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FRONT-LINE DEFENSE: SECURITY TRAINING FOR

MASS TRANSIT AND RAIL EMPLOYEES

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC 

SECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE 

PROTECTION, AND CYBERSECURITY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 28, 2006

Serial No. 109–107

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

TOM DAVIS, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

JIM GIBBONS, Nevada 

ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

DAVE G. REICHERT, Washington 

MICHAEL MCCAUL, Texas 

CHARLIE DENT, Pennsylvania 

GINNY BROWN-WAITE, Florida 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

JANE HARMAN, California 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

NITA M. LOWEY, New York 

ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of 

Columbia 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey 

DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, U.S. Virgin Islands 

BOB ETHERIDGE, North Carolina 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND

CYBERSECURITY

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California, Chairman 

DON YOUNG, Alaska 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

JOHN LINDER, Georgia 

MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

STEVAN PEARCE, New Mexico 

KATHERINE HARRIS, Florida 

BOBBY JINDAL, Louisiana 

PETER T. KING, New York (ex officio) 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington 

PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON-LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio)

(II) 
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Economic Security, 

Infrastructure Protection and Cybersecurity ..................................................... 1

The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Economic 

Security, Infrastructure Protection and Cybersecurity ..................................... 15 

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Washington ............................................................................................. 19

The Honorable James R. Langevin, a Representative in Congress From the 

State Rhode Island ............................................................................................... 2 

WITNESSES

Mr. William Fagan, Director of Security, Federal Railroad Administration ...... 18

Mr. Terry Rosapep, Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of Program 

Management, Federal Transit Agency: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 9

Mr. John Sammon, Assistant Administrator, Transportation Sector Network 

Management, Transportation Security Administration: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5

PANEL II 

Mr. Edward Hamberger, President & CEO, American Association of 

Railroads: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 38

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 40

Chief Polly Hanson, Metro Transit Police Department, Washington Metro 

Area Transit Authority: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 34

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 36

Mr. John P. Tolman, Vice President and National Legislative Representative, 

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 31

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 32

Mr. Ed Wytkind, President, Transportation Trades Department, AFL–CIO: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 25

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 27

(1)

FRONT-LINE DEFENSE: SECURITY TRAINING 

FOR MASS TRANSIT AND RAIL EMPLOYEES 

Thursday, September 27, 2006

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE

PROTECTION, AND CYBERSECURITY, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:21 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Dan Lungren [chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Lungren, Sanchez, Dicks, and 

Langevin. 

Mr. LUNGREN. [Presiding.] The Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity will come to order. 

The subcommittee is meeting today to discuss security training 

for mass transit and rail employees. And I would like to thank everyone for being here today, especially our witnesses. 

We meet today to discuss security training programs for rail and 

mass transit agencies. The importance of railroads and mass transit to our daily lives and national economy cannot be overstated. 

Mass transit commuter rail and freight rail are responsible for 

moving millions of people every day and for delivering thousands 

of freight shipments across the country. 

The subcommittee has looked at the security of these important 

systems in a variety of ways. Last year, in the aftermath of the 

London subway attacks, we looked at the vulnerabilities of soft targets, including public transportation, and the security measures 

being taken to protect them. We also looked at the various ways 

the DHS and our rail and transit agencies were working to prevent 

a terrorist attack from ever occurring. 

Today we address another important component of our security, 

and that is training. Thousands of employees have been trained in 

the years since 9/11 on security issues, and these include police officers, emergency responders, management security officers, and 

sometimes front-line employees. 

We know that, in the event of an attack on our rail or mass transit facilities, employees will often be the first people impacted by 

the event. They will play a key role in managing the terror aftermath, evacuating civilians and providing first aid, which could significantly reduce the number of lives lost. 

In addition, rail and transit employees are an important part in 

the fight to prevent an attack from ever occurring. Employees such 
2

as operators, drivers, clerks, mechanics and other front-line employees are valuable allies, watching for suspicious activity and 

packages. These employees, who know their surroundings and 

work environment, are well-suited to identify when something or 

someone does not belong. 

It is important to note that much discussion has been given to 

security-specific training. And I just want to recognize that employees oftentimes receive other forms of training that may serve a 

dual purpose, such as emergency response training, which is applicable whether the incident was a terrorist attack or an accident. 

Our goal today is to hear what the federal government has been 

doing to provide employee training on security. In some instances, 

our transportation systems have gone beyond what the federal government has offered and have developed their own training 

courses. We look forward to learning about these, as well. 

Security training for employees is an important part of the overall effort to implement layered security measures. And I look forward to the testimony today about the numerous efforts to train 

employees to recognize and respond to potential security problems. 

And I certainly thank our witnesses for being here. 

And I would recognize the only other member of the subcommittee here, Mr. Langevin, if he has any comments at this 

time. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I want to welcome our witnesses here today. I look forward 

to your testimony on this very important topic. 

And I am pleased that this subcommittee is holding a hearing on 

security training for mass transit and rail employees. 

I, along with many of my colleagues, particularly Ms. Sanchez, 

have been very concerned about the fact that most mass transit 

and rail employees are not receiving comprehensive training on 

how to recognize and report potential threats, also to protect themselves and passengers, and to respond if there is an incident. 

Over the last 5 years, Congress has done a lot of talking about 

supporting first responders and providing them with the tools that 

they need. But when it comes to rail security, we must remember 

that, in the bombings of mass transit and rail systems in Madrid, 

London and Mumbai, the first people on the scene were transportation workers. 

In the critical first few minutes after an incident, transportation 

workers who have received adequate training can help save lives 

and mitigate the damage of an attack. The knowledge and experience that transportation workers have about their workplace is a 

critical resource in responding to an incident. 

We need to maximize the first-responder potential of all rail and 

mass transit employees by ensuring that they receive substantive 

security training. 

For this reason, I know my colleague Ms. Sanchez has proposed 

an amendment to the Transportation Security Authorization Bill 

that would have required rail and mass transit systems to establish security training programs for their workers. And during the 

discussion of this amendment, both Chairman King and Chairman 

Lungren indicated that they wanted to learn more about this im-
3

portant topic before acting. And so, we agreed to hold this hearing 

today. 

So I am pleased that we are able to consider this important topic 

before the October recess. And I am looking forward to discussion 

on all of the issues relating to employee training. 

And I want to thank, again, the witnesses for being here to share 

your insights and also, in particular, thank Chairman Lungren for 

holding this hearing. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Langevin. 

And other members of the committee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

We are pleased to have two panels of distinguished witnesses before us today on this important topic. 

And I would just remind the witnesses that your entire written 

statements will appear in the record, and we would ask you to 

make opening 5-minute summaries of your statements. 

The chair would now recognize the first panel and ask Mr. John 

Sammon, the assistant administrator of the Transportation Sector 

Network Management Office at TSA, the Transportation Security 

Administration, to testify. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN SAMMON, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, 

TRANSPORTATION SECTOR NETWORK MANAGEMENT, 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. SAMMON. Thank you. 

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify on the important 

subject of security training for freight rail, mass transit, and passenger rail employees. 

I would like to highlight some of the important steps TSA is taking in partnership with DHS, DOT, state and local governments, 

and industry to ensure these employees receive the best training 

possible to protect themselves, the public, and the rail and mass 

transit systems. 

I first would like to introduce myself to the committee. I am the 

assistant administrator of TSA for the Office of Transportation Sector Network Management. TSA created that office in 2005 to open 

a direct line of communication and foster cooperation with the industry across 10 different modes of transportation, including mass 

transit and freight rail. 

Prior to joining TSA, I worked for more than 25 years in the 

transportation industry, including positions as senior vice president 

at CSX and Conrail. In these positions, I gained valuable experience working with network and customer partners to get things 

done. 

The Department of Homeland Security pursues a layered approach to security and transportation, including transit and rail security. The effort starts with gathering effective data analysis and 

dissemination of intelligence. The recent disruption of the terror 

plot in the United Kingdom and the developing plot targeting the 

underwater tunnels in New York and New Jersey illustrate the necessity of that approach. 
4

The best defenses are preventing the terrorists from ever reaching their targets and by creating visible, unpredictable deterrence 

environments to disrupt their planning capabilities. 

Transit and rail employees are part of America’s first line of defense, and will be among our first responders in the event of a terrorist attack or other disruption in the transit system. We depend 

on their vigilance and observations to detect indicators of a developing plan or attack. 

The actions taken by these individuals in the critical moments 

immediately after an attack or disruption can significantly reduce 

the severity of injuries and the number of deaths. As a result, there 

is simply no substitute for security awareness and emergency response training for the nation’s transit and rail employees. 

We must rely on and cultivate human capabilities to prevent, 

deter, detect and respond to security threats. These skills can be 

acquired through extensive training, rigorous emergency planning, 

and regular emergency testing and drills. 

We recognize that TSA and the transit and rail industry need to 

provide more training for more employees. While there are a number of cooperative initiatives being undertaken, the real story 

comes with the Transit Security Grant Program. 

It is TSA’s intention to leverage this program to ensure that 

qualifying systems meet certain baseline standards. These standards include front-line employee awareness training, front-line employee response training, and emergency drill training; these in addition to incident response plans, vulnerability assessments, mitigation plans, invisible/unpredictable deterrence programs. By leveraging in excess of $100 million in security grants in fis- cal year 2006 and $175 million in fiscal year 2007, TSA can focus 

the transit agencies on training before technology. And we can use 

that transit grant funding to bring training up to baseline standards across the nation. 

TSA is acutely aware of the importance of training in the freight 

rail area. And this year, in conjunction with DOT, we issued a list 

of recommended security action items for rail carriers for the transport of toxic inhalation hazard materials. The list included recommendations that relate directly to continued education and 

training. 

Four video training modules have been developed by the railroad 

industry over the past several years, covering security awareness 

training. These video training modules help front-line employees 

identify potential security breaches, threats, risks, and underscore 

the importance of reporting. 

Our general manager of freight rail has over 30 years of field operating experience in the railroad industry as general manager and 

vice president. He has directed our rail inspectors to conduct an 

initial assessment of how well the classroom training translates to 

security compliance in the day-to-day activities of the front-line employees. This assessment will include all rail carriers that transport toxic inhalation railcar shipments. 

In addition to the rail industry’s training program, we are currently developing an interactive training program on the recognition of explosive devices on railcars and rail property. This will be 

made available to the rail carriers at no cost in the coming months. 
5

In summary, we value the critical role that Congress, and especially this subcommittee, plays in the effort to protect rail security. 

We look forward to working with you in the future to achieve this 

goal. 

Thank you. And I would be pleased to respond to any questions 

later. 

[The statement of Mr. Sammon follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN P. SAMMON

Good morning Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sanchez, and Members of the 

Subcommittee. I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify on the important 

subject of security training for freight rail, mass transit, and passenger rail employees. 

America has some form of rail transit (i.e., some combination of subway, light rail 

and/or commuter rail systems) in 30 cities in 22 states. These systems provide 11.3 

million passenger trips each weekday. In fact, of the 3.5 billion rail trips taken annually, 77 percent are on heavy rail systems, more commonly known as subways. 

As you know, public transportation is inherently an open, accessible system intended to help people move rapidly and efficiently between home and work, shopping, medical care, and other community activities on a daily basis.

Federal Rail Transit Security Initiatives Since 9/11 

Immediately following September 11, 2001, the Federal Transit Administration 

(FTA) of the Department of Transportation (DOT) undertook an aggressive nationwide security program and led the initial Federal effort on transit security. The initial response included conducting threat and vulnerability assessments in 37 large 

transit systems, 30 of which carry almost 90 percent of all transit riders. The assessments gave us a comprehensive view of transit system readiness, 

vulnerabilities, and consequences and identified the three important areas that continue to form the fundamental baseline of transit security: employee training, public 

awareness and emergency preparedness. TSA continues to build upon these fundamentals. 

In 2002, to help guide transit agency priorities, FTA issued a Top 20 Security Action Item List to improve transit safety and security operations, particularly with 

regard to employee training, public awareness, and emergency preparedness. In a 

joint effort coordinated with the Mass Transit Sector Coordinating Council, TSA and 

FTA revised the Security Action Items this year.

The Role of Transit Employees in Transit Security 

Transit employees are part of America’s first line of defense and will be our first 

responders in the event of a terrorist attack or other emergency on a transit system. 

Their vigilant observations may detect indicators of a developing plan or attack. 

Their actions taken in the critical moments immediately after an attack or an emergency can significantly reduce the severity of injuries and the number of deaths that 

result. As a result, there is simply no substitute for security awareness and emergency response training for transit employees. We must rely on—and cultivate—

human capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond to security threats. 

The 400,000-plus transit employees throughout America are the ‘‘eyes and ears’’ 

of our most important security system. Transit employees travel the same routes, 

maintain the same facilities, and see the same people every day as they go about 

their duties. They are in the best position to identify unusual packages, suspicious 

substances, and people who are acting suspiciously. But they need to develop an understanding of what to look for and skills in how to respond. These skills can be 

acquired through extensive training, rigorous emergency planning, and regular 

emergency testing and drills. 

Rail Transit Security Training Initiatives at TSA 

I want to affirm that training remains a core fundamental for TSA. We understand that training and preparedness are critical if transit agencies are to respond 

appropriately to a terrorist attack or a natural disaster. We recognize that TSA and 

the transit industry need to provide more training for more employees to realize our 

goal of thoroughly integrating security awareness training as part of the security 

paradigm. 

In fiscal year 2006, TSA provided nearly $1.5 million in direct financial support 

for the implementation and continuing development of programs to enhance transit 

security, most notably security training for transit employees. Of the allocation, 

$1,196,000 enables expansion of multiple Federal training programs that have come 
6

to be recognized for their quality and are widely used by transit systems. This funding will enable an additional 22 courses on Counter-Terrorism Strategies and the 

FTA developed Terrorist Activity Recognition and Reaction to be held over the next 

year. We continue to focus on training that outlines for transit employees actions 

that can be taken in the minutes preceding and immediately after an event that 

are crucial to mitigating the potential impact. Timely decisions by an operator or 

controller to determine whether to evacuate a train station or take it to the next 

station in the midst of a chemical event for example, are vital choices that dramatically affect the impact of an attack. TSA is funding an incident management course 

for operations control center personnel that will equip them with the skills to take 

operational actions to respond to a chemical, biological, or explosive incident. TSA’s 

Surface Transportation Security Inspectors help facilitate the availability of course 

offerings to transit system security officials. 

TSA has a key role in awarding the $143 million for the 2006 Transit Security 

Grant (TSGP) and Intercity Rail Security Grant Programs. Working in concert with 

our partners, TSA has worked to streamline the TSGP process, ensure that the resources are focused on key risk reduction priorities. One of the security priorities 

emphasized in the 2006 TSGP is the expansion of employee training programs that 

emphasize basic security awareness for front line employees, equipment familiarization, incident severity assessing and reporting, crew communication and coordination, operational response and evacuation procedures. As we move into the next 

cycle of grant allocations, TSA wants to ensure that transit agencies have implemented all the fundamentals before investments are made in other projects that do 

not have the return on investment that fundamental training programs provide. To 

date, we have awarded almost $400 million over the last three years with training 

as one of the key focus areas. 

Congress authorized and funded TSA to hire 100 Surface Transportation Security 

Inspectors (STSIs), which we completed in October 2005. Our inspectors are in the 

field every day across the country, working to raise the baseline of security throughout the industry. To date, our inspectors have surveyed and assessed over 750 properties. They have an assessment tool that measures an agency’s level of training for 

frontline staff and other personnel in addition to monitoring other key security action items. Further, TSA’s STSIs are also empowered to provide federal assistance 

through existing programs to help local agencies improve their security standards. 

Some of the assistance that is offered includes Visible Intermodal Protection Response teams, explosive detection canine assistance, joint public awareness campaigns, and exercise and drill expertise. 

Through our work with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) 

TSA has trained over 480 law enforcement officers, transit police, transit system security directors and security coordinators, and other first responders through the 

Land Transportation Anti-Terrorism Training Program. This program provides 

training to local authorities in protecting land transportation infrastructure including rail, light rail, mass transit, and bus operations. Areas of focus include security 

planning, transit system vulnerabilities, contingency planning, recognition and response for threats involving explosives and weapons of mass destruction, and crisis 

and consequence management. In Fiscal Year 2006 alone, 240 persons have completed the program. 

TSA will continue to monitor the level of industry compliance with the baseline 

security action items. The results of these assessments will determine if additional 

regulatory steps are needed to ensure that a strong security baseline including a 

well trained workforce is in place. 

TSA remains mindful that it must have a layered approach to security. We understand that information sharing, both classified and unclassified, is a critical component to working with industry to prevent and respond to attacks. We have made 

significant improvements in our ability to communicate with transit agencies. TSA 

communicates with the top 100 transit agencies regularly. We are working aggressively to expand access to secure phones so that we can provide them access to sensitive threat information in real time. Another layer is the use of canine teams in 

transit systems. 

Currently, we have 33 canine teams deployed in 11 systems and we expect additional agencies will be added to our canine program this year. We also appreciate 

your support in providing funding requested in FY 2007 to support Transit Watch, 

a program that encourages public awareness and preparedness. We will continue to 

add measures and support programs to enhance a layered security approach 

prioritize training among the many measures systems can take.

Freight Rail Security Training Initiatives 
7

TSA is acutely aware of the importance of security training in the freight rail 

arena. This year, in conjunction with DOT, we issued a list of recommended security 

action items to rail carriers for the transport of toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) materials. Included in these security action items are recommendations that directly relate to continued education and training. We are currently developing a CD–ROM 

based interactive training program on the recognition of improvised explosive devices on railcars and on railroad property. This training will be made available to 

rail carriers at no cost in the next couple of months. 

TSA, other DHS components, and the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), in 

cooperation with affected railroads, conduct high threat urban area (HTUA) assessments in order to identify the vulnerabilities of selected urban areas where TIH 

shipments are moved in significant quantity. TSA has developed a risk assessment 

tool in coordination with railroad owners and operators and federal agencies participating in the HTUAs. TSA has provided a comprehensive training program for railroad security directors to effectively use this tool. TSA has also developed a Rail 

Corridor Risk Management Tool for use by freight owners and operators nationwide 

where on-the-ground assessments are not conducted.

Conclusion 

In closing, the nation’s rail and transit operators and their employees have responded admirably to the new threat environment. Thanks to their efforts, passenger and freight rail is more secure and better prepared to respond to emergencies 

than ever before. However, we must continue to focus on this important issue, including ensuring that training is disseminated throughout transit organizations, 

that employees are receiving refresher training, and that we are developing training 

to address the emerging needs of the transit environment. 

I appreciate the opportunity to provide this important update on rail security. We 

value the critical role the Congress, and especially this Subcommittee, plays in the 

effort to protect rail security. We look forward to working with you on the full range 

of subjects so critical to protecting America’s transportation infrastructure, its passengers, and the commerce that it carries. 

Thank you. I would be pleased to respond to questions.

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Sammon, for your testimony. 

The chair would now recognize Mr. Terry Rosapep, the deputy 

associate administrator, Office of Program Management at the Federal Transit Agency, to testify. 

I understand that while you will be testifying for the Department 

of Transportation, you also have Mr. William Fagan, the director 

of security at the Federal Railroad Administration, to answer questions regarding training for rail at DOT. 

Thank you, both, for being here. 

And, sir, you may proceed. 

STATEMENT OF TERRY ROSAPEP, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE 

ADMINISTRTOR, OFFICE OF PROGRAM MANAGEMENT, FEDERAL TRANSIT ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. ROSAPEP. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman Sanchez, Congressman Langevin 

and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss security training for transit and railroad employees and the Department of the Transportation’s initiatives in that 

area, first by highlighting the Federal Transit Administration’s involvement in transit security and then the involvement by the Federal Railroad Administration. 

The FTA, its federal and state partners, and the transit industry 

have built a solid foundation for security by focusing on three priorities: public awareness, emergency preparedness and employee 

training. 
8

Since 9/11, FTA has delivered security training to almost 80,000 

transit employees in an ongoing collaboration with NTI—the National Transit Institute at Rutgers University—DOT’s Transportation Safety Institute, and the Johns Hopkins University. 

FTA now coordinates security training through the public transportation annex to the DOT–DHS memorandum of understanding, 

which sets out the respective roles of the departments on security 

issues. 

The annex’s executive steering committee oversees eight project 

management teams. The training team looks specifically at how to 

develop new courses on timely security topics. The safety and security roundtables team also enhances security training through direct outreach to the security chiefs at the 50 largest transit agencies. Another team is dedicated to the Transit Watch program, 

which is tantamount to a security training for passengers. 

In partnership with Johns Hopkins, FTA has developed and is 

delivering a course on strategic counterterrorism for transit managers. In addition, a security training assessment for the 30 largest 

transit agencies, and also for 20 smaller ones, is being completed. 

And that will give us a better baseline to determine training needs 

throughout the industry. 

With NTI, FTA is working to deliver several security training 

courses. These include chem-bio and explosive incident management, as well as systems security awareness, which imparts basic 

security skills to front-line employees. 

FTA has collaborated with DOT’s Transportation Safety Institute 

on six specific security training courses. Topical areas include security design review principles, bus and rail hijackings, and response 

to threats posed by weapons of mass destruction. 

Turning to FRA, FRA promotes the safety of the U.S. railroad industry and works closely with its federal and state partners in the 

railroad industry in addressing training and other security issues. 

In the area of freight rail security, FRA worked closely with the 

DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 

PHMSA, on a March 2003 regulation requiring each shipper and 

carrier of significant quantities of HAZMAT to adopt and comply 

with a security plan. 

PHMSA regulations require each company to give its employees 

both security awareness training and in-depth security training 

concerning the company’s security plan and its implementation. 

To date, FRA has reviewed more than 6,000 security plans and 

conducted some 4,000 inspections for compliance with the regulations security training requirements. 

Further, in June of this year, FRA, TSA and the railroads agreed 

on voluntary security action steps the industry should take to enhance security in the transportation of toxic inhalation hazard materials, TIH. The action items include regularly reinforcing security 

awareness and operational security concepts to all employees, and 

training employees to recognize suspicious activity, to report security concerns stemming from the inspection of cars containing TIH 

materials. 

FRA and TSA have also assisted the freight railroads with instituting their own more comprehensive security plans, and have pro-
9

vided input to employee security training modules which the railroads and NTI are now developing. 

In the area of passenger railroad security, FRA issued regulations in 1998 requiring passenger railroads to prepare and secure 

FRA approval of plans to address emergencies, conduct employee 

training on the plans, and conduct emergency simulations. In addition, Amtrak and the commuter railroads have instituted their own 

security plans and conduct their own security training. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, be assured 

that the Department of Transportation will continue to work with 

DHS to strengthen transit and rail security. We look forward to 

continuing to work with Congress to advance the shared goal of 

protecting our transit and rail infrastructure. 

We will be happy to answer any of the questions you may have. 

Thank you. 

[The statement of Mr. Rosapep follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TERRY ROSAPEP

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity 

to testify today on behalf of the Secretary of Transportation and the Federal Transit 

Administration (FTA). I am pleased to have this opportunity, with my colleague, 

William Fagan, Director of Security at the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), 

to update you on transit and rail security training and the U. S. Department of 

Transportation’s (DOT) initiatives in that area.

FTA and Transit Security 

America’s transit system is complex, dynamic, interconnected, and composed of 

over 6,000 local systems. By their nature, these systems--and the entire transit network—are open and accessible, and therefore difficult to secure. Each workday, 

transit and commuter rail systems move approximately 14 million passengers in the 

United States. 

FTA, its Federal and state partners, and the transit industry have built a solid 

foundation for security in the years following the attacks of September 11, by focusing on three security priorities: public awareness, employee training, and emergency 

preparedness. FTA has designed its security training programs with the certainty 

that regardless of where an attack comes from or how it is devised, security training 

of employees and passenger awareness will always help to prevent or mitigate damage. 

Since September 11, in our ongoing collaboration with partners at the National 

Transit Institute (NTI) of Rutgers University, the Transportation Safety Institute 

(TSI) of the Department of Transportation, and Johns Hopkins University (JHU), 

FTA has delivered security training to almost 80,000 transit employees nationwide. 

We have utilized an array of formats for security training, ranging from classroom 

instruction and roundtables to videos and toolkits, to suit the needs of each audience and to disseminate broadly our knowledge about security. 

In September 2005, FTA and two agencies within the Department Homeland Security—the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Office for Domestic Preparedness, now the Office of Grants and Training (G&T), signed the Public 

Transportation Security Annex to the Department of Transportation (DOT/Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on security. The annex identifies specific areas of coordination among the parties, including 

citizen awareness, training, exercises, risk assessments, and information sharing. To 

implement the Annex, the three agencies have developed a framework that 

leverages each agency’s resources and capabilities. 

With the Annex in place as a blueprint, FTA, TSA and G&T have established an 

Executive Steering Committee that interacts with DHS, DOT, and transit industry 

leaders. This committee oversees eight project management teams that spearhead 

the Annex’s programs. Each of these programs advances one or more of FTA’s three 

security priority areas, which again are public awareness, employee training, and 

emergency preparedness. We have been implementing the Annex energetically since 

its inception. 

The ‘‘Training Team’’ looks specifically at how to develop new courses on timely, 

cutting-edge security topics such as strategic counter-terrorism, and biological and 

chemical threats. The Annex’s ‘‘Safety and Security Roundtables’’ team also en-
10

hances security training. It works on direct outreach to the transit industry, and 

plans two educational events a year for the security chiefs of the 50 largest transit 

agencies. Transit security leaders have responded favorably to opportunities for 

peer-to-peer forums, and the security roundtables provide just that. The next roundtable, our third, will be held in December 2006 in Secaucus, New Jersey. 

It is also worth noting that the Annex includes a team dedicated to the ‘‘Transit 

Watch’’ program, which is tantamount to a security training initiative that teaches 

transit passengers to become more mindful of their environment in the context of 

risks of the times for terrorism. 

FTA, with our Federal partners at DHS, continues to work with Johns Hopkins, 

TSI, and NTI to deliver and develop security training programs. 

Before I detail these course offerings, I would like to call your attention to a few 

highlights. First, FTA’s course offerings are comprehensive and focus on all transit 

environments, including smaller agencies. Second, security training aims to disseminate the most current and up to date thinking on the most current and up to date 

threat information for the transit industry. Third, these courses cover a comprehensive range of topics that mesh with transit industry realities and needs. Finally, 

FTA’s courses equip transit agencies to implement security training for all of their 

employees. This magnifies the impact of security training courses, as it encourages 

those we educate to educate, in turn, their peers and employees. 

In partnership with JHU, FTA has already piloted and revised a two-day course on Strategic Counter-Terrorism for Transit Managers. This course provides counterterrorism management training to transit police and security forces in a large 

enough number to ensure a core, consistent approach to security planning across 

transit agencies. 

With JHU, FTA has also developed a Strategic Curriculum Development Guidance 

Document, which is an essential tool for standardized, high quality security training. 

Finally, in conjunction with JHU, FTA is just now completing the Security Training Assessment for Top 30 Transit Agencies, and for 20 smaller agencies. This assessment will help FTA and our partners in the Federal government identify security training gaps and needs in the industry. Usefully, it takes into account smaller 

agencies, whose requirements and characteristics often differ from those of larger 

urban systems. 

FTA is working with NTI to deliver six security training initiatives for the transit 

industry: 

The System Security Awareness for Transportation Employees training that FTA 

developed with NTI imparts basic security skills and is offered in the form of a fourhour class, DVD/video or employee handouts. FTA has also distributed over 4,200 

copies of its system security awareness Warning Signs video, developed in collaboration with NTI. FTA is in the process of developing a parallel video targeted specifically to smaller transit agencies. 

FTA has just developed a six-hour course on Chemical/Biological and Explosive 

Incident Management for Operations Control Center Personnel. This course has been 

developed and is currently being delivered to ten transit agencies in large metro 

areas; an additional 20 deliveries will be scheduled for 2007. 

The Terrorist Activity Recognition and Reaction course draws on FTA’s work with 

Israeli experts on passenger monitoring, and lessons learned from Israel’s security 

experts. FTA has already reached 6,000 employees with this material. In the next 

quarter, FTA plans to complete two additional training initiatives with NTI. The 

first is an Emergency Drills/ Exercise Guidance Document for transit agencies. The 

second is a new training course that will help ensure that transit employees can 

use the National Incident Management System for Transit to collaborate effectively 

with emergency responders and services during an incident. 

During 2006, FTA has collaborated with TSI to offer or develop six security training courses. 

In June, FTA and TSI offered a Crime Prevention through Environmental Design

course in El Paso, Texas; FTA is now developing a Security Design training course 

with TSI that achieves the same purpose but with the emphasis against terrorism. 

From April to August of this year, FTA offered its Transit System Security course 

five times. This course encourages participants to develop and implement security 

policies in a uniform format. The FTA–TSI course in Effectively Managing Transit 

Emergencies also takes a broad perspective and teaches transit employees how to 

understand the emergency management concept. 

Two additional courses train employees to handle specific kinds of security 

threats. FTA offered the Threat Management and Emergency Response to Bus and 

Rail Hijackings course eight times this year. It also offered a course in the Transit 

Response to Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
11

TSI is in the process of updating and revising all of its courses so as to be in compliance with FTA and DHS requirements. 

As this brief review illustrates, FTA has forged successful collaborations both 

within the Federal government, between the government and the transit industry, 

and with JHU, NTI and TSI, to develop and disseminate the latest security training 

and knowledge. FTA’s work with these organizations and within the MOU Annex 

is the primary way that we influence security training practices in the transit industry.

FRA’s Role in Railroad Security 

FRA’s primary mission is to promote the safety of the U.S. railroad industry. 

FRA’s railroad safety mission necessarily includes its involvement in railroad security issues, and FRA works closely with TSA and the railroad industry on a daily 

basis in addressing railroad security issues. 

The United States railroad network is a vital link in the Nation’s transportation 

system and is critical to the economy, national defense, and public health. Amtrak 

and commuter railroads provide passenger rail service to more than 500 million passengers yearly. Freight railroads connect businesses with each other across the 

country and with markets overseas, moving 42 percent of all intercity freight, measured in ton-miles. Passenger and freight railroads operate over 170,000 route miles 

of track and employ over 227,000 workers. 

FRA’s involvement in railroad security predates the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. From 1997 through the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 in March of this year, DOT worked closely 

with Congress to secure the enactment of Federal criminal legislation to more effectively deter and punish terrorist who attack railroads and mass transportation systems. In 1998, FRA issued regulations requiring passenger railroads to prepare and 

secure FRA approval of plans to address emergencies (such as security threats), conduct employee training on the plan, and conduct emergency simulations. This regulation is discussed in more detail below. 

Since the terrorist atrocities on September 11, 2001, FRA has been actively engaged in the railroad industry’s response to the terrorist threat. The railroads have 

developed their own security plans, and FRA has worked with the railroads, rail 

labor, and law enforcement personnel to develop the Railway Alert Network, which 

enables timely distribution of information and intelligence on security issues. Working with the FTA, we have participated in security risk assessments on commuter 

railroads, and we have conducted security risk assessments of Amtrak as well. 

FRA’s security director works on a daily basis to facilitate communications on security issues between government agencies and the railroad industry.

Freight Railroad Security 

A special focus for FRA and DOT, collectively, is the security of hazmat transported by rail. A major initiative to improve hazmat security has been the Pipeline 

and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration’s (PHMSA) March 2003 regulation 

requiring each shipper and carrier of significant quantities (amounts for which placards are required) of hazmat to adopt and comply with a security plan. Under the 

regulation, security plans must include an assessment of security risks and appropriate countermeasures or mitigation strategies, or both, to address those risks. The 

plans must, at a minimum, address three specific areas: the company personnel who 

prepare and handle hazmat shipments; unauthorized access to hazmat shipments 

or transport conveyances; and the security of hazmat shipped or transported by the 

company from its origin to its destination. To assist railroads that transport hazmat 

and shippers that offer hazmat for transportation by rail to comply with this regulation, particularly small—and medium-sized companies, FRA and PHMSA developed 

a program on how to write and implement security plans for their companies. FRA, 

PHMSA, and TSA have been working together on developing proposed revisions to 

the PHMSA rule. 

FRA recognizes that railroad and shipper employees’ awareness and understanding of the PHMSA regulation and procedures governing the safe and secure 

transportation of hazmat shipments are critical. Therefore, PHMSA’s regulation provides for safety and security training for employees engaged in the transportation 

of hazmat. Specifically, every shipper and carrier of hazmat must give its employees 

training in awareness of risks associated with hazmat transportation and methods 

designed to enhance hazmat transportation security. In addition, every shipper and 

carrier required to have a security plan must give its employees in-depth security 

training concerning the company’s security plan and its implementation. These 

training requirements are also recurrent; employees must receive the required 

training at least every three years. To date, FRA personnel have reviewed more 

than 6,105 security plans (including the plans for all Class I freight railroad car-
12

riers) and conducted 4,054 inspections for compliance with the security training requirements. 

Further, as a result of extensive collaboration with the freight railroad industry, 

on June 23, 2006, DHS and DOT issued ‘‘Recommended Security Action Items for 

the Rail Transportation of Toxic Inhalation Hazard (TIH) Materials.’’ The Action 

Items are based on lessons learned from an assessment of high-threat urban area 

rail corridors and from reviews of railroads? security plans. Implementation of the 

Action Items is expected to raise the security baseline for the transportation of TIH 

materials. We believe the Security Action Items are of great value and can be quickly implemented. They include regularly reinforcing security awareness and operational security concepts to all employees at all levels of the organization, training 

employees to recognize suspicious activity and report security concerns found during 

inspections of cars containing TIH materials, and other security training program 

elements. DOT and TSA are monitoring implementation of the Action Items and, 

should they not be voluntarily adopted as expected, we will consider more formally 

instituting the Action Items. 

While we must remain ever vigilant to secure hazmat shipments on our Nation’s 

railroads, for the sake of railroad employees and the public whom we all serve, it 

bears emphasis that the vast majority of hazmat shipments arrive at their destinations safely; few tank cars have leaks or spills of any kind; fewer still are breached 

in an accident or incident. Considering just chlorine, for example, since 1965 (the 

earliest data available) there have been at least 2.2 million tank car shipments of 

chlorine?only 788 of which were involved in accidents (0.036 percent of all the shipments). Of those accidents, there were 11 instances of a catastrophic loss (i.e., a loss 

of all, or nearly all) of the chlorine lading (0.0005 percent of all the shipments). Of 

the 11 catastrophic losses, four resulted in fatalities (0.00018 percent of all the shipments). For all hazardous materials, in the 12 years from 1994 through 2005, hazardous materials released in railroad accidents resulted in a total of 14 fatalities. 

While one death is obviously too many, the record of transporting these commodities 

is very good. 

Railroads have also voluntarily imposed their own, additional security requirements addressing the security of not only hazmat but of freight in general. The Nation’s freight railroads have developed and put in place security plans based on comprehensive risk analyses and the national intelligence community’s best practices. 

The Association of American Railroads (AAR) has established guidance for the major 

freight railroads in the form of a model strategic security plan. Further, the AAR 

and Class I railroads have been working with the National Transit Institute at Rutgers University to develop employee training modules for security. With FRA and 

TSA input, four video modules have been developed covering security awareness 

training. In particular, the video training modules help frontline employees identify 

potential security breaches, threats and risks and explain how they should report 

them. A fifth training module is being developed to address the notification of employees in a security incident and what they need to do under the railroad’s security 

plan, such as moving cars to more secure areas. Notably, the training is intended 

for all railroad employees—not just those employees responsible for the transportation of hazmat. The video training modules will be made part of a training library 

for use in recurrent training, rules classes, training of new employees, and other 

training. The training modules will also continue to be shared with the smaller railroads.

Passenger Railroad Security 

In the area of passenger railroad security, FRA requires railroads that operate 

intercity or commuter passenger train service or that host the operation of that 

service to adopt and comply with a written emergency preparedness plan approved 

by FRA. Each plan must address employee training and qualification. Crewmembers 

aboard a passenger train must be trained initially and then periodically every two 

years on the applicable plan provisions. At a minimum, training must include the 

following subjects: rail equipment familiarization; situational awareness; passenger 

evacuation; coordination of functions; and ‘‘hands-on’’ instruction concerning the location, function, and operation of on-board emergency equipment. Personnel of a 

control center (a central location on a railroad with responsibility for directing the 

safe movement of trains) must also be trained initially and then periodically every 

two years on appropriate courses of action for potential emergency situations. This 

training must include dispatch territory familiarization and protocols governing internal communications between appropriate control center personnel whenever an 

imminent, potential emergency situation exists. Additionally, each railroad must establish and maintain a working relationship with emergency responders on its line 

by developing and making available a training program on the plan, inviting them 
13

to participate in emergency simulations, discussed more below, and by distributing 

updated plans to them, including documentation concerning the railroad’s equipment, the physical characteristics of its line, necessary maps, and the position titles 

and telephone numbers of relevant railroad officers to contact. Further, railroads 

providing passenger service must periodically conduct full-scale passenger train 

emergency simulations and must conduct a debriefing and critique session after actual or simulated passenger train emergency situations. These requirements for fullscale simulations and for post-simulation and post-emergency debriefing help ensure 

that employees? abstract knowledge of emergency procedures is put into practice 

and then refined based on their collective experience. 

Amtrak and commuter railroads have instituted their own security plans and conduct security training. FRA assisted Amtrak in the development of its security plan. 

Specifically, in coordination with Amtrak’s Inspector General, FRA contracted with 

the RAND Corporation to conduct a systematic review and assessment of Amtrak’s 

security posture, corporate strategic security planning, and programs focusing on 

the adequacy of preparedness for combating terrorist threats. 

In partnership with FTA, FRA participated in security risk assessments on the 

ten largest commuter railroads and contributed the funding for security risk assessments on three of these railroads. FRA also participated in FTA’s ‘‘best practices 

tool kit’’ initiative, contributing our knowledge of commuter rail operations, infrastructure, and organization to ensure that the recommended security enhancement 

measures were sound and feasible in a railroad environment. FRA staff worked 

closely with many of the railroads that receive FTA grant funding, to plan and assist in the development and implementation of security simulations and drills. FRA 

also devoted staff with both railroad knowledge and facilitation skills to the 17 FTAsponsored workshops across the country (called ‘‘Connecting Communities’’) to bring 

together commuter railroads, emergency responders, and State and local government leaders so that they might better coordinate their security plans and emergency response efforts. 

The American Public Transportation Association (APTA) is also leading commuter 

railroads in the development of industry standards for passenger rail security. This 

initiative is in addition to APTA’s system safety audit program, to which most commuter railroads subscribe, and which includes security as an element of overall system safety. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, be assured that the Department of Transportation will continue to strengthen transit and rail security. We look 

forward to continuing to work with Congress to advance the shared goal of protecting our transit and rail infrastructure, and all that rides on it. I, and my colleagues, will be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much for your testimony. Appreciate it. 

I thank both the witnesses. 

And I thank you, Mr. Fagan, for being here to respond to questions as well. 

We will start the round of questioning. And I will yield myself 

5 minutes for that purpose. 

We are going to have a second panel here, and we have two representatives of unions involved in the industry. And the tenor of 

one of the prepared statements is that we would hear a lot of good 

things from the administration but that, in fact, it is more talk 

than action. And the suggestion that the good work done by the 

National Transit Institute only represents training approximately 

30 percent of the transit industry’s total workforce. 

Mr. Sammon and Mr. Rosapep, how would you respond to that? 

I mean, I view that as a criticism, and I would like you to give us 

an answer. 

Mr. SAMMON. Thank you. Let me start first. 

In terms of the overall federal spending that is available, DHS has made available about $18 billion to state and local governments. And they use that money in various and sundry ways, 

whether they use it for first responders, transit—however they 

have been making decisions on that. 
14

There is about $4 billion, or $3.5 billion, a year available from 

FTA capital grants that there is more flexibility to use with training and also for capital security items. And I think, since 9/11, approximately $900 million from all federal agencies has been available for transit security. 

Now, in terms of the question of training, that is why what we 

want to do at TSA is in—TSA is now working with DHS in a lead 

role on the grants program. And what we want to do is, rather 

than have the grants go out simply for capital items, we want to 

require a baseline of training before people are eligible for capital 

grants. So we want to leverage that excess of $100 million to get the 

properties their front-line employee training up to standards. And 

that is what we plan to do and we want to do. 

And working with the unions—I worked at Conrail for quite 

some time, and we had at one point one of the worst safety records, 

and we turned it around to have one of the best safety records. And 

we did that by working with the people on the ground directly. 

Every one of our senior officers was out working with folks on the 

ground. 

So I think the front-line employees, at some point in this process, 

should be involved. And it is very important, because their attitude 

and their involvement take you from having a training and awareness program that is on paper versus a real, robust one in the field. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Is it ‘‘Rosapep’’ or ‘‘Rosapep’’? I want to make 

sure—

Mr. ROSAPEP. It is ‘‘Rosapep.’’

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. Mr. Rosapep, could you respond to that, 

please? 

Mr. ROSAPEP. Yes, I would say that, you know, since 9/11, the 

training programs have in fact been focused on the largest 30 transit agencies, as opposed to all of the systems out there. So we have 

a higher penetration of the top 30 agencies, probably more like that 

60 percent of the employees. But overall, the 20 percent figure is 

correct. 

As an example, in your district—and we have been focusing on 

getting out the basic security awareness course to those top 30 

agencies. We have done Sacramento in your district. In Congresswoman Sanchez’s district we have done the Orange County transit 

system, to get the basic security programs out there. 

But those are the larger ones. 

We are right now conducting an assessment of not only those top 

30, to see how well we have penetrated and the training has gone 

down in those agencies, but we are also looking at a selection of 

20 smaller agencies across the country as well, because we also 

think those are important. 

When we have that assessment complete, I think we will have 

a much better idea of what it is going to take to do the training 

that is necessary at the larger systems as well as the smaller ones 

and get a broader penetration throughout the industry of the training that is really necessary. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Have you had an opportunity to look at some of 

the systems themselves? That is, you say in Orange County and 

Sacramento they have had the training. In testimony that we have 
15

coming up later from one of the union representatives, mentions 

that the Washington, D.C. system has had training, the L.A. metro 

have trained their front-line employees. At least that is their statement. 

Have you had any opportunity to go in and look at the quality 

of that training that actually took place? I guess I would ask it this 

way: Are there any metrics, are there any performance standards, 

is there anything to show that it has taken? 

Mr. ROSAPEP. That really is part of the assessment we are doing, 

is to go back to those agencies that we have trained in the top 30 

to see, has it been effective? And if it hasn’t, why not and what can 

we do about it? 

Frankly, another parallel effort going on to actually define some 

performance metrics for training. All of us are party to this effort. 

But that will give us an ongoing way of measuring just how effective the training is on an ongoing basis. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Do you have any sense whether these systems 

sense the importance of this? 

That is, you look at the bottom line of an operation. Preparing 

for a terrorist attack, in many cases, might be the outlier, you 

know? It is something that we don’t think is going to happen. That 

is, that could be the comment or a thought of an operator. Therefore, we can’t justify it to our bottom line. 

Do we have that problem? Or is there a seriousness that you find 

with the operators you deal with that actually they understand 

how important this is? 

Mr. ROSAPEP. Our experience so far, it is not an issue of that. 

They sense the importance of it and are eager to get the training. 

The other side of it, too, is, so much of the, what we call, security 

training is just as applicable to safety issues. In fact, it is hard to 

define a clear line between the two. 

And the fact is, our transit agencies have been doing safety training and safety programs for years and years. They know the importance of it. Some of these new security programs add a new twist 

to it, but it is not something that they have to be convinced of, that 

it is something that they would like and need to do. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. My time is up. 

The gentlelady from California, the ranking member of this subcommittee, Ms. Sanchez, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry for arriving 

late, but I do thank you for this hearing. I think it is very important, because I have been hearing from a lot of different areas with 

respect to training and the security on the different rail line, in 

particular. 

So let me get this—I am a little bit concerned about, in talking 

to people about the perceived lack of coordination between the Department of Homeland Security and Transportation. There appears 

to be a lot of overlap and duplication with regards to security training. 

And, you know, there are very few resources. I used to do transportation consultation many decades ago, and so really understand, 

in particular for mass transit, what it takes to move people and 

where the monies are coming from, and the lack of monies. 
16

So who is the primary department and agency responsible for security training? And what steps are you taking to improve the coordination between the two departments? 

And my second question has to deal with this issue of whether 

TSA is just acting as a passthrough to give monies, then, over to, 

let’s say, FTA for this security training. It seems to me that there 

recently was, for example, a $1.5 million transfer from TSA to the 

FTA and another $200,000 transfer that was made last year. 

So is TSA developing the training? Is it just moving the money 

over to FTA? Should we just be giving the money directly to FTA? 

What is the coordination, and who is really doing this? 

And if you answered this before I walked in, I am sorry, but I 

need to, sort of, understand. 

Mr. SAMMON. No, that is a very good question. 

I think, if you go back before 9/11, as discussed a few minutes 

ago, I think most of the training and efforts in terms of security 

and safety were handled by the FTA. And in many cases, if you 

think about security, ‘‘Am I going to be mugged?’’ or ‘‘Is this a terrorist attack?’’, a lot of the things involved—there is a fine line in 

terms of separating both of them. 

So in the past, and in their roles of dealing with the nation’s 

transit agencies, FTA—in the testimony he has gone through—developing a number of training programs in dealing with the agencies. 

In my discussions with the agencies, they want to deal with?it 

is fine that the federal government has all these different security 

agencies. But in terms of, if you are going to have programs and 

training programs and we are going to do training—for instance, 

if you do safety training and you take an operator out of his equipment for the day and he is going to be in a room, you can do both 

safety training and security training. Security training can be 

against a criminal, and it can also be terrorist security training. It 

is effective to do it all at once in modules. 

So a lot of the development of the training programs has been 

developed by FTA. And TSA supports that effort. 

What TSA is doing and what we want to do is, in terms of, are 

the transit agencies at a baseline standard of training, are they 

there? And we want to use the grant program through DHS as the 

incentive to get people to the baseline of training. 

In the other part of my oral testimony today, we mentioned what 

we are doing in the rail industry. The rail industry has developed 

a four-part module, in terms of training for real employees and security awareness and so on. What we want to do with our inspectors is to make sure to see the effectiveness as it applies to the 

ground, their day-to-day activities, and how that applies. 

So I think, in terms of this, TSA is working?we have a memorandum of understanding with FTA and FRA. We work closely 

with them, in terms of these issues. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. My last question to you: It is my understanding 

that TSA has frozen all promotions and hiring for rail and mass 

transit officials at TSA, in addition to halting initiatives in these 

areas, due to funding shortfalls. Is there a shortfall? 

Mr. SAMMON. What we have—I recently hired the general management of rail from—promoted Gil Kovar, who is sitting in the au-
17

dience here. He has 30 years of experience in the rail industry as 

a senior line operating person. We have made permanent nine of 

the 11 general managers since I arrived, and we hope to have a 

transit general manager here shortly. 

So, we have been hiring people. We brought on an air cargo executive on Monday, who is retired, who is from Emery Worldwide. So 

we have been hiring people. 

In terms of a—

Ms. SANCHEZ. So you haven’t frozen promotions or stopped hiring 

of rail and mass transit officials? 

Mr. SAMMON. I haven’t stopped any hiring per se. 

What I have done since I have gotten there, in terms of looking 

at the overall resource of the group that I have, I want to make 

sure that the resources are in the right place. We may have too 

many people in one area and not enough people in another, and I 

am making that determination. 

So, before I fill jobs just because they were there before, I want 

to make sure we are filling the right jobs in the right places, and 

that TSA is putting its resources and using its resources most effectively. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Let me ask it just one different way. I see that my 

time is up. 

So there is no freezing of hiring into positions in—

Mr. SAMMON. I just hired the cargo general manager on Monday. 

But I have told people what I want to do—

Ms. SANCHEZ. What about the lower rungs? Is there an official 

freeze? 

Mr. SAMMON. There is not an official freeze. What we are doing 

is, in terms of the vacancies we have, I want a review and justification of all the vacancies in terms of the priorities of TSA, to make 

sure we are putting people in the right jobs rather than filling historic vacancies. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, thank you, again, for your testimony, for being 

here today. 

One of my concerns, in terms of what I have heard both from 

constituents and just on a general topic, is related to Amtrak police 

officers. And I am sure that we all agree that if you want to hire 

and retain good people, we have to pay them fairly. 

So I am going to address my question to Mr. Fagan. 

Mr. Fagan, as the director of security for the Federal Railroad 

Administration, you probably understand more than most people 

the need for a steady workforce of railroad police officers. 

And railroad police officers obviously serve on the front lines to 

ensure passenger safety. They are responsible for ensuring both the 

trains and the stations are secure, and assisting passengers with 

any security concerns that they may have. 

It is therefore important that they be compensated fairly and 

granted equitable contracts under which to work. 

Now, while I understand that you don’t work for Amtrak, I am 

sure that you have heard that Amtrak’s police officers have been 

operating now without a contract for 7 years—7 years. 
18

Now, the Amtrak police officers right now, as I understand it, are 

not paid commensurate with what their counterparts working for 

other rail companies make. Additionally, while they do receive costof-living adjustments, they are less than adequate, often amounting 

to an increase of one penny a month. 

So this leads to the unfortunate truth that much of Amtrak’s important police force leave to find better-paying jobs, which ultimately leaves gaping holes in rail security. 

So my question is, have you heard of this problem occurring? 

And do you think the Amtrak police officers should be operating 

under an updated contract? And do you think that this is a problem confined to Amtrak, or is it spilling over into other railroad police officers? 

And finally, in your capacity as the director of security for the 

Federal Railroad Administration, what can you do to help ensure 

Amtrak retains its important police force? 

Mr. FAGAN. Sir, I am very proud of our police officers both at the 

railroad and transit industry and in our local communities. Amtrak 

pay and personnel policies are an internal matter to the company. 

And we will review that question and provide you an answer in 

writing, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I would appreciate that. Obviously, 7 years, I 

think even to a reasonable person, is a long time to go without a 

contract. And if they are only getting about a penny-a-month increase in their cost-of-living adjustment, that is certainly not adequate. Doesn’t speak well of morale, I am sure, and it is going to 

be harder and harder to retain good people. Particularly in this day 

and age, I think that is an important topic to address. 

If I could, my next question is for Mr. Sammon. We witnessed 

the horrible events that unfolded during the attacks on London’s 

subway system just over a year ago, and we are fortunate that here 

in the United States we have not yet experienced that type of attack. 

And we are currently severely, in my opinion, underprepared to 

handle the results. Not only do we lack the capability to prevent 

such attacks from happening, but many of out nation’s subway systems are still not cell-phone accessible, which means that it could 

take first responders an even longer time to hear about the attacks. 

Now, I understand that the Washington Metro system is fortunately able to accommodate the use of cell phones along much of 

the tracks. However, cell phone simply cannot operate in much of 

the New York City subway system, where most threats to our nation’s mass transit have been received. 

So the fact that many of our nation’s subway systems lack the 

ability to allow for the use of cell phones leaves our mass transit 

systems extremely vulnerable to attack. 

So my question, Mr. Sammon: Do you see this as a problem to 

our mass transit system? And how do you propose that we act to 

make all of our nation’s subway systems cell-phone accessible? 

Mr. SAMMON. That is a very good question. And I think what we 

would, in terms of the cell phone specific, I don’t know that TSA 

has a specific plan on cell phones. 

Part of what we are looking for is the subway systems, in the 

context of the grant program, is, what is their response program? 
19

And part of that response program certainly is communication, and 

communication from the operators to the first responders. 

And we don’t have a specific plan for cell phones specifically. 

However, if you look at the risk-based distribution of our grant 

money in the past, it has gone to?one of the items that goes into 

determining that risk-based assessment is miles of underground 

track and underground stations. So certainly the systems that have 

the kinds of vulnerabilities that you are speaking to do receive, 

have received in the past, most of the funding. 

And I will bring up the cell-phone communication to make sure 

that we do have that as an important part of that recognition of 

the kinds of grants and applications we look at. Because certainly, 

when we talk about response plans and effective response plans, if 

you can’t communicate, you can’t respond. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Well, that is exactly—

Mr. SAMMON. Yes. Good point. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. —my concern, as well. And we don’t want to be 

talking about it after the fact. The opportunity is here to do something about it now, and we certainly welcome the opportunity to 

work with you on that. 

Mr. SAMMON. Very good. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Washington is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the testimony of the witnesses. 

Mr. Sammon, why hasn’t TSA required security training for rail 

and mass transit employees? 

Mr. SAMMON. We are working with the transit industry to develop a 1-year action plan which includes, among other things, 

would be training. We are—

Mr. DICKS. I mean, this seems to me this would be, like, the first 

thing we would do. But now 5 years have gone by, and we still 

don’t require training. So are we just leaving it up to the transit 

agencies and the railroads to do this training themselves? 

Mr. SAMMON. In the discussion we had before in the oral testimony, what I spoke about was using the excess of $100 million in 

the grants program—

Mr. DICKS. Who does that money go to? 

Mr. SAMMON. That goes to the transit agencies. 

Mr. DICKS. But still, there is not a requirement that they use it 

for training. 

Mr. SAMMON. There will be. And that is what we are doing and 

that is what we are changing in response to the recognition, first 

of all, the training is critical, training is essential. 

And in the past, in terms of the grants program, agencies could 

apply for training. Most apply for capital grants. But in their assessments of what is important, they have applied for training. 

They have not applied it for as many training programs—some 

have—as they have applied for capital. 

And what we want to do is raise a bar and have that bar set as 

we look at this next distribution of funds, to say, ‘‘If you are not 

trained, in our opinion, to a proper level, we don’t want to hand 

out money for technology before you do training.’’
20

So we may see, in this next round, a larger portion of that $130-

or-so million go for training than it has in the past. Because it 

doesn’t do any good for me to pay for—

Mr. DICKS. When can we expect this requirement? 

Mr. SAMMON. This requirement will—as we go through the 2006 

specifics, in terms of what specific projects will be approved, it will 

start coming out there. Now, will it be—

Mr. DICKS. You mean 2007? 

Mr. SAMMON. Well, we have—

Mr. DICKS. We have got about 2 weeks to go, or a few days to 

go, in 2006. 

Mr. SAMMON. Well, no, the amounts have been released, but the 

specific projects and what we will apply and how the money?and 

which projects apply, that will be done by the end of the year, certainly by 2007. 

And will it be done perfectly this first time? Probably not. But 

for 2007, people will understand the guidance and the requirements. 

But the training, we want—it doesn’t do anybody any good to 

buy them a chem-bio detection unit if the employees don’t know 

how to get out of the subway system or aren’t trained to evacuate. 

So they have to be trained first, before we start layering in lots of 

technology on these systems. 

But we agree with the committee’s assessment there. 

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Rosapep, do you think that TSA should mandate 

security training for mass transit employees? 

Mr. ROSAPEP. When you mandate something, we need to be prepared that we have the resources to make sure that the training 

is available so that the transit agencies can take care of that. 

We concur with the notion that the training has got to be there 

before people start buying technology. And FTA has been pushing 

that ourselves for a number of years. 

The courses that we have been pushing are those basic security 

awareness training for all the front-line staff. That plays in better 

to accomplishing that before funding goes in to the hard capital 

side of things. 

FTA’s own programs, this year, people are now able to use their 

FTA capital formula funds for training purposes. That wasn’t possible before this year. So there are new resources being made available for those agencies to be able to get the training that they need 

and want. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. So you are saying, until this year, the money 

that we gave them was not available for training? 

Mr. ROSAPEP. For FTA’s formula programs, they are strictly capital for the large agencies—

Mr. DICKS. Right. Right. 

Mr. ROSAPEP. —so things like training and conducting emergency 

drills and preparing plans are operational, and they weren’t eligible 

before. 

When Congress passed the new SAFE–T legislation for the transportation programs, they changed the definition of what is capital 

for FTA and for our transit agencies so that they can address security operational things, such as training. 
21

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Fagan, do you think TSA should mandate security training for rail employees? 

Mr. FAGAN. Sir, the Federal Railroad Administration mandates 

emergency training for passenger railroad employees as well as security training for HAZMAT employees. 

In the passenger arena, we take a triad approach of training the 

front-line crew employees, personnel in the dispatch and control 

centers, as well as the local emergency responders. 

Mr. DICKS. Could I just—Mr. Chairman, I know I—just let me 

ask one—give me a second. 

FRA is doing this, right, as you said. But TSA is supposed to be 

responsible for this. Why are you doing it if TSA isn’t doing it? Do 

you get my drift here? 

TSA is supposed to do this, right? 

Mr. SAMMON. In terms of training? 

Mr. DICKS. Yes. 

Mr. SAMMON. Yes. And that is why we wanted—

Mr. DICKS. For rail employees now I am talking about. 

SAMMON; That is why my general manager is sending his inspectors out, to make sure that the training that has been in place 

from the rail industry is effective and in place in the field. 

Mr. DICKS. But we are not requiring it. 

Mr. SAMMON. We are, in terms of—

Mr. DICKS. Mandatory. In other words, a rule that you have to 

do it. 

Mr. SAMMON. Right. Right. 

Mr. DICKS. Let me ask you one quick thing, Mr. Chairman. What 

about ferries? I come from the Pacific Northwest, the Bremerton 

area. Who is in charge of ferry security? 

We have had some issues out there, as you know. And I just 

wanted to know, is TSA—I know the Coast Guard has probably 

been playing the lead role here, which is probably appropriate. But 

who is supposed to be in charge of this? 

Mr. SAMMON. Well, in most areas, the Coast Guard. But there 

are grants that are applicable, in terms of security grants that TSA 

direct for that area. But generally, in many of the maritime areas, 

the Coast Guard does have a lead role, because there are maritime 

regulations that go back for many, many years that involve the 

Coast Guard. 

Mr. DICKS. Yes. Thank you. I think the program that they have 

developed is pretty good, by the way, for the ferry system. I mean, 

they have the dogs and everything. They are doing as much security as they can without completely disrupting the ferry system. 

Mr. SAMMON. Yes, they are doing great. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. I think we will try a second round here, and 

I will start off. 

Mr. Rosapep, you mentioned in your both prepared and oral testimony that you focus on three security priorities: public awareness, employee training, and emergency preparedness. 

I want to ask you about public awareness. I would dare say that, 

for most people who ride on airplanes today, they are aware of the 

threat. They would respond differently today than what happened 

on 9/11 because we recognize the tactics of the terrorists have 

changed. 
22

But it strikes me that the average person who rides on mass 

transit probably doesn’t have that same awareness of what the 

threat would be, how to respond to it, what they should do. 

When you say that your agency is involved in public awareness, 

what do you mean by that? 

Mr. ROSAPEP. The primary transit awareness program is the 

Transit Watch program, which actually is now jointly being funded 

by DHS and DOT. That program was started a few years ago. 

Locally, if you go Metro, you hear the warning signs all the time, 

you know, looking for unattended bags, looking for suspicious behaviors, trying to get people to understand what to look for; if they 

see it, who do they report that information to. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Again, what are the metrics on that? 

I mean, sometimes I see we have created scenarios by regulation 

that are so broad that, after a while, people don’t pay any attention 

to them. If you tell everybody—for instance, in my home state of 

California where, under Prop 65, we have to warn people that you 

might be exposed to certain cancer-causing agents at very, very, 

very low amounts, but we require every hotel, every convenience 

store, every supermarket to post that, people walk by it, they don’t 

pay any attention, it doesn’t mean anything to them. 

There are other parts of Prop 65 that work, but in that regard 

we have overdone it so that nobody pays any attention. 

Has there been any study to go back and say, ‘‘Hey, these notices 

of people to do that actually caused them to be aware of that?’’, 

number one. 

And number two, do you have anything that shows you how well 

passengers are responding, that is, are reporting when there does 

seem to be a suspicious package someplace? 

Mr. ROSAPEP. We haven’t completed a formal assessment of that 

program, but that is exactly the type of thing we need to do as 

these programs develop, is to determine do they get stale and no 

one is paying attention to them anymore. 

I think, just some of the feedback we have been getting is, transit agencies are getting lots of calls about looking at suspicious 

packages, unattended bags left on transit vehicles. So that message 

is still alive and is still out there, and people are paying attention 

to it. 

So at this stage of the game, I don’t think it is a stale message. 

We have added new wrinkles to it this year, again, that we want 

the agencies to start emphasizing not only the unattended bags but 

getting messages out there about how to evacuate the systems if 

it is necessary. I think that is particularly an area where most people don’t pay any attention to it; they don’t want to think about it. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Yes, I mean, if you would compare that to airlines, 

I would suspect most people, even though we kind of have our eyes 

glazed over when they talk about us sitting in the emergency exit 

rows and when they give the demonstration, most people, despite 

themselves, are paying somewhat attention, know where they are 

supposed to follow, how they are supposed to go, and those sorts 

of things. 

But I don’t sense the same thing on mass transit. 

Mr. ROSAPEP. Oh, I think you are absolutely right, which is why, 

again, the new version of Transit Watch for this year that we are 
23

just rolling out now is starting to put emphasis on the agencies developing and communicating the evacuation plans for their customers and trying to get the word out so they understand how it 

works. 

I think that is going to take some time. You know, every system 

is a little different, so there is not one standard way of how do you 

evacuate these systems. But I think some systems—and Washington Metro, locally, is putting some emphasis on the whole evacuation part of it. 

I think, as we learn from some of these efforts, we can exchange 

what works best between other systems across the country. But it 

is a—

Mr. LUNGREN. Well, just a for instance, I would assume that certain things that you do if you are in a tunnel are different than 

the things you would do when you are not in a tunnel. 

Mr. ROSAPEP. Oh, absolutely. 

Mr. LUNGREN. And I am not sure that I have ever heard anybody, when I go on a mass transit system, anybody say that, explain to me what I should or should not do, as opposed to when 

I just get on and you tell me, ‘‘Look for suspicious packages.’’ It just 

seems to me to be a total sense of unawareness. 

I mean, we have all been in systems where they slowed down in 

a tunnel and they announce to you that they have got a couple 

trains ahead of you, you are going to have to wait, and you sit 

there in darkness—well, you are not in darkness, but it is dark 

outside the cab—and, frankly, your reaction is, ‘‘What would I do 

if I were told to evacuate?’’ I wouldn’t have the foggiest idea, I 

think most people sense. Whereas, on an airplane, I think people 

at least have some sense. 

And I guess what I am saying is there is a huge cleavage between where we are with airlines and where we are with mass 

transit, just in terms of public awareness and, I think, public confidence if you had a crisis. 

Mr. ROSAPEP. I am in agreement with you on the whole evacuation part of things. There is a lot more work to be done in that 

area. 

And, again, the changes we are doing to Transit Watch for this 

year is just the beginning, I think, of what needs to be done. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. 

All right, Ms. Sanchez is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Last year, Chris Kozub of the National Transit Institute testified 

before our committee on training for mass transit employees. In his 

testimony last year, he stated that the NTI and FTA’s training had 

reached about 20 percent of the transit employee workforce, which 

we believe is about 300,000 people. 

And, as of today, that number would be a little bit more than 30 

percent. NTI is not even near the halfway point of getting this security training done. 

So may I ask both Mr. Sammon and Mr. Rosapep, what steps 

have been taken to reach the remaining 70 percent? And in what 

time frame do we think we are going to get these people the security training we would like to see them have? 
24

Mr. SAMMON. Thank you. That is a very good question, and it is 

one of the things that we are concerned about. 

And, again, that is why we want to refocus the grants program 

to make sure that the eligibility for the grants is tied to training. 

And it may turn out that a large portion of the grants program 

turns from capital to training. 

But we do expect that the training component of this has to be 

a fundamental baseline that people meet before we go off and buy 

complex or other hardening systems or other security systems. If 

the employees aren’t trained, we think that they are the front line 

and the first requirement before we look at grants. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And so, what is the timeline? I mean, are you 

going to get the 70 percent that still aren’t trained at least one 

training class by the end of this fiscal year coming up? Or—

Mr. SAMMON. No, I doubt that. I would say that you will get, as 

people become aware of the changing guidelines, that you will have 

more people trained. 

The transit workforce is—the airline workforce, you are dealing 

with a controlled environment. You have a controlled plane, you 

have a controlled airport. It is much more controlled. In transit, 

you have buses running all over the place. You have stops. We 

haul, in transit, many more times the ridership than we do in air. 

So I would say it is going to take more time. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. But you don’t have any set metrics, any milestones? You haven’t even projected this out? 

Mr. SAMMON. Right now what we are doing is taking an assessment. We expect to have, as an assessment, by the end of the year, 

for many of the properties, to know where their training stands 

and the types of training, whether it is awareness training or response training. And we are going to start there and use that for 

the grants process—

Ms. SANCHEZ. Let me ask a quick question before I have Mr. 

Rosapep answer this previous question. 

TSA employs over 40,000 people. We know that the majority of 

these people are related to aviation security. In fact, from the numbers that I have, only 10 people work in the mass transit section 

at TSA. 

Why are there only 10 people? 

Mr. SAMMON. There are 10 people in mass transit; there are 

about 10 or 12 in rail. Each of the policy areas has a limited number of people. The 40,000 people are largely baggage screeners and 

passenger screeners that are out in the field at airports—the 

screeners, their supervisors and so on. And that is the majority of 

the expense that TSA has there. But—

Ms. SANCHEZ. So you are telling me that in TSA, most of these 

people are actual people hands-on. And, while you only have 10 

people who are planning the mass transit section, and you have 10 

people in the rail section, so does that mean you only have 10 people in management for TSA that aren’t actually baggage checkers 

or security checkers? I mean, what is the number for the aviation 

component? 

Mr. SAMMON. That is a good question. The comparable number 

of people in airports is five. The comparable number of people in 

airlines is under 10. 
25

So to make that comparison is not a direct comparison, but the 

number of policy-planning people in airports and airlines is under 

20. And it is about the same number of people in mass transit and 

rail. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. But you have the same number for mass transit 

in the entire United States, not per airport. 

Mr. SAMMON. No, no, no. What I have in TSNM that you are 

comparing the 10 people from mass transit and rail, the 10 rail, 10 

mass transit, I have approximately 10 for airlines and approximately five for airports. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So you only have 15 in total nationally? 

Mr. SAMMON. That are at the TSA office that do the same kind 

of work as the people that you are comparing for mass transit and 

rail, yes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see my time is over. 

Mr. DICKS. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. Well, we thank the panel very much for 

their testimony. 

You might be advised that members may send to you written 

questions, additional questions. We would ask you to respond to 

those in writing. 

And we thank you, once again, for participating. 

We now have the opportunity for a second panel, and I would ask 

them to come forward: Mr. Ed Wytkind, Mr. John Tolman, Chief 

Polly Hanson, and Mr. Edward Hamberger. 

We thank you all for coming. 

We have a distinguished second panel to discuss the issue of 

front-line defense, security training for mass transit and rail employees. 

As I mentioned to the first panel, your written testimony will be 

included in the record in its entirety. So I would ask each of you 

to confine your statements to approximately 5 minutes for summary, and then we will take questions. 

The chair is now privileged to recognize Mr. Ed Wytkind, the 

president of the Transportation Trades Department at the AFL–

CIO, to testify. Sir? 

STATEMENT OF ED WYTKIND, PRESIDENT, TRANSPORTATION 

TRADES DEPARTMENT, AFL–CIO 

Mr. WYTKIND. Good morning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ms. 

Sanchez and Mr. Dicks. It is certainly good to be before the committee. Thank you for providing transportation labor this opportunity. 

I think, after listening to the first panel, it is clear to us that our 

government continues to do to way too much assessing, debating, 

evaluating, studying, and hiring of consultants to look at the problems. And we are now 5 years since September 11th, and rail and 

transit systems really remain unsecure still in America. 

And specifically, to the topic of this hearing, I don’t really know 

what workforce our government and many of our employers think 

they are training. The workforce that I am talking to, the workers 

that I very recently spoke to about 3 or 4 days ago, very local representatives who are workers in the freight and the passenger rail 
26

industry, they are telling me that they are not receiving training 

for security. And those that are receiving it are receiving it, kind 

of, second-and third-hand, through videos and brochures and pocket guides. 

And I have been listening for 5 years about how workers are 

training. And it was interesting, in questions asked by the committee to the first panel, it is kind of shocking to me to hear the 

Federal Transit Administration say that they are still assessing, 

you know, what needs to be done and how the training is being 

done in the field. 

I have a tough time evaluating what the gentleman from the 

TSA said about the grant program and how they are going to begin 

to somehow condition these grants on worker training. I have no 

confidence in that. 

The Congress has a chance to get the job done on worker security 

training after 5 years since 9/11 in the pending ports security bill 

that has now been expanded, or at least there is consideration of 

expansion, to include rail and transit in there. And in that bill, 

mandated training is what is pending if the bill gets completed. 

That is how you will get the next panel you have before the committee, perhaps in the coming months, to be able to come before 

you and talk about how workers are actually being trained and 

how they are operating under a mandate. 

Until that mandate is in place, I believe the problems that were 

very adequately raised by you, Mr. Chairman, by Ms. Sanchez and 

by Mr. Dicks—who, in a few exchanges with the first panel, really 

pointed out just how little is being done. And I heard a lot of double-speak and a lot of excuse-making. And frankly, I have been listening to that for 5 years. 

And while I may sound a little too hard-edged about it, I have 

testified many times before the House and the Senate on this very 

topic. And I started working on this issue literally weeks after September 11th, and it is actually shocking to me that we are still 

having a debate with our government about whether workers 

should be trained to deal with security and terrorism risk in the 

transportation system. 

I think, Chairman Lungren, your comments about some of the 

things that aren’t being done to have passengers know what is 

going on around them, to understand what they ought to be doing 

in the event of an attack, it is not dissimilar to what I am hearing 

from Amtrak workers and from mass transit workers. 

To this day, at least 60 percent of mass transit workers are telling their union that they are not getting any training. To this day, 

Amtrak workers are still telling us that the training they are getting is abysmal. 

I looked at the video that the railroad industry likes to tout and 

I am sure will be touted in a few minutes. The video is appalling. 

It doesn’t train workers. There is no guarantee that they will know 

what they are doing. It is, frankly, a low-budget video that multibillion-dollar corporations ought to be able to do a better job of producing. 

And worst of all, no matter how good the pamphlets are, no matter how good the brochures are, no matter how effective the NTI’s 

training curriculum is—which, by the way, they do a good job—if 
27

1 A complete list of unions affiliated with TTD is attached. 

the workers at the ground level, at the rank-and-file level do not 

receive the training in classroom-style environment, with recurring 

training, with updated training, with security briefings for workers, 

with the proper communications tools—in addition to passengers 

not having the ability to communicate by cell, the workers don’t 

have the ability to communicate with each other along much of the 

rail system. I am sure my colleague, Mr Tolman, may talk about 

that. 

So I had a lot of prepared remarks for this, and I did submit a 

comprehensive statement. But the panel that you had before us 

really deserve to be up here another 3 or 4 hours. Because it is appalling to the labor movement that we are still debating, 5 years 

after 9/11, about whether workers ought to be trained to deal with 

security risks in the United States of America. 

I don’t know why we are still there. I am proud to see that the 

Congress is stepping in to try to fill the gap. But it really is time 

to get the job done and have workers in this country trained. 

Thank you for allowing me the time. 

[The statement of Mr. Wytkind follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT EDWARD WYTKIND

Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Sanchez, and Members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of the 31 member unions of the Transportation Trades Department, AFL–CIO (TTD), I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify today at 

this important hearing on security training for workers on our nation’s railroads 

and public transportation systems.1

TTD’s member unions represent hundreds of thousands of bus, subway, light and 

heavy rail operators, clerks and maintenance employees at transit, commuter and 

freight rail systems across the country, as well as virtually all workforces at Amtrak. These workers are literally on the front lines of our battle to keep our transportation networks secure each and every day and no one is more vested in improving our lines of defense against those who wish our nation harm. 

Five years have passed since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on U.S. 

soil. In this five-year period alone, we have witnessed four brutal, deadly terrorist 

attacks on major transit systems in countries across the globe. The July, 2006 attacks in Mumbai, India claimed the lives of nearly 200 people and injured over 700 

more. Last year, the London Underground and bus systems were rocked by a series 

of explosions in which 56 people died and over 700 were injured. In 2004, a bomb 

in a Moscow Metro rail car killed 39 people and wounded 129 others, and a coordinated series of detonations on four commuter trains in Madrid killed 191 victims 

and injured over 1,500 more. 

It is difficult to believe, but these horrific annual wake-up calls have not been 

enough to spur this Administration to take action on transit and rail security. Obviously, public transit and rail systems are by their very nature attractive targets for 

terrorism—they move masses of people, are highly visible and exposed, and are integral to the smooth functioning of both communities and commerce. Yet the federal 

government still has not stepped in to provide the necessary funding, oversight, and 

guidance to ensure that railroads and transit systems address their immediate security needs. 

Transportation labor has testified numerous times before Congress to chronicle 

the unacceptable security gaps that continue to exist in surface transportation. 

Staggering funding deficiencies are just the beginning—the fact that we spend $9 

per airline passenger but just one penny per rail and transit passenger on security 

is a frequently-quoted statistic, but it bears repeating. In addition, vulnerable targets have not been hardened, access control at key facilities is lacking, and security 

plans by railroads and transit systems have yet to be adopted and implemented 

with federal oversight. These and other shortfalls are well documented in the excellent report, Detour Ahead: Critical Vulnerabilities in America’s Rail and Mass Transit Security Programs, produced by Ranking Member Thompson and others on this 

Committee. 
28

Yet today I am here to focus on one fundamental aspect of enhancing security—

employee training. Preparing hundreds of thousands of transit and rail workers in 

the event of a terrorist threat or attack within the U.S. is a vital component of surface transportation security. It is common sense that training each and every frontline employee is a highly effective way to secure and safeguard our transit and rail 

networks. 

Not only do the men and women who work on buses, subways, and railways deserve to be prepared, worker training is also a sound investment of security dollars. 

With the proper training, frontline workers are well positioned to spot potential security breaches or other warning signs of a potential problem. As the eyes and ears 

of their workplaces, they are often the first to discover suspicious activities or 

threats, and are the first to receive reports from passengers. These employees need 

to know how to recognize a potential problem, what protocols to follow for reporting 

and responding to potential threats, and how to protect themselves and their passengers from harm. 

In the event of an incident or attack, workers are the first on the scene—even 

before police, fire fighters, and emergency medical responders—and what they do in 

the first few minutes is crucial to minimizing destruction and loss of life. On the 

transit and passenger rail side, workers are often called upon to evacuate passengers away from an incident. On the freight railroads, workers are needed to help 

mitigate damage to facilities and equipment. Training will allow these workers to 

quickly and efficiently handle the security scenarios they confront on the job. 

It is well documented that real security training works. According to a study by 

the Volpe Center, ‘‘probably the most significant factor in determining whether a 

transportation employee makes a helpful or harmful decision during an emergency 

is training. Trained and alert transportation professionals can make the difference 

between success and disaster.’’ Likewise, Rafi Ron, former Director of Security at 

Tel-Aviv Bun-Gurion International Airport has testified before Congress that ‘‘training provides the skills and confidence. . .to employees who are present at every 

point in the system. No one is in a better position to recognize irregularities on the 

ground than the people who regularly work there.’’ We could not agree more with 

these strong endorsements of training. 

Even officials from the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) have testified before Congress on the need for 

and the inherent value of worker security training. In fact, I am sure that in their 

testimony here today you will hear those exact sentiments. Yet while statements 

and press releases from the Administration say all the right things, too little has 

been done to actually ensure that employees receive adequate security training. The 

problem is not that good training programs have not been developed. The problem 

is that if railroads and transit systems are not required to provide security training, 

it will not be universally implemented by systems across the country. 

The National Transit Institute (NTI) has taken the lead in developing voluntary 

training courses and materials that teach workers to improve their ability to observe, recognize, and report suspicious objects and activities, to be more aware of 

pre-attack activities, and to spot the warning signs of potential threats. Tens of 

thousands of transit employees on various systems around the country have had access to some form of these training materials. 

However, even this only represents approximately 30 percent of the transit industry’s total workforce, according to testimony last July by Chris Kozub, Associate Director of Safety and Security at NTI. A recent survey of transit workers conducted 

by the Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU) also found that even five years after 9/

11, approximately 60 percent of ATU members working for transit systems in the 

U.S. remain untrained. Even the best programs will have no effect—and will not 

enhance security—if they are not implemented and used to train all workers. 

This low rate of training is even more staggering given that the NTI security 

training programs are available to transit agencies at no charge. Even with the existence of free programs that can be conducted on site and tailored to the needs of 

each agency, many transit systems continue to resist calls to train their employees 

because of the additional costs associated with keeping the buses and trains running 

during training sessions. Certainly, there are systems like WMATA here in Washington, D.C. and the Los Angeles Metro that have trained their frontline employees 

without a mandate in place, and we applaud these efforts. Unfortunately, they are 

clearly the exception rather than the rule. In fact, WMATA is a unique case because, as it is located in the nation’s capitol, the system has received record 

amounts of funding from DHS for security enhancements. Experience dictates that 

leaving the choice up to industry does not lead to a sufficient number of workers 

being trained. Congress must step in and extend this crucial instruction to all transit workers. 
29

On this point, I would like to note that this Committee included language requiring the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to issue guidelines on rail and 

transit worker training during markup of the DHS reauthorization bill. While we 

support the inclusion of language in Section 903 of this bill (H.R. 5814), this provision falls short of requiring transit systems and railroads to conduct training. Instead, we urge the Committee to support an approach, such as the provision included in the security bill introduced by Ranking Member Thompson, Representative Loretta Sanchez and others (H.R. 5714) to mandate training. In addition, the 

Transportation and Infrastructure Committee has unanimously passed a transit security bill (H.R. 5808) that includes similar language requiring transit worker training. 

The reality on the freight and passenger rail side is even more astounding, where 

workers are receiving virtually no security training. Rail workers continue to tell 

us that if they get any training at all, it consists of a pamphlet or a short video 

on suspicious packages that offers vague, and often conflicting, guidance. I have 

seen one of these videos and it does little to teach workers how to be more aware 

of their surroundings in and around rail cars, yards, and maintenance facilities or 

how to spot vulnerabilities—and certainly not what to do or who to communicate 

with about a security breach. The training materials are not tailored to any specific 

job responsibilities and are not designed to impart any specific skills—they simply 

tell workers to be vigilant. There is absolutely no way that this constitutes meaningful training. 

Let me give you just one example I recently heard from one of our members about 

why security training—and treating workers as partners—is so critical. There have 

been several instances of bomb threats on Amtrak trains, during which crew members were instructed to remain on the trains without any information or knowledge 

of what was happening. Passengers were evacuated from the train and surrounding 

platforms while security forces conducted a sweep of the area. This is clearly unconscionable from a worker safety perspective. But more broadly, leaving these workers 

to fend for themselves without protocols to communicate with law enforcement personnel or without a way to provide assistance based on what they could have witnessed on the train also creates a huge disconnect in our efforts to strengthen the 

security of passenger rail. 

We understand that Amtrak and the Association of American Railroads (AAR) 

have partnered with NTI and TSA to develop a computer-based, system security 

training program for all passenger and freight railroad employees. Amtrak has alleged that at least 10,000 employees had received this training as of the end of last 

year and that the intent was to have workers do this training at their worksites 

during layovers or after hours. Yet, I hear from our members at Amtrak that in 

most places, employees have absolutely no access to a computer, let alone the information of how to log in to the Amtrak intranet and receive training. Therefore, if 

they are even being given the information, workers are being asked to undergo 

training on their own initiative and on their own time. And despite the claims that 

workers had received training materials last year, most of our members received a 

pamphlet on system security awareness—but it was mailed to their homes just last 

week. 

Freight railroad employees have had even less access to security training—despite 

what you may hear from my fellow panelist from the AAR. These employees work 

in tunnels, in unsecured yards, and perform critical maintenance at facilities without restricted access, yet they have not been told by their employers what protocols 

are in place should an incident or threat arise, or should they see something out 

of the ordinary. The lack of training for these employees is even more intolerable 

since there is absolutely no reason why the freight railroads cannot leverage the resources to provide real security training for its workers. Unlike public authorities 

that are dependent on government grants to implement training, these multi-billion 

dollar corporations that are awash in cash can certainly afford to continue to run 

the trains while paying for on-the-job training for its workforce 

To the extent that the partnership with NTI improves training materials available to rail workers, we are clearly supportive. We caution, however, that computerbased training materials are a good supplement to, and not a substitute for, a live 

training course. Although an interactive computer program is better than being told 

to watch a video, this type of training does not provide workers with the opportunity 

to ask questions or actively apply the information to their particular workplaces. Security training cannot be a one-time, check-the-box exercise for employers. Workers 

cannot be expected to retain and apply skills which they were exposed to one time 

for the remainder of their work tenure and refresher materials are critical to make 

sure workers are most effective on the front lines. 
30

More to the point, one only need look at what has happened on the transit side 

to know that even with the best programs available on the rail side, unless frontline 

employees are required by TSA to undergo training, there is little reason to believe 

that they will receive it. My members find it difficult to believe that the railroads, 

who have argued since 9/11 that mandatory training is too burdensome or that 

training is already being done and therefore no federal intervention is needed, have 

had a sudden change of heart. Instead, Congress must step in and instruct TSA to 

ensure that worker training actually gets done. 

Finally, I would like to note that this Committee is on record in support of mandatory security training for port employees. Thanks to the leadership of Representatives Reichert and Pascrell, an amendment was adopted during full Committee consideration of the port security bill (H.R. 4954) to require DHS to develop guidelines 

for a port worker security training program. While the final conference report is 

being negotiated as I speak, we understand that worker training language, which 

was also included in the Senate bill, will be retained. Moreover, a Senate Commerce 

Committee rail security bill was included as an amendment to the port security bill 

during Senate floor consideration. This amendment also includes a worker training 

mandate for the rail sector. We strongly support the inclusion of training language 

for all workers—port, rail, and transit—in a final conference report on port security. 

Arming frontline transportation employees with the knowledge of how to spot and 

react to potential threats and how to protect themselves, their passengers and their 

workplaces in the event of an emergency is a fundamental, common-sense security 

enhancement. Workers must be treated as partners in the battle to protect our vulnerable rail and public transit systems, and only through training will they be prepared to do so. I urge this Committee and this Congress to pass legislation requiring 

security training for rail and transit workers and to remain vigilant in overseeing 

that this requirement is fully implemented. 

Thank you for the opportunity to share transportation labor’s views today. 

TTD MEMBER UNIONS 

THE FOLLOWING LABOR ORGANIZATIONS ARE MEMBERS OF AND REPRESENTED BY THE

TTD: 

Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) 

Amalgamated Transit Union (ATU) 

American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) 

American Federation of Teachers (AFT) 

Association of Flight Attendants-CWA (AFA–CWA) 

American Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA) 

Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS) 

Communications Workers of America (CWA) 

International Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) 

International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) 

International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers 

(IBB) 

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) 

International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers (IFPTE) 

International Longshoremen’s Association (ILA) 

International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) 

International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, ILA (MM&P) 

International Union of Operating Engineers (IUOE) 

Laborers? International Union of North America (LIUNA) 

Marine Engineers? Beneficial Association (MEBA) 

National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) 

National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC) 

National Conference of Firemen and Oilers, SEIU (NCFO, SEIU) 

National Federation of Public and Private Employees (NFOPAPE) 

Office and Professional Employees International Union (OPEIU) 

Professional Airways Systems Specialists (PASS) 

Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMWIA) 

Transportation • Communications International Union (TCU) 

Transport Workers Union of America (TWU) 

United Mine Workers of America (UMWA) 

United Steel, Paper and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, 

Allied Industrial and Service Workers International Union (USW) 

United Transportation Union (UTU)
31

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you, Mr. Wytkind. 

And now the chair would recognize Mr. John Tolman, the vice 

president and national legislative representative of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, to testify. 

STATEMENT OF JOHN TOLMAN, VICE PRESIDENT AND 

NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATIVE, BROTHERHOOD 

OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS 

Mr. TOLMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman Lungren and Ranking 

Member Sanchez and members of the committee. I appreciate the 

opportunity to be here today, and I appreciate the interest that 

Congress has taken on this issue. 

I could almost echo my colleague Ed Wytkind’s testimony to 

every word he said. However, I did prepare a brief statement, and 

I will run through it. 

I represent approximately 70,000 members of the Teamsters Rail 

Conference, which is made up of Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen and Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way 

Workers. 

The issue of rail security is of vital concern for our rail workers 

and general public. And each and every day, we are on the front 

lines of our nation’s transportation system and see the woeful lack 

of security on the railroads. 

The lack of security is more than just troubling; it is tragic. It 

is tragic because we have seen the damage that can be done by 

these accidents on the railroads and shudder to think of the damage that could be wrought by the terrorists or sabotage. 

It is frightening to think today that, after more than 250 terror 

attacks on railroads worldwide from 1995 to 2005?since June of 

2005, we have seen attacks in London, India. And in the past 11 

years, there has been only one successful attack in the United 

States, and that is in Hyder, Arizona, on October 9, 1995. It killed 

an Amtrak employee and injured 78 other people. This case has not 

been solved today. And more recently, there have been plans uncovered—there were attempted attacks on New York subways on 

three different occasions. 

The frequency and severity of the attacks on railroads worldwide 

and here at home demonstrate the urgency for change in the way 

the rail security system works. However, our current regulations 

are severely inadequate. 

As you know, the Department of Homeland Security and Transportation Security Administration spend $9 per day per passenger 

on security but only one cent per rail and mass transit passenger. 

This is a pittance when compared to the number of riders each day 

on our nation’s rail and mass transit. 

Each weekday, 11.3 million passengers in 35 metropolitan areas 

in 22 states use some form of rail or mass transit. These passengers ride over trains that cover 10,000 miles of commuter rail 

and urban rail lines. 

The very nature of the rail system makes it vulnerable for attack. In addition to more than 10,000 miles of commuter rail, 

urban rail lines, there are over 300,000 miles of freight rail lines. 

These lines are open and easily accessible to the public. 
32

In response to these concerns, we have taken a number of actions. For example, the BMWE and the BLET have drafted model 

security legislation. There has been introduced at state level in 

every section of the country. This legislation, we believe, would accomplish, among?most important is training and whistle-blower 

protection. 

Also, in May, a meeting with the Federal Railroad Administration Rail Safety Advisory Committee that two of our state legislative directors made a presentation, currently available with a locking device for locomotive automatic brake valves. These locks that 

would prevent an unauthorized person from moving a locomotive 

are already in use in some European countries and other parts of 

the world. 

Ultimately the strongest response to potential security threats 

faced by the railroad and transit industries begin in this House. 

And we applaud this committee for taking this issue up. We would 

ask for your consideration for H.R. 4954. We believe that that addresses some of our concerns. 

When we did a survey of over 4,000 of our members, 84 percent 

of them said they received absolutely zero training post–9/11. And 

that was in 2004–2005. This is a major concern for us, and we look 

forward to working with you to try to help correct this issue today. 

Thank you very much. 

[The statement of Mr. Tolman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN P. TOLMAN

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and the members of the committee, I would 

to thank you for inviting me here today to testify on the issue of railroad security. 

On the behalf of the 39,000 members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 

and Trainmen—and more than 70,000 Teamsters Rail Conference members—I 

would like to thank you for your interest in this subject. 

The issue of railroad security is of vital concern to all railroad workers, including 

Teamster Rail Conference members represented by the BLET and the Brotherhood 

of Maintenance of Way Employes Division (BMWED). Each and every day, we are 

on the front lines of the nation’s transportation system and see the woeful lack of 

security on our railroads. This lack of security is more than just troubling; it is tragic because we have seen the damage that can be done by accidents on the railroads 

and shudder to think of the damage that could be wrought by terrorism or sabotage. 

It is frightening to think that there were more than 250 terror attacks on railroads world wide from 1995 until June of 2005. Since June 2005, we have seen attacks perpetrated in London and Mumbai, India. In the past 11 years, there has 

been one successful attempt to attack a railroad in the U.S. and several more attempted attacks. The attack in Hyder, Arizona, on October 9, 1995, killed an Amtrak employee and injured 78 other people. The case was never solved. More recently, plans were uncovered to attack the New York subway system on three different occasions. 

The frequency and severity of the attacks on railroads worldwide and here at 

home demonstrate the urgency for change in the way our rail security system 

works. However, our current regulations are severely inadequate. 

As you know, the Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation Security Administration spends nine dollars per airline passenger on security, but only 

spends one penny per rail/mass transit passenger. This is a pittance when compared 

to the number of riders each day on our nation’s rail and mass transit systems. 

Each weekday, 11.3 million passengers in 35 metropolitan areas and 22 states use 

some form of rail or mass transit. These passengers ride on trains that cover over 

10,000 miles of commuter and urban rail lines. 

The very nature of the rail system makes it vulnerable to attack. In addition to 

the more than 10,000 miles of commuter and urban rail lines, there are 300,000 

miles of freight rail lines. These lines are open and easily accessible to the general 

public. 
33

In response to these concerns, we have taken a number of concrete steps. For example, the BLET and BMWED have drafted model security legislation that has 

been introduced at the state level in every section of the country. This legislation 

would accomplish the following: 

• require rail operators to conduct a risk assessment of their facilities, cargo, 

and hazardous material storage procedures, paying special attention to storage 

within a fifteen mile radius of a school, hospital, nursing home, public utility, 

or public safety facility; 

• develop a comprehensive security plan, to be filed with the state’s Transportation Department; 

• implement a Community Protection Plan covering security, training, and 

emergency response; and 

• provide for whistle-blower protection for all rail workers and rail contractor 

employees. 

Also, at the May meeting of the Federal Railroad Administration’s Railroad Safety 

Advisory Committee, two of our State Legislative Board Chairmen made a presentation on currently-available locking devices for a locomotive’s automatic brake 

valve. These locks—which would prevent an unauthorized person from moving a locomotive—are already in use in some European countries and in other parts of the 

world. 

Ultimately, though, the strongest response to potential security threats faced by 

the railroad and transit industries begins in this House. We believe that the disproportionate attention to homeland security and concentration of federal resources 

in the aviation industry has left rail and transit vulnerable. However, the Senate 

recently acted to change that calculus, which we applaud. 

The amendment included in the version of H.R.I54 adopted by the Senate addresses a number of the problems regarding rail security that were outlined in the 

Teamsters Rail Conference ‘‘High Alert’’ report, which was based on survey responses from more than 4,000 Rail Conference members employed nationwide. Rail 

workers, who reported the safety and security measures in place on any one workday during a year-long survey period, reported as follows: 

• 94% of respondents said that rail yard access was not secure; 

• 83% of respondents said that they had not received any, or additional, training related to terrorism prevention and response during the 12 months prior to 

the survey; 

• 70% of respondents reported seeing trespassers in the yard; and 

• only minimal security training had been provided to employees who have 

been warned that they could be the target of a terrorist attack. 

The vulnerability assessment outlined in the Senate bill would address key areas 

that the Rail Conference feels are not adequately handled by the industry, and requires recommendations that include: 

• improving the security of rail tunnels, bridges, switching and car storage 

areas, other rail infrastructure and facilities, information systems, and other 

areas identified by the Undersecretary as posing significant risks to public safety and the movement of interstate commerce, taking into account the impact 

that any proposed security measure might have on the provision of rail service; 

• deploying equipment to detect explosives and hazardous chemical, biological 

and radioactive substances, and any appropriate countermeasures; 

• training employees in terrorism prevention, passenger evacuation and response activities; 

• conducting public outreach campaigns on passenger railroads; 

• deploying surveillance equipment; and 

• identifying the immediate and long-term costs of measures that may be required to address those risks. 

The employee training called for in the Senate bill is one of the Rail Conference’s 

most sought after security provisions. Throughout the country, railroad workers 

have established that their employers provide little or no specific training for terrorism prevention or response. In the High Alert survey, 84% of respondents said 

that they had not received any additional training in terrorism response or prevention in the 12 months preceding the survey; and 99% said they did not receive training related to the monitoring of nuclear shipments. This lack of training should be 

of critical interest to citizens who live near rail yards and tracks. The workers who 

lack this training will be the first ones to respond to incidents. 

In the absence of training by the railroads, the Teamsters Rail Conference unions 

have worked together with five other unions to develop, on their own, a five day 

intensive Hazardous Materials and Rail Security training course for members, with 

funding from the National Institutes of Environmental Health Sciences grants. This 
34

training is provided through the National Labor College/George Meany Center in 

Silver Spring, MD. 

We also strongly support the ‘‘whistleblower’’ provisions included in the bill. Railroad workers should not—and cannot—be subjected to dismissal when they provide 

security threat information to the government. 

Rail labor has long expressed an interest in developing security training with 

Congress, the FRA and the carriers. We believe that the version of H.R.I54 adopted 

by the Senate should be accepted in conference, because—if enacted into law—it will 

provide us the opportunity to do so.

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much. 

And now the chair recognizes Chief Polly Hanson, Metro Transit 

Police Department of the Washington Metro Area Transit Authority, to testify. 

STATEMENT OF POLLY HANSON, CHIEF, METRO TRANSIT POLICE DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON METRO AREA TRANSIT 

AUTHORITY 

Chief HANSON. Good morning, Chairman Lungren and members 

of the committee. My name is Polly Hanson. I am the chief of the 

Metro Transit Police here in Washington, D.C. The Metro Transit 

Police was established in 1976 with the mission of providing the security of Metro’s customers, employees, facilities, and revenues, 

and preventing crime. 

The recent bombings in Madrid and London did call for a top-tobottom re-emphasis and re-energizing of our entire workforce on 

anti-terror emergency response procedures and training. 

We did work with NTI and FTA in the development of the 

‘‘Warning Signs’’ video and the brochures that have been referred 

to. And we do and have offered that training in situations where 

there is someone, generally a Transit Police officer or a trained instructor, to discuss what people see and to re-emphasize the procedures. We also have this on our intranet, so that nonoperational 

employees may view the video, which has been shown in management meetings as well. And we look forward to working with both 

FTA and NTI in the development of the next series of trainings or 

‘‘Warning Signs II.’’

We have supplemented our existing training working with NTI 

to develop specialized training for employees who maintain escalators, track structures, buses, and railcars. And we will be using 

fiscal year 2005 Department of Homeland Security bus grant 

money to develop anti training for not just our bus operators but 

we are going to share that with all the bus systems in the region 

that feed into Metro property. 

As the largest transit provider for the nation’s capital, we take 

responsibility in homeland security with the seriousness it demands. Our approach to transit security involves partnerships with 

our employees, our customers, the Transit Police, and our other 

public safety partners. 

In 2004, we launched a training initiative called ‘‘Managing 

Metro Emergencies.’’ It was devised and developed in response to 

both the Madrid bombings and a tremendous amount of criticism 

that WMATA received after we had to evacuate people from a station because of a fire. 

This training has provided training to over 2,000 regional law enforcement, fire, rescue, Department of Transportation, and Metro 
35

personnel. And it examines mitigating, evacuating, and recovering 

from a major service disruption. The course puts particular emphasis on enhancing the management of the pedestrians and vehicle 

traffic. 

And it was well-received by the region so much that firefighters 

in the region demanded a ‘‘Managing Metro Emergencies II’’ class 

through the Council of Governments and requested Urban Area Security Initiative money so that we can actually run that in a tabletop setting. 

Also in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security, 

we did have an opportunity to pilot and launch the Behavioral Assessment Screening System training. And we have hosted over 300 

Metro Transit Police and regional law enforcement officers who 

took this highly specialized training to spot behaviors of would-be 

terrorists planning to execute an attack. 

We have an emergency response facility, which we opened in 

2002, that is the only transit facility of its kind in the nation that 

is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to train emergency personnel. It includes a mock train tunnel that allows regional emergency responders to train for disasters like smoke and fire, collisions, and terrorist incidents in a transit tunnel environment. 

And more than 8,000 firefighters, police officers, first responders, 

FBI, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the Pentagon 

police have trained at this facility. And it was given the American 

Public Transportation Association’s innovation award in 2004. 

The training facility also houses the nation’s first passenger rail 

emergency evacuation simulator, which is a simulator which can 

roll a commuter rail 180 degrees in a 10-degree increment, simulating railcar positions after derailments. 

And we use this rollover rig to train police, fire, and other first 

responders, and of course have invited any of our local colleagues 

like Amtrak police to come out and experience that training. And 

the FRA is going to use it to assist in evaluating interior design 

safety of inner-city and commuter passenger rail cars. 

We continue to be an active participant in regional exercises. 

Last weekend we sponsored a regional drill that provided an opportunity for region first responders to practice their skills in a Metro 

environment, using our own procedures, using a rescue train, testing communications. We have also participated in the regional 

drills and exercises sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security and the Metropolitan Washington Councils of Government. 

We think a critical component toward ensuring that the safety 

that we conduct involves our employees and regional first responders, and we also want to engage our customers, and we have. 

And, in fact, we encourage public announcements. And I heard 

some discussion about that, the ‘‘See It, Say It’’ campaign, ‘‘Is that 

your bag?’’ But we also have monthly open houses, where our safety, police and corporate communications personnel do hand out 

evacuation information. And we have also provided opportunities 

for customers to come, get on a train, and learn themselves how 

to evacuate. 

And in 2004, we launched a program called Metro Citizens Corps 

that provides Metro-specific training, ranging from rail safety and 

emergency preparedness to looking for terrorist activity. And more 
36

than 200 citizens across this region have participated in that training. And we will participate in retraining in a drill this Sunday as 

well. 

We appreciate the important contribution that training provides, 

and will continue to seek opportunities to work with our employees 

and partners, including the Federal Transit Administration and 

Department of Homeland Security, to refine, expand, and progress 

in the training arena. 

I appreciate any comments that you may have, or questions. And 

I would be happy to answer them. 

[The statement of Chief Hanson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF POLLY L. HANSON

Chairman Lungren and Members of the Committee, good morning and thank you 

for asking Metro to testify at this hearing. I am Polly Hanson, Chief of the Metro 

Transit Police Department (MTPD) for the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit 

Authority (WMATA).

sBackground on WMATA and MTPD 

By way of background, WMATA was created in 1967 as an Interstate Compact 

agency through enactment of legislation by the U.S. Congress, and by the Commonwealth of Virginia, the State of Maryland, and the District of Columbia. The Metro 

System is designed to serve the constituencies of the National Capital Region, including employees of the federal government, the residents of the region, the citizens of our nation who come to Washington to do business with the federal government, and the millions of people who visit from throughout the world. 

Since the mid 1960’s, there has been dramatic growth and change in the National 

Capital Region. As population and employment in this region has skyrocketed, the 

demands on and expectations of WMATA have also grown exponentially. Each day 

we provide 1.2 million trips on our rail and bus systems. We are the second largest 

subway system and fifth largest bus system in the United States. Metro is widely 

recognized as being critical to the operation of the federal government. Over 150,000 

federal employees (45 percent of the region’s federal employees) participate in the 

Metrochek program. Nearly half of all Metrorail stations serve federal facilities, and 

approximately 10 percent of Metro’s daily ridership uses stations next to the Capitol 

and Pentagon. 

The Metro Transit Police Department was established in 1976. MTPD is the nation’s first non federal tri-state transit police force. We have authorized strength of 

423 sworn transit police officers and 102 special police officers. Our purpose is to 

prevent crime, protect Metro’s customers, employees, facilities and revenues and enforce laws, ordinances, rules and regulations.

WMATA’s Employee Security/Emergency Preparedness Training Initiatives 

The recent rail/transit bombings in Madrid and London have also called for a top 

to bottom re-emphasis and re-energizing of our entire workforce on anti-terror and 

emergency response training. Many of the industry’s best practices have been incorporated into nationally available resources developed in partnership with the Federal Transit Administration and the National Transit Institute (NTI). Since 2003, 

all of our bus drivers, train operators and other operations employees have been 

shown the National Transit Institute’s Warning Signs video, which covers key aspects of system security for transit employees, including what to look for and what 

to do regarding suspicious activity, packages, devices and substances. Last year, 

after the attacks in London, we began showing the video again to all of our 8000 

operations employees. They also receive job specific security brochures covering 

these areas. The Warning Signs video is also being shown to non-operations personnel, and has been posted on our internal web site for viewing by all 2000 nonoperations employees. 

We look forward to the next version of Warning Signs being developed by FTA 

and NTI. 

We are supplementing our existing training for employees with additional terrorist activity recognition classes. WMATA has been working with the National 

Transit Institute to develop specialized training for employees who maintain escalators, track structures, buses and railcars. The training will review the recognition 

of unattended or suspicious items and unusual behavior. WMATA is currently using 

a portion of its FY05 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Bus Transit Grant 
37

allocation towards the development of an anti-terror training initiative focused on 

bus operators. Once complete, WMATA plans to share the training with all the local 

and regional bus operators that feed into WMATA’s bus systems. 

All of this training will serve to reinforce the need for our employees to respond 

aggressively in these situations, but it’s also worth noting that our operations employees on a daily basis face the challenging task of keeping a prudent balance between implementing proper security safeguards and maintaining rapid transit service.

WMATA’s Regional Security/Emergency Preparedness Training Initiatives 

As the largest transit provider for the National Capital Region, Metro takes its 

responsibility in homeland security with the seriousness it demands. WMATA’s approach to transit security involves a partnership between employees, customers, the 

transit police and other public safety departments in the region, and the federal government. Our training initiatives designed to enhance both WMATA and the region’s emergency preparedness reflect these partnerships. 

Beginning in 2004, Metro Transit Police launched a new training initiative entitled ‘‘Managing Metro Emergencies.’’ The training was devised and developed in response to the Madrid bombings as well as a recent series of service disruptions that 

forced thousands of customers to evacuate the Metrorail system. The ‘‘Managing 

Metro Emergencies’’ course has provided over 2000 regional law enforcement, fire 

and rescue, department of transportation and WMATA personnel enhanced training 

for mitigating, evacuating, transporting and recovering from a major service disruption in our system. The course puts particular emphasis on enhancing the management of pedestrian and vehicle traffic after any evacuations of rail stations. The 

course was so well received by the region that Metro will be offering a new more 

operational oriented course requested by the region’s fire departments. 

Metro transit police in partnership with the Department of Homeland Security 

launched another new initiative focused on prevention and detection—Behavioral 

Assessment Screening System (BASS) training. 300 Metro Transit Police and regional law enforcement officers took a highly specialized training course to spot behaviors of would-be terrorists planning or executing an attack, and learned how to 

take action to mitigate danger, including identifying the behavioral characteristics 

of a suicide bomber. 

WMATA’s Emergency Response Training Facility opened in 2002, and is the only 

transit facility of its kind in the nation that is available 24 hours per day, seven 

days a week to train emergency personnel. The facility includes a mock train tunnel 

that allows regional emergency responders to train for disasters such as smoke/fire, 

collisions and potential terrorist incidents in a transit/tunnel environment. More 

than 8000 firefighters, police officers and other first responders, including the FBI, 

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, and the Pentagon Force Protection Agency have trained at the facility. The facility was awarded the American Public Transportation Association’s Management Innovation Award for 2004. 

The training facility also houses the nation’s first passenger rail emergency evacuation simulator. The simulator can roll a passenger commuter rail car 180 degrees 

in 10 degree increments, simulating railcar positions after derailments and other 

rail incidents. Metro will use the ‘‘rollover rig’’ to train fire, police, and other first 

responders on the complications associated with rescuing people from a rail car. The 

Federal Railroad Administration will use it to assist in evaluating interior design 

safety of intercity and commuter passenger rail cars. 

WMATA also continues to be an active participant in various regional exercises. 

Just last week, WMATA sponsored a regional drill that provided an opportunity for 

the region’s first responders to practice their skills in the Metrorail environment, 

along with testing Metro’s own procedures for utilizing a rescue train. WMATA has 

also sponsored a series of table top exercises with all key regional players, including 

federal agencies, as part of our effort to enhance continuity of operations planning 

(COOP) following the September 11, 2001 attacks. WMATA also participates in regional drills and exercises sponsored by the DHS, the Metropolitan Washington 

Council of Governments and various local jurisdictions in the National Capital Region.

Public Awareness/Education Campaigns 

A critical component towards ensuring that all the training we conduct with our 

employees and regional first responders raises the National Capital Region’s emergency preparedness level is to also constantly engage our customers. WMATA has 

increased public announcements to our customers, stressing the need to be attentive 

to their surroundings. Our recent public outreach efforts include campaigns known 

as, ‘‘See it, Say it’’ and ‘‘Is that your bag?,’’ which was cited by former Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) Under Secretary Hutchinson as an effective tool for 
38

raising passenger awareness and involvement in the transit environment. We are 

also conducting monthly ‘‘Open Houses’’ at rail stations during the morning rush 

hour. During these events, officials from the Metro Transit Police and our safety 

and communications departments are on hand to answer questions from customers 

as well as distribute emergency preparedness/safety brochures and expanding upon 

emergency evacuation procedures that can be found at our web site: 

www.wmata.com.

In 2004, Metro Transit Police launched a Metro Citizens Corps program that provides Metro-specific training ranging from rail safety and emergency preparedness 

and response to identification of terrorist activity. More than 200 citizens across the 

region have received the training. Area residents who have received specialized community/emergency response training within their local jurisdiction are eligible to 

join the Metro Citizens Corps.

Conclusion 

WMATA appreciates the important contribution training provides towards enhancing our emergency preparedness and response capabilities and will continue to 

seek opportunities to work with our employees and many partners in the National 

Capital Region, including the Federal Transit Administration and the Department 

of Homeland Security to refine and expand upon the progress achieved to date. I 

would be happy to answer any questions posed by the Committee.

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Chief. Appreciate that. 

The chair would now recognize Mr. Edward Hamberger, the 

president and CEO of the American Association of Railroads, to 

testify. 

STATEMENT OF EDWARD HAMBERGER, PRESIDENT AND CEO, 

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF RAILROADS 

Mr. HAMBERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of the 

members of the AAR, thank you for the opportunity to discuss security training for freight rail employees this morning. 

Railroads moved forcefully and comprehensively to improve security immediately after the events of 9/11. We did not wait for government mandates to develop a comprehensive security plan. Indeed, immediately following the terrorist attack, we created a toplevel security task force comprised of more than 150 railroad customer and former intelligence personnel to conduct an exhaustive 

evaluation of freight rail security issues. 

The end result was the Terrorism Risk Analysis and Security 

Management Plan, a comprehensive, intelligence-driven, prioritybased blueprint of actions designed to enhance freight rail security. 

I know, Mr. Chairman, you have received a briefing. I know that 

the majority and minority staff have received detailed briefings on 

this plan. It was adopted by the AAR in December 2001 and remains in effect today. 

As a result of that plan, the railroads quickly enacted more than 

50 permanent security-enhancing countermeasures, such as limiting access to key rail facilities and information and tightening up 

cybersecurity procedures to eliminate access to critical information. 

In addition, the plan defines four progressively higher-security 

alert levels and details a series of specific actions to be taken at 

each level. Railroads test the plan through regular tabletop exercises and drills to evaluate it and modify it as necessary. 

Our security plan does rely heavily on the efforts of our industry’s dedicated and highly professional employees. They are, indeed, the eyes and ears in the industry’s security effort. As was 

true of our overall security plan, we did not wait for government 

mandates when it came to security training for our employees. 
39

The industry’s focus has been on recognize, record and report. 

The training has included what to do when an employee sees a 

stranger, suspicious activity, or suspicious object on rail property, 

to whom to report the anomaly, the need to keep information about 

train movements and cargo confidential, and the need to keep rail 

property secure and safe. 

We began implementing an employee security training shortly 

after 9/11 when the Class I railroads provided training videos and 

printed materials to all employees. 

In the materials, the railroads expressed to their employees three 

fundamental expectations that are the cornerstones of rail employees’ responsibilities regarding security: Number one, do not put 

yourself in danger. Number two, report suspicious activities on or 

around railroad property. And number three, do not divulge sensitive information about rail operations to others. 

Over time, freight railroads began to incorporate security issues 

in a more formal fashion, for example, as part of employees’ periodic FRA-mandated safety rules recertifications, as part of newhire training, and as part of new-manager training. 

Many railroads have incorporated security issues into employees’ 

manual of standard operating procedures. 

Moreover, as you heard on the first panel, all railroads are compliant with the U.S. DOT-mandated hazardous material 232 security training for employees who handle hazardous materials. 

More recently, railroads concluded the security would be enhanced if rail employees’ security training was more standardized 

across the industry through the use of a common curriculum. And 

that has been accomplished. 

Much of the work was done in collaboration with the National 

Transit Institute at Rutgers University, which developed the interactive uniform security curriculum for public transit employees. 

With NTI’s assistance, we adapted that curriculum for use by 

freight rail employees. 

It includes four modules: what is security; vulnerability risk and 

threat; what to look for; and employees’ role in reducing risk. The 

goal of the standardized curriculum is to provide rail employees of 

an understanding of their role and responsibility in system security, and how to implement the procedures upon detection of suspicious objects or activities. 

Also as part of the standardized curriculum, employees are 

trained how to react to threats, which may take the form of perceived suspicious activity, suspicious or out-of-place objects or vehicles, evidence of tampering with equipment, or warning phone 

calls. 

Again, railroads do not expect their employees to play the hero 

by potentially putting themselves in harm’s way. Instead, they are 

expected to follow company policies and procedures, informing appropriate authorities of the situation, moving to a safe location, and 

awaiting further instructions. 

One hundred percent of all of our employees will receive this 

training, and there will be a written record that they have, indeed, 

receive it. It will be updated and renewed each year. And it also 

includes daily security briefings as part of the daily safety briefing. 
40

The Senate recently adopted an amendment regarding rail workers security training as part of the port security bill. Thanks to the 

rail industry’s proactive efforts, freight rail security training efforts 

already include the elements called for in that legislation. 

We are proud of the success we have achieved in enhancing security while keeping our nation’s vital rail network operating efficiently and safely. We will continue to work with Congress, federal 

agencies, our employees, the communities in which we operate, and 

other relevant parties to further improve security and safety even 

more. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The statement of Mr. Hamberger follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF EDWARD R. HAMBERGER

On behalf of the members of the Association of American Railroads (AAR), thank 

you for the opportunity to meet with you today to discuss rail employee security 

training. AAR members account for the vast majority of rail mileage, employees, 

and revenue in Canada, Mexico, and the United States. 

Nothing is more important for railroads than the safety and security of their operations. Indeed, for railroads, safety and security are interconnected: a safer workplace will tend to be a more secure workplace, and a more secure workplace will 

tend to be a safer workplace. That’s why everyone should be encouraged by the fact 

that the safety of rail operations continues to improve. By a variety of measures, 

railroads are the safest transportation mode. 

In fact, according to Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) data, the rail industry reduced its overall train accident rate 65 percent from 1980 to 2005, and 15 percent since 1990. The rate of railroad employee casualties has been reduced 79 percent since 1980 and 69 percent since 1990, and in 2005 was the lowest in history. 

Through the first six months of 2006, the train accident rate is 18 percent below 

the comparable rate in the first six months of 2005 and is on pace to set a new annual record, while the employee casualty rate is down nearly 10 percent and is also 

on pace to set a new record. 

Freight railroads are proud of these safety accomplishments. At the same time, 

though, they are keenly aware of the tension between the need for transportation 

efficiency and the assurance that our transportation systems are adequately protected from terrorist and other threats. There must be a proper balance between efforts to protect against terrorist acts, on the one hand, and providing for the free 

flow of goods and promoting our country’s international competitiveness on the 

other. 

Below I will briefly describe efforts freight railroads have made to enhance security in the post 9-11 era and address the specific area of rail employee security 

training. In a nutshell, railroads expect their employees to avoid putting themselves 

in danger in the event of a real or perceived security-related incident; to report any 

suspicious activity on or around rail property to the proper authorities; and to refrain from divulging sensitive information on rail operations to those who have no 

need to know that information.

The Railroad Terrorism Risk Analysis and Security Management Plan 

Immediately following the terrorist attacks in September 2001, U.S. freight railroads created a top-level security task force (comprised of more than 150 railroad, 

customer, and intelligence personnel) to conduct an exhaustive evaluation of freight 

rail security issues. The end result was the Terrorism Risk Analysis and Security 

Management Plan, a comprehensive, intelligence-driven, priority-based blueprint of 

actions designed to enhance freight rail security. The plan was adopted by the Association of American Railroads (AAR) in December 2001 and remains in effect today. 

As a result of the plan, freight railroads quickly enacted more than 50 permanent 

security-enhancing countermeasures. For example, access to key rail facilities and 

information has been tightened, and cyber-security procedures and techniques have 

been strengthened. Security awareness briefings were given to railroad employees, 

who were instructed to maintain high awareness and vigilance and to immediately 

report suspicious activity. 

In addition, the plan defines four progressively higher security alert levels and details a series of actions to be taken at each level: 

Alert Level 1 is ‘‘New Normal Day-to-Day Operations’’ and exists when a general 

threat of possible terrorist activity exists, but warrants only a routine security pos-
41

ture. Actions in effect at this level include conducting security training and awareness activities; restricting certain information to a need-to-know basis; restricting 

the ability of unauthenticated persons to trace certain sensitive materials; and periodically testing that security systems are operating as intended. 

Alert Level 2 (which is in effect today) is ‘‘Heightened Security Awareness.’’ It applies when there is a general non-specific threat of possible terrorist activity involving railroad personnel and facilities. Additional actions in effect at this level include 

security and awareness briefings as part of daily job briefings; conducting content 

inspections of cars and containers for cause; conducting spot content inspections of 

motor vehicles on railroad property; and increasing security at designated facilities. 

Alert Level 3 means there is ‘‘a credible threat of an attack on the United States 

or railroad industry.’’ A decision to declare Level 3 will be evaluated in light of the 

specificity of a threat against railroad personnel and facilities. Examples of Level 

3 actions include further restricting physical access and increasing security vigilance 

at control centers, communications hubs, and other designated facilities, and requesting National Guard security for critical assets. 

Alert Level 4 applies when a confirmed threat against the rail industry exists, an 

attack against a railroad has occurred, an attack in the United States causing mass 

casualties has occurred, or other imminent actions create grave concerns about the 

safety of rail operations. Security actions taken at this level include stopping nonmission-essential contractor services with access to critical facilities and systems; increasing vigilance and scrutiny of railcars and equipment during mechanical inspections to look for unusual items; and continuous guard presence at designated facilities and structures. 

Alert Levels 3 and 4 can be declared industry-wide for a short period of time or 

can be declared in a particular geographic or operational area (e.g., the Midwest or 

hazardous materials) where or when intelligence has identified that terrorist action 

against a specific location or operation is imminent. 

Railroads test the plan through table-top exercises twice yearly, and evaluate and 

modify it as needed to ensure maximum continued effectiveness. 

Access to pertinent intelligence information is a critical element of the plan. To 

this end, the rail industry is in constant communication with the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and elsewhere within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Transportation 

(DOT), the FBI’s National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF), state and local law 

enforcement, and others. A railroad police officer and railroad analysts who hold 

Top Secret clearances work with government intelligence analysts at NJTTF and at 

DHS to help evaluate intelligence and to serve as subject matter experts. 

Intelligence information, in turn, is disseminated through the Railway Alert Network (RAN), a secure 24/7 communications network operated by the AAR at the Secret level that links federal security personnel with railroad operations centers. 

Through the RAN, railroads and the intelligence community share information to 

maintain situational awareness and immediately institute appropriate alert levels. 

Communication is also enhanced by the Surface Transportation Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ST–ISAC), which was established by the AAR at the request of the DOT. The ST–ISAC collects, analyzes, and distributes security information from worldwide resources to help protect vital information technology systems 

and physical assets from attack. It operates 24/7 at the Top Secret level. The ST–

ISAC grew out of Presidential Decision Directive 63 (May 22, 1998), which recognizes freight railroads as ‘‘essential to the minimum operations of the economy and 

government.’’ 

Rail security efforts strongly benefit from the fact that major railroads have their 

own police forces, and a rail security amendment to the port security bill recently 

passed by the Senate would further enhance the ability of railroad police to ensure 

rail security. This amendment would permit police officers in the employ of one railroad to exercise their law enforcement powers on the property of another railroad. 

This flexibility could prove especially valuable in the event of a national security 

threat involving an individual railroad. AAR strongly supports this provision. 

Notwithstanding rail industry efforts, there can be no 100 percent guarantee 

against terrorist assaults, including assaults involving hazardous materials 

(hazmat). If such an assault involving freight railroads occurs, railroads have wellestablished programs and procedures that can and will be invoked that are designed 

to respond to and minimize the impact of such incidents. 

In this regard, the efforts of emergency response personnel are critical. Railroads 

assist communities in developing and evaluating hazmat emergency response plans. 

Through their own efforts and the Transportation Community Awareness and 

Emergency Response Program (TRANSCAER), they provide basic training for more 

than 20,000 emergency responders per year. 
42

In addition, more than 20 years ago, the AAR established the Emergency Response Training Center (ERTC), a world-class training facility that is part of the 

Transportation Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI) in Pueblo, Colorado. The ERTC has 

provided in-depth hazmat emergency response training to more than 25,000 emergency responders and railroad and chemical industry professionals from all over the 

country and abroad. Most recently, the ERTC entered into an agreement with DHS 

to provide critical training for 100 new rail security inspectors hired by the TSA. 

The ERTC is considered by many to be the ‘‘graduate school’’ of hazmat training 

because of its focus on comprehensive, hands-on training using actual rail equipment. That’s why the AAR strongly supports the Allard/Salazar amendment to the 

port security bill that would make the TTCI a member of the National Domestic 

Preparedness Consortium (NDPC), which is a group of premier institutions that develop, test, and deliver training to state and local emergency responders.

Rail Employee Security Training 

Railroad security efforts depend a great deal on the efforts of railroads’ dedicated 

and highly professional employees—including engineers and conductors aboard 

trains; maintenance of way crews, inspectors, and signalmen working along railroad 

right-of-way; railroad police officers; and others. They are the ‘‘eyes and ears’’ in the 

industry’s security effort, and we should all be grateful for their vigilance and care. 

In terms of employee security training, the freight rail industry’s focus has been on 

‘‘see something, say something,’’ and keep out of harm’s way. The training has encompassed topics such as what to do when an employee sees a stranger or suspicious activity on rail property; to whom to report the anomaly; the need to keep 

information about train movements and cargoes confidential; and the need to keep 

rail property secure and safe. 

With 9/11, it became clear to railroads, as it did to firms in other industries, that 

security awareness would have to take on new importance. In response, Class I railroads soon thereafter provided a training video and/or printed materials to all employees—in most cases mailing the materials to employees’ homes—that could be 

characterized as ‘‘Security Awareness 101.’’ In the materials, the railroads expressed 

to their employees three fundamental expectations that to this day remain cornerstones of rail employees’ responsibilities regarding security: don’t put yourself in 

danger; report suspicious activities on or around railroad property; and don’t divulge 

sensitive information about rail operations to others. 

Over time, freight railroads began to incorporate security issues in a more formal 

fashion—for example, as part of employees’ periodic FRA-mandated safety rules recertification, as part of new-hire training, and as part of new manager training. 

Many railroads have incorporated security issues into employees’ manual of standard operating practices. Moreover, all railroads are compliant with U.S. DOT-mandated HM–232 security training for employees who handle hazardous materials. 

More recently, railroads concluded that rail security would be enhanced if rail employee security training was more harmonized across railroads through use of a 

standardized curriculum, and railroads have made that harmonization a reality. 

Much has been done in collaboration with the National Transit Institute (NTI) at 

Rutgers University. NTI was established under the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 to develop, promote, and deliver training and education 

programs for the public transit industry. Freight railroads are fortunate to have 

been able to take advantage of NTI’s success in promoting safety and security in 

public transit to develop an interactive, uniform security awareness curriculum for 

freight rail employees. 

The standardized curriculum has four modules: What is Security; Vulnerability, 

Risk, and Threat; What to Look For; and Employees’ Role in Reducing Risk. The 

goal of the standardized curriculum is to provide rail employees with an understanding of their role and responsibility in system security, and how to implement 

their companies’ procedures upon detection of suspicious objects or activities. 

For example, one module of the curriculum focuses on what system security entails in a general sense—i.e., the use of operating and management policies and procedures to reduce security vulnerabilities to the lowest practical level, as well as a 

process focusing on preventing all levels of crime against people and property. 

Under a system security approach, rail employees are taught to realize that they 

and their duties are part of a larger, extensive system and that system security begins with the employee. To that end, employees are encouraged to be observant and 

to be familiar with their companies’ policies and procedures in the event of a threat 

or incident. 

Another module of the curriculum covers how to identify suspicious or dangerous 

activities. In the case of suspicious individuals, the focus is on behavior—specifically, where the person is, when he or she is there, and what he or she is doing. 
43

Railroads know that their employees know their daily work area (e.g., facilities, 

right-of-way, rolling stock) better than anyone, and will be in the best position to 

know if something does not look quite right or is out of place. Thus, for employees, 

training emphasis is on being familiar with their work area; observing and reporting 

suspicious activities and objects; reporting missing or malfunctioning equipment; 

and, if appropriate and endorsed by their railroad’s policies, approaching and engaging persons to resolve or confirm suspicions. However, rail employees are not to approach threatening people; are not to try to intervene in dangerous activities; are 

not to pick up, touch, or move suspicious objects; are expected to withdraw from any 

dangerous environment or situation; and are expected to report dangerous situations immediately. 

As part of the standardized curriculum, employees are also trained how to react 

to threats, which may take the form of perceived suspicious activity, suspicious and/

or out-of-place objects or vehicles, evidence of tampering with equipment, phone 

calls or other warnings, or other circumstances. Again, railroads do not expect their 

employees to ‘‘play the hero’’ by potentially putting themselves in harm’s way. Instead, they are expected to follow their company’s policies and procedures, inform 

the appropriate authority of the situation, move to a safe location, and wait for further instructions. 

As noted earlier, the full Senate recently adopted several rail security amendments as part of the port security bill. The legislation now heads to conference with 

a similar measure cleared by the House of Representatives in May. 

Among many other things, the Senate-passed bill requires DHS to develop guidance for rail worker security training to include determination of the seriousness of 

any occurrence, crew communication and coordination, appropriate responses, evacuation procedures, psychology of terrorists, and situational training. Thanks to the 

rail industry’s proactive efforts, the rail employee security efforts noted above already include these elements, and more. 

According to the Senate bill, within 90 days after guidance is issued, railroads are 

to submit their training programs to DHS for review. We submitted our program 

both to DHS and to FRA for review and comment in February 2006. TSA has reviewed the rail industry’s training program, and earlier this week communicated 

that it is ‘‘relevant and up-to-date’’ and is ‘‘helpful’’ in ‘‘rais[ing] the baseline of security-related knowledge.’’ 

Earlier this week, TSA dispatched approximately 100 security inspectors to rail 

facilities throughout the country to observe and evaluate railroad compliance with 

seven voluntary security-related action items. Five of these action items deal with 

employee security training. 

Under the Senate bill, within one year of a DHS review, railroads must complete 

training of all front-line workers, defined as security personnel, dispatchers, train 

operators, other on-board employees, maintenance and maintenance support personnel, bridge tenders, and others as deemed appropriate by the Secretary of DHS. 

Even without this legislation, railroads will accomplish this objective. Going forward, rail employee security training will be documented and records of it maintained. 

As the information noted above makes clear, railroads treat very seriously their 

obligations in regard to security and have made sustained, earnest efforts to provide 

their employees with the tools and training they need to react appropriately when 

security-related issues arise. Moreover, railroads are not standing still in this regard. Through their efforts with NTI and others, railroads are continually refining 

their training efforts to improve their usefulness and effectiveness. Railroads are 

also always open to reasonable, constructive suggestions on how employee security 

training can be improved. 

At times, though, some rail industry critics, including some elements within rail 

labor, are not always constructive or reasonable. Members of this committee should 

be made aware that most major freight railroads are currently engaged in negotiations concerning a new national collective bargaining agreement with more than a 

dozen unions representing rail industry employees. During this period of negotiations, union leaders have at times engaged in self-serving tactics aimed at the bargaining table that misrepresent the industry’s strong record of safety and security. 

A case in point is a recent Teamsters-sponsored attack on the rail industry disguised as a ‘‘study’’ of security gaps on U.S. railroads.

Conclusion 

U.S. freight railroads are proud of the success they achieved in keeping our nation’s vital rail transport link open following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Since then, railroads have taken many steps to increase the security of our 

nation’s rail network, including the development of a comprehensive security man-
44

agement plan that incorporates four progressively severe alert levels and the institution of effective employee security training programs designed to keep their employees safe while enhancing security. Railroads will continue to work with this 

committee, others in Congress, federal agencies, and all other relevant parties to 

further enhance the safety and security of our nation’s railroads and the communities they serve.

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you very much, Mr. Hamberger. 

I will yield myself 5 minutes for the first line of questioning. 

If I had to describe the impact of the panel, it would remind me 

of an old movie that I saw years ago when I was in college, and 

the refrain used in the movie was, ‘‘What we have here is a failure 

to communicate.’’ I get different messages as I go across the panel 

from left to right or right to left. And I am just trying to figure out 

whether there is a failure to communicate or there is something 

deeper than that. 

Mr. WYTKIND AND MR. Tolman, the message I got from you was 

that there has been very little, if any, training of your folks; that 

the quality of the training is not very good; that, unless you have 

absolutely classroom-setting training as opposed to videos or CDs 

or written material, they can’t be effective. 

And, Mr. Tolman and Mr. Wytkind, both of you seem to suggest?well, you didn’t seem to suggest, you stated?that a small percentage of your employees have actually received the kind of training that we have heard about. 

Am I missing something here? Do you have any response to what 

was said by the chief and by Mr. Hamberger? 

Mr. WYTKIND. Absolutely. First of all, the comments—

Mr. LUNGREN. And try and keep your comments very succinct so 

I can try and get folks to respond. 

Mr. WYTKIND. I will. And the comments by the chief, we said in 

our written testimony that we applaud some of the work that is 

being done by L.A. Transit and by WMATA to try to deal with 

these training needs. It is still not 100 percent where it needs to 

be, but they have made great strides there. 

On the freight side, there is a lot of material being developed, 

there is no doubt about it. We also acknowledge that in our written 

testimony. The issue is the rank-and-file workers are not receiving 

hands-on training. 

And so, the questions need to be developed that need to focus 

more to the freight railroads of, you know, how are the workers 

being trained? Are they being put through rigorous training classes 

while on the job, or are they just being sent home with interactive, 

kind of, video/Internet programs? 

Mr. LUNGREN. So it is not the question that the material is not 

good. It is the question of whether there has been a concentration 

of that in an integrated program to? 

Mr. WYTKIND. That is right. Although we can’t embrace every 

piece of literature because we don’t get asked to provide input. Yes, 

that is basically the fundamental problem, is they are not receiving 

it. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. Mr. Tolman? 

Mr. TOLMAN. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would have to 

agree with my colleague. I mean, essentially they are not receiving 

anything. Eighty-three percent of them said, in our survey, they 

weren’t. 
45

But we took it one step further, the labor unions, and developed 

a HAZMAT training class at the George Meany Center. We currently do a class—we probably have about two running every 

month—to train our members. We take this very serious, as you 

do. You know, we have taken the initiative in our own hand. 

Through grant money, we have done this. 

But we are not receiving—our members are not receiving—and 

I can’t speak for the transit industry, because we don’t represent 

transit employees, and, you know, so I—

Mr. LUNGREN. Okay. Mr. Hamberger? 

Mr. HAMBERGER. I had the same thought run through my mind, 

as I was listening to Mr. Wytkind and Mr. Tolman, about the failure to communicate. 

One of the things that will come out of our effort to have this 

training, which is part of the recertification process and it is a very 

direct relationship between the trainer and the employee, we will 

have a written record. We will no longer have the discrepancy of 

whether or not the employees have received the training, whether 

or not the training is acceptable. 

We have submitted this series of four tapes to both the FRA and 

the TSA last February. We did hear from the TSA earlier this 

week. And what they said was that it was—

Mr. LUNGREN. I will hold more hearings, from now on. 

Mr. HAMBERGER. Yes. That it was ‘‘relevant, up-to-date and helpful in raising the baseline of security-related knowledge.’’

We are committed, as I have tried to get across in my testimony, 

to security. We understand the importance of training of employees 

in security. We believe that this training program is adequate. 

And, at the same time, I will refer back to Mr. Sammon’s comments, that, beginning this week, the TSA is sending 100 of their 

inspectors out onto the freight rail properties to take a look at 

whether or not we are abiding by our commitment, which we have 

entered into as an industry with TSA, to have rail employee training. They are doing an evaluation and a survey of that beginning 

this week. We will have third-party indication of whether or not 

the training is being done and whether or not it is effective. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank you. 

Chief, I respect everything you said. And maybe it is just because 

I rarely ride the Metro here, but I do occasionally, but I don’t—

maybe I am not attentive, but when I get on, and if we stop under 

the river, frankly, I don’t have a sense of what I would do, in terms 

of evacuation. 

Am I an odd person out on that, or do you think that most of 

the folks who ride your rails do have a sense of where they go if 

there is a problem? 

Chief HANSON. I think some of the messages become wallpaper. 

And I know our train operators make them because we write them. 

And our spokesperson from the police department is here, and if 

you go on the subway you hear her voice—if you want to. People 

have iPods on; they are busy reading books. 

And I know, myself, I have been accused of being mean because 

I have suggested to customers that some of this is a responsibility 

that they have to take. During an incident, I am not going to be 

there to hold everybody’s hand and show them how to evacuate. 
46

And that is why we have our information on our Web site, a very 

dynamic display of how to evacuate. It is clearly posted in a visual 

way that doesn’t require as much reading, in case English is not 

the primary language. And that is why we created this—

Mr. LUNGREN. So that is where I would go find it? 

Chief HANSON. There are a number of opportunities to find it. 

And that is why we do do the outreach. And in September, which 

was National Preparedness Month, we outreached every week. 

But—

Mr. LUNGREN. I am not trying to be critical. I am trying to figure 

out how we solve this problem. You have got our nation’s capital, 

where you have millions of people that come as visitors. They don’t 

ride it every day or every week or every month. They come into 

town, they go on their—

Chief HANSON. Clearly they would have to follow the instructions 

of the train operator. And I do agree that training needs to be robust. 

Once you watch this, this is about it. Then how do you take it 

up a notch? And how you take it up a notch is by taking groups 

of employees and putting them in practical situations, and that 

costs money. And it costs overtime, because if the train operator, 

the bus operator and the transit policeman are in some training facility, who is providing the service? And the primary mission of the 

railroad and the bus company is to drive people around and give 

them a ride. 

And so, there is a huge expense. And if you look at the transit 

grants, listening to TSA say now they are going to make everybody 

take their transit grant money, if you only get a couple million dollars, poof, that is gone. And some of the capital investment is necessary. And there is an expectation that the public has that a transit property is doing technology, training, public service campaigns. 

So you have scarce funding spread around and diluted then. And 

being able to provide transit grant money to do backfill overtime 

is really what is going to help transit properties get employees in 

situations where they are not having to watch a video in the bus 

operators’ lounge during a break and can actually work with first 

responders in a situation that replicates the stress and the immediate decision-making that is required to act the way we need people to act when there is an emergency. 

I think the American public is not engaged because they don’t 

want to be, and particularly in this region. I think New Yorkers, 

because it happened there, they have a recognition of the need to 

be prepared that we don’t sense in this region and other parts of 

America. 

But the American public does have to accept some responsibility 

for what is going to happen in an emergency. Because in the beginning moments, it is going to be chaotic, and the first responders 

won’t be there. And that is when it is so necessary to be able to 

do what you need to do. 

Which is why we took hundreds of CERT members, the people 

we have trained to evacuate, participated in this drill where we 

had a train under the water and we had to evacuate people. And 

it took longer than we thought it was going to take. And we used 
47

the cache of radios that the region has, and communication wasn’t 

what it should have been. 

And all of those things, which just highlight once again where we 

should be focusing our attention with our operational employees. 

The train operator didn’t keep giving messaging to the customers. 

So there are issues. 

And unless you really practice them in a situation like 

that?watching a video is okay, but it is not really what you want 

to do. But the industry doesn’t have the money to spend. And mandating that people spend their little bit of Transit Security Grant 

money I don’t think is going to get us there either. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Ms. Sanchez is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I like this chief. 

[Laughter.] 

I don’t think she said anything differently than what I heard out 

of the people who represent the workers. And I am sensing, from 

my standpoint, you know, I go up to New York maybe a couple 

times a year, and I go up to the Bay area in California maybe two 

or three times a year, and I am here. And once in a while, I use 

the transit—certainly when I am in those other cities. And here 

when I have to go anywhere off the Hill and the transit can be 

used, I use it. 

And, you know, I am actually one of those people who gets on 

in the car and I look around and see who is there, am I going to 

have any problems, you know, where are the exits. I listen to what 

the guy is saying, and I read any of the signs that tell me. 

But you know what? These cars can stop anywhere: under the 

tunnel, under the river, on top of a bridge or what have you. And 

then what am I going to do? I mean, as a person who uses these 

infrequently, I am relying the train operator. 

And any different station—in New York, each station is different. 

Some stations have locked stairways now because, you know, either 

cuts or security problems. They don’t keep all the exits open, and 

it doesn’t have a thing that says, ‘‘Don’t go this way.’’ I mean, if 

you are running through, depending on what station you are in, 

you are running through, you don’t know where to run, you don’t 

know that the gate is going to be locked, if there is a fire going on. 

So you do depend on the transit workers to keep their wits about 

them, to know what they are doing, to stay there and continue to 

get everybody out, except in the case of their own personal safety. 

I can understand that. 

But, you know, if they are not—I don’t expect them to know that 

off of a video. We take videos home all the time. We take reports 

home all the time. And half the time, when we take them, they sit 

there in the pile; we don’t get a chance to read them, for whatever 

reason. We are supposed to read them for the next morning, and 

guess what? You are tired when you get home, or you have to make 

dinner for the husband or what have you, or vice versa or what 

have you. 

[Laughter.] 

So I am just saying that, you know, a video? 

Mr. LUNGREN. Thank God for microwaves. 

[Laughter.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And takeout. 
48

[Laughter.] 

A video isn’t the same as putting the time allotted to an employee—not just once, but in the classroom, in situations where you 

can see he didn’t keep telling the people what to do; it took a lot 

longer to get people out; the stairways were locked where we 

thought they wouldn’t be; or, you know, everybody ran for the elevator, and the elevator didn’t work; whatever it is. 

I mean, they need to do this, because someone like me, even 

though I get on the train and I look around and I think about what 

I am doing, I am still not going to know. And I need to rely on 

those people. 

And what I am hearing is that that just really isn’t getting done. 

And the employees want it. And I am sure the chief wants it. But 

the money hasn’t been dedicated to doing that. 

And, you know, the first 15 minutes of a disaster, whatever it 

may look like, is the time when you save lives or you don’t. And 

that all comes down to who is trained and who is not. 

So we have got to figure out how we get this done, Mr. Chairman. If we mandate it, then we have got to figure out—I know the 

farebox recovery rates. You know, I worked in that for a long time. 

I know it is tough out there. So we need to figure out how—if this 

is a priority, how are we going to fund it. 

I would ask across the table, do you believe that the federal government should mandate security training for rail and mass transit 

employees? 

Mr. WYTKIND. Would you like me to start? 

Obviously, from my testimony, we have been calling for a mandate for some time. 

And I also think there needs to be some consideration to the difference between the private freight rail industry and the public 

transportation industry in this country. I believe resources need to 

be provided to the metro operators around the country to help pay 

for security across the board, including training. 

But I also think, if you look at what the stock pickers and the 

Wall Street analysts are saying about the freight railroads, they 

can afford to train their workers. They have got all the money they 

need to train the workers in this country who operate and maintain the nation’s freight railroads. And that ought to just be a very 

specific mandate and, ‘‘You are going to do it.’’ And then it needs 

to be overseen by the Department of Homeland Security and this 

committee, to make sure it is done. 

Whereas on the public transportation side, I believe you need to 

add some resources to it as well, because I do believe there are resource issues in these public transit operators, and they have to be 

addressed. 

Mr. TOLMAN. Absolutely, I agree with my colleague. 

I also do like the chief, as well. I like what she said. You know, 

money, overtime, equals training. I mean, that is what it is about. 

I just have to get my colleague, Ed Hamberger, to agree with me. 

You know, we have been in national negotiations with the railroads for the past year and a half. You know what their numberone issue has been? Reduce crew size from two to one, in the middle of national security. I think, you know, it is about the money. 
49

And you are absolutely right. First responders, we are the first 

responders. That is why we are concerned. That is why we are 

doing HAZMAT training. I absolutely agree with you. 

Thank you. 

Chief HANSON. I believe it should be mandated if it is funded and 

developed with consultation and involvement of stakeholders, to include union personnel. 

Mr. HAMBERGER. Number one, I appreciate Mr. Wytkind’s stock 

picks. I will be sure to call him next time I have a spare dollar to 

invest. 

[Laughter.] 

Number two, I will not comment on what is being discussed by 

those people who are negotiating across the table in the round of 

labor discussions. 

Number three, we did not object to the legislation adopted by the 

Senate, as I indicated both in my written and oral statement. We 

believe that we are meeting the requirements put into the Senate 

bill. We believe that we are meeting the requirements that DHS 

has asked us to take on, which we have agreed to do on a voluntary basis and for which we pay. 

And we are meeting the requirements developed by the Department of Transportation, PHMSA, whatever that officially stands 

for, and the requirements that that has, the higher requirements 

for the movement of hazardous material. 

Mr. LUNGREN. The gentleman from Washington? 

Mr. DICKS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Hamberger, it isn’t mandatory, right, at this point, for you—

Mr. HAMBERGER. The PHMSA requirements are mandatory, yes, 

sir. That is for hazardous material—

Mr. DICKS. Hazardous material, but not regular cargo? 

Mr. HAMBERGER. That is correct. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. Now, what would it cost the railroads to train 

these people? 

Mr. HAMBERGER. We are training them, as I indicated. 

Mr. DICKS. But you haven’t got—I mean, the numbers are still 

pretty low, aren’t they? These don’t argue with the argument that 

only, like, 30 percent or 20 percent of your workers have been 

trained? 

Mr. HAMBERGER. I do take exception to that. That is not what 

my members indicate. But to set that issue aside, we have adopted 

this more formal approach, whereby every employee, not just those 

in the front line but every employee, will receive the training. And 

there will be a written record that they have received it when they 

receive it. So we disagreed—

Mr. DICKS. Well—

Mr. HAMBERGER. —on how many have been, but, going forward, 

it will be 100 percent. 

Mr. DICKS. I think what the fellows from the labor unions are 

saying is that the training, thus far, has been inadequate. They 

feel that—

Mr. HAMBERGER. That is their view, obviously. 

Mr. DICKS. That is their view, that it has been inadequate, that 

it is not sufficient. And, as I understand it, now that they are going 
50

to make this mandatory, then the question will be, how long will 

it take you to train all of your people? 

And I am interested in the cost. I think it is important for the 

Congress to understand the cost. And I agree with the chief, that, 

in my view, the transit people are going to have to have help here. 

And you can’t take the money out of all the capital funds; you won’t 

have any capital projects. I mean, I think we have to provide the 

training money on top. 

Now, the railroads are probably going to have to pick this up, 

knowing this administration. So what is it going to cost you? 

Mr. HAMBERGER. Could I develop that and get back to you? 

Mr. DICKS. Yes. I think that is fine. But, I mean, it will cost 

some money. 

Mr. HAMBERGER. It clearly will. 

Mr. DICKS. And is that the reason why it hasn’t been done up 

to this point? 

Mr. HAMBERGER. Well, I would disagree with the assertion that 

it hasn’t been done up to this point. As I tried to indicate, we have 

done training. We have adopted this—

Mr. DICKS. But isn’t training just the video and the brochure? Do 

you have any actual facilities where you train people? 

Mr. HAMBERGER. Indeed we do. I am embarrassed that I did not 

bring it to the fore before you asked the question. We indeed have 

the world’s foremost training facility in Pueblo, Colorado, a 56-

square-mile training facility, which we operate under contract with 

the Federal Railroad Administration. 

Our hazardous materials emergency response teams are trained 

there. We train a number of emergency response units from around 

the country. In fact, many of our customers—Dow and DuPont—

send their emergency response teams to Pueblo for training. And 

we do that—our own employees, obviously, we pay for. 

And if I can put a plug in, Senator Salazar did put in the port 

security bill an amendment making Pueblo eligible as the national 

defense preparedness curriculum for funding. Under questioning, 

the Department of Homeland Security admitted that there is a 

basic flaw in that program, in that there is nowhere to have people 

train on the ground, hands on, in dealing with exploding railcars 

and how to deal with emergency response for hazardous materials. 

So that is—

Mr. DICKS. Well—

Mr. HAMBERGER. —that is where we train. 

And I think the—if I may, sir, the issue is not every employee 

is an emergency responder. 

Mr. DICKS. No, I understand that. That is why we were talking 

about—

Mr. HAMBERGER. And so, what we are doing is training the emergency responders. 

Mr. DICKS. So you are doing the emergency response. But the 

rest of it, you don’t have facilities for, a special place where you are 

training these people, like the chief does for her people. 

Mr. HAMBERGER. It is done as part of the training, the recertification—

Mr. DICKS. Is it done on the clock or off the clock? 
51

Mr. HAMBERGER. I believe it would be on the clock. Yes, it would 

be on the clock. 

Mr. DICKS. So you are paying for it? 

Mr. HAMBERGER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. DICKS. Okay. 

Now, Chief, let’s go back to your point here. And I appreciate 

your candor and your directness in answering the questions. 

Am I right? Wouldn’t it be better if Congress provided the money 

for the training without taking it out of your capital funds? 

Chief HANSON. Yes, because, in fact, the congresswoman made a 

comment about time. And the chemical detection systems—we 

know, because we have one—does save time. And in the sarin gas 

attack, it was a half an hour, 40 minutes, before they knew what 

they had. When you have a system like that, it is moments. Then 

you can shut down trains, stop trains from coming in, do things 

with your exhaust fans. 

So now if you tell people, ‘‘You have a couple million dollars, but 

you have to spend it on training, don’t spend it on your capital,’’ 

people aren’t going to be able to do everything. And, in fact, they 

can’t do much of anything now with a couple million dollars, as 

much as cameras and other things cost. 

So if we are going to mandate training, it has to be funded. And 

there has to be consideration for the fact that, with operational employees, who, most of them are union folks, it doesn’t matter, operational or not, they have got to be replaced when they are not there 

to run the railroad or drive a bus. So who is going to shoulder that 

cost? 

And the bottom line for the Transit Authority is that they can’t. 

They would like to do it, but they can’t, because there are other infrastructure needs—keeping the buses running, keeping the trains 

up-to-date, repairing the railroad—that requires that capital. 

So if we are going to mandate it, it has to be funded. 

Mr. DICKS. Well, I just want to commend the chairman, again, 

for holding this hearing. I think the chairman has leaned forward 

on all these areas. What shocks me is that this is like so many 

other areas with homeland security, where we are simply not doing 

as much as needs to be done. 

And I think, as this Congress comes to its conclusion, I hope we 

can keep doing this, Mr. Chairman, because I do think it has a 

positive effect in getting them, Homeland Security, to realize that 

they have got to do more to safeguard the American people. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Well, I appreciate the gentleman’s comments. I 

just would have to make one comment, however. 

We can’t gainsay the fact that we have spent, what is it, $18 billion from the federal government on security overall. We do need 

to spend more, but I hope we are not coming to the point that 

money is the only thing. 

Obviously you are going to have, in my judgment, requirements 

that we have to spend more money. But I would hope that we don’t 

take the position that it is just a management/employment issue or 

that people will not participate in training unless they are absolutely paid or paid overtime or double time or whatever it is. Because, you know, for God’s sake, you are talking about their lives 

too. And I would hope that people would want to be involved in 
52

training programs that train them how to save their lives and the 

lives of others. 

And while money does come into it, I hope we are not going to 

just put it down to a question of money. Because, God knows, we 

will never have enough money to do everything we want to do. 

And, you know, if the administration is taking a tack, at least 

to begin the process, of leveraging money they do have to try and 

get the potential recipients of that money to start thinking about 

training as a part of that, frankly, that is a good thing. 

Yes, we would put more money to it, but if you have a certain 

amount of money and you go back and you look at it and you say, 

‘‘Hey, wait a second, we haven’t paid enough attention on training. 

Let’s use the money that we do have to leverage it’’—not all for 

training, but, as they ask for capital investment, we want to make 

sure that they have got a training component—frankly, I think 

that is a good thing. 

It is not the adequate—it is not the total answer. But I would 

hope that it is a beginning. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, may I say something? 

Mr. LUNGREN. Yes? 

Ms. SANCHEZ. I think you are right. I mean, it is always about 

resources and trying to put them in the right place and getting the 

most you can. But I have got to tell you that, again, if I am a rider 

on the system, I want that employee to know what they are doing, 

because I am depending on them and my life, to a large extent, 

may depend on their knowing what they are doing. 

And what troubles me is not that this would be a union management thing. What troubles me is that these union representatives 

are telling me, basically, that their employees are not confident—

Mr. LUNGREN. Oh, I heard that, loud and clear. And we had better answer that. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. —that they will do the job that is required of them 

and that they want to do to save my life. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Absolutely. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And I want that employee to be confident that he 

knows or she knows what they are doing if I am in an emergency 

and I am depending on them. 

Mr. LUNGREN. I agree. That is why I am heartened by the fact 

Mr. Sammon said they are going to start sending people out to the 

field to actually certify or to do evaluations to see whether Mr. 

Hamberger’s folks are doing what they say they are doing. 

Again, not a total answer, but at least moving in the right direction. 

And I know Mr. Dicks has—

Mr. DICKS. It has been 5 years, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LUNGREN. —Mr. Dicks has suggested that they do it on the 

eve of the hearing—

Mr. DICKS. It has been 5 long years. And these gentlemen have 

followed this very closely, and they see that the administration continues to analyze and think but they don’t get out and do anything. 

And I hope the pressure of this hearing, I hope at least they will 

start doing something at long last. 

Mr. LUNGREN. Well, we will continue having hearings. 
53

And I want to thank the panel. You have been very helpful to 

our consideration of this matter. 

As we mentioned, members of the committee may have some additional questions for you. And if they do, we would ask you to respond to those in writing. The hearing record will be held open for 

10 days. 

And, without objection, the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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