SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2162-18T1

DORENA CALBAZANA,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

EVRON COOPER, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

Submitted September 16, 2019 – Decided

Before Judges Rothstadt and Mitterhoff. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, 

Docket No. FM-04-1249-13.

Newman & Ingemi, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Scott 

J. Newman, on the briefs).

Dorena Calbazana, respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM

This is an appeal of a post-judgment order entered in the Family Part on 

December 21, 2108, denying defendant Evron Cooper, Jr.'s motion seeking 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 31, 2019
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reconsideration of a prior order entered on October 26, 2018. The October order 

compelled defendant to contribute to the college expenses of the parties' son. 

Defendant also challenges the provision in the December 21, 2018 order that

granted plaintiff Dorena Calbazana's cross-motion for the counsel fees incurred 

in defending the motion for reconsideration. We affirm, substantially for the 

reasons set forth in Judge Yolanda C. Rodriguez's thorough oral decision as 

placed on the record on December 21, 2018. We add only the following 

comments.

We discern the following facts from the record. Plaintiff and defendant 

were married on February 14, 1998. The parties have one child, a son. On 

January 6, 2003, a final judgment of divorce was entered, incorporating by 

reference a property settlement agreement (PSA) entered by and between the 

parties. Concerning anticipated college costs, the PSA specified that if their son

continues schooling beyond high school and is enrolled 

in college on a full time basis at the time of his high 

school graduation, the parties shall renegotiate 

responsibility for payment of college expenses and/or 

continuation of support while the child attends college. 

If the parties cannot agree on payments for child 

support and/or college expenses while [the] child 

attends college, either party may apply to a Court of 

competent jurisdiction for determination of the 

disagreement. The parties' share of the college 

expenses should not be calculated until after utilizing 

all available scholarships, grants and loans. The 
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College shall be selected by the child, with the 

agreement of both parents, giving due consideration to 

the financial ability of both parties to pay the costs. 

Upon the child's emancipation as defined in paragraph 

Sixth (C), neither party shall have any further 

obligation to contribute toward college expenses.1 

2

 

The son began attending Camden Community College in fall 2016. He 

incurred a total cost of $10,732 for his attendance at the two-year school. 

Thereafter, he began attending Rutgers University in fall 2018, electing to 

commute to school from home. The cost of attendance during the fall 2018 

semester was $7,873. 

On September 19, 2018, plaintiff filed a motion to compel defendant to 

contribute to his son's past and future college costs.

3

 After a hearing at which 

 

1

 On June 25, 2013, a different Family Part judge, after interviewing the parties' 

son in camera, entered an order finding, inter alia, that the son was "not 

interested in developing a relationship with [defendant], his father."

2 On June 29, 2016, January 3, 2017, and August 25, 2018 defendant filed 

motions to emancipate his son and terminate his child support obligation, which 

were all denied by the trial court. On February 15, 2017 and November 16, 

2017, defendant filed motions to emancipate the child and decrease and/or 

terminate his child support obligations, and for reimbursement of child support 

paid from August 8, 2016 through February 2017. These applications were 

likewise denied.

3

 Defendant filed a cross-motion to emancipate his son and terminate child his 

child support obligations. The judge's October 21, 2018 order denied the crossmotion. Although defendant argued on the motion for reconsideration that the 
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defendant testified,

4

the court concluded that defendant should pay half of the 

son's cost of having attended Camden County Community College, and going 

forward, a 68 per cent pro rata share of the son's cost of attending Rutgers 

University.5 Judge Rodriguez made her determination after conducting a 

thorough review of the factors enunciated in Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529 

(1982). 

Thereafter, defendant sought reconsideration of the judge's decision. On 

December 21, 2018, Judge Rodriguez entered an order denying defendant's

motion for reconsideration and granting plaintiff's cross-motion for an award of 

attorney's fees.6 In that regard, Judge Rodriguez "[did] not find that anything 

new that was unavailable at the motion date of October was pointed out to the 

court, nor any new cases, or anything that has been pointed out that the [c]ourt 

overlooked last time in rendering its decision." In addition, based on her 

 

judge erred in denying the application on cross-motion, on appeal he appears to 

have abandoned that argument, so we find it unnecessary to address it.

 

4

 Plaintiff's counsel argued on her behalf, and she did not testify.

5

 Defendant's salary at the time of the hearing was approximately $86,000 and 

plaintiff's salary was approximately $39,000. 

6

 At the December 21, 2018 hearing, defendant testified telephonically, and 

plaintiff's counsel argued on her behalf.
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determination that "this is essentially the same motion the second time," the 

judge found that an award of counsel fees was appropriate. Referencing the 

factors set forth in Rule 5:3-5, the judge found that (1) defendant's position was 

not reasonable or in good faith, as it was essentially a rehash of his arguments 

on the initial motion, "as well as a number of these issues with respect to seeking 

a modification of child support [which have] been denied a number of times 

before;" (2) plaintiff obtained a favorable result ; (3) the financial circumstances 

of the parties demonstrated that plaintiff, who earned roughly half of what 

defendant earned, was "not a wealthy individual and for her to continue to incur 

the expense of counsel to deal with similar motions is not appropriate;" and (4) 

based on her review of the fee certification, the judge found the fees were 

reasonable. Accordingly, the judge ordered that defendant pay $1,955 in 

attorney's fees. This appeal ensued. 

On appeal, defendant argues that the judge abused her discretion in 

denying his motion for reconsideration. Specifically, defendant contends that 

Judge Rodriguez incorrectly applied the first and eleventh Newburgh factors and 

failed to consider the fourth and ninth factors. Defendant further contends that 

Judge Rodriguez abused her discretion by ordering him to pay for half the cost 

of his son's first two years of college "because the request for payment was not 
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made prior" to his son's enrollment in Camden County Community College. 

Finally, defendant contends the judge erred in awarding plaintiff counsel fees.

We review denials of motions for reconsideration for abuse of discretion. 

Guido v. Duane Morris L.L.P., 202 N.J. 79, 87 (2010). Motions for 

reconsideration "shall state with specificity the basis on which [they are] made, 

including a statement of the matters or controlling decisions which counsel 

believes the court has overlooked or as to which it has erred[.]" R. 4:49-2. 

Reconsideration should be utilized only for those cases 

which fall into that narrow corridor in which either 1) 

the Court has expressed its decision based upon a 

palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious 

that the Court either did not consider, or failed to 

appreciate the significance of probative, competent 

evidence . . . . 

[Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384 (App. 

Div. 1996) (quoting D'Atria v. D'Atria, 242 N.J. Super. 

392, 401-02 (Ch. Div. 1990)).] 

With this framework in mind, we now turn to defendant's contentions 

concerning Judge Rodriguez's application of the Newburgh factors. In 

Newburgh, the Court set forth twelve non-exhaustive factors in considering what 

portion of college expenses a child may reasonably demand of a non-custodial 

parent:

(1) whether the parent, if still living with the child, 

would have contributed toward the costs of the 
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requested higher education; (2) the effect of the 

background, values and goals of the parent on the 

reasonableness of the expectation of the child for higher 

education; (3) the amount of the contribution sought by 

the child for the cost of higher education; (4) the ability 

of the parent to pay that cost; (5) the relationship of the 

requested contribution to the kind of school or course 

of study sought by the child; (6) the financial resources 

of both parents; (7) the commitment to and aptitude of 

the child for the requested education; (8) the financial 

resources of the child, including assets owned 

individually or held in custodianship or trust; (9) the 

ability of the child to earn income during the school 

year or on vacation; (10) the availability of financial aid 

in the form of college grants and loans; (11) the child's 

relationship to the paying parent, including mutual 

affection and shared goals as well as responsiveness to 

parental advice and guidance; and (12) the relationship 

of the education requested to any prior training and to 

the overall long-range goals of the child.

[Newburgh, 88 N.J. at 545.]

See also Gotlib v. Gotlib, 399 N.J. Super. 295, 309 (2008).

Subsequently, an amendment to the child-support statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-

23(a), codified this list of factors. Kiken v. Kiken, 149 N.J. 441, 449-50 (1997). 

"Thus, a trial court should balance the statutory criteria of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a) 

and the Newburgh factors, as well as any other relevant circumstances, to reach 

a fair and just decision whether and, if so, in what amount, a parent or parents 

must contribute to a child's educational expenses." Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535,

543 (2006). 
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In deciding the initial October 2018 motion, Judge Rodriguez expressly 

considered and appropriately weighed factors one, four, nine and eleven, among 

others, to reach a fair and just decision. As to the first factor, the judge 

considered the parties' own educational backgrounds and the provision in their 

PSA, which contemplated that a court would intervene and make a determination 

if the parties could not agree on a choice of college or their relative 

contributions, which is exactly what happened in this case. 

Likewise, we reject defendant's argument that the judge incorrectly 

applied factor number eleven. The judge acknowledged that defendant and his 

son do not have a good relationship, but noted that 

it's not the worst scenario I've ever seen or read. In fact, 

there is some relationship. And as I said, I certainly 

hope it will be strengthened between the son and his 

father, but there are situations in case where there have 

been some very difficult and nasty comments said 

between the child and the parent. That's not the case 

here. But even if that were the case, I'm not saying that 

under the law that means that a parent can't – or can't 

be ordered to contribute to its college. 

We discern no error in that finding. See Gac, 186 N.J. at 546 (holding 

"[a] relationship between a non-custodial parent and a child is not required for 

the custodial parent or the child to" request assistance for college expenses). 
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Also belied by the record is defendant's contention that the judge on the 

original motion failed to consider factor number four concerning defendant's

ability to pay the costs for his son's college education. To the contrary, Judge 

Rodriguez made detailed findings concerning the parties' relative salaries and 

she also considered defendant's other obligations, including his obligation to pay 

his own student loans, before concluding that defendant was capable of making 

a pro rata contribution. As to factor number nine, the judge found that the child 

had successfully availed himself of grants and loans, and that he also held a parttime job.

Similarly without merit is defendant's argument that the judge erred in 

requiring him to pay half of his son's past-incurred Camden County Community 

College expenses. Defendant argues that the judge overlooked the Supreme

Court's decision in Gac holding that failure to request contribution before a 

child's enrollment in college "will weigh heavily against the grant of a future 

application." 186 N.J. at 546-47. Again, defendant's assertion is belied by the 

record.

In that regard, Judge Rodriguez on the original motion found that the facts 

and circumstances of this case do not invoke the concerns expressed by the 

Supreme Court in Gac. The judge noted that unlike the facts in Gac,
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Your son didn't attend a high priced college or 

university, but rather, as it's been pointed out and I 

think there's no dispute, he's approached this in the 

most economical way possible, which is two years of 

community college, transfer, then to a four-year 

institution.

And you, sir, I believe you did something like that as 

well. 

So while in a perfect world, both parents sitting down 

with the child, going through maybe a couple of 

brochures and options, I find that that's certainly more 

of the situation – in other words, not permitting going 

back, and having a parent pay tuition in the past is more 

of a situation, such as Gac v. Gac, where the child goes 

to some really expensive school and the noncustodial 

parent says, wait a minute, nobody even checked with 

me, that's not fair, I would have recommended that they 

go to community college. Well, that's where we are. 

Your son did select the most economical way to get his 

advanced degree. 

In short, we conclude the judge did not abuse her discretion in denying

defendant's motion for reconsideration because defendant made no showing that 

the judge expressed her decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational 

basis, nor did he point to probative, competent evidence that the judge failed to 

consider or appreciate. See Cummings, 295 N.J. Super. at 384 (citation

omitted). 

We likewise conclude the judge did not err in awarding plaintiff attorney's 

fees. Judge Rodriguez made reference to the applicable factors set forth in Rule
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5:3-5,7finding that (1) defendant's position was not reasonable or in good faith, 

as it was essentially a rehash of his arguments on the initial motion; (2) plaintiff 

prevailed; (3) the financial circumstances of the parties demonstrated that 

plaintiff, who earned roughly half of what defendant earned, was "not a wealthy 

individual and for her to continue to incur the expense of counsel to deal with 

similar motions is not appropriate;" and (4) based on her review of the fee 

certification, the judge found the $1,955 fee was reasonable. We conclude the 

judge's findings are supported by substantial credible evidence in the record and 

that her award of attorney's fees was entirely within the bounds of her discretion. 

 

7

 Rule 5:3-5(c) sets forth the following nine factors to guide the court's 

discretion in awarding counsel's fees in a Family Part action:

(1) the financial circumstances of the parties; (2) the 

ability of the parties to pay their own fees or to 

contribute to the fees of the other party; (3) the 

reasonableness and good faith of the positions 

advanced by the parties; (4) the extent of the fees 

incurred by both parties; (5) any fees previously 

awarded; (6) the amount of fees previously paid to 

counsel by each party; (7) the results obtained; (8) the 

degree to which fees were incurred to enforce existing 

orders to compel discovery; and (9) any other factor 

bearing on the fairness of an award.
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To the extent that we have not specifically addressed any of defendant's 

remaining arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant 

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.