NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETER EVAN DRESEL, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

PENSION PLAN OF THE PACIFIC 

NORTHWEST LABORATORIES, 

BATTELLE MEMORIAL INSTITUTE, 

Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 15-35643

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-01665-MJP 

MEMORANDUM*

PETER EVAN DRESEL, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

PENSION PLAN OF THE PACIFIC 

NORTHWEST LABORATORIES, 

BATTELLE MEMORIAL INSTITUTE, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 15-35652

D.C. No. 2:14-cv-01665-MJP 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Marsha J. Pechman, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted December 6, 2017

Seattle, Washington

 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

DEC 18 2017

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.

In this Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) case, the Pension 

Plan of the Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Battelle Memorial Institute (the Plan) 

appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of claimant Peter Dresel and the

denial of the Plan’s cross-motion for summary judgment. The Plan contends that it 

did not abuse its discretion in denying Dresel Early Retirement Benefits (ERB) under 

its Pension Plan. Dresel cross-appeals, arguing that the district court applied an 

overly deferential standard in reviewing the Plan’s decision.

Whether the district court was overly deferential to the Plan does not require 

remand. Although the district court could have tempered its abuse of discretion 

standard of review with some skepticism because the plan administrator both paid 

benefit awards and determined eligibility for benefits,

1 we affirm because the district 

court’s holding that the Plan abused its discretion survives under even the most 

deferential standard of review.

2

The district court properly held that the Plan abused its discretion in denying 

Dresel ERB. Under a straightforward application of the abuse of discretion standard, 

 

1 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 111 (2008).

2 Dresel’s cross-appeal is moot. See Schikore v. BankAmerica Supplemental 

Ret. Plan, 269 F.3d 956, 961 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We need not decide which standard 

of review is applicable because even under the more deferential traditional standard, 

we conclude that the plan administrator’s decision must be vacated.”).
3 

a plan administrator’s decision must be upheld “if it is based upon a reasonable 

interpretation of the plan’s terms and if it was made in good faith.” Sznewajs v. U.S. 

Bancorp Amended & Restated Supplemental Benefits Plan, 572 F.3d 727, 734 (9th 

Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by 

Salomaa v. Honda Long Term Disability Plan, 637 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 2011). 

By contrast, a plan administrator abuses her discretion when she construes a pension 

plan “in a way that clearly conflicts with the plain language of the [p]lan.” Lehman 

v. Nelson, 862 F.3d 1203, 1217 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Tapley v. Locals 302 & 612 

of the Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs-Emp’rs Constr. Indus. Ret. Plan, 728 F.3d 

1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013)). Here, using the Pension Plan’s definitions of 

“Member,” “Retirement,” “Early Retirement Benefit,” and “Early Retirement Age,” 

a Member—which includes former employees—is eligible for ERB if he elects to 

commence benefits after he turns fifty-five years old, but before he reaches sixtyfive years old, and has ten years of credited service.

Dresel met the requirements to receive ERB: He was a fifty-seven-year-old 

former employee with over seventeen years of credited service when he elected to 

receive ERB. Thus, the Plan abused its discretion by requiring Dresel to be an 

“active employee” when he elected the commencement of benefits. See Canseco v. 

Constr. Laborers Pension Tr., 93 F.3d 600, 608 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[P]ension plan 
4 

trustees or administrators may not construe a plan so as to impose an additional 

requirement for eligibility that clashes with the terms of the plan.”).

To the extent the Plan argues that it is reasonable to redefine “Retirement” as 

the termination of employment because Dresel was eligible for Deferred Vested 

Benefits (DVB), the Plan waived this argument. “The general rule, . . . in this circuit 

and in others, is that a court will not allow an ERISA plan administrator to assert a 

reason for denial of benefits that it had not given during the administrative process.”

Harlick v. Blue Shield of Cal., 686 F.3d 699, 719–20 (9th Cir. 2012). In addition, 

ERISA regulations require that the plan administrator provide the claimant with 

“[r]eference to the specific plan provisions on which the determination is based.” 

29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g)(ii) (2017). Here, the Plan neither explicitly cited its 

interpretation of “Retirement” nor referenced the Pension Plan section for DVB

during the administrative process and, thus, is precluded from now presenting this 

new reason for denying Dresel ERB.

AFFIRMED.