-1- 

### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE

AT KNOXVI LLE Se pte m be r 6, 200 6 S es sio n
CATHY L. CHAPMAN, ET AL 

### . V 

### . RIC K J. B EAR FIEL D Appeal by p erm ission fromthe Court of Appeals, Eastern Section

Circuit Court

for Washi ngton Coun ty No. 8999 Jean A. Stanley, Judge

No. E2004-02596-SC-R11- CV - F iled on Novem ber 6, 2006

We a cce pted this a

ppeal to c larify whether experts te stify ing in le g al malprac tice case s m u s t be familiar with a sing le, statewide profe ssional standard of car e or a st andar d of care for a pa rticular loc a lity wi thi n th e state

. B e c aus e weho ld that a sin g le , s tate wi de pr of

e ssi on a l st a nd ardof

c aree xists for attorney s prac ticing in T ennesse e, expert witnesses testify ing in le g al malprac tice case s must be familiar with the statewide profe ssional standard. The judgme nt of the Court of Appe als is affirmed. We remand the caseto the trial court f or further proc eeding s consistent with this opi nion. Tenn. R. App . P . 11; Judgme nt of th e Court of Ap peals Aff

irm ed; Re m anded
C OR NE L I A A. C LARK , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , C.J ., and J ANI CE M. H OL DER , G AR Y R. W ADE , J J ., and E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , S P .J ., joined.
J ason W. Blac kburn, Johns on City , Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellant, Rick J . Be arf

ield.
J ohn J . Bandeian, B ristol, Tennessee , for the appellee s, Cathy L

. Chapman, Brandon M. Chapman, Kaylan L . Chapman, and D ana L . Chapman.

OP IN ION BACK GR OUND Cathy L . Chapman and othe r member s of the Chap m an family (“the Chapmans”) reta ined J ohnso n Ci ty

a tt o r n e y Ri c k J. B e ar f ie ld( “ B e ar f

ie ld ” ) in2 0 0 1 to r e p r e s e n t th e m i n a me dical ma lpr a c ti ce act io n r e su lti ng fr om a Cha pman f a mil y me mbe r’ s d e a th. Th e Cha pmans be c a me dissatisfied with Be arf

ield’s re prese ntation and obtained ne w counse l. After r eviewing the ca se, the-2-

Chapmans’ ne w counse l advised them to file a le g al malpra ctice suit against Be arf ield. On J uly

8, 2004, in the Washi n gt o n C o u n t y Circuit Court, the Chapmans filed pro se the leg al malpra ctice action ag ainst Be arf

ield that has g ener ated this appe al.
B e arf ie ld ans we re d th e Ch apmans ’ c omp la int a ndde nie d n ume ro us fa c tual a lle g a tio ns . Be arf ield subsequently

moved for summary

judgme nt. I n support of his motion, Bearfield filed a Statement of Material Fa cts, see T enn. R. Civ. P. 56.03 (2006), and his own aff idavit. I n the aff idavit, Be arf

ield opined that neither

he nor any

at t o rn ey u n der his dire ction had committed malprac tice, citing as his authority the professional standard of car e applicable to attorney s “in the upper Ea st Tennesseeare a.” The Chapmans r esponded to Bea rfield’ s motion, submitt ing their own Statement of Material Fa cts and the a ffidavit of Richa rd L . Duncan, a Knox v i l le medica l malprac tice attorne y . Duncan asserted that he wa s “familiar with the standard of ca re f or attorne y s in medical malpra ctice c ases in T e nn e sse e ” a ndop ine d th a t B e arf ie ld’ s p ro se c uti on of theCha pmans ’ m e dic a l ma lpr a c tic e c la im fell below the standard of what “a rea sonable attorney

un d er s imilar circumstanc es” w ould have done. The motion for summary judgme nt was initiallyschedule d for h ea ri n g on September 27, 2004, but w as then resc heduled by ag ree ment of the parties. On Octobe r 5, 2004, B earfield filed a Reply Statement and a supporting a ffidavit. On Octobe r 7, 2004, the trial c ourt hea rd ar g uments on Be arf

ield’s summaryjudgme nt motion. At the hear i n g, Be arf ield advanc ed a two- part a rg ument. First, B earfield attac ked the sufficie ncy

of Dunc an’s a ffidavit b ec au s e Dunc an did not demonstrate a familiarity

with the profe ssional standard of

car e re quired of attorney s in upper ea st Tennessee . Second, he a rg ued that the Chapmans’ e x pert a ffidavit did not meet the requireme nts of Tenne ssee Rule of Civil Procedur e 56.06 beca

use it did not include the medica l reports and other doc uments it refe renc ed.
OnOc tob e r 8 , 2 00 4, theCha pmans fi le d a re vis e d a ff

idavit of Ric ha

rd L

. Du nc a n, no w w ith the re quired supporting documents attache d. Specific le ave of the trial court had not been g rante d fo r t h i s fi l i n g. On October 18, 2004, the t rial court g rante d summary judgme nt to Bea

rfield be cause(1) the Duncan aff

idavit did not meet what the judge t er m ed “t he loca lityrule” : the aff idavit did not demonstrate D uncan’ s familiarity with the profe ssional standard of car e require d of attorney s in that part of e ast Tenne ssee, and (2) the Cha pmans’ failure to attach supporting documents to the Dunc an aff idavit made it “tec hnically defic ient.”
Th e Ch apmans app e a le d. Th e Cou rt of Ap pe a ls v a c a te d th e g rant o f s umm ary jud g me nt. First, the intermediate a

ppellate c ou rt co u l d fi nd no basis for a “loca lityrule” that g overns the c on du c t of

a n atto rn e y

pr a c tic ing la w i n T e nn e sse e . Se c on d, thec ou rt fo un d theDu nc a n a ff

ida vit technically

defic ient but rea soned that the Chapmans should haverec eived e x tra time to corr ect theIn M ead o ws v. Stat e, 8 4 9 S

. W

. 2 d 7 4 8 , 7 5 2 (1 9 9 3 ), w e o verrul ed S p al d i ng o n gro und s unrel at ed t o t he i ss ue 1 in th is c a se .

In un p u b lishe d o p inio n s, thr e e o the r C o u rt o f A p p e a ls p a n e ls ha v e inte rp re te d “ju risd ic tio n ,” e ithe r e x p licitly 2
or i mpl i ci t l y , t o me an a pol i t i ca l s u bdi v i s i on of t h e s t at e. Se e Log an v . W i n s t ea d, N o. 03A01- 9902- CV

- 00057, 1999 W L 53 82 08 , at *2 (T enn . C t

. A pp . Jul y 1 4, 1 99 9) (c r edi t i ng a def endan t at t orn ey ’ s s er vi ce as a di s t r i ct at t orn ey ge ner al i n the T hird Ju d i cial D i st rict an d as an att o rne y in the c o un t y in w hich the c ase w as he ard as ev i d en ce o f his aw are ne ss of t h e s t an dar d of

c ar e i n h i s “

j u r i s di ct i on ”) ; D av i s v . Si mps on , N o. 1295, 1990 W L 16893, a t * 2 ( T en n . C t

. A pp. Fe b.

-3- mistake.
We a c c e pte d th is a

pp e a l to c lari fy

wh e the r e xpe rt s te sti fying in l e g a l ma lpr a c tic e c a se s mu st be familiar with a single statewide pr ofessional standa rd of c areor a standa

rd of c arefor a particula

r locality within the state. We hold that a single , s t at ew i d e p ro fessional standa rd of c areexis ts for a tto rn e y s p ra c tic ing in T e nn e sse e a nd that expe rt wi tne sse s tes tif y ing in le g a l malp ra c tic e c a se s mu st be familiar with the statewide pr ofessional standa rd of c are .

DI SCU SSIO N Stand ard of Review
We r e vie w a

tria l c ou rt ’s g rant o f su mma ry jud g me nt de no vo . Se e B la ir v. W. T ow n M a ll, 130 S.W .3d 761, 763 (Tenn. 2004)

. I n acc ordanc e with T ennesse e Rule of Civil P roce dure 56.04, a g rant o f s umm ary

jud g me nt is app ro priate on ly wh e n ( 1) the reis n o g e nu ineiss ue wi th r e g ardto the material fac ts relevant to the claim or def ense c ontained in the motion, and (2) ba sed on the undisputed fac ts, the moving pa rty is entitled to a judgme nt as a matter of law. I d. at 764. A Statewide P rofessional Stand ard of Care for Tennessee Att orneys I n Spalding v. Davis, 674 S.W .2d 7 1 0 (T en n . 1984), the Court noted that “ [t ]he settled g e ne ral rul e in mos t if not al l [ Un ite d Stat e s] juri sd ic tio ns is that a n atto rn e y . . . may be he ld l ia

ble to his client for dama g es re sulting fr om his failure to exercise [t he] ordinary car e, skill, and dilige nce . . . which is commonly

possessed and e x erc ised by attorney s in prac tice in the jurisdiction .” I d. at 714 (empha sis added). Twice since 1984, in L azy Seven C oal S ales, I nc. v. S tone & Hinds, P.C., 1 813 S.W .2d 400, 405-06 (Te nn. 1991), and in Sanjines v. Ortwein & Assocs., 984 S.W.2d 907, 910 (Tenn. 1998) , we r epeated with approva l, though without furthe r el ab o ration or analy sis, the Spalding f

ormulation. Howeve r, none of t hese cases presente d a g ood opportunity to define the term “jurisdiction.” Since 1984, various panels of the Court of A ppeals ha ve been i n co n s i stent in defining the “jurisdiction” re fer ence d in Spaldin g . On the one hand, two reported opinions of the Court of Appea ls have linked the le g al malpra ctice standard of car e with the medical malprac tice standa rd, which is g overne d by

a statutory

locality rule. See Unde rwood v. Waterslides of Mid-Am., Inc., 823 22 7 , 1 9 9 0 ) (noti ng t hat a d efend ant at t o rney ’ s “qual i f i cat i o ns and exp eri ence i n d o m est i c l i t i gat i o n i n K no x C o u n ty” h el ped i n for m h i s a wa r en es s of t h e pr ofes s i on al s t an dar d of ca r e) ; A n t h on y v. Fel k n or & C u n n i n g h am, N o. 146, 1988 T enn . Ap p. LE X I S 60 1, at * 8- 9 (T enn . Ct

. Ap p. Sept

. 30, 198 8) ( ho l d i ng , w i t hout an al y s i s , t hat Spal di ng meant “ an at t orn ey ha s t he dut y t o us e t he car e and s ki l l ordi nar i l y us ed by at t orn ey s i n t he s ame or s i mi l ar l ocal i t y un der s i mi l ar c irc u m sta n c e s” ). -4- S.W .2d 171, 183 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) ( finding t h at a p rofe ssional’s familiarity with “the loca l standard of

car e is the exception r ather than the rule,” with the principal e x ceptions being law and medicine) ; Clec kner v. Dale, 719 S.W .2d 535, 539 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) ( “a la wy er’ s standard of car e does not dif

fer marke dly from that of phy sicians or other profe ssionals”) (i n t er n al q u otation marks and c itations omitted). On the other hand, one interme diate appe llate court panel under stood “jurisdiction” to mean “ Tenne ssee.” See Wood v . P ar k er, 901 S.W.2d 374, 379 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (“ [w] e find nothing

. . . to show that defe ndant

. . . deviated f rom the ac cepte d standard of car e for attorney s in Tennessee ”) ( emphasis adde d). In this case, th e C ourt of Appe als, in its opini on below, also a dopted a state wide prof essional standar d of ca

re. We ag reewi t h t h e i nstant decision of the Court of A ppeals. A “ jurisdiction” is “[a] g eog raphic are a wi t h in which political or judicial authority may be exerc ised.” B lack’ s L aw Dictionary

855 (7th ed. 1999); se e also Webster’s Third New I nternational Dictionary 1227 (1993) (def inin g j u ri s d iction as “the limits or territory within which any

particula r powe r may

be exercised” ). This Court allows an attorney with a Tenne ssee law license to pra ctice any wher e in the state. See Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 7 § 1.05 (2006) (“A ll pe rsons admitted to the bar of Tenne ssee are . . . ( i) of fi c e rs of the c ou rt s of Te nn e sse e , eli g ibl e fo r ad mis sio n to pra c tic e in an y c ou rt in this State

. . . and (i i) su bj e c t to thedu tie s a ndstand ard s impo se d f ro m ti me to time on a tto rn e y s inthi s State.”). A n attorney

p ra ct i ci n g i n Tenne ssee, then, must exercise the ordinary car e, skill, and dil ig e nc e c omm on ly

po sse sse d andpr a c tic e d b y atto rn e y s thr

ou gh ou t the sta te . I ndeed, w hile there may be loc a l rules of practice within the various judicial districts of our State, ther e ar e no loca l sta nd ar ds of c are . T he reis o nly on e stand ardof

c arefo r atto rn e y s pra c tic ing in T e nn e sse e : a statewide standa

rd. B y ext en s i o n , an expert who opines in a le g al malpra ctice c ase a bout an attorney ’s adherenc e to our prof essional standar d of ca

re must be f

amiliar with the statewide profe ssional standard of

car e. Be arf ield argue s that the medica l malprac tice loca lityrule should be e x tended to leg al malprac tice actions. Howeve r, the locality rule for medical malprac tice is a cre ature of statute. See Te nn . Co de An n. § 2 9- 26 -1 15 (a )( 1) (S up p. 20 05 ) (st and ardof c arere late s to “ thec ommun ity in which the de fendant prac tices or in a similar c ommunity ”). N either this Court nor the leg islature has cre ated a simil ar standa

rd for the leg al profe ssion, and we de cline to cr eate one her e. We also believe the adoption of a statewide profe ssional standard of car e for attorney s who prac tice law in Tenne ssee is g ood policy . Threeconce rns motivate our c onclusion. First, if a loc al profe s s i o n al s t andar d of ca re pr evailed, plaintiffs might havedifficulty proving their leg al malprac tice ca ses bec ause loc al attorne y s might not be willing to speak a g ainst their collea g ues. See 3 Ronald E. Mallen & J eff rey M. Smi th, L eg al Malpra ctice § 19.5 ( 5th ed. 2000). Sec ond, local variations in t he standa

rd of car e could cre ate an ineffic ient and inequitable mora ss of profe ssionalI n t hei r comp l ai nt , t he C hapmans p l eaded s peci f i c fact s t o s uppo r t t hei r cont ent i on t hat B ear f i el d com mi t t ed 3
m a lp ra c tice , i n c lud ing his fili n g o f an inc o rr e c t p le a d ing t h a t v iti a te d the ir m e d ic a l m a lp ra c tice c la im , his fa ilure to co nsul t wi t h t he p rop er expe rt s, and hi s d el egat i o n of t o o m uch res p o nsi b i l i t y t o an i nexp eri enced at t o rney . I n B earf i el d ’ s A nswer, he de ni es t hese fact ual al l egat i o ns, placi ng those p o i nt s i n c o nt roversy . In hi s summ ary judgm ent m o tio n , B e a rfie ld le ft tho se sp e c ifi c fac tua l m a tter s in c o n te n tio n . In b o th h is S ta te m e n t o f M a te ria l F a c ts a n d his se lfp re p a re d e x p e rt a ff

id a v it, B e a rfie ld a sse r ts t h a t “[ a ]t a ll tim e s re le v a n t t h e re to , B e a rfie ld a n d the a tto rn e ys u n d e r h is d ire c tio n a c te d w ithin the sta n d a rd o f ca re re q u ire d o f atto rn e ys i n t he upper E as t T enn es s ee ar ea” and t hat “ [ n] ei t her B ea r f i el d n or t h e at t or n ey s u n der h i s di r ec t i on c ommi t t ed an y a ct or made an y omi s s i on t h at wa s bel ow or dev i at ed f r om t he st and ard o f

care i n t he upper E as t T enn es s ee ar ea. ” T hes e c oncl us ory s t at ement s of m i xed l aw a nd f act al one may n o t re m o v e fro m c o n tro v e rs y the sp e c ifi c fac ts tha t he d e n ie d in h is A n sw e r. -5- stand ard s o f c are , r e du c ing thelik e lih oo d th a t some a tto rn e y s w ou ld f a c e ma lpr a c tic e c la ims wh ile incre asing the likelihood for other s. See id. Finally , the emer g enceof the interne t as a primary tool for leg al rese arc h underc uts historica l tr ansportation and communications arg uments favoring loc al va ri a tio ns in the stand ardof c are . Se e Rus so v. Grif

fi n, 51 0 A .2 d 4 36 , 4 38 (V t. 19 86 ). We j oin those states which have ac cepte d these and other rationales for maintaining a statewide standa

rd of profe ssional car e for

their attorne y s. See, e.g., Bre tt v. Be rkowitz, 706 A.2d 509, 517 (De l. Super. C t

. 1 9 9 8 ) ; K e l l o s v . S a w i l o w s ky , 3 2 5 S

. E

. 2 d7 5 7 , 7 5 8 ( G a . 1 9 8 5 ) ; F e n a i l l e v . C o u d e rt , 4 4 N

. J

. L. 286, 289 (N.J. 1882); L ittle v. M at t h ew s o n , 442 S.E.2d 567, 570 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994), aff ’d 455 S.E.2d 160 (N.C. 1995); Fe il v. Wis hek, 193 N.W.2d 218, 225 (N.D. 1971); Smit h v. Haynsworth, Marion, McK ay

& G eura rd, 472 S.E.2d 612, 614 (S.C. 1954); Russo v. Griff in, 510 A.2d 436, 438 (Vt. 1986); Cook, Fla nag an & Be rst v. Clausing, 438 P.2d 865, 866 (Wash. 1975); Moore v. L ubnau, 855 P.2d 1245, 1250 (Wy o. 1993).
B e c aus e the reis a

state wi de pr of

e ssi on a l st a nd ardof

c arefo r atto rn e y s p ra ctic ing in Tenne ssee, the Court of

Appea ls corre ctly

overturne d the trial court’s a war d of summary judgme nt to Be arf ield. The Chapmans’ expert aff iant did not need to asse rt k n o wledg e of any prac tice stand ard s p e c uli ar t o th e “ up pe r E a st T e nn e sse e area. ” To thec on tr ary , h e c or re c tly a sse rt e d h is knowledg e of the profe ssional standard of car e for attorney s prac ticing in Te nnessee . I nstead, it was Be arf ield’s orig inal aff

idavit which re lied upon the er roneous pr ofessional standa rd of c are . Be causewe hold that the tria l court used an in co rr ec t standard of revie w in considering Be arf ield’s motion for summary judgme nt, we ag reewit h t h e C o u rt of Appe als that the g rant of summary judgme nt was err or and that this c ase must be remanded to the trial court. It is therefor e unnece ssary

to determine w hether , even if Be arf ield’s aff idavit is subjected to the corr ect standa rd of review, it

is o th e r w is e s u f

f ic ie n t t o s h if

t th e b u r d e n to th e Ch ap man s to d e mo n s tr a teg e n u ine i s s u e s o f m a t e r i a l f

a c ti n c o n tr o v e r s y. At this stag e, it is also unnece ssary for us to determine the 3 a de qu a c y of a ny ple a din g s o r a ff

idavit s su bmi tte d s ub se qu e nt t o th e orig inal a ff idavit

.-6- CO NC LU SION
A s ing le , s tate wi de pr of

e ssi on a l stand ard of

c aree xists fo r atto rn e y s p ra c tic ing la w i n Tenne ssee. The ref

ore, e x perts testifying in leg al malpra ctice c ases in T ennesse e must be familiar with the profe ssional standard of car e for the entire state. We aff

irm the judg ment of the Court of Appea ls and remand this case to the tria l court for further proce eding s consistent with this opi nion. The costs of t his appeal are taxed to the appellant, Rick J

. Be arf ield, for whic h execution may issue, i f n e c e s s ary.

____________________________________ CO RN ELI A A . CLAR K, JUSTI CE