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Joint Special Operations University

Brigadier General Steven J. Hashem

President

Dr. Brian A. Maher

Vice President

Strategic Studies Department

Lieutenant Colonel Michael C. McMahon

Director

James D. Anderson

Director of Research
JSOU Report 05-5

The JSOU Press

Hurlburt Field, Florida

2005

Dividing

Our

Enemies

Thomas H. Henriksen
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the author 

and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy or position of the U.S. 

Government, Department of Defense, USSOCOM, or the Joint Special 

Operations University. 

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*******

Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded 

to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations University, 357 Tully Street, Alison Building, Hurlburt Field, Florida 32544. 

Copies of this publication may be obtained by calling JSOU at 850-884-

2763; FAX 850-884-4732. 

*******

This report and other JSOU publications can be found on the SOF Education Gateway at https://jsou.socom.mil/gateway/. Click on “Highlighted Research” to view. The Strategic Studies Department, JSOU is 

currently accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For more information please contact Mr. Jim Anderson, JSOU Director of Research, at 850-884-1569, DSN 579-1569, 

james.d.anderson@hurlburt.af.mil. Thank you for your interest in the 

JSOU Press. 

ISBN 0-9767393-7-2
iii

Foreword

Dr. Thomas H. Henriksen provides us with historical insights 

of the benefits and difficulties of implementing strategic 

concepts for Dividing Our Enemies. He suggests that understanding and leveraging the human fault lines to counter terrorism 

can sometimes be an important complement to, or even substitute 

for, Special Operations Forces’ direct action tactics and larger battles 

of annihilation. Overwhelming fire is likely to be much less effective 

by itself in today’s global fight against violent extremism than other 

approaches that can take advantage of the political divisions among 

insurgents and terrorists. 

Henriksen’s review of some past and recent experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq suggests that Special Operations Forces are 

probably exploiting the right strategic vision for our Global War on 

Terrorism. The use of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to counter the Taliban forces was unique to that historical setting. Yet it is “certainly a historically 

viable stratagem,” Henriksen suggests, with 

likely application in places like the Philippines, Africa, and Central Asia. The vital role 

played by SOF in engaging the Kurdish opponents to Hussein’s government during the 

Persian Gulf War and the SOF actions during Operation Provide Comfort presaged the 

Kurdish revolt in the mid-1990s and Kurdish 

help again in 2003 during Operation Iraqi Freedom as US forces 

moved unopposed into Kirkuk. 

The downside of attempting to use factions against one another is 

seen in our strategic blunder in Fallujah in the spring of 2004, when 

successfully advancing US Marines were ordered to withdraw from 

that city and the Baathist-run Fallujah Brigade was put in charge to 

police the town. This resulted in angered Kurdish and Shiite leaders, a sanctuary for terrorist extremist Abu Musab Zarqawi, and an 

operational and moral back-slide for US forces. Henriksen points out 

that exacerbating Sunni–Shia division would contravene our vision 

for a viable democratic government in Iraq, but that in line with our 

global campaign against terrorist extremists, exploiting the rivalries 

or animosities among the insurgent bands clearly meets our goals. 

... suggests that 

Special Operations 

Forces are probably 

exploiting the right 

strategic vision 

for our Global War 

on Terrorism.
iv

Henriksen’s paper invites the SOF reader to revisit established 

doctrine for Foreign Internal Defense and Internal Defense and Development along with the complex issues about how to divide and 

conquer. It is likely that the intelligence needed for exploiting the 

differences among our enemies will result from these on-the-ground 

operations. And while lacking the glamour of direct action missions, 

the effects of special operations teams on the ground conducting unconventional warfare, psychological operations, and civil military operations are absolutely central to achieving an end-state of realizing 

democratic and viable governments. These are the special operations 

ways and means that can lead to successfully “leveraging inherent 

human fault lines to counter terrorism ... ,” as Henriksen writes. SOF 

warriors will agree that having our enemies eliminate each other offers advantages over slug-it-out methodologies.

Lt Col Michael C. McMahon, USAF

Director, Strategic Studies Department

October 2005
1

Henriksen: Dividing Our Enemies

Dividing Our Enemies

Thomas H. Henriksen

Our priority will be first to disrupt and destroy terrorists organizations of global reach and attack their leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and 

finances. This will have a disabling effect upon the terrorists’ 

ability to plan and operate.

—National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002

Politics and Counterinsurgency 

I

f warfare is the continuation of politics by other means, as 

Clausewitz suggested, then counterinsurgency is the continuation of warfare by political means. The Prussian military philosopher understood that political objective dictates the type of war to 

be waged, its scope, and its intensity. The importance of the political considerations in counterinsurgency operations is nearly impossible to overstate. In the American way of waging counterguerrilla 

conflicts, politics has played—and continues to play—a central role 

in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The intrinsic properties of combating 

insurgents and terrorist networks demand keen attention to the political realm, not just martial capabilities. 

The political dimension includes a range of civic action initiatives 

to win over the hearts and minds of the indigenous population to the 

U.S.-led regime changes that occurred in the initial phase of hostilities in Afghanistan and Iraq. They include refurbishing schools, 

building roads, digging wells, and treating the sick. These civic action programs alone are not unlike similar counterinsurgency initiatives by the British, French, Portuguese, or even the United States 

in years past.1

What is different today is the degree to which American power is being applied not just to the conventional hearts and minds

campaigns but also what is termed nation building and democracy 

promotion. On this macro-level, the elements of democracy include 

free and fair elections, political parties and campaigns, independent 

media, and public discourse. In Afghanistan and Iraq, American 

power is being wielded for the revolutionary goal of transforming au-
2

 JSOU Report 05-5

thoritarian societies along democratic lines. In both countries—but 

especially in fissiparous Iraq—the U.S.-led coalition worked, and is 

working, to preserve the territorial integrity of the battered lands. 

Iraq’s well-publicized ethno-religious divisions between the Sunni, 

Shiite, and Kurdish populations hardly need elaboration, except to 

emphasize the additional burdens placed on post-Saddam Hussein 

counterinsurgency forces to counter secessionist pulls. 

These political endeavors transcend the traditional application of 

America power. As Russell F. Weigley wrote 

in his classic book “the strategy of annihilation became characteristic of the American 

way of war.” 2 In short, American power has 

been exerted to build and preserve, not just 

to annihilate. Future engagements promise 

similar political considerations. 

On the micro-level, specific U.S. and coalition units within Iraq 

and Afghanistan have sought—and do seek—to ameliorate harsh or 

deprived living conditions of the indigenous populations. The efforts 

encompassed a series of health and welfare efforts to include medical treatment, potable water, job opportunities, and even electricity 

production to run air conditioners in the inferno summer months. 

These and similar civic action programs represent the obverse side 

of the counterinsurgency political coin. It is a crucial dimension in 

counterguerrilla campaigns. But the reverse side of this coin is one 

less discussed. It involves no effort to win over those caught in the 

crossfire of insurgent and counterinsurgent warfare, whether by bullet or broadcast. 

On the contrary, this underside of the counterinsurgency coin 

is calculated to exploit or create divisions among adversaries for the 

purpose of fomenting enemy-on-enemy deadly encounters. It is an 

unconventional yet necessary component of this shadowy form of 

battle against an elusive adversary that does not stand and fight. 

Rather, in the insurgency dimension of the current anti-terrorist 

campaign, small groups of Special Operations Forces will continue to 

find themselves up against bands of insurgents in societies marked 

by tribal and sectional differences that could be turned to the advantage of special operators. Africa, Central Asia, the Philippines and 

elsewhere have witnessed the deployment of SOF to counter Islamic 

extremists. As such, understanding and leveraging inherent human 

fault lines to counter terrorism is like the joker in card games; it can 

These political endeavors transcend the 

traditional application 

of American power. 
3

Henriksen: Dividing Our Enemies

substitute for the “card” of greater numbers and greater firepower. It 

is ideally suited to the world of stealth and countersubversion. 

Dividing and Defeating 

Sowing divisions among enemies is as old as warfare. By the time 

Niccolò Machiavelli cited the ancient political maxim divide et impera, the strategy of dividing to conquer had long become accepted 

practice in statecraft and warfare. The tactics associated with pitting 

one enemy against another have not been ignored by U.S. military 

forces. But they have often been subordinated to the American way of 

war that relied on massive firepower, as characterized in both World 

Wars, the Korean War, first and second Persian Gulf Wars, and much 

of the Vietnam War. The global struggle against violent extremism 

presents a highly political conflict where overwhelming supporting 

fire is less applicable. By the same token, the extreme ideological and 

political divisions among the terrorists and insurgents open chinks 

to clever and adaptable forces. Terrorists and their intellectual backers, whether they be commentators, columnists, or clerics, have profound doctrinal and agenda differences.3

From the founding of the United States, Washington governments, 

in fact, have relied on subterfuge, skullduggery, and secret operations to advance American interests. Even in the midst of America’s 

greatest conventional war of the twentieth century, the United States 

resorted to covert operations under the Office of Strategic Services. 

The OSS along with British intelligence services, for instance, aided 

the French resistance to disrupt the German occupation and to prepare for Europe’s liberation. The Cold War also witnessed clandestine missions. United States and its allies mount diversionary efforts 

to confound and divide their enemies. And American adversaries 

likewise staged secret missions against the United States, its allies 

and interests.4 Having the nation’s enemies eliminate each other has 

obvious advantages. When divisions were absent, American operators instigated them. 

Among this generation’s incarnations of this divisive strategy, 

which took place during the Vietnam War, was the fabrication of 

a fictitious resistance movement entitled the Sacred Sword of the 

Patriots League (SSPL). While stood up by the Central Intelligence 

Agency in 1962, the SSPL was handed off to the Military Assistance 

Command Vietnam’s Studies and Observation Group (MACVSOG or 

SOG). Special Forces officers assumed oversight of SSPL and other 
4

 JSOU Report 05-5

covert operations aimed at North Vietnam. As noted by Richard H. 

Shultz, Jr. in his masterful book, the purpose of the SSPL “was to 

foster the impression that a well-organized resistance was active in 

North Vietnam.” 5 SOG conducted a spate of covert operations, psychological operations, and deceptions to throw North Vietnam off 

balance. SOG operators sought through their Diversionary Program, 

code-named Forae, to convince Hanoi that teams of enemy agents 

had penetrated deep into its territory. The deception sought to disrupt the North Vietnamese rear, by taking advantage of the communist’s regime’s well-known paranoia about spies and saboteurs. 

While SOG had unheralded successes as well as serious setbacks 

during its operations spanning from 1964 to 1972, it constantly ran 

against impediments from senior military officers, State Department, 

and the Lyndon Johnson White House. The timidity and bureaucratic obstacles hampered operations and constrained missions to 

narrow agendas. With the SSPL venture, SOG took pains to raise a 

bogus “fifth column” within totalitarian North Vietnam in order to 

spark a witch-hunt amongst the communist party and the military 

command that would impair Hanoi’s support of the Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam. Given the commanding attention devoted to 

internal security—with overlapping police apparatuses, informants, 

and population control measures—communist societies were generally labeled as denied areas for covert paramilitary operations because of their impenetrable nature. SOG’s phantom league offered a 

means to circumvent Hanoi’s home-front safeguards. 

Divisions in Afghanistan and Iraq 

The Soviet era’s virtually inaccessible societies are a universe apart 

from present-day Afghanistan and Iraq, where tribal loyalties, local 

attachments, shifting alliances, ethnic antagonism, and religious hatreds abound. During the Soviet era, Marxist-Leninist regimes touted the classless society by which only the working class and their 

vanguard (the communist party) were said to exist. The aristocracy, 

bourgeoisie, and the capitalists were liquidated. This imposed uniformity furthered totalitarian control of vast populations, although 

all communist societies were marked by hierarchies and privileges, 

especially for party members. Other despotic dispensations resort to 

different means to maintain power, however. 

Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, Iraq, and many of countries in the region and beyond, the regimes play on ethnic and religious differences 
5

Henriksen: Dividing Our Enemies

to maintain power. In their own version of dividing-to-rule, pre-U.S. 

invasion governments in Afghanistan and Iraq indeed deepened factional divides, which left them vulnerable to foreign manipulation 

that facilitated regime change. 

The deep divisions within prewar Afghanistan worked to the U.S.-

coalition’s military advantage. The mountainous country’s steep valleys and high peaks contributed to the isolation that produced factionalism and warlordism throughout its history. The 1979 Soviet 

invasion acted to coalesce Afghan tribesmen, urban dwellers, and 

religious clerics against the Red Army and their local allies. Aided by 

Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and China, as well as the United States, the 

Afghan resistance wore down the invading Soviet military and compelled Moscow to pull out of the inhospitable country in 1989. The 

Kremlin left behind a Soviet puppet, Mohammed Najibullah, a sadistic intelligence 

chief, who held out until April 1992, when 

his regime crumbled. Without an external 

threat to unify the onetime Afghan resistance, the insurgent bands fell to fighting among themselves, and Afghanistan 

plunged into anarchy. 

Demobilized fighters banded together under warlords to battle 

other local armies. In the ensuing chaotic fighting, Kabul fell to an 

alliance of Tajiks, Uzbeks, and other non-Pashtun groups representing the first time in three hundred years that the dominant Pashtuns 

lost control of the capital. Burhanuddin Rabbani, a Tajik, emerged 

from a power struggle to head an uneasy alliance of northern warlords and presided from Kabul over an unruly country beset with 

brigands and cutthroats.6

The Taliban (“the students”) movement took up arms to end 

the internecine conflict and lawlessness. Led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, a veteran of the Soviet war, the Taliban adhered to an 

extremely conservative interpretation of Islam, which they strictly 

enforced on themselves and others. Based mainly among the Pashtuns and nurtured by Pakistan, which wanted to influence events in 

Afghanistan, the Taliban accrued arms and martial skills from Pakistani benefactors.7 Sympathetic elements within the Inter-Services 

Intelligence (ISI) directorate, Pakistan’s military intelligence agency, 

provided assistance to the poorly trained and armed ragtag Taliban 

militias. 

Without an external 

threat ... the insurgent 

bands fell to fighting 

among themselves, 

and Afghanistan 

plunged into anarchy.
6

 JSOU Report 05-5

By the end of 1996, the Taliban prevailed over the northern warlords and seized the main cities including the sprawling, mountainringed capital where the ousted Rabbani government had ruled. By 

force of arms, the Taliban fighters imposed a semblance of order, if 

not enlightened progress, in most of the country. Fed up with years 

of lawlessness, many Afghans acquiesced toward or embraced the 

Taliban as a necessary evil to restore civil stability. 

The Taliban’s military success and their religiosity attracted sympathizers and financial supporters from the Arabian Peninsula and 

elsewhere. Estranged from his base in Sudan, Osama bin Laden and 

some 150 henchmen, moved to Afghanistan in the months preceding 

the Taliban capture of Kabul. In Afghanistan, bin Laden morphed 

from terrorist financier to terrorist mastermind. The Saudi-exile set 

up terrorist training camps, instigated the bombings of the two U.S. 

embassies in East Africa along with the USS Cole, and launched the 

“planes operation” against the United States. 

For this part, Rabbani and his cohorts escaped to a tiny wedge 

of territory northeast of the capital in the Panjshir Valley to carry 

on their anti-Pashtun struggle as the Northern Alliance. This loose 

network of Taliban opponents afforded the 

United States a ready-made ally to attack 

the theocratic government in Kabul, which 

played host to al Qaeda. Unlike SOG’s subversive operations against North Vietnam, 

the United States did not have to fabricate 

an opposition front. What’s more the Central Intelligence Agency still had liaisons 

with Soviet-era resistance fighters in Afghanistan, which afforded 

CIA and Special Forces operators invaluable contacts within the 

mountainous society.8 They bribed, armed, and somewhat organized 

the fiercely nationalistic Northern Alliance into a tactical ally and 

proxy force. In times past, they would have opposed a U.S. invasion 

but now America was the enemy of their enemy, and thus a friend. 

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade 

Center and the Pentagon, the United States launched a counter attack on Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda headquarters in Afghanistan. A 

month after the air bombardment began on October 7th, senior U.S. 

military officers briefly floated the idea for the Americanization of 

the proposed ground war with scenarios for deploying some 55,000 

troops. That huge number and the logistical nightmare of resupThis loose network 

of Taliban opponents 

afforded the United 

States a ready-made 

ally ...
7

Henriksen: Dividing Our Enemies

plying them led to the reliance on airpower, Special Forces, and the 

Northern Alliance to bring down the Taliban regime. Along with directing precision-guided munitions on Taliban and al Qaeda targets, 

SOF units undertook a variety of missions—to secure airports, cut 

roads, and attack fleeing militiamen—that preceded deployment of 

troops from the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Army units. This strategy spared the United States from fielding a huge ground force.9 Additionally, SOF and CIA worked among warlords in the north and 

the Pashtuns, the southeastern Afghan community, to split them 

from Taliban rulers.10 By convincing and bribing disgruntled northern chieftains and Pashtun leaders, whose communities formed the 

Mullah Omar’s backbone, either to switch sides or withhold support 

from the Kabul regime, operators and agents splintered the Taliban 

allies. 

That the “Afghan Model” can be exactly replicated to other settings is open to doubt because Taliban-ruled Afghanistan constituted a unique set of historical and political circumstances.11 But the 

model of dividing disaffected elements from a regime is certainly a 

historically viable stratagem. Many states in Africa, Central Asia or 

even the Philippines where SOF are deployed in counterterrorism 

operations possess ethnic, religious, or sectional division. 

Iraq. Iraq presented another stark illustration of ethnic and religious 

cleavages put to the use of a ruling party. The Baathist Party, a secular and state socialist movement, ruled Iraq as a police state for decades by relying on the Sunni population, which made up about 20 

percent of the country’s population, to suppress the Shiite majority 

(some 60 percent of Iraq), the Kurds (less than 20 percent), and many 

other smaller segments of the populace. President Saddam Hussein 

wielded the purse and the dagger like a Mafia don to buy patronage 

or to eliminate opposition. His power plays left him vulnerable among 

excluded communities when the U.S.-led multinational coalition invaded. In addition to their commando-style missions of securing oil 

wells and neutralizing missile batteries in western Iraq, SOF played 

a vital role converting Hussein’s Kurdish opponents to an American 

asset during the invasion phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

The story of Special Operations Forces in capitalizing on and widening divisions within our enemy’s ranks is better known in Afghanistan than during Operation Iraqi Freedom and in post-invasion Iraq. 

The Taliban-Northern Alliance conflict was well known to outsiders. 

Washington’s massive support to the anti-Taliban alliance also re-
8

 JSOU Report 05-5

ceived saturation news coverage. Yet, the effort of dividing our enemies in Iraq affords worthy case studies in divisive tactics. During 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, the U.S.-led invasion benefited from the 

prewar contacts with the Kurds in northern Iraq. After the Persian 

Gulf War, the United States went to the aid of the Kurdish population 

in Operation Provide Comfort. Later, the CIA instigated a Kurdish 

revolt in the mid-1990s.12

When Turkish government blocked the transit of the 4th Infantry Division across its territory into Iraq in early 2003, the decision 

hampered the execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Working with 

Kurdish political leadership, the United States instead landed light 

forces in northern Iraq. Two battalions from the 173rd Airborne Brigade rolled into Kirkuk on the heels of Kurdish uprisings that ousted 

Iraqi army units from the major regional city and nearby oil fields. 

The paratroopers met no opposition because the Kurdish peshmerga militias cleared the area of the retreating Iraqis. The airborne 

soldiers and the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit reinforced the SOF 

units operating in northern Iraq and pressured Saddam Hussein’s 

forces to the south in another example of turning to internal divisions to bring down adversarial regime. As in Afghanistan, the historical splits within Iraq aided SOF and regular coalition forces. Both 

U.S. interventions seized upon existing geopolitical opportunities. As 

such, they may not be readily repeatable. But they provide insight 

into smaller-scale instances of generating red-on-red conflicts. It is 

these type of forays that can be executed at the operational and tactical level that demanded greater attention and afford lessons for 

future use to field operatives. 

Red-on-Red Conflicts 

The post-invasion phase in Iraq provides an interesting case study 

of fanning internecine discontent among enemies, leading to redagainst-red firefights. Events during fall 2004 within the central Iraqi 

city of Fallujah showcased the clever machinations required to set insurgents battling insurgents. Ensconced within the Sunni Triangle, 

which early on had developed into anti-coalition stronghold, Fallujah 

played a prominent part in the rising chain of bombings, beheadings, 

and shootings of Iraqi, U.S. civilian and military personnel, and other 

non-Iraqi residents. A brief background is required prior to describing the events within Fallujah in late 2004. 
9

Henriksen: Dividing Our Enemies

Following the murder and dismemberment of four private contractors by a mob in Fallujah on March 31, 2004, U.S. Marines laid 

siege to the city that had become a hotbed of anti-American resistance. After three days fighting, the Marines penetrated deeply into 

the city with only six dead. Yet the attack became controversial owing to noncombatant casualties, destruction of buildings, and the 

local sentiment that it had been motivated by revenge for the grisly 

deaths of the four security personnel. Lakhdar Brahimi, the U.N.’s 

recently named envoy to Iraq, accused U.S. military commanders of 

meting out collective punishment. Ordered to halt the offensive, the 

Marines broke off their attack. A three-week stalemate ensued. As a 

gesture toward Iraqification, the local U.S. commanders pulled back 

and handed over security responsibilities to the city’s residents.13

Authority was vested in a Baathist-run Fallujah Brigade to police 

the town and restore order. This high-risk gamble of cooptation instead of confrontation proved in the longer run to be a mistake and a 

failure. It also supplies a cautionary footnote for those trying to convert rabid enemies to brothers in arms. The attempt angered Kurdish and Shiite leaders. More gravely, it checked the use of American 

power on the verge of annihilating the coalition’s foe. Officered by 

former Republican Guard generals, the Fallujah Brigade proclaimed 

victory over the Marines, collaborated with the insurgents, surrendered the Marine-supplied weapons and trucks to the insurgents, 

and turned a hotspot into the epicenter of the insurgency.1 4 Fallujah 

became a “no-go” zone for U.S. forces, a terrorist safe haven, and 

the headquarters of the notorious Jordanian-born Palestinian terrorist Abu Musab Zarqawi, who orchestrated multiple car bombings, 

kidnappings, and beheadings of American, Iraqis, and foreigners. In 

sum the city of 250,000 inhabitants descended to a Taliban-like polity of Islamic extremism. As a consequence, Fallujah represented the 

greatest single military setback to the counterinsurgency campaign 

to date. 

The Fullujah episode highlights one of the paradoxes in the application of raw military might. Custom and international law sanctions the wielding of military force against enemy combatants. Thus, 

the “shock and awe” operations conformed to accepted practices, 

particularly since the U.S. attackers minimized “collateral damage,” 

i.e. harm to innocent civilians. But the United States was unable 

to use its full strength to achieve security in the occupation phase 

without inflicting many casualties among the noncombatant popula-
10

 JSOU Report 05-5

tion. Counterinsurgency campaigns demand the use of discriminating firepower to hit insurgents without undue civilian deaths. Otherwise, the general population sides with the underground fighters and 

against the occupiers. Calibrating proportionate counterattacks to 

guerrilla provocations of hit-and-run attacks, suicide bombings, and 

other nonconventional tactics is a tricky business. Too little force 

allows the insurgent to survive and too much can generate fresh 

recruits to the insurgent cause. The dilemma lies at the heart of waging counterinsurgency campaigns. In addition, it points again to the 

overwhelming political aspect of counterinsurgent warfare. 

After the return of local sovereignty to Fullujah residents, the 

central Iraqi city seethed with intramural tensions among the anticoalition inhabitants. Lying at the heart of Sunni resistance to the 

American-led coalition, Fullujah brimmed with anti-Americanism. 

Entering the city became hazardous for U.S. troops, which lacked allied Iraqi police or military forces in the city that months earlier had 

passed under thrall of anti-U.S. forces. 

 Zarqawi used Fallujah as center for his countrywide insurgency. 

It was the hub to his spokes, so to speak. Not all Fallujah residents 

were enamored with Iraq’s chief terrorist’s operations. Zarqawi’s 

Salafi beliefs grated on men who did not want to grow beards or 

women to cover their hair. The strict Salafi outlook clashed with the 

more moderate and different Sufi views of the residents, such as 

praying at the graves of relatives, which the Salafis regard as blasphemous. This division occurred between Sunni peoples. 

Additionally, the Zarqawi jihidis and the nationalistic Fallujahans 

disagreed over the use of terror tactics. Both wanted the Americans 

out of the Fallujah and out of Iraq; but they disagreed on the tactics. 

Many of the city’s inhabitants opposed kidnappings of foreign journalists, indiscriminate bombings that killed Iraqis, and sabotage that 

blew up infrastructure benefiting fellow citizens. They believed that 

the jihadi tactics incurred undo coalition attention toward Fullujah 

to preempt the attacks. The nationalistic Iraqis as embodied in the 

Mujaheddin Shura Council, made up of 18 clerics, tribal chiefs, and 

former Baathist Party members, opposed Zarqawi for his tactics. The 

council’s head Abdulaziz al-Janabi even called Zarqawi a “criminal.” 

Evidence of factional fighting between the residents came to light 

with nightly gun battles not involving coalition forces.15 These firefights between insurgent factions represented the impact of U.S. 

psychological operations (PSYOP), which took advantage of and 
11

Henriksen: Dividing Our Enemies

deepened the intra-insurgent forces. The PSYOP contingent cleverly 

crafted programs to exploit Zarqawi’s murderous activities and to 

broadcast them countrywide, thereby diminishing his folk-hero image among Iraqis. 

Although the jihadis and Baathists shared hostility to the U.S. 

military forces surrounding Fallujah, their mutual antipathy to each other presented an opportunity turn them against each other. Gun fights 

among enemy combatants worked to the obvious 

advantage of friendly forces, American and Iraqi. 

Battles among anti-coalition forces caused casualties, killed enemy combatants, and heightened 

factionalism thereby weakening the insurgents. 

In short, red-on-red battles can enhance the 

conventional blue-on-red engagements, which characterized much 

of the insurgency action in post-Hussein Iraq. 

Other urban centers also witnessed hostility between secular insurgents and Muslim extremists—some of them within Al Qaeda affiliates. The divisions occurred over the practice of killing and maiming innocent Iraqis by bombings. In Ramadi, the capital of Anbar 

province, anti-extremists hung posters on walls and handed out flyers in mosques denouncing the jihadi tactics. In Baghdad, in the 

mainly Sunni section of Azamiyah, anti-coalition insurgents pulled 

down Al Qaeda banners from walls and streetlights.16 Within at least 

Fallujah, U.S. psychological warfare warriors took advantage of the 

insurgent infighting. 

Information from the Joint PSYOP Task Force, 8th PSYOP Battalion of the 4th PSYOP Group out of Fort Bragg provided a case study 

in seizing on the splits between anti-coalition elements and turning 

them to good account. By tapping into the Fallujans’ revulsion and 

antagonism to the Zarqawi jihidis the Joint PSYOP Task Force did its 

“best to foster a rift between Sunni groups.” 17 The Joint PSYOP Task 

Force promoted the split by appeals to the Fallujans through meetings, radio and televisions broadcasts, and posters. It also distributed political cartoons depicting Zarqawi as a murderer of Muslim. One 

cartoon unflatteringly caricatured Zarqawi with a bandolier over his 

shoulder and standing amid piles of skulls. The caption read: “I will 

kill, slaughter and kidnap more and more humans to satisfy my desires and be worthy to receive the title of murderer.” 18 SOF units also 

disseminated handbills showing Zarqawi surrounded by rats. Obvi-

... their mutual 

antipathy to each 

other presented 

an opportunity 

turn them against 

each other. 
12

 JSOU Report 05-5

ously, for these and other psychological methods to resonate with 

the Iraqi population, there had to budding divisions between nationalistic type insurgents and jihadi elements within Sunni-dominated 

Fullujah. This campaign did not endanger the larger U.S. mission 

of trying to dampen down conflicts between the Sunni and Shiite 

branches of Islam to preserve Iraq’s territorial unity. 

The psychological warfare experts also undertook a spectrum of 

activities to develop and strengthen trust between Iraqis and coalition forces and intensify local opposition to Al Qaeda and its Iraqi 

subsidiaries. They employed radio and television spots, conducted 

interviews with newspaper reporters, distributed handouts, utilized 

loudspeakers, posted Internet messages and held face-to-face briefings with tribal, political and religious leaders. After U.S. and Iraqi 

forces retook Fallujah, the Joint PSYOP Task Force played up the 

fact that Zarqawi fled before the fighting, leaving his fellow jihadis 

and many more Baathist insurgents to face the coalition’s fury. 

Conclusions and Recommendations

Like the warning in the physicians’ Hippocratic oath, SOF and PSYOP 

troops must beware of doing more harm than good when planning 

to foment or benefit from infighting within enemy ranks. Exacerbating the Sunni-Shia divisions, for instance, would contravene strategic aims in Iraq and stated policy of Iraqi political leaders. But 

exploiting the rivalries or animosities among insurgent bands as the 

case in Fullujah or other anti-coalition havens is well within coalition goals and the rules of warfare. Devising techniques to instigate 

red-on-red conflicts is worthy of study, codification, and analysis.

A deep understanding of the political landscape that derives from 

intelligence, experience, and study is, first and foremost, a requirement for this type of operation. In applying this complex tactic, SOF 

should not just be consumers of data but also first-hand providers 

of intelligence on potential divisions among red forces. In addition, 

they should take the lead in encouraging and assisting line units to 

gather and disseminate political information as well as the regular 

military intelligence. 

As with other weapons, orchestrating red-on-red clashes has an 

apt time and place for employment. All hostile environments will not 

accommodate its application. But as another arrow in counterterror 

quiver, it can, when launched deftly, be discriminating and lethal. 
13

Henriksen: Dividing Our Enemies

Endnotes

 1. Thomas H. Henriksen, Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique’s 

War of Independence 1964-74. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood 

Press, 1983; Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-62. 

New York: Penguin Books, 1977; and J. Paul de B. Taillon, The Evolution of Special Forces in Counter-Terrorism: The British and American 

Experience. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2001.

 2. Russell F. Weigly, The American Way of War: A History of United States 

Military Strategy and Policy (1973; reprint Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), page xxii.

 3. The literature on this topic is vast. Two summaries can be found in 

Marc Segeman, Understanding Terrorist Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2004), especially chapters One and Two and 

Trevor Stanley, “Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and Salafism,” TerrorismMonitor (the Jamestown Foundation), Volume III, Issue 

14 (July 15, 2005), pages 8-10.

 4. Thomas H. Henriksen, “Covert Operations, Now More Than Ever,” Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs, Volume 44, Number 1 (Winter, 2000), 

pages 145-56; John Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations From World War II Through The Persian Gulf 

War. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996; and Christopher Andrew, For the 

President’s Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency 

from Washington to Bush. New York: HarperCollins, 1995.

 5. Richard H. Shultz, Jr., The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy’s and 

Johnson’s Use of Spies, Saboteurs, Covert Warriors in North Vietnam 

(New York: HarperCollins, 1999), page 64.

 6. Olivier Roy, Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War (Princeton: New 

Jersey: Darwin Press, Inc., 1995), pages 103-09.

 7. Larry P. Goodson, Afghanistan’s Endless War: State Failure, Regional 

Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban (Seattle, Washington: University of 

Washington Press, 2001) pages 76, 106, 111.

 8. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and 

Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: 

Penguin Press, 2004), pages 458-59. 

 9. Eric Micheletti, Special Forces: War on Terrorism in Afghanistan, 2001-

2003 (Paris: Histoire & Collections, 2004), pages 6-12.

 10. David Pugliese, Shadow Wars: Special Forces in the New Battle Against 

Terrorism (Ottawa, Ontario: Esprit de Corps Books, 2003), page 22.

 11. For a sober analysis see, Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future 

of Warfare: Implication for Army and Defense Policy (Carlisle Barracks, 

Pennsylvania, 2002.

 12. Robert Baer, See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the 

CIA’s War on Terrorism (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2002), pages 

171-237.

 13. Patrick J. McDonnell, “Outgoing Marine General Faults Fallouja Strategy,” Los Angeles Times, September 13, 2004, page A1.
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 14. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Key General Criticizes April Attack In Fallujah,” Washington Post, September 13, 2004, page A 17.

 15. Patrick J. McDonnell.

 16. Hamza Hendawi, “Insurgents Show Hostility To Extremists,” San Diego Union-Tribune, April 10, 2005, page 1.

 17. Telephone interview with LTC Michael Ceroli, former commander Joint 

PSYOP Task Force, 8th PSYOP Battalion of the 4th PSYOP Group, June 

1, 2005.

 18. Materials provided from Joint PSYOP Task Force, 8th PSYOP Battalion 

of the 4th PSYOP Group.
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Henriksen: Dividing Our Enemies

About the Author

Thomas H. Henriksen is a Senior Fellow at the Joint Special Operations University and a Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution. His current research focuses on American 

foreign policy in the post-cold war world, international political affairs, and national defense. He specializes in the study of U.S. diplomatic and military courses of action toward terrorist havens, such as 

Afghanistan, and the so-called rogue states, including North Korea, 

Iraq, and Iran. He also concentrates on armed and covert interventions abroad.

Henriksen’s most recent book, an edited volume on competing 

visions for U.S. foreign policy, is entitled Foreign Policy for America in 

the 21st Century: Alternative Perspectives (Hoover Institution Press, 

2001). Other recent works include Using Power and Diplomacy to 

Deal with Rogue States (Hoover Essays in Public Policy, 1999) and 

the edited collection North Korea after Kim IL Sung (Hoover Institution Press, 1999).

He also authored or edited the following books and monographs: 

One Korea? Challenges and Prospects for Reunification (1994); The 

New World Order: War, Peace, and Military Preparedness (1992); Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique’s War of Independence 

(1983); The Struggle for Zimbabwe: Battle in the Bush (1981); Soviet 

and Chinese Aid to African Nations (1980); and Mozambique: A History (1978). 

Additionally, he has written numerous journal articles and newspaper essays concerning international politics and security as well 

as U.S. policy toward rogue states in the post-cold war era.

Henriksen has received research grants from the American 

Philosophical Society, the State University of New York, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and the National Defense Foreign Language fellowship program. His book Mozambique: A History 

was chosen for the Outstanding Book Award for African History by 

Choice. During 1982, he traveled to the former Soviet Union as a 

member of the Forum for the U.S.-Soviet Dialogue.

He is a member of the board of trustees of the George C. Marshall Foundation and a member of the board of trustees for the International Conference Group on Portugal. During the 1979–1980 

academic year, he was the Susan Louise Dyer Peace Fellow at the 

Hoover Institution. He taught history at the State University of New 
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York from 1969 until he left in 1979 as a full professor. During 1963–

1965, Henriksen served as an infantry officer in the U.S. Army. 

His national public service includes participation as a member 

of the U.S. Army Science Board (1984–90) and the President’s Commission on White House Fellowships (1987–93). He also received a 

Certificate of Appreciation for Patriotic Civilian Service from the U.S. 

Department of the Army in 1990.

He received his B.A. in 1962 from Virginia Military Institute, his 

M.A. in 1966 and his Ph.D. in 1969, both from Michigan State University. He was selected for membership in Phi Alpha Theta, the history honorary society, as a graduate student.