U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFF ICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS

BJA NI J OJJDP BJS OVC

National Institute of Justice

Research Report

Homicide in Eight U.S.

Cities: Trends, Context,

and Policy Implications

A N I NTRAMURAL P ROJECT O F THE N ATIONAL I NSTITUTE O F J USTICE
U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

Janet Reno

Attorney General

U.S. Department of Justice

Raymond C. Fisher

Associate Attorney General

Laurie Robinson

Assistant Attorney General

Jeremy Travis

Director, National Institute of Justice

Justice Information Center

World Wide Web Site

http://www.ncjrs.org

National Institute of Justice

World Wide Web Site

http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/
Homicide in Eight U.S. Cities:

Trends, Context, and

Policy Implications

An Intramural Research Project

Pamela K. Lattimore, Ph.D.

James Trudeau, Ph.D.

K. Jack Riley, Ph.D.

Jordan Leiter, Ph.D.

Steven Edwards, Ph.D.

December 1997

NCJ 167262
This Research Report discusses an NIJ intramural research project. Opinions

expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the U.S. Department

of Justice. Comments and questions should be addressed to Pamela K. Lattimore,

Director, Criminal Justice and Criminal Behavior Division, Office of Research and

Evaluation, NIJ, 810 Seventh Street N.W., Room 7333, Washington, DC 20531;

or at pam@ojp.usdoj.gov.

The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice

Assistance, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.
i

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors thank Attorney General Janet Reno, Assistant Attorney General Laurie Robinson, OJP, and NIJ

Director Jeremy Travis for their support of this research. The authors acknowledge the contributions of DOJ

staff: Eric Baumer, Stephanie Bourque, Stephen Holmes, Eric Jefferis, Robert Kaminski, Nancy La Vigne,

Richard Lewis, Angela Moore-Parmley, Steve Shandy, and Jane Wiseman made site visits; Thomas Feucht,

Ginger Kyle, Rosemary Murphy, and Christy Visher reviewed materials. Gil Gee and colleagues at the FBI’s

Uniform Crime Reporting Center provided assistance with the data. The authors extend thanks to the many

individuals in the eight study cities and two pilot cities who gave their time and cooperation. Special thanks also

go to Michael Farrell, Adele Harrell, Michael Maxfield, Cheryl Maxson, Richard Rosenfeld, and Margaret Zahn

for their reviews and constructive criticism. Of course, the responsibility for errors and omissions lies solely

with the authors.
ii
iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter One: Introduction .................................................................................................................................. 1

Chapter Two: Project Design .............................................................................................................................. 5

Research Hypotheses ...................................................................................................................................... 5

Site Selection .................................................................................................................................................. 7

Interview Development ................................................................................................................................ 17

Project Implementation................................................................................................................................. 19

Appendix 2–A. Homicide Counts and Rates for 77 Cities ........................................................................... 21

Chapter Three: Homicide Trends ..................................................................................................................... 25

Population and Homicide Victimization ...................................................................................................... 25

Homicide Victimization Rates ..................................................................................................................... 31

Disproportionate Homicide Victimization ................................................................................................... 36

Homicide Arrests and Homicide Arrest Rates ............................................................................................. 39

Similarity of Homicide Victims and Offenders ............................................................................................ 40

Circumstances of Homicides ........................................................................................................................ 45

Chapter Four: The Macro Domain: Environmental Context and Homicides.............................................. 47

Economic and Related Factors ..................................................................................................................... 48

Poverty .................................................................................................................................................... 48

Income Distribution ................................................................................................................................ 49

Employment ........................................................................................................................................... 51

Household Type...................................................................................................................................... 51

Education ................................................................................................................................................ 54

System Responses or Resources ................................................................................................................... 54

Emergency Medical Services ................................................................................................................. 54

Domestic Violence Programs ................................................................................................................. 57

Public Housing ....................................................................................................................................... 63

Summary....................................................................................................................................................... 65

Appendix 4–A. Homicides and Poverty in Washington, D.C., 1994 ........................................................... 69

Chapter Five: The Micro Domain: Behavior and Homicide .......................................................................... 71

Drugs ............................................................................................................................................................ 72

Two Hypotheses ..................................................................................................................................... 72

Perceived Impact of Drugs on Violent Crime and Homicide ................................................................. 72

Use Versus Market Stability ................................................................................................................... 74

Drug Use ....................................................................................................................................................... 74

Cocaine and Homicide Trends ............................................................................................................... 75

Other Drugs and Homicide Trends ......................................................................................................... 81

Drugs and Domestic Violence ................................................................................................................ 86
iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Drug Market Stability ................................................................................................................................... 87

Linking Drugs and Homicide Trends ..................................................................................................... 92

Policy Implications ................................................................................................................................. 96

Guns .............................................................................................................................................................. 97

Gun Hypothesis ...................................................................................................................................... 97

Perceptions of Guns ................................................................................................................................ 97

Gun Control Strategies ........................................................................................................................... 99

Gun Prevalence ..................................................................................................................................... 101

Guns and Drug Selling ......................................................................................................................... 101

Policy Implications ............................................................................................................................... 102

Gangs .......................................................................................................................................................... 103

Gang Hypothesis .................................................................................................................................. 103

Perceptions of Gangs ............................................................................................................................ 103

Gangs and Drugs .................................................................................................................................. 104

Policy Implications ............................................................................................................................... 105

Appendix 5–A. Data Sources ..................................................................................................................... 109

Appendix 5–B. Supplement to Homicide and Drug Analyses ................................................................... 113

Chapter Six: Criminal Justice System Domain: Response to Homicide and Violence .............................. 119

Law Enforcement Efforts ........................................................................................................................... 120

Changes in Policing Practices in the Study Cities ................................................................................ 121

Policing Practices in Public Housing ................................................................................................... 122

Community Policing Efforts................................................................................................................. 122

Summary of Law Enforcement Efforts................................................................................................. 123

Arrest Policies and Police Practices for Domestic Violence ...................................................................... 123

Multiagency Task Forces............................................................................................................................ 124

Four Task Force Arrangements ............................................................................................................ 126

Witness Cooperation, Protection, and Intimidation.............................................................................. 128

Summary of Task Force Issues ............................................................................................................. 129

Incapacitation and Deterrence: The Effect of Inmate Flows ...................................................................... 129

Likelihood and Severity of Punishment ............................................................................................... 130

Likelihood of Arrest ............................................................................................................................. 131

Clearance Rates and Victim/Offender Relationship ............................................................................. 135

Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Future Work ............................................................................................. 137

Demographic Patterns and Homicide ......................................................................................................... 138

Economic Conditions and Homicide .......................................................................................................... 139

Services and Homicide ............................................................................................................................... 139
v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Drugs, Guns, Gangs, and Homicide ........................................................................................................... 140

Policing and Homicide ............................................................................................................................... 142

Task Forces and Homicide ......................................................................................................................... 142

Punishment and Homicide .......................................................................................................................... 142

Future Work................................................................................................................................................ 143
vi

LIST OF TABLES

Table 2–1. Structural Hypotheses Relating to Changes in City-Level Homicide Rates .................................. 6

Table 2–2. Linear Regression Model Results for 32 Cities ............................................................................ 12

Table 2–3. Eight Cities Selected by Strongest Homicide Trend .................................................................... 14

Table 3–1. Distribution of Homicide Victimization Counts, 1985 and 1994................................................. 27

Table 3–2. Regression Results of Victim/Offender Age ................................................................................ 43

Table 3–3. Homicide Victim/Offender Age Relationships ............................................................................ 44

Table 3–4. Homicide Victim/Offender Race/Gender Combinations ............................................................. 45

Table 4–1. Intimate/Family Homicides by Victim’s Gender, 1985–1994 ..................................................... 59

Table 5–1. Correlation of Homicide and Male Arrestee Cocaine-Positive Percentages ................................ 76

Table 5–2. Regression Model of Cocaine-Positive Percentages on Homicide Rates..................................... 77

Table 5–3. Percentage of Opiate-Positive Arrestees Testing Positive for Cocaine ........................................ 83

Table 5–4. Percentage of Cocaine-Positive Arrestees Testing Positive for Opiates ...................................... 83

Table 5–5. Percentage of Arrestees Testing Positive for Cocaine Who Also Reported Recent

Alcohol Use .................................................................................................................................. 85

Table 5–6. Percentage of Arrestees Reporting Recent Alcohol Use Who Also Tested Positive

for Cocaine ................................................................................................................................... 85

Table 5–7. Market and Use Risk Factors for Heroin, Powder Cocaine, and Crack ....................................... 94

Table 5–8. Correlation of Total Homicides and Gun Homicides ................................................................... 98

Table 5–9. Regression of Total Homicides and Gun Homicides ................................................................... 98

Table 5–10. Homicide Rates and Arrestees’ Self-Reports of Firearm Ownership, 1995 ............................... 102

Table 5–11. Correlations of Homicide Rates and Percentages of Cocaine-Positive Male

Arrestees in Nonstudy DUF Cities ............................................................................................. 115

Table 6–1. Change in Domestic Violence Arrest Policies ........................................................................... 124

Table 6–2. Relationship Between Clearance Rate and Homicide Count ..................................................... 133

Table 6–3. Correlation Between Homicide Count and Percentage of Homicides for Which

Victim/Offender Relationship Is Unknown ................................................................................ 136
vii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1–1. Homicides in the United States, 1985–1994 ................................................................................ 2

Figure 1–2. United States’ Homicide Rate, 1960–1995 .................................................................................. 2

Figure 2–1. Site Selection Process ................................................................................................................... 7

Figure 2–2. Mean Annual Homicide Counts for 77 Largest U.S. Cities, 1985–1994 ..................................... 8

Figure 2–3. Mean Annual Homicide Rates for 77 Largest U.S. Cities, 1985–1994........................................ 9

Figure 2–4. Mean Annual Homicide Counts and Rates for 32 U.S. Cities, 1985–1994 ............................... 10

Figure 2–5. Ten-Year Homicide Rate Trends in 32 U.S. Cities, 1985–1994 ................................................ 11

Figure 2–6. Annual Homicide Rates for Selected Cities, 1985–1994 ........................................................... 14

Figures 2–7

through 2–10 Observed and Expected Homicide Rate Trends for Selected Cities, 1985–1994....................... 15

Figure 2–7. Decreasing Quadratic Homicide Trend in Atlanta and Washington, D.C. .......................... 15

Figure 2–8. Decreasing Linear Homicide Trend in Detroit and Tampa .................................................. 15

Figure 2–9. Increasing Linear Homicide Trend in New Orleans and Richmond .................................... 15

Figure 2–10. “No Change” and Increasing Quadratic Homicide Trends in Miami and Indianapolis ....... 15

Figure 2–11. Average Population of Selected Cities, 1985–1994 ................................................................... 16

Figure 2–12. Population and Homicide Counts of Eight Selected Cities During 1985–1994,

Compared With 77 Largest U.S. Cities ...................................................................................... 17

Figure 3–1. Cities’ Population, by Race, 1985–1994 .................................................................................... 26

Figure 3–2. Homicide Victimization Counts, by Gender, 1985–1994 .......................................................... 28

Figure 3–3. Homicide Victimization Counts, by Race, 1985–1994 .............................................................. 29

Figure 3–4. Male Homicide Victimization Counts, by Race, 1985–1994 ..................................................... 29

Figure 3–5. Female Homicide Victimization Counts, by Race, 1985–1994 ................................................. 30

Figure 3–6. Homicide Victimization Counts, by Age Group, 1985–1994 .................................................... 30

Figure 3–7. Homicide Victimization Counts of Black Males Compared With Total Homicides,

1985–1994 .................................................................................................................................. 31

Figure 3–8. Black Male Homicide Victimization Rates, by Age, 1985–1994 ............................................. 32

Figure 3–9. White Male Homicide Victimization Rates, by Age, 1985–1994 .............................................. 34

Figure 3–10. Black Female Homicide Victimization Rates, by Age, 1985–1994 ........................................... 35

Figure 3–11. White Female Homicide Victimization Rates, by Age, 1985–1994 .......................................... 36

Figure 3–12. Disproportionate Homicide Victimization of Black Males, 1985–1994 .................................... 37

Figure 3–13. Homicide Arrests of Black Males Compared With Total Homicide Arrests,

1985–1994 .................................................................................................................................. 38
viii

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3–14. Homicide Arrest Rates for Black Males, by Age, 1985–1994 ................................................... 40

Figure 3–15. Homicide Arrest Rates for White Males, by Age, 1985–1994 ................................................... 41

Figure 3–16. Homicide Arrest Rates for Black Females, by Age, 1985–1994................................................ 41

Figure 3–17. Homicide Arrest Rates for White Females, by Age, 1985–1994 ............................................... 42

Figure 3–18. Circumstances Surrounding Homicides, 1985–1994 ................................................................. 46

Figure 4–1. Individuals Living Below Poverty, by Race, in 1980 and 1990 ................................................. 49

Figure 4–2. Income Distribution for Washington, D.C., 1980 ...................................................................... 50

Figure 4–3. Income Distribution Measured by Gini Coefficients, 1980 and 1990 ........................................ 50

Figure 4–4. Black Income Equality, 1980 and 1990...................................................................................... 51

Figure 4–5. Employment and Labor Force Status, 1990 ............................................................................... 52

Figure 4–6. Percent Employed (Age 16 and Older), by Race and Gender, 1980 and 1990 .......................... 52

Figure 4–7. Poverty Status by Household Type, 1990 .................................................................................. 53

Figure 4–8. Percent of Households Headed by Married Couples, 1980 and 1990 ........................................ 53

Figure 4–9. High School Graduates (Age 25 and Older), 1980 and 1990 ..................................................... 53

Figure 4–10. Serious Assaults Resulting in Homicide, 1985–1994 ................................................................ 58

Figure 4–11. Homicide and Aggravated Assault Rates, 1985–1994 ............................................................... 58

Figure 4–12. Female Homicide Victim/Offender Relationship, 1985–1994 ................................................... 60

Figure 4–13. Male Homicide Victim/Offender Relationship, 1985–1994 ...................................................... 60

Figure 4–14. Homicides and Poverty in Washington, D.C., 1994................................................................... 70

Figure 5–1. Homicide and Male Arrestee Cocaine Use, 1987–1994............................................................. 76

Figure 5–2. Homicide and Male Arrestee Cocaine Use, by Age, 1987–1994 ............................................... 78

Figure 5–3. Homicide and Male Arrestee Cocaine Use, by Race, 1987–1994.............................................. 79

Figure 5–4. Race-Specific Victimization and Male Arrestee Cocaine Use, 1987–1994 ............................... 80

Figure 5–5. Age-Specific Victimization and Male Arrestee Cocaine Use, 1987–1994 ................................ 80

Figure 5–6. Homicide and Marijuana Use by Male Arrestees, 1987–1994 ................................................... 81

Figure 5–7. Homicide and Opiate Use by Male Arrestees, 1987–1994 ........................................................ 82

Figure 5–8. Homicide and Self-Reported Alcohol Use by Male Arrestees, 1987–1994 ............................... 84

Figure 5–9. Homicide and Self-Reported Alcohol Use (Excluding Cocaine) by Male Arrestees

1987–1994 .................................................................................................................................. 86

Figure 5–10. Female Homicide Victimization and Drug Use, 1987–1994 ..................................................... 88

Figure 5–11. Homicide and Female Arrestee Cocaine Use, 1987–1994 ......................................................... 88

Figure 5–12. Homicide Rates and Retail Cocaine Prices, 1987–1994 ............................................................ 90
ix

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 5–13. Homicide, Male Arrestee Cocaine Test–Positive Percentages,

and Local Law Enforcement Interventions................................................................................. 93

Figure 5–14. Homicide and Male Cocaine Use, Part 1 .................................................................................. 114

Figure 5–15. Homicide and Male Cocaine Use, Part 2 .................................................................................. 114

Figure 5–16. Homicide and Cocaine and Methamphetamine Use by Male Arrestees .................................. 116

Figure 5–17. Homicide and Self-Reported Alcohol Use by Male Arrestees, Part 1 ..................................... 117

Figure 5–18. Homicide and Self-Reported Alcohol Use by Male Arrestees, Part 2 ..................................... 117

Figure 6–1. Inmate Flows, 1985–1993 ........................................................................................................ 131

Figure 6–2. Homicide Victimization and Clearance Rates, 1985–1994 ...................................................... 132
x
1

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

In recent years, sharp declines in homicides have been

recorded in several major U.S. cities. New York City,

for example, experienced a 31-percent decline in its

homicide rate between 1990 and 1994.1 Although

attention has focused on those cities that have recently witnessed dramatic declines in homicide, the

downward trend is by no means universal. Indeed, as

can be seen in figure 1–1, between 1990 and 1994, the

total number of homicides in the United States reflected little change (23,440 homicides recorded in

1990 and 23,310 in 1994) and greatly exceeded the

18,980 recorded in 1985.2

In fall 1995, the National Institute of Justice initiated

a series of studies to examine violence in the United

States, with a particular focus on violence in cities.

The initial efforts were focused on homicide because

it represents the most serious level of violence and is

the most precisely measured offense in the Nation’s

crime-reporting systems. During the study, it was

necessary to consider “homicide and other serious

violent crime” because a variety of factors—some of

which were the focus of the project—may influence

whether a crime is classified as a serious assault or a

murder. The primary focus, however, was on homicide.

Figure 1–1 also shows homicides in “large cities”

over the 1985–1994 period, where “large city” has

been defined as one with a population of 200,000 or

more during at least one year of the study. The focus

was on what happens within a city boundary, not in

the larger surrounding geographic region (e.g., county

or Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area [SMSA]).

There were 78 U.S. cities that had populations greater

than 200,000 during the period of interest, but Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) data were not available

for one of those cities (Wichita, Kansas). The remaining 77 cities, which had approximately 20 percent of

the total U.S. population, accounted for approximately half of the homicides recorded annually in the

United States over this period. Further, in 43 of these

cities, the number of homicides in 1994 exceeded the

number in 1990; in 41 of these cities, the per capita

homicide rate in 1994 exceeded the 1990 rate.3 Thus,

the focus on national trends and on trends in major

cities such as New York that have witnessed recent

declines may mask a more complex picture that has

substantial variation.

Figure 1–2 places the recent homicide trend in the

United States in historical context. Since 1960, the

homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants has varied

between a low of about 4.5 in the 1960s to a high of

about 10 around 1980.4

 The years 1984 and 1985

provide the most recent historical low, with an estimated value of 7.9. This study used 1985 as the start

point for its 10-year framework.

Policymakers, media representatives, and scholars

have attributed the recent declines in homicide to a

variety of factors, including demographic and population changes that may have reduced the number of

violent offenders on the streets, nuisance and violence

abatement programs that may have deterred and

incapacitated violent offenders, greater police visibility through wider implementation of problem-oriented

or community-oriented policing, reductions in drug
2

use or stabilization of drug markets, and improvements in social or economic conditions. Generally,

these attributions of program effectiveness—e.g.,

changes in policing practices—have been made with

respect to the trends in specific cities that have witnessed declines in murders. The difficulty with this

approach is that communities that witnessed increases

in murders also might have experienced similar

changes in programs or policies. To determine

whether a program or policy change is effective, one

must look at the programs or policies in cities that

have experienced various trends in homicides over the

period of interest.

In approaching this project, the researchers were

interested in focusing on homicide as a local phenomenon. The reason for this is twofold. First, many of

the factors chosen for study vary across locations and

over time—not necessarily in concert with national

trends. Second, the policies and programs to address

violent crime are primarily the responsibility of local

governments (albeit, perhaps, with financial infusions

from the Federal Government or State legislatures).

Thus, many of the causes and most of the solutions to

violent crime were assumed to have been operating at

the local or city level.

Resolving the conflicting components of the homicide

picture has obvious policy implications. At the tactical level, the allocation of violence prevention resources, for example, depends to some extent on the

understanding of what works to prevent violence.

Similarly, at the strategic level, antiviolence policies

that may be considered or adopted in light of predicted changes in demographic trends may have to be

reconsidered as the understanding of homicide

changes. Moreover, what works to combat violence in

one community may not work in another. In short,

policymakers may benefit substantially by increasing

their understanding of homicide.

This report describes the rationale for and approach to

a study of homicide in eight U.S. cities—Atlanta,

Detroit, Indianapolis, Miami, New Orleans, Richmond, Tampa, and Washington, D.C.—that experienced different trends in homicide from 1985 through

1994. Throughout the planning and operationalization

of the project, emphasis was placed on investigating

policy-relevant avenues of inquiry and providing

findings in a policy-relevant time horizon. The recent

changes in violent crime patterns, particularly in New

York City, led to increased emphasis on reducing

violent crime and homicide elsewhere. The researchers hoped to inform this debate by providing research

results as quickly as was feasible. At the same time,

the project team wanted to structure the project in a

way that would anticipate and encourage additional

research on homicide. This study was undertaken to

attempt to offer insights on the diverse homicide

trends in cities across the country and help organize

and prioritize research on the subject.

Figure 1–1. Homicides in the United States,

1985–1994

Note: Large cities are defined as those with populations of

more than 200,000.

Figure 1–2. United States’ Homicide Rate,

1960–1995

Note: Black bars represent study years (1985–1994).

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

Homicides

U.S. Total Large Cities Only 0

2

4

6

8

10

12

1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995

Homicides/100,000 Pop.
3

Five basic decisions guided the development of the

project:

♦ To focus on communities with strong changes

in homicide trends in the belief that these

changes in homicide trends would be substantial and, thus, more observable.

♦ To analyze a limited number of cities to

establish deeper understanding of changes in

signal communities rather than a broader

understanding of national trends.

♦ To study factors that are closely linked with

serious violence and homicide.

♦ To focus on recent history (1985–1994)

because this period is most relevant to

policymakers.

♦ To address both perceptions of and actual

changes in factors in these communities.

The resulting study researches homicide trends

between 1985 and 1994 in eight cities. It begins

with a focus on the community, using homicide as

the “dependent variable” in the project’s inquiry

into context, policy, and homicide.

Key findings of the project include evidence:

(1) Reinforcing the local nature of homicide (“all

crime is local”).

(2) Supporting a link between cocaine (primarily

“crack”) use and homicide.

(3) Guns as the instrument of homicide increased

over time in all eight cities—even those that

showed declines in total numbers of homicides.

(4) Supporting the perceived effectiveness of

problem-oriented policing, public housing

policing, multijurisdictional task forces, and

programs and services for domestic violence

victims.

(5) Relating inmate flows into and out of State

prisons with the level of homicide.

The results also suggest that:

(1) Community-oriented policing activities and

programs were too recently implemented in the

eight cities to substantiate their effectiveness.

(2) Drugs other than cocaine (“crack”) were not

associated with homicide trends in any discernible way.

(3) Drug market structure appeared less associated

with the level of violence than initial assumptions or findings had suggested.

(4) Gangs were not viewed as a significant cause of

violence in the eight cities, except to the extent

that they were involved in drug dealing, perhaps

because none of the cities is particularly noted

for high levels of organized gangs.

(5) Further investigation is needed regarding the

relationship between the availability and lethality

of guns, the quantity and quality of emergency

medical services, and homicides.

(6) While cross-city analyses of economic factors

produced weak and mixed findings, within-city

analyses using census tract data may be more

promising.

Chapter 2 describes the project design and provides

additional information on the hypotheses investigated,

interview development and testing, and site selection.

Chapter 3 presents an analysis of the homicide trends

in the selected cities. The next three chapters describe

key findings in each of the substantive domain areas—

environmental or macro, situational or micro, and

system response. The chapter entitled “Conclusions

and Future Work” includes a summary of key policy

findings and a discussion of plans for future research.

Notes

1. “Homicide” and “murder” are used interchangeably

throughout this report to refer to murder and

nonnegligent homicide as it is classified by the

Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime

Reports.

2. The period 1985 to 1994 is used throughout this

report, although data are now available for 1995.
4

According to the Uniform Crime Reports (Crime in

the United States 1995, Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Department of Justice, 1996, p. 13), murder and nonnegligent homicide dropped 7.4 percent in the United

States between 1994 and 1995 (from 23,310 to

21,597). Numbers reported here are the estimated

numbers from the UCR. The U.S. data are from the

Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics—1994, K.

Maguire and A.L. Pastore, eds.,Washington D.C.:

U.S. Department of Justice, 1995; and Crime in the

United States 1994, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, 1995. City-level data were provided

by the FBI, Uniform Crime Reporting Center; a city

was included in the dataset if the population was

200,000 or greater during any year between 1985 and

1994. Homicide data were missing for several cities

for some years. The number(s) of cities for which data

were missing were one in 1985, 1986, and 1987; eight

in 1988; three in 1989; and two in 1990.

3. Data were missing for Minneapolis for 1990.

4. Homicide rate estimates per 100,000 for 1960

through 1994 are from the summary of UCR estimates provided by the Sourcebook of Criminal Justice

Statistics—1994, 1995, p. 324; the estimated rate for

1995 is from Crime in the United States 1995, p. 13.
5

CHAPTER TWO

Project Design

The project centered on gathering information on

homicide, violence, and associated factors from key

policymakers, law enforcement and criminal justice

system representatives, and community leaders in a

limited number of cities. The project was intended to

be of reasonable scope with respect to time, personnel, and other resources. The main focus was on

policy-related issues, with some attention paid to

identifying the nature and extent of contextual factors

associated with crime and violence.

This broad framework led to three questions: “What

would we ask?” “To which cities would we go?” “To

whom would we talk?” Answers to these questions

are in the remainder of this chapter. Specifically, this

chapter addresses (1) research hypotheses, (2) site

selection, (3) interview development, and (4) project

implementation.

Research Hypotheses

Several criteria were used for establishing the research hypotheses. Generally, priority was given to

issues where a strong, direct link between the factor

and the homicide rate could be anticipated. Specifically, an attempt was made to narrow the hypotheses

to those where anticipated effects could be described

as “first order.” (These were also described as hypotheses in which the “chain” linking the factor and

homicide could be envisioned as short.) To accommodate the 10-year period under study, the project also

sought to investigate issues on which communities

were likely to have acted over the past decade.

To facilitate project design, hypotheses were grouped

into three major categories or domains—two contextual and one response. The contextual domains were

environmental or macro and situational or micro. The

response domain included only the criminal justice

system (law enforcement, prosecution, courts, and

corrections). Service providers were included in the

macro domain. The underlying structural hypotheses

are summarized in table 2–1.

Macro domain. The macro domain included the

environmental and social context within which homicide and violence occur and the set of societal forces

that, in the aggregate, may stem from individuals’

behavior but are typically beyond any individual’s

control. Examples of macro-level issues included

demographic trends, employment rates, and educational attainment of citizens. Macro-level factors also

were defined to include programs, services, and policies

that are not the responsibility of criminal justice system

agencies. Examples from this category included

emergency medical service (EMS) programs, educational services, community groups and their responses to

violence, and domestic violence programs. This domain

proved the most difficult to narrow and, as envisioned,

to satisfactorily research. Specific hypotheses in the

macro domain are listed below:

(1) Positive/negative changes in economic conditions result in decreases/increases in violence

and homicide.

(2) Increases/decreases in the numbers (and proportions) of those in violence-prone demographic

groups result in increases/decreases in violence

and homicide.
6

(3) Improvements in system responses (e.g., EMS,

domestic violence victim shelters) will result in

decreases in homicide.

(4) Increases in violence prevention programs (e.g.,

mediation) will result in decreases in violence

and homicide.

Micro domain. The micro domain included the

situational factors that relate directly to homicide and,

typically, an individual’s behavior. Thus, this domain

of analysis was concerned with homicide in its situational context and can be best described as “guns,

gangs, and drugs.” Specific hypotheses in the microlevel domain, listed below, related to the availability

of drugs and guns, the market structures associated

with drugs and guns, and the extent of gang activity:

(1) Increases/decreases in the stability of drug

markets will be associated with increases/decreases in violence and homicide.

(2) The extent of drug use and type of drugs prevalent in local markets will be related to the level

of violence.

(3) Increases in the lethality and availability of guns

will be associated with increases in violence and

homicide.

(4) Gang activity—in connection with drug and gun

markets or for other purposes—will be associated with violence and homicide.

In particular, the researchers were interested in

whether certain drugs are more strongly associated

with violence (e.g., crack cocaine) than others (e.g.,

marijuana). With respect to investigations of gangs, it

is acknowledged—as will be seen in the next section—that none of the sites is known as a “gang city.”

The response domain. The response or criminal

justice system domain encompassed law enforcement,

prosecution, courts, and corrections. This area of

inquiry was established to explore the impact that

criminal justice policies and practices might have on

homicide trends. Thus, for example, one hypothesis to

be tested in the criminal justice system area was that

changes in police deployment practices have reduced

the level of violence and, therefore, the number of

homicides. In this domain, questions were designed to

examine whether:

(1) More proactive and/or community-oriented

policing is associated with a decrease in serious

violence and homicide.

(2) Interagency, multijurisdictional activities against

violence, drugs, and/or gangs are associated with

a decrease in serious violence and homicide.

(3) Actual and perceived increases/decreases in the

likelihood or severity of punishment are associated with decreases/increases in violence and

homicide.

Table 2–1. Structural Hypotheses Relating to Changes in City-Level Homicide Rates

Structural Domain

Environmental or Situational or Response or

Macro-Level Factors Micro-Level Factors Criminal Justice System

Economic conditions Drug market stability Policing practices

Demographic changes Extent and type of drug use Task forces (interagency,

multijurisdictional)

System responses or resources Availability and lethality of Actual and perceived likelihood or

(e.g., emergency medical services, handguns/other weapons severity of punishment

domestic violence shelters)

Prevention programs Gangs and gang activity Incapacitation of a large number

of young, crime-prone males
7

(4) Increases/decreases in the incarceration of large

numbers of young, crime-prone males are associated with decreases/increases in violence and

homicide.

The project team developed an approach for identifying cities that would be the subjects of investigation.

The site selection process is described in the section

that follows. The conclusion of this section details the

development of a series of questions to generate

information pertinent to the hypotheses, the identification of individuals who would be targeted for

interview, and the field investigation.

Site Selection

A variety of options were considered to select the

cities that would be the focus of the inquiries. Available resources were sufficient to visit 8 to 10 cities.

The goal was to investigate the relationships between

homicide trends and qualitative factors such as policing effectiveness that would be poorly measured at

best. Therefore, efforts were focused on those cities

where homicide trends were the “strongest” over the

period of interest. Thus, no deliberate attempt was

made to identify cities that could be construed, either

individually or as a set, as representative of the

Nation as a whole. Additionally, potential explanatory

factors such as policing policies, urban migration

patterns, and demographic characteristics were explicitly avoided in the selection process. The implication

of this decision was that issues of interest—e.g., gang

activity, urban migration patterns, or demographic

characteristics—might not be represented in the final

set of cities. Further, this process did not ensure

heterogeneity with respect to other factors of interest

such as geographic region.

In general, cities were selected for indepth study

based on their population and the strength of their

homicide rate trends over the past decade (1985–

1994). This period was chosen because 1985 represented the most recent upturn in homicide. Figure 2–1

shows the selection process. The research team chose

to look only at cities with populations of more than

200,000 during at least one year of the study period.

As previously noted, 1 of the 78 cities with populations over 200,000 was dropped because of missing

homicide data; thus, the initial city set contained 77

cities. Population was used as a criterion because as

few as one or two additional homicides in small cities

can greatly change homicide rates. Population was

based on those residing within the city boundary, not

the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA).

The 77 cities selected exhibit considerable range in

the number and rate of homicides, as can be seen in

figures 2–2 and 2–3. The average annual number of

homicides over the 1985–1994 period ranged from a

low of 4.6 (Lincoln, Nebraska) to a high of 1,834

(New York, New York), while the average homicide

rate per 100,000 population ranged from a low of 2.4

(Lincoln, Nebraska) to a high of 60.4 (Washington,

D.C.). The mean number of homicides over all 77

cities for this period was 140.7; the median number of

homicides was 58.8. The mean homicide rate over all

77 cities was 19.6 per 100,000 population; the median

rate was 15.8—roughly twice the national homicide

rate over this period, which was 7.9 per 100,000 in

1985, 9.8 in 1991, and 9.0 in 1994 (see figure 1–2).

Figure 2–1. Site Selection Process

Set 2

Number Homicides > Median

Homicide Rate > Median

N = 32

Set 3

Increasing/Decreasing Trend, 1985–1994

N = 23

Set 4

Strongest Trends

N = 7

Plus N = 1 No Change

Set 1

City Population > 200,000

N = 77
ure 2–2. Mean Annual Homicide Counts for 77 Largest U.S. Cities,* 1985–1994

 as those with populations of more than 200,000.

 homicide count for each city is listed in Appendix 2–A. Black bars denote study cities.

NYC = 1,834

8

D

Chicago

Los Angeles

New York

etroit

W

Dallas

Philadelphia

Houston

ashington D.C.

N

Baltimore

ew Orleans

Atlanta

M

Jacksonville

Kansas City

Oakland

Phoenix

Fort Worth

Cleveland

Memphis

San Antonio

Saint Louis

iami

R

Birmingham

Milwaukee

San Diego

ichmond

In

Denver

Las Vegas

Charlotte

Nashville

Long Beach

Columbus

Boston

San Francisco

Newark

dianapolis

T

Oklahoma City

ampa

Virginia Beach

Anaheim

Akron

Riverside

Jersey City

Corpus Cristi

Omaha

Saint Petersburg

Tucson

Honolulu

Toledo

Mobile

El Paso

Louisville

San Jose

Tulsa

Austin

Stockton

Pittsburgh

Rochester

Portland

Cincinnati

Baton Rouge

Santa Ana

Minneapolis

Buffalo

Seattle

Jackson

Fresno

Norfolk

Sacramento
igure 2–3. Mean Annual Homicide Rates for 77 Largest U.S. Cities, 1985–1994

l homicide rate for each city is listed in Appendix 2–A. Black bars denote study cities.

 = 15.8

D.C. = 60.42

D

Chicago

Los Angeles

New York

etroit

W

Dallas

Philadelphia

Houston

ashington D.C.

N

Baltimore

ew Orleans

Atlanta

M

Jacksonville

Kansas City

Oakland

Phoenix

Fort Worth

Cleveland

Memphis

San Antonio

Saint Louis

iami

R

Birmingham

Milwaukee

San Diego

ichmond

In

Denver

Las Vegas

Charlotte

Nashville

Long Beach

Columbus

Boston

San Francisco

Newark

dianapolis

T

Oklahoma City

ampa

Alit

Anchorage

Saint Paul

Raleigh

Virginia Beach

Anaheim

Akron

Riverside

Jersey City

Corpus Cristi

Omaha

Saint Petersburg

Tucson

Honolulu

Toledo

Mobile

El Paso

Louisville

San Jose

Tulsa

Austin

Stockton

Pittsburgh

Rochester

Portland

Cincinnati

Baton Rouge

Santa Ana

Minneapolis

Buffalo

Seattle

Jackson

Fresno

Norfolk

Sacramento
010203040506070

Mean Number Mean Rate

gure 2–4. Mean Annual Homicide Counts and Rates for 32 U.S. Cities, 1985–1994

al homicide count and rate for each city is listed in Appendix 2–A. Black bars denote study cities.

D

Chicago

Los Angeles

New York etroit W

Dallas

Philadelphia

Houston ashing

ton D.C.

N

Baltimore ew Orlea

ns

Atlanta

M

Jacksonville

Kansas City

Oakland

Fort Worth

Cleveland

Memphis

San Antonio

St. Louis iami R

Birmingham

Milwaukee ichmond In

Charlotte

Nashville

Long Beach

Boston

Newark diana

polis

Tampa

Sacramento

Homicides/100,000 Pop.
11

Of the 77 cities selected, attention was focused on

those with large homicide problems, i.e., annual

numbers of homicides that averaged above the group

median (58.8) and annual homicide rates that averaged above the group median (15.8 per 100,000

population). Thus, cities that represented a substantial portion of the national homicide picture were

targeted, while those with low trends (and a resultant susceptibility to the effect of atypical events)

were culled out.

Thirty-two cities had mean annual homicide counts

and mean annual homicide rates that averaged above

the medians for this set of cities and, thus, met the

selection criteria. The homicide counts and rates for

these cities are shown in figure 2–4.

In step 2 of the selection process, researchers identified the homicide trend (if any) in each of the cities

and examined its strength. Cities that had clear

trends or patterns in their annual homicide rates

were sought. Rates rather than counts were reviewed

at this point to control for population size. This

purposive sampling was done in the belief that the

underlying causal factors that could partially explain

the trends would be more visible in communities where

the trends were strongest. However, because of the

sampling strategy, results from the investigations are

not generalizable, for example, to national trends.

Five categories of trends were considered:

♦ Decreasing linear.

♦ Decreasing quadratic.

♦ Increasing linear.

♦ Increasing quadratic.

♦ No change.

Linear trends are those in which, over the 10 years

under consideration, homicide rates generally

moved in a straight or downward direction. Quadratic trends have values that “change direction”

once over the relevant study period. Specifically,

decreasing quadratic trends are those where several

years of increases in homicide rates are followed by

several years of decreases. Cities with decreasing

quadratic trends have received the most attention

recently largely because the peaks, or points of

change in direction, have occurred in recent years and

offer stark contrast to rates of the late 1980s. Increasing quadratic trends are the opposite—homicide rates

decrease at first and then increase.

Regression analysis was used to fit each of the 32

cities’ 10-year homicide rate data to linear and quadratic curves. Goodness-of-fit statistics were used to

decide which type of curve best explained each city’s

10-year trend. A city was placed into the decreasing

linear category, for example, if the 10 years of data fit

a downward sloping line better than a quadratic

decreasing or increasing curve. If none of the four

curves provided sufficient fit to the data, the city was

placed in the no-change category.1 Interestingly, in

contrast to the national trend in homicide rates (which

is decreasing quadratic as shown in figure 1–2) and

recent media focus, 14 of the 32 cities that met the

initial screens had increasing homicide trends (13

linear, 1 quadratic) and 9 had decreasing trends (7

quadratic, 2 linear). The remaining nine cities showed

no clear homicide trends for this time period. Figure

2–5 summarizes the trend analyses for the 32 cities.

The results of the regression analyses for the 32 cities

are given in table 2–2. Both linear and quadratic

models for each city are shown. Cities are listed

within the category that provided the best fit to their

data in order of the strength of the trend. (No-change

cities are listed in alphabetical order.)2 Within each

category and where possible, the two cities with the

strongest trends were selected. Only one city’s homicide trend was characterized as increasing quadratic

and, thus, a single city appears in this category.

1

2

7

9

13

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14

Inc. Quad.

Dec. Linear

Dec. Quad.

No Change

Inc. Linear

Trend Type

Number of Cities

Figure 2–5. Ten-Year Homicide Rate Trends

in 32 U.S. Cities, 1985–1994
12

Homicide Homicide

City Model R2 df F-Statistic β0 β1 β2 Number Rate

(Mean) (Mean)

Decreasing Linear

Tampa linear 0.510 7 7.29* 95.4451 -0.8294

Tampa quad 0.534 6 3.43 670.633 -13.706 0.0720 60.78 21.07

Detroit linear 0.424 8 5.88* 08.104 -0.5591

Detroit quad 0.618 7 5.67* -1090.1 26.2447 -0.1497 613.4 58.07

Decreasing Quadratic

Washington, D.C. linear 0.728 8 21.39* -490.65 6.1571

Washington, D.C. quad 0.944 7 59.06* -11108 243.656 -1.3268 361.9 60.42

Atlanta linear 0.221 8 2.27 -52.949 1.1325

Atlanta quad 0.841 7 18.56* -6055.7 135.411 -0.7502 202.9 48.41

Dallas linear 0.005 8 0.04 22.4082 0.1470

Dallas quad 0.541 7 4.13 -4963.6 111.681 -0.6231 363.4 35.56

Jacksonville linear 0.013 7 0.09 34.1304 -0.1545

Jacksonville quad 0.750 6 9.02* -3733.7 84.1953 -0.4716 130.9 20.27

New York linear 0.186 8 1.83 -21.071 0.5155

New York quad 0.842 7 18.60* -3085.0 69.0528 -0.3829 1834 25.07

Philadelphia linear 0.524 8 8.82* -73.958 1.1047

Philadelphia quad 0.817 7 15.61* -2682.6 59.4581 -0.3260 401.4 24.91

Cleveland linear 0.406 8 5.46* -50.335 0.8786

Cleveland quad 0.619 7 5.69* -2066.8 45.9856 -0.2520 148.0 28.30

Increasing Linear

New Orleans linear 0.911 8 81.78* -504.43 6.2402

New Orleans quad 0.916 7 37.99* 920.890 -25.643 0.1781 278.0 54.07

Saint Louis linear 0.675 8 16.61* -275.30 3.6248

Saint Louis quad 0.746 7 10.28* 3444.45 -79.584 0.4649 199.8 49.12

Richmond linear 0.775 8 27.55* -273.08 3.6131

Richmond quad 0.825 7 16.45* 2617.80 -61.054 0.3613 106.7 50.29

Birmingham linear 0.728 8 21.37* -177.93 2.4412

Birmingham quad 0.728 7 9.37* -360.14 6.5172 -0.0228 111.4 40.56

Baltimore linear 0.885 8 61.39* -166.89 2.2790

Baltimore quad 0.885 7 27.05* -376.12 6.9593 -0.0261 279.3 37.08

Milwaukee linear 0.750 8 24.04 -124.42 1.6042

Milwaukee quad 0.824 7 16.38* -1713.9 37.1589 -0.1986 119.6 19.16

Norfolk linear 0.594 8 11.71* -117.27 1.5521

Norfolk quad 0.692 7 7.86* 2107.8 46.0783 -0.2487 58.8 21.64

Table 2–2. Linear Regression Model Results for 32 Cities
13

Chicago linear 0.764 8 25.97* -95.490 1.3760

Chicago quad 0.764 7 11.36* 103.62 1.5579 -0.0010 798.7 27.66

Oakland linear 0.643 8 14.43* -87.001 1.3707

Oakland quad 0.724 7 9.19* -1622.8 35.7254 -0.1919 133.3 35.68

Kansas City linear 0.687 8 17.59* -74.944 1.1700

Kansas City quad 0.783 7 12.60* -1452.5 31.9845 -0.1721 131.3 29.77

Charlotte linear 0.360 8 4.49 -83.521 1.1569

Charlotte quad 0.410 7 2.44 -1456.1 31.8598 -0.1715 79.5 20.02

Long Beach linear 0.451 8 6.56* -74.413 1.0513

Long Beach quad 0.487 7 3.32 -1016.8 22.1314 -0.1178 84.0 19.68

Memphis linear 0.448 8 6.49* -60.461 0.9625

Memphis quad 0.548 7 4.24 -1500.6 33.1774 -0.1800 163.8 25.69

Increasing Quadratic

Indianapolis linear 0.510 8 8.34 -102.19 1.3186

Indianapolis quad 0.726 7 9.26* 2606.31 -59.269 0.3385 71.6 15.82

No Change (in alphabetical order)

Boston linear 0.005 8 0.04 9.7967 0.0806

Boston quad 0.151 7 0.62 -1399.2 31.5989 -0.1761 97.2 17.01

Fort Worth linear 0.029 8 80.24 68.5617 -0.4108

Fort Worth quad 0.035 7 0.13 641.868 -13.235 0.0716 141.8 31.79

Houston linear 0.043 8 0.36 -7.2653 0.3783

Houston quad 0.297 7 1.48 -2914.3 65.4060 -0.3633 454.9 26.59

Los Angeles linear 0.263 8 2.86 -19.117 0.5074

Los Angeles quad 0.299 7 1.49 -608.78 13.6978 -0.0737 906.0 26.30

Miami linear 0.168 7 1.41 549.107 -0.2587

Miami quad 0.168 7 1.42 292.107 0 -0.00007 130.3 34.49

Nashville linear 0.178 8 1.73 46.268 -0.3320

Nashville quad 0.202 7 0.89 431.082 -8.9400 0.0481 82.6 16.56

Newark linear 0.002 8 0.02 28.6789 0.0626

Newark quad 0.017 7 0.06 542.665 -11.435 0.0642 101.2 34.28

Sacramento linear 0.019 8 0.16 36.0768 -0.2140

Sacramento quad 0.026 7 0.09 430.610 -9.0394 0.0493 60.0 16.93

San Antonio linear 0.184 8 1.80 -10.527 0.3404

San Antonio quad 0.201 7 0.88 318.923 -7.0292 0.0412 187.6 19.94

Table 2–2. Linear Regression Model Results for 32 Cities (continued)

Homicide Homicide

City Model R2 df F-Statistic β0 β1 β2 Number Rate

(Mean) (Mean)

*Significant at p<0.05.
14

Finally, given time and resource constraints and an

interest in exploring extreme changes in homicide

trends, only one no-change city was selected. The

eight cities selected are shown in table 2–3; the

observed homicide rate trends for these cities are

shown in figure 2–6.

Figures 2–7 through 2–10 show the eight cities’

observed homicide rates and expected homicide rates

as predicted by the best-fit regression lines. The

regression equations appear to adequately capture

the trend information contained in the city-level

homicide rate data.

All of the selected cities are in the Eastern United

States, and most are in the South. Additionally, only

Detroit had a population greater than 1 million, with

an average population of 1,055,606 over the 10-year

study period. Richmond had the smallest population,

with a 10-year average of 213,634. The average

annual populations for the eight cities are shown in

figure 2–11.

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Homicides/100,000 Pop.

85–94 85–94 85–94 85–94 85–94 85–94 85–94 85–94

D.C. ATL DET TMP N.O. RCH IND MIA

Note: The study cities are abbreviated as follows: Washington, D.C. = D.C., Atlanta = ATL, Detroit = DET, Tampa = TMP,

New Orleans = N.O., Richmond = RCH, Indianapolis = IND, Miami = MIA.

Figure 2–6. Annual Homicide Rates for Selected Cities, 1985–1994

Table 2–3. Eight Cities Selected by

Strongest Homicide Trend

1985–1994 Homicide

Rate Trends

(number of

 eligible cities) City 1 City 2

Decreasing linear (2) Detroit Tampa

Decreasing quadratic (7) Washington, Atlanta

D.C.

Increasing linear (13) New Orleans Richmond*

Increasing quadratic (1) Indianapolis **

No change (9) Miami ***

* St. Louis was selected originally but was substituted with Richmond

(third on the list; see table 2–2) because St. Louis is being studied

extensively by other investigators, including Margaret Zahn and

Richard Rosenfeld.

** Only one city exhibited this pattern.

*** Only one city with this pattern was selected.

Selected Cities
rough 2–10. Observed and Expected Homicide Rate Trends for Selected Cities, 1985–1994

sing Quadratic Homicide Trend

 and Washington, D.C.

Figure 2–8. Decreasing Linear Homicide Trend

in Detroit and Tampa

Figure 2–10. “No Change” and Increasing Quadratic

Homicide Trends in Miami and Indianapolis

easing Linear Homicide Trend

Orleans and Richmond

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

n Atlanta Observed in D.C.

n Atlanta Predicted in D.C.

an D.C. Mean

0

102030405060708090

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

Homicides/100,000 Pop.

Observed in Tampa Observed in DetroitPredicted in Tampa Predicted in DetroitTampa Mean Detroit Mean

57.0120.56

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

Richmond Observed in New Orleans

Richmond Predicted in New Orleans

ean New Orleans Mean

0

102030405060708090

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994

Homicides/100,000 Pop.

Observed in Indianapolis Observed in MiamiPredicted in Indianapolis Miami MeanIndianapolis Mean

33.9415.82
16

previously noted, these two cities were selected over

the other decreasing quadratic cities because of the

abruptness of the change from increasing to decreasing during this period. In the case of both Washington

and Atlanta, the 1994 rate was lower than the peak

but remained higher than the 1985 rate. Washington’s

homicide rate increased from 23.5 per 100,000 in

1985 to 80.6 per 100,000 in 1991 and then decreased

to 70.0 per 100,000 in 1994. Washington’s population

declined by 9 percent during this period, from

626,000 to 570,000. The annual numbers of homicides from 1985 to 1994 were 147, 194, 225, 369,

434, 472, 482, 443, 454, and 399. Atlanta’s homicide

rate increased from 33.2 per 100,000 in 1985 to 58.6

in 1990 and then declined to 46.4 per 100,000 in

1994. Atlanta’s population declined during this period

by 6 percent, from 436,214 to 411,204. The annual

numbers of homicides from 1985 to 1994 were 145,

186, 207, 217, 246, 231, 205, 198, 203, and 191.

Decreasing linear trend: Tampa and Detroit.

Tampa’s homicide rate declined from 24.5 per

100,000 in 1985 to 21.0 per 100,000 in 1994—a

decrease of 14 percent (see figure 2–8). The annual

numbers of homicides from 1985 to 1994 were 70,

79, 61, (missing), 57, 62, 64, 49, 43, and 62. Tampa’s

population increased by 3 percent during this period,

from 275,770 to 283,412. Detroit’s homicide rate

declined from 58.2 per 100,000 in 1985 to 52.9 per

100,000 in 1994, a 9-percent decrease. The annual

numbers of homicides from 1985 to 1994 were 635,

648, 686, 629, 624, 582, 615, 595, 579, and 541.

Detroit’s population decreased 14 percent from

1,115,659 to 957,828 between 1985 and 1994.

Increasing linear trend: New Orleans and Richmond. New Orleans’ homicide rate increased from

27.1 per 100,000 in 1985 to 85.8 per 100,000 in 1994,

an increase of 217 percent (see figure 2–9). The

annual numbers of homicides from 1985 to 1994 were

152, 197, 205, 228, 251, 304, 345, 279, 395, and 414.

New Orleans’ population decreased by 10 percent

during this period, from 527,228 to 472,707.

Richmond’s homicide rate increased from 41.5 per

100,000 in 1985 to 77.2 per 100,000 in 1994, an

increase of 86 percent. The annual numbers of homicides from 1985 to 1994 were 92, 82, 78, 99, 98, 113,

116, 117, 112, and 160. Richmond’s population

The selected cities represented meaningful (if not

representative) contributions to the Nation’s homicide

picture. Although the selected 8 cities represented less

than 10 percent of the total population of the 77-city

set, they accounted for more than 15 percent of the

homicides in these cities over the 10-year period.

Figure 2–12 shows the percentage of population and

of homicides for the 77 large cities that were due to

the selected 8 cities and the remaining 69 cities. The

population panel shows that the portion of the population represented by the eight selected cities diminished over the period (in part because of declining

populations in some of the cities). The homicide panel

suggests that the 8 cities contributed a disproportionate number of homicides to the 77 city totals (not

surprising since cities above the median were selected), just as the 77 cities contributed a disproportionate number of homicides when their population is

compared with the total U.S. population. Additional

demographic information on the cities is provided in

chapter 3. The eight cities selected are described

briefly below.

Decreasing quadratic homicide rate trend: Washington, D.C., and Atlanta. For these cities, the

homicide rate during the study period reached a

maximum and then decreased (see figure 2–7). As

Miami

Figure 2–11. Average Population of Selected

Cities, 1985–1994

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Average/100,000 Pop.

Washington, D.C.

Atlanta

Detroit

Tampa

New Orleans

Richmond

Indianapolis
17

decreased by 7 percent during this period, from

211,135 to 196,593.

Increasing quadratic trend: Indianapolis. The

homicide rate for Indianapolis declined slightly and

then increased during this period (see figure 2–10).

Overall, the homicide rate increased from 12.5 per

100,000 in 1985 to 28.4 per 100,000 in 1994, an

increase of 127 percent. The annual numbers of

homicides from 1985 to 1994 were 59, 63, 57, 79, 41,

58, 95, 88, 68, and 108. Indianapolis’ population

increased by 5 percent during this period, from

475,603 to 500,414.

No Change: Miami. The homicide rate for Miami

changed little over the study period (see figure 2–10).

The homicide rate ranged from a low of 33.2 in 1987

to a high of 36.4 in 1991. The annual numbers of

homicides from 1985 to 1994 were 131, 148, 128,

(missing), 132, 129, 134, 128, 127, and 116. Population numbers for Miami changed little over this

period; they were 352,708 in 1985 and 363,221 in

1994.

As the analyses leading to site selection proceeded,

a concurrent effort was under way to design the

study. The project design, including approach and

hypotheses to be investigated, is described in the

next section.

Interview Development

Interviews for each structural area were constructed

through an iterative process that included developing

an initial set of questions organized around the hypotheses, reviewing the instrument by an external

panel of experts, and pilot testing in two cities. Revisions to the interview instruments were made after the

initial review and after each pilot.

An independent team of individuals with substantive

knowledge in the domain areas reviewed the interview questions and hypotheses. As a result of this

review, the hypotheses were refined and made more

central to the interview instruments. Additionally,

many of the interview questions were reformulated to

Note: Missing data for a few years, a few cities.

Figure 2–12. Population and Homicide Counts of Eight Selected Cities During 1985–1994,

Compared With 77 Largest U.S. Cities

Population

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

Homicides

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

Remaining 69 Cities Selected Cities Remaining 69 Cities Selected Cities
18

establish better definitional and comparative terms

across sites. Finally, many questions were adjusted to

more fully distinguish between perceived and actual

events.

The initial set of interviewees included local representatives of Federal justice agencies, police department

representatives, the sheriff, the probation office

supervisor, representatives of the court (prosecutor,

public defender, chief judge), representatives of the

city government, school officials, the director of

emergency medical services, and the coroner or

medical examiner.

The interviews were pilot tested in two cities—

Kansas City, which exhibited an increasing linear

homicide rate trend, and Cleveland, which had a

decreasing quadratic homicide rate trend. The intent

of the pilot tests was to ensure that the interview

questions were appropriate and comprehensive and

that the scheduling protocol, which planned for about

20 interviews, was practical and feasible. Perhaps

most significantly, the visits to the pilot cities convinced the research team that specific interview

instruments were needed in certain key areas where

they had previously been lacking. For example, prior

to the pilot testing, interviewers had planned to

question emergency medical service personnel using

an instrument that contained generic questions about

program resources and their adequacy. It became

clear from the pilot studies that using nonspecific

instruments was time consuming and distracting and

raised the substantial risk of low inter-interviewer

reliability across cities. That is, generic questions,

probes, or contextual followup questions thought of

by an interviewer in one city might not be asked by a

second interviewer in another city. From the pilots, it

was determined that the quality of data collection

would improve if interviewers started with a specific

instrument and modified or discarded questions as

became necessary during each interview’s course.

These types of improvements were most common for

programs and issues that tended to be substantially

the same from city to city. Still, it was not possible to

design specific interview instruments for some

interviewees, primarily community groups, in advance of the questioning. Some organizations varied

to such an extent from city to city that only a general

interview instrument would suffice. Nevertheless,

information gathered from the pilot cities allowed the

interview design team to include more salient interview instructions and guides.

The final set of data collection instruments consisted

of more than 20 individual-specific interview instruments for the study.3 Generally, the instruments were

organized so that questions were grouped around the

hypotheses from a single domain, so that one interviewer could handle that portion of the interview. In

general, respondents were asked for their perceptions

and definition of the problem; how the individual or

organization responded to the issue in terms of both

policies and resources; how the issue had changed

over time; and what data sources and tracking systems were used to monitor the problem. Both openended questions and scales were used in the interviews. An interview instrument typically included a

mix of questions from the three domains. Significant

emphasis was placed on eliciting information on

interagency cooperation.

A second major result from the pilot interviews was

that some interview subjects were added and some

were abandoned. For example, it was decided that

public housing administrators and public housing

police would be interviewed separately. In contrast,

despite intense interest in exploring the media’s role

with respect to homicide in a community, it was

decided that media interviews were impractical. First,

many media representatives appeared to have relatively short tenures in their communities, meaning

they could not provide the longer term perspective. In

addition, many media outlets tended to cover crime

from a larger bureau, such as a city or metro desk.

Most media outlets covered only a small fraction of

the violent crimes and homicides that occur in their

communities. Therefore, except for high-profile cases,

few media representatives had a continuity of view

with respect to crime issues. Although this problem

perhaps could have been circumvented by interviewing reporters as a group or by interviewing assignment editors, this approach proved to be impractical

as well. Instead, the media’s reporting of crime issues

was reviewed as part of the presite preparation, and

specific questions about the media’s impact and

strategies were inserted into other interviews. Perhaps
19

it is meaningful that despite strong convictions that

the media influence perceptions of homicide trends,

the research team could not devise an adequate

strategy for assessing that factor.

Project Implementation

The project was organized as a matrix comprising the

three domain areas and the eight cities. Each project

team member was assigned to a domain area and one

or more cities. Domain team leaders were identified

to collate findings, and city team leaders were identified to coordinate the site visits. Site visits were

conducted by teams of three individuals (one representing each domain area) that visited a city for 3

days. Between 20 and 30 individuals were interviewed in each city. Following the site visit, each

individual prepared a written report; subsequently,

debriefings were held and another researcher reviewed and coded the interview instruments.

Prior to conducting interviews in the field, the interviewers were trained on the instruments at NIJ. As a

mechanism for improving the quality of followup

questions, interviewers became familiar with the basic

crime trends, socioeconomic patterns, and cultural

issues in the communities for which they were responsible. Interviewers contacted the sites and established the interview dates, thus helping them to

become acquainted with the structure and operation of

local institutions.

Site visits were conducted during the summer of

1996. Interviews were conducted by one or more

team members, depending upon the extent to which

questions for that interviewee represented one or

more domains. For example, the police gang unit (or

officer) was interviewed by team members from both

the micro domain and the criminal justice system

domain. The following individuals or appropriate

representatives from the indicated agencies were

interviewed:

♦ U.S. Attorney

♦ Drug Enforcement Administration

♦ Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

♦ Federal Bureau of Investigation

♦ Police chief

♦ Police homicide unit

♦ Police gang unit

♦ Police drug unit

♦ Police juvenile unit

♦ Sheriff

♦ Probation office supervisor

♦ Prosecutor

♦ Public defender

♦ Chief judge

♦ Mayor or city manager

♦ School administrator

♦ School security

♦ Public housing administrator

♦ Public housing security

♦ Director of emergency medical services

♦ Coroner or medical examiner

In addition, efforts were made to conduct interviews

with at least two representatives from community

groups that dealt with issues relating to homicide.

Community groups were typically identified through

a review of newspaper files and contacts in city and

police organizations. The team also talked with

representatives from domestic violence prevention

and intervention programs and people knowledgeable

about the local economy.

Upon returning from the site visit, each interviewer

provided an overview of findings relating to the

hypotheses from his or her domain. Separately, a

coder entered the data from each of the interview

books into a database. The writeups, along with the

interview books, were submitted to the domain

leaders, who were responsible for analyzing the

domain hypotheses across sites (in consultation with

other team members). Additionally, two debriefings

were held with all individuals who made site visits.
20

The purpose of these debriefings was to distill and

collate hypothesis-specific information across the

sites. The first debriefings were coordinated by the

domain team leaders (who also made site visits). The

second debriefings were conducted by individuals

who were knowledgeable in the domain areas but had

not been directly involved in the project.

Initial review of the data resulted in a secondary effort

to collect and analyze additional existing data. For

example, NIJ Drug Use Forecasting (DUF) data were

used in the micro domain because five of the eight

cities are DUF sites. Additionally, National Correctional Reporting Program, Bureau of Justice Statistics, data were consulted with respect to the incapacitation hypotheses. Finally, information was collected

about domestic violence shelters and programs. The

results of these and similar analyses are included in

subsequent chapters.

Notes

1. Note that some of the no-change cities may have

experienced considerable year-to-year variation in

their annual homicide rates. We subsequently use “no

change” to refer to cities in which such variation

could not be fit to either a linear or quadratic curve.

Because we had a limited data series (10 data points

for each city), we did not attempt to fit more complex

curves to the data.

2. In the increasing and decreasing linear categories,

cities were ranked by the absolute value of their slope

coefficients (β1). Cities with larger slopes exhibited

steeper, more dramatic trends. Quadratic category

cities were ranked on the basis of the abruptness of

the change in trend, which is captured by the quadratic coefficient (β2

). Cities that lacked a clear trend

were ranked by their data’s mean absolute deviation

from a horizontal line.

3. Copies of the interview instruments are available

from Pamela K. Lattimore, Director, Criminal Justice

and Criminal Behavior Division, Office of Research and

Evaluation, NIJ, 810 Seventh Street N.W., Room 7333,

Washington, DC 20531; or at pam@ojp.usdoj.gov.
21

 A P P E N D I X 2A

Homicide Counts and Rates for 77 Cities

Characteristics of Large Cities, 1985–1994

(ordered by mean number of homicides)

 City City Mean Homicide Mean Number of Average

 Number Rate Homicides Population

 1 Lincoln 2.45 4.60 189,812.50

 2 Mesa 3.88 10.50 273,330.10

 3 Aurora 5.86 13.20 224,050.60

 4 Lexington 6.75 15.11 223,805.20

 5 Colorado Springs 5.47 15.40 282,705.90

 6 Arlington 6.21 15.70 257,406.50

 7 Anchorage 7.06 16.70 234,650.60

 8 St. Paul 6.89 18.70 270,473.40

 9 Raleigh 9.62 19.50 199,202.70

10 Virginia Beach 5.82 21.80 374,395.60

11 Anaheim 8.50 22.40 260,574.50

12 Akron 10.50 23.70 225,559.70

13 Riverside 11.19 24.80 218,641.60

14 Jersey City 11.57 26.10 225,758.80

15 Corpus Christi 10.05 26.70 266,089.10

16 Omaha 7.76 27.22 351,612.10

17 St. Petersburg 12.08 29.67 245,497.40

18 Tucson 8.31 33.78 405,328.20

19 Honolulu 4.02 34.00 848,417.90

20 Toledo 10.63 35.89 338,332.10

21 Mobile 18.35 37.50 204,611.60

22 El Paso 7.37 38.30 516,793.40

23 Louisville 14.27 39.78 279,273.20

24 San Jose 5.21 39.80 766,558.20
22

25 Tulsa 10.79 40.30 373,315.00

26 Austin 9.09 41.90 466,541.00

27 Stockton 20.90 42.60 202,299.50

28 Pittsburgh 11.28 42.70 380,892.70

29 Rochester 18.93 44.50 235,679.70

30 Portland 11.45 47.80 420,338.50

31 Cincinnati 13.01 48.10 369,674.40

32 Baton Rouge 20.76 48.80 236,560.90

33 Santa Ana 18.28 49.90 268,712.20

34 Minneapolis 13.84 50.67 364,943.30

35 Buffalo 15.58 51.00 328,051.10

36 Seattle 10.64 55.10 517,583.20

37 Jackson 28.42 57.40 203,104.60

38 Fresno 17.33 58.30 330,423.70

39 Norfolk 21.64 58.80 274,002.50

40 Sacramento 16.93 60.00 355,829.80

41 Tampa 21.07 60.78 288,495.30

42 Oklahoma City 13.87 62.00 446,793.80

43 Indianapolis 15.82 71.60 461,307.70

44 Denver 15.47 77.10 498,558.30

45 Las Vegas 13.12 77.70 586,942.60

46 Charlotte 20.02 79.50 393,264.30

47 Nashville 16.56 82.60 500,005.90

48 Long Beach 19.68 84.00 423,755.80

49 Columbus 15.38 93.90 606,963.00

50 Boston 17.01 97.20 571,328.90

51 San Francisco 13.43 100.00 744,865.20

52 Newark 34.28 101.20 295,678.10

53 Richmond 50.29 106.70 213,634.00

54 Birmingham 40.56 111.40 275,958.20

55 Milwaukee 19.16 119.60 622,444.20

 City City Mean Homicide Mean Number of Average

 Number Rate Homicides Population

 Characteristics of Large Cities, 1985–1994

(ordered by mean number of homicides)
23

56 San Diego 11.41 125.30 1,093,809.00

57 Miami 34.49 130.33 377,927.10

58 Jacksonville 20.27 130.89 646,053.20

59 Kansas City 29.77 131.30 441,403.50

60 Oakland 35.68 133.30 372,777.60

61 Phoenix 13.57 133.50 973,931.80

62 Fort Worth 31.79 141.80 445,837.90

63 Cleveland 28.30 148.00 525,022.30

64 Memphis 25.69 163.80 640,115.60

65 San Antonio 19.94 187.60 939,786.30

66 St. Louis 49.12 199.80 410,168.00

67 Atlanta 48.41 202.90 420,532.00

68 New Orleans 54.07 278.00 522,980.90

69 Baltimore 37.08 279.30 755,832.80

70 Washington, D.C. 60.42 361.90 603,990.00

71 Dallas 35.56 363.40 1,022,514.00

72 Philadelphia 24.91 401.40 1,615,011.00

73 Houston 26.59 454.90 1,717,886.00

74 Detroit 58.07 613.40 1,055,606.00

75 Chicago 27.66 798.70 2,902,224.00

76 Los Angeles 26.30 906.00 3,436,760.00

77 New York 25.07 1834.00 7,309,488.00

 City City Mean Homicide Mean Number of Average

 Number Rate Homicides Population

Characteristics of Large Cities, 1985–1994

(ordered by mean number of homicides)

Note: Study cities are shown in bold.
24