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WHITE HOUSE NARRATIVES ON THE IRAN 

NUCLEAR DEAL 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 17, 2016 

Serial No. 114–77 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 

http://www.house.gov/reform 


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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah, Chairman 

JOHN L. MICA, Florida 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TIM WALBERG, Michigan 

JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan 

PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas 

CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MICK MULVANEY, South Carolina 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

ROD BLUM, Iowa 

JODY B. HICE, Georgia 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

GLENN GROTHMAN, Wisconsin 

WILL HURD, Texas 

GARY J. PALMER, Alabama 

ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland, Ranking 

Minority Member 

CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri 

STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

MATT CARTWRIGHT, Pennsylvania 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDA L. LAWRENCE, Michigan 

TED LIEU, California 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

STACEY E. PLASKETT, Virgin Islands 

MARK DESAULNIER, California 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico 

JENNIFER HEMINGWAY, Staff Director 

DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Staff Director 

ART ARTHUR, Subcommittee Staff Director 

WILLIAM MARX, Clerk 


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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on May 17, 2016 ............................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Mr. Michael Rubin, Resident Scholar, The American Enterprise Institute 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 6 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 9 

Mr. Michael Doran, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 19 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 22 

Mr. John Hannah, Senior Counselor, Foundation for Defense of Democracies 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 31 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 33 

APPENDIX 

Article from the New York Times Magazine, by David Samuels, Published 

on May 5, 2016 Titled, ‘‘The Aspiring Novelist Who Became Obama’s Foreign-Policy Guru’’ ................................................................................................. 78 

A May 16, 2016 letter from W. Neil Eggleston, Counsel to the President, 

to Jason Chaffetz, Chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and 

Government Reform ............................................................................................. 106 

A May 16, 2016 letter from Senator John Cornyn (TX), Senator Mark Kirk 

(IL), and Senator John Barrasso (WY), to President Barack Obama .............. 108 

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report by the Director General Titled, ‘‘Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran 

in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)’’ dated 

January 16, 2016, Submitted by Representative Stephen F. Lynch (MA) ...... 110 

Written Statement for the Record from Representative John J. Duncan, Jr 

(TN) ....................................................................................................................... 115


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WHITE HOUSE NARRATIVES ON THE IRAN 

NUCLEAR DEAL 

Tuesday, May 17, 2016 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, 

WASHINGTON, D.C. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in Room 

2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jason Chaffetz [chairman of the committee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Chaffetz, Mica, Turner, Duncan, Jordan, Walberg, Amash, Gosar, Gowdy, Farenthold, Massie, Meadows, DeSantis, Mulvaney, Buck, Walker, Blum, Hice, Russell, Carter, Grothman, Palmer, Cummings, Maloney, Norton, Clay, Lynch, 

Connolly, Cartwright, Lawrence, DeSaulnier, Welch, and Lujan 

Grisham. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Good morning. The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform will come to order. 

Without objection, the chair is authorized to declare a recess at 

any time. 

Today’s hearing is entitled ‘‘The White House Narratives on the 

Iran Nuclear Deal.’’ I think this is important that we take this up 

and deal with this situation. 

As we get going, there are three items I would ask unanimous 

consent to enter into the record. The first is the New York Times 

Magazine article ‘‘The aspiring novelist who became Obama’s foreign policy guru.’’ 

The second is a letter from the White House of May 16. This is 

a letter addressed to me, copied to the ranking member, Mr. Cummings, and it is from Neil Eggleston talking about how the White 

House would not make Ben Rhodes available to the committee 

today. 

And I would also like to enter into the record a May 16 letter. 

This is from Senator Cornyn, Senator Mark Kirk, and Senator 

John Barrasso. 

And without objection, I would like to enter these three into the 

record. Without objection, so ordered. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Iran, it is one of three countries that are 

still on the state-sponsors of terrorism, and I think it is important 

that we have some clarity. There are some issues that are outstanding. It is one of the most important foreign policy initiatives 

that the President has taken forward, but I still think it demands 

a lot of clarity. 

We were hoping that the clarity would be provided by Benjamin 

Rhodes. He is the assistant to the President and deputy national 


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security advisor for strategic communications and speechwriting. 

He is obviously a very talented and trusted person in the White 

House. I do not doubt his talents and his knowledge. But the deal 

that had been spun up and sold to the American people I am not 

sure was as clear as it should have been, and I have serious questions about the transparency, the truthfulness, and when it really 

ultimately started. 

And I think those are legitimate questions as we move forward 

because here you have a state sponsor of terrorism in Iran and we 

still don’t fully know the answer to a lot of these questions. Now, 

some may think they know the answers to all these questions, but 

there is still a shroud of secrecy, and I think this is a very viable 

thing to look at. Mr. Rhodes was in a unique position to offer this 

perspective, given his heavy duty and work on this. 

What is mystifying to me is how readily available he made himself to the media, but only select media, those in his echo chamber. 

He showed obviously disdain for people with foreign policy credentials. He showed great disdain for the media themselves. He is entitled to those personal opinions, but he also elected to share those 

with the New York Times and put them out there. He is also very 

negative about Congress going so far as to saying could not have 

a rational discussion—I am summarizing here—with the Congress. 

So we provided that. 

Josh Earnest from the podium there at the White House openly 

mocked Congress, said that perhaps we should be calling other 

members up such as Senator Tom Cotton, who should also raise 

their right hand and swear and affirm and answer questions. 

I took that suggestion, shared it with Senator Cotton. We accommodated that. Mr. Cotton, Senator Cotton had agreed, if Mr. 

Rhodes would be here, to also be here to answer questions and ferret out any of these details. But Mr. Rhodes elected not to speak. 

Now, he does have a public speaking engagement today. He is out 

giving a public speech today but refuses to come and speak with 

Congress. 

I am going to play a clip. I have got two clips in my opening 

statement. And I think you can see where maybe some on the other 

side of the aisle will say, oh, we know everything about this, it has 

been thoroughly debated, but I want you to watch this clip. We are 

going to go to what we call clip B if we could, and let’s watch this. 

[Video shown.] 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. So as you can see there, Victoria Nuland 

offered what turned out to be absolutely and totally not true. Ms. 

Psaki, I think, was more candid in that assessment. And then you 

have this article comes out and basically the administration 

thought it was in their best interest to spin up the story that negotiations started with a more moderate regime in 2013, but that is 

not what had happened. That was fiction as well. 

I also want to talk about 24 by 7 access. I think the American 

people were led to believe that Americans with the best interest 

would have access and be able to see and get in there and go into 

these nuclear facilities 24/7. So I want to play another clip. This 

is clip number E or letter E. 

[Video shown.] 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thanks. You can take that down. 


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So, first of all, as somebody pointed out on our committee, I think 

Mr. Palmer pointed out I don’t think Mr. Kerry was the chief negotiator, but that is another point. But the second part of it is, is 

there 24 by 7 access? Can you access anything, anywhere, any 

time? Spinning quite a different story as we go along. 

We have also heard a lot of numbers related to sanctions relief 

and dealing with escrowed oil funds. President Obama was quoted 

in an Atlantic article talking about $150 billion that would be going 

back to Iran. The Iranians say they have access to $100 billion. The 

Treasury Department says it is $50 billion. Secretary Kerry said 

they have only had access to $3 billion, and then blamed Treasury, 

talking about a lot of money going to a state sponsor of terrorism. 

There are also questions about ballistic missiles. In December 

2015 he said there was a violation of the United Nations Resolution 2231 in testimony by the Iran Deal coordinator, Ambassador 

Mull. But in March of 2016 you have the United States Ambassador Power to the United Nations who toned it down a little bit. 

Now, they are calling it just an ‘‘inconsistent with’’ is their quote, 

as opposed to a violation of the United Nations resolution. 

Then you also have issues about boosting Iran’s economy. Secretary Kerry is currently on tour in Europe. The State Department 

suggests that we are obligated, we are obligated, the United States 

of American is obligated to boost the Iranian economy, again, something we need to understand. We don’t understand the side deals. 

There are still sanctions of terrorism on Iran. We want to understand that. 

And then there are questions about everything that has actually 

been agreed to not just in writing but the side deals and any other 

verbal commitments that were also made. 

I would also note to our colleagues that the chairman of Armed 

Services, Mr. Thornberry, has a very important amendment I think 

we should all consider and look at that will be part of the NDAA 

issue as we move forward. 

Again, there are a lot of outstanding questions. We wanted to get 

the person who is right in the thick of things from the White House 

to come here and testify. The White House on Thursday claimed 

that this wasn’t about executive privilege, and then less than 24 

hours before this hearing, they reversed course and said, oh, it is 

about executive privilege. Now, who is being inconsistent? Who is 

being inconsistent? 

You have plenty of time, Mr. Rhodes, to go out and talk to all 

the media friends and talk to the echo chamber that you brag 

about in the New York Times, but when it comes time to actually 

answer hard questions under oath did you decide not to do it. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. My time has far exceeded what we had allocated. We will now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Cummings. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I 

thank all our witnesses for being here today. 

Mr. Chairman, sitting here today, I am surprised and—I mean, 

very surprised and shocked that you would invite John Hannah to 

testify before our committee as an expert witness, particularly on 

the subject of false White House narratives. Mr. Hannah was Vice 

President Dick Cheney’s top national security advisor in the White 


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House. He personally, personally helped prepare Secretary of State 

Colin Powell’s infamous speech to the United Nations in the runup to the Iraq War, a speech that Secretary Powell has called a 

permanent blot on his record. 

Mr. Hannah was identified by the Iraqi National Congress as 

‘‘principal point of contact’’ in the Vice President’s office. The INC 

was an organization that supplied our nation with reams, with 

reams of false information about weapons of mass destruction. 

Mr. Hannah worked directly for Scooter Libby who was convicted 

after the Bush administration leaked the identity of a covert CIA 

agent Valerie Plame. Her husband, Ambassador Joe Wilson, had 

publicly debunked the administration’s false claims about the Iraqi 

nuclear program. 

This was the same Scooter Libby who told the FBI that it was 

‘‘possible’’ that Vice President Cheney actually directed him to leak 

information about Ms. Plame’s covert status. That is Mr. Hannah. 

Now, I don’t know Mr. Hannah and I don’t believe I have ever 

met him before today, but based on the public record alone, let me 

say this. If our goal is to hear from an expert who actually promoted false, false White House narratives, then I think you picked 

the right person. But if our goal is to hear from someone who was 

not involved in one of the biggest misrepresentations in our nation’s history, then you picked the wrong person. 

Listening to John Hannah criticize anyone else for pushing a 

false White House narrative is beyond ironic. He and Dick Cheney 

and their colleagues in the White House wrote the how-to manual 

on this. The profound tragedy here is that thousands, thousands of 

U.S. service members from our districts were killed in Iraq and 

thousands more sustained terrible injuries. The American taxpayers have now spent hundreds of billions, billions of dollars even 

by the most conservative estimates. 

Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, you rushed to invite Mr. Hannah 

without consulting anyone. In fact, this entire panel has been 

stacked with hand-picked witnesses who all oppose the Iran agreement. You did not invite prominent Republicans like Brent Scowcroft or Richard Lugar. You did not invite any of the dozens of generals or admirals or other military experts who support this agreement. 

Other committees have held dozens of substantive hearings on 

the Iran agreement, but do you know how many this committee 

has held? Zero. The Subcommittee on National Security held one 

last November, but that was it, nothing at the committee level. Yet 

all of a sudden now our committee is rushing to hold today’s hearing without even the one-week notice required by the House rules 

according to the parliamentarian. 

These experts here are all repeating the same talking points for 

the same Republican political narrative. This committee has basically created its own Republican echo chamber. 

With respect to Ben Rhodes, I am struggling to understand the 

allegations against him. If I understand it correctly, Republicans 

accuse him of misleading the American people by claiming that 

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just knew the president was working towards an agreement before 

2013, they would have rejected the deal. 

Of course, this is absurd. There are dozens of public press reports 

from every single year of the Obama administration documenting 

how they were working to reach out to Iran with varying degrees 

of success. All you have to do is Google it. From the time President 

Barack Obama was a candidate for President until today, press reports are full of accounts of how letters were being exchanged, 

meetings were being held, and negotiations were being launched. 

The Republicans rushed to hold this hearing not as a way to obtain substantive information about the merits of the Iran agreement or even to investigate a legitimate allegation. Instead, this 

hearing is exactly what it purports to condemn, a partisan narrative designed to mislead the American people. That is not just 

ironic, that is hypocritical. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back, and I thank the witnesses 

again for being here. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

The prime witness that we had invited, Mr. Rhodes from the 

White House, declined to come before the committee. We are disappointed in his failure to appear. 

The chair also notes that contingent upon Mr. Rhodes appearing, 

an invitation to appear was extended to the Honorable Tom Cotton, 

United States Senator from the State of Arkansas. This was done 

at a request of the White House. Given that Mr. Rhodes had refused to appear before the committee today, the distinguished Senator from Arkansas is also excused. 

Mr. GOWDY. Mr. Chairman? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes, the gentleman from South Carolina. 

Mr. GOWDY. I have an inquiry. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes. 

Mr. GOWDY. Is Mr. Hannah here? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes. 

Mr. GOWDY. Well, then why did Mr. Cummings ask him the 

questions? He will have a chance to ask Mr. Hannah whatever 

questions he wants to ask him. We don’t have a chance to ask Mr. 

Rhodes the questions we want to ask because he didn’t bother to 

show up —— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Will the chairman yield? 

Mr. GOWDY.—but Mr. Hannah did. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Will the chairman yield? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I can say whatever I want to say in my opening 

statement. 

Mr. GOWDY. Yes, you can. It just needs to be fair. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And I can —— 

Mr. GOWDY. That is my point. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well —— 

Mr. GOWDY. Just be fair about it. You can say what you want. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Gentleman will state his inquiry. 

Mr. GOWDY. I just wanted to know if he was here. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. He is here. 

Mr. GOWDY. And you tell me he is. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 


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Mr. GOWDY. Okay. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. And Mr. Rhodes is not here. 

I would also note that the Democrats were free and usually almost always in my experience invite a Democratic witness, but 

there is no Democratic witness today because you didn’t invite one. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Will the gentleman yield? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Sure. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Chairman, you know for a fact that we got less 

than the notice that is required in the rules and did not object and 

went on with the hearing. You know that. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I disagree —— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ.—with the timing issue that you suggest. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. You gave us the required time? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Yes. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I disagree with you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Okay. We will sort that out. We have a 

good working relationship, Mr. Cummings and I, but —— 

Mr. GOWDY. Parliamentary inquiry. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The gentleman from South Carolina. 

Mr. GOWDY. Does the executive privilege apply to media interviews or only to appearances before Congress? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I don’t know the full answer to that, but 

I believe they are free to talk to whoever they want to in the 

media, but they did claim in Mr. Eggleston’s letter to claim executive privilege. 

Mr. GOWDY. So is that a yes or a no? Does it apply when you 

are being interviewed by the New York Times or ABC or CBS or 

just when Members of Congress just want to ask questions? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Evidently just when Members of Congress. 

Mr. GOWDY. I thank the chairman for that clarification. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. We are going to continue with 

the hearing. We do have Mr. Michael Rubin. He is the resident 

scholar at the American Enterprise Institute; Mr. Michael Doran, 

a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute; and Mr. John Hannah, senior counselor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. We 

welcome you all and thank you for being here. 

Pursuant to committee rules, all witnesses are to be sworn before 

they testify. And if you will please rise and raise your right hand. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. Let the record reflect that all 

witnesses answered in the affirmative. 

We would appreciate you limiting your verbal comments to 5 

minutes. It will give us time to ask you questions. And your entire 

written statement will be entered into the record. 

I now recognize Mr. Rubin for his opening statement. 

WITNESS STATEMENTS 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL RUBIN 

Mr. RUBIN. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, 

honorable members, thank you for the opportunity to testify here 

today. 


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The major Iran-related issues about which the White House misled when selling the Iran deal were verification. The JCPOA loosened the standard set in South Africa and Libya. It embraced 

Iran’s voluntary compliance with the additional protocol when previously Rouhani had bragged that voluntary compliance allows 

Iran to reverse course at any time. 

It also ignores the problem of offsite research. Have Iranians 

transferred some nuclear work to labs in North Korea? Under the 

JCPOA, we will never know. 

Another issue in which it misled was Rouhani as a moderate. 

Rouhani is no moderate. Loyalty to Khomeini’s vision was a major 

theme of his campaign commercials. He stuffed his cabinet with 

veterans of the Intelligence in effect constructing not a reformist 

cabinet but a KGB cabinet. In 2005 he laid out a doctrine of surprise. Lull the Americans into complacency with dialogue and then 

deliver a knockout blow. Just last week, he offered full-throated endorsement to the legacy of Qods Force Chief Qassem Soleimani, 

Iran’s master terrorist. 

It also misled about who benefits inside Iran. The real tragedy 

of the deal is it pumps money into the coffers of the Revolutionary 

Guard. History belies the idea that showering Iran with trade moderates the country or trickles down to ordinary people. Between 

1998 and 2005, the European Union almost tripled its trade with 

Iran and the price of oil quintupled. Iran took its hard currency 

windfall and invested in its ballistic missile program and its covert 

nuclear enrichment facilities. 

Reformist President Khatami’s spokesman bragged about how he 

had defeated the West. We had an overt policy, which was one of 

negotiation and confidence-building he said, and a covert policy, 

which was continuation of the activities. The person in charge of 

directing the money into the military, Rouhani in his capacity as 

chairman of the National Security Council. 

The problem goes beyond the supreme leader’s investment arm. 

The economic wing of IRGC controls perhaps 40 percent of the 

economy, including every sector now open for business. 

Many of those who supported the JCPOA acknowledge it to be 

a flawed and faulty agreement but argued the alternative was war. 

This may have been crafty politics, but it undermined the U.S. position. By creating a binary choice between the JCPOA and war, 

Rhodes removed credibility to the notion that the Obama administration envisioned the best alternative to negotiated agreement. 

This played into Iranian hands because they knew no matter what 

they pushed for, Kerry would concede. 

The problem now is that what Rhodes did has become the rule 

rather than the exception. In my written testimony I detail the 

long history of diplomats and politicians lying to keep diplomacy 

alive. Too often they blame political opponents in the United States 

more than foreign adversaries for the failure at diplomacy. 

As I document in Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging 

Rogue Regimes, a history of the last half-century of U.S. diplomacy 

with rogue regimes and terrorist groups, as diplomats proceed with 

high-level engagement, they too often calibrate it to the fantasy 

they have constructed rather than reality. 


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This often leads officials to avoid congressional oversight and, on 

occasion, to lie to Congress. During the 1990s, senior State Department officials testified that they could draw no direct links between 

Yasser Arafat and terrorism to avoid triggering an aid cutoff. Declassified documents show Clinton’s peace team knew their testimony was false. 

Likewise, in 2007 during the Bush administration, Christopher 

Hill, the State Department’s point man on North Korean issues, 

presented to Congress an artificially rosy picture of the diplomatic 

process with North Korea in order to keep support for engagement 

alive, no matter the truth of Pyongyang’s behavior. 

More recently, diplomats advocating the New START treaty lied, 

both directly and by omission, to Congress in order to avoid reporting that Russia had been cheating on arms control accords. 

So what to do? Rhodes has placed the security of the United 

States and its allies at risk. Certainly, any dissemination of falsehoods to Congress and the American people merit a broader investigation. National security and Congress’ credibility are at risk. 

That is not enough. In the past six decades, the U.S. State Department has failed to conduct lessons-learned exercises as to why its 

high-profile diplomacy with rogue regimes has seldom, if ever, succeeded. 

Conducting a broader review is not to criminalize policy debate; 

that would be poisonous and counterproductive. But if the State 

Department refuses due diligence, it would be beneficial if Congress would examine diplomacy leading up to the JCPOA if only to 

ensure that the same mistakes are not made for a seventh time. 

There should be bipartisan consensus. Even supporters of the deal 

acknowledge serious concerns about its flaws, so, too, do most serious arms control and counterproliferation experts outside of the 

echo chamber about whose crafting Rhodes bragged. 

One final point if I may, I’m concerned that perhaps by creating 

an echo chamber and solely talking to people within it, in effect 

what Rhodes did was create a propaganda operation in which he 

entrapped none other than Secretary of State John Kerry. Did Secretary of State Kerry talk to people outside the echo chamber? If 

not, he’s a victim of Ben Rhodes as well. 

Thank you. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Rubin follows:] 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I will now go to Mr. Doran of the Hudson Institute. You are now 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL DORAN 

Mr. DORAN. Chairman Chaffetz —— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Sorry, microphone there, please. 

Mr. DORAN. Thanks. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, members of the committee —— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Sorry, if you can move that microphone 

right up close and comfortable. There you go. Thank you. 

Mr. DORAN. Thank you for inviting me to address some of the 

problems raised by the recent profile New York Times Magazine of 

Ben Rhodes, the deputy national security advisor for strategic communications. Mr. Rhodes admitted to the New York Times that he 

created a war room of some two dozen detailees from around the 

executive branch who came to the White House and monitored all 

communications—all public communications about the Iran deal, 

communications coming out of the—Capitol Hill, the think tank 

world, on social media, and in the traditional media. 

He also created what he called an echo chamber. That was a network of sympathetic NGOs, think tanks, and pliant members of the 

press to whom he ceded narratives, false narratives I would say, 

about the Iran deal, and then he directed the reporters to these 

NGOs and think tanks to give seemingly independent verification 

to the narratives that he put out. 

In my view, the creation of the echo chamber and the war room 

does constitute a deception of the American people and of their representatives. But the question is what were—what exactly was the 

nature of the deception? And I think to understand that we have 

to understand the larger policy context, and that is that the strategic goal of the President was to carry out a detente with Iran. 

It was to end the conflict with Iran as a necessary precondition to 

pulling the United States back from the Middle East because ending the military engagement in the Middle East, I think, is the 

President’s overall goal. 

Now, if the President had been up front about this with the 

American people and said that he wanted to A) pull the United 

States out of the Middle East and B) make Iran part of the security 

architecture of the region, he would have encountered immediately 

a severe political backlash that would have undermined his whole 

project. And former Defense Secretary Panetta, former chief of the 

CIA Panetta said as much to the New York Times Magazine. 

Now, that’s the need for a propaganda operation that—to deceive 

the American people. It’s not just to misrepresent what’s in the 

Iran deal but to misrepresent everything else that’s around it that 

is the strategic goal of the President in the Middle East. 

I’d like to say a few words if I may about what I think were 

the—what is the anatomy of the deception, that is the main lines 

of false narrative that the war room and echo chamber put out. 

And in my prepared statement, I go into more detail about this. I’ll 

just summarize here five major points. 

Number one, conjuring moderates. The echo chamber created the 

impression that Hassan Rouhani, the president of Iran, was a modVerDate Sep 11 2014 11:36 Dec 06, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\22276.TXT APRIL

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erate coming to power, representing a wave of moderation in Iran, 

a desire to fundamentally change relations between Iran and the 

West. This narrative of the moderates coming to power and the 

need to support the moderates has been the gift that keeps on giving to President Obama’s diplomacy. It creates a pleasing story of 

a breaking down of barriers. It creates a moral equivalence in political terms between those who are critical of the deal in the United 

States and hardliners, the supposed enemies of Rouhani in Iraq. 

And, importantly, it makes—it lulls us into a false sense of security about all of the concessions that we have made to Iran, and 

in particular, the sunset component of the nuclear deal, which 

gives Iran effectively in 10 years a completely legitimate program 

and the ability to move—nuclear program, and the ability to move 

quickly toward a weapon. If Iran is moderating, if we have—if we 

are supporting a process of moderation in Iran, then allowing it to 

have these capabilities is really no danger. 

The second deception is falsifying the chronology of the negotiations, which began much earlier than the election of Rouhani. They 

go back to July 2012, and they were initiated by the United States. 

The third deception is erasing concessions from the United States 

along the lines of what Dr. Rubin just discussed. 

The fourth is hiding the regional cost. The President has in effect 

recognized Syria as an Iranian sphere of influence, and one of the 

goals of the deception of Mr. Rhodes is to prevent people from connecting the dots between the Syria policy and the Iranian nuclear 

policy. 

And the fifth part of the deception is blaming allies. The White 

House on background and in public is very willing to criticize our 

Sunni allies as creating sectarian extremist in the region. It’s willing to criticize in very derogatory terms Prime Minister Netanyahu 

of Israel. It never criticizes the Iranians. You never hear a word 

from the White House about what the Iranians are doing in Syria 

in pursuit of the—in support of Assad’s murder machine. 

I’ll just sum up now by what I think we need to do about this, 

and I would say two points. Number one, I agree with you, Chairman Chaffetz, that we do not actually know what is in the Iran 

deal. We still to this day don’t know, and I completely agree with 

your assessment about the activities of Secretary of State Kerry. In 

Europe last week, he was in Europe drumming up business for the 

Iranians, and the Iranians are saying that this is part of the deal. 

Is it part of the deal or is it not? We don’t know. So I would support further investigation. 

And then secondly, I think we have to trim the size of the NSC. 

It just—I don’t see how anyone who looks at this and sees a war 

room of 22 detailees from around the executive branch in the White 

House with the job of monitoring communications and creating a 

false narrative in the media is a legitimate part of the NSC’s mission. The NSC should be a coordinating body. It should not be a 

muscular imperial body running roughshod over all of the executive 

branch. 

So I would add my voice to those who are saying that the NSC 

should be cut back severely from the 400 members it currently has 

to something more like 100. 

Thank you. 


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[Prepared statement of Mr. Doran follows:] 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I will now recognize Mr. Hannah for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN HANNAH 

Mr. HANNAH. Chairman Chaffetz, Ranking Member Cummings, 

members of the committee, on behalf of the Foundation for Defense 

of Democracies, thank you for the invitation to testify on the Iran 

nuclear deal. 

For me as a foreign policy analyst, perhaps the most important 

revelation made in the recent New York Times profile of Ben 

Rhodes was its allegation concerning President Obama’s overriding 

strategic purpose in seeking a nuclear deal with Iran, a purpose 

which until now has been largely concealed from the American people. 

According to the article, ‘‘By eliminating the fuss about Iran’s nuclear program, the administration hoped to eliminate a source of 

structural tension between the two countries, which would create 

the space for America to disentangle itself from its established system of alliances with countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Israel, 

and Turkey. With one bold move, the administration would effectively begin the process of a large-scale disengagement from the 

Middle East.’’ 

Now, if accurate, this is truly a stunning admission with very big 

implications. As suggested elsewhere in the article, it does represent nothing less than a radical shift in American foreign policy. 

According to the article, Mr. Rhodes’ passion for the Iranian nuclear deal did not derive from any investment in the technical details of sanctions or centrifuges or the future of Iranian politics but 

rather ‘‘from his own sense of urgency of radically reorienting 

American policy in the Middle East in order to make the prospects 

of any American involvement in the region’s future wars a lot less 

likely.’’ 

Now, whether you agree or disagree with this inclination to step 

back from the leadership role that the United States has played in 

the Middle East since World War II, the troubling fact remains 

that this fundamental shift in American strategy has never been 

openly communicated to the American people. It has never been debated by the U.S. Congress and it has never been revealed to 

America’s long-time allies in the Middle East. 

Determining whether or not this very substantive claim is true, 

that is, whether the White House is now in reality seeking to engineer a large-scale American disengagement from the Middle East 

is a question of vital importance to U.S. national interests, again, 

whether you agree with it or disagree, and it’s one that I think the 

Congress should seek clarification on. 

If, in, fact the nuclear deal with Iran is as Mr. Rhodes suggests, 

the center of the arc for President Obama’s efforts to radically 

transform U.S. policy, it raises a host of concerns. Certainly, it 

casts doubt on the administration’s repeated claim that no deal was 

better than a bad deal. To the extent that the preeminent objective 

instead, in Mr. Rhodes’ view, was to ‘‘eliminate the fuss about 

Iran’s nuclear program’’ rather than to actually eliminate that program itself, one wonders whether the administration did demand 


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or had a tough enough posture in negotiations as it might otherwise have been. 

Similar concerns, I think, exist now that the deal is in place and 

being implemented. When Congress was reviewing the JCPOA last 

summer, the administration made repeated assurances to the Congress that it would vigorously enforce the agreement while using 

every tool at its disposal to counter Iranian terrorism, its destabilizing regional activities, ballistic missile program, and human 

rights abuses. 

Since then, however, Iran’s bad behavior has dramatically escalated. It has significantly increased its combat role in Syria, it’s increased—or it’s arrested additional U.S. citizens, conducted multiple ballistic missile tests, it’s fired rockets in very close proximity 

to U.S. ships in the Persian Gulf, held 10 American sailors captive, 

and threatened to close the Straits of Hormuz. 

The U.S. response to these repeated provocations, despite the administration’s earlier assurances, has so far ranged from quite 

tepid to nonexistent. Even more worrisome, perhaps, has been the 

reported U.S. willingness to at least contemplate granting Iran additional sanctions relief that it failed to negotiate in the JCPOA. 

Specifically, Iran is demanding access to dollarized financial transactions. This would be a huge unilateral concession that would 

greatly expand Iran’s ability to do business internationally while 

legitimizing an Iranian banking sector that remains mired in elicit 

financing activities. 

Let me close by stressing that especially in light of the questions 

raised by the New York Times profile about what America’s true 

underlying purpose is in pursuing the Iran deal, it’s extremely important that Congress now hold the administration’s feet to the fire 

when it comes to the commitment to combat Iran’s continued aggression. At a minimum, Congress should do everything in its 

power to ensure that Iran receives no new sanctions relief in the 

absence of significant new Iranian concessions. And far more aggressive use should be made of nonnuclear sanctions to constrain 

Iran’s expanding ballistic missile program and deter the Iranian 

Revolutionary Guard Corps from their destabilizing activities in 

Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. 

The bottom line is that the United States should not be sending 

Iran the message that we now place such a high premium on its 

continued adherence to the nuclear deal that it will have carte 

blanche to pursue its increasingly threatening policies in other 

areas that endanger our interests and those of our allies. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify. 

I know this is the place where I would normally say I look forward 

to your questions, but maybe more appropriately I stand by and am 

ready to try and answer your questions. 

[Prepared statement of Mr. Hannah follows:] 


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Chairman CHAFFETZ. Fair enough. I think that is a fair summary 

of where we are at. 

I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Rhodes I wish were here. He has a unique perspective. He 

said some truly amazing and over-the-top things that were quoted 

in the New York Times. I haven’t heard anything refute that. One 

of the ones that I think would concern all of us is this quote that 

he said on the fourth page of this article. He says—it is printed 

out—‘‘I don’t know anymore where I begin and Obama ends.’’ That 

is a true—if you really think and let that settle in, that is a truly 

stunning statement. 

He also said some other things that I think are very concerning. 

‘‘All these newspapers used to have foreign bureaus,’’ which I think 

he makes a good point on that. And then he says, ‘‘now, they don’t. 

They call us to explain to them what is happening in Moscow and 

Cairo. Most of the outlets are reporting of world events from Washington. The average reporter we talk to is 27 years old and their 

only reporting experience consists of being around political campaigns. That is a sea change. They literally know nothing.’’ 

He went on to say—Mr. Rhodes said, ‘‘But then there are these 

sorts of force multipliers. We have our compadres. I will reach out 

to a couple people and, you know, I wouldn’t want to name them’’— 

and then he goes on and—anyway, it is really interesting in his approach. 

That is one component, but you compile that on top of what you 

also hear former Secretary Panetta said. This is what Secretary 

Panetta said. And this is a quote from Panetta. ‘‘And you know my 

view, talking with the President was—if I brought it to the point 

where we had evidence that they are developing an atomic weapon, 

I think the President is serious that he is not going to allow that 

to happen.’’ But then Panetta stops according to the article, and 

the authors says, ‘‘But would you make that same assessment 

now?’’ And Secretary Panetta’s quote is ‘‘I would make the same assessment now? Probably not.’’ Probably not. So he said it once. I 

have repeated it twice, but this is of what is deep concern. 

I think it would be naive to just gloss this over and say, hey, we 

got this deal, it is in the best interest of the United States, it is 

not something that was fully brought before the Congress. I would 

hope that we would walk out with an understanding from the three 

of you as what those big outstanding questions are. 

But maybe somebody could shed some light on these so-called 

side deals, these things where Iran has maybe made other—do you 

have any insight, Mr. Doran, any of you, on what these so-called 

side deals might be? 

Mr. DORAN. No. There’s what we have uncovered, but as time 

goes on, as time goes on, we keep finding out more and more that 

wasn’t in the text, and of course the Obama administration says 

there is nothing else. But the Iranians are saying that there is a 

larger deal in particular with regard to access to dollars and expanding their economy. And the behavior of our officials suggest 

that they are right. Our officials say that the Iranians are not correct, but here we have Secretary Kerry in Europe last week meeting with banks trying to get them to overlook concerns about Iran’s 

illicit activities and to drum up business for Iran. 


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So there’s a mismatch here between what we’re saying and what 

we’re doing, but what we’re doing actually does match quite closely 

with what the Iranians are saying, and that’s been a characteristic 

of the deal from day one. The deal has been shaped by the red lines 

of the supreme leader and not by the red lines of the President of 

the United States. So our red lines have dropped all along the way 

and the Iranians have stayed consistent with theirs. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Mr. Rubin? 

Mr. RUBIN. Very quickly, the JCPOA is almost like a timeshare 

agreement where you sign the deal and then you’ll only find out 

then what the true costs are. One of the subjects for oversight 

would be with regard to changing the language restricting Iran’s 

ballistic missile work. Was it a deliberate concession or was it the 

result of incompetence? 

What troubles me mostly is how we seem to be having become 

Iran’s lawyer. For example, the Iranians will now complain that we 

are not enabling enough openings for their economy, and yet what 

didn’t hit the Western press was last week the Iranians on the 

order of the supreme leader canceled an order, $20 million—I’m 

sorry, $2 million for Chevrolets. And the answer was we shouldn’t 

be doing business with the Americans. Who’s kneecapping the Iranian economy, us or the Iranians? It’s time to have the Iranians 

stop blaming other people and take accountability to themselves. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. My time is expired. 

I now recognize the ranking member, Mr. Cummings. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Hannah, you were Dick Cheney’s top national security advisor, is that right? 

Mr. HANNAH. Yes, sir, from 2005 to 2009. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And your office was ground zero in the Bush administration’s marketing campaign to sell the Iraq War to the 

American people. Is that a fair statement? 

Mr. HANNAH. No, I don’t think it is. We—as you said, we played 

an important role in making the first draft of Secretary Powell’s 

speech to the United Nations. That was certainly true —— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. 

Mr. HANNAH.—but we —— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. So you were involved in making the first draft, 

is that right? 

Mr. HANNAH. Yes, that’s correct. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Is this pretty much the draft that he presented 

to the United Nations? I mean —— 

Mr. HANNAH. It —— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I know a first draft usually goes through many 

more drafts but —— 

Mr. HANNAH. Sure. Sure. It—I thought there were some similarities in it. If you actually hear some of Secretary Powell’s people 

tell the story now, they say my draft was filled with inaccurate intelligence reports, reports that couldn’t be supported by the intelligence community, so at the end of the day they threw out my 

draft. Secretary Powell then spent four days with the highest levels 

of our intelligence community at Langley doing a new draft that he 

said was primarily based on the intelligence community—community’s NIE. So I—their claim is that there were no—that my draft 


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did not actually form the foundation of what he presented to the 

United Nations. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. I am sure having heard that, I am sure you probably said then let me at least listen to what he did say, is that 

right? Did you read his —— 

Mr. HANNAH. Oh, sure. No, I —— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Okay. 

Mr. HANNAH. Yes, I did. Absolutely. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And was there any mention of weapons of mass 

destruction in your draft as compared to the final draft of Secretary 

Powell? 

Mr. HANNAH. Yes, I think both of our drafts were entirely focused on weapons of mass destruction. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. And what would you say was the difference because he seemed like he was very disappointed with the information that you had provided him and said that it was a blot on his 

reputation and pretty much said, you know, until the day he dies 

he is going to regret it. But I am just curious. 

Mr. HANNAH. Just a correction, first of all, when he said it was 

a blot, I think he was talking about what he presented to the 

United Nations. I don’t think he was talking about the draft that 

I presented him. It’s what he did with George Tenet and the rest 

of the intelligence community that he ended up presenting that 

was obviously filled with errors. Most of it was wrong. 

My draft—the instruction to me when I started that draft was 

that you need to go look at all of the intelligence there is, including 

raw intelligence, which we regularly got at the White House, which 

were individual reports by individual intelligence sources. I did 

that and put it into a draft, and then have the intelligence community look at that draft and decide what pieces of intelligence could 

they support, which ones weren’t they able to support. That source 

was not reliable, didn’t have enough of a reliable record of reporting, and they would throw it out. So I wrote the draft knowing that 

large segments of it would be thrown out because the intelligence 

community just didn’t have the necessary confidence level in that 

reporting. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Now, let me read what Secretary Powell’s chief 

of staff said about your document. I take it that is the first draft. 

He said, ‘‘Hannah was constantly flipping through his clipboard 

trying to source and verify all the statements. It was clear the 

thing was put together by cherry-picking everything.’’ In fact, they 

discovered that you did not use a DIA report properly, you did not 

cite a CIA report fairly, and you referenced a New York Times article that quoted an intelligence report out of context. 

So they scrapped, as you said, your entire document. And the 

Secretary’s chief of staff described it in this way. He said, ‘‘Finally, 

I threw the paper down on the table and said this isn’t going to 

cut it.’’ Now, this was the chief of staff, right, for Secretary Powell. 

How could you have given him such a document that appears in 

his opinion to have been baseless and misleading? 

Mr. HANNAH. Well, I mean, there’s a long history to this. It was 

Mr. Wilkerson, Colonel Wilkerson —— 

Mr. CUMMINGS. Yes, I —— 

Mr. HANNAH.—who was his chief of staff. 


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Mr. CUMMINGS. That is correct. 

Mr. HANNAH. He has a long record of—that anybody can go read 

about his views of the Iraq War and his regrets and deep regrets. 

I think we just have a different view of the draft I presented. 

I do acknowledge that it included an awful lot of stuff that I 

knew that came from the intelligence community that they would 

not be able to support. If they thought it wasn’t used properly, they 

could use it properly if they thought it was useful. So we just have 

a basic, I think, difference of view about what I actually provided 

and what the purpose of my draft was. It wasn’t meant to be a 

final draft, the final word that would go to the United Nations. It 

was meant to be a rough draft that the intelligence community 

would go through with a fine-tooth comb and pick out those parts 

that they thought were the—made the strongest case that in fact 

Saddam did have weapons of mass destruction. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. But it wasn’t just Mr. Wilkerson. It was also 

George Tenet who reportedly turned directly to you—and I am sure 

you will remember this—and said ‘‘you wasted a lot of our time.’’ 

Is that true, and did he say that, George Tenet? 

Mr. HANNAH. He certainly didn’t say it to me. He may have—certainly, I can easily see him saying that kind of thing, but he didn’t 

say it to me. 

Mr. CUMMINGS. All right. Thank you very much. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I now recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thanks to the panel for 

being here. We wish that there were other members of course. 

Mr. Doran, in your testimony you discuss the need to restore 

checks and balances and note that while Mr. Rhodes’ behavior is 

scandalous, and I think propaganda is a word that you used, it 

wasn’t a rogue operation but that he was carrying out the will of 

the President. Questions that I am sure my constituents representing them here in the people’s House would want me to ask 

in reference to this is, number one, how can Congress take steps 

to prevent this President and future Presidents from circumventing 

Congress? 

Mr. DORAN. I think this is part of the inherent tension in our 

government. I did say that I think that the—Mr. Rhodes is doing 

the bidding of the President. I think it’s important to remember 

that. We have now numerous accounts from—mainly from former 

Defense Secretaries Panetta and Gates especially, showing how 

there’s an inner core in the White House of five or six people who 

consult closely with the President about his views, and everybody 

else is pretty much left out of the conversation, including principals 

on the National Security Council. And Mr. Rhodes is part of that 

inner circle. 

The only answer I have to this—I spent a lot of time thinking 

about it. The only answer I have are the two that I gave you. One 

is over—just exercising the oversight responsibilities that Congress 

has, asking the hard questions, and continuing to put pressure on 

the executive branch to come clean. 

The second is, I think, cutting back the size of the NSC. It’s simply wrong. I think anyone on both sides of the aisle would see that 

the National Security Council, created by statute in 1947, was creVerDate Sep 11 2014 11:36 Dec 06, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\22276.TXT APRIL

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ated to be a coordinating body, not an operational arm of the government. And under President Obama, it has slipped into becoming 

an operational arm. 

And I think when you look at the war room, as described not by 

me but by Mr. Rhodes, this is an operational White House. 

Just one last point here, there’s an issue here that I think 

there’s—we all just need to be aware of, but there’s not much we 

can do about it, and that is the collapse of the press. So one of the 

reasons why this is a threat to our checks and balances is because 

of the collapse of, I would say, certain informal checks on governmental power that have disappeared over the last decade, you 

know, very, very quickly because of the rise of the internet. 

What Ben Rhodes said in that article about foreign events being 

reported from Washington and from the White House by young reporters who don’t know anything and don’t have any other sources 

of information except what the White House is telling them is completely correct, and it’s a danger. There’s not much in terms of legislation that we can do about that, but we need to be aware of it. 

It’s sort of a double danger because not only do those reporters 

not have alternative sources of information, but because all of the 

information is coming out of the White House, they have a special 

interest in maintaining good relations with the White House, and 

reporting the news stories as the White House wants it reported. 

Mr. WALBERG. Well, let me go on from that as well, and, Mr. 

Rubin, you may want to jump in here as well. Ben Rhodes’ assistant in the article—in his report—his comments in the New York 

Times Magazine article indicated that there were compadres involved in this, and some of those were in the think tank community 

as well. Who would he be referring to in a think tank and policy 

world? 

Mr. RUBIN. The Ploughshares Fund. 

Mr. WALBERG. The what? 

Mr. RUBIN. The Ploughshares Fund has funded many of the elements of the so-called echo chamber, to use Ben Rhodes’ words, 

supposedly neutral assessors, for example, in various arms control 

think tanks, perhaps in the Atlantic Council as well and elsewhere 

were receiving grants. Now, one can say just because one has received a grant from this high-level funder—and by the way, this 

funder also had provided grants to senior Iranian officials working 

in the United States as well at universities and so forth—just because they have funded doesn’t necessarily mean that there’s a 

quid pro quo, but what you will find is that anyone who has received Ploughshares funding, especially for the bulk of their grant 

or the bulk of their salary, never, not once contradicted the assessment which Ben Rhodes sought to put forward. 

Mr. WALBERG. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I will now recognize the gentlewoman from New York, Mrs. 

Maloney, for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Thank you. 

After a good deal of deliberation and research, I voted against 

the Iran nuclear deal. And at the time I was hoping very much 

that I was wrong, but everything that has happened since and the 


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additional information that has come forward, it literally has convinced me that I made the right decision. 

But I have to say as a Member who took the time to carefully 

study the plan before making a decision, as I believe all of my colleagues did, I had absolute, complete access to all documents. I 

read every document, even classified documents. Every meeting 

was addressed in various areas. The administration bent over backwards to provide accurate information to us. 

And I must say that this was one of the most hotly debated 

issues that I have experienced since I have been in Congress, but 

both sides were deeply involved in putting forward their cases. 

There were demonstrations, there were petitions, there were meetings, there were conferences, there were debates. It was completely 

and totally open to everyone to learn and to make their own decision. 

So my colleagues on the other side of the aisle are now taking 

another opportunity to attack the administration with a futile fishing expedition based on a widely questioned New York Times profile of an advisor to President Obama. I believe it is quite a stretch 

to suggest that the White House building a comprehensive information campaign to support a major foreign policy initiative amounts 

to any way misleading the American people. 

And I find it incredibly hypocritical to invite Mr. Hannah, who 

worked for Dick Cheney and helped market the Iraq War based on 

false pretenses to come now before us as an expert witness on an 

alleged false White House narrative. I find the hypocrisy really beyond belief. 

And I would like to ask Mr. Hannah, do you know who Scott 

McClellan is? Yes or no. 

Mr. HANNAH. Yes. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Yes. Well, Scott —— 

Mr. HANNAH. Yes. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Other people may not know, but he was the 

White House press secretary, and he wrote a book about his experience. He explained how a small group of advisors called the White 

House Iraq working group helped sell the Iraq War by misleading 

the American people. 

And I am quoting from President Bush’s press secretary. He said, 

‘‘The White House Iraq group had been set up in the summer of 

2002 to coordinate the marketing of the war to the public.’’ And, 

Mr. Hannah, wasn’t Scooter Libby your boss and Dick Cheney’s 

chief of staff? Weren’t they part of the Iraq group? 

Mr. HANNAH. The Vice President wasn’t. I think Scooter Libby 

was. I’m not 100 percent sure, but I think you’re right. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Yes. Yes. Well, Scott McClellan further wrote, he 

explained exactly how you and others misled the American people. 

And he said this, ‘‘As the campaign accelerated, qualifications were 

downplayed or dropped altogether. Contradictory intelligence was 

largely ignored or simply disregarded.’’ 

So, Mr. Hannah, why did you ignore and disregard evidence that 

contradicted your political narrative for the war? 

Mr. HANNAH. Congresswoman, I would just say that, you know, 

to the extent that I got it wrong in believing that Saddam had 


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weapons of mass destruction, an awful lot of people got it wrong. 

It was not a figment of the imagination —— 

Mrs. MALONEY. Sir, are you saying —— 

Mr. HANNAH.—of the Vice President’s office. 

Mrs. MALONEY.—that Mr. McClellan was wrong in the book 

when he said he misled and lied to the American people, this 

group? 

Mr. HANNAH. All I can tell you is that there have been bipartisan 

commissions that have looked at how—the intelligence on weapons 

of mass destruction —— 

Mrs. MALONEY. Do you think —— 

Mr. HANNAH.—that came to the conclusion that the President of 

the United States did not lie about —— 

Mrs. MALONEY. I am not talking about him —— 

Mr. HANNAH.—evidence of weapons of mass destruction. 

Mrs. MALONEY.—I am talking about McClellan. Was McClellan 

wrong? Was he misinformed? Was he lying —— 

Mr. HANNAH. I may have had one —— 

Mrs. MALONEY.—when he wrote we were misleading the American people. We downplayed any —— 

Mr. HANNAH. I —— 

Mrs. MALONEY.—contradictory information? 

Mr. HANNAH. I—Congresswoman, I haven’t read his book. All I 

can tell you is that a lot of people who know Scott very well—I 

don’t know Scott at all really —— 

Mrs. MALONEY. Okay. Are you saying —— 

Mr. HANNAH.—have contradicted his presentation. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Okay. 

Mr. HANNAH. They believe he was wrong in his judgments and 

he —— 

Mrs. MALONEY. Are you saying that you did include contradictory 

intelligence showing that your case was weak or nonexistent? 

Mr. HANNAH. No. I think we were instructed to write what we 

thought was the best case for why Saddam had weapons of mass 

destruction. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The gentlewoman’s time is expired. 

Mrs. MALONEY. No, I have 21 seconds left according to this. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. No, your—that is —— 

Mrs. MALONEY. So I would just like to —— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. No, no, no, no, you are 27 seconds over 

time. 

Mrs. MALONEY. Oh, okay. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. 

Mrs. MALONEY. All right. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I now recognize the —— 

Mrs. MALONEY. Well, I would like to put my closing statement 

in the record. It is a zinger, and it is very hypocritical, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. No, no—you know, Mr. Hannah is here to 

answer questions. Mr. Rhodes is not here to answer questions. 

That is what is difficult about this hearing. 

We will go to Mr. Gosar now of Arizona. I recognize him for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. GOSAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. Rubin, Mr. Doran, and Mr. Hannah, thank you for your testimony and for providing valuable information to this committee, 

which sheds light on the deceptive manner in which the Obama administration sold out the American people and our allies across the 

globe with the Iran capitulation agreement. 

Even when presented with the facts like the facts each of you 

have laid out in your testimony, the administration box doubles 

down and tries to discredit anyone who disagrees with their false 

narrative, including me. When asked about Ben Rhodes’ revelatory 

interview with the New York Times Magazine, Press Secretary 

Josh Earnest dodged and decided to lambaste several Members of 

Congress, including me, as liars, truly eliciting Alinsky’s principles 

to their core. 

Why? Because I said that under this illegal Iran deal and lifting 

sanctions that Iran would be able to access up to $100 billion that 

was previously frozen. His Treasury Secretary Jack Lew stated the 

sanctions relief would be worth about $100 billion. The President 

of Iran said his country would get $100 billion. 

Despite the fact that I said something similar in September of 

2015, the White House is now trying to brand me as a liar in attempting to deflect Ben Rhodes’ recent statements. The point is not 

whether it is $100 billion or $50 billion or whether it is all at once 

or over a period of time. 

The real problem is that President Obama is funding the world’s 

largest state sponsor of terrorism. Iran is no friend to the United 

States, to Christians, to Jews, or even Sunni Muslims. Iran is a 

rogue nation hell-bent on nuclear war in the Middle East. 

A responsible President who loves his country and supports our 

allies would never lift sanctions and give this murderous regime 

money, much less billions. This deal is a strain on our national 

character. Our next President we can only hope will terminate this 

nonsense and promote freedom, accountability, and opportunity 

overseas, not a regime that stones women, hangs homosexuals, and 

kills members of other religions and political beliefs. 

White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest suggested I show up 

to the Oversight Committee. Well, here I am. Where is Ben 

Rhodes? I guess you can run and hide. 

Now, Mr. Doran, much of the news coverage recently had focused 

on Mr. Rhodes and the lies and misinformation that he had spun 

relating to the Iran deal. However, we know that no one operates 

in a vacuum. Does Mr. Rhodes represent a rogue employee of the 

White House or does this spin campaign represent something more 

deeply about how the White House handled the Iran deal? 

Mr. DORAN. I believe it represents the President’s strategic vision 

and the President’s will. He—the President is on record as early as 

2006 saying that he wanted to improve relations with Iran and 

Syria and that he saw Iran and Syria as sharing core interests and 

stabilizing Iraq and that we should work with them to do that. 

I don’t think he ever lost that. I think —— 

Mr. GOSAR. So you would say that he actually is ultimately responsible for developing this frame of capitulation? 

Mr. DORAN. Absolutely. And it’s the—that’s the key factor to understand why we made all of these concessions to Iran because 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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we’re not actually trying to stop it from getting a nuclear weapon. 

We’re trying to develop a partnership with it. 

Mr. GOSAR. Yes. Unfortunately, as you said, the lies and misrepresentation that are deeply woven deep within the Iran capitulation agreement are just the latest example of a culture of deception that has been this administration’s MO since its inception. 

Let’s not forget that this is the same administration that sold the 

American people out to the insurance companies under the guise 

of health care reform. The President’s congressional minions drove 

a legislative garbage truck full of special interest giveaways 

through Congress and over Americans’ pocketbooks by knowingly 

and willfully repeating the lie, ‘‘If you like your doctor, you can 

keep your doctor.’’ 

This is the same administration that blatantly violated Federal 

law by engaging in unlawful lobbying in order to promote its 

Waters of the United States regulation. The Government Accountability Office confirmed that the executive branch, under the direction of EPA Administrator McCarthy, unleashed an illegal propaganda campaign in order to force WOTUS down the throats of the 

American people. 

Mr. Rubin, it is clear that the Obama administration had a covert agenda to reach a deal with Iran at any cost that was driven 

more by the optics of diplomacy and legacy than the real facts on 

the ground. What are the dangers of such a narrative-driven approach to policy-making? 

Mr. RUBIN. When one calibrates policy to a fantasy that is constructed rather than to reality, the cost is often paid with blood. 

Iran has not become any less of a terror sponsor as a result of the 

JCPOA. In fact, if we take the—if we just take the $50 billion figure, that’s 10 times the annual official budget of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 

One thing I would do, sir, productively, is take the ability of the 

State Department, take the ability to designate state sponsors of 

terrorism out of the hands of the State Department and put it in 

an independent commission so it doesn’t become a political football. 

Mr. GOSAR. I thank the gentleman. And this behavior has become the status quo for an Obama administration that has blatantly disregarded the rule of law and the respect for the American 

people to enact its partisan agenda. It is a dangerous precedent 

and it needs to be stopped by Congress. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

I will now recognize the gentlewoman from the District of Columbia, Ms. Norton, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. NORTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Now, we can re-litigate the Iran deal as much of the testimony 

attempted to do or we can discuss the central allegation that 

brought us to this hearing. It is of course—and that is what I 

would like to pursue, that essentially Republicans, my colleagues 

accuse Ben Rhodes of misleading the American people by claiming 

that the Obama administration began negotiating the deal, and the 

operative year is 2013 after Iran elected a so-called moderate president. The claim is that if the American people knew that the PresiVerDate Sep 11 2014 11:36 Dec 06, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\22276.TXT APRIL

AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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dent was working towards the agreement before 2013, they would 

have rejected the deal. 

So here is how the claim is worded in the New York Times Magazine, that Rhodes ‘‘shaped the story’’ of the Iran deal, that the 

Iran deal began in 2013 when a moderate faction within the Iranian regime beat the hardliners, leading to an election where there 

was ‘‘more openness.’’ 

So the author says that Mr. Rhodes claimed the story began in 

2013. That is what brought us here, gentlemen. But the problem 

is that isn’t true. The President’s efforts with respect to Iran were 

widely reported from the time he became President, so I am going 

to ask that a clip from the Washington Post 2008 when the President became President be posted. It describes how the Iranian 

President wrote to President Obama after he was elected in 2008. 

Now, you are all a panel of so-called experts. I assume you read 

the Washington Post on occasion. Were you not aware of this 2008 

report? Were any of you unaware of that 2008 report? 

Mr. HANNAH. I don’t remember the report exactly, Congresswoman, but I think you’re exactly right that in fact everybody 

knew going into that election that President Obama had made 

clear that he thought he would be the one to end our three-decadeold war —— 

Ms. NORTON. But this is about —— 

Mr. HANNAH.—with the Islamic Republic. 

Ms. NORTON.—negotiating the agreement itself and about being 

in touch with the Iranian regime before there was a regime change. 

Let’s go to the Washington Times in 2009. I assume you read the 

Washington Times. It describes how President Obama sent two letters to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. Now, that is 

2009. This is well before 2013. There are many reports from every 

year of the administration. This is why this hearing befuddles me. 

Two thousand ten from The Economist, Mr. Obama says the various components of his policy should not be seen in insolation. 

First, he tried to engage Iran early and directly not because he was 

naive about the regime but in order to make clear to the world that 

America was not the aggressor and he was willing to work with 

Iran if it behaved reasonably. 

Two thousand eleven from The Atlantic, ‘‘On three occasions in 

as many years U.S. diplomats have sat down’’—this is 2011—‘‘with 

high-level Iranian officials to discuss confidence-building measures 

as part of a six-party body negotiating issue.’’ 

Two thousand twelve—all of this is before 2013—United States 

and Iran have agreed in principle for the first time to one-on-one 

negotiations from Iran’s nuclear program. Now, you are supposed 

to be experts. Some other experts not invited here have said that 

it is nonsense that only after regime change did the President 

begin to negotiate. 

Joe Cirincione, the president of Ploughshares Fund, called it 

utter nonsense. Suzanne Maloney of the Brookings Institution 

agreed, and she explained the core claims of official deception 

around the Iran deal were never actually substantiated. 

Now, none of these experts, so that we could have some balanced 

picture, were called here. Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, by not inviting these experts, we are getting a very one-sided story —— 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Chairman CHAFFETZ. Will the gentlewoman yield? 

Ms. NORTON. I will yield to the chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Democrats always, always have an opportunity to invite a witness to come to this hearing. Democrats chose 

not to invite a witness to this hearing. And the person we called 

from the White House, Mr. Rhodes, also refused to show up. 

Ms. NORTON. I understand, Mr. Chairman, and the ranking 

member has already indicated that had there been time —— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I am just responding to your —— 

Ms. NORTON. That had there been time, there would have been 

a Democratic witness. I thank you very much, and I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I will now recognize the gentleman from 

Ohio, Mr. Jordan, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. JORDAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, are any of you familiar with the name Jonathan 

Gruber? Mr. Doran, do you know Jonathan Gruber? Do you know 

that name? 

Mr. DORAN. It rings a bell, but I can’t call it up. 

Mr. JORDAN. Anyone, Mr. Rubin, do you know Mr. Gruber? 

Mr. RUBIN. I know the name. 

Mr. JORDAN. You know the name? Do you know what he does 

for—you know, what his occupation is? 

Mr. HANNAH. I think he’s an economist who was enlisted to help 

with the health care reform. Yes, sir. Yes. 

Mr. JORDAN. Yes, the famous guy who was—and do you know 

what title he was given when he was helping with ObamaCare and 

health care reform? Do you know what he was titled, anyone remember? Architect of ObamaCare. And you know, that is one 

thing, you are the architect of ObamaCare and all, but he got a little notoriety in the press and actually had to come and sit right 

where you guys are sitting a few years ago. Any of you guys know 

why he was brought in front of the committee and had to sit here? 

Anyone want to take a guess? Mr. Rubin? 

Mr. RUBIN. Well, basically he lied about the cost of ObamaCare. 

Mr. JORDAN. Yes. He was deceptive, right? He said things like 

this. He talked about the stupidity of the American voter. He 

talked about—this is a direct quote. He was out bragging after this 

thing is passed, ‘‘Lack of transparency is a political advantage.’’ 

That is a nice way of saying if you deceive people, you might get 

your way, right? It might help your case. 

So here is Jonathan Gruber, architect of ObamaCare, talking 

about deception, things like if you like your plan, you can keep it, 

like your doctor, you can keep it, premiums are going to go down, 

Web site is going to work, Web site is safe, emergency room—everything turned out to be false. 

And now, we hear about another person in the Obama administration, Mr. Rhodes. He comes along and he is given the title, according to the piece in the New York Times, ‘‘the single most influential voice shaping American foreign policy.’’ Wow, things are 

starting to sound familiar. And he creates a false narrative as well, 

talks about this echo chamber and deceiving the press. And his derision for the press is kind of like Mr. Gruber’s derision for the 

American voter because he says something like—what is the line 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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he used there—‘‘they literally know nothing’’ was one of the lines 

that I think Mr. Rhodes used in his piece. 

Mr. Rubin, you talked about this false choice, I think, in your 

opening statement that Mr. Rhodes set up and used this echo 

chamber of folks who ‘‘literally know nothing’’ to further this message to the American people, this binary choice, either it is the deal 

or it is war. That is what he set up, right? 

Mr. RUBIN. Yes. 

Mr. JORDAN. And the thing that strikes me, Mr. Chairman—and 

I won’t take my full time here. I just wanted to make this point. 

So this isn’t the first time this administration, on some big policy 

decision, has deceived the American people. But maybe more importantly, it is not in my judgment the first time Mr. Rhodes, on 

a big policy issue, on a big concern to the American people, has 

tried to deceive them. 

And, Mr. Rubin, you are getting ready to say something. Go 

ahead. 

Mr. RUBIN. Well, I mean, the deception comes oftentimes in the 

way of cherry-picking. If we want to look at previous Iranian offers 

or acknowledgements of letters, for example, what’s actually interesting is when Supreme Leader Khomeini, on the 30th anniversary 

of the seizure of the American embassy, a seizure for which no Iranian reformist or hardliner has ever apologized, mocked President 

Obama for the letters he was sending and said we are not going 

to talk to the Americans until they fundamentally change their position. 

And so one of the reasons why we need this transparency, this 

transparency about what you’re saying, is sometime around 2012 

the Americans fundamentally changed their position but didn’t 

come clean to the American people about it. 

Mr. JORDAN. Yes, I thank you for that. 

Let me just finish up with this, then, just to, I think, make this 

point. Mr. Gruber deceives the American people on ObamaCare, 

along comes Mr. Rhodes on the Iranian deal, uses deception to create this false choice and help get this agreement passed. And as 

I said, this is not the first time Mr. Rhodes has done. It is not the 

first time the administration has done, more importantly, not the 

first time Mr. Rhodes has done it. I think he did it on the Benghazi 

issue. I think he did it there as well when he said in the now-famous talking points, which frankly became the catalyst for the formation—the reason the House of Representatives and the Speaker 

formed the committee when he created this false choice between— 

it is not a failure of policy; it is rooted in a video, and straight from 

the talking points. 

And so, again, the pattern with the administration, what appears 

to be a pattern with Mr. Rhodes himself, and then when he is 

given the ask to come testify doesn’t even have the courtesy to 

show up. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my 4 seconds. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I will now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. 

Lynch, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 

panel. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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I can’t let this go. Earlier, Mr. Doran said that if only the President had been up front about withdrawing from the Middle East. 

I have to say that, you know, the President was clearly—during his 

campaign going back to 2007, 2008, I mean ad nauseam. At the 

time that the President took office, we had about 165,000 troops 

and 180,000 contractors in Iraq, and he went on and on about the 

fact that he was going to get those people out of there, that he was 

going to withdraw from the Middle East. I think he got elected 

based on that claim. 

But he was like Trump does with we are going to build the wall, 

we are going to make America great again, President Obama, during his campaign, he went on and on. He hammered away at that 

and said if I get elected, I am going to withdraw those troops. I am 

going to get—in the first 16 months—I went back and read it—he 

said in the first 16 months he is going to get all the combat brigades out of Iraq. So he was very much up front about that. He 

was perfectly clear on that. 

The other fiction here is that the American people were tricked 

by Ben Rhodes. And remember, we were the audience, us here. 

They were trying to get the bill, the Iran agreement through Congress. So we are the ones getting all the information. And I have 

to say I was never tricked by Ben Rhodes. And with all due respect 

to Ben Rhodes, in terms of the merits of that agreement, he was 

probably not as qualified as a lot of the other people that were coming to Congress and testifying before both, you know, Republican 

and Democratic caucuses. 

We had a list of experts. It is very lengthy, but I will just hit 

on a few. We had 78 nuclear nonproliferation experts, 60 national 

security experts, 5 former ambassadors to Israel, 29 Nobel Prizewinning scientists, 36 retired generals, over 100 former U.S. ambassadors, and over 500 Iranian-Americans with experience both in 

the U.S. and Iran, 340 rabbis, 53 Christian leaders. These scientists included physicists who helped design the first hydrogen 

bomb. 

So we had stone-cold experts on this. We were not listening to 

Ben Rhodes. And those are the people that—and I actually sat with 

one of the experts from the IAEA about what he thought after having been in Iran and at some of their—at ARAK, at Fordow, at 

Natanz and what they actually thought about the ability of this 

agreement to stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. So those 

are the people that we also listened to. It wasn’t Ben Rhodes and, 

you know, some political spin. 

But I would say that if we are really trying to measure this 

agreement—and that seems what is going on here; we are all rehashing this agreement again—I think the best way would be to 

go to the IAEA because under the agreement they are the ones 

that we have put on the ground and asked them to do these inspections. 

And so I would just like to—for the record, I am going to ask 

have admitted the first two reports, January and February, by the 

IAEA, the international agency, verification for monitoring in the 

Islamic Republic of Iran in light of the United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 2231. So this is an inspection done by the IAEA 

because of the agreement. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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And some of the things—I will just tell you what they report. I 

will just give you the greatest hits. They determined that ARAK— 

they went into A–R-A–K—everybody things I’m saying Iraq—but 

ARAK heavy water research reactor and they determined that Iran 

was not pursuing the construction of the existing IR–40 reactor. 

They had removed the existing calandria from that reactor, and 

they had rendered the calandria inoperable by filling it with concrete, which is part of the agreement. They had stored under continuous conditions—continuous agency monitoring all existing natural uranium pellets and fuel pursuant to the agreement. They 

modified the fuel process line at the fuel manufacturing plant at 

Isfahan so that it cannot be used for the fabrication of fuel. Iran 

was not accumulating enriched uranium through its enrichment research and development activities. 

Let’s see. It goes on. I got 27 seconds left. A lot of good stuff in 

here. And these are people who have actually been in Iran doing 

the inspections. Iran at Fordow was not conducting any uranium 

enrichment, had removed all of its nuclear material at Fordow. 

This was all pursuant to the agreement. 

And I am getting to 8 seconds. Had completed the modalities and 

facility inspection arrangements to allow the agency to implement 

all the transparency measures provided in the agreement. 

So that is what the IAEA is exactly doing, and, you know, that 

is part of the agreement. That is what we put them for. 

The great advantage to us no matter what happens in the future 

is that up to the time that this agreement was signed we never had 

people on the ground in those facilities. We were always guessing 

about the level of progress they had made on their nuclear weapons 

program. Now, we have people on the ground. 

So even if they breach, we will have had the benefit of having 

people on the ground looking at those facilities, and for military 

purpose or diplomatic purposes, that is a good thing. 

I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman, and we will enter 

those into the record unless there is an objection. 

Mr. LYNCH. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. No objection, so ordered. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I now recognize the gentleman from South 

Carolina, Mr. Gowdy. 

Mr. GOWDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank you for not only the panel that is before us but 

the panel you tried to have before us. Not only did Ben Rhodes not 

appear and cost us an opportunity to question Mr. Rhodes, it cost 

us the opportunity and the privilege to ask questions of our friend 

and colleague Tommy Cotton. Speaking of constitutional crisis, 

hauling a United States Senator before a committee of Congress 

would really have created a constitutional crisis, so good thing for 

us Tommy was willing to come on his own. 

And the background contrast would have been interesting to me. 

You know, the White House is very critical of Senator Cotton and 

has been for several months now. Senator Cotton, of course, when 

he was serving tours of duty in the United States Army in Afghanistan and Iraq, Ben Rhodes was navigating the mean streets of a 

creative writing curriculum. And I mean that literally. That is not 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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figurative. He has a master’s in creative writing. And if you are interested in writing haikus and sonnets and novellas, he is probably 

the right guy. 

On the other hand, if you are advising the leader of the free 

world on foreign policy matters, I don’t know how a haiku helps. 

But I would have enjoyed the opportunity to ask Mr. Rhodes how 

his background prepared him to sell the Iranian deal, but yet 

Tommy Cotton’s background did not prepare him to criticize the 

Iranian deal. That would have been an interesting dichotomy for 

me. 

But what I really wanted to do, Mr. Chairman, was ask Mr. 

Rhodes to help me, as Gruber did in the past, understand what he 

meant by certain things. Mr. Chairman, he said ‘‘we created an 

echo chamber.’’ Does the chairman know who ‘‘we’’ is? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I do not. 

Mr. GOWDY. Well, certainly he couldn’t be referring to other presidential advisors because he then invoked executive privilege and 

he can’t be talking about what other presidential advisors said. So 

it couldn’t be that, could it? I don’t —— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I do not know. 

Mr. GOWDY. Okay. Well, then he said, ‘‘Reporters call us to explain to them what is happening in Moscow and Cairo.’’ And I am 

curious which reporters that would be. Which ones call him to find 

out what is going on in Cairo? But we can’t ask him because he 

is not here. 

And I would add he has plenty of time to sit down for what he 

had hoped to be a fluff piece in the New York Times. He has been 

on television plenty of times. He had plenty of time to draft memos 

for the President, but he doesn’t have time to come before a committee of Congress. 

And then this is what really concerns me, Mr. Chairman. In talking about those reporters, he said ‘‘they literally know nothing.’’ 

How does someone literally know nothing? He said they were 27 

years old, which suggests that they probably have a driver’s license 

at that point. You have to know something to get a driver’s license. 

If they are 27, they would be eligible to vote in the Democrat primary more than likely, so you have to know something. So when 

you say they literally know nothing, that struck me. I wanted to 

ask him about that. 

Also, I think that his appearance today, had he bothered to come, 

would have created an opportunity for a little bit of bipartisanship, 

which I know our friends on the other side of the aisle like from 

time to time. It said he expressed contempt for the editors and reporters at the New York Times, the Washington Post, and The 

New Yorker. That might have provided an opportunity for some bipartisanship. It would have given us an opportunity to share our 

own frustrations. But he didn’t come. 

Mr. Chairman, you do a great job leading this committee. It is 

up to you whether or not you assert the people’s right to question 

Ben Rhodes, but this selective use of executive privilege on one day 

but it is not executive privilege on the next, at some point Congress 

is going to have to stick up for itself. We are going to have to decide whether or not we do have a right to question people. And if 

you have time to make these comments to a reporter, you ought to 


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be able to come explain yourself. And if you have time at the White 

House to send a bunch of mean tweets about a guy who served two 

tours, two combat tours in Tommy Cotton and he is willing to 

come, but the creative writing expert isn’t willing to come, at some 

point this body is going to have to stick up for itself. 

With that, I would yield back to the chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I will now recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And lordy, lordy, the outrage of my friend from South Carolina 

does a heart good, does a heart good. 

From my point of view, this hearing is nothing but a smokescreen, yet another in a long chain of attempts by my friends on 

the other side of the aisle to deny what is manifestly true, that the 

Iran nuclear agreement is working. It is not a panacea for all Iranian behavior, though they would like you to believe that, just as 

disarmament agreements with the Soviet Union, our implacable foe 

during the cold war, were also not designed to address every aspect 

of Soviet behavior, would that they could, but they are not designed 

to be the be-all and end-all to circumscribe an entire relationship. 

But they were designed and this was designed for a specific set of 

goals. 

And Lord Almighty, we had a hearing in the House Foreign Affairs Committee where again my friends on the other side of the 

aisle desperately wanted not to talk about compliance, but being 

the skunk at the picnic, I did. And let me see. In terms of compliance, we found that the agreement has reduced the number of centrifuges, as planned, from 19,000 to 6,104, that the fuel enrichment 

plants at Natanz and Fordow saw those centrifuges reduced. Iran 

is no longer enriching uranium above 3.67 percent, verified by the 

IAEA, as my friend Mr. Lynch indicated, and has reduced its stockpile of enriched uranium, as required, to no more than 300 kilograms shipped out of the country, verified. Centrifuge production 

in uranium mines and mills under constant surveillance and 

verified, and of course the plutonium production capability eliminated. 

I asked point blank is there any evidence of cheating because 

that is all we heard. They were going to cheat, they couldn’t be 

trusted, and this was nothing but enabling behavior to allow Iran 

to become a nuclear threshold state, and the answer was no, so far, 

no cheating. 

Now, my friend from South Carolina—we are friends; we are 

sometimes sparring partners—just is all exorcised about the fact 

that somebody, God knoweth why, would not accept a friendly invitation to come before this committee because we are a very hospitable environment to witnesses. And once in a while we deny 

them their Fifth Amendment rights, once in a while we badger 

them, once in a while we call them names, once in a while we censor them, a lot of times we interrupt them when we don’t like their 

testimony, but they ought to come here nonetheless. 

You are lucky, Mr. Rubin. You are really lucky to be here today. 

Mr. Hannah, when you received an invitation from the Senate 

Intelligence Committee in 2006, did you accept that invitation? 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. HANNAH. I don’t remember getting an invitation. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, actually, it is in the committee report. Did 

you not see that report? 

Mr. HANNAH. I must —— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. They published a report. 

Mr. HANNAH.—not have. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. What? 

Mr. HANNAH. I must not have. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well —— 

Mr. HANNAH. I don’t recall. 

Mr. CONNOLLY.—let me help refresh your memory because they 

issued a final report, and they said that every request made to you 

for an interview was denied. And it concludes, ‘‘These decisions inhibited the committee’s ability to pursue legitimate lines of inquiry.’’ Any reason why you would say no to the Senate Intelligence 

Committee when it was under Democratic—actually, it wasn’t 

under Democratic control in 2006, but you still said no. And that 

doesn’t refresh your memory? 

Mr. HANNAH. It doesn’t refresh it, but I can tell you that there 

was obviously—especially in the office of the Vice President—counsel there was a very aggressive proponent of executive —— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Go ahead. Say it. 

Mr. HANNAH. You say it for me. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Was that word coming out? 

Mr. HANNAH. Executive privilege. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Privilege, there you go. So for a Republican 

White House, it is perfectly okay, and you had a very aggressive 

counsel saying you are not going, but here, with somebody who 

gives a profile for a magazine where he boasts about himself, we 

have got to haul him in chains before this committee because we 

are being denied access, and that is wrong. And you have agreed 

to testify about it, knowing that. So do you think Mr. Rhodes 

should be here in a way that you were not 10 years ago? 

Mr. HANNAH. In our administration what I remember is that Dr. 

Rice, when she was in her capacity as NSC advisor, actually did 

testify. So I think there —— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I am talking about you, Mr. Hannah. You were 

named by the Senate Intelligence Committee by name and singled 

out for your refusal to make yourself available to that committee 

when it was doing its work. Was there less gravity to the issue at 

hand 10 years ago involving you than there is today involving Mr. 

Rhodes? 

Mr. HANNAH. Issues were very grave in both cases, I think. I 

think Mr. Rhodes actually is a more influential player than I am 

—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right. 

Mr. HANNAH.—and he’s been willing to talk about all of these 

issues —— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well —— 

Mr. HANNAH.—so openly and with such contempt for so many 

people —— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well —— 

Mr. HANNAH.—that —— 

Mr. CONNOLLY.—we are glad to have you here —— 


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Mr. HANNAH.—I think he’s in a different —— 

Mr. CONNOLLY.—today talking as well. 

Mr. HANNAH.—situation. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I am sure my colleagues 10 years ago —— 

Mr. HICE. [Presiding] The gentleman’s time is expired. 

Mr. CONNOLLY.—would have enjoyed having you. 

One good aggressive White House counsel deserves another, Mr. 

Chairman. Thank you. 

Mr. HICE. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

The chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. DeSantis, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would think that Ben Rhodes would be falling all over himself 

to come here. I mean, he seems to think he is so much smarter 

than everybody. Well, educate everybody. Tell us why those of us 

who oppose this were wrong. Show us what we are missing. Educate the American people. I think it would have been a great opportunity for him if, in, fact he is as smart and worldly as he says. 

And I think part of this, yes, there is deception involved, and any 

time a major policy is sold to the Congress or the public, that is 

a major, major thing. Rhodes himself said that the Iran deal was 

going to be the ObamaCare of the second term. 

And of course with ObamaCare in the first term, the President 

famously said over and over again, if you like your plan, you can 

keep it, if you like your plan, you can keep it. Not only was that 

not true, the administration knew at the time it would not be true, 

and yet they did it in order to engineer passage of ObamaCare. 

And then with this deal, the President was in the presidential 

debate in 2012. He said the deal is very simple that I will accept. 

They end their nuclear program. It is pretty straightforward, he 

says. And of course what we see now is Iran retains really a major, 

major nuclear program. I believe they are on a path to a bomb at 

worst once the time the 8, the 15 years goes up. 

So there is a lot, I think, that is important about that, and it important to talk about it. But I also think that some of what we are 

talking about with Rhodes, for example, the idea that, well, 

Rouhani’s election really changes everything because this guy is a 

moderate, never mind that he would never have been allowed to 

run by the Ayatollah if he truly wanted to change the nature of the 

regime. So you have a regime that is the world’s leading state 

sponsor of terrorism. You have a regime which, you know, people 

fail to mention that they were responsible for as many as 1,500 

American deaths in Iraq. They were leading the Qods Force, 

Soleimani, they were funding these massive EFP bombs, which 

took out at least hundreds of our soldiers and probably as many 

as 1,500. 

So that is the nature of the regime. And the notion that was 

propagated, and Rhodes is honest about it, he says, look, this is an 

opening, it is a new—we have got to take this opportunity. It is a 

once-in-a-generation opportunity. Well, it turns out they never believed that. They knew that this regime—in fact, they were negotiating with the regime before Rouhani had ever been elected, and 

so all that was kind of a ruse to camouflage the basic policy. 


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And I think Mr. Doran hit on it. This is a policy that understands the radial nature of the Iranian regime, understands the 

hostile nature of the Iranian regime, and is doing a deal with those 

hardliners to effectively solidify those hardliners. And they think 

that that is the way to have a more peaceful world. 

And so the deception is important just for itself, but what it really masked is when we were going through all this—this is the biggest thing we have done this Congress—I thought that John Kerry 

and the President and these people were very naive about how they 

conceded the Iranian regime. It turns out they really weren’t that 

naive. They knew exactly what we knew and they still wanted to 

go ahead with it. And so that is why I think it is very, very troubling. 

And then we are seeing that now play out with really gratuitous 

concessions such as giving Iran indirect access to the American dollar. That wasn’t even called for by the Iran deal, and yet that is 

something that the administration is doing. 

And so I think that this is important. There are few—I don’t 

think we have done an issue this important in the Congress in 

years and years. And so the idea that you are not up front with 

the American people is very important, but I think what this 

should allow us to do, I would like to tease out the implications 

now of this policy with somebody like Mr. Rhodes. 

So, Mr. Doran, what is your view? I mean, it seems like Rouhani 

as a moderate, they admit it is a ruse, so they knew very well the 

nature of the regime, and they think that effectively us unilaterally 

stepping back from having a confrontational posture with Iran is 

going to be better for the world security? 

Mr. DORAN. I think that’s right. I think the President has a vision of the Middle East as a kind of roundtable now. The security 

architecture is a kind of roundtable and we have all the stakeholders around the roundtable, and the Iranians are stakeholders. 

And the assumption is that if we start treating them with respect 

and respecting their interests that they’ll come toward us and that 

they—the key assumption—I think the key false assumption here 

is that they share the same interests that we do, the same core interests, this defeating ISIS, stabilizing Iraq, and so on. 

I think particularly relevant are the views of Fred Hof at the Atlantic Council, who was President Obama’s point man on Syria 

from 2009 to 2012. He’s somebody who understands the—you 

know, there’s nobody that’s been closer to the Obama administration’s policies on Syria than Fred Hof. And he has now come 

around to the view that President Obama has in effect recognized 

Syria as an Iranian sphere of interest and did so in order to reach 

the agreement with them. 

Mr. DESANTIS. Well, I appreciate it. I think the upshot of all this, 

the nuclear obviously very significant, but even beyond that, Iran 

is really emerging as the dominant power in the region. How you 

can see that is good for our security is beyond me. And I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Cartwright, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


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And, Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to associate myself 

with the words of Representative Lynch of Massachusetts and also 

Representative Maloney of New York. I don’t think it is possible to 

overstate the amount of study that went into the Iran deal on both 

sides of the aisle, and it is with great regret that I see it has 

turned into a political football the way it has. 

Mr. Hannah, let me get this straight. You drew up the false talking points for Colin Powell when he spoke in front of the U.N., and 

you wrote in the talking points that there were weapons of mass 

destruction in Iraq and that was what ended up in his speech. And 

that you are here today to question someone else’s credibility and 

somebody else’s professionalism. Am I getting that straight? 

Mr. HANNAH. Not exactly. I’m not sure I’m questioning his professionalism. I’m questioning the tactics that he used. We based 

our intelligence on the intelligence that was there. It was wrong. 

That was a mistake. It wasn’t any kind of purposeful desire to deceive or not give the American people what we —— 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. And you told us earlier in your testimony 

today that you drew up that speech not knowing if it was true, 

knowing that it would be vetted by the intelligence community, 

drawing it up as a piece of salesmanship to see if anything was 

true, and if it was, it would stick. Your words were quite clear on 

that. 

And one of the parts of the salesmanship was that this idea 

that—was that the Bush administration cooked up this idea that 

there was yellowcake uranium coming from the African nation of 

Niger going to Saddam Hussein, and it was the American Ambassador Joe Wilson who gave the lie to that fiction. He said it was 

a bunch of nonsense. In fact, he wrote an op-ed in the New York 

Times in 2003 in July debunking the claim that yellowcake uranium was going to Saddam Hussein from Niger. 

But, Mr. Hannah, you were one of Dick Cheney’s top national security advisors, you worked with Cheney, you worked with Scooter 

Libby before he was convicted. Surely you discussed Ambassador 

Wilson’s op-ed with him, with Vice President Cheney, especially 

since it was contradicting one of your key talking points in selling 

the war in Iraq. Did you talk about Ambassador Wilson’s op-ed in 

the New York Times with Vice President Cheney? 

Mr. HANNAH. I did not talk to the Vice President, but we did talk 

about it within the office and within the —— 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Did you talk to Scooter Libby about it? 

Mr. HANNAH. I’m almost sure I did, yes. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. All right. Well, Ambassador Wilson wrote, ‘‘It 

did not take long to conclude that it was highly doubtful that any 

such transaction had ever taken place.’’ He directly contradicted information that you put out publicly. In response, the Bush administration retaliated against him by publicly outing his wife Valerie 

Plame, who was a CIA operative at the time. 

Mr. Hannah, my question for you is what was your role in outing 

Valerie Plame as a CIA operative? 

Mr. HANNAH. I had no role in outing Valerie Plame as a CIA operative. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Mr. Hannah, special counsel was appointed to 

investigate the criminal leak of classified information. It was PatVerDate Sep 11 2014 11:36 Dec 06, 2016 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\22276.TXT APRIL

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rick Fitzgerald, special counsel. He concluded that there was—and 

I am quoting here—‘‘concerted action by multiple people in the 

White House to discredit, punish, or seek revenge against Ambassador Wilson.’’ Do you dispute those findings? 

Mr. HANNAH. I haven’t looked at them. I—yes, I dispute the way 

that the name of Valerie Plame reached the press. It was by a person who seemed to have no desire—was in the State Department. 

Deputy Secretary Armitage happened to mention her in a conversation with a reporter. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Mr. Hannah, the Bush administration smeared 

Ambassador Wilson and his wife, ruined her career, sacrificed a national security asset in the CIA all because Ambassador Wilson had 

the temerity to debunk your false claims, and he told the truth. 

Your boss and Dick Cheney’s chief of staff Scooter Libby was convicted but then President Bush commuted his prison time. That is 

correct, isn’t it? 

Mr. HANNAH. I don’t think those are the exact—he was never 

charged with releasing the name of a covert CIA operative. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. The second voice and that you talked about 

outing Valerie Plame, that was Karl Rove, wasn’t it? 

Mr. HANNAH. I have no idea. I know Karl’s name was in there 

but I had no dealings with Karl. 

Mr. CARTWRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I now recognize the gentleman from North 

Carolina, Mr. Meadows, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Rubin, let me come to you because as these decisions continue to get made with regards to the validity of the Iran deal as 

we would call it, decisions by Members of Congress hinge on very 

small sometimes often minute pieces of information where they can 

justify going one way or another. Do you believe that some of the 

statements by Mr. Rhodes was a factor at all in some of the Members of Congress casting their vote one way or another? 

Mr. RUBIN. Yes, and I can give you examples if you would like. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Please. 

Mr. RUBIN. Well, first of all, when it comes to verification, according to U.S. law, incumbent with the Corker-Cardin compromise, all agreements are supposed to be presented to Congress. 

Now, it emerges that there were secret side agreements with the 

IAEA. One of these secret side agreements that comes into play 

with regard to verification is that the State Department decreed 

that the IAEA would not need to report to the level it had reported 

under sanctions, especially with regard to the possible military dimensions. So to say that the IAEA said that verification—that Iran 

is complying with the deal, that’s like bragging that someone is the 

valedictorian of the summer school class. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So —— 

Mr. RUBIN. So it becomes a major problem. It lets them off the 

hook, and we only found out about that afterwards because the 

White House kept it secret. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Well, we have had sworn testimony both in a 

number of House committees and Senate committees where the 

sworn testimony by administration officials were that there are no 


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and were no secret side agreements. Would you say that that is a 

credible argument under sworn testimony to make? 

Mr. RUBIN. They are lying to Congress. 

Mr. MEADOWS. All right. So that is a pretty bold statement, Mr. 

Rubin, that they are lying to Congress. So if we go back and look 

at the tapes when they say that there was no side agreements in 

sworn testimony, do you think it is incumbent upon this committee 

to hold those particular individuals who gave sworn testimony in 

contempt of Congress? 

Mr. RUBIN. Yes. 

Mr. MEADOWS. Thank you, Mr. Rubin. 

And let me go on a little bit further because the troubling aspect 

of this is for somehow members on the other side of the aisle to 

suggest that there is wrongdoing in previous administrations that 

would justify wrongdoing in a current administration. 

Is it your opinion, Mr. Rubin, that regardless of who the administration might be, whether it be Republican or Democrat, that it is 

incumbent upon them to be honest and straightforward with Congress when they are negotiating something of this type of magnitude? 

Mr. RUBIN. Yes. National security should not be a political football. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So is it your sworn testimony here today that because of the talking points of Mr. Rhodes and the inaccuracy or, 

as you would characterize them, lying that took place, that the 

whole debate that transpired within Congress was based on faulty 

assumptions that had no relevance or relationship to truth? 

Mr. RUBIN. It was almost as if instead of looking at the whole 

chessboard the White House was just directing Congress to look at 

four pieces. 

Mr. MEADOWS. So if we were only looking at four pieces and 

something that is so critical to national security and to the security 

of our all Israel, do you think that it was disingenuous to suggest 

that some of the talking points that were coming out of the Israeli 

Government were indeed characterized as being dishonest and not 

truthful—do you think an apology is owed by this administration 

to that government? 

Mr. RUBIN. You know, this administration has a sorry record at 

this point of coddling adversaries and throwing allies under the 

bus. Perhaps apologies are due when domestic Washington politics 

got in the way of serious foreign-policy discourse. 

Mr. MEADOWS. I thank you, Mr. Rubin, and, Mr. Chairman, I 

yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I will now recognize the gentleman from Vermont, Mr. Welch, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. WELCH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

At the heart of this is a question whether this was—the one 

faced by the President, is an Iran without nuclear weapons better 

for our national security, for the Middle East and for the world 

than an Iran with nuclear weapons? That was the question. 

And the engagement of Mr. Rhodes was one significant person 

among hundreds, and along with our best allies, France, Germany, 

England, and also our sometimes frenemies China and Russia. And 


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the collective decision of those countries and us was that the Iran 

nuclear deal was in our collective interest. 

Now, there was fierce disagreement about that among the witnesses and among many of my colleagues here in Congress, but 

this was a long and complex negotiation that was ultimately ratified by our strongest allies. And there was a judgment that the 

Commander in Chief had to make as to whether or not this agreement was in the national security interest of this country. 

I agreed with him. I worked closely with Mr. Rhodes and found 

him to be an exceptional public servant, knowledgeable, and despite what you are saying, candid and direct. 

Let me just ask a couple questions here because the decision the 

President made was in contrast to decisions that a previous President made. Do each of you believe that the American people got the 

right information that there were weapons of mass destruction in 

Iraq, each of you, Iraq? Thank you. 

Mr. HANNAH. No, it’s shown that it was false. 

Mr. WELCH. Right. 

Mr. DORAN. No. 

Mr. RUBIN. No, the American people got what the intelligence 

community believed. 

Mr. WELCH. Who has supervisory authority over the intelligence 

community, sir, Mr. Rubin? 

Mr. RUBIN. Congress. 

Mr. WELCH. The President has no role? 

Mr. RUBIN. The buck stops with the President, but if we’re talking about oversight —— 

Mr. WELCH. You —— 

Mr. RUBIN.—that’s what separation of powers is about. 

Mr. WELCH. All right. So you are saying—and by the way, I will 

go along with this. Congress blew it on the Iraq resolution. But are 

you suggesting to me that there is not ultimate responsibility for 

making the decision in evaluating the recommendations of the intelligence community on the matter of sending our troops to war, 

of spending trillions of dollars, throwing the Mideast up into upheaval, and he is not the one who ultimately bears the responsibility for that decision? 

Mr. RUBIN. The President made the decision to go to war. I’m not 

willing to put the broad instability in the Middle East on his shoulders. 

Mr. WELCH. I was —— 

Mr. RUBIN. The Middle East needs to be accountable —— 

Mr. WELCH. All right. 

Mr. RUBIN.—for the Middle East. 

Mr. WELCH. Second thing. So we went into this war in Iraq, we 

toppled Saddam Hussein, we were promised we would make money 

on the war. That was testimony from some of the President’s advisors. It will be over in 60 days and the troops would be greeted 

with flowers in the street. It didn’t work out that way. 

Afghanistan, the longest war in the history of this country, we 

still have troops there. The place is a mess, nation-building, an arrogant policy embraced by a prior administration, didn’t work out 

so great. Any of you think that Afghanistan is on a solid footing 


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for democracy at the moment, just a yes or no if I can get that from 

each of you? 

Mr. RUBIN. No. 

Mr. WELCH. Sir? 

Mr. DORAN. No. 

Mr. HANNAH. No. 

Mr. WELCH. Sir? 

Mr. HANNAH. No. 

Mr. WELCH. All right. So we have to President who says, you 

know what, this war approach isn’t so great, and he had to make 

a decision and he said, look, let’s try negotiations. I supported sanctions. Every tough sanction that we were able to impose on Iran 

I supported, as did virtually all of the Democrats and Republicans. 

You know what? The sanctions work. It brought Iran to the table. 

In this decision you are focusing on this fine public servant, Ben 

Rhodes, because of a newspaper article is something that then disregards the fact that we blew it in Iraq, we are blowing it in Afghanistan, and the President decided to pursue negotiations, got an 

agreement, and had the full support of those allies, the P5+1. 

So if there are implementation issues, let’s get on it. I am all for 

that. But to sit here and to suggest with this history of failure 

when war is the option that we should have done that, and that 

is essentially what the alternative was. That is essentially what 

the alternative was. I don’t buy it, and I don’t believe the American 

people buy it, and we are picking and choosing trying to come up 

with some little detail that somebody somewhere said to suggest 

that we ought to unravel the whole thing. I disagree. 

I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The gentleman yields back. 

I now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Walker, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

On September 11, 2015, CNN stated, ‘‘The effort was one of the 

most aggressive lobbying drives ever to take shape between congressional Democrat leaders and the Obama White House on this 

bill H.R. 3461.’’ Now, among the people who voted no were 25 

Democrats. You heard today Mrs. Carolyn Maloney acknowledged 

that. She wasn’t the only one on this particular committee. There 

were others. 

My question is what did those 25 Members know that either the 

other Members did not know or sadly in some cases chose to ignore 

or even lobbied? In regards to Mr. Shapiro, we have heard a lot of 

talk today. You know, I am sure you guys may be dads, and it is 

always interesting when you confront one of your children and ask 

them if they did something wrong. The telltale sign or the giveaway is when they immediately acknowledged that another brother 

or sister did something wrong. That is what the smokescreen has 

been here today. You know, so much of the smokescreen has been 

about Mr. Hannah. Nobody wants to talk about Mr. Shapiro. 

But let me talk about the difference if I could just for a second. 

Here is a big difference between Mr. Hannah and Mr. Shapiro. Mr. 

Shapiro enjoyed running to the press sharing false information. Mr. 

Shapiro became the poster boy, almost the spokesperson of a 


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flawed and horrific Iranian deal. The words ‘‘anytime, anywhere’’ 

continue to ring true as far as even to this day. 

So my question, gentlemen, if you would please, whether intentional or not, did Mr. Shapiro in your opinion mislead the American public with this ‘‘anytime, anywhere,’’ multiple times, Mr. 

Rubin? 

Mr. RUBIN. Mr. Rhodes most certainly did. Now, the key here is 

that by lying about whether Rouhani was a moderate, he provided 

cover for the fact that the administration left Iran with 5,000 P– 

1 centrifuges and that the administration never had any hope, once 

this agreement expired, that the resulting Iran with an industrialscale nuclear program would be any different. And I should note, 

sir, that that’s the number of centrifuges which Pakistan built not 

a bomb but an arsenal. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Rubin. And maybe one correction. 

I said Mr. Shapiro. That would be Ben Rhodes. 

Mr. Doran? 

Mr. DORAN. Yes, I think he deceived the American people. 

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Hannah? 

Mr. HANNAH. If the article is accurate, yes, I think that he engaged in certain deceptions about what the administration was 

really up to and what we were facing in Iran. 

Mr. WALKER. The Iran agreement lifts restrictions on arms sales 

to Iran after 5 years and after 8 removes the ban on Iran developing ballistic missiles potentially capable of reaching the United 

States. Question, Mr. Rubin. Can you elaborate on the threat the 

ballistic missile capability poses to the United States? 

Mr. RUBIN. One of the problems I have with the reporting in the 

United States is people tend to pat themselves on the back every 

time there’s a failed missile test. The fact of the matter is you learn 

a lot from a failed missile test and Iran has made clear in its public 

statements that it intends to continue with its ballistic missiles 

until such a time as they can strike anywhere, anytime. 

I should also say a major flaw in the agreement is it bans the 

arms sales for 5 years for offensive weapons but never defines what 

offensive is, which is why Iran is on a shopping spree in Russia 

and China right now. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Rubin. 

Mr. Doran? 

Mr. DORAN. The—one of the things that the agreement did basically was remove ballistic missiles—effectively remove the ballistic 

missiles from the kind of sanctions that they were under by the 

change in language that the chairman mentioned. 

If the administration had told Congress before the deal that the 

deal was going to result in an Iranian-Russian military alliance 

which was going to intervene in Syria and result in a rise of Iranian power around the region, I think we would’ve had a very different debate. 

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Hannah, would you like to expound? 

Mr. HANNAH. I would say the only thing about—on the ballistic 

missile I think everything my colleagues have said is right. It essentially—Iran is determined to do this, and it’s important to note 

that the only really rational military use of these missiles is if you 


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can put a nuclear warhead on them. That makes them really militarily useful. 

And the fact that Iran is so dedicated to expanding and building 

out this program, including eventually an ICBM, not only being 

able to hit all of their neighbors, including Israel, but eventually 

at some point in time being able to hit the United States, the fact 

they’ve had such deep cooperation with North Korea over the years 

that already has an ICBM capable of ranging the United States 

makes you believe that this nuclear deal is only kicking the can 

down the road, and they fully intend at a point in time when 

they’re stronger and more able to stand up to sanctions and to 

American power to go ahead and, once restraints are limited, to go 

for a nuclear weapon. 

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, panel. With that, I yield back, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. 

I will now recognize the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Clay, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. CLAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the witnesses 

for being here today. 

Mr. Hannah, you worked for Dick Cheney. You actively participated in the preparation of Secretary Powell’s infamous speech to 

the United Nations about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. I 

find it incredibly ironic that the chairman invited you here to testify about false White House narratives, given your involvement in 

that debacle. 

One of the primary claims for war was that Saddam Hussein had 

so-called mobile labs that were roaming around inside Iraq manufacturing biological weapons. Secretary Powell showed a cartoon 

drawing of one of these mobile labs during his speech to the United 

Nations. We have a slide of it. Could someone please put it up on 

the screen? 

[Slide.] 

Mr. CLAY. Oh, there it is. Those are the mobile labs. Mr. Hannah, who drew this picture? 

Mr. HANNAH. I do not know. I assume whoever in the intelligence community was responsible for the graphics for his presentation. 

Mr. CLAY. And you used this is part of your preparation—as part 

of you preparing Mr. Powell for that speech? 

Mr. HANNAH. My guess is that, yes, the issue of the biological 

labs would have been in whatever I provided —— 

Mr. CLAY. Yes. 

Mr. HANNAH.—in the draft. 

Mr. CLAY. Okay. Let me read Secretary Powell, who stated during his speech to the United Nations, ‘‘one of the most worrisome 

things that emerges from the thick intelligence file we have on 

Iraq’s biological weapons is the existence of mobile production facilities used to make biological agents.’’ What was the source of 

that claim, Mr. Hannah? 

Mr. HANNAH. I believe the primary source was—it was a defector 

and it was human intelligence. I think it was a defector. 

Mr. CLAY. Wasn’t it a source known as ‘‘Curveball’’? 

Mr. HANNAH. I believe so, yes. 


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Mr. CLAY. Okay. Secretary Powell highlighted this so-called eyewitness account in his United Nations speech. He warned that Iraq 

could use these mobile labs to produce enough biological weapons 

‘‘in a single month to kill thousands upon thousands of people.’’ 

Isn’t that right? 

Mr. HANNAH. Is that what he said? 

Mr. CLAY. Yes. 

Mr. HANNAH. Yes, if you’re reading that accurately, yes. 

Mr. CLAY. But we now know that that claim was false. In fact, 

Secretary Powell said his claim has ‘‘totally blown up in our faces.’’ 

Do you agree with Secretary Powell? 

Mr. HANNAH. I agree that the claim was false, yes. 

Mr. CLAY. Is it true that no U.S. officials ever personally interviewed Curveball before we used—they used that information? 

Mr. HANNAH. I don’t know that firsthand, but I think the CIA 

has said that this was controlled by a German intelligence service. 

Mr. CLAY. Yes. And it is true that the Germans who were speaking with Curveball could not believe you were using this information publicly because he was so unreliable. Isn’t that true? 

Mr. HANNAH. That’s the claim. That was never relayed to me by 

the CIA. They were talking to the CIA, I think, at that time. If 

they said that, it wasn’t a claim that was relayed to me. 

Mr. CLAY. Okay. Well, I have an article from November 20, 2005, 

from the L.A. Times, and it says this: ‘‘The senior BND officer who 

supervised Curveball’s case said he was aghast when he watched 

Powell misstate Curveball’s claims as a justification for war. ’We 

were shocked,’ the official said. ’Mein Gott, we had always told 

them it was not proven.’’’ Mr. Hannah, is that true? 

Mr. HANNAH. Is it—well, I don’t have any —— 

Mr. CLAY. The Germans warned from the beginning that this information was not verified. 

Mr. HANNAH. That’s what historically it is reported. Between 

their communications, between their intelligence and the CIA, 

that’s what the Germans have claimed. 

Mr. CLAY. But it got into the Secretary’s speech, into Secretary 

Powell’s speech, you know? Your narrative was at best misleading 

and at worst blatantly false. As a result, thousands of people were 

killed and injured when this nation went to war based on those 

false claims. You know, do you have any remorse about that? 

Mr. HANNAH. I have great, deep remorse about any American 

soldier that’s lost, especially if it’s based on information that we 

put out in good faith, that our intelligence communities and other 

intelligence communities around the world thought was true and 

thought we were acting in the best interest of the United States. 

So I do have great remorse about what —— 

Mr. CLAY. Right, but it wasn’t vetted. The information —— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The —— 

Mr. CLAY.—you just threw it at the Secretary —— 

Mr. HANNAH. No, that’s not —— 

Mr. CLAY.—and had —— 

Mr. HANNAH. That’s not true at all, Congressman. It’s not accurate. 

Mr. CLAY. It is true. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The gentleman’s —— 


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Mr. CLAY. It is absolutely —— 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

Mr. CLAY.—a grave mistake. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The gentleman’s time —— 

Mr. CLAY. I guess I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The gentleman yields back. And I would 

also duly note that Mr. Hannah worked for President Clinton, 

served as a senior policy advisor to Secretary of State Warren 

Christopher as well. 

So I will now recognize the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Hice, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. HICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

There seems to be a great deal of confusion as to the purpose of 

this hearing, which is supposed to be about this current administration White House narrative on the Iran nuclear deal. In Mr. 

Samuels’ article, Leon Panetta stated that he, during his tenure as 

director of the CIA and Secretary of Defense, never saw the letters 

that Obama covertly sent to Iran’s supreme leader in 2009 and 

2012. 

He goes on to say that he would like to believe that Tom Donilon, 

then-national security advisor; and Hillary Clinton, then-Secretary 

of State, had a chance to work on the offer they presented. Mr. 

Doran, let me begin with you. Is there any information confirming 

that Mr. Donilon or Secretary Clinton worked on those letters? 

Mr. DORAN. None that I know of. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. Mr. Rubin, is circumventing—let’s use that 

word—of relevant department and agency heads in major foreignpolicy decisions typical behavior for members of the National Security Council and other White House staffers? 

Mr. RUBIN. It has become a problem that has grown with time 

dating back administrations. 

Mr. HICE. So this is common practice these days? 

Mr. RUBIN. This has become all too common, yes. 

Mr. HICE. Mr. Hannah? 

Mr. HANNAH. I do think something has changed in that regard. 

Just the fact that we have a deputy national security advisor for 

strategic communications whose job is both to help develop policy, 

it seems, as closest foreign-policy aide to the President and the guy 

who is selling it, I think, is worrisome. 

I have got to say that in our administration you can make— 

maybe fault us for a lot, but the fact is that people like Karl Rove, 

who was in charge of our communications, never sat in National 

Security Council meetings. There was a pretty strict divide between those two. 

Mr. HICE. Mr. Rubin, back to you. How much undue influence do 

you believe that these staffers have over national security policy? 

Mr. RUBIN. As Mr. Hannah said, I believe that this administration has blurred a line that has existed over previous administrations, both Democratic and Republican. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. Mr. Hannah, you mentioned in your testimony 

earlier that with one bold move the administration effectively made 

a radical shift in American foreign policy. Is that a correct assessment of your opinion? 

Mr. HANNAH. Yes, it certainly is. Yes. 


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Mr. HICE. Okay. The question then comes down to who ultimately is responsible for that shift in foreign policy. Would you say 

it is Ben Rhodes, other staffers, or the President himself? 

Mr. HANNAH. No, the policy toward Iran and toward the general 

retrenchment for the Middle East seems clearly to be President 

Obama’s. He’s in charge of that policy. 

Mr. HICE. Okay. And yet there is some influencers appears to be 

in his life. Ben Rhodes, as referred to earlier, is recognized as the 

single most influential voice on foreign policy to the President. So 

what kind of role did he have in shaping this radical shift? 

Mr. HANNAH. I don’t know. And I do want to add the caveat that 

this is the shift presented by the policy, although I think it is consistent, as Mr. Doran has said, with the general thrust of the administration’s policy toward Iran and toward the Middle East since 

2008. I just don’t think it’s been presented that way. They want to 

remove and distance themselves from our closest allies in the Middle East, including Israel, and what they tell our allies and they 

tell the American people is that their relationship is stronger than 

ever and they will forever have Israel’s back. 

And that’s justified by what’s presented in the article. And it’s 

that contradiction that worries me so much about what is really 

going on. Are we having a full and open debate about what we 

want to do? You’ve got to hand it to Mr. Trump. At least he says 

I want to get out of this place. It’s too expensive, it’s too costly, our 

allies are too much trouble. I want to distance ourselves from it. 

Mr. HICE. So let me clarify what you are saying because it is 

troubling to me as well, extremely troubling that the American people, that Congress, that our allies, when there is such a radical 

shift of the magnitude of this type of foreign policy that the American people, Congress, and our allies are not aware of it. So the 

only way—do you believe the American people and Congress would 

support a shift that major had they known about it? 

Mr. HANNAH. No. I think as Mr. Doran said—and Secretary Panetta is in fact quoted in the piece as saying had they done it, 

they’d have gotten the blank kicked out of them. 

Mr. HICE. Absolutely. So the only way to pull this over the American people’s eyes and Congress and our allies is by spinning the 

truth and maybe people get on board something that is not indeed 

reality or truth. 

Mr. HANNAH. That is the extremely strong suggestion of the article that you had to spin it —— 

Mr. HICE. But yes, no, then right down the line, would you agree 

with that assessment? 

Mr. RUBIN. Yes. 

Mr. HICE. I will yield. 

Mr. DORAN. Yes. 

Mr. HICE. Mr. Hannah? 

Mr. HANNAH. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HICE. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. The gentleman yields back. 

I now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. DeSaulnier, 

for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 


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Mr. Rubin, first, I assume you are vigorously opposed to the Iran 

agreement? 

Mr. RUBIN. I’m opposed to it, yes. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. And you have been all along? 

Mr. RUBIN. I thought that there could be a much stronger agreement and we could have made much better use of leverage to get 

a much more favorable agreement. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. But you are opposed. 

Mr. Doran? 

Mr. DORAN. Yes. 

Mr. HANNAH. Yes, I’d associate myself with Michael’s —— 

Mr. DESAULNIER. So just to be clear, for instance, former Secretary of State Colin Powell, he has called the verification regime 

‘‘vigorous in the agreement. These are remarkable changes.’’ And 

so we have stopped this highway race that they were going down, 

and I think that is very, very important. Would any of you agree 

with Secretary Powell’s quote in his view of this agreement? 

Mr. HANNAH. It reminds me of the statements in support of the 

agreed framework with North Korea, which we now know did not 

merit those endorsements. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. So you wouldn’t agree with it? 

Mr. HANNAH. No, I would not. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Brent Scowcroft, former advisor to Presidents 

Ford and George H.W. Bush, ‘‘To turn our back on this accomplishment would be an abdication of the United States’ unique role and 

responsibility incurring justified dismay among our allies and 

friends.’’ You would disagree with that quote as well, Mr. Doran? 

Do you have any comment? 

Mr. DORAN. Yes, I disagree with it. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Mr. Hannah, it strikes me that in your response to some of my colleagues on this side of the aisle’s comments about your role with Vice President Cheney and the agreement or the decision to invade Iraq, it was a mistake and you 

apologized for that in your own way, but we should just move on 

from that. Is that a misrepresentation of how you view your actions? 

Mr. HANNAH. It’s somewhat more complicated than that but too 

long to explain. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Of course. 

Mr. HANNAH. But, yes, that—if the case depended on a weapons 

of mass destruction in Iraq, that was false, and the American people didn’t understand the grounds on which we were going to war, 

to take out a guy who was a horrible dictator and a major strategic 

threat to American interests, that the American Congress in 1998 

passed a law almost unanimously saying—the Iraq Liberation Act 

saying we’ve got to do something to get rid of this guy, didn’t say 

war necessarily but it says we’ve got a big trouble with Iraq, we 

need to do something about it. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. But it was based, wouldn’t you say, on the assumption that there were weapons of mass destruction in these mobile biological labs? 

Mr. HANNAH. No, in 1998 it was the Clinton administration. You 

had Secretary of Defense Cohen standing up and holding up a bag 

of sugar and saying if Saddam had this much biological weapons, 


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he would kill thousands upon thousands of people that he represents —— 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Right. 

Mr. HANNAH.—a major threat to the United States. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. But that wasn’t it —— 

Mr. HANNAH. That was the basis —— 

Mr. DESAULNIER. But that wasn’t the part of the discussion we 

were having as a nation in order to commit ourselves to send young 

American to war in Iraq. It was the weapons of mass destruction, 

which you admit now was a mistake. 

Mr. HANNAH. Yes, that intelligence clearly was false. A bipartisan commission —— 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Right. 

Mr. HANNAH.—looked at it and said most of that was wrong. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. So, on balance, comparing these two processes, 

whether you think it is spin or not, the consequences strike me as 

being much more significance, obviously, to the decision to tell people it was based—we were going to invade Iraq not because we 

didn’t like Saddam Hussein, although that was the case as well, 

but that there were biological weapons and weapons of mass destruction versus what we see with the Iran nuclear deal. 

Now, you can assume as experts that this is not going to turn 

out well, but to this point they are not equal in terms of the negative consequences to this country and the stability of that peace in 

the Middle East. Would you say? I mean, how could you possibly 

say at this point? 

Mr. HANNAH. Listen, I would say that the—that you’re right, 

that war and the death of the—and injury of American soldiers is 

a terrible, terrible price to pay. We haven’t seen a lot of Americans 

dying, but just take a look at the Middle East right now after 8 

years of this administration. It’s hard to say it’s better because 

Americans aren’t dying but half-a-million Syrians have died, chemical weapons are being used, Russian and Iranian influence —— 

Mr. DESAULNIER. But that all was because of a decision that you 

were very much a part of to get the country to go to war in Iraq. 

Mr. HANNAH. Well, you know it’s much more complicated than 

that because it —— 

Mr. DESAULNIER. No, it isn’t. 

Mr. HANNAH. It is, Congressman —— 

Mr. DESAULNIER. Not from my perspective. I am not an expert 

—— 

Mr. HANNAH. Okay. 

Mr. DESAULNIER.—but I have gone to funerals of constituents 

who are dead in their 20s and their teens because you and Vice 

President Cheney encouraged the invasion of Iraq. 

Mr. HANNAH. It was because Iranian IEDs, Iranian EFPs that 

killed Americans, not a narrative, and that is why it’s —— 

Mr. DESAULNIER. How did that action stop —— 

Mr. HANNAH.—so not understandable that we’re letting Iraq off 

the hook. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. How did our invading Iraq stop those other actions? You have sat here and testified they continue to support terrorists in the region. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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Mr. HANNAH. We didn’t invade the Gaza Strip, we didn’t invade 

Yemen, we didn’t invade Syria, and yet we see Iran on the warpath 

all over. And what this agreement did was take the budget of the 

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the hard currency available to 

it, and increase it by an order of magnitude. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. They were doing that before. That is why we 

went into Iraq is what you are saying. Yes, no? 

Mr. HANNAH. No, I’m saying you are trying to —— 

Mr. DESAULNIER. You said —— 

Mr. HANNAH.—blame a narrative on the fact that Iran has been 

the leading state sponsor of terrorism according to the U.S. Department of State since 1984, and to try to somehow distract from that 

and distract from a false—a narrative of false moderation is counterproductive, I would argue. 

Mr. DESAULNIER. I just have to tell you in all honesty I feel like 

I am in a replay of a sequel of Dr. Strangelove here, and it would 

be nice to have a balanced discussion about this. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I would agree with the gentleman. It would 

be nice to have a balanced discussion. That is why we invited Mr. 

Rhodes and we invited the participation of Senator Cotton, who is 

on the other end of the spectrum. But when the White House refuses to make them available and Democrats call no witnesses, we 

can’t have that discussion. That is what a shame about today’s 

hearing. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Russell, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In dealing with the Iran nuclear issue, I am saddened that rather than look forward to how best secure the United States from a 

real nuclear threat, we see a progressive attack on our entry into 

Iraq to cloud the issue. It is almost like the classic page from the 

Communist playbook that advises ‘‘admit nothing, deny everything, 

and make counteraccusation.’’ 

I take exception to the twisted narrative that our entry into Iraq 

was based upon bad faith and false pretense. If an abusive neighbor attacks everyone in his neighborhood and then threatens them 

with total destruction, are we to believe, as progressives seem too, 

that we should sit idly by and not take action to secure ourselves 

from such threat? 

The truth of the matter is that Saddam had technical capacity 

to develop a bomb. In the summer of 2003 I have firsthand knowledge that the 1st Battalion, 36th Infantry, along with special operations forces, they secured a Zippe centrifuge, which is of the highest order for refinement of nuclear material, and it was smuggled 

out of Europe. They obtained technical drawings and hardware 

from the garden of Saddam’s nuclear physicist Dr. Mahdi Obeidi. 

Dr. Obeidi’s account of Saddam’s threat is well-documented in his 

book The Bomb in My Garden, an account the CIA describes as 

largely accurate and balanced. 

I remember as I served in Iraq during that time as we were 

hunting for Saddam that this would be major news as the Zippe 

centrifuge and technical drawings would come to light. Instead, it 

is largely hidden to this day. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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It is also interesting to note that senior leaders and one in particular who relayed to me that during a major Syrian flood he was 

directed by Saddam to move material to an eastern Syrian site. 

This was material of both a nuclear and a chemical nature. It is 

interesting that that very site was attacked during Operation Orchard by the Israeli Air Force, and that site was completely destroyed because they were making a nuclear reactor. Again, the silence on these issues is deafening. 

As one of the commanders that helped track down and capture 

Saddam Hussein, it is very emotional for me to hear Members of 

this Congress condemn our efforts, but it is not surprising. From 

day one, as we sacrificed in the field, progressives in this Congress 

condemned our efforts with progressive leaders even going so far 

as to declare that the war was lost while we buried our friends in 

the field. That steady drumbeat forced us to bury friends not only 

there but ship come home and put them in Section 60 of Arlington, 

and then we come home to watch politicians, many still in office, 

destroy what we fought for. They persist even today, Mr. Chairman. 

I will never regret bringing a dictator to justice, and I am proud 

to have played a part in it. History, should we even allow it, will 

judge us and our efforts in Iraq kindly. I am not sure the same can 

be said of Congress. 

Now, we turn to yet another nuclear threat with Iran. Dr. 

Obeidi, in reflecting on our security, stated that to succeed ‘‘illicit 

nuclear programs share a common weak spot. They need international complicity.’’ In Mr. Rhodes and this administration, it appears he provided and they provided all of it to Iran. 

Mr. Rubin, how and how early did the administration start talking about minimizing congressional oversight of the Iran deal? 

Mr. RUBIN. I am not privy to the internal discussions within the 

administration, but it appears from secondhand sources almost 

from the beginning. 

Mr. RUSSELL. I have passed the Iran Terror Financier Act, the 

only real effort to oppose the nuclear deal, which now sits in the 

Senate. And with Mr. Rhodes’ exposure, the need for congressional 

oversight, there are key provisions in my measure and it sits in the 

Senate. That language even today could be acted upon by the Senate that would provide us key oversight on any decisions. 

The President acted unconstitutionally. While he is free to make 

agreements and have negotiation, he is not free to bind us with 

treaty-like obligation. Do you think that if we pass the key provisions out of the measure that currently sits in the Senate that 

would increase that oversight? As was noted last week by Politico, 

do you think that it would be helpful in deterring and at least making what we do have better? 

Mr. RUBIN. Yes. And very briefly, the strongest, most effective 

actions that have been taken by Iran both under the Clinton administration with executive orders and under the Bush and Obama 

administrations have been the unilateral American sanctions rather than the watered down United Nations Security Council resolutions, even though the Bush administration achieved a number of 

those as well. 


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Mr. RUSSELL. Thank you, sir, and thank you, gentlemen, for your 

service and thank you for being here today. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Mr. Russell, we thank you for your service 

and your sacrifice and your time serving this country, and we are 

better for it. Thank you. 

I now recognize the gentlewoman from New Mexico, Ms. Lujan 

Grisham, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks for the opportunity to talk about what I think is 

really important in this agreement and issue, which is making sure 

that we are holding Iran accountable, that we are clear about what 

those accountability issues and measures are, and not just how 

that is being communicated but how that is being verified. 

And my only disappointment in the hearing today, Mr. Chairman, is that we are having conversations about what-ifs but we are 

not talking to the folks—with no disrespect to the panel members— 

about really who is enforcing, who is accountable, and certainly for 

my constituents and the number of individuals that I spoke to with 

expertise in this area either as concerned citizens or organizations 

and the administration and people outside of the administration, 

that is my core focus. 

And in fact, as part of the hearing of this nature, I was more concerned and more—I would like information about the reductions in 

the uranium stockpile, the status of the centrifuges in Iran, the 

monitoring and detection measures that the U.S. has, and then our 

allies have also been doing. Does anyone on the panel have any 

specific authority or expertise on any of those issues because you 

are directly involved in that accountability? 

Mr. RUBIN. Are we serving a government right now or am I in 

IAEA? The answer to that is no. However, we have dedicated years 

to the study of these issues and so could give suggestions if you 

would like. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. Well, and I appreciate that. For example, 

I have spent 30 years in the health care industry, and I have a variety, I think, of very credible opinions, but at the end of the day 

I am not your physician so I can’t talk to you about your specific 

health. And what I really think is important with, again, no disrespect, gentlemen—and one of the things that I appreciate about 

this hearing is that we tackle tough subjects. I expect that in this 

committee. I expect that of the chairman, particularly in this issue, 

keeping America safe, being clear that we will make sure that everyone is accountable, that we are clear about what the risks are, 

I think that those are all incredibly valuable things for us to be 

paying attention to. 

And I can tell you that my constituents back home, in addition 

to the country, expect that from me. But to know exactly where we 

are more than opining based on—again, no disrespect to your credentials, far better than mine on these specific issues directly—but 

again, I think, Mr. Chairman, we ought to be talking to the individuals who are absolutely responsible for assuring, verifying these 

issues so that we know exactly what we are dealing with because 

they are actually doing it. 


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What can we be doing better to make sure that we are getting 

that information and that our accountability enforcement efforts 

are what they ought to be and that we have a way bipartisan to 

weigh in to reshape them productively if need be? Anyone? 

Mr. DORAN. I totally agree with you. I agree with everything you 

have said, and I think that I would like to have a discussion with 

those people. But the administration has worked to obfuscate this 

entire—the agreement and all the processes around it. And I think 

that’s one of my main messages here is not that I’m the expert on 

centrifuges or that I’m the expert on sanctions and so on. It’s that 

those of us who would like to understand what is happening are 

not being given the information we need. We can’t have an open 

and honest debate about this because we really don’t have the key 

facts. And I think if you read my prepared statement, you’ll see 

that I’ve made, I think, a pretty cogent argument to that fact. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. Anyone else? 

Mr. RUBIN. Well, what I would say is when surgery goes awry, 

oftentimes the doctors will conduct an after-action study about 

what went wrong. Likewise in the private sector, businessmen will 

practice negotiations and look at what they might have done better. 

In the U.S. military, sergeants, majors, and chiefs will berate soldiers from making mistakes not for a political ax to grind but to 

make them better soldiers and sailors. 

What the State Department has not done in the last 60 years is 

conduct an after-action report about high-profile diplomacy. This 

goes across administrations. So, yes, we can say that this is what 

the IAEA needs to be looking for, that they need not only to be 

looking at declared nuclear facilities but also undeclared nuclear 

facilities, that there has to be independent testing of Iran—of work 

being conducted on Iranian nuclear military sites and that there 

has to be extraterritoriality in the inspection in case Iran takes 

some of its lab work to North Korea. 

Those are all specific things which could be done, but we have 

to go broader and look at why diplomacy hasn’t worked. Let’s have 

the State Department be introspective. If they’re not going to do 

the due diligence, the Congress should. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. And I appreciate those points, and my time 

is up, but in response, again, without having that expertise in this 

hearing, we don’t have a debate based on facts. And I might disagree with you about our efforts in what I am going to call complex 

and high-level diplomacy and maybe on some points I am not, but 

without having those individuals before this committee, we are illequipped to do that. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I concur with the gentlewoman. That is 

why it is so frustrating when Mr. Rhodes, who is at the center of 

this, was, as of Monday, going to appear and then suddenly executive privilege is claimed and they decide not to have him. So you 

are right. The Congress is kept in the dark because the administration won’t share the information with us. 

Ms. LUJAN GRISHAM. And, Mr. Chairman, with—and the chairman is very patient with me and this is not a place to debate that, 

and I appreciate the chairman more than he knows, and I mean 

that earnestly, but again, I am not sure that Mr. Rhodes is the 


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right person. But we do. We need to continue to have an effort to 

get facts so that we are not speculating about where we are in enforcing this agreement. And that is all of our responsibility. 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for again giving me maybe the last 

word, and thank you for being patient with me today, sir. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Thank you. I thank the gentlewoman. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Grothman, 

for 5 minutes. Microphone, please. Microphone. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Could we have slide 3? 

[Slide.] 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. I better read it over here. The easiest way 

for—okay. This is a quote from a New York Times article. ‘‘The 

easiest way for the White House to shape the news, he explained, 

is from the briefing podiums, each of which has its own dedicated 

press corps. ’But then there are sort of these force multipliers,’ he 

said, adding that ’We have our compadres. I will reach out to a couple of people and, you know, I wouldn’t want to name them. I will 

say, hey, look, some people are spinning this narrative that this is 

a sign of American weakness.’′′ 

Well, since he won’t name them, Mr. Doran, do you want to take 

a shot at who was he speaking of when they talk about the administration’s compadres in the press who helped them spin the White 

House narrative and who in the press do you think he is kind of 

referring to there? 

Mr. DORAN. I wouldn’t want to speculate on individuals. I would 

just note that in general the major newspapers and the major networks have supported the line coming out of the White House. And 

one of the things that Mr. Rhodes drew our attention to and I think 

it’s important to focus on is the blurring—as a result of the fact 

that newspapers and networks are reporting foreign news from 

Washington, we have this blurring now of opinion and news so that 

the line that Mr. Rhodes is putting out find its way into news articles and that it also finds its way into opinion columns at the same 

time, which then they had a kind of mutually reinforcing effect. 

But we also find at the same time that only about 13 percent of 

Americans actually believe what they’re hearing anymore, and I 

think we can draw our own conclusions about that. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Well, having been here for 14 months, I don’t believe anything I read in the paper around here, but the major papers, do you believe like the New York Times, the Washington 

Post, would you consider those major papers you are talking about? 

Mr. DORAN. Yes, you can see like—I’ll give an example. You 

know, recently, the Saudis put to death this cleric Nimr al-Nimr, 

a Shiite. The line that you got universally in the newspapers, in 

the news articles, and in the opinion pieces and then on the networks was that there’s a huge Saudi sectarian escalation which is 

destroying relations with Iran. All the things that Iran is doing 

around the region, flexing of its muscles like Dr. Rubin described, 

we’re not hearing about. And I believe that that was news reported 

out of the White House. 

I’ll just say one more thing about this, too. Because of the rise 

of the internet, we have all these nontraditional news sources now 

that people go to, and it puts enormous pressure on the serious reporters that are out there. I mean, I’m thinking of people like 


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David Sanger and Michael Gordon of the New York Times. These 

are very serious reporters, right? But they know—and if they don’t 

know it and if they’re not thinking about it directly in their own 

minds, their editors know that if they don’t—that if they take a 

line that is hostile to what the White House is saying, the White 

House can go to Vox or to BuzzFeed or somewhere else and give 

the story. 

So even reporters that I think we would all agree are extremely 

serious reporters are under pressure, I think, not to report a story 

that’s going to harm their access to the White House. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. And just so we understand, we mentioned 

the New York Times and Washington Post by name, but because 

they feed the Associated Press, just because I don’t get the New 

York Times and Washington Post doesn’t mean that that is not the 

article that I am getting, say, in almost any other major newspaper 

around the country, correct? 

Mr. DORAN. Yes, it replicates itself immediately. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. Now, when he talks about his compadres, 

do you have any opinion if he is talking about anybody in the think 

tank or policy world? 

Mr. DORAN. Well, the two that were mentioned in the article 

were the Ploughshares Fund and NIAC, but it is not hard—you 

know, if you followed would happen on Twitter when this article 

came out, the friends of the White House and the friends of the 

echo chamber, you could identify the echo chamber by seeing how 

they pounced immediately on the article, picked out one or two little facts that they could criticize, and built a whole, I think, specious argument that the author had a political agenda in this. And 

then that narrative then was spun out of social media and into the 

mainstream media. 

Mr. RUBIN. If I may say very quickly, sir, I don’t know David 

Samuels, the author of the article, but to criticize him for not being 

supportive of the Iran deal illustrates the problem of an echo chamber because journalists saying that only sympathetic journalists 

that can cover the administration, that itself is a sign of a much 

greater problem. Huge problem. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Can I play video here or are we done with our 

time? 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. Let me go to Mr. Palmer —— 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. I want to come back. Yes. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ.—and then if you want to come back, we 

will come back. 

Now, we are going to recognize the gentleman from Alabama, 

Mr. Palmer. 

Mr. PALMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we have about 

worn this out. We have covered everything from Iran to the fact 

that I think Mr. Meadows establish very clearly that we were lied 

to by this administration, perhaps even with contempt. 

But I want to go to something else that I think is really at the 

core of what we ought to be talking about, and that is a key promise from the administration is that the Iran nuclear deal would provide the public and lawmakers with assurance that Iran was meeting its obligation, and Iran’s ability to engage in proliferation 

would the substantially mitigated. 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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I mean, we can go back to the Rhodes statement that it would 

be the strongest inspection regime that any country faces in the 

world. We could go to what the State Department posted on the 

Web site, that the International Atomic Energy Agency would have 

regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, that they would be 

providing the IAEA with much greater access, that it would require—that they be granted access to investigate suspicious sites or 

allegations of covert enrichment. But that is not what has actually 

happened. 

I want to share with you that after the deal was implemented, 

the International Atomic Energy Agency published its regular report on Iran. I think it came out in February. And the report contained less information than the IAEA had regularly provided 

about Iran before the deal was in place. In fact, when asked about 

these gaps, IAEA Director General Amano said that, in fact, the 

deal restricted the IAEA’s ability to report publicly about Iran’s nuclear program. 

Mr. Rubin, given that, how much confidence do you have in this 

deal? 

Mr. RUBIN. I have very little confidence in this deal for reasons 

that I’ve outlined in my written testimony. It falls far short of the 

most rigorous inspection regime ever, and the danger isn’t just in 

Iran, very briefly. The danger is that it permanently dilutes the 

standard by which other potential proliferators are held. 

Mr. PALMER. But would you agree that General Amano’s statement validates the concerns that you expressed about the deal from 

the very beginning? 

Mr. RUBIN. Yes, I would. 

Mr. PALMER. Would you also say that, given this statement from 

the General Amano, that the exaggerated concessions that this administration claims that they obtained might be called into question as well? 

Mr. RUBIN. Yes, I would. 

Mr. PALMER. You know, we have been talking about echo chambers, we talked about misrepresentations. I go back to the statement that Secretary of State Kerry made that he was the chief negotiator. We know that the framework of the deal was already in 

place before he really got involved, these statements that have 

been brought out in the New York Times Magazine article, but 

what we really haven’t talked about is the fact that the deal is a 

fraud, and Iran could be on a path to a nuclear weapon. 

And here is something else that we haven’t really discussed that 

I think we need to be talking about, too, is that according to Ben 

Rhodes that this deal also is part of a plan to abandon our friends 

and allies in the Middle East. Does that give you some concern, Mr. 

Rubin? 

Mr. RUBIN. Yes, it does. 

Mr. PALMER. How about you, Mr. Doran? 

Mr. DORAN. Absolutely. 

Mr. PALMER. How about you, Mr. Hannah? 

Mr. HANNAH. Yes, very much so. 

Mr. PALMER. Do you believe that the Obama administration 

withheld information from Congress about the deal intentionally? 

Mr. RUBIN. Yes, I do. 


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Mr. PALMER. Do you believe that was in violation of the CorkerCardin agreement, the law that he signed into law himself? 

Mr. RUBIN. It absolutely was, and on top of which the CorkerCardin amendment was written in such a way to prevent this from 

happening. And unfortunately, the administration simply broke the 

law. 

Mr. PALMER. I couldn’t agree more. Peter Roskam, the gentleman 

from Illinois, introduced a House resolution and argued that very 

point. The House passed that resolution that this deal was illegal 

from the get-go because the Corker-Cardin law required that all information be provided to Congress, including the side agreements, 

and it clearly wasn’t. 

I think there is one issue, really one question that we need to 

ask, and I will ask each one of you to answer this. Do you believe 

this deal has actually assured Iran a path to developing a nuclear 

weapon? 

Mr. RUBIN. Yes. At the very least it leaves Iran with an industrial-scale nuclear program upon the expiration of the controls, and 

the administration went into this knowing that the Iranian regime 

was not moderate. 

Mr. PALMER. Mr. Doran? 

Mr. DORAN. I agree with all that. 

Mr. PALMER. Mr. Hannah? 

Mr. HANNAH. Yes, I agree with Michael’s conclusion. 

Mr. PALMER. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure it is the jurisdiction 

of this committee to look into the ramifications of that possibility, 

but I do think that is essentially what we should have been talking 

about this entire time. And the fact that this administration misled 

Congress is one issue that I think we need to pursue, but I think 

at some point Congress needs to look at what our positions ought 

to be going forward in regard to Iran. 

I yield back. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I totally agree with the gentleman and appreciate his perspective. And he is right. That is the ultimate fear 

that we have is that Iran, not a friend of the United States, not 

a friendly partner within the world community, that they are even 

more so on a pathway to develop a nuclear weapon, and that is 

what is scary. 

We will go one more time to Mr. Grothman of Wisconsin. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Sure. And we will go one more time to Ben 

Rhodes—I mean, not to Ben Rhodes, to Michael Doran. 

Ben Rhodes commented on the White House’s desire to avoid 

scrutiny. And I would like to look at video clip D and ask you a 

question about it. 

[Video shown.] 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. How do you feel the process circumvented 

the transparency with Congress? 

Mr. DORAN. They structured the deal so that they could take it 

to the Security Council and effectively move out on it before Congress ever really got to look at it. 

And there’s a second dimension to what we just heard that’s disturbing. That was Ben Rhodes talking to a group of progressive activists and telling them what was coming down the line and giving 

them the talking points about how to support it. I mean, that— 


AKING-6430 with DISTILLER
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what you just heard was Ben Rhodes talking to the foot soldiers 

that are going to create—that are—in his echo chamber. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Tell us again what those foot soldiers are. 

Mr. DORAN. I’m sorry? 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Tell us again what you describe those foot soldiers —— 

Mr. DORAN. Oh, those—in this case these are progressive—this 

is progressive groups. I don’t know the exact—what we’re talking— 

they regularly briefed dozens of progressive groups. I’m not talking 

about pseudo-experts on nuclear proliferation and things that that. 

I’m talking about just grassroots progressive organizations to get— 

to help them carry the water politically. 

But it’s one of these blurring of the lines between rules that I 

don’t think we saw in previous administrations where you have 

somebody who’s in charge of communications but yet sitting at the 

table with the Secretary of Defense and sometimes telling the Secretary of Defense that he’s wrong and then going out and talking 

to domestic political groups and telling them how to go militate in 

favor of the foreign policy of the administration. 

Mr. GROTHMAN. Okay. Thank you. 

Chairman CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman. I thank you all for 

your attendance here, your participation, your expertise in illuminating what is a very disturbing situation. 

The committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:46 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 


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