U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFF ICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS

BJA NI J OJJDP BJS OVC

Police Pursuit: Policies and Training

by Geoffrey P. Alpert

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

National Institute of Justice

Jeremy Travis, Director May 1997

continued...

• Surveys of 160 police recruits before

training and 145 of them after training—as well as selected interviews—

in South Carolina and Miami, Florida.

• Public opinion interviews with 300

people in Omaha and 255 in Aiken

County.

• Interviews with 146 jailed suspects

who had been involved as drivers in

high-speed chases in Columbia, South

Carolina; Omaha, Nebraska; and Miami, Florida.

Results of the study indicate that law enforcement personnel and members of the

public focused on the severity of the offense committed by the suspect when

supporting a pursuit. The second most

important factor was the risk to the public

(as defined by traffic, road conditions,

and the weather). This Research in Brief

discusses these and other major findings

of this study and their implications for

policy and training issues.

Results of the national survey

A sampling of 800 municipal and county

police agencies was selected, consisting

of 40 percent large agencies and 60 percent smaller jurisdictions (population

fewer than 100,000). Of the 737 agencies

contacted, 436 provided usable data, 284

reported that they could not provide the

The basic dilemma associated with highspeed police pursuit of fleeing suspects is

deciding whether the benefits of potential

apprehension outweigh the risks of endangering police officers, the public, and

suspects in the chase. The issues addressed in a comprehensive National Institute of Justice (NIJ) study of police

pursuit echo those discussed in research

on police use of deadly force: On the one

hand, too many restrictions placed on police use of pursuit could place the public

at risk from dangerous individuals escaping apprehension. On the other hand, insufficient controls on police pursuit could

result in needless accidents and injuries.

Until now research on police pursuits has

focused on indepth studies of single agencies or studies based on limited data from

multiple agencies. The recent comprehensive NIJ study included information from:

• A national survey of 737 law enforcement agencies, which yielded usable

data from 436.

• More than 1,200 pursuits recorded by

three police departments: Metro-Dade

(Miami), Florida; Omaha, Nebraska;

and Aiken County, South Carolina.

• Surveys of 779 officers and 175 supervisors—as well as selected interviews—

in the above jurisdictions as well as in

Mesa, Arizona.

Issues and Findings

Discussed in this Brief: Research

on police pursuit issues, particularly

policies and training. Data were

gathered through a national survey

of police agencies; case studies of

three police departments; and surveys and interviews with police officers, supervisors, recruits before

and after training, members of the

public, and jailed suspects who

had attempted to elude police.

Key issues: Pursuit driving is a

dangerous activity that must be

undertaken with due care, only after an understanding of the specific risks as well as the need and

realistic methods to apprehend a

fleeing suspect. Law enforcement

agencies developing policies may

wish to address this question: For

what offenses and under what

conditions should police risk accidents and injuries to pursue fleeing

suspects?

Key findings:

• Most agencies had written policies governing pursuit but many

had been implemented in the

1970s. Of those that had updated

them, most had made them more

restrictive to control risk.

• As the severity of the crime increases, more law enforcement officers, supported by their

supervisors and public opinion, said

they are willing to risk the dangers

of pursuit to chase suspects.
2

garding pursuits. For example, although

60 percent of the agencies reported providing entry-level driving training at their

academies, the average time devoted to

these skills was estimated at less than 14

hours. Once in service, the amount of additional training offered averaged only

slightly more than 3 hours per year and

focused on the mechanics of defensive

and/or pursuit driving rather than on issues that should be considered when deciding to continue or terminate pursuits.

Respondent agencies may have spent at

least some time teaching officers how to

pursue, but training devoted to when—

or why—to pursue appears to have been

minimal or nonexistent.

Implications of the national survey

These findings point to several issues for

consideration by State and local law enforcement agencies:

• Create and maintain systems to collect

information on pursuit driving. Without

this information, the impact of local

policies on police pursuit cannot be

determined.

• Review and update pursuit policies. The

fact that most agencies had policies

was favorable, but the quality and direction of those policies was questionable as departments had instituted

them as long as 20 years ago, although

many have updated them recently to

make them more restrictive.

• Evaluate the need for pursuit-specific

training. Officers cannot make proper

and appropriate decisions with minimal

or no training.

• Support written policies with training

and supervision. A written policy may

mean little if officers are not both carefully trained to implement it and held

accountable for abiding by its provisions.

necessary information because it had not

been collected, and 17 declined to participate.1

Policies. Ninety-one percent of the 436

responding agencies had written policies

governing pursuits, but many of them

were implemented in the 1970s. Fortyeight percent of the agencies reported

having modified their pursuit policy within

the past 2 years, and most of those (87

percent) noted that modification had made

the policy more restrictive than before.

Although most (89 percent) reported that

routine followups to pursuit incidents

were mandated by their agencies, most

said they were either informal supervisory reviews (33 percent) or incident reports prepared by pursuing officers (47

percent).

Data collection. Municipal and larger

agencies were more likely than county or

smaller agencies to collect pursuit information routinely. The majority of the 135

agencies that collected pursuit data routinely did so voluntarily (fewer than 5

percent of the States represented by the

survey respondents reported that their

data collection programs were State mandated). Although this means only 31 percent of the respondents had data collection

programs, 308 agencies (71 percent) were

able to provide the number of pursuits

their officers had engaged in during 1993.

The number of pursuits reported ranged

from none to 870 during the 1-year period, with large agencies reporting higher

numbers of incidents than small ones.

One-quarter of the responding agencies

indicated that officers used force to apprehend a suspect after a pursuit during

1993.

Training. Many departments acknowledged taking only limited steps to train

their officers on skills and procedures reIssues and Findings

continued...

• Increasing the number of vehicles

involved in police pursuits increased

the likelihood of apprehension, but

also the chance of accidents, injuries, and property damage.

• There is a lack of initial and continuing training for law enforcement on the specific risk factors

and benefits of pursuit driving. The

survey of police recruits before and

after academy training indicates

that such education can have a

major impact on attitudes.

These and other study findings indicate the need for agencies to develop a clear and understandable

police pursuit policy delineating departmental requirements within

the context of State laws and the

police mission and to create and

implement specific training to support the policy.

Target audience: State and local

policymakers, law enforcement supervisors and officers, criminal justice trainers, and researchers.

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f
3

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

escape was found to depend on the

number of police vehicles and police

departments involved in pursuit (increasing the number of vehicles decreased the likelihood of escape), the

location of the pursuit (fewer suspects

escaped in business districts than in

residential or rural areas), and the

time of day (fewer suspects escaped

during daytime hours than at night).

In Omaha, the likelihood of escape

was related to supervisory assistance

(the lack of supervisory assistance increased the likelihood of escape), the

number of police cars involved in the

chase (pursuits with one police car resulted in more escapes than chases

with more than one police car), the

speed of the chase (chases conducted

at higher speeds resulted in more escapes than those at lower speeds), the

location of the pursuit (chases in residential areas resulted in more escapes

than those in rural areas), and the level

of traffic congestion (chases in light

traffic resulted in more escapes than

those in heavy traffic).

• Require that officers justify their actions or have a supervisor evaluate

the pursuit (afteraction reports).

When actions are found to be inappropriate, officers may not be receiving meaningful discipline for

problem pursuits.

Results of case studies in three

jurisdictions

While the national survey provided a

panoramic snapshot of pursuit policies

and practices, the cases studied provided data for indepth analysis. Researchers reviewed case records of

more than 1,000 pursuits conducted

by Metro-Dade (Miami), Florida, officers between 1990 and 1994; 229 pursuits conducted by officers in Omaha,

Nebraska, between 1992 and 1994;

and 17 pursuits conducted in Aiken,

South Carolina, between 1993 and

1994 (see table 1).

Risk of injuries. Pursuit-related accidents were found to occur more frequently

when pursuits were conducted for felonies than for nonfelonies, when they

occurred on surface streets rather than

on highways or freeways, and when they

happened in urban and suburban areas

rather than in rural areas. The likelihood of accidents also increased as the

number of pursuing vehicles increased.

The prediction of personal injury resulting from a police pursuit depended

primarily on four variables in MetroDade: the greater the number of police

cars the greater the likelihood of injury.

Involvement of other police agencies

also increased the likelihood of injury.

High-speed chases resulted in more

injuries than low-speed pursuits, and

chases in residential areas resulted in

more injuries than those conducted in

nonresidential areas.

In Omaha, pursuit-related property

damage occurred in 40 percent of pursuits. In Omaha also, the pursuits least

likely to end in an accident were those

initiated because of vehicles being

identified as “suspect.”

Apprehension vs. escape. In MetroDade, the likelihood of the suspect’s

Table 1: Number of, Reasons for, and Results of Police Pursuits

Number (Percentage) of Incidents

Metro-Dade Omaha, Aiken County,

Reasons for Pursuit (Miami) Florida Nebraska South Carolina

Traffic violations 448 (45%) 112 (51%) 5 (36%)

DUI/Reckless driving 8 (4%) 1 (7%)

“Suspect” vehicle 7 (3.5%) 2 (14%)

Driver known from previous incident 3 (1.5%)

Felonies 344 (35%) 89 (40%) 6 (43%)

Armed robbery 117 2

Vehicular assault 67

Aggravated assault 37

Stolen vehicles 37 36 3

Burglary 24

Other felonies 62 53 1

Accidents

Personal injury 428 (41%) 31 (14%) 2 (12%)

Property damage 213 (20%) 91 (40%) 4 (24%)

Arrests 784 (75%) 118 (52%) 14 (82%)
4

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

In Omaha, pursuits initiated for reckless driving or driving under the influence (DUI) were the most likely to end

in an arrest (75 percent), while pursuits

initiated because a vehicle was “suspect”

resulted in the smallest proportion of

arrests (43 percent). Officers were most

likely to terminate the pursuit voluntarily

when it was initiated for suspect vehicles

(29 percent), and least likely in chases

initiated for felonies (16 percent).

Implications of case studies

Policy. Like the national survey, the

findings from these sites point to similar implications for policy and training.

In addition, the case study findings allow for more specific analyses. For example, although the national survey

shows that most of the agencies that

had updated policies had made them

more restrictive, findings from both

Metro-Dade and Omaha show the strong

effects of policy changes. When MetroDade adopted a “violent felony only”

pursuit policy in 1992, the number of

pursuits decreased 82 percent the following year. In 1993 Omaha changed

to a more permissive policy, permitting

pursuits for offenses that had previously been prohibited; the following

year, the number of pursuits increased

more than 600 percent (see table 2).

Implications of other case study findings are not as clear. For example, the

data reveal that the more police cars

involved in a pursuit, the more likely a

collision will result. However, data also

show that the more police cars involved

in a pursuit, the more likely an apprehension will be made. One implication

could be that in violent felony situations,

it may be reasonable to take the risk of

causing traffic accidents by increasing

the number of police vehicles in the

chase in order to improve the likelihood

of apprehension. Such a policy would

not endorse the uniform increase of

police units involved in a pursuit; instead it suggests that policymakers

might rethink the use of police vehicles

to block civilian vehicles from entering

intersections. The supervisor might be

given the authority to assign cars to

specific locations to travel at reasonable

speeds (i.e., within the speed limit) and

without emergency signals in addition

to directing primary and secondary units.

Training. Any change in policy requires development of rules and regulations and then training for supervisors

to enable them to recognize when to

take the risks of accidents to achieve

the desired result of suspects’ apprehension. Similarly, in interjurisdictional

pursuits, officers must know how to assess a situation and make sure that the

pursuit is within their agency’s policy

before providing support for other officers.

Police officers’ and

supervisors’ views

Conditions for chases. Police officers and supervisors in four police departments (Metro-Dade; Omaha; Aiken

County, South Carolina; and Mesa,

Arizona) were asked whether they

would engage in or approve a pursuit

under low- and high-risk conditions

(see tables 3 and 4). The major finding

is that the percentage of all officers

willing to engage in a pursuit, and of

all supervisors willing to approve a

pursuit, increases as the severity of

the crime increases. In other words,

the need to immediately apprehend a

dangerous suspect is the most important concern for law enforcement personnel. Police said that the most

important risk factors to consider during a pursuit were traffic conditions

and weather. Advances in technology

could lead to changes in risk factors

(see “Technology and Pursuit Driving”).

Table 2: Numbers of Police Pursuits Before and After Policy Changes

Jurisdiction Nature of Policy Change Before Change After Change

Metro-Dade, Florida more restrictive 279 51

Omaha, Nebraska more permissive 17 122

Table 3: When Police Officers Say They Would Engage in Pursuits

Level of Risk*

Violation Low High

Traffic Violation 43% 10%

Property Crime: Misdemeanor 42% 17%

Property Crime: Felony 64% 34%

Stolen Vehicle 65% 37%

DUI 70% 43%

Violent Felony: No Death 87% 80%

Violent Felony: With Death 96% 95%

Officer Shot 96% 95%

* Risk was defined by level of traffic congestion, weather conditions, type of road (e.g.,

whether surface street, highway, or interstate), and area of pursuit (e.g., whether urban,

rural, or commercial). In filling out the questionnaire, respondents themselves determined

whether they felt their risk was high or low.
5

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

The fluctuations between and among

agencies in relation to the type of law

violation reveal distinctions that have

implications for policy and training.

Although there is widespread agreement about officers’ willingness to pursue when a fellow officer has been shot

or when violent felons have committed

murder, there was wide variation

within and among agencies regarding

other situations:

• The more experienced officers in

Omaha and Aiken County were more

likely to engage in pursuit of misdemeanor property crime suspects under high-risk conditions than their

less experienced counterparts.

• Officers in Mesa, Arizona, with

more than 5 years of experience were

nearly twice as likely to pursue suspects of traffic violations under lowrisk conditions than the less

experienced officers.

These findings suggest that some officers, especially veterans, may need retraining on the dangers of pursuit.

Results of pursuits. The risks of pursuits were seen in the officers’ responses

to the results of their efforts (see also

“Sanctions.” page 7) Seventy-three

percent had been involved in at least one

pursuit during the previous 12 months:

• Forty percent reported that a pursuit

in which they were driving the primary

vehicle resulted in an accident.

• Forty-five percent felt physically

threatened by the suspect in the

pursuit.

• Thirty-three percent reported that

from about one-fourth to one-half of

all pursuits resulted in use of force

to apprehend the suspect. Slightly

more than half of the officers

Table 4: When Supervisors* Say They Would Approve Pursuits

Level of Risk**

Violation Low High

Traffic Violation 31% 7%

Property Crime: Misdemeanor 38% 13%

Property Crime: Felony 59% 27%

Stolen Vehicle 59% 23%

DUI 71% 38%

Violent Felony: No Death 91% 77%

Violent Felony: With Death 98% 94%

Officer Shot 97% 96%

 * Supervisors’ responses are from the three largest departments surveyed.

** For an explanation of risk level, see Table 3 (page 4).

Technology and Pursuit Driving

he data from this study show that

a suspect who does not know he or she

is being pursued will drive in a reasonably

safe manner, and suspects who know

they are being pursued and drive dangerously will slow down after the police terminate their pursuit.

Continued improvements in technology

to slow or stop a vehicle may reduce risks

in pursuits. The use of helicopters or

fixed-wing airplanes, while expensive, already can allow law enforcement to

monitor a fleeing suspect unobtrusively

and alert ground units when he or she

stops. The spike belt, a strip of spikes that

slowly deflate a vehicle’s tires when run

over, has been available for several years;

nets and barricades are being developed

to bring vehicles to a stop; and emerging

technology promises remote-control devices to allow police to shut down a car’s

electrical system.

T

described those more likely to use

excessive force as “aggressive” or

“hotheaded.”

Recruits’ opinions

Similar to the results obtained from the

officers and the supervisors, the percentage of recruits who were willing to

engage in a pursuit increased as the

severity of the crime increased. The

importance of the risk factors also decreased as the seriousness of the offense increased.

Data collected from recruit classes

both before and after training at four

locations (see table 5) show that the

training had an effect on altering some

opinions reported by the recruits. For

example, prior to the training course,

77, 79, and 86 percent of recruits at

each of three locations (St. Petersburg,

South Carolina Highway Patrol, and

Metro-Dade) were willing to engage in

pursuit for a stolen vehicle under lowrisk conditions. After the training, the

percentage decreased to 59, 70, and

73 percent respectively. At Metro-Dade,

before training, 100 percent said they

would pursue a DUI suspect under

low-risk conditions; after training, 73

percent said they would. These results

indicate that training programs can be

designed to support policy objectives
6

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Table 5: When Recruits Say They Would Engage in Pursuit

Before Training (T)

Metro-Dade St. Petersburg, South Carolina South Carolina

(Miami) Florida Criminal Justice Highway Patrol

(N=33) (N=31) (N=45) (N=51)

Low High Low High Low High Low High

Offense Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk

Traffic Violation 71% 15% 58% 7% 78% 43% 56% 26%

Property Crime: Misdemeanor 41% 11% 58% 13% 69% 24% 49% 14%

Property Crime: Felony 69% 22% 73% 10% 82% 55% 77% 43%

Stolen Vehicle 86% 43% 77% 35% 94% 75% 79% 57%

DUI 100% 68% 81% 57% 98% 96% 93% 84%

Violent Felony: No Death 100% 86% 87% 76% 89% 81% 91% 88%

Violent Felony: With Death 100% 100% 97% 90% 96% 96% 95% 100%

Officer Shot 100% 100% 97% 97% 96% 98% 95% 100%

After Training (T2)

Metro-Dade St. Petersburg, South Carolina South Carolina

(Miami) Florida Criminal Justice Highway Patrol

(N=29) (N=30) (N=38) (N=48)

Low High Low High Low High Low High

Offense Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk Risk

Traffic Violation 46% 7% 24% 0% 83% 24% 54% 11%

Property Crime: Misdemeanor 33% 7% 17% 10% 63% 22% 46% 11%

Property Crime: Felony 67% 20% 52% 3% 96% 49% 57% 30%

Stolen Vehicle 73% 33% 59% 0% 94% 62% 70% 49%

DUI 73% 52% 57% 10% 93% 100% 84% 73%

Violent Felony: No Death 79% 57% 90% 70% 96% 83% 84% 69%

Violent Felony: With Death 97% 84% 100% 97% 100% 100% 97% 100%

Officer Shot 94% 94% 100% 100% 100% 100% 92% 97%

and that jurisdictions could assess

whether or not their training programs

are meeting their goals.

Public opinion

Interviews with 555 residents of Aiken

County and Omaha indicate support

for police in apprehending individuals

suspected of violating the law. The

public agreed with law enforcement

personnel that the seriousness of the

offense increases the need to pursue

suspects, but the level of risk to the

public decreases that need. Although

some differences in opinion were

found between races and socioeconomic levels for some law violations,

no differences were found for serious

felony offenses.

Media coverage of pursuit-related issues may have an effect on public perceptions. In Omaha, the print and

electronic media covered pursuit driving regularly, with stories that included changes in policy, accidents,

injuries, and proposed legislation. In

Aiken, only minimal coverage was reported on a few tragedies. More research is necessary both to determine

the relative risks the public is willing

to allow for the apprehension of suspects and to compare the opinions of

community members who are aware of

the risks and benefits of pursuit.2

Suspects’ opinions

A unique feature of this study was the

information received from those who

fled from the police. One hundred

forty-six interviews were conducted in

jail cells in three cities: Omaha, Miami, and Columbia, South Carolina.

More than 70 percent of the suspects3

said that they would have slowed down

“when I felt safe,” whether the pursuit

was on a freeway, on a highway, or in a

town. The phrase “when I felt safe”
7

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

was interpreted by the respondents as

outdistancing the police by 2.2 blocks

on surface streets, 2.3 miles on highways, and 2.5 miles on freeways.

Fifty-three percent of the suspects responded that they were willing to run

at all costs from the police in a pursuit

and 64 percent believed they would

not be caught. However, 71 percent

said they were concerned with their

own safety and 62 percent stated that

they were concerned with the safety of

others while engaged in a chase.

These data from suspects provide the

foundation for an information base

about suspects who run from the police

and the reasons for their flight.

Conclusion

Police pursuit driving remains a controversial and dangerous activity. For

generations the conventional police

wisdom was that effective law enforcement demanded that officers apprehend

suspects, even at great social costs.

The tragic accidents that have resulted

from pursuits testify to their danger.

Policy. The study indicates the importance of the perceived severity of

the offense committed by the fleeing

suspect as the major factor in determining whether or not police should

engage in or continue a chase. Therefore, policy might focus first on the

type of offense and second on risks to

the public, especially traffic patterns

A critical component of police training

should be an analysis of the specific

risk factors as well as the benefits of

pursuit driving. This education requires

careful training in departmental policies and the reasoning that underlies

the more recent, restrained philosophies and policies.

Notes

1. The respondent sample included 149 agencies (34 percent) that had 1 to 25 sworn officers, 97 agencies (22 percent) that had 26 to

150 sworn officers, 100 agencies (23 percent)

that had 151 to 500 sworn officers, 49 agencies

(11 percent) with more than 500 sworn officers,

and 41 agencies (10 percent) that did not report

the number of officers among their personnel. It

should be noted that the sample respondents

overrepresent large police departments. For example, based on Bureau of Justice Statistics

surveys, 79 percent of police departments have

25 or fewer sworn officers (vs. 34 percent in

this sample) and fewer than 1 percent have 500

or more (vs. 11 percent in this sample).

2. See Picolo, Stephanie, “Attitudes Toward the

Use of Hot Pursuits by the Police.” Master’s

thesis, University of Maryland, 1994.

3. The average age of fleeing suspects in this

study was 26.2 years and ranged from 18 to 40.

In ethnicity fleeing suspects were 56.8 percent

white, 36.3 percent African American, and 6.8

percent Hispanic American. Ninety-four percent of fleeing suspects were male and 6 percent were female.

and congestion. A balance of these

variables indicates that an appropriate

policy would limit chases to violent

felons.

Specific rules and regulations would

guide determination of the balance between risks of pursuit and the goal of

apprehension of fleeing suspects. This

study asked police for their responses to

high- and low-risk situations. A policy

would be based on formulating categories of risk and standards so officers

could make distinctions during the

heat of the chase. For example, criminal activities could be given a ranking,

and risk factors could be scored in categories of high and low. From these

scales, a chase matrix could be created that would give officers specific

standards for decisionmaking and rules

for the beginning stages of a pursuit.

At the same time, more research is

necessary to develop a thorough understanding of the impact of one variable on another. That is, univariate

analyses of factors such as speed or

type of vehicle being chased may mask

the impact of other variables such as

traffic and road conditions or the lack

of training or supervision.

Training. Although many police officers and supervisors recognize the

inherent dangers of pursuit and are

making efforts to control them, this

study reveals a lack of initial and continuing training on the issues involved.

Sanctions

oday, in many jurisdictions, fleeing

and eluding a police officer is a minor offense, which is often dropped or plea

bargained. Officers in this study reported

strong opinions on sanctions for suspects

fleeing and eluding the police:

Sanction Percentage Agreeing

Incarceration 90%

6–9 months in jail 40%

1 year in prison 53%

T
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Findings and conclusions of the research reported here are those of the authors and do not

necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

This project was supported under

NIJ award 93–IJ–CX–0061 from

the National Institute of Justice to

Geoffrey P. Alpert, Ph.D., Professor

in the College of Criminal Justice,

University of South Carolina. The

complete report by Geoffrey Alpert,

Dennis Kenney, Roger Dunham,

William Smith, and Michael

Cosgrove, “Police Pursuit and the

Use of Force. A Final Report to the

National Institute of Justice,” is

available from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS)

through interlibrary loan or for a

copying fee. Call 800–851–3420;

write NCJRS, 1600 Research Boulevard, Rockville, MD 20850; or e-mail

askncjrs@ncjrs.org; ask for NCJ 164833.

Also available is a 60-minute videotape of Dr. Alpert’s discussion of

this research, which was prepared

as part of NIJ’s Research in Progress

series. The tape Police in Pursuit:

Policy and Practice includes questions from the audience of researchers and practitioners. It can also be

ordered from NCJRS; ask for NCJ

161836. Costs per tape, including

postage and handling, are $19 (U.S.)

or $24 (Canada and other countries).

NCJ 164831

The National Institute of Justice is a

component of the Office of Justice

Programs, which also includes the Bureau

of Justice Assistance, Bureau of Justice

Statistics, Office of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for

Victims of Crime.

Additional references

Alpert, Geoffrey P., “Police Pursuits:

Making Policy Decisions.” Paper presented to the meeting of the Transportation Research Board, Washington,

DC, January 1995.

Alpert, Geoffrey P. and Lorie Fridell,

Police Vehicle and Firearms: Instruments of Deadly Force. Prospect

Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1992.

Alpert, Geoffrey P., Dennis Kenney,

Roger Dunham, William Smith, and

Michael Cosgrove, “Police Pursuit and

the Use of Force. A Final Report to the

National Institute of Justice.” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of

Justice, 1996.

Auten, James, An Analysis of Police

Pursuit Driving Operations. Volume 1

& 2. Champaign, IL: Police Training

Institute, 1994.

Falcone, David, Edward Wells, and

Michael Charles, Police Pursuit in

Pursuit of Policy: The Empirical Study,

Volume II. Washington, DC: AAA

Foundation for Traffic Safety, 1992.

Geller, William and Michael Scott,

Deadly Force: What We Know. Washington, DC: PERF, 1992.

Lucadamo, Thomas, “Identifying the

Dimensions of Police Pursuit.”

Master’s thesis, University of Maryland, 1994.

National Insurance Crime Bureau,

“Vehicle Theft Rate Study: Metropolitan Statistical Areas.” NICB, 1996.