarly situated white male colleague. Motley-Ivey , 923 F. Supp. 2d at 234-35. The court therefore finds that Pl aintiff has adduced evidence s ufficient to demonstrate that she was subjected to discriminatory i ntimidation, ridicule and insu lt.

c. Plaintiff Has Adduced Evidence From Which A Jury Could Find Tha t The Treatment To Which She Was Subjected Was S evere Or Pervasive Enough To Al ter The Conditions Of Her Employment And Create An Abusive Working Envi ronment A plaintiff must a lso demonstrate that the discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult to which he or she was subjecte d was “sufficiently severe or pe rvasive to alter the conditions of [his or her] employment and creat e an abusive working environme nt.” Harris , 510 U.S. at 21 (quoting Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson , 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). “In e valuating a hostile work environment claim, the c ourt ‘looks to the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminator y conduct, its severity, its offe nsiveness, and whether it interferes with an employee’s work performance.’” Ayissi-Etoh , 712 F.3d at 577 (quoting Baloch v. Kempthorne , 550 F.3d 1191, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). Importantly, the “sta ndards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII d oes not become a ‘general civility code.’” Faragher v. City of Boca Raton , 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (quoting Oncale , 523 U.S. at 80). “Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment – an environment that a reasonable person woul d find hostile or abusive – is beyond Title VII’s purview.” Harris , 510 U.S. at 21. Defendant contends that Plainti ff has failed to demonstrate tha t the alleged incidents of harassment were severe or pervasive enough to constitute a host ile work environment. (Mot. at 37-38). Defendant also reiterates on reply that “Plaintiff has not adequately distinguished her case from the many cases where summary judgment was found for t he employer [despite the employee] alleg[ing] daily mistr eatment.” (Reply at 12) (citin g, inter alia , Beshir v. Jewell , 961 F. Supp. 2d 114, 128 (D.D.C. 2013) (facts insufficient to estab lish a hostile work environment15 despite allegations of daily yelling); Singh v. U.S. House of Reps. , 300 F. Supp. 2d 48, 56–57 (D.D.C. 2004) (even loud expressions of disapproval are the kinds of normal strains that can occur in any office setting and do not make out a hostile work environment)). As the court indicated at th e November 23, 2015 motion hearing, it disagrees with Defendant’s contentions, and finds that a jury could reasonably conclude that the ridicule, intimidation and insult to which Plaintiff was subjected was se vere or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of her employment and create an abusive working environment. In short, the evidence adduced by Plaintiff pa ints a portrait of hostility an d abuse that is markedly more severe and pervasive than that wh ich was present in any of the cases cited by Defendant. For example, Plaintiff has addu ced evidence indicating that, fo r a period of well over one year, she was “abused almost every day” by Horn and Michalic, w ho “constantly” ridiculed and humiliated her in front of her colleagues, regularly screamed a nd yelled at her, sometimes cursed at her, often drove her to tears, and on at least one occasion yelled at her so loudly that they actually disrupted other employ ees. (Opp’n at 12-13, 20; Opp’n Ex. 1 ¶¶ 18, 34; Supp. Notice Ex. 3 ¶¶ 6-7). There is also evi dence indicating that Plaintif f was falsely accused of stealing money from another employee’s re tirement party, lying about her mother’s illness, having outside employment and misusing s ituational telework and the le ave process, any one of which could have conceivably constituted grounds for dismissal if tru e. (Opp’n at 17; Opp’n Ex. 1 ¶¶ 16, 28, 33). Additionally, there is evidence that Horn “con stantly walked past [Plaintiff’s] office, followed her and questio ned her whereabouts” (Opp’n at 15), and that Horn and Michalic invaded Plaintiff’s privac y by listening in on her phone calls and stealing some of her personal effects. (Opp’n Ex. 1 ¶¶ 26, 30-31). Indeed, there is evidenc e indicating that, about a week after the reappearance of a missing U SB drive belonging to Plaintiff, Michalic cryptically cited the contents of some of the personal documents on the USB drive in what appears to have been a16 threatening manner, to menacingl y convey to Plaintiff that she had read those personal documents. ( Id. ¶ 30). Importantly, Plaintiff has also provided medical evide nce indicating that she experienced a nervous brea kdown, severe depression with psy chotic symptoms and incapacitating stress, a nxiety and insomnia at least in part as a result of the mistreatment that she received at the hands of Horn a nd Michalic. (Opp’n at 13-14, 1 8; Opp’n Ex. 1 ¶ 20). In the court’s view, all of the foregoing evidence takes this c ase well out of the realm inhabited by the cases that Defe ndant cites, where alleged mist reatment was deemed insufficiently severe and perv asive, and into the realm of host ile working environment. Accordingly, the court finds tha t Plaintiff has adduced evidenc e from which a jury could find that the intimidation, ridicule and insult to which she was sub jected by Horn and Michalic was severe or pervasive enough to alt er the conditions of her emplo yment and create an abusive working environment. Because the court has also found, supra , that Plaintiff has adequately linked the allegations comprising her host ile working environment claim an d has adduced evidence sufficient to demonstrate that s he was subjected to discriminat ory intimidation, ridicule and insult, the court finds that a jury could reasonably find in Pl aintiff’s favor on her Title VII claims for race- and sex-based hostile work environment

. IV. CONCLUSION Upon consideration of Defendant’s Motion, the parties’ briefs a nd supplemental filings in support thereof and in opposition thereto, and the parties’ arg uments at the November 23, 2015 motion hearing , the Motion is hereby GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART

. The Motion is GRANTED as to the Equal Pay Act and Title VII retaliation claims that Plaintiff has abandoned.17 The Motion is DENIED as to Plaintiff’s claims for rac e- and sex-based hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. An appropriate Order accompani es this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: July 11, 2016 

## Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge