Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 90A02-1610-CR-2469 | June 22, 2017 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Stanley L. Campbell

Fort Wayne, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Lisa G. King,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

June 22, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

90A02-1610-CR-2469

Appeal from the Wells Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Kenton W. 

Kiracofe, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

90C01-1602-F4-6

Barnes, Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] Lisa King appeals her two-year sentence for one count of Level 6 felony 

possession of methamphetamine. We affirm.

Issues

[2] The issues before us are:

I. whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing 

King; and

II. whether her sentence is inappropriate.

Facts

[3] On February 12, 2016, the State charged King with Level 4 felony dealing in 

methamphetamine, Level 5 felony possession of chemical reagents or 

precursors with intent to manufacture a controlled substance, Level 6 felony 

theft of a firearm, and Level 6 felony unlawful possession or use of a legend 

drug. The charges were based on the Bluffton Police Department’s discovery of 

methamphetamine precursors, stolen firearms, and prescription medication in a 

vehicle belonging to Daniel Zerbe, Sr. King was in a relationship with Zerbe, 

Sr. at the time and empty prescription bottles belonging to her also were found 

in the car. The bottles were found in a makeup bag, which also contained the 

prescription drug methylprednisolone; this drug did not have any prescription 

information with it. Additionally, there was information that King was seen in 

or near the car on February 1, 2016, along with Zerbe, Sr. and his son, Daniel 
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Zerbe, Jr., and all three were reported by a neighbor to be engaged in suspicious 

behavior, such as shining flashlights in or around the car for about an hour. 

King was arrested and incarcerated on March 16, 2016, and never bonded out 

of jail.

[4] On August 17, 2016, King agreed to plead guilty to a new charge, Level 6 

felony possession of methamphetamine, and the State dismissed the four 

original charges. The plea contained no sentencing limit. King informed the 

probation officer preparing the presentence investigation report that she had 

been contacted by Zerbe, Sr., through Facebook1 while she was in a drug 

treatment program in Tennessee and that he eventually convinced her to come 

to Indiana with him to help Zerbe, Jr., get into drug addiction treatment. 

Instead, by December 2015, Zerbe, Sr. was manufacturing methamphetamine,

and King was using it daily. 

[5] On September 28, 2016, the trial court sentenced King to a term of two years 

executed. The court said it was giving King “some weight” for her guilty plea 

but that she had received a substantial benefit in the dismissal of the original 

four charges. Tr. Vol. II p. 34. It also found that her criminal history 

warranted an enhanced sentence. King now appeals.

 

1 King’s ex-husband is Zerbe, Sr.’s brother.
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Analysis

I. Abuse of Discretion

[6] King first claims the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing her. An 

abuse of discretion in identifying or not identifying aggravators and mitigators 

occurs if it is “‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances 

before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn 

therefrom.’” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007) (quoting K.S. 

v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006)). Additionally, an abuse of discretion 

occurs if the record does not support the reasons given for imposing sentence, 

or the sentencing statement omits reasons that are clearly supported by the 

record and advanced for consideration, or the reasons given are improper as a 

matter of law. Id. at 490-91. 

[7] King argues that the trial court erred in discounting the mitigating weight of her 

guilty plea based on the State’s dismissal of the original four charges. However, 

the weight that the trial court decides to assign to an aggravator or mitigator is 

not subject to appellate review. Id. at 491. King cannot establish an abuse of 

discretion on this issue.

II. Appropriateness

[8] We now assess whether King’s sentence is inappropriate under Indiana 

Appellate Rule 7(B) in light of her character and the nature of the offense. See 

Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. Although Rule 7(B) does not require us to be 

“extremely” deferential to a trial court’s sentencing decision, we still must give 
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due consideration to that decision. Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 873 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2007). We also understand and recognize the unique perspective 

a trial court brings to its sentencing decisions. Id. “Additionally, a defendant 

bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that his or her sentence is 

inappropriate.” Id.

[9] The principal role of Rule 7(B) review “should be to attempt to leaven the 

outliers, and identify some guiding principles for trial courts and those charged 

with improvement of the sentencing statutes, but not to achieve a perceived 

‘correct’ result in each case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 

2008). We “should focus on the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than 

the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the 

sentence on any individual count.” Id. Whether a sentence is inappropriate 

ultimately turns on the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, 

the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a 

given case. Id. at 1224. When reviewing the appropriateness of a sentence 

under Rule 7(B), we may consider all aspects of the penal consequences 

imposed by the trial court in sentencing the defendant, including whether a 

portion of the sentence was suspended. Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1023, 

1025 (Ind. 2010).

[10] The sentencing range for a Level 6 felony is six months to two-and-a-half years, 

with the advisory sentence being one year. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b). Thus, 

King’s sentence was at the upper level of the range. As to the nature of the 

offense, King admitted to possessing an unspecified amount of 
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methamphetamine. She had been using the drug regularly for several months, 

and she has done so off and on for many years, having been in a rehabilitation 

program before this latest relapse. King’s admitted offense fits an unfortunate 

pattern often seen with this highly-addictive drug.

[11] Regarding the character of the offender, the most substantial disagreement 

between the parties is the significance of her guilty plea as a reflection of good 

character. Courts at any level must carefully assess the mitigating weight of a 

guilty plea. Marlett v. State, 878 N.E.2d 860, 866 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. 

denied. “One factor to consider in determining such weight is whether the 

defendant substantially benefited from the plea because of the State’s dismissal 

of charges in exchange for the plea.” Id. However, we agree with King that the 

dismissal of charges does not automatically counteract the mitigating weight of 

a guilty plea where the record is unclear that the State actually could have 

garnered convictions on the dismissed charges. See id. 

[12] Ultimately, based on the limited record before us, it is unclear that the State 

could have obtained a conviction against King on any of the original charges it 

brought against her, with the possible exception of illegally possessing a legend 

drug (methylprednisolone), which is the same felony level as the crime to which 

she pled guilty. King’s plea did not contain a cap on her possible sentence. 

Thus, King delivered a substantial benefit to the State by pleading guilty and 

did not receive much in return. This is not a case in which King’s guilty plea 

appears merely to have been a “pragmatic decision.” Cf. Amalfitano v. State, 956 

N.E.2d 208, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied. 
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[13] Still, we cannot conclude that King’s sentence is inappropriate. She has a 

criminal history in Tennessee consisting of a 1997 conviction for misdemeanor 

public intoxication and 2008 misdemeanor convictions for “simple possession,” 

possession of a drug without a prescription, and possession of paraphernalia. 

App. Vol. II p. 33. Thus, although King does not have a lengthy or particularly 

serious criminal history, what she does have is closely related to the current 

offense. King also admitted to frequent drug use in the months prior to the 

current offense, as well as off-and-on substance use for many years. We 

acknowledge the difficulties inherent with battling substance abuse. However, 

King has tried various punitive and non-punitive roads to rehabilitation, and in 

fact left her most recent rehabilitation attempt to move to Indiana and be with 

Zerbe, Sr. and began receiving a steady supply of methamphetamine from his 

manufacturing operation. King’s multiple prior attempts at rehabilitation, in 

and out of the justice system, have been unsuccessful. Furthermore, King has 

prior arrests for child neglect, domestic assault, resisting arrest, forgery, and 

theft; at the time of sentencing, she also was facing a pending charge in Ohio for 

tampering with evidence in a murder case involving Zerbe, Sr. Although not 

technically constituting a criminal history, a defendant’s history of arrests, as 

well as pending charges he or she is facing, may properly be considered when 

evaluating a defendant’s character for sentencing purposes. See Tunstill v. State, 

568 N.E.2d 539, 545 (Ind. 1991); Hape v. State, 903 N.E.2d 977, 1001 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2009), trans. denied. In sum, even if we give full credit to King for pleading 

guilty, her criminal history, history of arrests, history of frequent drug usage 
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that she has not been able to conquer, and pending charges lead us to conclude 

that an enhanced sentence of two years is not inappropriate.

Conclusion

[14] King’s abuse of discretion sentencing argument is not viable, and her sentence 

of two years for Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine is not 

inappropriate. We affirm.

[15] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Crone, J., concur.