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22–353 2016

INTERVIEWS OF WITNESSES

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON

THE EVENTS SURROUNDING

THE 2012 TERRORIST

ATTACK IN BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, 2012–2016

VOLUME 9 OF 11

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding the

2012 Terrorist Attack in Benghazi

(

Available on the Internet:

www.fdsys.gov
(II)

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina, Chairman

LYNN WESTMORELAND, Georgia

JIM JORDAN, Ohio

PETER ROSKAM, Illinois

MIKE POMPEO, Kansas

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama

SUSAN BROOKS, Indiana

ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland

Ranking Minority Member

ADAM SMITH, Washington

ADAM SCHIFF, California

LINDA SA ́ NCHEZ, California

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois

PROFESSIONAL STAFF

PHILIP G. KIKO, Staff Director and General Counsel

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director
CONTENTS

Page

Interview of Erin Pelton .......................................................................................... 1

Interview of Team Chief, Office of Terrorism Analysis ........................................ 171

Interview of Matt Olsen .......................................................................................... 173

Interview of Gentry Smith ...................................................................................... 429

Interview of GRS 4 .................................................................................................. 625

Interview of Officer A .............................................................................................. 627

Interview of Admiral James Winnefeld ................................................................. 629

Interview of Managing Director, Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing

and Innovation ..................................................................................................... 827

Interview of Raymond Maxwell .............................................................................. 949

Interview of Ethan Chorin ...................................................................................... 1057

Interview of C–17 Pilot ........................................................................................... 1091

Interview of Libyan National .................................................................................. 1235

Interview of General John Kelly ............................................................................ 1237

Interview of Admiral Kurt Tidd ............................................................................. 1399

Interview of Physical Security Specialist .............................................................. 1487

(III)

INTERVIEW OF

ERIN PELTON

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, FEBRUARY 11, 2016
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

CRAIG MISSAKIAN, Deputy Chief Counsel

MARK GRIDER, Deputy General Counsel

MAC TOLAR, Senior Counsel

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director/General Counsel

RONAK DESAI, Minority Counsel

ERIN O’BRIEN, Minority Detailee

FOR ***

JONATHAN SU, Esq.

ANGELA WALKER, Esq.

Latham & Watkins

555 Eleventh Street, NW

Suite 1000

Washington, D.C. 20004

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Mr. Missakian. Let's go on the record.

Ms. , welcome. As I said, my name is Craig Missakian. I'm

one of the lawyers for the majority staff. I'll begin by having the

other folks in the room introduce themselves to you. We can start with

the gentleman next to you.

Mr. Su. Okay. Jonathan Su from Latham & Watkins for Ms. .

Ms. Walker. Angela Walker with Latham & Watkins for Ms. .

Ms. O'Brien. Erin O'Brien with the minority.

Mr. Desai. Ronak Desai with the minority staff.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I'm Susanne Sachsman Grooms from the

minority.

Mr. Grider. Mark Grider with the majority.

Mr. Missakian. Okay.

First, thank you for attending here voluntarily. I know you came

down from New York. We appreciate the effort you put in.

Just a couple of ground rules before we get into the questioning.

The way this works is the majority and minority staffs switch off.

We'll ask you questions for an hour, and then we'll hand it over to

them, and they'll ask you questions for up to an hour, and we'll go

back and forth until we're done.

Hopefully we'll be finishing soon, and I've assured you that

you'll get out in plenty of time to make your plane, and I still expect

that to be the case.

Do you understand that, as you answer questions here today, you're

answering questions being posed to you by a congressional committee

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and that if you provide false information you may be subject to criminal

prosecution?

Ms. Yes.

Mr. Missakian. And do you understand that that does not change

even though the questions being asked of you are being posed to you

by staff as opposed to Members of Congress?

Ms. Yes.

Mr. Missakian. Is there any reason why we should not proceed with

your interview today?

Ms. No.

Mr. Missakian. And do you have any questions before we begin?

Ms. I do not.

Mr. Missakian. Great.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Let's start with the night of September 11th, 2012, the

night of the Benghazi attacks. First off, where were you that night?

A I was working until some point in the evening, and then I

was at home.

Q Okay. And, physically, where do you work? Or where did

you work, I should say.

A I worked at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New

York.

Q Okay. And how long had you worked at the U.N.?

A On September 11th?

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Q Yes, at that point in time.

A Somewhere between 5 and 7 weeks, I believe.

Q Where were you working before that?

A I was working at the National Security Council.

Q Here in Washington?

A That's correct.

Q What was your position with the National Security Council?

A I was director of communication and assistant press

secretary.

Q Who was your boss?

A Tommy Vietor and Ben Rhodes.

Q Okay. And how long had you been in the position at the

National Security Council before moving over to the U.N.?

A Approximately 1 year.

Q How did it come to pass that you moved from the NSC to the

U.N.?

A My predecessor at the U.S. Mission to the U.N. was resigning

from his position, and there was an opening. And I interviewed with

Ambassador Rice, and she hired me for the job.

Q What was your specific title at the U.N.?

A Director of communications and spokesperson.

Q Did you know Ambassador Rice prior to taking that job?

A I had interacted with her previously on one occasion, but

I did not really know her.

Q So on the night of September 11th, or the day September 11th,

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you were in New York at your office at the U.N.?

A At the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, yes.

Q U.S. Mission to the United Nations. Is that in the same

building as the U.N. or a different building?

A It is not.

Q It is not. Who else is there with you in whatever office

building you were in? From the U.S. Mission I mean.

A There is a staff of people who work at the mission. I had

my own office in that building.

Q Approximately how many people are on the staff there?

A I don't know exactly.

Q How many people are in the press office there for the U.S.

Mission again?

A Roughly 11.

Q And were you the head of that office?

A I was.

Q How did you first hear about the attacks in Benghazi?

A I don't recall.

Q Prior to hearing about the attacks in Benghazi, were you

aware of the protests in Cairo?

A I was.

Q How did you learn about those?

A I don't recall specifically.

Q Generally, how did you learn of it?

A I was aware of media reports around the developments in

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Cairo.

Q Do you recall any specific meetings within the U.S. Mission

to the U.N. focused on what was occurring in Cairo on September 11th?

A I do not.

Q Do you recall any meetings at all that following week about

what was occurring in Cairo?

A I do not.

Q What do you recall hearing or learning about what was

occurring in Cairo on September 11th?

A I recall hearing that our embassy was breached.

Q And as you sit here today, you can't recall how you learned

that?

Mr. Su. Craig, you said Cairo, September 11th. I want to make

sure you're talking about Benghazi on September 11th, or --

Mr. Missakian. No, Cairo.

Mr. Su. Cairo. Okay. Sorry.

Ms. I don't recall specifically, no.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Do you recall having any conversations with anybody at the

U.S. Mission, again, on September 11th, regarding what was occurring

in Cairo?

A I don't recall specifically, no.

Q Okay. Generally, what do you recall?

A I recall being distressed about what was happening in Cairo.

Q Do you recall that prior to the protests beginning in Cairo

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that you had learned that there might be protests in Cairo over the

Internet video?

A Could you repeat the question?

Q Sure. Let me try to rephrase it for you. For example, on

September 10th, did you learn that there might be protests in Cairo

over the Internet video?

A I do not recall learning there may be protests, no.

Q As far as you can recall, you first heard about the protests

in Cairo after they had begun?

A As far as I recall.

Q All right, let's move forward in time. What do you recall

first hearing about the attacks in Benghazi?

A I don't recall specifically.

Q Okay. You keep answering questions by you don't recall

specifically. Does that mean you have a general recollection? Or are

you struggling to, like, recall specific words?

A I recall generally that period. I don't recall specific

conversations that took place, specific meetings that took place, et

cetera.

Q Okay. I understand. So if I want you to try to recall a

specific meeting or a specific statement that was made during a meeting

or a conversation, I'll ask you that. But when I ask you just what

do you recall, your general recollection is sufficient, if you have

one.

So what do you recall learning about the attacks in Benghazi?

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A I recall learning that some of my colleagues, my former

colleagues, had been killed. I mean, that was the most important thing

that I recall. The details were foggy at the time.

Q And when you say your former colleagues, who are you

referring to?

A Ambassadors -- the Ambassador, Sean Smith, and the other

two gentlemen, Glen and Tyrone.

Q Okay. When you refer to them as colleagues, do you mean

to suggest you used to work with them in the past?

A I worked with Ambassador Stevens. And I was a foreign

service officer who had worked in the Middle East for several years.

Q So you had worked at the State Department?

A That's correct.

Q How long were you at the State Department?

A Approximately 9 years.

Q And what were your positions there?

A I was a foreign service officer. So I was assigned to

embassies in Mexico, in Saudi Arabia. And then I was assigned to the

State Department Bureau of Near East Affairs.

Q How long were you in the Bureau of Near East Affairs?

A Two years approximately.

Q During what period of time?

A 2009 to 2011.

Q So from --

A Excuse me. Let me make sure I have that right. Yeah, 2009

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to 2011. And then from 2011 to 2012, I was at the National Security

Council on detail.

Q Do you recall that when you first heard about what had

occurred in Benghazi, that the deaths had already occurred?

A I was aware that there was an attack in Benghazi before I

was aware that U.S. officials were killed.

Q And do you recall how you learned about the attacks?

A I don't recall specifically, no.

Q Do you recall generally? For example, did somebody tell

you? Did you read something? Did you see something on the news?

A Probably all of the above, but I don't recall specifically

how I first learned.

Q Did you have any discussions with anybody at the U.S.

Mission in New York about the attacks in Benghazi the night of the

attacks?

A I don't recall specifically, but I'm confident we talked

about it.

Q Okay. What do you recall generally having discussed?

A Being distraught that some of our colleagues, people who,

in some cases, we knew, were part of the Libyan mission and our concern

for their safety.

Q Did you have any conversations with Ambassador Rice?

A I don't recall.

Q Was Ambassador Rice in New York at the time?

A I don't recall.

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Q Do you recall having any conversations, whether in person

or on the phone, with Ambassador Rice that night?

A I don't recall.

Q Do you recall any conversations with Ambassador Rice about

what had occurred in Benghazi that week?

Mr. Su. You mean during that week period?

Mr. Missakian. Yes.

Mr. Su. Okay.

Ms. I don't recall specific conversations, no.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Do you recall generally having spoken to her about Benghazi

though?

A Yes.

Q But not that night, the night of the attacks?

A I don't recall any conversations that night, no.

Q What do you recall about that night? Just walk us through

as best as you can recall.

A I recall generally being concerned with what was happening

across the Islamic world, because there were protests against multiple

U.S. facilities where I had friends and former colleagues working.

And, obviously, Benghazi was one piece of that. I recall being

concerned about their safety and well-being, as well as concerned

regarding the trajectory of what was happening across the region writ

large.

Q How many other embassies or locations do you recall being

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concerned about, other than Cairo and Benghazi, that night, the night

of September 11th?

A I believe at the time I was also very concerned about what

was happening in Tunisia.

Q Why is that?

A Because the embassy had been breached, as well.

Q What are you basing that on?

A My recollections, as well as I had worked previously with

the our Ambassador to Tunisia, who I knew well.

Q Okay. Do you recall having conversations with that

Ambassador? How did you come to learn that the embassy in Tunisia had

been breached on the night of September 11th?

A I'm not sure it was the night of September 11th, but I recall

learning from both the media and State Department communications about

what was happening in the region, including in Tunisia, in Cairo, and

in Libya.

Q It's possible you could have learned about Tunisia and then

become concerned about it not on September 11th but on some day

thereafter?

A It's possible. It's possible.

Q So I just want to focus on the night of September 11th for

now. So I understand that you had some concern. What do you recall,

if anything, that you did that night?

A I recall emailing Jeff Feltman.

Q Who is Jeff Feltman?

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A He was a former boss of mine, formerly the Assistant

Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs. And, at the time, he was

at the United Nations.

Q Have you seen the email that you sent to him since then?

A No.

Q But that stands out in your mind as something that you did?

A Yes, because I knew he would be concerned, as I was, about

our colleagues in the region.

Q Do you recall receiving any emails from the State Department

about what was occurring in Benghazi?

A Not specifically, no.

Q Generally, do you recall receiving information from the

State Department?

A We routinely received information from the State Department

about developments across the world that were breaking, if you will,

or developing.

Q To the extent that there are emails from the State

Department that include you as a recipient, you have no reason to

believe you did not receive those emails. Is that fair?

A I don't understand the question.

Q To the extent there are emails that the State Department

sent out on the night of September 11th about what was occurring in

Benghazi, if your name was a recipient on one of those emails, do you

have any reason to believe that you didn't receive them that night?

A No.

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Q Why did you email Mr. Feltman?

A To express my concern about what was happening in the

region.

Q Do you recall him responding to you?

A I do.

Q You keep saying "what has happening in the region." Now,

this is on the night of September 11th. Do you recall having concerns

about the region that night?

A Yes.

Q Why?

A Because there were attacks against our facilities in Cairo

and Libya and threats against others.

Q You're aware of threats against others. How did you become

aware of those threats?

A I don't know. I don't recall specifically.

Q You don't recall specifically what? The threats or how you

became aware of them?

A How I became aware.

Q But you do, as you sit here today, you do recall specifically

hearing about threats to other embassies in the Middle East?

A I can't recall specifically when I learned about threats

to other facilities in the region.

Q So it's possible that you could have learned about the

threats to the other facilities after September 11th?

A Yes.

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Q I think you used the term "violence against the embassy in

Cairo." I don't want to put words in your mouth. Is that what you

said, or something to that effect?

A I think I said "breach of the embassy."

Q So tell us what you understood to have occurred at the

embassy in Cairo on September 11th.

A I understand that there was a protest at the embassy and

that some number of protestors breached the external perimeter.

Q Did you have an understanding of how many protestors were

involved in Cairo?

A I can't recall if I knew exactly on September 11th how many

protestors there were.

Q I would be surprised if anybody knew exactly how many

protestors there were, but did you have a sense of it? Was it 100,

1,000, 2,000?

A I don't know. I can't recall.

Q As you sit here today, you don't have any sense of how many

protestors there were in Cairo?

A I do not.

Q Okay. Do you have an understanding or a sense of whether

any of the protestors in Cairo had weapons?

A Do I have a sense? Could you repeat the question?

Q Yes. Do you have a sense of whether or not any of the

protestors in Cairo had weapons?

A I do not believe that they did, but I don't know for sure.

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Q What is your understanding of what the protestors did in

Cairo?

A As I mentioned, they gathered at the embassy, and they

breached -- and some number of them breached the external perimeter.

Q Do you have any reason to believe that Ambassador Rice was

not fully apprised of what was going on in Cairo as the events were

unfolding?

Mr. Su. Can we --

Ms. I'm not sure I understand what "fully apprised"

means.

Mr. Missakian. You're not? You don't understand what that term

means?

Mr. Su. Well, can we ask it this way, which is: What is your

understanding of the extent of Ambassador Rice's awareness of what was

going on in Cairo at the time? Is that fair?

Mr. Missakian. It's a different question, but we can start with

that.

Mr. Su. Are you aware of whether she received briefings? What

is your personal awareness?

Ms. I do not know what briefings Ambassador Rice

received.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Do you have any understanding of what information she was

receiving regarding what was occurring in Cairo?

A I do not.

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Q And do you have an understanding of how, ordinarily, she

would receive information about an event happening in the world?

A As a senior member of the national security team, Ambassador

Rice had access to many streams of information. I can't say

specifically in any given moment where she was receiving information,

but it is routine to receive a lot of information on any given day from

many sources.

Q Did you send her any information the night of September 11th

about what was occurring in Cairo or what was occurring in Benghazi?

A I do not recall specifically.

Q Tell us as best you can what you understood to have happened

in Benghazi the night of.

A The night of September 11th, what I understood happened?

Q Yes.

A At the time, we had very few details about what had happened.

And at some point that evening, I was aware that the United States had

taken some casualties. Again, the details of the situation were not

clear.

Q Do you recall any -- let me withdraw that.

Do you recall having learned the night of September 11th that

there were weapons involved in what occurred in Benghazi?

A I do not recall learning that that evening, no.

Q Do you recall that there were two separate attacks in

Benghazi, one on the State Department facility and one on a separate

U.S. facility some distance away?

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A I do not recall learning that that evening, no.

Q But you did learn that at some point that week?

A I don't recall when I learned that.

Q You did learn it at some point though?

A That there were two separate attacks?

Q Yes.

A I recall learning that there were two waves of attacks, yes.

Q As you sit here today, what did you learn about the two waves

of attacks?

A When?

Q At any time.

Let me clarify that. I'm really most interested in what you knew

during the period between September 11th and then, first, up to

September 16th. We can talk about what you learned after that, but

I kind of want to focus just on that first period.

So, in your mind, if you can't remember when you learned

something, just tell me what you learned, and we can do our best to

figure out when you learned it.

A At the time, because I was so interested in what was

happening both in Benghazi as well as in the region writ large, I was

following a lot of media reporting, I was talking to many of my friends

and colleagues, and I was consuming routine information that was

provided by the State Department, including press briefing transcripts

from the State Department, other materials, et cetera.

I can't recall specifically that week what I learned because I

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was digesting a lot of information that was evolving as our

understanding evolved.

Q Let's talk about classified information for a moment. At

the time that you held this position at the United States Mission, did

you have a security clearance?

A I did.

Q Up to what level?

A Either Top Secret or Top Secret/SCI.

Q And do you recall at any point during that week receiving

classified information about what had occurred in Benghazi or Cairo?

A I do not recall.

Q And do you recall -- if you had received that information,

how would it have come to you?

A I have a classified email system.

Q Did you have a briefer, a classified briefer?

A I did not.

Q I think we understood that Ambassador Rice had a classified

briefer. Would you attend the classified briefings that she would

receive?

A I did not.

Q So, to the extent you received classified information, it

would have come to you over your classified email system?

A That's correct.

Q But as you sit here today, you can't recall accessing that

information during the period we're talking about?

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A That's correct.

Q Do you recall having any conversations with anybody at the

State Department about what was occurring in Cairo or Benghazi during

the period from September 11th through, say, September 16th?

A I don't recall specifically, no. But I know I talked to

many people during that time. Again, as I said, I was obviously very

concerned about friends and colleagues in the region.

Q As best you can, tell us who you would have spoken to during

that period at the State Department.

A I spoke with many people.

Q Are these people that you knew previously, or are these

people that you spoke to because they held a certain position at the

State Department and they might have information that you wanted?

A This is in the period between the 11th and the 16th?

Q Yes.

A A combination thereof, both people that were friends and

colleagues who I was communicating with on a personal level as well

as people that I would be working with professionally during that

period.

Q And the second group, the folks you would be working with

professionally, who would those people have been?

A There would be a great number of them.

Q Okay. In any particular department?

A Yes. I would have worked closely with the Department of

State, as well as the National Security Council.

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Q Okay. Right now I'm just focused on the State Department.

So, within the State Department, were there people within the State

Department that you would have been communicating with on a

professional basis to get information that you needed at the time?

A Yes.

Q And, within the State Department, was there any particular

department or bureau that you focused on?

A I can't speak specifically to that, but I can say that it

was very common and routine for me to liaise on a near-daily basis with

the Bureau of Public Affairs as well as the Bureau of Near Eastern

Affairs.

Q That would have been Victoria Nuland's department and

at NEA?

A Both of them were people that I routinely dealt with, yes.

Q When you dealt with NEA, for example, were you dealing with

just the press people within NEA or were you dealing with NEA more

broadly?

A Normally, I would be dealing with the communications

professionals, but I cannot say specifically that I never dealt with

anyone else in the bureau.

Q During, again, focusing on that week, September 11th to

September 16th, can you recall speaking to anybody specifically within

the State Department's NEA Bureau?

A Speaking with anyone specifically?

Q Yes.

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A I can't recall specifically, no.

Q Generally, do you recall speaking with anybody?

A As I mentioned, I have a long history of working with

individuals in that bureau. I worked there for 2 years. I also worked

overseas in one of the embassies. And I was very concerned for my

colleagues and friends in the region. So I recall generally talking

with them on a personal level about what was happening in the region

and our concern for the safety and well-being of our colleagues around

the region.

Q Right. And I understand that. Maybe my question wasn't

clear. You identified two groups of people that you may have been

speaking to. The first group were people that you knew on a personal

level that you wanted to reach out to. The second group were people

you were speaking to on a professional basis. Maybe you knew them

beforehand, maybe you didn't, but they had information you needed.

We're just focused on the second group here. So if you were

calling people within NEA solely for the purpose of talking to them

on a personal level, sharing your concern, worry, whatever, I'm not

as interested in that.

Were you speaking to people within the NEA on a professional level

to get information they may have, to share information you may have

had? Do you recall any conversations like that?

A I don't recall specifically, no.

Q Okay. But it's possible that it did occur that week?

A Yes.

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Q Other than NEA, I think you identified the press office

where Victoria Nuland was the spokesperson for the State Department.

Do you recall speaking to anybody in that department during that week?

A I recall communicating with Toria Nuland.

Q And what do you recall about that?

A I don't recall the specifics of our conversations, but I

recall speaking with her as I prepared Ambassador Rice for her Sunday

show appearances.

Q Okay. Generally, what do you recall about that

conversation or conversations?

A As I mentioned, I don't recall specifically.

Q Yeah, I'm not asking you for specifics in terms of I wouldn't

expect you to remember word for word what each of you said in that call.

But to the extent you can recall the topics that were discussed or,

generally, sentiments that were shared, that's what I'm asking for.

A I remember speaking or communicating with her about various

developments across the Islamic world that week. For example, what

were the latest developments in Sudan, where there were threats of

additional protests; what were the latest developments in Tunisia; what

were the latest developments in Yemen; what were the latest

developments in Egypt; that kind of thing.

Q You were calling her to get information about the latest

developments, or you were calling her to give her information about

the latest developments? What was it?

A I was calling her to understand the latest developments.

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Q Okay. And did you make similar calls to people in NEA to

understand the latest developments in the region?

A Not that I recall.

Q Would that have been a logical thing for you to do since

they are the experts in that region at the State Department?

A It was routine for me to deal with both the Bureau of Public

Affairs as well as the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.

Q Other than trying to understand the latest developments,

was there any other purpose for your call to Ms. Nuland or the Bureau

of Public Affairs or to NEA for that matter?

A Again, I have personal relationships with many of these

people, so it's possible that I also spoke with them about my personal

concern regarding what was happening across the Islamic world.

Q Was there also a purpose to make these calls to ensure that

anything that Ambassador Rice said was consistent with the best

information at the State Department?

A Yes.

Q Was that routine as well?

A It was routine to communicate with my colleagues in the

State Department about what they were saying to the media so that -- and

also their latest understanding of things so that Ambassador Rice was

similarly prepared for dealing with the media.

Q At the time, did you know in the State

Department's NEA Bureau?

A Yes.

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Q And who else did you know in that department?

A Most of the people in that bureau I knew.

Q Just thinking in my mind through some of the names, I may

not have them all, but ?

A Yes.

Q

A No.

Q Do you not know her, or do I have her wrong?

A I don't know anyone named , no.

Q

A I know who she is, yes.

Q Do you recall speaking with either or

at all that week?

A I don't recall, no.

Q Let's go back to the night of September 11th. Our

understanding is that at approximately 10 p.m. that night the State

Department issued a statement related to the attacks in Benghazi. Did

you have any involvement in drafting or reviewing that statement?

A I did not.

Q Okay. Are you aware of the statement that I'm referring

to?

A I recall the State Department issuing a statement that

evening, yes.

Q Have you ever reviewed it or read it?

A Yes, I've read it.

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26

Q When did you read it?

A That night.

Q Did you read it after it was issued?

A Yes.

Q And you specifically, as you sit here today, you have a

specific recollection of reading that statement?

A Yes.

Q Is there any reason why that sticks out in your mind?

A Because what was happening across the region, including in

Benghazi, was of great interest to me personally.

Q Then did it surprise you that the statement made no mention

of the rest of the region?

A No.

Q Why not?

A We had not sustained casualties in other attacks or protests

in the region.

Q I'm not sure I follow. I mean, there were no other

casualties, period, other than in Benghazi.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Perhaps, if you want her to talk about the

statement, you would want to show her the statement?

Mr. Missakian. Susanne, this is my time. If you want to show

her the statement during your time, that would be fine.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I just don't know that she would

necessarily recollect whether the statement does or doesn't reflect

what was going on in other places.

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27

Mr. Missakian. That's up to her to tell me.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q My question is, you said it does not surprise you that it

did not refer to the rest of the region, and that's because there were

no casualties in other regions. Do I understand you correctly?

A I do not recall the specific content of the statement. I

recall reading a statement that evening because I was paying great

attention to what was happening at various diplomatic facilities across

the Islamic world.

Q Beyond that, you don't recall having any reaction to the

statement, other than just reading it?

A That's correct.

Q Okay.

Now, the next morning, the President, or the White House, I should

say, issued a written statement and Secretary Clinton also issued a

written statement. Were you involved in the review or drafting of

either of those statements?

A I was not.

Q There were also some remarks that the President made from

the Rose Garden. Were you aware or were you involved in drafting or

reviewing those remarks in any way?

A I was not.

Q You were aware of them, though, after the fact, I gather?

A Yes.

Q Were you involved in any way in preparing any public remarks

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28

about what had occurred in Benghazi?

Mr. Su. By whom?

Mr. Missakian. By anybody.

Ms. I recall Ambassador Rice issuing a condolence

statement about the death of Ambassador Stevens.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Were you involved at all in drafting or reviewing the

statement that was issued by the U.N. Security Council regarding

Benghazi?

A Was I -- I'm sorry, could you repeat the question?

Q Sure. It's my understanding that the U.N. Security Council

issued a statement condemning what had occurred in Benghazi. Do you

recall that?

A I recall the statement, yes.

Q Were you involved in drafting or reviewing or preparing that

statement in any way?

A I was not.

Q And why is that?

A As a communications professional, it was not my purview to

be involved in the deliberations or the specific policy outcomes of

the Security Council. And a press statement from the Security Council

is one such outcome.

Q Okay. So you, in your position, would not have had any

input on something like that?

A Correct.

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29

Q To your knowledge, did Ambassador Rice make any other

remarks about Benghazi that week? And by "that week," I mean, say,

September 11th through September 14th.

Mr. Su. Public remarks?

Mr. Missakian. Public remarks. Thank you.

Ms. Ambassador Rice had a public appearance in Chicago

that week, and I recall her making brief remarks about the situation,

specifically condolences, I believe, about the attack in Benghazi.

I also recall that she made a statement, a public written

statement, about the loss of our colleagues and that she tweeted about

that as well.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Okay. Now, the statement she made in Chicago, at what event

was that statement made?

A It was affiliated with Holocaust Memorial Museum. I don't

recall beyond that.

Q Okay. That's the one I have in my mind. Were you involved

in any way in drafting that statement?

A I don't recall.

Q Okay. Would you have been ordinarily?

A It's possible. I don't recall.

Q Okay. Just generally speaking, take us through, if you

were involved in that, take us through the drafting process and the

review process for written remarks like that.

A Ambassador Rice had a speechwriter with whom she engaged

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30

specifically on public remarks. The speechwriter would draft -- would

provide drafts to her and, in some cases, others for feedback. And

that process could continue several iterations until there was a final

draft that both she and her senior staff were comfortable with.

Q Okay. What role would you have in that process, if any?

A In most cases, I was part of the group of senior staff who

could provide inputs.

Q Do you recall the name of that speechwriter?

A -- I mean, excuse me, .

Q

A

Q Thank you.

And as you sit here today, you don't recall any specific

involvement in that particular set of remarks?

A No, I do not.

Q Now let's move forward that week. What do you recall about

what was -- I know there was a lot going on in the region, but, in your

mind, can you separate out what you were learning about Benghazi, in

particular, that week?

A I don't understand what you're asking me.

Q Okay. The attacks occurred on September 11th.

A Yes.

Q That Friday, September 14th, I'm asking you what you learned

that week about what had occurred in Benghazi.

A I was following the media reporting as well as the internal

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31

reporting from the State Department about what was happening throughout

the week.

Q What do you recall learning about what had occurred?

A I recall learning that four colleagues had died. And

that's what I recall.

Q Nothing beyond that?

A Not specifically, no.

Q Okay. Anything generally?

A That our --

Q For example --

A That the diplomatic facility had been attacked.

Q Okay. For example -- and I'm sure you're well aware now

that there were buildings on the State Department's compound that were

burned. Do you recall learning that during that week?

A Yes.

Q Do you recall learning anything about the number of

attackers that initially stormed the State facility?

A I do not recall that specifically, no.

Q Do you recall learning how Ambassador Stevens had passed

away?

A I recall there was a lot of confusion about the specific

details regarding his death, including confusion about his whereabouts

in the immediate aftermath of the attack.

Q So you recall there being confusion about whether he was

alive or not. Was this on the night of the attacks?

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32

A Yes.

Q Do you recall there being a belief that he possibly had been

kidnapped?

A Yes.

Q And how did you learn that?

A I don't recall specifically.

Q Let's try to work through additional details about the

attacks that you may have learned that week. We've talked about the

fact that the buildings were burned. Anything about the types of

weaponry that was being used?

A I do not recall. You're talking about the 11th through the

14th?

Q Yes, during that period of time.

A I do not recall.

Q Do you recall that there was heavy weaponry used -- for

example, that mortars had been fired at the other U.S. facility in

Benghazi?

A I recall that there was sustained attacks against our

facilities in Benghazi. I don't recall specific types of weapons used.

Q And when you say you learned that there were sustained

attacks, that would be both at the State facility and the other

government facility a distance away?

A I don't recall knowing that those days, the 11th through

the 14th, specifically the sequence of the attack, including whether

there was specific weaponry used on one facility versus another.

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33

Q But you did learn that fact at some point?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So you're just not sure whether you learned it during

that period we're talking about or afterwards.

A Well, let me clarify slightly. I am aware that at some

point I learned there was two waves of attacks that were -- there was

two waves of attacks. I don't recall specifically when I learned that.

Q So it may have been within this period from 9/11 to 9/14,

or it may have been sometime thereafter?

A I recall that the details regarding specifically what

happened were murky and not fully available at the time.

Q And how do you know that?

A How do I recall that?

Q Well, in other words, you're making a general statement

about the level of knowledge that existed at the time. Are you

referring to your level of knowledge, or are you referring to the

general level of knowledge within the U.S. Government?

A I'm referring to my level of knowledge. But I also followed

very closely specifically the briefings that were conducted for the

media by both the State Department as well as the White House press

briefing, in which they would discuss these details.

Q I see. So would it be fair to say that your understanding

of what happened in Benghazi was in part based on these briefings that

you just referred to?

A Yes.

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34

Q And my understanding is that there was a press briefing that

was done on September 12th and then there was another press briefing

that Jay Carney did on September 14th, that Friday. Did you read the

transcripts from those briefings?

Mr. Su. During that week?

Mr. Missakian. During that week.

Ms. I can't recall specifically if I read the transcript

or watched the briefing live.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Okay. The Jay Carney briefing I believe was on television.

I believe the one that the State Department gave on September 12th was

just on the telephone.

A The background briefing.

Q The background briefing. Tell us what that means,

"background briefing."

A A background briefing is -- it's a press briefing in which

senior officials give information to, in this case, the State

Department press corps about a given situation. And they can be

attributed as senior -- in this case, most likely, senior

administration officials rather than by their names and titles.

Q So, to a layman, when I hear "background briefing," that

means it's on background and it can't be used. I gather it does not

mean that in this context?

A In these contexts -- in this context, it means, generally,

senior administration official said X. You can report that.

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35

Q Did you participate in that background briefing call?

A No, I did not.

Q So to the extent that you're aware of what was said, it would

have come to you in a transcript of the call?

A Yes.

Q And would it have been typical for you to receive those

transcripts sometime shortly after they were prepared?

A Yes.

Q So if it was prepared on September 12th, you would have

received it on that day or shortly thereafter?

A That's the general process, yes.

Q Do you recall watching the Jay Carney briefing on September

14th?

A Again, I don't recall if I read the transcript or watched

the briefing.

Q Let's talk a little bit about how Susan Rice was prepared

for the talk shows which occurred on September 16th.

First off, let's start with the decision to have Ambassador Rice

appear on the talk shows versus somebody else. Were you involved in

that decision in any way?

A In which decision?

Q Well, let me take a step back. It's our understanding that

the person that they wanted to do the talk show appearances was

originally Secretary Clinton but she declined. Are you aware of

Secretary Clinton being approached to do the talk shows?

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36

A Yes.

Q How did you become aware of that?

A I recall that Ambassador Rice was asked to do the Sunday

shows if Secretary Clinton was not available to do them.

Q And how did you learn that?

A I don't recall specifically.

Q Okay. Did you learn that from Ambassador Rice or from

somebody else?

A I don't recall specifically.

Q Do you recall having a conversation with anybody about it?

A Yes.

Q And when did that conversation occur?

A February 14th.

Q This is the Friday?

A Yes.

Q And do you recall --

Mr. Su. September 14th?

Ms. Yes, September 14th.

Mr. Missakian. Oh, did she say February?

Ms. Oh, sorry.

Mr. Missakian. I see where your mind is.

Ms. September 14th, yes. Thank you.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Was it before or after the ceremony to receive the remains,

if you recall?

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37

A I don't recall specifically what time of day it was.

Q Do you have any understanding of why Secretary Clinton

declined to do the talk shows?

A I do not.

Q At what point during the day on September 14th did you learn

that Ambassador Rice would be the person to do the talk shows?

A I don't recall specifically what time it was, but I recall

that it was the afternoon of the 14th.

Q Do you recall that anybody other than Ambassador Rice and

Secretary Clinton were being considered to do the talk show

appearances?

A I do not recall that, no.

Q And do you recall having any conversations -- and we'll

start with September 14th -- with anybody about Ambassador Rice

appearing on the talk shows?

A Yes.

Q Who do you recall speaking to?

A I recall speaking to Dag Vega. I recall speaking to Ben

Rhodes. I recall speaking to Ambassador Rice.

Q Okay. Let's start with Mr. Rhodes. How many

conversations do you recall having had with Mr. Rhodes on that Friday?

A I don't recall specifically.

Q Do you have a sense of whether it was one or more than one?

A I don't recall specifically.

Q Was it more than 10?

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38

A No.

Q So somewhere under 10?

A Yes.

Q And I gather these were telephone calls?

A I recall speaking to him by phone, yes.

Q What do you recall about those conversations? As best you

can, tell us what he said and what you said.

A I don't recall all the specifics of our conversation.

However, I do recall at one point asking him to provide, for lack of

a better term, a memo regarding the objectives of the Sunday show

appearances.

Q How did he respond to you?

A He said he would write it.

Q And did he eventually deliver that to you?

A Yes.

Q Other than that, do you recall anything else that you

discussed with Mr. Rhodes?

A On the 14th?

Q On the 14th.

A No.

Q Do you recall discussing with him anything about what had

actually occurred in Benghazi or anywhere else in the region?

A I do not recall that, no.

Q Let's go to Mr. Vega. What do you recall discussing with

Mr. Vega on the 14th?

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39

A I recall discussing with Dag logistical matters.

Q Such as?

A If she were to do the shows, when we would know, you know,

who to be in touch with, those kinds of things.

Q So when you spoke to Mr. Vega, it was still up in the air

whether or not she would do the shows, if I understood you correctly?

A I believe I spoke with Mr. Vega about whether she would do

the shows as well as, after it was determined that she would do the

shows, about logistical issues, coordination issues for the day of.

Q What do you recall discussing with Ambassador Rice on the

14th?

A I don't recall all of the details of our conversations, but

I recall discussing whether she would do the shows if Secretary Clinton

was unable to do it.

Q So at the time you had the conversation with her, it had

not been decided whether or not Secretary Clinton would do the shows

or not?

A I recall speaking to her before it was decided.

Q Did you have a second call with her that same day after it

had been decided?

A I don't recall specifically having a phone call with her

that day after it was decided.

Q At that point, during that phone call with Ambassador Rice,

do you recall discussing anything else about the appearances?

A I don't recall specifically, no.

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40

Q Where was Ambassador Rice at that point?

A I don't recall specifically where she was when I spoke with

her. But I recall that she went to Andrews that day to receive the

remains of our fallen colleagues.

Q Did you at that point begin to work on putting together a

package of information that Ambassador Rice could use if she was called

upon to do the talk shows?

A I recall preparing what I'll refer to as a briefing package

that day. I don't recall if I started it before or after it was

determined definitively that she would do the shows.

Q As best you can recall, tell us what went into the package

you prepared on the 14th.

A As was customary for any media appearance, I assembled a

variety of materials, anticipating the kinds of issues that she might

be discussing on her Sunday show appearances -- so, for example, what

was the latest information regarding the situation in Cairo, Tunis,

Sana'a, the latest regarding Iran's nuclear program given that Benjamin

Netanyahu was going to appear on two of the Sunday shows. And that's

a sense of what I -- is what I recall preparing between Friday and

Saturday.

Q In your list of areas where you were attempting to collect

the latest information, you left Benghazi out. Was that intentional,

or were you just giving me some examples?

A I don't recall preparing information about Benghazi. What

I do recall is understanding that we would have access to talking points

40
41

that would be provided by the intelligence community that were

unclassified and consistent with our latest understanding of what had

transpired in Benghazi.

Q Okay. So do you remember that statement specifically

coming from someone?

A No, I do not. I do not remember.

Q You seemed very specific about that. Where are you getting

that recollection from?

A Well, I recall that in the process of preparing Ambassador

Rice between Friday and Saturday, September 14th and 15th, that I was

not focused on Benghazi because I was going to receive talking points

that were appropriate for public use by the intelligence community.

I don't remember how I came to know that I was going to get those

materials.

Q And I believe you also said that the talking points you were

expecting would be consistent with something. Tell me again what you

said.

A I can't recall exactly how I phrased it.

Q Okay. But whatever you said was not based on a specific

recollection of a conversation, correct?

A As I mentioned, I recall that I was not -- as I was preparing

Ambassador Rice's briefing book, for lack of a better term, I recall

that there were a number of issues I needed to develop talking points

for but that Benghazi specifically was not one of them because there

were talking points that were already coming together, being developed

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42

by the intelligence community, that would be appropriate and available

for Ambassador Rice to use on the Sunday shows.

Q But that's all you can recall about those talking points?

A No, that's not all I can recall about them. I can recall

receiving them on Saturday, for example.

Q Right, but I'm -- sorry, my question was unclear. Before

you received the talking points, you had some expectation that they

were going to be coming to you. And I think you said that your

expectation was that they would be appropriate for public use, that

they would be prepared by the intelligence community. Did you have

any understanding about the nature of the talking points on that Friday?

Mr. Su. Other than what you've already said.

Mr. Missakian. Other than what you've already said.

Ms. No.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Okay. So if I understand you correctly, you were trying

to collect the latest information on these other areas but you did not

make a similar effort for Benghazi because you knew that these talking

points were eventually going to be coming your way. Is that fair?

A That's fair. And I would add that the premise for why the

administration, specifically Ambassador Rice, was doing the Sunday

shows was because, at the moment, there were attacks happening across

the Islamic world on our diplomatic facilities, and we were attempting

to make sense to the American people what was happening in the region

writ large. Benghazi was obviously one piece of that, but Benghazi

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43

was not the focus of the Sunday show appearances.

Q And why do you say that? I mean, in my mind, if four

Americans had died, in my mind, Benghazi would absolutely be a focus

of the Sunday talk shows because of that, but apparently not in yours.

A Well, I don't control the focus of any Sunday show

interview, but I recall receiving the promos for the Sunday shows that

were largely focused on what was happening writ large. Because, at

the time, it was unclear whether there would be additional attacks

against diplomatic facilities that could result in the deaths of

additional American personnel.

Q So your understanding of the focus of the talk shows was

based on the promos that you received. Is that correct?

A Could you repeat the question?

Q You've testified about what the focus of the talk shows was

going to be. And I'm asking you if you based that understanding of

the focus on the promos of the talk shows that you received.

A I'm also -- I based it somewhat on the promos, as well as

on my professional judgment.

Q And, in your professional judgment, you did not expect

Benghazi to be a significant focus of the Sunday talk shows?

A I did not say that. What I said is it was one part of what

we anticipated being discussed.

Q So it would not have been a significant focus of the Sunday

talk shows?

A I did not say that.

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44

Q No, I'm asking you. I know you didn't say that. I did.

So, in your professional judgment, Benghazi would have been a part of

the Sunday talk shows but not a significant focus of the Sunday talk

shows. Is that fair?

Mr. Su. Well, you'll have to define "significant focus." I

mean, she has testified that Benghazi was going to be part of the

discussion that involved the broader issues happening in the Middle

East.

Mr. Missakian. I think my question is clear. So if you could

answer it.

Ms. I anticipated that there would be questions about

Benghazi.

Mr. Missakian. Right, but you did not anticipate that it would

be a primary or significant focus of the talk shows. Is that fair?

Mr. Su. Can I speak to her for just a minute?

Mr. Missakian. Sure.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Missakian. You can answer.

Ms. Okay. I think it's clear, both then and now, that

Benghazi would be part of the conversation given, in particular, the

loss of four of my colleagues. But, again, I would note that there

were still threats against U.S. diplomatic facilities ongoing at the

time and that it was unclear whether there would be additional

fatalities as a result. And we were focused on -- I was focused on

understanding what was happening in all of those situations, including

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45

Benghazi.

Mr. Missakian. All right. My hour is up. Let's go off the

record.

[Recess.]

Mr. Desai. Let's go back on the record. The time is

approximately 12:12 p.m.

Good afternoon, Ms. Let me reintroduce myself. I'm

Ronak Desai. I'm one of the counsels with the minority staff of the

committee.

And on behalf of the minority staff and all its members, I just

want to thank you for your appearance here this afternoon. I also want

to thank you for your service to our country. We do appreciate it.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. DESAI:

Q And I think you told my colleagues in the last round that

you had served as a career foreign service officer prior to your most

recent stints in the government, first at NSC and USUN. Is that

correct?

A I was actually still a foreign service officer at that time.

Q Great. So if you're a career foreign service officer -- and

you said you were detailed to NSC first. Is that right?

A That's correct.

Q So you were still a career at that point as well?

A I was.

Q And you were still a career while you were serving at our

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46

mission at the USUN. Is that correct?

A I was on a leave of absence from the Foreign Service at that

time.

Q Okay. So while you were a career, that's in contrast to

a political, where you, you know, would serve for -- have a political

appointment. This is you serve in the service for whomever happens

to be President at that time. Is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Wonderful.

My colleague in the last round started a conversation with you

about Ambassador Rice's appearances on the Sunday morning talk shows,

and I just want to pick up to some extent where he left off.

And Ambassador Rice's appearances have garnered a significant

amount of scrutiny and even some controversy since that time, as I'm

sure you're well aware. And, you know, there have been some members,

including some Members of Congress, who have accused the Ambassador

of intentionally misleading the American people. And I just think it's

worth getting into this a little more carefully and taking a look at

what she said and what took place.

So I think one of the things that was discussed in the last hour

is that one of the documents that -- or part of the preparation materials

that Ambassador Rice relied on were these talking points. And she

relied on these intelligence talking points with respect to what she

said about Benghazi during these Sunday morning talk shows.

And if I'm not mistaken, these were talking points that were

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47

prepared at the request of Congress, specifically the House Permanent

Select Committee on Intelligence, prepared by the intelligence

community for I think what you said was their public use as unclassified

talking points. Is that right?

A That's my understanding, yes.

Q Okay. And were you involved in any capacity in drafting

those talking points that were coming from the intelligence community?

A I was not.

Q Okay.

So, if I can, just so we have something to go off of, I would like

to enter these talking points into the record. And I'll mark this as

exhibit 1.

[ Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. DESAI:

Q So what I've just handed you, exhibit 1, is a document

comprising of two pages. It is the cover sheet of the "Report of the

U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Review of the Terrorist

Attacks on U.S. Facilities in Benghazi, Libya, September 11-12, 2012."

And attached to this cover sheet is Appendix I of that report,

"The Benghazi Talking Points," which I believe are the final version

of the intelligence community talking points that were prepared at the

behest of Congress.

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48

[12:15 p.m.]

BY MR. DESAI:

Q It says here on the second page, quote, "The final,

unclassified version of the CIA talking points, as provided to HPSCI

on September 15, 2012, read as follows," end quote. And I'm just going

to quickly read through these three talking points.

The first one says, quote, "The currently available information

suggests that the demonstrations in Benghazi were spontaneously

inspired by the protests at the US Embassy in Cairo and evolved into

a direct assault against the US diplomatic post in Benghazi and

subsequently its annex. There are indications that extremists

participated in the violent demonstrations," end quote.

The second talking point reads, quote, "This assessment may

change as additional information is collected and analyzed as currently

available information continues to be evaluated," end quote.

And the third and final point reads, quote, "The investigation

is ongoing and the US Government is working with Libyan authorities

to bring to justice those responsible for the deaths of US citizens,"

end quote.

Does this appear to be the language that Ambassador Rice reviewed

and relied upon in preparation for her statements with respect to

Benghazi on the Sunday morning talk shows?

A Yes.

Q So Ambassador Rice told this committee recently that she

believed these intelligence community talking points reflected the

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49

intelligence community's best current assessment of the facts that

could be shared publicly at that time. Was that your understanding,

as well?

A Yes.

Q So, at the time, you understood these points that I just

read to you from the IC to be factually accurate as determined by the

intelligence community? Is that your understanding?

A Yes.

Q And you don't have any reason to personally doubt the

factual accuracy of the intelligence community's talking points at that

time. Is that correct?

A No.

Q And no one else had indicated to you that there was anything

inaccurate or factually defective about these intelligence community

talking points. Is that right?

A Yes -- no -- say that again.

Q Sure. No one indicated to you that there was anything

factually inaccurate about these statements, is that right, these

talking points?

A No.

Q Okay.

And did you think it was appropriate at the time for Ambassador

Rice to defer to and rely on these intelligence community talking points

when appearing on the Sunday talk shows to talk about Benghazi?

A Yes.

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50

Q Okay. And why was it appropriate for her to defer to the

intelligence community's talking points when talking about Benghazi

on those shows?

A It was appropriate because the situation was complex and

our understanding of it was evolving. And there were also sensitive

aspects of what had happened or of our -- basically, our presence in

Benghazi.

Q And, in your view, would it have been appropriate for

Ambassador Rice to have tried to reinvestigate the intelligence

assessment or do her own fact-finding on the ground in Benghazi with

respect to what happened on September 11th or to essentially

second-guess the intelligence community's assessment as to what had

taken place at that time?

A I think it was appropriate for her to rely on their

expertise.

Q Okay.

So was it is your understanding that when discussing the Benghazi

attacks on those various Sunday morning shows on the 16th of September

that it was Ambassador Rice's intention to communicate the information

that's contained in these talking points to the best of her ability?

A Yes.

Q And is it fair to say that she was doing her best to adhere

to the language and meaning of these intelligence community talking

points as closely as possible when she was discussing Benghazi on those

shows?

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51

A Yes.

Q And from what you recall, did she do this?

A Yes.

Q So what I'd like to do is turn to the specific statements

Ambassador Rice made on those Sunday morning talk shows. And I'm going

to mark this document as exhibit 2.

[ Exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. DESAI:

Q So, Ms. , I just handed you exhibit No. 2 into the

record. And this is an email with the document ID of C05394585. It's

an email from -- am I pronouncing that correctly?

A

Q to Victoria Nuland,

and . It's dated September the 19th, 2012,

timestamped 4:31 p.m. The subject line reads, "2012-09-16 - Amb

Rice - Sunday Shows.docx," and it includes an attachment with the same

title.

If you could just turn the page for me, you'll see the referenced

attachment. That carries with it a document ID, for the record, of

C05394586.

And this document appears to be a compilation of transcripts from

Ambassador Rice's five appearances on the various talk shows. I

believe it's ABC's "This Week," CBS's "Face the Nation," NBC's "Meet

the Press," "Fox News Sunday," and CNN's "State of the Union," all from

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September 16th, 2012.

Is this an accurate characterization of what I've just handed you?

A Yes.

Q What I'd like to do is walk you through some of the specific

statements that Ambassador Rice made on these programs because, after

reviewing them, they appear to follow a pattern. Generally speaking,

Ambassador Rice begins by talking about the FBI investigation into the

Benghazi attack. She then gives the current and best assessment of

what happened, and she gets that current best assessment of what

happened in Benghazi from the intelligence community's talking points.

She then concludes with another caveat, that the investigation will

give the final answers.

So if we can turn to the first transcript, ABC "This Week." And

this is page 3. And the page numbers are noted at the top of the

document.

Ambassador Rice says on page 3, she says, quote -- and here we

are at -- she says, "Well, Jake, first of all, it's important to know

that there's an FBI investigation that has begun and will take some

time to be completed. That will tell us with certainty what

transpired."

A I got it, yes.

Q So it appears, again, she begins -- Ambassador Rice begins

her answer with a caveat or warning that the investigation is ongoing

and, as a result, any information that she's sharing on the program

is subject to change.

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Is that your understanding of what she does here?

A Yes.

Q And do you know why that was important to her, Ms. ?

A I can't speak for Ambassador Rice.

Q She goes on to say -- and I'm still on page 3, about middle

of the page -- quote, "But our current best assessment, based on the

information that we have at present, is that, in fact, what this began

as, it was a spontaneous -- not a premeditated -- response to what had

transpired in Cairo," end quote.

Again, she seemed to be very deliberately clarifying that this

was the U.S. Government's current best assessment at that time. Is

that also your understanding?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

Now, if I can please ask you to compare that statement with the

intelligence community's talking points in exhibit 1. And compare

that sentence in Ambassador Rice's statement to the very first talking

point just for a second. Do those appear consistent to you?

A Yes.

Q So they both contain the word "spontaneous." Is that

right?

A Yes.

Q And Ambassador Rice's statements that we've just read and

the first talking point here from the IC also both reference these

events in Cairo. Is that correct?

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A Yes.

Q Okay.

And to the extent that Ambassador Rice used slightly different

words -- for example, I think she calls it a response instead of saying

it was inspired by in this instance, and at times she used slightly

different wordings -- in your view, is this more or less the same? Are

these consistent or synonymous with what the intelligence

point/talking point says here in the first bullet point?

A Yes.

Q If you could go back to the exhibit -- exhibit 2, excuse

me -- Ambassador Rice continues, "In Cairo, as you know, a few hours

earlier, there was a violent protest that was undertaken in reaction

to this very offensive video that was disseminated," end quote.

Was that a commonly known fact at the time, that these Cairo

protests were a reaction to this offensive video?

A Yes.

Q And further down, Ambassador Rice states, again -- and she

says, quote -- and I'm here, again, still on page 3, maybe about

three-fourths of the page down -- quote, "We'll wait to see exactly

what the investigation finally confirms, but that's the best

information we have at present," end quote.

In your view, was this, again, Ambassador Rice's attempt to

bookend and reinforce her previous statement that the facts were still

developing, that there was an investigation going on, and, as a result,

the information was subject to change?

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A Yes.

Q In your view and if you recall based on either your

conversations with Ambassador Rice or, again, just your own view, was

this in any way -- what she just said here in this transcript, was this

in any way meant to express that she was sharing with the American people

the definitive and final accounting of what took place in Benghazi that

night?

A No.

Q Was she in any way trying to indicate that she was conveying

the definitive, final accounting of what was happening throughout the

region at this time?

A No.

Q In fact, it appears that it was, you know, her goal -- she

was intending to make very clear that the government's understanding

was actually potentially subject to change as facts on the ground

developed and the investigation continued. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

If we can now turn to CBS's "Face the Nation" on page 8. And,

once again, we have Ambassador Rice here talking to Mr. Schieffer, and

she begins her conversation with him talking about the FBI

investigation.

She says, quote, "Well, Bob, let me tell you what we understand

to be the assessment at present. First of all, very importantly, as

you discussed with the president, there is an investigation that the

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United States government will launch, led by the FBI that has begun."

And, again, what is your understanding of why Ambassador Rice

started with the FBI investigation and telling Mr. Schieffer that this

was the starting point and facts could develop over time?

A I believe she wanted to convey that what we understood at

present may not be the final facts as confirmed by the FBI

investigation.

Q She goes on to say, quote, "So we'll want to see the results

of that investigation to draw any definitive conclusions," end quote.

And, again, she begins to, you know, reiterate here that the FBI

investigation is ongoing and, as a result, you know, it's generally

impossible to ascertain definitively what had happened at this time

given the situation on the ground. Is that your understanding, as

well?

A Yes.

Q She continues, quote, "But based on the best information

we have to date, what our assessment is as of the present is in fact

what -- it began spontaneously in Benghazi as a reaction to what

transpired some hours earlier in Cairo, where, of course, as you know,

there was violent protest outside of our embassy sparked by this hateful

video," end quote.

And, once again, does it appear as if Ambassador Rice's language

with respect to Benghazi here, does it track the intelligence

community's language in the talking points that were provided to her

in preparation for these shows with respect to Benghazi?

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A Yes.

Q And can we just compare these very quickly, once again.

Going back to exhibit 1, the first point, she uses the word

"spontaneously." She references the Cairo events as the inspiration

as the cause of that reaction. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q Moving on to NBC "Meet the Press" on page 12, we see

Ambassador Rice still following this general pattern with respect to

referencing the FBI investigation.

At the outset, she says, quote -- and this is her first quote on

page 12. "Well let us -- let me tell you the best information we have

at present. First of all, there's an FBI investigation which is

ongoing and we look to that investigation to give us the definitive

word as to what transpired," end quote.

So, again, she begins her answer with the FBI investigation and

the warning that the information that she has at that time was not

definitive. Is that your understanding?

A Yes.

Q She then goes on to state, quote, "But putting together the

best information that we have available to us today, our current

assessment is that what happened in Benghazi was, in fact, initially

a spontaneous reaction to what had just transpired hours before in

Cairo," end quote.

Does that statement again emphasize that Ambassador Rice's was

working off, quote, "the best information to date"?

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A Yes.

Q Does it reference the spontaneous language we just looked

at in the intelligence community's talking points in exhibit 1?

A Does it -- I'm sorry, does it --

Q Does it track that same language --

A Yes.

Q -- with respect to using the word "spontaneous"? And it

repeats the Cairo reference that we also see here in bullet point 1

of the intelligence community's talking points on exhibit 1. Is that

correct?

A Yes.

Q Ambassador Rice continues to call these, quote,

"opportunistic extremist elements came to the consulate as this was

unfolding," end quote.

Does that language track the intelligence community's talking

point that there are, quote, "indications that extremists participated

in the violent demonstrations"? And this is the language that comes

from the last sentence of the intelligence community's first talking

point in exhibit 1.

A Yes.

Q So you see that the two seem to track each other, is that

your understanding, what Ambassador Rice said with respect to

opportunistic extremist elements and what the intelligence community

says in the last sentence of bullet point 1? Is that your

understanding?

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And take a second to just compare them.

A Yes.

Q Going back to exhibit 2, Ambassador Rice says about a little

further up than midway on page 12, quote, "Obviously, that's -- that's

our best judgment now. We'll await the results of the investigation

and the President has been very clear. We'll work with the Libyan

authorities to bring those responsible to justice," end quote.

Once again, we see another caveat here. Ambassador Rice says

that the FBI investigation will continue; that's going to be the

definitive word as to what transpired.

And, again, is it your understanding that this was what appears

to be happening? Ambassador Rice is offering a caveat to say, we need

to see what's going to happening based on the FBI investigation?

A Yes.

Q Let's move to "Fox News Sunday." And this is page 23 of

exhibit 2.

And Ambassador Rice begins by saying, quote, "Well, first of all,

Chris, we are obviously investigating this very closely. The FBI has

a lead in this investigation," end quote.

And, once again, is it your understanding that Ambassador Rice

is beginning her conversation with Fox News here by referencing the

FBI investigation because it would be providing definitive answers as

more facts were ascertained? Is that your understanding?

A Yes.

Q She goes on to say, quote, "The information, the best

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information and the best assessment we have today is that in fact this

was not a preplanned, premeditated attack. That what happened

initially was that it was a spontaneous reaction to what had just

transpired in Cairo as a consequence of the video," end quote.

And if we can compare what Ambassador Rice just says here in the

transcript, does it appear as if she's once again tracking the

intelligence community's talking points and the language that we have

in bullet point 1 in exhibit 1?

A Yes.

Q Are those two things consistent, in your view?

A Yes.

Q She then states, "Obviously, we will wait for the results

of the investigation and we don't want to jump to conclusions before

then. But I do think it's important for the American people to know

our best current assessment," end quote.

In your view, once again, is Ambassador Rice bookending

her conversation with Fox News by saying that the information we have

is the best right now but it could change as we garner more facts down

the road?

A Yes.

Q So, based on this exercise we just did of comparing

Ambassador Rice's statements on the Sunday morning shows to the

intelligence community's talking points, would it be fair to say that

when addressing the Benghazi attacks specifically on her various

appearances on the Sunday morning shows that Ambassador Rice adhered

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to the language of these talking points pretty consistently and pretty

closely?

A Yes.

Q Great.

So I alluded to very briefly that Ambassador Rice's appearances

on these shows has garnered scrutiny, has generated some controversy,

and there's been a lot of examination of what she said since then. And

we've just done this exercise comparing the intelligence community's

talking points, the ones that she relied on when talking about Benghazi

on these shows, to what she actually said.

On April 18th, 2013, the Director of the National Intelligence

Agency, James Clapper, he testified before the Senate Armed Services

Committee. And, referring to Ambassador Rice, he said, quote, "I

thought it was unfair because the hit she took, I didn't think it was

appropriate. She was going on what we had given her, and that was our

collective best judgment at the time as to what should have been said,"

end quote.

Do you agree with DNI Director Clapper here that it appeared that

Ambassador Rice was relying on the intelligence talking points, which

reflected the intelligence community's best assessment of what had

happened at the time, when she was talking about Benghazi on these

Sunday morning shows?

A Yes.

Q Despite the intelligence community having said this now

publicly a few times, Ambassador Rice continues to garner criticism

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for what she said. And I just want to ask you a few questions about

that, as well.

Appearing on the Hugh Hewitt radio show on May 7th, 2013, Chairman

Gowdy stated, quote, "We know that we were lied to. I think I can prove

tomorrow that it was an intentional misrepresentation by Susan Rice

and others," end quote. And that's a pretty serious allegation, so

I want to give you the opportunity in the time we have remaining to

respond to some of this.

Were you at all involved in any plan or any process to deliberately

cause Ambassador Rice to misrepresent the facts to the American people

for political purposes on the Sunday morning talk shows following the

attacks?

A I was not.

Q Was it ever your sense that statements Ambassador Rice made

on the Sunday talk shows were meant to deliberately mislead the American

people about the Benghazi attacks for political purposes?

A No.

Q Is it your understanding that Ambassador Rice, to the best

of her ability, attempted to follow the intelligence community's

talking points and press guidance that she understood to be the

collective best assessment at that time of what had taken place in

Benghazi on September 11, 2012?

A Yes.

Q Do you believe Ambassador Rice at any point during her

appearances on the Sunday talk shows or elsewhere with respect to the

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Benghazi attacks deliberately downplayed some facts or emphasized

others in order to favor a particular political narrative?

A No.

Q Were you aware or involved in perpetuating any kind of

intentionally false or misleading narrative about the Benghazi

attacks?

A I was not.

Q Did anyone ever pressure you to say anything about the

Benghazi attacks that you believe to be false or inaccurate?

A No.

Q Did anyone else working on any statement, talking points,

or any other remarks about the attacks ever tell you that they had been

pressured into making changes that they believed to be false?

A No.

Q What's your response to this general allegation or these

set of allegations that I've just enumerated with respect to that there

was intentional misleading by the Ambassador or others working for her

to deliberately mislead the American people, if you have any response?

A It's frustrating. And I think those of us who give our

lives to public service expect more. And I also think it does a

disservice to our colleagues whose lives were lost to perpetuate

conspiracy theories.

Q At this time, I would like to enter into the record exhibit

No. 3.

[ Exhibit No. 3

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Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. DESAI:

Q And I'll just give you a few moments to review what I've

just handed you, Ms. .

All set?

A Yes.

Q So I've just handed you exhibit No. 3. This is an email

dated September the 14th, 2012. It has a document ID of C05415285.

It has a subject line, quote, "PREP CALL with Susan; Saturday at 4:00

pm ET," end quote. There's a timestamp here at the top of page 1 of

8:09 p.m.

And what I'd like to do, actually, is start at the beginning of

this email chain, which I believe begins on page 4 of the document.

So what appears here is that Mr. Dag Vega, who you I believe were

discussing with my colleague in the last round, sends an email to a

host of individuals. And he says, quote, "We plan to hold a call on

Saturday at 4:00 PM ET to help prepare Susan for her interviews on the

Sunday shows. She will appear on all of them," end quote.

Just as an initial matter, do you recall whether or not some

version of this email or the information that's being conveyed in this

email, which we'll talk about here in a second, was actually sent to

Ambassador Rice at any point?

A No.

Q In an instance where the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. will

be publicly representing the United States on a matter such as this,

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is it, I'll say, usual or routine practice for Ambassador Rice's office

to coordinate with the White House and other stakeholders in the

government that would have equities involved in what's going to be

discussed on those shows?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

So Mr. Vega sends the email. He then conveys a certain amount

of information here. So it's the dial-in for the call. And he then

has, "Here are the promos," is what he says. And we appear to have

promos from at least four of the shows, NBC "Meet the Press," ABC "This

Week," CBS's "Face the Nation," and then "Fox News Sunday" on the next

page.

So if I can just make sure I understand what these promos are,

are these the kinds -- what's being conveyed here? Is this the

information or the kinds of questions or discussion topics that this

particular show or shows were planning to discuss with Ambassador Rice

when she appears on their network? Is that right?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And the promos that are here from these various shows

that are enumerated on this page, are they created exclusively by the

shows themselves or the producers of those particular shows?

A Yes, as far as I know.

Q Your office or anyone at USUN or Ambassador Rice's office

would not play any role in formulating the discussion topics or the

information that's being conveyed in these promos here. Is that

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correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay.

And the reason that these are helpful, from what I can tell, is

that they help Ambassador Rice's office and yourself and the others

to adequately prepare her for the full range of questions and discussion

topics that she's likely to get once she's on the show. Is that

correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

So it would be fair to say, then, that these promos are, you know,

highlighting plans to discuss a fairly broad range of foreign policy

issues that, in fact, do include the Benghazi attacks but are not

limited to just the Benghazi attacks but, rather, cover a much broader

span of subjects, including violence that was afflicting the region

at this time. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q So, as you were helping Ambassador Rice prepare -- and let

me step back for a second. Did you help her prepare for these shows?

A I did.

Q And as you were helping her prepare, would it be fair, then,

to say, at least based on these promos -- and we can go through them,

but -- that you're preparing her for, again, a fairly wide range of

topics with respect to what's happening in the region at this time,

not just exclusively the Benghazi attacks? Is that correct?

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A Yes.

Q Okay.

If I can focus your attention to the very first page of exhibit

3. And so Mr. Vega sent this out. It looks like Mr. Rhodes responds

to a bunch of folks, and there's a certain amount of information here.

And it looks like we have, broadly speaking, three categories:

"Goals" at the very top of the page, with some information; "Top-lines"

at the middle of the page, with some information; and then the second

page begins with some questions and answers.

Is that a fair characterization of what this is?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

If I can turn your attention to the last section, the question

and answers, first, on page 2, and if I can have you just review those

Q&A's very briefly. I'm just going to ask you a couple of questions

about what's written here.

A Just page 2?

Q Yeah. Just the Q&A, which goes on to page 3, as well.

Okay. So, as an initial matter, as I review this, these two

pages, the Q&A, these presumably aren't affirmative statements that

Ambassador Rice is going to make on these shows. Is that right? And

by that, I mean, by contrast, these are questions that she's

anticipating or that your team is anticipating she could potentially

be asked on these shows based on the promos you've received. Is that

fair?

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A Yes.

Q Okay.

A I would add --

Q Please.

A -- it was also based on my professional judgment.

Q Okay.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Although you weren't the author of this

particular document.

Ms. That is right.

BY MR. DESAI:

Q And as you've gone through these Q&A's on page 2 and 3, the

way I've read it is that there's actually only one question about

Benghazi out of all the questions that are outlined here. And that

question is at the bottom of page 2, which I believe is the third

question and answer. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q The two questions preceding that question focus on the Arab

Spring. And then the questions afterwards talk about, it looks like,

the Presidential election. Romney's advisers have some comments on

what's happening. And then it looks like the questions at the end of

page 3 deal with Israel and Iran. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q And I think what you had mentioned to my colleague in the

last hour was that these questions on Israel and Iran you guys were

anticipating based on the promos, also because I think you guys knew

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that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would be appearing on

these shows, as well. Is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay.

So, just to be clear, the only mention of Benghazi out of all these

Q&A's is the third question, the last one on page 2. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

With respect to that question about Benghazi, the third question

at the end of page 2, the question says, quote, "What's your response

to the Independent story that says we have intelligence 48 hours in

advance of the Benghazi attack that was ignored? Was this an

intelligence failure?", end quote.

And the proposed answer here says, quote, "We are not aware of

any actionable intelligence indicating that an attack on the U.S.

Mission in Benghazi was planned or imminent. The currently available

information suggests that the demonstrations in Benghazi were

spontaneously inspired by the protests at the US Embassy in Cairo and

evolved into a direct assault against the US Consulate and subsequently

its annex," end quote.

If I could have you compare that sentence starting with "The

currently available information" with the language, again, in the

intelligence community's talking points in exhibit 1, just to see if

the two track each other, if the answer provided here in question three

is consistent with the language provided by the intelligence community

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in exhibit 1.

A Yes.

Q It does. And there are a couple of small differences, I

know. I think the answer here in question three refers to the Benghazi

consulate and the other is a mission. But, despite those two minor

differences, is it fair to say that the language in the sentences are

identical?

And I'll give you a second just to compare those.

A Yes.

Q Okay.

And I know in the last hour you had some discussion with my

colleague about what the focus of the shows were, how much Benghazi

comprised of the focus. But what I would like to do is look at the

document more broadly. And we've done some of that already by looking

at the promos and the information that was being conveyed.

Jay Carney, who was the White House spokesperson at the time, has

characterized this email publicly during a press conference, I believe,

and this is what he said about it. Quote, "In fact, this was not. It

was explicitly not about Benghazi. It was about the overall situation

in the region, the Muslim world, where you saw protests outside of

embassy facilities across the region, including Cairo, Sana'a,

Khartoum, and Tunis," end quote -- sorry, not end quote.

He then continued, quote, "This was part of our effort to explain

our views both as a matter of policy and as a matter of what was happening

on the ground with regards to the protests that were underway around

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the region," end quote. Some complex syntax there. I apologize.

So what he seems to be saying is that this wasn't just about

Benghazi, right? The shows were not just about what happened that one

night in Benghazi specifically or exclusively, but, rather, this was

attempting to take a larger view of the region and what was going on.

And he mentions Cairo, Sana'a, Khartoum, and Tunis.

Can you give me your impression of how you read Mr. Rhodes' email

here and the information that was being conveyed and whether, in your

view, they're talking specifically about Benghazi or, rather, are they

focused on broader issues in the region and what was going on at the

time more generally? And if I could just get your sense on that,

please.

A Sure. The email from Ben Rhodes, in my estimation, was

about the developments that were unfolding at the time across the

Islamic world. They were not specifically focused on Benghazi, with

the exception of the question and answer we have already discussed.

Q Okay. So would it be fair to say that your view seems to

be more or less consistent with Mr. Carney's view here, what he conveyed

in this press conference in May of 2014, that this email, the

information enumerated within it, wasn't, again, just about Benghazi

but about the larger unrest in the region and what was happening writ

large in the Islamic world during this time period?

A Yes.

Mr. Desai. We can go off the record. Thank you.

[Recess.]

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[1:34 p.m.]

Mr. Desai. Let's go back on the record. The time is

approximately 1:34 p.m.

BY MR. DESAI:

Q Ms. if I can just refocus your attention to exhibit

3, which we were talking about before we went on break. And, in the

last hour, you went through the question-and-answer section of the

document. I wanted to focus your attention now on the "Goals" section,

which appears at the top of page 1.

And, again, if you've already answered this, I'll apologize, but

did you have any role in formulating or drafting any of the goals that

are enumerated under this section on page 1 of exhibit 3?

A No.

Q Okay.

And if I can actually focus your attention first on the second

goal here, which says, quote, "to underscore that these protests are

rooted in an Internet video, and not a broader failure of policy," end

quote.

And so these goals, this email comes from Mr. Rhodes. Mr. Rhodes

has indicated to us that, with respect to this specific goal that I

just read to you, what he was referring to, again, was the ongoing

protests that were taking place and occurring across the region in the

Islamic world. And that's what this was referencing with respect to

"the protests are rooted in an Internet video, and not a broader failure

of policy."

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Is that your understanding, as well, when you read this specific

goal?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

And with regard to the ongoing unrest that's being referenced here

in the region, if you know, what was the cause of this unrest that's

being referenced here?

A The attacks or protests at various diplomatic facilities

across the Islamic world were spawned by a video.

Q Okay.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Is the video you're talking about the

"Innocence of Muslims" --

Ms. Yes.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. -- YouTube video?

BY MR. DESAI:

Q Okay. And do you in any way view this particular goal, the

second one I read to you just a minute ago, as an effort to somehow

mislead the public or spin the truth as to what was happening in the

region during this time?

A No.

Q If I can focus your attention to the first goal, now, under

that section, it states, quote, "to convey that the United States is

doing everything that we can to protect our people and facilities

abroad," end quote.

So, just to be clear, the unrest that we just mentioned here a

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minute ago, that unrest was still ongoing at this time. You said it

was, I believe, spreading through large parts of the Islamic world.

Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And, in your view, was it important for Ambassador

Rice to convey to the American public that, as this unrest is ongoing

in this region, that it's the U.S. Government's priority, top priority

rather, to ensure the safety and security and well-being of its

personnel abroad who are in this region that's being afflicted by this

violence?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A I would just note that --

Q Please.

A -- I think, when it says "our people," I think I interpret

that as Americans writ large. Because it's the responsibility of

American diplomats and personnel to protect U.S. interests, including

American citizens, all around the world.

Q Okay. So it's your understanding that that term is

encompassing not just diplomats or official U.S. Government personnel

but it's a top U.S. Government priority to protect all American

citizens --

A Yes.

Q -- in the region that are being affected by this violence.

Is that right?

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A Yes.

Q Okay.

And would it be fair to say that, at this time, as this unrest

is ongoing and these protests and this violence is ongoing in this

region, that there still existed a risk to the safety, security, and

well-being of Americans abroad in this region? Was that still a real

threat or risk, rather?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

And, again, just to be clear for the purposes of the record, this

wasn't some intentional effort to mislead the public into believing

that there was unrest when there, in fact, wasn't any, right? That's

not what was going on here.

A That's correct.

Q That there actually was unrest and there was protest and

there was violence. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And, rather, instead, that this was actually an

effort by the government and the administration to reassure the public

that the U.S. Government was doing everything it could to address the

unrest and to ensure the safety, security, and well-being of its

personnel and its citizens abroad?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

Moving to the third goal under that section, it says, quote, "to

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show that we will be resolute in bringing people who harm Americans

to justice, and standing steadfast through these protests."

Given the continuing concern about safety and security of our

personnel and of Americans in the region in the wake of these ongoing

protests and unrest in these countries, did you view this as a

prospective message to those abroad who are possibly contemplating

further violence or further activity against Americans and American

interests in the region, that this is basically saying, listen, if you

come after us, we're going to address it and come after you? Is that

a fair reading or interpretation of this particular goal?

A Yes, but I also interpret it as indicating that we will work

to bring those to justice who perpetrated the attacks that had already

taken place.

Q And that was attacks that happened anywhere in the region.

Is that right?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. So that would be the attacks both in

Benghazi where American lives were lost and the attacks in other areas

where, say, U.S. property was injured?

Ms. Yes.

BY MR. DESAI:

Q And then if I can just focus your attention to the very last

goal under this section, quote, "to reinforce the President and

Administration's strength and steadiness in dealing with difficult

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challenges," end quote.

Is this a common goal of the United States Government?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what do you understand to be the intent behind

this particular goal?

A To convey confidence to the American people that the

administration was doing everything it could to resolve the unrest.

Q And did you think it was important to assure the rest of

the world that the administration would remain strong and steady and

were, in fact, going to address the unrest as it was spreading through

this part of the world?

A Yes.

Mr. Desai. We can go off the record.

[Recess.]

Mr. Missakian. All right. Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Ms. , I just want to ask you some followup questions

about what was previously marked as exhibit 3, so if you could get that

in front of you.

I may have misheard what you said, but was this document, exhibit

3 to your interview here, part of the package that was provided to

Ambassador Rice to help her prepare for the talk shows?

A I don't recall specifically if this was inserted into that

package of information. I don't recall specifically.

Q Okay. To your knowledge, did Ambassador Rice have this as

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part of her preparation for the talk shows? And by "this," I mean

exhibit 3.

A I believe she had it in some form. I can't say specifically

whether I forwarded it to her or whether I took parts of it and included

it into her briefing book.

Q Okay. And how did you get the briefing book to her

physically?

A Because it was a compressed amount of time and we were

compiling information up till sort of the last moment, I was sending

information to Ambassador Rice's assistant, and she was finalizing the

book, and she ultimately delivered the book to Ambassador Rice.

Q Okay.

Our understanding is that Ambassador Rice was in Ohio someplace

on Saturday, September 15th. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q What was she doing in Ohio?

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I don't know that that's really any of our

business.

Mr. Missakian. If it was a personal trip, then obviously it's

not. If it was work-related, then you can say.

Ms. She was at a game of some kind.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Did you say "game"?

A Yeah, like a football game, I believe.

Q Oh, okay. Okay. So her assistant who physically

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delivered the binder to her, was that assistant in Ohio, as well?

A I believe that it was delivered to her when she returned

to Washington.

Q On that Saturday.

A Yes. I don't believe her assistant was in Ohio.

Q And what's the name of the assistant?

A

Q Do you have an understanding of the documents that were

included in the preparation binder?

A What do you mean by do I have an understanding?

Q Well --

A I had the primary --

Q -- my understanding is that a binder was prepared for her

to help her prep for the shows. Do you have an understanding of what

was in that binder?

A I had the primary responsibility for preparing her for the

shows.

Q Great. Then you're the best person to ask: What was in

the binder?

A I can't -- as I think I mentioned earlier today, I don't

recall exactly what was in the binder. But some of the things I recall

were in there include the latest developments around our embassy in

Tunisia; our embassy in Sana'a, Yemen; the latest developments in

Sudan; our policy regarding Iran and its nuclear program; and the HPSCI

talking points on the Benghazi attack.

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Q I'll ask you about the HPSCI talking points because at least

there's some confusion in my mind about whether or not those talking

points were in the binder or not.

But what you just told me were kind of the topics of information

that were in the binder. What I'm asking you is what specific documents

do you recall being in the binder.

A Our briefing book, for lack of a better term, is comprised

of talking points, not of documents per se.

Q And now you've lost me. How would a talking point be

conveyed other than within a document?

A I mean, ultimately there was one document, of which many

sources of information were included.

Q I see. And who prepared that one document?

A Well, I had a role in it, had a role in it, and my

deputy, , had a role in it.

Q So it was a document, if I understand you, that was prepared

by the three of you, using information received from other sources?

A Maybe it would be helpful to explain generally how a

briefing book is put together.

Q It may well be. Please.

A When the Ambassador had any kind of public appearance, it

was my responsibility to prepare her or ensure that she was prepared

for said public appearance. And what we would do -- "we" meaning me

and my staff -- was to compile anticipated questions and suggested

answers to a variety of topics. That general process took place in

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preparation for Ambassador Rice's Sunday show appearances.

Q Okay. And where did you get the source information, if you

will, that was then reflected in the talking points document that you

and your colleagues prepared?

A As is customary, I assembled the information from a variety

of sources, including from State Department press guidance, from White

House press guidance. And as is often the case with situations that

are unfolding in real time, there is no press guidance yet available.

So I'm using my judgment and working with counterparts to develop

appropriate responses for public consumption that convey our best

information to the American public.

Q Okay.

So it doesn't sound like this document that was prepared for

Ambassador Rice was a very long document, or was it?

Mr. Su. So you should answer the question, but I want to make

sure that you are distinguishing between general process as opposed

to the document, you know, for the Benghazi shows. So just make that

clear in your answer so the record is clear.

Ms. I don't recall the length of the briefing book in

this case. But, generally, for something as broad as five Sunday show

appearances, in which you're dealing with multiple subject matters,

the document is fairly substantial.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Would the document consist of both the talking points that

you and your colleagues had compiled as well as the source information

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that you were relying on? Or would the briefing book be limited to

just the talking points document that we've been discussing? And now

I'm referring specifically to the binder that was used on September

15th.

A I don't recall the binder, the briefing book, for that day

with great clarity. But, generally, we only include talking points

and anticipated questions and suggested answers.

Q And, to your best recollection, were the HPSCI talking

points included in the binder that you put together?

A So, to clarify, I was sending information to to

compile the final binder, because I was collecting it in real time,

and we had only a small window in which to get the materials to

Ambassador Rice the evening of September 15th. So I don't know whether

the HPSCI points were part of that package or were given to her

separately.

Q So I gather that you did not send the HPSCI talking points

to

A I don't recall.

Q Is it possible that you did?

A It is possible.

Q Okay.

Let's go back to exhibit 3 just so I can ask a few followup

questions here.

Did you have any discussions with Ben Rhodes about what we're

looking at here on exhibit 3?

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A Yes.

Q Okay. When did you have those discussions with him?

A The afternoon of Friday, September 14th.

Q Okay. Did anybody else participate in the discussion?

A No.

Q Was it one discussion or more than one?

A I don't recall.

Q When you had the discussion, did you have this document or

a version of this document in front of you?

A No. As I mentioned earlier, I asked him to prepare this

document.

Q Right. So my question is, did you have a conversation with

him about this document?

A My conversation with him was specifically for him to develop

this document. I did not --

Q So the conversation you had was before he had drafted the

document.

A That's correct.

Q Did you have any conversations with him after he drafted

it?

A Not that I recall.

Q Okay. So you don't have any firsthand knowledge, for

example, about what he intended by the first bullet point under "Goals."

Is that fair?

A Could you repeat the question?

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Q Sure. You were asked a number of questions about your

understanding of various statements within exhibit 3, and you gave your

understanding. I'm just trying to understand what your understanding

was based on. Was it based on something Mr. Rhodes told you about what

he meant, or is it based on something else?

A I think it's based on my experience as a communications

professional.

Q Okay. Fair enough.

So let's look at number one here under the "Goals" section. And

it says, quote, "to convey that the United States is doing everything

that we can to protect our people and facilities abroad."

And you testified that it was your understanding that the

reference to "our people" was not just our people at our diplomatic

facilities but Americans anywhere in foreign countries around the

world.

And that understanding was not based on anything Mr. Rhodes told

you but, now you say, based on your professional experience. So

explain to me how your professional experience led you to conclude that

"our people" included Americans generally as opposed to those just at

our diplomatic facilities.

A I was a U.S. foreign service officer for nearly a decade,

and our number-one job as diplomats is to protect U.S. interests and

Americans overseas.

Q I understand that, but your statement was attributing an

intent to Mr. Rhodes. And I'm trying to understand how your experience

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led you to interpret what Mr. Rhodes meant in using that phrase.

A This language is consistent with practice by U.S.

Government communications professionals.

Q So every time the phrase "our people" is used it is meant

to refer to Americans generally?

A I can't say that.

Q What actually was done in the context of the unrest in the

Middle East to protect Americans generally?

A I think many things were done. But, in some cases, we drew

down our diplomatic personnel --

Q Just to be clear, I'm not talking about what was done at

diplomatic facilities. I'm talking about what was done to protect

Americans outside those diplomatic facilities.

Mr. Su. To the extent you know.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q To the extent you know.

A We also issued travel warnings to Americans and clarified

information regarding the security situation in a number of countries

around the Islamic world.

Q Okay. Anything else?

A We also --

Q Besides the traveling warnings.

A We also worked with the host governments in many of these

countries to ensure they were as dedicated as we were to protecting

Americans and American interests in their countries.

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Q Okay.

Mr. Su. One second?

Mr. Missakian. Sure.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. I would just add that I'm not aware of everything

that was done, but I am aware of some things as they were reported or

conveyed publicly during that time.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Okay. But you weren't involved directly in anything that

was being done around the globe, were you?

A No.

Q Now, let's drop down to the second bullet there, and I'll

quote: "To underscore that these protests are rooted in an Internet

video, and not a broader failure of policy," end quote.

I believe you said that your understanding of that bullet point

was consistent with Mr. Rhodes' understanding. And although you

didn't speak to Mr. Rhodes, tell us what your understanding of that

second bullet is based upon.

A The protests, broadly speaking, in the Islamic world were

inspired by the YouTube video, "Innocence of Muslims" I believe it was

called.

Q Let me get at it a different way. It's your view, I gather,

that that second bullet was not meant to apply to Benghazi. Is that

fair?

A I think the goal of that point is speaking broadly to

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protests as they were occurring across the Islamic world.

Q So would it have included Benghazi?

A I don't know.

Q You don't know one way or the other?

A I don't know the specific intent of that bullet.

Q Okay.

Now, you were asked some questions about the next bullet, number

three, again, quoting: "To show that we will be resolute in bringing

people who harm Americans to justice, and standing steadfast through

these protests," end quote.

And I think you were asked by Mr. Desai whether that was intended

to apply prospectively. For example, if somebody harmed an American

in the future, that we were sending a message that we would bring those

people to justice. And you said you also believed, I think -- correct

me if I'm wrong -- that this was intended to apply to the folks who

had harmed the Americans in Benghazi. Is that correct?

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I'm not sure that the question ever asked

her what the intent of the author of the document was. I believe that

all the questions just referred to what her reading of the document

was.

Mr. Missakian. Well, that's the same thing.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. No, that's not true.

Mr. Missakian. We can have the record speak for itself.

Do you understand my question?

Ms. Could you repeat it, please?

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Mr. Missakian. Sure. You were asked some questions about how

you understood bullet number three. So, in essence, they were asking

you what the drafter had in that person's mind.

So my understanding is that what you stated was that this was meant

not only to apply prospectively, as they tried to get you to say, but

it also applied --

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. All right, this is just getting a little

ridiculous.

Mr. Missakian. -- it also applied --

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. You have now --

Mr. Missakian. Susanne, can you please --

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. -- in our question.

Mr. Missakian. Can you please try for once just to act

professionally? You'll have your time to clean it up if you want to.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I think --

Mr. Missakian. This is my time. Please stop.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. -- you have used your time to misrepresent

what we said on the record -- what she said and what we said.

Mr. Missakian. I did not misrepresent anything. I did not

misrepresent a single thing. You know exactly what you tried to do.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I know exactly what was said, and I know

exactly what we did. And we asked for her --

Mr. Missakian. So do I, and so does the record. And we'll let

the record speak for itself.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I'm happy to. Then let the --

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Mr. Missakian. Great. Let's move on.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. -- record speak for itself, and you can

stop saying what we said or what we intended to say since you clearly

don't have a good understanding of that.

Mr. Missakian. I have an absolute crystal-clear understanding

of what you attempted to do. So does the record. I'm happy to let

the record speak for itself. I assume you're not because you keep

talking.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q So let me try to ask the question again. And I apologize

for the interruption.

The third bullet states "to show that we will be resolute in

bringing people who harm Americans to justice, and standing steadfast

through these protests," end quote.

You were asked some questions about the intent of that bullet,

and the suggestion was that that bullet might apply prospectively. And

I believe you said that it was also your view that that was intended

to cover the Americans who had been harmed in Benghazi, as well. Is

that correct?

And if I have your testimony wrong, all you have to do is say,

yes, you've got it wrong and tell me why.

A I would add to what you said that I interpret it as meaning

that the United States will be resolute in bringing people who harm

Americans and American facilities to justice. So I would include in

that what happened in Cairo and in Tunisia, for example.

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Q And in Benghazi.

A Yes.

Q Now, as part of one of the questions you were asked -- was

to suggest that this bullet would also apply to U.S. property that,

I think the term was, injured. Do you recall being asked that?

A Yes.

Q Okay. But you would agree that there's no mention of U.S.

property in this bullet; it solely refers to people who harm Americans.

Is that fair?

A It's true.

Q So where are you getting the understanding that this was

also intended to apply to U.S. property in addition to American people?

A I think that these goals are -- they're general statements.

They're not meant to be inclusive of -- or exclusive of -- inclusive

of everything, that this is all that the goals should be. This is a

roadmap for the goals, and I can interpret them the way that I think

is appropriate.

Q But your interpretation is not based on anything that the

drafter, Mr. Rhodes, said to you. In other --

A That's true.

Q True. Okay.

Now, you were read a statement by Mr. Carney, and I'll read it

to you again. Mr. Carney said, quote, "Correct, but you misstated it.

In fact, this was not -- it was explicitly not about Benghazi."

And my understanding, based on the question, although I don't have

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it here, is that Mr. Carney was referring to what's been marked as

exhibit 3 to your interview. Is that your understanding?

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Would you like a copy of the document?

Ms. I don't understand the question. Are you asking me

if Jay Carney's statement is pertaining to this document?

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Yes.

The part that I quoted is at the very bottom. Maybe if we look

a little bit ahead.

Yes, I believe he is talking about this. Because, earlier,

there's a question, "Jay, I guess you're aware that Judicial Watch

obtained an email from Ben Rhodes to staff members about the Benghazi

attack." So it's my best belief that he is referring to exhibit 3.

Mr. Carney says, "In fact, this was not -- it was explicitly not

about Benghazi." So when I hear that, when I hear the word "explicit,"

I expect to see something in here that says this is not about Benghazi,

this is intended to apply to everything but Benghazi. I don't see that

here. But you seem to agree with Mr. Carney's statement, and I'd just

like to know why.

A I agree with Mr. Carney saying it was about the overall

situation in the region, the Muslim world.

Q Okay. So then you disagree with his statement that this,

exhibit 3, was explicitly not about Benghazi.

A I think you can interpret that statement in different ways.

Q Okay. How would you interpret it?

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A I think if -- I can't speak for Mr. Carney, but my

interpretation of what he meant here was that this is not specifically

about Benghazi, that exhibit 3 is about the region writ large.

Q Yeah, I understand that. But Mr. Carney is very specific.

He says this, exhibit 3, is explicitly not about Benghazi. But I don't

see any statement in here where Mr. Rhodes excludes Benghazi from what

is being said here, which, in my mind, would be explicit.

A Again --

Mr. Su. Wait -- well, wait for the question.

What is the question?

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q The question is: You seem to agree with Mr. Carney's

statement. Do you agree that there's nothing explicit in exhibit 3

that excludes Benghazi?

A I agree -- what I will say is I can't speak for Mr. Carney,

but the way that I interpret what he was saying is that this is about

the region writ large, not specifically about Benghazi. As for whether

Benghazi is part of this or not, I cannot speak for Mr. Rhodes and his

intent in this document.

Q Okay. That's fair. Thank you.

You were also asked a question about whether you believed

Ambassador Rice had either done her best or done to the best of her

ability to adhere to the HPSCI talking points in the statements that

she made on the Sunday talk shows. Do you recall being asked those

questions?

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A Yes.

Q And you said that it was your belief that she did her best

or to the best of her ability to adhere to the HPSCI talking points.

What is that conclusion based upon? Did you have a conversation with

Ambassador Rice in which she told you that I did my best to adhere to

the talking points? Or was it based on something else?

A My assessment is based on my reading of her transcripts and

my understanding at the moment of what she said.

Q And your understanding at the moment -- so if I understand

what you're saying, is your view that she did her best was you doing

your kind of own word-for-word comparison between HPSCI talking points

and the transcripts of those shows?

A I would caveat your statement by saying that I'm not

evaluating her on a word-by-word basis. I'm evaluating her intent and

effort to maintain fidelity to the talking points. But whether or not

it's word-for-word accurate is not how I establish -- or evaluate her.

Q Right. You're evaluating her intent based on your own

personal comparison of the two, the HPSCI talking points with what she

said on the shows.

A Can you repeat the question again?

Q Sure. You came to a conclusion about her intent, which you

were very happy to share with my colleagues from the minority. Would

it be fair to say that your conclusion about her intent was based on

your personal comparison of the HPSCI talking points to what you

understood her to have said on the talk shows?

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A Yes. But it's also based on my experience working with

Ambassador Rice.

Q Anything else besides that?

A Not that I can think of.

Q Did you take part in what we understand to have been a prep

call on Saturday, September 15th, to prepare Ambassador Rice for the

talk shows?

A Yes.

Q Who else took part in that call, to your knowledge?

A I recall Ambassador Rice participating, Ben Rhodes

participating, Dag Vega, and David Plouffe.

Q Had you participated in similar prep calls in the past with

Ambassador Rice?

A Could you be more specific?

Q Sure. Had Ambassador Rice appeared on the talk shows at

any point in the past? Come to think of it, I guess you hadn't been

there that long. So was this the first time you had participated in

a prep session with Ambassador Rice?

A For Sunday shows, yes.

Q Yes.

Mr. Su. I'm sorry, Craig. Would you mind, just for the record,

introducing your colleague?

Mr. Missakian. Oh, sorry. This is Mac Tolar. He's another

attorney from the majority staff.

Mr. Su. Thank you.

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BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q So I gather this was the first time you had prepared with

Ambassador Rice during your time working for the USUN. Is that

correct?

A For Sunday show appearances, yes.

Q Had you taken part in preparing Ambassador Rice while you

were working at the NSC?

A Not for Sunday show appearances, no.

Q For any sort of appearances?

A I prepared her once for an interview, but it wasn't a Sunday

show interview.

Q Do you have any understanding of why Mr. Plouffe was a

participant in this particular prep session?

A No.

Q Did he say anything during the call?

A I don't recall.

Q Okay. Tell us about what you recall from this telephone

call.

A I recall generally preparing her for what we expected she

would discuss the following day on the Sunday shows.

Q Did the topic of Benghazi come up?

A I don't recall.

Q Do you recall who was doing most of the talking?

A I don't recall.

Q Do you recall anything Mr. Rhodes said during the call?

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A I don't recall.

Q Do you recall anything that Ambassador Rice said during the

call?

A I don't recall.

Q Okay. Do you recall anything that was said during this

call?

A Not specifically, no.

Q Generally?

A I just remember that we were preparing for the appearances.

Q Where were you during the prep call?

A I was in my hotel room.

Q Which city?

A In Washington.

Q Had you flown down that day?

A I had taken the train down.

Q Okay. Would that have been typical?

A This was my first Sunday show with Ambassador Rice.

Q Would that have been typical for the person in your

position, to come down to be in the same city with her for the Sunday

talk shows?

A Yes.

Q And was anybody in the hotel room with you, or were you just

there on the phone by yourself?

A I was by myself.

Q And where was Ambassador Rice at this point?

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A I don't know.

Q And do you recall having in front of you the same materials

that Ambassador Rice had been given to prepare herself for the shows?

A I -- no.

Q Like, for example, do you recall anyone saying, okay, let's

flip to page X of the binder and discuss that?

A No, I don't recall that.

Q So, as you sit here today, it sounds like you don't recall

too much about that call.

A I don't recall specific details about the call, no.

Q It doesn't sound like you even have a general recollection.

Mr. Su. She's testified as to what she recalls.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q All right. Well, we know you were there to prepare for the

talk shows. You don't have to remember anything that was said on the

call to know that. That was the purpose of it, correct? I'm asking

you if you remember anything generally that was discussed during the

call.

A I remember very -- I don't remember a lot of specifics about

particular topics that we were preparing for, no.

Q Okay. What do you recall generally having been discussed?

A I remember discussing that Prime Minister Netanyahu would

be on two of the Sunday shows.

Q As you sit here today, that's all you can recall?

A Yes.

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Q Okay. Do you remember whether or not the people on the call

had the HPSCI talking points during the call or whether they came later?

It's unclear at this point whether they were there during the call or

whether they came later.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Is it?

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q What do you think?

A I don't remember the exact time in which I received the HPSCI

talking points.

Q Okay. So it's unclear in your mind whether they were there

during the call or after.

A Yes.

Q How long did the call last?

A I don't know.

Q Give us an estimate.

Mr. Su. If you can. If not, then you can't.

Ms. Around an hour.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Did you have any calls with anybody after that initial call

to discuss the Sunday talk shows?

A I don't recall the sequence of my discussions with -- that

day. But I recall speaking with Toria Nuland that afternoon to

understand what was happening in some of the countries where there had

been threats against our diplomatic facilities.

Q So this call with Ms. Nuland, you believe it occurred on

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that Saturday, the 15th, but --

A Yes.

Q -- you don't know if it occurred before or after this prep

call that we've been talking about.

A Yes.

Q Do you recall the topic of Benghazi coming up in your call

with Ms. Nuland?

A No.

Q Other than the prep call, that call with Ms. Nuland, do you

recall any other telephone calls either that day or the next day about

the Sunday talk shows?

A I was in touch with Ambassador Rice's assistant throughout

Saturday to coordinate the prep materials for the Ambassador.

Q Other than that, any other calls that you can remember?

A No.

Q Did you have any in-person meetings to discuss the talk

shows either that Saturday or the next day, Sunday?

A I went to Ambassador Rice's house the morning of the shows.

Q Was there anybody else there other than you and Ambassador

Rice, other than family members obviously?

A No. Her assistant,

Q It was just the three of you?

A Yes.

Q And what was the purpose of that meeting?

A We were accompanying her to the shows.

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Q So you were just picking her up?

A Yes, although I also came prepared to discuss what was in

the media from Saturday night to Sunday morning.

Q Is that something that you had collected on your own, or

had somebody collected it and provided it to you?

A I had done it myself.

Q And what did you do?

A Read the newspapers.

Q And what did you do with what you read? I mean, in other

words, for example, did you copy articles and have a stack of articles

that you brought with you? Did you just remember it all in your head?

What did you do?

A I brought the newspapers with me. I also had made notes.

Q And do you recall anything specific about the articles that

you were going to be highlighting to Ambassador Rice?

A No.

Q What do you recall about that discussion?

A I don't recall any specifics about the discussion.

Q Do you recall anything generally? Topics, Benghazi, the

region, Iran, anything like that?

A No.

Q Nothing whatsoever?

A No.

Q Do you have that material with you still?

A No.

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Q Okay. What happened to it?

A I recycled the newspapers, most likely.

Q Right. Of course. But you said you took notes. What

happened to your notes?

A I don't remember. I left the government several years ago.

Q How long did that meeting in the morning take, do you recall?

A No, I don't.

Q So you met with Ambassador Rice, prepared her a little bit

more, and then she did the shows. Was there any interaction with her

between the shows?

A Yes.

Q Okay. What was the nature of that?

A To escort her to the next show, to give her feedback on her

appearances, to provide any other context that might be useful for her

upcoming appearances, et cetera.

Q And do you recall any specific feedback that you gave her?

A No.

Q Do you recall any other substantive information that you

gave her that day?

A No.

Q Do you recall keeping anybody else up to speed or up to date

on what was occurring with Ambassador Rice on the talk shows?

A Yes.

Q Okay. What do you recall?

A I recall two things. One, I recall being in communication

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with the producers at each show to let them know when we were wrapping

up each show and headed to the next one. And I recall, at CBS, I sent

an email to Ben Rhodes.

Q I've got that email, actually. Did you review that email

prior to your deposition here today or your interview here today?

Mr. Su. It's privileged.

Mr. Missakian. Well, it's not, but I'll move on.

Let's mark this as exhibit 4, I believe.

[ Exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q All right. So I've just marked for the record a one-page

document that has document control number C05622905 at the top.

And it's an email, as you said, from you to -- well, it's two

emails, actually. The first one is from on September 16th,

9:41 a.m., to a number of people, including Benjamin Rhodes. I'll read

it into the record. The subject is "CBS."

"They open w Libyan President who says no doubt attack

preplanned/predetermined. Says planned by foreigners. Says maybe

better for FBI to stay away a little while though they need their help

w investigation."

Next sentence, "She said in all other shows that no evidence this

was premeditated, as we discussed."

Last line is "Just fyi."

Do you recall having drafted this email?

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A Yes.

Q And what was the -- why did you write this email?

A I wrote this email to alert Ben that what the Libyan

President had said on CBS was inconsistent with what Ambassador Rice

had said on the other shows that we had already taped.

Q Did that inconsistency concern you?

A No.

Q Why not?

A Because what Ambassador Rice said reflected the best

information that we had at the time.

Q So in response to hearing what the President of Libya said,

I gather you didn't do anything to see if something had been missed,

for example?

A I don't understand the question.

Q Well, you heard what the President of Libya said. If I'm

hearing you correctly, you immediately discounted it because it was

inconsistent with the HPSCI talking points. Is that fair?

Mr. Su. That's not what she said.

Mr. Missakian. Well, that's a question.

Mr. Su. You can answer that question. What was your --

Mr. Missakian. No -- please.

Ms. Can you repeat the question?

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Sure. Is it fair to say that when you heard the President

of Libya say the exact opposite of what Ambassador Rice said, you

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discounted it immediately because it was inconsistent with what the

HPSCI talking points provided?

A I discounted what the Libyan President said because, based

on my experience working

.

That, in addition to the fact that I knew Ambassador Rice was

presenting the best information that we had at the time, led me to not

be concerned with what he had said. I simply wanted to convey to my

colleagues that there was an inconsistency.

Q Okay.

And when you say in this second sentence "as we discussed," what

discussion were you referring to?

A I don't recall specifically.

Q Would it be fair to conclude that this was the discussion

from the day before?

A It's possible.

Q Okay. Because --

A I wouldn't assume it, but it's possible.

Q Well, I'm not aware of any other conversations that you had

with Benjamin Rhodes, Dag Vega, other than that one. Were there others

that you had with those two individuals?

A I had spoken with those individuals in the days proceeding

Sunday, yes.

Q Okay. So in any of those conversations that you had with

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Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Vega in the days prior to September 14th, did the

topic of whether Benghazi was premeditated or preplanned come up?

A First of all, I spoke with them on the 15th and on the 14th,

as I've already stated. I don't recall any conversations prior to the

14th with Ben or Dag.

Q Okay. So let's focus on -- so now we have -- at least in

my mind, there are two conversations with Mr. Rhodes and Mr. Vega, one

that occurred on the 15th, the Saturday, and then one that occurred,

apparently, on the 14th.

A I spoke with both Dag and Ben on the 14th but not together

that I can recall.

Q Not together. Okay.

So in your conversation with Mr. Vega on the 14th, do you have

any recollection that you discussed the issue of whether the attack

in Benghazi was preplanned or premeditated?

A No.

Q Is that something that you would have discussed with him

under any circumstances? In other words, one-on-one I mean.

A No.

Q We know that you spoke to Mr. Rhodes on the 14th, and

previously I think you testified that it was focused on Ambassador Rice

doing the talk shows. Do you recall that during that one or more

conversation you had with Mr. Rhodes on the 14th the issue of whether

or not Benghazi was premeditated or preplanned was discussed?

A No.

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Q And then we know you had a conversation with Mr. Rhodes,

Mr. Vega, and others on the 15th. So it is possible, I gather, that

the conversation that you're referring to, in fact, most likely is the

one that occurred on the 15th.

A It's possible.

Q Okay.

I'd like to mark as the next document in order exhibit No. 5.

[ Exhibit No. 5

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q For the record, this is a multipage document that has

document control number C05527792.

Ms. , this is an email. It's from , dated

September 12th, 2012, to a variety of people, including Susan Rice and

yourself. The subject is "Toria Nuland backgrounder on Libya."

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[2:31 p.m.]

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Do you recall this document?

A I recall the briefing. I don't recall the specific

document.

Q Okay. And "the briefing" meaning the background briefing

that we --

A Yes.

Q -- discussed earlier.

Would this be an example of the type of updates and information

that you were getting from the State Department throughout that entire

week about what had occurred in Benghazi?

A This was an email from my deputy to a number of my colleagues

summarizing a briefing that the State Department held.

Q So who is ?

A He was the deputy spokesperson at the U.S. Mission.

Q So most likely this is something that he received from the

State Department, then he was just circulating it within --

A No.

Q -- your group?

A This is his summary of a briefing that was held, of which

there is an actual transcript. This is not the transcript. This is

his notes.

Q Ah. Okay. Yeah, I understand it's not the transcript. I

didn't see here that this was -- it was his summary, though.

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A He notes at the top this is a nonverbatim summary.

Q Right. I understand it's a nonverbatim summary, but I just

didn't see that it was his summary that he had prepared. So your belief

is this is something that Mr. prepared himself.

A Yes.

Q So does that mean that he would have been on the call at

the time? Would that have been typical?

A Either he was on the call or he summarized the transcript.

Q Ah. So he may have received the transcript after the call

and then prepared this from the transcript.

A Yes.

Q Is that something that he ordinarily would have done within

the normal course of his job duties?

A Yeah.

Q And even though you don't, I gather, you don't recall this

email, but do you have any reason to believe that you did not receive

it at the time, at or about September 12th, almost 20 to 6:00?

A No.

Q Do you recall having any discussions with Ambassador Rice

about that background briefing or this summary?

A No.

Q Nothing further on that. Thank you.

[ Exhibit No. 6

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

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Q Ms. , I've given you a document that has been marked

as exhibit 6. Again, it's a multipage document. The document control

number is C05562256.

It appears to be a single -- actually, two emails. The first

email in time is from Bernadette Meehan to you on September 14th, 2012,

at 4:09 p.m. The subject is "Libya Guidance." And then you appear

to forward this email to Mr. and .

Do you recall this email -- this series of emails?

A No.

Q Looking at the first email from Ms. Meehan to you, what are

we looking at there?

A We are looking at an email from Bernadette to me in which

she copied and pasted the press guidance that the White House had given

to Jay Carney, as well as it seems that would be used by Toria Nuland

at the State Department.

Q In the email from Ms. Meehan to you, the first line says,

"Below is the guidance that Jay used today, and Toria will use. Also

attached are the video talking points, and the compilation of

statements. Will keep you posted through the weekend."

Do you have an understanding of what Ms. Meehan is referring to

when she says, "video talking points"?

A No, I do not.

Q Is it possible that that -- well, let me withdraw that

question and mark this next document.

[ Exhibit No. 7

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Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q I'm marking as exhibit 7 another multipage document. For

the record, this document has document control number C05579767.

Ms. , do you recognize what I've marked as exhibit 7?

A I don't remember it, but --

Q Do you have an understanding of what we're now looking at?

A Yes.

Q Okay. What is it?

A It's a chain of emails from the White House to various

communications experts at various national security agencies with a

number of talking points, statements, and instructions, I think.

Q And I don't see your name in the "to" list on the first page.

Do you have --

A I see it.

Q Oh, no, sorry, I do see your name. Do you have any reason

to believe you did not receive this email at or about the time it was

sent?

A No.

Q Now, taking exhibit 6 and putting exhibit 7 next to it, do

you have an understanding of whether or not Ms. Meehan, when she says

"video talking points," is referring to the document we've marked as

exhibit 7, which is titled, "Talking Points on Movie"?

A It's possible. I cannot say definitively that it's the

same thing.

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[ Exhibit No. 8

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Missakian. Exhibit 8, for the record, is a two-page document

with document control number C05415302. It is an email from

to a variety of people, including and Susan Rice,

dated September 16th, 2012, at 1:19 p.m.

Mr. Su. Craig --

Mr. Missakian. Yes?

Mr. Su. -- could I talk to you just briefly about this particular

document real quick?

Mr. Missakian. Yes. Sure.

Mr. Desai. Go off the record?

Mr. Missakian. Yes, let's go off the record for 1 second.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Missakian. Let's go back on the record.

Counsel, out of an abundance of caution, asked me if I believe

that this document is classified because of the footer at the bottom.

I do not believe that it is and note that on the second page it says

"unclassified." But if there's a difference of opinion, if the

minority has a difference of opinion, I'm happy to consider it.

Mr. Su. Okay. That's fine.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Now, what we're looking at here is an email to you and

Ms. Rice. Do you recall this email, Ms. ?

A Yes.

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Q And you recall receiving it at the time, I gather?

A Yes.

Q And why do you recall this email in particular?

A I recall that this -- actually, I don't recall this specific

email. I don't recall this specific email.

Q Okay.

Now, if you scan down towards the bottom, there's a section titled

"Libya," and then below that there are three bullets points. The last

one says, and I quote, "Morell is having his analysts consider the

disparate views of the field leadership," close quote.

First off, do you know who Morell is?

A Yes.

Q And who is that?

A Michael Morell.

Q And I assume you knew that at the time?

A Yes.

Q Do you recall being apprised of this fact, that Mr. Morell

was having analysts consider the disparate views of his field

leadership?

A I would just note that I don't know what "views of the field

leadership" means.

Q Okay. Were you aware at the time or do you recall being

aware at the time of disparate views, whatever they may have been, at

the CIA?

A About what?

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Q Well, I believe I know what he's talking about, but I really

want to get your understanding. So it doesn't have to be

topic-specific, but do you recall generally being aware that there were

disparate views relating to Libya at the CIA?

A No.

Q Thank you.

Mr. Su. So, Craig, we've been going about an hour. And so I

don't know what you want to do about --

Mr. Missakian. Well, I've got -- let's go off the record for a

second.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Missakian. Let's go back on the record.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I'm sorry --

Mr. Missakian. Let's go off the record.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. No, this is still on the record.

Mr. Missakian. Let's go on the record.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I just wanted to make sure that exhibit 8,

on the record -- and I just missed it if you did -- had the date and

the time of the email. It was Sunday, September 16th, 2012, at 1:19

p.m.

Mr. Missakian. That's what I said.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Great. Sorry if I missed it.

BY MR. MISSAKIAN:

Q Ms. , do you recall being involved in any preparation

for Representative Keith Ellison?

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A No.

Q No.

Ms. , just a couple kind of general questions to finish up

here.

At the time, do you recall having any information that connected

the video that we've been talking about to the attacks in Benghazi?

A I recall there being press reports about that.

Q Okay. Other than the press reports, do you recall any other

information?

A No.

Q And to the extent you believed that there had been a protest

that preceded the attacks in Benghazi, what was that belief based upon?

A Excuse me.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Can you repeat that question?

Mr. Missakian. Sure. To the extent you believed at the time that

there was a protest that preceded the attacks in Benghazi, on what did

you base that belief?

Ms. I based it on what was in the media as well as on my

reading of the HPSCI talking points.

Mr. Missakian. Thank you.

I don't have any further questions but reserve my right to follow

up the minority's questions.

Let's go off the record.

[Recess.]

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Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Let's go back on.

So, if we can bring your attention back to exhibit 4, that's the

email from, I believe, you to Ben Rhodes and a couple of others,

forwarding to them the Libyan President from after the Sunday talk shows.

I think there was a fair amount of discussion about the sentence

in this email, quote, "She said in all other shows that no evidence this

was premeditated, as we discussed."

I think what I understood from that is you didn't recall what you

had or had not discussed about that topic with Ben Rhodes previously.

Is that accurate?

Ms. Yes.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. And that it's possible that you had

discussed with him that there -- that you had had some discussion with

him about the fact that -- or about the fact that there was no evidence

that this was premeditated.

Mr. Missakian. I don't recall her saying anything of the kind.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Oh, really? Okay.

Do you recall having any discussions with Ben Rhodes about the fact

that Susan Rice should rely on the HPSCI talking points when discussing

the Benghazi attacks?

Ms. I recall that Ambassador Rice was supposed to rely

on the HPSCI talking points when asked about Benghazi. I don't recall

specifically who gave me that instruction.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. And is it possible that that instruction is

what you are referring to when you wrote that sentence?

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Ms. Yes.

BY MR. DESAI:

Q So we're just going to switch gears here a little bit. I've

asked you a couple rounds of questioning ago about some allegations

that were made with respect to Ambassador Rice's statements. What I'd

like to do is just ask you about a set of broader allegations that have

been made in connection with the Benghazi attack. And it's our

understanding that our colleagues in the majority are still looking

into some of these allegations, so we are asking every single witness

about them.

And anyone can speculate about the Benghazi attacks, and I'm sure

everyone has opinions, but what we're interested in here is about

whether or not you have direct knowledge or direct evidence about the

allegations that I'm going to ask you about.

So here's how I would like to proceed. I'm going to just tell

you what the allegation is and ask you whether or not you have any

knowledge or evidence to support the allegation that's being advanced.

And if you don't, I'll simply move on to the next allegation until we're

out of allegations.

There's quite a few of them, so I'm going to ask you in advance

to be patient. And I appreciate your indulgence as we go through this.

It has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton intentionally

blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One Congressman

has speculated that, quote, "Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta to

stand down," end quote, and this resulted in the Defense Department

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not sending more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington

Post Fact Checker evaluated this claim and gave it four Pinocchios,

its highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Colonel Qadhafi to his

own people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya

in spring 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Colonel Qadhafi to his

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own people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya

in the spring of 2011?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. Mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that, quote, "the CIA was not collecting and

shipping arms from Libya to Syria," end quote, and that they found,

quote, "no support for this allegation," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A No.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound, and

there have been a number of allegations about the cause of and the

appropriateness of that delay.

The House Intelligence Committee issued a bipartisan report

concluding that the team was not ordered to stand down but that,

instead, there were tactical disagreements on the ground over how

quickly to depart.

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Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand-down order

to CIA personnel?

A No.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do

you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind

the temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed the Annex

to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A No.

Q A concern has been raised by one individual that in the

course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board

damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that

production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to the Accountability Review Board?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Let me ask you these questions also for documents that were

provided to Congress.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

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removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to Congress?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the CIA Deputy Director, Michael

Morell, altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks

for political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when

he told Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully performed our duties

in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship," end quote.

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave

false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an

intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows

about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talks

shows?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief," end quote, on the

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night of the attacks and that he was, quote, "missing in action."

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing in action

on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considered

flying on the second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors

to stand down. Military officials have stated that those four

individuals were instead ordered to remain in place in Tripoli to

provide security and medical assistance in their current location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that, quote, "there was no stand-down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House

Armed Services Committee that there was no stand-down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives.

However, former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the

former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a

review of the attacks, after which he stated, and I quote, "Given where

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the troops were, how quickly the thing all happened, and how quickly

it dissipated, we probably couldn't have done more than we did," end

quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Chairman McKeon's

conclusion?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not

to deploy them?

A No.

Mr. Desai. Thank you once again for your appearance.

We can go off the record.

[Whereupon, at 2:58 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

122
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON :

" SENATE ! 113th Congress

2d Session

S. Report

2014

113–134

REPORT

of the

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

REVIEW

of the

TERRORIST ATTACKS ON U.S. FACILITIES IN

BENGHAZI, LIBYA, SEPTEMBER 11–12, 2012

together with

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

January 15, 2014.—Ordered to be printed


rfrederick on DSK6VPTVN1PROD with HEARING

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STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

137
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

138
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

139
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

140
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

141
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

142
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

143
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

144
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

145
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

146
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

147
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

148
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

149
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

150
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

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151
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

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152
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

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153
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

154
EXHIBIT 3

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C05622905.

EXHIBIT 4

160
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 5

161
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

162
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 6

163
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

164
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 7

165
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

166
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

167
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 8

168
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

169

INTERVIEW OF

TEAM CHIEF,

OFFICE OF

TERRORISM ANALYSIS

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, FEBRUARY 16, 2016
Excerpts of the foregoing interview were cited in the Report of

the Select Committee on Benghazi. The Central Intelligence Agency declined the Committee’s request to declassify the interview

transcript.

172
INTERVIEW OF

MATT OLSEN

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC
174

APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

PHILIP G. KIKO, Staff Director and General Counsel

CHRIS DONESA, Deputy Staff Director

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel

MAC TOLAR, Senior Counsel

CARLTON DAVIS, Counsel

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director/General Counsel

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel

LINDA COHEN, Minority Senior Professional Staff

LAURA RAUCH, Minority Senior Professional Staff

FOR ODNI

KEN WAINSTEIN

BRAD B* * *

MAIA M* * *
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This exhibit was not cleared for public release.

EXHIBIT 1

348
EXHIBIT 2

349
350
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 3

351
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

352
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

353
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

354
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

355
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

356
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

357
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

358
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

359
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

360
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

361
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

362
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

363
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

364
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

365
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

366
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

367
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

368
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

369
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

370
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

371
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

372
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

373
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

374
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

375
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

376
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

377
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 4

378
This exhibit was not cleared for public release.

EXHIBIT 5

379
EXHIBIT 6

380
381
382
383
384
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 7

385
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

386
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

387
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

388
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

389
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

390
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

391
Statement by the Director of Public Affairs for ODNI, Shawn Turner, on

the intelligence related to the terrorist attack on the U.S. Consulate in

Benghazi, Libya

Sept. 28, 2012

In the aftermath of the terrorist attack on U.S. personnel and facilities in Benghazi, Libya, the

Intelligence Community launched a comprehensive effort to determine the circumstances

surrounding the assault and to identity the perpetrators. We also reviewed all available

intelligence to determine if there might be follow-on attacks against our people or facilities in

Libya or elsewhere in the world.

As the Intelligence Community collects and analyzes more information related to the attack, our

understanding of the event continues to evolve. In the immediate aftermath, there was

information that led us to assess that the attack began spontaneously following protests earlier

that day at our embassy in Cairo. We provided that initial assessment to Executive Branch

officials and members of Congress, who used that information to discuss the attack publicly and

provide updates as they became available. Throughout our investigation we continued to

emphasize that information gathered was preliminary and evolving.

As we learned more about the attack, we revised our initial assessment to reflect new

information indicating that it was a deliberate and organized terrorist attack carried out by

extremists. It remains unclear if any group or person exercised overall command and control of

the attack, and if extremist group leaders directed their members to participate. However, we do

assess that some of those involved were linked to groups affiliated with, or sympathetic to

al-Qa'ida. We continue to make progress, but there remain many unanswered questions. As

more information becomes available our analysis will continue to evolve and we will obtain a

more complete understanding of the circumstances surrounding the terrorist attack.

We continue to support the ongoing FBI investigation and the State Department review of the

Benghazi terrorist attack, providing the full capabilities and resources of the Intelligence

Community to those efforts. We also will continue to meet our responsibility to keep Congress

fully and currently informed. For its part, the Intelligence Community will continue to follow the

information about the tragic events in Benghazi wherever it leads. The President demands and

expects that we will do this, as do Congress and the American people. As the Intelligence

Community, we owe nothing less than our best efforts in this regard, especially to the families of

the four courageous Americans who lost their lives at Benghazi in service of their country.

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EXHIBIT 8

392
Statement by the Director of Public Affairs for ODNI, Shawn Turner, on

the intelligence related to the terrorist attack on the U.S. Consulate in

Benghazi, Libya

Download this Statement in PDF Format

Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

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INTERVIEW OF

GENTRY SMITH

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, FEBRUARY 25, 2016
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

PHILIP G. KIKO, Staff Director and General Counsel

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel

KIM BETZ, Member Outreach Liaison and Counsel

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director/General Counsel

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel

ERIN O’BRIEN, Minority Detailee

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ERIC SNYDER, Senior Counsel

ALISON R. WELCHER, Attorney-Adviser

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3

Ms. Betz. This is a transcribed interview of Ambassador

conducted by the House Select Committee on Benghazi. This

interview is being conducted voluntarily as part of the committee's

investigation into the attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities in

Benghazi, Libya, and related matters pursuant to House Resolution 567

of the 113th Congress and House Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

Would the witness please state his name for the record?

Mr. . .

Ms. Betz. The committee appreciates your appearance at this

interview today. My name is Kim Betz with the committee's majority

staff, and I'll ask everyone else in the room, and we can go around

the table, to introduce themselves as well. So as I said, I'm Kim Betz

with the majority.

Ms. Jackson. And I'm Sharon Jackson, also with the majority

staff.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I'm Susan Sachsman Grooms with the

minority.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny, minority staff.

Ms. O'Brien. Erin O'Brien with the minority.

Mr. Snyder. Eric Snyder, State Department.

Ms. Welcher. Alison Welcher, State Department.

Ms. Betz. Before we begin, I'd like to go over the rules that

will guide our discussion this morning and explain how the interview

will proceed. Generally, the way the questioning has worked is that

a member from the majority will ask questions for up to an hour and

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4

then the minority will have an opportunity to ask questions for an equal

period of time if they choose. Questions may only be asked by a member

of the committee or designated staff. We will rotate back and forth,

1 hour per side, until we are out of questions and the interview will

be over.

Unlike a testimony or a deposition in Federal court, the committee

format is not bound by the rules of evidence. The witness or their

counsel may raise objections for privilege subject to review by the

chairman of the committee. If these objections cannot be resolved in

the interview, the witness can be required to return for a deposition

or hearing.

Members and staff of the committee, however, are not permitted

to raise objections when the other side is asking questions. This has

not been an issue we encountered in the past, but I wanted to make sure

that you were clear on the process.

This session is to begin in unclassified, and I don't anticipate

that we will move out of an unclassified session. However, if any

question calls for a classified answer, please let us know and then

we can accommodate that answer.

You are welcome to confer with counsel at any time throughout the

interview, but if something needs to be clarified, we ask that you make

this known. If you need to discuss anything with your counsel, we will

go off the record and stop the clock to provide you with the opportunity.

Mr. . Okay.

Ms. Betz. We'd like to take a break whenever is convenient for

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5

you. This can be after every hour of questioning, after a couple

rounds, whatever you prefer. During a round of questioning, if you

need anything, a glass of water, to step out, confer with your counsel,

please let us know and we'll go off the record and stop the clock. We'd

like to make this process as easy and comfortable as possible.

As you can see, an official reporter is taking down everything

you say to make a written record. So we ask that you gave verbal

responses to all questions, yes, no, as opposed to nods of the head.

Mr. . Okay.

Ms. Betz. I'm going to ask the reporter to please feel free to

jump in in case you do respond nonverbally. Do you understand that?

Mr. I do.

Ms. Betz. Also, we should both try not to talk over each other,

so it's easier to get a clearer record. We want you to answer our

questions in the most complete and truthful manner possible, so we will

take our time and repeat or clarify our questions if necessary. If

you have any questions or if you do not understand any of our questions,

please let us know. We'll be happy to clarify or repeat in such a way

that you can answer.

If you honestly don't know the answer to a question or do not

remember, it's best not to guess. Please give us your best

recollection. And if there are things you do not know or can't

remember, just say so, and please inform us who, to the best of your

knowledge, may be able to provide a more complete answer to the

question.

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You are required to answer questions from Congress truthfully.

Do you understand that?

Mr. Yes, I do.

Ms. Betz. This also applies to questions posed by congressional

staff in an interview. Do you understand this?

Mr. . Yes, I do.

Ms. Betz. Witnesses that knowingly provide false testimony

could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury or making false

statements. Do you understand this?

Mr. . Yes, I do.

Ms. Betz. Is there any reason that you are unable to provide

truthful answers to today's questions?

Mr. . No, there is no reason.

Ms. Betz. Okay. That's the end of my preamble.

Does the minority have anything to add?

Mr. Kenny. Just like to thank the witness for coming here.

Ambassador, appreciate your willingness to come in here

voluntarily today. Thank you, and we look forward to your testimony.

Ms. Betz. And I'd like to echo those sentiments. We appreciate

you taking the time to come here today.

Mr. . Certainly.

Ms. Betz. So the clock now reads 10:09, and we'll start with our

first hour of questioning.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. BETZ:

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Q Can you just talk to us a little bit about your background

and how long you were with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security.

A Yes. I've been with the U.S. Department of State,

September of this year would be my 29th year at the U.S. Department

of State. The majority of that time, 27-1/2 years of that has been

with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. I joined in 1984 -- I'm sorry,

1987 -- and my first assignment was at the Washington field office.

And after the Washington field office, I went overseas to serve

as an assistant regional security officer at the Embassy in Cairo,

Egypt, from 1989 to 1991. 1991, I came back to the United States to

serve on the Secretary of State's protective detail for three different

secretaries of state, Baker, Eagleburger, and Christopher.

In 1994, I took my next assignment, with the Criminal

Investigative Liaison Division. I did that for 2 years. In 1996 went

back overseas to serve as the regional security officer in Rangoon,

Burma, until 1999. 2000 was 1 year of language -- or 1999 to

2000 -- and returned back to Cairo as a deputy regional security officer

in 2000 through 2004.

In 2004, I transferred to Tokyo, Japan, to serve as the regional

security officer there until 2007. 2007, I returned to the U.S. to

assume the position as the office director of the Physical Security

Programs, until 2009. 2009, assumed the responsibility of deputy

assistant secretary of countermeasures until 2014.

After a period of waiting for my confirmation, I was confirmed

as the director of the Office of Foreign Missions with the title of

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ambassador, which I assumed June, July of 2015.

Q Congratulations.

A Thank you.

Q So can you describe for us, when you served as the DAS for

countermeasures, what were some of your responsibilities.

A As the DAS for countermeasures, I was responsible for all

the physical and technical security requirements for all of our U.S.

diplomatic missions, both domestic and overseas. Overseas, that's

about 280, 285 locations, and domestically there's about 400

facilities. And then, in addition to the physical security and

technical security responsibilities, I also had responsibility for the

Diplomatic Courier Service.

Q So who then under your auspices would report to you? Do

you recall? So the different divisions and offices.

A Yes. So the Office of Physical Security Programs, the

office director of Physical Security Programs, the office director for

Security Technology, and the office director for the Diplomatic Courier

Service.

Q Okay. And with regard to other DAS's, for example, the DAS

of IP, Charlene Lamb, were you coordinating with them? How was your

interaction with them? Did you interact with them on a daily basis?

Weekly? Monthly? How did you coordinate your respective

responsibilities?

A There was daily interaction with directorates depending on

what issues were going on. International programs, if it was

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internationally focused, there was a lot of coordination and

communication that went back and forth between the Office of

Countermeasures -- the director of countermeasure and the director of

international programs.

Q What decisions would sort of be at your level? What

decisions would rise to the PDAS and then ultimately to, you know, the

assistant secretary? Can you talk about that hierarchy a little bit?

A Most of the decisions at my level would have been on issues

that had not been worked out among the office directors or the regional

directors from other directorates. Or in certain circumstances,

memorandum, information memorandums would come from me to my superiors

to the assistant secretary. And also for things such as exceptions

and waivers, they would be originated within my office to then go up

to the deputy secretary or assistant secretary or the secretary for

approval.

Q How often would you then interact with the assistant

secretary or -- and for that matter, the under secretary? What were

your interactions like?

A For the assistant secretary, there was a weekly meeting

where he would meet with his senior officers. So there was at least

a weekly meeting. And then depending on an issue and the severity or

significance of the issue, if it required his direct involvement, he

would always consult with the particular directorates that had the

responsibilities for whatever that issue might be.

Q And did those weekly meetings change? I mean, were those

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pretty typical for Libya dealing with those issues regarding Libya,

both Tripoli and Benghazi?

A Yes.

Q Would you see an increase in weekly meetings or daily

meetings, given the issues there?

A Well, on a daily basis, there was a video conference with

the Diplomatic Security seniors. That conference was generally led

on the Diplomatic Security senior side by the PDAS or director, and

on the other end of the screen would be the assistant secretary. Those

were done daily at about 8 o'clock in the morning.

And during those, there would be a brief on the situation in the

world. And so depending on what's going on in the world, those would

be the major topics. That brief was chaired by the principal deputy

assistant secretary or the director of diplomatic security. The

Intelligence, Threat Analysis Division would be the ones who would be

conducting the lead and going over the information when activities had

transpired the day before or were of that significance that it needed

to be discussed first thing in the morning.

Q And you participated in those VTCs?

A Yes, I did.

Q And were they, I would say for the period of 2011 and 2012,

primarily focused on Libya or sort of globally specific?

A They were focused globally, yeah.

Q Okay.

A And so activities depending on what the activities were

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somewhere in the world. Those issues would be the point of reference

for the day.

Q Okay. Going back, taking your memory back to 2011 --

Ms. Jackson. Can I ask a question first?

Ms. Betz. Sure.

Ms. Jackson. Can you compare and contrast what your office did

versus the Office of Overseas Building Operations and what you were

responsible for versus what OBO was responsible for. Was there

overlap? Were they totally distinct? But could you just help me

understand the two offices.

Mr. Yeah. Overseas Building Operations sees themself as

the owners, builders, maintenance organization for all of the U.S.

facilities abroad, all the embassies, consulates, American centers,

whatever diplomatic facilities that are abroad.

Ms. Jackson. Is that owned and leased?

Mr. . Yes, it's owned and leased. Diplomatic Security

Countermeasures is responsible for the physical security requirements

for those facilities, ensure that they meet the standards that are

required according to the Overseas Security Policy Board for those

facilities.

For a newer facility there would be a joint team of Overseas

Building Operations and Diplomatic Security personnel from

Countermeasures who would visit a site as it was under construction

to see how it was being constructed and were the activities and the

construction process going to result in a facility in the end that met

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the standards for the requirement.

For a facility that was already in existence, there would be times

when, based on the physical security survey, there would be a necessity

for upgrades at that facility, depending on the size, depending on what

the activities were, depending on how many more people that come in,

or if there had been a new standard that had been instituted.

So in those situations, there would be discussion, collaboration

with Diplomatic Security and Overseas Building Operations to ensure

that those issues were addressed. So relationship-wise, there was an

interrelationship, there was a lot of communication that went on

between the two frequently, and lots -- and issues to be resolved.

Ms. Jackson. So to just sort of boil it down a little bit, from

what I've heard you say is OBO was sort of like the construction

management team and Countermeasures was more like the building

inspectors? Very broadly and very generally, but --

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Let me clarify. So is it fair to say that Countermeasures

made recommendations and OBO funded them? So basically because they

had a funding, they were sort of the funding mechanism, that gave them

sort of more ownership to your point?

A No. It was OBO's responsibility to construct and acquire

buildings. It was Diplomatic Security's responsibility to ensure that

those facilities met the security requirements based on the Overseas

Security Policy Board.

Q Okay. So going back to 2011 and the Ambassador's entry into

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Benghazi, were you part of those discussions with regard to his security

detail?

A Not in -- well, not specifically in regards to his security

detail. But understanding that his security detail would need

equipment and supplies in support of that operation, it would be my

organization, the section within Physical Security Programs, which is

called DEAV, Defensive Equipment and Armored Vehicles, that would

provide a lot of that equipment for that security team that would

accompany him.

Q Now, a physical security specialist did travel with him when

he went in. Did that person report to you? What was that person's

purpose in traveling with him?

A There was a physical security specialist that traveled with

the team initially, and that person was from Countermeasures. He did

not report directly to me. He would have been the Program Coordination

Branch of Physical Security Programs.

And the reason that he traveled with the team was that this

particular individual had quite a bit of subject matter expertise on

operating in hostile environments based on his prior background before

becoming a member of Diplomatic Security, and had gone on assignments

in Iraq and other locations of that type. So based on that, it was

decided that he accompany the team for the entry into -- or their return

to Benghazi -- or to Tripoli.

Q So was his purpose in making recommendations regarding

securing the location, where the Ambassador was residing, Envoy at that

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time?

A Yes. Yes, for the physical security issues.

Q Okay. And do you know, did that office ever report up to

you as to what physical security assessments were done, you know, at

the first location at the Tibesti Hotel, what was needed and what the

vulnerabilities were?

A He was with the team at the time that they were posted at

the Tibesti Hotel and had done an assessment of the situation on the

ground at the hotel and had made recommendations for how they should

set up. Of course, being in a hotel, it's a hotel environment and you

want to keep a low profile, particularly for the small group of

personnel that were there.

Q We talked a little bit about the OSPB security standards.

When the Ambassador, Special Envoy resided in the hotel, at what

point -- did those OSPB standards apply to that location at that point

in time?

A Not really.

Q Not really?

A No. They were security recommendations that are made for

a hotel. There is no OSPB standards that would address hotel

operations.

Q So what would be some of the security standards for a hotel?

A There would not be any security standards for a hotel, but

security recommendations that are made during times that we're in a

hotel, a solid core door, just basic things that you would expect from

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15

even being in the States, solid core door, viewfinder, very good locking

equipment on the door; in situations such as being overseas, to look

for hotels where there would be a security presence from either the

host country or that the hotel provide its own security and what are

the security procedures that are followed at that hotel for its guests.

Ms. Jackson. So is there a checklist that DS goes through when

you're scoping out hotels in various locations for these various

security issues, some of which you've just summarized for us?

Mr. . I'm sure that there is.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. All right.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q But nothing formal. Is that what you're saying?

A Well, there's that and then --

Q Is there a precedent?

A -- after you have done it for a while, you come to understand

what the requirements are and what is it that you're looking for as

you're going to a hotel.

Q Is that checklist written down anyplace, or is it more just

through sort of experience?

A I don't -- I think that it may be written down someplace,

but I don't know where that would be.

Ms. Jackson. The part of DS that's the protective services

detail, that was not under your umbrella. Is that correct?

Mr. . That's correct.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. That was under another deputy assistant

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16

secretary?

Mr. . Correct.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q As we're talking about 2011, and you described to us being

updated as to the mission and to the threats, were you being apprised

of the situation when the decision was made to leave the Tibesti Hotel

and to locate in an interim -- ?

A Yes. This was one of the issues that would have been

discussed at the 8:00 briefing and at other briefings, if they were

Libya specific. Because of a couple of incidents that had happened

at the hotel, one that comes to mind was the fire of a vehicle which

was suspected that it had been fire bombed, the security personnel who

were on the ground felt that they needed to relocate to a safer location

and so began a search for other sites in Benghazi that would provide

for a more secure location and at the same time a lower-profile

location.

Q And so were you being updated and briefed on those trips

to various locations throughout Benghazi to find a better or more secure

facility?

A I was briefed when one was -- when, I guess, the last two

were found that they thought met the requirements that they were looking

for.

Q Okay. And did they brief you -- let's talk about sort of

the first compound, I think, the one that was anticipated to be the

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17

location for the mission, the manned compound, I think it has been

described as, or the compound mission. I think there have been various

names for this.

A Okay.

Q Does that --

Ms. Jackson. Just ask him. Ask him to describe.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Well, there is one facility in particular, I think, that

it was thought that the mission was going to reside in and certain

security upgrades were made to this facility. Are you aware about

$75,000 that were provided to this facility for security upgrades?

A And then we did not it?

Q And then you did not occupy it?

A I understand that there was one compound that was supposed

to have been constructed for an oil company. And I'm not sure if this

is the same location that you're describing or not, because I didn't

know there was $75,000 that was put forth. And then the second being

the one that we acquired, took the lease in, that had the Villa A.

Q Correct. Correct. And I'll come back to that. I didn't

know if you were aware of the intended facility of which I believe where

we have documents that suggest that, you know, certain security

upgrades were made, I think totaling about $75,000. And I was just

curious if that $75,000 was spent on those upgrades or was some of it

recouped and then diverted to --

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Perhaps it would be helpful to show him

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18

those documents, because that's not our understanding of what the

documents show. So maybe if you pull them out.

Ms. Betz. Okay. Well, yeah, I'll just move on to the A and B.

So I guess, to better ask the question, can you talk about the

villa that the mission did not reside in, what you know about it?

Mr. . From what I understand, it wasn't complete. It had

not been completely constructed at the time that the team was looking

for a location. And I guess that the location that was subsequently

decided on was complete, and from a time perspective, that they wanted

to get out of the hotel and get into something that was ready. That's

why that one was chosen --

Ms. Betz. Okay.

Mr. . -- is based on my understanding.

Ms. Jackson. To your knowledge or recollection, was any money

expended on that what I will call the pre-Villa A, the one that was

ultimately not selected, was any funds expended on trying to make it

habitable and secure enough for the Stevens team?

Mr. . I don't recall any of Diplomatic Security's funds

being spent on that.

Ms. Jackson. And if it wasn't DS funds, where would other funds

come from? Were there other pots of money out there?

Mr. . I don't recall any of the funds from the Department,

I guess, I should have said, being spent for that.

Ms. Jackson. Go ahead.

Ms. Betz. Okay. So going back to what we'll all agree on is

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19

Villa A, where they resided in Villa A, were you apprised of any

assessments, physical security assessments that were done at that point

in time on Villa A?

Mr. . I know that there was a physical security assessment

done on the facility prior to or -- yeah, prior to it being leased,

looking for what were the security advantages to the facility as opposed

to being in the Tibesti Hotel.

Ms. Jackson. And who did that?

Mr. . That would have been done by probably the -- well,

because I don't have the names of the person, my guess is it would have

been done by the security team that was on the ground there who had

the responsibility for that, along with the temporary person from

Physical Security Programs.

Ms. Jackson. So the person that you sent in with the Envoy's team

initially stayed?

Mr. . Yes, for a period of time, yes.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Does name ring a bell?

A name does ring a bell; however, I don't

know if would have been with the team at this time.

Q So it's your recollection that a review was done of all three

villas, Villas A, B, and C?

A Well, I don't think that Villa C was with that original

group. I think it was just Villa A, possibly Villa A and B.

Q And when, to the best of your recollection, when do you

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20

recall Villa C being added?

A I think it was later in the year, because I think when they

were looking to move from the hotel, that would have been the April

time -- yeah -- they went there in April -- so June, July timeframe.

And then Villa C may have been later, like October, November timeframe.

Q At the point where Villa A and Villa B were acquired, were

you a part of any discussions about the applicability of SECCA at the

time?

A No, I would not have been in discussions about SECCA because

it wasn't a new -- going to be a newly constructed type of facility.

What we would have been -- but, of course, we would have wanted a place

that gave us the maximum amount of setback, and other security

requirements, a perimeter wall, grilling on windows, substantial

doors, vehicles, access control advantages, things that would have made

that location a more secure location than the activities or the

situation at the Tibesti Hotel.

Q Well, let's talk a little bit about sort of those security

requirements. To the best of your recollection, with regard to both

SECCA and OSPB, the OSPB security standards, when do those standards

apply and to what facilities do they apply to?

A Those standards apply to any newly constructed or newly

acquired facility that will come under the ownership of the Department

or the U.S. Government.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q So newly acquired means leased?

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21

A Yes.

Q And so this was a facility that you were going to lease.

Is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q So why wouldn't they apply?

A They would apply. OSPB standards would apply. And based

on this survey that was done and the facility that was selected, it

met a great majority of those standards. And where you can't meet those

standards specifically, then you do things to mitigate the disconnect

or the, you know, what is the requirement and what is the reality on

the ground and what things can we do to the facility that will bring

it in line with what the requirement is.

Ms. Betz. Is that known as the exceptions and waiver package?

Mr. That would be part of -- in an exception and waiver

package it would be stated what are the mitigating steps that were taken

in situations where a requirement was not fully met.

Ms. Betz. Well, just so I'm clear, so if the OSPB and SECCA

requirements apply to a facility, including one that is leased, newly

leased, part of that process then is applying for exceptions and waivers

to those requirements?

Mr. Yes. In a normal situation or when we traditionally

acquire a facility, we will look -- you will identify sites, you will

apply the standards to those sites, and where those standards aren't

met, you will make the improvements to that site prior to purchase,

prior to lease, or while you're constructing.

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22

The situation as it was unfolding in Benghazi was that there was

a threat in the facility that they were in, i.e., the hotel, and there

was a decision by the security personnel on the ground to move -- to

look for a more secure facility quickly that put them in a better

situation than the situation in which they had been in the hotel.

And after searching at several sites, the Villa A, Villa B site

was the site that met the majority of those requirements and provided

a greater deal of safety slash security in the location in which they

were in in the hotel.

Ms. Jackson. Then did Villa A and Villa B go through the whole

analysis of what are the OSPB standards that apply and the analysis

for a waiver and exception package?

Mr. . There was no waiver and exceptions package because

it was not at that point. There was a security survey done and

conducted on the site prior to it being agreed upon as the site to be

leased.

And what the site provided or had available and what was not there

were the things that were noted in the survey. So for the things that

were not there, then the next step would be that when the site is

acquired that you begin immediately to make the security upgrades

necessary to bring it into compliance with the security

recommendations, the requirements.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q How would those upgrades be funded, those security upgrades

be funded?

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23

A Various sources. Mainly, Physical Security Programs.

Secondarily, OBO. And another source would be the regional bureau,

NEA, the executive office there. So you have a combination of those

entities, and in addition to that, International Programs also has

funding available for improvements to be made. So multiple sources

is the answer for where the funding can come from.

Q So just so I'm clear and not to beat a dead horse, so to

speak, so the OSPB and SECCA standards, to the best of your

recollection, applied at that point --

A Yes.

Q -- when the mission moved into the interim facility?

A Yes.

Q And waivers and exceptions were not conducted, but there

was a process started to upgrade?

A Yes, there was a process started to upgrade. And that is

correct, there was no waiver of exceptions package that had been

started.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Was it ever started? Was the waiver exception --

A No.

Q Why not?

A Because before that process could take place, the attack

happened.

Q We're talking over a year later. The waiver and exceptions

package could not have been started in that over a year -- from the

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24

time they moved in, in the July, August timeframe, until a year later

the attack, there was no time at all to even start that process?

A There had been a process started. The security upgrades

had begun. The waiver and exceptions package had not begun.

Q Are you aware of any determination that was made in DS that

the waiver and exception package was not required?

A I don't think it ever had gotten to the point of discussing

whether there was a requirement. It would be understood that if the

Department was to remain in Benghazi and the facility, that Villa A,

Villa C -- well, subsequently Villa B and C -- if that would remain

the compound, then, yes, it was understood that a waiver and exceptions

package would be required for that location.

Q So is there any timeframe within the State Department that

Foreign Service officers can be in a leased location without having

this process started? I mean, is it 3 months, 6 months? I mean, it

was over a year.

A No. No, there's no timeframe. I don't think that that's

even addressed. As I state, because there hadn't been a document did

not mean that nothing was being done. From the time of identifying

the site, steps were being taken to ensure that the OSPB requirements

were being met.

Ms. Betz. Can we go off the record for 1 second?

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Betz. I just want to show you a few -- a couple of documents

regarding our discussion to see if that helps refresh your memory. And

452
25

I will show you what I'll mark as exhibit 1.

Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. BETZ:

Q And the document, while you're looking at it, is State

Department document C05396431. It is an email from to

, dated June 20, 2011.

I would note that the witness is not on the email, but I want to

ask him -- it's pertinent to our discussion earlier about SECCA. And

I will just focus principally on the first full paragraph. The first

page of the email, first paragraph.

A Okay.

Q So we talked a few minutes ago about the applicability of

SECCA and OSPB to the interim facility, and we talked about how they

applied at the time. This is an email from L, which, to my knowledge,

means the Legal Department. Is that correct?

A Yes, that's correct.

Q And in it, my understanding is that Legal is opining, and

I'll read:

And I'll stop there.

Does this help refresh your recollection about the applicability

453
26

of the security standards or -- I guess I'm trying to reconcile this

email from the Legal Department and the nonapplicability of SECCA at

the time because of the lack of notification to the Libyan Government

regarding the mission.

A I understand what has been stated here. And this would be

more in line with the questions you asked about the waivers and

exceptions package, because it would be the waiver and exceptions to

SECCA requirements. This language is stated in there that we're

submitting this request for a waiver exception because of these

activities.

So I understand, yes, they're saying that SECCA does not apply.

Ms. Jackson. At the time that this discussion was going on in

June of 2011, were you aware that a legal opinion was being sought as

to the applicability of either SECCA or OSPB or both?

Mr. No, I was not aware, because we would have been

looking at what requirements of OSPB did the location that we were

seeking to move to, what did it mean already. So we would have been

moving ahead of this action here anyway to get a facility, a compound

that gave us the most advantageous from a security perspective entity

that's going to meet our requirements.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So if I understand, these discussions were occurring

separate and apart from what you're describing, and you're describing

that sort of in the back of your mind at some point waivers and

exceptions were going to be submitted at some point? And not a trick

454
27

question or anything. I'm just trying to understand the sequence of

events.

A I understand what you're saying. At this point, we were

listening to the personnel on the ground as they described a compound

that met the requirements that they were looking for of being a more

secure location. And once they found that compound, they were then

able to articulate these are the things that it gives us from a security

standpoint that makes it better than where we are. That was our focus

at that time.

The SECCA, the exceptions discussion had not come into play for

us.

Q So would Legal not consult you in these discussions that

they were having as to whether or not -- regarding the applicability

of the security requirements? Do they make those decisions -- I guess,

is it accurate to say that they make those decisions in isolation

without consulting you as to what's going on on the ground?

A When an exceptions package is formulated, it's sent to Legal

for review. So at this point we would not have been consulting with

Legal, because what we were doing here was something that is regularly

done when we look for a site.

Q Is it accurate to say, then, they were making an independent

decision?

A I don't know.

Q Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

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28

Q Could I ask you to flip to the second page of this exhibit?

At the bottom where there's an exchange from a I think, ,

, to a , John C. Stevens, , and

. And the third line says, and I quote: "On another

topic, can DS go ahead and provide the needed waivers for this

compound/lease?"

First of all, do you recognize any of the names in this particular

exchange?

A Yes, .

Q And he was head of then Envoy Stevens' security detail?

A Yes.

Q And , is that a name you're familiar with?

A No, it's not.

Q What about ?

A No.

Q ?

A No.

Q And you understand that this entire email exchange is

talking about the lease for the compound in Benghazi. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Which compound?

Ms. Jackson. Lease for a compound.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. But it's not Villa A.

Ms. Jackson. At this time it was.

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29

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. No, it's not.

Ms. Jackson. Well --

Mr. Snyder. Can we -- he wants to review the whole document.

Ms. Jackson. Sure. Absolutely.

Mr. Snyder. Thank you.

Ms. Jackson. We can just go off the record for a minute. Thanks.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Again, at the bottom of page 2, on this last exchange on

this page, where it says, "On another topic, can DS go ahead and provide

the needed waivers for this compound/lease," they're talking, first

of all, about a lease of a compound in Benghazi. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Do you know which compound or which villa they were

referring to at this time?

A Not specifically.

Q Okay. And were you aware around this time in June, mid-June

of 2011, that there was a conversation about the need for waivers and

exceptions for any type of lease or compound in Benghazi?

A No, I was not aware of that.

Q Okay. And did you ever become aware that waivers and

exceptions packages were being discussed for any type of a lease for

any type of a compound in Benghazi in 2011?

A No.

Q Okay. That conversation never occurred, to your

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30

knowledge?

A Correct, it did not come to my level.

Q Okay.

Mr. Snyder. If I could just have a moment.

Thank you.

Ms. Betz. And just to clarify, if it didn't come to your level,

what level would it have reached? Who would have been making these

decisions and being consulted, if it didn't reach you?

Mr. I think that it would have been a discussion between

the personnel on the ground and the Office of Physical Security Programs

as they worked through what was available and what were the next steps

to be taken.

Ms. Jackson. And that was one of the offices that you --

Mr. . Yes.

Ms. Jackson. -- directed and supervised?

Mr. . That's correct.

Ms. Betz. We'll just show you another document, which we'll mark

as exhibit number 2.

Mr. Okay.

Exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Betz. This is a short document. I'll identify it as

C05397277. It is an email from to .

The subject is Benghazi compound, and it's dated 6/20/2011.

Mr. Okay, yes.

458
31

Ms. Betz. And this is an email which states: "This is to confirm

that a determination has been made by DS that no waivers or exceptions

to security standards are needed for the Benghazi compound property."

Do you recall having any type of discussion about waivers or

exceptions?

Mr. . No, I do not recall having any discussion about

waivers or exceptions.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q You previously stated that you did not recognize the name

, who is the recipient of this email. Do you recognize

the name ?

A Yes, I do.

Q And who is Mr. ?

A works within the Office of Physical

Security -- was working within the Office of Physical Security Programs

at this time.

Q Do you remember his exact position?

A I think he -- I believe he was in the Program Coordination

Branch, which would have been the branch that had the day-to-day

conversations with the personnel on the ground and also with

International Programs regarding the activities.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Would he have reported to you or to somebody else in between?

A He would have reported to the branch director of the

Programs Coordination Branch and also to the office director for

459
32

Physical Security Programs.

Q So is it accurate to say then that discussions were

occurring within Diplomatic Security about the applicability of

waivers and exceptions with regard to a property in Benghazi?

A It appears from these documents that there was.

Q And so does this change your recollection regarding the

applicability of OSPB and SECCA and/or the beginning of a waiver or

exception process?

A No, it doesn't change my recollection because I wasn't

involved in any of these discussions. I understand from looking at

the documents that the legal opinion was that they did not apply. And

it appears from this last email that this was the decision that was

then sent forth to .

Q Well, so here's what I'm trying to reconcile is, this is

a document that suggests that those on the ground with those -- working

with those individuals in D.C. within the Office of Physical Security

Programs are having conversations about the need for waivers and

exceptions. And if they're of the mind that neither waivers nor

exceptions are applicable, are these packages being prepared per your

previous statements? Does that make sense?

A The packages would not have been being prepared based on

the fact that there would not be a requirement to prepare the packages.

So no, the packages would not have -- the waivers exceptions packages

would not have been being prepared.

Ms. Welcher. I'm sorry. Are you basing this on the documents

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33

or your own knowledge?

Mr. I'm basing this on what's on the documents.

Ms. Jackson. But your prior statement had been they weren't

being prepared because of time considerations; that if that were to

occur, it would've occurred somewhere down the road, that the attacks

were an intervening factor. Was that your prior statement to us?

Mr. . Well, I thought your prior question to me was had I

been involved in the preparation or instruction that the packages be

prepared. And no, I had not.

And then the question became, well, I thought, why were the

packages not being prepared? And my response was, because we were in

the process of making the upgrades that would have been incorporated

in the package when it was to be prepared later.

Ms. Betz. But correct me if I'm wrong, the discussion also

focused that this was the start of the process. If I misunderstood

you, correct me.

Mr. . The start --

Ms. Betz. The start of the waivers and exceptions process; that

the process of upgrading the facilities was the start -- unofficial

start -- of the waivers and exceptions package.

Mr. No, the process for upgrading and improving a

facility would occur whether there was a followon waiver and exceptions

requirement or not.

461
34

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Is there a typical timeframe in which you will go in and

occupy a facility, perhaps do some upgrades, and then begin the process

of preparing a waivers exception package? Is there a period of time

that DS takes to do upgrades?

A No, there's no specific time. Sometimes it's determined

that a facility may have been in existence and there is a new requirement

for a physical security standard, and you recognize that that facility

that you currently occupy will not be able to meet that requirement.

And thus moving ahead, you will have to submit a request for a waiver

because you can't meet that requirement.

So it's not a -- it's not really the timing element. It's what

can be addressed and what cannot be addressed.

Q But apart from that, for newly leased, you're going in,

you're going to lease a new property, it's not going to meet all the

standards. What is the timeframe that DS, you know, typically takes

before it will start the waiver exception package process?

A There is no specific timeframe.

Q What's the longest that you -- I mean, what we have in

Benghazi is over a year. Now, obviously there's some other documents

that indicate that it wasn't necessary and wasn't going to be done.

But I believe your prior statement was that prior to seeing these

documents you assumed it would be done at some point. Am I

misinterpreting what you had said before?

A No, I didn't state that before. There was the statement

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35

that if decisions had been made to stay at that location, then we know

that at some point we would -- we know that then we would need a waiver

and exceptions to continue to operate at that location.

Ms. Betz. Let me clarify. So if the decision was made to stay

at that residence, so to the best of your recollection, was a constant

sort of watch or property evaluating on going while the mission was

residing in the interim and then ultimately compound?

Mr. . I'm sorry.

Ms. Betz. Were there constant sort of like reviews of alternate

facilities occurring while you were residing in the compound, that

you're aware of?

Mr. Not that I'm aware of. There were constant reviews

of that facility to see what upgrades were required. But I do not know

if there were reviews of looking at alternate locations to operate.

Ms. Jackson. One distinction that we've seen is the distinction

between temporary, interim, and permanent facilities with respect to

OSPB. Can you explain your understanding of those three categories

and how OSPB standards apply to those three categories?

Mr. No, I can't. I have heard the terms myself,

temporary, interim, and permanent, but I don't make the distinction.

I don't know what temporary, interim, and permanent mean. We operate

under the instruction that any facility that we acquire meet the

standards.

Ms. Jackson. And who gave you that instruction? Where did that

instruction come from?

463
36

Mr. I don't have a response for where it came from.

That's just the mode in which we operate.

Ms. Betz. We're close to our time, so we'll just go off the

record.

[Recess.]

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[11:17 a.m.]

Mr. Kenny. We will go back on the record. The time is 11:17.

Ambassador, I want to take the opportunity again to thank you for

appearing here voluntarily today. I will take a moment to reintroduce

myself. My name is Peter Kenny. I am counsel with the minority staff.

I am joined here by my colleagues, Susanne Sachsman Grooms and Erin

O'Brien. On behalf of the ranking member and the select committee

minority members, just again thank you for your appearance here today.

Examination

BY MR. KENNY:

Q I would like to pick up where we left off in the last round.

I think it was a bit confusing, at least from our vantage point, in

trying to understand some of the statements that you were making and

some of the questions that were being asked of you. And it was our

sense that people may have been talking past each other a little bit.

So I was hoping we could go back to maybe clarify some of the statements

that you made.

One being, I had written in my notes, initially you were asked

a question about SECCA. And I will preface this entire discussion:

In the last round there was a discussion about SECCA requirements, OSPB

standards. Some questions were asked of one or the other, some

questions were combined. I am going to do my best to separate those.

We understand that different requirements may mean different

things. OSPB, of course, as we understand it, has incorporated some

of the SECCA requirements, but the processes are different, the

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38

language that's included in both is different. So when we refer to

SECCA, we will refer to waivers to SECCA, and when we will refer to

OSPB standards, we will talk about exceptions to OSPB standards. Does

that work for you, sir?

A Yes, that works for me.

Q Okay. Great. And is it fair to say that it was a little

confusing in the last round because we were switching back and forth

between talking about whether both standards and the requirements

applied versus whether OSPB applied in certain instances and SECCA

requirements applied in certain instances? Is that fair to say, that

it was kind of a confusing discussion?

A Yes, it was.

Q Okay. And we will do our best with our questions help

hopefully clear some of that up. We will start with some of the SECCA

requirements. You were asked in the last round if you were aware of

discussions about whether SECCA requirements applied to the facilities

that were ultimately leased in Benghazi. And I had noted that you said

that you weren't aware of discussions, but there weren't any because

it wasn't a language -- I believe you said that it wasn't a major -- I'm

sorry, a newly constructed facility. Do you remember, recall making

that statement?

A Yes.

Q You were then later asked if the SECCA requirements applied

to Benghazi, and I believe you had written that the answer was yes.

Is that accurate?

466
39

A Yes.

Q Okay. So just so that we better understand, is it your view

that the SECCA requirements did apply to the facilities in Benghazi.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Or do you just not know?

Mr. . I guess my focus was actually on getting -- I

understand -- I understand SECCA requirements, I understand OSP

requirements. I can state -- well, based on the documents that I have

read, I understand that the legal opinion was that SECCA did not apply.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Is it fair to say these things -- it sounds like what I was

hearing was that you weren't involved in discussions about whether

SECCA applied or whether OSPB standards applied at that time. Is that

fair?

A That is correct. I was not involved in my discussions as

to whether or not SECCA or OSPB were required at that time. That would

have been at the level of the Office of Physical -- PSP, Physical

Security Programs.

Q And that's in fact what exhibits 1 and 2 appear to show,

is that there is a discussion between individuals within those offices

and perhaps others to include the L Bureau. Is that your

understanding?

A Yes, that is my understanding.

Q Okay. So the discussion about whether SECCA -- we'll focus

just on SECCA first -- whether SECCA requirements applied to the

facilities in Benghazi was a discussion, as you sit here today, your

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40

understanding is that was occurring at a level below you?

A Correct. The focus was really on getting the personnel

from -- into a more secure facility. The focus was on getting them

out of the hotel because of the threats that were present in the hotel

and the activities that were going on there and moving them to a more

secure facility that had a lower profile than where they were at that

time. And so, yes, while I understand that those other discussions

took place, the focus was about securing the personnel that were on

the ground.

Q I see. So your view, your focus was on ensuring that

whatever facilities were openly occupied were improved to bring them

into compliance at the best maximum extent practicable under either

SECCA or OSPB. Is that accurate?

A Yes. At first it was an improvement on where they were;

and, B, if there were improvements that were required at a later date

for these locations that they relocated to, that those continue.

Q Okay. And as a general matter, and I believe our discussion

we've focused on the summer of 2011 timeframe, so this is when Special

Envoy's team resided at the Tibesti hotel. There was a decision to

leave and then ultimately that team ended up at what we now know as

Villa A property, later Villa B. Was it your understanding then that

those improvements began shortly after they occupied that facility and

carried forward? Is that accurate?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And again, you had mentioned that you weren't aware

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41

of these discussions that were taking place about whether standards

or requirements applied contemporaneously. Is that because your staff

didn't raise those to your attention at that time?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A The --

Q So I'll tie it back this way. You had mentioned -- you were

asked a general question in the last round about when matters would

come to your attention, a very general question. And the answer you

gave is that if things were not worked out by office directors, if

decisions weren't worked out at that level the decisions may come to

your attention?

A That's correct.

Q So it sounds like, at least with respect to whether SECCA

requirements applied, whether OSPB standards applied, that that was

something that was being worked out at a lower -- a level below you,

beneath you.

A That is correct.

Q Okay. So again, I understand just from our vantage point

some of these things appear to be a little confusing in the discussion

we were having. I think it is helpful to have you clarify some of those

pieces for us.

At this point, what I would like to do is introduce into the

record -- this will be exhibit No. 3.

Exhibit No. 3

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42

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And I will go ahead and identify this for the record. This

is a portion of a transcript of a July 9, 2013, transcribed interview

before the House Oversight Committee of then Assistant Secretary for

Diplomatic Security Eric Boswell.

A Okay.

Q And I have included several portions here of Ambassador

Boswell's statements about OSPB standards and the SECCA requirements.

And I will give you a moment to read from that. I'm going to focus

your attention on page 65 and 66, but I included the full portion just

for your benefit.

A Okay.

Q And I'll direct your attention to the bottom of page 65,

I'm going to read a portion of this into the record. The question

begins: "Okay. Turning specifically to the Special Mission Compound

in Benghazi, did OSPB security standards apply to that facility?

Answer: I'm not aware that they did. I never got a request for a

waiver for such standards. Question: You're saying you're not aware,

but in your opinion, did they apply? Answer: In my opinion, they did

not apply because they -- in my opinion, the standards apply to

permanent facilities, not temporary ones. Having said that, as I

mentioned previously, in any place we have people, we do our best to

get as close, because OSPB standard is the standard for us, it's the

gold standard, and we try to get as close as we can to it." Close quote.

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43

The reason I wanted to introduce this is not to call into question

anyone's judgment on the question of whether OSPB standards applied

to the facility or not. Our read of this and based on the statements

that you made today is that this is a fairly confusing subject area.

Would you agree with that characterization?

A Yes.

Q And at least in Ambassador Boswell's view, the standards

didn't apply because the facilities were characterized as temporary

facilities. You were asked a question that in the last round.

I just wanted to focus on the second portion of his response, the

second part of the answer. And I believe you touched on this a little

bit in some of your responses in the last round. But it sounds like,

at least from your viewpoint, whether OSPB standards technically

applied or didn't apply, that your approach within Countermeasures was

to apply the standards in such a way as to improve physical security

at the compound as much as you could. Is that a fair statement?

A That's correct.

Q And that's because the focus was on the physical security

on the ground, as opposed to a process for documenting and the exception

and waivers, in this case the exceptions process. Is that fair?

A That's correct.

Q And here the Ambassador indicates that he's not aware, he

didn't get a request for -- he refers to it as a waiver. We understand

that to be an exception for OSPB standards, is that. And a request

for an OSPB exception, who approves, ultimately approves an exception

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44

in that process?

A The assistant secretary for diplomatic security.

Q Okay. So Ambassador Boswell in this case --

A Correct.

Q -- would have been the ultimate authority or decisionmaker

with respect to an exception for OSPB standards.

A Correct.

Q And here he says he didn't receive a request for them.

Those requests would have been routed through your office. Is that

right?

A Correct.

Q And based on what you told us earlier, you didn't receive

a request for an exception?

A That's correct.

Q And I think we touched on this a little bit before because,

based on your understanding today, is that because you believe these

issues were kind of being worked out at the working level between

security professionals in the field and desk officers at DS

headquarters?

A That's correct.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. And Legal.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And Legal.

A And Legal.

Q For the SECCA requirements?

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45

A Correct.

Q You also mentioned or indicated in the last hour that

whether a process were to go for exceptions, that that was a process

that would take some time to develop. Is that fair?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. And it's also our understanding as well that an

exception process can take a period of time to develop. Is that fair?

A That's correct.

Q Okay.

A After you -- when you look at what you have, as I say, you

look at what you have and you look at what is required, and then you

begin to try to mitigate that. The exceptions process is initiated

at the post, you know, the survey is done, the security professional

will come back and state this -- these are what are met and these are

what cannot be met. And the requirement states that, for an example,

the wall be 9 feet high. Our wall is 8-1/2 feet high. We will require

an exception to the requirement that our wall be 9 feet high.

Q You're speaking generically.

A Yes, generically. So here are the mitigating steps we will

take to address that issue. We will put razor wire, barbed wire on

top of the wall for an additional 1 foot so that it mirrors the

requirement of a 9-foot-high wall, although the wall is not -- it's

only 8-1/2 feet high, but we've taken a mitigating step to address that

shortage. And so that we conform with what the requirement is, we now

request the exception.

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And so that type of language is laid out in a document that then

goes through the clearance process and ultimately ends up for the

approval or disapproval for the assistant secretary.

Q Okay. And again, regardless of whether the OSPB standards

apply or not, the view of your particular office Countermeasures at

the time, your view is that you would do the best that you could --

A That is correct.

Q -- to improve security? Okay.

If I could quickly direct your attention back to Exhibit 1, I will

direct your attention to page -- the last page, where this is -- or

writing. And just at the top there, he writes: ,

for the compound, I need the following information," and asks for some

descriptive information about the property.

If you look in response to that from on June 16, 2011,

if you look under site description, it says, it reads, quote: "Villa

Compound Description: The proposed compound would be a single walled

compound to cover both residences and office space. The compound

consists of the following living areas. 12 two bedrooms units with

living room, kitchen, bathroom. 4 one bedroom units with living room,

kitchen, bathroom. 2 executive units with 2 bedrooms, living room,

kitchen, office, bathroom. 1 compound kitchen and dining area. And

1 multiuse structure connected bathroom. 2 cement/stone villas."

Close quote.

To the best of your recollection, is that description descriptive

of the property that later became known as Villa A or is that more likely

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47

descriptive of the property that was referred to as the man camp or

French villas property?

A I honestly don't know.

Q Okay. So when we look at the analysis on the first page,

you were asked some questions about that, as well as a request of whether

to proceed a request for waivers. As you sit here today, you're unclear

as to which facility this particular analysis applied to?

A That's correct.

Q And if I could, I'd like to go ahead and introduce -- this

will be exhibit No. 4.

Exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q I'll give you a moment to read this. I'm going to focus

on the email in the middle of the page. We included the full chain

for the sake of completeness. And just to identify this, it's document

C05394858. It's an email from to and others,

July 5, 2011, 6:50 a.m.?

And for the record, your name is not on this email chain.

A Okay.

Q Okay. And I would ask you to direct your attention to the

second email down in this chain, which is an email from .

Do you know who that individual is?

A Yes, I know .

Q Do you know what position he served in at this time?

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48

A No, I don't recall what position was serving in at

this time.

Q Are you aware whether deployed to Benghazi as

the regional security officer or assistant regional security officer

at any point in 2011?

A I believe he did, but I can't say for certain.

Q Okay. And on the second page here -- well, first, he begins

the email by saying: " -- further info on the proposed

property. We're referring to our current residences as Villa A and

the neighboring property as Villa B." Close quote.

It then goes on to describe a little bit about the circumstances

at Villa A, Villa B. If you turn to next page there is a section

entitled "Physical Security Upgrades," where it reads, quote: No

immediate physical security upgrades are required before occupancy.

Compound perimeter walls are approximately 4 meters in height. Razor

wire would provide anti-ram, but would greatly raise our profile since

we are situated in a residential neighborhood; locally, razor wire is

used primarily government installations. Blending into neighborhood

and maintaining a low profile are important elements in the mission's

overall security posture. Razor wire not recommended.

Residential and office structures have significant setback.

Concrete barriers/planters not required.

Existing vehicle gates are made of steel and in good condition.

No modifications necessary.

Both Villa B vehicle access points (north and south) will be

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49

permanently blocked using armored vehicles and/or heavy scrap

machinery (already on the property). Villa A has two vehicle access

points (north and south) used for mission vehicles during the day; these

will be blocked using armored vehicles overnight.

Landlords do not support major modifications to their properties,

including the installation of drop arms. Risk will be mitigated by

permanently blocking two of the four vehicle access points. Non

mission vehicle and foot traffic will be channeled to Villa A Bravo

gate. Screening efforts will be concentrated to one area.

We've reviewed a lot of documents from personnel who had been

deployed to Benghazi. Here at least there appears to be -- this is

a description of -- would you describe this as a security assessment?

A Yes, I would.

Q And do you --

A A physical security assessment, actually.

Q Okay. And is there any indications here that there are

deficiencies for which an exception would need to be sought or

mitigating measures need to be taken?

A No. This is a very good description of the facilities on

the compound and addressing a lot of the items slash requirements that

we would look at based on standards.

Q Okay. And at the time, this is July 2011, it appears this

description is referring to both Villa A and Villa B. Is that your

understanding?

A Yes.

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50

Q And would this be an example of what you described as the

focus at the time when the Special Envoy moved from the hotel to quickly

find a property that was suitable, more secure from a security

perspective?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And certainly, although subsequently, separately,

other communications may have been made about physical security at the

compound, at least here there is no indication of major physical

security vulnerabilities at Villa A or Villa B, correct?

A That's correct.

Q And there is also no reference or request for an

exception --

A Correct.

Q -- to OSPB standards.

And it sounds like certainly here there is a discussion of some

steps that will be taken using armored vehicles and blocking positions,

that sort of thing?

A Uh-huh.

Q Is that what you'd described as some of the steps that post

would take to enhance their security?

A Yeah, or mitigate requirements, because you can't use drop

arms, drop bars, they will use armored vehicles in the place of that.

So that's a mitigating stuff.

Q And moving forward, we'll mark what will be exhibit 5. For

the record, this is document number C05578319.

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51

Exhibit No. 5

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q It is a document entitled "Physical Security Programs Makes

a Move in Benghazi," by, redacted, , DS/C/ST. I'll give you

a moment to review that.

I would just like to first ask for your understanding of what this

document is?

A Yes, this is an article by about the assistance

provided from the Office of Physical Security Programs for

locating -- for first moving into the hotel in Benghazi and then later

locating property to relocate.

Q Okay. And is this an article that would have been prepared

for internal consumption? Is this something that would have been

prepared for external release?

A Mainly for within the Department and mainly within

Diplomatic Security. I think the greater readership was within

Diplomatic Security for these.

Q Okay. That's fair. And I'll note that there appear to be

some -- a few line edits in here. So this appears that it may be a

draft form. Do you recall this article at the time?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So an article was produced and distributed

internally within the Department?

A Yes, I believe so.

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52

Q Okay. And as you sit here today and you read the content,

the description, it paints a story of how certain facilities were

occupied, is this generally an accurate description of what occurred,

to the best of your understanding?

A To the best of my understanding, yes.

Q Okay. And there was some discussion in the last round about

which facility is occupied and when. It appears here that there is

a sequence that it is laid out. Is it your understanding that this

is an accurate sequence of how the events played out or transpired

Benghazi?

A This appears to be an accurate sequence, yes.

Q And would this further be an example of what you discussed

in the last round about some of the challenges associated with finding

a facility that would be suitable from a security perspective in

Benghazi at that time?

A Yes.

Q There is reference, for instance, to 12 potential site

visits that occurred?

A Uh-huh, yes.

Q At the time, do you recall that Villas A and B were seen

as the best choices from a security standpoint?

A I believe they were.

Q Okay. So in light of 12 potential options, the best option

from a security standpoint, to the best of your understanding, was

Villas A and B?

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53

A Yes, that's correct.

Q Yeah, and just one clarifying, there is no date that appears

on this, but to the best of your recollection, did this article appear

internally within the Bureau before the attacks?

A Yes, it appears that this was earlier -- an earlier article,

prior to the attacks.

Q And then if you look on the last page there is a line that

reads: "TDY/RSO works in entrance area of Villa A." So

does that refresh your recollection about the role may

have played in 2011 and whether or not he was deployed to Benghazi?

A Yes, this would indicate that he was deployed to Benghazi

during that timeframe.

Q And if we could just return real briefly to exhibit 1 and

exhibit 2. Again, you indicated you weren't contemporaneously aware

of these discussions at the time, discussions with Legal. As you sit

here today, is there anything that appears inappropriate about the

process that is unfolding in either exhibit 1 or exhibit 2 where

individuals appear to be consulting with legal advisers regarding the

applicability of certain standards?

A No not at all, not at all.

Mr. Kenny. Okay. We'll go off the record.

[Recess.]

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Ambassador, thank you again. So we'll continue with our

second hour for the majority, third hour.

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54

We've talked a lot about OSPB standards and SECCA. And in the

last hour we continued the discussion clarifying sort of on separate

tracks OSPB standards and SECCA. And what I want to focus on are how

those standards are developed in terms of isn't it accurate or would

you agree that there are different standards based on different

threats?

A Okay.

Q So a threat level would determine those OSPB standards that

would apply to mitigate that threat?

A I -- I -- okay.

Q Do you agree?

A Oh, okay. There are going to be basic requirements for any

facility regardless of the threat level at a location. Of course we

have various threat levels, low, medium, and high. But regardless of

the threat level, there will be basic standards that will require to

any facility. So yes, there will be some standards that are tied

directly to threat, but OSPB may or may not fit into that category,

I guess because subsequent to Benghazi we have the high-threat,

high-risk posts. And so there are things that are done at those

locations that are in addition to what the standards are.

So it's not really a direct tie between threat and the standards,

because I'd try to think of a place around the world where, based on

that threat, you have higher standards of OSPB requirements.

Q Well, taking a step back before the attacks, and just let's

start off, I guess, with a SETL, a security environment threat listing?

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A Correct.

Q And what is a SETL threat?

A A security environment threat list is an assessment of each

post around the world, and you assess certain categories, the threat

in certain categories, political violence, crime, terrorism, and to

classified settings as well, yes.

Q And is it fair to say that there are certain OSPB standards

that are tied to the SETL threat ratings that would mitigate those

threats?

A There are certain requirements based on what the threat

level, as to which of the standards ought to be met.

Q Okay. And do you recall what the SETL ratings were for

Benghazi at the time?

A There would not have been any SETL threat rating for

Benghazi.

Q Would there have been one for Libya?

A There would have -- yeah, for Tripoli. I believe Tripoli

was high --

Q Okay. I'd like to --

A High for --

Q So I'd like to introduce now what will be exhibit 6.

Exhibit No. 6

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q So just to clarify, the OSPB standards that are out there

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apply -- when you say they apply to all facilities, so every standard

applies to facilities that are rated low on the SETL listing. Is that

correct, every single standard?

A Correct. Here is an example. For a low threat post, the

perimeter may require a fence, whereas for a high threat location it

may require a wall, that is an example, particularly for residential

standards, which are OSPB.

Q So then the threat -- so there are different standards or

requirements that come into play depending on the threat level of that

location?

A That's correct, yes. I -- yes.

Q So it's sort of the higher the threat level, the higher the

standard will be, or the more stringent the standard will be?

A Yes.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q In order to mitigate that threat?

A Correct.

Q I will give the witness a chance to look at the document.

And just for identification purpose, it's State Department document

CO5388931. It is an email from to , dated

December 15, 2011. And just for the record, the witness is not on the

email. It goes to the discussion of the SETL threat in Libya.

A Okay.

Q And to further inform our discussion on the SETL threat in

Libya at the time, this is an email of which, as I noted, that you are

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57

not on, but goes to the discussion of SETL threat, between the RSO in

Tripoli and the TDY/RSO in Benghazi, who is . And are

you familiar with these two names?

A I am familiar with .

Q . And in this email is responding to

a request from the TDY/RSO in Benghazi as to what the SETL threat is --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- at the time and at the end of 2011. And the SETL threat

rating for terrorism is high, political violence critical, crime high,

and as you alluded to earlier, two classified ones were both high.

And so can you tell us what those threat levels mean with respect

to the risk to American diplomats? For example, what -- is a critical

threat -- does that suggest a grave risk to American diplomats? Is

that something you're familiar with?

A I don't know how I would characterize that? High threat

means, based on the activity that we have seen in the post, you know,

that we've seen at that location, that that amount -- that the amount of

activity ongoing at that location would indicate that it has earned

a high rating for that environment. And the same for critical, that

the situation is such that it has earned that threat rating. Critical

political violence for Libya at the time, there was a war going on,

so that would be the rating.

Q And so to my colleague's earlier point, given these

risks -- the higher the risk or threat rating, the higher the standard

and the need to mitigate that risk, the greater importance to mitigate

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58

that risk, correct?

A Yes, yes.

Q And so to go back to exhibit 4, I want to focus on the second

page. And my colleagues in the previous hour had talked about the

physical security upgrades, that the assessment that was done and the

upgrades that were needed, and we just talked about a threat level that

you described as an ongoing civil war. And so, in your opinion, do

these assessments and the security measures in place sort of mitigate

that threat that is in place or was in place?

A I -- the information that's on the document here gives an

account of the physical security pieces that are in place for the

compound that they are looking at inhabiting, and it sort of speaks

for itself. It speaks to the height of the wall, which is 4 meters,

and the requirement is a 9-foot wall. So it would actually be --

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay, could you do the math for me?

A Yes, 4 meters is approximately 12 feet, so it's

approximately 3 feet higher than a wall that would be required for a

compound.

Q Where the rating is high for terrorism and crime and

critical for political violence, is the wall required to be anti-climb

or was it at the time in 2011?

A Yes.

Q So this wall did not meet that standard, is that correct,

because they are talking about it, they would have to add something

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to it to make it anti-climb?

A I see the comment about the razor wire, but based on the

description of the wall, of its height, there is not enough detail here

to state that it is not anti-climb. I mean --

Q So in other words, this description doesn't give you enough

information to determine whether it would meet the OSPB standard?

A It gives information to me of some of the portions of the

standard that it would meet. You are absolutely right, it's not there

as to whether or not it would meet the anti-climb factor.

Q Okay. And going to the next paragraph, where it talks about

significant setback, does it -- it doesn't tell you exactly how much

setback it has?

A That's correct.

Q So again, you are not given enough information in this

document to know whether it met the OSPB standards and the SECCA

standards for setback. Is that correct?

A That is correct.

Q And then again down a little bit lower where it talks about

the installation of drop arms. Were drop arms required where there

was a SETL rating of high or critical for the categories we've

discussed?

A Okay, I want to go back for just one point. It stated about

the setback, it said: "Concrete banners/planters not required."

Q I'm sorry, where are you referring to?

A Where it says "significant setback." The next sentence

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says: "Concrete barrier/planters not required."

Q Yes.

A Generally stating, the reason that that would be there is

to provide enhanced setback. So if it is stating that it is not

required --

Ms. Betz. That suggests to you that there is sufficient setback?

Mr. That would suggest that.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q But it doesn't tell you for sure.

A That's correct, that's correct, it doesn't tell me for sure.

And you said about the drop arms?

Q Uh-huh.

A What was your question?

Q Was drop arms a standard that was to be met in locations

that were rated high or critical for terrorism, political violence?

A Vehicle arrest barriers, yes, are a requirement, for the

mitigating way would be to place an armored vehicle there that would

function in the same -- would function as a vehicle arrest barrier.

Q And that is a sufficient mitigation in areas where they have

car bombs and things like that.

A That is a sufficient -- that is a sufficient mitigation if

there is no drop arm or delta barrier installed, yes.

Ms. Welcher. For the record, you're basing your foundation for

questions on a document in July 2011 about the SETL ratings, but the

SETL ratings that you cited are from a December 15th, 2011, document,

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and the statement says these are new ratings that just came out. So

I don't know if you have another document about the SETL ratings in

July of 2011, but I just want to put on the record that the ratings

you were citing were not -- do not appear to have been in place.

Ms. Jackson. May or may not.

Ms. Welcher. May or may not.

Ms. Betz. And I think just to respond, I think the witness talked

about an ongoing civil war. So I think civil war critical threat

rating.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q I want to turn to now -- so moving our timeframe up to

December 2011 and the extension of the mission for an additional 12

months, for an additional year. Do you recall that period?

A Yes.

Q And do you recall clearing a memo, a memorandum of extension

that was drafted by the NEA Bureau for Under Secretary Kennedy's

signature --

A Yes.

Q -- outlining the parameters of extending the mission for

another 12 months?

A I do recall that there was a memo.

Q And do you recall any discussions just generally about the

memorandum that you had or the extension that you were having at the

time whether with NEA or Under Secretary Kennedy's office or

individuals within your own office about the extension?

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62

A I don't recall specific details about any discussions.

Q Did you have concerns about extending the mission? Do you

recall having concerns or discussing those concerns with anyone about

the mission's extension?

A I don't recall any specific discussions about specific

concerns. I do recall the memo being drafted. I remember clearing

of the memo.

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[12:25 p.m.]

Ms. Betz. I'm going to just show you a document which will be

exhibit No. 7.

Exhibit No. 7

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Betz. And while the witness is looking at the document, I'll

go ahead and identify it. It is State Department C05578953, and it

is a series of emails in the document of which the witness is not a

sender or a recipient, but is identified in the series of emails. And

it will be page 2, the top of page 2, that we will focus on.

And I guess, while we're at it, I'll hand you the extension memo

so that you can read them concurrently.

Ms. Jackson. Which been marked as Exhibit 8.

Ms. Betz. Eight.

Exhibit No. 8

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Betz. And for purposes of the extension memo, we'll be

focusing primarily on page 2, the second full paragraph, the last

sentence, beginning with "with."

Ms. Jackson. And just for the record, this does not bear a

document number, but it is an action memo for Under Secretary Kennedy,

dated December 27, 2011, from Jeffrey Feltman, subject: "Future of

Operations in Benghazi, Libya."

Mr. Snyder. What paragraph?

Ms. Betz. So on page 2, the second paragraph, the last sentence.

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And then on page 3, it would be the third paragraph and the sentence

beginning, "If you agree with this course of action," in the middle.

Mr. Snyder. Got it. Thanks.

Mr. Okay.

Ms. Betz. And just for clarification, on the extension memo, my

colleague just described it, but just to reiterate, while the witness

is not the drafter or the subject or the action -- it is not seeking

the action of the witness, the witness did clear the memo on behalf

of Diplomatic Security.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Ambassador , going back to exhibit 7, and looking at

the bottom of page one, do you recognize any of the two names in this

email exchange? ?

A I do.

Q Okay. And who is ?

A was a special assistant in the Office of

Assistant Secretary.

Q And did she work directly for you?

A No, for Eric Boswell.

Q Eric Boswell, okay.

And so in this email she is responding to , and I'll

quote: "Acting PDAS clears the attached action memo AM

to M on the future of Benghazi operations with the comment that this

operation continues to be an unfunded mandate and a drain on personnel

resources."

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Do you recall those concerns?

Let me take a step back.

A I don't think this would be an inaccurate quote.

Q Okay. So this is an accurate description of your concerns

at the time?

A Of the DS concerns, correct, correct. In my role as acting

PDAS, as I was acting at that time, that's the director of diplomatic

security, which would encompass not only Countermeasures, but the other

directorates within Diplomatic Security. So this comment would've

been based on that DS assessment.

Q So this was not your own personal assessment but the

assessment, the collective assessment of Diplomatic Security?

A Yes. Or -- yes -- or input from this person that had been

queried for clearance.

Q Did you ever have any additional discussions with either

Assistant Secretary Boswell or Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary

Bultrowicz or others about the concerns that you relayed with regard

to the extension memo?

A No, because with this going from me up to Secretary Boswell,

he would have seen these comments.

Q And did you discuss the contents of the memo before clearing

it on behalf of Diplomatic Security or on behalf of the PDAS?

A The other seniors would have seen the memo as well and had

an opportunity to comment based on its accuracy and maybe providing

information for the document itself.

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BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And by other seniors, you mean the other deputy assistant

secretaries?

A Correct.

Q And at that time that would've been, like, Charlene Lamb

for DS/IP?

A Yes.

Q Would there have been other DAS's?

A Yeah, there would've been the DAS for intelligence threat

analysis, , and I believe training, since the personnel

on the ground were from Mobile Security Division. I don't recall who

the DAS was. Maybe -- I don't recall who the DAS was. And from

Domestic Operations as well, because they provided a lot of the

temporary support for the operations there.

Ms. Betz. But you didn't -- but just so I'm clear, so you did

not have discussions with them personally. These were just

recommendations, to the best of your understanding, that they were

making to you?

Mr. . Correct. Correct.

Ms. Betz. And then you were clearing it on their behalf?

Mr. . Correct. Yes.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q I noticed that this is at the end of the year. It's dated,

this particular exchange, December 23. I'm anticipating that you were

filling in for either PDAS Bultrowicz or Assistant Secretary Boswell

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because it was the holidays and you got the duty?

A I have no idea. I have no idea. It would've been -- I

would've been PDAS Bultrowicz though.

Q Filling in for him?

A Correct.

Q And when you fill in for him, do you often get, like, a list

of things that are likely to come across your desk and these are the

recommended actions, or how did that work at the time?

A No, I didn't -- I wouldn't get a list of things that might

come across my desk. It basically was the things that came across my

desk during the time that I was in that position, we would address them.

Q So when you got this action memo and made the reference or

someone on your behalf made the reference about your comment that this

operation continues to be an unfunded mandate and a drain on personnel

resources, how is it that you collected that information in order to

send that comment on?

A Well, first of all, the operation in Libya, there was no

specific allotment of money for that operation that would address the

unfunded mandate issue. The drain on personnel resources, when you

establish a post and you begin operations, it's always preferable to

have permanently assigned individuals in those locations as opposed

to having continuous temporary duty assignments going through because

of the costs that are associated with that.

And so that would be the resources. Looking at how you intend

to operate there, you want to establish permanent positions in those

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locations so that you don't have that continuous resource requirement

of sending people over on a rotating basis.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q And just to clarify, to go back, the concern about the

unfunded mandate was that there was no sort of direct funding stream

for the mission in all aspects or with regard to physical security?

Can you sort of describe maybe a little bit fuller in terms of that

unfunded mandate?

A I think it would -- well, because it didn't come from

Countermeasures, it would not have been solely for physical security.

So I would say that it was broader for the operations in Benghazi.

Q Let me ask you this. As the DAS for Countermeasures, were

you concerned about the ability to fund sufficiently the physical

security measures needed to secure the facility?

A It had not become an issue for me yet at that time, based

on, as we spoke of in the first hour, the sources that were providing

funds for the operation, particularly from the physical security side.

You had Physical Security Programs, you had International Programs,

you had OBO, and then you had the regional bureau as well.

Q You said it had not been a concern at that time. Did it

ever, did funding for physical security upgrades ever become an issue

for you or a concern of yours?

A No.

Q Okay. I want to turn now to exhibit 8 and the extension

memorandum itself.

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A Okay.

Q And turning to page 2 and the last sentence that reads, "With

the full complement of five Special Agents, our permanent presence

would include eight U.S. direct-hire employees, two slots for TDY PM

and USAID officers, and one LES program assistant."

So do you recall any conversations in clearing this memo regarding

the designation of five agents to secure the compound with these eight

other individuals?

A No.

Q You don't recall a conversation?

A No, I don't recall a conversation.

Q So you don't recall whether five was the minimum or five

was the cap?

A No, I don't.

Q And turning then to page 3 and the third paragraph, and in

the sentence that states, "If you agree -- "

A Okay.

Q "If you agree with this course of action, NEA will work with

DS to rapidly implement a series of corrective security measures as

part of the consolidation of the State footprint."

A Uh-huh.

Q Help me understand what corrective security measures means.

A I don't understand the context in which this is stated.

Okay. Well, in relation to the sentences that are directly above that,

it's a matter of repositioning the security elements that cover the

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compounds. It appears that they've given up Villa A and maintaining

Villas B and C.

There would have been security guard postings, positions on Villa

A, that you now need to consolidate onto the Villa B and C compound,

and also the access control points, the technical security pieces that

are in place there, camera coverage, alarms, those types of things.

It's just a reconfiguration of the overall security package to

accommodate the grounds that you now are going to occupy.

Q And so taking a step back, this is a memorandum that would

renew the leases for Villas B and C and terminate the lease for Villa

A, correct?

A Yes.

Q And these would be corrective measures that would be taken

to secure Villas B and C, correct?

A Correct.

Q And were you consulted on those decisions to let A go and

keep B and C? In our previous discussion you talked about A and B being

the more secure aspect of the compound, but yet moving forward, this

is a memorandum that authorizes the leases of B and C and terminating

A. So I'm just trying to better understand from you if you were

involved in any of the discussions to let Villa A go versus Villa B

and C.

A Yeah. No, I don't recall being in any discussions

relinquishing Villa A.

Ms. Welcher. And as to his prior testimony, I'm not sure that's

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quite what he said, so I would just refer to the record just to be clear.

Ms. Betz. And if I'm inaccurate, correct me.

Mr. Okay.

Ms. Betz. That's my understanding of that.

Ms. Jackson. Who on your team would've been involved in

reviewing the decision as to which villas should be retained, or was

that left to some other component?

Mr. I think it may have been left to some other component.

I think it's based more on the needs of the operation and the footage

space that would be needed for that. I don't think it's solely a

security issue as to why they're moving from Villa A to then

consolidating with B and C.

Ms. Jackson. So what you're telling us is that space

considerations would have been the deciding factor as opposed to the

security aspects of the three compounds or the three villas that were

available?

Mr. I think there's an overall discussion of what are the

needs of the operation there and what is it -- what does the

compound -- you know, what is it that the compound is to look like.

And it appears that it's going -- that Villas A, B, the 13-acre compound

with Villa A, B, and C is more than is needed and so it's being

consolidated to more what the need is, which is the space, the less

than 13-acre area for Villas B and C.

Ms. Betz. I want to show you what we'll mark as exhibit 9.

Exhibit No. 9

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Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Betz. And while the witness is looking at the document, I'll

go ahead and identify it. Basically I'm going to focus on the top two

email exchanges. And the document is State Department SCB0049956.

And it is an email from to , ,

and , dated February 15, 2012. Really, it's just the first

email or the email at the top of the page.

Mr. Kenny. It looks like there are two documents attached here.

The last page is a different Bates number.

Ms. Betz. Oh, it must be our copying.

Mr. Kenny. Actually, there's several.

Ms. Jackson. Just the last page.

Ms. Betz. Just the last page.

Mr. Kenny. So are we going to mark that as a separate exhibit?

Ms. Betz. Just tear it off.

Mr. Kenny. Thank you.

Ms. Jackson. We'll shred them. You can just tear it up if you

want. Take the last page off.

Mr. Okay.

Mr. Snyder. See, now it reads completely differently.

Ms. Jackson. We're not even going there.

Ms. Betz. We're not even going there, exactly.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So returning to our discussion of Villas A, B, and C and

the decision to move forward with B and C, this is an email exchange,

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as I noted, between and the RSO in Benghazi, the RSO

in Tripoli, and . Who is ?

A is one of the officers in the Office of Physical

Security Programs, Project Coordination Branch.

Q And is --

A Same.

Q Same.

A Yes.

Q And , just for point of clarification, was

somebody that worked on a daily basis with those in Benghazi regarding

physical security elements?

A Yes, he was the principal point of contact. Libya was in

his portfolio within Project Coordination Branch.

Q And did you meet frequently with ? Did he

maybe did not report to you directly, but were you briefed on what he

was doing with regard to these security measures?

A I would inquire from when necessary. But no, I did

not meet frequently with him.

Q Okay. But his information is credible. We don't have any

reason to believe what he's suggesting is inaccurate?

A That's correct.

Q Okay.

Ms. Jackson. So he was good at what he did?

Mr. He was good in his responsibilities as an adviser on

physical security matters.

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Ms. Jackson. And he understood the process and was accurate in

his work, and did you have full confidence in his work?

Mr. I believe that he was a competent officer in the job

that he was hired for.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So at the top of the email exchange, says,

I do not know who was responsible or why the decision was made

to relinquish Villa A, but I believe that the compound created by this

arrangement, Villa A and Villa B, was an exceptional facility that

satisfied the operational requirements of your post."

It goes on to say, "Perhaps your question would be best raised

by the principal officer with NEA/EX and OBO real estate before you

go too far down the path of returning Villa A to the owner. ."

So this email suggests that has concerns about

Villa B and C moving forward. Is that fair?

A Since he makes very little reference to Villa C, it's sort

of hard to infer from him what his assessment would be of Villa C. From

this it's clear that he has a comfort level with Villas A and B, but

it does not discredit what his opinion would've been of Villas B and

C.

Q Do you recall -- oh, I'm sorry.

A That's it.

Q Do you recall if an assessment was ever conducted on Villa

C, a security assessment?

A I don't. No, I don't.

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Q But do you have any reason to believe that his concern was

not a viable concern with regard to the security or his preference for

Villa A and B, given he was on the ground at the time that Villa A and

B were occupied by the mission?

A It appears that he is responding to the assessment from

and basically stating that there is more information that's

out there that he doesn't have and that they need to seek NEA/EX and

OBO for more information on why the decision was made to -- why that

decision was made.

Q Are you aware of any type of discussion like this around

the time that the extension memo was approved, cleared and approved

in December?

A That there was a recommendation to consolidate on those --

Q Yeah.

A -- to consolidate the size of the compound?

Q Not the size, per se, but any type of similar discussion

as to the choices to move Villa A and B forward versus B and C. Do

you recall any of those type of discussions, and did they rise to your

level?

A I only recall that there was a discussion to consolidate

the size of the operation.

Q But not necessarily which villas?

A Correct.

Q And is that a decision that should've been brought to your

attention?

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A No.

Q Do you recall having any general conversations about

co-locating at this time?

A No.

Q Do you recall having any type of discussion about

co-locating?

A No.

Q So not in June -- you don't recall having a discussion in

June 2011 about co-locating?

A No, I don't.

Q Or in December 2011 about co-locating?

A No, I don't recall.

Q So that's a discussion that would not come to you or rise

to your level?

A I just don't recall there being any discussion on

co-location.

Q Do you know who would've had those discussions?

A No.

Q Do you recall?

A I don't recall.

Q Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And co-location is one of the requirements under SECCA. Is

that correct?

A Yes, co-location is one of the requirements under SECCA

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where there is a constructed facility, where the U.S. Government

constructs a facility for its operation. Then if there are other

U.S. Government entities that are out there, separate facilities, that

the requirement would be that they are co-located under the newly built

facility.

Q Is it just newly built facilities, or is it also newly

acquired facilities?

A To my recollection, I can only recall cases of newly built

facilities.

Q And when we're talking about the security of compounds and

under SECCA, is it your understanding that there are two requirements,

one being the co-location and the other one being a 100-foot setback?

A Yes.

Q Are there other provisions under SECCA that you recall that

deal with physical security or the security of a U.S. Government

facility overseas?

A Those are the two that come to mind.

Q Okay. So any other standards that we're talking about,

such as height of wall or anti-climb or drop-arms, those would all fall

under OSPB standards?

A Yes.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So moving forward, the extension is moving forward, were

you aware or do you recall any concerns from those on the ground about

obtaining any type of physical security measure or anything like that,

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any barriers that they were experiencing or that kind of thing?

A I recall that there was continuous conversation between the

Office of Physical Security Programs, the Office of Security

Technology, and the personnel on the ground about things that, you know,

the current situation and things that could be done to make

improvements. I recall there being a discussion about some vehicle

barriers that the British were offering, and I believe in the end they

were given to the people on the compound.

And there were other continual upgrades being made. I recall

grilling on the windows, that even though the Villas had window

grilling, there was an office that did not have it or that had

substandard grilling, and there was a discussion of upgrading the

grilling on the windows of that compound.

I recall there being a discussion about creating escape hatches

within the grills. And I recall an early conversation about

establishing safe havens, hardened areas within the facilities. Those

are just some of the ones that come to mind.

Q Do you recall concerns about the perimeter wall? Were

those brought to your attention?

A I recall there being an issue about establishing guard

platforms on the perimeter wall. And I recall that there was the

satchel bomb that was placed against the perimeter wall and damage that

resulted from that.

Q Do you recall concerns that the RSOs were expressing about

the landlord's unwillingness to address certain security issues like

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the perimeter wall? Were those brought to your attention?

A I don't recall anything about the landlord not wanting to

address.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q You said guard platforms or guard towers?

A Guard platforms.

Q And those would be like elevated platforms so you could see

over the wall? I mean, I'm just wanting --

A Yes. Yes. Exactly.

Q Were those ever funded and built?

A Yes.

Q The guard platforms were?

A Yes.

Q Is there a distinction between that and a guard tower?

A There is a distinction between that and a guard tower. A

tower would be a freestanding entity that gives the guard cover and

may be placed on the outside of the wall. It may be built into the

wall or it could be erected behind the well. Platforms generally are

going to -- it's just that; it's a platform behind the wall. The

thought behind both is to give the guard an elevated presence so that

he can see activities going on beyond the wall and on the outside in

both directions.

Q Were guard towers requested for Benghazi?

A I don't recall there being guard towers requested for

Benghazi.

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Q Okay.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Do you recall the mission requesting the assistance of a

physical security specialist to come do an assessment on B and C? Do

you recall any conversations or requests coming from Benghazi?

A No. But we -- there were physical security specialists who

visited Benghazi. visited Benghazi.

visited Benghazi. They are physical security specialists.

Q Once the mission was extended and Villas B and C became the

compound, do you recall any physical security specialist being sent

to do an assessment on that, on the new compound per se?

A I do not.

Q Okay. Going back, you just talked about your recollection

of the sort of satchel attack on the perimeter wall.

A Yes.

Q How were you notified of the attack?

A The 8 o'clock meeting that I spoke of the next day, I know

that that was one of the points that was brought up at that -- in that

briefing. There was also a spot report that was done, that's generally

done shortly after an incident, and it would have come up on that as

well.

Q So were you a recipient of all the spot reports and cables

that were being sent from Benghazi and Libya to the State Department,

to DS? Would you have been a recipient on those?

A Yes.

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Q And what steps did you take or what did you do after that

VTC describing the satchel incident?

A I'm going to confer at that point with Physical Security

Programs, have them reach out to the personnel that are on the ground,

give us an assessment of the damage and what are the repairs that are

going to be needed, and if there is funding that needs to take place

from us, from Physical Security Programs, in order to get it done.

Q Is there any revisiting that's done as to maybe we need to

do something more rather than just repairing and rebuilding the wall?

A That's a matter that the post personnel on the ground would

discuss, and then if they recommend that, that discussion would then

continue with the personnel within Physical Security Programs.

Q I'm going to show you what is marked as exhibit 10, a

document.

Exhibit No. 10

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. BETZ:

Q For identification purposes, this is State Department

document C05388866. It is a series of email exchanges from Scott

Bultrowicz to Charlene Lamb, copying Eric Boswell and the witness. And

I'll give the witness a second to look at the document.

A Okay.

Q And just for the record, as I stated, the witness is on the

series of email exchanges. And I want to focus on the third email

exchange as well as the one above it. And in it, PDAS Bultrowicz is

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inquiring of DAS Lamb, as well as to you, as well as Assistant Secretary

Boswell.

"Charlene, this along with last week's incident is troubling.

What is posts current movement operations? "

In the email above it, she responds and describes that they are

in lockdown. But I want to focus on the last couple of sentences. "If

the tide is turning and they are now looking for Americans and

Westerners to attack, that is a game changer. We are not staffed or

resourced adequately to protect our people in that type of an

environment. We are a soft target against the resources available to

the bad guys there. Not to mention there is no continuity because we

do everything there with TDY personnel. The cost to continue to do

business there may become challenging." Unquote.

Do you recall this email exchange?

A Yes. I really don't, but I -- yeah. But I'm on here and

I would have --

Q Well, let me ask you this. So this is an email exchange

that comes subsequent to the second attack on the facility and the same

day that the U.K. Ambassador's motorcade was attacked. And so it seems

that there is a trend starting or occurring with regard to attacks.

Were you concerned by these, THIS series of incidents that were

unfolding?

A Yes, it would have -- yes, I would have -- I was concerned

about the activities going on, on the ground in Benghazi.

Q Did you have any discussions with either Assistant

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Secretary Boswell or PDAS Bultrowicz or DAS Lamb with regard to this

email or just the incidents in general and any type of assessments or

reviews that needed to be done?

A I don't recall any specific discussions based on this

activity, particularly as it related to the physical security profile.

Ms. Jackson. Beyond those people, did you direct your people to

evaluate or reevaluate the physical security stature of the compound?

Mr. No, I did not direct my people to do so, mainly because

of their frequent communications with the personnel on the ground in

Benghazi. So they would have not needed my direction to reach out and

say: We've seen that this happens, do you need anything from us?

Ms. Jackson. Did your people then bring it to your attention?

Did they, you know, bring it up to your attention following these

events, that we've been in discussion with the people on the ground?

Mr. No.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Just moving forward to August 2012, and we talked about you

being a recipient of different cables, were you aware of the Emergency

Action Committee -- let's take this back. You're aware of an EAC?

A Yes, I'm familiar with an EAC.

Q And you're aware of EAC cables that are sent describing

events and requests that may be forthcoming?

A Yes, I am familiar with EAC cables.

Q And were you aware or informed of any EAC cable that came

out of Benghazi on or around August 15-16?

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A I don't recall a specific EAC cable from that time.

Q So no one brought to your attention any concerns or any

forthcoming requests that may be coming from Benghazi with additional

physical security requests?

A I don't recall any specific requests. That's not to say

that there weren't any made. I just don't recall any specific cable

from an August EAC.

Q Well let me ask you this, were you involved in any

conversations about making the mission permanent at that point in time,

whether in July, August? Were you a part of any discussions about the

future of Benghazi and its future?

A I recall that somewhere during that timeframe that there

was a monthly meeting held that was chaired by Under Secretary Kennedy

and NEA/EX being the other main body there, but also attending the

meeting with the Diplomatic Security and OBO personnel, of which you

would cover a list of issues in the NEA region that were of importance

and they wanted deeper engagement with Under Secretary Kennedy on.

I know that during one of those meetings during that timeframe

the question was asked -- that was also coinciding with the time that

they were asking to extend for the year. And so permanent, not

necessarily in that word, but what's the future for Benghazi, and I

think the decision was made that we would remain there until at least

December of 2012.

Q Okay.

Ms. Jackson. And so throughout the time that Benghazi was in

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existence, there were these monthly meetings that were chaired by Under

Secretary Kennedy involving every location within NEA. Is that

correct?

Mr. Correct. Yes. Well, locations with NEA that they

needed more input on.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Let me ask you this. Were there other meetings or task

force that you were a part of that you were aware that DS was a part

of that dealt with Libya per se?

A Yeah, there would've been -- there was a weekly discussion

with OBO on activities worldwide. And it was called the risk

management -- the risk meeting, I think is what it was titled. It was

generally on Fridays. And again, depending on what was going -- you

know, what were the issues of significance from the previous week, they

would always go on the discussion agenda.

Q Do you recall being a part of or DS being a part of the COWG,

the Contingency Operation Working Group?

A Yes.

Q And was that Libya specific?

A No. No, that was broader than Libya. And -- yes, it was

much broader than just Libya. Mainly NEA posts, but definitely not

solely Libya and not solely NEA. NEA, SCA posts seemed to be the major

locations that were discussed.

Q Do you recall any other working groups that might have been

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shared by DAS Lamb or PDAS Bultrowicz about Libya specific? Are you

aware of any other type of working group or task force?

A I don't recall any others.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Just a couple concluding questions. You said at the very

outset -- so it has been a while -- that one of the offices that you

directed dealt with protective equipment, I believe?

A Yes.

Q And I believe you might have mentioned that it included the

fully armored vehicles, things like that. Did it also include

weaponry?

A Yes, it did.

Q Okay. Do you recall requests ever coming in from the agents

in Benghazi that they wanted machine guns, SAWs, fully automatic

weapons?

A No, I don't. I've seen documentation on what was sent to

Benghazi, what was sent to Tripoli, but I don't recall there being a

request for SAWs. That's not to say there wasn't; I just don't recall

it.

Q Okay. Who would have been in charge of handling that

request?

A For weaponry of that specificity, it would have been the

decision of the Defensive Equipment Policy Review Board, or it may have

been called the Firearms Policy Review Board at that time, because

that's not a type of weapon that is normally deployed, that we normally

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deploy abroad. So it would have been a decision of that board to

deploy.

Q And would those requests have been funneled through you

before it went to that board?

A They would have initially come to DEAV. And DEAV is a

sitting member on that board, and the office director of Physical

Security Programs is also sitting director on the board. It's chaired

by the deputy assistant secretary for training. And so that would be

the group that would have taken up that issue.

Q But would you have been informed of it, if --

A Yes. Yeah, I would have been informed of it. But I don't

recall being informed of a request for SAWs.

Q And if I could just briefly go back to exhibit 1, which was

the sort of legal opinion as to whether SECCA applied to a facility

in Benghazi. I'll give you a moment to pull that one out.

And at the bottom of the first page, I want to go to the -- what

would be the third paragraph, where it says -- the legal opinion is,

You've told us before that this was never brought to your

attention. Is that a correct recollection of that?

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A Correct. That is correct.

Q Would you have been that appropriately senior official that

it should have been brought to?

A It could have been me or someone in my -- within the chain,

particularly the director of Physical Security Programs.

Q As you sit here and read this now, would you have expected

your people to have brought this to your attention, to say we've got

a unique situation here?

A I would have expected them to consult first with the legal

team to see what was being discussed and upon their advice then move

forward from that point on.

Q Okay. And they've given their advice. What would you have

expected your people to do with that advice?

A I'm not understanding. I see that there had been a legal

opinion rendered and that they followed their advice based on the legal

opinion that was rendered.

Q And so you -- all right.

Ms. Welcher. And I believe we previously discussed that this

legal opinion was not with regards to the villas that were ultimately

occupied, correct?

Ms. Jackson. Well --

Ms. Betz. I think we left it undefined.

Ms. Jackson. Uh-huh.

How many facilities overseas were there like Benghazi in 2011 and

2012, where they were not officially notified to the host government,

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found to be not -- found that the waivers and exceptions were not

applicable to them? How many other facilities were there like

Benghazi?

Mr. I believe Benghazi was the only facility like

Benghazi?

Ms. Jackson. Okay. That's all I have.

Ms. Betz. That's all we have.

Ms. Jackson. We'll go off the record.

[Recess.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q We'll go back on the record. The time is 1:30 p.m.

Ambassador, again, thank you. Appreciate your patience here

today. Just have a few follow-up questions regarding some matters that

were discussed in the previous rounds and then hopefully we can have

you on your way.

I'd like to redirect your attention, if I could, to both exhibit 7

and 8. Exhibit 7 is an email chain that you are not on that includes

the thread from , and then exhibit 8 is the action memo

dated September 27, 2011.

And just so the record is clear, there was an assertion at the

beginning of the hour. I just wanted to ask for you to clarify, at

the time that you received this memo, at the time the memo was passed

on to Under Secretary Kennedy, you were serving as the acting principal

deputy assistant secretary for diplomatic security. Is that correct?

A That's correct.

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Q And then for the purposes of reviewing this memo, at that

time you represented all of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's

interests or equities?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. And if I could direct your attention specifically

to exhibit 7, the second page at the bottom, you were read the comment

at the top of this page. The email immediately preceding your

clearance and the comment that is attached, it appears to be an email

from to a series of other individuals, ,

. Do you recognize any of these names on this line?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And I'll just read for the record Ms. ' email

reads, quote: "Please provide comments/clearance on the attached AM

to M on the future of Benghazi operations by tomorrow at noon. This

is a redraft of a memo we have cleared before," close quote.

And just to ask for your understanding of who these individuals

are, not with specificity, but what level these individuals served

within the bureau.

A They're special assistants to the DAS's within the

directorates of Diplomatic Security.

Q And you discuss a couple of those DAS positions. But do

you see here the special assistant for the DAS for international

programs?

A I see three.

Q You see three? Okay. So there were multiple special

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assistants --

A Yes.

Q -- for certain --

A Correct.

Q -- deputy assistant secretaries? And is that because some

of those offices tended to be more busy and required more support from

special assistants? Is that in general --

A I assume that that's the reason.

Q And so just to understand a little bit about the process

here. So Ms. who it's listed here is a special assistant in

Assistant Secretary Boswell at the time's office, is requesting a

comment then from this group of individuals. Did this also include

your special assistant?

A It included the special assistant for Countermeasures and

the special assistant to the director of diplomatic security, yes.

Q Okay. Thank you. That's helpful.

So the process, just so that we better understand here, appears

to be that Ms. is reaching out to the special assistants for these

various deputy assistant secretaries within the Bureau of Diplomatic

Security and asking for their input on this memo before it's cleared.

Is that correct?

A That is correct.

Q And then would the role of Ms. be then to receive any

comments and consolidate those for you to review?

A Yes.

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Q Okay. And moving up the chain, the comment that this

operation continues to be an unfunded mandate and a drain on personnel

resources, I believe you indicated in the last hour that those weren't

concerns that were originated within the Countermeasures directorate.

Is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. Do you recall the source of those comments?

A I do not.

Q Or which office? Okay.

A No, I don't.

Q Okay. But it seems -- to you, does it seem likely that that

comment originated based on the email below from one of those special

assistants who would have consulted with their deputy assistant

secretary?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And at the time, you had no reason to question,

including this comment, in this particular line?

A No.

Q Okay. If I could direct your attention now to exhibit 8.

The bottom of the first page, there's a line that reads, quote:

"Because of budget constraints" -- it is the last sentence in the

paragraph -- quote, "Because of budget constraints and the reduced

footprint, Diplomatic Security's current presence consists of two

Special Agents with an additional three slots currently unfilled,"

close quote.

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And you were asked about your awareness of staffing, security

staffing requirements in Benghazi in the last round. What I'd like

to ask you now is whether you were aware of, when it refers here to

budget constraints, what that was referring to.

A No, I'm not, I'm not aware of what that was referring to.

Q Okay. In the context here, does it appear to be referring

to the staffing requirements for Diplomatic Security agents in

Benghazi?

A I don't know if it's specific to the staffing requirements

or overall security operations for Benghazi.

Q And for the way an action memo would work, because this

particular sentence references Diplomatic Security, is it your

understanding that that language or that information would have been

provided by DS representatives?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So you believe the source of that sentence came from

someone within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security?

A I do.

Q Okay. And just so we better understand, you did ultimately

clear on this memo. Is that correct?

A That is correct.

Q Okay. And I take it then that you agreed with both the

recommendations in here that the special mission should be extended

for 1 year as well as that the lease for Villa A should be dropped and

the presence should be consolidated to Villa B and C. Is that right?

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A That's correct.

Q So Ms. statement where you clear but there's a

comment that's attached to that, is the purpose of that comment to

convey in any way that the bureau would not provide any of the security

resources that were discussed in this memo?

A No, that's not the indication.

Q Okay. Was the comment meant to indicate that the bureau

wouldn't support the continuation of the special mission if it was

deemed necessary?

A No.

Q And you were asked a series of questions about the specific

configuration, whether Villas A and B versus B and C. I'd just like

to ask, at the time that you reviewed this memo, did you have any serious

concerns about the physical security platform at the special mission?

A No, I did not.

Q Did you believe that the Department's personnel were

occupying an unsafe facility in Benghazi?

A No, I did not.

Q And if you had had serious concerns at this time about the

physical security platform at the Special Mission Compound, Villas B

and C, or that personnel were occupying an unsafe facility, would you

have cleared on this action memo?

A I would have noted it in comments similar to what was stated

for the others, and, no, I would not have cleared.

Q Sure.

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And if I could direct your attention to the bottom of page 3. The

last line there at the bottom reads, there's an, "Attachment:

Tab -- Benghazi proposal." Do you recall reviewing a Benghazi proposal

at this time, some sort of attachment to this action plan?

A Yeah, I don't have recall of what the Benghazi proposal was.

Q Okay. We'll go ahead and mark -- this will be exhibit 11.

Exhibit No. 11

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Kenny. This is a multipage document. It bears the document

number C05391931. And it's a multipage document, so I'm just going

to refer you -- I'll provide you an opportunity to review this, if you

like. I'm just going to focus your attention on the first page and

then the top of the second page.

Mr. Okay.

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[1:38 p.m.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Again, I had asked you to go to page 3 of the action memo

where it indicates that there is an attachment. As you sit here today,

does this document appear to be the attachment that accompanied this

action memo?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And I would like to read just the middle of the page,

of the first page. This document appears to be discussing the various

options at the time.

And perhaps before we dig into exhibit 11 a little bit, I would

like to ask for your understanding of this process, it was apparently

played out over a holiday period, you were the acting PDAS at the time.

I will just note that in exhibit No. 7, I believe, Ms. in

the first email sends a request at 3 p.m. on December 22 and asks for

clearance by the following day at noon. It seems like a fairly short

period of time to review this, but she also indicates that this is a

redraft of a memo.

Do you recall at this time whether there were other facilities

that were under consideration and those facilities may have fallen

through at the last minute, for instance?

A No, I don't recall.

Q Okay, that is fine. Maybe I can help refresh your

recollection with exhibit 11.

But before we do that, we will start in the middle of the page

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here, on the first page, it reads, quote: "Given the uncertain future

for this place and the security environment's evolution over time, we

did our best to consider all relevant factors. We had several key

factors in mind when ranking our recommendations, to include current

and likely future security posture, security enhancements at all sites,

including the possibility of requesting reasonable waivers, other

costs -- all of them -- from security to set-up, to break-down, to

moving, upgrades, equipment/furniture, and life services, general

quality of life issues. Weighing all of these things, our rank-ordered

preferences for a new home are as follows: 1. Condense down into

Villas B&C; 2. Two, move entire operation to Villa E; 3. Condense

down to Villas A and B; 4. (last resort) Move entire operation to Villa

D." Close quote.

Again, here there is a reference to a Villa D. Do you recall a

discussion about Villa D in the late December timeframe?

A I do not.

Q That's fine. Just directing your attention to the

discussion that begins on the second page, there is the various

configurations laid out, appears to be advantages and disadvantages

listed. For option number 1, which is Villas B and C, if you go to

the fifth tick, the fifth bullet down, it reads: "Best option from

a security perspective -- multiple ingress/egress, best footprint and

setback of the available options, accommodation for TNC guards,

reasonable upgrades will help harden." Close quote.

Based on seeing this, is it your understanding -- and first let

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me ask it this way. When you read language like this, evaluating a

facility from a security perspective, is your expectation that that

would reflect the view of the RSO or the security professional on the

ground?

A Definitely the view of security personnel who had been

consulted.

Q Okay. So here does it appear that a security professional

in Benghazi had evaluated Villas B and C and was making an assessment

that Villas B and C were the best from a security perspective of the

various options that were listed?

A I couldn't say that it was a security professional from

Benghazi, but I would say that it is definitely from consultations with

security professionals who understood the situation of those

facilities in Benghazi.

Q Okay. But at least here there appears to be some discussion

about which configuration would be best from a security perspective?

A Correct. Correct.

Q And based on that discussion it appears that Villas B and

C were considered the best security option --

A Correct.

Q -- at that time.

A Yes.

Q And if Diplomatic Security had had concerns about physical

security at Villas B and C, would you have expected that to be reflected

in some way contemporaneous with this action memo?

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A Yes.

Q Okay. And did they?

A Not that I'm aware of.

Q And, sir, just reading through my notes here, I did have

one brief question for you. You had had earlier identified four

potential sources of funding.

A Yes.

Q You had PSP, program for security -- Physical Security

Programs?

A Yes.

Q OBO, Overseas Building Operations. You had said the

International Programs Directorate. Is that DS/IP?

A That's correct.

Q And you had also said the Near Eastern Affairs Executive

Office?

A Yes.

Q Is that what is otherwise known as NEA/EX?

A That is correct.

Q I would, sir, just like to offer you the opportunity, there

was a discussion in the last round about some of the physical security

upgrades that were implemented, and your understanding that they were

continuing to be implemented at the special mission. I would just like

to offer you the opportunity, if you would like, to comment on that.

I know the Accountability Review Board examined the physical security

platform in Benghazi and they had also documented a series of upgrades

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100

that were undertaken.

So I would just like to offer you the opportunity if you had

anything you would like it add on that point.

A No, I think -- I remember covering several of them that were

done. Had the wall -- we did the platform on the wall. We did install

drop arms, even though initially the landlord wasn't agreeable to that,

so drop arms were installed. There were safe havens put in each of

the residences that was there. It was the grilling done on the windows

that were not grilled. And those are some of the things that come to

mind right off the bat.

Of course there were lots of technical security things done as

well. An imminent danger notification alarm was put in. There were

other alarms installed. There were cameras installed around the

compound. There were digital video recorders installed in the

compound in order to capture what was there -- to record what was being

captured on the cameras.

Q And those were all physical security upgrades that were

undertaken by your office?

A That is correct.

Q And they were funded by your office as well?

A That is correct.

Q Do you recall learning that funding from OBO was inhibited

in any way because of the temporary nature of the facility, that it

was a short-term lease?

A I don't recall that conversation. I am aware that it took

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place. It did not take place with me being present, but I'm aware that

there were discussions.

Q Okay. And who would those discussions have taken place

between?

A There would have been OBO and my -- and the personnel from

Security Physical Programs or other individuals.

Q So individuals underneath you?

A Correct. Correct.

Q And I know there has been a lot of discussion about setback

today. Can you just explain just real briefly why setback is

important?

A Setback is important for multiple reasons. The one that's

most prevalent is the mitigation of a blast impact, that it has been

discovered that 100 feet -- that a blast equivalent to 5,000 pounds

of TNT on a new building at 100 feet is -- that is the building is a

sustainable building from that distance, reducing that distance

released a higher vulnerability of progressive collapse of a building.

In addition to blasts, you are provided some other benefits, such

as standoff from counterintelligence attacks and other technical

attacks against your facility. And one other very practical one is

the fact that if there is an intruder on the compound that distance

of 100 feet from the perimeter to the facade of the building or the

door provides sufficient reaction time to lock down the building for

personnel, for the security personnel that are inside.

Q Okay. And do you know whether -- there has been an extended

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conversation about, in our discussion today, about setback and what

the requirements are for it. And I would just like to ask your

understanding, to the extent that there may have been deficiencies with

respect to setback at the Special Mission Compound on the night of the

attacks, do you know if that ended up being a vulnerability that was

exploited on that night?

A I do not believe there was a vulnerability that was

exploited on that night.

Q Okay. At this point we'd like to shift gears a little bit.

A Okay.

Q This is something that we do with all the witnesses that

come in. There has been a series of public allegations that have been

made about the attacks over the last 3-1/2 years, and we have asked

every witness whether they have any firsthand personal knowledge to

substantiate or corroborate those allegations. I would like to take

that opportunity to do that with you now. There are about a dozen of

them so please bear with me. And not asking for you to speculate, just

asking whether you have any firsthand knowledge of evidence to support

these allegations.

First, it has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton

intentionally blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One

Congressman has speculated that, quote, "Secretary Clinton told

Leon" -- Leon Panetta -- "to stand down," close quote, and this resulted

in the Defense Department not sending more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

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Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A None.

Q Next, it has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington

Post Fact Checker evaluated this claim and gave it, quote, "four

Pinocchios," close quote, its highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

in April of 2012 a cable denying security resources to Libya?

A None.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A None.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military options in Libya in

spring 2011.

Do you have any evidence Secretary Clinton misrepresented of

fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own people

in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in spring

2011?

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A No.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that, quote, "The CIA was not collecting and

shipping arms from Libya to Syria," close quote, and they further found,

quote, "no support for this allegation," close quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

A None.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A No.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex on the night of the attack to assist the Special

Mission Compound, and there have been a number of allegations about

the cause and the appropriateness of that delay.

The House Intelligence Committee issued a bipartisan report

concluding that the team was not ordered to, quote, "stand down," close

quote, but that instead there were tactical disagreements on the ground

over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand-down order

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to CIA personnel?

A None.

Q Setting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision or think it was the right decision, do you have any evidence

that there was a bad or improper reason behind the temporary delay of

CIA security personnel who departed the Annex to assist the Special

Mission Compound?

A No.

Q A concern has been raised by one individual in the course

of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board damaging

documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from materials that were

provided to the ARB?

A None.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Let me ask these questions for documents that were provided

to Congress.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging document from the materials that were

provided to Congress?

A No.

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Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when he

told Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully performed our duties

in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship," close quote.

Do you have any evidence the CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave

false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided Congress for political reasons?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an

intentional representation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows

about the Benghazi attacks.

I'll try that again. It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan

Rice made an intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday

talk shows about the Benghazi attacks. Do you have any evidence that

Ambassador Rice intentionally misrepresented facts about the Benghazi

attacks on the Sunday talk shows?

A No.

Q It has been alleged the President of the United States was,

quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief," close quote, on the night

of the attacks and that he was missing in action.

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Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing in action

on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four U.S. military

personnel who were stationed at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the

attacks were considering flying on a second plane in Benghazi, were

then ordered by their superiors to quote, "stand down," meaning to cease

all operations. Military officials have stated that those four

individuals were instead ordered to, quote, "remain in place," close

quote, in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance at that

location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that, quote, "There was no stand-down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi," close quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House

Armed Services Committee that was there no stand-down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives. However,

former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the former

chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review of

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the attacks, after which he stated, quote, "Given where the troops were,

how quickly the thing all happened, and how quickly it dissipated, we

probably couldn't have done more than we did," close quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

conclusion?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not

to deploy?

A No.

Mr. Kenny. And, Ambassador, I believe that's all we have at this

point. So thank you again.

We'll go off the record.

[Whereupon, at 1:58 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

536
EXHIBIT 1

.

537
.

538
.

539
.

540
.

541
EXHIBIT 2

542
1

RPTS DEAN

DCMN HERZFELD

COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM,

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

WASHINGTON, D.C.

INTERVIEW OF: ERIC BOSWELL

Tuesday, July 9, 2013

Washington, D.C.

The interview in the above matter was held in Room 2247, Rayburn

House Office Building, commencing at 10:00 a.m.

EXHIBIT 3

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27

That does not include the militias. We would not have vetted

individuals in the militias, just as we wouldn't vet policemen in Paris

standing outside our Embassy. But I am quite certain that there was

a careful examination by the Embassy of whether they felt the

February 17 Martyrs Brigade militia was the right kind of thing.

Q I'm going to introduce as Exhibit 1 the unclassified ARB

just to go through a couple of passages there.

[Boswell Exhibit No. 1

was marked for identification.]

BY MR. OHLY:

Q On page 30, the last paragraph on the page, the first

sentence says, "Another key driver behind the weak security platform

in Benghazi was the decision to treat Benghazi as a temporary,

residential facility, not officially notified to the host government,

even though it was also a full-time office facility."

Some questions came up at our May 8th hearing about, you know,

who can get waivers from OSPB and SECCA standards. Did you have any

insight as to how that waiver process or the OSPB standards were applied

to the mission in Benghazi?

A Some. First, exceptions to OSPB standards are my

responsibility. Waivers to SECCA could some fall in my area, but most

go higher than me by law. This was -- Benghazi was, in fact, a temporary

mission facility. There was some discussion in the paper that the NEA

Bureau sent forward regarding extending it as to whether there might

be -- there was a discussion in an annex to the paper -- I had not seen

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28

it, I saw it afterwards -- as to whether -- as to whether any waivers

or exceptions would be required. There was no decision in that paper

about that matter.

I should describe to you a little bit what the process is. For

any kind of waiver or exception, it originates usually with a post.

A post will say, we need an exception to OSPB standards for reason X,

Y or Z; we can't find a property big enough. That request is fed to

the Countermeasures Directorate in the State Department, which works

for me. There is then a very intensive paper process of leading up

to ultimately a decision document that either goes to me or higher.

There was no such decision document that came to me regarding

Benghazi, and my assumption is that -- well, I wasn't looking for one,

but my assumption is that there was no decision document because it

was a temporary facility. SECCA and OSPB apply to permanent facilities

that are notified to the host country government. It does not apply,

it is my understanding, to temporary facilities, of which we have very

few. Nevertheless we are all very aware of OSPB standards, and we try

our very best to get as close as possible to those standards whether

a waiver is necessary or not. We just try to get as close as we can,

and we did in the case of Benghazi.

BY MR. BEATTIE:

Q Could I ask a follow-up to that?

In my hearing you say that in the case of Benghazi, because it

was as temporary facility, it was essentially a nonwaiverable facility.

Would that be a fair way to think about it? In other words, a waiver

545
29

would not be required?

A It is the latter, the feeling that a waiver would not be

required because it was a temporary facility.

Q Okay. Thanks.

A By the way, waiver requests are reviewed by the State

Department lawyer en route to me.

BY MR. OHLY:

Q So to your knowledge there was never -- who made the

decision that it would be a temporary facility and not -- no waivers

need apply?

A I'm not sure who made the decision that it would be a

temporary facility. It was sort of understood that, you know, when

Chris Stevens went into Benghazi in April, he was going be there for

a short period of time, and that got extended. And even when you look

at the -- I don't know if the word "temporary facility" is in the memo

that went up to Under Secretary Kennedy. I think it was, but I don't

know for sure. But when you extend a facility for 1 year, that's

obviously not a permanent facility. A permanent facility is going to

be in business for indefinitely.

Q So it was just assumed because of that that there would be

no waivers?

A Yeah. It was extended. Its temporary nature was extended

for a year.

BY MR. BEATTIE:

Q You said the memo that went to Under Secretary Kennedy,

546
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66

they apply?

A In my opinion, they did not apply because they -- in my

opinion, the standards apply to permanent facilities, not temporary

ones. Having said that, as I mentioned previously, in any place we

have people we do our best to get as close, because OSPB standard is

the standard for us, it's the gold standard, and we try to get as close

as we can to it.

BY MR. KNAUER:

Q And isn't it the case that you're facing very limited

options in many parts of the world?

A There are places where you simply can't comply with the

standards and do business. For example, there could be a place where

you can't get the setback that you need. To give you an example, our

U.S. Embassy in Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada, which is a new embassy

constructed maybe 15 years ago, relatively new embassy, is situated

in a spot that does not have the 100-foot setback that is required,

that is a standard. There was an evaluation done at the time of whether

that waiver -- whether that problem could be mitigated. It was

determined that it could, and so that's a waiver of a standard. It

happens.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And just out of curiosity, do you have a sense of how many

diplomatic posts around the world don't meet the OSPB standards?

A I don't really have a -- I don't really have a sense, but

I -- no, I don't really have a sense, but it's not unusual. It's not

548
67

unusual.

Q Is it a large number?

A I don't really know.

BY MR. KNAUER:

Q Is it more than 10?

A Oh, yeah, I'd say --

Q More than 20?

A Certainly. I've approved a number of waivers like that,

yeah.

Q I guess what factors into this is that you have to make a

decision as to whether or not you're going to do business in that region

or not and you have to determine if it's important enough to do business

there that you have to find a facility, in some cases even if it doesn't

meet these standards?

A Yes. And you would do everything you could to get as close

to those standards as you possibly could. In the specific case of

Benghazi, we were aware that, you know, the villas they had rented would

not meet. Everybody was aware of it. Ambassador Stevens was aware

of it. The Department as a whole was aware that this did not meet

standards. But what we did was put as much effort into it as we could

to get as close as possible to the standards.

The most important consideration for Benghazi, the greatest

threat that we were worried about -- well, there were two greatest

threats that we were worried about. One is an attack on our vehicles

when we are moving and the other is a car bomb or an IED of some sort.

549
68

The reason we had -- we went into a villa complex in Benghazi that was

of the size it was, was to give us the best possible standoff against

an IED, which was the common form of attacking something in that part

of the world.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So, would you say then the focus was less on determining

whether an exception to an OSPB standard might be needed, the first

priority would always be how can we bring a facility up to snuff, up

to these types of standards?

A We do everything we can to bring a facility -- can I just -- I

didn't overhear -- we do everything we can to bring ourselves up to

standard, that's the standard we try to meet.

Q Referring now to the Secure Embassy Construction and

Counterterrorism Act security requirements, so-called SECCA

requirements --

A SECCA.

Q -- these relate to collocation and setback. In your view,

did these apply to the Special Mission Benghazi?

A No, they do not apply to Special Mission Benghazi. They

apply to permanent facilities, embassies or consulates. They do not

apply to --

Q And when we say a permanent, is it the timeframe, the fact

that a facility might be on a lease or only authorized for a certain

period of time, is that what would make a facility temporary? Does

it need to be formally notified to the host nation as well?

550
69

A The Benghazi facility was never formally notified to the

host nation. That's the point. It was not notified to the host nation

as a diplomatic facility.

Q And because it wouldn't formally notified, it wasn't a,

technically speaking, a diplomatic facility that would bring it under

the requirements --

A Under SECCA.

Q -- under SECCA.

A Yes. SECCA also -- SECCA applies to newly acquired, newly

constructed buildings. SECCA does not apply, for example, to Embassy

Paris. SECCA can't. OSPB does.

Q Okay. Had a decision been made to make a post permanent?

You had mentioned that there was a process one would have to undertake

in order to seek a waiver or an exception. Could we just revisit that

process? I think you had mentioned where specifically that would be

initiated. Who specifically would initiate that process?

A It would be -- sorry. Did I cut you off?

Q Please.

A It would be initiated at a post or possibly in the Office

of Overseas Buildings. When they were designing a building, I knew

they wouldn't be able to meet a certain standard because of the

configuration of the plot or something like that. They might initiate

it, I imagine. But generally, an exception request is initiated by

a post, and at some point in the process the post formally -- the

ambassador formally signs off on it.

551
70

Q Okay. And just to be as clear as possible on this, there

seems to be some lingering confusion about whether waivers or

exceptions were required or sought in the case of Special Mission

Benghazi. In your view, neither an exception to OSPB or a waiver to

SECCA requirements was required?

A I never received a request for a waiver, and so -- and I

did not believe that OSPB standards -- a waiver was or an

exception -- exception is the term of art -- for OSPB standards. An

exception, formal exception would be required.

Q So you didn't believe that an exception would be required

for OSPB standards?

A Right.

Q And the SECCA requirements?

A Didn't apply.

Q Didn't apply.

A Not a newly acquired, newly constructed embassy or

consulate.

Q Sorry to belabor the point, Ambassador.

A Sure.

Q Then a waiver was not necessary?

A A waiver was not necessary.

Q Okay. I would like to turn now and ask a few questions just

about Charlene Lamb, who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary for

International Programs.

A Uh-huh.

552
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 4

553
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

554
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

555
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

556
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

557
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

558
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 5

559
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

560
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

561
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

562
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

563
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

564
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

565
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

566
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

567
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

568
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

569
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

570
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

571
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 6

572
EXHIBIT 7 .

573
.

574
.

575
.

576
.

577
.

578
.

579
.

580
.

581
.

582
.

583
.

584
.

585
.

586
.

587
.

588
.

589
.

590
.

591
.

592
.

593
EXHIBIT 8

594
595
596
597
EXHIBIT 9

598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
EXHIBIT 10

609
610
(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

EXHIBIT 11

611
(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

612
(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

613
(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

614
(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

615
(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

616
(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

617
(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

618
(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

619
(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

620
(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

621
(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

622
(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

623
(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

(STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.)

624
INTERVIEW OF GRS 4

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MARCH 1, 2016
Excerpts of the foregoing interview were cited in the Report of

the Select Committee on Benghazi. The Central Intelligence Agency declined the Committee’s request to declassify the interview

transcript.

626
INTERVIEW OF

OFFICER A

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MARCH 2, 2016
Excerpts of the foregoing interview were cited in the Report of

the Select Committee on Benghazi. The Central Intelligence Agency declined the Committee’s request to declassify the interview

transcript.

628
INTERVIEW OF

ADMIRAL JAMES WINNEFELD

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MARCH 3, 2016
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

MAC TOLAR, Senior Counsel

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director/General Counsel

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel

SHARON GREEN, Minority Counsel

LAURA RAUCH, Minority Senior Professional Staff

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WILLIAM A. HUDSON, JR.

EDWARD RICHARDS

630
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

4

Ms. Clarke. Good morning, Admiral Winnefeld. This is a

transcribed interview conducted by the House Select Committee on

Benghazi. This interview is being conducted voluntarily as part

of the committee's investigation into the attack on U.S.

diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and related matters

pursuant to House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress and House

Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

And could you just, please, state your name for the record?

Admiral Winnefeld. James A. Winnefeld, Jr.

Ms. Clarke. Thank you. Again, Admiral Winnefeld, the

committee appreciates your appearance today for this interview.

My name is Sheria Clarke. I'm with the committee's majority

staff. And we'll just take a moment to go around the room and

have everyone introduce themselves for the record.

Mr. Tolar. I'm Mac Tolar with the majority staff.

Admiral Winnefeld. Mac?

Mr. Tolar. Mac.

Ms. Green. Shannon Green with the minority staff.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I'm Susanne Sachsman Grooms from the

minority staff.

Ms. Rauch. I'm Laura Rauch with the minority staff.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny, minority staff.

Mr. Hudson. And Bill Hudson from the Office of the

Department of Defense as general counsel.

Mr. Richards. Edward Richards, DOD for GC.

631
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

5

Ms. Clarke. We are also joined here by Representative Martha

Roby from Alabama.

So before we begin, I would like to go over the ground rules

and explain how the interview will proceed. Generally, the way

the questioning will proceed is that a member from the majority

will ask questions for an hour, and then we'll rotate back and

forth with the majority to ask questions as well for an hour.

Questions may only be asked by a member of the committee or

designated staff members. Again, we'll rotate back and forth, one

hour per side, until we are out of questions, and the interview

will conclude.

Unlike a testimony or a deposition in Federal court, the

committee format is not bound by the rules of evidence. The

witness or their counsel may raise objections for privilege

subject to review by the chairman of the committee. If these

objections cannot be resolved in the interview, the witness can be

required to return for a deposition or hearing. Members and staff

of the committee, however, are not permitted to raise objections

when the other side is asking questions.

This room is cleared up to TS/SCI level, so we can discuss

classified information during this interview. You are welcome to

consult with counsel at any time throughout the interview. If

something needs to be clarified, we ask that you make this known,

and we'll do our best to clarify that.

If you want to, again, confer with your counsel, we can go

632
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

6

off the record and stop the clock to provide you with opportunity.

Admiral Winnefeld. Can I ask you a question on the clearance

level?

Ms. Clarke. Yes.

Admiral Winnefeld. TS/SCI will, then, comply with special

compartmented intelligence.

Ms. Clarke. Yes.

Admiral Winnefeld. How about code word programs, operational

programs? Are we cleared for that as well?

Ms. Clarke. Yes.

Mr. Hudson. So I think we're cleared to --

Ms. Clarke. Yes.

Admiral Winnefeld. Okay. I just want to make sure.

Ms. Clarke. We'd like to take a break whenever it's

convenient for you. It could be after every hour or whatever you

prefer. If you need anything, again, just let us know.

Admiral Winnefeld. Okay.

Ms. Clarke. As you can see, an official reporter is taking

down everything you say to make a written record. So we ask that

you give verbal responses to all questions, yes and no, as opposed

to nods of the head. And I'm going to ask the reporter to please

feel free to jump in, in case you do respond nonverbally.

Mr. Tolar. Just on that same note, we're going to be

discussing a lot of acronyms and DOD-specific things. We may ask

you to elaborate on that just so we have a clear record of what

633
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

7

exactly we're talking about.

Admiral Winnefeld. Okay.

Ms. Clarke. Also, we should both try not to talk over each

other so it's easier to get a clear record. We want you to answer

our questions in the most complete and truthful manner possible.

We'll take our time and repeat or clarify our questions if

necessary.

If you honestly don't know the answer to a question or you

don't remember, it's best not to guess. Please just give us your

best recollection, and if there are things that you do not know or

you can't remember, just say so, and please inform us who, to the

best of your knowledge, may be able to provide a more complete

answer to the question.

Admiral Winnefeld. Okay.

Ms. Clarke. You are required to answer questions from

Congress truthfully. Do you understand that?

Admiral Winnefeld. I do.

Ms. Clarke. This also applies to questions posed by

congressional staff in an interview. Do you understand that?

Admiral Winnefeld. I do.

Ms. Clarke. Witnesses that knowingly provide false testimony

could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury or for making

false statements. Do you understand that?

Admiral Winnefeld. I do.

Ms. Clarke. Is there any reason you are unable to provide

634
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

8

truthful answers to today's questions?

Admiral Winnefeld. None whatsoever.

Ms. Clarke. Okay. That's the end of my preamble.

Does the minority have anything that they would like to add?

Ms. Rauch. Just thank you for being here today. We

appreciate your volunteering to appear before this committee, and

we look forward to your testimony.

Admiral Winnefeld. Okay.

Ms. Clarke. And with that, the clock reads 11:09, and so we

will go ahead and get started.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Admiral Winnefeld, I understand that you are now

retired. Could you describe for us the position that you held

prior to retiring with DOD?

A I was the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

before I retired on the 1st of August last year.

Q And can you just give us a brief overview of what your

duties as the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were?

A Essentially, the Chairman's alter ego, unofficially.

Officially, essentially, three portfolios. One being a policy

portfolio, which involved formulation of strategy, participation

in Deputies Committee meetings at the White House and the like.

Another portfolio was investments, which included running the

Joint Requirements Oversight Council, participating in budget

635
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

9

meetings, and assisting with the acquisition piece. And the

third, of course, is the personnel side, both the good and the

ugly side of the personnel side. That, in rough cut, is what the

vice chairman does. Sort of the man behind the curtain trying to

keep the trains moving.

Q And so you mentioned that you participate in the

Deputies Committees. So you represent the DOD, the Joint Staff at

Deputies Committee meetings. Is that correct?

A I represented the Joint Staff at Deputies Committee

meetings and normally had a counterpart from the Office of the

Secretary of Defense at my side who would represent the civilian

side of the Department.

Q And during the time -- our focus here today would be on

the attacks in Benghazi. So during September of 2012, who was

that counterpart that would have represented the Secretary of

Defense?

A I believe it was Jim Miller. Michele Flournoy, I

think, had left at that point, but you'd probably want to get a

precise timeline of when she left when he took over as the under

secretary of defense for policy.

Q Okay. So let's go to September 11th, 2012, and the

night of the attack. When did you first learn about the attack in

Benghazi?

A I was that afternoon in a Joint Requirements Oversight

Council meeting in the bowels of the Pentagon. We do it in a very

636
UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

10

classified space. When I, sort of, came up for air, and I don't

know the precise time, it was somewhere around 4:30 or 5:00, I was

informed that there had been an attack in Benghazi.

I don't recall the exact nature of that report, but I believe

it was when the attack was over that the report was given to me,

that there had been an attack, that the Ambassador was missing,

that one person was killed, but that the remainder of the

personnel there had been evacuated to a safe location.

Q So you said that was around 4:30 or 5 o'clock. And do

you recall, once you learned of the attack, did you have

opportunity to talk with the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff about what you had learned?

A No, because my understanding was that the Secretary,

the Chairman, and General Ham were together, and I was told they

were together, and they had either received the news together or

they were huddled up very, very shortly after General Ham had

gotten the news, but it was a very quick timeline there, and they

were off and running managing the situation. And in fact, I think

the Chairman was going over to the White House with the Secretary

right after that.

So I was aware that they were aware, but I didn't spend any

time with them, because our paths just didn't cross.

Q Okay. And who informed you of the attack?

A I believe it was the deputy director for operations, we

call him the DDO, down at the National Military Command Center.

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And probably, you know, when I -- when I came back up to my

office, I suspect it was my staff that said: Hey, the DDO is

trying to reach you. And I called him. But he's the one who

informed me of, you know, the full report.

Q And so is your understanding that the Secretary of

Defense and the Chairman had been informed of the attack?

A Yes.

Q And you believe that they were in transit to or may

have already left for a meeting with the White House?

A That's what I was -- I recall.

Q Once you were informed of the attack, what did you do

at that time?

A I was really curious about what actions were in train,

what was our approach to the situation. And given that we thought

that the attack was over and the people were in a safe location,

our attention was turning towards what's the likelihood of a

copycat attack elsewhere in the region, because, you know, we had

the attack in Cairo, and now an attack in Benghazi, which was

completely unexpected. Now what?

So how do we posture ourselves to best protect ourselves from

the potential copycat elsewhere in the region, and with the

Ambassador still missing, are we about to do have a hostage rescue

mission? And in the longer term, who are these people who did

this, and how do we hold them accountable? But that was not an

immediate concern. We were more concerned about our people. We

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were concerned about particularly the Ambassador, not knowing

where he was. And then what else in the region do we need to

prepare for.

Q And you mentioned the event in Cairo. When did you

become aware of what was happening in Cairo, and what did you

learn about that?

A I don't remember much about the timeline of Cairo. I

believe it was the day prior. And as that unfolded, we received

reports about the security situation. We didn't really have

anything postured to go in there. It wasn't a -- it wasn't a

friendly place to put U.S. forces and to try to rescue an embassy.

And the Egyptians were handling that.

We were obviously more concerned, I think, about whether this

was going to spread through the region. Particularly after the

attack of Benghazi, what's next? And we were worried about

Tripoli, we were worried about Tunis, and any other number of

cities.

Q And so with respect to the events in Cairo, you

mentioned that the Egyptians were handling it. What did you mean

by that?

A My understanding was that the Egyptian security forces

were maybe a little late, but they were helping to secure the

Embassy.

Q Did you have an understanding of whether Libyan

security forces were helping to secure individuals in Benghazi?

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A The only thing that I recall was the 17th of February

Brigade, or whatever it was called, was, you know, a militia,

right, vastly different from the government force and in Egypt as

opposed to a militia force in Benghazi, but that they were

friendly to Ambassador Stevens, who had a good relationship with

them, and were providing, supposedly, some kind of security after

the fact to help our guys in a safe place.

Q And so you learned of the attack, and you focused on

the likelihood of a copycat attacking the region and better

posturing to respond to a potential followon event. What,

specifically, did you learn or were you told about the posture

currently and steps needed to move the posture into a better

ability to respond?

A I think there was a lot of discussion going among the

Secretary, Chairman Dempsey, and General Ham at the time about

what action should be taken to posture forces better in the event

of a copycat attack.

Q And were you a part of those conversations?

A I was not part of that. And so that's why I think

there was discussion going on about activating the FAST platoons

and moving the commander's in extremis force, the CIF, (REDACTED)

We weren't sure yet whether that was going to be needed, because

we didn't know where Ambassador Stevens was.

Q Just to step back for a moment, this discussion that

you're talking about, between Secretary Panetta and General Ham

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and General Dempsey, occurred following the meeting with the White

House? Is that correct?

A I don't know. I wasn't part of that. I think they

were probable discussing it before they went over to the White

House. I think that there were probably discussions going on

between the director of joint operations on the Joint Staff and

AFRICOM. I don't know -- you know, I wasn't privy to those

discussions. I would suspect that people were ramping up options

to offer to people. It was like: Hey, what do we have available?

What's out there? What could we move? What could we activate?

What could we put on a higher alert? That sort of thing. That

was coalescing, I think, probably during that time, but I was not

part of that.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Following the White House meeting, we know that

Secretary Panetta got together with General Ham, General Dempsey,

a few other folks. Immediately upon his return to the Pentagon,

at that time he discussed what the course of action going forward

was going to be. And at that time, it's our understanding that he

told General Ham: Prepare your folks to deploy. For all intents

and purposes, he was told, General Ham was informed: Do what you

need to do to get your folks in place.

A Okay.

Q Is that your understanding of events?

A My understanding was that the sort of final direction,

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decisions, that was done after they came back from the White

House.

Q Yes, sir. I'm sorry. That's what I'm talking about.

Immediately following the White House, now he's got the blessing

from the President, do what you need to do.

A Right.

Q Secretary Panetta, at that point, tells General Ham,

General Dempsey: Do what you need to do, you have permission to

deploy -- to prepare to deploy, obviously. And that would have

been around 6:30 at night following that White House meeting. Is

that generally your understanding of how that --

A I know there was a discussion that occurred among those

three after they got back. I don't know the exact timeline of

that discussion. I think later, after that discussion, is when

the formal orders went out that directed movement (REDACTED) FAST

platoons, and I think the CIF as well, but I don't know the exact

time.

Q Sure.

A But your timeline sounds about right.

Q What is your understanding of when AFRICOM received

authority, verbal authority, to do what they needed to do?

A After the White House meeting at some point. When

Secretary Panetta gave the -- what we call a voco --

Q Sure.

A -- verbal authorization, basically, sometime after the

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White House meeting, I would guess sometime between 6 or 8 o'clock

at night.

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BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So you talked about the three assets that ultimately

were deployed. Were you a part of any discussion about the

greater picture of what assets were available and kind of

narrowing down the field to which assets would actually be

deployed?

A No, I think I was -- I was generally aware of what was

available, having served in the European theater. I knew, in

fact, the FAST platoons used to work for me when I was the 6th

Fleet commander, so I had a pretty good understanding of what

their capabilities were and, frankly, weren't. So I had a fairly

decent feel.

And, of course, as the events unfolded, you would find, you

know, what's actually there, are there any ships there, that sort

of thing. So I wasn't necessarily part of the discussion in terms

of what would be activated, what would be moved, because, you

know, in my humble position, I was trusting of Carter Ham and

Marty Dempsey and the Secretary, with the people who were around

them advising them, I think the director of operations was

probably with them, giving them advice. And I didn't need to be

another cook, you know, stirring the pot there when they were

sequestered making those decisions themselves.

I will tell you, ordinarily, I would probably be part of

that. That day I was not, because I had so many meetings that

afternoon, and then I was hosting a dinner for the ASEAN

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ambassadors that night and was confident, my understanding was

that Marty and Carter had this under control in terms of offering

the right options to be exercised.

Mr. Gowdy. So General Dempsey and General Ham would have

been the ones that could tell us the full panoply of every

conceivable asset available at a certain time?

Admiral Winnefeld. I would say -- you know, opening the

aperture on that a little bit, because so much of what AFRICOM

does is dependent, at least back then, particularly, depended on

EUCOM assets. You want to bring EUCOM into that in terms of what

was available that they could provide.

And there's generally -- we had found a very collegial

relationship among the COCOMs, in terms of when somebody's in

extremist, willingness to share, you know, pushing assets to

brother COCOMs. And so I think you want to tap into the European

Command stream to make sure that you had a complete understanding.

And also, Special Operations Command stream, because

sometimes Special Operations Forces are in theater and the COCOM

doesn't necessarily have a complete understanding. So if you

really want to get the full measure, you'd need to do that.

Mr. Tolar. Do you have an appreciation what SOCOM assets

were in the AOR at that time?

Admiral Winnefeld. Not a full appreciation. I know that

the -- there was the CIF was exercising in Croatia. They had

their own C-130s with them that did not belong to EUCOM, that

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those were SOCOM assets. And there are other SACEUR forces

around, Stuttgart, I guess, is where most of them were living.

But I don't have memorized what the exact laydown was.

Mr. Tolar. Why do you say their aircraft were with them in

Croatia.

Admiral Winnefeld. Because they were doing an exercise, and

the exercise required them to have their aircraft there. They had

a number of C-130s with them.

Mr. Gowdy. Admiral, I have to vote, so I want to apologize

to you for the distraction of leaving. I am coming back. And,

hopefully, that will be the last vote series.

Admiral Winnefeld. Okay.

Mr. Gowdy. So I apologize for the distraction of leaving.

Admiral Winnefeld. Okay.

Mr. Tolar. My apologies.

To return to that briefly. Everything we've learned to date

indicates that the aircraft were not colocated with the CIF.

Admiral Winnefeld. Depends what you mean by colocate. And I

don't know the exact geography of that, but I believe, and you are

going to want to check this, that the C-130s were in and around

Croatia at the time, because they were flying and they were doing

an exercise. But I'd also say that they were -- they

were -- because they were doing an exercise, they were busy, they

were working.

Mr. Tolar. Yes, sir.

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Ms. Clarke. So when were you made aware of which assets

would actually be deployed to respond to the situation in

Benghazi?

Admiral Winnefeld. I got more clarity on that when my dinner

was over. If I remember correctly, I was interrupted during my

dinner with a phone call at one point. And I believe -- I don't

have perfect recall here, it has been 3-1/2 years -- that I was

just being given an update and that the Secretary had decided to

deploy the FAST platoon -- FAST platoons, I guess, the

CIF(REDACTED) And then I finished my dinner. And then when the

dinner was over, you know, I caught back up and I sort of jumped

in to see how the deployment was going.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Did you return to the Pentagon?

A No, I did not. I didn't need to. (REDACTED)

Q Approximately what time did you leave for your dinner

engagement?

A Let's see, I probably left the Pentagon 5:30 or 6.

Q And what time was your dinner engagement over,

approximately?

A It was over probably around 9:30.

Q Thank you.

Ms. Clarke. Given that you were engaged in a dinner event

until 9:30, you did not attend the 7:30 SVTC that occurred with

the White House and the State Department. Were you briefed on

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what was discussed during that SVTC?

Admiral Winnefeld. I don't recall whether I was -- I

probably got a debrief after my dinner was over, but there's

enough time that elapsed between the end of that. And I didn't

want to get in the J3's way. The J3, Admiral Tidd, I believe, I

believe, attended for me. And I didn't want to look over his

shoulder, get in his way. He was carrying out whatever actions he

needed to carry over.

And later on in the evening, when I sort of jumped back into

the problem, I didn't want to be part of the problem by taking a

lot of bandwidth to catch up. I just sort of eased back in, read

emails, listened to any updates that I might have gotten over the

phone, which were not many. So I did not get, as I recall, a full

line-by-line accounting of what happened at the VTC?

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BY MR. TOLAR:

Q In terms of the planning for a response, obviously,

AFRICOM's got the plan on that, correct?

A Yes, sir, sure.

Q So General Ham and his staff are planning the response?

A Sure.

Q What's going on at the joint level? Are they

also -- what is the J3 doing? Is he just trying to facilitate or

kind of what is that role?

A There's generally a collegial cooperative discussion

going on between the staffs of the J3s. You usually try to let

the COCOM kind of have a little quiet time to get their act

together and to come you with the different courses of action that

they would hastily assemble in this case. It's not a, you know,

it's not an abbreviated process, but you make it as quick as you

can.

And then the Joint Staff will overwatch that as best they

can, because there's considerable expertise, you have the best

staff officers on the planet on the Joint Staff, and they would

offer helpful additions or deletions or ideas or what have you to

something like that when they were exposed to AFRICOM's initial

thinking.

So there's a certain collegial back-and-forth process would

be generally, how that worked. I don't know how it worked that

night, but I'm suspecting there was some brainstorming going on

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over the phone between AFRICOM's J3 and the Joint Staff's J3.

Q And once you reengaged after the dinner, were you in

just kind of receive mode? (REDACTED)

A I didn't have any -- there's no sort of common

operational picture where I could watch things moving or anything

like that. But the one thing that I wanted to make sure we were

doing our best on was making sure the airlift was going to be

available as quickly as possible. Because we didn't -- there was

nothing on alert in the EUCOM AOR, you know, technical term of

alert.

And I wanted to make sure that we were not losing any time

there and called General Breedlove, who at the time was the EU

safety commander, at U.S. Air Forces Europe, commander, to say:

Hey, is there anything we can do to move the timeline left?

And he said he had already waived crew rest, so that was not

an issue for his C-130s. And what they were really waiting on is

just the physics of getting airplanes and aircrews rigged from a

standing start. You know, they've got to go pull countermeasures

out of a magazine and bring it over and load it on the airplane.

They've got to probably -- because there are two C-130s they were

doing. They had to probably unload one or both, I don't know, but

generally, those things sit loaded. So they had to pull pallets

off and prepare them for accepting the FAST platoon and they could

get to Rota. Had to get the aircrews briefed, awake, you know,

alert, and that sort of thing.

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So there's a process they had to go through, but I really

give USAFE some credit for, from a standing start, actually making

a pretty good alert time as far as I can tell. I don't remember

the exact hours and numbers there, but they did pretty well given

the fact that they weren't already standing at alert.

Q Do you recall at what time it was, approximately, when

you engaged General Breedlove?

A I don't. I know it was -- had to before around 1 in

the morning and sometime probably after my dinner, of course. But

based on my discussions with the Joint Staff DDO, what have you, I

just felt like, okay, let me make sure we are moving as fast as we

can, so I called him. Sometime after 9:30 and before 1 in the

morning, let's say.

Q Were you sensing that perhaps the air wasn't moving as

quickly as you would like to see it and you are trying to

encourage it? Is that fair?

A I think it was a matter of not knowing whether it was

or not. I just wanted to make sure. I wasn't getting the signal

of difficulty, where, hey, these guys are taking too long, you

know, can't you light a fire, you know. It wasn't anything like

that. It was just, I wish we could get going here, and I wanted

to get an understanding of whether they were doing everything we

can.

And immediately Phil said, "I waived crew rest," straight off

the bat, which was in his authority to do and only his authority.

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And they moved pretty quick getting the airplanes ready.

Q After that point, did you monitor or have a sense or an

appreciation of how long it was, in fact, taking the planes to get

up and mobilized, et cetera?

A Yeah. I was aware of -- and I don't have an exact

recollection of the precise timelines, you know, that caused

them -- you know, how long it would take them to get to Rota, how

long it would take them to load and so on. But I was monitoring

that as it happened.

And you know, when you are back in Washington, it's never

fast enough for you. But you also know, having been an

experienced person in the field, that there's always things that

go wrong, the fuel truck, you know, isn't working, they have to go

get another fuel truck, things like that are always impediments.

And you just grind your teeth and try to resist calling and

harassing people who are doing the very best they can to get these

things moving.

Q The C-130s came out of Ramstein, is that your

understanding?

A It's my understanding.

Q Who prioritizes -- and I understand the

in-system-select program utilized by USAFE, et cetera --

A Right.

Q -- but who makes the call as to who gets the priority

support for those aircrafts? Is that TRANSCOM?

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A In terms of what the --

Q This C-130 here is the next one available to go. Who

decides where it's going to go that night?

A Yeah. I think -- you have to really talk to USAFE and

TRANSCOM about that to get the precise answer. If USAFE has their

own organic C-130s, then they can -- then that's their show. They

can say: We are going to move these C-130s to do that, it's sort

of tactical thing.

I think you'd probably find the C-17 piece, when you are

starting to get into real operational airlift, you know, strategic

airlift, that TRANSCOM would have a say. And, again, I don't want

to speculate. I really shouldn't speculate in a setting like

this. But you'll get a good answer out of USAFE and TRANSCOM in

terms of who has the real clear authority.

But I have no doubt that in an in extremis situation like

that, that nobody would be saying no to a request for a bird, and

I don't recall anybody that night turning anything down.

Q Sure. Yes, sir. I'm guessing -- so, obviously, it's

fair to say that you would assume that that night the response to

Benghazi was the number one issue?

A Oh, absolutely.

Q And that's what everybody was moving toward?

A Absolutely. Without question.

Q Did you or did -- at your level, did you all have any

input as to which one of those response elements were the

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priority?

A In terms of --

Q CIF versus FAST?

A I don't think it was a question of which one was

priority, because the aircraft that were going to move to CIF were

not USAFE aircraft; they were the SOCOM aircraft. So it

wasn't -- it wasn't like we were going to -- like USAFE was having

to decide, well, I've got only so many C-130s, and I need to

decide whether I'm going to send some to Rota and send some to

Croatia. That wasn't a factor.

My recollection was the only thing USAFE was focused on was

getting those C-130s to move to the FAST platoon, because the CIF

was going to move with their own organic C-130s. (REDACTED) The

CIF sort of own those guys. It may have been in an airfield not

far away, but they may have had to fly from one place to another

very briefly to pick up the CIF. But that was their show.

And I also believe that you'll find, if you ask -- and,

again, I don't have perfect recall here, because it has been

3-1/2, but the C-130s that were with the CIF were working. They

were in an exercise. So their aircrews were tired. And I believe

they were put into crew rest before they could move the CIF as

opposed to the C-130s where Phil Breedlove waived crew rest,

because he's got a bigger pool of C-130 crews at Ramstein he can

draw from. You only had what you had with the CIF.

Q So who was the SOCOM commander at the time?

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A The SOCOM commander?

Q Yes.

A Was that Bill McRaven at that time? But he wouldn't

have been the guy making that call.

Q I guess who could waive crew rest, just the COCOM

commander for the SOCOM assets?

A Good -- I don't know. The SACEUR commander would be

the person probably, but I don't know what -- how SOCOM works

those authorities.

Q Sure.

A But they were in crew rest, because they had -- I

believe they -- I don't know for sure, but I believe they had been

flying that night and their crews were spent.

So look at it this way. You have X number of C-130s at

Ramstein, and X-plus-many C-130 crews, so it's kind of a pool.

And waiving crew rest in that situation is a very low-risk thing.

For the exercise, I believe you probably only have one C-130

crew per C-130, and those guys have already flown, and they're

done for the day. And so my sense is that SACEUR probably put

them on crew rest to get them reset so that they could fly safely

to move the CIF.

Q I guess knowing the CIF's role (REDACTED)

A Right.

Q Clearly, they did not meet it that night?

A Nope, they didn't.

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Q Who has the authority to say(REDACTED)who could waive

that?

A The best answer I can give you is the person who sets

that requirement is the person who can waive that requirement.

And it's probably the AFRICOM commander who sets that

requirements. It's not the Secretary. At least it wasn't then.

And so if they wanted to say, hey, we're in the middle of an

exercise, and when we're in the middle of an exercise, our

response time is going to suffer, are you okay with that? Then,

theoretically, the AFRICOM commander can waive that.

Now, if it's a shared CIF, and I can't remember whether the

CIF back then was shared between AFRICOM and EUCOM, then they both

have to agree to that, at least in theory. But it sounds like the

CIF would have made their timeline, but the airlift was the issue.

Q They sat on the tarmac for about 9 hours?

A Yes.

Q They were ready to go, sat around for 9 hours,

approximately. I guess what I don't understand is, if the CIF has

an extremis role over here, but they also have that other half

they put on when the balloon goes up and something serious happens

and 0300 is put into play, they had that hat on that night --

A The CIF did.

Q Yes, sir.

A Yes.

Q Obviously, when the balloon went up and they got the

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call, they weren't -- they responded in conjunction with that

mission, that special mission. That special mission has

requirements, and I think that requirement, I would assume, and I

don't know this, I hope you can answer, is bigger than a EUCOM or

COCOM commander, because it's a bigger response, (REDACTED) and

that's why I'm just trying to make sure I understand who can tell

them(REDACTED)we'll give you a pass on that?

A We give those kinds of authorities to combatant

commanders, at least we did back then. And I think one of the

many things we learned that night that may not have had an effect

that night but could have had an effect under different

circumstances, to be quite honest, is that we needed to better

synch up our airlift alert times to our response force alert

times. And that was a lesson we took out of that and have since

done it. And I would add, at no small cost. There's no free

lunch in this business.

Q Yes, sir.

A And if I remember correctly, USAFE has lost about 25

percent of their training time because of the need now to have

aircrews basically sitting on their hands in alert.

Q We've seen them. Yes, sir.

A So they have less training capability, less airlift

capability, because they are now sitting in alert. It's the new

normal, right?

Q Yes, sir. No, we actually went to Ramstein, and we saw

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the two C-130s over there out by themselves.

A Yes, they didn't use to have that.

Q And they said these are tethered to the CIF, right, and

everything else is over here to the left and the others to the

right.

A Big lesson learned.

Q We appreciate that.

A I don't know that it would have made a difference that

night, candidly, but it would have made a difference on another

night.

Q Well, it's -- I guess that gets to kind of the sense of

urgency levied by DOD. If, in fact, this unit that has this

requirement to be up and running can't meet that because the

airplanes are on crew rest, are you aware if anybody reached out

to USAFE and said, "Hey, I got a guy sitting on the deck, they've

been there 1 hour, they have been there 5 hours, can you get a

plane down there to get these guys rolling?" The Secretary says

he wants everything done as quickly as possible. We have a sense

of urgency; we've got stuff going down. Did anybody reach out to

USAFE and say, hey, could you help us?

A I don't know.

Q Who would know that?

A The SACEUR commander might. You know, people tend to

work inside their own stovepipes. Hey, I've got my own airplanes;

I'm a special operator; I want to use my own airplanes to move my

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own guys, because we know each other and we train together, so I

going to throw my guys in crew rest. And remember, the reason we

were moving the CIF, we were moving it to, what, Sigonella.

Q Yes, sir.

A It was not because they were going to go to Benghazi.

Q Correct.

A We were worried about the copycat attacks elsewhere in

the region. And so I think they were more in a -- it wasn't a

lack of urgency, but it was -- you know, they keep safety in mind.

It was, okay, there could be a copycat attack; we need to

reposture ourselves in the theater. Let's do it, but let's not

kill ourselves doing it.

You know, in 20/20 hindsight, if anybody had known there was

going to be a second attack and that potentially the CIF could end

up going there, maybe they would have asked that question that

you're asking. But, again, their mindset was we're moving the CIF

to Sigonella because something else could happen in the region.

But, you know, we needed to, and we ended up better

synchronizing our airlift. And I don't know whether the SACEUR

commander asked that question or not.

Q And you mentioned the CIF was being relocated or moved

into the ISB in order to -- for a potential followon operation.

A Right.

Q Is it not your understanding that the CIF, the primary

mission, though, (REDACTED) to possibly conduct a rescue, because

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at this time you did not know the Ambassador was passed?

A Right. They could -- the CIF could be used for any

number of things(REDACTED), including supporting the National

Mission Force.]

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So I think we jumped ahead a little bit and talked

about some specific issues. But if we can turn back to the

timeline where you were being alerted to what assets were going to

be deployed. You said you thought that that may have occurred

sometime around 9:30 once you finished your previous engagement.

Is that correct?

A Correct.

Q And then that --

A It may have -- pardon me for interrupting -- it may

have been during an update phone call in the middle of my dinner

that I took. I don't remember when exactly I got that

information, but it was either then or right after the dinner.

Q Okay. Do you recall who you talked to during your

update phone call?

A It was probably the DDO, the deputy director for

operations.

Q And so once you were notified of the assets that were

going to be deployed, did you have any further discussions with

anyone about whether you thought there were additional assets that

should be considered or assets that hadn't been considered that

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you thought needed to be a part of this response?

A I don't know for sure. I don't have perfect recall of

that conversation. But knowing me, I probably asked what Navy

ships do we have in the region. There wasn't a very good answer

there, because the amphibious ships were all in the Central

Command in AOR. Sometimes we get lucky there, sometimes we don't.

I probably asked a couple of other questions, but I don't recall

specifically.

Q Do you recall asking any questions about whether there

could be close air support provided from Aviano Air Force Base, if

that option had been considered?

A Yeah, we talked about that, and there are probably

seven or eight cascading reasons why that just wasn't a very good

idea. And it was fair quickly ruled out.

Q And what were some of the reasons why that was not a

good idea?

A You want me to go through the whole litany? I think I

can.

Q Okay.

A First of all, when you look at what it takes to

generate those forces inside Aviano, you have air crews. It's the

middle of the night. They are sleeping. They've got to get woken

up. And you could waive the crew rest. You've got to get them

briefed. You've got to get ordnance literally moved from a

magazine that's not adjacent to the airfield. You've got to move

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that ordnance, which is a time-consuming process. You've got to

load it on the airplanes. You might want to go watch that process

sometime, because it's not just slap a bottom on an airplane. It

takes quite some time.

That's assuming that you've gotten permission from the

Italians to even do this, because they have a very close hold on

what flies in and out of Aviano's weapon center. So let's say you

get that done.

Then you got to get tankers, because an F-16 could probably

make it down to Benghazi, but it won't come home unless it gets

gas, and it won't be able to stay there very long unless it gets

gas before it flames out. So you've got to get tankers. Those

are going to come from England.

Those F-16s, they have got to fly the distance from

Dallas -- or Washington to Dallas, let's say. The tankers have

got to fly the distance from Washington to Phoenix. So these are

vast distances, so there's the time of flight to get there.

But let's say you could just snap your fingers and there were

F-16s suddenly over Benghazi immediately. It's the middle of the

night; there's no joint tactical air controller on the ground.

You don't even have any communications with people on the ground.

You don't even know where this is happening. If you're lucky and

you've got a latitude and a longitude to point your systems at,

you might be able to see the action going on on the ground, if

there was action going on on the ground, but for most of the night

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there wasn't.

No Air Force or Navy pilot will ever drop a bomb into an area

where they are not certain who's there and what's going on unless

there's communications with people on the ground and a JTAC or

what we call a forward air controller airborne.

So, I mean, it was highly unlikely that we were going to be

able to make a difference, even if we could get there in time with

air power, so we chose not to do it.

Q Now, we were just -- you were just talking about the

CIF being moved to an intermediate staging base, not necessarily

to respond to Benghazi, but because of concern of followon copycat

attacks.

A Right.

Q So the CIF was moved in advance to prepare for

potentials. Why wasn't that same consideration given to, okay,

the close air support may not being able to respond to Benghazi,

but we think other things may happen? Why weren't -- why wasn't

Aviano contacted to say, "Go ahead and get prepared just in case

something happens"?

A I think if you ask USAFE -- and, again, I could be

wrong here -- I think you'll find that they, on their own, put

aircrafts eventually on alert at Aviano.

Q And they did. I believe the squadron commander

testified to the HASC committee that he was alerted at 9:05 a.m.

on the morning of the 12th, so that's several hours after the

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attack had happened, and that's several hours after the other

forces had been authorized to deploy.

And so I guess just my question is, during that initial

determination that, okay, we don't know what's going to happen

next, maybe we should start getting assets ready to deploy, why

wasn't there a consideration at that moment to --

A Yeah. Well, it's a valid question, but I would say

that even if there were copycat attacks somewhere else in the

area, you're still going to be reluctant to just go dropping bombs

willy-nilly into an area like that without a JTAC on the ground.

It's a very big, blunt instrument to use, and it's a very

dangerous instrument to use in a close quarters environment, urban

area, where you don't know who's who and that sort of thing. It's

just not a great employment.

USAFE did it out of an abundance of caution, but I don't

know that we would ever use them. You could, in daylight hours,

do a flyover of some sort, which is about as good as I think it

gets. But it wasn't -- it wasn't foremost on our minds. I give

USAFE credit for taking the initiative of putting those guys on

the line.

Mr. Tolar. So USAFE indicated that they had a three-phased

plan for the use of FAST movers, and the first phase was a 8- to

10,000 kilometer high-speed pass above the SMC range?

A A thousand feet.

Q I'm sorry. Yes. Yes. Second one was drop flares over

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the Annex. The third one was to fire some kind of kinetic rounds

into that field next to the Annex. Were you aware that they had

made such plans?

A I was not. That's sort of a tactical-level thing.

Q Sure. Okay.

A But makes sense to me. Again, it was going to be too

late, too little too late. But that sounds sensible, and in

daylight hours, you might even consider a lower fly-by. And I did

it many times myself in Iraq.

Q And going back, just being proactive, I mean, the

commander wasn't informed until 9 the next morning, some almost 12

hours after the attack, to get the ball rolling. Does that seem

reasonable if you're trying to be proactive and plan ahead, does

that seem reasonable that the DOD would -- the food chain would

wait some 12 hours to tell them to be proactive and move toward

the sound of the guns?

A Yeah. At the DOD level, we were really not focused on

close air support, because of the infeasibility of really getting

it there, and then the minimal effect it would have once it got

there. But, again, it makes sense, Phil was, you know, feeling

frustrated, he wants to help, he wants to do something, that he

would put his aircrews on alert. I think it makes sense.

But could we -- could DOD have directed that earlier? Yeah,

we could have, probably. But I don't think it was a lack of

anxiousness or leaning forward.

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Q I hear you say that, sir, but it just -- it seems like

every issue associated with the aircraft seems like it just took

an extremely long period of time to get planes in the air. I

mean, the FAST team is sitting on the deck for some 6 hours, you

know, they're waiting for planes. Basically, almost 15 hours from

the time that they were told they were entering before a plane

even lands, and then they start doing it. It just seems like it

took an extremely long period of time before the aircraft being

mobilized, prepared to move these guys.

And based on what we've learned, AFRICOM commander,

approximately 6:30, could have been 6:15, could have been 7 p.m.,

East Coast time, had the authority to meet and move to the ISB.

It's just like it took them a long time.

A I think there are a number of factors in play. One, it

wasn't a matter of not having enough urgency, I think it was more

a matter of posture, coupled with the fact that the focus was on

regional challenges, not on something additional was going to

happen in Benghazi later that night. And so when there was not

the perception of an immediate threat right there --

Q Sure.

A -- people are going to operate safely.

Q Yes, sir.

A And they want the people to fly safely. They

want -- especially when you are carrying troopers around. And the

posture piece, as I said, the airlift was not in an alert posture.

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Probably should have been.

Q Notwithstanding the posture issue, I mean, again, the

Ambassador was missing. We did not know that he had expired at

that time.

A Yeah.

Q And so I just -- I don't see the sense of urgency

associated with responding to finding this Ambassador and possibly

trying to execute a rescue mission.

A I think an indication of the sense of urgency is that

Phil Breedlove waived all crew rest on his guys.

Q Sure.

A He could have put his hand down and said: I'm sorry,

I've got to put people on crew rest. And we had a discussion. I

didn't need to persuade him at all. He was ready to go. It's

just the physics of getting the airplanes ready and wanting to fly

safely to get the guys out.

Mr. Gowdy. Hang on one second, Mac.

When was the crew rest conversation?

I apologize for just coming back in from votes.

Admiral Winnefeld. Sir, sometime after I finished my dinner

that I was hosting, and sometime, I think, before 1 in the

morning, I had a phone call with Phil, and I was just trying to

make sure that everything was being done to get the airplanes

moving. And I asked him about crew rest, and he said: I've

waived it.

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Mr. Gowdy. I don't have the --

Admiral Winnefeld. Pardon me for interrupting, sir. That

was for the C-130s going to pick up the FAST.

Mr. Gowdy. Yes, sir.

Admiral Winnefeld. I did not have a conversation with

anybody on the C-130s that were organically located with the CIF,

because they did go into crew rest, because they were already

tired. They had been used. So I apologize for the interruption.

Mr. Gowdy. No, sir. And I don't have time to do it justice,

so I am going to have to come back when our hour is, but I can

just say that all of the members, I'm sure, on both sides are

constantly asked by folks at home who are not in a position to

know why nothing reached Benghazi. And if anything should be

beyond politics, if anything can be beyond politics in today's

culture, it should be our military. So I would rather us take all

the time necessary, and you interrupt me whenever you want to, so

we can lay out for our fellow citizens what happened and why.

Admiral Winnefeld. Sure.

Mr. Gowdy. And to that extend, if I could just go back

chronologically, there's been testimony that the President circa 5

p.m. on the 11th told Secretary Panetta: Do everything you can to

help our people. That was Secretary Panetta's testimony. That

may not be verbatim, but that's the gist of it, do everything you

can.

And Secretary Panetta's testimony was that he came back and

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said the same thing: Deploy, don't prepare to deploy, don't think

about it, don't -- you don't need to hear from me again, do

everything that you can do, active tense. Because we asked him a

half dozen times, was there any ambiguity? Did you need to talk

to anybody else? Did you need to talk to the President again?

And he said no.

So, you know, like taking the most extreme time period, 7

o'clock, the President and Secretary of Defense have both weighed

in on this. And then we come to the Jeremy Bash email, which I

want to make sure you have a copy of. You were copied on it, but

I want to make sure you have a copy of it in front of you. What's

that marked as, Mac?

Mr. Tolar. No. 1.

Mr. Gowdy. That would be exhibit 1 for Madam Court Reporter.

Mr. Tolar. Please note for the record, Mrs. Brooks is now in

attendance.

[Winnefeld Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

Admiral Winnefeld. Okay.

Mr. Gowdy. You were copied on this email --

Mr. Tolar. Mr. Chair, I apologize. I'm also handing out

exhibits 2 and 3.

Mr. Gowdy. Okay.

[Winnefeld Exhibits Nos. 2 and 3

Was marked for identification.]

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Mr. Gowdy. I need to give the admiral a chance to read --

Admiral Winnefeld. Could you tell me the time.

Unfortunately, the "not for public release" covers up the time.

Mr. Tolar. It appears to be --

Mr. Gowdy. Well, here, I have a copy that is not encumbered

by that stamp, which I'm happy --

Admiral Winnefeld. It says Tuesday, September 11th, at what

time?

Mr. Gowdy. 7:19.

Admiral Winnefeld. 7:19. It's covered up by the R on my --

Mr. Gowdy. All right. This is from Jeremy Bash, who was, in

our vernacular, chief of staff to Secretary Panetta.

Admiral Winnefeld. Right.

Mr. Gowdy. You are copied on it, and there are others,

including State Department officials, and it is titled "State

Colleagues: I just tried you on the phone but you were all in

with S. After consulting with General Dempsey, General Ham, and

the Joint Staff, we have identified the forces that could move to

Benghazi. They are spinning up as we speak."

What is your understanding of the phrase "spinning up"?

Admiral Winnefeld. It's a colloquial term that would mean

we've told them get moving, and they are generating -- they are

doing what they need to do to get aircrews woken up or whatever.

I would say there's -- it's not an instantaneous event from

leaving the Secretary's lips to somebody shaking somebody awake in

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the middle of the night saying: Get your airplane. There is a

process it goes through before that happens. But spinning up

means: Hey, we've got these guys starting to move. The orders

are going out. You know, the system is doing its thing to get the

forces going.

Mr. Gowdy. And I know that you went over this with Sheria, I

just think it's important enough to go over it again. In terms of

both your prior testimony and the Bash email, "We have identified

the forces that could move to Benghazi," who would have been part

of identifying those forces? The full panoply of options, who

would have been part of the process?

Admiral Winnefeld. That would have been a lot of intense

phone activity between, probably, the director of operations on

the Joint Staff and the director of operations at AFRICOM, both

talking to each other and talking to their respective bosses and

their bosses talking to each other, informing the conversation

between General Dempsey, General Ham, and the Secretary. And also

sort of brainstorming among themselves: Hey, what's out there?

What do you have? What can we do? And coming up with courses of

action and options that could be presented to the Secretary to

make a decision.

Mr. Gowdy. At some point, for want of a better analogy,

would there have been a map laid out for the Secretary of Defense?

This is the full universe of assets, potential, theoretical that

you have at your disposal.

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Admiral Winnefeld. That is not something that just, back

then, that you could push your button -- push a button, it spits

out of a machine, and here's everything that's available. Today,

there is. In fact, I instituted that myself, in the wake of this.

There is now a PowerPoint slide that's updated every day that

shows everything, literally everything that's available to respond

anywhere in the EUCOM, AFRICOM, or Central Command AORs, and the

PACOM AORs, along with the timeline that it's on. Because those

timelines constantly shift.

So we are much better at that. That's a lesson. In terms of

having visibility over what's available, we can do that much more

quickly than we could back then.

Mr. Gowdy. All right.

Admiral Winnefeld. But there is still the knowledge

of the -- for instance, AFRICOM and the European Command J3s, they

have a pretty good feel for what's out there, what they have at

their disposal. So that was a conversational thing, but it wasn't

a slide you'd throw in front of the Secretary at a moment's notice

back then.

Mr. Gowdy. All right. And, again, I know we are replowing

the same field, but it's important for me to at least have in my

head. I want to say the 10th, I may be off a day, there was a

notice or an advisory issued by the White House that special

precautions had been taken on the anniversary of 9/11. Of all the

things in the world that are eminently predictable, the calendar

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would probably be number one. So everybody knew that the

anniversary of 9/11 had come.

Cairo happened at some point. And, presumably, the

administration was aware of an anti-Muslim movie trailer before

Benghazi.

Admiral Winnefeld. Yeah.

Mr. Gowdy. We heard a lot about it after Benghazi, but I'm

presuming they knew about it beforehand, and how potentially

incendiary it would be.

So did any forces move towards the region in anticipation of

that confluence of factors?

Admiral Winnefeld. In terms of a strict answer to your

question, forces moving towards the region, no, not that I'm aware

of. Generally, every year there's been a 9/11 since 9/11. We

have this discussion, because we're worried that somebody is going

to use the anniversary as an excuse to do something -- and they

never have, including, I think, the Benghazi thing was not

necessarily coupled to 9/11. It was coupled to the movie trailer

you were talking about.

But we still take precautions. And those precautions tend to

be enhanced base security overseas. And, you know, the State

Department and these discussions we have, we'll say: Hey, we are

enhancing our embassy security by whatever methods. Defense

Department says: We're enhancing our own base security,

protecting our own troopers.

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But to my knowledge, we never actually specifically moved

forces on a 9/11 anniversary from one place to another to increase

security in an area of responsibility.

Mr. Gowdy. All right. You connected -- perhaps I heard you

wrong -- wittingly or unwittingly, the movie to Benghazi. I want

to talk about that more late, I don't want to get into it right

now. But the movie existed prior to Benghazi.

Admiral Winnefeld. It did.

Mr. Gowdy. And the movie existed prior to Cairo, and there

may be a link between the trailer and Cairo. But yet it wasn't

sufficient alarm that anything different was done from a military

standpoint, from a preparedness positioned standpoint? Is that

fair?

Admiral Winnefeld. That's a good question. I don't recall

whether there were any specific actions we took as a military

because of the trailer. Sometimes when something like this will

happen, for instance, the preacher down in Florida who likes to

burn Korans, we will definitely take precautions in places like

Afghanistan and so on, because that really does put our troopers

at risk. It's insane. And that would trigger -- that specific

kind of event tipper, you know, that's enough for us to go: Okay,

we need to enhance our force protection on our bases.

I don't know, I don't recall whether the trailer itself

triggered us to do that or not.

Mr. Gowdy. The next paragraph: They include an SOF element

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that was in Croatia, parenthetically, (which can fly to Souda Bay,

Crete), and a Marine FAST team of Rota, Spain.

Next paragraph: Assuming Principals, capitalized, agree to

deploy these elements.

What principals need to agree to deploy elements?

Admiral Winnefeld. I think I know what you're talking about,

but I don't see it on the email.

Mr. Hudson. I think it's redacted.

Mr. Gowdy. You want my copy?

Admiral Winnefeld. I think I know what you're saying. The

principals agree. Here's the way that will work. The Secretary

and his team will be putting together options, and they will even,

potentially, be putting together options in motion, because it

takes them time for them to actually do this.

It's not a serial process; it's a parallel process. And,

generally, when you want to deploy a military force into another

nation, you want to coordinate with the State Department. And

that's both administrations I've served with, the Bush

administration and the Obama administration, that's just standard.

You make sure the Ambassador, who is the President's

representative in the country, knows that you are going to do

that. And, generally, the State Department would have a view. It

would be very unusual in a situation like this for the State

Department to object, and, in fact, they didn't object.

If, for some reason, there were a dispute -- because the

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Secretary could just do it if he needed to -- but if there were a

dispute, there's time in this case for that dispute resolution

mechanism, call the national security adviser, say: Hey, we've

got a problem here; we want to send forces in and State doesn't,

who wins.

That would be resolved in parallel. It wouldn't slow us

down. But in this case, it wasn't a factor.

So there was no -- I wouldn't call it a veto, but if you get

a serious objection from State, a fundamentally sound reason why

it's not wise to deploy military force at this time in this

country, then you ought to have that discussion. And the

Secretary, though, can still act if he feels he needs to act. He

can always call the President, say: I really have to do this.

Mr. Gowdy. Which leads me to approval from the host nation,

the host nation being Libya.

Admiral Winnefeld. Right.

Mr. Gowdy. Are you confident that that's what Mr. Bash meant

by host nation?

Admiral Winnefeld. Yes.

Mr. Gowdy. Not any of the other countries referenced?

Admiral Winnefeld. Yeah. This is about putting forces in.

I believe we -- I don't know whether we needed to or got -- I

think we did -- approval from Spain to transit through there.

Generally, if you deploy a force from somebody's country that

could potentially go into hostile action, you would inform the

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country you are doing that from. You don't have to, but it would

be wise to do that. And what I'm reading in here is that most

likely he's talking about Libya.

And at this time, we were trying to build as strong a

relationship as we could with this nascent, unstable Libyan

Government and trying to be as transparent with them as we

possibly could be in any movements in and out of the country. And

I think that the deputy chief of mission, who ultimately was the

charge after we learned that Ambassador Stevens died, probably

wanted to keep that intact and give a courtesy call to the Libyan

Government saying: Hey, we need to do this. And I believe he

did, and I think we got a pretty quick answer back.

Mr. Gowdy. So despite the use of the word "approval," you

really weren't seeking the permission. You had a missing

Ambassador and you had Americans that were under assault. Had

Libya said, "No, we don't think it's a good idea," would that have

prevented you from doing it?

Admiral Winnefeld. I don't believe so.

Mr. Gowdy. So you weren't seeking approval from the host

nation, you just needed to notify them?

Admiral Winnefeld. I think what we would -- the way we would

couch that to the Libyans is, first, approval, and if they had

shown any reluctance, then we would have said: Well, I'm sorry,

we're going to do it anyway. Now, we're notifying you.

But if you expect them to approve, and it's much better for

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them to perceive it as you asking for their approval, if you're

trying to build this relationship from scratch with them. But if

they're going to say no, and we need to go in and rescue somebody,

I'm sorry, we're going to go do it. There's no doubt in my mind

that that's what we would have done.

Mr. Gowdy. Are there exceptions you can think of where the

United States has neither notified nor sought approval, in quotes,

from a host nation before conducting a military exercise?

Admiral Winnefeld. Sure, Yemen. We've done hostage rescue

attempts in Yemen.

Mr. Gowdy. Pakistan?

Admiral Winnefeld. Absolutely.

So I don't think we have a reluctance to act under duress,

but we will usually try -- either we will -- if we don't ask, it's

because we don't have a relationship with that government. So in

Syria, when we went in and we tried to rescue somebody in Syria,

we didn't ask Bashar Assad for permission to go do that.

But, generally, if it's a friendly nation or a nation

particularly we're trying to build a relationship with, we'll give

them a courtesy call. And the risk you take there, of course, is

that there's going to be a leak from that government. But we've

found, even with Libya, that the leaders you consult with are

usually, like, the really top, like the prime minister level, they

get it, and they will approve it, and they won't leak it.

Mr. Gowdy. Well, let me play devil's advocate for a moment.

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If you have a functioning government and a country that you are

seeking to bolster your relationship with, why would the

government not beat you to the facility to provide support for

your folks like they did in Egypt?

Admiral Winnefeld. Because the Libyan Government was utterly

incapable of doing that, particularly in Benghazi. They didn't

have much control in Benghazi.

Mr. Gowdy. You see where the conundrum comes in, that we're

calling a country that's utterly incapable of defending our folks

to ask permission: Can we come in and defend our folks?

Admiral Winnefeld. Right. Again, this is a political level

thing where you're trying to maintain -- you're trying to show

them how nations behave, and we want to bring an armed forces into

your sovereign territory to rescue potentially our guy. We're

asking for your approval. And if they say no, we would probably

tell them we're going to do this anyway. But, you know, we

expected them to approve this.

So this preserves our political relationship with them.

There's nothing that central Libyan government could have done to

help that night in Benghazi, really, in terms of actions on the

ground.

So I think we handled that fairly well, with the

understanding that if they had said no, we were going to probably

go do this anyway if that's what it came down to needing to do. I

don't think hat anybody was reluctant to press onward if the

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Libyans had said: We don't want you to do this. That

relationship with that government wasn't important enough for us

to sacrifice one of our people.

Mr. Gowdy. Let me check the clock before I go into the next

one. Are we out? We're out of time.

Admiral Winnefeld. When you come back.

Mr. Gowdy. So we'll come back after the minority goes.

Admiral Winnefeld. Okay.

Mr. Gowdy. Thank you.

Mr. Tolar. Off the record.

[Recess.]

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[12:27 p.m.]

Ms. Rauch. The time is about 11:27.

Admiral Winnefeld. 12:27?

Ms. Rauch. I'm sorry. 12:27.

Admiral Winnefeld. I'm watching that clock.

Ms. Rauch. Well done.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. RAUCH:

Q Again, we appreciate you being with us here today. My

name is Laura Rauch with the minority staff of the Select

Committee. I'm joined by my colleagues Peter Kenny, Shannon

Green, and our staff director, Susan Sachsman Grooms.

On behalf of the ranking member, Elijah Cummings, and the

other Democratic Members of Congress who serve on this committee,

thank you for being here today and agreeing to answer our

questions.

A Okay.

Q So I'd like to just start with some pre-attack concerns

and your awareness before the attack in Benghazi.

In the days before the attack, were you aware of any specific

intelligence or warning that there would be an attack in Benghazi

on or around the night of the 9/11 anniversary?

A No. We weren't aware of any intelligence about attacks

related to -- in Benghazi at all.

Q And when did you first learn about the incendiary film

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titled "The Innocence of Muslims"? You may know it as the YouTube

video?

A I don't know the exact time, but when it came out, we

were all pretty well aware that it was out, and I don't know if

that was a couple weeks prior. I just don't recall.

Q And was there any preparation, was there concern, or

how was it affecting operations?

A We were concerned. You know, here we go again on

inflaming Muslim tensions around the world. I simply don't

recall, as I had mentioned in the previous testimony, whether

we -- that was enough to trigger us to increase our force

protection posture at bases, that sort of thing. We may have; we

may have not. I'm not sure, but we were very concerned by it.

Q Were you and other national security officials

concerned that potential protests against the video could turn

violent against American interests?

A Generally, whenever anything like that happens, again,

a preacher burning a Koran, a Muslim cartoon, or anything like

that, yes, we get concerned that there would be a negative

reaction from Muslim populations, but we just don't know where.

Q And can you recall -- now I'd like to shift to the day

and night of the attacks on September 11, 2012. Do you recall

when you first learned about the protesters in Cairo that day?

A I don't recall the exact time, but as the protest

approached the Embassy, I guess, whenever we were getting reports

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on that.

Q But you don't remember exactly --

A I don't remember a time.

Q Did you understand this was connected to the video at

the time?

A I think our assumption was it was connected to the

video. I don't know whether we had a definitive link,

because -- I mean, we were talking to the protesters, but I think

our assessment was that it was associated with the video.

Q And considering Cairo's close proximity to Benghazi,

were you concerned that the violent protests in Egypt would spill

over perhaps to Libya and potentially Benghazi?

A We weren't thinking of Benghazi. We were thinking more

in terms of Tunis and Tripoli and, I believe, maybe Khartoum. I

don't recall Benghazi coming up. You know, there are a lot of

cities in North Africa; Benghazi's one of them. And I think, if I

recall, Carter was more worried about a different city in

northeastern Libya. I can't recall the name. It starts with a D.

He was more worried about that city than he was about Benghazi, if

I remember correctly.

Q And when you say "Carter," you're referring to Carter

Ham?

A General Ham. Sorry.

Q Okay. Who was at the time the Commander of AFRICOM?

A Right.

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Ms. Rauch. So I'd like to enter into the record exhibit 4.

[Winnefeld Exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

Admiral Winnefeld. Do I have that?

Mr. Richards. No.

Ms. Rauch. I'm going to --

BY MS. RAUCH:

Q This is -- you'll be receiving it. It's an

unclassified DOD timeline of the night of the attacks and then the

following day. I'll just give you a moment to look through that.

Have you seen this document before?

A I have. Yep.

Q And so, according to this timeline, the attack started

in Benghazi around 9:42 p.m. Eastern European time, which was

about 3:42 p.m. eastern daylight time, a 6-hour time difference.

Do you -- I think you touched on it briefly, but you said your DDO

informed you of the attacks. Is that correct?

A I was at a meeting at the time in the bowels of the

Pentagon, and when I came out of that meeting and went up to my

office, my staff, I think, told me: Hey, there's been an attack;

DDO wants to talk to you.

And then my discussion was with the DDO, as I recall. And

that was probably, you know, 4:30, 5, something like that. I

don't have an exact time.

Q Okay. And I want to note, on this timeline, referring

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back to it, that it shows that by 5:30 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time,

or 11:30 p.m. Eastern European Time, all surviving American

personnel had departed the State Department facility. Do you see

that?

A Yep. Uh-huh.

Q Do you recall hearing that everyone had departed,

learning that everyone had departed the State Department facility?

A Yeah. The strongest recollection I have of the report,

actually, so maybe my report was later, was that there's been an

attack. We've lost -- we think we've lost somebody. The

Ambassador's missing, but everybody's been moved to a separate

facility. And the attack's over. There are fires on the

compound. And that's my strongest recollection of the report.

Q And you don't remember when you heard this exactly?

A I don't remember when it was.

Q Okay. Okay. So, during his appearance before the

Senate Armed Services Committee on February 7th, 2013, General

Dempsey, your former boss, testified about the forces Secretary

Panetta ordered to move on the night of the attacks. He said,

quote: I want to make just one comment related to your

chronology, because I think it's important. Once we started

moving forces, nothing stopped us; nothing slowed us. The only

adaption -- I'm sorry -- adaptation we thought about making was

for a period of time we thought we were going to be entering a

hostage rescue, because we didn't know where the Ambassador was,

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but once we started forces moving, they didn't slow; they didn't

stop.

Do you agree with General Dempsey's statement that once

forces were moving, they never slowed or stopped?

A There was certainly nothing decisionwise or

interventionwise, you know, that prevented us from moving

anything. There -- all the natural things that happened in

between that, you know, slow forces down from moving whatever, but

there was no cessation-of-movement order or anything like that.

Once they were told to move, they carried out their movement.

It's never as fast as you want it to be, but they carried out

their movement.

Q And you just noted that there were things that

naturally -- there was natural movement to things; there's an ebb

and flow to moving these forces. Can you elaborate on

specifically what you mean, what they might have been dealing with

on the night of the attacks to deal with? And you talked about it

a little bit in the last hour, but if you could --

A Sure.

Q -- drill down on that just slightly more.

A So USAFE was starting from a standing start. They did

not have any forces on alert, so they had to wake up air crews,

wake up maintenance personnel, wake up ordnance personnel to go

get countermeasures pods to put on the C130s they were going to

launch. They had to do C130s, not just one, which doubles the

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complexity and doubles the challenges associated with that.

They probably -- I'm guessing they probably had to offload one or

both of those C130s with cargo that was already prepositioned on

them.

Q And this is the C130s that were going to the FAST team?

A Right. Exactly.

And then you just -- there are things that always happen,

whether it's getting a clearance from the German airspace

authorities or whether a fuel truck doesn't show up in Rota. I

don't know if any of those things happened, but there is always

this entropy, you know, the sand that gets in the machinery that

makes it go slower than you want it to go, but, you know, we got

good people on the ground. They're pushing as hard as they can,

and they always work through those problems. But there's a

process you have to go through in order to get an airplane ready

and launch it and get it downrange. So they were just working

their way through all those things. I give USAFE a lot of credit

for -- I think they did some good work that night based on the

challenge they were handed.

Q Thank you. And we understand from Secretary Panetta's

Senate testimony, as well as the DOD's timeline, that upon

returning from the White House, Secretary Panetta conferred with

senior staff, including General Dempsey and General Ham, to

discuss response options for Benghazi and the potential for

further violence throughout the region. You mentioned some of

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them: Tunis, Tripoli, Cairo, Sana'a, other places.

Secretary Panetta testified that he was told by the President

to do everything he could to save American lives. Was that your

sense as well?

A My understanding was there was no impediments

whatsoever to the authorities that we had to act to save lives, to

better posture ourselves in the region for potential follow-on

incidents, and, if necessary, to do a hostage rescue.

Q And so I just want to -- because there's been a lot of

discussion about this, about who had authority and so forth, I

just would like to read you -- Secretary Panetta appeared before

this committee in this very room where you're sitting on

January 28th, 2016, so just a couple months ago. And he told us,

quote: I had the authority to deploy those forces, and I ordered

those forces to be deployed, and I didn't have to ask anybody's

permission to get those forces in place.

And because it's pertinent, I'd like to read you just the

full transcript. The question was: And then the email

continues -- and this is referring to the email which you've been

presented with today, the Jeremy Bash email --

A Sure.

Q -- which you're on that email with the chain.

And -- quote: And then the email continues with the following

sentence, assuming principals agree to deploy these elements.

Question: Who are the principals that would have had to

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agree to deploy the elements that you had identified?

Answer: No one. I had the authority to deploy those forces,

and I ordered those forces to be deployed, and I didn't have to

ask anybody's permission to get those forces in place.

Question: Sir, that is my understanding as well, that the

National Command Authority consists of two people, the President

and the Secretary of Defense.

Answer: That's right.

Question: And if you, as the Secretary of Defense, ordered

the deployment of military assets, that's all it takes?

Answer: That's correct.

Ms. Green. Is that your understanding as well?

Admiral Winnefeld. Yeah, it's my understanding. And as I

mentioned in previous testimony, that in train and parallel with

that, a prudent Secretary of Defense is going to talk to a

Secretary of State and National Security Advisor and the like and

say: Hey, this is what we're going -- we need to do. It's sort

of, are there any objections to this? You know, what do you all

think? And he needs to do that because of the need, you know, to

get dip clearances, to get, you know, host-nation permission, as

we discussed earlier, so it's prudent for him to be collegial

about this. In both administrations I've worked in, that's the

way it happens.

But the Secretary is correct: At the end of the day, he and

the President are the National Command Authority, and if it comes

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time to deploy something, he can make that call himself, but a

smart Secretary does it in a collegial way.

BY MS. RAUCH:

Q And so, according to the DOD timeline, which you have

before you, Secretary Panetta directed three specific actions in

these meetings, and we've discussed them --

A Yeah.

Q -- a little bit today already. He directed a FAST

platoon, which was stationed in Rota, to prepare to deploy to

Benghazi; a second FAST platoon, also stationed in Rota, to

prepare to deploy to the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli; he directed the

EUCOM CIF to deploy to an intermediate staging base in southern

Europe; and then he directed a Special Operations Force based in

the United States to prepare to deploy to an intermediate station

base in southern Europe. And at the time, you were tracking all

of this information, and you were aware of these?

A I was aware of the deployments that had been ready

ordered, yes.

Q Okay.

A And just for timeline purposes, you know, the email we

talked about earlier came out at 7-something. That was in the

middle of my dinner at that point. When the dinner was over is

when I, you know, read retroactively a couple of hours earlier all

of that and got caught up on what the deployments were that had

been ordered, and I was tracking those.

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Q And so do you have the sense that when these orders

were being carried out, do you know if there was any limitation on

any of the assets, was there -- that you were aware of that night?

A A policy limitation, you mean, or a decision

limitation?

Q Essentially any limitation that you saw.

A Yeah. The only limitations were physical limitations

really, just the ability to get them moving. There was

no impediments, no wickets that had to be jumped through

decisionwise. So, once the Secretary said, "move them,"

there -- you know, it's time to go, and now it's a matter of

transmitting the orders and physically moving the stuff. And

there -- I think there were some obstacles in there. We can

always do things better and faster. There are probably little

things we could have done that night. I don't have an itemized

list for you, but that most -- that train was moving at that

point.

Q Okay. And in your role as the Vice Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, essentially the second in command of the

Department of Defense, did you consider these three chosen assets

the appropriate response?

A Absolutely. Yeah.

Q And can you explain why?

A Well, first of all, because we had so many assets

focused in the Middle East, we didn't have an awful lot in Europe,

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so that was pretty much the -- that's what we had available was

the in-extremis force, the FAST platoons, (REDACTED) There's not

a lot of other force on any kind of an alert that you could

energize quickly to move into a situation like that. There

is -- there was -- the Army has a brigade in Italy, that sort of

thing. If things got really bad, you could energize them, but

they're not on any kind of a rapid deployment posture.

So I think those were the right forces to move. And

everybody had a clear understanding -- for example, the FAST, the

FAST teams are not a maneuver force. They don't get on the ground

ready to go, take an objective, that sort of thing. They really

are a reinforcement force. That is a force that's specifically

designed to go into an embassy, a compound, and reinforce it.

They're not designed to get on the ground, move to an objective,

take the objective, and secure it, but it's all we had. And so we

did the best with what we had and decided to move the FAST platoon

certainly to reinforce Tripoli. So it was doing its normal job to

go reenforce Tripoli.

The notion of sending it to Benghazi was a real long shot,

because it would have to get onto the ground at the airport; it

would have to somehow move to wherever it needed to go; and

then do actions on an objective, which is not what a FAST platoon

normally does. Now, they're steely eyed marines; they could

probably do a pretty good job, but there are some physical

limitations associated with a FAST platoon that would have made

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that a very difficult mission for them.

Q And can -- but the CIF, however, is a fully capable

force that can do a hostage rescue and so forth?

A Yeah. Well, they can do limited hostage rescue.

(REDACTED)

Q Which was indeed spun up?

A Right.

Q Or, sorry, put into motion that night?

A Yeah. They actually --

Q It was deployed that night?

A -- deployed, yeah.

Q Okay. And then was it your sense that your staff,

everyone that was in your -- which is pretty much everybody at the

Department of Defense -- was doing everything in their power to

respond to the situation in Libya?

A I'd -- I detected no lack of urgency; I can tell you

that. Kurt Tidd, the J3, had his folks energized, you know,

working very hard to try to do whatever we could from the D.C.

arena to get things moving. You know, that -- I didn't sense any

reluctance there. People were definitely energized.

Q And was it your sense that personnel from across the

interagency that -- you were on a lot of emails that night, and

we'll present some of them later -- that you were in touch with a

lot of the interagency that night. Was it your sense that they

were doing everything they could to assist in the crisis?

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A As far as I could tell, the key players, obviously,

were State, DOD, and the National Security Council staff, and

everybody was focused on the problem.

Q Did the Secretary of State ever tell you or anyone at

DOD to stand down or slow down the DOD's response?

A I had no communications with the Secretary of State and

never anybody else from State, for that matter, asking us to slow

down.

Q And so did the President ever tell you or anyone at DOD

to stand down or slow your response?

A No.

Ms. Green. Admiral, sir, during this time that the Secretary

had ordered deployment of these assets, at some point in the

night, did you become aware of the(REDACTED)team from Tripoli that

had deployed to Benghazi to assist in the crisis?

Admiral Winnefeld. I was not -- I don't know that we were

getting very good information on that throughout the night. So I

don't know that at -- you know, in the middle of the night, I

could have given you a definitive, you know, two stayed or two

went to Benghazi and four stayed in Tripoli and the whole dynamic

of why the -- I think, later in the morning, maybe 6, 7 in the

morning, whatever, I was getting more situational awareness on

what had happened there, that they had asked the team to stay in

Tripoli to help protect the Embassy, because there's no security,

and to receive the passengers coming back from Benghazi. I think

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I was aware of that later in the morning, but I wasn't tracking

that -- those details throughout the night.

BY MS. RAUCH:

Q So just to continue along our line of questioning with

the military assets that were selected to respond on the night of

the attacks or that were available to serve on the night of the

attacks, you described the FAST and some -- the CIF to some

degree. (REDACTED)

A (REDACTED)

Q And so you believe this was an appropriate response,

and this was a --

A Absolutely. We didn't know where Ambassador Stevens

was, and we also weren't sure if there were any copycat attacks

that were going to happen, whether there would be hostages taken,

so this was a prudent move to establish them in theater, both for

the eventuality that Ambassador Stevens might still be alive and

be a hostage and that there could be some follow-on event in the

next few days that would require us using them; better to have

them there. With no competing incidents occurring anywhere else

in the globe, you know, it was a good investment to throw them in

there for (REDACTED)

Q Okay.

Mr. Kenny. And when you say "in the region," that would

include copycats within Libya as well. Is that correct?

Admiral Winnefeld. Yeah. Within Libya, Tunisia, you name

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it. We were worried at that point that: Hey, we've had

one follow-on event here; what's coming next? We didn't know, and

we wanted to be prepared for that?

Ms. Rauch. And since it's a --

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I'm sorry. You said one follow-on

event?

Admiral Winnefeld. Well, we had Cairo, and then Benghazi

was -- we viewed as the follow-on event. We didn't know if there

was linkage. We weren't obsessed by that; we were just worried

that, you know, things feel like they're getting out of control

here, we want to get some forces in theater that could rescue a

hostage.

BY MS. RAUCH:

Q (REDACTED)

A (REDACTED)

Q Continuing with the military assets, we've heard some

criticism about the United States military failing to deploy

close-air support to Benghazi on the night of the attacks. You

discussed this in the last hour. You clearly have a lot of

experience as a former naval aviator.

A Right.

Q Secretary Panetta responded to this criticism in his

testimony before SASC on February 7th, 2013. He said, quote:

Some have asked why other types of armed aircraft were not

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dispatched to Benghazi. The reason simply is because armed UAVs,

AC-130 gunships, or fixed-wing fighters with the associated

tanking, you've got to provide air-refueling abilities, armaments.

You've got to arm all the weapons before you put them on the

planes. Targeting and support facilities were not in the vicinity

of Libya, and because of the distance, it would have taken at

least 9 to 12 hours, if not more, to deploy these forces to

Benghazi. This was, pure and simple, in the absence, as I said,

of any kind of advanced warning, a problem of distance and time,

end quote.

Quote, he continues: Frankly, even if we were able to get

F-16s or the AC-130s over the target in time, the mission still

depends on accurate information about what targets they're

supposed to hit, and we had no forward air controllers there. We

had no communications with U.S. officials on the ground, and as a

matter of fact, we had no idea where the Ambassador was at that

point to be able to kind of conduct any kind of attack on the

ground, end quote.

Again, you discussed the important role of a JTAC or a

forward air controller on the ground, and you did so, I think, in

a very thorough way.

But continuing on some of the things that Secretary Panetta

spoke about, how would you say that what's been termed as the

tyranny of distance impact the ability of the U.S. military to

respond in a crisis, and going back nearly 4 years, because things

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have changed a bit? As you've said, you've had lessons learned,

and you've changed posturing because of it, but going back to that

frame.

A Yeah. The tyranny of distance, in particularly North

Africa, as I'm sure you've probably seen a picture of the U.S.

imposed upon -- you know, the entire continental U.S. fits neatly

into North Africa. It's a big place. We've constantly reminded

State while I was the Vice Chairman and also, you know, National

Security Council staff, gently, politely, that if you're counting

on reactive forces from DOD to pull your fat out of the fire,

basically, when there's an event going on, you're kidding

yourselves. It's just too hard to get there. Usually, an event

is over fairly quickly, and even in the best alert posture we can

be in, it's going to be a couple of hours, 2 or 3 hours, before we

can be someplace.

So what you should really be counting on is using these

forces to either preemptively reinforce an area, like an embassy,

or preemptively evacuate an area, like an embassy. Don't count on

us to drop in in the middle of the night and stop a situation

that's going on.

Now, that won't prevent us from trying, certainly. If

there's an event in a place that -- you know, like a Benghazi and

if we're postured in order to get there, we'll certainly try,

we'll always try, but I've made it very clear to them -- and they

understand this -- that they need to be very careful in their risk

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assessments. And it's a lot easier to reinforce and get out early

than it is to save something that's under fire. And that has a

lot to do not only with the tyranny of distance and how long it

takes to get there, but, you know, it's not easy to take a force

and just drop it into the middle of an unknown area at night, and

it's even harder when you're under fire. You know, V-22s don't

like to fly when they're under fire, that sort of thing. So we've

tried to make it very, very clear to them, try, please, please, to

do good risk assessment and evacuate or reinforce so that we don't

have to rescue you in the middle of a firefight.

Q And the proliferation of MANPADS in Libya was well

known by the U.S. military --

A Yeah.

Q -- around this time? The State Department was leading

a rather extensive operation to locate and destroy --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- shoulder-fired missiles after the fall of Qadhafi?

A Uh-huh.

Q Were you concerned or you or anyone on your team

concerned about the MANPADS threat on the night of the attacks?

A I would -- only as a pilot, and this is my own personal

opinion, I would only take a MANPADS threat in Libya seriously in

daylight hours. They can't hit you at night. They'd have to be

really, really good to do that. And so if it were necessary to

fly around at night, candidly, I wouldn't worry too much about the

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MANPADS, but as soon as the sun comes up, you got to be very

careful with that.

Mr. Kenny. Sir, at the end of the last hour, a document was

introduced, exhibit 1, which was an email --

Admiral Winnefeld. I've got it.

Mr. Kenny. -- from Jeremy Bash to Jacob Sullivan. Do you

see that there, sir.

Admiral Winnefeld. Yep.

Mr. Kenny. There's a redaction that appears in this email,

so what I'd like to do at this point is go ahead and introduce an

exhibit. This is going to be exhibit No. 5.

[Winnefeld Exhibit No. 5

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And we introduce this exhibit, sir, just for the sake

of the completeness of the record to include the portion that was

redacted in exhibit 1. And I'll give you a moment to review it.

I'm just going to identify the document for the record. This is

exhibit 5. It's an email from Jacob Sullivan to Jeremy Bash and

others, dated September 11th, 2012. The timestamp is 7:21 p.m.

A Okay. Are you looking at what was redacted out of

Jeremy Bash's email or --

Q So the portion that I'm referring to, sir, is, if

you're on exhibit 1, the middle of the page, there's an email from

Jacob Sullivan. The time stamp is 7:21 p.m.

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A Yeah. Okay.

Q And then if you look at exhibit 5, that appears to be

the same email, same timestamp. Do you see that, sir?

A Yeah.

Q And those appear to you to be the same email?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And, again, exhibit 5, we introduced because in

exhibit 1, there is a sentence there that's redacted.

A Yeah. Okay. I see it.

Q So I'll go ahead -- and have you had a chance to review

the document, sir?

A Okay.

Q So I'll just go ahead and read into the record Jacob

Sullivan's response to Jeremy Bash's email. You were asked some

questions about that in the last hour. We're going to pick up

where some of those questions left off. But here, Jacob Sullivan

writes to Jeremy Bash and others, and I'll note for the record

that you are on the cc line of this email, and Jacob writes,

quote: "Thanks, Jeremy. Plus Cheryl. We are joining a SVTC with

NSS colleagues at 7:30 p.m. -- believe your team will be on as

well. We should work through this issue in that venue," close

quote.

And I believe you'd clarified a little bit earlier. I'd just

like to ask so the record is as clear as possible, but at the time

this email chain was sent, to the best of your recollection, you

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were attending a dinner. Is that correct?

A Yeah.

Q Okay. And I think you indicated that following the

dinner, you attempted to catch up and read your email traffic? Is

that right?

A Yep. Uh-huh.

Q Okay. Do you recall this email thread?

A It makes sense to me. I don't recall it specifically,

but it certainly fits in with my pattern of understanding of what

happened.

Q Okay. And you see here, sir, there's a reference to a

SVTC with NSS colleagues at 7:30 p.m.?

A Uh-huh.

Q You were asked in the last round whether you had an

awareness or whether you participated in that SVTC. I believe

you'd indicated the answer to that is no. Is that correct?

A Right.

Q Okay. Were you contemporaneously aware that a SVTC, a

deputies committee meeting, was taking place at that time?

A No. I was in my dinner -- if I was aware, I sent Kurt

Tidd, who was the J3, who, otherwise, in my absence, he would just

go. So --

Q I think that's helpful. Do you recall being briefed on

the contents of that deputies committee meeting at a later point

in time?

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A I don't recall specifically chapter and verse being

briefed on the output. I probably was. And my sense is, you

know, the DOD-relevant topics in a SVTC like that are fairly

narrow, so I probably would get, yes, everybody concurred with,

you know, deploying forces. They're -- I'm just making this up.

You know, can you hasten the timeline? We're seeking country

clearance; you know, all the sort of routine things that have to

be coordinated in order to make something like this work.

Q Okay.

A And so my sense is that the question that was posed in

the first email as to, you know, assuming principals agree, that

was -- I would believe was answered in that -- in that SVTC.

Q No. Thank you. That's helpful, because the way that I

read Mr. Sullivan's response when he indicates we should work

through this issue --

A Yeah.

Q -- in that venue --

A Yeah.

Q -- so your understanding is, then, that the venue he's

referring to would have been that 7:30 p.m. deputies committee

meeting?

A Yeah.

Q Okay. And the "this issue" here is the coordinating

piece for DOD's response?

A Yep.

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Q Okay. And --

A And this is -- you know, there's just -- whenever

something like this happens, whether it's a hostage rescue or you

name it, particularly an emergent event, there's always a SVTC

like this, and there are a lot of really good points brought up by

interagency partners about considerations and -- in stream.

They're very useful events, and we can very quickly resolve

questions, like, does anybody have any objection if we sent forces

into Tripoli? My supposition here is that that was a very quickly

resolved; nobody has objections.

Q Okay. And when you say "supposition," that's --

A I don't recall precisely the content of that SVTC, you

know, but it all makes sense that there were probably issues

worked out fairly quickly in a collegial way among the various

participants in this SVTC.

Q And I believe you had also indicated in the last hour

that this coordination process that you described was something

that you had witnessed or experienced in multiple administrations?

Is that correct?

A Yeah.

Q So is it your understanding of how that process

unfolded on the night of the attacks -- I'm sorry. Was that a

yes?

A Yeah. It's not unusual.

Q Okay. And is your understanding of how that process

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unfolded on the night of the attacks a response to an in-extremis

or crisis response type situation, is it consistent with your

understanding of how that coordination process would play out at

other times --

A Yes.

Q -- in your experience? Okay.

Mr. Kenny. And I know we've done a little bit of discussion

of what may have been discussed during that SVTC, so what I'd like

to do at this point is to put a document in front of you. This

will be exhibit No. 6.

[Winnefeld Exhibit No. 6

Was marked for identification.]

Admiral Winnefeld. Yes. This is at 8:53. Okay.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And I'll give you the opportunity to review this

document. For the purposes of my questioning, I'm going to

primarily ask you about the second email down in the chain from

Kurt Tidd, Vice Admiral Tidd, 8:53 p.m.

A Okay.

Q And for the purposes of the record, exhibit No. 6 is an

email chain. The parent email is from a Kristie Canegallo to Ross

Myers, dated September 11th, 2012, 9:35 p.m., the subject is:

National Military Command Center Benghazi Update Conference Call.

Secret, comma, Record.

And I'd like to direct your attention to the second email

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down in this chain, which is from Vice Admiral Tidd. And I'd

first just like to ask you who Vice Admiral Tidd was, and what was

his role at this time?

A He was the Director of Joint Operations on the Joint

Staff.

Q Okay. And you'd referred at various points in the day

to a DDO, a deputy director for operations.

A Uh-huh.

Q Would that individual have worked for Vice Admiral

Tidd?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And when you described earlier your role in

terms of ensuring that the trains run on time, Admiral Tidd is the

J3, in the Joint Staff. Would that have also been his role?

Would he have on the night of the attack had an awareness of asset

availability, what assets were, in fact, moving on the night of

the attacks?

A That's his primary job.

Q Okay.

A He's the operations officer of the world.

Q Okay. And I'll just note here, sir, there -- in the cc

line, I won't ask you to read through it, but I will note that

your name does appear on the cc line --

A Right.

Q -- as does Jeremy Bash's.

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A Uh-huh.

Q And if you'd like, I can direct your attention to that,

but there are many names there.

A Yeah. I see the Chairman. Yeah. This is a

standard -- he's plucking this off of other emails and pasting it

in, in the interests of time, so he's not typing all these

individual email addresses in --

Q Of course. Of course.

A -- because there are, you know, any number of people on

here who --

Q And we'll note here that the time stamp for this email

is 8:53 p.m., which is nearly -- close to an hour and a half after

the Jeremy Bash email that was originally put in front of you in

exhibit 1 and exhibit 5. And the body of this email begins,

quote: Discussions at deputies and followed up between OSD and

the Chairman, close quote. And then there's a list of -- a

summary of the discussion that occurred at that --

A Yep.

Q -- both at the deputies. Is your understanding when

Admiral Tidd writes, "discussion at deputies and followed up,"

that this email encompasses the content of that 7:30 deputies

committee meeting as well as followup discussions between the

Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs?

A I would not want to -- well, it says "discussions of

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deputies," so my sense is that the deputies sort of coordinated on

what DOD intended to do. So the Secretary had decided he wanted

to deploy the CIF (REDACTED) FAST platoons. That was exposed to

the deputies in the deputies SVTC, and they all concurred with

that, is what this is telling me, and that then the J3, Kurt Tidd,

put this out formally in an email.

Q But when we see deputies here --

A Yeah.

Q -- you had indicated earlier you tended to be a

representative as a deputy at deputies committee meetings --

A Right.

Q -- which we understand is a formal --

A Right.

Q -- structure under the National Security --

A Right. But I can have a representative there. And, in

fact, I'm at my dinner at this time, and Tidd is in the deputies

committee meeting for me, and so he participated in that process.

Q So this email here, at least to you sitting here today,

does that appear to be a summary of some of the discussions that

occurred at that deputies committee meeting?

A I think what it does is it doesn't -- there is a lot

more, based on my vast experience, frankly, with a lot of deputies

SVTCs, there's a lot more that gets discussed in those SVTCs. All

this is doing is reporting out what the Secretary has directed to

do. And he would not put this out unless the deputies had

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concurred with it. If the deputies had not concurred with the

SecDef deciding to do these things, that would have been a big

issue, but it wasn't. The deputies obviously concurred, so Kurt

put it out: Hey, this is now official; Secretary says do this.

Q Okay. And just so I understand, and I apologize to

belabor the point, but it appears that this is the Secretary of

Defense's actions that were directed, orders that were directed

following the deputies committee meeting or perhaps

contemporaneous with that meeting?

A Yeah. To put it precisely, the Secretary made a

decision: This is what I want to do. I want to make sure the

interagency is okay with it.

It gets entered into the deputies SVTC process. And when

it's the J3's turn to speak, he says: Okay. Here is what the

Secretary wants to do. He wants to deploy X, Y, and Z.

And so the Deputy National Security Advisor probably says:

Is everybody okay with that?

And everybody says: Yeah, that's -- let's do it.

And so Kurt says: You know, that concurrence has been

achieved.

And this email reflects, indirectly reflects that that SVTC

essentially did not disagree with what the Secretary wanted to do.

Q And when you say "concurrence," you made a reference

earlier to the National Command Authority, and just so that we can

better understand --

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A Yeah.

Q -- the President had met earlier with the Secretary of

Defense and had relayed his order to save American lives --

A Yeah.

Q -- to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of

Defense then returned to the Pentagon. This is

following -- appears to be following those discussions --

A Right.

Q -- but then it sounds, if I understand correctly, that

the Secretary of Defense's options or proposals for orders to

deploy were then discussed at the deputies committee meeting.

A Right.

Q Is that correct?

A Yeah.

Q Is that part of that coordination process that you

discussed --

A Right.

Q -- earlier? Okay. And had there been a disagreement

or dispute about the deployment of a particular asset, I think you

described that that would have been something that was unusual?

A Yeah. It would have been unusual, and the Secretary

probably would have said: Look, get them moving anyway.

And then he would be on the phone with the White House.

Q Okay. And to the best of your understanding, did that

occur at the that 7:30 deputies committee meeting? Did anyone

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object to the deployment?

A No. I'm not aware of any objection.

Q Okay. So, subsequently, you haven't learned that there

was an objection to the deployment of any of the three forces that

are discussed here?

A Right. And it would have to be a very strong objection

from a very senior person. If somebody, let's say, from the FBI

is there and says, "You know, I'm not so sure about this," they

would have been overruled, basically, by the rest of the deputies.

It's not a voting, you know, unanimous consent must be achieved,

but if somebody raises a violent objection, like, "Hey, you know,

this is a real problem here for this very good reason," we would

have paid very close attention to that, because it may be

something we hadn't thought of. We would have gone back to the

Secretary and said: You know, somebody over at State raised this

really good point in the VTC that indicates we shouldn't

necessarily act so quickly. What do you think?

But that did not happen here. Everybody wanted us to go.

Q Okay. And had there been an objection, is that

something that --

A It would have been resolved very quickly, I believe.

Q Okay. And is it also something you would have been

made aware of?

A Eventually, yes. I was at my dinner at this time, but,

yeah, I would have been quickly been made aware that there's

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something contentious going on among the deputies regarding

whether we're going to send these forces or not --

Q Okay.

A -- but that didn't happen.

Q And just to read the first two paragraphs on the top of

the second page, the first paragraph reads, quote," SecDef has

directed deployment --

A Yep.

Q -- of the CIF to the ISB determined most suitable by

AFRICOM, supported by EUCOM.

Perhaps you can help me, sir, with the acronym here.

A Okay.

Q It says -- is that direct launch authority?

A That -- direct liaison authority.

Q Direct liaison authority. Thank you. Important

distinction.

A "INFO," obviously, is there, and "ALCON" is all

concerned. All concerned.

Q Okay.

A So that's sort of a -- that's a lingo, "DIRLAUTH ALCON"

means: Everybody, you're free to coordinate with each other in an

unfettered way; make this happen.

Q Okay. And this is the -- this is -- essentially when I

read this, this -- and would this have been the understanding of

everybody on this email chain, that this is the authority of the

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Secretary of Defense --

A Yes. Absolutely. No question.

Q -- ordering the deployment of the CIF?

A When the J3 on the Joint Staff says, "SecDef has

directed the deployment of," there's no question of what that

means in anybody's mind.

Q And did you see anywhere here, sir, that the SecDef

held back this particular asset in any way, that he had placed

some limitation or contingency on the deployment of this asset?

A The only thing he was -- I noticed in here was: Hold

departure until we're sure we have clearance to land in Tripoli.

Now, sure --

Q We'll get to in a moment, sir.

A All right.

Q But, please.

A Well, I was just going to say that that didn't hold

anything up, because you still have to generate the airplanes.

You still have to fly them from Ramstein to Rota. You still have

to load them. And there's no doubt in our mind that you would get

that -- that dip clearance in parallel.

Q Sure.

A So I'm not --

Q I'm trying to -- I'm -- just so that we can keep the

record clean with respect to the three different response

elements --

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A Right. Okay.

Q -- so my question was directed at the top here --

A Oh.

Q -- with specific respect to CIF --

A Oh, okay.

Q Do you see here that there was a limitation --

A No limit --

Q -- placed in any way on the deployment of the CIF?

A None whatsoever.

Q Okay. No attempt by the Secretary of Defense to slow

down or delay --

A No.

Q -- the deployment? Okay.

And then the next paragraph, again, SecDef has directed

deployment. Here it's the U.S. Special Operations Force, to the

same ISB as the CIF. And, again, here, do you see any limitation

on the deployment of that particular response element?

A No.

Q Okay. Now, in the first and second paragraph, there is

a reference to an ISB. We understand that to mean an intermediate

staging base.

A Correct.

Q Can you just explain what the role of an ISB is?

A It's where you take a force that normally lives at a

home station and forward deploy it to essentially a staging base

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that gets it closer to its objective but doesn't fully commit it

into its objective. It just gets it at a higher state of

readiness where it can respond more quickly with a shorter

distance. The tyranny of distance has shrunk at an ISB.

Q And can you explain to the best of your recollection

why an ISB was determined to be the correct course of action on

the night of the attacks rather than the direct insertion of these

forces into Libya?

A Because what they were thinking at the time was the

regional piece. It was the sense that the Benghazi attack was

over, which doesn't mean that they had lost sight of it; we still

had chores to do down there: you know, get people out of there,

potential hostage rescue, that sort of thing.

But in terms of the CIF, you know, (REDACTED) what have you,

but they had their eye on a broader regional perspective, and not

knowing where the Ambassador was.

Q So you described it as your sense that it was over, but

attention hadn't necessarily shifted. And we've heard it

described perhaps differently, that it was there was a lull in the

activity or the attack had subsided in some way. Would those

descriptions be inaccurate in any way to describe the sense of --

A I think, in 20/20 hindsight, there was a lull -- lull

in the activity and another incident occurred. At that -- you

know, if you really immerse yourself in that moment, it was:

There's been an attack on the Embassy -- or the compound. That

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attack is over. We're searching for the Ambassador. We've got

one dead. It's our understanding that the rest of our people are

in a safe location. Now, open up the aperture. What's happening

in the rest of the region? What if we have a hostage rescue we

have to take care of here? How do we get our people back? There

was -- so the sense was that there was an attack, and the attack

was over, but we've still got things that we need to do.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q Did the priority remain at that point, even with that

sense, that DOD needed to, A, rescue hostage, if necessary, in

Benghazi and, B, evacuate individuals from Benghazi? Was that

still the priority?

A The priority was all over the place. Everything was

the first priority, right? (REDACTED) So that was that. The CIF

could support that, or the CIF could be used for some

other -- potentially a different hostage rescue operation or some

other CIF-appropriate activity, and the FAST, of course, to

reinforce. And all those were priorities at the time. And I

don't know that I would raise one above the other. Everything was

moving in the same direction.

In terms of getting our people out of Benghazi, my

recollection is that we were counting and we knew that there was

going to be indigenous Libyan air moving them out of Benghazi, and

we weren't necessarily going to have to send an airplane in there

to get them, but the C-130s that were moving the CIF, that were

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moving the FAST could potentially have done that if it became

necessary. But, you know, the timeline was not very supportive of

that, right? It turns out that the Libyan aircraft moved them

before we could get there.

Mr. Kenny. And on that point, sir, in the third paragraph

here, as you perhaps moved a step ahead of me --

Admiral Winnefeld. Sorry about that.

Mr. Kenny. -- but this is in direct reference to the FAST,

but the last sentence here reads, quote: "Embassy making efforts

to move all AMCITS from SAO Compound Benghazi to Tripoli, possibly

using same Comm Air that 5-pax team arrived on," close quote.

So, at least at this time, was there an understanding that

there was some sort of retrograde plan for American citizens

evacuating from the temporary mission facility in Benghazi from

Tripoli -- from Benghazi to Tripoli?

Admiral Winnefeld. It was our understanding, and this seems

to reinforce that, that it was going to be Libyan air of some

sort, The King Air or whatever, that was going to move our people

from Benghazi back to Tripoli.

Ms. Rauch. And just to clarify, "AMCITS" means American

citizens.

Admiral Winnefeld. Right.

Ms. Rauch. Is that correct.

Admiral Winnefeld. Right.

BY MR. KENNY:

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Q Okay. And so would that information have, then, been a

factor -- we take this information about where protectees may be

located, the evacuees, survivors of the attack, along with N+ in

talking about response time for certain elements. As you

understand, the U.S. Special Operations Forces based in the

U.S(REDACTED) The CIF was essentially in Europe at the time, but

it was on an exercise, as you mentioned earlier. Was that

something that then factored into the decision about how to use

those particular assets and where they would be most effective?

A Yeah. I mean, if we felt that the American citizens in

Benghazi were going to be moved to Tripoli, we were reinforcing

Tripoli with the FAST platoon, and ultimately the C-17, I think,

picked these guys up in Tripoli. And the CIF (REDACTED) that was

a regional piece. And, again, we didn't know at that time when

the Secretary gave this order where the Ambassador was. We had

every expectation that he could have been captured. We really

thought that he was potentially captured at that point, and we

really wanted to know where he was, and we were ready to go get

him.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. And was your backstop -- if the

American citizens hadn't gotten evacuated from Benghazi as you

were expecting them to do, was your backstop to that the sort of

long shot FAST that you were -- that was being sent to essentially

Benghazi at the time? You said you didn't think it was going to

get there, but -- in time, but that it was being sent.

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Admiral Winnefeld. Well, there's two possibilities there:

one, if the American citizens can get to the airport in Benghazi

safely; then it's a matter of who's providing the air lift --

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Okay.

Admiral Winnefeld. -- and if there's no Libyan air lift

available, then we would have to send somebody in there to move

them, but it was our understanding that that was not really an

issue, as events showed.

The other more difficult question is if the 17 February guys

had not been supportive and now our folks are trapped in the CIA

facility that we had no idea existed, then how do you get those

guys out of there in a potentially contested environment? That

would have been a much more difficult problem. But, as it turns

out, we did have the support and it looked like there was -- you

know, with some delays, right, that there was going to be

relatively free movement from that compound back to the Benghazi

airport. So neither of those turned into a problem.

And I don't -- the FAST platoon would not have been the ideal

force to put on the ground in Benghazi to go get those guys at

their compound. The CIF would have been much better set up to do

that --

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And the --

A -- in my opinion.

Q The second contingency you just described where there's

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a contested environment --

A Yeah.

Q -- an inability to move Americans to the airfield, was

that something that the Department was planning for on the night

of the attacks? Was that part of the decisionmaking?

A I don't know that we had gotten that far. AFRICOM may

have been looking ahead to that, and the SOCAF folks may have been

looking ahead to that, but our understanding was that our guys

were going to be able to move to the airport from where they were.

Q And just, real briefly, sir, as I note we're running a

little bit low on time, but in this paragraph, it discusses

country clearance landing rights in Tripoli. The second sentence

in that paragraph reads, quote: We'll work with State to nail

that down, but intent is to get security force augmentation into

Tripoli, Tripoli, not Benghazi, at least not initially, ASAP.

A Yeah.

Q And the second to last paragraph, again, talks about

the point is to get -- the last sentence of the second to last

paragraph, but the point is to get marines on the ground securing

the Embassy in Tripoli as rapidly as we could move them.

Was that your understanding as well that, at least at this

particular point in time, the plan was to get Marines in Libya as

soon as possible?

A Into Tripoli.

Q Into Tripoli, correct.

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A To do their traditional role of reinforcement looking

forward to the possibility of a copycat attack in Tripoli.

Q And was your sense, though, that those forces were

moving as quickly as they could?

A They were moving as quickly as we could under the

circumstances.

Q Okay.

A Obviously, today, I think we would be able to move them

more quickly than we did that night, but that night, we were

moving them as quickly as we could.

Q And if I can direct your attention to the third page.

This is an 8:39 email from Captain Lindsey.

A Yep.

Q There is a reference here, provided SecDef's VOCO to

PTDO 1 times FAST platoon from Rota, Spain, to Benghazi.

A Yep.

Q So, at least at this point in time, at 8:39 p.m., there

had been at least an initial prepare-to-deploy order to deploy the

FAST to Benghazi. And is that part of that discussion that you

were referring to earlier when there was an initial discussion

about sending the FAST to Benghazi of whether or not that would

have been the right tool for that particular job?

A Right.

Q Okay. And then when we see on the following page where

it refers to the Embassy efforts to move the American citizens

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from the Benghazi Compound back to Tripoli, would that have

obviated the need to have a FAST platoon in Benghazi?

A Yeah. The only reason to have a FAST platoon in

Benghazi would be to provide security at the airport. Possibly,

if there were local transportation available for them, they could

go reinforce a different facility there. But the whole intent was

to move our people out of there, not to reinforce the CIA facility

they were holing up in.

Q And just to direct your attention, sir, to the last

sentence of the subsequent email on the second page, it reads,

quote: Consider this authorization to move. We will follow up

with depords ASAP.

The line here from Admiral Tidd -- I'm on the second page,

sir.

A Okay. Yeah.

Q Middle of the second page.

A Right.

Q The line here from here Admiral Tidd, the J3 on the

Joint Staff: "Consider this authorization to move." Given the

wide distribution of this email, do you view this as all that was

needed, all the authority that was needed to move American

military resources as quickly as possible?

A Yes. And the followup with depords, it formalizes

that, but this is essentially what you call a VOCO, verbal orders

on -- I can't remember what the actual acronym is, but

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essentially, I don't have time to write this in a formal message

traffic deployment order. You're authorized to move. Paper will

follow later. That's essentially what this is saying.

Q Okay. And I may have a few followup questions on this

email and some other related issues, but I see we're out of time.

A Okay.

Ms. Rauch. We are out of time for now. Thank you.

Admiral Winnefeld. Okay.

Mr. Kenny. We can go off the record.

[Recess.]

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[1:40 p.m.]

Ms. Clarke. Go back on the record.

Admiral Winnefeld. Okay.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Admiral Winnefeld, I just want to pick up where we left

off the last hour with exhibit 6, and I just had some questions.

A Exhibit 6. Okay.

Q That was the last exhibit we were discussing.

A Yes.

Q So one of the things I wanted to direct your attention

to was on the second page, this is the email from Kurt Tidd.

A Right.

Q We just -- in the last hour, you discussed deployment

of a CIF (REDACTED)

If you look on the second page, the second paragraph, it

reads, "SECDEF has directed deployment (REDACTED) Let me know

what the N-hour will be."

Can you explain, if the SECDEF had already issued deployment

for that particular asset, why was Vice Admiral Tidd requesting

that asset to describe, or requesting AFRICOM to describe what

time the N-hour would be? And my understanding is the N-hour is

not the actual time that kind of stops the clock ticking for when

that particular asset had to be in the air? Is that correct?

A Right. Well, what I think is going on here, this is an

email from Kurt to Bruce Lindsey, who is the DDO. So he's just

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asking Lindsey, backfill me on the information.

Q Okay.

A And there's no question when at 8:53, you know, they

are saying go, that's -- that's the signal to these guys to get

moving. They may already have been spinning up, for all I know,

to use that term again. This is really a paperwork drill, because

we have a very formal system inside DOD, because we have to have a

historical record of records of deployment orders for legal

purposes, for historical purposes, whatever. And so all Kurt, I

think, is asking there, just tell me what you decided was going to

be the formal moment that you assign as N-hour.

Q And who --

A He wasn't trying to -- I'm sorry. He wasn't trying to

give them any latitude of, hey, slide N-hour to a time that's

convenient for you. This was just, tell me what the paperwork is

going to say when this is all over. I really think that's what he

was saying.

Q And who would establish that N-hour?

A It would probably be the DDO.

Q And did you have an understanding of what time that

N-hour was actually set?

A No, I don't, because to somebody in my position, it

was, the word's gone out; they're going, and I don't even pay

attention to the paperwork drill in terms of what formal N-hour

would be, as long as I know they've got the word and they are

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moving, and they are spinning up and going.

Q So the formal N-hour is set, say, 2-1/2 hours later,

how does that impact the process for actually getting these assets

moving?

A It won't. The word goes -- I can tell you, (REDACTED)

and it comes down to, you know, the Secretary, move, they're not

paying any attention to N-hours or -- you know, they want to beat

whatever time it is that is specified. But what's really

happening is all the wheels are now in motion for them to man up,

pack up, get the airplanes there and move. They have a process

that they go through; it takes a certain amount of time. And

they're not -- they're not really focused too much, I don't think,

in that actual N-hour formality. It's really just a

documentation.

So they're not going to go, oh, gee, they gave us a couple

hours of slack here. They're just going to go, because that's

what they do.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q (REDACTED) are people alerted as to that fact? Are you

alerted?

A We would want to know what happened if they don't meet

their N time.

Q Are you aware -- do you know why they didn't meet it

that night?

A No, I don't. I don't recall why they didn't make it.

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Q Okay.

A If they didn't make it, I don't know why.

Q Okay.

A Because they're -- they're pretty good about that.

Q That's the thing, they are the elite, and they got a

VOCO; they had a soft start already. A soft start, it's still, we

didn't make it?

A Yeah. I honestly don't know the reason why.

BY MS. CLARK:

Q The other question I had about this exhibit is, so this

order, Kurt Tidd sends this email at 8:53 p.m. it says at the

bottom, considering this authorization to move, we will follow-up

as soon as possible. So this is almost an hour and a half after

the deputy committee meeting, where there is coordination had

taken place -- had started, and according to Secretary Panetta's

testimony, this was probably almost 2 hours following his initial

order to deploy these forces. At this time, had anything actually

begun to move, or were these forces waiting for this particular

authorization to begin?

A I don't have a definitive answer on that. Here's what

I would -- what normally would happen there. Okay. I want to

make it clear, this is what would normally -- the Secretary says,

hey, move this stuff. The informal network that I talked about

earlier, the joint staff operations guys, the SOCOM operation

guys, the AFRICOM, they're talking. They say, The Secretary's

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decided to do this, get your people moving. Get, you know,

prepared to deploy, start -- you know, I hate to use the term

again, spitting them up.

And so all that's going on in parallel while the deputy's

committee process is happening. And then it's followed up by the

formal order to move. So what's happening in the field is people

should be starting to get people out of bed, get things lined up,

get them moving.

Q And when you say --

A But they wouldn't -- but they wouldn't actually

probably move until this -- until this VOCO actually came out.

Q So before this VOCO came out, people should have been

alerted?

A Right.

Q And, you know, this is the middle of the night. So

they would have been, you know, someone would have gone to

get -- like you said, get people out of bed. That -- that process

should have already been developing before this VOCO came out?

A Could have been developing. You -- I would defer you

to the people out in the field as to what their impression was,

what information they received that night as to whether they

actually were or not. But, in general, if something's going on in

the world, people are starting to lean forward, they would be

thinking of this. But they wouldn't actually move until this

order came out. Is it a perfect process? No. I'll tell you

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that.

Q Now, this email is a little before, I think, the

timeline that we talked about earlier where you said you had a

dinner event, and you thought that you may have completed that

dinner event around 9:30, so this email comes out a little before

that.

Once you came -- once you were able to kind of get back up to

speed, as you said, you read through the emails and kind of got an

understanding of what's happening, did you -- were you receiving

updates on what was happening with these forces? Were they

actually moving? Where were they in the process of actually

deploying those forces?

A I wouldn't have the information available to me to

follow in great detail, like, you know, are there aircrews have

been -- have been woken up, you know, what have you. But,

intermittently, I was checking in. I was tracking the progress,

and what I was really trying to remain alert to was whether there

were any impediments, you know. Because you keep your ear to the

ground, is there anything out there that's a stumbling block that

I can help resolve. And that's what somebody in my position would

listen for. Because you generally want the people in the field to

be able to do their jobs without me micromanaging.

So it's a very careful balance you strike of listening to

what's going on, and trying to sense if there's any difficulty,

any impediment. And then if you sense a problem, then you drill

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into it and try to solve it if you need to. I didn't really sense

any problems like that that night that I needed to weigh in on.

I'm sure there -- there are always little things going on on the

ground. But I just make this up, you know, field truck doesn't

show up, you know, whatever, but there's nothing that I feel I

needed to weigh in on. The only thing that I really got involved,

was calling Phil Breedlove, the USAFE commander, to make sure that

there was nothing holding him back on the aircrews. And he had

already beaten me to it. He already had waived crew rest, which

is what I was worried about mostly, being cynical Navy guy

regarding Air Force crew rest rules, I wanted to make sure that

wasn't a problem, and it could have been a problem, but Phil had

already waived it down.

Q With exhibit 6, I think we talked a little bit about

this in the last hour. On the last page, the original email from

Bruce Lindsey, the DDO, it notes that during this conference call

with the national military command center, that the SECDEF VOCO

for deployment of FAST platoon to Rota, Spain -- from Rota, Spain,

to Benghazi and then one from Rota, Spain, to Tripoli. And I

believe at the last hour, we discussed that there was a decision

made that using the FAST platoon in Benghazi, based on the current

information, wasn't necessary at the time, because at least from

your understanding, the American citizens were planning to be

evacuated?

A Right. And that they were going to be evacuated by

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Libyan Air.

Q Was -- given that the Secretary -- the SECDEF had

actually ordered those particular assets to go to Benghazi, was

there some follow-up with him or his staff that, sir, we don't

think these assets need to go to Benghazi because of

the -- because of our understanding of the situation?

A This wasn't an order to go to Benghazi. This was a

prepared-to-deploy order. A PTDO is a prepare to deploy. So this

wasn't -- that wasn't the Secretary saying go to Benghazi. It was

prepare to go to deploy to Benghazi. I think there's a

distinction there.

Q Understanding that distinction, was there still some

coordination with him to say, sir, we understand you said prepare

to deploy, we do not think at this time we need to -- that assets

will need to move to Benghazi?

A My recollection was that throughout the process, that

General Ham and General Dempsey and Secretary Panetta weren't all

that sanguine about deploying the FAST platoon to Benghazi to

start with, but they wanted to have it as an option, so that they

can put it on the PTDO in case it was needed. So there was an

airlift being set up for it and the whole thing, but they ended up

not using it, because they didn't think they needed it.

Q And how -- would that have been -- again, would

that -- were you privy to those conversations, or how were you

aware of that discussion?

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A I don't recall how I was aware. It's just my

recollection of where they were. I was -- I actually never had a

conversation where I was in with the chairman, General Ham, and

the Secretary just because the timing didn't work out. Normally,

I would be, but I just wasn't -- wasn't available.

Q Um --

A I almost remember, like, really, you really are serious

about sending these guys to Benghazi? And said, we're doing this

as a -- I wouldn't say a hedge, but they wanted to have it as an

option, but I don't think they really thought they would end up

sending them to Benghazi, because of the likelihood that they

would be moving our guys by Libyan Air back.

Q I believe earlier we passed out exhibit -- I think it

was exhibit 2. And it's an email. At the very top it has the

name (REDACTED)

A Yes.

Q I want to talk with you about that.

A 1:44 a.m. Okay.

Q So this is a chain of emails that begins with an email

sent from Denis McDonough, who is the deputy national security

advisor at the time. And you're on this chain of emails. And I

just wanted to discuss with you, beginning on the first page, it's

an email that you sent at 1:19 a.m. to Denis McDonough and other

people. And just to kind of get a framework in our mind of what's

happening at that point, at this point in time, the people that

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were at the Special Mission Compound had been moved to the Annex,

and then at this point in time, Libya time, the Annex had actually

been attacked, and there was mortar fire, and at this time

everyone had moved to the airport in Benghazi.

A They were all at the airport at that time?

Q Yes. So you -- now, you write, "Understand we now have

dip clearance for the FAST platoon into Tripoli, working to

accelerate the airlift, have spoken personally with the USAFE

commander." And is this what you have been referring to during

this -- throughout our conversation today about the phone call you

had?

A Right. And I think that the phone call happened,

actually, well before this, but I had spoken to him, and it was,

hey, Phil, you are not letting aircrew rest, hold you back, right?

And if there's anything you can do to accelerate it, please make

it happen. And that was the discussion we had. He's a good

friend, and he would let me know if there's anything they could do

to speed it up. He was all over it. He was doing whatever he

could to speed the airlift up, but they were starting from the

stand and start.

Q Do you recall whether that discussion that you had with

the USAFE commander occurred before or after the mortars attacked

the --

A I believe it was before.

Q Before. What prompted you -- do you recall what

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prompted you to -- if -- to send this email at this time if that

discussion had occurred prior to mortar attack?

A I don't -- I don't think it had anything to do with the

timing of the mortar attack. It was really just an update to the

system, level setting everybody where, hey, we've gotten good

clearance; I've gotten that information. That's no longer a

challenge. I remember, because the Secretary said he wanted to

wait for the dip clearance before he actually moved, so that was

not an impediment.

And then just to make sure people knew that, you know, they

are not just land at the airport in Tripoli. We've got to get

some ground transport for this -- not very mobile FAST platoon to

get to the embassy. So that we were working that. I don't know

if we had resolved it. We were still working it, and then getting

the remains back. This was just, I hadn't received any

information and I had put it out to the -- to the interagency

committee. I think you see on there, Cardillo. He's the DNI guy.

John Brennan, Tony Blinken, Deputy National Security Advisor. At

that point, I think he might have been the Vice President's

National Security Advisor, Sherman from State, Miller from OSD,

Sullivan, Michael Morell. So I'm just putting out information I

received to the broader interagencies.

Q And what role did you play in obtaining the dip

clearance for the FAST platoon to go into Tripoli?

A Not my -- not my role. That's a State Department role

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where either the attache or the deputy chief of mission, whatever,

would actually call the Libyans and say, we need clearance. They

work that in country.

Q And do you have an understanding of when you were aware

that the dip clearance had been obtained?

A It was probably not long before this. It might have

been what stimulated me to put the email out in the first place.

Q And given that this is -- this email was at 1:19 a.m.,

is it the -- according to the previous email we were just

discussing, the VOCO for deployment of these forces was, at the

latest, at 8:39 p.m., did you have an understanding of what -- why

it took so long to -- first, did you consider it to be a length

of -- an unusual length of time to actually obtain these

diplomatic clearances, and then did you have an understanding of

why it took so long to obtain?

A That was actually very quick to get dip clearance,

particularly from a fairly disorganized, unstable government like

the Libyan Government at the time. We -- usually, when you ask

for a dip clearance -- there are countries who ask for 30-days

notice for things like this. Obviously, that wasn't going to

apply here.

So this took some kind of intervention on the part of the

U.S. official in country calling a fairly senior Libyan official,

I don't know who it was, saying, we got to get in here, and very

quickly getting an answer back, yes.

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We had a very good relationship at the time with the Libyan

Government, and we're trying to maintain that, which is why we're

asking in the first place. And they were very responsive.

Believe it or not, that's actually a fairly quick timeline to get

the clearance.

Q Again, you mention that that process would have been

handled by -- at least from your understanding, would have been

handled by potentially the defense attache that was posted in

Tripoli, or the DCM?

A Somebody -- some senior official in the country, DCM or

some embassy official or the -- possibly, the attache. But, you

know, somebody assigned to make that phone call in the middle of

the night to the Libyans saying, we need a dip clearance and we

need it fast. And they got it. They got it pretty quick.

Q Was anyone -- based on your experience, was any

individual in the State Department here in D.C. handle that

process, given that this was an extreme situation and time was of

the essence?

A It's possible that somebody from the State could have

been the one that made the call. But I would -- I would assume

that it was somebody in country who did.

Q So going to the first page of this email, about

approximately the middle of the page, there's a subsequent email

from you. This one's at 1:40 a.m., so about 21 minutes later.

And you write, "Aircrews are on the ramp at Ramstein. Two C-130s

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will move to Rota then Tripoli. One departs at 0600 Zulu, the

other at 0700 Zulu." And you then say, "We now have country

clearances for Spain and Libya."

What was your understanding of the need to obtain country

clearances for -- from countries other than Libya that night?

A For Spain, I don't recall whether you -- if you any

time you fly a military aircraft into Rota, you need a country

clearance. I believe that to be the case. It wasn't just for,

you know, pulling people out of Tripoli or whatever. You might

want to check that when you talk to other people from in theater

as to the Spanish requirements for dip clearance, but I think that

was probably routine. And I'm sure the Spanish were very, very

quick in responding as well.

Q And you talked earlier about if -- typically, the way

you would want to go about handling the process of obtaining dip

clearance, especially from Libya, given that they were a newer

government trying to get established, is that you approached them

as a request for approval?

A Right.

Q And subsequently, if, for whatever reasons they seem to

not want to approve or they didn't approve, then it became more of

a notification?

A Yeah.

Q Now, that same process would have applied to Spain in

requesting for approval for their military aircraft to come into

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Rota, Spain?

A We would have asked for approval, yes. We would have

expected a yes. These are allies of ours who are understanding

that we are in a crisis situation, and it would be extremely

unusual for them to deny that. So it's very hypothetical to ask,

what if they did deny it? Gosh, you know, that would have

caused -- that could cause the Secretary of State to call his

counterpart or her counterpart at the time.

Q I -- I don't want to -- for you to address a

hypothetical. I just want to understand kind of the expectation

that night for obtaining diplomatic clearance. It's not only from

Libya, but for other countries that may have been involved --

A It's really just a given. It's a matter of routine

that when we fly around the world, we get -- unless it's an

aircraft emergency, you get a diplomatic clearance when you go

into somebody's country. So, for instance, if you have an

aircraft carrier that is sailing around and you have an airplane

that can't land and needs to fly into Italy, we have a standing

agreement with them. But the airplane lands, and then we clean up

the paperwork later. If we were going to deliberately fly an

airplane in Italy, you get a dip clearance. And different

countries have different requirements for those clearances in

terms of timing. For instance, overflight of Egypt is -- has

been, in the past, very difficult. They've been good to us over

the last few years, but, again, it's a -- it's -- it depends on

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the country. But we always ask.

Mr. Tolar. Are you going to start something new?

Ms. Clarke. Yes, go ahead.

BY MR. TOLAR

Q Go back real quickly, sir -- with regard to the CIF,

you mentioned that the aircraft, it was your impression that those

guys, because they have been in the middle of the operation, they

have been working all week; they were on crew rest, do you recall

conversations about the aircraft possibly being down for

maintenance?

A I don't anything specific to that.

Q Particularly in Bagram?

A No, I don't remember any maintenance issues. I'm not

ruling that out, I just don't remember it.

Q Sure. And you mentioned earlier also that you

said -- I think you said DOD had no idea the Annex existed?

A The CIA Annex?

Q Yes, sir. In Benghazi.

A I'm not aware of anybody in DOD who did. It's possibly

that our -- our SOF operators in Tripoli knew.

Q Sure.

A But -- and I think we were in a timeframe when we

just -- we just weren't that good at understanding where all of

the little U.S. Government facilities are all around the world.

We sort of counted on the individual departments to look after

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their own, and we just had no idea there was a CIA facility. I

didn't.

Q Would you say the same thing with regard to the

compound or the SMC, the Special Mission Compound, same thing?

A I was not aware that there was a Special Mission

Compound in Benghazi. So I think, you know, one of the lessons

learned for us, coming out of that, was try to get better

visibility, at least at the COCOM level. And of course, the COCOM

knew that that facility was there in Benghazi, but I don't think

we knew in D.C.

Q The COCOM leadership wasn't aware?

A Yeah. So his representative on the ground, I guess,

who did this -- I don't even call it his representative, but the

special operators knew. But that was one of our lessons learned

from that night, is do a better job of understanding where all

these various facilities are.

Q And do you have, especially -- and I'm talking about

then, especially then when you talk about those high-threat

problem areas, did you all monitor at all the movement of

ambassadors in those areas of the country?

A No. That's -- it's not only almost an impossible task,

it's if somebody at State would resist. You know, they -- they

want their ambassadors to have unfettered freedom to move, and

it's just not something we did or do now. The ambassadors are

independent, free agents, President's representatives, and for

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them to feel like they have to report their every movement to DOD

would be something that they would resist.

Now, if they told us, would we absorb that information?

Sure. I don't know how much good it would do, because we're not

responsible for their security when they travel, but it would be

interesting to know.

Q Is that not something that, perhaps, the DATT would put

on a sitrep or something?

A Not that I'm aware of. (REDACTED)

Mr. Tolar. Okay.

BY MS. CLARK:

Q I wanted to ask you another question about the

USAFE -- your conversation with the USAFE commander. Did

you -- and you indicated that you proactively checked in with him

because you wanted to make sure that there were no issues, and

particularly, in your mind, with the issue with crew rest. During

your conversations, did he identify to you any issues that he was

seeing with actually getting these C-130s ready to go, to deploy

to Rota, Spain?

A No specific issues, other than he was starting from the

standing start. And he was -- he was -- you know, whipping the

ponies, as it were, to try to get a force that was not under an

alert into an alert-like posture and move them as quickly as

possible. And they were -- he was pulling out the stops to get

that done, including waiving the crew rest down, as I mentioned.

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But he didn't identify any maintenance issues or aircraft

availability issues or any -- any other problems that I recall

that were slowing him down.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q I know you didn't fly those, but what is your rough

estimate of how long it would take to go from middle of the night

cold start to wheels up?

A If I have to -- if I have to get countermeasures out of

a magazine --

Q Do C-130s always fly with countermeasures?

A No, only if they are going to go into a potential

threat area. And if they are going to fly into Tripoli, which,

you know, we weren't sure what was going on, I think USAFE felt

them needed to have countermeasures on that.

Q Do you know if all the aircraft had countermeasures?

A I don't know for certain, but I believe they did.

That's something that you can check with USAFE guys.

Q Thank you.

A So grabbing the countermeasures, getting the aircrews

up and briefed, possibly offloading an aircraft, getting the

rest -- I don't know if the airfield was open or not, Ramstein is

probably open 24 hours a day. I would say a minimum of -- of 2

hours, probably.

Q For all that?

A Now, if it were a Navy guy, probably would be 30

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minutes. But, you know -- I'm being cynical. I apologize. You

know, I think it's a harder challenge than people really realize,

that, you know, you are calling people at home; they've got to

drive into work; you have to assemble the crew; you have to brief

the crew, make sure the airplane is ready, it takes time to do

that.

Q And that's what we can't seem to reconcile here. It

looks like it would have taken 8, 10 hours to get a plane in the

air, kind of thing, and we just --

A I think it probably depends on when the start time was.

And I -- my sense is that USAFE, being sort of on the end of this

string, right, probably didn't really start this process until the

2053 East Coast time email from Kurt Tidd. That's probably when

they started this process.

Q Exactly. But giving them the benefit of the doubt that

they didn't start till then, it's still, they weren't even close

to 2 or 4 or 6 hours getting the planes in the air. I don't know

what happened on the ground.

A Nor do I. And that's a worthwhile question to ask.

Q God, what does that say about our ability in a crisis

situation?

A I think it speaks to the importance, again, of one of

the lessons learned from that night, that -- that we learned --

Q Sure.

A -- and employed, was synchronize your

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alert -- synchronize your airlift alerts to your response force

alerts.

Q Sure.

A That -- you know, then you have aircrafts that are

already sequestered on a ramp someplace that are prepped and ready

to go, if you have aircrews who are prepped and ready to go. We

learned that lesson.

And as I -- as I've mentioned on the side, we're paying a

price for that. It's -- it's costing USAFE 25 percent of their

training hours to maintain this alert posture. If we had more

resources, we could probably restore that, but we don't -- we

haven't.

Q Let me ask you this, just your opinion on this, but

given today's environment with budget constraints and everything

else, do you have an opinion whether or not those are good

resources, having the CIF have organic aircrafts, per se, that are

limiting USAFE's ability to fly planes out of the forces?

A Well, the -- as long as the threat of extremism exists,

and as long as we are at a new normal where we could have

facilities that would need to be reinforced or evacuated on short

notice, they could probably make sense.

Q Okay.

A Now -- so what happens when you lose 25 percent of your

training hours, you know, maybe you are not getting as many night

landings. So if you are going to have to go in the middle of the

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night and drop into an unfamiliar place like Tripoli, it's not as

safe as it used to be, because the pilot probably hasn't had a

night landing in, you know, a month or something like that. But

the alternative is not having a force that's as alert.

Q Sure. With regard to spinning up or mobilizing a C-17

versus C-130, is that a discernibly longer requirement or response

time?

A I -- I don't know. I would have to ask TRANSCOM, to be

honest with you.

Q And were you aware of the heavy -- the heavy lift unit

of Hungary, that coalition of nations that the U.S. is a part of,

where we have, I guess, 4 C-17s over there that we all share?

A Right.

Q Are you aware of that organization?

A Yep.

Q Did we consider utilizing or make a request to utilize

those assets that night that you know of?

A I'm not aware that we asked allies for any airlift

assistance that night. My sense is that if -- if we had thought

of it, we would have said, nice idea; I'm a little busy right now.

Q Right.

A We can react much faster than anybody else can.

Q Okay.

A There's nobody going to beat us to the punch on this,

in terms of having a C-17 or a C-130 ready in the middle of the

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night. I think they could have asked, but sincerely, I think that

we would beat anybody by a wide margin.

Q Who -- at what level -- who had the authority to

request the use of those assets? I mean, I guess they are

controlled by Navy technically, but how prior --

A Yeah, if they are controlled by NATO, that's a complex

question, because you've got to go through the NATO process, which

is a reason not to do it.

Q So the Secretary would have to do that, then?

A The Secretary would have to do it, and I would -- I

would want to consult with SACEUR on the exact process involved.

Obviously, SACEUR and EUCOM are the same person, but I don't know

what -- where the authority lies to use those assets on a short

notice. That would be an interesting question. But even -- even

if that were a very clean avenue, I don't think they could be as

responsive as our guys could be.

Q Thank you.

BY MS. CLARK:

Q In the exhibit we were just looking at --

A This is number 2 or 6?

Q 2. Number 2.

A Okay.

Q One -- the email that you sent at 1:18 a.m., one of the

assets that you discussed was -- I guess the last sentence you

say, "We're also working the issue of ground transport," and we

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talked about that. And then as well as the issue of how to and

whether we need to help recover the chief of missions -- the COMs,

and I presume that means the chief of missions, and the

communications officer's remains.

Do you recall when you learned or when you received

confirmation that the chief of mission had -- was actually

deceased and was no longer a potential hostage rescue situation,

but that he had actually deceased -- was deceased?

A When did I find that out? I don't recall the exact

time. Sorry. And I think what I'm referring to in that last

sentence is whether State wanted to charter something or use some

other type of mode to move them out of there, or whether they

wanted DOD assistance to move them out of there. That's the

whether-we-need-to piece.

Q Okay.

A There's no reluctance to help them. They ask for it,

we'll help them.

Q Okay. But you don't -- sitting here today, you don't

have a recollection of when you received formal confirmation that

the Ambassador was deceased?

A No. It was in the middle of the night sometime. I

just don't recall exactly what time.

Q Do you recall whether -- do you recall how you received

that confirmation?

A It would have had to have been by phone, a phone call.

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I don't think it was email.

Q Would that have been a phone call with someone from the

State Department or someone from the --

A Probably DDO.

Q DDO?

A And I don't -- obviously, I know at this point, which

you say was 1:19?

Q 1:19?

A So I don't know, it had to be before that, but I don't

know what time.

Q I think earlier you talked a little bit (REDACTED) that

came down from Tripoli. And in your discussion, it seemed -- you

seem to be recalling that you learned more specifics about kind of

the makeup of that team and the individuals that were asked to

stay in Tripoli versus the individuals that traveled to Benghazi.

And you indicated that you had that understanding, you thought,

perhaps, early the next morning? Is that correct?

A Yep.

Q Did you have an understanding -- putting aside the

specifics of who actually went to Benghazi, did you have an

understanding prior to that morning that someone from -- that the

particular team had gone to Benghazi? So over the night, did come

to know that they were -- that these DOD personnel were traveling

from Tripoli to Benghazi?

A Yes. (REDACTED) They are special operators. And I

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believe in the middle of the night that I did know that a couple

of them had traveled down to Benghazi. I can't tell you when that

happened or how I found out, but I think I knew that a couple of

them had gone down there. And I knew that four of them had

remained behind -- or I don't even know if I knew it was four, but

a number of them had remained behind with the intent of

reinforcing the embassy, because we didn't have anybody there, and

we were worried about the embassy.

Q And the individuals that were on the ground, were they

reporting back to the defense attache in Tripoli, or were they

reporting to any other -- to their command? Where were they

providing information about what they were learning that was

happening --

A The folks in Benghazi?

Q Yes.

A My recollection is they were providing information back

to Tripoli, but I don't recall for sure. And

COM -- communications for them, I think, were quite a challenge.

It was all cell phones or what have you. But you would want to

check with them, but my recollection was they were talking to

Tripoli.

Q I have just some follow-up questions, I think, and so

we may jump around a little bit.

A Sure.

Q So earlier in our discussion, we talked about some of

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the assets that were identified to deploy. Do you recall whether

there was a discussion about deploying the FEST, the foreign

emergency support team?

A No, I don't recall any discussion of the FEST. And I'm

not -- I'm not really all that familiar with the FEST, to be

honest with you. I was pretty focused on the DOD piece.

Q I think you also mentioned earlier that it was your

understanding that the CIF was located maybe not directly with its

aircraft, but that the aircraft was in the region because they

were --

A Training together.

Q -- training. And then you thought that there may have

been an issue with crew rest, and because they have just completed

a training mission that was part of the reason why they may not

have deployed on -- I would just say on time is that because of

crew rest. Did you have a conversation with someone regarding

that issue, or how did you come to have that knowledge about the

CIF team being on crew rest?

A I think it was a subsequent, long after the event, I

recall that they had been put in crew rest. It wasn't -- I wasn't

aware of that that night.

Q Okay.

A It was after the event. And I -- I don't know what

their flying schedule was the day of, but my sense is that they

put them into crew rest because they were used up already.

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Q And, typically, if -- so the Secretary of Defense has

ordered this particular asset to deploy to a saving base, if they

were in need of a crew rest, would that particular FAST team be

reported back to the joint staff or the Secretary of Defense to

say, essentially, sir, we understand your order, our team had just

finished an exercise, and they need to go on to crew rest? How

does that information get related back to the --

Mr. Tolar. Let me add on to that before you respond, sir.

Coupled with the fact that the guys on the ground had been in a

week-long exercise, 24/7, the team leader's testimony was they

slept a couple of hours the entire week. They had just gotten

back, 1:00 in the morning, at 1:15, he gets the phone call.

Admiral Winnefeld. Yeah, okay. So two different questions.

How does that information get back is I don't know that the

details of the why would come with the information. It would be

more like, we're going to be able to move at X time. And,

theoretically, somebody in the Pentagon can go, well, gee,

that's -- that's a delay. You know, why the delay? And then they

would get the answer back, crew rest. So I don't know how

that -- I don't know how that played out. I was not actually

aware over the course of the night. The CIF was -- we were

getting more information on the FAST deployment, frankly, than we

were on the CIF deployment.

So the very good -- very good question you asked on -- on the

ground piece, I don't know that there are any institutional rules

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in place for special operators, for even Marines on -- on, you

know, how much sleep you have to have before you go into action.

The Air Force has a lot of rules on crew rest, and those rules are

used by special operations Air Forces as well, even though they

weren't in the same chain of command that night; they were in a

different chain of command, they still have the same Air Force

institutional rules, which they chose to apply. And I don't

know -- again, there was a very good question asked earlier, and I

don't have the answer to it, was, who has the waiver authority

inside that special operations aircrew pipeline. I don't know how

high that has to go in their world. I do know the USAFE commander

had that authority and used it.

But, again, he had a deep pool of -- you know, of C-130 folks

to call upon, so they could get somebody who was reasonably well

rested rather than somebody they knew had already flown that

right, which the SOF guys were faced with. So it's an

institutional -- that they are dealing with?

BY MR. TOLAR

Q Talking about the Air Force as an institution, somebody

talked to us that the Air Force in the way they operated,

irrespective of the N-systems service program, that they kind of

were very rigid in how they operated. They basically had milk-run

schedules, and they kind of adhered to that. And when it came to

responding to urgent requests, things of that nature, they weren't

as flexible as maybe they could have been. Do you have an

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impression or thoughts about that, how it operated at the time,

and whether or not that had changed at all since the new normal?

A I -- you know, it's easy for me as a Navy guy to be

critical of my Air Force brothers and sisters. They -- when

crunch time comes, they usually rise to the occasion. And I would

say, again, that the evidence for that, for me is Phil Breedlove

in the middle of the night saying, the heck with crew rest; we've

got something we got to do here; let's get moving. Now, I don't

know all the reasons why it took longer than we might have

expected, but my understanding is that the crew rest was not

a -- was not one of those reasons, which I was delighted to see,

frankly, because that's why I was worried was going to be the

reason when I called him in the middle night. But I -- they've

been pretty -- pretty flexible. They do have processes. They've

got more processes than any service that I know, the ATO process

and all that, but it served us well as a military force. They are

extremely well-organized, and very -- they run like a well-oiled

machine businesswise, and I think, again, when crunch time comes,

they've been pretty responsive.

BY MS. CLARK:

Q With the crew rest waiver, is that something that's

documented? So he waives the crew rest, but does that also -- is

that also captured in some type of documentation by the USAFE

commander?

A It would probably in their command center's log that

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they keep that he had done that. I don't think you had to sign a

letter.

Q Right.

A But his direction would be recorded by somebody.

That's my sense.

BY MR. TOLAR

Q Would you talk a little bit about the SVTCS versus the

U issue. Were you tracking it that night?

A I was not. And I don't recall, anyway, tracking it.

If it was an issue, I think it was an irritant. I don't think it

held anything up. I don't think it delayed anybody. It could've,

but I don't recall that it did.

Q Let me share with you what I think we know. The FAST

plane is on the ground; they are loaded. It's approximately 1300,

and basically, for the next 3 hours, the FAST team commander,

captain -- is getting guidance, take off utilities, put in your

SVTCS, and then it changes again, and they go back again, and they

go back to using SVTCS.

There was also -- I think that's our understanding of -- that

there was a delay associated with it. Who would have been -- in

the DOD chain of command, where did that stop in terms of making

this guy flip and flop? Who would make that call?

A Well, it could go all the way to the Secretary if it

got really, really contentious. And maybe I'm having a 3-1/2-year

senior moment. I don't remember that it came up that high, but it

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could. The -- obviously, the contention would be between the

mission inside Libya, the chief of -- deputy chief of mission, in

this case, charge at that point, and either the AFRICOM commander

or, you know, somebody like that. They may have been arguing over

this -- over this SVTCS versus uniform piece. And that could make

its way back to the Pentagon. I just don't remember. I'm drawing

a blank there. We've had that situation in the past, I just don't

recall it lined up with this particular event.

Q At the same time, apparently, there were ALSO questions

about whether or not they would be allowed to take their personal

weapons with them on the plane and carry it in. Do you recall any

discussions or issues associated with that?

A I don't recall that at all. I mean, if it's a FAST

platoon; they've got to carry weapons. I don't understand why you

would send a FAST platoon into Tripoli without weapons.

Q Based on the commander's testimony, it sounded like

they probably wanted to box them up like we might do if you're

deploying overseas, you might box all your weapons up and unload

them when you get there. He wasn't willing to do that. The FAST

commander was pushing back on that. But apparently, that was also

contributing to that 3-hour delay of getting off the ground,

including that and uniforms.

A Yeah. And the only thing I can think of that could

have been a problem there is that the chief of missions was

thinking that having Marines carry weapons on the way from the

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airport to the embassy visibly might have been unnerving to the

Libyans. I would imagine the Marines pushing back pretty hard on

that, and we would support them in that -- in that pushback.

Q All right. Given the environment that we're going

into, did the -- is there a discussion about rules of engagement

for the FAST team going into Libya versus the CIF? Just talk

briefly about that, the ROE and how it applied to each one of

those units.

A They carried standing ROE with them, and when the FAST

platoons go and defend an embassy, for example, they've got a

pretty well-laid out set of ROE.

Q Okay. Irrespective of where they are, for all intents

and purposes?

A Right. And so if they were to need something on an

ROE, they could ask for that, and it could be put out as part of a

deployment or execute on it. I don't recall anybody asking for

a -- of control agents or that sort of thing. I can tell you that

if they had asked for it, the Secretary would have said yes,

knowing Secretary Panetta. I don't want to speak for him, but

that would have been a no-brainer. But I don't recall anybody

asking for something on an ROE that night.

Q How about for CIF?

A I don't recall any request or something from ROE from

anybody.

Q Did they have similar type of standard ROE doctrine

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that they followed, irrespective of --

A Standing CJS ROE.

Q Sure. Do you recall late 2011, early 2012, the State

Department requesting FAST team support for Yemen and for Tripoli?

A I recall -- you said early 2012?

Q Yes, sir. Late -- it could have been late '11 or early

2012. I apologize. I don't have the date. Basically, the State

Department says, we would like the FAST team in Yemen; we would

like one in Tripoli. Do you recall that?

A I remember, yes, we sent 50-some folks to Yemen, and

I'm a little hazier on Tripoli, but we had Marines in Tripoli as

well.

Q I think what we've learned here is that the Yemen

Marines were approved, but the Tripoli ones were not.

A By the Secretary?

Q That's the question. Who -- who had the

authority -- if the Secretary of State requests FAST teams

for -- who has -- who approves that in the DOD chain?

A It would be the Secretary.

Q So Secretary Panetta would have approved that?

A He would approve it. And if there were disapproval,

now you have an interagency disagreement that would rise to the

level of deputies, principals, potentially the President. So -- I

don't recall that kind of disagreement being a -- you know,

normally when the Secretary asks for a FAST team, it's like yeah,

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let's go. So I don't recall that denial.

Q If that happened, clearly, you would have to go to the

White House for resolution? Is that your --

A Yes.

Q -- your experience?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Almost done. A couple more.

It's fair to say it's not uncommon for DOD personnel to

operate in countries without SOFA agreements in place, status of

forces agreements in place? That's not uncommon, is it?

A It's not uncommon, but we don't like to do it.

Q Obviously, as we got into August, September of 2012,

Secretary Ham and Ambassador Stevens were discussing about the

status of the SST personnel and their future?

A Right.

Q They had been working under title 50 under the chief of

mission, and there were discussions about moving them to Title 10.

Given the fact that we have operated in places with an SOF

agreement and General Ham wanted to keep his folks there under

Title 10. Yet, it looks like the Ambassador wanted him to send

them back to SACEUR to lay low until, perhaps, things changed or

whatever. Did he seek guidance from the Secretary, or would he

with that regard? I mean, he wanted them there, but he ended up

letting them go home, because the Ambassador encouraged him to do

so?

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A Well, if the Ambassador does not want them in the

country, then we're probably not going to keep them in the

country.

Q Okay.

A And I -- my recollection is that General Ham, you know,

fairly repeatedly recommended to Ambassador Stevens that -- that

we leave forces there. And I think he wanted to do that for two

reasons. I think, one, he was worried about security. And the

other is that he wanted to be able to stay engaged, because the

special operators who were there helping to protect the mission

were also engaging with -- with Libyan forces and Carter wanted to

continue to do that.

And Ambassador really wanted to wean himself off of DOD

support and get that profile back down. I think he also wanted to

get -- create a little more room inside the embassy compound and,

ultimately, said no, I really want these guys to move, and we said

okay.

Q Did you have direct discussions with General Ham

regarding that?

A I did not. I know that he and Marty talked about it,

and I was probably on the edge of one or two of those

conversations, but I was not directly engaged with Carter on that.

Ms. Clarke. Just for the record, Marty is?

Admiral Winnefeld. General Dempsey. I'm sorry.

BY MR. TOLAR

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Q In terms of medevac aircraft, are they prioritized

differently to the best of your knowledge?

A In terms -- prioritize vis-à-vis?

Q In how they are utilized and dispersed or assigned

missions?

A Prioritized compared -- you mean among the combatant

commanders?

Q Yes, sir.

A Each theater has its own medevac in place, I believe.

Q Okay.

A So they are medevac'd at Ramstein.

Q I apologize, I thought they were actually helping to

support the other operations over in CENTCOM?

A Oh, they are. The Air Force medevac community, as it

were, is fluid, but there are assets dispersed around the

different COCOMs. As you know, with Landstuhl right there in

Ramstein, there's constant flow of medevac assets coming through

Ramstein.

Q Yes, sir. July of 2014, we had reached -- we had since

returned to Tripoli in the embassy there, and the Ambassador is in

place. And in July of 2014, we had to get her out -- or get

everybody out, do an evacuation. Do you recall that?

A I do.

Q We're trying to remember the name of that operation.

A I don't remember the code name.

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Q Lotus something. That was a very complex operation.

There was a lot of moving parts. Do you recall when the planning

started for that operation? Because, I mean, clearly, this wasn't

something that was generated within a week's time or something

like that.

A Well, it was probably a phased process, where the

embassy would have an emergency action plan developed all along.

There were a lot of discussions regarding the potential for the

evacuation of that embassy. It wasn't -- you know, we didn't snap

our fingers and suddenly evacuated. We talked about it for a long

time. And there were a number of courses of action that were

produced for how we would do it. (REDACTED)

And ultimately, if I remember correctly, it was deemed most

prudent to convoy them out through to Tunisia, and so this was

sort of the middle of the night. (REDACTED)

Q You did.

A And it was a successful evacuation. But there was a

pretty deliberate planning process, and a discussion process in

the interagency over the different courses of action that we would

potentially use, and, in fact, when we would actually do it.

Because no ambassador wants to evacuate, close an embassy. And

the challenge for us is pushing them to not allow that feeling to

cause them to wait too long.

Q Do you recall what other sources of action were

considered?

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A There may have been a maritime one, (REDACTED)

Q Do you recall why?

A I think it was the Ambassador's call. The Ambassador

preferred -- she felt that she had enough coordination on the

ground that she just felt more comfortable with a convoy route,

lower profile, less military, high-level presence in Libya, and

just kind of sneak out in a convoy.

Q Does -- does she have trumps on that decision?

A She has -- you know, obviously, the President has, you

know, 100 percent of the vote on that. But if the Ambassador

comes in and says, look, this is my country. I know my country.

I've liaisoned with everybody. I feel strongly that this is the

way we should do this, then that carries an awful lot of weight in

the interagency process. We're not going to try to force her to

do something that she doesn't believe in. If we vehemently

disagree and say, this really isn't safe for you to do that, we

will make our point in the interagency context, and then we'll

come to a decision.

Q Do you recall -- was the maritime evacuation a

preferred course of action?

A From the DOD?

Q Sure.

A I think we were actually okay with the convoy. I

don't -- I don't remember precisely how we rank ordered them.

Q Sure.

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A (REDACTED)

Q And do you recall if -- if DOD had any conversations

with the Ambassador encouraging her to leave sooner than later,

and if so, who would have had those conversations?

A It would be probably General Ham who would have a

conversation with her. And, as I recall, General Ham and the

Ambassador had a very good relationship.

Q I apologize. I think General Rodriguez was in place at

that time.

A Good point. They had a very good relationship.

Q Sure.

A And a lot of that discussion would take place at the

deputies' level.

Q Sure.

A And we did have a number of deputies committee meetings

and lead up to that where we debated. And when I say "debate," it

wasn't a contentious debate. We discussed all the intelligence

information that would suggest an evacuation was appropriate. As

you remember, there are different -- different Libyan militias

that are maneuvering around each other, (REDACTED) All of that

was swirling around. And the whole point we were -- we were

making, as DOD was, don't wait too long for this to happen.

Because, again, as I stressed earlier, it's really hard for us to

rescue you and sit you. Let's either reinforce or get out of

there preemptively.

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Q And I guess -- I guess that's -- I'm trying to wrap my

brain around. It sounds like the convoy over land evacuation was

a movement of some 100 or so vehicles?

A I don't know if it was 100, but it was a lot. It was a

lot of good numbers.

Q There's RPVs; there's -- There's -- they brought in

crisis response team; they had to go sit and wait by the phone

until they got -- so they were tied up, and you have fast movers,

a lot of moving parts and a lot of bodies and a lot of people,

whereas -- or you can just go two clicks to get on that boat right

there and you're out.

A Right. I honestly don't know all of the exact reasons

why we picked that convoy. It's what the Ambassador wanted to do.

I don't know if it had to do with, I don't want to lose 100

vehicles. She was confident, though, that the route west was

safe, you know, that that was friendly territory.

Q Sure.

A That they weren't going to give them a hard time. In

fact, they whipped through there. They had to stop for gas once,

I think. And so we -- we -- unless we feel very, very strongly

that the chief of mission is -- is choosing a faulty course, we

will try to support that person if we can.

Mr. Tolar. I'm okay for now.

Ms. Clarke. Actually, I think that's the end of our hour.

So we can go off the record.

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Thank you, sir.

[Discussion off the record.]

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[2:54 p.m.]

Ms. Rauch. My colleague is just going to follow up with what

we were discussing in our last hour and just finish up with that

line of questioning.

Admiral Winnefeld. Sure.

Ms. Rauch. And then I'll move into some other things that

are essentially followup on some of the things you've been

saying --

Admiral Winnefeld. Sure.

Ms. Rauch. -- and then we'll try and wrap it up.

Admiral Winnefeld. Okay.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Admiral, thank you, again, for your patience here

today. I'd just like to ask a few followup questions on some of

the discussions we were having earlier. We had an extended

discussion about seeking, obtaining the Libyan host country

clearance in order to bring outside U.S. military forces into the

country. And just so that we don't misunderstand your statements

here today, you had earlier indicated or referenced U.S.

Government's relationship with the Libyans, which was nascent. At

that point it was a transitional government. They just recently

held elections. And just so we better understand you, I don't

want to come away from this incorrectly thinking, if it is indeed

incorrect, that somehow the U.S. Government was valuing its

relationship with the Libyan Government over American lives on the

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ground in Libya that night.

A Of course not. We asked them for permission for

country clearance, what have you, because we do that everywhere.

If they had said "no" -- again, that's a big hypothetical, because

we fully expected them to say "yes," and they did say

"yes" -- then I'm sure that we would -- with U.S. lives at stake,

we would take whatever action we felt necessary to protect those

lives.

Q Okay. Thank you. That's helpful.

And with specific reference to the FAST team, you understand

the FAST team was the only team for which that country clearance

was sought.

A Right. Uh-huh.

Q It's our -- it sounds like, if I'm understanding

correctly, that didn't slow down, when I say "that," that seeking

the Libyan nation's approval, did not slow down the deployment of

the FAST team in a way that cost American lives on the night of

these attacks?

A I'm not aware of it causing any delay at all. We

got -- as far as I remember, we got the country clearance in time

that it didn't cause anybody to have to sit on a ramp anywhere or

anything like that.

Q Okay. Thank you. That's helpful.

And this is perhaps a bit of a related discussion, but there

was a question in the last hour, and you had offered your

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assessment on the difference between PTDO, prepare-to-deploy

order, as well as what we viewed in exhibit 6, which was directive

authorization to move now.

And what I'd like to ask for your assessment, we've heard

from other witnesses who, understanding that there may be a formal

distinction within the Department, within the bureaucracy, but

we've heard from other witnesses that they viewed those two things

on the night of the attacks as essentially equivalent; in other

words, because these assets had notification times and required a

certain amount of time to spin up and to generate, that it

took -- that their response on the ground was essentially the same

had they received a prepare-to-deploy order versus an actual

departure order.

A That's correct.

Q So do you agree with that you assessment, sir, that --

A Yeah.

Q -- that the time to consummate the prepare-to-deploy

fit inside the window of the actual deployment order. So there

was no additional time spent waiting for the PTDO to turn into a

deploy order, that the deployment order occurred well within that

window? So if I understand you correctly, if the forces on the

ground, when they receive the prepare-to-deploy order, they --

A They act as though they're deploying.

Q -- they would immediately begin --

A Right.

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Q -- preparing to deploy?

A Exactly.

Q And it would be the same if they had received an actual

departure order?

A Yep. And, as it turns out, they didn't get the

departure order for Benghazi, but they got the departure order for

the rest.

Q And I think part of the confusion over that point that

we've had, and I've seen this, unfortunately, in a couple

different interviews dating back, our understanding is that the

events on the ground developed, they changed over time, as did the

Department's understanding of what was occurring, and that

initially there was not a complete picture of what was actually

unfolding in Benghazi. That developed over the course of the

night.

I wonder if you could help explain for us just in a general

picture, stepping back, over the course of that night, your

understanding of how that mission set changed, and we discussed

how Benghazi and the different response forces that were

considered were specific to the Benghazi response, how and why

that changed as the course of the night unfolded and perhaps more

information was becoming available to you?

A Yeah. In terms of the mission changing, when the first

attack had happened -- and, again, we had work to do, we needed to

get people out of there, we needed to consider the possibility of

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a hostage rescue and all that sort of stuff, but another big

priority was what's going region wide, and so the mission was

always about those things all night long.

Once we actually got the people back to Tripoli, then the

Benghazi piece is -- that's done, other than the possibility of

finding the perpetrators, which is a more longer term deal. So

that's the only other change that would happen over the course of

the night is once we knew the Ambassador had passed away and that

we knew where his remains were, the mission changed from a

potential hostage rescue that night of him to recovering people,

recovering remains, reinforcing the Embassy, you know, which was

part of the mission all along. I hope that's helpful.

Q Uh-huh.

A And then – (REDACTED) We were still worried about what

was potentially going to happen in the rest of the region. We

could have stopped them at that point.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q And just to be clear, right, if the individuals had not

been able to evacuate from Benghazi, which they obviously were,

were the FAST teams being prepared to deploy such that if you

found that they were stuck in Benghazi and that was the best

available asset that you had, that the intention would have been

to send a FAST team to Benghazi?

A If that were the best available asset. If I were to

speculate on what -- you know, again, this is all hypothetical,

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because it didn't work out that way, but my recommendation

probably would have been to send the CIF to Benghazi to pull them

out, not the FAST team.

Q If the CIF had been ready and available that night?

A Right. And the CIF wasn't that far behind. I don't

have the exact timeline in front of me when they all arrived in

their locations, but the CIF is just -- again, the FAST team is a

great bunch of guys, but they're a reinforcing, not a maneuver

force, and the CIF is more of a maneuver -- it's very light -- but

a maneuver force. That's who I would have picked.

Q Got it. But if the FAST team was available and the CIF

was delayed behind the FAST team --

A Sure. You could do that, but you got to make sure that

the FAST team would have ground transportation to get from the

airfield in Benghazi to the facility where our people were being

holed up, which I think that could have happened. The local

militias could have helped with that, but in the event, it wasn't

required. But we could have done that, yes.

Q Is it fair to say that the commanders on the ground

would have been prepared for all contingencies?

A They were preparing as best they could for all

contingencies, yes.

Q I'm sorry. Yes. So just to clarify, by that, you're

talking with General Ham on the ground?

A General Ham wasn't -- he was back here, but I

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would -- I would say the SOCAF and the commander of the FAST

platoon and the like were energetically working and AFRICOM

headquarters in Stuttgart was energetically working to, you know,

what-if this thing. And I think events happened quickly enough

that, you know, we discovered the Ambassador had actually passed

away, (REDACTED) We discovered that they were actually going to

be flying back, and that was going to happen. So those events

were unfolding fairly quickly, so all of those contingencies

didn't end up being necessary.

BY MS. RAUCH:

Q So going back to exhibit No. 2, which is the email we

talked a lot about, it's the email chain --

A Okay.

Q -- that you're on, the "Quick level set before we head

into tomorrow AM SVTC". And if you -- noting on the first page,

the last timestamp of the email chain that you're actually on

is -- was 1:44 a.m. eastern daylight time. Are you seeing that?

A Uh-huh.

Q Which would have been 7:44 a.m. Eastern European time,

which is Benghazi time. And as my colleague noted earlier, by

this time, we know that all U.S. personnel had been evacuated to

the Benghazi airport, and according to the DOD timeline, which was

exhibit 1, the -- I'm sorry, it was exhibit -- I think it's

exhibit 4, but I'd have to confirm that.

Ms. Green. That's right.

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Ms. Rauch. Is that correct? Thank you.

BY MS. RAUCH:

Q According to the DOD timeline, the first evacuation

plane was headed to Tripoli. Okay. So, from this document, this

email chain that you're on, it appears to me that you were fully

engaged throughout the attacks. Is that a correct statement?

A I was fully engaged once I got out of my dinner.

Q Okay.

A I didn't sleep much that night. I was staying in

touch, monitoring as best I could what was going on. That

includes spending a lot of time sitting in my chair waiting for a

report to come in, but, yeah, I was engaged.

Q Were you -- so you were up throughout the night or --

A Yeah.

Q Okay.

A I mean, I may have gotten 30 minutes at some point in

there, but I was pretty much sleepless that night.

Q Okay. Very good. And it also appears to me that

several high-ranking members of the interagency, which you noted

in previous testimony today, you clarified some of who they were,

along with White House officials were fully engaged on that night

as well. In fact, that's who you were probably going back and

forth with. Is that correct?

A Yes. And if they're on SIPRNet, that means they're at

work, you know. So, yeah, they're --

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Q (REDACTED)

A (REDACTED)

Q So you were nearly fully operational as you could be --

A I was probably more operational there than I would was

at work.

Q Okay. Very good. So I would like to draw your

attention to, let's see, it's page 3 of this email. And if you

look at the second full paragraph down, it notes that Secretary

Clinton has reached out -- or has sent out a notice to each of the

missions around the world. Is that correct? Do you see that?

A Yep, I see it.

Q Okay. And then, next, it says that John Allen, who at

the time was the four-star ISAF Commander, and that's

International Security Assistance Force, for the record,

Commander, and he was at a heightened alert in Afghanistan. Is

that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Okay. And directing your attention to the third

and final paragraph on this page -- or sorry, the fourth paragraph

on this page, it reads, quote: And on getting the videos in

question taken down, I reached out to YouTube and asked them to

take down two videos.

A Okay.

Q One that was not developed by Pastor Jones, but which

he is promoting, and another of him burning the prophet in effigy

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that he did -- I'm sorry -- that he did film.

Secretary Panetta also reached out to Pastor Jones to ask him

to pull down his video, noting that even if YouTube takes the

video down, Pastor Jones can put it up somewhere else.

And that is the original email that started this, which was

at the time Deputy National Security Advisor Denis McDonough, that

was written by Mr. McDonough. So I just want to confirm, once

again, to say that it's a -- was a -- would it be correct to say

that the YouTube video was a very real concern on the night of the

attacks?

A Yes.

Ms. Rauch. I'd like to hand you what I'm marking as

exhibit --

Admiral Winnefeld. I mean, on the night of the attacks, it

was obviously a concern here. And as I think I alluded to

earlier, we were particularly worried about -- on the DOD

side -- about Afghanistan, because we'd had issues there in the

past with pastors burning Korans and even soldiers inadvertently

putting Korans in burn pits that had been confiscated from

prisoners and that. So it was more volatile in Afghanistan, and

we had more troops at risk in Afghanistan, so that's why you see

John Allen popping up in there.

Ms. Rauch. So I'm going to hand you exhibit -- I'm going to

get you exhibit 7, which is going to address what you just brought

up, actually.

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[Winnefeld Exhibit No. 7

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. RAUCH:

Q And so this is an article that was published by Al

Jazeera, the Qatar-based news outlet. It's dated 15 September

2012, and the first few paragraphs read, quote: "The Taliban have

claimed responsibility for a deadly attack on the military post in

southern Afghanistan where Britain's Prince Harry is based.

Friday's attack at Camp Bastion in Helmand Province left two U.S.

soldiers dead and some others wounded, U.S. officials said."

It goes on to read, quote: "The Taliban said it was in

response to the anti-Islamic video that has sparked a wave of

ongoing protests. Al Jazeera's Afghanistan corespondent Bernard

Smith reported from Kabul. Camp Bastion is a British airbase and

is adjacent to Camp Leatherneck, the main base for the U.S. Marine

Corps in Helmand. A defense official in Washington said that the

two dead were U.S. marines, speaking on condition of anonymity,

while other U.S. official described the attack as complex, meaning

it was a coordinated strike using several weapons."

And I'm sure you recall this attack.

A Yes. I'm sorry. Yes, I do.

Q And 11 people were killed, including two U.S. marines,

six AV-8B Harrier jets were destroyed, and the total damage was

estimated at more than $200 million. The Marine Corps Times call

it worst loss of aircraft in a single day since the Vietnam era.

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So I just point this out because it seems that the

anti-Islamic film was a very real concern for the military.

A Yes, it was, particularly in Afghanistan.

Q And you were noting this earlier, you were concerned

that you have mentioned the Koran burning, and as I recall,

several people died in that as well, not Americans, but --

A Right.

Q -- several Afghanis died after rioting and protests

after that.

I just want to follow up, we were talking earlier about

the -- my colleagues were talking about the defense attache on the

ground in Libya on the night of the attacks. He did testify -- he

testified before Congress on the issue of the attacks in Benghazi

that the Libyan Government had approved the flights and that he

had communicated that fact to the deputy chief of mission in

Tripoli. And he said, quote: We had a green light from the

government of Libya to bring it in. It was just a question of

when we were going to know the specific information that goes into

a standard flight clearance request.

And in his testimony before SASC on February 7th, 2013,

General Dempsey stated that, even if the U.S. had not received a

country clearance, he would have acted. And he said, quote: I

want to assure you that had we been able to -- there's a whole

bunch of speculation about we were risk-adverse; we needed the

country's permission to come in. If we had been able to get there

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with anything, we'd have gone in there under the command of the

commanders -- of the Commander of the U.S. Africa Command.

And you've already addressed this, but I just want to clarify

again. Does the statement from General Dempsey depict the

sentiment of the Department of Defense on the night of the

attacks?

A Yes.

Q Everyone was determined?

A Absolutely. And, again, just to reiterate, we asked

permission pro forma to keep our good relations with the Libyans,

but we wouldn't hesitate to fly in there without permission if it

came down to saving American lives.

Q Okay. And I apologize for asking you to repeat

yourself yet again, but I just want that clarified. It's become

very important.

A Sure.

Q And then all of these questions and theories over the

years that there were more resources that weren't sent to Benghazi

on the night of the attacks seem to imply that you and other

officials within the military or the interagency had resources at

your disposal that you chose not to send. Was that correct or

true at all?

A I don't know of any resources that we had at our

disposal that we chose not to send other than the close-air

support, which we felt was not viable.

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Q Okay. And we've discussed that twice already today.

A Right.

Q My colleagues in the last hour brought up, they

mentioned the SST, and you spoke about it. Just a quick question

regarding that. Although the State Department did not request a

third extension of the SST beyond August 2012 --

A Right.

Q -- did anyone at Embassy Tripoli ever contact you to

indicate they did not support the withdrawal of the SST at that

time for security reasons?

A No, I was not contacted by anybody.

Q We're almost done, sir, I promise. And we're just

trying to be judicious here, that's why we're taking the time to

converse. My colleague had a couple of followup questions, and I

want to give him that opportunity.

A Sure.

Q And then I want to just go through the CIF timeline

with you, and then I think we'll be wrapped up.

A Okay. Sure.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And, again, sir, thank you. In the last -- or in an

earlier round today, I believe I had written in my notes that you

had said at one point in response to a question from the chairman

that you viewed that the Libyan central government was incapable

of responding to the attacks. And I'd just like to ask, you know,

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with the benefit of hindsight, it's obviously easy for us to make

similar assessments, although at times you had also acknowledged,

for instance, that the Libyans had arranged for a C-130 to help

with the evacuation of Americans that were based in Benghazi at

the time.

My question to you on this point, sir, is, would it have been

unreasonable for Embassy officers at Embassy Tripoli or anyone in

the Department of State, to include the Secretary, on the night of

the attacks to have asked the Libyan government for emergency

support in Benghazi?

A They could have asked the Libyan Government for

support. I don't know if they did or not. If they had, I think

the Libyan Government response would be: We don't have a lot of

control on the ground in Benghazi, but we'll do what we can.

I don't -- but I don't know if that request was ever made. I

just don't. It could have been.

Q Okay. And, today, you've been asked a lot of questions

about the location and the movements of specific assets, specific

airframes. Of course, we're now nearly 3-1/2 years removed from

the events in question. If the committee were to have specific

questions about specific airframes, specific assets, and where and

when those particular assets move, where would be the best place

to look? For instance, would the Department of Defense force

laydown be a good place or one of the better places to look for

that information?

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A I think there are three places you could probably look,

and I'll probably not be making many friends when I say this, but

Transportation Command for the assets that they had that might

have been flowing through theater; U.S. Air Forces Europe, USAFE,

for the assets that they had in theater; and then SACEUR for the

assets that they controlled in theater.

And I think it would be important to understand not only

where airplanes were, but whether those airplanes were healthy or

not, because airplanes are -- you know, there's a

full-mission-capable array, a mission-capable array, that sort of

thing, to make sure that we just don't count assets, that we count

flyable assets as well. Those are the three areas I would pursue.

Q And to the extent that crew rest has been discussed as

one possible reason why -- to the extent that that had been

discussed, you'd indicated that there are a series of regulations

particular within the Air Force that govern crew rest. And just

to the best of your ability, can you explain for us why those

regulations exist with respect to crew rest?

A Yeah. The regulations for crew rest exist so that we

don't have tired, exhausted air crews flying complex machinery

when they're tired. The accident rates increase as you get less

sleep, and I think there are probably almost actuarial statistics

that show that within various safety centers within the Army,

Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps. And based on those statistics,

judgment, what have you, they've established a number of crew rest

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rules over the years that govern the requirements for pilots who

are flying in airplanes. Airlines have the same thing. And

believe it or not, the Navy's actually adopted a lot of that for

its crew. When I was a young Navy pilot, there were no crew rest

rules for me. I could -- you know, I was tasked to do whatever I

wanted to do. And if we were in a high-tempo environment, it was,

whoever has been in bed the longest, wake them up and put them in

the air. Nowadays, we actually have stronger rules than that.

Q Is it fair to say, then, that those regulations, crew

rest regulations, are designed not only to protect the safety of

the pilot and copilot, the air crew, but the passengers as well?

A And the plane, yes. All of those, all of the above.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q I know sometimes some folks over here hear the word

"regulation" and then we think that it's not a necessary or

important thing, right, that we, or some, worry that it's just

sort of a check-the-box requirement that isn't important. Can you

just sort of speak to that for us? For example, if a commander in

the field says that his team still needs the crew rest even in an

emergency, would that likely be an actual, like, real thing, or

are we just talking about sort of --

A These are rules that are written in blood. People have

crashed airplanes because they were tired. And so we tend to take

them very, very seriously, but we will always leave a waiver

loophole in there for an in-extremis situation, which is what Phil

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Breedlove used. I think he was confident that he had a big enough

pool of C-130 pilots; he could probably grab some people who

were -- who, even though they weren't formally placed in what they

call crew rest, they had probably been in bed for a while and were

probably safe to fly.

And I also believe that air crews who are accustomed to

having -- who live under crew rest rules are particularly alert

when they're waived, that they have to be extra careful, extra

prudent, more deliberate in how they, you know, do checklists and

things like that.

And, again, I don't know where the crew rest waiver was on

the SACEUR side, but those rules are written in blood.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q On the crew rest piece, you've indicated that you had

found out that information at some point later than the events in

question.

A The SACEUR one?

Q The SACEUR for the CIF. Do you recall hearing on the

night of the requests -- or on the night of the attacks that a

request was made to waive the crew rest regulations for that

particular team, that that had been elevated within the Department

and had not been approved?

A No. I was not aware of any request by anybody to waive

that for the CIF. My recollection subsequent was that the SACEUR

Commander had put them in crew rest. I don't know what his

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decision calculus was, whether he was thinking, "I can put these

people in some crew rest and they'll still make – (REDACTED)

timeline plays out, and they're on the ground," and that was his

thinking, or whether he just said, "Look, I got some really tired

air crews here, and I'm not going to -- you know, they're not

going to be safe flying in the middle of the night after they've

already been flying." I don't know what his calculus was.

Q Okay. But when you say your understanding is that he

put them into crew rest, that was at some point prior to the

attacks?

A No, no. No. It was -- there's a -- crew rest is sort

of a formal term. They could have been done with their flights

and, you know, gone home or to their -- wherever they were

staying, but the crew rest term is, okay, as of now, here's

the -- the clock has started, and you can't do anything until you

actually show up for your brief for X number of hours, even if you

had been sleeping for 4 hours prior. You know, and I don't know

that -- I don't know the answer to this, but I don't think you can

sort of retroactive crew rest. In other words, if it's midnight,

and you know somebody went to bed at 8 o'clock, just because you

saw him go to bed, and then you need him, I don't think you can't

say: Well, I saw that person go to bed at 8 o'clock; therefore,

we're going to start their crew rest as starting at 8 o'clock.

You have to sort of start right when you say start. So I hope

that helps answer the question.

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BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q But if you knew the person had gotten sufficient sleep,

you could waive the crew rest for them?

A Yeah. You could waive the crew rest even if they

hadn't gotten sufficient sleep, depending on who the authority is.

And I don't know who the authority was for those SACEUR aircraft

to waive that. I don't --

BY MR. KENNY:

Q But it is at some point below you. Is that --

A Oh, yeah. It's definitely below. I would -- the

Chairman and the Vice Chairman would never be in the crew rest

waiver chain. It would be strictly within the service or SOCOM

chain. I mean, I suppose the Secretary could say: You know, damn

it, overrule that, but --

Q If it came to his attention?

A And I don't recall -- there was no waiver ever even

requested that I'm aware of that would have been addressed, much

less turned down, on the CIF crew rest piece.

Ms. Rauch. Almost finished.

Admiral Winnefeld. Okay.

Ms. Rauch. So I'm going to hand out now two exhibits, and

it's going to be 8 and 9.

[Winnefeld Exhibit Nos. 8 and 9

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. RAUCH:

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Q I'm giving these to you. Take as much time as you need

to have a look at them if you'd like, but they're really just a

reference material to go through the timeline that I'm actually

going to walk through with you. We've discussed the CIF a lot

today, it's been discussed a lot in our investigation, and so I'd

like to take this opportunity to walk through the actual timeline

of the CIF with you. And I'll be using these documents along with

the DOD timeline that we introduced earlier, and that's where

we're drawing this information from.

So exhibit 8 is -- this is the Department of Defense's

response to questions that the Select Committee on Benghazi posed

to them, and it's dated 24 July 2015. And exhibit 9 is an

after-action report compiled by the (REDACTED) operators who were

in Benghazi on the night of the attacks and were part of Team

Tripoli, the response, the rescue, the Quick Reaction Force rescue

response to Benghazi.

A Okay.

Q Okay. And you might get a copy from Bill after this,

because you might enjoy reading this, actually --

A Okay.

Q -- just on your own time if you'd like. But, again,

take as much time as you need right now to have a look at these

documents, and let me know when you're ready.

A It might be quicker for you to just point to me.

Q Why don't I -- I'm happy to do that. Actually, most of

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it is on the first page of both of them. And I just want these

here because in case there's anything in question, we can look at

them and you can see where I derive these timelines -- these times

from.

A Okay.

Q And so, again, walking through the CIF timeline on the

night of the attacks, I'd like to start out by noting that these

times that I'm going to be saying are in local Benghazi time, so

Eastern European time.

A Uh-huh.

Q And we've already, my colleagues established that the

CIF operates (REDACTED)

A Okay.

Q Okay. And our various investigations have determined

that the attack began at appropriately 9:42 p.m. at the Temporary

Mission Facility in Benghazi. At 2:39 a.m., we know a VOCO was

issued by the Secretary of Defense, which mobilized the CIF. At

approximately 2 a.m., a seven-person Quick Reaction Force,

(REDACTED) arrived in Benghazi from Tripoli. And we know -- and

take your time, as much time as you need.

A Were there seven -- seven special operators that

arrived in --

Q (REDACTED)

A Yeah.

Q -- along with, I think it was five -- or four GRS plus

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a linguist.

A Okay. (REDACTED)

Q Correct.

A Okay.

Q Correct.

A Okay.

Q And so looking at the timeline, we know that by this

time, that all the Americans have been evacuated from the

Temporary Mission Facility to the CIA Annex.

A Right.

Q And at this time, the Ambassador had been reported

missing. At some point thereafter, we know that the CIF -- the

N-hour for the CIF was established at 5 a.m. And I think you

testified earlier that that likely would have been done by the

DDO?

A Probably.

Q Okay. So we also know from this timeline that

somewhere between 2 and 4:30 a.m., Team Tripoli received word that

the Benghazi -- at the Benghazi airport that the Ambassador was

deceased. And that's actually on the front page, and I can point

that out to you on the after-action report.

A Okay.

Q The exhibit 9.

A That's between 2 and 4 a.m.?

Q Between 2 and 4:30 a.m., they received word and --

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A That's Benghazi time?

Q Correct. These are all in Benghazi time.

A Okay.

Q And if you -- again, that's on the --

A Okay.

Q -- first page of this document.

A Okay.

Q And -- I beg your pardon. It might be on the second

page. No. It is on the first page, for clarity.

So, at approximately 5:15 a.m., which is 15 minutes after the

N-hour was established for the CIF, there's a mortar strike on the

Annex, and soon after, it's determined that there would be a full

evacuation from Benghazi.

Okay. At 6:30 a.m., we know from the DOD timeline that all

Americans depart the Annex for the Benghazi airport for

evacuation. We also know that from the after-action report. So,

at this point, the N-hour for the CIF is N+2.5 hours.

At 7:37 a.m., the first evacuation flight leaves Benghazi,

and that's the -- I've heard it was a Lear and I've heard it was a

King Air. I haven't determined which one it is, but both have

been reported, but it's a jet and it's a small jet, but I think

they carried about 17 people, as many as they could get on. So

that first flight left at 7:37 a.m.

And then, at 7:41 a.m., an ex ord is issued sending the CIF

to an ISB, the intermediate staging base in Sigonella, and that's

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in our DOD response timeline.

A Okay.

Q At 10:07 a.m., the second and final evacuating flight

leaves Benghazi airport with the Ambassador's body. All Americans

have now been evacuated from Benghazi. And that is the CIF

N-hour, N+5.

A Okay.

Q So, in walking through this timeline step by step, and

I know I went through it very quickly, just being cognizant of

your time, I think we have just determined that everyone was off

the ground in Benghazi (REDACTED) And I think we also determined

that had the N-hour been established at the same time as the VOCO

rather than later, which we've discussed, so that would have been

at 2:39, hypothetically, the decision to fully evacuate Benghazi

with the Tripoli QRF, which is the DOD-led response entity, Team

Tripoli, would have occurred and the first evacuation flight would

have already departed, and that would have been at N+5. So that's

even if the -- if the VOCO would have been established -- I

apologize -- if the N-hour would have been established at the same

time as the Secretary of Defense VOCO.

I just take this time to walk through all this, because I

think this all gets lost pretty often. Do you have any questions

about that timeline, or do you agree, or do you think there's any

issues with that timeline?

A No. I think what you're trying to say is this

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happened; the people left Benghazi inside that timeline. And we

still take the lessons learned within DOD on alert times and all

that sort of stuff, but I understand what you're saying.

Q So the reason why I took the time to walk through this

is because, again, we've discussed it a lot today and in previous

interviews, and sometimes I think it's lost that, you know, there

was a military response; it was a DOD-led Team Tripoli.

Again, if you read the after-action report, it's pretty

thorough in explaining how they got -- were able to commandeer

that jet, of course, (REDACTED) but it was a pretty quick

response. It was actually quite amazing, and I think they saved a

lot of lives. Would you agree with that statement?

A Yes.

Q And I think it's, you know, important to note

that -- well, let me ask it in a question. The United States

military is pretty good at responding quickly to things in terms

of changing missions. Is that a fair statement to say?

A I would agree.

Q And that's part of how you operate. Is that correct?

A Absolutely.

Q Did that occur on the night of the attacks?

A I think we were fairly agile, if I relay it through

what USAFE did, through what FAST platoon carried through,

(REDACTED) even though they didn't make their timeline, you know,

there was a lot of scrambling and agility in the middle of the

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night. Again, we always wish we could do things faster and

better, there's no question about it, but I think people were

working as hard as they could to get things done.

Q And, in fact, in terms of doing things faster and

better, you've already acknowledged, I think at least twice today,

I think maybe three times, about lessons learned and how you

specifically have made changes, one being, for example, the force

laydown where now you know exactly where all your forces are

postured.

A Uh-huh.

Q And so if this were to happen now, you could look up

and know exactly where everything was.

A Yes.

Q And there have been other lessons learned. Is that

correct?

A Yes.

Q And then do you -- well, I'll stop there.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q So one more question before, and then we're going to

just ask you, I think, this sort of set of questions we ask

everybody.

I know you're now retired. I know it's been a lot of years

since the attacks, and there were a lot of lessons learned --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- and a lot of changes made at Department of Defense.

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As we are seeking to hopefully wrap this thing up sometime in the

future, I'd say near future, but I'm not sure that's realistic, do

you have any recommendations to us, you know, improvements that

either Congress can help make or that you think DOD still needs to

make that we should consider?

A In terms of things that are left undone?

Q Yeah.

A I'd have to scan my mind for what lessons were actually

out there, one being that we did not have a good posture in Europe

and Africa to start with. I think we've corrected that as well as

we can within the budget limitations that we have, with a certain

sacrifice towards training and that sort of thing, so I think

that's done.

I think we have corrected the issue of matching our airlift

alert times to our reaction force alert times.

I don't know how well we've done in terms of visibility over

where everybody's stuff is, (REDACTED) I believe we've done that

with State Department and any other ancillary facilities they

might have.

I believe that -- my number one takeaway from this whole

event was risk assessment and making sure that people don't get

maybe carried away a little bit with the mission and lose sight of

the risk associated with traveling to a far flung location with

minimal security in a very dangerous place at a very dangerous

time.

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I think that's what we saw happen that night. As highly as I

regard Ambassador Stevens as a very accomplished diplomat who made

the ultimate sacrifice for our country, I do ask myself about his

risk assessment that night. I think we've all benefited from that

lesson, and I think State Department has a pretty sober

recalibrated view of that sort of thing.

And then we can always -- as I've said several times, we can

do things faster and better. And I think all along, the Joint

Staff, the COCOMs have learned a lot about rapid transmission of

orders and all the other things that I've talked about. So I

think we've captured all of those.

I don't know of anything that Congress could help us with

other than perhaps coming to some kind of terms on the Budget

Control Act so that we can restore our readiness and perhaps flesh

out our forces the way they ought to be configured so that we can

do the kinds of things we need to do in Europe without sacrificing

on capability and other places in the world. But I think we've

done the right thing in establishing a much greater alert posture

in this new normal we've called it, both with more Marine security

attachments, with larger Marine security attachments in some

places, with Marine Special MAGTF, that's in -- Special

maritime -- Marine Air-Ground Task Force, in Moron, Spain; also

one we've developed in the Arabian Gulf. So I think we've done

that, but it has come at a cost of our ability to do operations

elsewhere.

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Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Thank you.

Admiral Winnefeld. That's a long answer. I apologize,

but --

Ms. Rauch. Thank you.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. It is helpful.

Ms. Rauch. Very helpful.

BY MS. RAUCH:

Q So I'm going to ask you about a series of allegations

that have been made regarding the attacks in Benghazi, and I'm

just asking if you have firsthand knowledge or evidence for any of

these. If you don't, we'll just move on to the next one. There

are quite a few. I apologize, it'll take a few minutes.

A Okay.

Q But, again, if you have firsthand knowledge or

evidence.

A Okay.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton

intentionally blocked military action on the night of the attacks.

One Congressman has speculated that Secretary Clinton told Leon

Panetta to stand down, and this resulted in the Defense Department

not sending more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

ordered Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of

the attacks?

A No.

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Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State

Clinton issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta

on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The

Washington Post Fact Checker evaluated this claim and gave it four

Pinocchios, its highest award for false claims.

Do you any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on

day-to-day security resources in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton

misrepresented or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by

Qadhafi to his own people in order to garner support for military

operations in Libya in spring 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton

misrepresented or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by

Qadhafi to his own people in order to garner support for military

operations in Libya in spring 2011?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. Mission in Benghazi

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included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other

countries. A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent

Select Committee on Intelligence found that, quote, "the CIA was

not collecting and shipping arms from Libya to Syria," end quote,

and that they found no support for this allegation.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

A No.

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Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from

Libya to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A No.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily

delayed from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission

Compound, and there have been a number of allegations about the

cause of and the appropriateness of that delay. The House

Intelligence Committee issued a bipartisan report concluding that

the team was not ordered to stand down, but instead there were

tactical disagreements on the ground over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand-down

order to CIA personnel?

A No.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision,

do you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper decision

behind the temporary delay of the CIA's security personnel who

departed the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A No.

Q A concern has been raised by one individual that in the

course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board,

damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that

production.

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Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that

were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department directed anyone else at the State Department to remove

or scrub damaging documents from the materials that were provided

to the ARB?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the

materials that were provided to Congress?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael

Morell altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi

attacks for political reasons and that he misrepresented his

actions when he told Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully

performed our duties in accordance with the highest standards of

objectivity and nonpartisanship," end quote.

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Michael

Morell gave false or intentionally misleading testimony to

Congress about the Benghazi talking points?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director

Morell altered the talking points provided to Congress for

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political reasons?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made

intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk

shows about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk

shows?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United

States was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief on the night of

the attacks and that he was missing in action.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing in

action on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military

personnel at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks, who were

considering flying on the second plane to Benghazi, were order by

their superiors to, quote, "stand down," meaning cease all

operations. Military officials have stated that those four

individuals were instead ordered to remain in place in Tripoli to

provide security and medical assistance in their current location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that, quote, "There was no stand-down order issued

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to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight

in Benghazi," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the

House Armed Services Committee that there was no stand-down order

issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join

the fight in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attacks that would have saved lives.

However, former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the

former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a

review of the attacks, after which he stated, quote, "Given where

the troops were, how quickly the thing all happened, and how

quickly it dissipated, we probably couldn't have done more than we

did," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

conclusion?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could

have saved lives but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally

decided not to deploy?

A No.

Q Okay. That wraps that up. Thank you so much.

A Okay.

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Q Thank you for your incredible service to this Nation,

which is obviously long and distinguished. And we appreciate you

being here today.

A Thank you.

Mr. Tolar. Sir, I've got 6-1/2 minutes at the most.

A Okay.

Mr. Tolar. Meaty stuff.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Would Admiral Tidd have an appreciation (REDACTED)

A I wouldn't want to speak for him. He would have

potentially a recollection of why that happened since he was the

J3.

Q Check.

Tail numbers for aircraft required in order to receive

country clearance, do you to have them in advance or can you say,

"I'll get back with you"? Do you know?

A It probably depends on the country and the urgency, but

I don't know a positive answer to that. I don't know whether a

generic C-130 coming in --

Q Check.

A -- or tail number required coming in. Some countries

probably require the tail number.

Q Recognizing that this may be in the weeds, but

apparently the C-130s in Ramstein were all slicks, to include

those utilized by the CIF. As such, they can't refuel in the air.

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A Uh-huh.

Q Do you know if that was contemplated in terms of the

response and the planning and all that kind of stuff?

A I don't know whether that was contemplated or not. I

think the C-130 had more than enough range to get there and back.

Q Which ones?

A Any C-130. I think they were J models, probably,

or -- no, no. The USAFE ones were J models. The CIF ones were

probably MC-130.

I don't know if they had enough legs to go there without

being refueled on the ground in Libya, but I'm sure they could get

there from Ramstein.

Q Okay. Well, I guess the point was, they'd have to get

from Ramstein to pick up the packs.

A Right.

Q And then from there, they'd have to get --

A Right. So they could -- Ramstein to Rota, refuel in

Rota.

Q Check.

A And then it's 3 hours and 40 minutes, I guess, from

Ramstein to Rota, something like that. I don't know. I think

it's, what, a couple hours from Rota into Tripoli?

Q And then they could get back --

A And then they could get back without refueling.

Q You made some comment earlier, and I apologize if I'm

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misquoting you here, but it was something to the effect sometimes

perhaps AFRICOM didn't have an appreciation for what Special Ops

Command might be doing. Would he know if they're operating

aircraft in his AOR?

A I think the AFRICOM commander probably would know if

they were operating aircraft in his AOR.

Q Okay.

A Now, there might be some program that SOCOM has, but

they would generally at least inform the AFRICOM special

operations component --

Q Sure.

A -- that they were passing through there.

Q So surely at least those guys are tracking that?

A Yeah.

Q Okay. Do you know what a U-28 is?

A Yeah.

Q What --

A It's a twin-engine prop, right?

Q I was curious.

A Yeah.

Q Did DOD contemplate reaching out to partner nations to

help support in any way in response?

A It may have happened, but I'm not aware of it

happening. And I believe the reason for that is that we felt that

in the timeline of circumstances, that nobody could do anything

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faster than we could.

Q If someone was going to reach out, who would have done

that at what --

A From DOD?

Q Yes, sir.

A It would have probably been the -- from the

Undersecretary of Defense for Policy's office.

Q Check.

A It could be from the J5 on the Joint Staff as well.

Q You talked about the change you implemented with regard

to tracking assets. Did you implement any other changes that are

still in effect today?

A In terms of my personal implementation?

Q Yes, sir.

A I think I was a -- I was one of several advocates very

quickly after the fact of synching up our airlift alert posture

with our response force posture. I wouldn't claim credit for

that, but I did insist that we have that laydown of response

capability and timeline, force type, you know, the whole thing.

It's actually -- I don't know if you have a copy of it, but it's a

very good one snapshot that's all laydown of what our response

capability is on any given day.

Q How much are -- let's see. And then -- Bill, is that

the new normal slide?

Mr. Hudson. It is. And I think you've also seen the force

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laydown slide that the Joint Staff prepared. I think that's what

you're talking about.

Admiral Winnefeld. The force laydown slide that the Joint

Staff repaired was the day of.

Q Right.

A I'm talking about a slide that is produced every night

by the DDO and his staff that shows what all the response forces

are in all the theaters and what their response times are. And

it's a pretty healthy mix and it's a good process.

Now, I left 6 months ago, that could have changed.

Q Sure.

A Seven months ago. But it was something that I looked

at every morning.

Q Real quick. The drones, you had two Predators in play.

Were you tracking -- could you see their feed?

A I did not have their feed at home or in my office.

Q Do you know if you all considered arming the second

drone?

A I don't believe that we could have, (REDACTED)

Q Okay.

A So I don't even know if we had the weapons in theater.

Q Sure. Drone are flown. Do you know where the pilots

were located for the drone?

A (REDACTED)

Mr. Hudson. And for the record, we're trying to find those

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pilots, and I think I indicated that, and so we'll have an answer

for you this week.

A There's 10 different places they could be flown.

Q Sure. Okay.

And the J3, can they monitor the feed from the drone, do you

know?

A They -- not all drone --

Q Check.

A -- but some drone they can monitor. And I believe they

may have been able to monitor the feed that night down in the

National Military Command Center as the feed came in.

Q Check.

And you mentioned that -- weighing risk and things of that

nature. What made you say -- I mean, is it just Monday morning

quarterbacking -- the Ambassador's decision to do what he did, or

could you talk about that any more?

A Well, I think it's just a very difficult thing to talk

about, because here you have a great American diplomat who paid

the ultimate sacrifice, and it's hard to be critical of somebody

who's doing the very best he can in a very difficult job, and he's

excited about the job and he wants to really move the ball down

the field.

But, you know, again, maybe it's just 20/20 hindsight, but

that was a very dangerous place to be without a lot of security at

a very dangerous time. And it's just tough to imagine not having

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181

more security or maybe not spending the night, maybe just going in

the daytime. I don't want to second-guess him --

Q I understand.

A -- but that was a risky place to be.

Q Last one. Tripoli July, June, July, whatever, of 2014,

we've reopened -- we're back in the Embassy, the Ambassador's

there. Do you recall if DOD ever proactively offered additional

assets, support, whatever, and it was not accepted?

A I don't have any specific recollection of that. I

believe that, knowing the two different AFRICOM commanders that I

worked with when I was the vice chairman, both of them would have

been forward leaning and essentially saying to the Ambassador:

The answer's yes. Now, what's the question? You know, how can we

support you? We'd be delighted to provide more support. Again,

for two reasons. One, not only to enhance the security of the

Embassy, but also to further DOD engagement on the ground with the

Libyan military in a positive way.

I don't know whether that was offered and turned down or

whether it was just an open ended, tell us what you need and you

get it. I think there's a subtle difference there that's

important.

Q Sure. Thank you again for your time. Appreciate your

service.

A Thank you.

Mr. Tolar. We're done? Thank you all.

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Admiral Winnefeld. Okay. Good luck with the rest of your

work.

Mr. Tolar. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 3:56 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 1

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REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

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Taliban take credit for British base attack

Two US soldiers killed in "complex" assault on military post in Helmand

province where Britain's Prince Harry is based.

15 Sep 2012 08:23 GMT |

The Taliban have claimed responsibility for a deadly attack on the military post in southern Afghanistan where

Britain's Prince Harry is based.

Friday's attack at Camp Bastion in Helmand province left two US soldiers dead and some others wounded,

US officials said.

Live Box 201291411393377356

The Taliban said it was in response to the anti­Islamic video that has sparked a wave of ongoing protests, Al

Jazeera's Afghanistan correspondent Bernard Smith reported from Kabul.

Camp Bastion is a British airbase and is adjacent to Camp Leatherneck, the main base for the US Marine

Corps in Helmand.

A defence official in Washington said the two dead were US marines, speaking on condition of anonymity,

while another US official described the attack as "complex", meaning it was a co­ordinated strike using

several types of weapons.

'Complex attack'

The attack, involving small arms and mortar or rocket fire, started around midnight local time, Master

Sergeant Bob Barko of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) told AFP news agency.

Another ISAF spokesman said the assault was over but details including the number of attackers and whether

they managed to penetrate the base were not immediately clear.

Prince Harry, 27, has been deployed at Camp Bastion as a military helicopter pilot.

According to Smith, the Taliban also claimed that the prince was a target in Friday's attack.

Taliban fighters have threatened to kill him, saying earlier this week they had a "high­value plan" to attack the

third in line to the British throne.

Barko said that ISAF was assessing the extent of the damage to the camp in Helmand, one of the toughest

battlefields in the war, but Harry was not thought to have been affected.

"The information we have is that he was not in any danger," he said.

Harry will spend four months based at the heavily fortified Camp Bastion.

In 2008, he was hastily withdrawn from Afghanistan when a news blackout surrounding his deployment, on

the ground directing aircraft in attacks on Taliban positions, was broken.

This time, however, the military has released photographs and video of him in Afghanistan from the start.

Britain's defence ministry said any risk "has been, and will continue to be, assessed".

EXHIBIT 7

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Transition process

NATO has about 117,000 troops in Afghanistan fighting the Taliban alongside government forces.

Most of the NATO troops are set to withdraw by the end of 2014 in a US­designed transition process that will

put Afghan security forces in charge of security for their war­battered country.

Live Box

The process is already under way with security responsibilities of about half of the Afghan population

transferred to the local security forces.

The Taliban have stepped up their attacks in recent months as part of efforts by the group to undermine the

transition process.

Helmand, in the troubled south, was the focus of a 30,000­strong troop surge announced by the US in 2009

designed to quell the Taliban­led fight once and for all.

A total of 327 international soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan so far this year, according to the

iCasualties website, 250 of them American.

The toll does not include those who died in the latest attack.

Source: Al Jazeera and agencies

Asia US & Canada Afghanistan United States

Tell us what you think

CONTINUE READING

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INTERVIEW OF

MANAGING DIRECTOR,

OFFICE OF

MANAGEMENT POLICY,

RIGHTSIZING AND

INNOVATION

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MARCH 4, 2016
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel

KIM BETZ, Member Outreach Liaison and Counsel

CARLTON DAVIS, Counsel

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director/General Counsel

DANIEL REBNORD, Minority Professional Staff

ERIN O’BRIEN, Minority Detailee

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUSTIN EVERS, Senior Advisor

ALISON R. WELCHER, Attorney-Adviser

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Ms. Jackson. All right. Ms. , welcome today. This is a

transcribed interview of conducted by the House Select

Committee on Benghazi. This interview is being conducted voluntarily

as part of the committee's investigation into the attacks on the U.S.

diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and matters related to that

pursuant to House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress and House

Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

And before the official reporter tells me that I have had way too

much coffee and talking fast, I'm going to slow it down a little bit

for you. Ms. , could you state your name for the record please?

Ms. . .

Ms. Jackson. Okay. We appreciate you being here today.

Obviously, this committee is conducting an investigation. And it is

believed that you have relevant information regarding that

information. And so we wanted to have a conversation with you today

about that. So thank you for being here today.

Ms. Okay. Absolutely.

Ms. Jackson. Again, my name is Sharon Jackson. And I'm with the

committee's majority staff. And so we have a record of who is here

today, we're going to go around and have everyone introduce yourself.

You have come with two representatives of the State Department. So

we'll start with Alison.

Ms. Welcher. Alison Welcher, State Department.

Mr. Evers. Austin Evers, State Department.

Ms. O'Brien. Erin O'Brien with the minority staff.

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4

Mr. Rebnord. Daniel Rebnord with the minority staff.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Susanne Sachsman Grooms with the minority.

Ms. Betz. Kim Betz with the majority staff.

Ms. Jackson. Before we begin, I'd like to go over the process

that we follow in these interviews so that you have an understanding

of how everything will proceed today. And I'm sure you've spent time

with Alison and Austin to go over that before.

But just to put it on the record, generally the way that

questioning has proceeded is that I, or another member of the majority

staff, will ask questions for up to 1 hour. And then the minority will

have a like period of time. In transcribed interviews, questions may

only be asked by a member of the committee, a Member of Congress on

the committee, or by the staff. Generally, we rotate back and forth,

1 hour at a time, until each side has exhausted all the questions that

they have. Occasionally, we've deviate from that process. But that's

generally the process that we follow.

Unlike testimony or a deposition in Federal court, the

committee's format is not bound by the rules of evidence. You, or the

counsel with you today, may raise objections for privilege. And those

are subject to review by the chairman of the committee. If those

objections cannot be resolved in the interview, the witness can be

required to return for a deposition or a hearing. Members or staff

of the committee, however, are not permitted to raise objections when

the other side is asking questions. It's generally not an issue that

has been problematic in our interviews. But that is the process that

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5

we follow.

We are in an unclassified setting here. So if any questions call

for a classified answer, please let us know. And we can either omit

it or reserve it until we are in a different setting. You are welcome

to confer with the counsel that is here today at any time throughout

the interview. But if something just needs to be clarified, if you

need a question repeated, or rephrased, or broken down in some way,

please just say so. It is important, to us, that you understand the

questions that we're asking before you give your answer. But if you

do need to discuss anything with the counsel that are with you today,

please just let us know. We'll stop the clock, go off the record, and

allow you the opportunity to consult and confer with them.

We will also take a break whenever it's convenient for you.

Typically, we do this at the end of each hour of questioning. But if

at any time you would like to take a break to use the facilities, to

get water or coffee, please just let us know. And we will do that.

As you can see, we have an official reporter that is making a complete

record of what happens here today. So it is important that you give

verbal responses to questions rather than nodding or shaking of the

head. It's also important that, to the best of our ability, we try

not to talk over each other. Sometimes it's easy to start answering

a question before it's completely finished, or for me to interrupt with

the next question, before you've finished your answer. So we should

both make an effort not to do that.

We ask that you give your most full and complete answer to all

831
6

the questions that we ask. But if you honestly don't know the answer

to a question, it's best not to guess and just tell us so. We would

ask, if you believe that there's someone else who might have relevant

information to that question, to let us know who that person is.

Do you understand that you are required to answer questions from

Congress truthfully?

Ms. . Of course.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. And do you also understand that this applies

to questions that are asked to you by congressional staff in an

interview?

Ms. . Of course.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. And do you understand that knowingly

providing false testimony could subject a person to criminal

prosecution for perjury or making false statements?

Ms. . Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Is there any reason that you would not be

able to give truthful answers to today's questions?

Ms. . None at all.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Well, that's the end of my preamble and the

procedures that are going to govern us today.

Did the minority have anything that they would like to add?

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Just thank you for coming.

Ms. . Absolutely.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. JACKSON:

832
7

Q Okay, All right. So we'll get started. Ms. , it's

my understanding you've been with the State Department since late 1989.

Is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. And what is your current position?

A My title is managing director of the Office of Management,

Policy, Rightsizing, and Innovation. I'm essentially the deputy to

the office director.

Q Okay. And is that an office that's known as M/PRI?

A Yes. It is.

Q Okay. And how long have you been in that position?

A The position, just since 2012. But I've been in the office

longer.

Q And how long have you been with M/PRI?

A Since 1997.

Q Okay. And tell us about your various positions within

M/PRI that you've had.

A Well, when I first got there, I did the liaison for the

M-family bureaus to GAO and the OIG, the inspector general's office,

and did various special projects. And then --

Q Let me just stop you. There were a couple acronyms in

there. You said the M-family?

A So underneath of the M, the under secretary for Management,

are bureaus. There are nine bureaus, such as Diplomatic Security,

Bureau of Administration, Resource Management, Human Resources,

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8

Consular Affairs, the Foreign Service Institute, and OFM, the Office

of Foreign Missions, and a couple of small offices. We are pretty much

the staff office for the under secretary for Management.

Q And by staff office, what do you mean?

A It means that my director works directly for Under Secretary

Kennedy at this time. We get a new under secretary every several years.

And so we're considered as staff.

Q Okay.

A We're not a bureau, in other words.

Q Okay. So you work directly for the under secretary for

Management, your office does?

A The office does.

Q As opposed to having your own bureau head?

A My director is an assistant secretary equivalent. I'm a

DAS equivalent. But because we don't have functions, we're not a

bureau, we work as an office directly for the under secretary. We do

cross-cutting issues.

Among those nine bureaus, sometimes they don't always see eye to

eye on issues. So we convene them and work toward the best

understanding of the issue.

Q Okay. And so, in addition to that, what are some of the

other duties and responsibilities of M/PRI?

A We do the greening initiatives, we send out the ecosystems

greening initiatives for the Department.

Q Promoting recycling?

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A Yes. Exactly. And sustainable electricity, you know,

wind farms, and solar panels, and those things, for our embassies

abroad. Also the greening diplomacy initiative within Washington,

D.C. We work with other countries who have their embassies here and

how they can do gardening on their rooftops, and solar panels, and try

to cut down their footprint, carbon footprint. We do rightsizing of

the U.S. missions overseas. And that's all agencies, not just State

Department.

Q And what is meant by rightsizing?

A So one of the, one of the OPAP, which is the Overseas

Presence Advisory Panel, one of the recommendations that came out of

the Nairobi-Dar es Salaam Accountability Review Board, they decided

that the State Department, on behalf of the President, should take a

look at the footprint of our missions overseas. So, our rightsizing

folks go in and make sure that the work has been planned to be done

so that we don't have a bigger footprint in countries than we need to

have.

Q Okay. And then you have an innovation section?

A We do. And they do things such as My Services, which is

when you're stationed overseas and you need to have a toilet repaired,

or you need a motor pool driver, you can electronically put in for a

service request. And so they do the metrics on that kind of

mission-wide services. And they think of new and better ways to do

things.

They manage the CMI, which is the Continual Management

835
10

Improvements, so that we're always on the look-out for how to do things

better and more efficiently, and bring things back to the U.S. to be

done. Where, if you have a function that's location neutral, you don't

need to be overseas and be in harm's way potentially, you can do them

in Charleston or other areas in the U.S.

Q Okay. I think I may have interrupted you about, and gone

off on a different tangent when you were talking about your various

positions within M/PRI. So if you could go back to that and tell us

about the various duties and responsibilities --

A That I have had?

Q That you have had.

A Okay. So after the Nairobi-Dar es Salaam bombings, I took

over the portfolio of the Accountability Review Board. Up until that

time, it was always done by a foreign service officer and at the 01

level. So that's consistent with the GS-15. So they converted that

position to be a 15. And that's when I took that over.

Q Okay. And so that would have been in approximately 1999?

A Yes.

Q And has that been your sole responsibility within M/PRI

since then?

A It has been solely my responsibility up until 2012 when I

took on a different position. But ARBs are not a full-time job in

themselves. Luckily, you'll have a few years every now and then where

you don't have an ARB. So you do other functions.

Q Okay. And do you have other functions permanently assigned

836
11

to you apart from the ARB work?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what are those?

A Well, up until -- what are they currently? Or what were

they up until 2012?

Q What were they up until 2012.

A I did advocacy for portfolio bureaus, so H.R., Human

Resources, FSI, the Foreign Services Institute, and DS, Diplomatic

Security. So, in other words, when they have a new policy coming up,

they give it to me for my clearance. And I make sure that it doesn't

sound outlandish or, you know, I give it thorough clearance.

We do special events. If you can remember back when President

Clinton was in, we did the National Performance Review, which was a

cost-cutting exercise. I used to do those. And the President's

Management Council, in the 2000s, that was my portfolio, to prepare

the under secretaries at the time during that decade to go to the White

House for meetings on management issues.

Q And when, in 2012, did your duties and responsibilities

shift?

A So we had a vacancy in, I would say, July of 2012 for our

managing director. And because that person had left, we rotated

responsibilities to be the managing director. And over time, the

position was announced. And I applied for it and was selected for it.

Q Okay. And since when has it been your permanent position

then?

837
12

A OPM approved me in February of 2013.

Q In February of 2013?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Would you describe for us, up until the Benghazi ARB,

describe for us your role with respects to the ARBs?

A Sure. Such as setting them up? Or --

Q What are all the different things -- well first of all, let

me ask you this: How many ARBs have you been involved in since you've

been at M/PRI?

A So I would say 11 of them. I came post Nairobi-Dar. I'm

doing gestures because I think of them as bookends.

Q Uh-huh.

A I was post Nairobi-Dar which meant that I was responsible

for the implementation, and the Department's intentions of following

through on those recommendations. And then there were nine in between,

and then Benghazi.

Q Okay.

A And so 11, essentially, is the answer.

Q Okay. And did they all follow a particular process? Or

have there been deviations in that process in the 11 that you've been

involved in?

A In what manner?

Q In how they were set up, run, things like that?

A I would say that, yes, that in the bookends, they

weren't -- they were more of what I call a celebrity arc. They had

838
13

people like Admiral Crowe for the Nairobi-Dar. And in this case, we

had a career minister, Mr. Pickering.

Q Admiral Pickering?

A Yes. And Ambassador, Admiral Mullen. So, otherwise, in

the nine in between, I would submit the names, make some recommendations

in the written materials to the Secretary, and give her or him options

of people who I thought were qualified just to start the process

rolling.

Q Okay. Now, you weren't there for the selection of the

Nairobi-Tanzania ARB. Is that correct?

A I was in the office, but it was not my responsibility. We

were a small office, so I knew what was going on.

Q Okay. And so for those 11 ARBs that you've been involved

in, you've read those reports, and been involved in the implementation

of those recommendations?

A Yes. I have.

Q Did you read prior ARB reports?

A I have gone back over them. Yes, I have.

Q Okay. So you're familiar with the various and sundry

reports that have been issued?

A Yes.

Q Are there particular offices or bureaus that are generally

the subject of an ARB investigation? And, if so, what are those offices

or bureaus?

A Well, it's always the office, the regional bureau where the

839
14

incident occurred. It's always that bureau. And it's usually

Diplomatic Security or office of Overseas Building Operations, OBO.

Usually we have to get their budget and planning bureau involved because

almost everything involves money and congressional notification. So

there are a set of M-family bureaus that I contact.

Q Okay. Can you tell us a little bit about the implementation

of ARB recommendations in, again, those 11 that you were involved in,

or at least the 10 up until Benghazi? How did that work?

A So when we get the report from the Accountability Review

Boards, we read the recommendations and determine who is best to carry

out an action. And I call these people together because, as I

mentioned, we have convening authority among the M-family bureaus.

And I get together their action officers. And we task out the

recommendations, and then give them a deadline of when they need to

let me know what their intentions are in following through. Because

our office also writes the report to Congress on our intentions of

following through with the recommendations.

Q Okay. And was that done on all these prior ARBs, the report

to Congress?

A Yes.

Q Okay. You say that you have convening authority. Can you

help us understand what that means within the State Department?

A Well, because we work for the under secretary for

Management, people know that we are convening these things on behalf,

in this case, for the Secretary of State because that's the customer

840
15

of the report.

So not every office gets the quick response that we do, I guess,

is the polite way to say it. You can get a lot of -- we have much more

power behind our name in that we're doing something on behalf of the

Secretary in this case, that people will respond, attend the meetings,

and be thoughtful in their follow through.

Q Okay. And prior to Benghazi, how would you report up the

implementation of recommendations? Would you do a quarterly report?

A biannual report? An annual report? Was it more ad hoc?

A It was more ad hoc. Our records were always available for

people to see. But we had spreadsheets and the action officers, the

due dates. And we would provide those whenever we were asked. Or,

periodically, we would report on the status of those recommendations.

Q Okay. But there was no formalized mechanism? You weren't

required to issue a report once a year on the recommendations?

A No.

Q Okay. And over the years, did you ever encounter

difficulty with offices or bureaus in following through with what they

had been tasked to do?

A No.

Q Okay. In your opinion in overseeing this, were the

recommendations implemented?

A Yes.

Q Okay. All of them?

A Well, not all of them, all of them that we accepted. And

841
16

I have to say, as much as we respect our members, occasionally you get

a recommendation that causes you to think what? You just really, for

example, putting gun ports or automatic windows, on a fully armored

vehicle, it doesn't make a lot of sense to have any, if you're encasing

a vehicle in armor, you wouldn't want to have those breaks in the

continuity of the armor. So there have been a few that we have not

implemented.

Q And who makes that decision? Who makes the decision not

to accept a recommendation?

A Well, we, as a group of action officers, decide that this

is what we're going to put forward, that we would recommend that the

Department not accept a recommendation. And so that goes through the

clearance process from my boss, to his boss, to his boss, through to

the Secretary. Because the Secretary signs out, or H signs out on

behalf of the Secretary, the report to Congress. And then in there

it clearly states whether we accept or not accept the recommendation.

Q Now, that report to Congress has to go within 90 days of

the ARB report. Is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. Are there any follow-on reports that would either

go to Congress or go to the Secretary?

A To the Secretary, we report on our progress of implementing

the -- or to the deputy secretary. But to Congress, it would only be

if we're ever asked to come up and talk about it, which we have done

in the past.

842
17

Q Okay. And prior to the Benghazi ARB, reports to the

Secretary were not routine, they were more episodic?

A Correct.

Q Are there formal policies and procedures that govern

Accountability Review Boards within the State Department?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And where are they found?

A In the 12 FAM O30.

Q Okay. And is there also a statute that governs the

Accountability Review Boards?

A Yes. The Diplomatic Security Act.

Q Okay. I want to mark as exhibit 1 something that you're

probably familiar with.

A Yes.

[ Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q I'm handing you what I've marked as exhibit 1, which is 12

FAM O30 Accountability Review Board, parentheses, ARB --

A Yes.

Q -- end parentheses. You're familiar with this?

A I am.

Q And just for the record, would you describe what this

document is?

A This is our, the excerpt in the 12 FAM that governs what

843
18

we do, how we stand up the ARB, the membership, the purpose, the

follow-through activities that occur.

Q Okay. And when we say FAM, that's the Foreign Affairs

Manual?

A It is the Foreign Affairs Manual.

Q And that's the governing policy manual for the State

Department?

A It is.

Q Okay. Throughout this document, and let me find a -- if

we could go to the last page, under 12 FAM 036.4, Reports to Congress,

there's some purple writing in subparagraph A.

A Yes.

Q Can you tell us the significance of that purple writing

compared to the black ink?

A I sure can. The purple writing is to draw a casual reader's

attention to the fact that this is a recent update. If you look at

the change transition on the first page, it will tell you the last

update. And that date there tells you that this language was inserted

in the colored, the purple colored writing.

Q And you denoted a date on the very first page under 12 FAM

030 of March 17, 2015. Does that then signify the last date the entire

chapter was updated?

A Updated, yes. Yes.

Q Okay. And within each subsection of this chapter, is there

a date associated with each subparagraph or subset?

844
19

A Yes.

Q And would that signify the date that that particular section

was updated?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So back to this Reports to Congress, it also bears

the same date of March 17, 2015.

A Yes. It does.

Q Okay. And the subparagraph before it is December 8, 2014,

12 FAM --

A Yes.

Q So that's an accurate reading of this document?

A It is.

Q Okay. If I could direct your attention to 12 FAM 032.1.

12 FAM 032.1 describes an ARB Permanent Coordinating Committee. Could

you tell us about the Permanent Coordinating Committee, or as I

understand it, it is referred to as the PCC?

A Yes. So when an incident happens, our office is informed

of it or we hear it on the TV, depending on how the tragedy unfolds,

we convene the PCC. My office director is the chair. And it is a

membership of Diplomatic Security, Intelligence and Research Bureau,

the regional bureau where the incident occurred, our Bureau of

Counterterrorism, Consular Affairs Bureau. And then we have a voting

member that is outside of the Department in the DNI, the Director of

National Intelligence. And we convene that group to get a briefing

on what happened and if they think it meets the criteria of the ARB

845
20

statute.

Q Okay. Now, does your boss, the director who chairs this

committee, is that the person who decides whether the PCC should meet?

Or are you directed to by others within the State Department?

A No. So what we do is, we put together the incident, some

facts as we know it, about the incident. We tell our director. He

contacts the legal adviser, who is not a voting member but is there

to provide advice to the PCC, and Diplomatic Security and the regional

bureau. And we say hey, this looks to us like it meets the criteria,

I'm going to call the PCC together. And it's the chairman's right to

assemble this group.

Q Has the PCC ever been directed by the principals of the State

Department to convene the PCC?

A I wouldn't, I would say no, not directed. We always

anticipate that, when we need to do it.

Q Okay. There's a lot of security incidents that occur

across the world involving the State Department. But, yet, there's

only been a small number of ARBs.

A Right.

Q And so I'm just trying to have you help us figure out when

is it that the PCC knows to convene? Or do you always convene and then

not choose to have an ARB? Could you just elaborate on that?

A So the PCC meets more frequently than I would like, but there

are a lot of incidents, as you say, that appear to rise to the level

of the Accountability Review Board statute. But in looking through

846
21

that, and getting some evidence from, either the regional bureau or

the DS, we realize it really isn't at or related to, the U.S. Mission,

or it wasn't significant destruction of property, or it wasn't a serious

injury. We have those three criteria that we have to judge the incident

against.

Q Okay. Does the PCC then meet to discuss those? Or can

there be sort of a preliminary decision that it doesn't meet the

criteria and the PCC does not need to meet?

A Yes. It can be both of those things.

Q Okay. How did you first learn about the Benghazi attacks

and the deaths that resulted from that attack?

A On the news.

Q That day?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what, if any, steps did you take in the days

following with regard to a potential ARB?

A Well, typically, what I do is get all the information we

can get on the incident. So I called DS for a spot report, or whatever

kind of report that they can generate. I might have seen, I mentioned,

I heard about it on the news. I might have seen the State Ops, I'm

a subscriber to the State Operations Center alerts. So I might have,

just to be clear, I could have either heard it on the news or seen it

on my BlackBerry.

So then we get the regional bureau together. And in that case,

it seemed like a very clear incident related to security, which is that

847
22

4th criteria, that the PCC is required to meet when an incident is found

to be related to security.

Q Okay.

A So --

Q Did you, or others within M/PRI, get any direction from

senior leadership in the State Department that this event was going

to qualify for an ARB, or should qualify for an ARB?

A I don't recall any.

Q Okay. All right. Did your director receive any to your

knowledge?

A The position was vacant at the time. I was filling in as

the assistant secretary. So I was the one who would have been told

to do something.

Q So you became the chair of the PCC?

A Yes.

Q Okay. I notice that the PCC is comprised of positions that

are not principals within the State Department. Do you know the reason

why that was? I mean, historically, have you learned -- have you

learned what the historical basis was for selecting these particular

positions to be the PCC?

A I think because they're experts in their area. And I think

that it's, in my view, it's high enough of a level that we don't

feel -- that we feel more able to convene these folks. They're very

busy people as you probably can guess. And we don't like to take

advantage of their schedules. So we try to convene them at the right

848
23

time. And so we think that this is the right level to have at the table.

They're in the weeds enough to know about the circumstances.

Q Okay. And going back to exhibit 1 and the composition of

the PCC, it's found on page 3 of 15, I notice that the date at the top

is October 9, 2014. Can you tell us what changed? Since there was

one subsequent revision to this, we don't have the purple writing to

tell us what changed in October of 2014?

Ms. Welcher. If you know.

Ms. . I have read this so many times and written it so many

times, I -- no, I can't tell you. I'm sorry?

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Can you tell me whether or not the membership changed in

2014? Or was this the membership that would have been on the PCC for

the Benghazi ARB?

A For all of the ARBs that I have been involved in, the only

change has been to number six. And that is, it used to be the CIA.

And when the DNI came into being, it complicated things. So we decided

to call it the DCI.

Q Okay. Can you describe for us the process that was used

to determine whether to recommend that an ARB be convened for the

Benghazi attacks?

A I'm sorry, I don't know what you mean by the process.

Q Did you convene a meeting and bring everybody together into

a room?

A No. We did not. Thank you. We did not. We did it by

849
24

electronic mail, by email.

Q And what type of information was assembled and sent out to

the various members of the PCC?

A I believe the only thing that was sent out at the time was

the statute, so that each of the -- and a summary of the incident, of

course, but the statute. And we asked for their votes on mail.

Q Was that electronic meeting, if you will, a process that

had been used in the past?

A A virtual meeting, we do that on incidents that we think

do not need the PCC to meet. That is our standard operating procedure.

But since this was well known by everyone in the Department, we felt

comfortable in doing it electronically.

Q And when you say we felt, who --

A I'm sorry, me and the person who has the ARB portfolio, my

understudy, if you will, the person in my office who has this portfolio

now.

Q Okay. And who is that person?

A Her name?

Q Yes.

A Is .

Q Okay. And how long has she had that position?

A Probably 18 months now.

Q Okay. And so the two of you were the only two who consulted

with each other about doing this virtually as opposed to having --

A No, we consulted, I'm sorry, we consulted in our normal

850
25

steps with DS and Al in the regional bureau.

Q And explain that. How would you consult? What would you

consult about?

A So we said this seems to meet the criteria of the ARB. And

they agreed. And so we sent it out, saying, you know, we believe this

fits the criteria. And we would like to do the vote over the email.

Q Okay. And they had no objection to that?

A No.

Q Okay. Did you confer with the under secretary for

management?

A I probably briefed him at the 8:00 o'clock morning meeting.

I don't recall precisely. But I would have informed him for sure.

Q And when you say 8:00 morning meeting, what are you

referring to?

A Our office has a daily meeting with the under secretary in

all the years I have been there, so it's not just this under secretary,

every morning at 8:00. And then sometimes under secretaries past, we

would meet at the end of the day as well. But, currently, it's just

morning meetings.

Q Okay. And so your recollection is that you would have

informed Under Secretary Kennedy that this is how you were going to

proceed?

A Yes.

Q I'm going to hand you a couple more documents to look at.

[ Exhibit Nos. 2 and 3

851
26

Were marked for identification.]

Mr. Evers. Is this one 2?

Ms. Jackson. That's 2.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And what I've put before you, as exhibit 2, is an email

exchange, dated September 15, 2012, from you to Patrick Kennedy. It

bears document number STATE-SCB 0093259 through 261. And then exhibit

3 is an email exchange dated September 25, 2012, from you to Patrick

Kennedy, , and bears document number SCB

0093114 through 148. And I'm going to give you a moment or two to take

a look at those.

Have you had an opportunity to look at those?

A I have.

Q Then, first, looking at exhibit 2, the one dated September

15, 2012, and what I would say is the bottom of the first page, which

would be, I would think, the third email exchange down from you on

Saturday, September 15, at 5:52 p.m. to Patrick Kennedy and you write,

and I quote: Dear Pat, I have been culling through the list of recent

retirees, parenthesis, I get the list periodically from FSI Transition

Center to keep up with who might be available for ARBs, end paren. I

was wondering if this event might warrant a celebrity of sorts, a la

Admiral Crowe for the Nairobi-Dar. Or if I could go ahead and start

reaching out to folks on the list. Do you have any sense of that from

the 7th floor?

So within 3 days of the Benghazi attacks, you're ready to jump

852
27

in and put the list together of potential members of the ARB. Is that

a correct reading of what you're writing here?

A That is correct.

Q Okay. And did you do that?

A Did I look through the list?

Q Did you put together a list of names to recommend to be

members of the ARB?

A I don't believe I did.

Q Okay. Why not?

A Well, because they went for option two and did more of the

celebrity approach as I would say. As I mentioned earlier, they got

Ambassador Pickering, who I consider to be in that category as

Ambassador Crowe, for when he was chosen for Nairobi-Dar.

Q Okay. But you did not come up with that list of celebrity

names?

A No. It is the Secretary who nominates these or who appoints

these folks. And when I give a list of names, I never know if they're

going to be accepted or not.

Q Okay. And when you say they were picking the celebrity

names, who did you mean by they?

A Oh, anyone above me. You know, it's one of those things

that, as a bureaucrat, you do your best to try to hit the mark. And

other times you miss, and it's out of your hands.

Q If we could go back to exhibit 1, to 12 FAM 033.2, it's on

page 8 of 15, subsection A.

853
28

A Uh-huh.

Q It talks about an ARB staff officer. Were you that at the

time?

A Yes.

Q And you were also the chair of the PCC?

A Yes.

Q So you were dual-hatted in a way?

A I was.

Q What is the distinction between the duties and

responsibilities of the person who is the chair of the PCC and the ARB

staff officer? Or has it always been one and the same person?

A No. It isn't. They convene the meeting. I provide the

briefings, set the agenda.

Q As the staff officer?

A As the staff officer. And provide the briefing materials

in advance of the meeting, if possible, and get the meeting set up.

So then there's a whole set of duties after the decision is made to

convene an ARB.

Q And what are some of those duties?

A Well, you prepare the notice in the Federal Registry, an

ALDAC, a cable to the field once you know who the participants on the

ARB will be. But until that time, you provide some suggested names

for membership in the ARB. You set up, with the executive office, you

find them space in the building to operate. You get their secure voice

telephones set up and get somebody to serve as the executive secretary

854
29

to that group.

And that executive secretary is kind of the bridge between the

board and the building. So that once we set them up, we don't have

any more things to do. We don't get involved in who they see or who

they interview, where, if they travel or not.

Q Okay. Back to 12 FAM 033.2-a, the second sentence says:

if the ARB PCC recommends that the Secretary convene a board, it will

forward a list of potential board members to the Secretary for approval.

But as I understand it, you did not do that with regard to the Benghazi

ARB?

A I did not. I don't recall doing it. I recall looking for

names.

Q Who instructed you not to do that?

A I don't think anybody instructed me not to do it. Names

were being raised to the 7th floor. So I was waiting for instruction,

whether to contact people or not. And I was told to hold I think, let

me ponder names it says.

Q And that is the, again, going back to exhibit 2, that was

the response from Patrick Kennedy to you, after you say I'm looking

at names --

A Yes.

Q -- and his response was let me ponder names?

A Yes. So then we talked about all of the names in the group,

the ones that I had, and the ones that he had.

Q Okay. And so you and Under Secretary Kennedy met and

855
30

discussed various names?

A Yes.

Q And do you recall when you did that?

A I don't recall.

Q Okay. Did any of the names that you suggested get

recommended to the Secretary?

A No. Not that I recall.

Q Did you have celebrity names in there?

A No.

Q Okay.

A I have the good luck of having some former ambassadors who

used to say hey, if you ever need me for an ARB, you know, I'll send

you my CV. And that is how I have a whole file folder full of names.

Q Okay.

A That's not the case anymore.

Q All right. And then if we could move on to exhibit 3, the

September 25, 2012 email exchange. And if we could go to the last page

and a little of the second to the last page, on what would be document

number 00093147 at the bottom, from you, dated September 25, 2012, at

7:58 a.m., and then on to the last page, to a and Stephen

Mull. Who are those individuals?

A Steve Mull, at the time, Ambassador Mull was the

Department's executive secretary.

Q Okay. And what does that position do? What does the

person do in that position?

856
31

A I can't, I can't imagine what all that position's involved

in. Right now, our current one is putting together the chief admission

conference. So I think he's the right hand of the Secretary I would

say.

Q Okay. And --

A And he has four deputies. And is one of those

four.

Q Okay. And you wrote to them on September 25th, you say:

dear colleagues, just a reminder, the Federal Registry notice takes

3 work days to be published, which means that I need the names of the

ARB members and the rest of the information by Wednesday morning if

they will be starting work on Monday, October 1. I would appreciate

knowing how this ARB is going to work, since it's not going in the normal

way. Can we talk this morning or tomorrow morning about

roles/responsibilities.

Please elaborate on why you wrote this email?

A Well, I had heard that they were going to start on October

1st. And I was reminding them that, because this is not something that

would normally be on their screen, that there are steps that we have

to do. And one of those steps is to put an article in the Federal

Registry to make the general public aware of this. So I was reminding

them that I needed this information.

Q Okay. And when you say you would appreciate knowing how

this ARB is going to work since it's not going in the normal way, what

did you mean by that?

857
32

A I don't recall exactly what I meant. But it sounds to me,

in reading this now, that I was a little bit concerned about being behind

the tide.

Q Sort of out of the loop?

A Yes. Well, it's a little strong. But I certainly wanted

to make sure we did everything process-wise. Because that's all that

I -- I mean, it's a lot to do, but that's all that I was involved in.

Q Okay. So is it safe to assume, and I don't want to -- which

is why you're here and we're asking you these questions, that by

September 25th, you did not have the names of the ARB members?

A I believe that's true from the way this reads.

Q Okay. And, in fact, if we go up the chain one, Ms.

responds to you later that morning, about half an hour later, where

she said , we don't have the final names unfortunately. Steve

will raise it with the key decision makers. I am happy to talk to you

at your convenience, but don't have much to share. will be

the executive secretary for the ARB. So if we meet, we should include

her. Thanks, . So do you recall when you received the names

of the ARB members?

A I really don't.

Q And who did you receive them from?

A .

Q Okay. Do you know, when they're referring to key

decisionmakers, do you know who was encompassed in that group, who was

making the decision for the members of the ARB?

858
33

A I really don't. As you can see, I was hungry for

information myself.

Q Okay. One of the things that you said just a little while

ago was that as the ARB staff officer, you would name the executive

secretary to the ARB.

A Right.

Q Is that set out in the FAM as one of your duties and

responsibilities?

A I don't recall if it's in the FAM. But what I normally do

is go to our H.R. Bureau and see who is available at the senior ranks

to take on a function such as this.

Q And what does the executive secretary to the ARB do?

A They arrange the meetings. They make sure that the board

has access to the Department for interviews and, you know, because

usually these people are removed from the Department, you know, they're

retirees, they're unfamiliar with the Department's ways. So in

sitting in on the interviews, the exec sec would know who they should

contact next, who this leads them to in a bureau. So they act, as I

call it, the bridge from the ARB to the building.

Q And in the 10 prior ARBs that you had been involved in, as

the ARB officer, had you made the selection of the executive secretary?

A I wouldn't say made the selection. I nominated people in

the past, sure.

Q And had they been selected then?

A Yes, normally.

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34

Q Okay. If I could, if you could go back to exhibit 1 to the

FAM, on page 5 of 15, under 12 FAM 032.3, subparagraph b, on the ARB

executive secretary, and it reads when a board is convened, M/PRI will

name an executive secretary to coordinate and facilitate the work of

the board. And was that the provision in effect in 2012?

A It was.

Q Okay. But that did not happen in this case?

A No. And it did not happen in maybe one or two of the other

cases. Someone was found available to be appointed. And I don't

appoint. I just recommend.

Q Well, it does say M/PRI will name an executive secretary.

It doesn't say recommend. It says will name. Was that language the

language that was in there in 2012?

A It was.

Q Okay. But that didn't happen in this case?

A No. And that's a little strong. So what we normally do

is go to H.R. and get the name of people who might be willing to serve

as the exec sec.

Q But a woman by the name of, is it ?

A Yes.

Q Okay. She was selected?

A Yes.

Q Do you know who selected her?

A No. I don't.

Q Okay. What position was she in at the time?

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35

A I believe she was one of the four deputies that Steve Mull

had.

Q Do you recall whether she was the chief of staff to Deputy

Secretary Burns?

A I don't recall.

Q Okay.

A I never knew her before then.

Q Okay. But she was a name that was supplied to you as to

be the person who was the executive secretary?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Were you given any information as to whether she was

willing to do this or not? Or did she have any reluctance?

A No. I'm sorry, my assumption was that she was willing to

do it. I don't know.

Q Okay. For the Benghazi ARB, did, were there additional

personnel assigned to assist the ARB?

A There's always a secretary assigned, an office manager.

Q Were there any other people to take notes, help write the

report, things like that to your knowledge?

A No. Not to my knowledge.

Q To your knowledge, there were no other people?

A Right.

Q Okay. So the two people that would have been assigned from

within the State Department would have been and one person

to act as the secretary/officer manager?

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36

A Yes.

Q Do you remember who that person was?

A I can't think of her name.

Q Was it --

A .

Q ?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And, to your knowledge, there was no one assigned?

A Not that I know of. Oh, so the board has an attorney that's

assigned to them. So, was there as their adviser. I

don't know if it's a full-time assignment, but she's available to them.

Q Did ever come and talk to you about how an ARB

works, how it progresses, what her duties and responsibilities would

be?

A We had lots of conversations. I gave them prior ARB reports

so that they would have a template for, you know, what one typically

looks like. So, yes, we had conversations.

Q Okay. How is it that an ARB either gets documents or

witnesses? Are they suggested to the ARB? Does the ARB decide what

it wants to see, who it wants to interview? Is it a combination of

those?

So I want to ask generally and then have you go specifically to

the Benghazi ARB?

A Typically, we prepare for the board a binder that includes

information about the incident, of course, the FAM citation, the

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37

Diplomatic Security act. And then I give maybe points of contact in

each bureau, certainly members of the PCC who made the decision to

convene or to recommend convening an ARB. And I will usually give them

contact information for those people so that they can start the process.

But other than that, we don't get involved. We don't want to be seen

as leading them in any way. So I know in that binder I prepared for

them, I had those key personnel listed.

Q Okay. Are you aware of whether there was a Department-wide

effort to gather relevant documents regarding the Benghazi attacks that

was then provided to the ARB?

A I'm not.

Q Do you know that that happened or whether that happened?

A I don't know.

Q Did you ever have discussions with regarding

gathering information to provide to the ARB?

A Only with regard to former ARB reports.

Q And can you elaborate on that? I'm not sure I follow.

A So they wanted a copy of, of course, my other bookend, the

Nairobi-Dar es Salaam, and some of the ones on Jeddah, and maybe some

of the Iraq ARB reports.

Q Did they typically want ARB reports that dealt with an

attack on a facility, as opposed to an assassination or other death

of personnel?

A Yes. Because that's why they didn't ask for Aman, for

example, because that gentleman was killed in his driveway. So that's

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38

why they focused on Iraq and Jeddah.

Q Okay. During this process of setting up the ARB, and the

choice of to be the executive secretary to the ARB, did you

have discussions with any of what I would call the 7th floor other than

Patrick Kennedy and Ms. ?

A I had conversations with Steve Mull as well, because he was

unfamiliar with the process. So, yes.

Q So he came in, and sat down, and said tell me about the ARB?

A No. He called. And I went up and told him about prior

ARBs.

Q Okay. Anyone else out of the 7th floor, Chief of Staff

Cheryl Mills, anyone else?

A No.

Q Okay.

A I had an email exchange that I should probably say that I

can remember with Wendy Sherman, because she was one of the ones, she

had a position with us for the Dar es Salaam bombings. And she asked

ARB-related questions because she knew that my office was involved in

that as well. And although I personally wasn't, she knew that the

office set up the ARBs.

Q And what did she want to know from the East African Embassy

bombing?

A She was trying to refresh her memory, I think, about what

the process is and, you know, whether there's a recommendation for

another panel to be stood up afterwards. I think she was conflating

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39

the ARB with the OPAP panel, which is the Overseas Presence Advisory

Panel. And so I remember that exchange.

Q And let me just follow on with that a little bit. Following

the East African Embassy bombing report, was there some sort of

subsequent review or company that was hired to look at certain

management things?

A There was the OPAP, the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel.

And that's where we got the rightsizing legislation to do the footprint

of our missions overseas. I'm sure many other things, but, as I

mentioned, I wasn't involved to a great disagree.

Q But you inherited it?

A I did.

Q Was that the organization that recommended that there

should be an under secretary for Diplomatic Security?

A I believe they did.

Q Okay. But that recommendation was never implemented. Is

that correct?

A Right. It wasn't.

Q Do you know why?

A I would say no, at that time, I didn't know why.

Q Have you subsequently learned, or have you learned what

happened historically?

A I think I learned over the past that the Department didn't

think that was in their best interest. We have a limited number of

under secretaries. And if we made an under secretary for Diplomatic

865
40

Security, you would have to take another one away. So you would have --

Q Or go to Congress and ask for another one?

A Perhaps, yes.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Just as a follow-up question, you said you inherited the

Dar es Salaam ARB. Were you involved in drafting the report to

Congress?

A No. I was not.

Q And who would be, who would have been?

A My boss at the time, .

Q But would you would have been involved in following through

on the recommendations or the steps that the Department was taking to

implement the recommendations of the ARB?

A Not initially. Because I didn't take over that portfolio

until it was well underway.

Ms. Jackson. And I see that we have come to the end of my first

hour. It's going quickly. So we're going to stop for a moment, take

a break. And we will probably switch sides with our colleagues. We'll

go off the record.

[Recess.]

Ms. Jackson. All right. Let's go back on the record. It is

about 11 minutes until 11. And we are going to continue with the

minority questions, majority questions.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Go ahead and ask the minority.

Ms. Jackson. I bet I could.

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41

Ms. . Could I clarify something I said before.

Ms. Jackson. Absolutely.

Ms. . I think I mentioned that the PCC meets more often

than I would like. And I wanted to put that in context. We only meet

when something horrible has happened, so if someone has lost their life

or a limb or a sense -- and I just wanted to clear that up. Because

my day, if you can imagine, is reading all the spot reports of what

happened overseas. It's really not as uplifting as one might like.

So I just wanted to put that in context.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q The fact that you would have to consider an ARB means that

a tragedy has occurred?

A Absolutely.

Q Yes, I can imagine that is not the fun part of your job.

A Right.

Q So, yes, we do understand that. And thank you for the

clarification.

A Sure.

Q I just want to backtrack and ask a couple follow-up

questions on some issues that we hit on in the first hour. And you

had mentioned that one of your or had been one of your other duties,

was to liaison or coordinate with Diplomatic Security over maybe policy

issues, and that you would review them and things.

Can you give us an example of what type of policy M/PRI would be

involved in and reviewing before it would go out, or why you would have

867
42

to clear on it?

A Sure. With regard to only DS or the portfolio?

Q Let's start with DS. And I'll ask you if it's the same or

different with other bureaus.

A Okay. So each of the analysts, the senior analysts in our

office, is given a portfolio of bureaus. Mine happened to be DS, H.R.,

FSI. And every time they had a policy change, it comes through to the

under secretary.

And we are asked to take a look at it, make sure it makes sense,

make sure it's not in contrast to any Federal regulations, like, in

H.R.'s case, it doesn't compete with OPM's regulations. And so that's

the kind of review we give documents going up for the under secretary's

decision.

Q Can you give us an example of something that you had reviewed

with regard to DS?

A Yes. They proposed making a change so that DS agents, who

are the cream of the crop of the DS population, are entitled to carry

two weapons.

Q Okay.

A And they were changing that. And I had to opine on whether

this is a good idea or not. And it is, so you do research on other

law enforcement bodies and, you know, and other departments, and see

if it's in line with their abilities.

Q Okay. And is that a similar process for other bureaus?

A Sure. A bureau, at OBO, budget and planning, all of those,

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43

every bureau that comes under the M-family.

Q Okay. One other thing that you mentioned early on was that

in the rightsizing part of M/PRI, you would look at overall staffing

at overseas missions to determine if they had the right complement of

people. Did I understand that correctly?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. And that would be the right number of foreign service

officers and security? Would it encompass both of those?

A It encompasses all agencies who have an overseas presence,

so Treasury, Agriculture, DOD. So the post puts forward its country

strategy plan. And so we look at that. And then we're looking 5 years

out from the current day staffing. And this is done not only for new

construction, but also for, on ad hoc, it's done every year 5 years

for each post.

So we have a cycle of reviewing every post for 5 years. It's also

done for OBO new construction and space requirements. So within State,

I think your question is, within State, I think that the political and

econ officers are, their objectives are laid out in the country strategy

plan. So we're looking more at the functions, the foreign affairs

functions that are being accomplished.

Q And for every overseas post you do this annually?

A Every 5 years.

Q Every 5 years?

A Yes. Or in the case of new construction so that OBO knows

how big to build the building.

869
44

Q With respect to embassies that are evacuated or closed in

any way, would you get called in to do a reevaluation?

A No.

Q How about when they were, when you described doing it on

an ad hoc basis, what would, what would warrant an ad hoc review?

A If an agency was going to expand greatly their cohort, they

would need to do what they call tightsizing, which is construction

within the same footprint. And you would have to be sure that there

were enough management people to take care of the customers who are

now at post.

Q In the year 2011, was the rightsizing part of M/PRI asked

to weigh in at all with respect to Libya?

Ms. Welcher. If you know.

Ms. . I wouldn't know that because I was not the manager

director then. I was totally, I was GS-15 with my own portfolio. I

didn't have any anything to do with rightsizing or innovation for that

matter.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Who was in that position at the time?

A The managing director?

Q Uh-huh.

A It would probably be

Q Could you spell the last name?

A . She's now retired. But she was a Foreign

Service OC.

870
45

Q Going back for a moment to the various DS policies that you

may have reviewed in 2011, do you recall a policy coming out of DS that

anyone who went to Libya needed to have high-threat training, or the

agents assigned to Libya needed to be high-threat trained, and the

people assigned in Libya needed to have FACT training?

A I was aware of that because I had both H.R. and FSI as a

portfolio.

Q And so those were the type of policies that you would have

reviewed and weighed in upon?

A Yes.

Q What about issues like danger pay?

A At the time, no.

Q How would that, how would an increase in danger pay make

its way through the hierarchy of the State Department?

A Danger pay is done in the Bureau of Administration. And

it's based on a certain set number of factors that's going on in the

local area.

Q Okay.

A I didn't have a bureau at the time.

Q So it's because you didn't have a bureau that you did not

weigh in on that?

A Right.

Q Even though it may have been danger pay for the people

assigned in Libya?

A No -- right.

871
46

Ms. Betz. Can I just follow up really quick?

Ms. Jackson. Sure.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q On the policies on high-threat training, and FACT training,

for those personnel that were traveling to Libya, did you have

discussions with DS before you made the recommendation, or discuss

those within the broader M-family?

A We had, we had meetings on FACT training itself and the

capacity for, you know, to, we had, over time, we've increased the

number of people who have to take FACT training.

So we've had many conversations over the last 5 years about how

to roll this into the general population and how to do it so that it,

you know, what am I trying to say, the capacity, I guess, of the training

center to be able to do those.

Q And was there a stated need for the personnel to be trained

both on the DS side for high-threat training and FACT training?

A Yes. Yes.

Q And what were some of those discussions on the need for those

personnel to be trained? Was there a concern?

A I think there was a concern that people were being sent to

places that they were not well trained in security. You know, up until

we were in these dangerous places, we didn't need to know how to do

a tourniquet. And we didn't know how to drive evasively. Because the

world has changed now over the last decade and half, so I think we were

trying to improve the comfort level of our people to be in these places.

872
47

Q So there was concern about the security environment and

personnel being able to operate in those concerning environments?

A I think, yes, I think we were trying to give people a level

of comfort. Yes.

873
48

[10:59 a.m.]

Ms. Jackson. All right, let me return now to the Benghazi ARB.

We had talked in the last, in the first hour about how this, the PCC

had essentially a virtual meeting to decide whether to recommend an

ARB. I would like to hand you what I have marked as exhibit 4 and ask

you to review this document.

[ Exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q It's essentially one page. There is just one sentence on

the back side of the page, and for the record, it is document No.

C05394445. It is an email chain at the top, from Charlene Lamb to Scott

Bultrowicz and others, reads: "Need an SBU summary of Benghazi today."

And I'm going to ask you about the email exchange at the bottom

of the first page, which is an email from you to a ,

, on September 18, 2012.

A Okay.

Q And in this email exchange, you're writing to .

And who is ?

A was the executive assistant to Eric Boswell,

the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security.

Q So was she a person you reached out to when you wanted to

communicate with DS?

A Yes.

Q And you write in here, and I quote: "M wants me to conduct

874
49

the ARB/PCC by email, if necessary, by COB today." And by "M," who

are you referring to?

A Patrick Kennedy, the Under Secretary for Management.

Q And "COB," obviously, means close of business?

A Yes.

Q Had you been directed by Under Secretary Kennedy to conduct

the PCC by email?

A I would think so since I said that. Probably at the 8

o'clock meeting that morning we would have discussed it. Oh, if

necessary.

Q Do you recall that you were directed to get it done that

day either in person or by email?

A I don't recall specifically the conversation, but you know,

he was leaving it to me that everybody knew what had happened, and we

felt like it met the criteria, so --

Q Okay. Following an ARB report, there is a separate report

that goes to Congress. Is that correct?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And was there a separate report generated for the

Benghazi ARB?

A There was.

Q And who did that?

A My office did.

Q Okay. And do you recall when it was submitted to Congress?

A I don't know the date specifically, but it would have been

875
50

in 60 days after. We have a window where we declare our intentions

to follow through with the recommendations.

Q Okay. And did your office receive any input from persons

outside of M/PRI in writing that report?

A Well, sure. We had to go to the people who are

subject-matter experts and ensure that, you know, the steps forward

that we would take to implement the recommendations.

Q And describe that process for us. How do you -- do you

convene a group? Do you convene a task force? Who leads it? Does

M/PRI lead it? Does someone else lead it? How does that work?

A Well, we usually commit the people who know the lines of

business that are involved in solving the recommendations, and we get

their commitments to their timeframe, and then we start drafting, and

we clear the drafts among the offices involved.

Q Okay. And who was heading up the implementation of the

recommendations from the Benghazi ARB? Within the State Department,

who was leading that effort?

A I believe it was headed by Steve Mull in this case.

Q From the executive secretary?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what do you base that belief on?

A My remembrance that they had looked at the recommendations

and broke them out into discrete subactions within the recommendations

to go even beyond what the recommendation required.

Q Okay. Were there any recommendations of the Benghazi ARB

876
51

that were not going to be implemented; that the decision was made not

to implement them?

A No, they were all accepted.

Q Okay. Do you recall a recommendation that there be

separate minimum standards on physical security for high-threat posts?

A I do recall that.

Q Okay. And that one was accepted?

A There are minimum standards.

Q Are they the minimum standards for all buildings regardless

of the threat level of the post?

A They are all the same standard, the OSPB standard.

Q Go ahead.

A Overseas policy security board.

Q Overseas Security Policy Board?

A Yes.

Q Was the Benghazi ARB to recommend that there be a higher

level of minimum standards at high-threat posts? Do you recall that?

A No, I don't. I don't recall it.

Q Once an ARB concludes and issues its report, what happens

to the records?

A They are turned over to my office where they are kept

separately in our office.

Q Okay. And did that happen with the Benghazi ARB?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And can you just describe that process to us? How

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52

do you get them? Do you box them up? Do you scan them? Where are

they physically kept?

A They are in our five-door .

Q I'm sorry. A what?

A It's a safe. is the name brand. It's the most

secure safe that we have. And they are in there under the records that

we keep and standing up in ARB, the employment letters and minutes of

the permanent coordinating committee. There are other documents that

we then attach to the report of the Board, and then our response, in

our report to Congress, in response to the Board recommendations. So

all of it is neatly kept together.

Q Okay. Now, do you keep a copy of all of the records that

the ARB reviewed such as emails or policy manuals?

A Oh, no.

Q You don't do that?

A No.

Q Okay. And why not?

A Because we have what they give us.

Q And when you say "they give us," who is "they"?

A The Board, the executive secretary and the OMS

usually -- the office management specialist, they deliver the documents

to us.

Q Okay.

A And, in this case, it was the report, and all of the

appendices.

878
53

Q Okay. So you don't keep -- do you keep summaries of

interviews they have conducted or other documents that were reviewed,

or does anyone?

A I don't. No.

Q And have you ever for any ARB?

A We have documentation like that for ARBs long past.

When -- before emails, when things are in longhand, interviews, that's

how some of those paper files are still there from 1988.

Q So, in the entire time that you managed the ARB process as

the ARB staff officer, the State Department did not maintain the

underlying records that were reviewed by an ARB?

A No. I don't understand. It sounds like we didn't keep the

records. We kept every record that they gave us. So they didn't give

it to me. You know, I only have what was given to me if the State

Department has them --

Q Okay. And, again, the executive secretary to the ARB would

be one of the people who would make the determination as to what was

turned over to your office?

A Yes.

Q Back to exhibit 1, under 12 FAM 034.2-5 on Classification

Authority, 034.2-5. It says that the Board does not have original

classification authority and that the director of M/PRI will exercise

classification authority for materials originating from Board

activities.

Was that something that you did at the time after the Benghazi

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54

ARB?

A By that time, we had a director who came on board in late

September of 2012, so she exercised the classification for them.

Q Okay. And for what, in particular, did the director of

M/PRI review? Was it the report and the appendices, or was it other

records that the ARB would have either created or reviewed?

A No, it was just the report.

Q Just the report?

A And the appendices.

Q Okay. Do you know who would have exercised classification

authority over records that were created by the ARB, such as interview

summaries, or memorandums, and things like that?

A No, I don't know.

Q Okay. Do you know whether was an original

classification authority within the State Department?

A No, I don't. No.

Q Okay. Staying with exhibit 1 on, I think it is the very

last page on the implementation of the recommendations -- actually,

it's 12 FAM 036.3 on Managing ARB Recommendations, starts on page 14

of 15, goes into the last page.

It's our understanding, and also from seeing the date of the

12-8-2014 that this section was amended and changed in December

of 2014. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And can you tell us what changed regarding the

880
55

management of ARB recommendations in December of 2014?

A If I recall correctly, it was paragraph B, where M, in

coordination with P are responsible for implementation of the ARB

recommendations.

Q And how is that different from what it was before?

A The involvement -- I think that was changed to include

involvement of P.

Q Okay. And how did M/PRI's role change then? Were there

changes?

A Yes, there were. In fact, each recommendation is now

packaged up into an action MO sent to the seventh floor to -- that proves

the evidence of its proposed status -- either closed or it's still in

progress -- that M and P then acknowledge or agree to or send back

additional questions.

Q Okay. And what was the process then before?

A The process before was a spreadsheet that I kept and with

supporting material, either cables, or changed regulations, changed

security policies that I just kept in a binder that I considered things

closed.

Q And what is the role of the Deputy Secretary for Management

Resources with regard to the ARB recommendations?

A We prepare reports for her, indicating which

recommendations are open or closed or in progress. And that's new

from -- since Benghazi.

Q And how often do you do that report?

881
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A We do a quarterly report, and it usually requires a briefing

as well. So we bring her up to date. She has questions sometimes on

the status of things.

Q Okay. And without going into great detail, what

recommendations remain open from the Benghazi ARB?

Ms. Welcher. If you know.

Ms. . I know of one or two, but I believe they are

classified. And I wouldn't want to talk about them now.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q All right. Other than those one or two that would be

appropriate for a classified setting, is it your understanding that

all of the other recommendations are closed?

A I'm sorry. I think that they are. There are three that

I know are still open for some degree or another, but because I'm

separated from this day-to-day function, I can't -- I wouldn't want

to say that they are.

Q Okay. And when was the last time a report went to the Deputy

Secretary regarding the status of the recommendations?

A I think December or January of this year.

Q And is another quarterly report in process right now?

A Sure, it is. Yeah.

Ms. Jackson. I think that's all the questions we have. So, with

that, we thank you. We are going to take another break. It is 11:15.

I did that in 26 minutes. So under a half an hour. So we are going

to go off the record.

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57

[Discussion off the record.]

EXAMINATION

BY MR. REBNORD:

Q We will go back on the record. The time is 11:24.

Ms. , my name is Dan Rebnord. I'm with the Select Committee

minority staff. I'm joined by my colleagues Susanne Grooms, Erin

O'Brien, and on behalf of the Select Committee minority members, we

would just like to thank you for appearing today voluntarily, and for

your many years of dedicated public service to our country.

So thank you.

A Thank you. It's my pleasure.

Q I would just like to start by going back to a few discussions

we had or you had with my majority colleagues in the first and second

hours about the PCC that met following the Benghazi attacks. It's my

recollection during the first hour that you had mentioned that the PCC

met virtually, or via email. Is that correct?

A Correct.

Q And then you clarified during the last hour at the very

beginning that the PCC met when something very serious or tragic had

happened. Right?

A Right.

Q So I just want to be perfectly clear for the record that

the PCC that met following the Benghazi attacks perhaps did so virtually

because it was, unfortunately, obvious that Benghazi would require an

ARB?

883
58

A Yes. It was obvious to all of us that it met the criteria.

Q Okay. Thank you. I just wanted to be clear for the record.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q So the part where you had to go through the process of doing

the formal PCC, was that just a sort of a formulaic process?

A Yes, we like to keep records of that decision.

Q And so, at some point, it sounds like Ambassador or Under

Secretary Kennedy directed you: We need to get that process done today

so we can move on to the next step. Is that sort of how that would

have happened?

A Yes. I don't recollect exactly. It was a very busy time,

but I think that's for the expediency of, you know, being -- doing what

we need to do, yes.

Q Because there never would have been a question in anybody's

mind that the PCC would have met and then decided not to have an ARB?

A No, this was a clear -- clear-cut.

Mr. Rebnord. Okay. Thank you. That's very helpful. I would

like to now introduce exhibit 5.

[ Exhibit No. 5

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. . Thank you.

BY MR. REBNORD:

Q And this is the State Department Office of the Inspector

General September 2013 Special Review of the Accountability Review

Board process. And we just have excerpts here, but it is still a fairly

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59

lengthy document so I won't ask you to review the whole thing in the

interest of time. But if I can turn your attention to the first full

paragraph on page 14, I believe, and I will just read it into the record,

it says, quote: "In almost all instances, the selection of ARB members

was made based on the recommendations submitted which M/PRI to the

Secretary. In only two instances (Nairobi/Dar es Salaam and Benghazi)

did the names of ARB members actually originate with the Secretaries

and their senior advisors."

So we have already talked about this a bit in the first and second

hours. But is this consistent with your recollection that the names

of potential Benghazi ARB members actually originated in the

Secretary's office, and not from M/PRI?

A That's my recollection, yes.

Q Okay. And you had said also when outlining your

background, that you joined the M/PRI office, I believe, in 1997?

A Yes.

Q Is that correct?

A Yes, it is correct.

Q So do you recall if the Nairobi/Dar es Salaam ARB operated

in the same manner?

A It's my understanding that it did, yes.

Q Okay. Okay. And do you have any idea why that may have

been the case? I believe you described the 1999 ARB and the Benghazi

ARB as sort of celebrity ARBs?

A Yes.

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60

Q Do you have any understanding of why that may have been the

case?

A In my opinion -- and I, you know, that's all I can give

you -- they were such obvious tragedies, so pointed attacks on our

diplomatic missions that it rose to that level, that it was

all-consuming in our -- you know, the Nairobi/Dar was the State

Department's 9/11, if you will. It was the first instance that we had

been attacked to that degree, and it rose to the level of the Secretary's

involvement.

Q Okay.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q And so it was really, in your opinion, it sounds like it's

the seriousness of the incident that made it important that the

Secretary was -- and the Secretary's office would be personally

involved?

A In my opinion, as I said, I wasn't involved, but I know that

it was just all consuming for my colleagues who were doing that.

Q And when you talk about sort of the celebrity status, can

you explain sort of what you mean by that?

A Well, and I don't mean to be flip about it, first of all.

That's probably a bad choice of words, but it's those people who have

impeccable credentials, who have served overseas, who know what it's

like to be under the advisory of the security professional in their

day-to-day operations. It wouldn't do the Department any good to

choose people who didn't have that understanding. And I think those

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61

are just chosen because of their experience.

Q And did you see that Admiral Crowe and Ambassador Pickering

and Admiral Mullen were all of that sort of character?

A And Admiral Crowe, in our terminology, is referred to as

Ambassador because he served one of our ambassadors overseas. So it

is not only his Navy career title that gave him those credentials, but

serving as an ambassador would be very much akin to Ambassador

Pickering.

Q When you are talking about their impeccable credentials,

do you sort of see that as giving them an enhanced credibility?

A Yes.

Q And then their report, therefore, being taken really

seriously, I guess?

A Yes, I would say.

BY MR. REBNORD:

Q Okay. And then if I can turn your attention back to the

exhibit where we left off. The report goes on to say: "Many of those

interviewed by the OIG team felt that the increased involvement of

Department principals in the selection process would ensure that the

prosed ARB membership properly reflects the background and skill sets

needed as well as appropriate consideration of diversity."

So it sounds from the report like the inspector general didn't

find anything improper about the Secretary's office nominating members

to serve on the Benghazi ARB, would you agree?

A I would agree.

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62

Q Okay. And, in fact, to the contrary, it sounds like the

IG found that the increased involvement of Department principals when

selecting potential ARB members would actually improve the ARB process?

A Correct.

Q Do you personally feel that there was anything improper

about how potential Benghazi ARB members were generated by the

Secretary's senior advisors instead of waiting to receive a list of

potential candidates from M/PRI?

A No, I don't feel that was -- at all took away from the product

that they produced.

Q Okay. And you felt that the five ARB members appointed to

serve on the Benghazi ARB were well qualified with impeccable

credentials --

A Yes.

Q -- as you say, to make recommendations to the State

Department about how to improve the Department's security procedures

and protocols?

A Yes. I read their CVs, and I felt that they were certainly

above and beyond anyone that I could reach.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Is that because sort of your list of people

are people who had volunteered to you, so you sort of have a limited

scope, and they were able to sort of ask anybody they wanted to?

Ms. . Yes, I think people take my calls, and I have a set

questions that I ask them, but it would give them much more impetus

to say "yes" if they got a call from someone on the seventh floor, I

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63

would say.

BY MR. REBNORD:

Q As you may be aware, there are some who have alleged that

the Secretary chose the members appointed to serve on the Benghazi ARB

in order to insulate herself and other seventh floor principals from

accountability or responsibility with respect to the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any reason to believe that Secretary Clinton appointed

members to serve on the ARB in order to insulate herself and other

seventh floor principals from accountability?

A No.

Q Do you have any reason to believe that the members appointed

to serve on the ARB were selected by the Secretary because she thought

they would protect her and other seventh floor principals from being

held responsible for what happened in Benghazi?

A No.

Q Thank you. If I can now turn your attention back to exhibit

3. And you had a discussion with my colleagues during the first hour

about the first email that you sent on September 25th at 9:53 a.m.,

and I would just like to ask with respect to the line.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. We are on the last page of that.

Mr. Rebnord. Oh, I'm sorry.

Ms. . Okay. All right.

Mr. Rebnord. Okay. I'm sorry about that.

BY MR. REBNORD:

Q With respect to the line, "I would appreciate knowing how

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64

this ARB is going to work since it is not going in the normal way,"

I believe that you had testified that you were expressing some concern

about being able to file with the Federal Register on time. Is that --

A Yes.

Q -- an accurate representation?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So that line about how this isn't going in the normal

way didn't have anything to do with any impropriety of the ARB process?

A Of course not. It was my -- the normal, as I knew it, and

what I had to do next, I was trying to be timely and, you know, thorough,

in what I needed to do.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Okay. So your concern was if they didn't

give you the names, you couldn't meet the deadline for the Federal

Registry?

Ms. . Correct.

BY MR. REBNORD:

Q And you had been, this is my sort of characterization, sort

of the steward of the ARB since I think it was 1999?

A Yes.

Q Have you ever read the FAM in such a way that would prohibit

the Secretary's office from nominating a list of potential ARB members?

A No. It does not.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Or generating.

Mr. Rebnord. Or generating.

Ms. . It does not preclude it. We do it as a service to

890
65

the Secretary. It's the Secretary's responsibility to appoint these

folks.

BY MR. REBNORD:

Q Okay. Thank you. I would now like to turn your attention

back to exhibit 5. And if I can turn your attention to the key findings,

which are on -- or key judgments, excuse me, which are on page 1, and

the first judgment or finding at the top reads, quote: "The

Accountability Review Board process operates as intended,

independently and without bias, to identify vulnerabilities in the

Department of State's security programs."

Would you agree with this inspector general finding?

A Yes, I would.

Q And did you ever have any reason to question the

independence or integrity of the Benghazi ARB?

A No.

Q And was it your impression that the State Department,

including seventh floor principals, took the ARB process seriously?

A Yes, they take it seriously.

Q So, for them, would you agree that the safety and security

of diplomatic personnel was paramount, that that was the end objective

of the ARB?

A Yes.

Q Okay. During the first hour, you had made a reference to

the fact that M/PRI maintained a list of potential ARB members and that

you used to have the luxury of former ambassadors and other, perhaps,

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66

other career officials. They would reach out to you and say: If an

ARB would, unfortunately, need to be convened, I'm here to volunteer.

Is that correct?

A Yes, that is true.

Q But that, perhaps, no longer is the case?

A That, indeed, is no longer the case.

Q Okay. And why is that?

A If I could be frank.

Q Please do.

A They have seen what was done to a career ambassador -- to

Ambassador Pickering and others, and they are not at all interested

in being treated in the same way. I had two occasions to have

conversations with retired ambassadors who say: Take my name off your

list. I won't go through that. If they did it to Tom Pickering, they

will do it to me, and I'm not going to do it.

Q When you say -- I know this is perhaps hard for you. These

are friends of yours. When you say "what was done to Ambassador

Pickering and Admiral Mullen," what do you mean by "what was done"?

A I was told that they were treated very rudely and were

second-guessed and examined very critically by, I guess, in the

previous committee. And now this committee, that no one wants to be

put through that. I didn't come to any of the -- I wasn't in the room

at any of the closed-door sessions, so I don't know firsthand, but I

was told that it was not something that people have the appetite for.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

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67

Q Is part of the concern the repeated questioning of the

integrity and credibility --

A Yes.

Q -- of the Ambassadors?

A Yes, it is very much that. People who have served their

whole adult life for an organization and have given their best advice

and guidance who have just been dismissed.

Q And is part of the concern that serving on a future ARB will

expose, you know, credible former ambassadors to political attacks?

A Yes. And one has said to me that they wouldn't, they

wouldn't even be a party to the writing of a report because having the

Secretary as the customer, if you will, they are free to be frank and

open. And to know that their words would have such scrutiny, they felt

like they wouldn't be able to tell it like it is, if you will.

BY MR. REBNORD:

Q Is it your impression that subsequent congressional

investigations of the Benghazi attacks have somehow affected the ARB

process going forward?

A It is my contention that it is. And this will play out in

the next couple of weeks, because on March the 1st -- am I okay to say?

Mr. Evers. As long as it is not classified.

Ms. . It is not classified. We lost two local staff at

one of our missions March the 1st, and so I have been trying to get

a list together should the PCC recommend an ARB, and I'm having no luck.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. You just can't find anyone who wants to

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68

serve on it?

Ms. . No.

Mr. Rebnord. Well, thank you for that. And, certainly, our

sympathies go out to the families of those victims who were lost in

that attack.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. What's the impact of having difficulty or

not being able to find really qualified, good people to serve on an

ARB?

Ms. . It has been my experience over the, you know,

15 years that I have been doing this, that we change the policies at

posts overseas. We change the security procedures, and, you know, as

early on as when Mr. Foley was killed in his driveway, he was surveilled

2 days and assassinated on the third day. So what did we learn from

that? We learned to vary your routes to work, to vary your times. And

so, in every one of these instances, we had clear procedures that are

then implemented, not only at that post but worldwide.

And if we don't have that close examination of what happened and

what we can do to make it not happen again, we have lost all of that -- the

ability to ensure the safety of our people overseas.

BY MR. REBNORD:

Q I would just like to ask you a couple of questions. There

was some discussion in the previous hours about the appointment of the

to serve as the Executive Secretary of the ARB, and I would

just like to follow up with a couple of questions related to that.

A Sure.

894
69

Q Did you have any reason to question Ms.

independence or integrity as the Benghazi ARB executive secretary?

A No, I didn't.

Q Did Ms. ever indicate to you that the ARB was

designed to insulate Secretary Clinton or other seventh floor

principals?

A No.

Q Did Ms. ever indicate to you that the ARB was meant

to whitewash what happened during the Benghazi attacks?

A No.

Q Okay. What I would like to do now is just ask you a series

of public allegations that have been made related to the Benghazi

attacks. What I'm asking for is whether you have any firsthand

knowledge of the allegation. If yes, I will ask you to follow up. If

no, just simply say so. And these are a little bit long, so I would

ask you to just please bear with me and if you need me to repeat anything,

please don't hesitate to let me know.

A Thank you.

Q Right, I'm sorry, whether you have any firsthand evidence

to support the allegation, not whether you have any firsthand knowledge

that the allegation was made.

A Oh, okay.

Q Yes. Okay. It has been alleged that Secretary of State

Clinton intentionally blocked military action on the night of the

attacks. One Congressman has speculated that Secretary Clinton told

895
70

Leon Panetta to stand down and this resulted in the Defense Department

not sending more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged Secretary Clinton personally signed an

April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington Post Fact

Checker evaluated this claim and gave it four Pinocchios, its highest

award for false claims. Do you have any evidence that Secretary

Clinton personally signed an April 2012 cable denying security

resources to Libya?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support from military operations in Libya

in spring 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

896
71

or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

spring of 2011?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. Mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that, quote, "The CIA was not collecting and

shipping arms from Libya to Syria," and that they found no support for

this allegation. Do you have any evidence to contradict the House

Intelligence Committee bipartisan report findings that the CIA was not

shipping arms from Libya to Syria?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A No.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound, and

there have been a number of allegations about the cause of and the

appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee

issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not ordered

to stand down but that, instead, there were tactical disagreements on

the ground over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

897
72

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no standdown order to

CIA personnel?

A No. I don't.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do

you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind

the temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed the Annex

to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A No.

Q A concern has been raised by one individual that in the

course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board,

damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that

production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Let me ask these questions also for documents that were

provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials

that were provided to Congress?

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73

A No.

Q It has been alleged CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when he

told Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully performed our duties

in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship," end quote.

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave

false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No.

Q It has been alleged Ambassador Susan Rice made a, quote,

"Intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows

about the Benghazi attacks."

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk

shows?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief on the night of the

attacks" and that he was, quote, "missing in action."

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

899
74

President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing in action

on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considering

flying on the second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors

to, quote, "stand down," meaning to cease all operations. Military

officials have stated that those four individuals were instead ordered

to remain in place in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance

in their current location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that there was -- found that, quote, "There was no

standdown order issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought

to join the fight in Benghazi," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House

Armed Services Committee that there was no standdown order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives. However,

former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the former

chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review of

the attacks after he which he stated, quote, "Given where the troops

were, how quickly the thing all happened, and how quickly it dissipated,

900
75

we probably couldn't have done more than we did." Do you have any

evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's conclusion?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives, but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided

not to deploy?

A No.

Q Ms. , thank you for your time today. I would like

to just give you the opportunity if there is anything else that you

think the committee ought to know, should be investigating, anything

else you would like to tell us while we have you here.

A I think I have said enough. Thank you.

Mr. Rebnord. Okay.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Thank you very much. We can go off the

record.

[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the interview was concluded.]

901
902
12 FAM 030

ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARD (ARB)

(CT:DS­232; 03­17­2015)

(Office of Origin: M/PRI)

12 FAM 031 GENERAL PROVISIONS

12 FAM 031.1 Objective

(CT:DS­158; 09­17­2010)

The ARB process is a mechanism to foster more effective security of U.S. missions and

personnel abroad by ensuring a thorough and independent review of security­related

incidents. Through its investigations and recommendations, the Board seeks to

determine accountability and promote and encourage improved security programs and

practices. In addition, the ARB mechanism enhances the integrity of the visa issuing

process by determining accountability in certain instances in which terrorist acts in the

United States are committed by aliens.

12 FAM 031.2 Responsibilities

(CT:DS­158; 09­17­2010)

A Board will be convened for the express purpose of investigating only that incident or

those incidents specified by the Secretary. A Board will examine the facts and

circumstances surrounding the incident or incidents, and makes written findings in

accordance with 12 FAM 035.

12 FAM 031.3 ARB Definitions

(CT:DS­225; 12­08­2014)

Act: The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, as amended.

ARB: Accountability Review Board.

Board: Accountability Review Board established under either Title III of the Act (22

U.S.C. 4831) or Section 140(c).

COM: Chief of a U.S. mission.

Committee: The ARB Permanent Coordinating Committee (ARB/PCC).

Consular officer: Any individual authorized to issue visas pursuant to Section 101(a)

(9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(9), and the

Department’s regulations under 22 CFR 40.1(d).

D: The Deputy Secretary of State.

Days: Calendar days.

D­MR: The Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources.

EXHIBIT 1

903
DNI: The Director of National Intelligence.

Department: The Department of State.

Incident: A security­related incident or a visa incident.

Individual: As defined in Section 303(a)(1)(B) of the Act (22 U.S.C. 4833(a)(1)(B)).

Party: Any person invited, subpoenaed or otherwise required to participate in any

investigation, hearing, or other official activity of a Board.

Records of a Board: Documents and information, in any form, that are used or

produced by a Board and which a Board believes should be included in its official

records.

Representative: A lawyer appearing at the witness’ expense, or a lawyer who

represents solely the interests of the witness testifying before an ARB. U.S.

government lawyers who are obliged to represent the interests of their employer

agencies are not “exclusive representatives” for purposes of these regulations.

Secretary: The Secretary of State.

Section 140(c): Section 140(c) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years

1994 and 1995, Public Law 103­236, as amended by Section 1(d) of Public Law 103­

415 (October 25, 1994) (8 U.S.C. 1182 note).

Security­related incident: A case of serious injury, loss of life, or significant

destruction of property at or related to a U.S. government mission abroad, or a case

of a serious breach of security involving intelligence activities or a foreign government

directed at a U.S. mission abroad (other than a facility or installation subject to the

control of a U.S. area combatant commander).

Visa incident: A terrorist act causing serious injury, loss of life, or significant

destruction of property in the United States when there is probable cause to believe

that an alien participated in the act, and when the alien was issued a visa contrary to

applicable visa lookout procedures established by the Department.

12 FAM 032 ORGANIZATION

12 FAM 032.1 ARB Permanent Coordinating Committee

(ARB/PCC)

(CT:DS­217; 10­09­2014)

a. Purpose: The ARB/PCC will, as quickly as possible after an incident occurs, review

the available facts and recommend to the Secretary to convene or not convene a

Board. (Due to the 1999 revision of the law requiring the Secretary to convene a

Board not later than 60 days after the occurrence of an incident, except that such

period may be extended for one additional 60­day period, the ARB/PCC will meet

within 30 days of the incident if enough information is available.) In addition, the

ARB/PCC will meet yearly to review the ARB process, existing policies and procedures,

all past ARB recommendations, and ensure that any necessary changes are effected.

b. Membership: The ARB/PCC will be composed of the following members:

(1) The Director of the Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation

(M/PRI), who will chair the ARB/PCC;

904
(2) The Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security or the Principal Deputy;

(3) The Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research;

(4) The Coordinator for Counterterrorism;

(5) The senior deputy assistant secretary (or secretaries, as appropriate) of the

relevant regional bureau(s);

(6) One representative designated by and representing the DCI; and

(7) The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Visa Services.

c. Other participants: As a result of the State­Justice Memorandum of Understanding

(MOU) dated September 20, 2001, the Department of Justice has been invited to

attend PCC meetings. Also, as determined by the Chairperson, representatives of

other offices and agencies may be invited to work with the ARB/PCC.

d. Security clearances: Members of the ARB/PCC must have the appropriate and

necessary security clearances from the Department of State and, as necessary, from

other departments and agencies before being granted access to classified information.

e. Incident vetting process: To identify incidents that warrant convening the

ARB/PCC, M/PRI will shepherd the following process:

(1) Once M/PRI becomes aware of an incident overseas, the M/PRI Director, as Chair

of the ARB/PCC, will consult with Diplomatic Security, the Office of the Legal

Adviser, and other offices as appropriate, to evaluate whether the ARB statute

criteria apply;

(2) If deemed applicable, M/PRI will convene an ARB/PCC, allowing enough time for

preliminary incident reports to be developed for consideration by the ARB/PCC;

(3) If the applicability of the ARB statute criteria is questionable, an ARB/PCC will be

convened;

(4) If deemed not applicable, M/PRI will notify ARB/PCC members in writing,

providing a summary of the incident and an explanation as to why the criteria do

not apply. Members who disagree with this decision will have three business

days upon receipt of notice to request that an ARB/PCC be convened. If such a

request is made, M/PRI will convene a meeting of the ARB/PCC; otherwise, no

ARB/PCC will be called. Members and their staffs will also be notified via

telephone;

(5) M/PRI will log all events involving loss of life, injury to personnel, or property

damage, noting whether a PCC was convened and the reasons for doing so or

not; and

(6) On a quarterly basis, the ARB/PCC will notify the Secretary of all incidents that do

not warrant convening the ARB/PCC. Examples of such an incident are property

damage resulting from a security­related incident that does not have a highdollar value or a very minor injury resulting from a security­related incident.

12 FAM 032.2 The Board

(CT:DS­162; 03­21­2011)

a. Membership: See Section 302(a) of the Act, 22 U.S.C. 4832.

905
b. Background of members: Members must possess expertise that will contribute to

the work of the Board (e.g., knowledge, experience or training in areas such as

foreign affairs, law, security, embassy construction, intelligence, and other areas

appropriate to the Board’s work). In the case of a Board convened pursuant to a visa

incident, at least one Board member must have had extensive experience as a

consular officer and consular manager. Only in exceptional circumstances should

Board members be current employees of the U.S. Government.

c. Term of appointment: A member’s term will begin upon the convening of the

Board by the Secretary and will coincide with the duration of the Board’s mandate.

d. Security clearances: Members and staff must have the appropriate and necessary

security clearances from the Department of State and, as necessary, from other

departments and agencies, before being granted access to classified information.

e. Inability to serve: Should a member be unable to continue serving after

appointment, the Secretary may relieve that person from duty on the Board and

appoint a replacement member or, in the case of the member appointed by the DNI,

the DNI may relieve that member and appoint a replacement.

12 FAM 032.3 ARB Staff

(CT:DS­225; 12­08­2014)

a. ARB Staff Officer: The Director of the Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing and

Innovation (M/PRI) shall appoint a member of the M/PRI staff to be the ARB Staff

Officer. The ARB Staff Officer will:

(1) Oversee the ARB process and ensure that all policies and procedures relating to

the ARB are adequate and up­to­date;

(2) Serve as the institutional memory and primary point of contact within the

Department for ARB matters;

(3) Maintain all permanent files, rules, procedures, rosters, libraries, etc., for the ARB

process, to include documenting all incidents involving loss of life, injury to

personnel, or property damage regardless of whether the incidents meet the

criteria under ARB statute, noting whether a PCC was convened and the reasons

for doing so or not;

(4) Coordinate the implementation process for ARB recommendations;

(5) Manage the annual ARB/PCC review of all past ARB recommendations; and

(6) Carry out ARB related staff work for the ARB/PCC.

b. ARB Executive Secretary: When a Board is convened, M/PRI will name an

Executive Secretary to coordinate and facilitate the work of that Board. The Executive

Secretary will normally be a Senior Foreign Service officer or a retired Senior Foreign

Service officer who is recommended by DGHR/CDA. The tenure of the Executive

Secretary will coincide with the tenure of the Board.

c. Experts, consultants and support staff: As determined by the Board, the

Department will provide the necessary experts, consultants and support staff to

enable the Board to carry out its duties effectively and efficiently. S/ES­EX will

provide a full­time dedicated administrative support coordinator (detailee or WAE) to

assist the Executive Secretary of the ARB, as formalized in Administrative Notice No.

05­02, dated February 22, 2005.

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12 FAM 032.4 Assignment, Hiring, and Contracting

Mechanisms

(CT:DS­158; 09­17­2010)

The full­time Administrative Support Coordinator appointed by S/ES­EX will work with

the appropriate offices in the Department such as S/ES­EX, DGHR, A/OPR, etc., and is

responsible for overseeing and coordinating the mechanisms to assign, hire and/or

contract for the personnel and services required by a Board. The Coordinator will also

ensure that all such personnel receive the necessary security clearances prior to

assuming their duties.

12 FAM 032.5 ARB Facilities, Services, and Supplies

(CT:DS­158; 09­17­2010)

a. As set forth in S/ES­EX Administrative Notice No. 05­02 dated February 22, 2005,

S/ES­EX is responsible for providing a Board with necessary and appropriate office

space, equipment, service, passes and permits, supplies and such other logistical

support as a Board may require.

b. S/ES­EX budgets and provides funding for ARB expenses.

c. The ARB Staff Officer, as appropriate, coordinates the needs of a Board with the

Administrative Support Coordinator in S/ES­EX.

12 FAM 033 CONVENING, SELECTING, AND

TERMINATING A BOARD

12 FAM 033.1 Convening a Board

(CT:DS­225; 12­08­2014)

a. Written decision: The Secretary, in writing, makes the decision to convene a Board

and sets forth the names of the Board’s Chairperson and members, the purposes and

jurisdiction of the Board (as established in Section 304 of the Act or, as appropriate,

Section 140(c)), and its duration. The decision will be published in the Federal

Register, or other similar document, if deemed appropriate by the Secretary.

b. Deadlines for convening a Board: The Secretary must decide whether or not to

convene a Board not later than 60 days after the occurrence of an incident, except

that such 60­day period may be extended for one additional 60­day period if the

Secretary determines that the additional period is necessary for the convening of the

Board.

c. Delays: The Secretary may delay the convening of a Board, if, after consultation

with the chair of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the chair of

the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the

Secretary determines that the establishment of a Board would compromise

intelligence sources or methods. The Secretary must promptly advise the chairs of

such committees of each determination to delay the establishment of a Board.

d. Security­related incidents:

907
(1) A Board convenes, with respect to a security­related incident, only if the following

two determinations are made; provided, however, that if these determinations

are made, a Board need not be convened if the Secretary also determines that

the case clearly involves only causes unrelated to security:

(a) That the incident involved serious injury, loss of life, or significant destruction

of property or a serious breach of security involving intelligence activities of a

foreign government; and

(b) That the incident occurred at or related to a U.S. government mission abroad

(other than a facility or installation subject to the control of a U.S. area

combatant commander);

(2) The Secretary of State is not required to convene a Board in the case of an

incident that involves any facility, installation, or personnel of the Department of

Defense (DOD) with respect to which the Secretary has delegated operational

control of security functions abroad to the Secretary of Defense pursuant to

section 106 of the Act. In any such case, the Secretary of Defense will conduct

an appropriate inquiry and report the findings and recommendations of such

inquiry, and the action taken with respect to such recommendations, to the

Secretary of State and Congress; and

(3) Pursuant to Public Law 109­140, Public Law 111­117, and Public Law 113­76, the

Secretary of State is not required to convene a Board in the case of an incident

involving serious injury, loss of life, or significant destruction of property at or

related to a U.S. Government mission in Afghanistan and which occurs in the

period beginning on October 1, 2005 and ending on September 30, 2014. In the

case of such an incident, the Secretary of State will promptly notify the House

Committee on International Relations and the Senate Committee on Foreign

Relations, conduct an inquiry of the incident, and submit to each such Committee

a report on the findings and recommendations related to the inquiry and the

actions taken with respect to such recommendations. Therefore, while the

Secretary may decide to convene a Board in the case of such an incident, he or

she also has the option of conducting a different type of inquiry.

e. Visa incidents: A Board will be convened with respect to a visa incident only if the

following three determinations are made:

(1) That the incident involved a terrorist act causing serious injury, loss of life, or

significant destruction of property in the United States;

(2) That there is probable cause to believe that a specifically identified alien was a

participant in the terrorist act; and

(3) That the alien was issued a visa on or after May 1, 1996; at the time of visa

issuance, the alien’s name was included in the Department’s Consular Lookout

and Support System (CLASS) and that the visa was issued as a result of a failure

by the consular officer to adhere to the procedures required to be followed by the

inclusion of the name in such visa lookout system.

f. Notification to Congress: Whenever the Secretary convenes a Board, the Secretary

will promptly inform the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the

Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives:

(1) That a Board has been convened;

(2) The membership of the Board; and

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(3) Other appropriate information about the Board.

12 FAM 033.2 Selection, Appointment, and Compensation

of Members

(CT:DS­217; 10­09­2014)

a. Selection: The ARB Staff Officer maintains a list of potential members. During the

ARB/PCC's yearly meeting the list will be reviewed and updated. If the ARB/PCC

recommends that the Secretary convene a Board, it will forward a list of potential

Board members to the Secretary for approval. The ARB/PCC coordinates its activities

in this area with the DNI’s representative.

b. Appointment: Members selected by the Secretary and the DNI for appointment to a

Board will, as necessary, be processed for employment purposes by S/ES­EX.

c. Compensation: Members who are not Federal officers or employees, unless they

waive compensation, will be paid (per the statute) at a rate not to exceed the

maximum rate of basic pay payable for level GS 15, Step 10 of the General Schedule

(5 U.S.C. 5332) for each day (including travel time) during which they are engaged in

the actual performance of Board duties. Members who are Federal officers or

employees shall receive no additional pay for service on a Board.

12 FAM 033.3 Timeframe of a Board

(CT:DS­158; 09­17­2010)

a. Initiating activities: A Board must begin its work within a reasonable period of time

following the Secretary’s decision to convene the Board.

b. Ample time: A Board must be given ample time to conduct its investigations and

write its report.

c. Extension of time: Should a Board decide that the time allotted for its work is

insufficient, it must apply, in writing, to the Secretary for an extension of time.

d. Termination: A Board’s authority terminates on the date set forth in the Secretary’s

order convening the Board, or on a date as is subsequently set by the Secretary.

12 FAM 034 BOARD POWERS AND PROCEDURES

12 FAM 034.1 Powers of a Board and Chairperson

(CT:DS­217; 10­09­2014)

a. Board powers: In accordance with Section 303 of the Act, the Board has the

authority:

(1) With respect to any individual to:

(a) Administer oaths and affirmations;

(b) Require that depositions be given and interrogatories be answered; and

(c) Require the attendance and presentation of testimony and evidence by such

individual;

909
(2) With respect to persons not included under the Act’s definition of individual to:

(a) Administer oaths and affirmations; and

(b) Require that depositions be given and interrogatories be answered;

(3) Determine Board procedures for hearings, investigations and other such activities

of the Board;

(4) Issue subpoenas, where necessary and in accordance with Section 303(a)(3) of

the Act; and

(5) Make findings and recommendations as provided in Section 304 of the Act, or, as

appropriate, Section 140(c).

b. Powers of the Chairperson: The Board Chairperson has the authority to:

(1) Regulate the course and conduct of Board activities, including but not limited to

holding hearings and controlling their course and conduct; and

(2) Designate, in writing, another member to act in his or her stead in case of

temporary absence.

12 FAM 034.2 Board Procedures

12 FAM 034.2­1 Investigations

(CT:DS­158; 09­17­2014)

a. Venue: The Board may conduct its investigations, including hearings, within the

United States or abroad. When appropriate and cost effective, the Board will make

every reasonable effort to take sworn testimony within the continental United States

(CONUS).

b. Use of investigative personnel: The Board may use, subject to the concurrence of

the sending office and/or agency, personnel from such entities as the Bureau of

Diplomatic Security (DS) or the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to assist its

investigative activities.

c. Noninterference with other authorities: The Department will notify the

Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of Counterterrorism of any decision by the

Secretary to convene an Accountability Review Board (ARB) shortly after such a

decision is made. The Board will carry out its activities in a manner that does not

interfere with or compromise the work of duly authorized authorities, such as law

enforcement, security, intelligence or diplomatic activities, either U.S. or foreign.

d. Clearance requirement abroad: Prior to undertaking any Board activities outside

the United States, the Board must obtain the concurrence of the chief of mission

(COM) or the Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources and, if

deemed appropriate by the COM or the Deputy Secretary, of the host government to

such activities.

e. Conduct of activities abroad: Any Board activities undertaken abroad must be

conducted in a manner consistent with local law and custom, as determined by the

COM or the Department. Activities abroad will be closed to the public unless the

Board desires they be open and the COM or the Department concurs.

12 FAM 034.2­2 Evidence

910
(CT:DS­39; 08­15­1994)

The Board may accept any evidence determined by the Chairperson to be relevant and

material to the investigation. The Federal Rules of Evidence are not applicable to the

Board.

12 FAM 034.2­3 Witness Rights

(CT:DS­217; 10­09­2014)

a. Representation:

(1) Any person appearing before or meeting with the Board or a member(s) of the

Board or responding to written questions issued by the Board, whether acting

voluntarily or by subpoena and whether sworn or unsworn, is entitled to be

accompanied and advised by an exclusive representative at the person’s expense

consistent with 12 FAM 031.3. Foreign and Civil Service employee witnesses may

be represented by the appropriate representation (e.g., the American Foreign

Service Association—AFSA). Except to the extent that their presence is required

by the DNI for the purpose of protecting sources and methods, the Board may

bar from ARB proceedings government lawyers who are not the exclusive

representatives of persons appearing before or meeting with the Board;

(2) An employee assigned domestically who is notified to appear as a witness by the

Board will, if the employee so requests, be granted 72 hours in order to obtain

representation. Should the employee desire additional time, a written request for

such time may be made to the Chairperson; and

(3) An employee assigned abroad who is notified to appear as a witness by the

Board, and who wishes to be represented by someone other than an exclusive

representative, may submit a written request to the Chairperson, requesting a

reasonable amount of time to obtain such representation. The amount of time

granted by the Chairperson will depend on such factors as the scope of the ARB

process, the limits of the employee’s expected testimony, and the feasibility of

obtaining counsel at that location.

b. Advising:

(1) Witnesses responding to or appearing before the Board or a member(s) of the

Board must be given reasonable written notice of the proceeding’s time, place

and nature. They must also be advised, in writing, of the authority under which

the proceeding is being conducted and the purpose(s) to which the information

they give may be used. Finally, the witnesses are to be advised of their legal

right to refuse to answer self­incriminating questions and of their right to have

counsel present; and

(2) The Department must notify post employees concerning their rights in connection

with ARB investigations prior to the arrival of the ARB investigative team at post.

c. Travel expenses:

(1) Subpoenaed witnesses will be paid the same fee and mileage allowances paid to

subpoenaed witnesses in the courts of the United States;

(2) The Department will pay the travel and per diem expenses, at U.S. government

rates, for one exclusive representative to travel to the location abroad, whenever

an ARB conducts activities abroad involving employees; and

911
(3) Travel expenses of a representative of a witness other than the witness’ exclusive

representative will be the responsibility of that witness.

d. Presentations: Subject to 12 FAM 034.2­2, a witness has the opportunity to bring to

the Board’s attention, areas of inquiry, material, and the names of additional potential

witnesses.

12 FAM 034.2­4 Confidentiality and Safeguarding of Classified

Information

(CT:DS­217; 10­09­2014)

a. Adopting procedures: (See 22 U.S.C. 4833.) Such procedures must ensure the

protection of classified information and administrative confidentiality of testimony

affecting personal privacy or ongoing criminal investigations. In addition, the Board

will take care to protect Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) information, such as security

policies and procedures.

b. DNI role: DNI will establish the level of protection and standards required for

intelligence information, including appointing a representative, as necessary, to

attend Board activities where classified intelligence information might be used.

12 FAM 034.2­5 Classification Authority

(CT:DS­158; 09­17­2010)

The Board does not have original classification authority. The Director of M/PRI will

exercise classification authority for materials originating from Board activities.

12 FAM 034.2­6 Records

(CT:DS­217; 10­09­2014)

Records pertaining to Board activities and proceedings will be kept by the ARB Staff

Officer and the DNI in accordance with 22 U.S.C. 4833(c).

12 FAM 035 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

12 FAM 035.1 Findings

(CT:DS­158; 09­17­2010)

a. Examination: A Board will examine the facts and circumstances surrounding the

security­related incident or a visa incident.

b. Written submission: In its report to the Secretary, a Board makes written findings,

which may be classified, as necessary.

12 FAM 035.2 Recommendations

12 FAM 035.2­1 Program Recommendations

(CT:DS­217; 10­09­2014)

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a. See 22 U.S.C. 4834(b).

b. Confidentiality: In its program recommendations, the Board takes care to safeguard

classified information and afford such information the required measure of protection.

In addition, any sections of such recommendations affecting personal privacy or

ongoing law enforcement investigations will receive appropriate confidentiality and

other applicable protections necessary under law.

12 FAM 035.2­2 Personnel Recommendations

(CT:DS­217; 10­09­2014)

a. Requirement: See 22 U.S.C. 4834(c).

b. Standard for determination: 22 U.S.C. 4834(c).

c. Confidentiality: In its personnel recommendations, the Board will take care to

safeguard classified information and afford such information the required measure of

protection. In addition, any sections of such recommendations affecting personal

privacy or ongoing law enforcement investigations will receive appropriate

confidentiality and other applicable protections necessary under law.

d. Signatures and dissent: Each personnel recommendation must be signed by all

members, thus signifying their support for and agreement with the recommendation.

In cases where a member dissents from part or all of such a recommendation, that

member may submit written dissenting views. Any such dissenting views must be

attached to the recommendation and signed by the dissenting member.

e. Notification of the head of agency or instrumentality: The Board must send a

separate notification on each individual who is the subject of a personnel

recommendation to the head of agency or instrumentality concerned. Such

notification must contain, at a minimum:

(1) The Board’s findings of reasonable cause, together with all relevant evidence

supporting such findings;

(2) The Board’s recommendations concerning investigatory or disciplinary action; and

(3) Any dissenting views.

f. Notification of the individual: The Board must send notification to each individual

who is the subject of a personnel recommendation. Such notification must contain, at

a minimum, a covering statement informing the individual that:

(1) The Board is acting pursuant to Section 304(c) of the Act or as the case may be,

Section 140(c);

(2) The report does not represent the initiation of disciplinary or other adverse action

against the individual; and

(3) The decision to initiate disciplinary or other adverse action against the individual

rests with the individual’s employing agency, or other competent authority.

12 FAM 036 REPORTS

12 FAM 036.1 Types of Reports

913
(CT:DS­225; 12­08­2014)

Section 304 of the Act envisages three types of reports that generally will also be

appropriate under Section 140(c):

(1) A Board’s report to the Secretary on its findings and any program

recommendations;

(2) The Secretary’s report to the Congress on any program recommendations and

the actions taken on them; and

(3) Report(s) to the Congress by the head(s) of the concerned agency(ies) or

instrumentality(ies) on any personnel recommendations.

12 FAM 036.2 The Board’s Report to the Secretary

(CT:DS­225 12­08­2014)

a. Content: The Board’s Report to the Secretary includes the Board’s findings, any

program recommendations and, regardless of agency or instrumentality concerned,

any personnel recommendations. The report must be based upon a consideration of

the entire record of information obtained by the Board.

b. Confidentiality: In its Report to the Secretary, the Board takes care to safeguard

classified information and afford it the measure of protection required. In addition,

sections of the Report affecting personal privacy or ongoing law enforcement

investigations will receive appropriate confidentiality and other applicable protections

required under law.

c. Signatures and dissent: All members must sign the Board’s report and thereby

signify their support for and agreement with the report. In cases where a member

dissents from any of the findings or recommendations, that member may submit

written dissenting views. Any such dissenting views must be attached to the Board’s

report and signed by the dissenting members.

12 FAM 036.3 Managing ARB Recommendations

(CT:DS­225; 12­08­2014)

a. Acceptance of recommendations: The Secretary of State, or his/her designee, will

determine what actions should be taken with respect to the recommendations. The

Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources will oversee the

Department’s progress on ARB implementation.

b. Implementation: The Under Secretary for Management, in coordination with the

Under Secretary for Political Affairs, is responsible for implementation of ARB

recommendations. On behalf of the Secretary and other Department principals,

M/PRI will coordinate and track recommendations and manage the overall

implementation process. M/PRI will report progress on ARB implementation to the

Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources.

c. Annual Implementation Status Review: The ARB/PCC will review all past

recommendations on an annual basis and provide a report to the Under Secretaries

for Political Affairs and Management, providing the implementation status of all past

recommendations, and noting any trends. The report will also be provided to the

Deputy Secretary and Deputy Secretary of State for Management and Resources.

914
d. Closing recommendations: The Under Secretary for Management will determine

the status of a recommendation.

12 FAM 036.4 Reports to Congress

(CT:DS­232; 03­17­2015)

a. Program recommendations: Per the ARB statute, the Secretary will, not later than

90 days after the receipt of a Board’s program recommendations, submit a report to

the Congress on each such recommendation and the action taken or intended to be

taken with respect to that recommendation. The report shall be sent to the Speaker

of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate; the Chairperson and

Ranking Member of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees, the

Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations; and the Chairperson and Ranking

Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs

Committee.

b. Personnel recommendations: The head of the Federal agency or instrumentality

receiving a report from a Board that contains a finding of reasonable cause under

Section 304(c) of the Act or Section 140(c) will, not later than 30 days after receiving

that finding, transmit to the Congress a report specifying:

(1) The nature of the case and a summary of the evidence transmitted by the Board;

and

(2) The decision by the Federal agency or instrumentality to take disciplinary or other

appropriate action against that individual or the reasons for deciding not to take

disciplinary action or other action with respect to that individual.

c. Distribution of copies of reports on personnel recommendations: A copy of

each personnel recommendation report to the Congress will be sent to the Secretary

of State and, if applicable, the head of the agency of said personnel. In addition, a

copy of such a report will be sent to the individual concerned, provided that doing so

does not violate the employing agency’s own procedures or regulations.

12 FAM 037 THROUGH 039 UNASSIGNED

915
EXHIBIT 2

916
917
918
EXHIBIT 3

919
920
921
922
923
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 4

924
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

925
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AND THE BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

ISP-I-13-44A Office of Inspections September 2013

Special Review of the

Accountability Review Board Process

IMPORTANT NOTICE: This report is intended solely for the official use of the Department of State or the

Broadcasting Board of Governors, or any agency or organization receiving a copy directly from the Office of

Inspector General. No secondary distribution may be made, in whole or in part, outside the Department of State or

the Broadcasting Board of Governors, by them or by other agencies of organizations, without prior authorization by

the Inspector General. Public availability of the document will be determined by the Inspector General under the

U.S. Code, 5 U.S.C. 552. Improper disclosure of this report may result in criminal, civil, or administrative penalties.

EXHIBIT 5

926
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

i

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

OF THE INSPECTION

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection

and Evaluation, as issued in 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and

Efficiency, and the Inspector’s Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General for the

U.S. Department of State (Department) and the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the BBG, and

Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and

the BBG. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service

Act of 1980:

• Policy Implementation: whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively

achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and

whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.

• Resource Management: whether resources are being used and managed with maximum

efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts

are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.

• Management Controls: whether the administration of activities and operations meets the

requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls

have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of

mismanagement; whether instances of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate

steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

METHODOLOGY

In conducting this inspection, the inspectors: reviewed pertinent records; as appropriate, circulated,

reviewed, and compiled the results of survey instruments; conducted on-site interviews; and

reviewed the substance of the report and its findings and recommen

individuals, organizations, and activities affected by this review.

dations with offices,

927
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

ii

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

United States Department of State

and the Broadcasting Board of Governors

Office of Inspector General

PREFACE

This report was prepared by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) pursuant to the

Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980,

as amended. It is one of a series of audit, inspection, investigative, and special reports prepared

by OIG periodically as part of its responsibility to promote effective management,

accountability, and positive change in the Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of

Governors.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office,

post, or function under review. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant

agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.

The recommendations therein have been developed on the basis of the best knowledge

available to the OIG and, as appropriate, have been discussed in draft with those responsible for

implementation. It is my hope that these recommendations will result in more effective, efficient,

and/or economical operations.

I express my appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report.

Harold W. Geisel

Acting Inspector General

928
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

iii

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

Table of Contents

Key Judgments 1

Introduction 3

Background 5

Accountability Review Board Process 6

Incident Identification 6

Permanent Coordinating Committee 7

Accountability Review Board 13

Secretary’s Report to Congress 16

Implementation of the Benghazi Accountability Review Board Recommendations 19

Repeat Recommendations 32

Repeat Recommendations from 1998 and 2012 Accountability Review Boards 34

Accountability Review Boards 1998 - 2012 38

List of Recommendations 39

List of Informal Recommendations 42

Abbreviations 43

929
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

1

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

Key Judgments

• The Accountability Review Board process operates as intended—independently and

without bias—to identify vulnerabilities in the Department of State’s security programs.

• The Department of State has neither a conceptual framework nor a process for risk

management. There is no one person or office specifically tasked to oversee the

assessment of risks in critical, high-threat locales and weigh those risks against the U.S.

Government’s policy priorities to determine if the strategic value of the program

outweighs the associated risk.

• Follow-through on long-term security program improvements involving physical

security, training, and intelligence sharing lacks sustained oversight by Department of

State principals.1 Over time the implementation of improvements slows and in some

cases institutional focus shifts, explaining, in part, why a number of Benghazi

Accountability Review Board recommendations mirror previous Accountability Review

Board recommendations, further underscoring the need for the involvement of the

Department of State principals in order to ensure that implementing actions are sustained.

• The current system for identifying and classifying serious security incidents does not

provide the Department of State with the comprehensive information it needs to

determine which incidents might rise to the level of an Accountability Review Board. As

a result, the Department of State has missed opportunities to draw lessons from events

that could improve security programs and enhance security for the entire foreign affairs

community.

• The Department of State is making progress implementing the Benghazi Accountability

Review Board recommendations. Many of them have worldwide applicability and remain

to be fully institutionalized.

• The implementation of Accountability Review Board recommendations works best when

the Secretary of State and other Department of State principals take full ownership and

oversight of the implementation process.

• The Benghazi Accountability Review Board proposed the introduction of a new authority

that would enable future Boards to recommend that the Department of State take

disciplinary action in cases of unsatisfactory leadership performance related to a security

incident. The Department of State plans to revise the Foreign Affairs Manual and request

that Congress amend the applicable statute to incorporate this change.

• The Benghazi Accountability Review Board recommended the establishment of two

review panels: one to examine the organization and management structure of the Bureau

of Diplomatic Security and the other to advise the Department of State on best practices

employed by other organizations. The potential benefits of these reviews will only be

fully realized if they are widely shared and discussed within the Department of State.

1 Department of State principals are the Secretary, deputy secretaries, and under secretaries.

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SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

2

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

• The Department of State has taken steps to fill gaps in information sharing, both domestic

and overseas. However, important technology issues that would significantly enhance

information sharing are still in process, with the associated costs still to be determined

and funded. Moreover, there is currently no established system for ensuring that

assessments of security at high-threat and other posts benefit from inputs from all

available diplomatic and intelligence sources.

All findings and recommendations in this report are based on conditions observed during the onsite review and the standards and policies then in effect. The report does not comment at length

on areas where the OIG team did not identify problems that need correction.

The inspection took place in Washington, DC, between April 15 and August 13, 2013.

conducted the inspection.

[Redacted] (b) (6)

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Introduction

“In 2000, responding to a number of security-related incidents and working to find the right

balance between programs and security in embassies, I directed my staff to begin working with

Congress to authorize within the Department a new Deputy Secretary or Under Secretary

position that would be dedicated to security and associated issues.” – Secretary Madeline

Albright

“This is my report and these are my people.” – Secretary Colin Powell

“My biggest concern was knowing what happened and wanting people to feel that the ARB was

about learning what happened in order to improve processes and procedures. As part of my

regular conversations with the head of DS and others, I made sure that DS was implementing

ARB recommendations. The process worked pretty well for the more routine incidents, but an

event of this magnitude like Benghazi, with White House involvement, the Department’s internal

process isn’t enough.” – Secretary Condoleezza Rice

"My experience reinforced that the Office of the Deputy Secretary for Management and

Resources—where considerations of policy and security converge for the purposes of ensuring

oversight and accountability—should be the locus for driving implementation of significant ARB

recommendations." – Secretary Hillary Clinton

The Department of State (Department) Office of Inspector General (OIG) undertook a

review of the process by which Accountability Review Boards (ARB/Board) are established,

staffed, supported, and conducted as well as the measures to track implementation of ARB

recommendations. The team reviewed all 12 ARBs between 1998 and 2012 to evaluate the

Department’s compliance followup process, including the methodology used and how well it has

tracked and monitored the implementation of ARB recommendations. The OIG team also

reviewed the Department’s progress regarding implementation of the 29 recommendations issued

in the Benghazi ARB report.

The ARB process was established by an Act of Congress2 to serve as a mechanism of the

Secretary of State (Secretary) to help safeguard the employees of the Department and other

personnel assigned to U.S. diplomatic missions abroad. When an incident results in the

convening of an ARB, the ARB investigates what happened and issues recommendations aimed

at preventing future incidents. The OIG team found that the process works best when the

Secretary takes a personal interest in the report and the implementation of recommendations.

The OIG team interviewed the four secretaries who held office between 1998 and 2012.

All stated that the ARB process was an effective tool that could provide the Department with

important lessons for enhancing the security and safety of U.S. diplomatic facilities and

employees. The interviews revealed that the secretaries had engaged actively in the ARB process

and had taken the ARB and the resulting recommendations with utmost seriousness. Without

exception, the former secretaries voiced strong support for an ARB process that was robust and

independent. When interviewed by the OIG team, the secretaries indicated that they were careful

to ensure that their own actions did not compromise the independence or integrity of the process.

2 The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, as amended.

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The secretaries also indicated that they took personal responsibility for the findings and

recommendations of ARB reports, for overseeing the preparation of their own required reports to

Congress, and for initiating calls to action by the Department to implement recommendations.

While endorsing the ARB process as an important internal investigative tool for the

Department, two former secretaries raised questions as to whether the process is sufficiently

robust for handling investigations of major, complex incidents, especially those in which the

interests and actions of several agencies were involved. The OIG team deemed this an important

issue but one that was beyond the scope of this review.

With the exception of the Nairobi/Dar es Salaam and Benghazi ARBs, responsibility for

implementing ARB recommendations was largely delegated to the bureaus and offices most

directly concerned, notably the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS). The OIG team was not able

to identify an institutionalized process by which the Secretary or Deputy Secretary engaged

beyond the drafting and submission of the Secretary’s legislated report to Congress. Some

former secretaries and deputy secretaries, in fact, had engaged in conversations with under

secretaries and assistant secretaries on how recommendations should be implemented. The

common expectation, however, was that implementation should be handled by the regular chain

of command in the bureaus directly concerned. With respect to both the Nairobi/Dar es Salaam

and Benghazi reports, initial responsibility for overseeing the implementation process was

assigned to a Department principal, reflecting the magnitude of those events and their policy and

budgetary implications. These cases, however, were exceptions. There has not been a formal

followup process overseen by a Department principal or his/her staff for the implementation of

recommendations. Nor has there been an institutionalized process for ensuring that

recommendations, coupled with lessons learned, are shared effectively and used to contribute to

improved security practices throughout the Department.

All four former secretaries described the inherent tug of war between risks and rewards as

the Department conducts its business in dangerous places around the world. Typically, the strong

preference among those responsible for advancing U.S. policy objectives is to keep posts open

whenever possible, even in dangerous places, while those officials responsible for security give

priority to the risks and the possibilities for harm. Within the Department, these sometimescontradictory positions tend to be represented respectively by the Under Secretary of State for

Political Affairs and the Under Secretary of State for Management. For that reason, two former

secretaries were strongly of the view that responsibility for reconciling these perspectives should

be vested at the deputy secretary level. Indeed, one former Secretary told the OIG team that this

concern was at the heart of the original proposal to create a second deputy secretary position, one

that would have as a principal responsibility overseeing and reconciling these competing

interests of policy and security on a daily basis.

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Background

“The Accountability Review Board (ARB) process is a mechanism to foster more effective

security of U.S. missions and personnel abroad by ensuring a thorough and independent review

of security-related incidents. Through its investigations and recommendations, the Board seeks

to determine accountability and promote and encourage improved security programs and

practices. In addition, the ARB mechanism enhances the integrity of the visa issuing process by

determining accountability in certain instances in which terrorist acts in the United States are

committed by aliens.”3 - 12 Foreign Affairs Manual 031.1

In 1985, the Report of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, also

known as the Inman Report, recommended that the Department establish a procedure to convene

a board of inquiry to review security-related events. The ARB statute was promulgated in

response to this recommendation and requires the Secretary, with some exceptions, to convene

an ARB in any case of serious injury, loss of life, or significant destruction of property, at, or

related to, a U.S. Government mission abroad.4 The ARB can also review any case of a serious

breach of security involving intelligence activities of a foreign government directed at a U.S.

mission abroad.

The Permanent Coordinating Committee (PCC) is the body established by the

Department to make recommendations to the Secretary as to whether an ARB should be

convened. In accordance with provisions of the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM), the PCC is to

convene within 30 days of a security-related incident. The purpose of this delay is to provide

sufficient time for information gathering and deliberation, while still allowing for the convening

of an ARB within the 60-day deadline set by the statute. The PCC comprises representatives

from the Department and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Pursuant to a

memorandum of understanding, a representative from the Department of Justice is also invited to

attend. Between 1998 and 2012, the PCC convened 46 times and recommended that the

Secretary convene an ARB 12 times.

3 To date, there has been no visa incident that required the Department to convene a PCC or ARB.

4 12 FAM 031.3, ARB Definitions.

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Accountability Review Board Process

ARB membership consists of five individuals. The Secretary names four members, and

the Director of National Intelligence names the remaining member. ARBs focus on whether, at

the time of the incident in question, there were sufficient security systems in place and whether

the systems functioned properly. In addition, ARBs determine whether there is reasonable cause

to believe anyone breached their individual duty relevant to the incident. ARB reports to the

Secretary include findings and recommendations. Once an ARB issues its report, a process

begins to implement the recommendations. The Secretary is required to submit a report to

Congress on actions the Department intends to take with respect to ARB recommendations.

Within the Department, the Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation

(M/PRI) oversees the ARB process for the Secretary of State. M/PRI convenes and chairs the

PCC and forwards the committee’s report and recommendation to the Secretary. When an ARB

delivers its report to the Secretary, M/PRI typically drafts the Secretary’s Report to Congress

summarizing the ARB recommendations. M/PRI also tracks compliance with the ARB’s

recommendations.

Incident Identification

When a security-related incident takes place at a diplomatic facility overseas, M/PRI

initiates the ARB process by identifying the incident and convening the PCC to consider it. The

M/PRI staff identifies incidents by monitoring cable traffic between U.S. missions and regional

bureaus, and receiving reports from the Department’s Operations Center. The M/PRI staff

screens these messages for security-related incidents that meet the threshold for convening a

PCC.

Currently, the DS Command Center reports all security-related incidents occurring

overseas to the Department, but DS does not routinely provide security reports to M/PRI. DS

provided these reports in the past, but stopped the practice after the rotation of senior staff within

the DS Command Center and subsequent changes in the standard operating procedures. In 2006,

the Under Secretary of State for Management issued a cable5 directive6 to all chiefs of mission

requiring posts to report potential ARB incidents directly to M/PRI. Despite this directive, there

currently exists no systematic process assuring immediate notification of security-related

incidents to M/PRI. In January 2013, in an effort to notify more quickly all Department

stakeholders, the Department issued additional guidance7 directing DS to report all securityrelated incidents affecting U.S. missions overseas to the relevant regional bureau, the Bureau of

International Organization Affairs, and the Department’s Operations Center. Unfortunately, DS

did not list M/PRI on the distribution for those cables. As a result, at the time this report was

prepared, M/PRI was not receiving those cables.

Informal Recommendation 1: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should include the

Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation as an addressee on all securityrelated incident reports.

5 Cables are the official internal records of Department policies, program activities, post operations, and personnel

management.

6 06 State 131130.

7 13 State 5195.

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Permanent Coordinating Committee

“The Committee will, as quickly as possible after an incident occurs, review the

available facts and recommend to the Secretary to convene or not convene a Board. (Due to the

1999 revision of the law requiring the Secretary to convene a Board not later than 60 days after

the occurrence of an incident, except that such period may be extended for one additional 60-day

period the Committee will meet within 30 days of the incident, if enough information is

available.) In addition, the Committee will meet yearly to review the ARB process, existing

policies and procedures, and ensure that any necessary changes are effected.” - 12 Foreign

Affairs Manual 032.1

The director of M/PRI chairs the PCC. Additional PCC members are: the DS Assistant

Secretary; the principal deputy assistant secretary for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research; a

senior deputy assistant secretary (or secretaries) from the appropriate regional bureau(s); the

Coordinator for Counterterrorism; a representative of the Office of the Director of National

Intelligence; and the deputy assistant secretary for Visa Services. A September 20, 2001,

memorandum of understanding extends an invitation to a representative from the Department of

Justice to attend PCC meetings. An attorney from the Department’s Office of the Legal Adviser

attends. When warranted, representatives from other agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for

International Development (USAID) and the Department of Agriculture, are also invited.

The PCC is the Department’s mechanism for initiating the legislated accountability

review process. The PCC’s role is to advise the Secretary on whether an incident meets the

statutory standard for convening an ARB. As stipulated in 12 FAM 32.1 a., the PCC is required

to meet no later than 30 days after a security-related incident. After reviewing all 46 instances of

PCC meetings within the past 14 years, the OIG team found that the PCC usually met the 30-day

deadline.

When a security-related incident is under review, DS typically takes the lead in

presenting preliminary investigative findings to the committee. PCC members indicated that DS

presentations at PCC meetings are consistently comprehensive and informative; however, during

the presentation of facts, most of the other participants do not routinely offer additional or

amplifying input from their bureaus or agencies nor is there a requirement or expectation that

PCC members will provide information that their bureaus may have regarding an incident. Past

and present PCC members interviewed agreed that an agenda requiring presentations from each

participant would result in a more robust, multi-perspective consideration of an incident. M/PRI

takes the position that such information is already solicited prior to each meeting. The

discrepancy can be eliminated if M/PRI issues clear instructions to PCC members that before

each meeting, they should canvas their bureaus for all information relevant to an incident on the

agenda.

Informal Recommendation 2: The Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing and

Innovation should implement a standard operating procedure outlining the role and

responsibility of the Permanent Coordinating Committee.

The Secretary is the only person within the Department with legislated authority to

convene an ARB. The PCC meets to decide one question: whether to recommend that the

Secretary convene an ARB. Although not a requirement, the PCC chairperson traditionally

attempts to reach a consensus. On occasion, obtaining consensus has delayed the decision until

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the committee obtained more information. The Secretary has the option not to accept the PCC’s

recommendation, but within the scope of this review, the Secretary always accepted the PCC’s

recommendations.8

If the PCC recommends that an ARB should convene, M/PRI forwards a package to the

Secretary with the PCC’s recommendation and any supporting documentation. This action

memorandum anticipates a positive decision by the Secretary and contains an abbreviated

description of the incident, a copy of the PCC minutes, a list of recommended ARB members, a

proposed mandate for the ARB, and a copy of the legislation governing the ARB. It also contains

a letter to the U.S. Attorney General notifying him/her that an ARB will be convened, thus

ensuring that the ARB investigation does not interfere with any concurrent Department of Justice

criminal investigation.

In instances in which the PCC recommends that an ARB not convene, M/PRI forwards a

memorandum to the Secretary outlining the conclusion of the PCC, the details of the incident,

and the PCC minutes. This process has been inconsistent: sometimes M/PRI forwards an action

memorandum, while in other cases it sends an information memorandum to the Secretary. By

their nature, information memoranda require no action. Sending the PCC findings to the

Secretary in this format presupposes concurrence with the PCC decision. A more consistent

approach is always to send an action memorandum to the Secretary for decision and signature.

Recommendation 1: The Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation should

draft an action memorandum for the Secretary’s signature that details the Permanent

Coordinating Committee’s decision regardless if an Accountability Review Board is

recommended. (Action: M/PRI)

In cases in which the PCC has recommended against an ARB, records indicate that the

PCC often discussed the possibility of alternative reviews of the incident under consideration

that would task a bureau to conduct a study of the incident and write a report. There is no bar to a

PCC recommending an alternative review in those instances in which it does not recommend an

ARB. There are only occasional examples of DS or other bureaus conducting such alternative

reviews. Formalizing this process of in-house reviews would add value to the PCC process by

creating an opportunity to identify lessons learned. Wide distribution of this information would

also help the regional and functional bureaus gain a better understanding of issues relevant to

physical security, training, intelligence sharing, and staffing.

Recommendation 2: The Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation should

coordinate with the Permanent Coordinating Committee members to establish guidelines that

broaden the committee’s ability to task alternative reviews. (Action: M/PRI)

Recommendation 3: The Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation should

implement a procedure to provide to the Secretary and relevant bureaus a report on the outcome

of alternative reviews in those instances in which the Permanent Coordinating Committee does

not recommend an Accountability Review Board. (Action: M/PRI)

8 There has only been one instance of a Secretary not accepting the PCC recommendation, in 1992, which is outside

the timeframe of this OIG review.

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Incident Prescreening

There is no documented process for determining which incidents M/PRI decides to bring

to the attention of the PCC. The director of M/PRI, as the PCC chair, decides whether to convene

the PCC and may consult with relevant offices, such as DS and the Office of the Legal Adviser,

in making that decision.

In cases where a determination was made that an incident did not justify a PCC, other

PCC members were not routinely informed nor was there a written record of these decisions. For

example, in a February 2008 security-related event, mobs attacked the U.S. embassy in Belgrade

and set it on fire, resulting in significant damage, the death of a demonstrator, an ordered

departure, and closure of the embassy.9 Because of the prescreening process, no PCC meeting

was convened. Similarly, the OIG team did not find any record of the PCC meeting in reaction to

the damage inflicted on Embassy Tunis on September 12, 2012. That attack resulted in the

destruction of 16 perimeter cameras, more than $150,000 in technical security equipment

damage, and the burning of the American school across the street from the embassy.10

Neither the legislation establishing the ARB process, nor the FAM, provide for the

practice of undocumented prescreening of incidents prior to calling a PCC. This practice

contravenes both the letter and the spirit of the legislation and the Department’s written policy on

the role of PCCs, as outlined in 12 FAM 032.1. In effect, it undermines the ability of the PCC to

decide whether to recommend an ARB, as well as the authority of the Secretary to convene an

ARB.

The OIG team understands that not every incident is appropriate for a PCC, but the ARB

process would benefit from a change in the FAM that includes a standard for a process that is

accountable, transparent, and fully documents a determination that a PCC need not convene.11

Recommendation 4: The Office of the Under Secretary of State for Management, in

coordination with the Office of the Legal Adviser, should amend 12 FAM 030 to codify a

transparent and fully documented process for vetting security-related incidents to identify those

that do not to warrant convening the Permanent Coordinating Committee and ensuring that this

information is communicated to the Secretary. (Action: M, in coordination with L)

Criteria for Convening an Accountability Review Board

“A Board convenes, with respect to a security-related incident, only if the following two

determinations are made ... (a) that the incident involved serious injury, loss of life, or

significant destruction of property or a serious breach of security involving intelligence activities

of a foreign government; and (b) that the incident occurred at or related to a U.S. Government

mission abroad....” - 12 Foreign Affairs Manual 033.1 d.(1)

The Department lacks clear guidelines for the terms “significant destruction of property,”

“serious injury,” or “at or related to a U.S. Government mission abroad” as found in the

legislation. M/PRI could not explain why the PCC considered some incidents worthy of an ARB

9 Inspection of Embassy Belgrade, Serbia, Report No. ISP-I-10-09A, November 2009. 10 Diplomatic Security 2012 Year in Review. 11 In May 2013, M/PRI began to maintain a list of incidents for which PCCs were not called and the reasons why.

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and not others, which leads to the appearance of inconsistency. At other times, the failure to

convene a PCC left the rationale for the decision open to question.

Within the 14-year period covered by this review, a significant number of security-related

incidents, more than 222 in all, were not subject to PCC consideration.12 Many of those incidents

involved injury and numerous instances of property damage to embassies and consulates since

1998, but there are no guidelines for what determining what is “significant” or “serious.”

Moreover, as is illustrated by the following examples, there are inconsistencies in the criteria

used by the PCC to make its recommendations to convene an ARB.

Security-Related Incident. There is inconsistency in what constitutes a security-related

incident. In June 2002, a suicide bomber detonated a large truck bomb 50 feet from the U.S.

consulate general in Karachi, Pakistan. The blast killed 12 persons, injured more than 50,

including a U.S. Marine, and knocked down a 12-foot section of the facility’s concretereinforced perimeter wall.13 The PCC recommended against an ARB because the incident

involved “only causes unrelated to security.” Despite concluding that the incident was unrelated

to security, the PCC also called the incident a security success story, as the practices employed at

the U.S. mission precluded loss of life or serious injury to U.S. mission personnel.14

Loss of Life. The legislation and the FAM do not distinguish between American and

non-American lives when someone dies in a security-related incident. Within the 1998-2012

scope of this report, the deaths of American citizens have been the focus of 11 out of 12 ARBs.

The exception was an ARB that was called for a 2004 incident in Jeddah when four locally

employed staff members and a contract guard were killed and nine locally employed staff

members were wounded. However, a PCC was not called after the 2012 murder of the embassy’s

senior Foreign Service national investigator in Sana’a, Yemen. He was shot dead by motorcycle

gunmen after they confirmed his identity as an embassy employee. The terrorist group, AlQaeda, in the Arabian Peninsula claimed responsibility for the attack. Despite the fact that the

incident was security-related and resulted in a loss of life, there was neither a PCC nor an ARB.

Serious Injury. M/PRI and PCC minutes provide different interpretations of serious

injury. M/PRI told the OIG team that the PCC defines “serious” as an injury from which an

individual cannot recover, such as amputation or loss of sight or hearing. However, the minutes

of a September 2004 PCC meeting define serious injury as “nearly fatal.” It is not a stretch to

argue that an injury, such as massive blood loss, would meet the latter definition but not the

former, or that loss of sight or hearing meets the first definition but not the second.

Significant Property Damage. There have been numerous examples of property damage

to embassies and consulates since 1998, but there are no guidelines for what constitutes

“significant.” For example, in July 2011, demonstrators outside the U.S. embassy in Damascus

threw eggs, rocks, and paint at the embassy compound, smashed ballistic-resistant glass

windows, broke security cameras, and set fire to the embassy’s roof before attacking the chief of

mission residence, where they destroyed two armored vehicles and an unarmored box truck.

12 “Significant Attacks against U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel 1998-2012,” U.S. Department of State,

Bureau of Diplomatic Security report.

13 United States Department of State Significant Attacks Against U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel 1998-

2012.

14 M/PRI list of PCC reasons for not convening an ARB.

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Despite the property damage, there was neither a PCC nor an ARB. In February 2008,

demonstrators set fire to the U.S. embassy in Belgrade, causing extensive damage and the death

of a demonstrator inside the embassy compound. Without guidelines on what constitutes

“significant,” it is difficult to justify the assertion that no incident has met the PCC or ARB

threshold for significant property damage in the past 14 years.

At or Related to a U.S. Government Mission Abroad. In September 2004, a bomb

detonated while an attacker was trying to penetrate the consular booth at the U.S. embassy in

Tashkent, killing two Uzbek police officers. The PCC recommended against an ARB because the

incident was unrelated to the mission, no U.S. mission personnel died, and the subject had not

successfully penetrated the consular booth or the embassy grounds. Proximity to the actual

embassy is not always a deciding factor. The PCC determined that the January 2008 Khartoum

roadside murder of a Foreign Service officer and his embassy driver while returning home from

a party met the threshold of a security-related incident and recommended that an ARB convene.

These examples demonstrate the need to establish basic guidelines to ensure consistency

in PCC deliberations. Several interviewees told the OIG team that DS often takes the position

that there is no reason for a PCC or ARB if the security systems worked as designed, even if

there is loss of non-American life, serious injury, or property damage. The OIG team finds this to

be limiting in that it precludes broader discussion. Even in instances that are determined not to

rise to the level of an ARB, there may be lessons learned from examining these events or security

flaws, even if everything seems to have worked as intended.

Recommendation 5: The Office of the Under Secretary of State for Management, in

coordination with the Office of the Legal Adviser should establish written guidelines for the

Permanent Coordinating Committee regarding criteria for “serious injury,” “significant

destruction of property,” and “at or related to a U.S. mission abroad.” (Action: M, in

coordination with L)

Exclusions from the Accountability Review Board Process

“The Secretary of State is not required to convene a Board in the case of an incident that

involves any facility, installation or personnel of the Department of Defense with respect to

which the Secretary has delegated operational control of security functions abroad to the

Secretary of Defense pursuant to section 106 of the Act.15 In any such case, the Secretary of

Defense will conduct an appropriate inquiry and report the findings and recommendations of

such inquiry, and the action taken with respect to such recommendations, to the Secretary of

State and Congress.” - 12 Foreign Affairs Manual 033.1d. (2)

There are two legislative exclusions when an ARB is not required:

The first relates to security-related incidents that involve a facility, installation, or

personnel of the Department of Defense for which the Secretary has delegated operational

control of security functions abroad to the Secretary of Defense in accordance with Section 106

of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security Act and Antiterrorism of 1986.16 In this case, the Secretary

15 The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, as amended. Section 106 of the Act is codified

at 22 U.S.C. 4805.

16 22 USC 4831(a)(2).

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is not required to convene an ARB and instead relies upon the Secretary of Defense to conduct

an appropriate inquiry and report the findings.

The Act requires the Secretary of Defense to report an inquiry’s findings and

recommendations to the Secretary and Congress.17 However, in practice the Department of

Defense does not routinely share the results of its investigations with the Department of State,

despite Department requests that it do so. Apart from being a violation of law, the lack of

information sharing is a disservice to Department personnel who are placed under Department of

Defense protection. Failure to fulfill this reporting requirement also results in missed

opportunities to share interagency lessons learned between the foreign affairs, defense, and

intelligence communities.

The Department has sent Executive Secretariat (S/ES) memoranda to the Department of

Defense requesting incident reports to no avail. It is incumbent upon the Department to be more

proactive in obtaining the reports of Department of Defense inquiries.

Recommendation 6: The Office of the Under Secretary of State for Management should contact

the Department of Defense counterpart and request that the Department of Defense fulfill its

statutory obligation to provide the Department of State with investigation reports of securityrelated incidents that involve Department of State personnel. (Action: M)

The second exclusion that relieves the Secretary from having to convene an ARB

involves a legislative carve-out for Afghanistan and Iraq.18 For security-related events occurring

in these two specific locations during the specified time periods, the Secretary is not required to

convene an ARB. The Secretary is required, however, to notify promptly both the House

Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and to conduct an

inquiry of an incident that occurs at or is related to a U.S. mission. M/PRI drafts reports of the

findings of these internal inquiries, recommendations, and actions taken, which are submitted to

each Committee through the Bureau of Legislative Affairs. Notwithstanding the carve-out, the

Secretary may still decide to convene an ARB.

Permanent Coordinating Committee Annual Meetings

“In addition, the Committee will meet yearly to review the ARB process, existing policies

and procedures, and ensure that any necessary changes are effected.” - 12 Foreign Affairs

Manual 032.1a.

Over the past 3 years, PCC annual meetings were not called as required. There have been

a few attempts to combine meetings involving incidents with routine housekeeping duties of an

annual meeting, but these meetings have not met FAM requirements. Annual meetings are a way

to review ARB processes, existing policies and procedures, and ensure that any necessary

changes are made.

Recommendation 7: The Office of Management Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation should

convene annual meetings of the Permanent Coordinating Committee to specifically review and

assess the committee’s work. (Action: M/PRI)

17 Id. This statutory reporting requirement is referenced in 12 FAM 033.1 d. (2). 18 22 U.S.C. 4831(a)(3), originally added in 2005 by P.L. 109-140. Section 3, 119 Stat. 2650 (Dec. 22, 2005).

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Accountability Review Board

Accountability Review Board Membership

“Members must possess expertise that will contribute to the work of the Board, e.g.,

knowledge, experience or training in areas such as foreign affairs, law, security, embassy

construction, intelligence, and other areas appropriate to the Board’s work. In the case of a

Board convened pursuant to a visa incident, at least one Board member must have had extensive

experience as a consular officer and consular manager. Only in exceptional circumstances

should Board members be current employees of the U.S. Government.19” - 12 Foreign Affairs

Manual 032.2

Upon recommending to the Secretary that an ARB be convened, M/PRI forwards a list

with the names of five proposed members for the ARB, together with biographic information.

There is no guidance in the FAM as to how this list is to be developed, but there is a requirement

that the PCC update the list annually per 12 FAM 033.2 a.

It is important to note that the OIG team found no reason to question the selection of

previous ARB members; however, the current system of compiling and maintaining a list is

informal and inconsistent. The list is developed over time based on recommendations from

various sources. Currently, names are drawn from a roster of potential candidates maintained by

M/PRI. Sometimes the Executive Secretariat (S/ES) tasks bureaus and the under secretaries to

provide additional names, while at other times this process is managed solely by M/PRI, with

assistance from the PCC and the Bureau of Human Resources. This roster is not routinely

reviewed by a Department principal.

The annual review and updating of the roster by the under secretaries and assistant

secretaries would provide a broader range of qualified candidates and improve the diversity of

talent available to serve on ARBs. Tasking under secretaries and assistant secretaries is best done

by S/ES, although M/PRI would continue to manage the list and provide names to the Secretary

should the need arise. S/ES has committed to working with M/PRI to determine the best timing

and procedure to manage and update the ARB candidate list.

Recommendation 8: The Executive Secretariat, in coordination with the Office of Management

Policy, Rightsizing and Innovation, should annually task the under secretaries and assistant

secretaries in the Department of State to provide potential nominees to serve on Accountability

Review Boards. (Action: S/ES, in coordination with M/PRI)

Several ARBs had repeat members, including the chair. Given the time limitations on the

ARBs, an argument can be made for repeat selections, because those members can bring

experience to the ARB that reduces the time required to complete the task. Moreover, there is no

indication that repeated service by ARB members has harmed the process. However, a number of

senior officials interviewed during the inspection expressed concern that repeated service on

ARBs might compromise the objectivity of the investigative process or give rise to the

appearance of impropriety in the selection process. To avoid that negative appearance, decisions

to put the same person on multiple ARBs must be clearly justified. All lists of candidates

19 See Section 302(a) of the Act, 22 U.S.C. 4832.

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14

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

recommended to the Secretary should include annotations explaining the strengths that each

candidate would bring to the ARB, particularly in the case of repeat members.

In almost all instances, the selection of ARB members was made based on the

recommendations submitted by M/PRI to the Secretary. In only two instances (Nairobi/Dar es

Salaam and Benghazi) did the names of ARB members actually originate with the secretaries and

their senior advisors. Many of those interviewed by the OIG team felt that the increased

involvement of Department principals in the selection process would ensure that the proposed

ARB membership properly reflects the background and skill sets needed, as well as appropriate

consideration of diversity. Moreover, the Secretary could benefit from having greater choice in

his/her selection of members for the ARB.

Accountability Review Board Staffing

When the Secretary convenes an ARB, the M/PRI director and staff act as de facto

members of the Secretary’s staff. Their duties are to brief ARB members at the outset on ARB

policies and procedures, serve as the institutional memory and primary point of contact for ARB

matters, and maintain permanent files, rules, procedures, rosters, libraries, etc., for the ARB.

M/PRI coordinates the naming of an executive secretary to the Board who is a current or retired

senior Foreign Service officer recommended by the Bureau of Human Resources, Career

Development and Assignments office. Once launched, the ARB operates independently of

M/PRI.

ARB members expressed satisfaction with the quality and level of support they received

from the administrative staff assigned to the ARB. There is considerable flexibility in the type

and number of additional experts, consultants, and support staff provided to ARBs, depending

upon the magnitude of the task. Some Boards have had full-time legal advisors; however, the

Office of the Legal Adviser has always been available for consultation to each ARB. Not all

ARBs include a security specialist among its members, yet several former ARB members

reported that the presence of a person with DS experience on the panel helped the ARB navigate

the DS organization. The composition of the ARB, including whether or not to have a DS

member, should not be prescribed but should be made on the merits of the case. However, all

ARBs could benefit from the assignment of a dedicated DS or security professional as a part of

the ARB’s staff, similar to the role of the Office of the Legal Adviser.

Accountability Review Board Impartiality

ARB members were conscious of the need to protect their impartiality by limiting their

contact with senior managers of the Department during the process. Former members

unanimously told OIG team that they encountered no attempts to impede, influence, or interfere

with their work at any time or on any level.

None of the 12 ARBs interviewed the Secretary to ascertain her/his role in the events

leading up to the incident under review. ARB members interviewed by the OIG team stated that

after reviewing documentation, they did not find reason to interview the Secretary; rather, the

ARBs focused their inquiries at the operational levels of the Department responsible for

implementing and overseeing security policies and programs. ARB members were unanimous in

saying that they felt empowered to interview anyone, including the Secretary, as the facts or

events warranted.

943
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15

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

All ARB members interviewed by the OIG team reported that they received full

cooperation from interviewees in Washington and at overseas posts. In addition to speaking with

individuals invited by the ARB, the ARBs made themselves available to anyone who volunteered

information regarding security incidents under investigation.

Accountability Review Board Timeline

“A Board will be given ample time to conduct its investigations and write its report.”- 12

Foreign Affairs Manual 033.3b.

A careful reading of the statute and the FAM indicates that there is no requirement other

than “ample time” for an ARB to produce a report, but the Secretary’s mandates to the ARBs

have consistently stated, “The ARB shall submit a detailed report to the Secretary of State within

60 days of its first meeting.” Previous ARB members and their executive secretaries emphasized

that they felt they were under considerable pressure to complete their work within 60 days.

However, all former Board members felt that they had sufficient time to complete their reports.

Once the ARB has delivered its report to the Secretary, its work terminates no later than

30 days thereafter, and it is not obligated to perform any additional duties. The Department is

available to assist ARB members, as appropriate, in the event they need to respond to followup

inquiries regarding the Board’s work.20

Accountability Review Board Report

The practice, documented over the past 14 years, has been for the ARB to deliver its

report in person to either the Secretary or one of the Department principals. Records indicate that

in a number of instances the Board briefed the Secretary in person and outlined its

recommendations. When an ARB was unable to brief the Secretary personally, the Board

members said they were left with the impression that the overall effort was not treated with the

weight it deserved.

It is clear from the legislation and from 12 FAM 036 that the ARB report belongs to the

Secretary. It follows that the Secretary makes the ultimate decision regarding the report’s

distribution. Nonetheless, the fundamental purpose of an ARB is to avert future incidents by

providing all employees of the Department of State—not just those in leadership positions—an

opportunity to learn from these tragic incidents.

It would be useful if copies of ARB reports and the Secretary’s Report to Congress

received wider circulation within the Department. In practice, copies of the Secretary’s Report

are shared with the Deputy Secretary, all under secretaries, all assistant secretaries, the U.S.

Attorney General, and where appropriate, other agencies like USAID. The reports are rarely

circulated to working-level staff. In the case of the classified Benghazi ARB report, many midlevel and senior employees expressed frustration that they had not been given access to the entire

report despite being asked to implement its recommendations.

20 In the case of the Benghazi ARB, the Department continues to work with members of the ARB to assist them in

responding to and preparing for congressional appearances and testimony.

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16

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

S/ES is taking steps to formalize the process for determining the proper distribution for

an ARB report and the complementary Secretary’s Report to Congress, subject to the

prerogatives of the Secretary.

Informal Recommendation 3: The Executive Secretariat should circulate Accountability

Review Board reports and the Secretary’s subsequent report to Congress more widely

within the Department of State.

The Benghazi ARB report does not have the proper paragraph markings, and the

justifications for classifying parts of the report are unclear. In addition, 16 taskers for

implementing the report’s recommendations were classified at a higher level than the original 7

recommendations themselves. Many of the documents submitted in response to the taskers

appear to be overclassified. By overclassifying some taskers, and subsequent responses, the

Department may unnecessarily restrict the distribution of information regarding the actions taken

to implement the ARB recommendations.

Informal Recommendation 4: The Executive Secretariat should coordinate with the

Bureau of Diplomatic Security to establish a process to properly classify and paragraph

mark Accountability Review Board reports and taskers.

Records Management

The ARB records and files from 1998 to present are inconsistent in the types of

documentation kept for archival purposes, as well as in their disposition. In several cases, ARB

files are incomplete; some contain documentation from the beginning of the process, starting

with the PCC to the ARB report itself, while others do not. Variations in types of documentation

retained in different locations made it challenging for the OIG team to determine what

constituted an official record.

In addition, interviews with several ARBs and their executive secretaries revealed that

they were not certain about what information was to be kept because the guidance on records

retention was unclear. To ensure that all documentation is preserved for official records, ARBs

need clear guidance on how information and documentation should be handled. This guidance

needs to be included in the briefing book for the ARB and its executive secretary at the

beginning of the process.

A related issue, which M/PRI is currently addressing, is the management of electronic

records. Currently, the disposition timetable for electronic records stipulates that a record copy is

to be stored and the originals deleted or destroyed after 180 days. ARB records will benefit from

the standard operating procedures that M/PRI is in the process of developing.

Secretary’s Report to Congress

“Report to Congress: the Secretary will, no later than 90 days after the receipt of a

Board’s program recommendations, submit a report to the Congress on each such

recommendation and the action taken or intended to be taken with respect to that

recommendation.” - 12 Foreign Affairs Manual 036.3a.

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17

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

The Secretary has a legislated mandate to submit a report to Congress on each

recommendation but is not required to forward to Congress a copy of the ARB report itself. The

Department submitted the ARB reports on the Nairobi/Dar es Salaam and the Benghazi attacks

to Congress in their entirety. Because the recommendations in these reports were so far-reaching

and had such significant resource implications, the Secretary considered it important that the

findings be shared with both houses of Congress. In the other 10 ARB investigations reviewed,

the secretaries’ reports to Congress provided a summary of the key elements of the ARB report,

transmitted the ARB’s recommendations for action, and informed Congress of the Department’s

response to those recommendations. The OIG team’s review of the secretaries’ reports to

Congress over the last 14 years indicated that they accurately conveyed the key elements of the

ARB reports.

The Department has not always been consistent in deciding to whom the report should be

delivered. For example, the 2003 Amman report was delivered to the Speaker of the House and

the President of the Senate. The 2004 Gaza report was delivered to the Senate Committee on

Foreign Relations, House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Speaker of the House, and the

President of the Senate. The 2005 Jeddah report was delivered only to the House, while the 2008

Khartoum report was delivered to the chairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the

Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs. This process does not guarantee that the report will reach

all of the members of Congress who have an oversight role with regard to the safety and security

of diplomats overseas. The Department lacks a methodology to improve consistency in providing

the Secretary’s Report to Congress, unless circumstances, or the Secretary, require deviation

from the standard list of congressional recipients.

Recommendation 9: The Executive Secretariat, in coordination with the Office of Legislative

Affairs, should create a baseline list of congressional recipients to whom a copy of the

Secretary’s Report to Congress is delivered. (Action: S/ES, in coordination with H)

Implementation

The implementation process begins with transmission of the Secretary’s Report to

Congress, which includes an outline of the Secretary’s response to the ARB Report and plans to

implement the recommendations.

Prior to the Benghazi ARB, M/PRI routinely oversaw the implementation process. It

established a working group composed of representatives from the appropriate bureaus within

the Department and, when required, handled liaison with other government agencies such as the

Department of Defense and USAID. The working group ensured that responsibilities for

recommendations were properly assigned, and M/PRI tracked implementation of each

recommendation. In some cases, M/PRI monitored this process for several years to ensure

compliance with the Secretary’s Report. M/PRI performed this task with dedication and

efficiency.

There is, however, no established process by which a Department principal assumes

formal oversight for the implementation process. For the most part, Department principals who

held office between 2002 and 2012 indicated their expectation that the implementation of ARB

recommendations would be carried out by the operational bureaus concerned. The way that the

Benghazi recommendations are being implemented, with oversight by the Deputy Secretary’s

office, is a desirable practice for future ARB recommendations, which the OIG team believes,

946
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18

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

should be formalized. A recommendation to this effect is in the section of this report that

discusses the Department’s implementation of the Benghazi ARB recommendations.

947

INTERVIEW OF

RAYMOND MAXWELL

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MARCH 8, 2016
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

PHILIP G. KIKO, Staff Director and General Counsel

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel

CARLTON DAVIS, Investigator

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director/General Counsel

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel

DANIEL REBNORD, Minority Professional Staff

ERIN O’BRIEN, Minority Detailee

950
3

Ms. Jackson. This is a transcribed interview of Raymond Maxwell

conducted by the House Select Committee on Benghazi. This interview

is being conducted voluntarily as part of the committee's investigation

into the attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and

matters related to it, pursuant to House Resolution 567 of the 113th

Congress and House Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

Mr. Maxwell, would you state your name for the record, please?

Mr. Maxwell. Raymond Douglas Maxwell.

Ms. Jackson. Thank you. And on behalf of myself and the

colleagues that I have here in this room today, thank you very much

for agreeing to come in for this interview.

As you know, I am Sharon Jackson. I'm with the committee's

majority staff. And I am with Carlton Davis, also with the majority

staff today.

And for the record, we will have the minority staff introduce

themselves.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Hi. I'm Susanne Sachsman Grooms from the

minority party staff.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny, minority staff.

Mr. Rebnord. Dan Rebnord with the minority staff.

Ms. O'Brien. I'm Erin O'Brien with the minority as well.

Mr. Maxwell. You have more minority staff than majority staff.

Ms. Jackson. Today they do.

951
4

Mr. Maxwell, this is the first time that you have been interviewed

by this committee, but we know that you were interviewed by the House

Oversight and Government Reform Committee back in May of 2013, and I

am sure you recall that event in your life.

Mr. Maxwell. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. And you had a copy of the transcript from your

interview of the last committee?

Mr. Maxwell. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. And you've had an opportunity to review it

before you came here today?

Mr. Maxwell. I have.

Ms. Jackson. The procedure that we're going to follow today is

very similar to the procedure that they followed in your prior

transcribed interview on this matter. So we're going to rotate back

and forth an hour at a time until we've exhausted all of our questions

for you today.

If at any time you don't understand a question or need to have

it repeated, please just say so, because it is important that you

understand fully what we're asking before you answer any question. So

just please do not hesitate to ask that anything be restated or

clarified in any way.

Mr. Maxwell. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. As you see, we have an official reporter here today,

as in your last interview, that's going to make a complete record of

what is said here today. So it's also important that I wait for your

952
5

answer before I start answering my next question and that you wait until

my questions are done before you offer an answer to assist the reporter

in getting a complete record.

Do you understand that?

Mr. Maxwell. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. And it's also important that you answer

audibly with yes or noes, rather than nods and shakes of the head, as

is normal in a conversation, so that the reporter can get down

everything. Okay?

Mr. Maxwell. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. We are in an unclassified setting today. I don't

imagine that any question that I pose to you today will call for a

classified answer. But if you think that we are going into that realm

and you think an answer of yours would go into a classified realm, please

just alert us to that fact and we will either withdraw the question

or reserve it for another opportunity where we can be in an appropriate

setting, okay?

Mr. Maxwell. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. I believe you were asked this before, but do you

understand that you are required to answer questions from Congress

truthfully?

Mr. Maxwell. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. And do you also understand that this applies

to questions posed by congressional staff in an interview?

Mr. Maxwell. Yes.

953
6

Ms. Jackson. Okay. Do you understand that witnesses who

knowingly provide false testimony could be subject to criminal

penalties for perjury or making a false statement?

Mr. Maxwell. Yes.

Ms. Jackson. Is there any reason that you would be unable to

provide truthful answers to today's questions?

Mr. Maxwell. No.

Ms. Jackson. All right. One other procedural thing,

Mr. Maxwell. It is our understanding that you elected to come here

today without any type of counsel or representation. Is that your

decision?

Mr. Maxwell. Yes, it is.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. If at any time you would like to have counsel

advise you before you answer any questions, we will stop and suspend

this interview and come back at which time you can have counsel of your

choosing?

Mr. Maxwell. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. Okay? So please just let us know.

Mr. Maxwell. Okay.

Ms. Jackson. All right.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q As we alluded to before, you were interviewed previously

by the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee back on May 30th

of 2013. Is that correct?

954
7

A That's correct.

Q And you have a copy of that transcript. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q And you reviewed it prior to coming here today?

A Yes.

Q As you reviewed that transcript, is there anything in there

that you thought was inaccurate because you misspoke or didn't

understand the question or anything that you would like to clarify from

that prior interview?

A Now's the time when I needed counsel.

There was something that I came across that was a slight

contradiction from what I said later, and I'll just be open with you

about it.

I was asked had I met Cheryl Mills before. And on that day, on

the May 30th, I said I had never met her. Now, I'm not sure what I

was thinking at the time. Maybe I was overemphasizing the meaning of

the word "met," because our paths had crossed. At the time, as I say,

I had never met -- we had never been formally introduced, but our paths

had crossed in the State Department. So that's a bit at odds with the

transcript. I'm looking for the exact place where it came up. It was

towards the end.

Q That's all right. We can find it. So that's an

elaboration and a clarification of your prior answer?

A Okay.

Q Is that an accurate -- is what you're doing today,

955
8

clarifying and elaborating on your prior answers?

A That's right. That's right.

Q So your paths had crossed, but you didn't feel that you had

had a formal meeting in any sense of the word?

A Exactly.

Q Okay. Any other instances like that as you reviewed the

transcript?

A No other.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q Had you ever exchanged any words with her?

A Yes, we had exchanged words before when she walked into a

room and said: Who is he? And Jake said: That's Ray Maxwell, he is

the DAS for the Maghreb. And she said: Okay.

Q But did you respond to her verbally?

A I did not.

Q So she had spoken around you, but you had never had a --

A She spoke around me.

Q Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Well, let's stay with that event. Can you tell us about

that event or that situation in which you encountered Cheryl Mills and

Jake Sullivan?

A Yeah. I don't have the exact date. I think -- it seems

like it was in October. It was definitely on a Sunday, I recall,

because one of my subordinates had come in to check in with me on Friday

956
9

and was complaining she had to be in all weekend working on a project.

And I said: Oh, what's the project? And she said: Well, we're

preparing some documents. And so I said: Oh, where's it going to be?

And she told me. I said: Well, I may stop by.

Q Okay. Let me just stop you there and back up and get a

little more detail as to that.

Who was the subordinate?

A This was

Q Okay. And you had previously said that you were the DAS,

or deputy assistant secretary, for the Office of Maghreb Affairs. Is

that correct?

A Yes, yes.

Q In the Near Eastern Affairs Bureau?

A Yes.

Q Okay. What was role in that?

A She was the deputy director of the Office of Maghreb

Affairs. But she was the acting director because at that point the

director was in Tripoli.

Q Okay. He had gone to Libya following the attacks?

A No, no. This was -- yeah, following the attacks.

Following the attacks.

Q When you said this was in October, I'm not sure if you said

the year or I just --

A 2012.

Q So it was in October following the attacks in Benghazi?

957
10

A That's right.

Q Okay. And came and talked to you about having

to work that weekend?

A Yes.

Q Was anyone else from your Maghreb office going to be working

that weekend?

A I'm not sure. I'm not sure. She mentioned that she was

going to be there. She didn't tell me at that point that there were

going to be other people there.

Q Okay. And what else did she tell you in this meeting?

A She was complaining that she had to work over the weekend.

And I said: Well, I didn't know anything about it but I may stop by.

I live in the neighborhood.

And so she said -- excuse me -- she said: Fine. And that Sunday

morning, I went in.

Q Okay. And did she tell you where this event was going to

take place?

A Yes.

Q Within the State Department?

A Yes. She told me there is an emergency management sort of

operations center in the basement floor under what we call the jogger's

entrance.

Q Okay. So that's in the main State building --

A Yes.

Q -- off of C Street?

958
11

A Well, it's actually off of 21st Street.

Q Okay. And can you describe this room for us?

A Yeah, it's -- well, it's emergency management. It's a room

run by the A Bureau, and I'm familiar with the A Bureau because I worked

as a special assistant to the assistant secretary for administration

for a while several years previously.

If something happens in the world, the information goes to the

operations center on the seventh floor. But if something happens in

Washington, then it's not handled by the seventh floor, it's handled

by the Bureau of Administration, and that's run out of this sort of

operations room in the basement under the jogger's entrance.

Q Okay. So told you that there was going to be

this project being worked on over the weekend. Did she give you any

more details about what she was going to be doing there?

A I don't recall that she did at the time.

Q Okay. What did you do next then?

A I came in that Sunday morning. And I think that was -- you

had to log in. I logged in.

Q Does that mean physically log in, like sign in a log book

or something?

A Physically log in.

Q Okay. Not just swipe your badge?

A That's right. That's right.

We were situated in a small room off to the left as you enter,

and we started off there in this small room.

959
12

Excuse me.

Shortly, within half an hour, Cheryl Mills came in with Jake

Sullivan. And Cheryl didn't know me. And so she said: Who is he?

And Jake said: That's Ray Maxwell, he's the DAS. And she said: Okay.

And they turned around and walked out.

Q How many people were in the room?

A You know, it's been a long, long time. It's been 4 years

ago. But I'm thinking three, maybe four people in the room.

Q Okay. was one of them?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Do you recall anybody else who was in the room that

day?

A You know, I don't recall. Earlier I said that there was

an intern there. And you guys called the intern. The intern got all

frazzled. He called me. And he said: Ray, I really don't remember

blah, blah, blah, blah. And I said: Look, if you don't remember, you

don't remember, I'm not going to, you know, bother you about that.

I thought an intern was there. It's possible that I had the wrong

intern. We had lots of different interns. So I didn't make a big deal

about it.

So for the purposes of our conversation today, I won't say that

there was an intern there since he claims that he wasn't there. Or

he didn't say he wasn't there, he said he didn't remember.

Q But your prior recollection was that there had been an

intern there that day?

960
13

A Yes.

Q And again, just taking a step back, you went there on that

Sunday because had told you that there was going to be

this project?

A Yes.

Q Did you know what the general topic of the project or what

the general scope of the project was to be?

A It was preparing documentation for what I thought was the

ARB.

Q The Benghazi ARB?

A The Benghazi ARB.

Q And did you learn that from ? Or did you know

that from another source?

A I knew that from what was going on at the time.

Now, subsequent to that -- and, in fact, between August and

October of this year, I was back at State. And someone whispered in

my ear: Ray, that wasn't documentation for the ARB, that was

documentation for a congressional committee. And my first response

was: Oh, that makes it a whole lot better. But because we were

preparing documents for lots of different groups, it could have been

a congressional committee. It could have been the ARB.

Q Okay. But your understanding at the time was that it was

documents for the ARB?

A My understanding at the time was it was documents for the

ARB.

961
14

Q Okay. And then subsequently someone else told you that

those were documents for a congressional committee?

A Subsequent to all this stuff coming out, someone said:

Ray, it may have been for a congressional committee.

Q Okay. And who was that individual?

A I'm not going to call that person's name.

Q Okay.

So you came in on this Sunday because said that she

was going to be there. Had you gone in on Saturday?

A You know, we normally worked throughout the weekend. My

best guess -- and it's only a guess -- is that because we worked

Saturdays and Sundays, I probably had been in on that Saturday too.

Q Do you recall if was there on Saturday?

A No. And had I just gone to my office, I wouldn't have seen

her because we didn't work in the same vicinity.

Q So when you say you might have gone in, you just mean to

your office?

A To my office.

Q You don't recall being in this document organization room

on Saturday?

A No.

Q So Sunday would have been the first time that you were there?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Did you have a conversation with ?

A Inside the room, yes, yes.

962
15

Q Would you tell us about that?

A Well, yeah. We started in a small room. There were stacks

of cable traffic we were going through. And said: Ray we're

going to go through these and we're going to remove anything

that's -- that puts Beth or this or the seventh floor in a bad light.

Beth, meaning Beth Jones, the acting assistant secretary. Liz,

meaning Liz Dibble, the principal deputy assistant secretary. And

anybody on the seventh floor means anybody on the seventh floor.

Q Okay. And did you respond in any way?

A At the time, I said: is that actually ethical?

And she just said: Ray these are orders. This is what we're doing.

Q Did she say whether she was doing any other type of

redactions?

A No.

Q Okay. Did you have any further conversation with

?

A No. We started plowing through the stacks of papers. In

a few minutes, we moved to a large room, I think because the people

who actually ran that room needed the first room that we were in. So

we moved to a second room that had stacks of papers and computers.

And actually it was interesting because I had been away on leave

in July and August, and I had missed a lot of the cables, and

particularly the cables from Tripoli and Benghazi, which were the

cables we were looking at. So I was catching up on my reading. I was

reading through those cables.

963
16

Q And did you do any sorting or segregating?

A I didn't do any sorting. I didn't pull anything out.

Q Did you have anything before you other than cable traffic?

A I only saw cable traffic.

Q Okay. Do you know what was reviewing?

A I do not.

Q And when you moved into the larger room, did you continue

with the document review?

A We continued with the same stacks.

Q You took the stacks --

A We took the stacks with us.

Q -- from the smaller room into the larger room?

A Yes.

Q Approximately how long were you there?

A No more than an hour and a half.

Q Okay. And approximately how many documents did you get

through during that time?

A I may have read 15 cables.

Q Okay. And did stay after you left?

A She did.

Q Okay. Did you go back at all any more that day?

A I didn't.

Q Okay. Did you ever visit that document organization room

again?

A I didn't. And I haven't.

964
17

Q Okay. Were other members of your staff down in that

document organization room?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. During the following week, you don't know if anybody

was there?

A I don't know because I worked on the sixth -- my office was

on the sixth floor and their office was down on the second floor and

I can't account for where they were every minute of every day. My

assumption was that they were all doing their regular work.

Q Okay. You never saw any type of rotational schedule where

everybody had to do some hours down there?

A No.

Q That was never brought to you by --

A No.

Q -- or anyone else?

A No.

Q Okay. You said there were three or four people down there.

Other than and possibly this intern, was there anybody

else that you recognized?

A There was no one else there that I recognized. But there

was a guy there who worked in that space, probably a guy that worked

in the A Bureau. I didn't know his name. I didn't know -- I mean,

he was just there helping with the equipment and stuff.

Q He wasn't doing any of the document review?

A No. But he was in the room.

965
18

Q So it was yourself and that was engaged in the

document review. And how many other people that you recall?

A I recall one other person, an intern. Maybe I got the name

wrong. It's possible. But I recall being there with an

intern.

Q Okay. The name that you had provided before was a

?

A That's right. That's right.

Q And is that ?

A Yes.

Q Oh, ?

A. .

Q Okay. Do you recall the names of any other interns that

you had at the time?

A There was a woman there who ended up working for the Atlantic

Council. Her name was --

Q I'm sorry. The Atlantic?

A The Atlantic Council. She is doing Libya stuff there now.

Her name was -- I can't recall her name. . I can't

remember her name.

. I don't remember her name.

Q Okay. Those would have been the only two interns you had

at the time?

A There were other interns in the office. We had about four

interns altogether, and I can see their faces, but I don't remember

966
19

their names.

Q Okay. And how is it that you recall that it was an intern

as opposed to another employee at the Office of Maghreb Affairs?

A Oh, well, we know the difference between the interns and

the regular employees. The employees are desk officers, and they have

specific desk responsibilities. The desk officers have specific

country responsibilities. We had one person for Algeria, for example.

One person for Morocco. One person for -- we had a desk officer for

Libya. She wasn't there. I'm trying to remember her name.

Mr. Davis. I guess the question is, in addition to , how

do you know that the other person that she was with was an intern and

not an employee from some other bureau within the Department?

Mr. Maxwell. Because I recognized him as being an intern in our

office.

Mr. Davis. Okay. Got it.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Following your being in this room for approximately an hour

and a half, what did you do after that?

A I went home.

Q Okay. Did you talk with anybody about what had happened

or your conversation with after that time?

A No. And in fact, if I may elaborate, I completely forgot

about it from that October until September of 2013.

What sprung it, what brought it back to mind was I watched

Ambassador Pickering and Admiral Mullen interviewed by this committee,

967
20

and they both spoke in very stringent terms that they had full and

unfettered access to all information, and I knew that wasn't true.

Q So that testimony before Congress is what triggered in your

mind your recollection?

A That was what triggered it.

Now we know it's really not true because they didn't have any of

the Secretary's emails or any of the Secretary's senior staff's emails

or we didn't know about the Secretary's emails back then.

Q And so is that the reason then why you didn't bring it up

when you were interviewed by the House Oversight and Government Reform

Committee in May of 2013?

A That is the reason why.

Q Okay.

A Because May is before September.

Q Okay. And in September of 2014 when you were interviewed

by Sharyl Attkisson, you revealed these allegations.

A Yes.

Q Is there any reason why you did not call this committee to

relay those allegations prior to your interview with Ms. Attkisson?

A There's no reason. There's no reason. As such, I had been

in contact with Sharyl Attkisson about things that she had done. At

the point in time when I reached out to Sharyl, a couple of things had

sort of reached a culmination for me. One, I was in a long, extended

grievance process with the State Department, and that finally

concluded -- not in my favor, but it concluded. And two, I had started

968
21

a graduate program in May of 2013 that I had just finished in August

of 2014. And so I had that burden removed from me. And before that,

I had both those things sort of going and I wasn't trying to add new

things.

I think that I did speak with folks from -- not the -- from this

committee about that same time.

Q Shortly after the article appeared?

A Shortly after the article appeared. Yeah, yeah.

Q But not before?

A But not before.

Q Okay.

Let me just take a step back to the document review process. Do

you know how those documents were assembled to be there in that room?

A I learned subsequently that the document call went out.

The documents came from various offices. The documents came from

various offices into NEA/EX, the Executive Bureau.

NEA/EX pulled together the documents and joined them in the A

Bureau office with documents from the rest of the building, because

it wasn't just the NEA Bureau that had documents on Benghazi, there

were documents within all different bureaus.

So NEA collected all the documents in NEA/EX. And from NEA/EX,

they went down to this room.

I also learned subsequently that the person in charge of the NEA

collection -- well, in charge -- the IT guy in charge of actually

gathering the documents wanted to impose a sort of system to serialize

969
22

the documents as they came in so that there could be no sort of insertion

or removal of documents once they were received. He ran into a lot

of opposition.

Q And who was the IT person?

A I don't remember his name. But I know that he was -- well,

I learned subsequently that he was very insistent on setting up this

system which would have eliminated the -- in retrospect, would have

eliminated the ability of anybody to withdraw documents without there

being some evidence, because he wanted to serialize each document as

it came in and then keep a kind of an index in a kind of a way that

a librarian would do. And they rejected it, and they gave him a hard

time. . He eventually took an

assignment in Australia, I heard.

Q Okay. Who else would have known of his request to serialize

the documents? Would there have been other people in the NEA/EX

Bureau?

A There would have been other people in the NEA/EX Bureau who

would have known.

Q And who would those people have been at the time?

A was there. I think she was the SPMO.

Q And what does SPMO mean?

A Supervisory post management officer. I can't remember

those names.

Q Okay. Was there at the time?

A was there at the time. Yes, yes, yes. She

970
23

was one of the PMOs. In fact, she was the PMO for Libya, I think.

Q And was she at the time in October of 2012, if you recall?

A was in NEA/EX at the time, but I'm not sure what her

job was.

Q Okay. You've previously described that Ms. Mills and

Mr. Sullivan came into this room. Was there any type of access control

to this room? Did you have to swipe your badge or sign in or anything

to gain access to this room?

A I thought I remembered signing in, signing a log. It's been

a long time.

Q Okay.

A I'm not precisely sure about that. But I thought I recalled

signing a log to get in.

Q Into that room, as opposed to into the building?

A Into that room.

Q Okay. And who would maintain those logs, if you know?

A The A Bureau would maintain those logs.

Q Okay. When you were in the A Bureau, did they routinely

keep those logs for an extended period of time?

A I don't know because I worked up in the front office. We

had -- our areas of sort of jurisdiction and emergency management was

a separate department in the A Bureau and it wasn't one I covered. I

covered the Office of Procurement Executive. I covered Small and

Disadvantaged Business Development. I covered the Global Publishing

office. And one other. It's been 10 years, I can't remember.

971
24

Q Okay. Just generally, is there some sort of access control

into the State Department on weekends?

A There is. You have to swipe your card.

Q Okay. And do you know if logs or any type of recordation

is kept of your entry and exit from the State Department?

A I would imagine someone has something somewhere.

Q Okay. But you don't have any details as to how long those

records are kept or anything like that?

A Or even who keeps them.

Q Going back to this document collection process, you said

that you subsequently learned that there had been a call for records

regarding Benghazi. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Did you take any steps to gather your records to provide

in response to this call for records?

A I did not. And I checked with my boss. And I said: Do

I need to do anything about this record call? And she said: No, you

don't need to because everything that you've done has come through me.

So I didn't submit anything.

Q And you said you talked with your boss. Who are you

referring to?

A Liz Dibble.

Q She was the principal deputy assistant secretary at the

time?

A Yes.

972
25

Q So she had led you to believe that she had collected her

records and produced them?

A Yes. And that I didn't need to.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q Just a few questions.

Why did you decide to go in on that particular Sunday?

A Again, told me that Friday afternoon when she

checked out she was coming in. She had some work to do. And she told

me in sort of round details what she was going to be doing. And I said

I may stop by.

Q And where was office? Was she on the sixth floor

or was she on the second floor?

A She was on the second floor. When she checked out, she came

to my office to check out.

Q Okay. Do you know if she worked any other Sundays in

addition to the one that you saw her there?

A probably worked most Sundays. She's a hard worker.

Q So Cheryl Mills and Jake Sullivan, approximately how long

were they in the room for?

A Less than 5 minutes.

Q Okay. And do you recall them saying anything else other

than asking who you were?

A No.

Q Were you surprised to see them there?

A Not particularly.

973
26

Q And why's that?

A I mean, they kind of run the place. They can go wherever

they want.

Q Was this in the morning or the afternoon that you were there?

A It was in the afternoon. It was early afternoon.

Q So you weren't surprised to see them there on a Sunday

afternoon in sort of a basement --

A You know, it was a bit of a surprise, actually. Now that

I reflect, it was a bit of a surprise.

Q Had you ever encountered either Jake Sullivan or Cheryl

Mills in person before?

A I had passed Cheryl Mills in the hallway going to the

cafeteria a couple of times. I knew Jake better because when I was

the director for regional affairs, we did a lot of stuff with SP, and

Jake was in SP.

Q So you had actually had occasion to interact with him?

A Kind of, sort of. I mean, we weren't drinking buddies or

anything but --

Q Now, , when she said that -- when she complained that

she had to work on the weekend, did she say where those orders were

coming from?

A I don't recall that she did. I assumed that it was coming

from Beth and Liz -- from Beth or Liz.

Q Was it common for or other people within your office

to be tasked with weekend work by people above you in the chain of

974
27

command?

A Unfortunately, it is very common.

Q So you didn't inquire as to why she was working on the

weekend?

A This is the way they ran things. It was crazy. But this

was how they ran things. They did whatever they wanted.

Q Did you subsequently learn who had instructed her to work

on the weekend?

A I didn't subsequently. No, I didn't.

Q Okay. And you never asked her?

A No.

Q Okay. You said at one point, she said that the orders were

to go through the cables and remove anything that could look damaging

to Beth, Liz, or the seventh floor. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q Did she tell you that she had any other instructions other

than just those instructions?

A No.

Q And did she tell you where those instructions came from?

A She did not. And I assumed they came from Beth and Liz.

Q But you did not ask Beth or Liz?

A I did not ask them.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q During the time that she was reviewing documents, did she

separate or segregate any documents? You said that you did not. Did

975
28

she?

A I don't know. I wasn't watching her. I was reading the

one that I was reading.

Q When Cheryl Mills and Jake Sullivan came in, were you in

this larger room or the smaller room?

A The smaller room.

Q The smaller room. Was in the smaller room too?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Did they come all the way in the room or were they

in the doorway?

A They were in the doorway.

Q Okay. Did they interact at all with ?

A Not that I recall. That's not to say that they didn't. But

I don't recall.

Q Do you recall, did you and stand up? Were

you already standing?

A We did not stand up.

Q You were still seated at a table?

A Yes.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q Let me ask it this way. You said that, regarding Cheryl

Mills and Jake Sullivan, they run the place, so they can do whatever

they want?

A Yes.

Q That aside, were you surprised that on a Sunday afternoon,

976
29

to see them come down to this small room doing this assignment where

was working?

A I wasn't necessarily surprised to see them show up on a

Sunday afternoon because that was how they ran things. They were

everywhere all the time.

Q But it's different than passing them in the hallway on the

way to the cafeteria --

A That's right.

Q -- on a Sunday.

A That's right.

Q They are at the same place where you are --

A That's right.

Q -- where you didn't even know that something was occurring

until one of your subordinates mentioned it to you on Friday?

A That's right.

Q That didn't strike you as a little odd?

A It did strike me as a little odd. It's a little odd. But

it wouldn't have stricken me as more odd, for example, if Pat Kennedy

had showed up, because this is how they ran things. They went wherever

they went, whenever they wanted to. They showed up anywhere. You

could expect to see them.

Q So you said that after this incident you kind of forgot about

it until you saw Pickering and Mullen testify?

A Yes.

Q So the following day, when you came in on a Monday, did you

977
30

have any follow-up with about how long she was there?

A No, not that I recall.

Q Okay. You never asked her whether she was going to have

to continue that assignment?

A I don't remember asking her anything.

Q And do you remember mentioning this to anybody?

A I don't remember mentioning it to anybody.

Q Or asking any additional follow-up questions about the

assignment?

A No.

Q You never asked Beth or Liz Dibble about it?

A I did not.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q To your knowledge, did or anybody else from

the NEA Bureau go down there and participate in the document review?

A was the desk officer for Libya, but was not there

that Sunday. Now, whether or not she went down there at any point in

time and did anything with any documents, I don't know.

Q Okay. Are you aware of any type of document coordination

group or coordination group that you had for Benghazi-related

information following the attacks?

A There was a coordination group out of NEA/EX.

Q And do you recall who was part of that coordination group?

A Well, was the NEA/EX director. He would bring

it up in senior staff meetings, the call for documentation and the need

978
31

for people getting things in. I'm not sure who worked under him, I'm

sure some people did.

I think -- the person I was told who tried to institute the

serialization program was an IT guy. There were other IT people who

maintained IT equipment and information management in general, and I

would guess that they were involved in it along with and

and people in the post management -- on the post management side.

Q Of the NEA/EX?

A Of NEA/EX. Now, that was one phase. There was probably

some other group on the seventh floor who was coordinating -- or from

the seventh floor via the A Bureau who was coordinating documentation

for the whole building, because people didn't bring papers into the

room where the ARB group was -- where the ARB team was conducting

interviews. That's not how it was done.

Q How was it done?

A It was -- to the best of my knowledge, things were -- from

the geographic bureaus, things were taken to this A Bureau room. And

from this A Bureau room, they were delivered to the ARB headquarters,

if you will.

Q Okay. And how did you learn that?

A I pretty much learned that -- I only knew the NEA part of

it. I pretty much learned the A Bureau part after the fact, after all

this had passed, just asking questions around to find out what was

really going on.

Q Okay. Do you recall who you learned that from?

979
32

A I'm not going to call those names because people came to

me in confidence to try to commiserate with me after everything that

had happened.

BY MR. DAVIS:

Q So I want to make sure I understand what you're saying. So

at the time, in October 2012 -- you think it was October, you definitely

know it was a Sunday?

A Yes.

Q You knew that the ARB had been convened and they were

investigating the attack?

A Yes.

Q And so when you saw the room of documents and going through

cables, you assumed at that time that it was for the ARB?

A That it was for the ARB, yes.

Q But subsequently, between August and October of last year,

when you were back at the State Department, somebody told you it was

actually for a congressional response?

A That's what I was told.

Q Okay. And who was the individual that told you that?

A I didn't call that person's name. I'm not going to call

that person's name.

Q But you know who that individual is?

A Pardon?

Q You're not going to tell us, but you remember today who that

980
33

individual was?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Did you doubt the veracity of what that individual

was telling you?

A No.

Q So that individual was in a position to know definitively

whether it was for the ARB or whether it was for Congress?

A I don't know.

Q Did you know if that individual was involved in either

producing documents to the ARB or producing documents to Congress?

A One or the other.

Q You don't know which one though?

A No.

Q But you know that individual was involved in one of those

activities?

A Yes.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q During the time that you were in the document organization

room, did you see anybody from Legislative Affairs there?

A I don't know.

Q What about from the legal department or legal bureau?

A I don't know. There were other people in the room. And

I assumed that the rest of those people, the people who were in the

room, were all from the A Bureau. That was my assumption.

Q Did anybody else come in and out in addition or apart from

981
34

Cheryl Mills and Jake Sullivan?

A I didn't notice anybody else. But again, I was there

for -- I was there for less than 2 hours, less than an hour and a half.

Q Did you ever subsequently learn who was coordinating the

document organization room?

A No.

Q To your knowledge, it was the A Bureau?

A To my knowledge, it was the A Bureau.

Q Okay. I'm going to change gears here and ask you about

another topic.

A Okay.

Q When you were interviewed by the Oversight and Government

Reform Committee back in May of 2013, you were on administrative leave

with the Department. Is that correct?

A Yes, yes.

Q And you had been placed on administrative leave at the end

of December of 2012. Is that correct?

A December the 20th. Yes, at the end of December.

Q Okay. And that was following the release of the

Accountability Review Board report. Is that correct?

A Yes, yes.

Q And you talked about what had happened at the time back in

December of 2012 and how you were placed on administrative leave in

your prior interview. Is that correct?

A Yes.

982
35

Q And is there anything that you would care to elaborate or

change regarding your prior answers, given how you were placed on

administrative leave?

A No.

Q Okay. Can you then take us from the time of your interview

before House Oversight and Government Reform at the end of May 2013

and today and what happened to your administrative leave, any

reinstatement with the State Department, what happened with the

grievance that you filed?

A Sure, sure. I think it was Congressman Issa who released

a -- wrote a letter to Secretary Kerry at the time saying: What are

you doing with these people? Why are these people on administrative

leave? And this was like the end of July.

Q Of what year? I'm sorry.

A End of July of 2013. And in August -- maybe it was August

the 19th or the 20th -- I got an email saying: You can come back in,

and your administrative leave is over.

Q Okay. Do you recall what day of the week it was?

A This is the thing wanted me to check. It was either

the 19th or the 20th of August.

Q Okay. And you were to report the next day, the next week?

A Report the next day.

Q And was there any elaboration in the email as to what had

happened to your administrative leave?

A There was no elaboration.

983
36

Q Okay. And do you recall who it was from?

A It was from some office in HR.

Q Okay. And did you report the next day?

A I reported the next day.

Q And who did you report to?

A I reported to the Bureau of African Affairs.

Q Were you instructed to do that?

A I was instructed to report to the Bureau of African Affairs.

Q And what happened when you arrived the next day?

A The then-assistant secretary of African Affairs -- I think

she still is -- had been the director general who was kind of my handler

during the whole administrative leave thing. So she told me that when

the smoke cleared -- she was in AF and she would have --

Q I'm sorry. What? I didn't catch all of that.

A She told me that when the smoke cleared and everything and

all the admin leave stuff had ended, that she would have a place for

me in AF.

Q She told you that during the pendency of your administrative

leave?

A She told me that during the -- what was the word you used?

Q While it was pending?

A While it was pending. While it was ongoing. She said:

Ray, we have a place for you in AF. Because I had served in AF before.

I had served in three AF posts overseas and in AF/EX in Washington,

and so I was kind of an AF guy. It was just an accident that I ended

984
37

up in NEA, a dreadful accident.

Q And this woman had been the director general of the --

A She had been the -- yes.

Q And she had then moved to be assistant secretary for African

Affairs?

A Yes.

Q Was her name Linda Greenfield-Thomas or Thomas-Greenfield?

A Yes. One or the other. Yeah, I never can get it straight.

Q Okay. So when she said this to you, was she still in HR

or was she in African Affairs?

A She was still in HR.

Q Did she know she was going to African Affairs?

A She knew. Everybody knows where they're going next.

Q Okay. So what happened when you reported to her at the

Bureau of African Affairs?

A They called me into the front office. She and Don Yamamoto,

who I had known for a long time, he was --

Q I'm sorry. Who?

A . He was the PDAS. She was the assistant

secretary. They called me into the front office. And they said:

Well, Ray, you're back and we have a number of different places where

we can put you in Washington or overseas. It's basically your choice.

What would you like to do? And they gave me a list of possible jobs,

some more interesting than others.

And I told them, I said: You know, you people abandoned me and

985
38

left me out to my own device and forced me to reconfigure my life during

the period of time that I was on administrative leave. It seemed like

it was going to be indefinite, and I had no indication I was coming

back. So I reconfigured my life. And now my life is reconfigured,

and I have no intention of coming back to the State Department.

Q So you gave them your notice that you were going to retire?

A They already had my notice. In fact -- well, that's a whole

nother long story. I was initially scheduled to retire in March or

April. I can't remember the exact date. And then I --

Q Of what year? I'm sorry.

A Of 2013. I mean, it was even earlier than that. But more

recently, I was going to retire in March or April of 2013. And I

withdrew my papers and told them that I wouldn't retire under the cloud

of this administrative leave, that I would just stay.

So in August, they brought us all back, and I sort of restarted

the retirement clock. There was a class, retirement seminar class

starting the 1st of October, and I got in that class. And I retired

officially November the 30th.

So AF was very nice. They said: Well, between now and October,

when your class starts, if you want an office, if you don't want to

take leave, you can come here and hang out and use the computer or

whatever.

Q And did you do that?

A And I did that. I did that. So I kind of hung out at AF

from the end of admin leave in late August until the 1st of October.

986
39

Q So a 5- or 6-week period?

A Five- or 6-week period.

Q And then when you go to this retirement class, is that full

time?

A Uh-huh.

Q And you were there until you retired?

A At FSI.

Q FSI is the Foreign Service Institute?

A Foreign Service Institute, exactly.

Q Okay. Did you have any further interaction with the

HR department regarding your administrative leave to determine why you

were reinstated, what had happened --

A No.

Q -- anything like that?

A No, nothing.

Q Did you have further conversations with

Ms. Thomas-Greenfield or Ms. Greenfield-Thomas?

A Nothing further. I mean, by that time, she was in AF. She

wasn't in HR anymore. But we didn't have any further conversations.

Q During the pendency of your administrative leave, had you

had conversations with her or anyone else regarding the status of your

administrative leave?

A Yes, I met with her about once every week.

Q Met face to face?

A Face to face.

987
40

Q So you would come into the State Department --

A Yes.

Q -- and meet with her?

A Yes.

Q And what did you learn from those meetings?

A Very little. Very little. She said: Ray, it's on Pat's

desk. They're trying to figure out what to do. It's on Pat's desk.

Pat is going to make a decision. They're trying to figure out what

to do.

I never got anything definitive.

Q And by Pat, who do you mean?

A Pat Kennedy.

Q You stated earlier that you had filed a grievance against

the State Department?

A Yes.

Q Can you tell us about that?

A The grievance mainly dealt with the manner in which I was

removed from the position. There are rules that provide for fairness

and due process when a person is removed from a position, and I felt

that those measures that are supposed to be taken hadn't been taken

and that I had been denied due process.

Q Okay. And you said you were ultimately unsuccessful in

that grievance process?

A I was totally unsuccessful.

Q Okay. How long did that grievance process take?

988
41

A It took forever. It took forever. It went on from

February of 2013 until June of 2014, because there was a determination

and then there was an appeal and then there was a rejection of the

appeal.

Q When you got the notice to come back, that you were being

reinstated to, for lack of a better term, active duty --

A Yes.

Q -- with the State Department, were you aware of what

happened to the other three individuals who were also placed on

administrative leave at the time you were?

A I wasn't aware directly. My assumption was, we were all

brought back at the same time. But I don't know that for certain.

Q During the pendency of your administrative leave, did you

ever have any conversations with any of those three individuals?

A Scott Bultrowicz and I exchanged emails once.

Q And what was the nature of those emails?

A Just, you know, how's it going? We're in this thing

together.

.

I don't know whatever happened to Scott either. I lost track of him.

Q Did you have any conversations with any of those three

people after you were reinstated in the --

A No.

Q -- in the State Department?

989
42

A No.

Q At any time during the pendency of your administrative leave

were you ever afforded any type of due process to challenge your status

of being on administrative leave?

A No.

Q Okay. Did you ask if there was such a process?

A Yes.

Q Who did you ask?

A Well, I asked through the attorney that I had with the

professional association AFSA, . And she went to HR. She

talked to several different offices in HR to try to find out, one, what

was the nature of the charge against me. This was before we knew

what was in the -- before we saw the classified report. We tried to

find out what was -- what were our rights within the framework of the

charges. We got nowhere.

Q All right, Mr. Maxwell, I think that's all the questions

that I have. So we are going to go off the record.

[Recess.]

990
43

[11:04 a.m.]

Mr. Kenny. We'll go back on the record. The time is 11:05.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And, Mr. Maxwell, just again, at the outset here, I just

want to thank you on behalf of myself, select committee minority, our

members, we want to thank you for your willingness to come and speak

with us today.

I'd like to pick up where we began in the first hour where you

were discussing or you were asked about some of your previous

appearances before Congress. And just so that we understand, you did

appear before Congress to discuss your employment situation, your

experiences with the Accountability Review Board, and the Benghazi

attacks. Is that correct?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. And we'd established that you had a transcribed

interview with the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee.

That was May 30th, 2013. Is that correct?

A Right.

Q Okay. And in addition to that transcribed interview, you

met with staff from the minority in October, late October of 2014.

Does that sound about right to you?

A That sounds about right.

Q Okay.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Minority of the select committee.

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44

BY MR. KENNY:

Q The select committee minority staff. Just to

differentiate between the House Oversight and Government Reform

Committee, and now there's a new committee, the Select Committee on

Benghazi. You met with select committee minority staff in late

October 2014. Is that correct?

A Yes. And I met with you and your colleague --

Q Chief counsel, that's right.

A -- afterwards, yeah. Just to balance things out, right.

Q And I had from my notes that that date was October 24th,

2014. Does that sound about right?

A That sounds right. That sounds about right.

Q Around that time, do you recall also meeting with the

majority staff from the committee?

A With you and the other -- and the --

Ms. O'Brien. With the Republican staff.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q With the Republican staff.

A Yeah. I met with them first and then I met with you guys.

Q Okay. And you were asked a variant of this question. I'll

ask it slightly differently. But in those discussions as well as in

your transcribed interview, were you able to be forthcoming with the

information that you provided to us?

A I thought so.

Q And did you provide complete and truthful information?

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45

A Yes.

Q Okay. With specific respect to the meetings with the

select committee staff, both the majority and the minority, do you

happen to know why it is that you met with the minority staff separately

from the majority staff? Was that something that you had requested?

A No, I didn't request it. I got a phone call from your

colleague saying: We'd like to talk to you because you spoke with the

majority staff. And I said: Well, the phone really doesn't work, I'll

come in and talk to you. That's what we ended up doing.

Q Okay. And following that discussion, do you recall

providing the minority staff with an information document that

summarized some of your views?

A Yes. I called it my op-ed.

Q Your op-ed.

A Never went anywhere, but --

Q So what I would like to do, just for our discussion today,

I'm going to refer to this document from time to time just to guide

our discussion going forward. But what I'd like to do is mark this

as exhibit 1.

[Maxwell exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Maxwell. Okay.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And this is a two-page document that you emailed to our staff

on October 24th, 2014.

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46

A Is it two or is it three?

Q As we printed it, it was a two-page document.

A Okay.

Q And again, you emailed this to our committee on

October 24th, 2014.

A Yes.

Q I'll provide that to you, give you a moment to review that.

A Yes. When I printed it out, it came out as three.

Q Okay. You can hold on to that copy.

A Okay.

Q And can you identify this document for us?

A Yes. This is something that I wrote.

Q Do you recall when you prepared this or when you wrote this?

A I think I wrote it in early June. I think I wrote it in

early June of 2014.

Q June of 2014, okay.

And do you recall the purpose for which you wrote this?

A I wrote it because I felt a kind of relief of a burden because

I finished both my graduate program and we completed a whole course

of going back and forth on the grievance process. And so this was kind

of like my taking a deep breath after all that was over.

Also, I wanted to kind of memorialize the things that I was

thinking at the time because things slip away in time. You forget

things. And these were the things that I wanted to remember.

Q Okay. So just as a general matter, are the views that are

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47

expressed here, these are your views?

A These are my views.

Q Okay. And is the information that's contained in here, as

you sit here and review this today, is this to the best of your belief

accurate information?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So as I explained before, we may refer to this

document just from time to time and may jump around from section to

section here. But what I'd like to do at this point is move to our

discussion of the document review session that you had described in

the last hour. Do you recall that it occurred at some point in October

2012, you couldn't recall exactly when it occurred?

A Right.

Q And we discussed some of the circumstances surrounding how

you learned of that particular review session.

A Right.

Q And I know that you have indicated that you lived nearby --

A Yes.

Q -- State Department headquarters, Foggy Bottom.

I'd like to ask, when you learned about this document review

session, why did you decide to attend?

A Just out of curiosity.

Q Okay. So didn't ask or request that you come

be present?

A No, she didn't. She only mentioned that she had to go in

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and do it herself.

Q Okay. And when you say curiosity, what was your curiosity?

A My curiosity was, one, why are my bosses giving my

subordinates work assignments without going through me. Of course,

that's how they did things, but it did sort of strike me as being

curious, if you will.

Q Okay. And correct me if I'm wrong, but I thought I recalled

you saying in the last hour that you weren't sure who had actually tasked

to go in and do the documents. Is that correct?

A I wasn't sure, but I assumed it was Beth or Liz or both.

Q Okay. So at the point you decided to go in, you had assumed

that the PDAS Liz Dibble or the acting assistant secretary at the time,

Beth Jones, had directed to go to the document review

session?

A Yes, that was my assumption.

Q Okay. But you didn't know that for certain?

A I didn't know that for certain.

Q Okay. So part of your curiosity was to determine who had

provided that tasking to her?

A I wouldn't say part of my curiosity was to determine. Part

of my curiosity was just to see what was going on.

Q Okay. But I thought -- I just asked you a moment ago why

you decided to attend and you said that you were curious about who had

provided the instruction to her.

A Yes.

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Q Okay. And so in order to help explain who had provided that

instruction to her, you attended this document session?

A I guess that's a fair, logical step.

Q Okay. And when you arrived, did you ask for clarification

on who had requested to be present that day?

A No.

Q Okay. Can I ask why, if you were curious on that point,

you didn't ask or inquire further with ?

A I don't have an answer. I don't have a reason why.

Q Okay. If part of your curiosity was understanding who had

sent , rather than show up on that Sunday, why not just

pick up the phone or send an email to PDAS Dibble or Assistant Secretary

Jones?

A It was late Friday. They were already gone. Of course,

they have BlackBerrys. They constantly check their BlackBerrys. It

never occurred to me to go directly to them and ask. And, frankly,

a lot of things had gone on around me from that point, prior to that

point, and from that point on.

And there were times when I sort of called Liz and Beth on doing

things like that, and they just lied. And so it never was beneficial

to put them in a position where they would have to lie.

Q I'm sorry. Who lied?

A Beth or Liz. There were several occasions where I would

say: Why would you go to or and tell them to do X, Y,

or Z and not include me?

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And, in fact, if you look at the newly revealed Hillary Clinton

emails, you'll see emails that went from Hillary Clinton to Beth Jones

to , and then would send it back to me. This is

documented.

So the way they sort of went around me is something that's

documented by the new emails that have been revealed.

Q Okay. And in those instances you just described, were

those related to this particular instance? Those were separate

incidents?

A Those were separate incidents, but it speaks to the point

that there were times when I questioned Beth and Liz on why they were

going around me and they just lied. And, you know, you know when a

person is lying to you. And it doesn't create workplace harmony to

open up a position where a person is going to lie. So why even bother?

Q So when you say they lied, what exactly did they lie about?

A There was one particular instance I recall where shortly

after the attack on Benghazi and the death of Chris and the other three,

Liz told me: Ray, we're going to send you to Tripoli to hold things

down until we can find a permanent replacement. And I said: Well,

you know, fine. , but I said: You know, I'll

check with her and we'll do it.

Later on, I found out that Beth, without including me, had told

that he would be going. And circle the wagons back and said:

Ray, Beth contacted me about going to Tripoli, but she told me not to

tell you.

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So following up on your sort of recommendation, so I checked with

Beth, and I said: Beth, one, why did you tell that he was going

to Tripoli without telling me; and two, why did you tell him not to

tell me? And she just lied and said: I didn't do it.

Q Did you feel animosity towards Acting Assistant Secretary

Beth Jones?

A Not initially. I didn't feel anything. You know, she came

in. I was already there. She didn't need to choose me. She could

have relieved me and chosen someone, but she chose to go with me. But

she most certainly did go around me on a lot of different things.

Q So over time, was it fair to say that your animosity towards

her, towards PDAS Dibble, was that something that built over time?

A No, I wouldn't say animosity built. I would say that --

Q What would you say?

A I would say that when these instances came up I called them

on it and then I left it. I dropped it. I didn't carry around a grudge.

Q So in those instances, to use your language, you called them

on it --

A Yes.

Q -- so you raised it to their attention?

A Yes.

Q So in this particular instance when you suspected or it

sounds like you suspected that either PDAS Dibble or Acting Assistant

Secretary Jones was going around you directly to , why

didn't you raise it with them then?

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A Because this was the end of a long series of things, and

by that time I was just not fighting anymore. I wasn't fighting

anymore.

Q Okay. You had indicated that when you did arrive that you

had personally reviewed some documents.

A Yes.

Q Can you elaborate for us specifically which documents

you --

A There are budget cables that came out of Tripoli and out

of Benghazi during the period of time from July -- mid-July to

mid-August. I was on leave for 3, 4 weeks.

. And so during that period of time I wasn't

in the flow of classified information and cable traffic.

When I got back, I caught up on a lot of stuff. But there was

a lot of stuff that I never got caught up on because of the attack on

the compound and sort of the diversion of our attention to other things.

So a lot of the cables that I read that Sunday were things that I just

hadn't seen.

Q Was part of one of the reasons why you attended that session

that day to catch up on some of that traffic?

A No, that wasn't the reason why. That presented itself once

I got there.

Q In the last hour, you were asked a series of questions about

who you recall being present in that room. I believe you described

it as a series of two rooms. You'd given us a number of about three

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53

to four people. And as I was notating who you described, I have

as one person you identified. You identified another person

as an intern, but you couldn't recall or you seemed to believe that

it was .

A I thought it was , but it may have been that woman who

was also an intern. I remember -- I recall an intern being there with

. And over time you just -- the memory fades.

Q So you're not sure as you sit here today whether it was a

male or a female who was the intern?

A If it wasn't , it would've been a female. And I don't

remember her name. I don't remember her name. I wish I could. She

works at the Atlantic Council. You can go to their Web site.

Q Okay. So that's part of what I was trying to better

understand is that you had described an intern as being there, but then

you also described another employee. I thought you described that

person as an employee who now works at the Atlantic Council.

A No, no, that was the intern.

Q Okay. So that was the intern?

A Yeah.

Q And is that person ?

A No. That's -- was the first intern's name that

I called, but said he couldn't recall being there. And so it

occurred to me, well, maybe there was another intern and I just got

them confused.

Q So as you sit here today, you remember that it was an intern,

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but you're not sure if it was a male or a female?

A That's right. I know it sounds weird, but --

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q And just to be clear, when you came and talked to us at the

select committee, it sounds like when you came and talked to the

majority staff in the fall of 2014, at that point you identified --

A .

Q -- as being the --

A Intern.

Q -- intern who was present at the --

A Document scrub.

Q Okay. And you identified him at that time because your

recollection at that time was that he was the person?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And since that time, what is it that is changing your

recollection or making you doubt your recollection?

A The committee contacted , and contacted me. And

said: Ray, I'm trying to remember it, but I just don't -- I don't

recall it. And I said: You know, , if you don't recall it, you

don't recall it. And at that point I considered, well, maybe I had

it wrong, maybe it wasn't . But I do recall an intern being there

with .

Q Got it. Okay.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Did you say anything else to during that

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conversation?

A No.

Q Did you discuss anything else?

A No. a good guy. And, in fact, he was in Tanzania

at the time working on some type of international development project

and he emailed me. I see on Facebook every now and then. We're

not close, but I think we are Facebook friends.

Q And when you say he was in Tanzania at the time, at the time

you spoke to him by phone?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So that's two people we've just discussed. And I

believe you've identified that there were some other individuals in

the room as well. You identified one as somebody you recognized as

somebody who worked for the Administration Bureau. Is that correct?

A Well, there were other people in the room. There's a large

sort of operational space and there were offices off to the side. And

we were in the offices off to the side. But the people who worked in

that space were in that space. So there were other people in the

overall space.

Q Okay. But I think the way you described it for us is that

you were in a smaller room --

A Yes.

Q -- at the time. So who was in that smaller room with you

at that time?

A There was -- we were initially in a small room, and I was

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56

there with and I thought an intern, but I can't recall which

intern it was. And in that first room, that was when Cheryl Mills and

Jake Sullivan came in. Then, shortly after they left, we moved to a

larger room because the people who owned the space needed the space,

and so they just moved us to the other room.

Q Okay. And so when you shifted from the smaller space to

the larger space, do you recall --

A No, to a similarly small space on the periphery of the larger

room.

Q Okay, I understand.

A Let me draw you a -- the space is like -- this is a door.

The space is like a big place with big TV screens and computers and

offices off to the side. So we came in, we started here, we moved here.

There were still people working out here.

Q Okay. So that's what I think we're trying to understand.

And just for the record, we'll mark this as exhibit number 2.

[Maxwell exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Maxwell. Oh, I would have made it prettier if I had known.

Don't type that.

Mr. Kenny. If you'd like to make any modifications before we --

Mr. Maxwell. No, no. That's fine.

Ms. Jackson. Could you just have him, like, write door, office,

office, or something?

BY MR. KENNY:

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Q Sure. So if you could just write some sort of descriptive

information for what the boxes represent.

A And there were computer stations all around.

Q Sure. We won't hold you to accuracy for the number of

workstations.

A I was back in the Department and I thought about actually

going down there just to check out the space, but I never bothered.

I was actually across the street in SA2, I think they call it.

Q Okay. And for the purpose of the record, I've now

marked -- this is exhibit 2. This is a sketch or a diagram of the room

you believe the document review took place in. It's on a committee

notepad. And it describes a large room with two smaller offices within

that larger room space. Is that an accurate reflection of this?

A That's an accurate reflection.

Q Okay. So we'll just leave that in the middle there in case

we have any additional questions about that.

So to return to our discussion, you were in one small office

space --

A Yes.

Q -- with two other individuals.

A Yes.

Q And at some point in time an individual or a group of

individuals needed that space and so you moved to another office space.

Is that correct?

A That's right.

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Q Okay. Did they explain to you at the time why they needed

that office and not the other office space?

A No, they didn't.

Q Okay. And do you recall who it was that informed you that

they needed that smaller office space?

A It was who said we were going to move to the other

space.

Q Okay. So informed you of that?

A Yes.

Q And I thought you had mentioned a few moments ago that it

was your understanding that that was because some other people needed

that space at the time. Is that accurate?

A That was my assumption.

Q Okay. So now that's an assumption that you made. So

that's -- nobody told you that they needed that space?

A Nobody told me that they -- that's right. That's right.

Q But there were other people present in the larger room at

that time?

A There were other people present in the larger room at the

time, yes.

Q Okay. And do you recall about how many people were in that

larger space at the time?

A In the overall space?

Q Yes.

A Six, seven people.

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Q Okay. So all together in the large conference space with

the adjoining or attached office spaces, there were approximately how

many people?

A Six and seven, three of us makes nine. Ten people total.

Q Ten people. And you were asked if you recognized any of

those six or seven individuals. I believe you indicated you hadn't.

Is that right?

A That's right.

Q Or you didn't recognize any of them. So you were unaware,

for instance, of whether any particular individuals were from the

Bureau of Diplomatic Security?

A No.

Q Okay. Or whether they were from the IRM division?

A No.

Q And how about the Bureau of Legislative Affairs?

A No.

Q Okay. Were those --

A My -- well, I mean, this is speculation. Based on the way

they were working on equipment, I assume they were either A Bureau

people or computer guys, which would have made them IRM.

Q Okay.

A Yeah.

Q Were there stacks of documents in the main conference room

as well?

A I don't recall what was in the main document. I recall

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there being stacks of documents in the room where we were.

Q Okay. Do you recall what those individuals, other than

what you just described, do you recall what those individuals in the

main room were doing?

A No.

Q Okay. And that's because that wasn't the focus of your

attention at the time?

A Sure. That was the focus of my attention at the time. I

mean, I was -- yeah.

Q So you described a discussion that you initially had with

-- let me back that up.

You described a conversation you had with ?

A On Friday.

Q On Friday. And then you described a later conversation you

had with her in --

A In the space.

Q -- in this space, okay. And when approximately did that

conversation take place after you arrived?

A Shortly after I arrived, because was sort of the

person in charge and she was sort of -- and she said this is what we're

doing.

Q Okay. When you say she was sort of the person in charge,

what do you mean by that?

A She was the person in charge.

Q Okay.

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A Okay. You've asked me what I mean by that. She was the

person who knew what needed to be done.

Q And you know that because how?

A Because she was giving people instructions: You do this,

you do that, you do this, you do that.

Q So let's walk through some of those instructions. So did

you see her provide instructions to the intern, for instance?

A No, I didn't, because the intern was already there when I

arrived. And I assumed that the intern got the same instructions that

I got.

Q Okay. But you don't know that because you weren't there

at the time?

A Because I wasn't there at the time.

Q Okay. And when you say she was providing instructions, so

she didn't provide instructions to the intern. It sounds like she

provided some sort of instruction to you. Is that accurate?

A But the intern was already busy working when I arrived, so

at some point some instruction must have been provided.

Q Okay. And when you say busy working, what was the intern

doing?

A Going through stacks of cables and things, basically the

same thing that I was doing.

Q And can you describe that for us. There was a large set

of documents the intern was reading?

A There were documents -- in the first room there was stacks

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of documents. In the second room, we actually read some of the

documents on a computer screen. There were things on the -- there were

cables on the computer screen.

Q Okay. So let's take a step back. So in the first room,

the intern, there's stacks of documents. What is the intern physically

doing?

A The intern is physically reading through the documents.

Q Okay. And is the intern creating piles --

A I don't know.

Q -- of documents?

A I don't know because I wasn't watching that person, and we

didn't stay there that long.

Q Okay. So when you say that provided

instruction to the intern, that's just an assumption that you made?

A That's just an assumption.

Q Okay. And when you said she provided instructions to other

people, who were those other people she provided the instructions to?

A Well, she certainly told me: Ray, this is what we're doing.

Q Okay. So when you had that conversation, who was within

earshot of that conversation?

A The people who were in the room were within earshot, but

that would have only been , me, and the intern, whose sex I

can't recall, as weird as that sounds.

Q Okay. So when you had this conversation shortly after

arriving in the small room, would the individuals who were located in

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63

the larger room, would they have been able to hear the conversation

you had with ?

A No, because the small room was enclosed.

Q Okay. Did you -- just returning to your comment that

was providing instructions to others -- did you see or

hear her provide instructions to anyone?

A Other than me, no.

Q Did you see her provide written instructions to anyone?

A No.

Q Okay. Were there any written instructions?

A I saw no written instructions.

Q Okay.

A I saw no written instructions.

Q Okay. And we can refer now to exhibit No. 1, because -- and

I'll direct your attention to the third paragraph here. In the middle

of the paragraph, I'll read into the record, it reads, quote: "There,

a mid-level NEA desk officer explained the operation to me. 'Ray,'

she said, 'we are to go through these stacks and pull out anything that

might put anybody in the NEA Front Office, (i.e., Assistant Secretary

Beth Jones or Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (PDAS) Elizabeth

Dibble) or the 7th Floor (State Department shorthand for the Secretary

of State and her principal advisors) in a bad light,'" close quote.

Sorry. The quote continues. "'But isn't that unethical?' I

asked. 'Ray,' she responded, 'those are our orders.'"

I'd just like to ask, because I thought I heard you a few minutes

1011
64

ago, when you were asked what instructions she provided to you or what

your conversation was, that she said that you were to remove documents.

Do you recall her specific verbiage, if she said to remove documents

or to pull out documents?

A You know, the good thing about writing something down is

you have it written. The bad thing about it is that you start focusing

on what you wrote and you lose your memory for what actually occurred.

And what we need to do now is focus on what occurred and not on what

I wrote.

Q Are you suggesting the two are different?

A No. I'm just saying that for the purposes of this

conversation, we need to focus on what actually happened and not my

account of it several months later, in case there's a difference, in

case there's a difference.

Q So as you sit here today, you're not sure whether what you

wrote here is an accurate reflection of what actually occurred?

A I think this is an accurate reflection, but as far as being

an identical thing, I would have to give that some thought. I mean,

you made a -- you wanted to know did she say remove or pull out. I'm

not sure that I remember exactly that distinction being made. Of

course, I wrote on this paper that she said go through these stacks

and pull out anything that might put anybody in NEA front office in

a bad light.

Q So the reason I make that distinction is because I just heard

you use a different term. Here, this is a fairly specific recollection

1012
65

of --

A Right.

Q -- of the conversation that occurred. But as you sit here

today, you're not sure what words were actually exchanged. Is that

fair?

A Yes. And time has passed and memories have eroded. Of

course, the words on the page haven't changed, and as long as it's on

paper it'll last for a few years.

Q Sure. In here, when it indicates that she told you we are

to go through these stacks and pull out anything, did you ask her what

she meant by that?

A No. I don't recall asking her what she meant by that. I

thought it was pretty evident.

Q Did she tell you that -- she or anyone else -- that they

were planning to remove or scrub documents that put individuals in a

bad light?

A I don't recall her using the word "scrub." The word "scrub"

came from the media after the Sharyl Attkisson article.

Q So "scrub" is not your word?

A "Scrub" is not my word. And I don't say scrub here

anywhere, I don't think.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Did she tell you what would happen to those

documents after they were pulled out or removed?

Mr. Maxwell. No. No. But, look, I mean, to sort of shine a

light on that, it probably -- if I had an attorney here, he would

1013
66

probably pull on my arm and say: Ray, don't say that, don't say that.

But the fact of the matter is, anytime someone asks for documents

from the State Department, they never do a raw collection and give that

entity that raw information. That's not the way it's done. It's

gathered, people go through it, they prepare it, and it's delivered.

And there's some editing going on in the process. I mean, that's just

the way it always happens. That's not an unusual thing.

And it could be the White House or it could be any congressional

committee or the ARB or anybody else. If someone wanted raw data, they

just weren't going to get it from the State Department. It gets

processed.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And what's your understanding of that process, just as a

general matter? When you say that it's occurred previously, what's

your understanding of what the State Department's process is for --

A Now we're talking about State Department culture, and

that's kind of amorphous and ambiguous, if you will. But, you know,

the State Department in this town is like its own sort of entity and

they release to the public what they want to release.

We see that going on right now with Secretary Clinton's emails.

She dumped them on the State Department, and the State Department went

through them with a fine-tooth comb, and the State Department released

what they thought would be appropriate for the public. So even the

public doesn't get the raw data.

Q So when you say they release things that are appropriate

1014
67

for the public, is it your understanding that there are guidelines in

place that govern what the public does and can have access to?

A There are probably guidelines in place.

Q Okay. Are you familiar, for instance, with FOIA guidelines

that exist?

A I'm familiar with FOIA guidelines.

Q Okay. And do you have a sense or understanding of some of

the categories of information in the FOIA guidelines?

A I don't. I don't.

Q You don't. Okay.

A And I've been away for, you know, all these years, so that

stuff is not clear in my memory. But the point is that in the

organizational culture when they provide information for another

entity, that information gets processed. That's just what happens.

And in the process of that information being processed, things

can be -- if there's no adequate machinery for recording, serializing

each document that has been submitted, who's to say that the finished

process batch is way less than the initial provided batch?

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q And you're asking that as a question. But in your

experience, have you ever processed documents and removed and destroyed

them or done that?

A I never have.

Q Okay. And have you ever personally seen someone do that,

process the documents, remove them, destroy them?

1015
68

A I think it's probably happened. I'm sure it's happened.

I can't tell you a specific time.

Q You can't recall a specific time when you saw someone

actually remove or destroy a document that was being processed

through --

A Yes.

Q -- the FOIA process?

A No, we're not talking about the FOIA process. We're

talking in general about an entity within the State Department

preparing documentation for someone who's requested it outside of the

State Department. Sometimes it's FOIA. Sometimes it's not

necessarily FOIA.

Q Okay. And in those instances, you're sure that somebody

has destroyed or removed a document, but you don't have a specific

recollection?

A I'm not sure. But what I'm saying is that if there's no

system put in place that serializes each document as it comes in so

that you can itemize and inventory those documents as they go out, if

that's not in place then there's nothing that prevents documents from

being removed -- or, for that matter, documents from being added.

Q Sure. Have you ever seen that actually occur? Have you

ever seen someone actually do that?

A No.

Q Okay. And has anyone ever told you that they actually did

that, that they removed and destroyed a document that was being prepared

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69

for production to someone else outside of the State Department?

A No one has actually told me that they've done it, no.

Q Okay.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Returning to the Sunday document review session, do you

recall indicating to you that the Bureau of Legislative

Affairs had organized that particular review?

A I don't recall that.

Q Okay. If she had indicated that to you, would that have

helped you better understand what the purpose of that particular review

was?

A If the Bureau of Legislative Affairs had been involved in

it, then it would have, in fact, been for one of the congressional data

calls and not for any other. That's why the Bureau of Legislative

Affairs exists. And if she had told me that, yes, it would have made

a difference. It would've been additional information.

Q Okay. And you indicated you weren't aware at the time of

the purpose of the document review session that you described, but at

some later point you learned or somebody told you that they believed

that it was for the purposes of a congressional request?

A Exactly. I assumed it was for the ARB because the ARB was

a big thing that was going on at the time that documents were being

collected for. But documents were being collected for a number of

different people who were asking for documents.

Q Right. Are you aware, for instance, that on September 20th

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of 2012, that the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee had

sent a letter to the State Department requesting a variety of documents

related to the attacks?

A I'm not aware.

Q Returning to your observations within the two rooms that

you were in, did you at any point in time witness pull

out any documents?

A I didn't see her pull out any documents.

Q Okay. Did you see her remove or destroy any documents?

A No.

Q Scrub or toss out any documents?

A No.

Q Did you see or the person you described as the

intern remove or destroy any documents?

A No.

Q Scrub or toss out any documents?

A No.

Q Rather than pull out documents, did you see any of those

individuals mark the documents in any way, for instance, with

highlighters or stickies?

A No. No. I was only focused on the documents that I was

reading myself.

Q Okay. And I believe you described was the

deputy director at the time?

A Yes. She was acting director, because was in Tripoli

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71

at the time.

Q Okay. And to refer your attention back to exhibit 1, the

sentence that I read for you there, you described her as a, quote, "a

mid-level NEA desk officer," close quote. Was that an accurate

description at the time?

A She was mid-level. She wasn't desk. She was the deputy

office director. So I shouldn't have said a mid-level NEA desk

officer.

Q Okay. So the Daily Signal article that was published

September of 2014, in that article -- and we can introduce it as an

exhibit to help refresh your recollection.

[Maxwell exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Maxwell. This is Sharyl's article?

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Sharyl's article. It's reported that you described

or the office director as, quote, "close to Clinton's top

advisers," close quote.

A Yes. Yes.

Q Why did the description change between this description

here and The Daily Signal's description?

A I don't remember exactly where it changed. I wrote this

as a sort of memory jog for myself. The conversation I had with Sharyl

Attkisson was somewhat based on this but somewhat based on our own

conversation.

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72

The fact of the matter is had worked in the operations

center. She had been a SWO. She was a seventh floor sort of entity,

identity, if you will. And we relied on that to get things done in

the Bureau.

Q Okay. When you say SWO, you're referring to a senior watch

officer --

A Senior watch officer.

Q -- in the operations center?

A Uh-huh.

Q And so you're saying at some point between when you prepared

this document in the summer of 2014 and when the Cheryl Attkisson piece

appeared in The Daily Signal in September 2014, that the description

of changed from a mid-level desk officer to one of

Clinton's top advisers. Is that fair?

A Well, I don't think The Daily Signal says she's one of

Clinton's top advisers. I think it says she's an inside person. I

don't think it says she's one of Clinton's top advisers.

Q Okay. Close to Clinton's top advisers?

A Yes. Yes. Same person.

Q Okay. And that's -- the basis for that statement is that

she worked in the operations center at some point in time?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Would anybody who works in the operations center be

considered close to Clinton's top advisers?

A No, anyone wouldn't be. The fact of the matter is, we

1020
73

relied on closeness with people on the seventh floor in order

to get things done for our office, in order to find out what was going

on on the seventh floor. had been a SWO, which is not anyone

working in the operations center. It's one of four people in a given

year.

I see the point you're making about the evolution from a mid-level

desk officer to an insider in the Clinton administration.

That's -- that happened. That happened in the conversation with

Sharyl Attkisson. I don't know what else to tell you.

Q Okay. Other than -- I asked you the question for

, more , the intern -- other than those three

individuals, did you witness anyone on that occasion pull out any

documents?

A No.

Q Did you witness anyone remove or destroy or attempt to

remove or destroy any documents?

A No.

Q Did you witness anyone scrub or toss out any documents?

A No.

Q Did anyone specifically tell you that they were ordered to

remove or destroy documents that put the Department in a bad light,

other than ?

A No.

Q And do you know for a fact that documents that you saw during

that session were not later provided to the Accountability Review

1021
74

Board?

A I don't know that.

Q Okay. In the course of your conversation, you indicated

that you raised -- and this is in exhibit 1 as well -- where you raised

the question, "But isn't that unethical," is what you said. It sounds

like you had an ethical concern or question about the activity that

you witnessed. Is that fair?

A Yes. Yes.

Q Okay. What was the basis of that concern?

A Well, if the instruction is to withdraw or to pull out or

to remove documents that put people in a bad light and the rest of the

documents are going to some entity that's going to review the documents,

how ethical is it to remove certain things and leave other things

because you think the things you removed put someone in a bad light?

Q So the ethical concern that you had was an ethical concern

you hadn't expressed at that moment in time. It was not new to you

later. Is that correct?

Let me rephrase it. At the time you had the conversation with

, at that time you had an ethical concern with what was

described to you?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And you raised it with your subordinate in the course

of that review?

A Yes.

Q What did you do next?

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75

A I didn't do anything next. I continued reading the

documents.

Q Okay. You didn't leave immediately?

A I didn't leave immediately.

Q Did you instruct or the intern not to

participate in that activity?

A No.

Q Did you at any point that day or at a later point in time,

did you raise your ethical concern or question with any of your

supervisors in the NEA Bureau?

A No.

Q So you didn't raise it with the principal deputy assistant

secretary?

A No.

Q You didn't raise it with the assistant secretary?

A No.

Q Did you raise your ethical question or concern with anyone

in the Bureau of Legislative Affairs?

A Why would I raise it with anyone? No. The answer is no.

Q Did you raise it with anyone in the Administration Bureau?

A No.

Q Okay. Did you report your ethical concern to the inspector

general?

A No.

Q Did you report your concern to the Accountability Review

1023
76

Board?

A No.

Q Okay. If at the time you thought or had a concern that

relevant documents were being pulled out of a production and wouldn't

be available for the Accountability Review Board to review, you didn't

think that was relevant to the ARB's investigation?

A We talked about a lot of different things, but the short

answer is no. And actually, my interview with the ARB was subsequent

to this thing taking place. Maybe that was my own moral lapse. So

maybe I felt at that point that I was on the team. It's possible.

Q What do you mean by on the team?

A On the team. I was, you know, I thought I was -- maybe I

thought that I was on the team with folks that were doing this, that

I was a part of it, that I was just as -- that I bore just as much guilt

as I accused them of.

Q So what I'm trying to understand is you felt like you were

on the team but you didn't participate in the activity and you expressed

an ethical concern about it at the time. Why would you have viewed

yourself as part of the team?

A Well, that's a question for a psychiatrist, isn't it?

That's a question for a psychiatrist. I'll give you an example. I'll

give you an example.

Immediately after the attack in Libya, the opposition folks that

we were supporting were massacring black-skinned Libyans. And I

raised that with PDAS Dibble and with assistant secretary -- Acting

1024
77

Assistant Secretary Beth Jones, and with the folks in the human rights

office and with the folks in the Maghreb office.

And, in fact, every cable that came up that didn't include some

reference to what was happening to the Tauregi, I made sure it was added.

But guess what? They just slapped me down. And this was in September.

So maybe by October I had just been slapped down enough about raising

ethical issues about things. So I didn't --

Q Let me ask the question this way. We understand based on

your previous interview that you had a previous relationship with Dick

Shinnick, was one of the Accountability Review Board members. Is that

correct?

A I do.

Q And how long had you known Mr. Shinnick?

A Since 1997.

Q Okay. So for a long time?

A For a long time.

Q Okay. Did you ever think to raise this concern that you

had about this document review directly to Mr. Shinnick, a person whom

you'd known for a long time, who was serving on the Board -- on the

Accountability Review Board?

A No.

Q And why not?

A That's a good question. I don't have an answer for that.

Q So I guess to summarize, the only person you did raise this

concern with was ?

1025
78

A That's right.

Q And we asked whether or not you were aware of other NEA

staffers, whether they participated. It sounds like you weren't. Is

that fair?

A Right.

Q So you didn't -- certainly didn't instruct anyone in NEA

not to participate in this activity. Is that correct?

A That's right.

Q Did anyone in NEA, any other staffers other than the two

you described, did they ever at any point express a concern to you about

participating in a document review?

A No. No.

Q You referred to a brief visit that was made by Cheryl Mills

and Jake Sullivan at some point on that Sunday. And just so we can

understand, you were in the small office when they arrived. Is that

correct?

A Yes.

Q And they came to the small office?

A They were standing in the doorway.

Q Okay. And did they do anything in the small office?

A No.

Q Okay. Did you see them review any documents?

A No.

Q Did you see them talk to anyone else other than each other?

A No.

1026
79

Q Did you see them remove or destroy any documents?

A No.

Q Did you see anything that you would consider to be

inappropriate about what they were doing when they were present?

A The only time I saw anything about them was when Cheryl said,

"Who is he?" or, "Who are you?" whichever one it was. And Jake said,

"That's Ray. He's a Maghreb DAS." And I continued doing what I was

doing.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. So nothing inappropriate? You didn't see

them do anything inappropriate?

Mr. Maxwell. I didn't see them do anything. I mean, as far as

I can recall, they turned around and walked out.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And you said that you then later forgot about this event?

A I completely forgot about it.

Q Okay. And that applied then when you appeared before the

House Oversight and Government Reform Committee on May 30th --

A It applied until I heard Mullen and Pickering give their

testimony in September of 2013.

Q Okay. Well, let's talk about that, and I think for this

we'll introduce -- this will be exhibit No. 3. I'll give you a moment

to review.

Just for the purposes of the record, this is an article that

appeared, a posting that appeared in The Daily Signal. The title is

"Benghazi Bombshell: Clinton State Department Official Reveals

1027
80

Details of Alleged Document Review," posted by Sharyl Attkisson,

September 15, 2014.

A Right. Okay.

Q So I'll direct your attention to the middle of the second

page under --

A Unfettered access.

Q -- the section that's "'Unfettered Access'?"

A Yep.

Q I'll just read from here. It reads, quote: "In May 2013,

when critics questioned the ARB's investigation as not thorough enough,

co-chairmen Ambassador Thomas Pickering and Admiral Mike Mullen

responded that 'we had unfettered access to everyone and everything,

including all the documents we needed.'"

A Yes.

Q "Maxwell says that when we heard that statement, he couldn't

help but wonder if the ARB -- perhaps unknowingly -- had received from

his bureau a scrubbed set of documents with the most damaging material

missing," close quote.

According to exhibit 3, Ambassador Pickering and Admiral Mullen

issued a statement claiming they had unfettered access to documents

in May of 2013.

A Okay. Then I got that date wrong.

Q Okay. It's our understanding that that statement was made

on or around May 6th of 2013, which would have preceded your appearance

before the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee.

1028
81

A Okay. Well, what I recall is it being later. Now, I'm not

sure if -- I don't know.

Q The statement is, as described -- responding to a question

from majority staff -- in the first line, in May 2013, co-chairmen

Ambassador Thomas Pickering, Admiral Mullen responded, and it includes

a direct quote from them. It's a quote that was widely publicized at

the time in connection with a hearing that the House Oversight and

Government Reform Committee held.

A Yeah.

Q Do you recall that hearing?

A I recall that hearing. It may well be that I didn't read

the statement until September, because I don't recall hearing the

"unfettered access" statement until the fall.

Q Okay. So even though there was a statement that was made

by the ARB chairman and co-chairman before you appeared on the House

Oversight Committee, your testimony today is you don't recall seeing

that until after you appeared before the House Oversight Committee for

a transcribed interview. Is that accurate?

A That's true. That's true.

Q Okay. And within this statement, when the ARB describes

their access as, quote, unquote, "unfettered," why was that a surprise

to you?

A Because I suspect that it was fettered. That's why it was

a surprise.

Q Okay. But it sounds like your suspicion that it was

1029
82

fettered, to use your word, was something that you had had -- was a

suspicion that you had held for a long period of time. Is that correct?

Why would it surprise you to hear investigators claim that they had

unfettered access?

A I understand your question, and I see the mixup in the dates.

It's clear here that I testified on May the 30th and it's clear here

that this article says Pickering and Mullen claimed they had unfettered

access in May of 2013, before my testimony. And I say that when I heard

them say that, that made me recall this other thing. I see the

confusion. I just didn't focus on their statements in May.

Q So in September of 2013, if I understand you correctly,

that's when you remembered that this incident took place in a document

review session in a room underneath the jogger's entrance. Is that

correct?

A Yes.

Q And what did you do then?

A I didn't do anything then because I was busy doing other

things.

Q Okay. The second line here, "Maxwell says when he heard

that statement he couldn't help but wonder if the ARB -- perhaps

unknowingly -- had received from his bureau a scrubbed set of documents

with the most damaging material missing," when you say "perhaps

unknowingly" -- well, first, is that statement an accurate reflection

of your views?

A That statement is an accurate reflection of my views, but

1030
83

it didn't happen after this statement was made in May. It happened

after I heard the statement made in September.

Q Okay.

A So we're talking about a placement of paragraphs. She put

the paragraph after the May 2013 statement about Pickering and Mullen.

I would have put it after the interview in September 2013.

Q Okay. And that's -- I think that's a fair distinction to

be made here. But is that sentence there, is that an accurate -- it's

not a direct quote from you. So I'd like to ask, is that an accurate

representation of your beliefs at that time?

A The word "scrub" wasn't mine. It wasn't my vocabulary.

But it did cause me to wonder if perhaps what they got had been -- had

not been a complete set of documents.

Q Okay.

A Now, we know now -- I mean, of course, it's on the

record -- we know for a fact now that they didn't have the complete

records because they didn't have the Secretary's emails. They didn't

have the emails of the senior staffers. We know for a fact now that

they didn't have unfettered access.

Q And I understand your point. But here --

A Yeah.

Q -- you're not describing whether the State Department had

a complete set of documents. You're talking about the ARB --

A That's right.

Q -- and you say "perhaps unknowingly." So the implication

1031
84

here is that the ARB was somehow aware that it had, to use your word,

fettered access. Is that what you believed at the time?

A No. I said perhaps the ARB unknowingly, meaning that the

ARB didn't know that what they had wasn't unfettered access.

Q But you're leaving open the possibility that they did know.

Is that fair?

A Well, that's the English language, yes. Yes.

Q Okay. Why would you leave open the possibility? Did you

have any evidence that the ARB was aware that its access was restricted?

A No, I had no evidence.

Q Okay. So this statement here is based on your belief, but

it's not based on any evidence that you had at the time --

A That's true.

Q -- or even today? Okay.

I just want to make sure that we cover all our bases here. Further

on this point, referring you back to exhibit 1, the second sentence

in paragraph three reads, quote: "But the Board's difficulty in

gaining access to information was not accidental, it was by design."

What did you mean by that?

A This was in reference to something that Dick Shinnick told

me in the hallway, and we talked about it in the May 30th testimony.

Dick said: Ray, we're not getting any kind of context, we're not

getting any kind of information.

The fact of the matter is, everybody, every individual but me went

up before the ARB, went before them with an attorney, and was very sort

1032
85

of circumspect about what they said. Only I was dumb enough, stupid

enough, because Dick Shinnick said: Ray, give us some context. And

only I went up there and had a free-flowing conversation and shared

everything that I thought I knew about the questions that they asked

me without being restricted.

And so --

1033
86

[12:04 p.m.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q I think you've lost me.

A Okay.

Q The sentence here does talk about difficulty gaining access

to information. But it says it was not accidental. It was by design.

What did you mean by, it was by design?

A It was by design of people in State wanting to regulate what

information went to the ARB.

Q Okay. And who are those people?

A I think it's pretty well established that Cheryl Mills was

involved, in every step of the way, of the ARB's deliberation. That's

not any new revelation. I think it's also clear that the executive

secretary, of the ARB, was in contact with people in the -- at least

in NEA about a number of different things. And so information was

regulated through that channel.

Q So maybe I'll just stop here and we'll walk through these,

and if you have more --

A Okay.

Q -- I'll give you the opportunity to add to that and to the

record.

A Okay.

Q But you just said a moment ago when I asked about who

designed the process such that documents would not get to the ARB, you

mentioned Cheryl Mills' name. And I would like to ask you what is your

1034
87

basis for that statement?

A I guess there's no organizational chart that I could point

to that shows Cheryl Mills being involved in the ARB thing. But we

do know for a fact because Mullen testified to the effect that, for

example, he contacted Cheryl Mills to let her know that Charlene Lamb

wouldn't be a good person to testify in a public testimony. And, you

know, Mullen called Cheryl to give her a heads-up that Charlene Lamb

wouldn't be the best person.

There was a kind of a -- some people would call it a collusion

between Cheryl Mills and the ARB staff, that sort of, in my estimation,

affected the independence of the ARB.

Q And you say some people would describe it as

that -- collusion is a very strong word. You would agree --

A Well, I mean, I'm not a lawyer. I mean, maybe I shouldn't

have said collusion. But if Mullen was on the phone having

conversations with Cheryl Mills about proceedings of the ARB, then the

ARB wasn't independent of the Secretary's staff.

Q So you're inferring your beliefs, in your statement, that

Cheryl Mills was somehow involved in restricting access of information

to the ARB is based on the phone call that Admiral Mullen placed to

Cheryl Mills?

A Assuming that that wasn't the only time that type of phone

called occurred.

Q Do you have any evidence of another --

A I do not.

1035
88

Q -- contact --

A I do not. I do not.

Q Okay. So when you make the statement, it is based solely

on the fact or the testimony --

A Solely.

Q -- from Admiral Mullen that he received the call from --

A Solely.

Q Okay. And nothing else?

A Nothing else.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q So just to be clear, it's not based on any personal

observation of Cheryl Mills doing anything or saying anything?

A It's --

Q For us, we're just trying to get -- what is it that you

personally observed or you have personal information about evidence

of versus, you know, stuff gets --

A Here's what I have personal information about. There were

daily decisions that were made, inside geographic bureaus, staffing

decisions, that needed to receive Cheryl Mills' approval throughout

the building. And that wasn't just the ARB. That was the way the State

Department was run under Hillary Clinton. Cheryl Mills had her hand

in everything, as did Pat Kennedy. But a lot of day-to-day things that

just should have been handled within bureaus had to go past Cheryl

Mills. And a lot of decisions couldn't get made because they were on

Cheryl's desk awaiting decision or determination. And that's how the

1036
89

building ran. And that caused a lot of people a lot of frustration

because Cheryl's only one person, and if everything has to go through

her to be decided, things just stack up on her desk. Day-to-day mundane

things had to go through Cheryl first. It was absurd.

In fact, I testified on May 30th that -- that my getting this job

was Cheryl Mills involved in the NEA Bureau because she felt that NEA

didn't have enough African American Ambassadors. Of course I didn't

know that at the time. I found that out after the fact. But she was

involved in lots of decisions, mundane decisions, that she just -- a

lot of people thought she shouldn't have been involved in. And that

played into the way the ARB was being run. Now, I don't have any

evidence. All I know is the way the building was run in general.

Q Okay. So what you're speaking to about Cheryl Mills being

involved in mundane decisions is not related specifically to the ARB.

It's related -- I'm sorry. It's not related specifically to the ARB?

A It is not.

Q Okay. It's related to her being involved in other --

A In things --

Q -- unrelated to the ARB?

A That's right.

Q And then you're extrapolating?

A And I'm extrapolating. That's true.

Q Okay.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Okay. And to return to our discussion, you had made

1037
90

reference, referred to Cheryl Mills. You'd also referred to the

executive secretary of the ARB.

A Yes.

Q Okay. And you had cited that as an instance or an example

of your belief that the ARB had fettered access, had restricted access

to information within the Department. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what is the basis for that?

A Well, there's no basis. There's no basis. But if she was

the executive director of the ARB, the executive secretary of the ARB

was her exact title, well, then, the executive secretary of anything

handles the documentation that comes into that thing. I was executive

secretary at the Embassy in Baghdad. When I was executive secretary,

I handled all the information that came into Ryan Crocker's office or

office, who was his DCM. That was my job.

I checked it to make sure that it was properly formatted. I

checked it to make sure that it was sort of in agreement with sort of

unity of effort requirements. If it wasn't in the right format or if

it didn't quite go along with the policy as Ambassador Crocker wanted

it, we would send it back. That was my job to send it back. That's

what executive secretaries do. So the minute you have an executive

secretary, the executive secretary becomes a kind of a gate, if you

will, and she was that gate.

Now, my experience with her was -- my personal experience with

her was that she was the acting assistant secretary for human rights,

1038
91

and there's several of the acronyms. Early in the process, I made it

my sort of personal crusade to get on people's radars what was happening

to minorities by the opposition that we were supporting. And she was

one of the people who worked with my PDAS to make sure that I was

corralled, or at least that was my impression. So maybe I had a

predisposed idea towards her.

Q Did you ever see or learn that was present in that

document review session that you described for us earlier?

A No. And she would have been foolish if she showed up for

that. She wouldn't have. She wouldn't have. Because the

information was gathered in that room and then taken up to her level

where she was. And the office for the ARB was on the fourth or fifth

floor.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q Do you have any evidence that the executive secretary

actually acted as a gatekeeper and restricted access of

information to the ARB?

A I don't have any evidence. I just know what an executive

secretary does because I had been one.

Q Okay. And what is your evidence that was involved

in corralling your concerns regarding the plight of minorities in

Libya? Is that something you're assuming, or is that something that

you sort of saw?

A It never saw the light of day. And it wasn't for my lack

of effort to make it see the light of day. That was my job. But it

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92

never saw the light of day in terms of policy. But I don't have any

evidence.

Q Okay. So you sent your concerns up and they stopped at some

point, but you don't know who stopped them?

A I don't know who stopped them. It could have been Beth or

Liz. And I don't know who stopped it.

Q Okay.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Okay. I think at this point, Mr. Maxwell, what we would

like to do is shift gears a little bit. And I'd like to ask you about

a series of public allegations that have been made about the attacks.

It's been 3.5 years. There's a number of allegations that have made

publicly about circumstances surrounding the attacks. And what I'd

like --

A In Benghazi?

Q Correct. And what I'd like to ask for here is just whether

you have firsthand knowledge or evidence to support the allegation.

If you don't, that's fine. Then we can just move on to next one.

A Okay.

Q But what we don't -- what we're not asking for is for you

to speculate. So if you don't have firsthand information, because I

know that we've done a little bit of speculating today --

A Okay.

Q And so I'll begin. The first allegation is it has been

alleged that Secretary of State Clinton intentionally blocked military

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action on the night of the attacks. One Congressman has speculated

that Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta to stand down, and this

resulted in Defense Department not sending more assets to help in

Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No. No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order, to Secretary of Defense Panetta, on the night

of the attacks?

A No. I worked until way past midnight on the night of the

attacks. And we had things that we were very overwhelmed with at the

time. And we were -- those are the things that we were focused on.

Q Okay. The next allegation, it has been alleged that

Secretary Clinton personally signed an April 2012 cable denying

security to Libya. Washington Post Fact Checker evaluated that,

claiming they gave it four Pinocchios, its highest award for false

claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A I don't know anything about that.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A I don't know anything about that. But it seems weird that

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she would be.

Q Okay.

A But no, I don't have any -- I don't know anything about that.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

spring of 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

spring 2011?

A No. And that was before I came into this job. Into this

job.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that, quote, "The CIA was not collecting and

shipping arms from Libya to Syria," closed quote, and that they found,

quote, "No support for this allegation," closed quote.

Do you have any evidence that contradicts the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

A That goes into a classified place.

So it's not something

we can discuss here and now. What I can say is I don't know anything

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about Syria's involvement in the relocation of those MANPADs.

Q Okay. And just to be precise on this, we understand that

you have a concern about certain classified information that you were

read into. The specific finding here is that the CIA was not collecting

and shipping arms from Libya to Syria. So do you have any evidence

that would contradict the House Intelligence Committee's bipartisan

report finding, that the CIA was not shipping arms from Libya into

Syria?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facility weapons transfers from Libya to

Syria or to any other foreign country?

A No.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound, and

there have been a number of allegations about the cause of and

appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee

issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not ordered

to stand down but that instead there were tactical disagreements on

the ground over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's finding that there was no stand order to CIA personnel?

A No.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision or think it was the right decision, do you have any evidence

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that there was a bad or improper reason behind the temporary delay of

CIA security personnel who departed the Annex to assist the Special

Mission Compound?

A No. But I would like to say at this juncture that I read

the report of the House Select -- the House Intelligence Committee.

And I read the Annex's, some of which were very revealing. Most people

didn't read the Annex's. And so if you haven't read the Annex's to

that report, you ought to read the Annex's.

Q And we have, sir.

A Okay.

Q I can assure you of that.

A Okay.

Q And when you refer to Annex's, these were the Annex's that

were publicly released as part of the report --

A That's right. And people still don't read them because

they're Annex's. But there was some interesting information in them.

Q Okay. This is going to be a variation of some of the themes

and topics we were discussing today.

A Okay.

Q Do you have evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from materials that were

provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

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97

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A Read that again.

Q Sure. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or

scrub damaging documents from the materials that were provided to the

ARB?

A That's a tough one. I have to think about that. Because

what I've said that did is exactly that. Of course if it wasn't

for the ARB, then it wasn't that. And so that sort of cancels it.

Q Are you referring to the instruction that you reported

receiving from ?

A Yes.

Q So other than that instance, do you have any evidence that

anyone at the State Department --

A No.

Q -- directed anyone else --

A No.

Q Okay. Let me ask these questions for documents that were

provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials

that were provided to Congress?

A No evidence.

Q It has been alleged the CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when he

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told Congress that the CIA, quote, "Faithfully performed our duties

in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship," closed quote.

Do you have any evidence the CIA Deputy Director, Mike Morell,

gave false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

A No. I have no evidence.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an

intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows

about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk

shows?

A No evidence.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief on the night of the attacks

and that he was missing in action.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or was missing in

action on the night of the attacks?

A No evidence. I don't know anything about that.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

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at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considering

flying on the second plane to Benghazi, were ordered by their superiors

to stand down, meaning cease all operations. Military officials have

stated those four individuals were instead ordered to, quote, "Remain

in place," closed quote, in Tripoli to provide security and medical

assistance at that location conversation.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that, quote, "There was no stand down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi," closed quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House

Armed Services Committee that there was no stand down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi?

A I don't have any evidence. Greg Hicks testified that there

was a stand down order. But I don't have any evidence.

Q Okay. This is the last one. It has been alleged that the

military failed to deploy assets on the night of the attack that would

have saved lives. However, former Republican Congressman Howard Buck

McKeon, former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee,

conducted a review of the attacks, after which he stated, quote "Given

where the troops were, how quickly the thing all happened, and how

quickly it dissipated, we probably couldn't have done more than we did,"

closed quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

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collusion?

A I don't have any evidence. I saw 13 Hours like everybody

else did. But I don't have any evidence.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not to

deploy?

A I don't have any evidence.

Q Okay. And that concludes our questioning. Thank you

again, Mr. Maxwell.

Ms. Jackson. We're good.

Mr. Kenny. Okay. We'll go off the record.

[Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

1048
April 29, 2016

Select Committee on Benghazi

U.S. House of Representatives

1036 Longworth House Office Building

Washington, DC 20515

Dear Sir/Ma’am:

I am writing to respond to a point in my testimony of March 9, 2016, of which I reviewed the

transcript and provided notes on March 21.

In the second half of the March 9 interview, Mr. Kinney inferred from a Sheryl Attkisson article

that I had access to a Pickering transcript in advance of my testimony before the House

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of late May, 2013. This was in response to

my assertion that there was information in Pickering’s testimony that the ARB had “unfettered

access” to all documentation that I did not discover until September, 2013.

Mr. Kinney’s point was that I should have had access to that information when I testified in May,

2013, again, based on an inference that he made from the Sheryl Attkinson article. At the time

of my March 9, 2016 testimony, I was willing to accept, at Mr. Kinney’s insistence, that Pickering

testified in May, 2013, while reserving my claim that I did not see that transcript until September,

2013.

However, when I went back to review the exact date of the Pickering testimony, I discovered

that the date of his testimony was in fact, September 19, 2013, not May, 2013 as asserted by

Mr. Kinney.

I am attaching a copy of the transcript of Pickering’s testimony.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

[RDM]

Raymond Maxwell

Attachment: Pickering testimony of September 19, 2013

1049
EXHIBIT 1

1050
1051
EXHIBIT 2

1052
EXHIBIT 3

1053
1054
1055
1056
INTERVIEW OF

ETHAN CHORIN

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MARCH 11, 2016
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

KIM BETZ, Member Outreach Liaison and Counsel

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director/General Counsel

ERIN O’BRIEN, Minority Detailee

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUSTIN EVERS, Senior Advisor

1058
(1)

TELEPHONE INTERVIEW OF ETHAN CHORIN

FRIDAY, MARCH 11, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI, Washington, DC.

The interview in the above matter was held in Room 1036, Longworth House Office Building, commencing at 2:08 p.m.

Appearances:

For the Select Committee on Benghazi: Sharon Jackson, Deputy

Chief Counsel; Sheria Clarke, Counsel; Kim Betz, Member Outreach Liaison; Susanne Sachsman Grooms, Minority Staff Director/

General Counsel; Erin O’Brien, Minority Detailee.

For The U.S. Department of State: Austin Evers.

Ms. JACKSON. So we will begin. This is a transcribed interview

of Dr. Ethan Chorin, conducted by the House Select Committee on

Benghazi. This interview is being conducted voluntarily as part of

the committee’s investigation into the attacks on the U.S. diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and matters related to that pursuant to House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress, and House

Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

Dr. CHORIN, I would ask that you state your full name for the

record, please.

Mr. CHORIN. Ethan Daniel Chorin.

Ms. JACKSON. Dr. Chorin, thank you very much for your appearance on this telephonic interview today. Again, my name is Sharon

Jackson. I’m with the committee’s majority staff. Given that we are

doing this by telephone, we will try to remember to introduce ourselves or identify who is speaking at the time, but I am going to

do the majority of your questions for perhaps up to an hour, and

then I will turn it over to my minority colleagues on the committee.

Do you have any questions regarding this interview before we get

started?

Mr. CHORIN. No.

Ms. JACKSON. Okay. Generally what we do is, I, or perhaps, Ms.

Betz will have a question or two. We will ask questions for up to

an hour, and then we turn it over to our colleagues on the minority

side and they will ask questions for up to an hour. And we generally rotate back and forth until we have exhausted all of our

questions.

We can take a break at any time, so if you want, if you need to,

you know, stretch your legs, get a coffee, hopefully not an adult

beverage during the middle of our interview, but in case you do,

just let us know, and we will take a break and allow you an opportunity to do whatever you need, and then we will resume.

1059
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Mr. CHORIN. Okay.

Ms. JACKSON. We are on an open telephone line, so this session

will be unclassified. I don’t anticipate that you would have any

classified information to disclose to us, but if, for any reason, you

think you are in that realm, please just let us know and we will

either withdraw the question or make arrangements to have it

asked in a more appropriate setting.

Mr. CHORIN. Okay.

Ms. JACKSON. We do have an official reporter taking down everything that is said to make a complete record of this. So we will

ask—she will let us know, and I give her permission to let us know

if for any reason she can’t pick up on an answer, or if she doesn’t

get all of the question.

We are doing this telephonically, so if there is, at any time, you

didn’t hear all of a question or would like it to be restated or rephrased, please just let us know and we will be happy to do it. If

we ask a compound question and you want it broken down, again,

please let us know, because we are trying to get the best record

that we can with regard to this investigation.

And now I just have a few final questions. Dr. Chorin, do you understand that you are required to answer questions from Congress

truthfully?

Mr. CHORIN. Yes.

Ms. JACKSON. All right, do you understand that this applies to

questions that are posed by Congressional staff in an interview?

Mr. CHORIN. Yes.

Ms. JACKSON. And do you understand that any witness who

knowingly provides false testimony could be subject to criminal

prosecution for perjury or making false statements?

Mr. CHORIN. Yes.

Ms. JACKSON. Is there any reason that you know of that you

would not be able to give truthful answers to today’s questions?

Mr. CHORIN. No.

Ms. JACKSON. Okay. Thank you.

EXAMINATION BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Dr. Chorin, I understand that you worked for the State Department and were assigned in Libya in the years 2004, 2005, and

2006. Is that the approximate time period you were there?

A: Yes.

Mr. EVERS. Sharon, this is Austin. Can I just put something on

the record really quickly?

Ms. JACKSON. Yes.

Mr. EVERS. So again, this is Austin Evers from the State Department. We helped facilitate this interview and certainly appreciate

the opportunity to sit in on it. With the indulgence of the committee, we did offer Mr. Chorin that if he has questions that he

would like to ask during the interview, if he wants to know about

ground rules or anything like that, that we would be happy to talk

to him sort of, you know, off the record, you know, notwithstanding

the fact that we don’t actually—he is not a current employee, and

I think what you mostly what you want to talk to him about is a

period when he was not a State Department employee.

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3

I hope that’s okay. It may not arise, but we just wanted to kind

play that facilitating role, and if it comes up, I’m happy to discuss

it with folks.

Ms. JACKSON. That’s fine from our perspective.

Mr. EVERS. Thank you very much.

Mr. CHORIN. Thanks.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Okay. So back to the questions. Dr. Chorin, when precisely

were you in Libya in the early 2000s?

A: I was on a temporary assignment, I believe, in August, September of 2004, and then left in either July or early August of, I

believe late July, of 2006.

Q: Okay. And then it is our understanding that you were working in the private sector in Benghazi, Libya, in 2011. Is that correct? Or were you in Benghazi earlier than 2011?

A: Well, I made trips to Benghazi during the posting with the

State Department, so, and I came back to Libya in 2011 for the

first time in late July as the head of—co-director of a nonprofit.

Q: Okay. And so focusing on that time in July of 2011, can you

describe what you were doing in Benghazi as codirector of this nonprofit group?

A: I and a Libyan American colleague had decided that we were

going to try to facilitate a medical exchange and development in

Benghazi, particularly in the area of trauma, also diabetes-related

issues and I had spent several months contacting people that I had

professional relationships with at various U.S. teaching hospitals.

And we started to put that plan into effect.

Q: Okay. And was one of those teaching hospitals Massachusetts

General Hospital?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. Were there other hospitals in the U.S. that you were

working with to coordinate care in Libya?

A: We had been speaking—I had been speaking with UCSF, University of California, San Francisco, and Yale as well.

Q: Okay. When you were in Benghazi in July of 2011, did you

have any interactions with then-envoy Chris Stevens?

A: Yes, we had a vague plan to meet up at that point, but he

had to leave and go back to Washington for consultations. I did not

meet him on that occasion.

Q: So did you ever meet with him while he was the Envoy in

Benghazi?

A: I did not meet with him personally while he was the Envoy.

We may have exchanged emails, and——

Q: And from the time period of July of 2011, how long were you

in Benghazi?

A: I believe I made four, possibly five trips between July 28 of

2011, and September 10 through 12, 2012.

Q: And approximately, how long would each of those trips be?

A: One to two—one week to ten days.

Q: Okay. And were all of those trips for the purpose of trying to

facilitate this medical cooperation between U.S. hospitals and Libyan facilities?

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A: Yes. I was also writing a book at the time, a history of the

Libyan revolution, so I also took the opportunity to interview various people.

Q: And where would you generally stay when you were in Libya?

A: At the Tibesti Hotel.

Q: Thank you. And during your trips, these four or five trips in

the second half of 2001 and through September of 2012, did you

have any interaction with persons who were at the U.S. facility

there, whether—you have told us it wasn’t then Envoy Stevens, but

there was a series of security officers or security personnel.

Did you have any contact with them up until September of 2012?

A: First, if I could clarify something about the previous point?

Q: Yes.

A: I believe it was, at most, four trips and it wasn’t five. Second,

to answer your last question, I had—we had interaction with somebody most trips. In the first one, I had spoken at least on one occasion with * * * at the mission. And I had been in communication

with then-Envoy and then-Ambassador Stevens about most of those

trips.

Q: Prior to going?

A: Yes. I kept him updated on the general plan.

Q: When you would arrive, or prior to going into Libya, would

you let the U.S. Government know of your travel plans and purpose? I understand that part of the time, or at least for your first

trip, the Embassy in Tripoli was closed, but sort of did you check

in to let anybody in the U.S. Government know that you were

going to be in Libya for those trips?

A: Well, usually Chris Stevens. And on the last occasion, I—we

had communications with the Embassy about coordinating the

trips, and a meeting with Ambassador Stevens in Tripoli, not in

Benghazi.

Q: Okay. Prior to July of 2011, did you know Ambassador Stevens?

A: Yes.

Q: And how did you know him?

A: We were introduced by colleagues at the State Department

while I was still posted to Libya. He had reached out to me regarding, I guess, I believe he had—as soon as he found out that he

would be posted to Libya as DCM, he reached out either directly

or through some mutual friend, mutual colleagues to essentially

pick my brain about what was going on.

Q: Okay. So he—the two of you did not overlap assignments in

Libya. Is that correct?

A: I believe we were supposed to, but he wound up—again, this

is according to my recollection. I think he was either delayed a

year; he certainly came after I did. We did not overlap.

Q: Okay. So the two of you—sometime while you were still working in Libya for the State Department, you and he began communicating or corresponding regarding your experience in Libya? Is

that a correct understanding on my part?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And did you continue that communication and conversations with him after that time?

1062
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A: Yes, there were—I think after he left Libya, we did not have

any further correspondence until just after the Libyan—the outbreak of the Libyan revolution.

Q: So there’s a gap between the time he terminated being the

Deputy Chief of Mission, and the Libyan revolution. Is that correct?

A: That’s correct.

Q: And how would you primarily communicate with Ambassador

Chris Stevens? Would it be by email? By phone? In person?

A: It was mainly by email. Yeah.

Q: Okay. You told us before that towards the latter part of 2011,

then-Envoy Stevens was called back for consultations in Washington. And did you have any face-to-face meetings with him at

that time?

A: Actually, from the time I was—started communicating with

him while I was still posted to Libya, the State Department until

March of 2012. Of course, our communications were entirely over

the phone or email. We had a number of things in common, and

he and I had read, respectively, pieces the other had written. So

it was sort of a connection that way, but the first time that I met

him in person was in, I believe, early March of 2012.

Q: And was that at a time when he was awaiting confirmation

to become the Ambassador to Libya?

A: That is correct.

Q: Okay. And did you meet with him here in D.C.?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And did you discuss the current situation in Libya during that meeting?

A: We did.

Q: Okay. And what can you tell us about that conversation?

What were then soon-to-be-Ambassador Stevens’ feelings about the

stability of Libya, the security situation there, the prospects for the

revolution being successful? Can you just give us a rundown of

your conversation with him as it pertained to Libya?

A: Okay. Well, obviously, that was some time ago, so my

thoughts on that are essentially colored by time, but it was also a

somewhat strange meeting in the sense that we knew quite a bit

about one another in corresponding, but this was the first time we

actually met face-to-face.

And we—I was also interviewing him quasi-formally for my

books. So I had a series of pre-prepared questions that I asked him.

But we did talk about the situation in Libya, of course, and he expressed quite a bit of concern that things were quickly degenerating security-wise, and otherwise, and was quite adamant that

attention needed to paid to the eastern regions in Benghazi, in particular.

Q: Did he elaborate as to what he thought needed to be done?

A: He expressed his concern that there might be an abatement

in attention with respect to Libya after the early push, and that

there needed to be reconstruction efforts and civil society, you

know, building efforts to compensate for the lack of infrastructure

and to consolidate security, particularly in the east.

Q: Okay. Did he offer any opinion as to whether he thought the

U.S. Government needed to be doing more to assist in the reconstruction? I’m sorry?

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A: Yeah, this was—I mean, I should say, this was also off the

record with respect to the book that I was writing, so this was not

meant to be a public conversation or anything that was going to

appear verbatim in the—in the book.

Could I ask you to repeat that question?

Q: Yeah, I believe the question was, did he offer any opinions or

thoughts on whether the U.S. Government could be doing more, or

should be doing more to assist in the reconstruction or rebuilding

of the Libyan civil society?

A: Yes. I believe he told me—well, he told me that he felt the

United States Government should be doing quite a bit more to help

peace and support for the transition. He also expressed quite a bit

of consciousness about the fact that there were, you know, a number of political forces at work, and if I can characterize his comments thereafter, it was hoping that he would get more assistance

in that arena, talking specifically about the reconstruction efforts

and that all—he was facing a really tough job ahead. And I detected there was a—I will leave it at that.

Q: Okay. Did he get any more specific about how he thought the

U.S. Government needed to assist in the reconstruction? Was it in

particular areas? Was it, you know, military support to Libya? Was

it more medical aid? Was he any more specific? Because as I take

a moment to step back one of the things that this committee will

be doing is making recommendations to hopefully improve the situation and ensure that another Benghazi does not happen.

So you are one person who can give us Ambassador Stevens’ insights on what he saw needed to be done.

A: Well, if I can also add a little bit of background to this in the

sense that we started communicating—we had—I wouldn’t say we

communicated on an extremely regular basis, but we had been

talking. I think one of our reference points was the assassination

of Abdul Fatah Younis in Benghazi on the—in late July.

He was not there in Benghazi at that time, as I mentioned earlier, but the situation was extremely tense and I had written one

piece for Foreign Policy which resonated with him, and we picked

up on those thoughts in this conversation that we are talking about

now. So there wasn’t a lot of—we had had some of this conversation before, is what I’m trying to say.

He felt that—I’m being very careful not to put anything, any

words in his mouth, but to summarize what I understood for what

he said was that, you know, essentially, Benghazi was not only the

epicenter of the revolution, but a long-neglected part of the Libyan

polity, and that the, essentially—what I got from him was that he

was concerned that all of the attention was moving where—all of

those factors that you mentioned, militarily, security-wise, medical,

to the epicenter activities moving to Tripoli. And I believe what his

point was, that he was afraid that the situation in Benghazi could

degenerate as a result of that relative shift of the tension.

And we both agreed that Benghazi was particularly important

for one, the threat of potential future spread of extremist activity,

as well as the fact that, you know, many of Libya’s thinkers, intellectuals, you know, people with high levels of education, also came

from Benghazi, and that there was a sort of an, essentially, again,

1064
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without putting words into his mouth, that Benghazi would be critical to future, to Libya’s future health as a unified state.

Q: Did he offer any opinion as to what he—you mentioned extremism. Did he elaborate any further on what he saw as either the

rise of extremism, or the expansion of extremism, or where he

thought extremism was being fostered? Did he express any further

concerns with respect to that?

A: I think a lot of the conversation was built on previous conversations, so as I mentioned before, you had talked about, or at

least via our other work, I mean, Ambassador Stevens had written

one cable in particular that I had read at that point on the situation in Derna, and which had been, you know, that was part of

the——

Q: I’m sorry, was part of what?

A: [continuing]: Which was released in the Wikileaks context.

There was, and I had written this piece, I mean, it was widely

known, or believed at the time that either Ansar al-Shari, or one

of its affiliates was responsible for, or had some connection to the

death of the assassination of Abdul Fatah Younis. I should actually

correct that by saying that it wasn’t—it was an Islamist faction

that that event was attributed to. But that’s the background to our

conversation. So there was no explicit mentioning in the Washington conversation about specific names of individuals or groups,

but it was clear that that was part of what he was concerned

about.

Q: Okay. And what, if anything, did he believe that the U.S. Government needed to do to counter that?

A: Again, I think he was advocating a—I know he was advocating a more intensive support, both financial and in terms of security, and social services would be implicit, meaning being that if

one could help the incomplete infrastructure in Benghazi, provide

for state infrastructure, provide for—provide services to the people,

that this would make it less likely that, you know, essentially solidify the—those who wanted to see order in that area and in Libya,

in general.

Q: Did he express any opinion about his own personal security,

either in Benghazi or in Tripoli, or that of the other U.S. Government personnel that were working either in Benghazi or at the

Embassy in Tripoli?

A: Not specifically. He did say that he was very concerned that

we were at a turning point, and that things could go badly quickly.

Q: And again, this is your conversation in March of 2012 here

in D.C.?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. Were there other occasions when you would talk with

or communicate with Ambassador Stevens about the security of the

facilities and personnel, either in Tripoli, or Benghazi?

A: We did not have those specific conversations, no.

Q: Dr. Chorin, we have talked a lot about Ambassador Stevens’

perceptions and beliefs about the post-revolutionary rebuilding of

Libya, and you have told us some of Ambassador Stevens’ thoughts

on the matter. Did you share his beliefs? You studied Libya for a

long time. Did you personally believe that the U.S. Government

was doing enough, or should the U.S. Government be doing more?

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A: I was—I think the interesting thing about our meeting that

I came away from, and which strengthened my previous impressions, was that Ambassador Stevens and I were very much aligned

on certainly all of the points that we discussed. I’m not sure I can

say anything, you know, more than that. I have got—I judge that

based on his writing, and what he conveyed to me in previous—the

previous phone conversations as well as that meeting. So with a

fair degree of confidence, I think I can say that our views were very

much aligned.

Q: All right.

A: And I did think that the—I was—I thought that it was the

right thing to do, the intervention, particularly back to in March

of 2011, to support the rebel forces in Benghazi, and I felt that it

was very important to also work for the United States to end the

other parties involved to implement some form of assistance in

terms of some, what would be under the classification of the thenevolving responsibility to rebuild.

And obviously, I felt very strongly about, but the thing that I

personally could do to help, was to use some of my knowledge of

development, and connections with the medical field to try to help

with—on the medical side.

Q: Dr. Chorin, you have written about the fact that it’s your belief that the U.S. Government should have done more in rebuilding

Libya. Can you give us any more—can you give us specifics about

how you thought the U.S. Government’s post-toppling of Qadhafi

intervention should have gone?

A: I think that—well, let me give you an example. In Benghazi,

the situation there was basically tolerable. There was—and promising, in many respects, right after the revolution. I believe it took

more than a year for the security situation to degenerate to a point

where it became extremely worrisome.

Q: Dr. Chorin, I’m sorry to interrupt, but could I ask you to be

a little more specific when you talk about when the revolution was

successful. Are you talking August, September October of 2011?

Could you just be a little more specific on the timeframe?

A: Sure. From the—from the U.S./NATO intervention, to, let’s

say, May of 2011, well, actually, that’s—I’m sorry, 2012.

Q: Okay. All right. So——

A: The security situation started to deteriorate very rapidly

starting around May of 2012. So there was a bit more than a year

there.

Q: And were you in Benghazi in the spring/summer of 2012?

A: Spring/summer of 2012, yes. I do not, at the moment, have

with me the—and I apologize for that, the specific dates, but we

were there, I believe, two months—in, I believe it was in May of

2012.

Q: Okay. But even if you weren’t in country, you were keeping

tabs on the security situation in Libya and Benghazi in particular?

A: Very much so. I felt that was my responsibility. We had engaged with the—with Massachusetts General, and Brigham and

Women’s Hospitals at that point, and none of the staff there had

much knowledge, local knowledge, so I was keeping a very close

watch as I would be doing otherwise for—on developments in the

region in Benghazi, in particular.

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Q: So what was happening in approximately May of 2012? What

difference did you start—what difference did you see at that time

frame?

A: Again, the—and there is a long list of incidents that began

around in that region of early June until—and then on. There was

an attempt on—attempted on—well, there was an attack on the

British Ambassador. There was an IED device at the mission.

There was kidnapping of some—involving medical workers. There

was, if you plucked the incidents from May to the attack on the

mission, the number—the frequency and intensity of those attacks

appeared to be growing.

Q: And how would you receive updates on what was going on in

Benghazi when you weren’t physically there? Did you monitor

international papers? Did you get updates from people at the Consulate? Did you have your—were there other Libyan nationals that

you worked with that kept you updated? What were your different

sources of information with respect to the security situation, and

did those sources also include then-Ambassador Stevens?

A: My sources were varied. I had myself and my colleague. My

colleague is a Libyan American, he had not been back for many

years, and had a very wide family network, particularly in

Benghazi. I would read social media, Facebook. At that time, I was

not looking so much at Twitter, but at Facebook posted in Arabic,

and newspapers like Asharq Al-Awsat and other Arabic language

local sources and my own contact network, as well as the hospital

staff to some degree, but not to a great degree.

Q: Okay. You gave us the name of a foreign newspaper, and for

the reporter, could I ask you to spell that for us, please?

A: It’s A-s-h-a-r-q, dash A-l-A-w-s-a-t.

Q: You just made our reporter smile. Dr. Chorin, if I could move

forward to September of 2012, it is our understanding that you

were in Benghazi, Libya, at least on the 11th and 12th of September. Is that correct?

A: I arrived on the 10th.

Q: You arrived——

A: And my colleagues—yeah.

Q: Okay. Were you on the same plane as Ambassador Stevens?

A: I was not. I came in from Istanbul.

Q: Okay. And prior to arriving, did you know that Ambassador

Stevens was going to be in Benghazi?

A: No. That was a surprise to me.

Q: Okay. And how did you find out?

A: I found out from my colleague who has relatives in the—on

the hospital and medical center staff, who heard from one of his

cousins, I believe.

Q: One of his cousins?

A: Well, I can’t be sure what the source was, but the, at that

point, it seemed to be quite well-known that Ambassador Stevens

was in town, and he had several meetings at which I’m sure some

of your other interviewees have spoken.

Q: Okay. Had you attempted to make any arrangements to see

Ambassador Stevens in Tripoli for this September trip of yours?

A: Yes. Originally, we were going to fly from Benghazi to Tripoli

to meet with Ambassador Stevens after we were in country.

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Q: And why didn’t that trip take place?

A: Because I had—there was a fatality, there was an attack on

the airport road. I’m, at the moment, blanking on the details, but

there was an incident which made me concerned about taking

other non-Libya-familiar colleagues into Tripoli.

Q: Was that an attack in Tripoli or Benghazi? Which airport?

A: In Tripoli. I felt at the time more—I mean also, I felt more

comfortable in—see, starting this project, I felt more comfortable in

Benghazi than I did in Tripoli. I simply had more information. So—

about the situation in Benghazi.

Q: Would you—did you spend any time in Tripoli in 2011 and

2012?

A: I did not.

Q: Okay. So whenever you were in country in Libya, you were

in Benghazi, or in the vicinity of Benghazi?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. So you arrive on the 10th, and you learn that Ambassador Stevens happens to be in Benghazi. What do you do with

that information?

A: I sent him an email, and he responded, you know, quite quickly.

Q: Okay. And then did you set up a meeting with him?

A: And I—yes, well, we didn’t, not immediately. We traded

emails. We were going to—he said he would definitely like to meet,

I believe. And we were going to make the arrangements to the following day to——

Q: Okay. And what particularly did you want to accomplish in

this meeting? It is our understanding that it was going to be at the

Benghazi Medical Center, and it was to talk about this joint, or

this collaboration between U.S. hospitals and the Benghazi Medical

Center, but we would like to hear from you if we are correct in that

assessment, and what was the purpose of the meeting?

A: Well, the purpose of the meeting was, you know, I would

check in with Ambassador Stevens whenever I could, and, you

know, as you said before, every trip we took. And we had previously made arrangements to meet with him in Tripoli. So since

I, you know, one reason it was a courtesy call, the second one is

that the partnership that we had facilitated had reached another

stage. There was a large denomination memorandum of understanding that my colleague and I had helped the two sides form,

which would have been signed on the 10th.

Q: And I had mentioned the Benghazi Medical Center. Was that

the commonly understood name of the facility that we are talking

about?

A: Yes, BMC.

Q: Was that the only medical facility in Benghazi? Was it known

as ‘‘the hospital,’’ or was there more than one hospital in Benghazi?

A: No, there were five major medical centers, and I believe two

specialist centers. So this was one of the, you know, one of the—

well, Benghazi Medical Center was the largest tertiary care facility

in Benghazi, and actually all of Libya. Not all of its capacity was

being used, but it was a focus of the, certainly, the regional—attempts to—if there was a facility in Libya that was going to be de1068
11

veloped as a National Center of Excellence it would be in Benghazi,

and it would be the Benghazi Medical Center.

Q: Okay. Thank you. That’s helpful. So back to September 10,

you were trading emails back and forth with Ambassador Stevens,

I assume updating him on your progress and seeing if he has time

to meet. Is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And then, do you reach an agreement to meet on the

11th or 12th, or does this back and forth continue into the 11th?

A: It continued into the 11th. Ambassador Stevens had suggested

that—well, actually, I believe what happened was we communicated on the morning of the 11th, and he—there was a short

phone call. My phone was not working for some reason, so again,

so he had a short conversation with my colleague. And we—I had

picked up the—so at that point, the notion of our meeting and his

hearing more about the situation at BMC, and our plans were set,

we were to communicate again later that afternoon.

My recollection is that there was another set of emails that went

back and forth, and he called, again, on my colleague’s phone, I believe somewhere between 4:30 and 5:30, when we were back at the

Tibesti Hotel, and that is the first time that I really had a chance

to talk to him for any length of time. I—the cafe in the hotel was

quite crowded, so I took the call off to the side and explained to

him what we had been doing. And he was quite noticeably encouraged, and if I dare say, happy that—at what had gone on.

He didn’t realize that the negotiations had proceeded so fast, and

he essentially offered two choices: either we come to the compound

that evening, or what his preference was that we go to the—that

he come to the hospital the next morning.

Would you like me to continue in this vein?

Q: Yes, please do.

A: So he was quite—we left that open for a little bit, and then

he said that—actually, he thought it was very important for the

U.S. Government to have a presence at the BMC, and particularly,

because I think there was something that we could almost surely

announce at that point, though that wasn’t made explicit.

He did say that he was very—that there were serious security

concerns, and that he would prefer if I discussed this with his—

one of his detail, and that that person would call me back in an

hour or so—after an hour or so.

Q: So this is the conversation in the late afternoon. You’re at the

Tibesti Hotel, and you have a longer conversation, and you are

making arrangements to meet the next day at the Benghazi Medical Center. Is that correct?

A: That’s correct.

Q: Okay. And—but during that conversation Ambassador Stevens says that there are some serious security concerns, and he

wants you to coordinate with one or more members of his security

detail?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay.

A: I think the—the gist, I don’t want to quote verbatim, but the

gist was that there were factors that were causing them to be very

careful about security, and the BMC could be aware that, you

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know, there needs to be a security plan and various details gone

over before he came over there.

Q: Was there—did he express to you, or in any subsequent conversations with his security detail, did they express to you the lack

of security or any specific problems with the medical center, with

the Benghazi Medical Center?

A: He didn’t mention any lack of security on his part. He did say

that it would be logistically not necessarily straightforward but

they would have to—if I’m recalling correctly—to map out the compound, and make a backdoor approach in the sense that they would

have to come, I believe, through a side entrance, and that—again,

more of these details came from his security person. But I think

that’s the limit of what he discussed.

Q: Okay. So if you would, just continue and walk us through the

additional events that happened after this phone call with Ambassador Stevens. Any subsequent calls with him, any subsequent

communications with his security detail, just kind of walk us

through the events, please.

A: Okay. So I—and so the security—the security person had a

first name, and I somehow—I assumed it was not his real name,

but who knows? And I don’t remember what the name was. It may

have been * * * or * * *. I don’t know. He called, and we basically

just went over—the point was fairly simple. He repeated what Ambassador Stevens said, and asked that I be in touch.

He said that there would be a group of people with Ambassador

Stevens, and that they would be carrying concealed weapons. And

that it was important that the director of the hospital understood

that. So he wanted me to call the director, and then we would

speak again.

So, I did call the director, and he was not available at the time.

He wanted me to call him back, I believe, so I—my colleagues and

I went to have dinner. That must have been around eight o’clock

or so. And then, I believe, I got a call back from the director, let’s

see, this—I’m just making sure that I have got this right. There

was a second call with the director a bit later. We were having

some problems reaching him, and this got into about 9:30, 9:40.

A: And I spoke to the director, and there was sort of—it was an

odd conversation which went on for several minutes. And at the

end of it, he asked me, in a somewhat understated way, whether

I understood that there was something going on at the compound.

And I said I had no—certainly, no idea of what was happening.

And again, he said he would call me back.

Q: Were you at the Tibesti Hotel at the time?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. And how far is the Tibesti Hotel from the U.S. compound, approximately?

A: I looked it up. I believe it’s at least a couple of miles.

Q: Okay. So the director of the Benghazi Medical Center was the

first to alert you that something unusual was going on at the U.S.

compound?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. Did he elaborate? Did you ask him what he meant by

that?

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A: Yeah. He said he was in communication with the local security forces and with other important persons in the Benghazi infrastructure, and that he didn’t have any more information.

Q: Did he indicate in any way that there was an attack, or a protest, or did he give you any type of elaboration as to what was

going on there?

A: No. It was very vague, but it was quite ominous.

Q: Okay. Now how long had it been since you had talked to anyone at the compound?

A: It had been, by that point, at least an hour, possibly an hourand-a-half.

Q: Okay. And so when was the last time, approximately, that you

had talked to Ambassador Stevens?

A: The only call that I had with Ambassador Stevens on this trip

was the one that took place around 4:30, 5:00.

Q: Okay. Had Ambassador Stevens said, other than his conversation with you about security for the meeting at the Benghazi Medical Center, had he talked about any of the security at the compound as he was there that day?

A: No.

Q: For example, did he mention that he was having all of his

meetings on compound because it was the anniversary of 9/11, or

he wasn’t leaving the compound for meetings that day?

A: I do believe that he mentioned that he was not leaving the

compound that day, and the reason was fairly obvious. I shouldn’t

say, maybe I should withdraw it. You know, there were obvious

reasons to be concerned.

Q: Beyond it being the anniversary of 9/11?

A: I—well, what I can say is that before I made this trip, I was

very concerned. I did not have the same level of anxiety about what

might happen to us on the previous trips. And the reason that

we—this is important from our perspective, the reason that we

made the trip was that there was quite a bit of pressure to sign

this agreement, which had been put into—you know, it had taken

a year or two of very hard work to put together, and I certainly

believed in that, but it was very—looking at the number of incidents, and I was particularly concerned about the kidnapping of

the medical workers. But, you know, I can elaborate on my own

thinking about it, but I was very concerned about this trip.

Q: So what happened after you had what you have described as

this odd conversation with the medical director? What did you do?

A: I went up to the third floor, where our rooms were, and related this to my colleague, and the co-founder of the group, and we

were concerned, to say the least, and probably—we had a conversation about what we should do, and based on my thinking, was it

something that was going on at the compound. I didn’t want to

make things more complicated by calling into an unknown situation. We discussed whether, you know, whether I should make another call or not, and decided that I should, so I called back and

I got the same—I believe it was the same person who I was speaking with before, and all I can say is, it sounded like he wished

somebody else was on the line.

Q: I anticipate it was a short conversation, but to the best of your

ability, could you relate for us that conversation?

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A: Yeah. I believe what happened was, you know, essentially,

things were—it wasn’t—it wasn’t a long exchange, obviously, and

I wanted to get off—it was clear that—sort of this pregnant pause.

They said, look, we are under attack, and I believe there was an

expletive there.

And then a pause, another pause, and we don’t know exactly

what’s happening, something like—there was something similar,

but it wasn’t—I don’t remember. That part didn’t stick with me.

And I did not want to prolong the conversation.

Q: Was there any request for assistance for you to do anything,

to call anyone to——

A: No. I think once he realized who it was, it was clear there was

nothing I could do, so the call just ended.

Q: Okay. So you had called the number that was associated with

this security agent. Is that correct?

A: That’s correct.

Q: Okay. Did you have the Ambassador’s cell phone number?

A: I did.

Q: Okay. Did you try and call it?

A: I couldn’t—I still couldn’t use my phone. Oddly, it started

working maybe two hours later. But my colleague had his and we

worked—as before, all of the calls went through his phone.

Q: Did you try and call the Ambassador’s cell phone number?

A: We did not.

Q: Okay. At any time that evening, did you try and call the Ambassador’s cell phone number?

A: No. We, you know, we did not think that was going to be helpful.

Q: Okay. From your location at the Tibesti Hotel, were you able

to hear any remnants of an attack? Were you able to monitor it on

local television or social media? I guess, how did you get any additional information that evening, if you did?

A: We were in pretty regular contact through the night with the

head of the—director of the hospital. So he was relaying us information which he was getting from the military command there.

Q: Was that normal in Benghazi? That the director of the medical center would get information from the military or were they related in some way? Or can you explain to us that relationship?

A: It was very well. I am assuming, I don’t know, but I don’t

know if it was any personal relationship, but obviously, the

Benghazi Medical Center was the key facility in the city, and the

director of the hospital was a very well-connected person.

Q: Was the director of the hospital concerned that the hospital

might be attacked?

A: He didn’t—if he had such concerns, he did not relate them to

us.

Q: Taking a step back, did he have more general concerns about

the various militias that were operating in and around Benghazi

and the security of the hospital? Had that been a problem in the

past, I guess?

A: Yes. He was the target of an attack which nearly killed him

several months before, and that was clearly hostility, various forms

of—I mean, you know, at the time, the various militias were going

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1Please see letter from witness at end of transcript for clarification/correction of this statement.

after public services, airports, hospitals, other assets as bargaining

chips, among other things.

So that Benghazi Medical Center had been in the tussle with the

local authorities, as well as, you know, the various issues that were

in place at the time.

Q: Was this widespread or was that hospital being targeted by

a particular group, either militia, or any other type of extremist

group?

A: Well, the situation there at the time was not extremely wellknown, and much of my information, you know, came from after.

So yeah, it was not a household thing at that point. Wanis

Bukhamada, who was the head of the Thunderbolt forces, the special forces that were assigned, and originally had been with Qadhafi, and had been moved to—reassembled and supported into, I

guess they were—they had Benghazi as the base, were switched to

the rebel side, and the commander of that route around this time,

May, June of 2011, became the head of the, basically, the de facto

head of the Benghazi military, you know, Benghazi security as

well.

Q: You gave us a name just a minute ago. What was that name

again, please?

A: Wanis, Colonel Wanis Bukhamada.

Q: Bukhamada?

A: I have—there are various spellings of it. B-u, space, Khamada

would be K-h-a-m-a-d-a.

Q: Okay. Alright, you mentioned Ansar al-Sharia just a moment

ago. What was its status in and around Benghazi at this time?

A: It had been understood to be present, and there was some

general, you know, but it was not a hostile 1—it was not a name

that came up as frequently as it obviously did afterward. It was

some, I had spoken to some senior, or former senior U.N. advisors

after that who had speculated that that group had been in charge

of—at least partly in charge of the—had taken partial control of

the area around BMC, the Benghazi Medical Center, but I had

heard several different reports that they were or were not at the

time.

Q: Okay. All right, if we could go sort of back to the timeline.

You had gotten the call from the director at the Benghazi Medical

Center. You had called back to the compound, had a very brief conversation with one of the agents, and then, I think, we were at that

point. What did you do next, or what did you learn next?

A: Okay. So at that point, it was clear there was an attack underway, so I went up to, again, back to the third floor to consult

with my colleague. And at that point, we were talking, and we

heard the volleys of RPG, what we assumed and later confirmed

were RPG fire. It clearly was a big firefight. And I remember his

turning to me and saying, ‘‘Well, that’s not good.’’

Q: Okay. You said that it was clear there was an attack underway. Let me take a step back in your prior conversations, either

with Ambassador Stevens or with the agent that day. At any time,

had the protests in Cairo come up in conversation?

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A: No.

Q: Okay. Were you aware that there had been protests in Cairo

that day?

A: I had—actually we were not at the time, no.

Q: Okay. So that is something that you learned afterwards?

A: Yes.

Q: Okay. Let me just pause for a moment because we have approached the first hour. And, I mean, I have maybe another 20

minutes or so. I just want to continue though the narrative. We are

going to talk just briefly about timing. Dr. Chorin, do you need a

break?

A: I could take one if you need me to, but I don’t need one.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. I think it is fine if you want to keep

going.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: Well, then I tell you what. I’m going to continue on for maybe

just another 15 minutes just to see if we can sort of walk through

the rest of that night and the next day. And then I will be close

to—I will either be finished or close to being finished with all of

my questions.

A: Great.

Q: So if you could just continue your narrative of, I believe you

said it was clear there was an attack underway.

Let me ask you this: Had you had any indication from social

media in Benghazi or anything that there was to be some sort of

protest at the Consulate, or anywhere in Benghazi that day?

A: No.

Q: Okay. Is that something that you would monitor when you

were in Benghazi?

A: You know, that is actually not reliable, and also not working,

so, you know, in the past, we generally relied on our human contacts, not social media.

Q: Okay. And had any of your contacts told you that there was

to be any type of protest or demonstration in Benghazi that

evening?

A: Nope.

Q: Okay. All right then. If you could just continue and walk us

through what happened the rest of that evening with respect to

your knowledge as to the attack at the U.S. facility?

A: So after the—after the explosion, we called the—we called the

director back, and it was clear he was getting—he had a direct line

to the individuals I mentioned earlier. And we had various—we

had conversations amongst ourselves what to do, whether the

Tibesti might be under attack. We tried to, we found our third colleague and informed him what was going on. And I spent some

time, basically, in—my room was facing the front part of the hotel.

My colleague’s was facing the back. We—I turned off the lights in

my room and tried to watch what was going on outside. There were

lots of pickup trucks and armed individuals milling around, and

this happened all throughout the night. There was just very unusual behavior outside our hotel.

So, there was a police car that left the Tibesti shortly after the

conversation that I just mentioned, which concerned me, because it

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was—not that it was going to do anything, but that was the only

visible sign of some authority we might recognize. So we had asked

that through the director, that the—that more—if they could send

somebody, and what do they advise us to do?

Then around 2:00 o’clock in the morning, 1:00 or 2:00, things still

were—there was a lot of activity outside of the hotel, and at that

point, there was some, I believe it was around then that the—that

we heard that there was a casualty, or more, at the mission, and

there was a question of whether we were going to be evacuated,

and by whom. And I think the, at the time, if I recall—well, that

was it.

They were basically trying to—the director was trying to assure

us that somebody was keeping an eye out for us, and that if there

were any problems, that they would come and take us to a safe

place.

So, I obviously didn’t sleep the rest of the night. And around, I

believe somewhere between 6:30, maybe 7:00, maybe seven o’clock

in the morning, the director came to the hotel and we sat for about

half an hour and—20 minutes. And I did not realize—obviously,

that he knew that Ambassador Stevens had been killed, but that

did not come out until towards the end of the conversation.

And he looked very grave. And there was some question about

what, you know, what the next steps were going to be. This was

mainly with me, and he decided that—we decided that that is

going to be it, for us to be taken to the hospital, mostly because

that was on the way to the airport. Do you want me to keep going

on this?

Q: Yeah. Had the director given you information about Ambassador Stevens at that 7:00 a.m. meeting?

A: Yes. But it came at the end.

Q: At the end of the conversation?

A: Right.

Q: And what did the director relate?

A: He said that there was a—there was—there were casualties,

and obviously, he was well aware of what had been going on all

night. And at one point, he used the past tense with respect to Ambassador Stevens. That’s when I tried to clarify, and he said, yes,

that’s the case.

Q: Okay. Had he treated Ambassador Stevens or was that another physician?

A: That was another physician. I am absolutely sure that he was

kept up to date by the minute. But——

Q: Did the director relate who he had heard was responsible for

the attack?

A: No.

Q: Were you—let me take a step back. Were you aware that

there was a second U.S. Government facility in Benghazi?

A: Not directly. But I would, you know, I had some vague—I

think I had some vague notion that there was.

Q: Okay. You had never been there?

A: I had never been there.

Q: Okay. So during that evening, you were, essentially, relying

on the Libyans for your personal security that evening? There was,

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you know, no one to call, no other place to go for U.S. citizens to

go and, essentially, self-evacuate yourself that evening?

A: No. We were very much relying on the director, and the——

Q: So, then what happens after your visit with the director in the

early morning of the 12th?

A: So I told our—there were three of us, so I—given that we had

been through this drill once before after the killing of the Colonel

Younis, likely—you know, to get our essentials and go to the hospital. So I asked everyone to please get their essentials and the director drove us to the hospital.

Q: Did the director have some sort of security surrounding him?

A: At that time, no.

Q: Okay. And what happened once you arrived at the hospital?

A: There was a lot of—there was, well, there was commotion. We

were in the director’s office. There were physicians who—can you

hear me?

Q: Yes.

A: The physician who treated—at least one of them who treated

Ambassador Stevens was there, and spoke with the general—person, and we got a more detailed brief on what had happened.

Q: And what did you learn?

A: Certainly, that he had been brought to the hospital nonresponsive, and I wasn’t a part of that briefing. Dr. Thomas Burke,

who was the—was our third there, but his colleague had left the

previous day. So I had heard about the struggle over—the security

people had come to try to take Ambassador Stevens’ remains

back—to evacuate and—but there was some sort of an, I believe

there was some sort of an arms tussle, and that there were other

militia members who had been brought to the hospital that night.

Whether they were militia members, rather, who had been

brought—the identity of them, those people was not quite clear, but

there was some violence associated with that.

And I will tell you what else——

Q: Did they relate who brought Ambassador Stevens’ body to the

hospital?

A: It was not totally clear. There’s the question of the translator,

whether it was Stevens’ translator who had aligned with the people

who brought Stevens. There’s some speculation about that, but we

didn’t get any further details.

Q: Okay, and do you know who his translator was? Did you—had

you ever met the person?

A: No.

Q: Okay.

A: I don’t think so.

Q: Does the name * * *, is that familiar to you?

A: Yes. But I couldn’t tell you more.

Q: Good. Is that a name that you associate with Ambassador Stevens’ translator, or are we referring to a different person?

A: I cannot definitively associate it with Ambassador Stevens,

but I would—yeah.

Q: Okay. So your associate, Dr. Thomas Burke, received the information from the treating physician as to the condition of Ambassador Stevens as being brought in nonresponsive, and any other

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medical assistance that was rendered to him that night. Is that correct?

A: Yes. He certainly got more information than we did. We were,

obviously, only focusing on the logistics of how we were going to get

out of there.

Q: Okay. But your basic understanding is that Ambassador Stevens was brought in nonresponsive and they were unable to revive

him?

A: That is correct.

Q: Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON

Q: To your knowledge, was any other American brought to the

hospital?

A: That was not my [inaudible]——

Q: I am sorry, what was your answer?

A: That was not—we were not privy to that information. Nothing

was discussed.

Q: So no one else was talked about other than Ambassador Stevens?

A: No.

Q: And then you have described that there was some sort of skirmish or tussle over when people arrived to take Ambassador Stevens’ remains away. Could you elaborate on that, please?

A: The precise details I do not recall. I remember there was

some—my recollection is that there was some tussle over the jurisdiction, not only as to who was coming to take Ambassador Stevens

away and who was authorized to release him, but I can’t be completely sure. There were also apparently tussles with threats

around militia. It was only referred to as militia members who

were brought in at the same time and treated and what was happening. Some of them were, I believe, deceased. So the question of

who was in control of admitting and discharging.

Q: During the day of the 12th, did you learn anything more

about the nature of the attack, the scope of the attack, the identity

of the attackers?

A: We did not.

Q: Following the 12th, did you learn any more about the nature

of the attack or the identity of the attackers?

A: Well, I had read quite a fair bit after the attack and heard

more information about what had happened, how we got out, as

well as some of the circumstances around the fact itself.

Q: From your Libyan sources, did you learn any more about the

identity of the attackers as opposed to reading news articles and

more public information?

A: I had discussions with other people who were proximate, but

not Libyan.

Q: And what did you learn?

A: I believe that I had written about this at one point, but there

were two individuals who were—one was the Italian Consul General, was having dinner near the compound—my understanding

was there was a restaurant next to the compound, the Venezia restaurant—and was waiting for Ambassador Stevens to come and

1077
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meet with him at that restaurant. He related to me what he told

an Italian, I believe, news aggregator right after the attack.

Q: And what was that?

A: That he did not believe there was any cause to—he did not

see any evidence of—he did not—there is a written record. He said

that he did not have any cause to believe that there was a protest.

Q: And how soon after the attack did he give this interview, if

you will, was his rendition of what happened made public? Was it

the next day, the day after?

A: The next day. And it appeared both—it also appeared in an

Italian newspaper, but I do not recall the name of the paper right

now.

Q: So the Italian Consul General’s eyewitness account was in the

papers on the 12th or the 13th?

A: I believe it was the—the dateline was the 12th. One interview

I think was carried, I am not 100 percent sure, I think it was carried by an Italian—major Italian paper the next day.

Q: And, Dr. Chorin, how did you get out of Benghazi after the

attack?

A: So the director—essentially the director asked, well, whether

we wanted to leave, and I said: Yes, very much so. I was concerned

that there might be some kind of counter-action from outside or

within. And he managed—we were taken to—we had to go back

into town. There was a passport that was left behind. And we were

driven by the director, followed by a team, a group of militia members who—essentially, they followed us and provided an escort to

the airport.

Q: And do you know which militia that was? There were several

in Benghazi.

A: Yes. This was described as a security force that was sort of

by the Benghazi Medical Center as an unaffiliated militia. I think

that potentially—the various parties had multiple affiliations, so

we couldn’t quite tell who they were. My view is that they either—

well, they played a role in getting us out, so that is all I can say.

Q: And you were grateful?

A: Yes. Well, I was grateful to get out.

Q: Yes, okay. And then did you leave Benghazi on the 12th?

A: We left Benghazi on the 12th. I don’t know how much of this

you would like to hear, but there was a problem with the incoming

flight. It had some mechanical problems in Istanbul, and they sent

a smaller plane, so there was no way to get us on the flight. And

I’m not even sure, I think the flight was completely booked even

before that. So we heard later that there were various efforts made

on our behalf that were fairly dramatic to get us on the plane. We

were basically left standing there while the plane was fueled and

loaded wondering whether we were going to get on.

Q: But you ultimately did?

A: Yes.

Q: Have you been back to Benghazi since then?

A: No.

Q: You wrote in an article that was published in the New York

Times on September 13th, 2012, that—and the quote is, quote: ‘‘It

is a mystery at this point why the consulate compound was so

lightly fortified,’’ end quote.

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First of all, did you write that?

A: Yes.

Q: Could you elaborate on what you meant by the compound

being lightly fortified? In your mind, in what respects was it lightly

fortified?

A: Well, this was from—now, as you know, the editing process

is—I’m sure I said that, but I think the conclusion that I was making was an extrapolation from—partly extrapolation from past experience and partly from bits I had heard here and there. And

thirdly, it was from the fact that—I think a combination of the information I had received from the, you know, the conversations

that I have already related with Stevens and his detail, as well as

the fact that it succeeded. I mean, I was quite aware of the provisional—that it was not a consulate, that it was a mission, and I

had seen those facilities before during my posting.

Q: In fact, when you were in Tripoli in 2004 to 2006, was your

facility one that, for whatever reasons, was not required to meet security standards?

A: It was a provisional—I mean, it was a liaison office, so it was

neither an embassy nor a consulate, it was a temporary mission before the normalization of relations. And I believe I have said this

publicly before, but I felt personally, and I know a number of my

colleagues did, that the security was essentially nonexistent, other

than that provided by the—I shouldn’t say nonexistent because, of

course, there were dedicated State Department security people

there, but we had no—it was nothing like a normal embassy.

Q: Dr. Chorin, just so that I can wrap up, which has been more

than my first hour, about an hour and 25 minutes, is there anything else about the time period of September 10th through September 13th that we haven’t asked you about that you could relate

to us? I understand there is probably a myriad of details, but have

we overlooked any significant event, conversation that comes to

your mind?

A: Well, I have been—since this started, I have wanted to not

dive into any partisan issues, so I hope you will allow me to say

that. I think this is a very complicated issue, and I certainly have

spent a long time looking at from a number of angles what happened not only to us individually and to Ambassador Stevens, but

also from the perspective of what possibly could have been done

differently.

A: And I would stress that, as we touched on just before, that

I do think that this is probably a very—it has certainly been remarked upon before, but I think the security stance or arrangements for provisional facilities, that was clearly a big issue.

But the bigger issue here was one we started out talking about

with regards to what kinds of needs specifically Libya would require after the intervention to be a functioning and secure entity.

A: And I would like to say that I think Libya has had a range

of very specific needs that relate to its nature and the nature of

the regime that was deposed and that the U.S. Government—I

would hope that the U.S. Government would invest more resources

in understanding the situation as it existed before the revolution

and since.

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Q: Dr. Chorin, is there anything that you think that the U.S.

Government should have done in late 2011 and the first half of

2012 that could have prevented or at least mitigated the downward

spiral that Benghazi went into?

A: I believe that—and, of course, I wasn’t in a position to make

any decisions or have anything close to the full range of information. You know, I think—I have said many times before that I

thought that the intervention was the right thing to do at the time

and that it was a courageous moment in an otherwise very chaotic

environment, but that we, the United States Government, the

United States had an obligation to follow through in terms of the

support that was offered to the Libyans afterward.

A: And I think that there a lot of—a number of officials and

prominent analysts have said that the Libyans themselves didn’t

have the capacity to accept assistance, which to some degree I believe I agree with, but I think that there was a window right after

the cessation of the first wave of hostilities something could have

been done in terms of at least stabilizing Benghazi.

A: Another mistake that was made, and this one was largely by

the Special Transitional Council, was to move the operating capital

from Benghazi to Tripoli as soon as it did. I think there was opposition to that decision, but I think that that opened up the whole

range of other—it left Benghazi exposed and it created a situation

where one had a multitude of supplicants, essentially heavily

armed supplicants in Tripoli fighting over resources, and that was

the dynamic that evolved.

I think that if one looks at the report, that that was one of the

founding documents, that the ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ doctrine,

there is a whole talk there about what should be done after such

interventions of this kind. And some of the basic descriptions there,

I think, were very applicable to Libya.

A: And I think also that the situation in Libya is unique with

respect to Islamist presence there and its history with respect to,

say, Tunisia, Algeria, and particularly Egypt, and that those differences could have worked in the favor of the stabilization.

But the fact that there was—I am fully aware of all the difficulties that relate to providing assistance in that kind of a context and

what was going on regionally, but I strongly believe that regardless

of the Libyans’ own painful, traumatic previous experience under

Qadhafi and the underlying divisions—tribal, geographic, otherwise—I think the point is that hopefully something can be done

now to address this.

I have some ideas, I have expressed them, but I think some of

the degree of what we have been facing now and what happened

with Ambassador Stevens could have, obviously with hindsight,

been mitigated. But I don’t think that that veers against the initial

instinct as in I think it was a good—I think it was a positive decision to go in if we had the commitment to follow up.

Q: Alright. Well, Dr. Chorin, thank you on behalf of myself and

my colleague who is here. Thank you for your candid answers to

our questions today. I am going to turn it over to my minority colleagues, unless you would like to take a short break. Otherwise, I

think they are prepared to continue through.

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A: And please, just on behalf of everyone that is here and this

whole committee, we are very sorry for the loss of your friend, Ambassador Stevens, and please accept our condolences on that.

Would you like a short break or would you like to continue?

A: I am okay.

EXAMINATION BY MS. O’BRIEN

Q: So this is Erin O’Brien speaking for the minority staff. First

of all, just like our colleague expressed, we want to say thank you

for taking the time to talk with us today. We don’t have a lot of

questions from our side, but a few that we are going to take you

through.

So my first question, have you ever actually been to the Special

Mission Compound in Benghazi, actually seen it?

A: I believe we drove by at one point, but I have not been inside

or—I have not been inside.

Q: So your description about the consulate being lightly fortified,

you gave us a couple of reasons, you know, it sort of being an extrapolation from experience and other things. But just to make

sure that we understood, it wasn’t based on your firsthand experience with the compound?

A: No, it was not.

Q: All right. Thanks for clearing that up.

You spoke to us a bit about the day following the attack. And I

wanted to read a piece from a September 13th, 2012, New York

Times article that we had spoken of before. In that you wrote,

quote: ‘‘The morning after the attack on the consulate, my colleagues and I returned to the medical center, where we witnessed

an outpouring of sadness and, as one physician put it, shame,’’ end

quote.

Could you talk to us a little bit more about the reactions of the

Libyans that you encountered?

A: There was quite a strong sense of shock among many of the

people. Certainly the Benghazi Medical Center staff and the members of the community that we interacted with outside that, that

was fairly limited. But at the airport, it was at the airport or the

people who were not hospital staff who were present.

Q: At the hospital itself, were there a lot of people there? Were

there Libyans there after hearing the news? Or was this just in

your conversations with the hospital staff?

A: Well, there were a number of—mainly the hospital staff.

There were, as I mentioned before, people who had treated Stevens.

And there was high emotional content. The codirector of the hospital who was from a very prominent Benghazi family of activists,

one of whom was Salwa Bugaighis, who I believe had met with Stevens that day. These were all people who were on the same page

and knew Ambassador Stevens or had met with him several times

before that, probably multiple times before that.

Q: How would you describe their emotions, were they upset, were

they angry, was it a combination?

A: It was a combination.

Q: What was it they would be angry about?

A: I think at the time that this was going to be stage two in the

recognition that there were forces at work in Benghazi that were

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trying to destabilize the city and kick its supporters and partisans

out. This had been going on for several months at that point.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS

Q: This is Susanne Grooms. I had a couple of follow-ups from

Sharon’s exceptionally long question—no, exceptional questions.

I think you talked about a specific conversation that you had had

with Ambassador Stevens while he was in D.C. waiting to be confirmed and sort of a series of other conversations that you had with

him via email, right, but not speaking conversations. My impression was that you don’t recall the exact words of any of those conversations. Is that right?

A: I think it would be hard for me to try to remember the conversations verbatim or any exact wording.

Q: But the general gist it sounded to me of those conversations,

and sort of what I have from my notes is that Ambassador Stevens

was talking about the importance of and your shared interest in

keeping a unified Libya, secure Libya, stabilized Libya, and ensuring that the U.S. Government and other entities work together on

that front. Is that sort of an accurate summary?

A: Yes. There was a definite tone of frustration and feeling that

he was under a tremendous amount of pressure. That came

through very clearly.

Q: Who did Ambassador Stevens feel that he had pressure from?

A: I think he was quite balanced also in terms of expressing that

pressure was coming from—well, I think the major thing was that

he felt, and that it was very clear, that it had to do a lot with very

limited resources, and he felt that there should be much more resources. And he hoped that those would be forthcoming, and he felt

that part of his job would be to—and he hoped he could do this—

was to convince various arms of the U.S. Government to put more

resources into stabilization and disarmament and all the rest of it.

Those two words were I am sure in there.

Q: Was one of those arms of the U.S. Government the Congress?

A: Yes.

Q: That he was trying to build a case to get resources for the stabilization from?

A: Yes.

Q: In those conversations with you, it sounded to me like they

were—and tell me if this is a fair characterization—but they were

about how to improve the security and the overall stability of the

infrastructure of Libya itself and not so much about his own personal concerns about his own personal security going in and out of

Libya. Is that accurate?

A: Yes and no. I think he was clearly being careful about what

he was—to some degree. And I think there was a bit of a lower barrier because we had gone over the ground rules of what was going

to be—you know, this was in the context of a somewhat formalslash-informal interview, and I needed to clarify what the rules

were.

I mean, we had this prior relationship, connection, correspondence, et cetera, so a lot didn’t need to be said. I am trying to answer your question as best I can.

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He did not specifically talk about his personal security. He did

talk about the general climate and the fact that it was getting

worse, and it was clear from his body language and what he said

and how he said it that he was under pressure.

Q: I am sorry, under pressure from who, about what?

A: Under pressure as in it is a very complicated situation, it is

clearly a dangerous situation, and he doesn’t have all of the resources that he feels that he needs to make the difference that he

wanted to as a representative of the U.S. Government.

Q: I thought that is what we had discussed in terms of all of

Libya, right, like he wanted to improve Libya. I think specifically

my question is, did he say anything specifically about his own personal concerns about his personal safety?

A: Not directly.

Q: So he didn’t say, like, ‘‘I am trying to reach out——’’

A: He did express concerns about Benghazi.

Q: He expressed concerns about the security situation overall in

the city of Benghazi?

A: Yes.

Q: But not his personal security as in, ‘‘I am going to Benghazi

and I am afraid to go to Benghazi’’?

A: No.

Q: Did he tell you ever that he—I guess at this point he might

not have done it—but did he tell you that he was trying to get

more, like, DS agents to come support the facility in Benghazi or

the facility in Tripoli?

A: No. There was no reason for him to mention those details to

me. No. This was all in the context of my main questions, as well

as the personal, you know, ‘‘How are things going, what do you

think?’’ on a personal level.

But I was at the time focused very much on the dynamics in

Benghazi, and his view, as expressed then, was that Benghazi was

very important as to how things were going to unravel in a country

as a whole. There was no discussion specifically of his own individual security.

Q: Did he feel like remaining as a U.S. presence in Benghazi and

the things that he personally was going to go do in Libya, were

those his attempts to essentially help stabilize Libya and prevent

that sort of turning point where things could go badly?

A: I’m sorry, I didn’t hear the last part.

Q: I’m sorry. Is it sort of fair to understand that he understood

his going to Libya, the decision to extend the presence in Benghazi

after they opened up in Tripoli, but the decision to stay in

Benghazi as sort of him trying to prevent that point where Libya

could go badly and destabilize? Was he trying to have an impact

on the situation?

A: Whether he stated explicitly that or the thrust of the argument was that it was very important to shore up the—to have a

U.S. presence in Benghazi? In which conversation? In the conversation in Washington or subsequent conversations?

Q: In any of your conversations with him.

A: Yes. Well, he made it clear that he felt that it was very important to have a U.S. presence in Benghazi.

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Q: And the reason for that was in part this specific concern,

right, that he wanted to try and keep Benghazi from destabilizing

and he felt the U.S. presence in Benghazi would help that?

A: Yes.

Q: I think you have written about this a little bit, but did you

see the—was there essentially an impact in itself to the attack and

the death of Ambassador Stevens on the destabilization in

Benghazi, like, how would you describe—his death itself became

sort of a, to some extent, a turning point in the destabilization of

Benghazi, is that sort of an accurate understanding of your writing?

A: Yes. I think that was a critical, critical point, and I believe

that that was intentional, as well as being highly ironic and tragic.

Q: And did you—this is just on a slightly different subject—but

did you say that when you talked to the Italian Consul General

that he told you that he had been expecting Ambassador Stevens

on September 11th to come join him at the restaurant?

A: I actually tried to get him to clarify this at one point. He had

said that he was—that Stevens had a long meeting scheduled that

evening and was going to meet with him very early on the morning

of the 12th. Whether that meant one o’clock in the morning or five

o’clock in the morning, my understanding was that he was in the

restaurant at the time, and when the noise—when the commotion—you know, the sudden attack occurred, he went out and tried

to ascertain what was going on. And the second was the case of another person who was—there was at least one other person in the

vicinity who we talked to later who said the same thing.

Q: Did he indicate to you that his plan was to meet Ambassador

Stevens at the restaurant or at some other place?

A: That is what he told me, that he was waiting—that he was

expecting—he waiting in the restaurant for him.

Q: Okay. So he was sort of sitting in the restaurant waiting for

Ambassador Stevens to come. It is not clear to you how long he was

planning on waiting, maybe all night?

A: Right. That is possible. I don’t know why he—I can’t say any

more about that. But, yes, at the time of the attack, he was in the

restaurant waiting for Stevens.

BY MS. O’BRIEN

Q: What I am going to do now—and again, this is Erin O’Brien—

just to close out our questions for today, and this is something that

we do with everyone that we interview, as you know there are a

number of public allegations that have been made related to the attacks on Benghazi. What I am going to be asking for here is not

your opinion, but just whether or not you have firsthand information of these allegations. If you do not, we will simply just move

on to the next allegation. There are about a dozen or so of these.

I am reading from script. It usually takes us a couple of minutes.

So please just bear with us.

Alright. The first one. It has been alleged that Secretary of State

Clinton intentionally blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One Congressman has speculated that, quote, ‘‘Secretary

Clinton told Leon Panetta to stand down,’’ end quote, and this re1084
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sulted in the Defense Department not sending more assets to help

in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A: No.

Q: Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the

night of the attacks?

A: No.

Q: It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington

Post Fact Checker evaluated this claim and gave it four Pinnochios,

its highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A: No.

Q: Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day security

resources in Benghazi?

A: No.

Q: It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented or

fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya

in Spring 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya

in Spring 2011?

A: No.

Q: It has been alleged that the U.S. mission in Benghazi included

transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries. A bipartisan report issued to the House Permanent Select Committee

on Intelligence found that, quote, ‘‘The CIA was not collecting and

shipping arms from Libya to Syria,’’ end quote, and that they

found, quote, ‘‘no support for this allegation,’’ end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee’s bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping arms from Libya to Syria?

A: No.

Q: Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in Benghazi

were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya to Syria

or to any other foreign country? Hello?

A: Yes, actually, if you could define——

Q: I can reread it. Just let me know if you ever need me to

reread it.

A: Well, if you could—does that mean evidence that’s not in the

public domain?

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. Yes. So what we are looking for is personal knowledge, any personal knowledge from the things that

you——

Mr. CHORIN. I just wanted to clarify.

Ms. SACHSMAN GROOMS. Yes, not from reading a news report.

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BY MS. O’BRIEN

Q: Do you need me to reread the question?

A: Yes.

Q: Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in Benghazi

were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya to Syria

or to any other foreign country?

A: No.

Q: A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound,

and there have been a number of allegations about the cause of

and the appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not

ordered to stand down, but that instead there were tactical disagreements on the ground over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House Intelligence Committee’s finding that there was no stand-down order to

CIA personnel?

A: No.

Q: Putting aside whether you personally agree with the decision

to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do you have

any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind the

temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed the

Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A: No.

Q: A concern has been raised by one individual that in the course

of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that

production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that

were provided to the ARB?

A: No.

Q: Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or

scrub damaging documents from the materials that were provided

to the ARB?

A: No.

Q: Let me ask these questions also for documents that were provided to Congress.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that

were provided to Congress?

A: No.

Q: It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons and that he misrepresented his actions when he

told Congress that the CIA, quote, ‘‘faithfully performed our duties

in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and nonpartisanship,’’ end quote.

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell

gave false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about

the Benghazi talking points?

A: No.

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Q: Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A: No.

Q: It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk

shows about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday

talk shows?

A: No.

Q: It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was, quote, ‘‘virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief,’’ end quote,

on the night of the attacks and that he was, quote, ‘‘missing in action,’’ end quote.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing

in action on the night of the attacks?

A: No.

Q: It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel at

Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considering

flying on the second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors to stand down, meaning to cease all operations. Military officials have stated that those four individuals were instead ordered

to remain in place in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance in their current location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that, quote, ‘‘There was no stand-down order

issued to the U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join

the fight in Benghazi,’’ end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the

House Armed Services Committee that, quote, ‘‘There was no

stand-down order issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who

sought to join the fight in Benghazi,’’ end quote?

A: No.

Q: All right. This is our last one. We are almost done.

It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy assets on

the night of the attacks that would have saved lives. However,

former Republican Congressman Howard ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon, the

former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review of the attacks, after which he stated, quote, ‘‘Given

where the troops were, how quickly the thing all happened, and

how quickly it dissipated, we probably couldn’t have done more

than we did,’’ end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon’s

conclusion?

A: No.

Q: Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives, but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided

not to deploy?

A: No.

Q: Okay. And with that, we are finished, and I believe our other

colleagues are finished as well.

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Ms. JACKSON. We are finished.

Again, Dr. Chorin, thank you very much for your time. It is, I

believe, after 8:00 p.m. your time in London. Is that correct?

Mr. CHORIN. After 9:00.

Ms. JACKSON. After 9:00 p.m.? It has been two hours we have

been doing this. But, again, thank you very much.

Mr. EVERS. This is Austin Evers from the State Department.

Ethan, if you would like to call, feel free, or you are absolutely free

to take the rest of the night off.

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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1089

INTERVIEW OF

C–17 PILOT

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MARCH 16, 2016
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

PHILIP G. KIKO, Staff Director and General Counsel

CRAIG MISSAKIAN, Deputy Chief Counsel

MAC TOLAR, Senior Counsel

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director/General Counsel

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel

SHANNON GREEN, Minority Counsel

LAURA RAUCH, Minority Senior Professional Staff

FOR ***

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

EDWARD RICHARDS

WILLIAM A. HUDSON, JR.

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Mr. Tolar. This is the transcribed interview of Eric (REDACTED)

conducted by the House Select Committee on Benghazi. This interview

is being conducted voluntarily as part of the committee's investigation

into the attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and

related matters pursuant to House Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress

and House Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

Would the witness, please, state his full name for the record.

Mr. (REDACTED)

Mr. Tolar. Sir, the committee appreciates your attendance here

today.

My name is Mac Tolar, and with the committee's majority staff.

At this point, I would like to ask everyone in the room to introduce

themselves, starting with Sheria to my left.

Ms. Clarke. Sheria Clarke.

Ms. Green. I'm Shannon Green with the minority staff.

Ms. Rauch. Laura Rauch with the minority staff.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny, minority staff.

Mr. Richards. Ed Richards, DOD, Office of General Counsel.

Mr. Hudson. Bill Hudson, DOD, Office of the General Counsel.

Mr. Missakian. Craig Missakian, majority staff.

Mr. Tolar. And, again, I briefly talked about this before, but

just to remind you, what's going to happen today is we're going to have

rounds of question. Each round will last one hour. The majority staff

will start. They'll ask questions for an hour. At that point, we'll

stop for a minute. The minority staff will have an opportunity to do

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the same thing. They may decide to waive and let us continue on.

That's completely their call. And we'll basically do hour rounds until

everybody's exhausted all their questions. Does that make sense.

Mr. (REDACTED). Or I'm exhausted.

Mr. Tolar. There you go. Well, I'm sure that won't happen.

As you could see, we've got a court reporter. Chantal is going

to be taking down everything we say and do make a written record of

this conversation. Accordingly, I would ask that you give verbal

responses to all questions such as yes or no as opposed to nods of the

head, like you just did.

Mr. (REDACTED) Okay.

Mr. Tolar. Yes or no?

Mr. (REDACTED). Yes, sir.

Mr. Tolar. Thank you. No "sir." Yes. Thank you.

I'm also going to ask Chantal to jump in if any case -- at any

time hears a nonverbal response. She's probably going to kick me under

the table. I would just assume avoid that if we can.

Mr. (REDACTED). Okay.

Mr. Tolar. No "okays." Can't do "okay."

Mr. (REDACTED). Oh, can't do "okay."

Ms. Tolar. No. Yes or no -- well, if you don't mind.

Mr. (REDACTED). Yes.

Mr. Tolar. Thank you.

Mr. (REDACTED). All right.

Mr. Tolar. Do you understand all this?

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Ms. (REDACTED). Yes.

Mr. Tolar. Perfect.

Mr. Hudson. May I just -- and so you received his clearances?

So we're at secret level? Is that right?

Mr. Tolar. I will get to that.

Mr. Hudson. Okay.

Mr. Tolar. Thanks.

Also, we should try to avoid to talk over each other so it's easier

to get a clear record. I have a problem with that sometimes, and I

apologize in advance, so just bear with me. If you will do the same,

I appreciate it.

Mr. (REDACTED). Yes.

Mr. Tolar. Perfect.

To the best of your recollection, please give us answers to any

questions that are asked of you. If you are not sure of an answer,

you can't remember, just say so, and that's okay. If you happen to

know of someone who could provide the answer or a better response, if

you would identify that, that would be appreciated.

Mr. (REDACTED). Yes.

Mr. Tolar. You are required to answer questions from Congress

truthfully. Do you understand that?

Mr. (REDACTED). Yes.

Mr. Tolar. This also applies to questions posed by congressional

staff in an interview. Do you understand this?

Mr. (REDACTED). Yes.

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Mr. Tolar. Witnesses that knowingly provide false testimony

could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury and/or making

false statements. Do you understand this?

Mr. (REDACTED). Yes.

Mr. Tolar. Is there any reason why you are unable to provide

truthful answers to today's questions?

Mr. (REDACTED). No.

Mr. Tolar. This interview is being conducted at the secret

level. If you hear a question or need to respond that might exceed

that level, please identify that, and we'll go off the record and talk

about it. Make sense?

Mr. (REDACTED). Yes.

Mr. Tolar. That's all I've got in terms of the preamble. Any

questions with that regard?

Mr. (REDACTED). No.

Mr. Tolar. Do y'all have anything?

Mr. Kenny. I want to thank the witnesses for coming in. Look

forward to your testimony today.

Mr. Tolar. Perfect.

All right. The clock now reads -- I've got 11:05. Let's go on

the record with the first hour of questions, please.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Sir, if you would, would you just walk me through your

military background?

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A I was in for 22 years, retired approximately 2 years ago,

started out as a maintenance officer for the first couple of years,

and started flying for the last 20 years of my career.

Q When did you retire?

A March 1st, 2 years ago.

Q That would have been 2014?

A Yeah.

Q And what branch are you in?

A I was in the Air Force.

Q Was that a -- were you active duty at that time?

A The last 12 years I was a reservist, and that was -- 728

airlift squadron in McChord.

Q What was your final rank?

A Major.

Q What are you qualified to fly?

A What was I qualified at the time?

Q At the time.

A At the time, C-17.

Q And at the time, by that I mean at the time of September

2012.

A Yes, C-17.

Q Okay. Prior to that, had you been qualified to fly other

planes -- other frames?

A Yes.

Q Which ones?

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A AWACS, E-3, E-3, T-37, I was an instructor. The T-37 is

a primary trainer, so I was an instructor on that, and then the C-17.

Q All right. Have you ever flown C-130?

A No.

Q If you will walk me through your civilian employment,

please. Where are you currently employed?

A JetBlue.

Q What do you do for those guys?

A I'm a captain for JetBlue.

Q Prior to today, have you ever been questioned about events

surrounding Benghazi and/or DOD's response of those events? For

example, has a House -- or have you ever testified or answered questions

before a House or Senate committee?

A No.

Q Are you familiar with the Accountability Review Board, the

ARB?

A I am. I've heard about it. I didn't read it.

Q Did they question you?

A No.

Q Have you discussed these events, the events surrounding

Benghazi, with anyone else?

A Parents, friends, stuff like that.

Q Have you ever given any interviews?

A Yes.

Q With who?

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A Brett Baier.

Q What was the impetus for that interview?

A What was the impetus?

Q Yeah. How did y'all connect?

A I connected -- I saw a piece that he had done and sent him

an email that said, Hey, I flew the mission on the ground. And so he

contacted -- he actually called me the next day.

Q Okay.

A And so we talked about it. It was a 20-minute interview

or something like that.

Q All right.

A I spent -- kind of the reason why I know some of this, the

background stuff, is because I spent the next 3 days with those guys.

Q Sure.

A After we got back to Ramstein, they kind of adopted me, I

guess you could say. So they told me a lot about what happened.

Q Sure. We'll get to all that.

A Okay. All right.

Q Well, let's just jump ahead. I want to talk to you about

September 11th at this point. Would you, please, tell me where you

were stationed at that time?

A I was temporary duty at Ramstein Air Base in Germany.

Q Temporary from where?

A From to McChord Air Force Base.

Q Washington?

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A Yes.

Q And what was your assignment there at Ramstein?

A We were there for 45 days to solely do, basically, sit on

alert and do high-priority missions.

Q When you say "we," who do you mean?

A So I had a crew of two other pilots and two load masters.

Q Does that constitute a single crew for a C-17?

A It constitutes -- okay. So a normal C-17 complement is two

pilots, two load masters. With the extra pilot, it allows us to go

up to a 26-hour duty day as opposed to an 18-hour duty day. So it just

gives us that extension so we can go. And that was during Iraq and

Afghanistan. Our normal complement was three pilots, two load

masters, so we could go off to a 26-hour duty day.

Q All right. So were you the only reserve team, so to speak,

that was augmenting -- who was the unit you were augmenting, first of

all?

A So what -- as reservists, we are all trying to earn active

duty points towards our active duty retirement. So we actually took

an active duty mission as reservists, went on active duty ourselves.

So I think at the time it was like the fourth airlift squadron was the

active duty squadron that handed us this mission to go over there. We

actually did 45 days, came home for a couple weeks, and went back out

for 45 days.

Q And the fourth airlift squadron is --

A Also McChord.

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Q Okay. And are y'all under the command of USAFE?

A No, had nothing to do with USAFE. This was all for CENTCOM.

We had absolutely nothing to do with USAFE over there.

Q Who did you report to?

A So, this was -- it was kind of this weird thing, where we

actually reported to TACC, which is tactical air command and control.

They are in St. Louis. So we were tasked to them. They run all the

airlift worldwide, and they would send us on missions. We had nothing

to do with McChord, just kind of like had nothing to do with us over

there.

Q Did you deploy with an aircraft or were you just following

an aircraft there?

A We deployed with an aircraft. Actually, we flew over

there -- no. We did not deploy with an aircraft. Because we flew over

commercial, but there was a constant cycle of airplanes, and when we

were sitting alert, we had an aircraft assigned to us.

Q And --

A When we were actually -- you know, we could sit, what's

called Bravo, so we had a one-hour alert sequence. And when we were

sitting Bravo, we had an airplane assigned us to on the ramp ready to

go.

Q On September 11th, what was your alert status?

A We were -- we were sitting alert. We had been sitting alert

for 20 hours already, because we had actually been -- sat in the Bravo,

because there was a detainee in Guantanamo that had died, and he was

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being transported, and we were supposed to fly him into Yemen. So we

were sitting on alert that morning.

Q The morning of the 11th?

A Yes. We -- we had been going for 20-plus hours already.

But at -- at that point, when we got the call, we were sitting Bravo

and sitting on alert. They could -- they could have us sit on Bravo

for up to 3 days straight, like 36 hours, and we have 12 hours rest,

and then they could put us back into Bravo.

Q So September 11, the morning prior to the attack that

evening, you're in Bravo status at Ramstein, you've got a plane assigned

to you, C-17. Is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you recall the tail number for that aircraft?

A I could tell you what it is.

Q All right.

A 10190.

Q 10190? That's the tail number for the C-17 aircraft you

had assigned to you that morning?

A Yes, sir.

Mr. Kenny. Can I interrupt for a minute. It appears to us the

witness has just referred to a document. Can you just have him identify

what the document is.

Mr. (REDACTED). So this is, we would have a mission cut. That's

basically what they would hand me on the way out the door, and so this

is basically just the mission cut from that morning. A lot of

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high-priority ones, I would, you know, keep that for my own record in

case I had to refer back to it, especially if they had an emergency

or something that happened, I could refer back to it. So it basically

has, you know, it has tail number, my name on it, take off and landing

times, stuff like that.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Is that mission cut solely for your mission, or is it for

all missions that morning?

A This is just for my mission.

Q Okay.

A Each one had an individual. It's a Word document, and

basically, what I could do is just download it from the computer and

it had, you know, basically the whole -- it's basically mission

history.

Q Are mission cuts retained, as far as you know?

A As far as I know, you can go back as far as you want and

get them.

Q And how do you go about doing that?

A TACC would keep all that. Actually, TRANSCOM, I think, is

the one that owns the server that that stuff is on.

Q All right. So when you're -- morning of September 11th,

you are on Bravo alert status. What are you doing?

A The morning -- on September 11th?

Q You are hanging out in the squad bay, or where are you?

A Now, when we took Bravo alert, we were in a hotel room. So

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it's kind of like torture, you basically go between your hotel room,

food and the gym, because you are on the 1-hour hook. So you stay in

the hotel. When they call you, you go in. So --

Q You've got 1 hour from the time you are called to get back

to the base?

A No. I've got 1 hour to be in, getting my briefing ready

to go fly.

Q You have to be wheels up in 1 hour?

A No, I have to be -- so the way it worked with the C-17,

roughly, is we would have a (REDACTED) alert sequence. That's what

we did during the war. I mean, obviously, we could get the airplane

off the ground in an hour if we need to. But the normal sequence, if

you just did everything normal, normal for planning was an hour to get

in, and (REDACTED) to get wheels in the well. So with -- with Bravo

alert, I had to be in, getting my intel brief in an hour.

Q And then would you still need (REDACTED) to get wheels in

the well?

A No. In fact, we didn't take (REDACTED) that morning.

Q Okay.

A I think we were off the ground in 2.5 hours, total.

Honestly, the only thing that prevented us from taking off earlier was

when -- when I got the call for -- to, you know, to go on the mission,

I get in, and I found out that they don't have enough gas on the airplane,

so we had to put fuel on the airplane, and that was because they didn't

even have diplomatic clearance to fly into Libya yet. In fact, I took

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off illegally as far as a pilot stand -- from a pilot point of view,

I should not have even taken off unless I got diplomatic clearance to

fly into a country. But we made a determination to take off, hold

outside of Libya until we got the diplomatic clearance, and then we

would be cleared in. Now, it ended up that 30 minutes out from the

border, we got clearance to fly into Libya. The point being that I

needed enough gas to go there and hold until I got that diplomatic

clearance because I didn't know how long that was going to be.

Q Sure.

A So I didn't have enough gas. I had no aircraft security.

So I requested what are called Ravens to accompany us, and they -- so

they – (REDACTED) they've got to be at the airplane. They are Air

Force's version of aircraft security. They are trained in

hand-to-hand combat. Kind of -- I mean, they have guns, but that's

not their primary role, but they are there for aircraft security. So

they did not have Ravens assigned to us. So no gas, no Ravens. I

quickly read over the report on Benghazi -- or Tripoli, because nobody,

obviously, no military aircraft had been in there any time soon. But

I read the CIA report at the time quickly, and it said, Make sure you

go with cash. Okay. So now I've got to come up with $30,000 cash in

the next hour. So there is -- there was all these things that suddenly

I had to get. If all those things would have been laid out before we

got there, an hour we would have been off the ground. But at that

point -- and I'll give you this background, only because I have a good

friend that worked in TACC.

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Q Sure.

A It be went from, Hey, we were going to send them to Benghazi,

to now it's going to be a medevac, and we need to get a medevac team,

you know -- so they changed the mission at some point, and they didn't

have all these things laid out when I showed up.

Q Well, slow down, let me back up. We'll get to all that.

A Okay. Am I going too fast?

Q No. It's the 11th, you are in the hotel, you are

there -- you have been on Bravo status, you are there through the day,

through the afternoon, that evening, the event happens in Benghazi --

A Right. We were sleeping that night.

Q So you were asleep at the time?

A Yeah.

Q Do you recall when you first heard about the attacks in

Benghazi?

A It was that morning. I think it was --

Q The attack happened -- just for the record -- in case you

don't recall, the attack happened the 11th in the evening?

A The brief night. Right.

Q About 9:40 in the evening. And when did you find out about

it?

A So about 8 or 9 the next morning is when I got a call from

TACC, and he said get in here as quick as you can, turn on CNN. So

that would have been right around 8:15, 9:15, whenever we got alerted.

Q And who would have called you from TACC?

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A Who -- in this case, it was a – (REDACTED) was the guy that

had our mission, but it could have been anybody, whoever the senior

was or the person that planned the mission would call us and alert us.

Q But in this case, it was (REDACTED)

A I believe [(REDACTED was the one that called, yes.

Q What's his rank?

A He was a lieutenant colonel, I think, he retired as.

Q And he called and said, go turn on the TV?

A He said, turn on the TV, get in as quick as you can.

Q And then get in as quick as you can?

A Uh-huh.

Q So he directed you to go to base?

A Well, we were on base. The hotel is right on base.

Q Okay.

A I could be -- we could walk to the airplane in 5 minutes.

Q Got you.

A Yeah.

Q All right. So now that morning you report to the hangar,

the squadron?

A We have basically -- they have a contingency office set up

with the intelligence cell, you know, because we were running all of

our missions for Iraq and Afghanistan through there for the last 12,

13 years. So it was a -- we would go into one room, get our intel and

tactics briefing. We would get our mission package from the office

next door, and that's basically -- and then there was supporting

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agencies around that, but --

Q Who were you reporting to that morning after you get the

call from TACC?

A To the intel and tactics office. I -- we don't actually

report to anyone.

Q Right.

A We show up. The intel officers brief us.

Q Check.

A Give us a briefing. Tactics officers talks about, you

know, threats that they can see, and then they hand me my mission package

and we walk to the jet.

Q Do you recall at what time you completed your briefings,

were ready to walk to the jet?

A I would say by the time we were alerted and got in, out the

door, I actually sent -- because there were all these things that

weren't done, I sent my crew out to start getting the airplane ready

to we can get out quicker and I stayed in and handled all the logistics.

I -- I would say they were out to the jet within an hour after

the call.

Q Typically -- are those aircrafts, typically, supposed to

be prepared to go? Was it not like in the ready state that it should

have been?

A No. It was -- it was -- it's not like alpha alert where

the airplane's ready to throw the switches and the engine starts. It

wasn't in that status. It was in Bravo status, so maintenance-wise,

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everything's ready to go. The cover's are pulled, the airplane is

ready for the crew; we do a walk-around, we load the flight plan, and

we start the engines and go. So, realistically, as soon as you get

out to the airplane, I mean, if all the maintenance is done and you're

all ready to go, it takes less than 30 minutes to get off the ground.

Q Okay.

A So it because all the other logistics that go on with

launching an airplane.

Q Based on your intel brief or threat brief, I know you talked

about you wanted Ravens added. Did you have any kind of

countermeasures on the aircraft already loaded or did you request them?

Was that an issue?

A (REDACTED)

Q Don't worry about it.

A (REDACTED)

Q Like chase and flares, that kind of thing?

A (REDACTED)

Q Sure. All right.

A (REDACTED)

Q Okay.

A (REDACTED)

Q Check. All right. So you go through your briefings, you

have your crew out there, finished prepping the plane; do you recall

what time you got out there and got in the seat?

A I think it was by the time we've got everything squared away,

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I was probably another half hour before I got out of there -- got out

there.

Q Between 10 and 11, you think?

A Yeah. I mean, you know, if you go based upon the, you know,

takeoff timeline here, I was probably out there -- because I know

the -- I would say by 11:00Z I was probably out there. So that would

have been 12:00 local.

Q What time did you take off?

A We took off at 12:14Z, which September, I don't think the

time changed, so you are an hour ahead of Zulu, so that's 1:00, right,

that time of year? I think you're plus 1 during the summer.

Q We'll flesh that out. But -- so you got out to the plane,

you had to get gas. How long did it take to do that?

A It was fueled by the time I got out there.

Q Yeah.

A That's why --

Q And -- and the Ravens -- by the time you got out there, the

Ravens were --

A They showed up pretty close to around the time that I did.

Q And talk about the mission itself. Were -- when you

reported, were you told then specifically that you were going to go

to Libya?

A Yes. Yeah, we knew where we were going.

Q And that didn't change?

A No. We've just had no -- we didn't know anything about the

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location. I mean, our intel brief was --

Q Sure.

A -- nonexistent.

Q Did they -- were there any discussion of you going to

Benghazi by Tripoli?

A No. It was -- by the time we got in there, it was Tripoli.

Q And, again, tell me what they told you that your mission

was going to be?

A To -- they didn't know whether Christopher Stevens was dead

or alive at that point. They didn't know how many HRs there would be,

and they didn't know how many walk-ons there would be. So they

basically had no idea what was going on on the ground there by the time

we got called. In fact, I was getting calls the whole way down saying,

we still don't know what's happening on the ground. I called the

defense attache, and a master -- master chief, tried to find out

information, and he just said, sir, sir, I need to go, and then hung

up the phone.

Q Where was the defense attache located?

A In Tripoli. We were being told at the time that we were

going to have to send our air medical folks down to downtown Tripoli

and get the bodies and the casualties or the injured. I was like, well

how are we going to get down there. So we -- we always travel with

our clothes. So the grand plan was to send two Ravens with our medical

folks, somehow get vehicles, go down in civilian clothes and -- and

get all these folks. So that's why I was calling the ground trying

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to go, is this really what we're going to have to do, (REDACTED)

Q And --

A So we didn't know a lot. Honestly, when we took off, I was

getting calls asking me if I knew anything. I was calling -- we have

a satellite phone on the airplane. At that point, we didn't have a

real clear picture of what was going on.

Q And lay out, again, exactly who was on your team that day,

who was on that plane?

A So we ultimately had three pilots, including myself, two

load masters, the air medical evacuation team, the doctors and nurses.

Q How many people does that constitute?

A You know, I'm thinking it was like 10 or 12 people. That's

pretty big. I mean, they set up stretchers. I don't know if you've

ever seen the inside of an airplane that's set up for air medical

evacuation, but they've got bed, stretchers, heart machines, all that

kind of stuff. Three Ravens. We had mortuary affairs folks on the

airplane, and -- oh, the other thing that they had not got me was a

maintainer, so that was another guy I had to get last minute within,

you know, before we took off was a maintenance person, because I didn't

want to get a C-17 stuck down in Tripoli. So --

Q All right. So y'all are loaded up, and at the time you took

off, wheels up, you indicated you didn't have diplomatic

clearance -- diplomatic clearance then?

A Yeah.

Q And why is that a problem for you?

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A Even as an airline pilot, you don't take off if you've got

all the stuff to be able to reach your destination. So legally, I

shouldn't have taken off. They said, it's your call, and I said, we'll

go. Because ultimately, what's going to happen is I get to the Libyan

border, and I've got to hold until it get's passed, if it doesn't, I

go to Sigonella, which is 20 minutes away and land there, so --

Q Who were you talking to whether or not diplomatic clearance

has been passed?

A The folks at TACC. They are the ones that passed it to me.

Q Once you were in the plane, did you have to wait for an order

from somebody to take off, or could you take off as soon as you were

ready?

A I had to get what is called positive alert. So I had to

call TACC -- I mean, they have -- really, they had given us positive

alert because they said get off the ground as soon as you can. But

I gave them a quick call, said, we're going. They said, okay. So --

Q Did the requirement for the medical staff on board, did that

delay y'all at all in terms of your ability to take I don't have?

A It takes awhile to set up, yes.

Q I mean, you were getting your briefings inside, and you

couldn't leave until that was done. So the fact that they were doing

all these other things simultaneously, did any of that delay your

ability to take off?

A Yeah, because the air medical folks didn't show up till,

I would say after my guys got out there. I mean that took a full hour

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to set that up.

Q Okay. Did -- was there any contemplation about you going

to Rota, Spain or to Croatia?

A I found out, after the fact, that there was discussion about

that. I mean, you know, we had been out there for 2 months already,

and we knew, you know, where all the players were. But there's no

discussion with me as to, you know, going to Sigonella, getting a FAST

team or anything like that.

Q Had you flown from Rota before from Ramstein?

A Oh, lots of times.

Q How long does it take to get to Rota, Spain from Ramstein?

A Rota's a long ways away. I mean, that's 5 hours.

Rota's -- yeah, because you've got to go down to the med to get to Rota.

I would a say at least 4 or 5 hours.

Q Okay.

A Yeah.

Q If you were picking up a FAST team, they have been –

(REDACTED) what other time would be required before you could take off

again?

A Nothing, we do an engine running offload.

Q Okay.

A So we'd put the engines in idle reverse and they get on.

Q Had you ever flown to Croatia from Ramstein?

A 30 minutes. No, Croatia, if it's -- Croatia, it's

probably -- it's got to be less than 2 hours, right around 2 hours.

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I mean, I'd have to look at the air miles. Let's see, Benghazi -- or

Tripoli was 2 hours and 39 minutes. So I'm -- I'm guessing Croatia,

you're probably talking at less than 2 hours.

Q You said Tripoli was 2 hours and 39 minutes. Is that at

your normal speed? Can you accelerate?

A We went quick.

Q You went quick?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Talk to me about --

A I mean, if somebody can tell me the air distance to Croatia,

I mean, we're doing 500 knots, so whatever that turns out to be.

Q Okay.

A And that's assuming you've got diplomatic clearances for

over flight, and depends what brief you've got to take.

Q Barring those issues, but landing in Croatia, assume you've

got all the clearances and whatnot, any other complications or

challenges to landing there and taking off again?

A None.

Q Obviously, C-17 cannot land on a bigger airstrip than --

A Oh, no.

Q -- than the C-130?

A No, the C-17 can land on -- I mean, that's why the C-17 was

built. We can land on dirt --

Q Okay.

A -- we can land on as short a runway as a C-130 can.

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Q On September 12th, did you -- you didn't have a need for

crew rest to be waived, but was that ever discussed with you?

A No, because we were in Bravo already. So there was

no -- from what TACC had -- you know, the guys that I've talked to after

the fact, they said we were the only crew in the entire European theater

that was legal to fly that day.

Q What does that mean?

A That means we are the only one in Bravo. Everybody knew

we were sitting Bravo. We were there only to do high-visibility,

high-priority missions. So on that morning and that night, we were

the only crew that was legal to fly with air medical folks, with

everybody, you know. Because they even looked at Al Udeid, and there

was nobody even legal to fly with air medical teams or anything like

that at Al Udeid. So we were, literally, the only crew available and

legal to fly.

Q And who informed you of this?

A (REDACTED) told me the same thing, yeah.

Q Other than talking to TACC and after getting your briefs,

were you communicating with anybody else that day? Other than the

defense attache, did you talk to anybody else?

A Tons. It was almost constant phone calls all the way down

and all the way back.

Q And what are the nature of those discussions?

A Do you know what's happening on the ground? Have you talked

to anyone?

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I had to talk to TACC because the airfield that was not legal for

me to take off at night, because there were some towers at either end

of the runway --

Q In Tripoli?

A In Tripoli.

Q Okay.

A -- so I had to get three-star general approval to take off

with my vision goggles going out of there, questions about dip

clearances. There was -- it was like constant phone calls all the way

down, all the way back. On the way back, I had a lot of medical folks

calling, saying, who do you have on board? Who are the HRs?

Q What is HR?

A Human remains.

What's the status of your wounded? So I had to have my medical

guys talk to people that were calling. There's a lot of confusion.

Q So you landed in Ramstein -- in Tripoli. Do you recall what

time you landed?

A Yeah. So that was 1453 Zulu. And, honestly, I mean, I'm

guessing there's plus 1 too there, but -- I don't remember exactly.

Q So you landed in Tripoli. What's going on now?

A So we land -- we're on the ground. We get a tactical

arrival going on there. When we had our intel brief before we left,

it was very -- they didn't have a lot. I mean, nobody knew a lot about

Tripoli at the time. (REDACTED) So we did the tactical approach.

And the other thing is we also knew there was 20,000 shoulder-launched

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missiles that disappeared after the fall of Libya.

So we did a tactical approach going in there, landed, took some

time for us to get over to the parking area. And then the parking area

that they put us into was kind of a little bit uncomfortable, I guess

you could say. It was a small pad at the end of the terminal. There

was a A-320 Airbus right on the corner, and we kind of squeezed into

the side of this pad with nowheres to go and not very much room to go

if we needed to get out of there.

And there was probably 100- to 150-plus people dressed in military

uniform that were not ours. So we all kind of looked at each other

and went, what is this? The airplane just kind of gets surrounded?

So I said, okay. I'm going to put on a bulletproof vest. I'm not going

to put on a helmet. I'm not going to put on a gun. And I put the Ravens

in the back door, and I said, we're going to lower the door, and I'll

walk off, and we'll see what happens. And if something happens, then

go.

Q And who greeted you?

A So I walked into this crowd of folks with uniform,

obviously, Libyan, and I'm kind of looking around for somebody

friendly, because no one's really coming at me. And then it was almost

like the seas parted, and I saw some guys with baseball caps, beards,

cargo pants, you know, obviously -- I mean, they are either SEALS, SF,

or State Department or CIA. So friendly looking guys. He kind of

walks toward me in the middle of the ramp. And I said, who are these

guys? And he said, this is the local militia; they own the airfield.

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While this is going on, my pilot, copilot are upstairs. Engines

are still running, and they see a Dodson pickup truck with a 50-caliber

strapped onto the back, speeding across the airfield at us. I didn't

know this was going on, but he showed up after the fact. I've got

pictures that the guy's sitting right there with the 50-caliber machine

gun.

So I talk to the DAO. My first question was we were told --

Q What's the DAO?

A Sorry. The defense attache.

Q Okay. Do you recall his name?

A I don't. And we were talking earlier. I thought it was

an Air Force lieutenant colonel. I'm almost sure, because it was a

Navy chief that I had talked to on the satellite phone. This was, I

thought, an Air Force lieutenant colonel.

I said, I was told that we have to send our folks down to go get

the bodies. And he goes, no, we're bringing them here. I was like,

okay. That's good.

Within about 3 to 5 minutes later, I'd say about 5 minutes later,

all of a sudden, these five guys with business suits are coming towards

me. And I said, who is this? He said, that is the Prime Minister of

Libya. He comes walking up to me. He grabs both of my hands and starts

apologizing.

From now, it was a matter of waiting for everybody to show up to

the airport, the HRs, the walk-on folks. We were told there were going

to be 33 walk-ons. So it was a -- it was about a 45-minute wait until

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everybody started showing up.

Q Do you know where they were coming from?

A I was told from the hospital in downtown Tripoli. That's

where they -- I mean, ambulance is showing up. We're showing up with

ours and --

Q Don't --

A Don't use names?

Q Please.

A Okay. There were two ambulances that showed up with guys

that were injured. One guy critically, and then we were told -- he

told me we were going to have 33 walk-ons and then the four HRs.

Q How long were you on the ground before you prepared to

launch, approximately?

A 2 hours and 24 minutes we were on the ground.

Q Okay.

A To get out of there was -- I know at one point, the defense

attache officer got a phone call, got off the phone and looked at me

and said, you guys need to go now. What I found out was an opposing

militia was gathering outside the airfield and the whole thing was being

watched by a drone. I found that out after the fact. And I think

somebody tipped him off that there was something going outside the

compound, and that's why we needed to go.

Q And did you go?

A Oh, yeah. We started -- in fact, my load master was trying

to get all the Libyans out of the way and start the engines, and finally,

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we just had to start the engines, and they removed themselves. They

didn't want to move.

Q Let's talk about the drone for a minute, please.

A Okay.

Q What did you subsequently learn about the drone?

A The biggest thing I found out the next day -- I mean, I found

out after we took off. I'll go through this quickly.

Q Sure.

A I don't want to take up --

Q No, you are good.

A There were a lot of guys running around taking pictures.

A lot of guys running around taking pictures.

Q Locals or U.S. persons?

A Libyans.

Q Okay.

A So I was going to make sure that Al Jazeera was not going

to get a picture of one of the four HRs on a stretcher with a sheet

over him on the news the next day. So I came up with a plan to put

a bunch of Suburbans around the back of the airplane. When the

ambulances came up, or when the HRs came in a cube truck, we put them

in there, put Suburbans in front, and I got the entire embassy staff

to make a wall going up the back of the ramp. And I told them, nobody

gets pictures. And the -- the militia was running around with their

cell phones up to their ear going like this trying to take pictures,

and we would basically just stand in front of them and block them.

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After we took off, I'm talking to one of the guys on the satellite

phone, and he goes, so why did you guys put all the Suburbans --

Q Who is "one of the guys"?

A It was, I think a full bird colonel that called me.

Q From -- called you from where?

A On the sat phones from TACC.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A Yeah. Sorry. He called and said, why did you guys put all

the Suburbans around? What was going on? And I went, wait a sec, how

did you know that? You are back in St. Louis. And he said -- I think

he referred to it as, you were being watched by everybody and God. And

I said, so you guys were -- had a UAV feed, and he goes, yeah, and

everybody was watching it.

I know for a fact one of my buddies was up at TACC and they had

it on a big screen TV. They were watching the whole thing.

Q The predator feed?

A Right.

Q Go ahead.

A So the big thing from that is the next day, the intel -- one

of the intel folks takes me in --

Q Intel folks where?

A This is back at Ramstein, after we got back.

Q Sure.

A The next day she takes me in, and she said, did you know

that they tried to fire a missile at you? And I said, No. (REDACTED)

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Q Have what?

A (REDACTED)

Q Spell that.

A (REDACTED)

Now, they had a lot of bad missiles at the time, so who knows what

that could have been, but they tried to shoot us at the end of the runway.

And that's one of the biggest things I found out from the UAV feed the

next day.

Q Do you happen to know where those drone pilots -- where the

actual pilots were physically located?

A Sure.

Q Where?

A (REDACTED)

Q How do you know that?

A The way that UAV works is you have folks --

Q You are talking about a predator specifically?

A (REDACTED)

(REDACTED)

Q Shoot the what?

A (REDACTED)

Q Are you aware that there were actually two Predators used

that night?

A Yes. Well, that night, I've heard after the fact. I know

that one was being used when I was on the ground, and I didn't -- I

didn't know that until after the fact.

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Q Do you know the pilots -- do you happen to know the pilots

personally or know who they are?

A I do not.

Q Do you know who they are?

A I do not know who they are.

Q Do you happen to know --

A That's easy enough to find out, though.

Q How? How can you find out?

A (REDACTED)

Q What -- what are the units that flew those missions?

A (REDACTED)

Q Perfect. Thank you. So let's talk about TACC for a

minute, please. Tell me, again, what the TACC is.

A Tactical air command and control, I think is what it was.

Q And who do they fall underneath in terms of command?

A TRANSCOM.

Q Are they part of the AMC?

A Yes.

Q And AMC is underneath TRANSCOM?

A Yes.

Q And you indicated that someone at TACC told you they had

the Predator feed pulled up and watched the whole thing live?

A Yes.

Q Who told you that?

A You know, I talked to probably 10 guys at TACC that day.

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I couldn't tell you.

Q Do you know when -- did they indicate to you at what point

they started watching the Predator feed? Was it the very initial

Predator feed from the evening before? Do you know?

A No. They just said that they were watching. Because one

of the things on this piece of paper, it says, "close watch" -- well,

I don't know if close watch, you know, it wouldn't have necessarily

meant a Predator feed. They just told me they were watching our

mission, the entire mission. Now, I don't know if that's from the time

we got on the ground or the time we took off from Ramstein. I don't

know.

Q Typically, when you have a Predator doing surveillance or

in the area, do you have the ability to communicate with them as the

pilot?

A No. I did not. (REDACTED)

Q Do you know if any of those Predators were armed?

A No, I don't. I can give you -- I can give you observations

based upon -- that probably wouldn't help.

Q Do you have an opinion --

A (REDACTED)

Q Have you flown a lot of missions in and out of Sigonella,

Italy?

A A ton.

Q (REDACTED)

A (REDACTED)

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Q (REDACTED)

A (REDACTED)

Q That would be the last thing you do?

A Yes.

Q Going back to the TACC. Do you have an appreciation of any

wargaming and a planning? I'm assuming they would plan your mission?

How does that go down?

A From what I was told, they wargamed our mission for the

better part of 11 hours before they decided to send us.

That's -- the -- the words that were given to me were, we what-iffed

it and wargamed it for 11 hours before you guys finally went.

Q Who told you this?

A It may have been [(REDACTED), may have been somebody else.

I'm not sure.

Q What does it mean when you say that you wargamed it?

A I don't -- the sense that I got was they couldn't decide

where to send us, to Benghazi or Tripoli, and what the situation would

be like on the ground. They were asking what-if questions and trying

to decide what to do with us.

Q Did anyone tell you what what-ifs they were specifically

considering?

A Did they tell me?

Q Yes.

A Only after the fact. They -- they talked about whether or

not to send us to Benghazi or Tripoli. He didn't have any knowledge

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of anything in Croatia. I mean, they were not aware of anything going

on in Croatia, as you asked before. But that could have -- most likely,

that was USAFE or AFRICOM, depending on who controlled that, so --

Q You indicated previously, or earlier, that you were

notified between 8 and 9 in the morning from the TACC to get in --

A From TACC, yeah.

Q -- TACC to get back into the office, basically.

That was 8 or 9 in the morning. Accordingly, if you are saying

they have been wargaming it for 11 hours, do you have an opinion as

to when they might have started wargaming this thing?

A Yeah. They started wargaming it at -- well -- you know

what, I wrote -- I wrote down what time he said he came into the office.

It was -- I'm -- I'm thinking it was, like, about 5 or 6:00 at night

central time. Yeah. I wrote down the number, but honestly, I don't

have it in front of me. So it was some time the previous evening,

obviously, he would have coincided with the 11:00, whatever central

time was when -- when those guys came in for their shift, that's when

they were handed our mission, and that's when they started wargaming

it, I guess you could say. I'm thinking it was like 8:00 at night

central time. I think that's what it was. So you're talking plus 6

hours -- no, plus 5 hours.

Q And did you get any other feedback or information about the

wargaming event?

A No. They just said, We're wargaming it and what-iffing it.

I don't think, ultimately, TACC had the call. There was -- the three

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stars were -- General Johns, I mean, if you want to talk to anybody

who was -- has their finger on what goes on on the floor, it was General

Johns. He's the three-star that was on the floor.

Q On the floor of the TACC?

A Yeah. He's -- he's responsible for the contingency cell

of the TACC. He's the guy who sent me an email the next day and said,

good job, blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. But he was the guy in charge

of the planning cell.

Q Talk to me -- talk to me more about the email that he sent

you.

A He just said, I'm very proud of you. You guys did an

excellent job. Thank you for, you know, performing in the manner that

you did. I want to congratulate you.

Q Subsequent to that, did you have any communications of any

kind or ever see General Johns again?

A I think I sent a follow-up quick email to him saying thank

you. And he may have sent a quick response back. But there was

no -- no discussion or anything like that. I just said, thank you.

You know, my team did a great job. I appreciate the thanks.

Q In addition to General Johns, is there anybody specifically

at TRANSCOM or any other subordinate commands there at Scott Air Force

Base that you think we should speak with or might have additional

information that would benefit this committee?

A Yeah. I don't know if this would -- you know, this would

help or not, but I know there was a C-130 that took off an hour before

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we did. They were cut by AFRICOM. They were going to Tripoli also.

The information that I got from TACC said, put everybody on your

airplane that you can, everybody else will go on the C-130. That C-130

that took off an hour before we did, we actually passed them in the

descent going into Tripoli. That was in AFRICOM-1. I don't think

they're controlled by TACC. I think they are cut by somebody else.

There's different cells in TACC, SAAM, contingencies, so not

everybody works together.

So they didn't end up taking anybody. I told them I load masters.

Everybody gets on this airplane, goes back to Ramstein, regardless of

whether or not you have to strap them to the floor.

Q That plane landed in Tripoli with you?

A They landed about 15 minutes behind us. We passed them up.

Q Where did they depart from?

A From Ramstein.

Q All right. So earlier you said y'all were the only crew

available to fly this mission, yet, this C-130 flew a mission?

A Right. We were cut to -- we were cut to TACC. That -- that

other C-130, I don't know if they were sitting Bravo. I don't know

if they had just shown up to fly another mission. I don't know what

they had done. The TACC folks didn't have anything to do with that

C-130.

Q Okay.

A So the reason why I bring that up, is you may need to talk

to AFRICOM to go, hey, what's the deal with the C-130 and did they have

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anybody attached to it, so --

Q Did you ever talk to that pilot as you are flying together,

descending, et cetera?

A No.

Q Do you know the tail number of that aircraft?

A No. It was assigned to Ramstein. It was a J model C-130.

Q What is a J -- is that a slick?

A It was, but it's the one with the updated electronic suite,

has the funky propellers.

Q Could that aircraft be refueled in the air?

A I don't know.

Q Do you know if that aircraft took on gas in Tripoli, fuel?

A I don't know.

Q Do you know when that aircraft departed in relation to you?

A No, because they stayed on the ground after we took off,

and as we were departing Tripoli, two C-130s were in the descent filled

with Marines coming in. And we met them, probably about going to 10,000

feet, there were two C-130s coming in as we were departing. And those

guys were from Sigonella. They were the FAST team from Sigonella.

Q How do you know that?

A Because we talked to the pilots. We said, Hey, we're

getting out there. Kind of gave them a heads-up as to what was going

on in the ground. They said, yeah, we're coming out of Sigonella.

Q I'm out of time here for the first hour. One quick

question. In terms of that C-130 that descended with you, have you

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since learned anything about that aircraft?

A No.

Mr. Tolar. That's it. It's been 1 hour. Let's take a quick

break, and we'll start again.

[Recess.]

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[12:18 p.m.]

EXAMINATION

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So we'll go back on the record. The time is 12:19.

A Okay.

Q Mr. (REDACTED), again, thank you. On behalf of the Select

Committee minority staff, our members want to thank you for appearing

here today.

I'd like, before we begin our round, we had noticed, and there

was a brief discussion about this in the last hour, that you have with

your -- I believe you referred to a document you have here. And at

various points in time, I believe you referred to that document to help

refresh your recollection about specifics, whether they were flight

times --

A Times, yes.

Q I'd like to ask, sir, if, first, whether you can describe

more that document, where it is, you know, how you obtained it, what

information it contains. And then if you wouldn't mind, if we could

mark that as an exhibit and have that as part of this record today.

A That's fine.

Q And we can -- I don't know if this is your only copy --

A No, no, no, no, no. We could make copies of it. That's

fine.

Q Okay.

A Doesn't matter. Describe -- it's got everything from

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mission call sign, mission number, takeoff and landing times, various

points and times in the planning stages. It talks about times when

diplomatic clearance was obtained. It talks about that they got a

quiet hour approval. Various things that happened during the mission.

It basically just gives a timeline.

Q So if we were to describe this for purposes of the record,

what would be the correct, proper way to refer to this document?

A I would say a mission summary.

[(REDACTED) Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q This is a mission summary. Okay. So we'll mark as exhibit

1. This is the mission summary provided by (REDACTED) to the

committee. And the information in here, is this a compilation of

material you pulled from various sources, or is this one readout --

A It's one -- one download that comes out.

Q Okay. And is there a particular system from which this

information comes? Is there a name for that system?

A I'm trying to think of -- I think it was GDSS. I don't know

what that stands for. And if you have TRANSCOM guys coming, I would

ask them.

Q Okay.

A Because I think they run the system.

Q No. I think that's helpful. If you wouldn't mind, I think

it would be helpful for us, just because the document is fairly

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technical, if you yourself, given your experience, if maybe we could

just walk through this and you could explain for us what each line item

is.

A Okay.

Q And while we're doing that, I know you'd indicated that

there's a couple different categories of information here. If you

could discuss with us at various points in time whether you

were directly participated in discussions or decision points that are

reflected in this document. So I can remind you as we go through.

A Okay. Yep, yep, yep.

Q I'm just -- what we'd like to do is just separate knowledge

that you have now after reviewing this document versus knowledge that

maybe you had the day after the attacks on September 12, 2012, if --

A Okay.

Q -- that's makes sense.

A Yeah. Okay.

Q Well, first let me ask, would this have been a document you

reviewed prior to undertaking your mission that day?

A No. We actually get a mission cut, a single piece of paper

that gives scheduled takeoff and landing times, as well as a weather

package and a NOTAM package, N-O-T-A-M, and airfield summaries. We

basically called it death by trees or something like that because it

was a -- you know, basically everything we needed to fly to an airfield.

Q And what is the NOTAM package?

A Hazards, runway hazards, airfield hazards.

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Q Both for the origin as well as the destination?

A Right.

Q Okay.

A Right.

Q And would these documents -- collectively would these be

part of your flight briefing for a particular mission?

A Yes. They would basically hand that to me. I would review

everything in it and determine, first of all, if I was legal to go to

the destination weather-wise, airfield-wise. For instance, the one

thing I picked out was there was obstructions at the end of the runway

and I was going to need clearance to take off with NVGs coming out of

there if it was at night. So that's the kind of stuff I'm looking for

to catch to make sure that I'm legal to fly to a place.

Q And please correct me if I misheard, but I thought you had

referred to this document which is now we've marked as exhibit 1 as

the mission cut.

A No, no, no. This is -- that's the mission history.

Q Okay.

A Yeah.

Q So, and again, just before we get into the specifics of the

document, who would have prepared this? This would have been something

that would have been entered into the GDDS system?

A Okay. So basically what happens is TACC is over here. I

have access to this. All this stuff would be handed to me.

They're -- TACC is the one that is entering all this information into

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GDSS. So if they talk to me and they go: Here's your Libyan diplomatic

clearance, they would call me on the phone, and they would be the ones

typing in this information. TACC is the keeper of this document, and

it's basically a summary of what's going on during the mission.

Q Okay. So this is a flight history, or a mission history?

A It's more a history, yes.

Q And is it a document that's prepared after the fact, so the

document's prepared contemporaneous to events?

A As it goes on. Because as you can see, you know, Libyan

diplomatic clearance, and it gives a time as to what they got when they

got that. So there's times, and then it has a name of who entered that

information.

Q Okay. But as far as your access to this information, this

is something that you accessed after the events. Is that correct?

A Right. Because --

Q Okay.

A -- they don't have a way to send that to me, the updated

version as I'm on the airplane.

Q Okay.

A So this is something I got afterward.

Q So everything here you may not have been aware of

contemporaneously on the night of or the following day, September 12.

Is that correct?

A As far as the entries go, yes. All the information, you

know, was given to me in real time. Again, this is the history, but

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I was dealing with all this stuff in real time, and then they would

enter this information as a history of what happened.

Q Okay. Great. And --

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Is that an unclassified document?

Mr. (REDACTED). It's not classified.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q That's helpful for us because we -- if we decide we want

to make copies for -- share with our counterparts, this --

A And this basically -- you know, the big things that you look

for is, you know, here's your --

Q Let's go ahead actually walk through this. And I

understand there's a practical -- bit of a practical limitation here

because we're all sharing from one set. So if the majority has any

questions, feel free to please come over here as well.

So could you just walk us through. The first line here it's an

RCUT.

A Recut. So the mission was recut.

Q Okay. What does that mean?

A Apparently, there was another mission that they had -- or

another reason they were going to send us. So that's probably, you

know, originally they were going to send us to Benghazi. Now we're

recutting the mission to make it a aeromedical mission. So it says,

"Recut. Mission built to rescue. 6 urgent patients, 3 human remains,

and 23 American citizens." So this is the current information that

they had at the time when they recut the mission.

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Q Okay. And HLLM is the -- ICAO, is that Tripoli?

A Yes. That's Tripoli.

Q And ETAR would be Ramstein?

A Ramstein, yeah.

Q Okay.

A And then -- so at the time --

Q So at this point, then, is there a time stamp for that entry?

A There was not a time stamp for that entry. But if you go

like to here, (REDACTED) those were all the DDOs, basically the duty

officers. These were the guys that I was talking to, [(REDACTED) They

were the ones that were entering this information.

Q Okay.

A They are the guys at TACC.

Q Where are they physically located?

A They're at TACC in St. Louis.

Q Okay. And when we see AE here, that refers to aeromedical

evacuation. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Would Blankenship, would that be --

A That would be another name, yes.

Q Okay. The call sign for the aircraft once it's purposed

for an AE mission?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A And then like 22:56, that's the Zulu day, and then the time

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is 07:54.

Q Can you use this? I just don't want you to --

A Okay.

Q -- mark there.

We will actually note for the record that exhibit 1 does have a

few markings. I'll just ask you, you'd underlined a few times here --

A Okay.

Q Is that correct?

A Yeah.

Q That these are your --

A Right.

Q -- markings on this document. Okay.

A So when people were asking me questions and I wanted to refer

quickly to it, I didn't panic and --

Q Okay. So when we see RCUT, that's a mission recut.

A Recut.

Q So that would imply that there was a mission that existed

prior to this mission?

A Yes.

Q Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And if we look here, it says it's a rescue, 6 urgent

patients, 3 human remains, 23 American citizens from Tripoli.

Based on that information, do you have a sense of the time that

this mission was set? In other words, you'd indicated in the last round

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that you ultimately ended up removing four remains.

A Right.

Q Four sets of remains. Here there's an indication of three

human remains.

A Right. And that was the confusion, you know, that

everybody had not knowing what was actually happening on the ground.

Q Okay. Does that help --

A At the time that it was recut, if there's no time stamp

there, then -- then -- and then I don't -- I don't know what time they

did that at.

Q Okay. And when we see these numbers here on the second

line, 2256/0754 --

A That's the Zulu day, and then that's the Zulu time. So

07:54Z.

Q Zulu. Okay. And so would that be the point at which this

entry's entered into the system?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So that would also be contemporaneous with when this

mission was recut?

A Right.

Q Okay. So this is 0754. And your understanding is that

refers --

A Right.

Q -- to Zulu time?

A Yes.

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Q Okay.

A So that's probably the time that the mission was determined

to be an aeromedical with 0754 on the 256 -- or on the 256 day.

Q So just to refer, still continuing on this line, so again

here, you identified HLLM as the airport sign for Tripoli. Is that

Tripoli International or --

A Four letter identifier for Tripoli International.

Q Tripoli International Airport. Okay. TIP.

So at this point in time, then 07:54Z, the mission was a medical

evacuation -- aeromedical evacuation from Tripoli, not Benghazi. Is

that correct?

A Right.

Q I recall in the last hour you indicated that there was some

confusion perhaps around this point, or early in the morning about

whether the mission would be Tripoli or Benghazi. Does this help

refresh your recollection about where your destination was?

A No. Because the time we were alerted, we're not told that:

Hey, we were thinking about sending you to Benghazi. We're going to

send you to Tripoli. So that information was something that I learned

after the fact was that there was some confusion and war gaming and

what if'ing. That's all information I found out after the fact. That

has nothing to do with that on there.

Q Okay.

A I'm given a mission. I'm given -- I'm told to go do this,

make it happen, make it succeed. That's all I know. The extraneous

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stuff I don't know.

Q Okay. The next line here, "total pt load."

A Patient load.

Q 2-1+3?

A What time was that at? Was that after we were already

in -- okay, so that was 2212. So that was after we got back. So there

was two ambulatory. You know, some of the guys came on -- when they

got on the airplane they were, you know, had cuts and bumps and all

that kind of stuff. So this is aeromedical speak. All I know is two

guys came out in ambulances. They were the critical guys. And beyond

that, you know, I don't know in what way anybody else was injured.

Q Okay. So --

A That's --

Q Walking wounded --

A There's walking wounded, you know, it's critical. All that

kind of stuff. That's --

Q Okay.

A -- aeromedical speak to me.

Q Okay. So I think that's helpful. So in terms of your

understanding of the medical component, then, of the mission, whether

it's administering aid to patients, whether they're walking or littoral

patients, that's not something you were focused on at the time. Is

that correct?

A No.

Q Okay. And moving down the line here, this is departure

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time, aircraft's ACARS system. So this is information that was pulled

from the aircraft. Is that correct?

A Yeah. The aircraft ACARS system. So it gives you

a -- let's see. I'm a C-17. I think it was once the aircraft started

physically moving, different aircrafts basically do block in and block

out time. But, yeah, this was taken via satellite feed from our ACAR

system on the airplane.

Q Okay. And two lines down, can you read this line for us?

A Libyan -- I think it's Libyan diplomatic approval.

Q Okay. And what's the time stamp there?

A 939.

Q And that would be 09:39 Zulu?

A Zulu, yeah.

Q Okay. And to the best of your understanding, Zulu at that

time, in relation to Eastern European time, the best guess you have

is that that's a plus one as you sit here today?

A I think -- when does the time normally change? I mean, when

do we fall back. That's in October. Right?

Q So I can help you out a little bit here. So in looking back,

our understanding is that at this particular point in the calendar year,

the difference between Zulu and Eastern European time is plus 2.

A Plus 1.

Q Plus 2.

A Oh, plus 2? Maybe. It's been a while.

Q That's our understanding. We're not informing.

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A During the summer? Yeah. Okay. I'll take your --

Q So, again, we had a discussion in the last hour about Libyan

diplomatic --

A Because it is plus 2, plus 1. I think you're right. Yeah.

Q Okay. So Libyan diplomatic approval here you're saying,

or if I understand it correctly, 09:39Z, Zulu, which would be 11:39Z.

A Right. Plus 2.

Q Or sorry. 11:39 local time, Ramstein Air Base. Is that

correct?

A Yep.

Q And what time do you recall departing the air base?

A What time did I take off?

Q Correct.

A Does it have our -- let's see. Positive launch.

Departure time for aircraft's ACARS system, 12:16Z.

Q Okay. So approximately 2:16 local time Ramstein. And

according to this, Libyan diplomatic approval was at 11:30 local time

that morning?

A It was after we had taken off.

Q Okay. Maybe you can help us understand that. Because

11:30, at least according to this document, would be before your

departure time.

A This is the time that they got the approval. It wasn't the

time necessarily that they gave it to me. This is when the approval

came through.

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Q Okay. I see?

A I found out -- because, remember, you're dealing

with -- yeah. I'm dealing with satellite phones. I'm dealing with

getting the information after the fact.

Q I see.

A So that's the time that they got it. I did not get it until

after we took off.

Q So are you saying the information here, to the best of your

understanding, that's a correct time for when USG received diplomatic

approval to enter Libyan airspace is 09:39Z?

A That's what I would understand from that. Whether or not

that's what it was, I'm not sure.

Q But at some later point in time -- you didn't receive that

information contemporaneously, you received that at some later point

in time?

A I got notified that we got the diplomatic clearance 30

minutes out from the border.

Q Okay.

A I mean, it was pretty close to when I was getting ready to

go in that we got the actual approval to go in.

Q Okay. And in the last round, you referred to that as

the -- first of all, I believe it described the decision to depart is

a decision that was placed in your hands?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And who exactly put that authority in your hands?

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A TACC did. They basically said: We do not have the

diplomatic clearance. That's your decision to go.

Q Okay. But a C-130 had also departed, to the best of your

recollection, an hour earlier bound for Libya.

A Yes.

Q Is that correct?

A Now, this may be one way to -- because the way

diplomatic -- I don't know if you're familiar with the way diplomatic

clearances work, but --

Q No, please.

A Basically, if you're trying the last minute to get a

diplomatic clearance to go into, say, Turkey, Turkey will go: Yeah.

Right. We'll have it for you in 4 days. Okay? Some of the countries

in Europe we have a standing diplomatic of clearance with like to

overfly Germany, for instance. Sometimes there's flights that are

going into a country that has a diplomatic clearance. This flight

really needs a diplomatic clearance. So we'll change call signs.

Steal this diplomatic clearance for this airplane to be able to go in.

So it's kind of like this whole -- they may have had a pre-existing

one from someone else that they pulled from somewhere for this airplane

to be able to go in. It's like a big -- that's why they don't have

us deal with that.

Q Sure. So who would deal with that?

A And the guys -- I'll just say, the guys that do the

diplomatic clearances, they're not sitting next to the guy planning

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the mission. That's a completely -- I don't know if they're in a

different building. I don't know if they're -- they're part of TACC,

but who knows how long before this guy has time to go: Hey, do you

have the diplomatic clearances yet. So it's not like they're all

sitting together to go: Here's your piece of paper.

Q But -- okay. And I think that's -- that is helpful

background for us. As we sit here and review this document, though,

it appears that diplomatic security was granted prior to your --

A Right.

Q -- flight's departure.

Okay. But your understanding at the time was it hadn't?

A Right.

Q That information just hadn't been received by you yet?

A Right.

Q Okay. And I see there's a quiet hour waiver approval here.

Can you describe for us what that is?

A So the one of the wonderful joys of flying in and out of

Germany is every little town around an airport has a quiet hour sensor

so that they can charge the U.S. military $20,000 every time we're too

noisy. So basically, after 10 o'clock at night or 9 o'clock at night

in Germany, you have to get a quiet hour waiver. Now, during Iraq and

Afghanistan we had a certain number of airplanes that could take off

that didn't go into the quiet hour pool, because I think you could have

so many per month. So you'd have like five a night you could go into

the quiet hour waiver, and then anything after that I think we had to

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pay additional money or something like that. But basically, to be able

to come in at that time, we had to have a quiet hour waiver. And that

was given by the German government, basically.

Q Okay. Do you have any evidence that that process in any

way slowed your departure on the 12th?

A Slowed our departure leaving in the first place or --

Q Correct?

A -- coming back? No.

Q Okay.

A No. Because that's --

Q It sounds like it's similar to --

A That's like 9 hours away.

Q -- National Airport or something similar.

Sorry. It's hard for the court reporter if we speak over each

other.

A No. Because it's, you know, 9 hours away that they had all

that time to work the quiet hours.

Q Okay.

A Yeah.

Q Okay. And before we leave this, you have dip clearance.

I wanted to ask, because you had mentioned that when you made the

decision to depart, that you believed you were undertaking an illegal

action. And if --

A Not -- I don't think I used the word "illegal." It was

standard practice of the Air Force to make sure that you had all the

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things that you needed to do to be able to get to an airfield. As an

aircraft commander in the Air Force, I had to make sure that I was legal

to go fly. There was no regulation per the Air Force that said: If

you don't have a diplomatic clearance, you can't go fly. Okay? Rules

of the road are that you need to be able to legally fly to that country.

Were there times that we took off flying out of Afghanistan, and we

got to Kurdistan and they go: We don't have your diplomatic clearance,

so we'd have to turn around and go back? It's however the country's

feeling that day, whoever's in charge. The whole diplomatic

clearance, I mean, I want to say it's a shell game, but it's kind of

like that mythical thing where I've got a number that I need to give

to the controller to go into his airspace but --

Q So -- and we can -- if --

A It was not illegal to go.

Q It was not illegal for you to depart?

A No. There was no -- nothing specifically saying you cannot

depart.

Q Okay. So -- and we can refer back to the court reporter

if you like, but in my notes, I had notated that you said: We took

off illegally. But as I understand you, you seem to be indicating that

you meant that more from the standpoint of did we have everything we

needed in order to complete the mission at that moment --

A Yes.

Q -- of departure.

A Yes.

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Q Okay. But sitting here today, you don't believe that your

action was in any way illegal?

A No. Nobody's going to -- if you do something illegally,

they call you up on the phone and they go -- well, for the military

not so much, but if I do something -- if I violate a rule as an airline

pilot, they call me up and go: We're going to give you a violation.

So if -- ultimately, if it would have been something really bad, I would

have gotten violated for it. Was it a smart thing to do? Well, in

this situation it was, because we had guys on the ground and we had

to get there. And --

Q But there was no Air Force regulation that says you cannot

depart unless and until you receive diplomatic clearance for your

ultimate destination. Is that a fair understanding?

A I'm going to say I don't remember a regulation specifically

that the Air Force gave me saying that I couldn't do that.

Q Okay. I'd like to talk a little bit -- I'll take a step

back. We may return to this document. I don't want to get too bogged

down in this. There's a lot of detail. And we may return to it at

a later point, but I didn't want to miss the opportunity to talk to

you about your deployment. You said it was a 45-day deployment in

theater. And at the time you were based at Joint Base Lewis McChord?

A Yes.

Q Is that correct?

Okay. And you were, at that time, under the command of TRANSCOM.

Is that correct?

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A No. We would be there under the direction of CENTCOM.

Q I see.

A I never talked to -- I mean, TACC, I think, is part of

TRANSCOM. But I never, like, heard anybody answer the phone:

TRANSCOM. It was Holliker TACC, you know.

Q Okay. Had you dealt with that particular unit before on

previous missions, the TACC?

A TACC?

Q Correct.

A They control all airlift worldwide. Yeah, I mean, they --

Q When you say "all" --

A They control all the airlifts, C-130s, KC-135s, C-5s,

C-17s, they're responsible for diplomatic clearances, flight planning,

weather cell, airfield suitability reports. Everything I need to do

to go fly to a place, they plan it, hand me the package and say, This

is your mission.

Q But for the purposes of your deployment, you were a CENTCOM

asset. Is that correct?

A I believe we were cut to CENTCOM, yes.

Q Okay. But you just happened during this deployment to be

stationed on your temporary duty in Ramstein which is part of the

AFRICOM -- I'm sorry, the EUCOM area of operations --

A Okay. I see what you're doing.

Q I'm not doing it. I'm just --

A No, no, no, no, no. Yeah. I'm trying to -- I'm going to

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help you understand this.

Q Sure.

A So Ramstein's a base. You had USAFE assets assigned to that

base. Okay. You had AFRICOM assets assigned to that base. Those

guys were permanent party guys, guys that lived there. It

was -- Ramstein was the hub for military airlift for Iraq, Afghanistan,

AFRICOM, USAFE. Everybody came through there. So it was depending

on what airplane -- whatever that airplane was cut to. There was

permanent party C-130s. There'd be a constant stream of assets of C-5

and C-17s on the ramp.

Q But your -- the missions for which you were cut were

primarily strategic or inter-theater. Is that correct? So you'd be

traversing between different AORs?

A We were cut to CENTCOM because we were contingency orders.

But it was, you know, like I said, only for high visibility missions.

So TACC basically knew we were there and they could use us how -- if

they wanted to use us for SAAM missions or for contingency missions

or whatever they deemed necessary. We were there to support high

visibility, high priority missions.

Q And maybe that's -- I'm just trying to better understand

that statement --

A Yeah.

Q -- and unpack that a little bit. You had given us one

example in the last hour of a particular mission that you were alerted

for on the day of September 11. But in terms of your 45-day, maybe

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you'll start by asking what your operational tempo was throughout that

period. How many missions were you flying?

A I mean, honestly, it was hit or miss. We would fly pretty

hard for 3 or 4 days, and then we'd have a little bit of a break. It

wasn't like we were flying every day. But there would be busy times,

and then there would be not so busy times. So there's -- there was

no consistency to what we were doing over there.

Q And those missions, were they primarily within the EUCOM

or AFRICOM area of responsibility?

A Some were in CENTCOM because we were doing missions in at

least Afghanistan. I guess we were out of -- I think we did at least

one mission into Baghdad, and we flew multiple missions into

Afghanistan. Those would all be CENTCOM missions.

Q Were any of those missions crisis response missions?

A Oh, no. No, no, no.

Q In your previous military experience as a pilot, have you

previously flown on crisis response-type missions?

A It -- honestly, it depends how you term "crisis." I mean,

we were -- we would do evacuations from, you know, earthquakes. You

know, we did a lot of airlift during the Pakistan flooding. They did

airlift in Haiti. We would do airlift in, you know, various places

where you had natural disasters and stuff. So crisis -- if that's what

you're defining like austere situations, I would say yes.

Q Okay.

A If it's --

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Q How about -- you had previously mentioned a Bravo status

and Alpha status. Have you previously been in Alpha status?

A No. That would be for like B-2s, B-52s.

Q Okay.

A Stuff like that.

Q So that's an unusual status for your aircraft to be in?

A Right.

Q Okay.

A Now, I do have a method -- I have a checklist that says this

is how you set up a C-17 for Alpha status. So there's that possibility.

But we were in Bravo.

Q Okay. And then moving to the night of the attacks, both

the night and the day after, I believe you indicated that you were

in -- you described it as Bravo alert status, which is 1 hour from

notification response time to report back for your flight briefing?

A To report in, yes.

Q Okay. And you'd indicated that the Bravo period could be

elongated. It could as long at 36 hours. But it also sounded like

it could be a shorter period of time?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And what -- do you recall at that time when your

Bravo alert status began?

A Not specifically. But my recollection is we were on alert

for approximately 20 hours before that. Because I know it was the whole

previous day. There is a -- as I said previously, there was a detainee

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out of Guantanamo that they were going to take out of there. There

was a tropical storm. There was aircraft breakage.

Q So you were --

A It was a long time.

Q So, to the best of your recollection, were you on Bravo alert

status on the 10th of September?

A Yes.

Q The evening of the 10th? Okay. And then it continued to

the day of the 11th?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And at some point on the 11th did that terminate,

and then you go into crew rest?

A No. Because we -- the morning of the 12th, we were still

waiting for the guy to come out of Guantanamo. So we were still on

alert.

Q Okay. And that carried through until what time?

A Well, the alert stops -- we got alerted. So Bravo is out

the window. We're now alerted. So --

Q For -- I'm sorry, for the Guantanamo Bay mission, you were

alerted?

A No, no, no, no. So TACC calls me up, says, We're putting

you into crew rest for 12 hours.

Q When is that?

A What's that?

Q When --

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A I don't know -- so it was the 12 hours prior to us going

into the Bravo status alert. Crew rest. Once we start Bravo, we can

do Bravo for 36 hours. Okay? Once we're alerted for a mission, that

Bravo status goes away. We're now alerted. They can call us anywheres

in that 36 hours. So you just sleep as much as possible, so when they

do alert you, you can go.

Q So when you received the phone call at eight or nine a.m.

on the morning of the 12th, where were you in that 36-hour sequence?

A You know, like I said before, we had -- we were probably

20 hours into it. So we had 12 hours of crew rest. We were 20 hours

into our Bravo eligibility.

Q Okay. And during the time that you're in Bravo, you'd

indicated, and it might just be an expression, that you were sitting

in Bravo status. But if I understand you correctly, at some point you

went to sleep the night of the 11th. Is that correct?

A Yeah. I -- sitting is a -- was a -- that's what we called

it, sitting Bravo.

Q Okay.

A Yeah.

Q But you did -- you --

A I slept the night before, yes.

Q Okay. So you were asleep the night of 11 -- September 11,

September 12?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

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A And so I got -- when I got up in the morning, I got on the

computer and went, Hey, where's our guy coming out of Guantanamo? And

the airplane was still at Dover Air Force Base. It had just gotten

to Dover. That crew went, you know, went into crew rest. And so I

knew the guy was not going to be out for another 16 hours. So

that's -- I called TACC that morning, and I said: Hey, can we get

released? It looks like it's going to be at least another 16 to 20

hours before he gets here. Can you release us? They said: We'll call

you back in 30 minutes. They didn't give me any kind of indication

that something was going on. They said: We'll probably call you in

30 minutes to release you. And then 30 minutes later they call and

they said: Turn on CNN. Get in here as quick as you can. So that's

how that -- we were cut for another mission and they moved us to this

mission.

Q Okay. I understand. Just bear with me.

A No, no, no. We're good.

Q I'm looking at my notes here.

A It's confusing to me when I used to do this stuff.

Q Well, and there's a lot of detail.

A Yeah.

Q So at that point in time, you received a call. The call

is to come in, report in?

Is that the equivalent -- let me ask you this way. At what point

did you receive an air tasking order to deploy? Did you receive an

air tasking order?

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A The air tasking order, that's the TACC guys. Okay? So

they receive the air tasking order, they build the mission, they hand

me the mission package.

Q Okay.

A I perform the mission. So --

Q So -- and that's helpful to help us understand that

sequence. So when you report in, when you receive a mission package,

at that point, the mission package is, for lack of a better word, it's

finalized. It's definitized. Is that fair?

A With the current information.

Q Okay.

A I mean, obviously as we found out from the, you know,

diplomatic clearance. So as much information as they have, they give

that to me.

Q So your job, you report in, you receive a mission packet.

You undertake to execute the mission. Correct?

Court Reporter. He is not answering that.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Let me re-ask the question. We do need audible responses.

Your job, as I understand it, the pilot, you get a call, you report

in, you receive a mission packet, you execute the mission. Is that

correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So you don't participate in discussions with the

TACC or with the component commands about planning for particular

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missions? Is that also fair?

A The planning of the mission, no. Unless I see a problem

with the mission.

Q Okay.

A I call TACC and we -- I go, There's a problem with this.

For instance, taking off at night from Tripoli, I need clearance to

fly with NVGs.

Q Right. But -- okay. So you would review your mission, and

if you had some sort of gut check, if you had a problem with it, you'd

go back to the TACC and raise a question or a concern about the mission?

A Yes.

Q Okay. But on the night of the attacks or on the morning

of the 12th when you received the call, by the point you received the

mission, the mission had been finalized. Is that accurate? There was

a mission. The mission was to go to Tripoli?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So did you participate in any discussion leading up

to that point?

A No.

Q Okay. With either the TACC?

A Yeah. I didn't have any discussion with them at all

regarding this mission prior to getting alerted for the mission.

Q Okay. And that's because as a pilot, your job is to execute

the mission, correct?

A Right. And my job is to be resting so that when they call,

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I'm able to go perform the mission. So that's why TACC does the

diplomatic clearances, the weather, the -- gets everything as done as

much as they can, so when they hand it to me, I'm not spending 3 hours.

Q Well, it sounds like it can be complicated, right? There

are a lot of people working --

A Ridiculous.

Q There are lots of people that work in the planning process

for these missions. Is that --

A Yes.

Q -- generally fair?

A Yes.

Q And it can take time to pull all this information and

assemble it?

A Yes.

Q Prior to receiving that call, I asked if you participated

in discussions about weather, about your particular mission. Did you

participate in discussions about weather or aircraft for any

noncombatant evacuation or an aeromedical evacuation in Libya?

A No.

Q Did you participate in any discussions about the

feasibility, applicability of any other U.S. military assets for

potential missions in Libya?

A No.

Q Okay. And then I have just a brief checklist here. On the

night of the attacks, did you have any direct contact with anyone in

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the National Military Command Center?

A No.

Q To include the morning, September 12?

A No.

Q On the morning of September 12, did you have any direct

contact with anyone in the Joint Staff Director of Operations or J3?

A No, sir.

Q Did you have, on September 12, did you have any direct

contact with anyone in the Joint Staff Director of Logistics, or J4?

A No, sir.

Q Okay. Did you have any direct contact with anyone in the

AFRICOM Joint Operations Center?

A No, sir.

Q Did you have any direct contact with anyone in any other

AFRICOM operation center or subordinate operation center?

A No, sir.

Q Okay. Your primary conduit, or point of contact was the

TACC. Is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q Okay. One point of clarification. While you're -- in

case the record isn't entirely clear on this. You mentioned that you

believe you were on some sort of 20-hour Bravo status on -- beginning

the night of September 10 continuing through September 11. At some

point on September 11, you go to sleep. Is that correct?

A Yes.

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Q Do you recall about what time?

A No. Honestly not. But 10 o'clock?

Q Okay. And during the time that you were asleep, were you

still on the Bravo status?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And that carried forward through until you received

a phone call?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So at no point while you were asleep did the Bravo

status expire or terminate?

A No.

Q Okay.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. So then in total, you actually were on Bravo

status for significantly longer than 20 hours, right?

Mr. (REDACTED). So just review how this works. TACC calls, and

I have a cell phone. Okay? I have 2 hours to respond to that cell

phone call. Once TACC has made positive contact, I go into crew rest

for 12 hours. TACC cannot contact me. I cannot be disturbed at all

during that 12 hours. Okay? Now I start Bravo status. I can be in

that Bravo status and on a 1-hour hook for 36 hours. So for 36 hours

I am tied to my cell phone and my crew is tied to me during that 36

hours. They can launch me anywhere in that 36 hours?

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So you had mentioned earlier that you thought at the time

it was a 20-hour status. Was that --

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A I had been in Bravo for approximately 20 hours already.

Q Okay.

A Yes.

Q So in order for Bravo status to change or shift, does that

require some affirmative action? Does somebody contact you and say

you're no longer in Bravo status, or does it just happen?

A Yes. That's why I called the morning of September 12,

called TACC, and said, Can you guys let us off for 12 hours so we can

go get out of our rooms and go, you know, get some food or something

like that.

Q So when you placed that call, do you think that was at the

end of your 36 hour --

A No. That was approximately 20 hours in. He goes, I'll

call you back. If TACC calls me and breaks my crew rest, Bravo's done.

I can call them and get status updates. Okay? But I was 20 hours into

my Bravo. So I had another, what, 16 that they could call me.

Q So your crew was on crew rest?

A The whole crew was tied to me, yes. We're all in Bravo

status. One hour we have to be into --

Q Yeah. Maybe that's -- we're having a hard time wrapping

around the Bravo alert versus the crew rest. It sounds like crew rest

can occur during the Bravo status.

A No. It's a -- so there's -- Bravo's like the worst form

of torture you could ever possibly imagine. Because basically,

anytime in that 36 hours, I have to be rested and ready to go fly. So

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I have to manage my sleep. I have to manage my eating, and hope that

I've just taken an 8-hour when they call me as opposed to, I'm ready

to take an 8-hour nap and now you're calling me, which is usually what

ends up happening.

So for 36 hours they can call me at any time. It's the 12 hours

before that they can't touch me. They can't call me. They can't do

anything. If they call me during the Bravo for anything other than

for me to go fly, it's just like crew rest. It's broken. They need

to reset me and give me another 12 hours.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. And at what time did you get out of your

12-hour crew rest and start the Bravo? When was that?

Mr. (REDACTED). So it would have been -- if I was 20 hours in

that at that time point, it was -- I mean, I'd have to do the math,

you know. Go back 20 hours and then for the 12 hours prior to that,

I was in crew rest.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And during that 20 hours or 36 hours, does that count against

your flight duty period?

A No. That's -- that's why this is so bad because anywheres

in that 36 hours they can call me, and then I can be sent out for 26

hours beyond that.

Q I see.

A So it's like the worst form of torture.

Q And on the morning of September 12, you called approximately

20 hours into your Bravo status?

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A Yes.

Q You called in order to check --

A Try to get released.

Q Okay. Why did you do that?

A Because we had been on Bravo for 20 hours. And we wanted

to be free, you know, to, I don't know, go have a beer or something

like that. So we didn't have to be on that hook to be able to be called.

All of us, you know, would like to go to sleep without worrying about

we're going to get called and sent out for 26 hours. So it was just

to get released, piece of mind, then reset us.

Q I have a few minutes remaining. I'd like to shift back to

exhibit 1.

I noticed here, line 4 in this document, refers to several numbers

here. Includes this phrase here. Do you know this term? Says, "yes

ccat." Do you know what that refers to?

A CCAT was -- that's the -- one of the aeromedical terms. I

don't know if that's the CCAT machine or -- I think that was -- it's

one of the medical terms. I don't know if that was how they set it

up in the back for the critical guys or what.

Q Okay.

A I couldn't tell you.

Q We've seen Critical Care Air Transportation Team, CCAT?

A There you go. It's the CCAT team.

Q Okay. And when it says, "yes ccat," that would indicate

that there was a CCAT team aboard?

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A Or required.

Q Okay.

A I'm not sure if it was -- either one, they showed up.

Q Okay. And in the last round you walked through for us the

manifest of personnel who deployed initially three times pilots, two

times load master, and then there were aeromedical doctors and nurses.

So were those doctors and nurses, would they form --

A CCAT.

Q They would form that CCAT team?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you said it was about 10 to 12 people altogether. The

CCAT team, do you know whether they are also on a Bravo alert? Are

they part of your team?

A I don't think -- honestly, I don't know what the rules are.

I don't know if they're.

Q I'm not asking you to speculate. Just do you know --

A I do not know.

Q Okay. So on that night, you weren't -- you didn't have

knowledge of whether the CCAT team was also on a 1-hour notice?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. Okay. And you discussed a little bit in the last

hour some of the changes that need to be made to a plane in order to

convert it, configure it for aeromedical evacuation. In order to do

that, is it your understanding that that requires information about

the medical condition of the injured? For instance, the number of

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patients, the condition of the patients, their medical needs while en

route?

A They basically came out with a standard package. I believe

they had basically a big cube that you'd roll on the airplane, and that

would have all the stuff that they needed. I think they were set up

to have -- handle any kind of trauma generally as opposed to something

specific. On the way down, they were asking us to find out any

information they could on the status of the patients. And I couldn't

find out. TACC didn't know.

Q Okay. Okay. And I think that's helpful.

A It's basically a mobile hospital. That's what they roll

on the back of that thing. And so they're set up for anything.

Q And if they had special needs, for instance, a particular

blood type or oxygen, do you have any visibility into their procurement

process for specialty medical items?

A No, sir.

Q Okay. And you indicated that it didn't sound like there

was a lot of information about the medical conditions of patients at

this time. Is that --

A We knew nothing.

Q Okay. Are you, in any way, as the pilot, are you involved

in validating medical requirements for evacuated patients?

A No.

Q Okay. Are you directly involved in any way in determining

the correct configuration for that specialty medical equipment that

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comes onboard?

A No.

Q And then are you involved in any way in actually the

build-out of the configuration of the aircraft?

A No.

Q Okay. And those tasks are performed by other personnel.

Is that accurate?

A The CCAT team.

Q Okay.

A I mean, as far as the medical stuff -- ultimately the

aircraft commander has final authority on everything that happens on

that airplane, everything on the ground. When I landed in Tripoli,

I was the on-station commander. But as the aircraft commander, I don't

know how they set up their litters or anything like that.

Q Right. Okay. And I just may ask a few clarifying

questions.

You indicated that while en route, you placed a call to the defense

attache's office in Embassy Tripoli, or you received a call?

A I got his cell phone number.

Q Okay. And you placed a call to the DAT?

A Yes.

Q And you reached a master chief?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And it's your understanding that individual worked

within the defense attache's office?

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A He identified himself, or TACC told me he was the defense

attache.

Q Okay. But I'm just trying to understand. Earlier you said

when you landed, you met with somebody who you believed was a U.S. Air

Force lieutenant colonel, whereas on the phone call, you spoke with

somebody who was -- you understood to be a master chief.

A So there was two of them.

Q Okay.

A It was kind of like -- the master chief may have met me and

then the lieutenant colonel came out around the same time, if not at

the same time. So there was really two defense attache officers.

Q Okay. And at that point in time, did they relay any

information to you about the medical condition of the patients, or did

they relay any information at all?

A Yes. They said we did not need to send our folks to the

hospital to go get anyone. They were bringing them here. That there

was four HRs. That the Ambassador was one of the four HRs. And that

there would be two ambulatory and approximately 30 -- 33 walk-ons.

Q Okay. And when you landed, you mentioned that a militia

soon gathered, quickly converged on the airplane. That sounds like

a concerning situation. Would you agree?

A Yes. I didn't know whether to get -- not to get off the

airplane. I didn't see any friendly folks.

Q And you'd indicated that you had two security personnel with

you. Is that correct? Was that --

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A I had three Ravens.

Q You had three Ravens.

A (REDACTED)

Q Okay. And given the size of this militia, I think you said

there were about 100 people, the Ravens, is their job to fend off a

crowd of that size?

A Which they wouldn't have been able to do.

Q And can you just talk just a little bit about airfield

security. Because it sounds like at this point after you landed, there

may have been a concern about airport security in Tripoli. So we just

want to understand, when you have a situation where a militia controls

an airplane, for instance, what concerns -- security concerns that

poses to you as a pilot?

A If there's a militia that -- if there's -- well, obviously,

if you have a militia that's not securing the airfield or friendly to

us going in there, it's obviously not a good thing.

Q But not a good thing in what sense?

A Well, you could have people overrunning an airplane. You

could have any number of things. I mean, bombs. We didn't know going

into Tripoli anything about the situation on the ground, whether or

not it was going to be secure or not secure. When we showed up in the

parking, there's 100 guys out there in uniform. We didn't know if they

were friendly or bad guys.

Q But as it turns out, they were friendly. Is that fair?

A It turns out that they were friendly, yes.

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Q Okay. But anytime you fly into a situation of uncertainty

like that, I guess you, as a pilot, you'd indicated if you had received

a mission where you had some sort of concern about that, you would have

raised that or elevated it. Is that something you think through in

the briefing stage what sort of security does an airport have before

I can fly in?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And did you have an understanding of what the

security situation was at the Benghazi Airport was, for instance, on

the night of September 11?

A We had no idea, honestly. We had about -- we had very

little information about anything regarding Tripoli.

Q But as a pilot, is it important for you to have an

understanding of the security situation in an airfield where you land?

It's a general --

A Yeah. It is a general desire, yes, to have an idea if the

airport is secure. During the war, we never really had to -- I was

never really briefed on the aircraft -- airfield security. There was

a few classified places where I flew into where I was not told how secure

the airfield was. That's why I brought the Ravens. That's why I

called and said, I want to bring Ravens. TACC said, You can have

anything you want.

Q I see. I'm not questioning your judgment as the --

A Oh, no, no, no.

Q Please forgive me if that --

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A No, no, no, no.

Q Because that would be a misimpression. What I'm trying to

understand is as a pilot, you do have concerns about security at an

airfield where you land --

A Yes.

Q -- regardless of where that might be?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And that's all.

Just real quickly while we just -- or maybe a little short on time,

but I have one or two follow-up questions.

You'd indicated in the last round your discussing Predators and

various other unmanned aerial systems.

A Yes.

Q Different platforms. You'd indicated -- I just want to

understand a little bit more about your background. You said you flew

C-17s. You enumerated the various airplanes that you flew. I just

wanted to better understand your experience with employing unmanned

aerial systems.

A Okay. I didn't know if that was a question.

Q That is --

A My experience in employing?

Q Yes.

A I have no experience in employing UAVs.

Q Okay. Have you ever piloted a drone?

A No, sir.

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Q Okay. So your experience is based more on your

observations as a pilot of other airframes when you see unmanned aero

systems --

A Yes.

Q -- on the airfield?

Okay. And I believe with that we may have a few follow-ups

questions in the last round, but I believe we're out of time.

A Okay.

Q So we'll go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Tolar. It is -- I've got 1:34. Let's go back on the record,

please.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q I'm going to rehash a few things we talked about the last

couple of hours, just to get some clarity for all our sake, and then

finish up with some other issues. But hopefully, we can wrap this thing

up here for the next hour from our perspective. Let me do this. When

you rolled off of Bravo status, typically, did another crew roll on

to Bravo status?

A For the mission we were cut for, for the -- the

high-visibility, high-priority missions, there was no one else to back

us up.

Q So, for any and all high-priority, high-visibility missions

that were run out of Ramstein Air Force Base, there was only one crew

that could work those or fly those, to the best of your knowledge?

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A Yes. We were the only crew over there to do that particular

job. Now, for the contingency side, the Afghanistan stuff that was

going on, you had a crew set up for a particular mission, and you had

crews in Bravo. So something happened in that primary crew, you would

have a secondary one, so -- but that was for a completely different

mission. For the high visibility, high priority, we were the only

crew.

Q For the mission that you had, were you then part of the N

system select program? Do you know what that is, N --

A No.

Q Do you know what that is?

A No.

Q Okay. I want to talk a little bit more about drones just

to make sure I understand. Were you aware -- and I can't recall exactly

what you answered, but were you aware on the night of the attack that

there were drones in Benghazi providing ISR feed?

A At the time that it was going on?

Q Correct.

A No, sir.

Q You learned subsequently?

A Yes, sir.

Q And then do you have any firsthand knowledge as to whether

or not those drones that night were armed?

A No, sir.

Q Do you know if they had the ability to be armed

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as -- once -- based on their – (REDACTED) Do you know firsthand?

A At -- the question is an MQ-1 and MQ-9 have the ability to

be armed. I don't know if they were armed.

Q Okay.

A If you said do you have the ability to --

Q That was a poor question. I apologize.

A Okay. So --

Q You are right. So --

A I have no knowledge that they were armed.

Q Okay. How about on the morning, any ISR assets that were

in -- generally, in the area, do you know if they were armed?

A No.

Q You don't know or --

A I didn't even know that there was ISR assets flying overhead

until after we were departing Tripoli.

Q All right. I want to show you, again, exhibit No. 1. Would

you take a look at that. And I just want to clear up my notes here,

some times. You indicated previously that you departed Ramstein at

12:16 Zulu? Was that correct?

A This is just a blank piece of paper. Right? Took off from

Ramstein 12:14 Zulu.

Q 12:14?

A Do you want me to go over all the times?

Q No. Did you say 12:16 or 14?

A 12:14 Zulu.

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Q Okay. And what time did you land in Tripoli?

A 14:63 Zulu, which was 2 hours and 39 minutes later.

Q What time did you depart Tripoli?

A 17:17 Zulu.

Q What time did you land at Ramstein?

A 20:19 Zulu.

Q Prior to -- or after you departed Ramstein en route to Zulu,

were you rerouted for any reason?

A On the way down?

Q Correct.

A No.

Q Are you aware of any other medical evacuation aircraft that

was launched and recovered for any reason that would have been going

into Libya?

A Just the C-130 that departed Ramstein.

Q Any other one?

A No, sir.

Q Okay.

A Once again, according to TACC, we're the only aircraft with

a crew available. And, oh, by the way, we had an air medical team there

at the same time.

Q Understood. Obviously, you are aware that the FAST

teams -- FAST teams were located in Rota, Spain?

A There was a FAST team in Sigonella, too.

Q Did you have any knowledge of their deployment prior to all

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this? I mean, prior to -- when did you first learn about the FAST

team's presence there and their deployment to Benghazi -- to Tripoli?

A I mean, it was pretty common knowledge that the FAST team

had been in Rota and Sigonella for 2 years.

Q Okay. And what is your understanding that the commanders

and extremist forces, the CIFs, did you understand what they were or

who they were at the time?

A No, sir.

Q Do you know what they are today?

A The --

Q Commanders and extremist forces, also known as the CIFs?

A No, I have no idea what that is.

Q If I told you they were special operations -- I withdraw

it.

A Special operations guys, we never -- they would show up to

the airplane. We'd take them where they wanted, and we'd drop them

off where they go, and they would not give us a designation.

Q Last time we were talking, you had departed Ramstein, you

had passed the FAST team coming in, and you were headed -- you departed

Tripoli. You passed the FAST team on descend; you headed back to

Ramstein? Is that correct?

A No. The FAST team was coming into Tripoli as we were

departing with everyone.

Q Right. You went back to Ramstein, you landed. What

happens now? Talk to me about that, kind of what went down.

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A Absolute chaos.

Q What do you mean?

A We were met by a sea of ambulances, fire trucks, people.

Once again, I thought it was the militia hanging out at Ramstein Air

Base, because there were so many people out there. There was a -- right

outside the window, after I got in the chocks, there was a one-star

and four-star general.

Q Do you know who they were?

A The one-star was a base commander at the time, the

three-star was Breedlove, General Breedlove.

Q How do you know it was Breedlove?

A I had seen him before, and he was actually friends with

another general that I knew. General Breedlove was the USAFE

commander, and they would have rah rah videos with him in it, you know,

playing at Ramstein Air Base.

Q All right.

A There was a whole flood of people outside the airplane when

we got in there. I told my load master, who generally goes outside

the airplane while we're shutting down the engines, in case any fire

starts or anything like that. I told him, Do not let anyone on this

airplane, because I know they're going to try and rush it, and it's

going to be complete chaos.

So I turned all four engines off, and I ran downstairs, because

I knew my load master was not going to be able to stop the sea of people.

I told one maintenance person, I said, one maintenance person can

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come on the airplane, and the only other people that I want on this

airplane are the medical folks. Everyone else, stay off my airplane.

I got kind of a strange look from the one star and the three star telling

them that they couldn't come on my airplane, but I had two critical

patients. One guy, we didn't know if he was even going to make it back,

so I wanted to get him to the hospital. The medical folks came on.

I let two folks come on that were dealing with the human remains, kept

everyone else off.

The medical team started, you know, obviously, getting the

critical care guys off and all that kind of stuff. The base commander

and General Breedlove -- one of the base commanders kept telling me

that they needed to take the 33 walk-on folks off the airplane because

right next to them was standing four or five guys in business suits,

and he turned out to be the U.S. Ambassador to Germany. Yes, U.S.

Ambassador to Germany.

Q Do you recall who it is?

A I don't know his name.

Q Was it Ambassador Murphy?

A I honestly don't know.

Q That's okay. Go ahead, please.

A The base commander was absolutely adamant that the

Ambassador needed to speak to the walk-on folks. I said, well, that's

fine. When I get all the medicals -- you know, all the people that

are injured off the airplane, you can come on the airplane and talk

to them.

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At that point, the base commander was very insistent that they

needed to come with him, away from the airplane, to talk to the

Ambassador. The Ambassador wanted to remove them from the airplane

immediately.

I said he was -- he could not do that. I said -- one of the things

that happened while we were in Tripoli, is the contractors were very

adamant about they were going to be the guys to load the four HRs.

Nobody else was going to touch them. They took the four bodies off

and loaded them on the airplane.

I told the one star, I said, I guarantee those guys are going to

want to be here when we -- when they take them off.

We were not able to do a ceremony to receive them on the airplane,

and I was going to have a ceremony done when we got to Ramstein, no

ifs, ands, or buts. They were not going to just remove them. We just

didn't have the time to do it in Tripoli. That's -- so it became a

little bit of a fight between the base commander and I, who -- I would

say he probably asked three for four times, said, I need to take the

folks with the Ambassador, and we need to leave. And I said, no, I

need them to stay here right now, because we're going to do a ceremony

for these guys. So it became a little bit of a fight.

Finally, we brokered a deal where he was going to take them with

the Ambassador. They were going to talk to them, but he assured me

that he would allow at least the six guys that loaded the bodies, he

assured me that he would take them back out to the airplane. It ended

up that all 33 folks came back out for the ceremony when we removed

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the body. So, I think everybody was pretty adamant about wanting to

be there.

Q Approximately how long were they with the Ambassador?

A An hour.

Q Do you have any firsthand knowledge of what was discussed?

A No.

Q Do you have any secondhand knowledge of what was discussed?

A No.

Q All right. Continue on.

So they were with the Ambassador, you are doing your airplane

stuff --

A We were addressing the four HRs. You know, we quickly put

flags on when we were leaving Tripoli, but it was -- you know,

when -- when the DAO told us we need to go, we were not able to, you

know, neatly dress the coffins and everything. So we got all that done.

We got all the ambulatory folks off the airplane, everybody that needed

medical assistance, they all went, and now it was the 33 people that

walked onto the airplane, came back out. There was a color guard that

came out, and so we did the ceremony taking them off the airplane at

Ramstein.

Q I'm sorry. Please continue. So you get the bodies off.

A We get the bodies off, and I went and debriefed our

intelligence folks as to what happened.

Q And is, typically, that's the first thing you do when you

finish a mission, debrief the intel people?

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A No, that's not typical.

Q Okay.

A It was just a lot of stuff that happened that day.

Q Okay. Briefly talk about the gist of that conversation.

A Basically ran through everything that had gone on. A lot

of things that we learned. Because, basically, when I'm debriefing

the intel folks, you know, nobody else had been into Tripoli. We had

some CIA reports, so I give them information in case somebody else is

going in, and that's how they kind of build up their report.

I'll -- I'll correct myself. Normally, when we get back from a

mission down range, Afghanistan, Iraq, that kind of stuff, we would

hand in our tactics bag, and we would give them a brief summary if we

got shot at, what would happen, and stuff like that. But this

was -- this was more of a complete rundown of what had happened the

whole time.

Q All right. So you debriefed with intel. Any idea what

time it is? Is it midnight yet?

A Probably close to midnight.

Q Okay. What next?

A I went to bed.

Q So you get back to the hotel?

A Yes. Yes, I went back to the hotel.

Q And do you recall what time you got back to the hotel?

A No, sir.

Q That takes us to the morning of the 13th?

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A Yes, sir.

Q Talk to me about that day.

A I got up in the morning, had breakfast, walked over to the

tactics shop, which is where we had gone the day before when we had

left. I checked my email, and I saw the email from General Johns

congratulating us on a good job. I had another email from somebody

at TACC asking me questions about what had gone on, a description,

various questions about the mission.

After I checked my email, I went back into the tactic shop, and

that's when the intelligence officer sat me down and told me

that -- that they had tried to take a missile shot at the end of the

runway when we were departing.

Q Just continue on, please.

A Oh, sorry.

Q That's all right.

A I got done talking to her, and then I went back to my hotel

room. Over the next few days, I received a few emails or calls asking

about various details of the mission. I don't recall who, with whom

I had those, or anything like that. That's basically it.

Q So some time in the morning of the 13th, you're back at the

hotel. Basically, you're off duty, per se?

A Yes.

Q And did somebody physically say, you've got 48 hours, 96

hours, 72? What was your guidance, or what were you directed to do?

A No. Because basically, when they have a mission in mind

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for us, that's when they call me. I've got 2 hours to respond, then

I have 12 hours of crew rest, and then I go back into Bravo status.

Q Okay.

A So until they call me, I am not on the hook for anything.

It ended up that they called us, set us up for another mission, and

the next day, that's when we went to (REDACTED)

Q And that mission would have been on the 14th?

A Yes. (REDACTED)

Q Do you know what their mission is?

A (REDACTED)

Q Check. Were these guys pilots or maintainers?

A (REDACTED)

Q At your hotel, were any of the 33 folks staying there also?

A Yes.

Q I think you mentioned earlier you spent some time with them

subsequently?

A Yes.

Q Anything about your conversations with them that you think

would be important for us to know or would lend guidance to our

understanding?

A A couple of things that they told me that --

Q And, I apologize. As you do this, please, try to

specifically tell me who you were speaking to or who may have told you

this.

A I couldn't give you specific names, honestly.

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One person was telling me that they actually got notification from

(REDACTED) So they knew that it was -- I believe it was Ansar Al

Sharia. While the whole battle was going on, they knew who it was.

They related to me the story about them getting into the Bombardia-700

with some of the injured guys. I know they told me the story about

one of the guys losing -- they didn't really come out and say he lost

Ambassador Stevens, but it was kind of like that's the guy over there

who was the last guy to see Ambassador Stevens. And there was various

other stories, but they kind of detailed -- I remember the last day

before they went home, there was a bunch of us eating German food, and

one of the guys -- a couple of the guys told me that they were told

at one point to stand down, that they were told not to go. Nothing

specific beyond that.

Q To the best of your knowledge, did all of those folks stay

there? Were they all staying there in the hotel with you, to the best

of your knowledge?

A Yes. Yes, they were.

Q And do you recall what -- did they all generally leave the

same day or depart the same day?

A Yes.

Q Do you know where they went?

A Back to Washington, D.C.

Q While in those -- approximately what date was that?

A Maybe the 15th -- I would've --

Q Okay.

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A Approximately.

Q (REDACTED) --

A The 14th.

Q -- 14th, right? So you think it might have been the

following day?

A Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

Q Okay. And while they were there, are you aware if they had

any meetings or briefings or anything?

A They all told me that they were being debriefed by Homeland

Security, the FBI.

Q They specifically said, the Homeland Security and the FBI

are talking with us?

A Yes. Yes.

Q Did they mention any other organizations that they were

speaking with?

A The CIA.

Q Okay. Did they discuss the nature of their conversations

with any of these organizations?

A The -- the actual conversations they were having? No.

Q Did you ever subsequently fly any missions into Tripoli?

A No.

Q Are you aware of anyone who did in the coming weeks and

months that you personally know?

A Somebody I met said that they had flown in there a couple

of weeks later. I -- I can't recall who it was.

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Q Do you know what the gist of that mission was?

A No, sir.

Q I want you to think about the ramp there at Ramstein on the

11th and 12th, and just talk to me about what kind of aircraft that

you physically saw located on the ramp. Not -- to the extent that you

can recall.

A It was just C-5 and C-17s. They had a squadron of C-130s

at the far end of the airfield and that was, you know --

Q So if I'm in the tower, and the airstrip is right there in

front of me, and it's going left and right, to the left is the ramp

space with the C-130s?

A Yes.

Q And then the bigger planes were to the right?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Do you recall how many -- you said a squadron of C-5s

or --

A No. The ramp was, honestly, fairly empty. I don't

specifically remember if it was C-5 or C-17 on the ramp.

Q Okay. Either/or?

A I know there was aircraft on the ramp that I don't know the

type and number.

Q That's okay. Approximately how many of those type

aircraft -- of the bigger planes that you could see, roughly?

A I was -- I mean, five, roughly.

Q Okay. How about the C-130s?

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A Honestly, no idea.

Q Okay.

A They were 12,000 feet away, down at the other end of the

airfield.

Q Got it. Are you familiar with the heavy aircraft wing over

in Papa, Hungary?

A The heavy aircraft wing? I know we have assets in Hungary,

but I don't know --

Q What assets in Hungary that you are aware of?

A Well, I think they had a -- I think they had a transit

station over there that we were flying C-17s and C-5s through.

Q Okay. Anything else?

A What's that?

Q Anything else about that?

A Not specifically about Hungary.

Q Are you aware -- in your conversations with those folks in

the hotel subsequent to returning to Ramstein or any other time, did

you become aware of any kind of request for airlift supports to either

Benghazi or Tripoli that was made and was denied?

A They mentioned something about that, yes.

Q And, again, who is "they"? I know you don't know specific

names, but it was --

A Don't know specific names. They said they had made a

request, that there was also a request for a month prior for C-130 to

be stationed at Benghazi, and that request had been denied, just that

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there was a general request for help, but that -- that's about it. I

mean, nothing specific.

Q Okay. That's all right. Do you recall if those persons

that made that statement about the request, were they State Department

personnel or other? If you don't know, please don't guess.

A I don't know. I don't know.

Mr. Tolar. All right.

Mr. Richards. Mac, could we just clarify the timeframe he's

talking about as far as when that request was made?

Did you say a month in advance of the attack the request was made?

Mr. (REDACTED). I was -- yes. They said that they had made the

request a month previous to have a C-130 stationed on the ground in

Benghazi, and that the request had been denied.

Mr. Richards. But that's the only request for help you were told,

correct?

Mr. (REDACTED). No. That was just one additional thing that

they had done.

Mr. Richards. Okay.

Mr. (REDACTED). There was a request for help, but then they had

also talked about the C-130 that had previously been requested.

Mr. Richards. Thank you.

Mr. (REDACTED). Those are two separate conversations.

Mr. Richards. Okay.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q It's okay.

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Real quick, I want to go back to the morning of the 12th and just

get a little more details about the nature of your preparation in terms

of your briefings and the tactical shop and the intel shop. Walk me

through a little more detail about what you learned in each one of those.

For example, in the intel briefing, what kind of stuff were they

telling you aside from the weather?

A The intel briefing, we were given pictures of the airfield.

Q The Tripoli airfield?

A Of the Tripoli airfield.

Q Yes.

A We were given satellite pictures that they had pulled.

Q Okay.

A They had showed where they thought it would be parked, which

was over in the VIP ramp, so they had kind of given us an idea of where

we were going to be going. Beyond that, it was -- for instance, when

they -- the intel gal started briefing me, she went through the whole

thing, basically said, we don't know a lot. (REDACTED) You can read

this on your way. And I looked at her, and I said, well, what about

the 20,000 shoulder-launched missiles they've been briefing us on the

contingency side for the last year? And she went, uh, I don't know.

So having flown contingency missions over there for the last 10

years, I had a better understanding of what the threats were over there

than some of the intel folks.

Now, granted, they rotate in and out, so --

Q Do you recall her rank?

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A Tech sergeant. It was -- it was -- it was maybe a master

sergeant. I don't specifically know.

Q Do you recall her name?

A No.

Q Okay. All right. So you got all -- and talk very briefly

about the nature of the documents, (REDACTED) she handed you to read

en route. Were they emails? Why they cables? What was it?

A No. So typically, we get what's called an airfield

summary. Airfield suitability report -- airfield suitability report.

She gave me an unclassified version and a classified version(REDACTED)

Q And then at the tactic shop, talk a little bit more about

what you learned there, what kind of information you gained there in

that morning briefing.

A Honest, we didn't -- we didn't get anything more out of the

tactics guys. They handed us our mission package. We had our intel

brief, and we really didn't get anything more from our tactics folks.

Q Okay. How about -- it was 2 hours and 39 minutes flight

time from Ramstein to Tripoli? Is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q Do you know what the flight time is to Benghazi from

Ramstein?

A Benghazi and Tripoli are roughly the same air miles. It

doesn't make a difference, no.

Q Okay.

A Because I think they were directly across from each other.

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I mean, they are not that far apart.

Q Right. Had you gotten a call in the middle of the night

to go?

A Um-hmm.

Q How quickly do you believe you could have gotten out of your

bed and landed in Benghazi with all your people and everything you had

with you?

A Honestly, if they would have called me and said, this is

an absolute emergency, get off the ground as soon as you can, we didn't

have to deal with their medical folks, and we had everything ready to

go, they just said, go, conservatively, 4 hours on the ground.

Q You believe you -- so, obviously, if you don't have to deal

with the medical folks, getting them in, prepping, and you don't have

to get more gas, you just, basically, get your briefings, get on the

plane --

A Go.

Q -- go, you believe you could have gone from your bed to

wheels down in Benghazi in 4 hours? Is that correct?

A Yes. Yes.

Q Is that realistic?

A That's conservative. I mean, that's on the conservative

side. If I go down my timeline of 3 hours and 45 minutes to launch,

then it's a different story. But I've actually -- yes, 4 hours

is -- it's completely doable. I've been 20 minutes away from the

airplane, been told that the airfield is closing, I had time to pick

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up my sandwiches and be off the ground in an hour. So -- or in 45

minutes. So, go in and tell tactics, take off, not having to wait,

anything else, 4 hours is very conservative.

Q Did it matter that this might have been in the middle of

the night?

A No, we were on Bravo alert. It didn't matter when we were

called.

Q You could still land, theoretically, in the middle of the

night with your night vision goggles, correct?

A Yes. Again, we would have to have approval, which

shouldn't be a big thing.

Q When you say "approval," you mean diplomatic clearance?

A No. No. No. Because of the obstructions of the

airfield, that's why we had to get three-star general to get out of

there so that would -- we would have to do the same thing, NVGs going

in.

Q Have you ever flown into a country without diplomatic

clearance?

A No.

Q Looking back on it now, do you have -- do you have --

A Let me -- I'll go back.

Q Sure.

A You didn't need it to fly into Iraq, you didn't have to have

diplomatic clearance.

Q Why not?

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A To flew into Afghanistan -- because it was a combat zone.

Q Okay.

A A designated combat zone, and, theoretically, you don't

need a diplomatic clearance. We were in control of Iraq and

Afghanistan. We were in control of the air space. You know, if you're

talking about Libya, we weren't in control of the air space, so we didn't

dictate whether or not you needed a -- you know, you needed to be on

the ATO in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq. You had to be designated

as flying, but it was not a specific diplomatic clearance.

So you would be on the air tasking order; you have reached 537;

you're flying into point stinky, which is the entrance to the AOR of

Afghanistan; you don't need a diplomatic clearance.

Q Thinking back on the events of the 11th and 12th, from your

perspective and based on your experience, were there things that went

wrong or weren't executed well?

A The biggest thing is I was -- I was surprised that not more

of this stuff was set up for us before we got the call to go. Normally,

I --

Q Explain, specifically.

A Normally, I shouldn't have to be trying to find Ravens to

provide security for the airplane. Normally, I shouldn't have to think

of, Hey, we better put a full tank of gas on this, because we don't

have diplomatic clearance. I shouldn't be the one to try and find the

maintenance guy or $30,000 worth of cash before I go out the door.

Normally, that stuff is done for me. That -- that's something that

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could have been done. But I don't know the background or the -- if

the mission was recut, they might not have had time to do that.

Ultimately, though, as the aircraft commander, it's my responsibility,

because if something gets screwed up, they come after me.

Q Anything else that you felt like didn't go well, or looking

back, or could have been done differently or should have been done

differently?

A No, I wouldn't say that, because, literally, everything

was -- there was chaos. Nobody knew what was going on. It was fly

by the seat of your pants, make decisions, be flexible.

Q Why did you need $30,000 cash, potentially?

A In case I had to pay for something to get out of there. And

I think I read something in the airfield suitability report that said,

they don't take credit cards in case you need gas.

Q Where are you going to get $30,000 cash in 20 minutes besides

your checking account?

A The -- yeah. So there was -- there's a lieutenant colonel

that's in charge of the squadron that supports us as we go out for

contingency missions. I don't even remember the guy's name.

Lieutenant colonel walks in right after all this started, and he goes,

Eric, what do you need? I said, $30,000 in cash. And he said, I'll

make a call. So he's actually the one that helped me make the calls

going -- he got -- he made the calls to get the Ravens, the maintenance

guy, and the $30,000 in cash. I called TACC said, this is what I'm

asking for, so we both worked together to try and get all the approvals

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for it.

A courier was not available, so they literally handed me a bag

of money, and I signed for it and went flying. That's the last thing

I got before I left.

Q And I'm going back. Typically, when you were -- at this

point, when you're ready to go, and you've got your mission, are you

typically talking to (REDACTED)] at TACC most times? Is he your

primary POC at this point?

A No. No. No. It's whoever is on duty at that point.

Q Okay.

A Yes.

Q Also, who owned your plane? If you told me that, I don't

remember. I apologize. Who owned the plane that you flew?

A We were cut through CENTOM. But when I say cut to

CENTCOM --

Q They had op -- you were OPCON, operational control, was

CENTCOM?

A Yes.

Q But some Air Force unit -- I mean, it's an Air Force plane,

correct?

A Yes.

Q It belongs to an Air Force squadron?

A Right.

Q Any idea what that was?

A Which squadron owned that particular airplane?

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Q Right.

A It was a McChord plane. We were a McChord crew. So McChord

owned that particular aircraft.

Q Again, anything that should have been done differently,

anything at all?

A I can't think of anything.

Q Okay. Would someone at TACC know what the original mission

was? In order to recut it, you've got to have an original mission,

correct?

A I -- honestly, I don't know that. I -- I don't have an

answer to that.

Q Okay.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q I just have a question on exhibit 1.

A That silly exhibit 1.

Q There's a line that starts "INF," and it starts "positive

launch"?

A Uh-huh.

Q "Mission is on positive launch, awaiting Libya dips." And

it looks like at that time was 10:11 Zulu, so that would have been after

the "Libyan diplomatic approval" line that says 09:38 Zulu. Can you

explain what that means?

A Is it two different people that put -- I mean, is there two

different names on there?

Q Yes. There are two different names.

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A Okay. So if it's two different names, you probably have

one guy -- because everybody has access to it. From what I understand,

everybody has it up. When they get their piece of the pie, they go

in there and enter it. So it could have been the dip clearance guy

put it in. It could have been the -- one of the floor managers that

put it in. So -- I mean, I can look specifically.

So you said the -- Libyan diplomatic approval was at 09:39, and

then Libyan diplomatic approval -- so they are 1 minute apart.

Q Right. And then right below the one Libyan diplomatic

approval at 09:38, there's a line that says," positive launch"?

A Oh. So positive launch is what I was talking about that

I ultimately have to call TACC and said, we're ready to go, can we

launch? And they go, yes.

Q And it says, "Mission is on positive launch awaiting Libyan

dips, crew is encouraged to try for early departure, but they need to

call TACC to coordinate ARR," which I assume is arrival time?

A Confirm dips. ARR would be arrival time, yes.

Q "In HLLT and to either confirm dips or get approval to deploy

without dips."

A Yes.

Q And they were referring to diplomatic clearances?

A Yes.

Q So it seems -- but you're not sure why this particular entry

would have been entered after the entry for the diplomatic approval?

A That's why I was saying there's different people putting

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this stuff in, and probably not talking to each other. But, I mean,

right there, when I say we weren't supposed to go without our diplomatic

clearance, here it even says that we weren't supposed to leave without

it, so -- and that was a decision that we made. And I said, yes, I

will take the aircraft without the diplomatic clearance, and I got

positive launch, and then we went.

Q Earlier, you were talking about the intel briefing that you

received prior to launching, and I think you mentioned that you were

reading (REDACTED)? Do you have any recollection what that document

was?

A It wasn't necessarily (REDACTED), that's why I was talking

about the airfield suitability report. So every airport that we fly

to in the world, we have an airfield suitability report, and it tells

me what the runway links are, what the runway's made out of, what -- how

much weight of an aircraft I can put on it. It's like, literally, 20

pages per airfield.

Q Okay.

A And there's a "remarks" section. And that remark section

is pilots can go in and go, This place was a nightmare, Watch out for

this. (REDACTED)

Mr. Tolar. Let's go off the record, please.

[Discussion off the record.]

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q We're back on the record.

Okay. Go ahead, please.

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A Did you say -- she talked about Papa, and I totally didn't

get that. Is that the Papa wing you were talking about?

Q Papa, Hungary --

A Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. That is the NATO C-17 wing.

Q Correct.

A Yes.

Q What do you know about it?

A I know that they are a squadron. I think they've got eight

airplanes, and it's NATO driven.

Q Let's do this: Is there anything else you can think of that

you -- this committee should be aware of, or you want to share, you

think we should know regarding the events surrounding Benghazi?

A No. I think we've covered everything that I can think of.

Q Is there anyone, or any specific unit that you think we

should reach out to, because they might have something to add that might

be beneficial at our investigation?

A Well, only because you talked about the UAV stuff, I

would -- you would need to find out -- I mean, if you're really

interested in the UAV stuff, I would definitely say you need to talk

to somebody if that -- if you feel has something to do with the

investigation, only because you brought that up a couple of times. And

I don't know enough about that -- that world.

Q TRANSCOM is going to be briefing us tomorrow. Are there

specific questions that you think we should ask them about as it relates

to the events surrounding Benghazi?

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A The only thing that I can tell you is find out who was making

the decision to send us or not to send us. Because, ultimately,

somebody was -- if they were talking about it for 10, 11, 12, 13 hours,

wargaming it and what-iffing it, somebody had to make the ultimate

decision to send us. So what -- what was the chain of events that they

decided to go from sending us to go pick up guys in Sigonella or Croatia,

or now we're, you know, a recovery mission. Obviously, I don't know

any of those specifics. So at some point, you got to go, this guy said

plan the mission; we don't know what we're going to do. Maybe we plan

two different missions at the same time.

But TRANSCOM is, ultimately, going to know what decisions were

made above TACC level, and at the TACC level.

Q In terms of the wargaming, do you know where -- what

department or organization or unit of TAC -- TACC would conduct those?

A It would be the --

Q I mean, I -- future ops or --

A Contingency cell.

Q Is there such a thing?

A Yeah. I mean, there's a --

Q Okay.

A There's a contingency cell; there's a SAAM cell. I think

we were either contingency or SAAM mission.

Q What does SAAM mean?

A Ah, man, I knew you were going to ask me that. I can't even

think of what the name of that is. It's S-A-A-M is the designation.

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Q Okay.

A Anything else or anybody else, anything at all?

Q No, sir. Have you seen the movie, 13 Hours?

A Yes.

Q What was your impression?

A Well done, not political. Some of the stuff that the guys

have told me about what happened, the movie seemed like the watered-down

version. Those are, I guess, my -- my impressions.

Mr. Tolar. That's all I've got. Thank you.

Mr. (REDACTED). Sweet.

Mr. Kenny. So I'm going to guess we've got 15, 20 minutes, so

it's going to take us a second to gather our thoughts.

Mr. (REDACTED). Oh, okay. You're done; he's not done?

Mr. Kenny. We're close, though.

Mr. Tolar. Maybe 15 minutes.

Mr. Kenny. 15, 20 minutes.

Mr. (REDACTED). Okay.

[Recess.]

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[2:37 p.m.]

Mr. Kenny. We'll go back on the record. Time reads 2:37.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Mr. (REDACTED), again, thank you. Appreciate your time

here today. We're hopefully towards the tail end of our interview with

you. And I'm going move as expeditiously as I can through this round

out of respect for your time. So there's a series of topics that cover

things that you said, statements in the last round and earlier today.

So I'm just going to try to work through those as quickly as possible --

A Yes, sir.

Q -- if that works for you.

A Yes, sir.

Q And I'd like to pick up -- I believe where we left off in

the last round there was a discussion about a NATO air base in Hungary.

And I believe you'd indicated that you had an awareness that there were

eight planes that were stationed there. And I'd just like to ask what

that awareness was based on.

A Well, I don't know the specific number of airplanes. I know

NATO owns C-17s. And you couldn't miss them because there was big

P-A-P-A on the tail. You could tell the NATO airplanes.

Q On the night of the attack, did you know at that particular

airfield, how many aircraft they had on site?

A No. I have no idea. You would see them at Ramstein in

onesies, twosies, but I had no idea who was doing what besides us.

Q Okay. You'd also referenced at some point, your belief or

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your awareness that there was a FAST team, Marine Corps FAST team

located in Rota as well as in Sigonella. Is that your recollection?

A Yes.

Q And I'd like to ask again what the basis for that knowledge

is.

A After the fact, somebody told me that there was a FAST team.

I didn't know them by the designation FAST team necessarily.

Q Okay.

A But I did talk to the pilots that were coming in on the two

C-130s. They told me that they had Marines onboard that were coming

from Sigonella. I didn't know them specifically as a FAST team until

at a point later, I flew with a Marine and that Marine said, Oh, yeah,

there's been a FAST team for 2 years at Sigonella and at Rota.

Q Okay. So let me unpack those two things. On the one piece,

when you said you were on a flight and somebody next to you, a Marine

next to you, indicated or informed you that there was a FAST team that

was --

A Yes.

Q -- permanently stationed in Sigonella?

A Yes.

Q Is that correct? Okay. And that was at some point after

the attacks --

A Yes.

Q -- you learned that? Okay. And before -- or sorry. On

September 12, the morning of September 12, as the day progressed, you

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fly to Tripoli. You're in Tripoli, you leave Tripoli, and while you're

departing from Tripoli, you pass two C-130s in the air --

A Yes.

Q -- and you had communication with them?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And they indicated to you that they had Marines from

Sigonella. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And did they tell you -- or did you have -- let me

ask this: Do you know of those teams where they were stationed?

A No.

Q Okay. So you had no awareness of whether those FAST teams

came from Rota or from Sigonella?

A No.

Q Okay. Do you know whether there was a FAST team in

Sigonella on the night of attacks?

A The night of the attacks, I had no idea.

Q Okay.

A No, sir.

Q Okay. Okay. And again, just jumping around a little bit

here, we talked quite a bit about your command relationship with TACC

and your interactions with the TACC. Just to revisit that topic

briefly, it sounds like if we could just summarize some of that

discussion, your discussions about your mission were conducted

primarily or exclusively, it sounds like exclusively, with the TACC.

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Is that correct?

A Ask that again.

Q I'm trying to understand where you were drawing information

from --

A TACC, yes.

Q From the TACC? Okay.

A Yes, sir.

Q And aside from the briefing that you discussed, the

intelligence briefing you discussed, but in terms of mission,

availability of aircraft, your alert status, you received all that from

information from the TACC.

A Yes, sir.

Q So you had know discussions with AFRICOM --

A No, sir.

Q -- direct?

Okay. And you had no discussions with EUCOM about the

availability of air assets?

A No, sir.

Q Okay. Did you -- okay. That's fair. And the reason I ask

is I think at a couple points today, you'd indicated that it's your

belief that your unit was the only available asset for high-priority

missions. And what I would just like to understand is -- that view,

it sounds like you learned that or you were told that from the TACC.

Is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

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Q Okay. And was that somebody within that cell you were

referring to who told you that?

A Yes, sir.

Q Okay. And so would their knowledge be limited in any way

to the assets that were attached or associated with your unit?

A Well, as I said before, TACC controls all military -- all

Air Force military air assets. So ultimately -- I'm trying to think

if EUCOM and AFRICOM -- I think, ultimately, everybody goes through

TACC, but they are separate cells. I may be wrong, but I think AFRICOM

and UCOM -- the air assets are all still -- get their direction through

TACC. But that might be a question to ask the TRANSCOM guys how that

works.

Ms. Rauch. And would that be true with other assets, for example,

the Navy has assets, the Marines have assets, the Army has assets as

well, significant air assets?

Mr. (REDACTED). Just Air Force. Air Force assets.

Ms. Rauch. So it would just be confined to Air Force assets?

Mr. (REDACTED). Yes. Yes, ma'am.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Okay. So the TACC, just to understand the lay of the land

because you refer to it, is they had a view of all assets globally,

but those assets, in fact, refer to U.S. Air Force assets, correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And the reason we ask these questions is because you

made the statement, but then it sounds like, at the same time, there

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was also C-130 that took off before your aircraft took off. Is that

correct?

A Yes. That's correct.

Q And do you know whether that was also coordinated through

the TACC? Do you know anything about the --

A The only thing I know is that they were a local C-130.

That's -- all I knew that it was a local C-130 that took off. And we

were told -- and I talked to someone at TACC and they said, This guy

is going to Tripoli.

Q Okay.

A So somebody at TACC told me that that's where they were

going.

Q Okay. But presumably that meant that there was another

aircraft that was also available, and an air crew that was available

that could dispatch with that C-130. Is that --

A Well, obviously --

Q -- a fair assumption?

A -- because the -- I mean, the crew -- the crew went. I see

what you're saying, clarifying that we were the only crew available

to go do that. That was -- we were the only crew that was available

with an aircraft that could put all the needed parts and pieces to be

able to go to Tripoli. They sent the C-130 as a backup. Anything that

we couldn't get on our airplane would go on that airplane.

Q I understand.

A So --

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Q So, and when you say the needed parts and pieces, what is

it that --

A The CCAT, the Ravens, the maintenance guys, plus be able

to take everybody out there.

Q Okay. So the medical, the security, the additional

personnel? Okay. And, again, as the only available asset, was it your

understanding that you were the only available asset for high priority

missions located at Ramstein under CENTCOM --

A Yes.

Q -- command? Under CENTCOM?

A Yes.

Q Okay. But you had no visibility into whether AFRICOM --

A No, sir.

Q -- had assets available or whether you -- SOCAF or

subordinate commands had air assets --

A (REDACTED)

Q And that would also include EUCOM as well?

A Yes, sir.

Q No visibility into EUCOM --

A No visibility into EUCOM.

Q Okay. We talked about -- a little bit about your views,

and looking back now, it's been some time, but you were asked a question

in the last round, best case scenario how quickly you and your team

could have assembled to move–(REDACTED)

A Yes, sir.

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Q -- you believed from when you received notice to when you

could have arrived somewhere in the country of Libya. Is that --

A Yes, sir.

Q Okay. And just so that my timeline is clear, because I

think at various points, I'd also noted that you said it took 3 hours

and 45 minutes to do a -- to perform your checklist --

A Yes, sir.

Q -- before you depart?

So in order to take off more quickly, you have to abbreviate that

checklist.

A Yes, sir.

Q Is that fair?

A Yes.

Q And what, then, is the shortest time that you feel safe as

a pilot abbreviating that checklist to where you can take off and

perform a mission successfully?

A 30 minutes.

Q Okay.

Mr. Tolar. How many? I'm sorry.

Mr. (REDACTED). 30 minutes.

Mr. Tolar. Thank you.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And that's the best-case scenario, correct?

A That's if everything is like -- yes. That's if everything

is ready to go and somebody is shooting at us and we need to get out

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of there. We could get the airplane off in 30 minutes.

Q Okay. And by "shooting at us," you're referring to the

firefight that was then -- that was unfolding throughout the course

of the night?

A No, no, no, no. I'm saying -- I'm saying if it comes right

down to it and I need to get that airplane off the ground, I can do

it in 30 minutes. I'm not referring to anybody shooting anywhere else.

Q Okay.

A You said how long could I comfortably -- how long would it

comfortably take me to get off the ground, outside of this instance?

30 minutes.

Q And that's assuming you and the aircraft was under some sort

of threat. Is that right? I guess I'm -- to back up, I thought I heard

you say if you were under fire or to help people under fire.

A It was an example.

Q Okay.

A I apologize. If everything is ready to go, the maintenance

status is good, I don't need to load anybody else, I can comfortably

do my checklist, start the engine, taxi out in 30 minutes.

Q And unfortunately it sounds like not everything was ready

to go. At least --

A Correct.

Q -- when you reported --

A Correct.

Q -- in the morning of the twelfth.

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A Correct.

Q Okay. (REDACTED) -- that's, again, a best-case scenario.

And given how factors unfolded on the ground, didn't seem likely or

attainable on the night, the night of, based on pre-posturing and those

sorts of things?

A Based upon what the mission was changed to at whatever

point, because now we became a aeromedical evacuation. I mean,

there's -- you know, you could -- there's 1,000 different factors that

you could throw into it(REDACTED) And that's even a comfortable

timeline for getting down there.

Q But as you've acknowledged about Tripoli, the situation in

Tripoli, even by the morning, seemed to be an uncertain situation.

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you have an awareness in Benghazi that what the sense

of the security situation was throughout the --

A No, sir.

Q -- course of that night?

A No, sir.

Q So you had indicated in one of your briefings that you'd

asked the briefer about a reference to surface-to-air missiles, that

threat.

A Yes.

Q Did you understand that that threat was present throughout

the country of Libya to include any airport in Libya?

A That is the threat that I based upon the intelligence

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briefings that I had before, I didn't have it assigned to any particular

airfield. I just know that those assets were missing in Libya.

Q But as a pilot, was missing or unaccounted for

surface-to-air missiles a concern to you?

A Yes.

Q Okay. That's a reasonable concern to have.

A Yes, it is.

Q Okay. Okay. You were asked some questions in the last

round, you described -- this is moving forward a couple days. So after

you had successfully evacuated personnel from Tripoli, you landed at

Ramstein. And you described an encounter that you had with the base

commander there. And it sounded like that there was a difference of

opinion --

A Yes, sir.

Q -- between you and the base commander. And I just want to

make sure that I understand you correctly and the record reflects

correctly. It sounds like the source of that dispute was when to

perform the transfer of remains ceremony or the ramp ceremony for the

fallen.

A No. The disagreement was trying to take away the embassy

staff from the airplane when they made it very clear that they wanted

to stay for the ceremony.

Q I see.

A I --

Q And when you --

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A The guy that was kind of seemed in charge of the embassy

staff, I said, You guys were very adamant about loading the four HRs

on the airplane. I'm assuming that you want to be out here when we

do the ceremony. And he goes, Heck, yeah.

Q And who is that individual?

A I thought I wasn't allowed to say names.

Q You can identify a position, perhaps, or a role.

A He had a baseball cap, beard.

Q Is he security professional?

A Yeah. He was one of the security guys.

Q Okay.

A Yes.

Q Okay. So that individual --

A Those were the guys that were adamant about loading the

bodies and taking the bodies off.

Q Personal --

A The contractors. Yes, they were -- so --

Q And, again, we're cleared up to secret in this room. So

these were the --

Mr. Richards. Not the names of the contractors.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Not the names. But these are -- your understanding is this

group of -- this cohort refers, when you're referring to "these guys,"

(REDACTED)

A Yes.

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Q Okay. And when you landed at Ramstein, they personally

wanted to be present to offload the remains of their colleague and the

other fallen?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. And it sounds like there was a disagreement or a

difference of opinion about when that ceremony would be performed, or

rather, that they would be -- that the survivors would go meet with

the Ambassador, and then would return for a ceremony?

A That was the -- that was the source of disagreement, because

originally, he kept repeating that the Ambassador wants to speak to

embassy personnel. He wants to take them away. And at that point,

after the first or second time he asked, I talked to the security

contractors and said, You guys were pretty adamant about loading your

guys on the airplane. Do you guys want to be out here when we take

them off? So it was like what their location was going to be when we

took the bodies off the airplane.

Q Okay. I understand.

A Yep.

Q And was the Ambassador present for that discussion?

A He was kind of waiting in the wings. He was --

Q So he was on the airfield?

A The Ambassador was right outside the airplane when we opened

up the door. And he was kind of standing there, and the one -- the

base commander kept going over to the Ambassador and then talking to

me, and then going back over to the Ambassador.

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Q Okay.

A So he was conferring with the Ambassador.

Q Okay. I see. And what ended up happening was that those

33 personnel or passengers were offloaded and they accompanied the

Ambassador to --

A A different location.

Q A different location. But then returned for the transfer

of remains ceremony?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And do you know the purpose for which the Ambassador

wanted to gather and summon all the passengers --

A No, sir.

Q Okay. And that was never communicated to you?

A No, sir.

Q Did you watch them all accompany the Ambassador and walk

to a separate facility?

A I saw them get in a bus and they drove away. I didn't see

where -- where they went to.

Q Okay. But at some point, the passengers returned and there

was a --

A Yes, sir. In fact, we held up doing the transfer until they

got back. We specifically waited for those guys to show up.

Q Okay. And, again, I think you mentioned you were unable

to do so in Tripoli because some of the security concerns that were

relayed to you. Is that right?

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A It was -- it was a handful trying to keep the militia guys

with the cell phones up to their ear walking around trying to take

pictures, and I didn't want anybody to get pictures of that.

There was one interesting thing that happened. This is -- I

don't know if this is relevant or not, but I specifically told the

embassy staff: Nobody takes pictures out here. I do not want to

incite these guys to take pictures. There was a Airbus 320 that was

parked up against the gate here. We were parked with the tail this

way. So our door was down. And there was people in the back of the

Airbus with the door open taking pictures down into the cargo bay. You

had all the guys on the ground trying to take pictures.

So I told the embassy staff: We're going to make a wall. Nobody

takes pictures. While -- after we had taken Ambassador Stevens off

the back of the truck, I noticed by the back of the truck, that an

American had his camera and he was pointing back toward the crowd taking

pictures after I specifically said nobody gets pictures.

So I walked over to the gentleman and I said: You have 2 seconds

to put that camera away. I specifically told you nobody gets pictures.

And he looked at me and he said: I'm from the White House staff. I

can do as I please. I said: Do you see that guy over there? And there

was a gentleman that was off to my left. And this guy was huge.

Tattoos on his neck. Very big man. I said: If you don't put that

camera away, that guy over there's going to have something to say about

it. Because we had talked previously. I said: Nobody gets pictures.

At that point, he put --

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Q This is in Tripoli, Correct?

A This is in Tripoli as we're -- we had just got Chris Stevens

off. We had not taken anybody else off, and he's taking pictures.

Q And this American was one of the 33 that you then --

A Yes.

Q -- transported?

A Yes.

Q And did they identify themselves to you other than how you

just described --

A He just said White House staff. He was accompanying a

Polish journalist. That's all I know. We took -- one of the 33 was

a Polish journalist.

Q Okay.

A And we were alerted to go ahead and take him when we were

on the way down to Tripoli.

Q Okay. Again, after you arrived, you described a debriefing

that you participated in. And you described, the following day also,

performing a mission, and then it sounds like by around the fifteenth,

September 15, you had a little bit more down time, and were able to

converse with some of the people you'd evacuated. Is that fair?

A I would say every night when we weren't flying, when I had

time off, I would run into them downstairs. So it was like, you know,

we were flying just during the day and then we'd be back at night. So

I spent time with them the subsequent days after we got back.

Q Yeah. And the "them" here referring to that you spent time

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with are the (REDACTED)

A I don't know it was necessarily just the (REDACTED) It

was -- I had a conversation with I know at least one of the State

Department folks that was the last person to see Chris Stevens. I had

a conversation with -- there was lots of us that talked. We were all

kind of honestly in shell shock and talking about things. So it

was -- it was not necessarily just the security contractors.

Q No, I appreciate the context for that. You had relayed a

couple observations or things that stood out to you. And you recall

at least one conversation with a State Department person. Was that

State Department person the one who provided you any of that information

you discussed in the last round, for instance, (REDACTED) discussions

of a stand-down, those --

A You're talking about that specific State Department guy

that I know who he is? Is that what you're saying?

Q I'm trying -- what we're trying to understand is in the last

round, we heard a lot of "they" and "them." And I know you were asked

do you know who "they" or "them" is and you said, Oh, I don't recall.

But you had very specific recollections of the things that were told

do you. And so I'm not asking for individuals. I'm just asking

for -- do you know, for instance, when somebody indicated to you that

there was mention of a stand-down, don't go, who -- where that

information was coming from, what group of individuals?

A At that point, I didn't really know who was who. So I didn't

know there was a difference between the State Department guys and the

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security contractors. I mean, they all kind of dress the same. They

didn't identify themselves as security contractors or State Department

or -- you know. I didn't know who was who at the time. And it's not

like we've -- it's not like somebody said --

Q But you --

A -- Hey, this -- I'm Jack. I'm CIA, or I'm John from the

State Department. So that's why --

Q Well, you didn't know at the time, but now you may know,

looking back, who those people were.

A I know a couple of who the players are now. But, honestly,

the players that a lot of the guys -- some of the guys that I talked

to, I have no idea who they are because I've never seen them again.

I mean --

Ms. Green. Never talked to them again?

Mr. (REDACTED). No. I know -- I mean, we know the three that

are out public. But -- and I -- there's been a couple of guys that

have gotten through me -- you know, touched base with me on Facebook.

But the guys that I -- that relayed some of these stories to me are

not the specific guys that I talk to now. Some of the guys that are

out now I have talked to, I remember talking to, but none of those guys

are the ones that specifically told me any of these stories or told

me -- relayed what happened.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So are you saying -- so let's just start with -- so because

we can talk about the three --

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A Obviously, one was in the hospital.

Q Correct. You recall speaking to some of those individuals

in the days after the attacks. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And for the specific items that we've discussed

today, you don't recall, sitting here today, whether it was that group

of individuals or you know for certain it was --

A It was not that group of individuals.

Q Okay.

A Yeah.

Q Okay. So, do you know whether they were part of the

diplomatic personnel, for instance?

A I don't know specifically.

Q You don't know whether they were security --

A Okay. So this is how the conversation went at dinner:

(REDACTED)

Q Okay. But --

A (REDACTED)

Q But sitting here today, the individuals that we're talking

about that -- with whom you had these discussions after the attacks

in Germany --

A Yes.

Q (REDACTED)

A (REDACTED)

Ms. Green. So it was an analyst who told you that they were told

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to stand down?

Mr. (REDACTED). Purely by deduction of reasoning. Because it

was not the three we know about. I know about the other two, who they

are. It was none of them that told me that. It was not the last person

to see Ambassador Stevens alive. So we're down to 29. (REDACTED) So

now we're down to 28. So you guys would know better than I do who the

other players are, how many State Department folks, how many analysts

there were. So let's -- just purely by deduction.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q But, again, you didn't know at the time who was who?

A I did not. No.

Q Okay. Okay.

Ms. Green. Can I just ask a question, Peter? Were you aware,

going into Tripoli, whether anyone had conducted a threat assessment

around the Tripoli airport relative to the MANPADS threat prior to U.S.

military aircraft flying into there?

Mr. (REDACTED). Absolutely not. No knowledge of that.

Ms. Green. Do you recall seeing MANPADs at the airport?

Mr. (REDACTED). I never saw any MANPADS myself, no. That's one

of those things where you can hide in a car and you can jump out

and -- pretty scary.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Actually, one quick -- just before we move on to the next

section here. In exhibit 1, the third line of exhibit 1, first page,

we discussed that this is an RCUT. So you believe this is a recut

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mission here at the top. The third line reads, "USEREQ: Correction

to patient onload location," and includes a time stamp of 0758. Do

you see that?

A User request correction to patient onload location.

Q Okay. Looking at the time stamp there, 0758, does that

suggest to you anything about what the previous mission planning may

have been?

A Well, if they're saying correction to patient onload

location, that's probably at the point they decided to switch from

Benghazi to Tripoli.

Q Okay. And did you have an awareness at this time

or -- well, I believe so 0758, would you have been awake, do you recall,

at that time?

A I was awake at that point and calling saying: Can we get

released?

Q Okay. Do you recall about when you rose that morning?

A No.

Q Okay. Okay. I think at this point what we'd like to do,

we're going to move into our final portion. It's going to take a few

minutes to get through it. There have been a series of many allegations

being publicly made about the attacks. One --

A This is the long goodbyes?

Q One job of this committee is to sift through, to sort through

those allegations, and it's something that we've asked every witness

who's come in to speak with us.

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A Okay.

Q These set of questions not looking for speculation, just

trying to understand if you have any firsthand knowledge that would

support --

A Okay.

Q -- any of the allegations. And there's a couple of them.

So it takes a little bit of time to go through so --

A Okay. Let's do it.

Q -- we'll work through it.

The first one is, it has been alleged that Secretary of State

Hillary Clinton intentionally blocked military action on the night of

the attacks. One Congressman has speculated that Secretary Clinton

told Leon Panetta to stand down, and this resulted in the Defense

Department not sending more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of attacks?

A No, sir.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A No, sir.

Q Move to the next one. It has been alleged that Secretary

Clinton personally signed an April 2012 cable denying security to

Libya. And The Washington Post Fact Checker evaluated this claim and

gave it four Pinocchios, its highest award for false claims.

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Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No, sir.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A No, sir.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

spring 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

spring 2011?

A No, sir.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons from Syrian rebels or to other countries.

Bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that, quote, "The CIA was not collecting and

shipping arms from Libya to Syria," closed quote. And that they found,

quote, "no support for this allegation," closed quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

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A I have no -- no, sir.

Q Okay. Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities

in Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A No, sir.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound. And

there have been a number of allegations about the cause of and the

appropriateness of that delay.

House Intelligence Committee issued its bipartisan report,

concluded that the team was not ordered to stand down. But instead,

there were tactical disagreements on the ground over how quickly to

depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand-down order

to CIA personnel?

A No. Not direct knowledge, just other than what I was told.

Q Okay. Putting aside whether you personally agree with that

decision or think it was the right decision, do you have any evidence

that there was a bad or improper reason behind the temporary delay of

CIA security personnel who departed the Annex to assist the Special

Mission Compound?

A No, sir.

Q Concerns have been raised by one individual in the course

of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board, damaging

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documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to the ARB?

A To the what?

Q The ARB.

A (REDACTED)

Q You're referring to documents that were --

A That were at the Annex.

Q -- located in the Annex that were destroyed --

A Yes.

Q -- classified materials at the Annex that were destroyed?

A Right. Right, right, right.

Q And that's part of an evacuation --

A Right.

Q -- procedure?

A Right.

Q Okay. But other than that do you have any evidence --

A No, sir.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No, sir.

Q I'm going to ask you these questions also for documents

provided to Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State

1227
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Department removed or scrubbed damaging documents from materials that

were provided to Congress?

A No, sir.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons, and that he then misrepresented his actions when

he told Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully performed our duties

in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship," closed quote.

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave

false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

A No, sir.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No, sir.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an

intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows

about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday shows?

A Nothing other than what I was told --

Q Okay.

A -- about the cell phones. But I have no direct knowledge

of what she was told or not told. So I don't -- I would say no.

1228
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139

Q Okay. It has been alleged that the President of the United

States was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief," closed

quote, on the night of the attacks and that he was missing in action.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing in action

on the night of the attacks?

A No, sir.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

who were stationed at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks were

considering flying on a second plane in Benghazi and were ordered by

their superiors to, quote, "stand down," closed quote, meaning cease

all operations. Military officials stated those four individuals were

instead ordered to remain in place in Tripoli to provide security and

medical assistance at that location. Republican staff report issued

by the House Armed Services Committee found that, quote, "There was

no stand town ordered issued to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who

sought to join the fight in Benghazi," closed quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House

Armed Services Committee that there was no stand-down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi?

A One of the guys said -- I mean, the whole stand-down thing

was they were talking about Benghazi and Tripoli. So yes, somebody

did tell me, but I don't know who -- like I said, I don't know who the

guy was that told me that.

1229
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140

Q Okay. Is that your understanding that that applied to

U.S. -- four U.S. military personnel in Tripoli?

A I don't know what U.S. military personnel specifically. I

don't know about U.S. military personnel. Again, I don't know who the

particular person was. I just was told they were told not to go. I

don't know if they were military, State Department, nonmilitary. I

don't know what they were.

Q But it is your understanding that those people who were told

not to go were in Benghazi?

A They talked about Tripoli also. They talked about both

places.

Q Okay. And you don't -- and the "they" you're referring to

is who?

A Again, I don't know. I didn't know at the time who these

people are, and I've never seen them again. So --

Q Okay. This is last one. It's been alleged that the

military failed to deploy assets on the night of the attacks that would

have saved lives. Former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon,

the former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted

a review of the attacks after which he stated, quote, "Given where the

troops were, how quickly the thing all happened, and how quickly it

dissipated, we probably couldn't have done more than we did," closed

quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

conclusion?

1230
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UNCLASSIFIED

141

A No, sir.

Q Okay. Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had

military assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could

have saved lives, but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally

decided not to deploy?

A Pentagon? Intentionally? No, sir.

Q Okay. And --

Ms. Rauch. Just one quick follow-up.

Mr. (REDACTED). So one more plus one.

Ms. Rauch. Welcome to Congress.

Mr. Kenny. You hang around long enough, we'll throw more

questions at you.

BY MS. GREEN:

Q I just had a clarification question. You have talked today

about how you were on Bravo alert with this mission to transport a

deceased detainee from Guantanamo.

A Yes, ma'am.

Q Right? Is it possible, going back to exhibit 1, that the

correction to the patient unload location is referring to the shift

from that mission to the mission in Tripoli?

A No. Because they had not even left. They had just arrived

at Dover. So they had not even cut a mission for us to take him down

to Yemen. They had just got to Dover and they needed to process the

body. Another crew had to take them to Germany, and then we would get

the body. So they had not even -- they were still 20-plus hours out

1231
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UNCLASSIFIED

142

from even building a mission for us.

Q Is it possible they were just making a correction? Did you

ever receive direction that your mission was to go to Benghazi?

A No. No one ever said -- by the time they got -- gave me

the mission, we were going to Tripoli. That's what the decision had

been made.

Ms. Green. Thank you.

Mr. Kenny. Great. Thank you. Go off the record.

Mr. Tolar. Stay on the record. I got one question, I promise.

Mr. (REDACTED). Yes, sir.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Real quick. The guy taking photos in Tripoli, you said he

said: I'm with the White House. I can do what I want, or words to

that effect?

A Yes.

Q Is that accurate?

A Yes.

Q Can you describe that person physically?

A No.

Q He indicated he was there with --

A Shorter than -- I'm sorry. Shorter than me. Accurate

description, I cannot -- I cannot give it to you.

Q And he indicated he was there with a Polish journalist?

A Yes.

Q Did you see that journalist?

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143

A Yes.

Q Do you have any reason to question the veracity of that

statement?

A That he was a Polish journalist? No. I was told by four

different service -- or four different people that he was a Polish

journalist.

Q Who were the people that told you that? I mean --

A The folks at TACC, the DAO, the lieutenant colonel, and then

one or two people on the ground.

Q Did those two folks stay in the hotel for a couple of days

with everybody else after you returned to Ramstein?

A I honestly never saw them again.

Q We keep talking about 33 people. Was there a manifest

created for your flight out of Tripoli?

A No, sir. The lieutenant colonel DAO, I told him, I would

like you to stand at the top of the ramp, and I want you to physically

verify every person that gets on this airplane. Because I'm being told

a Polish journalist is going to get on. I got guys walking on with

guns with blood all over them. I don't know who anybody is. I said,

I need you to vouch for every single solitary person that gets on this

airplane.

Q And, again, who was the lieutenant colonel?

A We've tried to put together who he was. I just know him

as one of the defense attache officers. I thought he was Air Force.

I've heard he's Army. I don't know.

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144

Q But there was never a roster or manifest created for the

flight?

A No, sir.

Q Was there anybody else that you saw that you could recall

that perhaps looked out of place, they weren't maybe company people

or they weren't State Department? Anybody that gave you that

impression?

A No, sir.

Mr. Tolar. That's all I have. Thank you very much. Appreciate

your time.

Mr. Kenny. Off the record.

[Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

1234
INTERVIEW OF

LIBYAN NATIONAL

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MARCH 22, 2016
This report was not cleared for public release.

1236
INTERVIEW OF

GENERAL JOHN KELLY

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MARCH 23, 2016
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

PHILIP G. KIKO, Staff Director and General Counsel

CHRIS DONESA, Deputy Staff Director

CRAIG MISSAKIAN, Deputy Chief Counsel

MAC TOLAR, Senior Counsel

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

HEATHER SAWYER, Minority Chief Counsel

SHANNON GREEN, Minority Counsel

LAURA RAUCH, Minority Senior Professional Staff

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

EDWARD RICHARDS

BILL HUDSON

1238
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Mr. Tolar. Good morning, sir.

This is a transcribed interview of General John Kelly, United

States Marine Corps, conducted by the House Committee on Benghazi.

This interview is being conducted voluntarily as part of the

committee's investigation into the attacks on U.S. facilities in

Benghazi, Libya, and related matters pursuant to House Resolution 567

of the 113th Congress and House Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

Sir, would you please state your name for the record?

General Kelly. John F. Kelly, United States Marine Corps,

retired.

Mr. Tolar. Thank you. So the committee appreciates your time

here today. It is very important. It is much obliged.

My name is Mac Tolar, and I'm with the committee's majority staff.

At this point, I'd ask everyone in the room to please introduce

themselves, starting to my left with Craig.

Mr. Missakian. Craig Missakian, General, with majority staff.

Good to meet you.

Ms. Rauch. Laura Rauch with the minority staff.

Ms. Sawyer. Heather Sawyer with the minority staff.

Ms. Green. Shannon Green, minority staff.

Mr. Hudson. Bill Hudson with the Office of the Secretary of

Defense General Counsel.

Mr. Richards. Edward Richards with DOD OGC.

Mr. Tolar. If the court reporters will note for the record that

Congressman Jordan and Congressman Westmoreland are also present,

1239
5

please.

And, sir, just in terms of the ground rules for this morning,

what's going to happen is the majority is going to ask questions for

1 hour. At that time, we'll take a head call, and then the minority

will have an opportunity to ask questions for an hour. We will continue

to rotate that way until each of us have exhausted all of our questions.

Does that make sense?

General Kelly. Sure.

Mr. Tolar. Perfect.

As you can see, we've got reporters here. Katy and Catalina are

taking down everything we say verbatim. As we go through, they're

going to try and get as clear a record, transcript as they can. As

such, I would ask that you please avoid answering questions with a nod

of your head or "uh-huh" or "huh-uh." Please say "yes" or "no."

General Kelly. Got it.

Mr. Tolar. Otherwise, they will kick me with their shoe or

something.

General Kelly. All right.

Mr. Tolar. Also, please try to avoid talking over one another.

I have a tendency to do that sometimes, and I apologize in advance when

I do, but if you could do the same.

General Kelly. Sure.

Mr. Tolar. To the best of your ability, please share with the

committee what you recall specifically. If you're unsure of a

response, please don't guess. Just say "I don't know." That's okay.

1240
6

If you know who might have the answer to that question, I'd

appreciate hearing that, or where that answer could be -- where we might

gain that answer, we'd appreciate that.

For the record, please note Mr. Pompeo is also present.

Mr. Pompeo. Hello, General Kelly. How are you doing?

Mr. Tolar. As well as Phil Kiko, the staff director for the

Committee on Benghazi; as well as Chris Donesa, the deputy staff

director for the committee.

Sir, you are required to answer questions from Congress

truthfully. Do you understand that?

General Kelly. I do.

Mr. Tolar. This also applies to questions posed by congressional

staff in an interview. Do you understand this?

General Kelly. I do.

Mr. Tolar. Witnesses that knowingly provide false testimony

could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury and/or for making

false statements. Do you understand this?

General Kelly. I do.

Mr. Tolar. Is there any reason why you cannot provide truthful

answers to today's questions?

General Kelly. No reason why.

Mr. Tolar. Sir, that's the end of my preamble.

Does the minority have anything to add?

Ms. Green. General, we just very much appreciate you coming in

to talk with us voluntarily. And it's a privilege to have you here,

1241
7

and we look forward to your testimony.

General Kelly. Thanks.

Mr. Tolar. For the record, please note that Chairman Gowdy is

present.

The clock on the wall says 9:37. Sir, we are going to go on the

record and begin asking questions.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Would you please walk me through your billets as a flag

officer in the Marine Corps?

A My billets as a flag officer.

Q Yes, sir.

A I started out as brigadier general with the -- I was the

assistant division commander of the First Marine Division. And that

2-year period, from 2002 to 2004, most of that time was spent in Iraq.

Started, of course, with the invasion of Iraq and then finished roughly

2 years later when I was reassigned duty as the Marine Corps'

legislative assistant. We really worked for the Commandant, but

technically you worked for the Secretary of the Navy.

Did that for 3 years, so '04 to '07. Made major general while

I was in that billet. Was then reassigned to the West Coast to command

the First Marine Expeditionary Force. That's a corps-level -- if

you're talking Army, that would be a corps-level organization. And

I took that organization back into Iraq for 14 months, '08-'09.

There were in the neighborhood of, I would say -- pretty good

1242
8

number -- it would be 40,000 U.S. military personnel, mostly Marines

but a lot of soldiers as well, and about 100,000 Iraqi police and

soldiers that worked for me during that period.

I came out of that in early '09 and was assigned duty or promoted

to three stars after confirmation by the Senate and spent the better

part of 2 years commanding the Marine Corps Reserve Component, and

that's headquartered in New Orleans.

At the end of that, I was drafted by Secretary Gates -- and I say

that in a positive way, having been actually drafted in 1970, which

wasn't so positive -- but drafted by Secretary Gates as a three-star

to be what's called the SMA, the senior military assistant. Very,

very, very unique job.

And when Secretary Gates left after 5 months, I continued on with

Secretary Panetta. Did that till November of '12 when I then confirmed

by the Senate and went and took demand in November '12 of the United

States Southern Command headquartered out of Miami.

Then retired from Active Duty on the 1st of February this year.

Q Talk to me briefly about your responsibilities as a COCOM

commander. And in terms of the responsibilities, does it vary from

COCOMs in terms of authority and things of that nature?

A The way the U.S. military is organized, the combatant

commanders, of course, are considered to be the so-called warfighters.

They're the operators, four-stars. The service chiefs, members of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, are title 10 guys and -- well, guys now -- and

they are responsible to the Nation to train, organize, and equip their

1243
9

organizations for fighting, for warfare. So they train, organize, and

equip through the process in the Pentagon, and then they give those

units to COCOMs to fight. That's what they do as service chiefs.

What they do as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of course,

is meet together with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a

regular basis -- twice a week is a rule -- and sort out other things,

to include operational things. And, of course, the Chairman and the

Vice Chairman, both of whom are four-stars, spend a great deal of

time -- and that is really where kind of the political and the military

comes together in many ways -- and they spend a great deal of time -- I

know the Vice Chief, in particular, regardless of who he is, spends

a great deal of time in the White House, back and forth, going to one,

I'm sure, hugely interesting meeting after another.

So back on the COCOMs. The COCOMs are the warfighters. Their

direct boss is the Secretary of Defense. And in the chain of command,

it's one more level to the President of the United States. As a COCOM,

your staff is constantly interacting with the Joint Staff in the

Pentagon. The COCOM himself will interact a lot with the staff on an

as-needed basis. But it's very important to understand that the staff

is not in the chain of command of a COCOM. The President is at the

top, the Secretary of Defense, and then we COCOMs work for the Secretary

directly.

So day to day, week to week, when a COCOM looks at his area of

operations -- they're oftentimes very, very different. Mine was

overwhelmingly taken up with partnership-building and with drug

1244
10

interdiction. And my responsibility was the entire Caribbean and

everything south of Mexico. Mexico was not in my area of

responsibility, but, in fact, we worked with the Mexicans all the time.

And I think in my case more so than perhaps the other combatant

commanders, we were really the model for interagency cooperation,

meaning in the interdiction-of-drugs world, in the protection of the

southwest border, it's really where the military -- that's me -- comes

together with Homeland Security and Justice and Treasury. So my

day-to-day relationships with FBI, DEA, all of the, you know --

Q Sure.

A -- was constant, I think probably much more so than the other

combatant commanders.

Q So I --

A But -- okay. I'm sorry.

Q No, please, go ahead.

A Well, we didn't control everything, obviously. The State

Department plays a big role in the world.

Q What do you mean "control everything," please?

A Well, as an example, if I wanted to -- which happened many,

many, many times -- if I wanted to open an initiative with the

country -- and we were very, very close and I think all the combatant

commanders were very close, as a general rule, with the country teams.

We might be closer with the country teams than the country

teams -- that's the Ambassador and his embassy team -- in some cases,

maybe closer with them than they are to Washington. Generally

1245
11

speaking, very close. Every country is very different.

So I found -- and I think I could speak for the COCOMs -- generally

speaking, you are talking, the staff or the COCOM himself, talking to

the right people in the embassy all the time.

Now, again, the interagency -- and I speak here mostly about the

State Department -- they've got their own views, different cultures,

different ways of looking at problems, certainly different ways of

looking at solving problems. And so we would have to not defer to them

but certainly work out issues with the State Department and, you know,

usually pretty successful in doing it.

But, again, two different cultures, two different ways of doing

business. But for sure, a COCOM cannot insert himself into something

in a country without the State Department agreeing to it.

Q Let's get back to that in a few minutes, if you don't mind.

A Sure.

Q In terms of your authority as a COCOM commander, did you

have the authority to waive crew day for pilots operating in your AOR?

A I could have done that.

Q You could have. How far down the chain below you could

someone waive crew day?

A That would be in my -- either myself or my deputy, a

three-star, whoever that would be. But, frankly, if I didn't have

authority to do anything that I thought I needed to do, I picked the

phone up and call the Secretary of Defense, who would be my boss. If

I got pushback on anything that I thought was critical, I would call

1246
12

the Secretary of Defense.

Q Could you waive crew rest?

A Never came up, so I'm not sure, so I don't want to guess

at it. But if I couldn't waive it, again, in a second I would call

the people that could waive it.

Q And, again, General Dempsey was not in your chain of command

per se, correct? You went straight to the Secretary of Defense?

A Right.

Q Thank you.

Talk to me a little bit about your billet as the SMA and kind of

what your day-to-day routine was, standing meetings or briefings, how

you interacted with the Secretary, et cetera.

A Unique job. Every Secretary, I think, is different to

one degree or another with his SMA. I know Secretary Gates did it

slightly different than Secretary Panetta did. But, generally, very

few people know about the billet, or care about it may be a better way

to put it, but it is a hugely influential billet.

Q How so?

A Well, you are literally, you know, in bed with the Secretary

of Defense almost 24/7. You're in his office less --

Q "Literally." Do you have a desk in his office?

A Well, right outside his office, yeah. But, you know, you

didn't go through -- the SMA, generally speaking, is the gatekeeper,

meaning no one was between me and the Secretary of Defense, either one

of them that I work for, both tremendous gentlemen.

1247
13

My counterpart originally with Secretary Gates was Robert Rangel,

who had been there for a number of years with Secretary Gates. When

Secretary Panetta came in, the only person he brought with him was

Jeremy Bash. Jeremy and I worked side by side, very quickly

established a friendship and a working relationship. Jeremy did

probably 90 percent, 80 percent of the interaction, the

chief-of-staff-type interactions with the political types -- State

Department, at the higher levels, NSS, that kind of thing -- for a lot

of different reasons. I did all the rest.

So my workday, as an example -- I lived over at the Navy Yard at

the time. My workday would generally start at my desk at 4 a.m., where

I would start the process of reading all of the emails. Neither

Secretary Gates nor Secretary Panetta used email. Secretary Gates had

an email account, but it was between him and his wife and his kids.

He never took anything official over his email. Consequently, I got

about 400 emails a day, which is fine; it's the job.

So I'd be at the desk at 4 a.m. Both Secretaries would roll in

about 7:30. At that point, the day is set up for them, and then we

start the process, "Okay, this is what your day looks like, boss." Very

early on, right after that would be the CIA would come in, CIA briefer,

to give them the Presidential book brief.

In my case, in both Secretaries of Defense, I was in every meeting

I wanted to be, and I was in the vast majority of the meetings just

because I would, you know, take notes and, frankly, hold the briefer

accountable. If it was a sloppy brief, I wouldn't hesitate to stop

1248
14

the brief and say, "Try again tomorrow."

Q Other than the morning PBB brief, were there any other

standing briefings or meetings with you or the Secretary?

A I mean, my involvement with him was constant. So there was

never a meeting between John Kelly or Jeremy Bash; it was constant.

Q Sir, I apologize. I mean the briefings delivered to you

and/or to Secretary Panetta from somebody else other than the PBB brief.

A That would be on a case-by-case basis according to the

schedule.

Q Okay. Nothing outstanding that was --

A As a general rule, no. It would just be case by case.

Now, people, particularly Secretary Panetta, who is very much a

talker, he would have a lot more people just do, not drop-ins, but

drive-bys, if you will, to bring them up on something.

And I adjusted to the way that Mr. Panetta worked. I would

oftentimes just call down to the Joint Staff, as an example, and say,

"Hey, send a one-star or maybe a two-star up here or even a colonel.

He had a question in the intel this morning." And I would do that for

two reasons: one, to get the younger guy, if you can imagine a one- or

two-star as being younger, but to get him or her up in front of the

Secretary just for professional development purposes; and they're the

ones with the information.

Q Did you participate in phone calls with the Secretary?

A Always.

Q How did you do that?

1249
15

A He'd never get on the phone without -- I would say, as a

general rule, never get on the phone without me. The phone in the

Secretary's office -- all of the phones have two receivers. They're

both push-to-talk. So if someone called in, the scheduler would come

directly to me sometimes and say, hey, so-and-so is on the phone. It

could be the National Security Advisor; it could be a lot of different

people.

I'd go in, tell the boss, the Secretary, they want to talk to you

about whatever. And I would say, remember the brief you got 2 weeks

ago, and, you know, this is -- and I'd frame it for him, although

99 percent of the time they could converse.

Then they'd pick the phone up, and in the course of the

conversation we'd both be listening in. And sometimes I would -- we'd

be talking sometimes as the person is talking, asking whatever. And,

of course, when the Secretary needed to respond, he would press the

little button and respond.

This was the same thing on weekends. If anyone wanted to talk

to the Secretary of Defense on weekends, they'd call me first. My

weekend routine was just about the same as my regular workday, roughly

4 a.m. to about 2000 at night. And once whether it was the White House

or whoever called me and said so-and-so wants to talk to the

Secretary -- it wasn't all that common on weekends that someone at a

high level would want to talk to him, but it'd be the same routine.

I'd then get the Secretary on the phone. Secretary Panetta, as

you probably know, went home to California quite a bit on

1250
16

weekends -- get him on the phone if he was close to a red switch. If

not, we'd have to put the thing on ice until he'd get close to a red

switch. And then he'd get on. I'd bring in whoever wanted to talk

to him. They'd have a conversation and then -- so it's a very, very

influential billet.

Q Just for the record, what's a red switch?

A I'm sorry. Red switch would be a phone that you could

converse on in a classified way up to Top Secret.

Q Thank you.

Prior to today, sir, have you ever been questioned about the

events surrounding the attacks in Benghazi?

A I have not.

Q Are you familiar with the Accountability Review Board, the

ARB?

A No. I don't -- no. I mean, I left the job shortly after

Benghazi, so I'm not familiar with that.

Q It was the -- the ARB was established to do an inquiry into

the events surrounding ARB right after the incident in early --

A I probably know that as an after-action effort.

Q You were not questioned by the ARB?

A No. No.

Q Sir, have you ever been to Libya?

A I have.

Q How many times?

A Well, you know, not to make a joke here, but back in the

1251
17

old days, we went pretty close to Libya and drew the mountain, did some

bombing there. That's when I was aboard a Navy ship, but we never did

land.

But the most recent, or the only real time was when I was with

Secretary Panetta in, I think, December '11. We did a quick

touch-and-go coming back from Iraq, Afghanistan, as I recollect, went

into it.

And I would, as the SMA, build a lot of these trips. I mean, there

were standard trips that would draw him to travel. And it was probably

my idea to say, why don't we swing through Libya if the State Department

approves, do a touch-and-go there. It probably would look good. You

could make some conversation.

In retrospect, I probably wish I hadn't done it, just because it

was a pretty dicey stop from at least the guy that was nominally

responsible for the Secretary's safety.

Q Who was with you on that trip?

A Well, the Secretary, and certainly Jeremy Bash was with him.

Beyond that, I'd have to actually query the team over there because --

Q That's not important, sir.

A Okay.

Q It's okay.

A Now, in Iraq -- I mean, in Libya, Carter Ham met us on the

ground, who was the COCOM, AFRICOM. So he was there. Gene Cretz, who

was the Ambassador, was on the ground. And we met various other members

of the Libyan Government, such as it is or was. The Prime Minister

1252
18

for sure we met with.

Q What constitutes a touch-and-go?

A When you don't spend the night, essentially. Short period

of time, relatively short period of time.

Q So you met with General Ham, you met with Ambassador Cretz,

you met with some local folks. Did you do anything else that day?

A Well, we went down to the American Cemetery, where a number

of young men were killed in 1805, and he laid a wreath there. That

was a little bit -- the cemetery was a little bit on the news at the

time, so we swung through there and laid a wreath.

But with the exception of that, we didn't do anything but meet

with the Ambassador, meet with some local politicians, you know,

Libyans, lay a wreath, and then we're out of there.

We staged out of Sigonella. We flew the normal airplanes, the

747, and then flew into Libya by C-17, a more tactical airplane.

Q Given your experience in the Marine Corps, some

40-something years at the time, what was your impression of the security

situation on the ground in Libya? You were in Tripoli, you said?

A Tripoli, yeah.

Q What was your impression of the situation in Tripoli at the

time?

A Well, when we got off the airplane, our security people were

United States Army, mostly very, very, very experienced guys. They

had come out of the MP field. But they were mostly warrant officers

or senior enlisted, I'd say, you know, E7s and above.

1253
19

And our advance team would always -- no matter where we landed,

there would be an advance team there. And when I got off the airplane,

I can't remember which one said it to me, he said, hey, Jesus Christ,

sir, we ought not to be here. And I said --

Q What did he mean by that?

A Well, what he said was there doesn't seem to be

anyone -- when they would do the advance work, they would plug into

the local -- obviously the embassy, and then they would work with the

local security people. And what he meant by that was there is no, like,

local security police or whatever apparatus to work with; it's all

militias.

And in our drive from the airport to the American Embassy, I

recollect going through at least four and probably five checkpoints,

each one of them manned by not official, but by militia guys. They

weren't in any way in uniform. I mean, you know, some of them might

have had on a camouflage set of trousers or a camouflage shirt, but

they certainly were not official military or police.

I mean, that really had the hair on the back of my head going.

You know, we were pretty heavily armed, the security folks are. But

it caught their attention, caught my attention.

Q Caught whose attention?

A Caught the security guys' attention on the ground and the

advance people.

Usually, when we land somewhere, things are very, very stable in

the sense of we've got the right people on the ground, whether it's

1254
20

U.S. military or the local police. Obviously, you don't worry about

it if you lived in -- I was going to say Brussels, but I guess you would

now. But you wouldn't worry about it if you landed in a country like

Europe or China or something like that. But, certainly, when you get

into a place like Iraq or Afghanistan, there would be a very serious

contingent of American soldiers on the ground. So security was pretty

important.

So Libya was not what we were used to, not what I think the

Secretary -- not what our detail would have accepted.

Q Did you share your concerns with Secretary Panetta at the

time?

A I just mentioned, I'm sure, that, "Hey, boss, this place

is a little bit dicey. We need to get in and out of here. Just, let's

watch ourselves." The Secretary of Defense had a lot of confidence

in people that worked for him. He said, "Okay, got it." So --

Q When Secretary Panetta had his conversation with General

Ham, was it just the two of them, or was the Ambassador present also?

A Well, you know, it was more of a -- the Ambassador was not

always present with us, but, you know, the typical thing would be, you

know, the general was there, they talked, they chatted, we went to the

Embassy. There was no one-on-ones, if that's what you're getting at.

Q In the discussions between the Secretary and General Ham,

did the security situation in Tripoli and/or Libya come up? Do you

recall?

A It for sure came up. And certainly it's my recollection

1255
21

that that was a hopeful period in terms of, you know, Qadhafi was gone,

they were getting organized.

Q Is this your opinion, or is --

A This was what was presented by the country team discussion.

This was a hopeful period, things were getting better.

Q "Country team" meaning the Ambassador's people?

A Ambassador and -- you know, typically, a country team

meeting would be the Ambassador, the DCM -- that's the number two in

the Embassy -- security guys, depending what embassy. You know, in

my case, it would be law enforcement. In other cases -- and there's

always intelligence people there at the table. And I think, generally

speaking, it was things are getting better.

Q Did General Ham express any concerns to the Secretary about

needs or requirements that had been requested, unfulfilled, et cetera?

A No. He was -- there was more of a courtesy. I know,

obviously -- I mean, you know, again, his boss gave his impressions

about how things were going. And I think, again, an awful lot of it

depended on what the opinion of the country team was at the time.

Q In your discussion with the country team and Ambassador

Cretz, did the situation or did the discussion ever revolve around

military assets being deployed in support of the Embassy operations

at this time?

A At that moment in time, I would say no.

Q It did not.

A No.

1256
22

Q Any other alarms or issues expressed by anyone in those

discussions on the ground that day, whether it was General Ham or the

Ambassador or Secretary Panetta?

A Well, as a general comment, the fact that the militias

seemed to be in charge, you know, it's never a good thing. When you

get to a country and you're hearing that things are getting back

together pretty good, and then you get there and you realize that, you

know, much of the city is being -- well, certainly the city was being

controlled by factions, all of whom, we were, it's my recollection,

were assured were friendly factions and over time they'd work out their

differences or whatever.

Q Was Benghazi ever discussed?

A Never. Not on that trip.

Q I'll tell you what. At this moment, sir, I'm going to defer

to Congressman Jordan and let him ask a few questions so that he can

get out and get some votes. They'll be called in a few minutes.

Mr. Jordan. Thank you, Mac.

General, thank you for your service and for being here.

I'm going to try to run through some documents that we put

together. So the first one here is -- you can mark that whatever you

want, Sheria.

[Kelly Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Jordan. This is a -- let's look at page 2. This is an email

from Bruce Lindsey, Deputy Director of Operations at the National

1257
23

Military Command Center, to you and to others, including General

Dempsey.

We're going to the day of the attack. So page 2.

General Kelly. Page 2.

Mr. Jordan. Right under "Classification," "Chairman, Vice

Chairman, Gen Ham, General Kelly."

Time is 4:32. So the attack happens at -- and all these are

eastern time. The attack happens at 3:42. Is this the first, in your

recollection, the first time you learned of what was going on that day

in Benghazi, or shortly before this, I would guess?

General Kelly. Yeah, shortly before that, for sure,

Congressman. It's my recollection a phone call came up probably, you

know, from the command center saying, hey, something is going on.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. A phone call to Secretary Panetta --

General Kelly. Would have come to me.

Mr. Jordan. And you conveyed that to --

General Kelly. Yeah.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. When we talked to the Secretary, that's what

he indicated.

Okay. Tell me, that second sentence -- or first sentence, "The

White House just convened a NOIWON" -- what does that stand for?

General Kelly. No idea.

Mr. Jordan. No idea?

General Kelly. That's their acronym.

Mr. Jordan. Okay.

1258
24

General Kelly. I'm sure it's some type of an action committee --

Mr. Jordan. Yeah.

General Kelly. -- you know.

Mr. Jordan. And were you part of that conference?

General Kelly. I was not.

Mr. Jordan. You were not. Okay. Would Secretary Panetta have

been part of that?

General Kelly. You know, as you know, I think, Congressman,

Secretary Panetta and Marty Dempsey, General Dempsey, were on the way

over, more or less, at this time for a regularly scheduled meeting with

the White House staff.

Mr. Jordan. I was getting to that next. Okay.

General Kelly. So they were on the way over. I don't

believe -- I know Secretary Panetta would not have been drawn into

something like that. That's an internal meeting for the --

Mr. Jordan. Okay. Fine. So that meeting, when Secretary

Panetta was with us, he said that meeting occurred around 6 o'clock.

General Kelly. Okay.

Mr. Jordan. And he went to the White House for the regularly

scheduled meeting. Were you in that meeting?

General Kelly. No. Typically -- in fact, in my case -- and I

can elaborate if you want. But, generally speaking, no one went to

the White House meetings with the Secretary.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. Okay. Because earlier you said I'm in

every -- I think you said in every meeting --

1259
25

General Kelly. I should have made that clear. If he went to the

White House --

Mr. Jordan. But that's the one time you didn't go with him.

General Kelly. Didn't go.

Mr. Jordan. But all times you didn't go with him. This was not

an exception that night.

General Kelly. Exactly right.

Mr. Jordan. Got it.

So then let me go to a second document here. Okay. This is what

we called -- this is an email from Jeremy Bash.

Ms. Clarke. I'm going to mark this as exhibit 2.

[Kelly Exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Jordan. What I'm trying to do is just work through the

timeline here. This is about an hour after the meeting with the

President, or approximately an hour. It's 7:19. You call this the

spinning-up email that Mr. Bash sent to a number of people at the State

Department and copied you.

Do you recall this email?

General Kelly. I don't. I'm on it. I read it. At the time,

it would've been something that -- you know, Jeremy, again, because

of the dynamics at the White House relative, I think, to uniformed

military people, particularly senior military people, Jeremy tended

to do all of the political stuff. They trusted him more. That's my

view. So back and forth to the senior members of the NSS or State

1260
26

Department or something, Jeremy had it.

Now, what spinning means, if that's your question, spinning would

be, you know, we're getting forces lined up, as an example. When this

first came in, when we first got the call, when I first got the call

that there was a problem at one of our embassies or consulates, as a

military guy, I just start immediately starting to plan the response.

Different in other cultures in this city, but military guys do that

right away.

So the first thing I thought about was, okay, we got FAST Marines

that, frankly, some of us have been recommending go to Libya since we

opened the Embassy. But I know I've got 100 FAST Marines,

and they're in Rota. So that's the

first thing that came to mind.

There's also a force -- all the COCOMs have it -- the Combatant

Commanders In-extremis Force. Typically, that In-extremis Force is

a special operations bunch of guys. It's not real big. The one in

Europe -- and we've found out immediately what it was up to, and it

was in the Balkans on a normal training mission.

Mr. Jordan. Right.

General Kelly. And so the National Military Command

Center -- and, again, at this point -- I think the Congressman knows

this -- at this point, really, the ball to a very, very large degree

is in AFRICOM's court. They are the warfighters. It just so happened

Carter Ham happened to be in town that day, that he happened to be there.

So his staff, I can only imagine, went from the normal 35,000 RPMs to

1261
27

150,000 RPMs immediately.

So you had the FAST Marines -- we had really no real idea what

was going on other than there was an attack. So you had the FAST

Marines, who are specially trained Marines. They're infantry Marines,

so they're gunfighters, but they also receive specialized training in

doing fixed-site security. They specifically do this at our

embassies, consulates, or even at a naval base. And they're ready to

go, as I say, on a pretty quick string. You've got to get a bird down,

pick them up, and then you've got to drive them to take them to wherever

they are.

The In-extremis Force guys are ready to go pretty much on a

moment's notice. And, again, they had been on an exercise. And by

this time, there's no doubt in my mind that AFRICOM was already spinning

up and moving.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. You mentioned the three assets that I was

going to talk about. Let me do a couple things here first.

When we interviewed Secretary Panetta, he said at some time before

this email went out, sometime between when he met the President and

when Mr. Bash sends this email, he ordered deployment. He ordered,

"Take the hill," was the term --

General Kelly. Right.

Mr. Jordan. -- that the Secretary used when he sat right there

in your seat.

And the three forces or three assets you just briefly talked about

were eventually moving.

1262
28

didn't leave, though, until 4:45 the next day,

4:45 a.m. on the 12th. The In-extremis Force in the Balkans didn't

leave until 10:21 the next day, the 12th. And the first asset you

mentioned, the FAST platoon in Spain, didn't leave until 12 noon.

And the question many of us are trying to grapple with is, if

Secretary Panetta meets with the President at 6, sometime between 6

and 7:19 on the 11th says "take the hill," but these forces don't start

moving until the next day. Why what I would perceive -- maybe not,

but what I would view and I think what many Americans would view -- why

the delay?

General Kelly. I can help you out here, I think. First --

Mr. Jordan. Before you answer that, if you could, General

Kelly --

General Kelly. Sure.

Mr. Jordan. -- in the same email, it says -- as you're answering

the question I pose, do it in the context also of "assuming

Principals" -- plural -- "agree to deploy these elements." When we

talked to Secretary Panetta, he said he was the only principal that

mattered. If he said go, it meant go. But that's not the -- you know,

Mr. Bash chose to use the plural there. So give it to me in that

context, as well.

General Kelly. Okay.

The Secretary authorizes the movement of military personnel,

large and small.

Mr. Tolar. To where?

1263
29

General Kelly. Anywhere in the world.

Mr. Tolar. Including Libya?

General Kelly. Generally speaking, nothing moves without the

Secretary of Defense giving authorization in what's called the Orders

Book to move. That could be a corps; that could be 25,000 men and women.

Or that could be a very small detachment. We're talking here about

relatively small detachments. He then releases that authority to the

COCOM, and then the COCOM manages the rest of it.

By this time, Congressman, I would put myself in a -- thinking

purely military here, putting myself in General Carter's seat and in

his senior staff's seat in Stuttgart, they would be trying to gather

as much information as they possibly could about what's going on on

the ground.

As an example, could a transport airplane have taken off and

landed at the Benghazi Airport, whatever passes for an airport there?

Sure. Would a responsible COCOM launch an airplane in what we're now

seeing is mayhem, I would expect -- and, again, I think from the time

I was there with Secretary Panetta in '11, December '11, until this

particular time -- and, again, most of that time I was in SOUTHCOM

worrying about the southwest border and the drugs. But my guess is

that things deteriorated nonstop until, you know, what exists on the

ground today.

So the military guy is going to say, what's on the ground and where

can we put people? And so the obvious thing is we put the In-extremis

Force or the Marines into a C-17 and fly them there. Okay, what's on

1264
30

the ground? This is what I would -- what's on the ground? Do we have

anyone on the ground? What are the atmospherics? We don't know.

Who's in charge of that airport? Some militia. Is this the same

militia that apparently worked with the attackers -- my view, at least,

had to have worked with the attackers to go after Benghazi? Don't know.

Mr. Tolar. Uh-huh.

General Kelly. So to have launched a defenseless, you know, C-17

there, I would, as the commander, have wanted to know more about what's

on the ground.

Now, we can do a lot of things to find out what's on the ground.

Ideally, you would hope -- you would hope -- you would think that we

had at least contacts through, say, the Central Intelligence Agency

with contacts on the ground. So that's one set of inputs. Another

set of inputs, frankly, is just to put people -- you know, technology,

drones or whatever, ISR. The ISR, you know, can report what it sees,

but the atmospherics, the people who's running the airport, you

wouldn't know.

I suspect -- I'm guessing, but I suspect the delay -- again,

Secretary of Defense says, "You have my authority. Go." Then the

warfighter, the COCOM, then turns that into action over some period

of time. And, in this case, I'm just guessing, Congressman, but I bet

any delay was basically what's going on on the ground. Can we land

a C-17 in there full of Americans relatively safely? Or when they get

on the ground, will that C-17 be hit by RPGs, or will the people on

the airplane be taken captive? I'm guessing, but I suspect that's how

1265
31

it would --

Mr. Tolar. Sir, just to be clear, when you say the Secretary says

go, that includes all the way into Libya. It's not limited to the ISBs

or stuff like that. He literally has at this point the authority to

go into Libya --

General Kelly. Unless he's limited. It would not be

unusual -- and, again, I believe -- I don't believe -- he said go.

Now, he could have put a restriction on that. He didn't, to the best

of my knowledge, as in, you know, move them to forward bases. Sigonella

is an example. Or move up the -- you know, you have the Marines

] in Rota. You have 50 other

Okay. Have them all on a 1-hour string.

You know, he could put some limitations on them.

Mr. Jordan. But did he?

General Kelly. But I don't think so.

Mr. Jordan. Well, do you think he --

General Kelly. In my recollection, he gave us -- he gave the

military commander the authority to move forces.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. So there were no strings put on any -- the

order to take the hill, there were no limitations, restrictions,

caveats, anything put on that order.

General Kelly. Not to my recollection, Congressman.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. Okay. So I want you to look at this next

document.

General Kelly. But if -- let me just add another point.

1266
32

Obviously -- not obviously to maybe everyone in the room -- the

Secretary of State and her senior staff get a vote, and, obviously,

the NSS gets a vote. And the NSS is very, very -- I never worked this

closely with any other NSS before, but I can tell you in my experience

is very, very, very controlling about what happens and, I would say,

micromanages.

So there's very little, if anything, that happens that I can --

Mr. Jordan. Back up. NSS?

General Kelly. National security staff, White House.

Mr. Jordan. Okay. I want to make sure.

General Kelly. There's very little that happens or doesn't

happen that is not, in my view, approved at the NSS.

Mr. Tolar. Why do they get a vote, sir? If the President told

Panetta "go" and Panetta told Ham "go," why do they get a vote?

General Kelly. Every President has a different relationship in

how he does business. And, again, in this particular administration,

again, my experience has been it's a fairly close-hold

approval/disapproval authority on things.

Mr. Tolar. So when Secretary Panetta said he had the authority

to send them in, he really didn't. It sounds like that State Department

had trumps.

General Kelly. As you go up the chain of command, there's trumps.

Mr. Tolar. Did State Department delay the Secretary's ability

to launch forces that night?

General Kelly. I don't know.

1267
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Mr. Tolar. Who would know?

I'm sorry.

Mr. Jordan. Let's throw this document away.

General Kelly. Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. I think we have -- you know, I am going to object

and interject here, because we have the transcript from Secretary

Panetta. We know what Secretary Panetta said, and we know that he

unequivocally said that the State Department was not involved.

So if you want to -- he did say that.

Mr. Jordan. Okay.

General Kelly. Okay.

Ms. Sawyer. We will happily show you that transcript, but --

General Kelly. I believe you, Heather.

Mr. Jordan. General Kelly --

Ms. Sawyer. I mean, we've been doing this for 4 years.

General Kelly. I mean, I'm not suggesting that they did. I

mean, they do get a vote in an awful lot of things. In this particular

case, what you're saying is Panetta said move, that gets passed to the

COCOM, and now he's working out what "move" means, how to do it and

all of that. But once again, along the way, you have people that can

intervene.

Mr. Tolar. Yes, sir.

Go ahead, Congressman.

Mr. Jordan. When you look at --

General Kelly. I don't know if they did, but you have people that

1268
34

can intervene.

[Kelly Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Jordan. Let's look at page 2 and 3 of this third document,

General. Let's go down to -- in the interest of time, let's go down

to, on page 2, kind of the third sentence or paragraph. "Secretary

of Defense has directed FAST" -- that's what you'd mentioned earlier

and we talked about that --

General Kelly. Those are the Marines, yeah.

Mr. Jordan. -- "to make all preps to deploy but hold departure

until we are sure we have clearance to land in Tripoli."

Now, is that the clearance you were describing, General Kelly,

like knowing what assets and what's available, what militia may be

controlling the airport in Tripoli? Or is that clearance from the

Government in Tripoli? Or what does that mean?

General Kelly. It means all of that. You know, if you don't have

clearance from the country to land, then you can't -- it's called

country clearance -- you can't land.

But at the same time, in what we were experiencing in Libya, I

think any military person would want to know, more importantly, to me

at least, because American lives depend on it, what's going on on the

ground.

Mr. Jordan. Okay.

The second sentence of that paragraph, "We'll work with State to

nail that down, but intent is to get security force augmentation into

1269
35

Tripoli (not Benghazi)."

Your thoughts on that?

General Kelly. What time was this email sent out?

Mr. Jordan. This email was sent out at 9:36 p.m.

General Kelly. I think -- I'm guessing, but, again, as a former

COCOM and someone that's done this, certainly Tripoli, in the view,

I think, of the people who were writing this, of the military people,

was a safer environment than, say, a Benghazi. I don't believe until

several days later we had really any clarity on what had actually

happened in Benghazi and why. And, of course, the investigation

continues.

In Tripoli, we knew they had, it's my recollection, normal flights

in and out of the airport on, you know, some basis. So, certainly,

getting people to Tripoli, as a COCOM, would have been a safer bet.

And, frankly, I think at that point, you know, we were doing -- that

email --

Mr. Jordan. But here's what I'm having trouble understanding.

It's now been 6 hours since the attack started, 5 hours since our

government learned about it and our military learned about it, and we

still don't have clearance to land in Tripoli. And this is the same

airport you landed in with the Secretary of Defense just a few months

before this. And we can't get clearance to land when we know Americans

are -- we already know that two Americans have been killed in Benghazi.

Chairman Gowdy. Actually, not to interrupt my friend from Ohio,

I'm not sure that we knew that the Ambassador was dead at this point,

1270
36

did we? Which makes it all the more dramatic --

General Kelly. Yeah.

Chairman Gowdy. -- that the decision was made to not go to

Benghazi.

Mr. Jordan. Well, we may or may not, because this email goes out

a half an hour before Secretary Clinton sends out her statement for

the government that night, where she knew at that time. So we may not

have, because it's 30 minutes before that goes out. So the chairman

is right; we may not have known.

But we do know there's a terrible thing going on in Benghazi, and

we can't get clearance to land in 5 hours in Tripoli is --

General Kelly. Clearance to land in a country is worked through

the State Department and the Embassy. So that would be the official

clearance. It's a bureaucratic process between our embassy and the

country that we want to go into.

Mr. Jordan. So our military could have been ready, you could have

had the FAST team in Spain ready to go and land in Tripoli, and you're

waiting on the Secretary of State's office to give you guys the thumbs

up to implement the order that was given 4-1/2 hours before by the

Secretary of Defense.

General Kelly. I would say that's a correct assessment.

Mr. Jordan. Okay.

Then go down to the next paragraph, second sentence. "Remember

Secretary of Defense holds final approval to deploy the FAST team."

If he's already said "go," what does that sentence mean? Because

1271
37

he's already said "go." The FAST team is the first team you mentioned

in your, kind of, outlining the assets that were available. Why does

the Secretary of Defense have to do something more?

General Kelly. Let's go -- the paragraph that you were

addressing that starts, "has directed FAST to make all preps to deploy

but hold departure until we are sure we have clearance to land in

Tripoli." Clearance to land, as I mentioned, in Tripoli comes from

the country through the State Department.

Mr. Jordan. Got it.

General Kelly. The next one down, clearly, the FAST guys are

ready to go and we're still waiting for clearance. Although the

Secretary, you know, has approved them to go, now we still have to get

that approval from the country.

Mr. Jordan. But does the Secretary of Defense have to do

something else? Once you get that approved, does he have to give the

second order, okay, it's okay to now do what I said to do, you know,

5 hours earlier?

General Kelly. In this case, if the clearance had come in and

said go, the FAST teams would have gone wheels up, because he'd already

authorized that, as I read it.

Mr. Jordan. So that was just redundant, the second sentence,

"Remember the Secretary of Defense holds final approval to deploy the

FAST pending the receipt of Tripoli country clearance." There didn't

need to be anything else done once you got the clearance?

General Kelly. If we had gotten clearance, he had already said

1272
38

go.

Mr. Jordan. All right. Let's go to the next page.

General Kelly. And, at this point, you've got the Embassy

dealing with Main State here in Washington. You've got -- certainly,

the COCOM is working with the country team. But that would be a normal

clearance procedure from the country.

Chairman Gowdy. Jimmy, can I ask one question?

Mr. Jordan. You sure can.

Chairman Gowdy. General, one of the last sentences on page 2 of

the exhibit you have in front of you: "But the point is to get the

Marines on the ground securing the embassy in Tripoli as rapidly as

we can move them."

Why not Benghazi? Why are you worrying about securing Tripoli,

where there is no active threat? There may be concerns about threats,

but there is no active threat. Where is the discussion of a response

to Benghazi?

General Kelly. That's a great question, Congressman. I go back

to kind of my previous comments about, at this point, as you point out,

Tripoli is relatively safe but don't know if they'll remain that way.

It's an obvious next target, I guess. Frankly, in my view, the Marines

should have already been on the ground since the day the Embassy opened.

They weren't. We relied on other ways to do it. It was great thinking

to get Marines on the ground. And as I said, they should have been

there long before.

Benghazi, I'm putting thoughts and I'm guessing at what the

1273
39

COCOM -- but he didn't know what was going on. And he had approval

from the Secretary to move people and to do things. He was doing some

of those things with ISR, repositioning some. But I suspect it was

the COCOM at this point who was not just satisfied that he could get

U.S. military people into Benghazi in a way that wouldn't jeopardize

all of their lives as well as whatever else was going on on the ground.

And what time was this email? Sorry.

Mr. Jordan. 9:36 p.m.

General Kelly. 8:53 our time?

Chairman Gowdy. 8:53 p.m. is what my copy says.

General Kelly. It's my recollection that we at this point -- and

I stayed in the Pentagon, in the office, till well after midnight that

night and was back in the office by about 4:30 the next morning. It's

my recollection at this time we did not know where Stevens was. There

were rumors that he had been evac'd to a hospital at the time, but we

did not know where he was.

And later in the evening, roughly midnight, unfortunately we got

the word that made us all obviously happy, that he had been found, he

was at the hospital, and he was okay. And by few hours later, of course,

we knew that that wasn't the case. But the sense of relief, certainly,

I think, in the State Department and certainly in the Secretary of

Defense's office that we had found the -- someone had found him and

he was being seen to was, you know, a real sense of relief.

But to answer the questions, I don't think -- at this point, my

only guess would be that Carter Ham was still working the "can we get

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people into Benghazi safely," whether it was a C-17 or you just got

smaller airplanes or something.

Mr. Jordan. Well, not to belabor it, but I think the chairman

makes a good point, because the sentence talks about intent is to get

security force augmentation in Tripoli. But you didn't just not

mention Benghazi; you specifically said not -- or not you, but the email

specifically says "not Benghazi." Did we ever intend to go to

Benghazi?

General Kelly. I can't answer that question. I don't know.

Again, in the normal course of events, the COCOM would be focusing

on the immediate problem, Benghazi, and trying to figure out how to

solve that problem and not get a whole bunch of other Americans killed.

But, by the same token, what else is going on in the region? You know,

what's going on at Tripoli? Well, nothing. Well, you know, what is

their protection posture? Well, we have a few militia people that are

in uniform that are guarding the place and we have some other things.

Then let's get some Marines on the ground there.

We do this, not routinely, but pretty regularly when -- Sana'a,

Yemen, is an example of this. Fifty Marines immediately on the ground,

followed up by 125 additional Marines to protect our embassy. So this

is not unusual, what's happening here, when an embassy is at threat.

But I can't, at this point, do anything but kind of give you some sense

of what the COCOM would be doing relative to Benghazi.

Mr. Jordan. Flip over one page, if you could, General. In the

final paragraph, the last, kind of the bigger paragraph, where we're

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talking about the status of the Ambassador, down near the bottom of

the page --

General Kelly. Right.

Mr. Jordan. -- "We're receiving numerous reports from high level

Libyan officials that 'he's okay' or 'he's safe' but none of these

assurances can be corroborated with his location or anything definitive

to suggest he is, in fact, safe."

Next sentence: "It's assumed amongst the staff here that they

don't know where he is, either, and they're buying time to locate him."

Any thoughts on what that "buying time" is all about?

General Kelly. I've got to think they're referring to the

Libyans as opposed to, you know, any folks we had on the ground. And,

as I said, this was about 9 o'clock, 2100. It was pretty close to

midnight, I think, on a VTC where the word was, hey, we got him. And

as you might imagine, everyone was very happy, very relieved.

But the rumors were rampant about -- they found him, he was okay,

we didn't know what that meant. And the people on the ground, of course

AFRICOM, working this hard. And as it turned out, you know, he was

dead. But, you know, he was certainly dead long before this, but --

Mr. Jordan. Yeah. So this is the Libyans buying time?

General Kelly. I think so, yeah.

Mr. Jordan. Yeah, that's how I read it as well. And the concern

I have is that they're buying time to try to locate the Ambassador.

They're concerned the American Ambassador has been taken hostage or

killed or whatever may be going on.

1276
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Chairman Gowdy. I think his other concern, General -- and I

don't want to put words in Chairman Jordan's mouth, but, again, kind

of to reset, we know that we have one dead American. We know that there

has been a firefight. Presumably, we know that State Department has

been relocated to the Annex. I don't know whether or not we know in

Washington that there's been further hostilities at the Annex. But

you have an ambassador that is either missing or you don't trust the

representations that are being given to you by Libyan nationals. And

not only are the resources going to Tripoli, they're going to Tripoli

not to relocate to Benghazi but to secure the Embassy in Tripoli.

So how do you explain to the -- I mean, how do we explain to the

American people that even a missing ambassador was not enough to direct

assets to Benghazi, that you're worried about securing a facility in

Tripoli where there is no threat?

Mr. Jordan. Well, and to add to it, if I could, Mr. Chairman and

General, you're also seeking clearance from the same people who are

buying time. And you're not going to go to the place where the

Ambassador is at, the place where the attack took place, where four

Americans were killed; we're looking to go to Tripoli.

Ms. Sawyer. Can I just clarify, have you actually testified that

you have firsthand knowledge that they were actually waiting on

clearance?

General Kelly. Have I --

Ms. Sawyer. That someone in the military --

General Kelly. No, I've never answered any questions on this

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topic before this meeting this morning.

Ms. Sawyer. Just today, have you actually testified that the

Department of Defense was actually waiting on clearance and that was --

General Kelly. No. What I have said, in the normal course of

events -- and I know this isn't normal, but bureaucracies are

bureaucracies -- I'm surmising that to move the Marines from Rota into

Tripoli, where there was no problem at this point, I'm surmising that

the normal request was going to the State Department to get clearance

from the host nation to land the airplane. That's what I'm surmising.

Ms. Sawyer. You're surmising. Did anyone ever tell you that

that night?

General Kelly. No.

Chairman Gowdy. Let him answer our question.

Mr. Jordan. Yep.

General Kelly. Renew the question just one more time?

Chairman Gowdy. Our question was a hypothetical assuming facts

that we now know to be true, so there is no surmising to be done, why

the focus on Tripoli and not Benghazi?

General Kelly. I would say that Tripoli, you know, as you

know -- and there's a lot of banter about why this happened in the first

place, some video or something like that. But there was a couple of

demonstrations in the region. I think Cairo had one. There was no,

to the best of my knowledge -- and, again, this would be a State

Department thing. But in the normal course of events, the U.S.

military on certain events, certain occasions, would heighten the state

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of alert -- 9/11, I would guess, in Europe and Africa. At U.S. military

bases, we do it all the time. I don't know if the State Department

did that in their posts in the region, but that's their business.

I think the best way to answer that, Congressman, would be that,

while they were -- in the normal course of events, the COCOM and his

staff and others, I would expect, to include the CIA, really, really,

really churning, trying to find out what was going on, what was ground

truth on the ground. And that would include everything from where was

the Ambassador to who's dead, where are they, can we land anything

safely at the airport, those kind of issues on Benghazi.

In the meantime, I suspect that a decision was made or certainly

recommended by the COCOM that we move FAST Marines in to protect Tripoli

as kind of an obvious other place that there may be problems.

So you have two things going on, maybe preventative, and, again,

very late, and they should have already been there, in my view, but

they weren't. So, you know, a move to get Marines on the ground and

protect the actual embassy location. And then in Benghazi, a real,

real, real desperate attempt to find out what was going on on the ground.

And as I say, later in the evening, when we were -- I was just

sitting in on a VTC, it was a State Department VTC, and during that

VTC the word came close to midnight, maybe after 11, it seemed to me

that it was announced that, hey, they got Chris Stevens. And as you

might imagine, everyone was very relieved. And as it turned out, that

wasn't the case. Everyone, you know, on the State Department end was

very relieved.

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[10:35 a.m.]

Chairman Gowdy. I think we're about out of time --

General Kelly. Well, we were too.

Chairman Gowdy. -- but you said something that -- against the

backdrop of everyone trying desperately to find out what's going on

in Benghazi, do you recall Secretary Panetta being asked to make phone

calls to either a YouTube producer or a pastor?

General Kelly. Certainly not that night. There was --

Chairman Gowdy. You say "certainly not that night." What makes

you so certain it wasn't that night?

General Kelly. Because I certainly would have been involved

in him making that phone call.

Chairman Gowdy. Hold that thought for a second. Do we have an

exhibit?

Mr. Jordan. Yes, we do. I think we got some. Or I think Sheria

has it.

Chairman Gowdy. We will mark this as --

Ms. Clarke. Exhibit 4.

Chairman Gowdy. Exhibit 4.

[Kelly exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

Chairman Gowdy. You can have a look at it. I'll ask you,

General, to familiarize yourself with particularly the last page, but

read the whole thing to get complete context.

General Kelly. Yeah. Okay. So as I read it, at 11 -- at

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46

23:45 that evening, A, we didn't know where -- we still didn't know

where Stevens was, and according to this, Panetta had called YouTube.

I was not aware of that. It surprised --

Chairman Gowdy. It surprised me too.

General Kelly. It surprises me.

Chairman Gowdy. Now, this is an email -- this is an exhibit that

includes an email originating from a Denis McDonough. Now, who is

Denis McDonough?

General Kelly. Denis McDonough, Congressman, is currently the

chief of staff of the White House. At the time, Denis was the deputy

national security advisor under National Security Advisor Tom Donilon.

So you had, within the National Security Staff, you had Donilon at the

top, and then Denis McDonough was the deputy at the time, very,

very -- both very close to the President. I think the President brought

McDonough over from the Hill from the Senate, I think, but I know he

had that kind of background. But at the time, Denis was the number

two in the National Security Staff.

Chairman Gowdy. Well, then you noted that Mr. McDonough says:

"The situation in Benghazi remains fluid. Ambassador Chris Stevens

remains unaccounted for; one State Department officer is confirmed

dead."

So they knew Sean Smith was dead. Had they known Ambassador

Stevens was dead, then they would not have said he was unaccounted for.

General Kelly. Right.

Chairman Gowdy. And then the final page of that exhibit is

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McDonough writing: "Secretary Panetta also reached out to Pastor

Jones to ask him to pull down his video."

You did not know about that?

General Kelly. It surprises me. At this time -- you know, there

have been times in the past when -- Jones is a fundamentalist pastor

out of, I believe, out of Florida somewhere. And he had done some

things in the past relative to the Koran and other things that there

always this: someone's got to call him and tell him not to do it.

And I believe there were a couple of times long prior to Benghazi

when he was doing -- about to do the kind of things he said he was going

to do, burn the Koran and all that, and I don't recollect Secretary

Panetta ever being enthusiastic about calling him.

His thinking, I think anyone's thinking was, look, if this guy

is that, you know, committed in what he's going to do, doesn't it just

add to the thing for a bunch of people at the Secretary of Defense or

whatever level to call him and say, "Hey, don't do this," because then

he gets to say, you know, "Even our own government," blah, blah, blah,

you see the point?

So Secretary Panetta was never -- this is maybe several

times -- was never thought it was a good idea to call this guy. So

it really would surprise me. I'm not saying Denis is lying or

maybe -- but it would surprise me if the Secretary would have picked

the phone up late in the evening and made a phone call.

Chairman Gowdy. Well, I've go one more question, then Jimmy can

go, and then we got to go vote.

1282
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Legitimizing the crazy pastor from Florida is one thing to do at

any time period. With a missing ambassador and a fluid situation in

Benghazi, is that really the best use of the Secretary of Defense's

time, is to call a pastor in Florida with all of what's not known in

Benghazi?

General Kelly. Congressman, I don't think the Secretary of

Defense doing that at any time is a good use of his time.

Chairman Gowdy. Jim.

Mr. Jordan. Thank you.

General, you said earlier that State gets a -- State gets a vote,

NSS gets a vote even after the Secretary of Defense has ordered

deployment, ordered to go.

Do you believe that the delay in the three assets that were

ultimately moved, one of them -- only one of them actually getting to

Libya, and that didn't go to Benghazi, it went to Tripoli, do you believe

that the lag time from when the order was given was strictly due to

NSS and State slowing it down with things like what the chairman just

asked about, with the clearance in Libya, with them buying time in

State? Do you think NSS and the State Department caused the delay?

General Kelly. That's -- that's -- I'd be guessing. I will tell

you that part of the delay, whatever "part" means, was the COCOM and

his staff doing due diligence about can we get people on the ground

safely, whether it's probably a C-130. But again --

Mr. Jordan. And you said that started -- that process started

the minute you got the call.

1283
49

General Kelly. Right.

Mr. Jordan. You were already working on it yourself, and the

combatant commanders were working on it. I'm asking -- and the order

happens at sometime between 6 and 7:19 p.m. on September 11th. The

first assets aren't moving till 4:45 on the 12th -- 4:45 a.m. on the

12th. And we have all this going on, concern about the video, concern

about getting host nation clearance. I'm just asking, it seems to me

that's where the delay came.

General Kelly. Again, I'd be guessing, Congressman. It could.

I mean, very --

Mr. Jordan. But it's not --

General Kelly. Very controlling.

Mr. Jordan. But you're a general. You're not -- this is not a

guess. This is an educated assessment that you would make.

General Kelly. It's an educated assessment that we were, as

Jeremy said in his thing, spinning, which means we're identifying

forces, we're ready to go, we're starting to launch airplanes, at least

to get eyes on the ground, all of that is happening. Panetta -- Mr.

Panetta says: Go, go, go, go. At that point, frankly, we don't need

much more guidance unless it's to stop.

Mr. Jordan. Yeah.

General Kelly. I don't know if there was a stop, but unless

there's a stop, the people in the military are executing.

Now, back to the COCOM. He's got the authority to go, but he is

doing his due diligence sorting out through his staff what's going on

1284
50

on the ground.

Mr. Jordan. To your knowledge, was there any type of stop or

change order given, and when, for example, the Special Op Force is the

first one to take off

was there any call to them in flight

saying, "Hey, don't go to -- don't go to Tripoli, don't land in

Benghazi, go to Sigonella instead"? Do you know if any -- that type

of order was given to that group or any other asset that was deployed?

General Kelly. I don't have any knowledge of that. But, again,

I worked in the Secretary of Defense's Office. The execution is done

by the COCOM. It's entirely possible in flight that they could have

told them to go somewhere else.

Mr. Jordan. COCOM can do that without first getting clearance

from the Secretary of Defense or NSS or State Department or the White

House?

General Kelly. They certainly would do it. The Secretary of

Defense --

Mr. Jordan. But my next -- they could do it without those higher

up the chain of command signing off.

General Kelly. Right.

Mr. Jordan. And -- but you don't know if it happened or not.

General Kelly. The Secretary of Defense approves movement of

troops, and then he's kept informed. One of the things that is a

challenge in the Pentagon, certainly when I was there, was to try to

keep the policymakers, the civilians, if you will, with all due respect

1285
51

to everyone in the room, to try to keep them in their lane and let the

military guys execute.

Mr. Panetta said go.

Mr. Jordan. Okay.

General Kelly. The military guys are executing.

Mr. Jordan. Okay.

General Kelly. But there is always a lot of field marshals in

this city that want to get involved in things that happen.

Mr. Jordan. I want to ask you one more question about that. We

can pass up this last document, and then go to page -- looks like the

second page, if we can.

Ms. Clarke. Mark this as exhibit 5.

[Kelly exhibit No. 5

Was marked for identification.]

Mr. Jordan. Second page, and this is another email chain on -- at

9:44 p.m. on September 11th, and you're referenced in the email, but

I don't know if it's sent to you. It's hard to tell with who's been

redacted.

General Kelly. Yeah. The "from" is redacted.

Mr. Jordan. So if you go to the second page, midway down, it looks

like third full paragraph, "State remains concerned -- " do you see

that paragraph, General.

General Kelly. Got it.

Mr. Jordan. "State remains concerned that any U.S. intervention

be fully coordinated with the Libyan government and conveyed Libyan

1286
52

concerns that about U.S. military presence, to include concerns that

wheeled military vehicles should not be used, and U.S. military forces

should consider deploying in civilian attire."

Again, concern -- I guess, first of all, tell me what the concerns

were with military vehicles, wheeled military vehicles. I don't know

how else they would travel.

General Kelly. The bottom email. If I could just read something

real quick.

Mr. Jordan. Sure.

General Kelly. To lead up.

How would they get around on the ground? You know, from the very

beginning of our going into Libya, the State Department has a very,

very, very hypersensitivity to the U.S. military being involved in the

kind of things that they do. I got it. They are the ones in the normal

course of events that are in charge of certain things. But at a certain

point, you have to make a decision that, you know, in this case, the

Department of Defense has got unique capabilities and assets to do

certain things.

If my guys -- if I was a combatant commander -- if I was the

commander and my guys come up and said, "Sir, we're ready go, but, you

know, we don't know what's going on on the ground and whatever, and

we really think we need to do this in civilian clothes, and when we

get on the ground, we'll get ahold of some civilian vehicles," and

that's kind of a camouflage thing, I'd say sure. I'd check with the

lawyers, and if that was -- but throughout our time in Libya, for sure,

1287
53

they were always, always, always hypersensitive, our State Department

was, to this issue of militarizing our presence on the ground.

But I think certainly in a case like this where things have really

gone wrong, and it may very well be that the only people that can at

least turn the tide a little bit will be military guys, then I'm not

so sure I care what the -- necessarily what the local country wants

at that point, certainly in Benghazi. So I don't know why they would

want to have gone with the, you know, no military vehicles.

Mr. Jordan. In your educated assessment, in your years serving

our country and all the knowledge that you accumulated, do you think

this is ridiculous?

General Kelly. It's pretty unusual.

Mr. Jordan. And do you think it slowed things down?

General Kelly. Well, the other thing -- again, to have gotten

military vehicles on the ground that night in Benghazi, that would have

been a multiple, say, C-17 lift because we'd be talking about --

Mr. Jordan. Right.

General Kelly. -- those kind of vehicles. And if I was looking

at this, I'd say get the people going, and when you get on the ground,

just commandeer some vehicles or pay someone a thousand bucks for his

clunker. Or, particularly if -- and I don't know this to be the

case -- but, you know, one of the things I'd be desperately trying to

find out is, are the militias at the airport on our side? Can they

be relied on? If they can be relied on, through whatever channels,

tell them that we want some vehicles when we get there.

1288
54

Mr. Jordan. Sure. All right. I got to run and vote. General,

I thank you for your time, for coming in and for all your service.

Mr. Tolar. It is 10:50, and we've exceeded our time. Let's go

off the record.

[Recess.]

Ms. Green. General, are you ready to get back on the record?

General Kelly. I am. Yeah.

Ms. Green. We can go back on the record then. The time is 11:00

a.m.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. GREEN:

Q And, General Kelly, again, my name is Shannon Green with

the minority staff.

I'm just going to, first of all, touch on a few things that were

covered in the first hour. And first of all, sir, in your role as the

senior military assistant to the Secretary of Defense, you were not

part of the operational chain of command. Is that right?

A That's right.

Q My colleague --

A Just to restate, operational chain of command is COCOM,

Secretary of Defense, President.

Q Thank you, sir. And you also explained that in the first

hour, that the chain of command very clearly was from the President

to the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commander. No one else.

A Right.

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Q You mentioned in the first hour, sir, a trip you had taken

with the Secretary of Defense in November 2011. The senior State

Department official at the time was Gene Cretz. That's who you meet

with. Is that right?

A Right. Ambassador Cretz.

Q Ambassador Cretz. It was not Chris Stevens. Is that

correct?

A Right.

Q Sir, have you ever had a conversation with Chris Stevens?

A Never.

Q During that trip, were you ever in Benghazi?

A No.

Q You mentioned, sir, that I believe General Ham, the

combatant commander of AFRICOM, was also present that day. Is that

correct?

A He was on the ground.

Q You also mentioned that the combatant commander would have

a close relationship with the country team. Is that correct?

A Yes. I would -- particularly, I would say, a country like

Libya that was, you know, where it was at the time, we had just moved

in and all of that kind of thing, I couldn't imagine that Carter Ham

did not have a pretty close eye -- not that he called the shots -- but

that he had a pretty close eye on and a working relationship with the

Ambassador.

Q Yes, sir. And we understand that that was the case.

1290
56

And, sir, would it be the case then that the Ambassador and the

country team would have shared any of their concerns about the

environment in Libya with the combatant commander?

A Again --

Q That be the appropriate person.

A Well, no, not the appropriate person. You got to remember

the chains of command here. Generally speaking, the combatant

commanders are very close to the country teams. But the country

teams -- you know, theoretically, the ambassador is the President of

the United States' representative in that country, which in a sense

makes the ambassador's boss the President.

The reality is, at least in the modern era, that the ambassador

is very much, I would say, kind of the senior State Department staff

officer in the country because he deals -- he or she deals, depending

on what part of the world, with the regional bureau, meaning Middle

East, and then it pretty much stops there.

Q Sir, you mentioned in the first hour that the Secretary of

Defense received daily briefings from a CIA briefer, the Presidential

daily brief, essentially.

A Right, yeah.

Q Did you normally sit in on those meetings?

A I could. They are very, very, very high level,

trends-in-the-world kind of thing. Very seldom was there -- is there

a drill down on, like, what's going on in Libya necessarily. So it's

kind of a high level thing.

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57

Q Secretary Panetta mentioned in his testimony before this

committee that he and other senior leaders were tracking an

inflammatory video in the days before the attack in Benghazi, and he

specifically mentioned General Allen's concern that the video could

lead to violence against U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Do you recall

those concerns?

A Certainly discussions, yeah, sure. Concerns.

Q Did you ever --

A I forget the name of it. What was it, "The Life of Muhammad"

or something like that, wasn't the name of the video, I think.

Q "The Innocence of Muslims," I believe, sir.

A Okay. And another one that caught -- that would come up

periodically again is this minister down in Florida, but it was

always --

Q Yes, sir, and I believe he was the person who actually was

promoting the film, "The Innocence of Muslims," which sort of caused

some of this unrest.

A Yeah.

Q Did you have any conversations with General Allen in those

days prior to September 11th, 2012?

A Certainly not on this topic.

Q Sir, I'd like to enter into the record an unclassified

timeline provided by the Department of Defense related to the actions

taken by DOD on September 11 and 12, 2012. This timeline has been

provided to the Armed Services Committees a couple of years ago, and

1292
58

it will help us understanding --

A Did you get a copy? Maybe I could --

Ms. Rauch. Is it 4? Sorry to pause.

Ms. Green. My colleague is going to pass out a copy.

Ms. Rauch. Is it exhibit 5?

Ms. Green. Exhibit 6, yeah.

Ms. Rauch. Okay.

[Kelly exhibit No. 6

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. GREEN:

Q Sir, have you ever seen this document before?

A I have. Just 2 days ago it was sent to me.

Q Oh, is that the first time you've seen it?

A Yeah.

Q Okay. It may help us reference times of events on the night

of the attack, so we can use it as a reference point.

Sir, Secretary Panetta testified about his meeting at the White

House on the night of the attacks, and you spoke a little bit with my

colleagues in the last hour about sort of those events.

When Secretary Panetta testified before the Senate Armed Services

Committee on February 7th, 2013, he said, quote: "Soon after the

initial reports about the attack in Benghazi were received, General

Dempsey and I met with President Obama, and he ordered all available

DOD assets to respond to the attack in Libya and to protect U.S.

personnel and interests in the region. It's important to remember

1293
59

that, in addition to responding to the situation in Benghazi, we were

also concerned about potential threats to U.S. personnel in Tunis,

Tripoli, Cairo, Sana'a, and elsewhere, that could potentially require

a military response," end quote.

Sir, is Secretary Panetta's testimony consistent with what he

conveyed to you upon his return from the White House?

A All of that, or just the part about the President -- we knew

we had authority. He had been given authority to move.

Q What guidance, then, did the Secretary provide to you, if

any, when he returned from the White House?

A The evening was kind of a running discussion. So he and

Marty Dempsey had come back, I'm sure Carter Ham was there about that

time, you know, and he just said: Okay, you know, you have my vocal,

my verbal authorization to move. We've already covered that in the

last session.

And as I say, I think it really -- it's really -- people need to

understand that when the Secretary of Defense -- the Secretary of

Defense does not have and should not have, my God, an operations

section, if you will. And the Office of the Secretary of Defense, all

political appointees -- I don't mean the inner office, the inner family

where I work -- but they are policy people, they interact with the White

House, State Department, all that. They develop, you know, plans and

whatnot in terms of how the DOD will support various things. They do

not have an ops section.

So when the Secretary of Defense, when it comes in either through

1294
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John Kelly or the more formal way where the book comes in or whatever,

and the Secretary says, okay, go, then that is an authorization that

is then passed by the Joint Staff to -- in the normal course of

events -- to the COCOM.

And as I say, we are always fighting back people wanting to get

into the nut -- you know, people that don't understand how to do the

kind of things we're talking about, wanting, well, we need to get

briefed back or we want someone to come over here and make -- so in

the world we live in, as military people, once the decision is made,

you turn it over to the operator, in this case, Carter Ham, and actually

kind of a parallel would be the Special Operations Command. At the

time, I think Bill McRaven had it, it might have been Joe Votel. Bill

McRaven, I think, had it. But in any event -- and then they just start

to execute.

And as I was trying to make the point before, as a COCOM is looking

at the problem as he understands it -- and again, there is an awful

lot of Monday morning quarterbacking that goes on naturally -- we had

the timeline, you know, this timeline was worked out, I'm sure, long

after -- but he's looking and saying, okay, we have a problem in

Benghazi, and I don't know what the hell's think going on.

I do know that we've had some riots across the Middle East, and

I think it was a very, very prudent thing to reinforce Tripoli because

we could, in a sense, we could get them on the ground -- this is Carter

Ham now -- get them on the ground, get that place protected. It could

break out there. Who knows?

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It's my understanding, you know, the people started

chattering -- people in Libya started chattering in the social media

about other attacks. But you still don't know what's going on in

Benghazi, and you're trying to find out what's going on in Benghazi.

So I think that's the explanation I would give you. And not every

single --

Q Is it fair to say then you're not getting real-time

information about what's happening on the ground in Benghazi?

A In the Secretary of Defense's Office?

Q Sure.

A No. One of the things, again, you have to caution people

about -- the secretaries that I worked for understood this, some people

didn't understand it -- we're getting just a blast of this might be

happening, this could be happening, we think this is happening. I

already pointed out the fact that late in the evening the announcement

was made that Chris Stevens was okay.

You have to let the men and women who are the pros at this sort

this thing out, and that's where I go back to the operators, to the

combatant commander, because you just get so many -- you know, it's

my understanding there were phone calls coming in to the State

Department from State Department people on the ground. I've got to

think there was information coming in through the CIA channels. And

you just can't act on every rumor that you receive.

Q Did you receive calls from the State Department and the CIA?

Is that what you were saying?

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A No, but I'm sure that kind of input was coming in. And by

the way, again, on that evening and most of the time, Jeremy interacted

with the political types, if you will.

Q Sir, at the bottom of the first page of the timeline,

according to this DOD timeline, at approximately 6:30 p.m. eastern

daylight time a DOD-led security team that was located at the U.S.

Embassy in Tripoli departed for Benghazi and landed in Benghazi at

approximately 7:30 p.m.

A Uh-huh.

Q This team has been referred to as Team Tripoli. Do you

recall when you learned about this particular asset responding to the

crisis?

A I would say probably the next -- when I came to work the

next day, all of this had begun to become somewhat clear. So probably

the next day.

Q Sir, in Secretary Panetta's Senate testimony, he discussed

this team, and he said, quote: "The quickest response option available

to the Department of Defense was a Tripoli-based security team that

was located at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, and to their credit, within

hours, this six-man team, including two U.S. military personnel,

chartered a private airplane, deployed to Benghazi. Within 15 minutes

of arriving at the Annex facility they came under attack by mortar and

rocket-propelled grenades. Members of this team, along with others

at the Annex facility, provided emergency medical assistance and

supported the evacuation of all personnel." End quote.

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Essentially, Secretary Panetta is saying this was the closest

U.S. military response that could get there. Do you agree with that

assessment, and are you familiar with that team?

A You know and I don't, but of the six, only two of them

military?

Q Yes, sir. But the two military --

A Not much of a team.

Q -- led the team.

A Not much of a team. Good on them for doing it. High risk,

to say the least. Did they ever leave the airport?

Q Yes, sir.

A And they got to the -- which facility? The first one or

the --

Q The second one.

A The second one. Yeah, you know, they were DOT

personnel -- DOD personnel. They were response. I mean, it's -- it

was high risk, to say the least.

Q Sir, in the first hour, my colleagues spoke with you about

an email, and I believe that was introduced as exhibit 2 into the

record. The original email is from Jeremy Bash, Secretary Panetta's

chief of staff, to a group of officials at the State Department, and

the email also cc'ed a number of individuals from the Department of

Defense, including yourself, sir.

Much conjecture and speculation has been made about what Mr. Bash

said in this email when he said, quote: "Assuming principals agree

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to deploy these elements, we will ask State to secure the approval from

host nation," end quote.

And earlier in the email, Mr. Bash notes that these elements

include, quote, "a SOF element that was in Croatia and a Marine FAST

team out of Rota, Spain." Do you see that?

A Got it.

Q Is it fair to say, even in his very important role as

Secretary Panetta's chief of staff, Jeremy Bash was a civilian employee

of the Department of Defense?

A He was.

Q He was not in the chain of command?

A Right, and a political appointee, not a public servant, if

you know the distinction.

Q Yes, sir. This email was raised by my colleagues during

this committee's interview with Secretary Panetta, and Secretary

Panetta did not opine on the contents of the email, but he was very

clear that the authority to make the decision to move forces was his

and his alone. And we have his transcript here.

He is asked the question about: "Assuming principals agree to

deploy these elements, who are the principals that would have had to

agree to deploy the elements that you had identified?"

Secretary Panetta responds: "No one. I had the authority to

deploy those forces, and I ordered those forces to be deployed, and

I didn't have to ask anybody's permission to get those forces in place,"

end quote.

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Is it fair to say, sir, that the only person that could have

overruled Secretary Panetta's orders to deploy forces was the

President?

A Could have overruled him, for sure.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q So with regard to this, you were specifically asked earlier

whether or not it could have been the case that either the State

Department on that night or NSS actually put a stop order in.

Now, Mr. Panetta, Secretary of Defense Panetta says that that was

not the case, that he had given the order and that no other principals

could have overridden it. Are you disputing what he told us? Do you

have a different firsthand account?

A He's exactly right in the way he puts it. He has the

authority now to move forces around the world and he does that

routinely, small forces, large forces. But certainly in a situation

like Benghazi, and, frankly, in most situations, much of this is worked

out by the staff at the White House with input from the staff in the

Office of the Secretary of Defense. Again, they are political

appointees, so they are of the same group of people there. They're

not long-serving public servants. They come in with a certain view

of life.

Generally speaking, the people that are on the ground -- the input

from the military side in most of these meetings, it would be from the

Vice Chairman of the Joint Staff, at the time would have been Sandy

Winnefeld, who had a tremendous relationship. And these meetings

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would come up with, okay, this is what we're going to do. And so if

the Secretary of Defense -- I mean, he certainly could say: No, we're

going the do it, and only the President can tell me not to.

But before that point, as decisions are being made and formulated

and the normal sausage making that goes into national security

development is being done by, as I say, the driving force over at the

White House would have been Tom Donilon, would have been Denis

McDonough, who was the national security advisor, and the Vice, you

know, a whole pod of other people that thought they had input to every

question --

Q Were you one of those people?

A Never, no.

Q Was Jeremy Bash -- you said he was the one who dealt with

the politicals that night. Would he have been --

A Jeremy --

Q If this were to have happened, would he be the person who

could have told us that that's what actually happened in reality?

A What's that?

Q What you were surmising could have happened, that someone

in the State Department or someone in the NSS could have put a stop

or a delay or somehow caused there to be a pause?

A If anyone in the Secretary's office would know that, it

would be probably by phone call from whoever to Jeremy, you know, tell

the boss that there's new thinking on this, or whatever.

So I would not have. Again, certain level of hesitancy to deal

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67

with senior military officers in terms of certain people. And Jeremy

was the channel through which things went back and forth politically.

And again, primarily, NSS discussions, input from NSS, concerns

would come to him through him, and again, high level just interaction

with the State Department, whether it's Burns or whatever, at the

highest level. That was not a role that they were comfortable with

with senior military officers, or at least myself.

Q But Mr. Bash would be the one who would have the firsthand

knowledge?

A I think so, yeah. I mean, if a stop order came, or whatever

you would term it, or a hesitant or a hold, it would have certainly

come from Jeremy, through Jeremy Bash, but would be unlikely that I

wouldn't know that because at that point he'd say: Hey, Kel, come on,

we need to talk to the boss. Didn't happen. So --

Q So that conversation never occurred? Mr. Bash didn't come

to you?

A No.

Q He didn't go to the Secretary of Defense to say someone had

told him --

A Not -- to the best of my knowledge, not.

Ms. Green. Sir, on the night of the attacks, we note from the

timeline that I just handed you that originally one FAST Platoon was

preparing to deploy to Tripoli, one to Benghazi. Do you see that?

General Kelly. Where are we?

Ms. Rauch. Sir, it's on the second page of the timeline.

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General Kelly. Okay.

Ms. Rauch. It's the first page where it actually lists times.

About the middle of the page where it says that Secretary Panetta

ordered three actions, and under number one it notes where the FAST

teams were sent.

General Kelly. Got it.

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BY MS. GREEN:

Q Later that night, the FAST team that was preparing to deploy

to Benghazi was redirected because, as we know, all U.S. personnel

actually had evacuated Benghazi by 4 a.m. eastern daylight time,

10 a.m. local Benghazi time. So the one FAST was sent to Tripoli, and

it actually arrived that day, on the 12th.

Sir, there has been some allegations out there that the FAST team

was delayed because they had to change uniforms. And so I just, as

a marine, want to talk to you about that for a second.

We had the opportunity to interview the young captain who

commanded that FAST team, sir, and so I'm just going to read you a quote

from this young marine. He was asked if he recalled getting the final

word about changeover in terms of uniforms. He said, quote: "I don't

know if there was ever like a, hey, this is the final answer, like we

are finally in civilian attire, but the last thing that we ran was

civilian attire before we went wheels up, and I said, 'Okay, well, I've

just lost cell phone service, so we're going to stay in civilian

attire,'" end quote.

Sounds like a marine, sir?

A Yeah.

Q In a later exchange, this marine testified about whether

confusion over the uniform interfered with his mission, to which he

responded, quote: "Absolutely not. It didn't -- it did end up being

a force multiplier, though, because what we were gathering off the

social media after we got there and then for the duration, that whenever

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we moved from compound to compound, we were made in civilian attire,

but when we were in the compound and on post, we were in uniform. What

that did is that told the Libyan people that they don't know who's a

marine and who's not a marine, and they don't want to mess with the

marines, so it gave everyone else wafda."

The captain went on to talk about why the Libyan Government might

not want them in their uniforms, and he said, quote: "Not to show that

you have American marines on the deck in the country outside of what's

seen to be U.S. sovereign territory. So the outside impression that's

given of a marine force on the ground in a foreign country is not the

most welcoming presence. Concurrently, you've got Iraq wrapping up

and Afghanistan going on. No one wants to be -- now, this is me kind

of making up these answers why they don't want us in uniform -- no one

wants to be the next country that's got marines coming in to do what

marines do." End quote.

That's sort of a lengthy quote to read you, sir, all to kind of

show this young marine seemed to have a pretty, I would say,

sophisticated understanding of why someone may not want to have them

in uniforms while they're out in town, so to speak, which of course

here in the U.S. we Marines don't walk out in our camouflage, do we,

sir? So not so different there in Tripoli.

Would it be fair to say, sir -- I guess my point is that marines

are pretty darn flexible, and a marine in a specialized unit like a

FAST company or a FAST Platoon, would they be used to having to alter

a variety of aspects of their mission, whether it's what weapons they're

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carrying or what uniforms?

A And do it routinely.

Q And again --

A But -- and not to take anything away from the captain,

because, in my view, the real wisdom tends to be down there in the

trenches --

Q Exactly, sir.

A -- and not in other places, those guys, all men right now,

they are ready to go, They can

be brought down to get on the airplane and wait. You know, they can

be on a 4-minute string. They're ready to go. And in their packed

bags would be civilian clothes, jeans and whatnot, for when they're

not on duty. And, you know, obviously, they're not going to go to a

place like Benghazi and expect to pull any liberty.

But still, when they have down time, they're going to have, you

know, PT time, physical fitness time, they'll have their clothes. So

the idea that this would slow them down, it takes most men just a few

minutes to change from one outfit to another.

The larger issue, of course, is this hangup, in my view, that

people had about having military people on the ground at all and having

military guys and gals in uniform. And this goes all the way back to

when we first sent in the first -- we first reestablished the Embassy.

It was absurd then, in my view, to be hung up on it when we've got who

knows what's happened in Benghazi, other than we know people are dead

and the place is on fire, and a very, very good decision is made to

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get, finally, to get FAST on the ground, some security on the ground

in Tripoli. The idea that we were hung up on what clothes we were going

to wear -- but regardless --

Q As far as we know, that never slowed them down, though.

A Right. But whatever happened, it wouldn't have slowed them

down.

Q Yes, sir.

Sir, there was a little bit of discussion in the first hour about

sending aircraft into Libya, and one of the sort of urban legends that's

come out of the Benghazi attacks is the notion that somehow the U.S.

military had air assets that they could have gotten in and saved lives

in Benghazi.

Secretary Panetta responded to this criticism in his testimony

before the Senate, and he said, quote:

"Some have asked why other types of armed aircraft were not

dispatched to Benghazi. The reason simply is because armed UAVs,

AC-130 gunships, or fixed-wing fighters with the associated tanking,

you've got to provide air refueling capabilities, armaments, you've

got to arm all the weapons before you put them on the planes, targeting

and support facilities were not in the vicinity of Libya, and because

of the distance, it would have taken at least 9 to 12 hours, if not

more, to deploy these forces to Benghazi. This was, pure and simple,

in the absence of any advance warning, a problem of distance and time.

"Frankly, even if we were able to get F-16s or AC-130s over the

target in time, the mission still depends on accurate information about

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what targets they're supposed to hit, and we had no forward air

controllers, we had no communications with U.S. personnel on the

ground, as a matter of fact, we had no idea where the Ambassador was

at that point, to be able to kind of conduct any kind of attacks on

the ground." Quote.

Secretary Panetta and Admiral Winnefeld have each also testified

before this committee and reiterated similar comments. And Admiral

Winnefeld, I haven't seen his transcript, but he was particularly

adamant that the U.S. military would be extremely ill-advised to send

in fighter aircraft in a situation such as Benghazi when we did not

know where the Ambassador was located, we had no forward air controller

on the ground, and of course Libya was a wash in MANPADS.

Do you agree with those assessments, sir?

A Which ones? I mean, there's a lot there. I --

Q The assessment regarding sending --

A Yeah, I think --

Q -- fighter aircraft into Benghazi?

A Let me start with -- you know, the Secretary of Defense

talked about how long it would take to put a package together to -- we're

pretty good at what we do, U.S. military. I mean, if you want the real

details of this, I think you should call in not a general, not an

admiral, certainly not a political appointee, but maybe a colonel or

lieutenant colonel actually in the Air Force or the Marine Corps or

the Navy, particularly the Marine Corps and the Navy that actually work

packages like this, how fast can you put this together. I mean, we

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had -- at the time, we had fighter assets in -- all over Europe.

Q We actually just had a great brief from TRANSCOM last week

actually, sir.

A Well, TRANSCOM is different than guys that do and gals that

do bomb dropping and planning to do bomb dropping. But that's good.

But we had fighters assets in Europe. We had tanker assets in

Europe. You know, as a marine, I'd tell you the Air Force is a little

process driven in terms of putting these things together, but they are

pretty darn good at what they do.

Q And we also spoke with the CIF commander, and like I said,

the FAST commander, and they provided some very good insights.

A Eight or 9 hours seems like a long time to me. I'll just

let it go at that.

But to your other points, the second point would be could we, in

my view -- let's say had we gotten F-16s or F-18s over the target or

F-15s over the target, over the place, without people on the ground

to tell us what was going on, you know, the pilot is kind of looking

through a straw as he looks through his sights, he could certainly find

the Benghazi conflict. The fact it was on fire, he could find it very

easily. If we --

Q Are you a pilot, sir?

A I'm not. If he had been told to find the CIA facility, he

could have found that pretty easily just because of GPS and whatnot.

But the expectation would be -- could he do something? It would be

hard. You know, he would see a lot of people running around. Are they

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bad people or are they just people looting? I mean, in our view, that

makes them bad people, but does it make them people that you want to

drop 2,000-pound bombs on.

The beauty of having someone on the ground, particularly a formal

air controller, is he is identifying targets on the ground and then

the delivery means would be the jets.

Modern air strikes are oftentimes conducted, most often conducted

well outside MANPAD range. Yes, if you brought them down to the

10,000-and-below-foot level, you would -- they'd be in some level of

increased danger.

But I think the biggest thing in my mind would be, and again, as

the operational commander, and I'm guessing, but I know the kind of

things that would be going through their minds, Carter Ham's mind at

AFRICOM, is -- I mean, I would want to put something over -- and I think

we did -- ISR to figure out what's going on on the ground. I would

want to know do we have any people on the ground, whether CIA or militia

or whoever, is there anyone left that we can talk to that can tell us

what's going on on the ground.

And maybe for sure, I guess, in my mind, would be to get armed

aircraft in the air and on station, meaning, you know, orbiting it over

the Mediterranean, tanking as they do it, waiting to do an air strike

if targets present themselves. But the fact --

Q Sir --

A Let me finish. The fact to -- if I could, I'm sorry -- but

to drop bombs without knowing what you're dropping the bombs on might

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make people feel good, but it may be counterproductive, particularly

when it's killing or hurting the wrong people. Sorry.

Q No problem. Were you involved, sir, in the task force

operation that began the night of the attacks?

A Task force? No.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q Yeah, I think we're just about done, but with regard to all

those assessments you were talking about, I think you did make clear

that the operational commander that night would have been General

Carter Ham?

A Right.

Q Do you know how many times he's testified before Congress

on Benghazi?

A No idea.

Q But he would be someone who you would certainly want, to

the extent we have questions about decisions that were made in real

time and information that people had in real time, he would be the person

who would be --

A He would be the only person, except what may or may not have

taken place in the White House, State Department, and when Secretary

Panetta was over there. But in terms of the decisions made to

launch -- to whatever -- he would be the only guy, because he would

be the guy that would be looking for the planning and the execution

of that particular mission. And if he elected, as I say, to delay,

it would be -- he could tell you why he elected to delay.

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If he -- you know, hypothetically, if someone -- if he's ready

to go and he's ready to launch airplanes and someone from the White

House or from OSD or Joint Staff says, "Hey, hold on that," he could

at least tell you that, "Someone told me to hold on that." He may not

know why, but --

Q But he would have known factually that it occurred?

A Right.

Q Or that it never occurred --

A Or that it never occurred.

Q -- despite the speculation that it might have.

A And he'd be able to tell you, I mean, clearly, if you were

to say, "Okay, why did you do Benghazi first?" -- Benghazi -- "Tripoli

first?" he could tell you why he moved people there immediately and

didn't to Benghazi. A lot of things. He's the guy. If he can't

answer it, it would be hard to get an answer from anyone. He's the,

you know, he's the operational guy.

Ms. Sawyer. Thank you.

Ms. Green. We can go off the record.

[Recess.]

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[11:47 a.m.]

Mr. Tolar. So let's go back on the record. I've got 11:47 in the

a.m.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q I want to talk with you a little bit about something you

mentioned earlier, and that was the U.S. is moving back into Libya.

You were in Libya in December of 2011. However, prior to that,

did you participate and were you aware of any discussions about the

U.S. reopening their presence in Tripoli?

A I was.

Q How were you involved in those discussions -- were you

involved or were you made aware?

A I was not involved as much as I was made aware. Again, in

the nature of the job I had, when almost anything was being discussed

for decision over at the NSS, National Security Staff, in the

White House, I'd be made aware of it.

And you also have to understand, the Secretary of Defense was a

frequent traveler to the White House but didn't participate very often

in the endless meetings that took place on an endless number of topics.

So he wasn't involved in the vast majority of the discussions that would

take place.

It was all done at the lower staff level. I mean, it might be

Denis McDonough, the National Security Advisor, deputy and below.

Sandy Winnefeld, the Vice, the nature of the job, he's over there a

lot.

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So as discussions would be brought up about going back into

Benghazi and what the posture would be, that kind of thing, I was made

aware of that. I became aware of that.

Q Was there a request for a FAST team to be placed in Tripoli

prior to or immediately following their reopening?

A Not a FAST team. I mean, there was not a --

Q FAST Platoon, excuse me.

A There was not a FAST -- there was never a request by anybody.

But I was very, very surprised and, you know, mentioned it to people

at -- the perfect -- my assumption was at a U.S. embassy you have

marines. Usually, that marine group is

marines, and they're internal. So they don't do security outside the

building.

You know, typically you have the host nation provide security.

So you have the internal so-called embassy marines at all of our

embassies. They have no real responsibility outside the building.

So, as I say, in the normal course of operations, the host nation

is responsible for the external security of the building, and they do

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a great job, again, as a general rule. And then there's always contract

security guys, local nationals that are hired. Again, they're badge

checkers and things like that.

But in a situation like opening, in my opinion, John Kelly's

opinion, when you're opening an embassy in a place like Tripoli in terms

of what had just happened there, and a breakdown really in law and order

and the factions that were pushing and shoving and who knows what the

hell is going on, in my view, the two assumptions I made was that, A,

there would be embassy marines sent to the embassy. That would be,

again, standard in any embassy.

And then, in my view, a FAST Platoon of 50 marines would go down

on the ground, and then any other assistance that DOD could provide.

As an example -- and these were real requirements -- until the normal

telephone network was established there was a need for communicators.

So they were DOD communicators.

We knew that the embassy had been, to one degree or another,

shelled. And the presumption -- the assumption was that there

were -- it was dirty, the sense of being unexploded ordnance lying

around, so you'd need an EOD team. And certainly, if you're deploying

an EOD team, and given the situation that was there on the ground, you'd

want some medics or corpsmen.

And so these were certainly my assumption. But the biggest one

to me was automatically a FAST team or FAST Platoon on the ground. That

never happened.

Q And did someone in DOD, to your knowledge, make

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recommendations for those assets to be deployed as the reopening or

in conjunction with the reopening of that embassy?

A In the course of conversations on the NSS staff, the

White House staff, these things, I am sure, were brought up, because

I can remember when the decision was made to not have FAST. In fact,

even the package that we all thought -- I thought -- was a requirement,

you know, a few medics, some EOD, some comm techs, technicians, there

was this, you know, why do you need so many?

And if you take the FAST Platoon --

Q Who would have said that?

A Pretty sure Denis McDonough. You know, again, that's his

job. He was looking at it through whatever prism he had to look

through. He was the deputy national security advisor. He was

chairing a lot of these what are known as the Principals meetings or

the level below that.

And so they were -- and I believe this would have come from the

State Department. They didn't want to, quote, you know, militarize

the scene with military people on the ground. And so I can even

remember, I know talking to Jeremy Bash or someone saying: Look, those

guys can go in there in civilian clothes if you want. I mean, they

can do anything. They're behind the -- generally speaking, they're

inside the walls anyways and not a lot of people are going to see them.

These are infantry marines. They would set up antisniper places just

in case that kind of thing started. They know what they're doing. But

if you want to wear civilian clothing, they can do that too.

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And the decision was made, I think the initial -- hard to

believe -- 14, I think, went in initially. There were a couple of

communicators. I think we had one medic. An EOD team was -- normally

there are four -- I think it was two maybe. So it was pretty small.

And then, as I understand it, over time it got a little bit bigger.

It's a made-to-order FAST mission. That's why they exist.

Q Who would have been negotiating what the DOD footprint would

have been like, should have been like, with the NSC staff?

A Well, the input would come certainly through Sandy

Winnefeld. I mean, that was his role as the Vice. He spends -- and

I think you all know this -- a huge amount of time at the White House

in the NSS discussions, as well he should, and he represents, you know,

what's within the realm of the possible, what DOD's recommendations

are, that kind of thing.

Another person, frankly, let's see, at the time, the Vice is

routinely at the White House, sometimes two or three meetings in the

course of a day. Another person, the director of the Joint Staff.

It's a three-star position, Scaparrotti, Scap, Scaparrotti.

Q Barotti?

A Scap, S-c-a-p-a-r-o-t-t-i. He is right now the four-star

United States Army -- great guy -- in charge of career, and I believe

he's being nominated to be a COCOM somewhere.

Now, let me go back. At the time Benghazi happened, it would've

been Scap, Scaparrotti. At the time we were reestablishing the

embassy, it would've been Bill Gortney, Admiral Gortney,

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G-o-r-t-n-e-y. And Bill was the director of the staff. It's not

unusual for the director of the staff to periodically go to these think

meetings over at -- these interagency meetings over at the NSS staff.

And, of course, it's the NSS staff's role to do the interagency

piece and bring all of the disparate views throughout our government

or throughout the departments into one room and they could all argue

it out and whatnot. So that is their role. But it would be either

the Vice, Sandy Winnefeld at the time, or perhaps the director of the

Joint Staff.

Now, there's a lot of talking back and forth too between, say,

White House, NSS staff to the political appointees or to the OSD

staff -- OSD staff's like 3,000 people -- and directly -- although I

don't like this -- directly down to, say, the Joint Staff, the J3, the

J5.

But in any event, there's a lot of talk going back and forth. But

it would be the Vice Chairman's responsibility or normal role to present

these kind of issues to the interagency discussions in the White House.

Q When you became aware that there was not going to be a robust

footprint but the skeleton crew of some 14 to 15, did you express your

concerns with anyone or discuss it with anyone?

A I'm sure, there's no doubt in my mind, I would have raised

it to the Secretary of Defense, I mean, just in terms of the constant

conversations we had back and forth. The world I lived in at the time,

there weren't meeting -- I didn't have meetings with the Secretary.

It's just an all-day, for the most part, being very close to him, and

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we'd discuss anything and everything that would come up.

Again, I'd go back into -- I don't remember that this was briefed

to us because it would've been a State Department issue -- back to that

again, we get called into a lot of things if the State Department wants

us called into those things. And if they don't, then they do

their -- you know, they're a department unto themselves and they do

their own work. If they don't say, you know what, we need to -- we

need to get -- we don't know what we need at this particular location

but we know we can't provide it from within our staff, let's get the

DOD involved.

I've got to think, though, that the NSS received at least an info

brief from the State Department at some level as to, okay, we're going

back into Tripoli, we're going to reestablish relations, this is how

we're going to do it. Gene Cretz is going to be our ambassador. He's

a good guy, da, da, da, da, da, da, and this is what we're going back

in there.

Q If State Department requests DOD support --

A That's a good way to put it.

Q -- how does that -- what's the food chain for that in terms

of, does it go up to POTUS and then back down to SecDef? What's the

chain of events for something like that?

A All of that. I mean, it could be -- it would be that for

sure, but it might be a call directly from the State Department to some

person, associate that they deal with on the OSD staff to say: Hey,

we're thinking about this, can you guys support or can you put

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some -- can you help us with this, we're not the military folks.

It could be a call-in for, you know, to Jeremy Bash about: Hey,

this is what we're thinking, can you organize a brief for us so that

we know what we're talking about when we go there?

So it's a, to say the least, an interactive process at multiple

levels.

Q Are you aware if State Department ever requested DOD support

for the reopening of the Tripoli embassy?

A With the exception of what I've just described, I think it

was 14, and it was EOD, corpsman or medical, what I've just described.

Q I understand that's what resulted. My question is, do you

know if they made a larger request, a more robust request?

A I do not.

Q Sir, I want to talk to you a little bit about September 10th,

the day before the attack. Did you travel with Secretary Panetta to

Pennsylvania that day for the memorial service?

A Did not.

Q Were you aware that that day the Secretary participated in

a call with other national security principals, may have been from his

vehicle?

A If it was from his vehicle and he was up in Pennsylvania

that day, I was not aware of that. But I'd have to say Jeremy would've

been -- Jeremy Bash would've been -- you know, port and starboard,

almost -- very seldom, but on a trip up to Pennsylvania, I had other

things to do. And that was more of a media thing and show respect,

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obviously.

Q Would you get any kind of feedback or report on what that

conversation might have been with the principals?

A Normally, Jeremy would say: Hey, boss, got a call from Tom

Donilon, they talked about, you know, whatever.

Q Apparently, the COCOMs were on that call. Were you aware

if any guidance was issued or relayed from the Secretary?

A No.

Q Okay. Thank you.

A Do you know what the guidance was?

Q No, I don't know. That's what -- I was just trying to see

if perhaps the day before the Secretary had any guidance for the COCOMs.

We talked -- you talked earlier a little bit about that video,

the YouTube video, "The Innocence of Muslims." You mentioned that the

Secretary was aware of it. That said, was there a lot of discussion

in the Pentagon about that video and its impact potentially?

A As I think I mentioned earlier, there were a couple of times

that this gentleman down in Florida was going to do -- you know, he's

very, very anti-Muslim, whether it was burn the Koran or whatever. And

he'd always come out saying: Hey, watch what I'm going to do Sunday,

I'm going to burn the Koran. And everyone would get agitated.

Again, he has his right to his beliefs and all, but I know my

Secretary thought it made no sense to call people like that. I mean,

they're going to do what they're going to do. And the sense is that,

you know, from a military point of view, we know how to defend our bases

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and do that kind of thing.

A couple times they wanted him to call. I just -- he just -- it

would make no point in his mind to call, lower himself to call. Going

to do it anyways. I believe Secretary Clinton may have called once

or twice, you know, again. But Secretary Panetta was not open to that

kind of thing. And it came up a couple times, you know, in --

Q Not in terms of the call, but in terms of the video itself,

was there a lot of discussion that you were privy to about that video,

the impact of that video, the ramifications, et cetera?

A No. The only discussion would have been, you know, it was

on CNN or FOX News, and we all said that's stupid and moved on, you

know.

Q September 11th, obviously --

A Let me add, there's in the world that certain people live

in --

Q Who are certain people?

A You know, all Americans. You look at life in different

ways. There seems to be among some that a given incident would cause

a whole -- a billion people on the planet to do something, like the

burning of the Koran or something like that. I'm very sensitive to

this, as the former commander of Guantanamo, but that's another one

of those -- we have Guantanamo, so there's a billion people on the

planet that want to end Western civilization.

There's other people that just say these things are just things

that go on in life and a billion -- a small segment of a billion people

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on Earth don't need much in the rationale to try to kill us, whether

it's Brussels, Paris, Boston, Chattanooga. They don't need much.

They're already committed.

So where one group, one part of the thought process is we can't

do anything to possibly offend some people, there are other people -- I

think Secretary Panetta for sure was one of them -- who say these people

are going to do what they're going to do, and whether it's 9/11

anniversary or some idiot burning the Koran or something, they don't

need a reason to do this, they're already committed to doing it.

Q Let's move on to September 11th. And I kind of want to go

through that day with a little more detail, if you don't mind.

A Sure.

Q Obviously, you were at the Pentagon that day?

A I was.

Q And upon the Secretary's return from the White House, did

he immediately call the meeting? Do you recall?

A Well, he, of course, came back from the White House with

Marty Dempsey. They typically would ride over, ride back. I'm

assuming they did that the same day, ride over, ride back together,

and, you know, exchange thoughts coming and going.

Carter Ham was in the building. He was probably standing by.

So -- but that was, you know, again, not a formal meeting. We

just -- the Secretary is back. Marty, I think. Winnefeld wasn't

there. I think he was -- he wasn't there. Jeremy. We probably had,

I'm guessing, someone up from the Joint Staff ready to update in terms

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of intel what we knew. So --

Q So upon return, there was a hastily called meeting. Those

folks, you say, were probably in attendance.

A Yeah.

Q Do you recall if Admiral Tidd would have been there?

A It is very likely he would've been there.

Q And briefly, again, you touched on this before, just to make

sure I'm clear on this, talk to me for a minute about what General

Dempsey's role in all of this with regard to the response to Benghazi.

He didn't command anything. So talk about his role and what his

responsibilities were.

A The Chairman of the Joint Staff, of course, is the senior

military officer in the Armed Forces, and he is the President's primary

adviser. No one would do anything without talking to the

Secretary -- to the Chairman. He's a wealth of knowledge, a wealth

of wisdom. When I say "anything," I mean anything big.

Guys like me would call, you know, for atmospherics: Hey, you

know, I know he's mad at me. My world, I know they're churning on this

issue of GTMO right now, what are the atmospherics, because I am not

going to do it. Or I object to what's being said about GTMO. It's

an insult to my people, you know.

So he's a great source of advice and all. Wouldn't hesitate to

call and say: Hey, what you said in the hearing the other day caught

people by surprise. Just, you know, keep telling the truth. Keep

doing what you're doing.

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So it would be pretty unusual to exclude him, although if -- but

he's not in the chain of command. And you understand what that means.

I mean, great advice, great suggestions, great all of that.

All of the COCOM staff, you know, the J1, 2, 3, 4, they are

connected with the Joint Staff because that's where all the information

comes from. We have passing interest in what OSD -- the political

appointees, we work very closely with them. But, again, they're

supposed to be up here and we're all down here. They love getting down

to where we are, but they don't understand the issues and all. But

it's a very collaborative process.

But to answer your question, it would be very unusual for

Secretary -- or for Chairman Dempsey's recommendations not to be given

powerful weight, certainly by the two secretaries I worked for. If

you go back a little earlier, the Chairman was irrelevant, almost

irrelevant in the Rumsfeld years. So there's another example of how

it works.

I know that Secretary Hagel and Marty Dempsey, again, very close,

and Secretary Hagel had a very close relationship with him. It's the

way it ought to be. You're really ignorant if you think you can do

it on your own.

Q As the COCOM commander, although General Dempsey is not in

that chain of command, per se, for warfighters, as a COCOM commander,

if General Dempsey said to you, "Slow down, don't move so quickly,"

or words to that effect, what impact would that have on your

decisionmaking process?

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A That would cause me to slow down a little bit more and have

a discussion about it. The guy on the ground is the COCOM, and guys

like General Dempsey understand that. What he brings to the

discussion, in what you've just described, is the atmospherics up here,

you know.

Q The political atmospherics?

A The political atmospherics -- as well as, you know, kind

of the military. Look, you're asking for an aircraft carrier. I don't

have one. I can get you one in 30 days, but I don't have one right

now for you. You know, that kind of thing. But good advice. But

atmospherics are very, very important, as you know, in the town.

But knowing the way General Dempsey is -- my best friend in the

world is Joe Dunford, he's the same kind of guy -- he's not going to

say no. He's going to give you all the advice he can give you. And

if you say, you know, "I've got it, Joe, but I want to talk to the

Secretary," that would not cause him to say anything. It is absolutely

your right.

Q In terms of that first meeting after the return from the

White House, did it happen pretty much immediately, to the best of your

recollection?

A Yeah. You know, people started to congregate. You know,

again, it would've been probably Tidd. It might have been the J2 came

up. Could have been a couple -- there probably was a couple of the

political appointees like Kathy Hicks or something like that. Could

have been Jim Miller. Jim Miller, I don't know if you've talked to

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him, but he was the under Secretary of Defense for policy, really a

first-class public servant. We used to call him Huddles. Just huddle

up and everyone tell the Secretary what's going on.

Q In terms of Mr. Miller, how long had he been there?

A Well, Jim was -- when I got there, Jim was the deputy under

Secretary of Defense for policy. Michele Flournoy was the principal.

Michele left well under the Panetta, so say a year. So he'd been maybe

the under Secretary of Defense for 6 to 8, 9 months.

Q What insight would Mr. Miller have potentially about the

response to Benghazi?

A Well, first of all, very, very smart guy, very astute guy,

had the confidence of the Secretary, not the military confidence but

the confidence in terms of policy. Someone in his position constantly

interacting with the National Security Staff. So he's got the

atmospherics, what they're thinking about.

Q Do you believe it is possible or plausible that he would

have engaged with the NSS staff about what the military footprint would

look like upon our return to Tripoli, in terms of the embassy?

Ms. Sawyer. What timeframe are we talking about?

Mr. Tolar. Do you understand my question?

Ms. Sawyer. So are we talking about the return in fall of 2011?

Mr. Tolar. I'm asking him if he understands my question.

Ms. Sawyer. I don't understand your question, so you can explain

to me.

BY MR. TOLAR:

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Q I don't care. It doesn't matter.

A When we were in the process as a Nation of reestablishing

diplomatic relations in '11, in reestablishing the embassy, Jim would

have certainly been in, I think, in the meetings or the under Secretary

of Defense for policy or the deputy would have certainly been in on

the discussions at the White House, at the NSS staff.

And as you know, it happens in every bureaucracy, you know, a

meeting takes place and say someone, the Secretary of Defense says,

you know, "I'm not going to do it or that's not a good idea," and, you

know, if you persist, "I want to talk to your President about it or

I will talk to the President," and then the meeting is over and someone

calls the under Secretary of Defense for policy and says, "Hey, you

better get your boss on board," or these are the -- you know what I

mean. It happens in every bureaucracy.

Q Sure.

A But Jim would have been someone that would have at least

been in attendance in some of the meetings about how they're going to

reestablish. But those discussions would have certainly been more

State Department saying: Look, these are the atmospherics on the

ground, we're working with the local country, this is what their

sensitivities are, et cetera, et cetera.

Q Got it. All right. Back to the meeting. So you're in

this meeting. The secretary has gotten back. He's gotten guidance

from the President. And I want to say he said something to the effect

of everything's on the table. Does that sound familiar?

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A At a meeting like that, he would have said whatever they

need is available. So everything is on the table.

Q And he would have said that to who?

A To the group.

Q Specifically, was he talking to General Ham, the COCOM

commander?

A Carter would have been there, as I've already said. Carter

would have been there. Chairman was there. Jeremy for sure. I was

there. And he says: Okay, let's just make it happen. That's the kind

of guidance you get from a guy like Mr. Panetta.

Q Would that constitute the vocal order to General Ham, do

whatever you need to do, you've got carte blanche? Is that fair?

A It is fair.

Q Is that what happened?

A Carter Ham, I'm sure, then called his organization back in

Stuttgart, who, frankly, would have already been planning, and said:

Okay, we got the VOCO, get back to me in an hour, what do you need?

Q At that point, after he returned from the

White House -- and, again, I hate to rehash this, but just to be

clear -- Secretary Panetta had the authority to order planes and

personnel into Libya, correct?

A Yes. I would say he -- unless he had been told by phone,

I didn't know about it, you know, yes, he would have had that

authority --

Q And --

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A -- particularly after talking to the POTUS.

Q Check. And was there specific guidance in that meeting

given to General Ham, or did he just say, "Ham, you've got the ball"?

A You got it. That would have been the level of guidance.

Q At that point, does General Ham have the authority to move

units into Libya -- or into Tripoli -- if he chooses to? Does he need

any other authority from Secretary Panetta to move assets into

Tripoli -- or into Libya?

A Unless at some point along the way someone told him to slow

down, I believe he had a VOCO. VOCO means go, whatever, you know,

whatever it means.

Now, these things are then followed up with paperwork and things

like that. I mean, oftentimes you start moving and then submit the

paperwork. But we were -- it was pretty obvious that we needed to do

something and the Secretary of Defense said do it, and you guys are

the experts, work it out, and Carter Ham ran with the ball.

Q So basically, in that meeting following the White House,

at that point General Ham had been given the authority to do whatever

he needed to do to execute a response to the events in Libya. Is that

accurate?

A I believe that's accurate.

Q So he, in terms of the DOD response, he's in charge?

A Yes, unless the Secretary of Defense changes it.

Q Sure. Who was in charge on the political side? Is there

somebody that would have been in charge -- or the -- I guess

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it's -- well, I withdraw that.

So General Ham is in charge now of AFRICOM and the response to

the AOR. What does he need to do in order to draw upon assets that

he doesn't own, FAST, CIF What does

he got to do in order to take operational control, whatever, tactical

control of those units, what does he have to do to make that happen?

Or is it implicit in the fact that Panetta says: Do what you have got

to do.

A Yeah, I mean, it's implicit. But to get at assets that he

doesn't own, at that point Joint Staff would be working all of the

deployment orders because they were in the room. And, you know, under

those circumstances, you get what you ask for.

Q And so when you say Joint Staff is working the orders, does

that mean Joint Staff is issuing orders and directives saying control

of these assets will be transferred to AFRICOM or words to that effect?

A Right.

Q So that's just the paperwork?

A The paper trail.

Q Paper trail?

A Yeah.

Q But in your mind, is there any doubt that Ham was in control

and could do whatever he wanted to do?

A Correct. No doubt in my mind.

Q Thank you.

A Let me caveat.

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Q On that night how were the other COCOMs informed that their

assets were going to be transferred to AFRICOM?

A Just by message.

Q Okay.

A Yeah. Or phone call. I mean, you know, a lot of that stuff

obviously would be coming out of Europe. Jim Stavridis, Admiral

Stavridis was the guy there. But the mindset we have as military men

and women, if you're the guy that's got the mission, everyone else

thinks in terms of supporting you. So as these decisions are being

made and being disseminated through message traffic or phone calls,

the only thing that EUCOM would be thinking about at that point was:

How do I support Carter Ham because he's got the mission?

Q That night, following the return of the Secretary to the

Pentagon, generally speaking, what was your impression of what the

mission was for DOD? What were you talking about in terms of what our

objectives are?

A In my view, it was, what's going on in Benghazi and what

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can we do to fix it? And then the second part of that was -- and I

would go back to one of the points the Congressman made -- what's going

on in the rest of Libya? And if the answer is nothing, what do we need

to do to make sure nothing happens? And that would have been to

reinforce the embassy.

Q Was there a discussion that you were privy to or became aware

of about DOD's role in trying to recover the Ambassador, either alive

or otherwise?

A Other than, as I said, given the mission to the COCOM, you've

got what you -- you know, you've got anything you need, go, and then

the COCOM starts working that problem.

Q Did the Secretary prioritize missions for the COCOM?

A No.

Q I'm sorry?

A No. I'm sorry. The answer to that would be no, that would

be an operational series of decisions, discussions by the COCOM with

his staff.

Q Does the J3 weigh in on that process at all or are they simply

kept informed of what goes down?

A Interactive.

Q Okay.

A Yeah.

Q Would they have input?

A They could have recommendations.

Q Okay. Do you know if --

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A The mindset, again, would be what do we need to do to support

the COCOM?

Q Did you have an appreciation of what the DOD footprint was

like generally in the AOR, AFRICOM/EUCOM AOR, in terms of our ability

to respond?

A No, just a general idea that we've got all sorts of, you

know, units there. One of the things we have gotten used to, you know,

we used to always have a MEU and an aircraft carrier in the Med. We

don't have it anymore. That went away 9/11, and the size of the Navy

and all that, that would have been the solution of the problem, but

we didn't have it.

So we have, you know, aviation assets flying out of various

countries. That was my first thought. Actually, the second thought.

The first thought was really the FAST team and the mission force that

was in the Balkans. After that, as you start putting packages

together, you're thinking in aviation. So, yeah, I had a general idea

of what was there.

Q Were you aware there was a C-17 at Ramstein on alert bravo

status, along with a crew to go with it?

A Not specifically aware, but I would have assumed that we

have alert aircraft in various places, Ramstein being the hub there

in Europe.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q General Kelly, I just had a question. I think Mac was just

going through talking about how the COCOMs would have been alerted so

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that assets that AFRICOM used that night weren't necessarily AFRICOM

assets.

A Right.

Q And so the COCOMs would have been alerted, and I think you

said that by message or phone call. If you look at exhibit 6, which

is the DOD timeline.

A Okay.

Q On the second page of the actual timeline, near the top,

at 8:30 p.m., there's an entry that indicates the National Military

Command Center conducted a Benghazi conference call with

representatives from AFRICOM, EUCOM, CENTCOM, TRANSCOM, SOCOM, and the

four services.

Would this have been the point in time on that night when those

particular COCOMs were alerted about the assets -- their assets that

may be used in response?

A Yeah, I would say -- let me take a look. That had been

certainly the point where the operations people within those

organizations, the J3s, the J4, the J5 -- J3 and J4, logistics and

operations, this is when it really starts to get formalized.

And so everyone's alerted. The discussion would have been this

is what's going on in Libya. AFRICOM is the supported commander, so

everyone else is in support of him. And then the discussion would have

been: Who's got what where? The services in this case wouldn't have

been as important. Always have representatives. They have, of

course, ops, 24/7 ops sections.

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And in this case, it's always nice for the services to know if

you're going to deploy. Even though they don't own them, the Marines

would have been very interested in the fact that the FAST teams were

going to go somewhere.

But this is when it all starts to get more or less formalized.

And I would tell you the conversation would have been we stand ready

to support AFRICOM in every case.

Q Prior to this, would the COCOMs have received any

notification prior to this point? I guess what I'm just trying to

understand is kind of the information for that night.

A Yeah.

Q Once Secretary Panetta authorized General Ham to do what

he needed to do, the forces were identified, how did that information

flow to the COCOMs to make them aware of the decisions that were being

made?

A Before anything got formalized, I suspect that the Joint

Staff, once the Pentagon became aware that there was an issue in

Benghazi -- and I think it originally started coming out through the

phone calls from the embassy or the embassy staff to, I think, probably

the ops section in the State Department. Again, they have a 24/7 ops

section but it's not really -- it's nothing like the military

maintains. It's almost -- it's an information disseminator. It's a

phone call or it's a point -- a phone number to call in Washington.

And then you start -- you know, they start waking people up or

making -- it's nothing like that we actually have in the military.

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So I suspect when those initial calls came in, Joint Staff, at

a minimum, would have been pushing information, what they knew,

something was going on in Benghazi, phone call and email to the ops

section for sure in Mons, Belgium, that's EUCOM, and certainly in

Stuttgart. And in Stuttgart you have AFRICOM and you have EUCOM.

So that would have started just automatically. The watch

officers would have started pushing information out. And then it gets

a little bit more -- a lot more formalized. But always speed is of

the essence. And as I say, we all knew instinctively, once a guy is

told he's the supported commander, in this case AFRICOM, everyone else

falls in line, what can I do for him.

Q I think a couple of times today we've talked about a SVTC

that occurred that evening, and I think you may have indicated that

you attended that SVTC. Is that correct?

A I did.

Q And I think, if you look at exhibit 5 --

A I got it.

Q -- this is the email where there are several redactions.

The main part of the email that starts kind of halfway down on the first

page is sent on September 11th at 9:44 p.m. and it's addressed to

Dr. Miller and Dr. Hicks. Is Dr. Miller, Jim Miller, the under

secretary for policy that you mentioned earlier?

A Right.

Q And then the first line of that email indicates, "The NSS

convened a SVTC at 1930 tonight," so indicating that that particular

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SVTC started at 1930. And in that same paragraph it says, the

second-to-last line, it says, "And Lieutenant General Kelly sat in as

well."

Do you recall participating in that SVTC?

A I didn't stay long. I was in and out. The SVTC would've

been done in terms of where we would have been in the Pentagon in what

was called cables. You know, at that point, you know, you've got

to -- I'm not trying to make a joke here -- but at this point no one

had a clue what was going on. And so to sit through, you know, another

SVTC, Jeremy was there, it was an NSS SVTC, so I wouldn't have stayed

long. I did not stay long.

Q When you say you didn't stay long, do you have

a -- 15 minutes, 30 minutes?

A I can't say. Just in and out.

Q Do you recall --

A It was a later in the evening one that I endured.

Mr. Tolar. Was there more than one?

General Kelly. There was -- it's my recollection there

was -- yeah, I mean, there was -- 9:44. This might have been the one.

No. Seems to me it was a later SVTC.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q I don't know if you had the opportunity earlier to read

through, this appears to be a readout of what was discussed in the SVTC.

And if you want to take a moment to read through to see if anything

in here allows you to recall what you understood during the discussions

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in the SVTC and information that you may have been privy to.

A One thing, again, I seem to recall during the SVTC -- 9:44.

I don't know if it was this one. Seems to me there was a later one.

But that's when they were confident that -- the announcement was made

that Chris Stevens had been found, you know, alive and injured.

Q And referring to the later SVTC that you seem to recall,

was that an interagency SVTC or was that another SVTC --

A I believe that was a State, came out of State.

Q So that would have just been between DOD and State?

A No, there were other channels, you know, in the SVTC. We

were mostly listening. It was them talking to each other really, as

I recollect.

Q For this particular SVTC, as it's referenced in this email,

do you have a recollection of the information prior -- and I understand

that you didn't stay very long. But during your time at the SVTC, do

you have a recollection of what was discussed or anything that stood

out to you in that SVTC?

A At this point in the evening a lot of people guessing what

was going on. There was just not any hard information, and it's just

the nature of something like this. And as time goes on, things tend

to clarify, and obviously when you then have an ability weeks or months

later to sit down and say, okay, let's go through this, you know, minute

by minute.

But at this point, it was one of the things, frankly, I always,

always, always would caution people about. Again, military people

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don't tend to do it because of the level of experience we have in

operations. But always more than suggesting to people that were

political appointees and whatnot that, let's not overreact to this.

I don't mean in this case. But we don't know what's going on.

And we can all sit together and guess at it, but we need -- and

that's what Carter Ham and his folks were doing, I can tell you, I can

guarantee you at this point, is trying to find out what was going on

on the ground from every source they could possibly piece together.

But this would happen all the time. You see something on

CNN -- not germane to this -- but you see something on CNN and everyone

would start getting spun up. I said: Hey, calm down, initial reports,

they're never as good or as bad as they come in. We need to take a

breath here. The guy or gal on the ground is dealing with it. Let's

wait until whoever it is -- Carter Ham in the Benghazi case, or

depending, John Allen when he was in Afghanistan, Joe Dunford -- let's

wait -- John Kelly, when I was in SOUTHCOM -- let's wait, he's the guy

on the ground, and just not overreact here in Washington. And for God

sakes, put the 8,000-mile screwdrivers away. Let them work the

problem.

It's a constant battle here in Washington. I understand it

because pressures of the media, pressures, frankly, of the Hill, they

need to give answers. And the answer, you know, a lot of times you

don't like to give is, you know, we don't know what's going on, but

there's a guy or a gal on the ground that's working this problem, let's

let that person have some time.

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Q I this readout on the second page it talks about some of

the ways ahead. And I understand you didn't attend the entire meeting,

but once the meeting ended, did you receive a briefing about the

discussions that were held during that meeting?

A It's my recollection everything was, you know -- again,

maybe I'm just a believer in this -- Carter Ham had this. I was,

frankly, mildly interested, in my job -- I'd have been very different

had I been in other jobs, if I'd been the J3 of the Joint Staff, I'd

have had a different view -- I was mildly interested, with all due

respect, in what a bunch of political appointees were discussing in

a near vacuum -- worse than that, in a world or in a situation where

it was nothing but speculation. This is what I heard. Hey, we just

got a phone call from this guy. It serves no purpose to make too many

decisions, particularly when you don't know what's going on.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Sir, again, looking at the timeline, it appears that the

National Military Command Center conducted a conference call at 8:30

p.m. I believe that's on the second page of your timeline.

A Got it. Yep.

Q Did you participate in that call, sir?

A No. That would have been -- all of this ops stuff is

outside the Secretary of Defense's office. We would have been called

into that. The military guys and gals are making it happen at this

point.

Q That's the warfighters?

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A Right, the warfighters are making it happen.

Q Do you have any appreciation what was discussed on that

call?

A I know what was discussed on that call only because I know

what those calls include, but not that evening. And the only reason

I would say that I might have gotten a phone call is if -- this is

hypothetically -- Jim Stavridis said: I'm not looking to let them use

my airplanes. I'd get a phone call right away, and I could straighten

that out for him. But that's just not the nature of how we do business,

as you know.

Q I'm curious about the timing of this meeting. It didn't

happen until 8:30 p.m. Do you have any thoughts on that, why perhaps

it didn't occur sooner?

A Yeah. I would say that by this time warning orders are out.

I mean, there's already been phone calls, there's already been emails,

and this is probably the first opportunity to get all of the players.

I know I keep saying this, but I'll say it a lot: AFRICOM is already

working this problem. So now you're bringing in everybody to get a

"who's on first" phone call and, once again, to talk to AFRICOM to say:

What do you need? Are you getting everything you think you need.

Q And based on your experience, what do you think was

discussed here?

A Exactly what I just pointed out: Hey, AFRICOM, where are

you on this right now? And then they would run down. What do you need

from us? TRANSCOM at this point would be hyper, very, very important

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in terms of moving forces and airplanes. But it would be: AFRICOM,

where you right now, and what do you need from us?

Q Who's directing that call? Who's leading that call?

A Who was in? That would have been the Joint Staff. They

would have been net control.

Q Probably -- so then Admiral Tidd probably?

A Probably Tidd, yeah. Tidd would have been in there for

sure. His whole senior -- you know, the 3 and people like that would

have been there and the 4. Probably the director of the Joint Staff,

I suspect, would have been in there, Bill Gortney. He wouldn't have

had to have been, but probably couldn't keep him away from meeting like

that.

Q You mentioned obviously that the Secretary didn't have an

ops center. How did you stay abreast of the developments throughout

the evening?

A I would watch the emails. And there was enough coming and

going where I would be kept up to date in what was going on. I

wouldn't -- what I would never want to do, what no one should do to

the civilian decisionmakers is to run in there with updates that you

don't even know are accurate. The Secretary of Defense knows that if

he's needed -- I mean, he's going to track it -- but if he's needed

on a given discussion, no one is going to hesitate to go in there and

say: Boss, we need your help on this one.

Q How often did you update the Secretary that evening? Was

it a regular thing or you just --

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A Just probably knowing the way the relationship and all,

just: It's still churning, boss, we've got things going, and we still

don't know what exactly is going on.

Q I mean, the reality at this point, what's the Secretary's

role?

A Zero. Not zero. He has a role because he sits atop the

structure, but he doesn't have an operational role. He has a decision

policymaking role. And, you know, frequently the boss would come in

with -- or we would go to the Secretary of Defense, the two I worked

for, for sure, and say: We're just getting this from the -- not on

this topic necessarily -- but we're just getting something from State

or from the White House. Could you put a fork in this thing? I mean,

this is silly thinking.

He would do that kind of thing. But minute-to-minute things,

that's the operators are executing.

Q Did you ever personally have any discussion with General

Ham that evening of the 11th?

A In the room, but not: Carter, what do you need from us?

He was just getting all of that.

Q Did you communicate with General Dempsey?

A Just, again, in the room.

Q Did you ever communicate with any of the commanders in the

EUCOM or AFRICOM AOR, including the COCOMs and commanders below them,

that night?

A Would not have had any reason to. Would have been very -- I

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mean, I'd done it in a New York second if there was a reason to. But

no.

Q You didn't do it that night?

A No recollection of that.

Q Or the next day?

A No.

Q I apologize. Briefly talk about the J3 ops center and kind

of what their role was that evening. Don't get in the weeds, please,

but just a broad look.

A The National Military Command Center is in the Pentagon,

and it is staffed 24/7, you know. And it receives constant information

from any number of sources. And it is the point of entry, if you will,

the operational point of entry into the Pentagon, into the Department

of Defense. And they are, as I say, the people in there are very, very

good. There's a large number of people.

They're fairly senior as a group. There's always a one-star

watch officer, and he's running the show, and he's got colonels and

lieutenant colonels. And they don't hesitate to pick the phone up and

in the middle of night, Christmas morning, doesn't matter, that's

usually when the calls would come in.

So it's very energetic, and they have their procedures worked out

and they're very fast to make decisions and they're very fast to pull

people in that need to know. You know, it's the old story, what do

you wake the Secretary of Defense up in the middle of the night for?

Working for the Secretary of Defense, I told people this is what I'll

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wake him up for, otherwise, you know -- and that would be like a

Benghazi. And the same thing, any commander tells the staff: This

is what you wake me up for in the middle of the night, otherwise work

the problem and I'll be in in the morning.

Q Is the NMCC synonymous with the J3 ops center?

A Yeah.

Q One in the same?

A One in the same, yeah.

Q Admiral Tidd was a J3?

A He was.

Q So he was in charge of that ops center?

A Right, they worked for him.

Q But there was a one-star running the floor?

A Running the floor.

Q Do you recall who that might have been?

A I don't. I think actually it's on one of the emails, Leskys

(ph), something like that. And they're in shifts. They do 8-hour

shifts. And when the shift's over -- typically, when you're about to

go on shift you show up a half an hour early and you get briefed on

what's going on in the world, get settled in, and then the other guys

kind of stay for about half an hour while you've got it and then they're

out of there.

Q You mentioned earlier that you think you went ashore

about sometime after midnight?

A Yeah, it seems to me.

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Q Prior to -- I'm sorry. You went home sometime after

midnight?

A Yeah.

Q Correct?

A Right.

Q Before you departed, did you have any pressing concerns or

issues you were thinking about that you can recall?

A No. AFRICOM had it.

Q I want to talk about September 12th, please. You got back

to the office 4 o'clock in the morning, more or less?

A More or less, real early. A little later than usual,

though.

Q Did you get an update on the status of the forces that were

tasked to respond -- FAST, CIF[

that morning?

A That would have -- in a case like that, and pretty

regularly, back on the National Military Command Center, I would

frequently have the watch officer come up and brief the Secretary, and

I'm sure we did it that morning, to where the watch officer came up

with maybe one other person, sat down with the Secretary and said:

Okay, this is what happened over the course of the evening.

But that brief would have been at that point, you know, Stevens

is dead, everyone's out of Benghazi, we've got, you know, we've got

marines going to Tripoli. Remember the topic of discussion was,

frankly, at that point who were the guys that went to help, because

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we were not immediately aware that there was a -- you know, it didn't

surprise anyone -- but that there was a CIA thing, facility there. But

that would have been the level of brief, things are happening.

Q

Were you aware at the time

that they sat on the tarmac for about 6 hours waiting on a ride?

A No, I wasn't aware of that.

Q Does that concern you?

A I would say it surprises me, but if a decision was made,

a conscious decision to hold them there by EUCOM, that most -- not EUCOM

but AFRICOM -- that would have been, I'm assuming, because there was

a need to hold them there. Now, it may have been, back to the country

clearance thing, it may have been State Department saying: Hey, we

haven't got country clearance yet.

Now, we can discuss whether that was -- whether we should have

done it or not, but that's, you know -- so if they sat on the ground

for 6 hours it was for a reason why, because you could bet that that

captain and those marines wanted to be in Tripoli.

Q The captain indicated that they were loaded on that plane,

ready to go at 1 p.m. local time. It took off at 4 p.m. local time.

Over the course of the next 3 hours, he was forced, directed -- pick

a term -- but basically having to change in and out of uniforms into

skivvies and back and forth and back and forth. Additionally --

A On the airplane or --

Q On the airplane, yes. I apologize, I don't recall

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specifically, but I believe so.

A Okay. I think it was brought up earlier that it might have

been down on the tarmac, yeah.

Q It was. The point was, they were ready for takeoff at 1

p.m. They didn't leave until 3 hours later.

Who would have been engaged -- who up the food chain would have

been directing them to change in and out of uniform?

A Well, for sure -- I mean, I can't imagine a military person

saying --

Q Why do you say that?

A Well, just because we're predisposed to wear our uniforms.

That's, you know, who we are. So if someone said -- for sure, if

someone said -- told EUCOM -- told AFRICOM, "Hey, we want them in

civilian clothes," that would have come from the interagency, the NSS

probably. Those would have been the desires, I believe, of the State

Department.

And, again, they're looking at it from the, you know, we don't

want to appear to be militarized in this thing. You know, maybe the

local government felt, okay, you can bring them in but you can't wear

uniforms. I don't know. But that wouldn't have been something -- to

change people in and out of uniform, that would have come all by itself

from the military commander.

Q It would not have?

A It would not have.

Q How do you believe that would have been communicated to the

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AFRICOM commander?

A A number of ways. At this point, it could have been -- you

know, remember the -- all the COCOMs have a State Department person

working for them, and that's a very valuable chain or information flow.

It could have come in that way. But, again, if it was something that

the commander didn't want to do, he wouldn't have done it. And then

it would have been elevated if, say, State Department felt very strong

about it, then it would have been elevated to a higher level.

Q Was the Secretary ever asked to engage on that issue that

night or that day?

A No.

Q Later that day, after the recovery was made, all the

personnel were Medevac'd to -- back to Ramstein. Immediately upon

landing it was requested they all be briefed by the Ambassador, the

U.S. Ambassador to Germany. Were you tracking that at all?

A No.

Q Do you know anything about it?

A No. If you can reveal, why would the Ambassador in Germany

want to talk --

Q That's the question.

A Oh. In the course of the day, one of the things the Marine

Corps -- you know, the Marine Corps has a very close relationship with

the State Department in terms of we man all of their embassies and have,

I think, since 1947. The Commandant of the Marine Corps extended a

desire to the State Department that the Marine Corps handle the body

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return and the ceremonial part of that thing, and that was something

that we transmitted to the State Department, and they were taken by

that. And, of course, if you remember, the reception there at Andrews,

it was all the marine body bearers from 8th and I.

In my recollection, the only message that I had or interaction

with the State Department the next day was simply that, that the Marine

Corps would like to handle the body return at Andrews.

Q And just for edification here and general understanding,

talk to me, please, about when it comes to setting a vocal order.

Obviously, the Secretary has the authority to do that and then he

directs the COCOM commander to do that. After that, the COCOM can do

whatever he wants in terms of issuing vocal orders to his subordinates.

Is that accurate?

A Absolutely.

Q Okay. Now, I want to talk to you about N-hour. Talk to

me about -- describe briefly what N-hour is, how it gets established,

by who, et cetera.

A Well, any time you put a plan together, if you're going to

put a plan together, and sometimes before you even put the plan

together, it's very common with us in these type of situations, you

start calling people, telling them to get moving, spinning up, if you

will.

And then the staff typically in a case like this would be current

ops, current operations in the J3. They put a quick straw man together.

And, of course, as you know, we plan all of this stuff, so it's

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relatively quick to do. You just start to plug and play information.

But there's always a start point to the event. Now, it could be

the start point could be on order, because you don't know when you're

going to start.

Q What do you mean on order?

A Wait for me to tell you to go. And, in fact, there are

probably hundreds, if not thousands of plans in the Pentagon, and

they're all, you know, execute on order.

So you would start to build the plan. And, of course, the staff

working across the staff are figuring out, okay, what's real, what's

within the realm of the possible here. What can we do. How fast can

we get the In-extremis Force out of the Balkans onto airplanes and maybe

prestage them in Sigonella, if that's what you were going to do. How

fast can we get airplanes down probably from Ramstein to Rota to

preposition to bring the FAST marines, if that was the decision.

So all of that timeline is worked as the staff is putting together

the operations plan. That is why organizations like TRANSCOM are so

vital and as good as they are because they can, you know, bring it down

really to a very, very, you know, rigid set of timelines, how FAST you

can move people, whether it's by air or whatever.

But N-hour is a decision, usually it starts out as an on-order.

And then once the commander is briefed -- and this can take as long

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as -- what I'm describing to you could take an hour of less or it can

take 3 weeks.

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[11:50 a.m.]

General Kelly. Or it can take 3 weeks.

And then he looks at the plan and says, "Okay, let's realistically

staff. When can we move?" And they say, "So we could move right now."

He could say, "Execute." Or he could give everyone 1 hour or whatever

or "let's go at first light," whatever that is and whatever you're

doing. But that's what that is.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Who would have set N-hour for the night in response to the

Benghazi attacks? Who would establish N-hour?

A I mean, again, it goes to the operational commander of the

AFRICOM. So he should have established the N-hour.

Q In your experience working with Secretary Panetta, did he

ever establish N-hour?

A No.

Q Did General Dempsey ever establish N-hour that you're aware

of?

A I can't imagine.

Q Would the J3 have ever established N-hour?

A I couldn't imagine. Because, again, they don't know what's

within the realm of impossible. They're not doing the scut work on

the plan.

Q Were you tracking when the AFRICOM commander established

N-hour?

A No. I mean, that night I was not.

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Q Do you recall when you learned that N-hour was established?

A You know, loosely the next day when I came to work. But,

again, by that time, everything was either over and we know what

happened in Benghazi or there were still, you know, a few units moving,

like FAST getting in place.

Q It just seems that N-hour wasn't established for a long

time. And then it's established, yet the movement of the personnel

was simply to an ISB at Sigonella. Do you have any thoughts on that?

A I don't. I mean, again, I don't know what was in the

combatant commander's mind.

Mr. Tolar. I'm sorry. Shannon, I'm over my time limit. I've

got a few more minutes. Do you want me to finish or do you --

Ms. Green. Please.

Mr. Tolar. Okay. Thank you.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q I'm going to bounce around with a few issues here.

First of all, I want to go back to the CIF. The CIF, as you're

aware, And when they are operating,

it's my understanding -- when they're operating in conjunction [

Is that your understanding?

A I don't know the exact timeline, but that wouldn't surprise

me.

Q As opposed to the FAST team has to be ready to go

waiting on a ride --

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A Uh-huh.

Q -- the CIF has to be wheels up[

A Uh-huh.

Q Does that sound --

A Makes sense to me.

Q Okay. Who in the CIF chain of command can waive that, that

requirement to be wheels up[(

A I would say the COCOM. I had a CIF working for me. Never

used them, thankfully. But if I was depending on them to have a certain

timeline in the plan, in the op plan, then they should come to me if

they want to extend that.

Q Explain the CIF's chain of command.

A Well, special operators up to the special operations chain,

but if they're committed to a COCOM, the COCOM owns them.

At this point at which -- I mean, they may be doing, like they

were that night, they were doing things in the Balkans, some training

exercise. That was not the COCOM's exercise; I don't think it was.

So they were doing what they were doing.

But they still needed to be[ again, it would

come to me. And, I mean, I'm a pretty good guy about allowing other

people to make decisions, but I would want to know that they came in

through the -- it would come through the J3, my J3 to say, hey, they're

going to be out of -- and I'd take a look at the AO and say, you know,

not much going on, okay, I'm okay with it. I mean, that would be the

process.

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Q We talked with the CIF commander.

The CIF

commander -- we now know that the CIF sat on the tarmac for almost

9 hours -- 9 hours -- before going wheels up. Do you have any thoughts

on that?

A Back to the same comment. It would be -- I'm assuming a

conscious decision was made by the combatant commander as he was getting

his head in the game, trying to figure out what was going on, whatever,

that that decision was made by the combatant commander and his staff.

Now, again, the other part of it is -- it could have been one of

two things. Either the combatant commander purely made that decision

because he was sorting out in his own mind, gathering information,

conditions on the ground, or he could have been influenced to make that

decision by the chain of command. I don't know.

Q I want to talk to you briefly for a minute about drones.

Obviously, drones were engaged that night to provide surveillance.

What is your understanding of the ability of those drones to be armed?

Do you have an understanding of that at all?

A

Q

A

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Q Are you aware of whether or not that night the drones that

were providing the ISR feed in realtime, are you aware as to whether

or not they were armed?

A No, I was not aware.

Q

A

A All right. Okay.

Q

A

Q Let's say we could have armed one of those Predators. As

a commander, what would you do with it?

A Back to the discussion about airpower.

Q Oh, yeah. Okay. So I'm talking about Benghazi, the night

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of the attack --

A Right.

Q -- you know what's going on. Let's say you could have armed

one of those Predators. What would you have done? Anything?

A Well, certainly gotten them back over Benghazi and started

watching what's going on on the ground. But if you can't figure out

who the people are, you know

So, I mean, in a case like this, again, to have the aircraft, drone

or otherwise, over the target, potential target, is one thing, but to

know who the people are that you're about to kill is an entirely

different thing.

Q Going back, a few minutes earlier, you made the comment that

authority was passed from the Joint Staff to the COCOM. But the Joint

Staff was just a conduit, they weren't a filter --

A Yeah. Authority would have been passed -- you know what

authority is, right?

Q Right.

A Authority goes from the President to the Secretary of

Defense to the COCOM, with a lot of help, thankfully, from the Joint

Staff.

Q Are you familiar at all with the evacuation of the Libyan

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Embassy in 2014?

A I'm not.

Q Tripoli. Do you know anything about it?

A No. I mean, just I know that it was eventually done because

of this, you know, deteriorating situation. But that would have been

off the early bird, you know, out of the newspaper, as opposed to -- I

would have no reason to be involved in knowing about that, being at

SOUTHCOM.

Q Did you ever have a discussion with General Rodriguez, as

COCOMs, about, hey, I've got to put together this plan or something?

A No. That's his problem.

Q Okay.

Sir, is there anything else that you can think of that might be

beneficial to this committee in our investigation, something we haven't

discussed, something that might be important, something that should

be fleshed out, any thoughts at all?

A I would just offer -- and I don't know if he -- I guess he's

not been here. But Carter Ham is the guy that -- I mean, so many of

these questions that I could only address hypothetically or "this is

what I might have done," you know, he's the guy that was taking those

decisions. And he's as good as they come, retired now. And if you

haven't spoken to him -- I know he's been at other venues, but if you

haven't spoken to him and you want answers to these questions, he's

the guy.

Q And anybody else?

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A It seems to me you've talked to -- I don't know if you can

get at people like Tom Donilon or -- when I say "get at" them, I

know -- or -- he's the chief of staff at the White House now. I don't

know if he's -- but Denis McDonough. These were the guys on the ground

there. And I think probably John Brennan, who at the time, I think,

was the National Security Staff terrorism guy before he took CIA.

Petraeus, if he hasn't been over here.

Q He has.

A Good. That's right.

Q Anything else you'd like to share with us or anything we

should be thinking about or consider or any other thoughts?

A I would just throw on the table -- this is just from a guy

that has seen this over the years. Again, the culture of the

organization at the State Department, wonderful, wonderful people,

very dedicated public servants. They see it, I think -- and I think

this is to their credit in a lot of ways. They see the deterioration

of a situation in a given country -- a lot of times, they see it as

kind of, "This will impact -- this will be a report card on us." You

know, they want to influence in a positive way U.S. interests in the

countries they serve in, in, you know, Main State and the world.

And so, when things are going down the tubes, my belief is that

they can wait too long, in hopes that maybe things will get better or

they can influence the players on the ground. But at a certain point,

you know, hope becomes a course of action which is no course of action

at all.

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And I would just offer that I don't know how you would do this,

but at a certain point, it would seem to me that other people need to

influence the action relative to how long we wait before we, say,

evacuate an embassy or whether we reestablish an embassy.

Or if a host country is telling the United States of America -- in

my view, it's infinitely more important and beneficial to the country

to have the American embassy there helping, reestablished and helping.

And in the process of doing that, if a host country, like Libya, which

was, you know, in a mess at the time and needed all the help it could

get -- and the United States, to say the least, I think was champing

at the bit to give them that help, as was a lot of other people -- and

they say, look, we really don't want, you know, Marines on the ground

in uniform or U.S. military people here in uniform, you know, in spite

of the fact the last time the Marines were in Tripoli was over 200 years

ago, but at that point you say, no, you know what, we need to send in

the right people to secure our embassy.

Now, we can have them there in civilian clothes and we can limit

their movement off the embassy grounds, which is sovereign U.S.

territory. But I think that would be received by a country,

particularly a country that needed the help so desperately.

So the idea that we didn't have Marines on the ground there from

the get-go -- and that means when we reestablished the

situation -- and, frankly, when we moved out to Benghazi, we know now

that it was, to say the least, dicey, I think everyone would agree,

even before this happened, to have had the right kind of people on the

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ground there. I'm a big believer in, you know, contract people are

fine, but if you're in a country like Libya, relying on militias and

all the rest of it, I think it's iffy.

So my point would be, at a certain point, I think, that should

be really a hard-fought-out decision by the interagency, not left up

to, in this case, the State Department. Because they're predisposed

to just, you know, try to make it work.

And then I would say, at the point at which a decision is made

that we're pulling the embassy out, I believe at that point the

expertise on how to do that, whether it's a contested withdrawal, a

dangerous withdrawal, or just, you know -- and I don't mean when they

decide to start to reduce the embassy staff. You know, the ambassador

gets permission from State Department and says, "I want to send most

of the staff home," they get on a commercial airline, and off they go.

That's his call. But at a point, in my view, where it's really dicey

and things are coming apart and really where, you know, there's a

potential that we'd have to shoot our way in and shoot our way out,

I think that decision, once the decision is made by the Secretary of

State that we're going to close an embassy, I think that the people

that really know what they're doing in that situation to get those

people out safe is the COCOM.

And so if the COCOM is looking at that situation and says we can

get C-130s in there and out of there in time, that's a way to do it.

If he says, hey, let's get them down to the port, we can pull them out,

put them all on a ferry, we'll hire a ferry and off that go.

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But I think it's no longer

a State Department operation. The professionals is DOD. And I think

we need to kind of take a look at that.

You know, we have one commission after another looking at the way

DOD does business, you know, Goldwater-Nichols and all of that, and

we're starting to go down that route again. And it's always good to

look at how you do business.

But I think that's something -- because at any given time, there

is probably on the globe, I'd say, you know, 10 or 12 or 15 or maybe

30 -- not 10 or 12 or 15 -- embassies that clearly are at risk. And,

as I say, the State Department, for all the right reasons, sees it as

a personal failure if they have to reduce the size of an embassy or

close it. But sometimes when you're looking at it that way, you're

not making the decisions fast enough to maybe say we've got to get out

of here.

You know, I've been in involved NEOs, noncombatant evacuations,

you know, in Beirut and places like that. That's the last thing you

want to do, is be flying in on helicopters, pulling U.S. citizens out.

That decision should have been made 4 months earlier, so instead of

having to pull out, you know, hundreds of staff, you only have to pull

out half a dozen.

So that would be something that I think probably is worth looking

at.

Q What is your understanding of the actual assaults on the

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compound in Benghazi? Did you see the video of how that went down?

A No. I just know, you know, in the course of the night, I

remember there was some chatter within the office, and I think it came

back over from the White House even, that, hey, this was the result

of some demonstration. Okay, fine, there's demonstrations all around

the world. It struck me that the average demonstration, you know, they

throw a few Molotov cocktails, throw some rocks over the fence,

something like that. This struck me early on as being different than

that.

And, again, I'm just an infantry guy, what do I know. But once

I heard there were RPGs and particularly mortars involved, I said, oh,

this was planned. Mortars, in particular, are hard. You have to be

trained to use a mortar. And when you're out putting rounds on a roof,

that's a pretty small target. When you're putting rounds on a roof,

that's real mortar gunnery. And it struck me that this was far more

than just a demonstration going bad.

Q But, again, you didn't see the video of the execution --

A No.

Q -- the bad guys into the SMC?

A No.

Q I'm sorry?

A No. I'm sorry.

Mr. Tolar. Shannon?

Ms. Green. We'll take a short break, and we have just a few more

questions.

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Mr. Tolar. Okay. Real quick.

General Kelly. Good to go.

Mr. Tolar. Yes, sir.

[Recess.]

Ms. Green. We can go back on the record. It's 1:18.

We won't take an hour, by any means, sir. I have a few questions,

my colleagues may have a question, and then we have a series of questions

that we ask every witness.

General Kelly. Okay.

BY MS. GREEN:

Q In the last hour, my colleagues represented that the FAST

team was waiting on the tarmac for 6 hours, perhaps a bit longer. There

was some speculation about why that might have been the case.

I'd like to direct your attention back to exhibit No. 4. The

subject line is "Quick level set."

A Okay. Got it.

Q Do you see that, sir?

A Yeah.

Q Just as an initial matter, you are not a recipient of this

email. Is that correct?

A The very first one?

Q I don't see your name --

A No, I don't either. No.

Q -- on this email, on any version of it.

A Right. Okay.

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Q Towards the bottom of that first page, there is an email

from Admiral Winnefeld. The time on that email is 1:19 a.m. Do you

see that, sir?

A Got it.

Q The first sentence of that email: "Understand we now have

dip clearance for the FAST Platoon into Tripoli. Working to accelerate

the airlift." What would that mean to you, sir?

A "Dip clearance" is diplomatic clearance. Of course,

that's a State Department effort. So --

Q So it appears that, as of 1:19 a.m. --

A Right.

Q -- they have diplomatic clearance for the FAST.

A Right.

Q Does that appear to be the case?

A Right.

Q And you weren't on this email. Is that correct, sir?

A I don't see my name in the --

Q Which could certainly be why you might not have been aware

of this --

A Right.

Q -- development.

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And what does that second part in that sentence mean? Or

second sentence, I guess. "Working to accelerate the airlift."

A The airlift would have been coming out of probably Ramstein,

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C-17s, the big birds, and then the smaller ones, C-130s. So accelerate

would be kind of unusual because this is quite a time into the tragedy.

But it seems to me that Sandy Winnefeld is talking -- "USAFE" is U.S.

Air Force Europe. So he's a component commander in Europe. He owns

the airplanes and works for the COCOM. And so it seems to me that

Admiral Winnefeld is saying that he has talked to the USAFE commander

and they can speed up the movement of the aircraft to do whatever they

want them to do.

Q Well, it actually says, quote, "We'll advise if it can be

accelerated," end quote.

A Okay. Got it. All right.

Q So just reading on the face of it -- and I understand you're

not on it -- it would seem to indicate that they are not sure yet if

they can accelerate. And that would be the aircraft that would take

the FAST Platoon to Tripoli?

A Yeah. Yes. What's unusual to me would be that at 1:19 in

the morning we hadn't already started moving airplanes. Now, again,

it could be that none were available, some were somewhere else, they

had go and -- I don't know. But it seems to me that we're talking,

what, about 6 hours, 8 hours after we found out that something was going

on.

And, to me, again, just John Kelly, my initial thoughts would have

been FAST, because they're available, and the Commander's In-extremis

Force in the Balkans, that we would have, you know, already started

moving airplanes to at least get on the tarmac and get ready to pick

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them up. Even if you didn't have dip clearance, you could do that.

And then as soon as -- if you got dip clearance, then bang, they're

at Rota, as an example, and they could move.

Q But just on the face of this email, it actually seems that

the contrary may have been true. There was dip clearance and not an

airplane for them to get on at that moment in time.

A It would seem to me that the holdup was dip clearance.

Q "Was dip clearance"? It says that they have dip clearance.

A Well, at 1:19 they have dip clearance.

Q And it says that we're --

A I think others --

Q -- working to accelerate the airlift.

A Others were saying earlier that why didn't they move earlier

than this, and the discussion was, you know, the State Department has

to work it out with the host country to get diplomatic clearance. In

this case, we got diplomatic clearance; now the holdup would appear

to be aircraft.

Q But those two things would have been working in tandem.

A Right.

Q You said that --

A Should have been working. Yeah, should have been working

in tandem.

Q So had the aircraft been there at that moment, they could

have left?

A It could seem to me they could have left because they had

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dip clearance.

Normally, you would not launch an airplane with people,

obviously, until you had dip clearance. Now, the flight from Rota

isn't that long, but normally you would not launch unless you knew you

could land.

Q And we've already discussed that you were not on that

particular email, but you also were not involved in the specific

discussions that might have taken place with the vice admiral and

certainly the conversations with General Ham, who you said would have

been the person to coordinate the actual operational response and have

the authority to do so that night?

A Right. And if you look at that email that Admiral Winnefeld

sent out, he's a military guy, but all of the "to"s on that email of

the names -- and I recognize a vast majority of the names. Oh, there's

[Captain was Sandy Winnefeld's XO

assistant. But everyone else on there you can see are political types

from the White House.

Q And you had indicated that the really definitive voice on

these questions would be General Ham?

A Right.

Q And I think you described him kind of being as good as they

come and that he really would be both the expert to have made the

decisions that night, I assume -- you think he was expert to make the

call?

A You don't get to be a four-star unless you're halfway

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decent. And I will tell you this, that military decisions are made.

Sometimes they are exactly the right decisions; sometimes they are not

in retrospect or in the Monday-morning quarterbacking. But you make

decisions on what you know on the ground. And most of us don't

hesitate. We do the mental calculation about who's going to live and

who's going to die.

None of these missions, from an American point of view -- I mean,

he would not hesitate -- he would do the calculation and decide whether

too many Americans might die that night, not that if any would die,

but too many, whatever "too many" is. And that's in his mind and in

his heart. So he is the guy, in my view, that can answer so many of

your questions on timeline, influences, and all of that.

But, again, I think, as always, you have to look at the

Monday-morning quarterbacking aspect of this and say, what did I know

at the point, at that moment in time. And I made a decision, and

sometimes a lot of people get killed and sometimes not so many, but

you've got to be careful.

Q I think when I spoke with you before, I asked you the

question did you know how many times he had testified before Congress,

and you said you didn't know.

A No. I heard a bunch of times, but it was kind of a, you

know, next-to-the-urinals conversation.

Q Right. Well, I can put a --

A I guess he's been here a lot, huh?

Q Yeah, I can put a fine point on that, a bunch of times. So

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he has testified to Congress eight times.

A Eight times.

Q And we have access to some of those transcripts. He has

been asked and I think he has done his best to explain multiple times

about the decisionmaking that night. But is there any reason that we

should have to believe that he wasn't fully forthcoming and honest when

asked those questions --

A No.

Q -- previously?

A No. He's an honest man. I suspect the answers are pretty

consistent. No reason why Carter Ham would not tell the whole truth.

Q And then I just had a quick other question for you that I'm

going to just use an exhibit that we're going to mark as exhibit 7.

[Kelly exhibit No. 7

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And this is taking you back in time even further -- I'm going

to give you a minute to read it -- because it's an article from April 2nd

of 2011. And the title of that article is "Florida Pastor Terry Jones's

Koran Burning Has Far-Reaching Effect." It's in The Washington Post.

Are you all set?

A I am.

Q So this, like I said, was an article from April of 2011.

And I think when you had testified before you had said that you were

familiar, at least to some extent, with Pastor Jones and some things

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he had done in the past. Do you remember this particular series of

incidents? Were you working with Secretary of Defense Gates at the

time?

A I was. Yes.

Q And did you remember that he had actually called Pastor

Jones? And I believe that he actually called Pastor Jones in September

of 2010 when Pastor Jones announced at that point in time that he was

going to burn the Koran and put the Koran on trial.

A Uh-huh.

Q Did you recall that?

A I wasn't there then. But I remember every time this guy

and others would come up on the skyline, up in the press or whatever,

there's always -- someone's got to call him and tell him not to do it.

With all due respect, and not remarking on his religious belief,

but he's nutty as a fruitcake. I mean, again, it was deemed, at least

in the conversations I had with people, that it was kind of a pointless

call. But if Secretary Gates called, it didn't work.

Q Well, I think, actually, it did work when he called in

September 2010, because Pastor Jones at that point in time didn't burn

the Koran.

A Uh-huh.

Q I think what it says here -- and I'll just point your

attention to the second paragraph. "Reverend Terry Jones had

threatened to burn the text in September, in the midst of a controversy

over plans to develop an Islamic center near the site of the September

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2001 terrorist attacks in Manhattan. He was eventually dissuaded

through the pleas of religious leaders and government officials,

including a phone call from Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates."

A Uh-huh.

Q So do you have a different recollection, that it was not

actually successful in dissuading him in September 2010?

A Yeah. Okay. Dissuaded him, but it didn't stop him.

Q No, it didn't stop him. And he goes on to say that when

he announced that he was going do it the next spring he didn't hear

from anyone --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- and no one complained.

And then on the second page, I would just --

A You sure Secretary Clinton didn't call him?

Q This doesn't report Secretary Clinton as having called him

in --

A I mean, it seems to me that --

Q -- 2010 or 2011.

A It seems to me that the calls on these kind of things, they

would say, hey, I'm the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State. It

would seem to me that Secretary Clinton would have made a call on some

of these kind of things. They are more hers, anyway.

Ms. Green. It's actually typically been a uniformed officer that

made these calls, because of concern about violence against U.S.

troops.

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BY MS. SAWYER:

Q And it may be, sir, that in addition she also did.

A Uh-huh.

Q I don't know. I have no evidence that she did.

A Uh-huh. Okay.

Q And maybe it was multiple U.S. officials. Because

obviously they were taking it very seriously that this man was

threatening to do something that might enflame violence.

Do you think that -- are you believing that someone who is the

Defense Secretary should not take that step if he or she, to the extent

we have a female Secretary of Defense someday, believes that that might

help save not only American lives but other lives around the world?

A There are a couple of parts to that. I mean, if we thought

it would work, if by that phone call then the people that do these kind

of things -- and I mean the jihadists, the Islamic terrorists, Islamic

extremists -- that they'd say, oh, okay, fine. But the fact is we,

as Americans, tend to get focused on -- they don't need a Koran burning

or a threat to burn the Koran. They do what they do.

There is no doubt if we had some sense that they would change their

opinion of us and say, you know, you're right, you know, we shouldn't

be blowing people up in Brussels, then it'd be worth it. But these

people don't need this type of motivation to do what they do.

I mean, you know, you go back to they killed a bunch of Americans

on 9/11, the original 9/11, and then they every year after that seem

to break out and do more bad things, or try to, on 9/11. You know,

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again, these people don't tend to need a reason to do what they do.

They've already got the reason. It's in their heart, it's in

their -- what passes for a soul, and they're just going do it.

So, I mean, if it's going to work, sure, why not. But, you know,

Mr. Jones -- and if you remember seeing him on TV and all of his antics,

didn't seem to me to be the kind of guy that the Secretary of Defense

ought to be working with, unless we knew that it would work and really

and truly the Islamic terrorist extremists would stop what they were

doing.

Q Yes --

A That's just a personal belief.

Q -- but given that it had worked at least one other occasion,

according to this report --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- is it all that surprising to you that during the week

when there was a tremendous amount of regional unrest, there were also

thoughts that it might work vis-à-vis this gentleman again, and

therefore it was worth a try?

A And the question, would I have -- would it make sense to

do it?

Q Given that it had worked with Mr. Jones, the notion that

it was very much dismissed within this room, that it would be far beneath

the Secretary of Defense to actually bother to pick up the phone and

call Pastor Jones --

A You know, not so sure it would have worked in this case.

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It worked kind of in this case. It deferred some of his actions to

the next time. I would suspect, and we'd have to drill down on this,

but from when Pastor Jones didn't burn the Koran or whatever he claimed

to do, I would suspect the next day and the day after that and the week

after that the Islamic terrorists were, you know, butchering children

in Afghanistan, trying to blow up embassy personnel in Kabul. They're

going to do what they're going to do anyways.

Q Right. And if other officials, officials who are the heads

of other countries, are asking this country to distance itself and take

steps to make sure that individuals within this country aren't

fomenting what they know are very deep passions about how the Prophet

is portrayed, do you think that U.S. officials should ignore those

requests?

A I think routinely our public officials, politics aside,

routinely differentiate between people like Pastor Jones and his view

of life, such as it is, and what America stands for. And there's no

way that anyone that has any openness in their opinion-making apparatus

would look at what Jones does and realistically say that's the policy

of the United States of America.

In their view, if we went and pulled him out of his church and

shot him or beheaded him, then that would maybe go a long way to convince

them, oh, okay, America --

Q But I'm not suggesting --

A But there's no -- no.

Q -- officials from any other country --

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A Stay with me. Stay with me.

Q I just want to make clear that I don't think an official

from any other country asked for us to take Pastor Jones and shoot him.

A Of course not. But what I'm saying is the people we're

dealing with, you know, understand that Pastor Jones and people like

him or the troops at Guantanamo that guard the terrorists don't do the

kind of things that they believe is being done whether it's Guantanamo

or here by Jones. They know that.

And I think, you know, every time something -- well, Brussels just

happened, and our President makes the statement that, you know, this

is inconsistent, you know, with the way decent and honorable people

do business. And every time there's something like this, they disavow

people like this and say, "We're not talking about all Muslims." This

is our President now and other responsible officials. "We're not

talking about all Muslims here. We're just talking about the ones that

have a very, very corrupted view of their religion."

Q And do you think those individuals take advantage of a

situation like this where someone does create a video and then blast

it out to kind of incite others to join them? I mean, would the people

that you're talking about, the people who are enflamed and act

violently, do you think they'd take an incident like this and try to

incite others? An incident like this, I'm talking about the video --

A Yeah.

Q -- and the pastor.

A I would say the vast majority of the Muslims that I know

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and dealt with primarily in Iraq would shrug their shoulders at an idiot

like this and say, you know, that's not representative of the United

States, we know that.

There's a certain element within the Muslim world that it doesn't

matter if Jones and people like that do these kind of things or not,

they are still going to do the best they can to kill us. And so I

don't think when Terry Jones does something like this it increases the

number of jihadists by 4 percent or 11 percent. I don't think it

creates any more jihadists at all.

One of the things, too -- and we know this, that we tend to

get -- and I think rightly so, as decent men and women -- we tend to

get more agitated about this stuff. But once they see that we're in

this kind of, you know, mode of kind of blaming ourselves for -- like,

if this happens, then there'll be attacks, then the people on the other

side, who are actually, I think, a lot smarter in many ways than we

are in terms of information management or media kind of messaging,

they say, okay, the Americans are sensitive that this will cause a

problem, that gives us the rationale to blow up the embassy in Benghazi

and then blame it on the Americans because they didn't do anything about

a guy like this. We tend to hand these things to them.

In reality, as I say, the vast majority of people -- let's talk

about Muslims. The vast majority of Muslims are more than smart enough

to figure out that this doesn't represent the American way of thinking

about religion and other cultures. And those that do are there

anyways, in my view.

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Q Okay. Thank you.

BY MS. GREEN:

Q We're almost done, General.

A Sure.

Q This is now the eighth congressional investigation into the

Benghazi attacks, as you may know. We want to make sure it's the last.

We are therefore asking every witness about a series of public

allegations that have lingered since the attacks. It is our

understanding, even when some of these allegations have been answered

by prior investigations, that our colleagues are still investigating

them.

And, sir, while anyone can speculate about the Benghazi

attacks -- and some have -- only a limited number of people have direct

knowledge of these issues. And so what I'm asking is not for your

opinion but just whether you have firsthand information about the

question.

A Okay.

Q If you do not, we will simply move on to the next question.

It has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton intentionally

blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One Congressman

has speculated that, quote, "Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta to

stand down," end quote, and this resulted in the Defense Department

not sending more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

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A I do not.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A She couldn't give him an order. Secretary Clinton could

not order the Secretary of Defense to do anything.

Q Is that a "no," sir?

A Bad question, but --

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta?

A No. No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington

Post Fact Checker evaluated this claim and gave it four Pinocchios,

its highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing instruction on day-to-day security

resources in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

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the spring of 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

the spring of 2011?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Permanent Select

Committee on Intelligence found that, quote, "the CIA was not

collecting and shipping arms from Libya to Syria," end quote, and that

they found, quote, "no support for this allegation," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A No.

Q A team of CIA personnel was temporarily delayed from

departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound, and there

have been a number of allegations about the cause of and appropriateness

of that delay.

The House Intelligence Committee issued a bipartisan report

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concluding that the team was not ordered to stand down but that,

instead, there were tactical disagreements on the ground over how

quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand-down order

to CIA personnel?

A No.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do

you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind

the temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed the Annex

to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A No.

Q A concern has been raised by one individual that in the

course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board

damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that

production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

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Q Let me ask these questions for documents provided to

Congress. Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to Congress?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons and that he then misrepresented his actions when he

told Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully performed our duties

in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship," end quote.

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave

false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an

intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows

about the Benghazi attacks. Do you have any evidence that Ambassador

Rice intentionally misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on

the Sunday talk shows?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

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was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief," end quote, on the

night of the attacks and that he was missing in action.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation the President

was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing in action on the

night of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considering

flying on a second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors

to stand down, meaning to cease all operations. Military officials

have stated that those four individuals were instead ordered to remain

in place in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance in their

current location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that, quote, "there was no stand-down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House

Armed Services Committee that there was no stand-down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives.

However, former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the

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former chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a

review of the attacks, after which he stated, quote, "Given where the

troops were, how quickly the thing all happened, and how quickly it

dissipated, we probably couldn't have done more than we did," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

conclusion?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not

to deploy?

A No.

Ms. Green. Sir, that concludes our questions.

General Kelly. You're kidding.

Ms. Green. I'm not kidding. Thank you for your patience.

Mr. Tolar. Sir, on behalf of the majority and Chairman Gowdy,

we appreciate your service, 45 years in the Corps. I also appreciate

your presence here today. I know you took time out of your day to do

this, but it's really important. Appreciate your sharing your

thoughts with us.

We're off the record.

[Whereupon, at 1:45 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

1386
This exhibit was not cleared for public release.

EXHIBIT 1

1387
EXHIBIT 2 .

1388
This exhibit was not cleared for public release.

EXHIBIT 3

1389
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

EXHIBIT 4

1390
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

1391
STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

STATE DEPT. - REPRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMMITTEE.

REVIEWED FOR SENSITIVE AND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PURSUANT TO MOU. NO FOIA WAIVER.

1392
This exhibit was not cleared for public release.

EXHIBIT 5

1393
EXHIBIT 6

1394
1395
1396
Education

By Kevin Sieff April 2, 2011

GAINESVILLE, Fla. — The charred Koran that inspired a deadly attack and violent protests across Afghanistan now sits in a

plastic Home Depot bag in a storage room here in a run­down church. It has been stashed atop a pile of cardboard boxes, next

to a tattered pair of boxing gloves. It still smells of kerosene.

The Rev. Terry Jones had threatened to burn the text in September, in the midst of a controversy over plans to develop an

Islamic center near the site of the September 2001 terrorist attacks in Manhattan. He was eventually dissuaded through the

pleas of religious leaders and government officials, including a phone call from Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates.

But when Jones announced in January that he was going to “put the Koran on trial,” he said he didn’t hear a single complaint.

On March 20, Jones dressed in a judicial robe and ordered a copy of the Koran to be torched in a portable fire pit.

“It’s like people forgot about us,” Jones said Saturday. “But we kept doing what we do.”

The world was reminded of the 30­person Christian congregation at Dove World Outreach Center on Friday, when a mob

incited by the burning of the Koran attacked a U.N. compound in Mazar­e Sharif, killing seven U.N. employees. On Saturday,

related protests in Kandahar left nine dead and more than 90 injured.

Jones, 59, had considered the possibility that burning the text might elicit a violent response and that innocent people might be

killed. In his characteristic drawl — a slow­motion delivery that seems incongruous with the church’s fiery rhetoric — the pastor

said the church also debated whether to shred the book, shoot it or dunk it in water instead of burning it.

He has been accused by those who intervened in September of breaking his promise not to burn the Koran — a point he

concedes. “If you want to be technical,” he said, “I guess we broke our word.”

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EXHIBIT 7

1397
He added, “We thought twice about it.”

But in the end, his desire to shed light on what he calls a “dangerous book” won out. The Koran was burned in a spectacle

streamed live on the Internet. To reach out to Muslims overseas, Jones included Arabic subtitles.

“For some of them,” he said, “it could be an awakening.”

Although there was initially little talk of the burning in the United States, the death threats poured in, Jones said. Last Monday,

he said, the FBI told him over the telephone that a $2.4 million bounty had been placed on his head in Pakistan.

The FBI also asked where Jones had put what remained of the burned Islamic holy book. He told them it was in a storage

closet.

In September, Jones drew international attention and a media frenzy. But on Saturday the grounds of the church in this college

town, home to the University of Florida, were quiet. A string of signs on the front lawn proclaimed “Islam is of the Devil.” A

half­dozen people were in the church with Jones, including his 29­year­old son, Luke, during the interview.

“We’re not big debaters. We’re not very well­educated,” Luke Jones said. “We’re just simple people trying to do the right

thing.”

The Gainesville city attorney in September began the process of changing the fire code, to prevent Jones from burning the

Koran outdoors. So Jones staged the March spectacle indoors while a fire department official observed.

Far from the Gainesville church, those who remained in contact with Jones after his threats in September are now asking

themselves why they remained quiet.

“I’m a bit upset with myself,” said the Rev. Patrick Mahoney, who saw Jones in Washington on March 3. “But he gave no

indication that he was planning this.”

During his months out of the spotlight, Jones flew to California to protest the massacre of Coptic Christians in Egypt. He also

wrestled with a more personal problem: His anti­Islam platform had been great for publicity but bad for church finances.

The church’s membership had plummeted. So had its income from selling furniture on eBay. The church’s Internet service

provider and insurance provider canceled their services.

Jones said the church has received nearly $20,000 in donations since August, along with letters of encouragement from

supporters around the world. But that hasn’t been enough to cover operating costs.

The pastor said he is trying to sell the property and move, perhaps to the Tampa area. “I know that Gainesville would be more

than happy to get rid of us,” he said.

1398
INTERVIEW OF

ADMIRAL KURT TIDD

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, APRIL 4, 2016
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

PHILIP G. KIKO, Staff Director and General Counsel

MAC TOLAR, Senior Counsel

SHERIA CLARKE, Counsel

SUSANNE SACHSMAN GROOMS, Minority Staff Director/General Counsel

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel

SHANNON GREEN, Minority Counsel

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

EDWARD RICHARDS

BILL HUDSON

FOR THE UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND

ELIZABETH M. GONZALEZ, Director, Office of Congressional Affairs

1400
3

Ms. Clarke. This is a transcribed interview of Admiral Kurt

Tidd, conducted by the House Select Committee on Benghazi. This

interview is being conducted voluntarily, as part of the committee's

investigation into the attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities in

Benghazi, Libya, and related matters, pursuant to House Resolution 567

of the 113th Congress and House Resolution 5 of the 114th Congress.

Would the witness please state your name for the record.

Admiral Tidd. Curt Walter Tidd.

Ms. Clarke. Thank you. Admiral Tidd, the committee appreciates

your appearance at this interview today. My name is Sheria Clarke,

and I am with the committee's majority staff. And I will just ask

everyone around the table to introduce themselves as well.

Mr. Tolar. Mac Tolar, majority staff.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. I am Susanne Sachsman Grooms from the

minority staff.

Ms. Green. Shannon Green, with minority staff.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny, minority staff.

Ms. SOUTHCOM Legislative

Affairs.

Mr. Hudson. Bill Hudson from the Department of Defense.

Mr. Richards. Edward Richards, DOD OGC.

Ms. Clarke. Thank you.

Before we begin, I would like to go over the ground rules and

explain how the interview will proceed.

The majority will ask questions for up to an hour, and then the

1401
4

minority will have an opportunity to ask questions for an equal period

of time, if they choose. We will rotate back and forth, accordingly,

until everyone has exhausted all their questions.

As you can see, an Official Reporter is taking down everything

we say to make a written record. I would ask that you give verbal

responses to all questions, such as yes and no, as opposed to nods of

the head. I am going to ask the reporter to please feel free to jump

in in case you do respond nonverbally.

Do you understand that?

Admiral Tidd. Understood.

Ms. Clarke. Also, we should both try not to talk over each other

so it is easier to get a clear record.

We just ask that today you give us your best recollection. And

if there are things you do not know or can't remember, just say so,

and please inform us as to who, to the best of your knowledge, may be

able to provide a more complete answer.

You are required to answer questions from Congress truthfully.

Do you understand that?

Admiral Tidd. I do.

Ms. Clarke. This also applies to questions posed by

congressional staff in the interview. Do you understand this as well?

Admiral Tidd. I do.

Ms. Clarke. Witnesses that knowingly provide false testimony

can be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury or for making false

statements. Do you understand that?

1402
5

Admiral Tidd. I do.

Ms. Clarke. Is there any reason you are unable to provide

truthful answers to today's questions?

Admiral Tidd. No.

Ms. Clarke. Thank you. That is the end of my preamble.

Does the minority have anything they would like to say?

Ms. Green. Sir, we just appreciate you taking time out of your

busy schedule to spend a little bit of time with us. We look forward

to talking with you and keeping it relatively short.

Admiral Tidd. Certainly.

Ms. Clarke. The clock now reads 1:01, and we will get started

with the first hour of questions.

EXAMINATION BY MS. CLARKE

Q Admiral Tidd, can you briefly walk me through your billets

as a flag officer?

A I was -- my first flag officer billet was on the National

Security Council staff in defense policy. After that, I was the

commander, Carrier Strike Group 8, embarked on the USS Eisenhower.

After that, I was the vice director for operations on the Joint Staff,

followed by commander of U.S. Naval Forces South and the U.S. 4th Fleet,

followed by the director for operations on the Joint Staff, followed

by the assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and then

to my current assignment as commander, U.S. Southern Command.

Q Thank you. And during the time of the attack in Benghazi,

what was your job? Were you currently the director for operations?

1403
6

A Correct.

Q And how long did you hold that position?

A For about 15, 16 months.

Q Can you briefly describe that role; kind of your day-to-day

routine in that role?

A The director for operations was responsible for the

coordination and the synchronization of operations of U.S. military

forces supporting the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the

Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, communicating with the

regional combatant commanders and the functional combatant commanders.

There is a whole long laundry list of other things, but, basically,

it is the director of operations.

Q Prior to today, have you ever been questioned about the

events surrounding Benghazi and/or the Department of Defense's

response to those events?

A Yes, multiple times.

Q Okay. And can you elaborate on those times?

A I met with the Department of State review board.

Q Is that the Accountability Review Board?

A Yes, the ARB, correct. And then also with the House Armed

Services Committee also conducted -- I don't know if it was a hearing

or investigation -- but I met with them and provided information to

them as well. And then, let's see, as I recall, a number of briefings

to Members. And I have lost track of who and how many times.

[Tidd Exhibit No. 1

1404
7

Was marked for identification.]

Q So I would like to just direct your attention to the night

of the attack. The first thing I will do is just hand out a timeline

that DOD prepared. And we will use this as kind of a guide for our

discussion today.

Mr. Tolar. This is marked as Exhibit 1.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So, on this timeline it indicates the attack began at

approximately 3:42 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time. Can you kind of walk

us through when you became aware of the attacks and the events -- the

steps that you took following notification of those attacks?

A My recollection was that the first reports I got was from

the National Military Command Center after -- so some point after

4:32 -- sometime between 4:30 and 5. Specific steps were to attempt

to find out more information. At that point, the NMCC was receiving

reports coming in -- my recollection was the initial report came in

from the State Department, but about the same time we reached out to

commander, U.S. AFRICOM staff in Stuttgart, and they attempted to get

more information. Initial information was very, very sketchy. And

so we were waiting to get more information.

Mr. Tolar. Admiral, I apologize, but in terms of the NMCC, what

is that organization?

Admiral Tidd. That is the watch center that is in the Pentagon,

and I am responsible for the NMCC. It comes under the J3, the director

for operations in the Joint Staff. And it is a communications focal

1405
8

point for all of the regional combatant commanders to report

information in.

Mr. Tolar. Thank you, sir.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So, once you received the information from the NMCC and you

began to find out more information, did you -- following that

notification, did you have any interaction with Secretary Panetta or

General Dempsey about what you had learned from the National Military

Command Center?

A Not directly. Not personally right away. Because, as I

recall, they were heading over to a meeting, and they were departing

about the time that these reports came in. We provided information

to his office. I did not personally make contact with him at that

point. And just to relay here's what we know, and more information

to follow.

Mr. Tolar. Who were you communicating with, sir?

Admiral Tidd. At his office?

Mr. Tolar. Do you recall?

Admiral Tidd. No, I don't recall.

Mr. Tolar. Thank you.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q As you mentioned, Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey

were en route to a meeting or getting ready to prepare to go to a meeting

at the White House at around 5 p.m., and then I believe, according to

the timeline, they returned around 6 p.m. At that time, did you have

1406
9

interaction with them?

A You're asking me to recall specific events from almost 4

years ago. My recollection of that evening was a bit of a blur, I will

be honest at this point. It was a series of continuous phone calls

talking with my

counterpart, the J3 on U.S. AFRICOM staff, and the deputy commander,

U.S. AFRICOM, in just a series of secure phone calls as information

was coming in, and then making sure that we were sharing information

laterally via the NMCC as quickly as we had it, just to try and provide

situational awareness as broadly as we could. I don't recall any

longer what the specific sequence of events and who I talked to at which

time. Sorry.

Q I understand that. Did you participate in any meetings

following the Secretary of Defense's return to the Pentagon?

According to the timeline, there were a series of meetings in the

Pentagon with senior officials. Did you participate any of those

meetings, if you can recall?

A The meeting that I recalled participating in was a Deputies'

Committee meeting that occurred by secure

teleconference. And it pulled together all of the various deputies

and members. And it was, initially, all of the various intelligence

organizations passed what information that they had and, I guess, to

situate the things that had been going on across this window: a series

of events associated with Cairo, unrest and instability in Tunis, and

instability and unrest down in Khartoum. And we had a series of

1407
10

problems in Sana'a in Yemen. And then this event that occurred in

Libya. But it was sort of -- initially, it was one in a series of -- not

a series, but one of a number of simultaneous unrest activities that

were occurring.

[Tidd Exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

Q I'm going to hand you what we will mark as Exhibit 2. If

you can take a look at this.

Just for the record, Exhibit 2 is doc ID number

C05580538, and it is a September 11, 2012 series of emails. And I

believe, sir, you were not a recipient of this email, but it refers

to a SVTC that occurred on that evening and, potentially, what you were

just referring to in your testimony. So I wanted to have you take a

look at this and then we will just discuss it.

A This looks like the OSD -- the Office of Secretary of

Defense's -- summary of that Deputies Committee meeting.

Q Okay. So this is a readout, as you mentioned, from the

Office of the Secretary of Defense -- a readout from the policy of what

happened or the discussion that was held during the SVTC at 7:30 on

September 11.

A Right.

Q So, I just wanted to kind of talk with you a little bit about

some of the things that are discussed in here.

The first paragraph down notes that you were present, as well as

Jeremy Bash. I think you have already indicated that.

1408
11

The third paragraph down, it talks about a

five-person Special Operations Force team arriving in Tripoli. Do you

recall what that Special Operation Force team was or what this is

referring to?

A I believe this was -- and now, I have to admit, having read

through a number of the after action reviews and the studies, I have

a better understanding today than I did when it was actually going on

at the time.

At the time, my understanding, these were some people who were

assigned to the embassy in Tripoli that basically pulled together as

an ad hoc team to move to this site at Benghazi.

Q And then it also mentions, "U.S.-controlled ISR assets

providing coverage (feed to AFRICOM and NMCC). Vice Admiral Tidd had

no information from the ISR feed at the time of the VTC.

A Yes. This was an unmanned Predator drone that had been

flying under AFRICOM's control, I believe -- I want to say in the

vicinity of Derna, and was attempting to maintain a watch on potential

radical Islamists in Derna. When the reports came in of this incident

taking place in Benghazi, AFRICOM diverted the drone over to the

vicinity of Benghazi to attempt to acquire the site and then watch what

was going on.

But it was -- we were able to call up the feed and see what AFRICOM

was looking at, but AFRICOM was kind of controlling where it was flying

and what it was looking at. I have subsequently seen that video. But

if I had not had somebody sit with me and explain to me exactly what

1409
12

was going on, it was very difficult to try and pick out what was

happening.

It was as we were preparing for the ARB that I finally got a sense

of exactly what was going on. If you looked at it, after watching it

live, and particularly -- it is not like you have got this commentary

that is running in the background, you're just looking at black and

white images and trying to sort out where it is, what you're looking

at, who's who. It was a very confusing seen.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Sir, do you recall if the Predators were armed that evening?

A They were not.

Q Do you recall that specifically they were not?

A

Q

A

1410
13

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So, on the second page of this email, the second full

paragraph begins with, "The U.S. military has begun notifying special

units of likely deployment," and it goes through and identifies those

units as the FAST platoon, the Crisis Intervention Force

A Right.

Q In your role as the J3, did you participate in discussions

regarding which assets the military should use in response to this

crisis?

A We spoke with AFRICOM and found out from them what forces

were available, as well as talking with -- they were in close

coordination with EUCOM. Because at that point in time, AFRICOM did

not have all of its own dedicated crisis response forces, and they were

coordinating with U.S. European Command. They provided the CIF -- or

they mentioned that they had a CIF, but that the CIF was engaged in

an exercise in the Balkans and Croatia, as I recall, and the FAST was

in Rota -- a FAST platoon was in Rota and was available. But at that

time we did not have organic lift co-located with the FAST platoon in

Rota. The aircraft that would have been required to move it was up

in Ramstein. So we worked out what would be the timelines to be able

to move that force as rapidly as possible.

The same with the CIF. Its aircraft were not

co-located with the force that was engaged in this exercise. And so

there was a delay in moving its dedicated aircraft to be able to go

1411
14

and get them pulled together and loaded up onto an aircraft and be able

to move.

there was a very kind of a rapid series of

events of initially we had a report that the ambassador was missing.

And so with the concern that we potentially had a hostage rescue

requirement,

and then a direction to -- and my

recommendations was let's get them moving and headed toward the theatre

so that as we sort out this rapidly changing kind of chaotic information

situation, as they began to take the steps that would be required for

them to be able to move, we subsequently got information in that the

Ambassador had been located and was dead.

We had information on his location at the hospital, but it still

seemed prudent at that point, since, again, we had a lot going on and

a lot of uncertainty as to what the potential next asks might be, that

the best move we could make

moved to the theatre, to an intermediate

staging base close by, because they would have the greatest capability

to be able to respond to the widest variety of unknown crisis type of

activities.

So the sooner we could get them

there to theatre, the better we would be postured to be able to respond

to whatever might be coming next.

My recollection was, at this point in time we were getting very

1412
15

serious concerns about the security of the embassy in Tripoli -- in

Tripoli, yes -- also the embassy in Tunis. And the situation in Cairo

was also very, very unstable. So, frankly, we just didn't know what

else we might have coming,

The FAST platoon we wanted to get there as quickly as

possible, but they're a static defensive force. And the sense of you

want to get them into an embassy or a location that you want to defend.

They are not an assault force that would go and conduct an active

assault. They don't have that kind of mobility. Their training and

their equipment is to be able to provide a very robust static defense.

So you, ideally, move them into a place before you have a security

situation occur.

Q And you mentioned the timelines for the FAST team and the

CIF team moving. Do you recall what those timelines were?

A I don't, off the top of my head, any longer. What we

communicated to the units that are responsible for owning them -- so

it was EUCOM and AFRICOM for the FAST,

1413
The one thing

we could not overcome is just the time-distance factors of moving from

the East Coast of the United States into the theatre.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Admiral, one of the lingering questions that we have been

trying to get a handle on is why it seemed to take so long to get the

response forces off the ground. The FAST team was in Rota[

They were ready to move prior to that. They sat

on the tarmac for about 6 hours before the planes got there.

A That is because we had no alert aircraft in Ramstein. So,

literally, it was the middle of the night there. And I don't know all

of the exact actions that they had to go to, but at Ramstein they had

to go and generate the airplanes, get the air crews, wake them up, brief

them, tell them what we knew, and have the planes ready to go. We did

not have an alert posture set for the aircraft.

Q Were you tracking that that night; the FAST team?

A Yes.

Q And the time it took?

A Yes.

Q Did you have concerns about how long it was taking?

A Everybody wanted them there instantaneously. And we were

getting a lot of questions, obviously, from both the State Department

and the White House: Are they moving yet, are they moving yet? It

1414
17

was just taking a long time.

Q Did you reach out to anyone in order to find out what was

taking so long? Was there anything else that could be done to expedite?

A I did not, no. My conversations were with AFRICOM, with

the J3, and the Deputy Commander. I was taking information from them.

Q I apologize, who was the J3? Do you recall?

A Rear Admiral Rich Landholt.

Q And then I guess the same question I'm going to pose to you

with regard to the CIF. They sat on the tarmac for about 9 hours.

A Honestly, I don't know where their airplanes were. Those

pieces, it was a little bit fuzzy getting all the understanding. All

I knew is they were involved in an exercise. And that told me that

they were not sitting on their rucks, ready to go, ready to deploy when

the first ask came out; that it would take them some -- there would

be some period of time required for them to recover back to the location,

pull their stuff together, and then be set and ready to go. Honestly,

I don't recall where their aircraft were located.

Q So, as you are aware, the CIF

which is what they had done that night.

Who can waive that requirement that that's no longer relevant or they

don't have to meet that requirement?

A I don't recall. I don't know. I don't know that anybody

waives it. I don't know. But like I said, they were in an exercise.

I know that they were maintaining the ability to be able to meet the

requirements that they had. All of this is in learning subsequently

1415
18

the details of it, not what was going on at the time.

Q

doesn't make their string requirement, does that give you

pause at the J3 level? Are you all tracking that or is that not

something you all typically track?

A Obviously, if there are known reasons, which, from time to

time,

at the Joint Staff we weren't

tracking the individual combatant commanders' CIF or CRE, what goes

on internal to those,

And at times, if, for instance,

1416
19

Q Other than the SOC Europe Commander, is there anyone else

you think would have a better understanding of the CIF, their response,

et cetera, that evening?

A I think that person would have the best understanding.

Q With regard to the airlift for the FAST platoons, other than

the USAFE commander, is there someone else you think might have a better

understanding?

A That is the person -- my understanding, again after the

fact -- my understanding is that was the person who was kind of

personally engaged in trying to expedite getting the aircraft moving.

Q Do you know who has the authority to waive crew rest for

a respective unit?

A I don't know.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Thank you, Admiral. Just stepping back for a little bit,

we have been discussing a SVTC that occurred on the evening of

September 11th. From your recollection, what was the purpose of this

particular SVTC?

A It was an information exchange to cross-level what does

1417
20

everybody know, is there any new information. The intelligence

community was obviously providing information on other things that were

going on, other locations that State was providing information on,

other embassies where they had concerns. FBI. It was a general kind

of a roundtable and round robin of everybody going around and passing

out what information they had, what did they know. And then what were

the asks. And then an opportunity for us to be able to say -- when

we got to the military, we talked about these are the types of forces

that we can deploy, and here's what we know, here's what we think, and

here's what our recommendations are.

Q And did you have any specific asks from the State Department

or from any other agency at that meeting regarding what DOD could do?

A We went down the list of the types of forces that are

potentially available. And one of the things that was mentioned was

the FEST, which is the Foreign Emergency Support Team, which is

basically an administrative embassy augmentation team when you have

a crisis going on.

We talked about the CIF -- the FAST, the CIF, [

FEST. And from State,

their only position was: send triggers pullers. The FEST they said

they didn't need.

And at this point, I mean there was -- my recollection is there

was some serious consideration -- we didn't know how long the embassy

in Tripoli was going to be open. So, I think what they were interested

in was not to throw a whole bunch of people into Tripoli that they would

1418
21

then subsequently have to get out of there. But they were looking at

all of the the other embassies that might potentially need help, and

they said: No, send the FAST

CIF.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q There were questions about how long the Tripoli Embassy

would be open. Was that in response to the attacks in Benghazi?

A Yes. People were recovering back to there, but there was

still a lot of concern at that point on what was the security posture,

what was the situation in Tripoli itself. Because, again, you

remember, the same day you had the embassy in Cairo was under attack,

at the embassy in Tunis there was an assault. It was just all of these

different embassies -- and we were looking at what are the other

embassies out there that might potentially also face some sort of

similar violence and what could we do to posture ourselves to be able

to deal with it.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q And at the time of the meeting, what was the status of the

assets that you all discussed? Were they preparing to deploy?

A They were alerted. The final decision had not yet been made

definitively, as I recall, but we came out of that meeting with

basically: send everything. But at the time, again, we were talking

about the CIF[

send it to an intermediate staging base, someplace

close by. And I turned that one over to AFRICOM and let them decide

1419
22

where did they think would be the best location, and talk to EUCOM and

sort out what would be the best location and just have everybody

rendezvous there at that location as we sorted out the situation on

the ground in Tripoli was going to look like and where we might need

to send people.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Sir, was it your decision, then, to send them back to an

ISB first?

A Yes. Because we didn't -- State was not prepared to

send[

And State was very, very concerned about what

the footprint would look like in Tripoli. They didn't want it to look

like we were invading.

That was the gist or that was the genesis of the discussion that

occurred over whether or not when the FEST arrives at the airport in

Tripoli -- because they wanted to reinforce security at the

embassy -- but there was concern that it not have this image of a big,

invading force.

And we knew that the FAST,

And there was

just concern of parading a bunch of trucks or buses full of Marines

in uniform, what kind of image that would present, recognizing it was

going to be daylight when they arrived.

1420
23

And so this discussion went back and forth -- what should it look

like, let's get them in -- but they wanted -- in a perfect world, they

would want them all to just kind of appear instantaneously at the

embassy but not have to be exposed as they were seen as they went from

the airport to the embassy.

Q Was it also your decision, then, not to send the FAST team

directly to Tripoli?

A My recollection is we did go directly to -- the FAST went

directly from Rota to Tripoli, is my recollection.

Q They went to the ISB first. They all three went to the ISB

first.

A Then if that is the way it played out, I think it was probably

because we were still waiting on diplomatic approval to be able to bring

them into Tripoli. Okay.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So we are talking about the FAST team going into Tripoli.

Following this discussion at the Deputies Committee meeting, was there

a decision to send the FAST team to Benghazi?

A We were looking at two FAST teams, but it very, very soon

became evident that everybody was leaving Benghazi. And so I don't

remember if it was just before that Deputies Committee or during the

deputies or just right after.

By the time we came out of the deputies, it was pretty clear that

nobody was going to be left in Benghazi. And so the decision -- I

think, at the deputies, there was some discussion -- but as I recall,

1421
24

we weren't going to send them to Benghazi, because everybody was going

to be back in Tripoli by the time we could actually get them there.

Q I'm sorry, you said that you can't recall whether you had

the understanding during the Deputies Committee meeting, but sometime

close in time --

A It was right around the time -- my sense was, as we came

out of the Deputies Committee meeting, there was never -- as I think

my way through it, the discussion that was coming out and what State

was telling us and the intelligence community was telling us was that

everybody was going to be leaving Benghazi.

And I think even at this point we knew that everybody had

moved -- they had moved from the temporary diplomatic facility, they

moved to the Annex, and they were moving or going to be moving, if they

had not already begun moving, from the Annex to the airport, and would

be leaving at the airport as quickly as they could.

So it was pretty clear we weren't going to be able to get anything

into Benghazi before the last people left. So, I don't think we ever

went beyond the notion of moving the FAST into -- the FAST platoon into

Tripoli.

Q And just to make sure I have an understanding of the

timeframe of this idea that everyone was leaving Benghazi, this was

close in time to your discussion during the Deputies Committee and not

later in the early morning after the mortar attack, right?

A I think so, yeah. Like I said, that is my recollection of

it.

1422
25

Q You mentioned also -- I think you mentioned that State had

a large concern about kind of how the military, whether it was the FAST

team or any other assets that went into Libya, how they were presented.

Looking back at the document we were discussing, the last -- the

second to last full paragraph at the very bottom, "State remains

concerned that any U.S. military intervention be fully coordinated with

the Libyan Government." The last sentence is that you "agreed to look

into the possibility of deploying units in civilian attire."

Do you recall what that discussion entailed regarding this?

A Again, like I said, they wanted to minimize the signature

that looked like a big military invasion, a big military arrival there.

And the reason that I remember the discussion was I had to go back and

find and make sure, as the FAST had moved out and was waiting for lift,

and the question that I had to go back and ask AFRICOM was: in their

rucksacks did they have civilian clothes that they could put on, or

was this going to entail having to go back to their barracks and draw

that equipment. They had what they needed, and so they didn't have

to go anyplace.

At that Deputies Committee meeting, I couldn't speak for them.

And I wanted would to go back and verify that. Because what I wanted

to know is: is it more important to get them there or to have the

signature in civilian clothes? As it turned out, it didn't matter,

because they had the civilian clothes with them already.

Q Sir, did you make the decision to have them arrive in

civilian clothing? Was that your decision?

1423
26

A No. That was the request from State Department, and I

passed that on down to AFRICOM.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q For what it is worth, sir, the FAST platoon commander

testified or talked to us in an interview, and he mentioned that once

the plane arrived, they were on the bird and then they were there for

about 3 hours waiting to take off. It was during that time they kept

getting conflicting word about civies versus UTS, and they changed back

and forth. Who would have been directing them to do what they did?

A It would have been coming from AFRICOM. But AFRICOM was

responding to this back and forth with State over what is the priority,

is it to move or is to have them in civies.

Q So State was requesting the civilian clothes?

A Yes. Yes, it was coming from the embassy.

Q It was coming from the embassy?

A The embassy back to Main State, from Main State over to

us -- the Pentagon -- and from us to AFRICOM. You can imagine it's

about six phone calls to work -- what do you want -- and work your way

back through.

Q In that same vein, you made a comment earlier about waiting

on diplomatic approval. Would you just elaborate on what you meant

by that?

A We wanted to make sure that nobody was going to shoot at

the airplanes when they landed at Tripoli. And we needed some

assurance from the embassy that they were going to be -- that the

1424
27

embassy was ready to receive them; that there wasn't going to be a

problem when they came in to land.

Q When you use the term "diplomatic approval," does that go

above and beyond requests for an airplane to get cleared to come into

the country?

A It is the embassy saying: Yeah, they are approved to come

in.

Q And that constitutes what you mean by diplomatic approval?

A Yes.

Q Thank you.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q So, Admiral, you were talking and you said that during the

course of this meeting the final decision had not yet been made about

which assets would actually be deployed, or I think you said something

to that effect.

A I think by the end of the meeting it was that everything

would go with the exception of the FEST.

Q Okay. Everything except the FEST would be deployed. What

were the next steps that you took in order to actually deploy these

assets?

A As I recall, I communicated it to the NMCC

-- the verbal order -- a

VOCO -- a verbal communication to commanding officers -- that we had

agreement

to move the CIF

1425
28

Because at that point, we wanted all

of them co-located to be able to operate together and cohesively. And

then for the FAST to be able to move.

Q And that information, you communicated it to the

NMCC. And would that VOCO be provided via a teleconference call or

how is that typically done?

A Honestly, I don't know whether they sent that via email or

via a phone call down. That was communicated to them to be able to

move this.

As I recall, I think I drafted an email that -- a similar email

to this one that went back to the chairman. It was drafted up by one

of the officers in J3 and I forwarded it to the chairman, to my

recollection.

[Tidd Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

Q So at this time I would like to introduce Exhibit 3. I

think this may be the email that you're referring to. So we'll just

take a look at that and have a discussion about that.

A Okay.

Okay.

Q For the record, Exhibit 3 is an email chain on September 11,

2012. And, Admiral, you are CC'd on the first two emails. I don't

believe you're on the top email. The doc ID number is SCB 001375.

So, the very last page -- or the second to last page -- is the

initial email. I believe it was sent by [Captain Do

1426
29

you recall what his role was?

A He was the deputy director for operations, the watch officer

at the NMCC.

Q In his email -- the email is sent at approximately 8:39 p.m.

Just before we discuss that, do you recall how long the Deputies

Committee SVTC was that evening?

A I don't. But -- I don't. I really don't. I guess I could

look here and see.

Q Do you have a recollection whether or not your participation

in that particular meeting ended prior to the end of the meeting? In

other words --

A Was I in the entire Deputies Committee SVTC? I think so.

I don't remember leaving early. I just don't recall.

Q That's fine.

And so [Captain writes -- this appears to be an

email where he is referring to a National Military Command Center update

conference call with several combatant commands. And I guess itis like

the second paragraph down it says, "Provided SECDEF's VOCO to

PTDO" -- is that prepared to deploy order?

A Right.

Q -- "FAST platoon from Rota, Spain, to Benghazi," and then

the same for Spain to Tripoli. It also mentions the Commander's

In-Extremis Force and then discusses an RFI -- a request for

information -- to AFRICOM/EUCOM for the following: a timeline, number

of pax for both CIF and FAST, capabilities, mission, lift requirements,

1427
30

weapons, and mobility on arrival.

Are you aware or do you know where that information would have

been -- if AFRICOM had supplied that information, would that have come

back to your attention or would that have come back to [Captain

?]

A I'm looking at the timelines here and I'm -- I am thinking

that -- that [Captain ] had a conference call with the various

watch centers of the commands that are listed here as a result of

decisions that came out of the Deputies Committee meeting.

And so the things that you see upfront -- the SECDEF VOCO, the

things to move, and then also forwarded request for information from

AFRICOM and EUCOM for the following -- I am guessing at this point now,

but I think this might have been in response to -- I gave him a verbal

dump from the Deputies Committee meeting. He had this conference call.

This is a report back with the information from the conference call.

And then I turned around and replied on top of that with subsequent

information that had been provided from phone calls that I had had at

the same time. As I read through this, I think that is the way it reads.

Q And so just to refer to your response to [Captain

email, the first line you write, "Discussions at Deputies, and followed

up between OSD and the chairman." Is OSD referring to the Office of

Secretary of Defense?

A Yes.

Q So following the Deputies Committee meeting, did you have

a subsequent conversation with the Secretary or a representative?

1428
31

A I think I had a conversation, as I recall, maybe with General

Kelly, who is the Secretary's military assistant.

Q And do you recall the substance of that conversation?

A We were talking about what came out of the Deputies

Committee meeting and what the asks were.

Q And then the second paragraph, "SECDEF has directed

deployment of the CIF to the ISB determined most suitable by AFRICOM."

And I think you referred to that earlier.

A Right.

Q And then the third paragraph, "SECDEF has directed FAST

deployment

same ISB as CIF. Let me know what the N-hour will be."

A That is a synchronizing time that is provided.

They tell us

what it will be.

Q And when you say a synchronizing time, is that to

synchronize or

was that for all of the elements?

A No,

Q And was there a reason[

A My recollection, from a number of different events,

1429
Q

A

Q And so just to make sure I understood you, your request,

"Let me know what the N-hour will be," was specifically[

1430
33

A That is what I was talking to. Because there is the formal

SECDEF order, it is a formatted message that goes out, and it lists

the N-hour in that message. And so we just need it back from them to

give us the N-hour so we can put it in the message and the message goes

out.

Q Were N-hours established for the other assets -- for the

CIF and the FAST team?

A If so -- again, the CIF is responsive to the theatre

commander and works for them. And so we were not involved, other than,

in this case, there was some question over whether or not they should

be put directly into Libya or not because of the sensitivities of what

the situation in Libya was at this time. And so the Secretary wanted

to make sure that whatever was sent there was going to be welcome and

that this was not going to be an assault.

Q And can you just elaborate a little more on that discussion

about whether or not to send the CIF directly to Benghazi versus sending

it to an ISB?

A Again, as the timelines that we were looking at, it seemed

abundantly clear that everybody was going to have departed Benghazi

by the time anybody could arrive -- by the time the lift could arrive,

they could load up, and they could fly -- just the time distance -- that

they would not have been able to be there. Because everybody was moving

out of Benghazi as quickly as they could.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q So does SOCOM set the N-hour or would it have been SOCEUR?

1431
34

A The theatre commander that SOCEUR works for would have been

setting whatever the response timeline was for his CIF.

Q

A

Q So it would have been General Votel.

A Yes.

Q Thank you.

A That sounds right.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Continuing on in your email, the next paragraph, "SECDEF

has directed FAST to make all preps to deploy, but hold departure until

we are sure we have clearance to land in Tripoli."

I believe this reflects kind of what we were discussing earlier,

that the concern was to make sure we have clearance.

A Correct.

Q And that is referring to diplomatic clearance, correct?

A Correct.

Q Then it goes on to say, "We'll work with State to nail that

down, but intent is to get security force augmentation into Tripoli

(not Benghazi, at least not initially) ASAP. Embassy making efforts

to move all AMCITS from SAO Compound Benghazi to Tripoli, possibly using

same Comm Air that 5-pax team arrived on."

And that is referring to what -- your understanding was that

1432
35

everyone was going to be leaving Benghazi and heading to Tripoli?

A That's correct.

Q During the course of that evening, did you receive any

additional information that may have changed that understanding about

whether or not the individuals that had moved from the diplomatic

compound to the Annex were actually going to be evacuated?

A We knew that the intent was that they be evacuated. My

recollection -- and, again, here is where the subsequent knowledge that

we all gained in the days and weeks following, exactly what transpired

on the ground. So, I don't know that I can de-conflict what did I know

at the time versus what I have subsequently learned.

So I am a little bit reluctant to say I absolutely knew at that

time that it was exactly this. My recollection was we were waiting

for them to move, waiting for them to move, waiting for them to move.

Then we got this sporadic report that the compound had come under fire.

At the time, it was a very, I guess, an incomplete report. We

didn't have a real clear understanding of what had come under fire.

And then it was: They are moving now, they are going to the airport,

they are at the airport.

And so, you know, it is not like you're watching a continuously

evolving piece. It wasn't until I saw the Predator video that occurred

over this long period of time that you began to kind of stitch together

exactly what has happening on a minute-by-minute basis.

But at the time, you get a report, and then it may be 45 minutes,

an hour later you get another piece of information. Then you don't

1433
36

get anything. And you call and say: Hey, what's going on? Have they

begun to move yet? Hold on. Wait. Then it works its way back up the

chain.

So you have get very small packets of information spread out by

a significant period of time where you're not hearing anything. And

at the same time, we are trying to coordinate all the other various

activities that are going on to make sure that we are wrestling with

finding out why was it taking so long to get the airplanes generated

from Ramstein down to the FAST, and when were they going to get there,

and what was the timeline, and how were they going move, and where are

they going to move to, and the business of uniforms, not uniforms.

You get bogged down in some of the things that ultimately end up

being not -- they are the things that bog us down back here, but that

weren't really affecting what was going on on the ground there in

Tripoli.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q Sir, I apologize if I missed this, but the comment in that

long paragraph says "hold departure until we are sure we have clearance

to land in Tripoli."

Is that hold departure from Rota or hold departure from ISB to

Tripoli?

Do you recall?

A I don't recall. Like I said, my recollection was that those

guys, when they finally left Rota, that they were going straight to

Tripoli. I've forgotten. If you say they landed first at Sigonella,

1434
37

okay. I just don't recall that. We just did not want them to be

landing in Tripoli until we knew that they weren't going to get shot

up by somebody on the runway.

Q Clearly, is it your understanding that General Ham had the

authority to move from Rota to ISB? He had full carte blanche to do

what he needed to do to get them prepared to go into Tripoli.

A I don't recall there ever being anything holding them up

at Rota, other than if they needed civies, to make sure they had civies

with them. Once we knew they had civies with them, it was get them

moving.

Q And real quick, talking about General Ham versus Admiral

Leidig.

A I didn't talk with General Ham. All my conversations were

with Admiral Leidig.

Q My question is: Did you have an appreciation -- was

Admiral Leidig running the show and advising the commander or was the

commander trying to make decisions from the Pentagon and advising

Leidig? Did you have an appreciation for that?

A I really don't. I don't know what was going on between

Admiral Leidig and General Ham.

Ms. Clarke. So, we have about 2 minutes remaining. I think

right now what we will do is take a break.

Admiral Tidd. Two minutes. I can go 2, if you want to.

Ms. Clarke. No, I think now is a good stopping point for us, sir,

if that is okay for you, and we can take a break. And I am sure the

1435
38

minority will have questions for you as well.

Thank you.

[Recess at 1:00 p.m.]

1436
39

[2:22 p.m.]

Ms. Green. We can go back on the record.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. GREEN:

Q Sir, we're just gonna go back through some of the items that

you discussed with my colleagues in the last hour.

And you mentioned at the beginning of this interview that your

memory from the night of the attacks was a bit fuzzy, right?

A That's correct.

Q Understandably so.

A That's correct.

Q My memory of last week is fuzzy.

A Yeah. No, the problem that I have, honestly, is

having -- having read the transcripts and the summaries and the after

action reviews that we've been engaged in, trying to disaggregate what

did I know then from the picture that I have today is the part that

is -- I -- I just don't have a great deal of confidence that I can really

distinguish between those two.

Q No, that's fair, sir.

And you had mentioned that you thought that the FAST platoon had

gone directly from Rota into Libya, right?

A Right.

Q And my colleagues indicated to you that the FAST stopped

at the intermediate staging base. And upon learning that, you

speculated that the reason for that was because they were waiting for

1437
40

diplomatic clearance, right?

A That's the only -- that's the -- yes, that's correct.

Correct.

Q Did anyone ever tell you that's why they were at the ISB?

A I don't recall that they stopped at the ISB.

Q And you don't know for a fact that they did, right?

A I -- no, I don't.

Q Did anyone ever tell you that seeking permission from Libya

was going to slow down the FAST team?

A I don't -- the conversation was not -- it was how can we

get them there as quickly as possible.

Q And, sir, we interviewed former Secretary Panetta, and he

indicated to us -- and you probably know this from all of your

operational experience -- that obtaining dip clearance and various

other logistical items would happen in parallel to the forces

deploying. Is that an accurate --

A That was typically the way that we would -- we would work.

And, in fact, in subsequent cases,

So this was -- you know, it was fairly typical that if we -- the

1438
41

only thing that we wanted to make sure that didn't happen was that we

would send them someplace that they couldn't recover back to and run

the plane out of gas while we were waiting for the final approval to

occur.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q But just a specific point from the last round.

A Okay.

Q You have no memory that the FAST platoon stopped at an

intermediate staging base, right?

A That's correct.

Q So I would assume, but I just want to just check with you,

you have no memory that the FAST platoon was delayed because of waiting

on the diplomatic clearance?

A I -- no. What I -- what I recall and refreshed by the

email, was that was the one -- the one caveat of -- from the Secretary

of Defense, basically, launch everything else, launch to the ISB, that

was fine, but don't send it -- don't send the FAST into Tripoli until

we were sure that they would be allowed to land in. That was the

only -- kind of the only caveat that he placed on his approval to deploy

those forces.

Q I'm sorry. I'm kind of beating a dead horse here, but just

to be very clear, because I don't want, sort of, your speculative

comment and the other one to be taken out of context.

A Okay.

Q You don't have any memory that that night there was a

1439
42

decision to go to the intermediate staging base because you were waiting

on diplomatic security -- clearance? Is that right?

A Correct. I do not recall that.

Q Okay.

BY MS. GREEN:

Q Actually, General Dempsey spoke to this in his Senate

testimony. He was, you know, asked about whether country clearance

delayed the FAST team. He said, quote, "I want to assure you, had we

been able to -- there's been a whole bunch of speculation about were

we risk averse. We needed the country's permission to come in. If

we had been able to get there with anything, we'd have gone in there

under the command of the commander of the U.S. Africa Command," end

quote.

Do you have any reason to doubt General Dempsey's testimony?

A Never. The piece -- I think he specifically was talking

about Benghazi in that -- in that specific instance, not Tripoli.

Q Yes, sir.

A On the evening, at the time that all of this was transpiring,

our mindset, our sense was that everything was going to Tripoli, that

no one was left -- or no one would be left in Benghazi. So

that -- that's -- that was the mindset that we had.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q So just to close out some of the diplomatic clearance, I

think you had explained in the last round that the request for

diplomatic clearance was coming from -- originating in embassy

1440
43

Tripoli? Was that your understanding?

A We were waiting -- I was waiting to hear from the Department

of State -- I was not waiting. I was talking to the Department of

State, basically. When they told me that it was okay, that the embassy

at Tripoli said it was okay for them to land, that was -- that was what

we were waiting for, was just for the embassy -- because they were

trying to negotiate. They were trying to find somebody within the

government of Libya to make sure that there would be no problems if

we brought this -- because you can't bring a large armed military force

into another country without having discussions with that government.

It has to be invited in. That's not to say what General Dempsey was

saying is if we thought we had the circumstances that -- that would

warrant going in, that that would be the decision that would be made

at a higher lever. It would not be made at the ambassador's level.

Q Well, sure. And obviously, going into Tripoli, although

there's not a current attack on the embassy would be different than

going into Benghazi, where there was an attack.

A Correct.

Q But I think in the previous round you had said something

about the genesis for the interest in making sure that those who are

entering Tripoli again, and not Benghazi, were in civilian gear and

had clearance from -- diplomatic clearance from the country of Libya

to enter, that part of the genesis from that was actually concerns on

the ground from the embassy in Tripoli?

A That's correct.

1441
44

Q Is that accurate?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. And were the concerns from the embassy on the ground

in Tripoli, did you convey those around the department? Were those

taken seriously?

A Yes. I mean, there was no reason not to take them

seriously. We were very much interested in supporting the embassy and

providing the embassy with what -- what they were asking for and getting

it there as quickly as we possibly could to be able to -- to reinforce

the embassy so that they would have the means that they needed in case

what had happened at -- in Cairo when -- and in Tunis might be heading

their way next.

Q And Embassy Tripoli had -- Embassy Tripoli was expressing

that they also had concerns --

A Absolutely.

Q -- that something could occur there?

A Yes.

Q And was Embassy Tripoli expressing that they wanted you all

to come as quickly as possible?

A They -- they wanted trigger pullers to reinforce the

embassy as quickly as possible.

Q And so there were a series of, sort of, information coming

out of Embassy Tripoli that you all were trying to factor into the

actions that you were taking that night?

A Correct.

1442
45

BY MS. GREEN:

Q We actually had the opportunity, sir, to interview the FAST

commander of that team that went into Tripoli, and he confirmed to us

that they switched in and out of uniforms to -- which is probably not

all that unusual for like a specialized team. Is that right, sir?

A I -- yeah.

Q We asked him whether changing into civilian clothes

interfered with his mission, and the Marine responded, quote,

"Absolutely not," end quote.

And he went on to explain, similar to what you just explained,

sir, about why the Libyan Government might not have wanted Marines in

civilian attire. And I'm just gonna read you his quote: "Not to show

that you have American Marines on the deck in the country outside of

what seemed to be U.S. sovereign territory. So the outside impression

is given of a Marine force on the ground in a foreign country is not

the most welcoming presence. Concurrently, you've got Iraq racking

up and Afghanistan going up. No one wants to be -- this is me kind

of making up these answers why they don't want us in uniform. No one

wants to be the next country that's got Marines coming in to do what

Marines do," end quote.

A I think there is a refreshing candor from young Marine

captains.

Q I think so, too, sir.

A I think you nailed it.

Q Sir, I'm going to direct your attention back to exhibit 3

1443
46

that my colleagues introduced in the last hour.

And you mentioned, sir, that the N-hour is a synchronizing

mechanism. Is it fair to say that setting the N-hour didn't slow the

forces?

A Correct. It did not.

Q And once Secretary of Defense gave the orders to deploy,

nothing stopped them from moving? Is that your --

A That's correct.

Q They weren't waiting for the N-hour?

A I am not aware that they were.

Q And, sir, exhibit 3 seems to be representing both the SVTCs

call that you were on as well as a conference call with the National

Military Command Center?

A Right.

Q And those were your folks that were running that?

A Right. Talking with the other military command centers.

Q And, sir, you responded to that email 14 minutes after you

received it. And I just want to clarify that on page 3, the conference

call essentially is laying out the orders from the Secretary of Defense.

Is that right, sir?

A It is. That's correct. Move the CIF and then some

requests, but, yes, it forwards the SECDEF's VOCO to move the FAST

platoons. I'm just looking to see if there was a discussion.

Q And, sir, if I could direct you to the second page, your

1444
47

email response. The third paragraph is about the FAST deployment.

A Correct.

Q Here, it says, the Secretary of Defense directed the FAST

to make preparations to deploy but hold departure until we are sure

we have country clearance to land in Tripoli.

But your email goes on to say, quote, "Intent is to get security

force augmentation into Tripoli ASAP," end quote.

A Correct.

Q And the last sentence of that last paragraph reads, quote,

"But the point is to get Marines on the ground securing the embassy

in Tripoli as rapidly as we can move them," end quote.

So, sir, it appears, based on your email, that the plan was to

send the FAST team as quickly as they could get there?

A That's correct.

Q So is it fair to say, sir, that obtaining Libyan country

clearance, as we said, and deploying Marines as quickly as we can aren't

mutually exclusive activities?

A No. No. They were -- the intent was they would be pursued

simultaneously.

Q The last sentence, sir, of your email says, "Consider this

authorization to move, we will follow up with depords ASAP."

A So this reinforced the VOCO orders that were passed

previously. This provides reinforcement of that. The actual depords

is a formal package of materials that's put together and presented,

and the Secretary of Defense actually signs those. And so it's

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a -- it's the paperwork that you follow up with to -- that formalizes

the decisions that have already been made and communicated verbally.

Q But the verbal order was all that --

A Correct.

Q -- the forces needed?

A Correct.

Q Sir, when we interviewed Secretary Panetta, and we've asked

a couple of others the same question, national, sort of, command

authority, sort of a simple question, but it goes from the President

to the Secretary of Defense, to the combatant commanders, right?

A Correct.

Q So there's a whole lot of interagency coordination that you

and others were involved in, whether it's the SVTC or whatnot, but those

interactions and discussions wouldn't change the orders given by the

Secretary of Defense? Is that right?

A Correct.

Q In the last hour, you seemed to indicate that decisions were

made at that SVTC that you participated in?

A Yeah. I guess what I would say is, obviously, there were

lots of discussions about what was wanted, what was desired. And when

you have the entire interagency participating and everyone agrees,

including, obviously, the Secretary of Defense or that the DOD side,

that's the most critical thing to us, but this is the coordination that

occurs to make sure that there's nobody -- nobody's surprised and that

everybody -- that nobody is in disagreement. But if the Secretary of

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Defense tells us to do something, we do it. That's the -- that's

our -- the military chain of command.

Q And that -- that is what happened on September 11th, 2012,

sir?

A Correct.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. That you got your orders from the Secretary

of Defense?

Admiral Tidd. Correct.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. Your orders didn't come from the White

House or from the State Department?

Admiral Tidd. No. The orders came from the Secretary of

Defense.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q I appreciate your patience, Admiral.

You mentioned in the last hour, coming out of that 7:30 SVTC, some

of the do outs, or some of the taskers that were associated with that

SVTC. You also described some of the members of the interagency, your

sense -- for instance, I've written in my notes here that everybody

wanted the forces that were discussed there instantaneously. You then

followed up by saying that there were communications you had with

individuals in the White House, individuals at the State Department

following that meeting.

A Yeah. I did not speak to anyone in the White House that

I recall. The only people I recall speaking with were -- now, I -- I

attended the SVTC in which the discussions were occurring, but my

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conversations were with people inside the Pentagon.

Q Okay. And I think that's a helpful clarification.

One of the things I had written in my notes is that you had said

that individuals at the White House or State Department had contacted

the Joint Staff to ask --

A Yeah.

Q -- our forces to move again.

A Yeah. No, I did -- let me change. I did have a phone call

with -- I don't recall any longer -- it was one of the senior State

Department individuals that was -- that was the point person for this

crisis that was breaking. That she was -- was at the SVTC, and her

name was passed -- and phone number was passed out, and I was just

exchanging information with her. And that was -- my recollection was

that was the phone call we were having over whether or not uniforms,

no uniforms, how -- what's the fastest you can move. And we just all

agreed that the key thing is to get them there as quickly as possible,

the Marines, the FAST Marines.

Q Thank you. So it was your sense, then, in that discussion

and other discussions you may have been briefed or informed about with

the State Department that the State Department wanted forces there

instantaneously? That was -- that continued throughout the evening?

A Yes. That was correct.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. And in your discussions with the State

Department about changing into civilian clothes and other things,

was -- was the request from the State Department -- were those all

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subordinate to the interests from the State Department that the forces

get there as quickly as possible?

Admiral Tidd. That was my sense. It was from a security

perspective that, I think, they were thinking of not moving uniformed

Marines at night in buses through the -- you know -- or, actually, in

the early hours of the morning through downtown Tripoli to the embassy.

And so I think that the only question I had was, okay, if it comes down

to a question of with uniforms or without uniforms, is it more important

to move them quickly? The answer was, yes, get them there quickly.

Ms. Sachsman Grooms. And that's the answer from the State

Department?

Admiral Tidd. Correct.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And at the time, that discussion centered on Embassy Tripoli

with respect to the FAST? Is that correct?

A It was only about Tripoli at that point.

Q At that point. And that is again, because?

A Their concern that there might be similar riots and unrest

that had occurred in Cairo and Tunis and in Benghazi.

Q And at the point in time of those discussions, your

understanding was that the personnel in Benghazi was set to evacuate?

A They were either -- they were either on their way out or

had left. And I didn't have a clear idea of how long it was going to

finally take them, the last flight to leave. It was only -- you know,

retrospective, we learned that last flight ended up taking a lot longer

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than we thought.

Q Yes, sir.

BY MS. SACHSMAN GROOMS:

Q Even with the last flight taking longer than you all thought

that it would have, would there have been any way to get forces into

Benghazi before that happened? I guess my point is, the forces still

weren't ready and moving, right?

A I mean the -- what we weren't sure at the time, and the

reason we were -- we were asking for two FAST platoons, we weren't sure

if we were going to be moving one platoon to Benghazi, one platoon to

Tripoli. The more we learned, the more it became evident nobody was

going to be left in Benghazi, that everybody was moving into Tripoli

and consolidate there. And so the decision was, let's keep the two

platoons moving in this direction, and if we need to put them someplace

else, we can put them someplace else. Because, again, we -- things

were moving quickly at a number of different embassies and, frankly,

we weren't sure at that point where we were going to need them next.

Q Got it. And if the FAST platoon had been ready, and there

were people on the ground still in Benghazi, would you have sent them

to Benghazi -- I mean, the order was set up originally to send them

to Benghazi?

A Yeah. And part of that, we just didn't know what the

situation was on the ground, where we -- was there a static situation,

and we were defending? Were they moving from -- I mean, pretty early

on, my recollection was that the intent was that they leave Benghazi,

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and that they move from Benghazi back to Tripoli. And so, again, you

know, FAST platoon is not -- that's not the kind of a unit that you

would use to go in and either do an assault or anything else. They

would -- they would be a unit that you would send in to set up a

protective perimeter and then be able to conduct either a -- you know,

ordered departure or something else from.

But as we got the word that -- that they were moving towards the

airport, I think pretty quickly the thinking shifted to, okay, you know,

we are not going to reinforce Benghazi, because nobody's going to be

left there.

Q Can you speak a little to the FEST, the F-E-S-T?

A Yeah.

Q I think you said the interest was in getting trigger pullers

to Libya, and so the idea of the FEST was dismissed pretty early on.

Did you agree with that decision? Can you talk a little about that?

A Yeah, I just -- what I did was review the types of units

that in a -- in an 0300 kind of crisis that could be made available,

and that there was -- I mean, there was the -- if you -- if you can

get there ahead of a crisis breaking out, you send in a FAST platoon

to reinforce, provide us a static defense around a fixed site. If you

think you've got a hostage rescue or some other dynamic type of a

situation,

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The FEST was -- if you -- if you are going to be conducting some

sort of a crisis response activity within a sovereign nation, in order

to provide a team of subject matter experts who understand exactly what

the employment of this team is, a FEST is an interagency team led by

somebody of ambassadorial level and that with members of State

Department, intelligence community, and military, and sometimes law

enforcement as well and communicators and other sorts of folks to be

able to expand the capacity of an embassy to be able to deal with a

crisis type of a situation.

And there are instances when you deploy the 0300 package that you

consider also deploying the FEST to be able to augment the embassy to

be able to deal with what might be going on. But the decision was made

at that evening's SVTC that, no, they did not need the FEST. What they

wanted was they wanted trigger pullers.

And although there's a small number of military personnel in that

FEST, it is not -- typically, it's not considered a trigger-pulling

outfit.

Q Is that because the FEST would be used to augment --

A The embassy.

Q -- the embassy, and instead, they were evacuating?

A Well, we didn't know. I mean, we just -- we didn't know,

and I think they weren't even sure at that point. What they didn't

1452
55

want to do was increase the number of people inside the embassy that

should, you know, a -- a requirement come to draw down the number of

people in the embassy, that they would then bring people in and have

to turn around and bring them right back out again.

Q And especially they didn't want to increase the number of

people that they would have to evacuate that were nontrigger pullers?

A Correct.

BY MS. GREEN:

Q Sir, since the Benghazi attacks, there's been sort of

multiple allegations that somehow the Defense Department was told to

stand down, whether it was, you know, Secretary Clinton telling

Secretary Panetta. On your SVTC or throughout the night, did anyone

ever indicate that you should stand down?

A I don't -- I don't recall hearing anybody saying stand down.

I've read the same allegations, the same stories, and I -- I don't know

where that came from.

Q Did anyone ever indicate to you that you should slow the

response of the military to --

A No.

Mr. Kenny. Sir, you were asked a series of questions about the

status of the CIF throughout the evening of September 11th and the

morning of September 12th.

As far as the alert posture, the posture of that CIF and their

movements on the night of the attacks, who would be best positioned

to answer those questions for the committee?

1453
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Admiral Tidd. I think the theater Special Operations commander,

which in that instance, I think they were still under -- under European

command, so the SOCEUR commander probably would have the best.

Mr. Kenny. Okay. Thank you.

BY MS. GREEN:

Q We also had the opportunity, sir, to interview the commander

of that CIF, and he explained to us sort of the difference between

responding in extremis to deliberative planning. And from what, in

his scope of understanding, once the ambassador was deceased, sort

of -- he indicated that, essentially the N-hour became irrelevant,

because they were doing deliberative planning at that point. Does that

resonate with you?

A That makes sense. And, again, it was just because we didn't

know what we didn't know. We didn't know what -- what was going on

at that point, so --

Q And by staging forces at the ISB, was that because of the

other threats driving in the region?

A We -- we knew we needed to get a very flexible, capable

package with a loss of capacity a lot closer to the problem than what

we currently had, and we wanted to put them someplace where they could

all be colocated and do the kinds of planning, share the information

and make sure they had the best possible information available to them.

And so once it became pretty clear that we did not have an immediate

hostage rescue situation going on, it -- our thinking was, get them

all here together and then -- and then see what comes next and be ready

1454
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to be able to respond to what comes next.

In fact, we did end up getting some requests from the embassy in

Tunis for augmentation of security personnel. And at that time the

decision was made to use Special Operations forces to do that instead

of Marines because of hypersensitivity of the embassy in Tunis to having

Marines come in in a FAST platoon. They wanted a lower profile

perspective, because they had already been, I think, assaulted one

time.

Q Sir, Major General Darryl Roberson has testified a number

of times to Congress about the Benghazi attacks. Did he work for you

or with you?

A He was the vice director for operations. Darryl Roberson,

yeah.

Q One of the things he said in his testimony, and sounds

similar to what you just said is, quote, "With respect to the CIF, was

it properly used, or what we should've, could've, would've done with

that, the very next day, 19 of those 30 people ended up in Tunis, a

compound that was compromised by protestors. That security was

breached, and the only force we could get in there without fighting

our way in was the Special Operations force to protect those grounds,"

end quote.

And then he went on to say that, you know, four people died in

Libya, and four people did not die in Tunis. Essentially, because they

were stationed at the ISB, they were able to deploy and secure those

grounds.

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Is that a fair assessment, that staging at the ISB enabled them

to get there to respond as well as to other places in the region?

A That is true. I mean, that was specifically why we put them

into an ISB so that we could respond much more quickly. Basically,

we were helicopter range away from three of the key countries

that -- that looked like we were -- had some of the more significant

problems with.

We did not -- on the night of the 10th, we did not have those same

forces in helicopter range of key countries, and so we could not get

them in.

Q Sir, on the night of the attacks, was it your sense that

everyone was doing everything they could to respond to keep Americans

safe?

A I believe that, yes.

Q Everyone at the Pentagon?

A I believe that.

Q Everyone at the White House?

A I believe that.

Q And folks at the State Department?

A That is my belief.

Q And was it your sense from the SVTC and other interactions

that folks were doing everything they could to --

A There was an enormous sense of urgency to try to sort through

all of the conflicting information that we were getting and had been

getting. And -- and, yes, I think everyone was doing everything they

1456
59

could to try to sort through that -- the conflicting information and

to make the best possible decisions that they could.

Q Does it seem that the forces that were deployed that night,

]CIF

and the two FAST platoons, that seems to show the gravity with which

the U.S. Government was responding.

A Given the information that we had at the time, those were,

without a doubt, the premiere, most capable forces that we had to deal

with a highly chaotic and uncertain situation. And we needed to send

the best possible eyes and ears forward, not knowing what we were going

to be dealing with to people that sort of -- the people who would be

on the ground would be the most capable of making the right decisions

in a very critical time-compressed environment. They were the best

trained that we had for that kind of a situation.

Q And just to be very clear, did the Secretary of State ever

tell you or anyone at DOD to stand down?

A I never heard that from her.

Q Did the President ever tell you or anyone at the Department

to stand down or slow the response?

A I never communicated with the President.

Q During his appearance before the Senate Armed Services

Committee on February 7th, 2013, General Dempsey testified that, quote,

"I want to make just one comment related to your chronology, because

I think it's important. Once we started moving forces, nothing stopped

us, nothing slowed us down. The only adaptation we thought about

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making was for a period of time we thought we were going to be entering

a hostage rescue, because we didn't know where the ambassador was. But

once we started moving forces, they didn't slow, they didn't stop,"

end quote.

A I agree with that.

Q There's also been this criticism of the Department of

Defense for not sending in fighter aircraft into Benghazi on the night

of the attacks. Have you heard that criticism, sir?

A Many times.

Q Despite three and a half years and now the eighth

congressional investigation, some continue to criticize the fact that

the U.S. military didn't send that type of asset.

This committee heard from Admiral Winnefeld, who was adamant that

fighter aircraft would not have been the appropriate response. And

Major General Roberson also testified to this before the Armed Services

Committee on May 21st, 2013. And he said, sir, quote, "There are many

factors that go into employing weapons on the ground. And having flown

in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is absolutely critical that we know where

we are dropping these bombs and who we are going to kill. There was

no JTAC on the ground. We had no way of contacting people on the ground

from the airplane, from the pilot's perspective. There was no way to

be able to affect with weapons on the ground. We didn't know who was

friendly and who was enemy. There was no way that we could have been

able to drop weapons in that environment from a drone or from an

airplane."

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Do you agree with General Roberson's perspective?

A Yeah. General Roberson and Admiral Winnefeld are, both,

two supremely qualified tactical aviators, who've actually dropped

ordnance from airplanes in combat. And I would be the last person to

second guess them, but I would agree entirely with -- with their

evaluation.

Q Major General Roberson also stated, sir, quote, "We don't

have assets to respond like a fire call, jump down the pole and respond

for any American that is under fire anywhere in the world," end quote.

A You know, we went back and we took a hard look. I will be

honest, it did not come to my mind that that was something that we ought

to consider doing. As we went back through it and we looked, we had

no forces that were positioned or postured or on an alert status that

would have been able to have responded had we had JTACs on the ground,

had we known exactly what the situation was, who the friendlies, who

the unfriendlies were. The reality was, we did not have armed aircraft

that were in a position to have responded, period.

Q Sir, General Ham testified that even if we did have armed

aircraft, it would not have been the right tool given the environment.

A I would not second guess him in that one at all. Let me

be more emphatic. I agree with General Ham. Okay?

Ms. Green. We can go off the record.

(Discussion held off the record.)

Ms. Green. Back on the record

BY MS. GREEN:

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Q Sir, I'm going to ask you a series of questions, and we ask

these of every witness, because of the many allegations that continue

to perpetuate surrounding the Benghazi attacks.

While anyone can speculate about the Benghazi attacks, and plenty

of people have, only a limited number of people have actual knowledge

or evidence of what happened before, during, and after the attacks.

So what I'm asking, sir, is whether you have any firsthand information

or knowledge. And bear with me, please.

It has been alleged that Secretary of State Clinton intentionally

blocked military action on the night of the attacks. One Congressman

has speculated that, quote, "Secretary Clinton told Leon Panetta to

stand down," end quote, and this resulted in the Defense Department

not sending more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally

signed an April 2012 cable denying security to Libya. The Washington

Post fact checker evaluated this claim and gave it four Pinocchios,

its highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

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an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risks posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for a military operation in Libya

in the spring of 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

the spring of 2011?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the U.S. mission in Benghazi

included transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries.

A bipartisan report issued by the House Armed Services Select Committee

on Intelligence found that, quote, "The CIA was not collecting and

shipping arms from Libya to Syria," end quote, and they found no support

for this allegation.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

A No.

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Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A No.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the Special Mission Compound. And

there have been a number of allegations about the cause of and the

appropriateness of that delay. The House Intelligence Committee

issued a bipartisan report concluding that the team was not ordered

to stand down, but that, instead, there were tactical disagreements

on the ground over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand-down order

to CIA personnel?

A No.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision to delay temporarily or think it was the right decision, do

you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind

the temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed the Annex

to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A No.

Q A concern has been raised by one individual that in the

course of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board,

damaging documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that

production.

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Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Let me ask these questions for documents that were provided

to Congress.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to Congress?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons, and that he then misrepresented his actions when

he told Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully performed our duties

in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship," end quote.

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave

false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

A No.

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[3:14 p.m.]

BY MS. GREEN:

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an

intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows

about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk

shows?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief on the night of the attacks

and that he was missing in action.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief or missing in action

on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks who were considering

flying on the second plane to Benghazi were ordered by their superiors

to stand down, meaning to cease all operations. Military officials

have stated that those four individuals were, instead, ordered to

remain in place in Tripoli to provide security and medical assistance

1464
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in their current location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that, quote, "There was no stand down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Benghazi who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House

Armed Services Committee that there was no stand down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the military failed to deploy

assets on the night of the attack that would have saved lives. However,

former Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the former

chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review of

the attacks, after which he stated, quote, "Given where the troops were,

how quickly the thing all happened, and how quickly it dissipated, we

probably couldn't have done more than we did," end quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

conclusion?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives, but that the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided

not to deploy them?

A No.

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[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Tolar. Let's go back on the record, please.

EXAMINATION BY MR. TOLAR

Q Sir, if you would, remind me again of your timeframe for

your billet as the J3. What period of time was that, approximately?

A From the summer of 2012 until approximately the late fall

of 2013. About 15 months. So, yeah, 2013.

Q And what was the subsequent billet?

A Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Q Talk to me briefly about your responsibilities in that

billet.

A Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is

the Chairman's liaison to the Secretary of State.

Q In that billet, were you privy to discussions about

deployment of forces and things of that nature?

A To the extent that, as a member of the staff -- the Joint

Staff -- yes. Not to the same level of detail as I had when I was the

J3. I guess -- that is what I said.

Q [Captain ] was the DDO. Briefly tell me, please,

what the DDO does?

A The DDO is the duty officer. So there is the senior officer

on watch. It is always either a flag or general officer or a flag or

general officer select. As the J3, he is my watch standard on call

24/7.

Q Is it your understanding that once the COCOM commander,

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General Ham, received authority from Secretary Panetta following the

White House meeting, did you believe that General Ham required any

additional authority to deploy assets?

A He was not involved in the decision

That came from the

Secretary of Defense, and it was then provided to him to be used. So

at that point, he had it. The decision on how it might be employed

once we got past the initial crisis then became a matter of discussion

back and forth.

So he could -- it would have been unlikely that he would have,

on his own, without discussing it with the Chairman and the Secretary

of Defense, employed it in ways like putting it ashore into specific

countries, things like that, using it in ways that it might be

considered unusual.

As a matter of routine, he would discuss those different concepts

about pieces of it might be deployed -- might be employed once it was

actually deployed.

Q But is it accurate to say that he had all the authority he

needed to move all those assets to the ISB?

A To the ISB, yes. Yes.

Q And that authority was established -- you're saying that

authority was established when Secretary Panetta told him in a VOCO

following the White House meeting.

A The VOCO deployed the force and put them under the

operational command of the theatre combatant commander. And that was

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subsequently formalized in the formal deployment order.

Q Yes, sir.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q Just for clarification, the VOCO -- when you're referring

to VOCO, if you look at the first exhibit that was handed out -- the

timeline -- at what point in time on that timeline is the VOCO?

A Early evening of the 11th.

Q So on the timeline, between 6 and 8 p.m., after Secretary

Panetta convened the meeting, and it says "provides verbal

authorization for the following actions." That is the first page of

the timeline. That's when you're referring to the VOCO?

A That's correct.

Q At that point is when Ham had the authority to move assets,

if he desired to, to intermediate staging bases.

A That's correct. He had the authority to move the forces

that he owned. The forces that were owned by the European Command

Commander was chopped to him when they arrived at the ISB.

was

placed under his command once it arrived there at the ISB.

Q When did the European Command commander have the authority

to move the forces --

A He was directed to do it at the same time. That

CIF -- basically, the CIF was transferred from European Command to

AFRICOM, and then they made a decision to move it there.

Q And that occurred at the same time?

1468
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A Yes.

BY MR. TOLAR:

Q During your discussions that night with either Admiral

Leidig or Admiral Landholt, did either of those gentlemen make any kind

of request to you for additional support or anything at all?

A We were discussing, going over in our minds what other

possible ISR resources might be made available, trying to figure out

what we had that might be diverted or might be shifted from another

theatre, and couldn't come up with anything that resulted in an ask.

We considered different types of things and then ruled them out

because either they couldn't get there in time or they really wouldn't

be suitable for the situation that we thought we were dealing with at

the time.

Q At the time, did you have an appreciation -- would the NMCC

have an appreciation or understanding of what the SOC assets were,

generally, in that AOR?

A In general terms, the CIF, yes.

Q ISR assets. I apologize.

A No. We knew that was being employed in the CT mission that

was going on at the time in North Africa, yes. It was a very small

slice. They didn't have a whole lot of resources available. It was

the Predator and periodically a P-3 and I think a couple of other

platforms, but they did not have a continuous, long-term dwell kind

of a capability to stare like we had in some of the other theatres.

Q Did the NMCC have an understanding -- realtime

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understanding of what those assets that the SOC possessed that were

in the area?

A Not ahead of time, no, because we would not have been

engaged -- at the NMCC, we would not be involved in the tactical

employment of those sensors themselves.

Q Explain to me why that is the case.

A That is the role of the theatre commander, the tactical

employment of resources and forces.

Q Talk to me briefly about the criteria that is considered

in the establishment of an N-hour, to the extent that you're able to.

Not necessarily on this night per se, but just in general.

A

]an N-hour is be

established, and that is the timeframe that is used as kind of the

central synchronizing point where a series of actions then will occur

based on that N-hour.

Q Did you work -- how often did you work with Dr. Miller,

the OSD policy gentleman?

A A fairly routine basis.

Q Talk to me briefly about his billet and what he did, to the

extent that you know.

A He was the principal policy officer within the -- policy

assistant to the Secretary and the Under Secretary of Defense, in terms

of somewhat analogous -- he was the person who attended the Deputies

Committee meetings as a general rule, and he was the senior person

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engaging with the National Security Advisor, Deputy National Security

Advisor, senior members of the National Security Council staff.

And so, in activities as the director of operations, typically,

I would -- when I would provide information or updates of an operational

nature, in addition to keeping the senior military assistant to the

Secretary of Defense, senior military assistant to the Deputy

Secretary of Defense, and I would keep Dr. Miller also -- he would be

on that line, along with the Chairman and Vice Chairman and people on

the Joint Staff chain.

Q On the night of the attack, did he engage at all in the civies

versus utilities discussion?

A I don't recall him being part of that discussion, no.

Q Were you aware --

A I don't think that discussion really involved anybody in

the Secretary or OSD. My recollection, it literally was making sure

that the Department of State, and specifically the embassy, was happy

with how they were going to be arriving to facilitate their moving

safely and securely through the city to the embassy.

Q Yes, sir.

Sir, on the night of the attack, were you aware at the time that

there was a C-17 and crew on BRAVO alert status at Ramstein?

A No. I was not.

Q For what it's worth, this is the crew that actually

conducted the Medevac from Tripoli.

A From Tripoli back to Landstuhl.

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Q Yes, sir.

A Okay.

Q At the time, you weren't aware?

A No.

Q Thank you. There were some discussions -- apparently,

there were some discussions about how fixed wing aircraft might have

been employed. Were you familiar with those discussions, in terms of

a three-phased deployment?

Let me be more specific. So, apparently there were discussions

about a three-phased deployment of fixed wing aircraft. The first

phase included a high-speed pass at 8,000 to 10,000 feet. The second

phase included dropping flares over the compound. And the third phase

included possibly shooting rounds into the field next to the Annex.

Were you aware of those discussions?

A No.

Q Were you aware of the discussions between General Ham and

the ambassador about the lack of a SOFA agreement and the extension

of the SST team in Tripoli?

A Yes. To the extent that -- we knew that it was a matter

of discussion in order to regularize the U.S. military presence and

get it translated over into a Marine Security Guard, which was the

standard procedure for embassies -- at our embassies around the world.

Q I apologize. Could you elaborate on that for me?

A Obviously, at some point -- when you establish an embassy,

at some point you want to be able to get a Marine Security Guard

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as -- that is the standard footprint that we have to provide security

for the classified material at the embassy.

We did not yet have a Marine Security Guard. We had a

series -- from going all the way back to the original movement and

establishment of the embassy, we had Special Operations Forces. That

is not a traditional mission for Special Operations Forces.

And so it was -- I guess at some point we knew that eventually

we would get the embassy in Tripoli translated over into a standard

footprint. We just didn't know when. I knew that there had been a

series of -- prior to my taking over as the J3, we had gone through

a series of extensions of a Special Operations Force capability. And

with each extension with a question that went to the State Department

and ultimately to the embassy, of: Okay, what is required in order

to translate this from this nonstandard Special Operations Force over

to a Marine Security Guard?

Q Who at the Joint level would be the point on all those

discussions?

A It was a discussion because the force, I think, was sourced

out of -- initially out of AFRICOM, and then out of the Joint Force

management process. It would take a formal extension by an op ord in

order to continue to use a Special Operations Force deployed into Libya

for this purpose.

Q Sir, I apologize. What I am trying to get at, is in order

to make the transition from an SST to an MSG, who at the J level would

be the one saying, Hey, we need to get an MSG in there, or words to

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that effect?

A With my predecessor as the J3 and me as the J3, it was:

Okay, this is a nonstandard situation. And the question was: When

do we shift it over to a standard one? What are the requirements, what

are the tripwires -- not tripwires, but maybe it's the conditions

required in order to do that?

And it was just continued -- I think my recollection was three

or four times that it continued on as a Special Operations Force as

opposed to a -- which is not exactly what they are trained for, not

the mission set that they are -- that is not why we have Special

Operations Forces.

Q What were the challenges that prevented the transition to

the MSG?

A I don't recall. It was just a series of -- that the

ambassador felt that he wanted to continue to use to have access to

the Special Operations Force as opposed to a Marine Security Guard.

And I don't recall the specifics.

Q Do you recall the evacuation of the Tripoli -- embassy in

Tripoli in June or July of 2014?

A I do.

Q How involved were you in -- obviously, not in the planning

per se -- but do you recall when the planning for that evacuation

commenced?

A The minute we put the initial large slug of people in

there -- the large security force -- it was -- as I recall, it was a

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company-plus size of Marines that went in there in order to expand the

perimeter and to provide adequate security to the embassy in the

Tripoli. And, literally, the first time they went in there, they began

talking about, okay if you had to pull out, how would you do it? And

the subsequent successive draw-down of the embassy personnel until it

reached the point where it was a relatively small percentage of the

total force that was there were embassy people doing diplomatic work

as opposed to security personnel safeguarding the perimeter.

Q Do you recall what your level of understanding was of what

options were presented in terms of evacuating that embassy, whether

it is by land, by sea, by air, et cetera?

A I remember we looked at the options.

Q Do you recall the actual evacuation and the type of assets

that were involved?

A I was trying to remember if I had shifted over to the ACJCS

at that point or not. Because I don't recall the specific details.

I just remember when it happened and closed down.

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Q At the time, there was a lot of turmoil in the Middle East.

Were there any discussions at the Joint level about the posture of DOD

at that time? Especially as we rolled up on 9/11, were there any

discussions about perhaps ramping up our posture, given what was going

on in that area?

A Every year as we come up on 9/11 we take a hard look at the

security situation, look at the security threats on a global basis,

and put out a standard warning. Having done this every year since

2001 -- I was in the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, so I have got some

personal experience with it -- we look all around the world.

We have come to recognize that if terrorists want to conduct an

attack, they will conduct an attack at the time that suits them, not

necessarily to coincide with a specific date. So, over the years, I

think it became -- you paid close attention to it, but you did not focus

exclusively on that. You had to pay attention every day of the year,

but you couldn't afford to hone in on any one single day.

We had significant unrest that had been occurring for a number

of weeks, but it was something that we were paying very close attention

to, and it was primarily in CENTCOM, but beginning to occur in North

Africa as well. We were watching that closely.

I think my recollection at the time, I was more concerned about

what was going on in Cairo than I was thinking about what might possibly

happen in Libya. That was not on my scope.

Q And was there any discussion about ramping up the posture

to respond in Cairo?

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A Cairo had a -- we took a hard look at what they had for a

security situation and the folks that they had. And CENTCOM had a

pretty robust QRF capability that was under their direct operational

control -- an ability to respond -- plus, we had I think some degree

of belief that the authorities in Egypt would provide adequate

protection to the diplomatic facilities there.

Q Did you have an understanding of what capabilities that

existed in Libya in order to respond or were capable to respond?

A No. I will be honest, I did not before the night of the

11th.

Q Were you aware of the Special Mission Compound in Benghazi

prior to the attack?

A No.

Q Were you aware of the Annex in Benghazi prior to the attack?

A No.

Q Sir, that is all I have.

Ms. Clarke. I just have a couple of questions.

BY MS. CLARKE:

Q I think earlier you mentioned that you were talking with

someone at the State Department, and you indicated that it may have

been a woman, regarding questions about the uniforms and whether that

would trump moving the assets as fast as possible.

Do you recall if that individual was Beth Jones?

A It might have been. I won't swear to it. Can I say that

here?

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That sounds familiar. It might have been her.

Q I know we just discussed a couple of times this afternoon

the deployment of the FEST. Who actually makes that decision? Is that

a State Department call or is that a Joint call?

A Ultimately, the Secretary of Defense has a piece of the

call, but it is at the request of the State Department. And I have

got to go pull out -- I haven't reviewed a copy of the 0300 op order

in awhile -- in which it is contained in there -- but it may in fact

be that even the National Security Advisor gets a piece of it. But

don't quote me on that. I am not sure about that piece.

Obviously, it is at the request of the embassy, through the State

Department, over to DOD, and then the Secretary of Defense has the

authority to -- or has to agree to deploy the aircraft that carry the

FEST.

EXAMINATION BY MR. KENNY

Q Sir, just a moment ago with my colleagues you had indicated

that at some point in the discussion about whether to transition to

a Marine Security Guard detachment approach at Embassy Tripoli, you

mentioned that the Ambassador felt that he wanted access to the SOF

team that was present in country. I just wanted to ask if you recall

the timeframe when that discussion took place.

A I think this was an ongoing discussion that had taken place

over -- every time it came time to renew the deployment order for that

Special Operations Force to execute that mission, it was revisited.

The question would go out and they would come back and say: No, it

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is still not time yet to transition over to a Marine Security Guard.

Q At the time that you became the director of operations, the

SST, the team --

A This question had been visited on a couple of occasions at

least, and my recollection was it was probably about time to revisit

it yet again. It was on a recurring -- I don't recall any longer

whether it was a 90-day or -- but we had to go back and reauthorize

the deployment periodically.

Q So when you say that the ambassador felt at the time that

he wanted continued access to the SOF, was that information that was

conveyed to you directly by the AMBASSADOR?

A No. Again, this is just in the staffing of the package of:

Do we renew or do we not renew the deployment order of the SOF package,

the SOF personnel. I did not communicate -- I have never communicated

directly with the ambassador. Just what came to us was now State says:

You need to keep it.

Q Okay. Your recollection of those discussions is those

occurred at some point prior to you assuming --

A It had been ongoing I mean literally since the establishment

of the embassy or the reestablishment of the embassy after operations

the year before.

Q Okay.

Ms. Green. I think that is all we have.

Mr. Tolar. Just one followup on that. I apologize, sir, but do

you recall why the ambassador felt like it wasn't time to make the

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transition? I mean, what about the SST did they prefer over an MSG?

Admiral Tidd. I would be speculating. I don't want to put words

in a dead man's mouth.

Mr. Kiko. I just have one question. Was it one ambassador or

was it more than one ambassador?

Admiral Tidd. I don't know. I don't know when the ambassadors

turned over.

Mr. Tolar. Sir, who was your predecessor?

Admiral Tidd. As the director of operations?

Mr. Tolar. Yes, sir.

Admiral Tidd. General Miller.

Mr. Tolar. Sir, on behalf of Chairman Gowdy and the committee,

we appreciate your time today. We appreciate your service. Thank you

very much.

[Where upon, at 3:42 p.m., the interview was adjourned.]

1480
EXHIBIT 1

1481
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1483
This exhibit was not cleared for public release.

EXHIBIT 2

1484
This exhibit was not cleared for public release.

EXHIBIT 3

1485

INTERVIEW OF

PHYSICAL SECURITY SPECIALIST

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, APRIL 6, 2016
APPEARANCES

FOR THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON BENGHAZI

PHILIP G. KIKO, Staff Director and General Counsel

SHARON JACKSON, Deputy Chief Counsel

KIM BETZ, Member Outreach Liaison and Counsel

PETER KENNY, Minority Senior Counsel

ERIN O’BRIEN, Minority Detailee

FOR THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AUSTIN EVERS, Senior Advisor

ALISON R. WELCHER, Attorney-Adviser

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Ms. Betz. So I guess we'll begin. Okay. This is a transcribed

interview of conducted by the House Select Committee

on Benghazi. This interview is being conducted voluntarily as part

of the committee's investigation into the attacks on U.S. diplomatic

facilities in Benghazi, Libya, and related matters pursuant to House

Resolution 567 of the 113th Congress and House Resolution 5 of the 114th

Congress.

Would the witness please state his name for the record.

Mr. . .

Ms. Betz. The committee appreciates your appearance this

morning at this interview. My name is Kim Betz with the committee's

majority staff, and I'll take this opportunity to have everybody go

around the room and introduce themselves as well.

Ms. Jackson. Okay. And I'm Sharon Jackson. I'm also with the

majority staff.

Mr. Kenny. Peter Kenny from the minority staff.

Ms. O'Brien. Erin O'Brien also with the minority.

Mr. Evers. Austin Evers, State Department.

Ms. Welcher. Alison Welcher, State Department.

Mr. Kiko. Phil Kiko, with the committee.

Ms. Betz. Before we begin, I'd like to go over how the interview

will proceed this morning. Generally, the way the questioning has

proceeded is that a member from the majority will ask questions first

for up to an hour. And then the minority will have an opportunity to

ask questions for an equal period of time, if they choose. Questions

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may only be asked by a member of the committee or designated staff

member. We will rotate back and forth, 1 hour per side, until we are

out of questions and the interview will be over.

Does that make sense?

Mr. . Absolutely.

Ms. Betz. Unlike a testimony or a deposition in Federal Court,

the committee format is not bound by the rules of evidence. The witness

or their counsel may raise objections for privilege, subject to review

by the chairman of the committee. If these objections cannot be

resolved in the interview, the witness can be required to return for

a deposition or a hearing. Members and staff of the committee,

however, are not permitted to raise objections when the other side is

asking questions. This has not been an issue we encountered in the

past, but I want to make sure you are clear on the process.

Mr. Uh-huh.

Ms. Betz. This session is to begin as unclassified. If any

question calls for a classified answer, please let us know and we will

reserve its answer until we move into a classified setting. And we

do have a classified setting reserved, if necessary.

You are welcome to confer with counsel at any time throughout the

interview, but if something needs to be clarified, we ask you make this

known. If you need to discuss anything with your counsel, we will go

off the record and stop the clock to provide you with this opportunity.

We want to make it as easy as possible, as I said.

We'd like to take a break whenever it's convenient for you. This

1490
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can be after every hour of questioning, after a couple of rounds,

whatever you prefer. During a round of questioning, if you need

anything, a glass of water, use of the facilities, to confer with your

counsel, please just let us know and we will go off the record and stop

the clock. As I said, we want to make this as easy as possible.

As you can see, an official reporter is taking down everything

you say to make a written record. So we ask that you give verbal

responses to all questions, yes or no, as opposed to nods of the head.

I'm going to ask the reporter to please feel free to jump in in case

you do respond nonverbally. Do you understand?

Mr. . Uh-huh.

Ms. Betz. We should also both not try to talk over each other

so we can get a clear record. I'm guilty of this. We want you to answer

our questions in the most complete and truthful manner possible. So

we will take our time and repeat or clarify our questions, if necessary.

If you have any questions or if you do not understand any of our

questions, please let us know. We'll be happy to rephrase or clarify

the question.

If you honestly don't know the answer to a question or do not

remember, it's best not to guess. Please give us your best

recollection. And if there are things you do not know or can't

remember, just say so, and please inform us as to who, to the best of

your knowledge, may be able to provide a more complete answer to the

question.

You are required to answer questions from Congress truthfully.

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Do you understand?

Mr. . Yes.

Ms. Betz. This also applies to questions posed by congressional

staff in an interview. Do you understand this?

Mr. . Yes.

Ms. Betz. Witnesses that knowingly provide false testimony

could be subject to criminal prosecution for perjury for making false

statements. Do you understand this?

Mr. . Yes.

Ms. Betz. Is there any reason you are unable to provide truthful

answers to today's questions?

Mr. . No.

Ms. Betz. That's the end of my preamble, so I'll just ask my

colleagues if they have anything for the record.

Mr. Kenny. We're good to go.

Ms. Betz. Okay. So the time now reads 9:22.

EXAMINATION

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Mr. , could you just talk a little bit about your

background at the Bureau of Diplomatic Security?

A Sure.

Q Just briefly.

A I started with the Office of Security, State Department,

New York Field Office, April 1976, as a special agent. I worked

5 years there. Then I transferred down to Washington, 2 years on the

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Secretary's detail, then I went off to Cairo as an assistant regional

security officer for 3 years there. And then after that I went off

as regional security officer at Dhaka, Bangladesh, for 2 years. Came

back to Washington, D.C., in the Physical Security Division for

2 years. I was on detail to the Office of Inspector General with State

Department for 2 years. I went over to Overseas Programs for 1 year,

International Programs, I worked the Africa desk. Then I was asked

to take over as RSO Beirut in 1992. I did that for a year.

Came back to headquarters where I was 5 years in Emergency

Planning Special Projects in Overseas Programs. And during that time,

I went off to be TDY RSO in Khartoum and TDY RSO in Sana'a, Yemen. Then

I went off after, what, 5 years in IP there, then I went off to be deputy

regional security officer at the Embassy in Algiers. Did about

14 months there. Came back to headquarters where I was the branch

chief in our Physical Security Project Coordination Branch for 2 years,

until I retired December 31st of 2001. And then had to clear payroll

for 2 weeks, then came back as a personal services contractor in January

of 2002. And that's where I currently work as a physical security

specialist. So I've got some background there.

Q There's some history and experience there.

A Exactly.

Q What were your roles and responsibilities as the physical

security specialist at the time in 2011?

A Libya -- in our section we have certain countries assigned

to us. Libya was assigned to me. Therefore, as a result, I supported

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Tripoli for physical security projects and Benghazi.

Q Okay. So just was Libya your only country?

A No, no. I had Morocco, Algiers, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt,

Israel, Syria, Jordan.

Ms. Jackson. So all of the Maghreb and a few other countries?

Mr. . Yeah.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q NEA?

A Yeah.

Q So as a physical security specialist, what were your

responsibilities in supporting Libya?

A In supporting Libya, my duties and responsibilities were

to support the RSO in whatever physical security projects that he wanted

to implement, walking him through the procedures and process in order

to get those projects approved, funded, and implemented; working a lot

with our Overseas Buildings Office, OBO. There's a lot of things we

cannot get done without participation of OBO because they bring the

technical disciplines and the funding for physical security projects.

Q What was your support specifically for Benghazi?

A Benghazi, I was sent out there by our office director to

assist them in setting up the physical security measures at the man

camp that had been identified as the site for the Special Mission to

operate out of.

Q And when you say man camp, can you describe a little bit

more of the man camp?

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A Oh, the man camp -- a little background, if I may. The man

camp was a facility that a local had basically put together with

prefabricated housing to support the offshore oil industry expats that

were working on the oil rigs. So he set up a man camp to provide that

service to those folks when they weren't out working on the rigs.

When the civil war started, that was -- a lot of those expats left

country, and this guy had a man camp that he had just developed with

no one to occupy it. My predecessor, when he was at Benghazi, was

tasked with, you know, finding a suitable facility for that special

mission to relocate out of the hotel and to set up a facility at a site

for the duration, you know, of the conflict. So he found this man camp,

and I was sent out there by our office director. He left and then I

came in, so that was the handoff there.

And, you know, that was my responsibility, was to do physical

security at the perimeter and access controls for that -- I forget the

size of the facility, but it was a good size. It had accommodations.

It had a multipurpose room, cafeteria, recreation facilities.

Q Who was your predecessor?

A .

Q Okay. And at the time, did you -- were you aware, did he

conduct any physical security assessments on the man camp that you had

access to before you traveled to Benghazi?

A No, no.

Q So there's nothing written, there was no written physical

assessment?

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A No, no. We hadn't taken over the property yet.

Q Okay.

A It was just identified. Okay. This is -- this is going

to -- this would meet our requirements. This satisfies our need.

Q When you were sent to oversee physical security upgrades

to the man camp, how did you determine what upgrades were necessary?

A When I got to Benghazi, it was not yet our property, but

we were allowed to walk over the -- walk around. We drove over from

Villa A. We drove over there and we walked around. And basically,

you look at it from the perimeter. So what did we need at the perimeter

for anti-ram, the height of the wall, and how many gates did we have,

where were they located and what hardening measures would be required

at each one of those gates.

Q And how were those upgrades going to be performed? Was

there a contract, a security contract in place or being negotiated in

which those security upgrades would be performed?

A The post had $75,000 that had been provided by DS to

implement those upgrades and they had a local contractor,

, who the post had been working with prior to my arrival. I

guess , as far as going around and looking, he was a contractor.

The post was very comfortable and confident that he would be able to

provide the required services that were needed.

In that environment you have to realize it was cash only. We had

no contracting officer. We couldn't put it out for bid, so it was going

to have to be a sole-source contract if we went down that route.

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Q And did you go down that route?

A No, we did not.

Q So you did not ever execute a contract --

A No.

Q -- for the security upgrades for the man compound?

A No.

Q And so what happened to the $75,000 that had been allocated?

A That remained, I believe, with Tripoli, you know, as the

mother office. And it was probably withdrawn later on -- I don't

know --

Q So would that --

A -- specifically, with that amount.

Q Would that have gone back into Tripoli in exile? Are

you -- let me take a step back. Are you familiar with the term "Tripoli

in exile" or "Tripoli on the Potomac"?

A Obviously, that would be back here then?

Q Correct.

A Yeah.

Q Correct. But at the time, Tripoli was not -- we had

evacuated from Tripoli?

A The first time.

Q The first time. Correct. And so there was no Embassy

Tripoli to which the $75,000 could be returned to. So I'm trying to

understand, did it --

A Okay. All right. We had the civil war. Tripoli was

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evacuated. So the $75,000 was available. So --

Ms. Jackson. Tripoli still had its bank accounts. Right?

Mr. . I assume.

Ms. Jackson. It's assumed.

Mr. . I assume so. I, you know -- that's the part that

I don't get involved in.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q When you arrived in Benghazi, you mentioned Villa A?

A Uh-huh.

Q That was known as the interim facility. Correct?

A Villa A was the first villa that we occupied.

Q And are you aware of any physical security assessments that

were conducted either before your arrival to Benghazi on the interim

facility or Villa A?

A They relocated to Villa A out of another facility that they

were in because they had to relocate out of the hotel when they had

the bombing, the car bombing in front. So this villa was found on short

notice and it basically satisfied our requirements. And then when I

got there, I walked around and I looked and I basically, you know, did

an assessment. I said this is pretty good. This is a very good

facility.

Q What, in your opinion, what upgrades needed to be performed

to Villa A at the time?

A At Villa A, they had good perimeter walls around it. They

had solid grillwork on all of the windows with the roll-down shutters,

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that's normally in that part of the world to keep the sand out during

the khamsins. The doors, I believe, were solid wood imported from

Europe, because they had the locking mechanisms where you turn the lock

and they had different pins that would go out at the upper, middle,

and lower level. So the residence itself was in fairly solid

condition.

The gates were heavy steel gauge gates. I know because I did a

lot of opening and closing of those gates when I supported, you know,

motorcade movements coming and going, because you wore two or three

hats when you were on the ground there.

So from that perspective, Villa A was -- needed minimal, minimal

upgrades. It would be more the concrete Jersey barriers curbside to

provide some additional anti-ram measures.

Q And that's the only --

A That would be for Villa A. That would be the only --

Q And at the time, you mentioned Villa B, so was Villa B

acquired during your time --

A Villa B was --

Q -- in Benghazi?

A When I was there, Villa B was acquired, yes.

Q And did you perform an assessment on Villa B?

A Yes, we did.

Q And what physical security upgrades did you determine were

necessary for Villa B?

A Villa B required -- we raised the height of the perimeter

1499
14

wall. We took some old machinery that was laying on the compound to

block one of the gates. We put some drop-arm barriers in, some

grillwork on the windows, replaced the doors, put on the windows.

But when we met with the owner of Villa B, he was very adamant,

when I was there -- this was his first exposure to us, the U.S. -- that

certain things could not be done. Like I had mentioned putting razor

wire, barbed wire on, you know, to raise the height of the wall, make

it less appealing to climb over, if you will, and he said, no, you

couldn't do that. That was taboo. Because in Libya, at that time,

barbed wire, razor wire on the top of a perimeter wall indicated a

Government of Libya facility, Qadhafi. So they said no. No razor wire

on top of the wall. Other measures he agreed to implement. He said,

yes, I can do that, yes, I can do this. And we said fine. Okay. We

have to just get that into the lease language that he would make those

upgrades.

Some of the window grillwork on the existing villa was more

decorative than FE/BR rated. Okay. So I said, you know, can we pull

this out? And, you know, okay, no, we can't. I said, okay, can we

put some more bolts in to give it better anchoring into the structure.

And he said, yes, you could do that. on the windows. I had to

explain to him what was and what it -- and why we did it. So

he said, yes, we could do that.

Then on the office annex next to the villa, the rectangular office

annex, the windows needed grillwork. He said he would do that. The

doors, replace them with either doors or solid wooden-core doors.

1500
15

You know, we'd provide the locking hardware. He said, yes, we could

do that.

Q So he performed or made all of the necessary upgrades that

you had requested at the time?

A Yes.

Q And how were those upgrades funded, again, just to clarify?

A These upgrades would have been funded in the lease for the

property. And whatever improvements he made, whatever expenses he

made would have been prorated back into the lease costs, and amortized

over the length of the term of the lease so he could recover his costs,

because that was our requirement. Okay. That's normally how we do

it as far as when we have a short-term lease.

Q Okay. Were you in Benghazi when Villa C was acquired?

A I was not.

Q Are you aware of any physical security assessment that was

conducted on Villa C?

A With Villa C, I had to rely upon the regional security

officers at post providing me with what they required for any physical

security upgrades to Villa C, you know, grillwork, or safe haven, or

anti-ram measures, curbside, you know, to extend our anti-ram posture

along that property. But I would rely upon them because they were our

eyes and ears on the ground.

Q Do you recall what some of those upgrades needed to be?

A They wanted to put a safe haven in and I said, okay, tell

me what -- where you want to put it, how you want to secure it, and

1501
16

what do you -- and, you know, basically getting them to talk through

the project that they're proposing. Okay. I get into the office early

so I can be on the telephone at 6:15 and talking to them, if they call

me, or they email back and forth.

So I would basically have said, if you put a safe haven, if you

designate a room as a safe haven, you have got to have an emergency

exit. So you can't put fixed grillwork without some type of hinge in

order to be able to get out of the building in case of fire. So I said,

you know, you have to have some type of mechanism, some type of way

to release it so you can get out in the case of fire. And that's what

they did.

Q Okay. Taking a step back, what, as you were performing all

of these physical security upgrades to the compounds or to the villa,

what is guiding, what standards are guiding your -- these upgrades?

A The standard, the OSPB, physical security standards, 12

FAH-6.

Q And are those standards required for all facilities?

A Those standards are required for all facilities that we

occupy on a long-term, permanent basis, yes.

Q And what do you mean by long term?

A Long term is, it could be any -- long term is a length of

time until OBO provides an adequate facility, or builds a new embassy,

new consulate.

Q And when does that typically occur?

A I'm sorry?

1502
17

Q When does that typically occur?

A Well, if it's on the top 80 list, okay, then as soon as OBO

can find property. And in the case of Libya, if I may, they -- when

they went in there to open the Embassy up, you know, the intent -- they

couldn't find class A commercial office space because the U.N.

sanctions in place over the years, there was -- they didn't find any

class A tenant and commercial office space or even a stand-alone

facility. So OBO basically puts that on the top 80 list. When we can

find a property, we want to go in there and build a new office building.

That was when we opened. What I'm talking about in Tripoli, in

particular, was when they went in there to reopen the post in 2004.

Okay. And that hasn't changed. I mean, the OBO is still -- when we

go back, they will still actively look for land in order to build a

new office building.

Q So moving back to Benghazi --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- and in the summer of 2011, when we acquired Villas A,

B, and C, is what you are describing to us the fact that no security

standards apply at the time because at the time it was not a long-term

facility?

A Well, no. What I'm saying is we try to implement physical

security measures to the maximum extent possible for each one of those

villas. Okay. And we would -- I would reference the 12 FAH-5, 12

FAH-6. 12 FAH-5 is the physical, the physical security standards on

classified; 12 FAH-6 is the OSPB physical security standards that is

1503
18

the classified version.

That's our guideline and we use that. And we try to get as close

as we can to those standards for each particular item that is required

for the perimeter, for access control, and for the building itself.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Does the amount of time that you expect to be in a building

impact the analysis of what is going to be maximum extent possible?

Does the length of time or the cost of the upgrades impact at all the

assessment that's done?

A Yes and no. Okay. The assessment is done based upon the

structure you're working with. If you have a house that was built as

a residential house, it can never be made to meet OSPB standards, short

of demolition, basically, in most instances. Okay. So you look

at -- all right, you can't put a lot of heavy upgrade material into

a residence if the residence itself cannot accommodate all that extra

weight.

Q Like the structure can't hold the weight?

A Yeah, exactly. Okay. So what can we do to get as close

as we can to making that upgrade? And that's what you strive for. If

they can't put in a DS-approved forced entry ballistic-rated door,

because let's say they're 1,000 pounds, can we do a locally fabricated

door in a frame that comes real close to replacing the wooden

door that's there? We'll look at that as an option.

Now, physical security projects cannot be implemented overnight.

It takes time to get the funding, to get the design, to get the

1504
19

contractor lined up, and to get the contractor mobilized and doing the

work. So that's a time factor that's taken into consideration in all

projects.

BY MR. KIKO:

Q I have one question. When you have a situation like that,

is there any compensation that's given if the structure is really -- you

can't, you know -- it's really difficult, you know, those are things

you talked about --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- where you would then have more Diplomatic Security agents

there? Is there anything that compensates in your regulations as to

how you implement it? If this is this situation, then we're going to

compensate for the lack of physical security with something else, or

is that not a factor?

A Well, that would be a decision made at the headquarters

level in order to, you know, how do we reduce this vulnerability?

Q Is that a factor, though, or not? Is that done, do you know?

A That, I'm not aware of.

Q You're not?

A Okay. I'm just -- this is what, I think, you know, in my

professional opinion, what we can do, you know. And that's the

way -- that's the way I move forward and I make the recommendation to

the front office, you know, our bosses.

Q Okay.

BY MS. BETZ:

1505
20

Q So I think too, just to follow up on that question, as we're

talking about measures, we talked a little bit about anti-ram,

strengthening the walls. So were recommendations made to the

landlords to put, at the time, the sandbags, the Concertina wire, the

drop-arm barriers?

A No, that wasn't made to the landlord. That was the security

officers on the ground coming back to me saying, this is what we'd like

to do.

Q So my question is, why were those features or measures not

discussed in the summer of 2011 as you're doing the assessments and

what is needed on the facility on the compound?

Ms. Welcher. Are you speaking about Villa C?

Ms. Betz. I'm talking about --

Ms. Welcher. A, B.

Ms. Betz. -- Villas A, B, and C. Were there discussions about

putting drop-arm barriers, Concertina wire on the facility at the time,

the sandbags, to harden, to strengthen the security of the compound?

Ms. Jackson. Summer of 2011.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q That's the summer of 2011.

A Some of those measures we were going to do separately but

not get the landlord involved. My concern with him was his reluctance

to do certain upgrades to the property, to the residence in particular.

So I wanted to minimize the amount of demands that I knew were coming

because it wasn't our property yet. We didn't have a lease. I mean,

1506
21

we were in the beginning stages of, you know, lease negotiations. I

knew that once we had the property under lease, then we could do this

ourselves and not get the landlord involved.

Q Okay.

A Because as -- I met with him, you know, he looked at me

straight in the face and he says, no, you can't do that. No, no.

Q Well, then to follow up again on the question, given that

there were certain things that you could not do, was the fact that there

were 10 Diplomatic Security agents on the ground, did that compensate

for the lack of physical security features that you could implement

or felt that you could implement at the time in the summer of 2011?

A Having that many DS folks on the ground that were trained

and equipped, that would reduce the vulnerability, absolutely.

That's, you know, that's my personal opinion.

Q Okay. We talked about security standards, and I want to

go back to SECCA.

Ms. Jackson. Before we get there, I have a couple of just sort

of follow-up questions on that. As I understand it, the mission moved

out of the hotel and went to another location in June of 2011. Is that

correct?

Mr. . Yes.

Ms. Betz. I was going to go back to that.

Ms. Jackson. Oh, okay.

Ms. Betz. No, go, go.

BY MS. JACKSON:

1507
22

Q Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q And then they went into this intermediate step which was

Villa A. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And then that's when you identified the man camp,

or some -- your predecessor, , identified the man camp as

a long-term facility for the expedition to stay at. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. What was the problem with the man camp?

A The man camp was on dirty land. Clear title could not be

established.

Q Was there some sort of toxic waste there, when you say dirty

land?

A No.

Q It was the title. Okay.

A No. That's a local term that the Libyans use for land that

was basically confiscated by Qadhafi and reapportioned to his

supporters. They would come in. Let's say a large track of farmland.

Q Uh-huh.

A He would confiscate that if this person was an opposition

member or had done anything that got him upset. They would come in,

confiscate his land, and reapportion it among Qadhafi supporters.

This land that the man camp was set up on was that kind of land.

Now, the person, from what I recall from what I was told, the

1508
23

person that got this land from Qadhafi was leaving country and sold

it at a very, very reasonable cost. And the guy who bought it was the

man who developed the man camp in order to provide services to the oil,

the offshore oil industry. Okay. He was the person to whom we were

going to enter into negotiation.

Ambassador Stevens was advised that this was a problem. It could

be perceived as a big problem, and the U.S. Government could get dragged

into litigation because the family members were still alive, I want

to say in London or Cairo, and that, you know, there could be, you know,

lawsuits pending. So he came back to Washington and got the readout

from L, basically says, do not enter into the lease negotiations.

So that Thursday morning, we had the meeting set up with the owner.

We went over there and the Ambassador explained, Special Envoy at that

time, explained to him, we will not be able to enter into lease

negotiations with the man camp. Basically, that was it. We turned

around and walked away. And I was tasked with restarting a search

effort to locate a suitable facility.

At that point, we went out, the and I went out, and

the admin officer, I want to say, to the various sites that my

predecessor had looked at. And we had to -- he said, this is what's

available. And I said, we can't use this, we can't use that for a

variety of reasons, lack of setback, or the building was not completed,

incomplete, because a lot of the skilled laborers that were

third-country nationals that did the finishing interior work left when

the civil war started. So there was -- they didn't have the workers

1509
24

available to finish the property.

We went out, we looked at some other ones, some other properties.

One big villa behind Villa A, we looked at that. That was a good

possibility. That fell through. So we went back and briefed

Ambassador Stevens. I said, you know, we got to keep looking. So he

goes, well, tomorrow morning, Friday morning, the owner of this villa

is coming over to see me. And I said, okay. That's good.

You know, so Chris raised that with him. They were having brunch

and, you know, he invited us over to talk to him and we explained to

him what we needed. And he said, excuse me, let me make a phone call.

So he gets up, walks over to the side, picks up the phone, calls the

owner of Villa B and explains the problem, and would he like to meet

with us. And he came over about 2 hours later.

That's when we got our first walkthrough of the property. And

I looked at Chris, Chris looked at me and he said, yeah, this will do.

And that's how we got to Villa B, keeping Villa A, and basically the

man camp was no more.

Q So Villa A wasn't large enough for the contingent at the

time. You needed some additional space in addition to Villa A?

A Well, yes, we did, because the intent was to staff up the

Special Mission in Benghazi to about, I want to say, 16 or 17 people.

And at this point, we were 9 -- well, 8 people and then myself. So

there was just, you know, not enough room.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Okay. Since we're sort of talking pre-Villa A, I'll go back

1510
25

to April 2011 and the initial entry, the then Special Envoy's initial

entry into Benghazi in April of 2011.

A That, I'm not --

Q Well, I just want to ask you a couple of questions about

that time frame. So were you involved in any discussions about the

Special Envoy's security --

A No.

Q -- going into?

A No.

Q Does physical security play a role in a protective detail?

A Protection, no.

Q Did a physical security specialist travel with the Special

Envoy when he initially went into Benghazi?

A Yes, that was . And he comes out of Physical

Security Programs, our Contingency Operations Branch. Okay. That

was -- he was involved in that.

Q Okay. So Mr. traveled initially with the Special

Envoy when he went into Benghazi?

A I believe so.

Q Okay. And did he have any discussions with you about the

security of the locations? Let's say they move into the Tibesti Hotel.

Correct?

A Not with me.

Q Not with you, but I'm saying, he did not have any

conversations with you about Mr. ?

1511
26

A No. All those discussions were held with the -- his

division chief.

Q Okay. So you're not aware of any security vulnerabilities

within the Tibesti Hotel?

A I am not.

Q You don't know if any security upgrades were made at the

Tibesti Hotel?

A I'm not aware.

Q So going back to our discussion on security standards, we

talked a little bit about OSPB. Are you familiar with SECCA, the

Security Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act?

A We all are.

Q Okay. And what are the standards that SECCA requires of

a facility?

A SECCA requires co-location of all activities under Chief

of Mission and 100 feet of setback.

Q Okay. And were those requirements, were SECCA's

requirements discussed in the summer of 2011 with respect to Villas

A, B, and/or C?

A I would say that SECCA was not. We had setback, so that

was not an issue.

Q Do you recall discussions about whether or not waivers to

SECCA were needed with regard to any of the facilities that were being

discussed in the summer of 2011?

A Waivers, waivers and exceptions, from the guidance I was

1512
27

given prior to my departure, were not required --

Q Okay.

A -- for the Special Mission in Benghazi.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And why not?

A That came from legal.

Q And why not?

A I wasn't aware of that discussion. I got that from my

division chief. She said waivers and exceptions not required for --

Q Had you ever been involved in any other property worldwide

where waivers and exceptions were not applicable?

A Well, there are certain categories where it's not

applicable. Where you have military working on host government

military facilities providing training, SECCA is not applicable.

Okay.

Q Uh-huh.

A It's in the cable that went out on SECCA as far as, you know,

the caveats where it's not applicable. You may have the Department

of Treasury folks, IRS in particular, that work in a ministry of finance

where SECCA would not be applicable. Okay. So certain --

Q But let me ask it this way: In any State Department leased

facility that is going to house State Department people, where they're

going to work, does SECCA apply?

A Yes.

Q Okay. Then why didn't SECCA apply to the Benghazi Mission?

1513
28

A That's a question that was made at a senior level, and the

only -- and I wasn't privy to that discussion. I was just given -- I

asked for guidance and I got the -- I got the guidance, it's not

applicable.

Q In your experience, in any other facility that you've been

involved in where State Department personnel were either going to

reside or work, so it's a U.S. diplomatic facility where U.S. diplomatic

officials are going to work, have you always applied SECCA or sought

a waiver for those facilities?

A Yes, we have, because it was under Chief of Mission, and

they couldn't be co-located either at the Consulate General or at the

Embassy because of lack of space, or they had a specific mission that

required them to be located somewhere else.

Q So Benghazi was treated differently than other facilities

that you had encountered in your career?

A Benghazi was treated differently because it was a

short-term, temporary special mission that had a limited lifespan when

it was established.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q And I just want to clarify. You had mentioned that you were

informed when you sought guidance that no waivers or exceptions were

necessary?

A Uh-huh.

Q So exceptions being to the OSPB?

A OSPB, yes.

1514
29

Q Okay.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q So you were told that the OSPB standards were not applicable

to these facilities in Benghazi?

A I was told that was not applicable.

Q Okay. You said one other thing too, that setback was not

an issue. Is that a requirement for 100 feet of setback on all sides

of a building?

A A hundred-foot of setback from the perimeter.

Q Okay. It was our understanding that the back wall was not

100 feet away. The back wall, perhaps Villa B near the office?

A No, they had more than 100 feet. They had more than

100 feet to that back wall.

Q Okay. Your recollection is that there was 100 feet of

setback?

A On all four sides of B, yeah.

Q And A?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

A No, A, the back wall was up against the adjacent property,

which was two large residential villas. And I want to say that was

probably 35 to 40 feet of setback from the back wall, where the kitchen

was to that back wall. And I don't believe there was any vehicle

access, except someone that's parking in their driveway or something.

But that was a dead-end residential road and there was, I want to say,

1515
30

4 or 6 residences on that road. And we looked at one of those at the

end of the road as a possible facility to relocate to once we found

the man camp was not going to be leased.

Q So it didn't meet setback, but there were other

considerations to offset that?

A Yes.

Q And I understand that you did not -- that Villa C was not

being leased at the time that you were there in June and July 2011.

Did you ever look at Villa C as a possibility or just look at --

A I did not, no, because it was, you know, it was not in the

planning at that time.

Q Did you ever look at it to see what was next to Villa B as

a --

A Well, again, it was a stand-alone residence. The area that

we were located in was, I would say, a high-rent area, so these were

nice houses that people had built. And they had a wall between, you

know, an interior wall between the two properties along the property

line. And, you know, you peek at it, you know, as best you can. You

know, you look at it. Okay, this is a, you know, private residence.

And I think they had a lot of shrubbery along that interior wall, so

it was a well-kept property.

Q Okay.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So moving from the summer of 2011 into the fall of 2011,

were you a part of any discussions about extending the mission?

1516
31

A No.

Q No. Were you involved -- as discussions were taking place,

were you consulted in the security of extending the mission, the

security of the facilities being contemplated? Were you consulted as

different locations were being proposed? Were you consulted on those

different locations?

A Could you --

Q Uh-huh. So in the fall of 2011 --

A Okay.

Q -- there were discussions about extending the mission.

Correct? Or are you aware, if you know?

A Extending the mission, you know, I'm not aware of those

discussions. Okay.

Q Are you aware of different locations that were being

proposed in the fall of 2011 to continue the mission into 2012?

A I was only aware of Villa A and Villa B being the site for

the Mission because it was supposed to be closed down either at the

end of the war, or that changed, and December 31st was the new target

date to close that mission and relocate back to Tripoli.

Q Okay. So you were not a part of any discussions about

continuing the mission in a different location --

A No.

Q -- other than Villas A, B, and C?

A No.

Q Were you consulted in the decision to terminate the lease

1517
32

on Villa A?

A No.

Q You were not consulted in that decision. Did you have

concerns when you learned about the decision -- when the decision was

made to continue with Villas B and C into 2012, were you concerned about

that decision?

A I had an opinion to, you know, myself that, wow, that's a

nice property to have to give up. But I understood why they gave it

up. But I said, wow, that was a nice property.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Okay. I'm a little confused, but let me ask a couple of

questions. It's my understanding that leases for Villa A, B, and C

were all signed in early August of 2011. Were you aware that leases

for three properties were signed that summer?

A I don't get involved in the leasing. I don't. You know,

I wasn't part of that discussion.

Q Did you ever become aware that there was a third property

that was leased in Benghazi?

A A third?

Q Villa C.

A Villa C. Eventually, yes, I became aware of it because the

RSOs would say, okay, you know, this is what we'd like to do. I said

fine.

Q How did you become aware that --

A I would say probably via email.

1518
33

Q And do you recall, were you advised before or after it was

leased?

A I don't recall.

Q Okay. And then but at some point you became aware that a

third villa had been leased and now there was Villas A, B, and C. Is

that correct?

A Yes.

Q They were all contiguous?

A Yeah. It made perfect sense.

Q And then you got requests for upgrades to one or more of

those villas?

A Yes.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Okay. So I'm going to show you a document --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- which we'll mark as Exhibit 1, to refresh your

recollection.

[ Exhibit No. 1

Was marked for identification.]

Ms. Betz. And as the witness is reviewing the document, I'll

identify it. It's State Department document C05412245. It is an

email from to the witness dated Monday, December 12th,

2011. And the subject is: Emailing: Various cost factors, Villa E

compound, Villas A, B, Villas B and C, Benghazi compound B and C option.

Ms. Jackson. And we can go off the record for a couple of minutes

1519
34

while you're reviewing that because it's a lengthy email. So take your

time.

Mr. . Okay.

[Recess.]

Ms. Betz. So we'll go back on the record.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So the witness has had a chance to look at the document.

And just for confirmation, this is an email, as I said, from

to the witness, Mr. . Is this a document that you recall?

A One of many, yeah. My name is on there, yes.

Q Okay. And so turning to page 2 of the email, I want to draw

your attention to what I believe, I think, is the -- it's a continuation

from the first page, but it's the first email chain on the top of page

2.

A Uh-huh.

Q And specifically, you are being requested to give input on

NEA/EX's decision to present the, quote, "B and C option as the

recommended choice."

And for clarification purposes, the internal email is from a

. Do you recall ?

A Yes, he was the DS/IP desk officer.

Q Okay.

A International Programs.

Q And did you frequently communicate with ?

A Yes. He provided me emails that he got, you know, that if

1520
35

I wasn't on distribution that he thought I would need to see. So, yeah.

Q And this is an email that he sent to you for your input?

A Yeah. Yes.

Q And so --

Ms. Jackson. So what is Mr. asking you to do?

Mr. He's asking me about my thought on the cost that

was provided in this email and local guard force platforms as far as,

you know, ideas, having been there, that I may have had. And I

responded back to him, you know, in my opinion, you know.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Did you have any opinion on the choice to present Villas

B and C as an option for going forward? Did you have any thoughts on

that proposal?

A I don't recall. I don't recall.

Q Do you recall -- let me ask you this: Do you believe that

choosing Villa B and C to move as the facilities or the site to continue

the mission into 2012 was the best choice?

A To contain B -- to keep B and C and relinquish A, that was

probably the most feasible choice, at that time, based upon the war

ending and the need to not expand accommodations because there was not

going to be no commensurate increase in staff. So that was probably,

again, a decision made at a higher level, you know, more for cost, I

would say, you know, because Villa A was a pricey lease, I understand.

Q Apart from the cost factors, in your opinion, did you as

a physical security specialist, did you believe that terminating Villa

1521
36

A and keeping Villas B and C was the best course of action in terms

of the security of the compound?

A Can I have a minute to talk with them?

Ms. Betz. Sure, sure. That's fine.

Ms. Jackson. Go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

1522
37

[10:21 a.m.]

Ms. Betz. So we'll go back on the record.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Mr. , before we broke and took a break, the question

that we had asked or the question that we were discussing was the

decision to terminate Villa A and to continue to occupy Villas B and

C, and whether, in your opinion, that was the best course of action

in terms of the security of the compound.

A I was much more familiar with Villa A, having never visited

Villa C. So that caused me some concern with the question. And I

wasn't consulted on that decision. And in circumstances like this,

I would have to defer to the people that were on the ground as far as

the decision that they were making, the RSO in particular, okay. From

a security perspective, was this the best combination. Okay. And

apparently that was the best combination, from their perspective, the

RSO perspective, the post perspective. So I'm not going to fault

anybody as far as giving up this, you know, or doing that. I just wasn't

familiar with Villa C. I didn't have the familiarity with it, you know,

to make that comparison.

So in situations like this, you've got to defer to your

counterparts on the ground to make the best possible decision. Once

they make that decision, then, you know, I'm there to support them in

any upgrades and improvements that they wanted to make.

Q Do you recall subsequent RSOs having concerns about the

decision to relinquish Villa A and to continue with Villa B and C?

1523
38

A No.

Q I want to show you what I'll mark as Exhibit 2. Can I just

finish this line out?

Mr. Kenny. Sure.

[ Exhibit No. 2

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And while she's handing that out, you said you were not

consulted on the decision of which villas were to be retained and which

one to relinquish?

A I don't recall, you know, being consulted.

Q Although you had not visited Villa C, had you received

photographs or aerial photographs of it, pursuant to the lease, or with

requests for any upgrades or anything?

A I got some overheads, overheads of it. So I knew where it

was.

Q You knew its general layout and the attributes that it had?

A Yeah.

Q Okay.

Ms. Betz. So the witness has before him Exhibit 2. And we'll

go off the record while he takes a moment to review it.

[Recess.]

Ms. Betz. So we'll go back on the record. And for

identification purposes, it's State Department document C05394244.

It's a series of emails. It's a long document for which we're going

1524
39

to focus on the first two emails of the document.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q The first email of the email chain is an email from you to

, , and ?

A was the section chief. He was my immediate

supervisor.

Q Okay. And who is ?

A RSO Tripoli.

Q And who is ?

A He was probably the ARSO.

Q Okay. And so are you --

A Or the RSO at Benghazi at the time. I'm not sure.

Q Okay. And we were discussing conversations about the

decision to maintain Villas B and C and terminate Villa A. And you

had described to us that the decision to terminate Villa A and to

maintain Villas B and C was a decision made on the ground by those on

the ground?

A Well, the people on the ground would be consulted by the

folks back here. All right, okay. Please give us your assessment and

options. And their positions would be taken into consideration in the

final decision process.

Q Who would be the final decision maker?

A I would say someone back at main State, who's ever handling

this issue, that, you know, I'm not privy to the kind of discussions

or I'm not aware of at what level or where it was being discussed.

1525
40

Q Would it be a decision within your hierarchy, within the

countermeasures and the Physical Security Division or would it be

outside of Physical Security?

A I would say it would be outside. But DS may be consulted

at some level for clearance on an option that was being pursued.

Ms. Jackson. But you weren't consulted?

Mr. . I don't recall being consulted on it, no.

Ms. Jackson. And you were the Libya guy? You had Libya --

Mr. . Well, I was the Physical Security desk officer, you

know, responsible for supporting Benghazi.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Well, I guess here's my question: Going back -- and not

to confuse the matter -- but going back to Exhibit 1, where

is asking for your input and he is discussing the decision or the

proposal to maintain Villas B and C -- on page 2 -- and specifically,

he says: "Any input would be appreciated, as NEA/EX is going to present

the B and C option as the recommended choice."

Is he asking for your input? Is he consulting you on that

proposal?

A He's asking me for, having been at post, my opinion on the

options being considered. And that's why I laid out here my opinion,

based upon his request.

Q And if your opinion would have been different, would that

have been a time to raise the question as to what is the best option

to go forward?

1526
41

A Well, asked the question, and I responded back to him

in IP. And I also infoed my chain of command. So as the desk officer

responsible, I threw out there what I thought was the best possible

response to request. And where it went and how it was taken

or what was used and not used, I do not know what the final results

were of my input.

Q And so then turning to Exhibit 2, and specifically the first

email chain in which you are responding to a question that ,

who was the RSO in Benghazi, you say: " ," quote, "I do not know

who was responsible or why the decision was made to relinquish Villa

A, but I believe that the compound created by this arrangement, Villa

A and B, was an exceptional facility that satisfied the operational

requirements of your post," end quote.

And so is that a position that you maintained or that you had in

December as well as in February?

A I would say yes, based upon my familiarity with Villa A

versus Villa C. So again, that, you know, I felt Villa A was a very

good facility.

Q And your immediate supervisor, , is copied on

this email, correct?

A Uh-huh.

Q On the February 15th, 2012, email.

A Yes.

Q And did you have any subsequent conversations with him about

the choice to move forward with Villas B and C?

1527
42

A Not that I recall.

Q How involved in Libya was Mr. ?

A Not that involved. It was more informational awareness for

him. In case I wasn't in the office and a question came up, he at least

was aware of the situation.

Q Did he defer to you on physical security decisions with

regard to Libya?

A I would say yes.

Q Did you have any conversations with Deputy Assistant

Secretary , , on any physical security issues that

were ongoing in Benghazi?

A No.

Q Under Secretary Patrick Kennedy, did you have any

conversations with him about physical security?

A No.

Q No? Okay.

A He didn't ever reach down to talk to me about that.

Ms. Jackson. In this same email exchange, it goes on to say, you

say, you write, in Exhibit 2 in the first exchange: "Perhaps your

question would be best raised by the principal officer with NEA/EX and

OBO real estate before you go too far down the path of returning Villa

A to the owner."

Mr. . Uh-huh.

Ms. Jackson. What motivated you to write "perhaps your question

would be best raised by the principal officer with NEA/EX"? I'm trying

1528
43

to understand the role that NEA/EX would have played in the choice of

villas.

Mr. If they were providing the funding for the

leases -- see, I don't know who provided the funding. If they were

providing the funding for the leases, so it was coming out of their

account, okay, the principal officer is the Chief of Mission. This

is impacting his facility. So he has to have an active say in how they

proceed and what course they take. So that's why I said, you know,

this was something I was not involved in. Perhaps these are the action

officers that need to be engaged.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Well, let me ask you this --

A Again, realizing that some of these folks that were acting

RSOs out there were not aware of a lot of the leasing arrangements,

the procedures of the department in how they do leasing arrangements,

and decisions being made and at what level they're being made. So I'm

trying to -- not knowing his background, I'm trying to give him guidance

as to how best to proceed and where to direct his inquiries and who

to direct him to to get the information.

Q Would these decisions -- you made a statement that you

deferred to those individuals on the ground.

A Uh-huh.

Q If those individuals on the ground are changing every 30

days, would they not each have their own opinion as to what is best?

And does that not make it more important or critical for you to provide

1529
44

guidance, given the changing dynamics on the ground?

A I assumed, okay, that DS was sending some level of officer

to Benghazi that had some level of overseas experience, and not a junior

officer out of the field office. Some level of overseas

experience -- Baghdad, Afghanistan -- but not a green officer that

didn't have any background in the overseas arena. So I'm assuming that

they had some working knowledge.

And what I would do is, when they came in with a request for an

upgrade, I would walk them through the process. I'd explain to them.

I'd say, what about this, what about that, have you thought about this,

have you thought about that? And I would go into a lot of depth, and

I would really bring the discussion down to the basic level. And I'd

ask all kinds of questions or raise all kinds of alternatives that I've

seen for field expedient measures in lieu of what they may have been

proposing.

So I tried to work with each one of them that came in to give -- you

know, that requested help from me. And that's the way I handled each

and every request.

Ms. Jackson. We're way over time.

Ms. Betz. We'll go off the record.

[Recess.]

Mr. Kenny. We'll go back on the record. The time is 10:47.

EXAMINATION

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And, Mr. , thank you. I want to take the

1530
45

opportunity to thank you again for appearing here today. I will take

a moment just to reintroduce myself. My name is Peter Kenny. I'm

counsel for the minority staff. I'm joined here by my colleague, Erin

O'Brien. And on behalf of the ranking member, the other Democratic

members of the committee, we just want to thank you for appearing here

voluntarily today.

A You're most welcome.

Q I thought it was helpful in the last hour to begin by hearing

a little bit about your background. It sounds like you had a fairly

extensive career at the State Department before you retired and then

were brought back as a contractor.

A Uh-huh.

Q And I guess not to oversimplify the world of Diplomatic

Security, but if you think of it in terms of guns, gates, and guards,

it sounds like your experience is not necessarily just limited to the

gates or the physical security aspect. Is that a fair --

A I have had exposure to most aspects of DS, yes.

Q Okay. Although your specialty today, as you sit here today

and for the past several years, is on the physical security side?

A Physical security, yes.

Q Okay. But in your position -- and I believe -- I'm not sure

if your title was as the desk officer. Is that the correct way to refer

to it within PSPCB?

A Yes, a desk officer.

Q Okay. So you were a desk officer. You had responsibility

1531
46

for several countries at the time?

A Yes.

Q And your principal point of contact with those posts would

be the regional security officer. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So you would have daily interactions with the RSOs?

A No. No, just as required, as needed.

Q Okay. So in general, you would have a familiar

understanding with the physical security plans, procedures at each of

those posts under your supervision. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And if an RSO had a question about physical security

or a concern, you would be one of the people that they could raise that

to back at DS headquarters. Is that correct?

A Absolutely.

Q Okay. And they knew that they could do that?

A I would hope so.

Q But in your experience, that has indeed been the process?

A In my experience, when someone is identified to go out as

an RSO, ARSO to a post, DS/IP will basically, in their consultations

prior to deployment and their checklist, they will say go over to DS/PSD

and this is the desk officer that you talk to for your country.

So part of my job is providing an outbriefing to outgoing RSOs

and assistant RSOs for their post to give them an overview, a physical

security layout as to any pending projects by OBO or at post, a

1532
47

post-managed project that's already in motion, in progress, in some

stage. So they are aware of what they're going into. I go over the

physical security survey for each post, and I, you know, show them

pictures, site plans, and that type of thing to try to give them an

overall situational awareness of that post they're going to.

And not only as a desk officer, but I put on my RSO hat as well,

having served overseas, and I give them some other ideas and areas in

which to focus in on. I'll say, you know, when you get to post, within

the first 30 days, visit each one of your facilities. Go to the

warehouse. Make sure you walk through the warehouse and see what's

in there so you have an idea of what's in there. So, you know, as I

say, my RSO hat is on, you know, and this is what I have found to be

useful.

And any physical security issue that you have, any project you

want to start, contemplate, come to me, call me, send me an email, tell

me what you want to do and I'll walk you through the process. We have

a defined process, whereby a project would be initiated at post. Okay.

The post comes in with a telegram, with a justification statement, a

scope of work, a cost to implement. And that then gets looked at by

our office, which is an oversight office, and OBO, which provides the

funding for existing facilities to implement the upgrades.

Q Okay. I think that is a helpful overview. So if I

understand you correctly, it sounds like you would meet with RSOs before

they deployed to post, provide an overview of projects, programs at

post. And also advise them if they have any questions or concerns,

1533
48

that they could raise those to you directly, and you would help or

provide whatever assistance you could. Is that a fair assessment?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And you also mentioned that if post had decided to

initiate a new program or project at post, that they would also reach

back to you. Is that typically how the process would work?

A That's how the process would work, yeah.

Q Okay. So new projects, new proposals to do anything

physical security related would be initiated at post, and then the reach

back would be direct to you --

A Yes.

Q -- for countries under your supervision. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And did you have confidence in the RSOs who deployed

to post that they would be able to identify the types of physical

security issues that might arise during their deployment, that they

would know to reach out to you or to contact you?

A I believe that several came through my office for

consultations on the outbound and that, you know, I would raise all

these issues with them and basically say, any questions you have, reach

back to me, reach to the RSO in Tripoli, you know, but come back and

let me know and we'll walk you through the process and we'll try to

help you as best we can.

Q Okay.

A And what I would always tell them is, for simplicity

1534
49

purposes, keep it one project per request. Don't muddle up a request

with three, four, six different projects. Okay. Because with one

project per request, that will give me a chance to vet it back here

to see which office will fund it.

Q But as a general matter, did you have confidence in the RSOs'

ability to be able to -- when they arrived at post, to be able to

evaluate for themselves the physical security programs at post?

A Yeah. If they were going out as a TDY or a TDY RSO, I had

confidence that they had the background to do that job.

Q So the RSOs, they receive some training or have some

familiarity with physical security standards, for instance. Is that

correct?

A Absolutely.

Q Okay. So if there were deficiencies or vulnerabilities

that were identified at post, you would expect an RSO would be able

to identify those?

A Absolutely.

Q Okay.

A ARSOs, before they go out for the first time, go through

the DS training center where this is a specific block of time that's

set aside for physical security and SECCA training, where they actually

are sent out and they do a physical security survey of that training

center. So they actually get hands-on direction and guidance and

critique by our office who does that.

Q So all ARSOs then would, before they deploy to post, have

1535
50

received some type of physical security training?

A Yes. And then RSOs, during their in-service training

before they go back out -- we call it retreads -- again, they're given

a specific segment in physical security programs with the latest

updates that they should be aware of.

Q Sure. What I'd like to do at this point, we're going to

use a series of documents to help guide the discussion.

In the last round we discussed with you extensively your trip out

to Benghazi as a security specialist on the ground in the June/July

2011 timeframe. What I'd like to do with this -- and we'll mark this

as Exhibit 3 -- we'll focus on the period that appears immediately to

follow that when you returned to Washington.

[ Exhibit No. 3

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q I will also read some identifying information into the

record, and give you an opportunity to review this document.

But before I do that, just I'll note for you again some of the

documents -- we've noticed in reviewing documents related to the

physical security, some of these email chains can run fairly long. So

we'll do our best to direct you to where --

A Yeah.

Q So here I'm just going to draw your attention to an email

that you wrote, at the bottom of page 2, dated August 1st, 2011, 11:08

a.m., and then the series of emails that followed that. So pages 1,

1536
51

2, and the top part of 3.

And, again, just for the record, this is Exhibit 3. This will

be an email dated August 2nd, 2011. It's from to

Mr. and others. The subject is Re: Notes from 8/1 Benghazi

Conference Call. And the document number is C05393020.

A Okay. You only wanted me to read page --

Q I'm just going to direct your attention to 1, 2, and 3.

But --

A Okay. One, two, and three.

Q -- if you feel comfortable, I would be more than happy to

have you read the entire document.

A Okay.

Q So just in general, this email thread, it appears to contain

some conference call notes surrounding an August 1st conference call

discussing Benghazi. And the status discusses the status of funding

that had been allotted for some physical security upgrades at a

different compound. And I believe we talked about that in the last

hour.

A That was the man camp.

Q Correct. And so the man camp, of course, is not Villa A,

B, or C. Is that right?

A That's correct.

Q Okay. And I'll just note, at the bottom of page 2 -- so

this is an email from you to . The second-to-last sentence

in the first paragraph, you had written, quote, "Villa C was an option

1537
52

that came into play after I departed post," close quote.

And I believe this touched on the discussion we had in the last

hour about your awareness --

A Yes.

Q -- of the discussions surrounding Villa C. Does that

refresh your recollection?

A Yeah. When I was at post, it was not an option.

Q Okay. And so at least here, this is August 1st, 2011, so

this would be approximately how long after you returned to D.C.?

A A couple weeks.

Q A couple weeks later?

A Three weeks later, 4 weeks later.

Q Okay. And so based at least on your reference here to Villa

C, was it your understanding that Villa C came into consideration very

shortly after you returned to D.C. --

A Yes.

Q -- from Benghazi?

Okay. And the second paragraph there reads, quote -- you wrote,

quote, "I would recommend that the RSO identify those upgrades

absolutely required for each villa based upon a revised compound layout

and with landlord approvals, come in with a cost to implement from the

life services contractor who originally said that he can do the work

and have the funding" -- and it contains some other details as well.

A Uh-huh.

Q I'm just going to focus on the first portion of that

1538
53

sentence --

A Okay.

Q -- where you make a recommendation that the RSO identify

upgrades absolutely required for each villa.

When you say each villa here, sir, were you referring to Villas

A, B, and C? If you can recall.

A I would say yes, each villa, based upon a new set of eyes,

a new RSO that's at post.

Q Okay.

A Okay.

Q And this fits what you told us --

A And what the landlords would and would not allow.

Q Right.

A I mean, when I was there, that was always a key critical

issue, what they would and would not allow us to do.

Q Okay. And on that point, in the last round you had

indicated that you had met with the owner, specifically the owner of

Villa B --

A Villa B.

Q -- at some point, and that he had agreed to incorporate some

physical upgrades into the lease that was executed or was signed with

him. That's your recollection?

A That's my -- yes.

Q Okay. From some of the documents we reviewed both around

that time and subsequent, it sounds like that particular villa owner,

1539
54

there may have been some challenges in dealing or negotiating with that

villa owner. Do you recall or have any context for that?

A I wasn't involved in that side of it. When we had the

initial discussion with him expressing our intent or desire to lease

his property, I said, well, there are certain upgrades we would like

to do. And I discussed those with him. And he said, okay, okay. Like

punching a hole in the wall that separated the two properties between

A and B so vehicles could drive through or people could walk between

the villas. He said no problem, you know, that that was okay.

Q Sure. But there were some upgrades that --

A With the wall --

Q -- he refused to allow?

A He refused to allow.

Q Okay. So it's not fair to say, then, that he approved every

upgrade or that he performed every upgrade request that was made of

him?

A No.

Q Okay. Just working our way up the chain of emails here,

and referring now to the bottom of the first page, there's an email

from to you, . And who is

, if you recall?

A I think he was TDY RSO there around the same time I was.

Q When you say there, he was the TDY RSO in Benghazi?

A Benghazi.

Q And in this email, the RSO in Benghazi wrote, quote,

1540
55

will send out the itemized punch list for Villa B. No upgrades are

needed for Villas A and C," close quote.

And first I'd just like to ask, this email is two or three emails

removed from your email where you asked, or where you recommended

rather, that the RSO identify upgrades absolutely required for each

villa. Is your understanding or did you believe at the time that this

was the RSO in Benghazi's response to your recommendation that they

identify those upgrades?

A I believe so. I believe that -- okay. What do we have in

place? What will the owner do? What will he not do? What can we do?

You know, please identify it so we have a list so we can put together

a funding request in order to get whatever you need accomplished, we

can get it funded and done.

Q Right. And so that was your charge, then, to the Benghazi

RSO?

A Yeah. I mean, you know, okay. Relook at it. Revisit it.

Q And this is his response to you?

A No upgrades are needed for Villas A and B.

Q A and --

A A and C, I mean.

Q Okay. And when he says here, " will send out an

itemized punch list for Villa B," what is a punch list?

A A punch list would be specific upgrades that would be

identified.

Q Okay.

1541
56

A Like on windows, grillwork on windows. goes

on the Do you know what the is? That's that

Grillwork on the outside. Do we need to

replace doors? Replace 3 wooden doors with 3 solid wooden doors or

locally fabricated doors.

Q So a punch list is a detailed list that --

A That's the scope of work to be accomplished.

Q Okay.

A Okay?

Q And that would be some detailed list of the specific

physical security upgrades that would be required?

A Yes.

Q So here, the Benghazi RSO indicates that there was a punch

list that would be submitted or sent for Villa B. Does that indicate

to you that there was some physical security work that was required

at Villa B?

A Oh, absolutely, yeah.

Q Okay. And then when he indicates that "no upgrades are

needed for Villas A and C," the Benghazi RSO indicates that -- you had

mentioned earlier that you would rely on the RSO in the field, their

appraisal or evaluation of the situation?

A Uh-huh.

Q Here, would you have relied on this?

A Yeah. I would have taken his recommendations. I would

have looked at those and I would have said, okay, -- you know,

1542
57

he has been out as an RSO before so I'm going to rely upon his assessment

at that time.

Q So this is an experienced RSO who --

A I want to say , yes, was an experienced RSO.

Q Okay. And if at least at this point, the Benghazi RSO had

made requests for physical security upgrades to Villas A and C, is that

something you would have taken seriously?

A Oh, absolutely. Yeah, absolutely.

Q Now, moving forward a little bit in time, I want to introduce

into the record -- this will be Exhibit Number 4.

[ Exhibit No. 4

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And just before I have you take a look at this document,

this is a multipage document. I'm going to direct you to a few portions

of it.

A Uh-huh.

Q Again, I'm not going to ask you detailed questions on every

section of this document. But just referring back for a moment to

Exhibit 1, there's a discussion in Exhibit 1. You asked several

questions. It appears, based on my reading, that post management

officer at NEA/EX reaches out to the desk officer at DS/IP who then

reaches out to you about a recommendation to move from Villas A and

B to Villas B and C. Would that be a fair way to characterize Exhibit

1?

1543
58

A Yeah. asked me what my thoughts were on it, and I

provided him my assessment.

Q Sure. And I understand. And it may be a little difficult

understanding -- and I'll just note for the record that, if you look

at the email, there clearly appear to be some attachments to this

document. Do you see that? The subject line, if you read it,

"Emailing." And then it includes on that line several documents. Do

you see that?

A Yeah, I see it up top, yeah.

Q Okay. And, unfortunately, this particular exhibit doesn't

appear to contain those exhibits, although it appears from the context

of the email that you were asked to review some of the information that

was in those exhibits. Is that your understanding?

A It would appear that way.

Q Okay. And I'll just use that to help frame for exhibit No.

4 -- and I will return your attention to Exhibit 4. Again, it's a

multipage document. It doesn't have a header so it's a little

difficult to describe for the record. But it's document number

C05391931.

And I'll give you a moment to review this. I'm just going to ask

you specifically about pages 1, 2, 3, and pages towards the rear of

this document that are Villas A and B and then Villas B and C.

So if you want, we can go off the record and you can take a moment

to review this.

[Recess.]

1544
59

Mr. Kenny. Back on the record.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And just before we went off the record, I had asked you to

review Exhibit 4, the document you have before you now.

First I would just like to ask, are you familiar with this

document? Have you seen this document?

A I probably did, since it was an attachment that came to me.

But --

Q Okay. And are you saying that because --

So that's what I'd hoped --

A Yeah.

Q -- to match with you, is whether some of the information

here appears to be some of the information that may have been attached

to Exhibit 1.

A Well --

Q I'm not asking if you believe it's identical but if the gist

of the information contained in Exhibit 4 would have been included as

an attachment to Exhibit 1.

A It appears that way, that --

Q Okay.

A -- you know, normally that's what happens when you hit

reply. And all these things don't -- you have to forward it. So I

would say, yeah, this material was probably forwarded to me.

Q Okay. You know, for instance, you have a reference to

$100,000 for upgrades to the perimeter wall.

1545
60

A That was --

Q You can see here that --

A That was made by someone else, okay, and I call that a wild

ass guess.

Q Okay.

A Because --

Q A WAG.

A Exactly. You really --

Q That's a new term.

Mr. Evers. he's trying to line up that figure to a number

on --

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Well, that's what I'd like to ask you. So --

A You really don't know. That's an amount that's a ballpark

figure that someone would throw out there kind of as a place mat because

you don't know what it's going to be until you get the engineer and

the contractor in there to look at all the scope of work that needs

to be done. So this is just a place holder.

Q No. I understand. I just had wanted to point out for you

that in Exhibit 4 -- at least my read of Exhibit 1, there's no reference

to $100,000 until writes to you including that figure;

whereas, in Exhibit 4, there are several references to $100,000 for

a perimeter wall. So I'm just trying to establish that some of the

information here at least appeared to be some of the same information

that was forwarded to you in Exhibit 1.

1546
61

A Okay.

Q It sounds like that's --

A Yeah, it sounds like it probably -- yeah, it was. Yes.

Q So returning just to Exhibit 4 now, the top page

here -- again, not a lot of identifying information to it -- appears

that it could be an email that was cut and pasted into a document. I

just wanted to direct your attention to the middle of this page. There

appears to be a cover page. It's a discussion of the various options,

property configurations in Benghazi. Does that look right to you?

A That appears to be so, yes.

Q Okay. So, for instance, there's a discussion of condensing

down to Villas B and C. There's also a separate discussion and

consideration of condensing down to Villas A and B. And in the middle

of the page, it reads, quote, "Given the uncertain future for this place

and the security environment's evolution over time, we did our best

to consider all relevant factors. We had several key factors in mind

when ranking our recommendations, to include:

Current and likely future security posture;

Security enhancements at all sites, including the possibility of

requesting reasonable waivers;

Other costs -- all of them -- from security to setup, to

breakdown, to moving, upgrades, equipment/furniture and life services;

General quality of life issues," close quote.

In looking at least at that portion of this document, if this

refers to the discussion of which of the various property proposals

1547
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for how best -- what the Special Mission would look like in Benghazi,

here it appears that security was a consideration. It appears to be

the first -- both the first and second points here make it a point that

security was an important consideration in that decision-making

process. Is that fair?

A Absolutely, yeah.

Q Okay. Okay. If I could actually just direct you then

to -- it would be page 11 of the document and page 12 of the document.

The top of page 11 reads: "Villa A and B. Sleeps 15."

A Okay.

Q And if you look at just at the first line, there's a line

for rent.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you see that both on page 11 and 12?

A $42,000 a month.

Q Okay. And then on page 12, do you see a similar line?

A Yeah. I see a similar line, yeah.

Q Okay. And so page 11, does that appear to be a breakdown

of costs associated with Villas A and B?

A That appears to be a summary of cost, yes.

Q Okay. Including some proposed physical security upgrades?

A Yes.

Q And then page 12 appears to be the same with respect to

Villas B and C?

A Yes.

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Q Okay. And again, just focusing on that first line, it

appears that the rent for both proposals appears to be the same. Is

that fair?

A Fair.

Q Okay. How about is that accurate? Is that correct?

A That's what's listed.

Q Okay. So in the last round, you had mentioned -- I'm not

sure if you were speculating. But you had mentioned that you thought

cost was a factor, perhaps the factor for the decision to release Villa

A. And looking now at pages 11 and 12 of Exhibit 4, where you just

indicated that the rents appeared to be the same for both proposals,

does that refresh your recollection about the importance of costs with

the decision to terminate the lease on Villa A?

A I believe that I was told the lease -- the cost for Villa

A was more expensive than the cost for Villa B, the lease costs. Okay.

And that Villa A was a lot more pricey than Villa B. You know, and

I could see why they would get rid of Villa A versus keeping Villa A.

Q Okay.

A Now --

Q Now, when you see that both of these are the same, that would

imply that the price of Villa A was the same as the price of Villa C?

A That's what it appears to be, yeah.

Q Okay. So when you say that you were told the cost was a

factor -- or sorry. Strike that.

You were told that the cost of Villa A was more expensive than

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the cost of Villa B. When you were asked in the last round about why

the decision had been made to release Villa A, were you told that it

was because Villa A was more expensive than Villa B?

A I don't recall what I was told. I understood that they were

releasing a villa because we had overcapacity --

Q Okay.

A -- for the people that were going to be assigned to that

facility, that post.

Q Okay. And that would make sense if there were 3 properties

at that time held --

A There were 3 properties.

Q -- by the U.S. Government.

A Exactly.

Q Okay.

A Overcapacity, the war ended, and the staffing level was not

going up.

Q Okay. So when you said cost was a factor in the last round,

was that perhaps not in reference to the decision to go from A and B

to B and C, but rather to go from 3 compounds to 2 compounds?

A Yeah, I would think so.

Q Okay. And you'd also said that you believed that that

decision had been made at a senior level. And I was hoping you could

clarify what you believed or what you meant by a senior level.

A This kind of discussion is held, I would say, NEA/EX,

somewhere in there. M, maybe senior DS folks, you know, getting

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together. At what level, I'm not rightly sure.

Q Okay.

A Okay?

Q But were you aware --

A It's made at a higher level than a desk officer.

Q Okay. So when you said senior level, you meant --

A A higher level of authority, that had the authority to make

those kind of decisions.

Q Okay. By more senior, you meant more senior than yourself?

A Oh, absolutely, yeah. Yeah.

Q Okay. But you weren't referring to a specific person?

A Absolutely not. No. When I say senior, I mean someone,

you know, that's in a higher authority, that's going to be able to --

Q Sure.

A -- talk to the Ambassador as equals.

Q Sure.

A So this way here, you know, that level of authority is being

brought to bear on the issue.

Q Okay.

A So the Ambassador knows it's getting the right level of

attention.

Q Okay. No, and that's --

A And I wasn't pointing a finger at any one office or anything

like that. Just, you know, higher than a desk officer, trust me.

Q Sure. Sure.

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If I could direct your attention, sir, to the second page of this

document. There's a discussion section here. It lists both

advantages and disadvantages --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- for Villas B and C. The fifth tick down on Villas B and

C, option number 1, reads, quote, "Best option from a security

perspective -- multiple ingress/egress, best footprint and setback of

the available options, accommodation for TNC guards, reasonable

upgrades will help harden," close quote.

Is that a commentary you would have expected an RSO to make in

a serious discussion for consideration of various proposals at post?

A The RSO would have contributed, I would say, his

professional perspective to the admin officer or the Ambassador,

whoever was putting this together in a response back to the department.

Q Okay.

A There would have been a lot of discussion at post before

the post response formally was submitted.

Q Sure. What I'm going to do at this point, we'll mark

Exhibit Number 5.

[ Exhibit No. 5

Was marked for identification.]

BY MR. KENNY:

Q And I'll just note for the record, this is an information

memo for DAS Lamb from the DS/IP/NEA . Your name doesn't

appear on the recipient line or the clearance lines, but you are

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referenced in this document. So I just wanted to give you an

opportunity to read it and then ask you a few questions about it.

A Okay.

Q Okay. So this is a document dated December 20th, 2011,

document number C05457274. Again, this is Exhibit 5. And I'd just

like to, again, ask you a few questions about this document, recognizing

that you're not listed as a recipient.

First, I will just ask, have you seen this document before?

A I don't believe I have.

Q Okay. The first page under the summary section, the

information memo reads -- and, again, before we dive into the

discussion of this, I'll just note at the bottom of this, on the second

page, there is a drafted line. We don't see a clearance line there.

So that was just to us that we don't know if this was a final document

or a draft document.

A Yeah.

Q I'll just note that at the outset.

Returning to the first page, just read into the record here at

the top of page 1, it reads, quote, "NEA/EX has provided DS/IP/NEA with

an email stating the changes to their action memorandum for the future

of the DOS presence in Benghazi. NEA/EX wants to facilitate the

clearance of their AM for M clearance by corroboration with DS/IP's

position on the recommendations. NEA/EX is recommending terminating

the lease on Villa A and keeping Villas B and C for residences and office

space. DS/IP/NEA, the TDY RSO in Benghazi, and DS/PSD has reviewed

1553
68

the recommendation and support terminating Villa A, while retaining

Villas B and C for official use," close quote.

And I would just like to ask for your understanding of that

paragraph. It sounds like, at least according to this, that NEA/EX

wanted to consult with DS/IP on an action memo that would release Villa

A and keep Villas B and C. Is that correct?

A It appears that way.

Q Okay. And we talked a little bit about . Do

you know who is?

A I believe may have been the deputy or the regional

director for IP/NEA at that time.

Q And DAS Lamb, did you know who she was?

A Yeah. She was in charge of IP.

Q Okay. And the third paragraph, the last sentence here

reads, quote, "DS/IP/NEA passed this information to the TDY RSO and

DS/PSD for their opinion and insight," close quote.

And again, DS/PSD, when we see that, does that refer to the

Physical Security Division --

A Yes.

Q -- to which you belong?

A Yes.

Q And perhaps looking back at Exhibit 1, which is the email

dated December 12th, 2011, do you recall whether this statement was

accurate, that DS/IP/NEA asked for your office's opinion and insight

on the recommendation to release Villa A?

1554
69

A Well, it would appear that asked me for my

opinion. And he took my response back to him to incorporate into some

type of memo.

Q Okay.

A That's what it appears to me.

Q Okay. And you had mentioned in the last round that

you -- when you sent Exhibit 1, you weren't sure how that information

was ultimately used. Would it appear to you, looking at Exhibit 5,

that your response was somehow incorporated into this document?

A If it's the same response for tab 5, then it could be.

Q Okay. But given the timing here, December 12th of the

email, December 20th, and the items that are being discussed,

specifically the recommendation to release Villa A, does it look like

that's the same email?

A It could be.

Q Okay. The fourth paragraph here -- and again, I'll just

read through this. It reads, quote, "The TDY RSO

stated in an email that keeping Villas B and C represented the best

option in terms of security compared to the other proposals for a

mission location (Tab 3). TDY RSO believes this option is the best

as it affords the best setback for the two residences," close quote.

And, first of all, were you familiar with RSO ?

A No.

Q Okay. Were you aware of whether the TDY RSO in Benghazi

thought that Villas B and C were the best option, from a security

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standpoint?

A Well, again, as I said earlier, having not seen Villa C,

I had to rely upon the DS representative at post at that time to provide

his professional assessment.

Q Okay.

A Okay?

Q But you had confidence in the RSO's assessment, if they

provided it to you?

A I had confidence that whoever DS sent to be the TDY RSO in

Benghazi at least had the qualifications and the background to

accomplish that job.

Q Okay.

A Okay.

Q Okay. No, that's helpful. And I think -- we'll just

follow up on that a little bit. You traveled to post in June/July 2011.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you recall whether there was a request for you to travel

to post in this time frame, in the December 2011 time frame?

A No.

Q Had there been a request for you to travel, is that something

that would have been customary for you, to redeploy to post?

A If requested, I would. You know, I would have gone back

out.

Q Sure. Is there a budget that covers your travel?

A It comes out of the office. And, you know, there should

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be no problem with requesting travel orders to be cut --

Q Okay.

A -- for a specific TDY visit --

Q Okay.

A -- in order to do a specific activity. So that's normally

not a problem.

Q You don't recall any discussions about funding being an

issue?

A Oh, never. Never.

Q Okay. And, again, you mentioned you didn't recall a

request coming from post for a security specialist to come in this time

frame?

A No.

Q Okay. Okay. And just lining up Exhibit 5, where we see

the representation that the Benghazi RSO thought that B and C was best

from a security standpoint?

A Uh-huh.

Q Lining that up with what's expressed to you in exhibit No.

2, where a different RSO in Benghazi expresses a different opinion,

can you just help us understand, when comparing physical security, are

these things sometimes a close call? Are they just a matter of

judgment?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So different security experts, those with

experience, expertise, when viewing an option where it's perhaps a

1557
72

close call, they can sometimes come to different conclusions?

A Depending upon the level of background and experience that

a DS officer will have will help him arrive at his final determination.

Q Okay.

A Okay. If someone has been an ARSO somewhere and has minimal

exposure, he's going to be less seasoned than someone that's been an

RSO, that actually had the responsibility of carrying out the duties

and responsibilities of that office, which Physical Security would

encompass. So there's going to be that level of professional

development. And that's why I have confidence that the people that

were being sent TDY as the RSO by IP at least had RSO experience,

background, and training behind them.

Q Okay. At least at this point in time?

A Yeah.

Q Okay. So you had no reason to question the experience level

of the RSOs --

A Not at all.

Q -- at this point in time?

A No.

Q Okay. The second paragraph on this page reads -- well,

just to follow up a little bit more.

So for two sets of individuals, similar levels of experience, they

look at a physical security problem. If they were to come to different

conclusions about how to arrive at that, does that mean that one of

them is right and one of them is wrong?

1558
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A No.

Q Okay. Can it just mean that there are different judgments

that can be made, especially if you have close calls between one and

the other? And I am not asserting that that was necessarily in play

here. I'm just trying to understand how you can have RSOs look at a

problem and have different evaluations or appraisals of that problem.

You mentioned experience. But are there other factors at play,

if we hold experience --

A There are always other factors at play. And those factors

are the ones that are generated at post by post. The preference that

the Chief of Mission would have for one option over another option,

the admin officer, admin counselor, his option versus another option.

So an RSO can make -- the RSO is the professional security adviser to

the Chief of Mission.

Q Right.

A Okay. He'll look at something and he'll make a

professional recommendation. That doesn't mean that the Chief of

Mission has to take it or accept it. He just takes it under

consideration.

Q No, I understand that. So I want to separate out a decision

that's made to occupy certain facilities from the security component,

the security review of that property.

A Uh-huh.

Q And at least from this document, it appears that the RSO

in Benghazi, in the December 2011 time frame, felt that Villas B and

1559
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C were better from a security standpoint than Villas A and B. And then

if you look at Exhibit 2, a different RSO, a later subsequent RSO had

a different opinion. And we're just trying to understand these

differences of opinions that can sometimes occur --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- within DS. Is that correct?

A Absolutely.

Q And again, it's not because one person's right, one person's

wrong. It's just sometimes these require judgment calls. Is that

fair?

A I would say so.

Q Okay. And that's irrespective of a Chief of Mission's

preference, right?

A The RSO would be the man or woman on the ground that would

look at a deficiency or vulnerability. Okay? How can I fix or correct

this?

Q Okay. But they could also look at two properties and say

one is more securable than the other, right?

A They could.

Q Okay. And here it looks like at least one RSO felt that

Villas B and C were more securable than Villas A and B?

A It appears that way.

Q Okay. I'm just looking at the last paragraph here because

we have a few minutes. Quote, "DS/PCB" --

Ms. Jackson. What exhibit, Peter?

1560
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Mr. Kenny. I'm sorry. Exhibit No. 5. Staying with Exhibit 5.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q The paragraph reads, quote, "DS/PCB/PSD physical security

specialists and both reviewed NEA/EX's

current recommendation. They both stated that they would support

field expedient measures proposed as part of NEA/EX's preferred

recommendation, but they expressed concerns about who would provide

funding as Villas B and C are short-term leased properties (Tab 5),"

close quote.

And, again, just to match exhibit No. 5 with exhibit No. 2, which

is your email -- I'm sorry, Exhibit 1. I apologize. Lots of

documents.

A It's okay.

Q Exhibit 1, which is your email with and

. Here it says Tab 5. There's a reference to Tab 5. It refers

to you expressing concerns about who would provide funding. I'll just

note, it appears that in your email on page 1, you wrote: "In my

opinion, since this special mission has a limited time frame to operate

in Benghazi, I would continue to support field expedient measures and

compound train features to be considered to the maximum extent

feasible," close quote.

A Uh-huh.

Q So it would appear that that language or that comment was

incorporated into this document, exhibit No. 5. Is that right?

A It could have been.

1561
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Q Okay.

A It's not unheard of for other officers to take terminology

from one comment that's provided and incorporate that in, especially

if, you know, you have someone that's hit the nail right on the head,

versus, okay, yeah, I'll use his terminology.

Q So refocusing again on Exhibit 1. You were asked to review

a recommendation for the B and C option. I mean asked

you specifically to take a look at costs in the LGF platforms as a

possibility?

A Uh-huh.

Q You mentioned to us that you were more familiar with A and

B because you had experienced them firsthand during your visit to post.

You were less experienced with Villa C?

A Correct.

Q When asked to review a proposal for B and C, did you make

a comment to or anyone that you didn't have familiarity

with Villa C?

A I don't believe so.

Q Okay.

A I don't believe so.

Q Do you recall why you wouldn't have mentioned that?

A No.

Q We had a little bit of a brief discussion in the last hour

about -- well, scratch that.

Actually, with the few minutes remaining, I would like to talk

1562
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a little bit about Physical Security standards. We had --

A Uh-huh. Sure.

Q -- kind of a robust discussion of that in the last round.

We were talking about the OSPB standards, the SECCA requirements --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- whether and when they applied. I had written in my notes

that the question of -- I believe it was the OSPB standards. You had

sought guidance about whether those applied to Benghazi before you

departed for Benghazi in June. Is that correct?

A True.

Q Okay. So the time frame for when you sought guidance was

when?

A Early to mid June of 2011, prior to my departure.

Q Okay. What was the makeup, to your understanding, of the

facility at that time, the Special Envoy's facility?

A This guidance was requested in lieu of us moving to a man

camp. So I wanted to know specifically what the front office was

looking for.

Q Okay.

A Okay? Basically. So when I hit the ground, I knew what

all I had to do.

Q And when you refer to front office, are you referring to --

A To DS, Physical Security. Our office director.

Q Okay. So for DS/PSD?

A Yes.

1563
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Q Okay. Not the countermeasures front office, for instance?

A Well, if they brought it forward to the countermeasures

office, that was -- I wasn't aware of that.

Q Okay.

A Okay. I just wanted some guidance from .

Q And just to talk a little bit about organization.

A Uh-huh.

Q PSD falls under the countermeasures directorate. Is that

correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

Ms. O'Brien. You just mentioned ?

Mr. . . She was the office director at the

time that I was sent out to Benghazi.

Ms. O'Brien. Okay.

Mr. . She has since retired.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q So you had sought some guidance, you said, from your front

office, from the PSD office.

A Uh-huh.

Q Would that have been at the office director level?

A Yeah. That was PSP, Physical Security Programs, the office

director.

Q Okay.

A That's .

1564
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Q PSP. Okay. And you were advised that OSPB standards did

not apply to Benghazi. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q And when they didn't apply to Benghazi, did that mean the

city at large or did that mean a specific facility?

A That meant for our facility.

Q Okay. But the facility at that point in time was what?

A The facility that we were going to occupy as the platform

was going to be the man camp.

Q And that's a proposal that ultimately fell through. Is

that correct?

A Correct.

Q Okay. And I think you indicated that a decision had been

made at a senior level, again, with respect to that discussion, that

OSPB standards didn't apply. What did you mean by that?

A Well, got that determination from legal.

Q Okay.

A So however they arrived at that, you know, I don't know.

Q Right. But where within DS would the exceptions and

waivers program reside? Who manages that program?

A That resides in Physical Security Programs.

Q Okay. So your office?

A In our office, yes.

Q Okay. And to the best of your understanding, your office,

did they seek some sort of legal advice on this matter?

1565
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A Well, that would have been , as the office director,

because the waivers and exception program comes under her jurisdiction

in the Physical Security Division.

Q Okay. I think I understand. But, again, this was the

June/July time frame 2011?

A Uh-huh.

Q And what was the mission at that point in Benghazi? Was

it a short-term mission? Was it --

A The mission was a special mission that was short term in

duration, and from what Chris Stevens told me, that we're going back

to Tripoli at the end of the war.

Q Okay.

A And, okay, sounds good to me.

Q Okay. So your understanding at that time or the time that

these discussions were made about whether OSPB standards applied, was

that the mission would last 6 months or so?

A No. It was just until the end of the war.

Q Until the end of the war. Okay.

A Okay. However long that took. He said, you know, we will

go back -- this will close down. We'll go back to Tripoli at the end

of the war and re-establish the Embassy.

Q Sure. Let me ask you a question. So you go and you seek

this advice. You're told OSPB standards don't apply to Benghazi --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- to specifically the man camp facility. Why even go to

1566
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Benghazi, if the OSPB standards did not apply, as a physical security

specialist? What was the goal?

A Because I was told to go out there and to get the facility,

and to the maximum extent possible, try to get to the standards for

physical -- for the perimeter and for access control and for anti-ram.

Q Okay.

A Okay.

Q So let me ask then, so when you were told that OSPB standards

didn't apply, is the practical effect of that that you then seek some

lower standard --

A No.

Q -- for facilities?

A Absolutely not.

Q Okay.

A The OSPB standards are our guidelines, okay, and this is

going to be a diplomatic facility. So I'm going to try to get as close

as I can to those standards as I possibly can.

Q Okay. So --

A Because that's what we build to. Okay? And if this is the

standard, how close can I get to approximating those standards? That's

what I strive for.

Q And you said some upgrades can take a period of time to

implement. So obviously, an understanding of how long a mission would

be effective or operative --

A Would determine --

1567
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Q What was possible, for instance?

A What was possible and what could be done as a regular project

or a field expedient project as an interim measure.

Q So in your mind, as the physical security specialist on the

ground in Benghazi --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- at this time frame, irrespective of whether or not you

personally thought OSPB standards applied, you still did your best to

improve physical security?

A If I had been given the opportunity at the man camp, okay,

I would have gone to try to implement OSPB to the maximum extent I could.

And the same thing for the other facilities. Okay? What can we do

to the maximum extent possible and feasible to harden this and reduce

the vulnerabilities? That was the bottom line, the dividing line.

Q So with specific respect to Villas A and B, which were, in

your experience, was limited to your visit, was that your experience

that you were doing -- or that DS was doing everything to the maximum

extent possible?

A We were trying to attain that level of accomplishment, yes,

to reduce the vulnerabilities. Villa A was well constructed. The guy

that owned it is a contractor. This is where his family lived. And

he had incorporated a lot of the standard residential security measures

that we recommend for our folks overseas. I mean, he had a nice thick

12-foot wall, 4 meters. Heavy steel gates, grillwork on the windows,

solid wood core doors. I mean, the guy was taking care of his family.

1568
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And he was in the construction business, from what I was told. So --

Q And at this time, when you were in Villa A and then when

the mission expanded to Villa B, were you uncomfortable with having

Mission personnel present in those facilities at that time as these

upgrades were being implemented?

A No.

Q Okay. If you had had those types of concerns, what would

you have done?

A I would have talked to the RSO. When I was there, I did

not feel uncomfortable. I did not carry a gun with me. I did not walk

around with a gun. I did not sleep with my gun, unlike Beirut and

Algiers. I did not feel that threat there.

When I was there warranted that because the war was still going

on. We had 17th February Brigade protection, armed protection with

us. And I would go out there and talk to those guys, those that spoke

English. And I would chitchat with them and try to get to know them

and try to understand what they were doing. And most of them were

college guys. And I made sure that when our food was delivered, we

always had the cook bring some down to them to ensure that they had

food and bread and stuff as well.

Q So you were comfortable with the level of security support

that 17 Feb. provided at that time?

A I was.

Q Okay. And you traveled throughout the city of Benghazi

scouting for properties?

1569
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A Well, not throughout.

Q Okay. You traveled beyond the compound walls?

A We went to a couple of places that were close by, and that

was Thursday afternoon and then Thursday evening, the villas behind

us. And then Friday morning is when we struck the deal with

the -- well, Friday afternoon is when we struck, you know, the deal

with the owner of Villa B. So my exposure around Benghazi was limited

to an afternoon with . That was quite an experience.

Q I see that I'm approaching the hour. I'll just close with

this question to you. In reviewing those properties, I would just ask

for your assessment of how difficult it was or what sorts of challenges

there were to finding suitable facilities for the mission from both

a logistics and a security perspective.

A It was exceptionally difficult to find any type of property

that could meet our requirements, from my limited time there, because

properties either had lack of setback or they were still under

construction. And the third country nationals that were involved in

the construction trade there had left country due to the civil war.

So there was a lot of unfinished buildings. There was a lot of

substandard facilities out there that, because of the U.N. sanctions,

that, you know, maintenance repair on facilities was just lacking

across the board.

Q Okay. And throughout this process, how important was

security as a concern?

A Well, that was the first thought. That was always the first

1570
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comment out of someone's lips, okay, security posture.

Q When reviewing a property?

A Exactly.

Q And were properties disqualified because of concerns about

physical security?

A Absolutely. We still do that today.

Q Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Kenny. We'll go off the record.

1571
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[12:05 p.m.]

Ms. Betz. So we'll go back on the record. It is now 12:08, I

guess I would say.

And so, again, thank you for taking the time to be with us today.

Mr. . Oh, no problem.

Ms. Betz. We appreciate it.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q I want to go back to some of the issues that my colleagues

discussed in the last hour to clarify that we understand sort of what

you described to us. You talked a little bit, taking a step back, sort

of in your role as the desk officer, that you would work with RSOs,

regional security officers, those agents who were going to serve

abroad, correct --

A Correct.

Q -- in a security capacity? You mentioned that you would

meet with them, that you would discuss certain aspects of security that

you were familiar with with regard to the facility, correct?

A Correct.

Q And some of those included a physical survey -- physical

security survey?

A Security survey, yeah.

Q So I want to talk about your interactions then with the RSOs

who served in Benghazi. And, as you know, there were multiple RSOs

who served every 30 days. So, in your capacity as the desk officer,

did you meet with each of those RSOs who went into Benghazi to discuss --

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A I met with those that were here in Washington that came

through for consultations.

Q Okay. Approximately how many?

A That I could not answer.

Q Okay. And when you mentioned that you would go over a

physical security survey, was a physical security survey available for

Benghazi?

A No, it was not.

Q And so what did you go over with those RSO agents at the

time?

A I went over the current state of play at post, what we had.

I took out the overheads and I'd say, "This is the facility." I'd give

them where it was in relation to the harbor and how -- side-by-side

and discussed the surrounding area and what had been requested, what

had been funded, what had been approved. And I said, "Once you get

out there, you know, if you can see anything else that we need to do,

let me know. Based upon your background and experience, you may see

something that someone else didn't or wasn't yet done. Come in, let

me know, and I'll try to get the money out to you as fast as I can."

Q And when you say "facility," did that include Villas A, B,

and C, or Villas B and C? So when you talked about showing them

photographs of the facility in relation to various places in the city,

I want to understand what you meant by "facility."

A It would have been what we had in place at that time. Okay?

Q Okay. So, in 2012, that would have been Villas B and C?

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Would you have had photographs, aerial photographs or photographs of

the --

A I would have went over -- yeah, I would have pulled out the

site plan and gone over it with them and said, "This is what we used

to have, and they got rid of it. For whatever reason, they got rid

of it. But this is the current facility."

Q And how is that site plan developed? When you say "site

plan," who developed the site plan?

A Could be multiple sources. Could be from DS/IP. It could

have been generated at post. But whatever I could get my hands on,

normally in IP was pretty good with providing me any type

of site plan, floor plans, that type of thing.

Ms. Jackson. So there's no formal document or attachments that

comprise a site plan? You're talking more about, sort of, your folder

on Benghazi?

Mr. . What I had available that enlightened the ARSO or

the RSO. I said, this is what I have available. This may be the same

as . It may be -- you know, I may have got something different.

But this is what I had available, and this is what I would show him.

And I would discuss, you know, my experience there on the ground,

what a difficult operating environment it was. It was kind of a

cash-only economy. And, basically, if there are any projects you want

to get done, keep it one request at a time. This way here, you know,

you can get it funded, you can get it taken care of. And if it's a

cash, you know, petty cash, let's say, however they got it

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implemented -- to try to give them an idea of how best to proceed once

they hit the ground and how I could support them.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q And in meeting with these various RSOs and ARSOs, we talked

a little bit last hour and in our first hour about the type of RSOs

that were serving in Benghazi and their experience level in terms of

being able to perform in an overseas capacity and one I think you

described as, correct me if I'm wrong, a high-threat --

A High-threat environment, yeah.

Q -- high-threat environment. And so, as you met with these

RSOs, did you have concerns? Did you mention or have conversations

about the experience level of the RSOs or DS agents that were coming

in to serve in an RSO capacity?

A That wasn't my call. Okay? I relied upon DS/IP.

Q I understand it wasn't your call, but, in your opinion, with

regard to your interaction with them, did you have concerns about the

experience? I'm not saying anything other than they just potentially

lacked the experience of serving in these high-threat posts.

A Not with the RSOs, the acting RSOs. But with some of the

ARSOs, some of the comments that I made, you could tell that it was

over their head, so I had to dumb it down and say, okay, this is what

I mean. Okay?

And, basically, if they wanted to do something in particular, if

I had a similar project, I would send them photos of a fence with razor

wire on it, I'd send them a photo of a vehicle barrier, a drop-arm

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barrier. So I would bring it down to that level just, you know, to

make sure that they understood what we were talking about and what they

needed to implement for whatever project they were looking at.

Q Had you ever served or worked with a facility where there

were so many incoming ARSOs and RSOs? Did you find that to be a

hindrance, or did it cause any issues with regard to the number of

individuals who were coming to serve in that capacity?

A Not for me. No. Just, you know, I took each one and

basically, okay, I've got a new name here, you know, okay, let me develop

the rapport. And I realized, having done that myself, I realized that

the TDY is, you know, it's a stressful thing and they were working 7 days

a week, so I could see the need to have the rotation.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Let me ask this. You talked about doing these sort of

outbound briefings with RSOs. And certainly we know that RSOs for

long-term assignments do come in for consultations.

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you recall any TDY RSO that you actually met with that

was going to Benghazi?

A I don't recall any in particular, no.

Q Okay. Do you recall meeting with before

Tripoli Embassy reopened?

A I want to say maybe.

Q Okay.

A But I know IP is usually very good at routing an RSO-type

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through PSD for an out-briefing if they're here in Washington on

consultations.

Q Right. I guess just in all of our interviews we've never

had an acting RSO tell us that they were ever in Washington for any

type of consultation in any of our interviews with them. So that's

why I'm exploring this.

A Yeah. If they were here in Washington, IP would get them

over to see me, if they were here in Washington. But I don't remember

any names jumping out at me in particular. So, you know, that's why

I can't answer that.

Q So this was your normal process.

A This is the normal procedure that we follow in the office,

yeah.

Q Right. But Benghazi was not normal.

A Out-briefing ARSOs and RSOs is a normal process that we

follow in the office, even today.

Q Even for short-term TDYs?

A If they're in Washington and they're told to come through

and get a briefing from us, by IP, then, yeah, we do the briefing.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q But do you recall specific meetings with RSOs who were going

to serve in Benghazi?

A I do not.

Q Okay. And do you recall specific meetings with ARSOs who

were going to serve in Benghazi?

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A I do not.

Q Okay. So, to the best of your recollection, with regard

to Benghazi, you don't recall meeting with any of the RSOs or ARSOs?

A Correct.

Q I want to turn to -- we continued our discussion about

security standards in the last hour. And we had, again, a robust

discussion, I think, on meeting the standards, meeting the OSPB

standards and the SECCA standards to the maximum extent feasible.

A Feasible. Possible.

Q So, in your mind -- and I'm trying to reconcile -- if you

would go back to exhibit 1, and on the first page, if you go down to

the last paragraph of your email to and it

starts with, "Since these are short-term, leased properties,

identifying an office that will provide the funding to implement any

upgrades will be an issue."

A Uh-huh.

Q And then if you go to the email exchange above that,

sort of chimes in to you and . And in the last

sentence, he says, "Bottom line, we can make it happen using a

field-expedient approach presupposing funding is available."

A True.

Q True. So I guess I'm trying to reconcile in my mind, how

do you accomplish something to the maximum extent feasible if funding

is not available or if funding is an issue?

A Our normal process is OBO, security management, would

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provide the funding for physical security upgrades to a facility. This

was not our normal approach. These were short-term leased residences.

OBO were not involved. So --

Q If I could stop you for 1 minute --

A Yeah.

Q -- when you say OBO is not involved, is that an internal

policy? Sort of, what dictates the fact that OBO does not get involved?

A The length of the lease is normally how they will break that

down.

Q Okay. So that's an OBO --

A That's an OBO -- that's an OBO issue.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Rule or policy or procedure?

A It's an OBO policy issue.

Q Okay.

A I'm not sure how they classify it.

Q Okay. And how long did a lease have to be before OBO would

become involved and make their money available?

A I want to say a long-term lease. A short-term lease,

normally they would require the owner of the property to make the

upgrades and rotate those costs back into the lease and prorate it over

the term of the lease. So they would recover those costs. Okay? A

long --

Q Right. But what I'm --

A A long-term lease for OBO, okay, then they would step up

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and provide the funding.

Q But is that anything more than 6 months, a year, 5 years,

10 years? What's the --

A For OBO --

Q In the State Department, what's the difference between

short-term and long-term?

A Short-term lease?

Q Yes.

A Okay. For OBO, I think it's 7 years or longer is a

long-term lease. Short-term is, I think, less than 7 years.

Q Did anyone, to your knowledge and experience, have the

authority within the State Department to waive that requirement and

say, OBO, you go pay for this? For example, could the Under Secretary

for Management direct them to do that?

A That's a question I have no knowledge of.

Q Had you ever seen that done?

A I have seen -- in the Foreign Affairs Handbook, there are

always -- what word am I looking for -- there are always --

Q Exceptions to the rule?

A -- exceptions to the rule for things to be accomplished.

Q And who would generally have the authority to grant the

exception to the rule?

Ms. Welcher. If you know.

Mr. . I've seen it in the past. What I have been involved

with is the chief of mission --

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Ms. Jackson. Okay.

Mr. . -- has requested something be done until the due

diligence catches up with what he wants done for a lease, for a piece

of property. We don't want to lose it. It's perfect for our

operation. Put it under a contingency lease. The chief of mission

has that authority to go ahead and do that. And then the OBO train,

with due diligence which would catch up.

Ms. Jackson. And who within Main State would have to bless that

request by the chief of mission, if anyone?

Mr. . It depends where it was going, the pot of funding

that would be responsible for it. In the case of a lease, it would

be OBO, you know, at some level within the OBO family.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Well, let me ask you this. Did specific embassies or

countries have their own pot of money from which to draw?

A No, I don't believe so. I don't believe so.

Q Okay.

A OBO provides all the funding for lease and household -- you

know, for lease properties that has to come -- there's no pot of funding

over here, no.

Q Okay. So when we talk about leases that

incorporate -- just so I'm clear -- that incorporate any physical

security upgrades, that would be made within that lease. Does

that -- the costs of --

A If we are going to require the landlord to make the upgrades,

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then that scope of work should be included into the lease for our

protection.

Q How else are security upgrades funded other than through

OBO?

A There are different pots of money -- and we're getting into

an area that I have a very limited knowledge of -- that are specifically

designated for certain areas or certain countries. And, you know, I

have no idea what those are. All I know is that we can get money from

different pots. And in the past, I have gone to NEA/EX and I say, how

about we split the cost 50/50? Sometimes that has worked on a request

from a post. So I've been able to work some accommodations in the past

to get projects done for an RSO at post when they wanted to do something

and, okay, how do we fund it, how do we fund it.

Q So, to follow up on that, if one wants to fund it, they will

find the means to fund it within the State Department for physical

security upgrades?

A Yes. Yes. The reason I raise funding here is because

physical security is one responsibility, residential is another

responsibility, local guards is another responsibility. And each

one -- well, I know local guards and residential, they do have their

own pots of money. And PSD has also a pot of money. Because whatever

requests came in here, I would look at the request and I'd say, okay,

physical security, local guards. Like, guard towers would be a local

guard force issue. Okay?

So I would send the email upstairs and I would say PSD, PSD, local

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guards. I said, you know, , can we provide the funding? And

normally we would get, "Yes, we can provide the funding." Where he

got the money, I didn't ask. I just got the money.

That was my job -- get the money, get it out to post as quickly

as we can so the RSO could then start the necessary administrative steps

on the ground to get the project moving. I would say, "You got the

money. Go ahead, you know, talk to the contractor, get things lined

up. It's coming." And, normally, we would have the money out to post

within 24 hours.

Q So just to come full circle, though, we talked about being

able to perform or to implement physical security upgrades to the

maximum extent feasible as long as there's -- and I'm going to add sort

of a clause -- as long as there's money available. Would that be a

fair statement?

A Yeah. Yeah. The post can't -- they can't commit the U.S.

Government to a project until it's been approved and funded back here

in Washington. And I always stressed that with them. "Okay, let me

work on the funding issue. You can do the preliminary workup." So

when I get it -- I was always confident that I would get it. And I

was never denied getting money for Benghazi.

Q But let me ask you this. You were never denied, given that

requests were minimal. Is that a fair --

A No. I was never denied on any request that came in. They

were coming in with simple requests.

Q Simple requests.

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A They were coming in with simple requests.

Q Had the requests been more complex, what would have been

the response?

A I would have deferred that upstairs. I says, uh-oh, how

do we do this?

Q So it comes back to as long as they made field-expedient,

simple requests, those could be funded, or were funded.

A Those were funded. Those were funded.

Q Had they been more complex or more expensive --

A No, if they were more complex, it would've required more

time. We had contracting rules then that had to be followed. If it

was a dollar amount, let's say $100,000 to replace the perimeter wall,

okay, do we have to let that out for bid? The contracting rules. And

then there was no contracting officer, no one at post that had warrant

authority to sign something like that, I believe.

So that would have extended the whole process to get something

identified, funded, completed.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q In that timeframe analysis that you are focusing on, was

it also a consideration, the short duration that you thought the

Benghazi facility was going to be open? You wouldn't undertake

replacing a perimeter wall if they were only going to be there for

6 months, would you?

A I would not have recommended replacing the wall. There are

other measures that we could do, like raise the height of the wall with

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razor wire or barbed wire or, on the inside, put a chain link fence

up. There was chain link available on the local economy. And could

we do that to strengthen the perimeter? Okay?

Then you talk to the owner of the property and say, "We would like

to do this. We'd like to extend the lease. We'd like to get this

upgrade made. Would you do this to your property?"

It just depends upon the circumstances and how best to proceed.

If we had something that was more complex, then I would've had to take

it upstairs for discussion. But we never reached that.

Q Was it communicated to the RSOs on the ground in Benghazi

that they should limit their requests --

A No.

Q -- to field-expedient measures?

A No. I said, you tell me what you need. You tell me what

you need. And then I helped walk them through the process --

Q Okay.

A -- knowing the conditions on the ground, how difficult it

was to get a good contractor -- although we had

lined up -- but the availability of materials, number one, but, more

importantly, the contracting problem and the cost and how do you pay

for that project, you know, because it was kind of a cash economy at

that time.

Now, I know there are provisions for offshore payments. So, I

mean, that would not have stopped this, you know, if we had to move

forward and basically go into something more complex. That would not

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have stopped us.

Q I just want to go back there for one moment, and then we'll

move on. But you said that you never told the RSOs or ARSOs on the

ground that they were limited in their requests, but I want to go back

to exhibit 1. And in that last paragraph, in the second exchange, the

paragraph that says, "Since these are short-term lease

properties" -- but if you go to the next sentence, it goes, "In my

opinion, since the Special Mission has a limited timeframe to operate

in Benghazi, I would continue to support field-expedient measures and

compound terrain features be considered to the maximum extent

feasible." And then your initials are after that.

A Uh-huh.

Q I noticed up in the CC line, it went to a , who

was the TDY RSO at the time.

Mr. Kenny. Is that established in this document here?

Ms. Jackson. It is not overtly established. Do you have any

dispute to that fact?

Mr. Kenny. Well, I just want to -- that's not as I understand

it.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Did you understand that did a TDY in Benghazi

at the time?

A I don't recall the name.

Q All right. If this language that I've just read that you

wrote had gotten to the RSOs in Benghazi, is it possible that they

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interpreted it as that, that they could only ask for a field-expedient

measures and compound terrain features?

A No. No.

Q They would not interpret it that way?

A They would probably come in to me for clarification, like,

what can we do? Do you have any samples, do you have any ideas that

we can implement? And that's where I would walk them through the

process. Okay, what do you want to do, where do you want to do it,

and how much is it going to cost.

Q Did you ever have any conversations with about

that the RSOs who were in Benghazi should be limited to requesting

simple measures or field-expedient measures?

A No.

Q Never had any of that?

A I don't believe I did. No. I never --

Q So if he communicated that to RSOs, he would be mistaken?

A You'd have to ask him. I mean, you know, I never

communicated that to him.

Ms. Jackson. Yeah, that's all I have on this.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q I want to turn to exhibit 3, which we discussed in the last

hour. And, specifically, we talked about, in the third email exchange

at the very bottom from to you and ,

specifically the second sentence, "No upgrades are needed for Villas

A and C."

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And I'm trying to reconcile that position with the upgrades that

were requested by the RSOs in December, beginning in late November and

December, in which there were a series -- do you recall a series of

requests being made --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- to you?

A Yeah.

Q And those requests consisted of -- and correct me if I'm

wrong -- potentially sandbags?

A Uh-huh.

Q Do you recall sandbags?

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A Fighting positions, yes.

Q Correct. Do you recall jersey barriers --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- being requested curbside?

A Curbside, yeah. I want to say they were excess from the

British Consulate that was closing.

Q Do you recall drop-arms being requested?

A I sent out design plans to have them done locally. Correct.

Q Correct. Concertina wire being requested?

A Yeah.

Q So I guess my question is, turning back to, if those requests

were being made in December, why weren't those upgrades made in

August -- July and August, when we first occupied the facility? So

I'm trying to reconcile no upgrades to, all of a sudden, all of these

upgrades are necessary.

A I would attribute that to the post and the owner of the

property becoming more exposed to one another, more knowledgeable of

one another, and him seeing how we were taking care of the property,

vice trashing it, and he becoming more comfortable with us making

upgrades to his property. Because I know in the beginning, he was very

standoffish. As I said earlier, only would give us permission to do

certain things. So I would attribute that to the post efforts to work

with the owner of the property to get these upgrades done.

Q Could it also be a situation where you have fewer DS agents

on the ground in Benghazi than you did in August at the time?

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A That, I don't know. No. I can't answer that.

Q Okay. We talked a little bit -- in the last hour my

colleagues asked if you were aware of any requests that had been made

for a physical security specialist to come do an assessment on what

would be the new compound, Villas B and C. You do not recall?

A I don't recall a request coming out of post.

Q Okay. So I just want to draw your attention back to exhibit

2, and specifically on page 5. It would be the sixth page, I believe.

And it is an email exchange from -- again, it's a series of email

exchanges, but this one on page 6, would be from to

and in which you are copied.

Ms. Jackson. Give the date.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q And it is a February 12th, 2012, email, 10:12 p.m., on a

Sunday. And I'll give you a moment just to look at this since I know

we're going deeper into the document.

And specifically, I want to go to paragraph, the paragraph

numbered 10.

A Okay.

Q So we'll go back on. Do you recall this email exchange,

let me ask first?

A No. I'm on the cc line, so, yeah, I got this.

Q And let me just describe it. It's an email request sent

by the RSO in Tripoli, -- correct --

A Yes.

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Q -- to who we described was the desk officer

at DS/IP, and --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- who, I believe, was a supervisor. Correct?

A I would think so, yeah.

Q Okay. And you are cc'd on the email?

A Uh-huh.

Q But it's a list of requests, physical security upgrades that

Benghazi had identified. Correct?

A Correct.

Q And in paragraph number 10, one of the requests is that,

"RSO Benghazi requests additional security upgrades in support of the

shift from three villa compounds to two, and have asked for a TDY visit

by a facility security expert as soon as possible to help scope them,"

end quote.

So do you recall, does that help refresh your recollection on a

request being made?

A Uh-huh. Okay.

Q And do you recall, was a physical security specialist ever

sent to help scope --

A No.

Q -- the upgrades?

A No, I was not.

Q Did you travel to Libya in 2012? Do you recall traveling

to Libya in 2012?

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A I did with an OBO team to Tripoli.

Q Were you requested to go down to Benghazi to help them scope

their physical security upgrades? Do you recall being asked to visit

Benghazi?

A I believe the RSO raised it with me and I said, I'm here

with the OBO team. I don't have orders to go. But I think he raised

it with me when I was there with the OBO team doing that facility

project.

Ms. Jackson. And do you remember when in 2012 that was?

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Does March or April sound about right?

A I'd say, yeah, March or April, because we were there with

OBO and the Turkish contractor laying out the scope of work for the

Tripoli Embassy compound that was, you know, just recently

reestablished at another site south of the city by the airport.

Q And do you know why -- and I'm not saying you -- but do you

know why a specialist was not sent to Benghazi to help scope their

upgrades?

A I do not.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Going back to exhibit 4 for a minute or two, it was

identified, or identified as lacking identifying documents. You have

no inkling as to who the author of this document was. Is that correct?

A It's hard to tell, but, no, I have no idea who did it.

Q It appears it comes from Benghazi, and I say that based on

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the very first line that's addressed to . And it says, quote,

"Here is our best effort to spin out a few more detailed options for

a contraction of our footprint here in Benghazi."

That leads me to believe that it was somebody on the ground in

Benghazi that was the author of this. But you have no idea whether

it was the principal officer, or the RSO, or --

A Well, I would say this is something that the RSO would not

author but would contribute to.

Q So on page 2 of exhibit 4, you -- when our colleagues were

talking to you, they read you the line under option 1, Villas B and

C, as the fifth bullet point down, that Villas B and C were the, quote,

"Best option from a security perspective." And then it goes on to

describe something more.

And, again, I think they were trying to link this particular

document, exhibit 4, with exhibit 5 and other things that were going

on in December of 2011 when the decision was being made to extend

Benghazi for another year. But I would like you to then -- and I believe

you said at the time as to exhibit 4, that you relied on expertise on

the ground and that the RSO would have contributed to this document,

exhibit 4. Is that correct?

A Uh-huh, yes.

Q And, again, we've asked you this before, but, you know, to

try and square that with exhibit 2 -- if I can find it -- where

has written in saying, in the second section down on the first

page, he writes to you, the -- I think it's the third sentence,

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are also reviewing the decision to move out of Villa A. From a security

perspective, occupying Villa A puts us in a better shape than the

current direction of decommissioning Villa A and remaining in Villa

B and C. Improvements to Villa A and B pale in comparison to the work

to be accomplished at Villa C," end quote.

And I want to take a couple of minutes and look at that. You had

told us earlier that you thought Villa A was a very hardened facility

for a residence. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q But it had some exceptional qualities as a residence?

A Yes.

Q Okay. We can infer that shared some of those

sentiments with you, because he wanted to revisit the issue of retaining

Villa A. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And he's also talking about, "Improvements to Villa

A and B, pale in comparison to the work to be accomplished at Villa

C." And I think he later on in this, he provides a whole laundry list

of things that he wants done to Villa C that he believes, in his opinion,

his security opinion, need to be done to Villa C.

Again, is he the type of person that you're going to rely on to

do that, to make those recommendations?

A Having not seen Villa C up close and personal, I would have

to rely upon him and his professional opinion when he's on the ground

making those assessments. So I would rely upon him.

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Q Yeah. And so did you push at this time that when this came

in in February of 2012, did you push on his behalf to have the powers

that be in Washington change their mind about how they were going to

consolidate the footprint in Benghazi?

A I did not.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Well, would that have been a position that you would have

been in, or would you have communicated that to your supervisors to

then have those discussions?

A I would say that I laid out my opinion to in that --

Q In exhibit 1?

A Yeah. I would say that's right. I think he knew. So

knew, you know, my position on it, you know. I'm again, only

a desk officer. That's my position. And that's what I told him.

Q So we've talked -- so moving away from the last hour, we're

going to move into our --

A New hour.

Q -- our new hour.

Ms. Jackson. Twenty minutes to go.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Twenty minutes to go, the questions that we had prepared.

But we talked a lot in our first hour -- well, we'd started to talk

about discussions on -- and we've continued those -- on renewing the

compound and which leases were going to be renewed, and terminating

Villa A.

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A Uh-huh.

Q And do you recall, or did you ever see the actual extension

memo that was drafted by Assistant Secretary Feltman and approved by

Under Secretary Kennedy? Do you recall ever seeing that memorandum?

A I don't recall. I don't recall.

Q So in terms of the references to security measures in that

memorandum, you don't -- you were not consulted in those discussions?

A I don't recall.

Q While the witness is looking at the document, I will go ahead

and identify it. It is State Department document SCB0049728. And it

is an action memo for Under Secretary Kennedy from NEA Jeffrey Feltman.

And the subject is: "Future of operations in Benghazi, Libya."

And it's really the third page that I want to focus on. Starting

with "Facilities."

Ms. Jackson. We can go off the record for a minute.

[Discussion off the record.]

Ms. Betz. So we will go back on the record.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q And we are looking at an action memorandum for Under

Secretary Kennedy which outlines the future of operations in Benghazi.

And for purposes of the next series of questions, we will be looking

at page 3, the second paragraph under "Facilities."

And I want to draw your attention to a sentence in the middle of

the second paragraph that starts with, "If you agree with this course

of action, NEA will work with DS to rapidly implement a series of

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corrective security measures as part of the consolidation of the State

footprint."

Being a physical security specialist, what does corrective

security -- what do corrective security measures mean to you? Is that

a term that you use frequently within your job?

A I think that's a term that would be used to look at the entire

security program in order to identify deficiencies, vulnerabilities,

and try to get those corrected.

Q So have you heard of the term "corrective security measures"

before?

A I have, but it's not a regular part of my dialogue.

Q And I guess I'm trying to understand how corrective security

measures relate to the OSPB security standards and/or the SECCA

requirements. Could you explain or at least help us understand how

corrective security measures relate?

A I think corrective security measures would be a collective

term used for local guards, procedural, physical, technical. So all

of those would be part of the security package at post. And whichever

ones needed to be tweaked, fixed, upgraded, that would be a corrective

security measure.

Q Would this have been, in your opinion, would this have been

an appropriate time extension of the mission for an additional

12 months for a discussion of the OSPB security standards and SECCA

requirements? So if the Mission was going to be extended for an

additional 12 months, would this have been an appropriate time or a

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good time to discuss the applicable security standards? It's no longer

temporary. It's in place more than 6 months. You've got a facility

that's going to be in place for a year. In your opinion.

A I would think that would be a discussion held at a more

senior level.

Q By whom?

A The people involved in making the decision to stay put, and

all of those individuals involved in that decisionmaking process

developing options for the approving authority. This, in my opinion,

could have been the time to raise that as an issue.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Ms. Betz made a distinction between being in a place for

approximately 6 months and then a decision being made to be there for

at least a year. Did that trigger anything within your office as to,

you know, trying to meet the OSPB standards? Was there anything known

as occupying facilities as is, without --

A We do that now sometimes. We occupy a facility as is and

we go in and make the improvements after the fact. That has happened.

Q Okay. And continues to happen?

A Far less frequently now that more State Department folks

are knowledgeable of SECCA and OSPB, especially on the OBO side.

Q And who makes the determination that the State Department

can go in and occupy a facility as is? Is there someone in the

Department that has to make that decision?

A Depending upon -- I would say the person at post would

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be -- the first person at post that would weigh in on this would be

the RSO.

Q But does the RSO, they're the final decisionmaker?

A No, they're not the final decision. They would be the first

person at post that could weigh in, that would weigh in on that

particular discussion.

Q Who's the final decisionmaker? Who would be the final

decisionmaker, if you know?

Ms. Welcher. Well, let me --

A In all honesty, that's hard to say. Because if OBO has to

provide the money to do the lease or the purchase, they may say no,

that's -- no, we can't do that. We won't do that. Okay. So it's hard

to say who that final person is. But with all State Department

facilities, OBO is the landlord. OBO, that would be a major lease

action. OBO has to be involved early on in the planning for this. They

have to be engaged.

That's the first thing I tell an RSO, is OBO real estate area

management involved in this initiative? Okay. Has your admin officer

or GSO touched base with them in order to get them involved? Because

we can't do anything unless OBO executes a major lease action that

actually gives posts the approval to move forward.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q But I think what you told us before is that those are only

for leases that are 7-plus years.

A Uh-huh. Yes.

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Q I mean --

Ms. Betz. How does that happen for those --

A On this one now, I don't know who paid the lease on this.

I have no -- you know, I don't know who paid the lease. So I don't

know who had a say in this facility.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Well, and I guess what I was going to ask, does that decision

or those recommendations become more complicated if you have RSOs

changing every 30 days and every 45 days? If you have a different RSO

serving in that capacity every 30 to 45 days, does that interaction

become more difficult?

A It becomes more difficult, but the clearinghouse is back

here in IP. Okay. They're the ones that are trying to maintain the

DS path forward. All right. So they should be the ones that are

controlling that activity.

If an RSO comes in and says, this, they go back and they say, okay,

your predecessor said that. Can you revisit this issue and come back

and let us know? All right. I would say IP would be the -- for DS,

because they're the ones that actually were assigning folks out there

and controlling it on a much more closer basis than I was.

Q Well, let me ask you this: You've put a lot on DS/IP. Was

their scope of responsibility more than just assigning RSOs overseas

as it relates to overseas facilities? Because do their

responsibilities exceed or are they more than just assigning diplomatic

security agents to serve abroad? You've described their

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decisionmaking as sort of broader than just sending people over.

A Oh, the DS/IP is the control office for the RSO overseas

from a DS perspective. That comes out of DS/IP. They are the hammer,

if you will, for DS to make sure that the RSOs are doing all their

paperwork and enforcing all of the security requirements and standards.

DS/IP is the ultimate hammer with RSOs.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q But did DS/IP have anything to do with the physical security

upgrade program requests?

A Well, they would defer to me. They may have gotten the

request in from the post.

Q So they --

A And I wasn't on copy for it, or it didn't go to me.

would make sure that, all right, this is a physical security issue.

I need to get this over into hands.

Q So he would act as the funnel of information to the

appropriate person. And if it was physical security upgrades, he would

funnel that to you?

A Yes.

Q Okay.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So I just want to show you what we'll call as Exhibit 7,

and this relates to the memo.

[ Exhibit No. 7

Was marked for identification.]

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Ms. Betz. And we'll go off the record before we deal with it.

I will identify the document. It's State Department document

C05578953. It is a series of email exchanges on which the witness is

not a recipient, or sender, or on the copy line. I just wanted to ask

him about it.

And specifically page 2, at the top of page 2.

[Discussion off the record.]

A Okay.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So turning to the email exchange that I want to focus on,

it's from a -- do you know who is?

A No.

Q -- to a . Do you recall who is?

A I think was NEA/EX.

Q Okay.

A Yeah, I think she was NEA/EX.

Q Okay. And copied on it are DS staffers . Do

you know a ?

A No.

QA ?

A No.

[ Exhibit No. 6

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Okay. But the subject line is the future of Benghazi

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operations. And that is the memorandum that we just discussed, which

is identified as exhibit 6. And in it, I want to focus on a comment

that's made from a to on the action for

clearance. And specifically, "Acting PDAS clears the

attached AM to M on the future of Benghazi operations with the comment

that this operation continues to be an unfunded mandate and a drain

on personnel resources," end quote.

We talked a lot about the funding issues --

A Uh-huh.

Q -- that were associated with the security, with being able

to conduct or implement physical security upgrades. Do you -- are you

aware of this comment? Let me just ask you that.

A Now I am.

Q So were you aware of this posture or comment at the time?

Do you remember it ever being said or stated within DS circles?

A I don't recall. I know it was an unfunded mandate, because

I had to go out of -- I had to take extraordinary steps to get the funding

for the guys on the ground to get the work done that they required to

get done.

Q So in your experience --

A In my experience, yeah, when you start sending people in

TDY for 30, 45 days at a time, that's a drain on personnel resources

because you're pulling them out of their other job functions, and

basically, you're going out here and, you know, you're going to be out

there for 45 days and this is your mission. Yeah. That -- whenever

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you have a special TDY arrangement like that, that has always been a

drain on resources.

Q And the unfunded mandate?

A I think that that's an accurate comment, that -- just going

on the record, that this is unfunded. So this way here, people that

deal with those things know that it's coming out of somebody's hide

somewhere, some pot of money is being drawn down in order to do this.

Q Is this a reflection of your concerns? Would you say that

this reflects your concerns with funding physical security upgrades?

A No.

Q So you believe that there was adequate funding for security?

A I was never told no. So from my perspective, what I

requested, I received. And I, you know, I was never told no. So --

Q So when you said, yes, this is an unfunded mandate, clarify

what you meant by -- what was unfunded then?

A An unfunded mandate is a requirement that is new and it

hasn't been specifically identified in any budget plan. So it's coming

out of -- coming out of a different pot of money, you know. I could

give you an example, but I, you know, I don't want to --

Ms. Jackson. Can I ask a question?

Ms. Betz. Yes.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q This says it's by acting PDAS . Who's

, or who was he at the time in December of 2011?

A I want to say was the -- in charge of

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countermeasures.

Q So he --

A And if he was acting, he hadn't yet been confirmed.

Q Or if he's the acting PDAS, is he the Acting Principal Deputy

Assistant Secretary?

A No. No, that's the director of DS.

Q If that person was on vacation --

A He's the PDAS?

Q -- can someone be named for them as the acting PDAS?

A Yeah. Yeah.

Q Okay.

A One of the office directors could then be given that.

Q All right. So at the time, was over

countermeasures in December of 2012?

A Yes. He was our -- he was the acting PDAS, so he was, I

would say, the acting director of DS and he was in charge of

countermeasures.

Q Okay. His permanent job was the --

A Countermeasures.

Q -- countermeasures. And that was the office that was over

your sub-office?

A Yes.

Q Okay. So he was in your line of command?

A He was up there.

Q Okay. Was he the equivalent of Charlene Lamb, a Deputy

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Assistant Secretary?

A I want to say maybe on that same staffing pattern.

Q They were level?

A I think they were the same. They were level.

Q Okay.

A Yeah.

Q All right.

Ms. Betz. And I think our time is up. So our hour is done, and

we'll go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

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[1:43 p.m.]

Ms. Betz. It is now 1:43.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q We ended our discussion in the last hour talking about the

extension of the mission into 2012. And I wanted to go back and clarify

something that you had said I think a couple of rounds ago as it relates

to the OSPB standards and SECCA. And you had noted, I think in the

hour with our colleagues, that you were told that OSPB standards and

SECCA did not apply to the man camp; am I correct?

A Did not apply.

Q Did not apply.

So was that analysis then sort of used as it relates to the villa

compound?

A It carried over.

Q Carried over. So basically -- and correct me if I'm

misstating this -- but the thought would be that exceptions and waivers

to OSPB and SECCA do not apply in Benghazi, generally?

A When I was there, that's the --

Q Is that a fair characterization?

A That's the guidance that I was given at that time.

Ms. Jackson. So SECCA and OSPB and the need for waivers and

exceptions was not going to apply to any facility in Benghazi,

regardless of its location; was that your understanding at the time?

Mr. . That was my understanding.

Ms. Jackson. Okay.

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BY MS. BETZ:

Q Okay. I want to talk a little bit about SETL, the Security

Environment Threat List rating. Are you familiar with --

A Oh, yeah.

Q -- SETL?

A Yes.

Q And in your experience, is it a SETL threat that sort of

guides the implementation of OSPB security standards?

A Yes.

Q Is that how it works?

A Political violence would dictate the level of physical

security measures that you would implement at a post because you have

low, medium, high, and critical for the threat ratings.

So low and medium would be -- some of the requirements are less

stringent than the other requirements at the high and critical level.

Q But is it a fair characterization to say that the SETL

ratings help identify those countermeasures or physical security

measures that would help mitigate that threat rating. Is that correct?

A Yes. Because you would go to 12 FAH 6. You would look at

the threat rating for your post. Then you would go to 12 FAH 6, and

you go down to that threat rating for your post. Then it would give

you the requirements for a stand-alone facility, tenant and commercial

office space, Marine security guards, chief of mission residence, what

the requirements are.

Q Sole occupant?

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A Sole occupant of a building. Yeah. All of that is public

diplomacy, public libraries, that type of thing. So all of that is

in there, and that's the baseline. That's the baseline that you use

for the upgrades that you want to implement.

Q And was there a SETL threat rating for Libya at the time?

A Oh, I'm sure there was, yeah.

Q Does critical -- critical for political violence sound --

A Well, with a civil war raging and the embassy closed,

critical would probably be a starting point.

Q Okay. And is critical the highest? I guess is that the

most severe threat?

A Yes. Yeah.

Q And what types of OSPB security standards are typically

implemented to address a critical SETL threat rating? Can you recall

off the top of your head?

A You've got 9-foot high perimeter barrier. You've got

anti-ram measures. You've got access control measures. You've got

hardening of the ground floor up to 16 feet with FEBR grill

work.

Ms. Jackson. What does FEBR stand for?

Mr. . Forced entry ballistic rated. Okay? We have

doors that are rated for that. Those doors -- to have that rating,

the doors are tested here in the United States by an independent lab.

So the manufacturer, if they want to get on our approved list, they

would send the doors to be tested to the independent lab, and they would

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then do the assault on the door and time it to see how long it would

last before they can get through. So once it receives that rating,

then it's on our approved list and that's a good selling point for the

door vendors. But it's been DS FEBR-approved.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q But it's safe to say those measures are in place to help

mitigate those kind of threats that are out there?

A Those measures are in place to help the occupants of the

facility evacuate into the safe haven, and it gives them time to collect

the classified material, bring it to the safe haven for destruction.

And the safe haven is protection.

Court Reporter. Could you repeat that?

Mr. . protection. That's like, I would say

this room would be hardened . And everybody around here

would be funneled in here. And that's where you hunker down, and you

wait for the police to come and restore law and order.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q When there are exceptions to the OSPB standards to mitigate

critical threat ratings, in your experience, what types of measures

are used, or have been accepted or approved that deviate from those

standards that would mitigate a critical threat rating? Do you

understand what I'm asking?

A I have a kind of idea of what you are asking. If we can't

meet --

Q If you can't meet the standards, what have been, in your

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experience, some of the approved measures --

A The alternative applications --

Q -- that are suitable to mitigate a critical threat rating?

A OBO security engineering branch would have a list of

alternative applications based upon where you want to put the

improvement. For example, if a window cannot accommodate

FEBR-rated grill work, we can put grill work in, and upgrade

that with additional bolts on either side, because that's what gives

the strength to the grill, so it can't be pulled out, is the additional

anchoring into the sides and the top and the bottom. They can also

apply an epoxy to the hole that they make, and they can put bigger bolts

in, so it's going to take a lot more effort to remove those grill works.

That's a measure that we could incorporate when the structure cannot

accommodate the FEBR-rated grill work, okay?

But because we're not fully meeting the FEBR grill work,

you need the exception because we're putting in the grill work.

And then we identify the additional measures that we're doing with that

grill work to get as close as we can to the standard.

But, again, you'd need an exception to that.

Doors, okay, DS-approved doors, if they're not on the list, then

they're not FEBR-rated. However, we do have alternative

products that are out there that post would come in with.

in Libya was using European forced-entry security doors,

and the ballistic rated glass. He used that at the embassy in Tripoli.

So he had an alternative. But we still would have to get a waiver -- no,

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an exception, an exception to that standard. But here's the mitigation

of what we did. Because the products installed were not approved.

Locally fabricated, we can do a heavy gauge door and OBO

would have the design criteria for that door to be made locally and

then installed. And, again, that would approximate , but

it's not approved. It's not the approved application. So, again,

we'd have to have an exception to that.

Q And are those exceptions typically field-expedient

measures?

A No. Those are more -- the field expedient is something

that you have to look at what is available locally as far as the

material, and the ability to fabricate that by a local contractor.

Q Then help me understand: How do field expedient measures

mitigate a critical threat rating?

A Okay. You have the compound. It requires an anti-ram

barrier on all vehicle approaches. Okay. An anti-ram barrier is

either bollards or concrete planters, where you have a large subsurface

excavation in order to put the concrete and the steel rebar that comes

up, that gives the application above ground the strength to withstand

a direct hit at miles an hour. Again, a lot of it is determined

upon the angle of approach, okay? Ours is miles an hour at

perpendicular. Okay? You can't do that, let's say, at the site

because, number one, it's time consuming. Will the city allow it?

What's below? Are there utilities running along the street here or

under the sidewalk? Okay?

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A field expedient measure to achieve nearly the same results would

be surface-mounted jersey-type barriers that are placed down side by

side with a steel cable linking three units together. So when it's

hit, it may give a little bit, but it's not going to penetrate. Okay?

And the three barriers linked together is a lot of weight per those

jersey barriers, and you would do that down the entire line. That would

be a field expedient measure that could be implemented basically

overnight within 2 days as long as you had the concrete barriers

fabricated and available to be delivered and placed down onsite.

So that's a field expedient measure in lieu of putting in concrete

bollards or concrete planters.

Q But safe to say, I mean, what you describe is a pretty

complex -- it's more than just a simple putting a jersey barrier in

front of a compound; it takes some thought, planning, to create a

field-expedient measure that would be suitable to --

A That's why I provide the guidance to the RSOs and to the

assistant RSOs and I say, this is how you do it. And I go down each

step one at a time.

And I know because I've actually had to do it. When the consulate

in Jeddah was attacked in 2004, myself and another member of our office

was sent out there to help recovery operations. And we had to relocate

jersey barriers that were already there out one lane of traffic. Well,

we come to learn that you need to have the right type of lift and crane

to lift these things out and relocate them.

So I know what it takes. So I bring that experience into the

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equation as I walk a junior officer through the process on how to do

it and what some of the pitfalls may be and what to watch out for.

Q And does that process become, again, more complicated if

you have a series of RSOs that are coming in and picking up where the

last RSO --

A It shouldn't be because I'm working with you to get this

done, and you rotate out of post, but the project is already in process.

So ideally, the guy that started it would have handed that off to one

of his guys that are going to stay put to follow up. And this is how

it's done.

Q You said "ideally." Did that happen in Benghazi?

A I would like to think so.

Q Do you know so?

A No.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Do you recall instances where a subsequent RSO sort of

disagreed with something that was going to be done, improving the wall

or building the guard platforms and basically said, you know, I don't

want to do X, I would rather do Y"?

A I don't remember having disagreements with any of them. I

always tried to arrive at a resolution.

You've identified a deficiency, a vulnerability. I don't want

to fight with you. How do we fix it? How do we correct it?

So I don't recall ever having a --

Q What about a reprioritization of projects? Do you recall

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that ever happening? Let's not focus on, you know, putting in a chain

link fence. Let's focus on getting additional cameras and lighting.

A No. No. Once they propose a project, and I got the funding

out there for them to utilize, it was their responsibility to

prioritize -- if they had several, it was their priorities to prioritize

based upon the ability of their contractor to deliver and perform the

work that they required.

The same contractor may not have been involved with the fence or

the security lighting, okay, that was another person coming in. So

if you had the same contractor, though, and he had limited cleared folks

that we were comfortable allowing on the compound to work, then that

could have changed the timeframe in which it was done.

There's just different factors on the ground that would dictate

how best to proceed.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q Were the field-expedient measures that were implemented in

Benghazi, were they of such -- I know "quality" is not the right

word -- but were they of such magnitude to adequately mitigate the

critical threat rating in Libya, in your opinion?

A I believe the measures were that we -- yes, I believe that

they were adequate.

Q Adequate?

A Yeah, I believe they were.

Q To mitigate a threat?

A Yes.

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Q A critical threat rating?

A Yeah.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Mr. , did you read the Benghazi ARB when it came out

in December of 2012?

A I read through it, yes.

Q You read through it. And I assumed you probably paid

particular attention to the issues with physical security upgrades,

that part of it?

A Yeah, I did. Yeah.

Q I want to read you one of the findings of the ARB that's

found at page 5 of the document. The document is 38 pages long, so

I'm not going to ask you to review the whole thing. But one of the

findings at page 5 said and, I quote:

"The insufficient special mission security platform was at

variance with the appropriate Overseas Security Policy Board (OSPB)

standards with respect to perimeter and interior security. Benghazi

was also severely under-resourced with regard to certain needed

security equipment, although DS funded and installed, in 2012, a number

of physical security upgrades."

And he goes on to list several of them.

And then it went on to say that:

"Special Mission Benghazi's uncertain future after 2012 and its

quote, 'non-status' unquote, as a temporary, residential facility,

made allocation of resources for security and personnel more difficult,

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and left responsibility to meet security standards to the working-level

in the field, with very limited resources."

Do you recall those sentiments being expressed in the Benghazi

ARB?

A To me?

Q No. That the Benghazi ARB found that the security platform

was at variance with the appropriate OSPB standards.

A Well, that's the decision that they arrived at after they

conducted their investigation.

Q Okay. And they interviewed you --

A Yeah.

Q -- along with others?

A Yes.

Q In fact, they interviewed you with other people from --

A OBO.

Q -- OBO? Okay.

A And the reason that I brought them in, because I wanted them

to hear directly from OBO that they did not provide funding for any

security upgrades, because the OBO guy says, What am I doing here? And

I said, Well, I kind of dropped your name because I wanted them to know

that, you know, your office was not involved in providing funding, which

is my normal stream to go to for physical security upgrades at

facilities.

Ms. Betz. So you found that a problem that OBO wasn't funding

physical security upgrades?

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Mr. . It was an impediment. It didn't stop the upgrades

from being done and funded. Okay? But it was outside of my normal

comfort zone to get things done. So I had to go via another route,

which our folks upstairs, you know, the front office folks upstairs

said make it happen, and the funding was made available. From what

pot of money, I know not.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And they went on to find that DS funded and installed a

number of physical security upgrades in 2012, but they also found that

Benghazi was severely under-resourced with regard to certain needed

security equipment.

Do you agree with that finding of the ARB?

A Define "equipment." I mean, we had vehicles there. The

security technology folks were bringing in cameras, monitors, alarm

systems and we were installing those.

From my perspective, I thought that they were getting everything

that was required out of our countermeasures section. Now other

resources, a different question. I don't know.

Q And one last exhibit to show you -- well, this is hopefully

the last exhibit we'll show you in our waning moments -- that I am

marking as exhibit 8. It's very short.

[ Exhibit No. 8

Was marked for identification.]

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q And exhibit 8 is an action memo for Under Secretary Kennedy.

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It's dated January 24, 2012. But I would like you to look at the date

stamp above it, because it's our understanding that this was actually

issued in January of 2013.

It's an unclassified action memo. The subject: "Affirmation

that Overseas Security Policy Board Standards Apply to All Overseas

Facilities."

And we'll give you a minute or two to take a look at that.

A Okay.

Q Okay. First of all, would you agree from the other markings

on this document that it likely came out January 24, 2013, not 2012

of the typed date?

A I can't comment on that.

Q Okay. Do you remember seeing this memo whenever it came

out?

A I don't remember seeing it.

Q Okay. Under "Background," it says, "The Accountability

Review Board recommended that the Department should develop minimum

security standards for occupancy of temporary facilities in high-risk,

high-threat environments."

Do you remember that finding of the Benghazi Accountability

Review Board?

A If it's an ARB recommendation, I read it.

Do I remember it out of the 70-something -- was it

76 -- recommendations?

Q I think it may have turned into 70 taskings within the

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Department, but there weren't that many recommendations.

A Okay. But if it was in there, I read it, and I said, that's

going to be interesting in how they implement that one.

Q Well, let me ask you: Has the Department developed

different minimum security standards for temporary facilities in

high-risk/high-threat environments, to your knowledge, today?

A I know several cables have gone out basically reiterating

this as far as guidance. And I would have to pull those up. And I

would have to look at the 12 FAH 5, 12 FAH 6 to get the latest guidance

on that.

Q So let's go up to the "Recommendation" portion of this memo.

And the recommendation is to Under Secretary Kennedy, that he then has

approved, "That you affirm our current policy that the interagency

Overseas Security Policy Board's standards for facilities apply to all

facilities, regardless of their nature (temporary, interim, or

permanent)," end quote.

When we look at this memo, we interpret it as prior to this memo

being issued, something else was applying, because it says that they're

asking Under Secretary Kennedy to affirm a policy.

And for us, as we read this, why would you have to affirm a policy

if it was being followed?

So it seems to us that this is like a reminder that's gone out

to everybody that OSPB standards apply to all facilities: temporary,

interim, or permanent.

Is that how you read this memo?

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A You have a facility, and you move into it. It's a temporary

facility until you start making the improvements.

Q And is that how facilities are treated to this day? Are

they still considered temporary?

A Well, you identify a facility and you want to move into it.

The security upgrades do not happen immediately. They have to be

designed, funded, planned, and then constructed. Okay?

So you do -- nowadays, I want to say that they're looking at having

those improvements done before they move in. But -- and I run across

this sometimes -- they have a facility that they have to -- they lost

their lease on this, and they have to move into that. We need to get

in there. We need office space.

You get in there on a temporary basis, and then you start -- you

know, you do what you can up front for access controls. And then you

start doing the physical security upgrades as you line up the

contractors to do it.

Now, an interim facility could be a facility that you move into

that is going to be the platform for several years until OBO finds land

and builds a NEC.

Q And N-E-C, NEC, is new embassy construction?

A New embassy compound.

Q Compound.

A So the facility that you're currently sitting in would be

an interim facility while the NEC is being designed and built. All

right?

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So an interim facility, any waivers or exceptions would go to the

DS assistant secretary. For a permanent facility, any waivers or

exceptions would have to go to the secretary.

Q Exceptions as well as waivers?

A No. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. SECCA. SECCA.

Q Go to the secretary?

A Go to the secretary. Okay? And this is what we try to work

with the RSOs on when they say, okay, we have to relocate the GSO

compound.

Okay. You've got to put it on the embassy compound; and if you

do not, then you have to get a SECCA waiver because it's not co-located;

and whatever OSPB physical security standards are not satisfied, you

would need an exception issued for those.

So the permanent facility is where we're going to maintain shop

for the future. Okay? An interim facility is a parking space while

we wait for this thing to be constructed. Am I --

Ms. Betz. Oh, it makes sense.

Mr. . Okay. And a temporary one would be something that

you move into and you start the process of converting it from temporary

to interim and --

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q But that is not what happened in Benghazi.

A No. Benghazi was completely an unusual arrangement that,

because of the nature of what it was, a special mission with a limited

life span, go in there and do what we have to do to make it as secure

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as we can in order to allow those folks to operate within.

Q Could Benghazi happen again? Could there be another

special mission where you have to go into a country in the middle of

a revolution? And would that facility be treated the same way that

Benghazi was?

A I hope not. But could it happen again? Sure.

I mean, when I first started in the foreign service, we did not

put our people in harm's way that way. It was always the Department's

policy to evacuate, close down, and get everybody out of that

environment. Just close shop.

And then when we go back in, you know, you get re-engaged or engage

from offshore somewhere, an adjacent piece of property. But when I

first started, it was always close down and evacuate, not put people

into these environments.

Q Okay. I want to go back to the background that, where it

says "Diplomatic Security will recommunicate this long-established

policy to all posts, as well as the need for a waiver or exception to

applicable standards, and the process for obtaining a waiver or

exception."

Today, in the State Department, for temporary facilities, when

does that waiver or exception process begin? Or does it begin, for

temporary facilities, post-Benghazi?

A Well, the cable went out with the guidance for two or four

of the posts. And I have not run across a temporary facility as such.

I have had several instances where we were going to relocate to another

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facility, but that could not be done until all the physical security

upgrades had been installed, and the appropriate waivers and exceptions

had been obtained and approved. Okay?

Q And is that the same process you follow today with interim

facilities?

A Yeah. I would say, you know, everybody's erring on the side

of extreme caution, that that would be the same.

Case in point, Alexandria. They've kept that post closed until

the replacement property is basically certified by OBO for occupancy.

And as I said, that's about 80 percent complete. And normally, OBO

security engineering branch folks go out to post, and they do an

inspection of all the physical security measures in place. I intend

to accompany them, you know, to give the DS blessing. But I have got

to rely upon the security engineer.

But you know they will make sure that the grill work is installed

properly, the bolts are torqued. I mean, I haven't seen it, but I have

been told that some of the engineers will bring a torque wrench with

them to make sure that the bolts are torqued to the specs, especially

with the doors, the security doors. But we'll go through and make sure

that all the doors work, the alarms work, the vehicle barriers go up

and down, the bollards, the pop-up bollards go up and down, the cameras

work, all that works. And then OBO would issue a certificate of

occupancy, at which time then the consulate folks can go in to reopen

the post. So there's a process there.

Q Just a couple more, and then we're going to wind up.

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How did you learn about the attacks in Benghazi on September 11,

2012?

A I was watching television at home.

Q You were at home?

A My wife looked at me. She said, Weren't you just there?

Weren't you there? And I said, Yeah. That's how I learned about it.

Q Did you get contacted for any information regarding the

physical layout?

A Not that night.

Q Did you later?

A The next day, you know, basically that's when the, what we

call taskers coming down from the front office, request for

information.

BY MS. BETZ:

Q So you didn't get any calls that evening about anything from

anyone?

A No.

Q In the subsequent days, did you have any conversations with

individuals outside of the State Department --

A No.

Q -- with other agencies?

A No.

BY MS. JACKSON:

Q Did you have any conversations with anyone from within the

State Department who was on the ground that night, either in Benghazi

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or Tripoli?

A No.

Q Before we finish what we believe are our final questions,

is there any question that we've asked you today that, as we broke for

a short lunch, that you thought about that you would like to elaborate

on or correct or clarify or expound on in any way?

A No. I think I have given you my honest, forthright answers

to each and every one. And when I did have a moment, I got a recess

as I gathered my thoughts. But no, I don't have any.

Q Is there any area that you thought we would delve into that

we have not?

A No. I think you've covered from A to Z.

Q All right.

A As I expected.

Q Yes.

Ms. Betz. So we'll go off the record.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Kenny. The time is 2:22.

BY MR KENNY:

Q Again, sir, thank you. I appreciate your patience as we

shift into the afternoon hours here.

In our final portion here, I would like to return to some of the

topics we have been discussing, ask you some follow-up clarifying

questions. We are going to jump from topic to topic. I will start

with, just real briefly, discussing -- we had an extensive back and

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forth with you and my colleagues on your views of Villa A versus,

perhaps, your lack of visibility into Villa C, lack of awareness of

Villa C.

And I would just like to ask, before you arrived in Benghazi, were

you aware that the special envoy had relocated from the hotel to another

facility?

A Yes.

Q Do you recall why they relocated?

A Because of the car bomb out front of the hotel.

Q Okay. And a car bomb, was that a threat that was something

that was considered a serious threat at the time in Benghazi?

A I believe so.

Q Okay. And was there a vulnerability, a particular

vulnerability at the hotel with respect to the car bomb?

A I believe so.

Q Okay. And so when they moved to what ultimately became

Villa A, was it your understanding that that facility provided some

improvement over the hotel compound with respect to the threat of a

car bomb, vulnerabilities of car bombs?

A Oh, absolutely. Absolutely.

Q And you had mentioned that you thought at the time -- so

VBIEDs, or we refer to them as vehicle-borne IEDs, that was considered

a serious threat in Benghazi at the time?

A I'm not -- it happened. I'm not sure if that was the first

or the second or the third. I just don't know. But when you have a

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car bomb go off in front of your facility where you are staying and

the hotel is not implementing any type of measures to counteract that,

then you've got a vulnerability there that you need to look at

relocating, and that's what they did. Because if the car bomb was an

acceptable method of attack, then you've got to reduce your

vulnerability and get somewhere where you had setback and control.

Q So let's talk a little bit more about setback, because our

understanding is that the compound at Villa A provided some advantage

to the hotel with respect to setback and access control. Is that your

understanding?

A I don't know anything about the hotel. I wasn't involved

with that. That was another member from my office.

Q Okay. You were asked some questions about maps and layouts

of facilities in Villas A, B, and C. You had indicated in a previous

round --

Well, first let me ask it this way. So setback is one of the

requirements of SECCA. It is also an OSPB standard. It has been

incorporated into OSPB; is that your understanding?

A 100-foot of setback, I want to say, started off in OSPB

standards, and it's now codified in SECCA.

Q Okay. So the other way around. Got it.

And is one of the reasons to have setback and why it helps improve

the physical security of a compound because, one reason, is that it

helps guard against the threat of a VBIED?

A Well, what it does is, it helps protect the occupants of

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the structure from the effects of blast, because it's been proven by

DOD and other agencies that the more distance you have between the site

of the blast and where you are, the shock wave dissipates over distance.

So 100 feet was the standard that the Department came up with and in

cooperation with the agency and DOD after the '82, '83 bombings in

Kuwait and Beirut. That's how the 100-foot setback came about.

Q And you mentioned in a previous round that your

understanding of Villa A was that not all the facilities on that

compound met the setback requirement. Is that right?

A No. There's only one building there. It was the house.

And the back side of the house was about 35, 40 feet, I want to say,

from the back of the building to the perimeter wall, and that perimeter

wall, the neighbors were on the back side. So the back of their houses

faced that wall. What the distance was, I don't know. I don't recall.

Q But that other space in the neighbor's compound, that was

an uncontrolled space?

A Yeah.

Q Okay. And your understanding, then, of Villa C, did you

understand or have an understanding of whether or not that particular

facility or the facilities on that compound met the setback

requirements?

A I would have to look at the map.

Q Okay.

A I just don't recall.

Q Okay. Well, actually, I can help you a little bit. If I

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can refer you back to -- I see you have your stack of exhibits there.

If you go to exhibit 4.

If you go to page 5, it appears to be a schematic of compounds

B and C, and it also appears to include Villa A as well.

A Uh-huh. Okay.

Q So in looking in this document -- well, first, Villa C, if

you look on all four sides, does it appear, as you sit here today, that

Villa C met the setback requirement?

A It did because we controlled the property immediately

adjacent on the one side.

Q Okay. And as you sit here today and you look at the

schematic for what is described as Villa A at the bottom of the page,

did that facility meet the 100-foot setback requirement?

A It did not because Villa A, 21 meters of setback was about,

I don't know, some 60-some feet. Or it has to be. Anyway, no.

Q Okay. So at least from the perspective of setback, which

is both a requirement under the OSPB standards as well as a SECCA

requirement, it appears that Villa C at least provided one security

requirement over Villa A; is that accurate?

A Yes.

Q Okay. And that would have helped guard against any sort

of explosion that would have occurred in or around the compounds?

A Setback helps with the protection of folks.

Q Okay. So the more setback you have, the better the

security?

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A The more you have, the better it is from the effects of the

shock, the shock wave.

Q Okay. So at least from that perspective, Villa C was better

than Villa A?

A Yeah.

Q Okay. Just moving on briefly now to the discussion of

funding. And we've had an extensive back and forth on this in the last

2 hours. I will continue that with you again. And just note at the

outset here, you were asked about some sections of the Accountability

Review Board's final report. And I just wanted to note for you that

the ARB did cite some of the efforts of the individuals in the Diplomatic

Security Bureau to secure funding for physical security upgrades. And

I believe that that may have applied to you. So I just wanted to note

that -- you or your team. So I just wanted to note that at the outset.

And first, I would just like to understand, we talked about

funding from OBO, funding from other sources. Your office, the program

coordination branch, did not have a dedicated funding stream for

physical security upgrade projects. Is that right?

A True.

Q Okay. And could you just, for our benefit -- or there may

be some historical reasons for that, can you just briefly describe for

us why that's the case?

A Yeah, I can. When DS was right-sized in the early '90s,

what they did is, they looked at those offices that had employees that

were doing activities that were duplicated by other folks in other

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offices. So when we were right-sized, what they did is, they moved

the security funding for overseas upgrade projects from DS/PSD over

to OBO. DS/PSD, then, was able to eliminate the contract personnel

that they had in there for contracting and other activities that would

be related to that. So they were able to reduce that. And DS/PSD

then -- PCB became an oversight office to ensure compliance with the

standards that the projects being proposed by the RSOs made sense, you

know, could be implemented. And then coordinated the activities

between the post and OBO to get them funded and implemented.

So it was done when we were right-sized. That activity was moved

over, over to OBO as far as contracting and money management --

Q Okay. Sure.

A -- for physical security upgrades at existing facilities

overseas.

Q So did you have any direct authority over funding as it

related to physical security upgrades?

A No, no.

Q Okay. And so that resided then within OBO?

A OBO -- OBO has the ultimate authority to approve and fund

the projects. Okay? Now we would weigh in with our recommendation.

And based upon the threat environment at post, and what's going on in

the region, I would always add that to our support for a post-proposed

project --

Q Okay.

A -- to make it harder for them to say no.

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Q Okay. And did they ever say no?

A Normally, OBO is very good when it comes to perimeter

security, anti-ram measures, and access controls around the perimeter.

They are normally very good with approving the project.

Q Okay. So normally -- so there are some circumstances or

instances in which a request might not be fulfilled?

A Well, they may have to prioritize it. Let's say a request

coming in from Cairo is going to get higher consideration than a request

coming in from Milan, for example. Just for an example, okay?

Okay, Cairo ; Milan

So, you know, can we defer the project in Milan and roll that into

another project that we have planned 2 years down the road as a physical

security upgrade project, which OBO does at some older posts, some

legacy posts, where they will identify a post. They put together a

number of requests and they say, well this now qualifies for a physical

security upgrade project which they will then handle separately.

Q So in the last hour, you had mentioned a few different

sources of funding. You had indicated there was an LGP --

A Local guard program.

Q An LGP pot of money as well as you indicated a residential

pot of money?

A Residential security pot.

Q Who controlled the residential pot of money?

A It's shared between OBO, once again, and DS. It's my

understanding that if we own the property, OBO does the perimeter

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upgrades and the access control upgrades and DS would provide the

funding for any improvements from the facade in; in other words, the

grill work in the windows, a safe haven up in the family quarters or

something like that. So it's kind of a shared responsibility.

Q Okay. And within DS, was there a particular office that

controlled the residential funding?

A Residential security, yes.

Q Residential security. And where did that sit within DS?

Was that under International Programs?

A That was under IP, yeah.

Q Okay. So residential security and residential security

funding was a suboffice within DS/IP?

A I assume so. Yeah.

Q Do you recall whether there was any discussions about

seeking funding from that particular pot of money with respect to

physical security upgrades in Benghazi?

A Well, I think in regards to guard posts, elevated guard

posts, okay, let's see if LGP will fund that local guard program because

this is in support of their folks.

Q And did they?

A I don't recall. I don't recall.

Q Did residential security provide funding for that

particular project?

A I don't recall. I'd have to have a look at the files.

Q Do you know the disposition of any request that may have

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come in requesting elevated platforms for Benghazi?

A I think that was an issue that was discussed as far as

elevated guard platforms once they got a guard force in place. But

I'm not aware how far that went along in the planning process.

Q Okay.

A I think it may have been discussed as -- you know, I think

I recall seeing something here, $800 for a guard platform. Well,

that's probably going to be pretty shabby, made of plywood. I mean,

something. You need in that environment, you need something more made

out of metal, gates going up. But as an interim quick

fix, they could put something together if plywood was available. It

would just depend.

Q But you don't know the status of that request?

A I don't know.

Q Okay. That's fair.

So in describing these several different pots of money that were

available to you, if you needed funding --

A Well, there was only one pot of money available to me for

physical security upgrades, and that was our budget and finance guy

upstairs, . Now where he got the money, I don't know.

All I said is, I need $12,000 or $15,000 or $28,000. Whatever

the request that came in that morning, whatever that amount was, I would

make sure that I got it up to him and the division chief. And I'd say,

you know, this is the request from Benghazi. We need to get on this

right away. Let me know as far as funding.

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Q Did you manage any budgets within your office?

A No.

Q Did you have any visibility into any of the budgets?

A No, nothing with budget.

Q So you may not know the status of funding within any of these

particular pots of money?

A Well, from the physical security, I would get an email back.

You know, it's been approved. And I would then reach out to the RSO.

And I'd say, okay, project approved funding to be provided. Stand by.

Q Okay. I'd like to move on to the standards and the SECCA

requirements. I had a discussion with you previously, earlier today

where I asked you to clarify a comment that you'd made earlier about

a decision being made at a senior level. And I'd asked the question

with respect to OSPB standards. And I would just like to clarify my

comment as well, or my question to you, that when you said that there

was a decision made at the senior level with respect to SECCA waivers,

what you meant by "senior level." And if it was the same as the response

you gave to my question about the OSPB standards.

A Well, when I say a senior level, I'm talking folks that are

above me. All right? To me, that's a senior level. Okay. Middle

management.

Q So you weren't refer referring to a particular individual?

A No, not at all. I'm not sure where those decisions may have

been discussed or arrived at. But mid-level, you know, not -- senior

in this environment, I'm not talking about the upper echelon folks.

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Q So mid-level, would that be below the Deputy Assistant

Secretary level, in your view?

A Yeah, I think so.

Q I'd like to ask, you made, I think at several points today,

the comment or the statement that any request that you received that

you did your best to fill or to that effect.

A Yes.

Q I just wanted to ask, in the context of our discussion about

OSPB standards, was there any request for a physical security upgrade

that you did not meet because you had been told that OSPB standards

did not apply to Benghazi?

A No, no.

Q Okay. If we could just turn to Exhibit 8.

Real briefly, this is the action memorandum for Under Secretary

Kennedy.

A Okay.

Q It's an affirmation of what is characterized here as a

current policy regarding OSPB standards and to which facilities they

apply.

Our understanding in this space is obviously limited, sir. You

have an extensive career, a lot of experience in applying these

standards at particular facilities. We have reviewed several reports

on physical security at the State Department over the years, IG reports,

GAO reports, and have noted that even the most in-depth look into

physical security seems to be met with some understanding of how

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difficult these standards are to -- well, we'll put it this way:

So when I look at a document like this, in my mind, or in my view,

this is an affirmation of something that's a current policy, but it

may not be a current policy that's widely known throughout the

Department. And so, my understanding of that is based on having seen

some reports that say the physical security standards, whether they're

in an RSO handbook or whether they're in the Foreign Affairs Handbook,

or they're in the Foreign Affairs Manual, the effort requirements may

be indicated in different places, and sometimes they're not always

consistent.

So my question to you, what I would like to ask is, whether you

have any comment on that in terms of the clarity before this memo was

sent out as far as which standards applied to which facilities based

on how they're characterized or designated.

A Well, there's only one source for the physical security

standards. It's 12 FAH 5, which is unclassified, and 12 FAH 6, which

are the OSPB standards. And that is where you tell RSOs to go to for

guidance and what is applicable to what they're looking at. That is

where the standards are: 12 FAH 5 or 12 FAH 6.

Q Okay.

A Now there may be -- there's no -- the RSO handbook, I

haven't seen that in many, many, many years so I can't comment on what's

been updated in that. But in RSO documents in the past, you will always

be referred to the Department policy on physical security standards.

Please see -- in the old days, it was the PSD blue book; then it was

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replaced by the OSPB red book.

Q Okay. And I think that makes sense. Also understanding

that your day-to-day job was physical security for so many years. And

it sounds like if an RSO had a question to you, you would refer them

to one or two places.

A Or I'd look it up for them, and I'd get back to them, and

I'd email them the appropriate chapter and verse.

Q But if you were an RSO at post and you were looking for

support for these things, you have these two sources you just

identified. It sounds like there may be some other documents as well,

RSO security handbook and some other documents, places to rely on?

A If there is an RSO security handbook, under physical

security, they would be referred to where they should go, 12 FAH 5,

12 FAH 6.

Q But you have never set those different documents side by

side to see, for instance, if there were differences in terms of --

A No, it would be the same.

Q Okay. To your understanding, okay.

Just a few more cleanup questions.

We talked about the Accountability Review Board. You

mentioned -- you thought that there were a lot of recommendations that

came out of that?

A I thought there were, but --

Q For instance, 29 recommendations made by the Accountability

Review Board accepted by the State Department. Those were subdivided

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into numerous taskings, I guess, that went out to the relevant offices.

Is your sense -- at the time, had you reviewed the ARB

recommendations at any point?

A I read over it because we were already doing, you know,

implementing a lot of the corrective actions.

Q After the ARB report was issued, have you continue to work

in a physical security capacity at high threat posts?

A Yes.

Q Is your sense that the ARB recommendations have helped with

respect to physical security at high threat posts?

A Absolutely.

Q Okay. Can you explain why?

A State Department employees are much more knowledgeable now

of SECCA and OSPB physical security standards. And the folks that I

deal with the most in the overseas buildings office, they always ask

for the DS opinion on what they're doing on any project development

initiatives to the point, you know, they're inviting us to go out with

their survey teams. And DS, what do you think about this? You know,

they'll look to us to. When we get to a facility, DS, what do you think

about this? And if DS turns it down, then it's not going to happen.

Right now, DS and OBO Fire are -- you know, they can kill a project

like that. OBO Fire, there's no waiver or exception process for OBO

Fire. So if --

Q What is OBO Fire?

A That's the fire safety guys.

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Q Fire.

A They will go out with the team as well. And they'll look

at a facility. And if it doesn't meet the OBO requirements for fire

exits, emergency fire suppression systems, that type of life safety

issue, then they can turn a site down, no questions asked. We move

on.

DS now, as I was saying earlier, in the case of Alexandria, we're

doing a new consulate there in a tenant and commercial office space.

And we looked at 29 different facilities before we settled on the one

that we got, which is a wing of a hotel. But, again, "DS, what do you

think?" I said, There's a lack of setback. Okay.

Q In the beginning of your response, you mentioned the one

upshot of the Accountability Review Board was that people were more

aware.

A They're more attuned to the security requirements, yeah.

Q To the security requirements. And I just would like to

refer back to exhibit 8, which is again the Action Memo for Under

Secretary Kennedy, and ask in your view whether you view that as part

of that process that has been helping you inform Department personnel

of the existence and applicability of those security standards?

A It appears that way.

Q Okay. In your view, as you sit here today, is the

Department doing a better job at keeping its personnel safe?

A Absolutely.

Q And those improvements have been put in place in the wake

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of -- some of those improvements have they been put in place in the

wake of the attacks of Benghazi?

A I would say yes. I would say yes. We always get

improvements after we have an incident overseas. In '98, East Africa

bombings, things improved dramatically and they continue to improve,

you know, right along up until the present day.

Q And in any of these environments you described how the

Department operates and perhaps different environments today than it

has in the past. In any environment, are you ever able to completely

eliminate the risk to personnel there?

A No.

Q Okay.

A No.

Q So I would just like to put that into context.

You were asked a question of whether you felt Benghazi could

happen again, and you responded that, sure, it could.

A Sure.

Q Could I ask, just to put that in the context of your comment,

that eliminating risk completely --

A Well, not eliminating it. Reducing it. That's the key.

There's always risk overseas. You cannot eliminate that, but you can

reduce it. And how do you reduce it? You make your facilities harder

to penetrate, harder to attack.

Q When you mentioned, though, that an instance like Benghazi

can happen again, in your view, what more could the Department do to

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help prevent an occurrence like that from the physical security side?

A From a physical security side? I think the Department now

is making the strides necessary by identifying facilities that need

to be replaced with new office buildings, new embassy compounds. So,

I mean, that's a tremendous stride forward compared to the way the

Department used to build NOBs years ago because there was no funding

made available. Now that's changed. There is the political will to

provide the funding for new embassy compounds to be built overseas.

Q And you referred just a second ago to an acronym, NOB?

A New office building, new embassy compound. New office

building is a term that was used, and then they upgraded it to a new

embassy compound.

Q So is it your view then that the Department either has or

is in the process of taking steps in order to prevent another Benghazi

from occurring?

A Both. They have, and they are taking steps every day to

prevent Benghazi.

Q Okay. And from a physical security side, is there more that

could be done?

A I think we're doing -- I think we're doing what we can do

right now, based upon what --

We're doing what we can do for our properties. Can we do more?

That would require doing things outside of our property line in

cooperation with the host government. And normally, they usually say

no.

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Q Okay.

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. Kenny. We will go back on.

BY MR. KENNY:

Q Before I shift into the next section, I just have one or

two quick questions I can ask you.

You referred earlier to an interior chain link fence project. Do

you know the disposition of that project? Do you know whether that

was ultimately --

A I want to say that was installed with razor wire atop, yeah.

Q And do you know that because --

A I have pictures.

Q You received pictures indicating it may have been built.

A Yeah.

Q Okay. So to your understanding, that project had been

completed?

A Yes.

Q Do you ever recall an email or communication from the RSO

in Tripoli about that project?

A No.

Q Okay. So do you recall whether anyone in Tripoli had, for

instance, recommended against that project?

A That I don't recall.

Q Or that they may have requested that the scope of work be

changed in some way to focus on the perimeter wall as opposed to an

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interior fence?

A That I don't recall. I don't recall. I know that with the

interior fence, I recall that the owner of the property didn't want

anything being done to the perimeter wall. So I said, okay. What we

need to do is reduce your perimeter, okay? And put up a secondary

barrier around the property, around the structure, to provide an

additional layer of protection.

Q Subsequent to the attacks, have you learned whether or not

that fence project was completed?

A No.

Q For instance, do you recall hearing anything about the

timeline of the attacks and how the attackers entered the compound,

that the interior chain link fence played any role?

A I am not aware of anything, no.

Q We talked a little bit about the interplay between your

office and the RSO, the security officers in the field. In your

communications with RSOs or ARSOs in Benghazi, did any of them ever

tell you that the special mission at Benghazi was a suicide mission?

A I don't recall. I don't recall that. I don't -- yeah, I

don't recall anybody going on paper with something like that.

Q Did any of them ever tell you that they have been told not

to raise concerns about security staffing in Benghazi?

A No.

Q Did any of them tell you they feared retaliation if they

advocated for security staffing or physical security upgrades to the

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mission?

A No.

Q At this point, we'll shift into our final portion. And let

me just begin by saying that there have been a series of public

allegations that have been made about the attacks in the 3-1/2 years

now since the attacks occurred. And what we'd like to do is ask you,

as we've asked other witnesses, whether you have any firsthand

knowledge to support those allegations. And we're not looking for you

to speculate, but if you do have any information to support those, we'd

obviously welcome that.

There's several here. So if you don't have any evidence, we'll

just note that, and we'll move on to the next allegation.

The first one is, it has been alleged that Secretary of State

Clinton intentionally blocked military action on the night of the

attacks. One Congressman speculated that, quote, "Secretary Clinton

told Leon (Panetta) to stand down," closed quote. This resulted in

the Defense Department not sending more assets to help in Benghazi.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton ordered

Secretary of Defense Panetta to stand down on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary of State Clinton

issued any kind of order to Secretary of Defense Panetta on the night

of the attacks?

A No.

Q I will move to the next one.

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It's been alleged that Secretary Clinton personally signed an

April 2012 cable denying security to Libya.

The Washington Post Fact Checker evaluated this claim and gave

it four Pinocchios, its highest award for false claims.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton personally signed

an April 2012 cable denying security resources to Libya?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton was

personally involved in providing specific instruction on day-to-day

security resources in Benghazi?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military operations in Libya in

spring of 2011.

Do you have any evidence that Secretary Clinton misrepresented

or fabricated intelligence on the risk posed by Qadhafi to his own

people in order to garner support for military options in Libya in

spring 2011?

A No.

Q It's been alleged the U.S. mission in Benghazi included

transferring weapons to Syrian rebels or to other countries by a

partisan report issued by the House Permanent Select Committee on

Intelligence found that, quote, "the CIA was not collecting and

shipping arms from Libya to Syria," closed quote, and that they found,

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quote, "no support for this allegation," closed quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the House Intelligence

Committee's bipartisan report finding that the CIA was not shipping

arms from Libya to Syria?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the U.S. facilities in

Benghazi were being used to facilitate weapons transfers from Libya

to Syria or to any other foreign country?

A No.

Q A team of CIA security personnel was temporarily delayed

from departing the Annex to assist the special mission compound on the

night of the attacks, and there have been a number of allegations about

the cause of and appropriateness of that delay.

House Intelligence Committee issued a bipartisan report

concluding that the team was not ordered to, quote, "stand down," closed

quote, but that instead there were tactical disagreements on the ground

over how quickly to depart.

Do you have any evidence that would contradict the House

Intelligence Committee's finding that there was no stand-down order

to CIA personnel?

A No.

Q Putting aside whether you personally agree with the

decision to delay temporarily, or think it was the right decision, do

you have any evidence that there was a bad or improper reason behind

the temporary delay of the CIA security personnel who departed the Annex

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to assist the Special Mission Compound?

A No.

Q A concern has been raised by one individual in the course

of producing documents to the Accountability Review Board damaging

documents may have been removed or scrubbed out of that production.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from materials that were

provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

directed anyone else at the State Department to remove or scrub damaging

documents from the materials that were provided to the ARB?

A No.

Q Let me ask these questions also for documents that were

provided to Congress.

Do you have any evidence that anyone at the State Department

removed or scrubbed damaging documents from the materials that were

provided to Congress?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that CIA Deputy Director Michael Morell

altered unclassified talking points about the Benghazi attacks for

political reasons, and that he then misrepresented his actions when

he told Congress that the CIA, quote, "faithfully performed our duties

in accordance with the highest standards of objectivity and

nonpartisanship," closed quote.

1649
164

Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Mike Morell gave

false or intentionally misleading testimony to Congress about the

Benghazi talking points?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that CIA Deputy Director Morell

altered the talking points provided to Congress for political reasons?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that Ambassador Susan Rice made an

intentional misrepresentation when she spoke on the Sunday talk shows

about the Benghazi attacks.

Do you have any evidence that Ambassador Rice intentionally

misrepresented facts about the Benghazi attacks on the Sunday talk

shows?

A No.

Q It has been alleged that the President of the United States

was, quote, "virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief," closed quote, on

the night of the attacks and that he was, quote, "missing in action,"

closed quote.

Do you have any evidence to support the allegation that the

President was virtually AWOL as Commander in Chief, or missing in action

on the night of the attacks?

A No.

Q It's been alleged that a team of four military personnel

at Embassy Tripoli on the night of the attacks were considering flying

on the second plane to Benghazi but were ordered by their superiors

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to, quote, "stand down," closed quote; meaning to cease all operations.

Military officials have stated that those four individuals were instead

ordered to, quote, "remain in place," closed quote, in Tripoli to

provide security and medical assistance at that location.

A Republican staff report issued by the House Armed Services

Committee found that, quote, "There was no stand-down order issued to

U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who saw to join the fight in

Benghazi," closed quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict the conclusion of the House

Armed Services Committee, that there was no stand-down order issued

to U.S. military personnel in Tripoli who sought to join the fight in

Benghazi?

A No.

Q Last one.

It's been alleged that the military failed to deploy assets on

the night of the attacks that would have saved lives. However, former

Republican Congressman Howard "Buck" McKeon, the former chairman of

the House Armed Services Committee, conducted a review of the attacks

after which he stated, quote, "Given where the troops were, how quickly

the thing all happened, and how quickly it all dissipated, we probably

couldn't have done more than we did," closed quote.

Do you have any evidence to contradict Congressman McKeon's

conclusion?

A No.

Q Do you have any evidence that the Pentagon had military

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assets available to them on the night of the attacks that could have

saved lives, but the Pentagon leadership intentionally decided not to

deploy?

A No.

Q Thank you. I think that concludes --

Ms. Jackson. I think we're done. Mr. , thank you very

much.

Mr. Kenny. Thank you very much. We'll go off the record.

[Whereupon, at 3:03 p.m., the interview was concluded.]

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