U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

i 

99–630 2016

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–99] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES HEARING 

ON

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 2017 

BUDGET REQUEST AND SEAPOWER 

AND PROJECTION FORCES 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 25, 2016 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, Vice Chair 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

STEVE RUSSELL,Oklahoma 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

DAVID SIENICKI, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

KATHERINE REMBER, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ........................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Stackley, Hon. Sean J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition; accompanied by VADM Joseph P. Mulloy, USN, 

Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Integration of Capabilities and Resources (N8), and LtGen Robert S. Walsh, USMC, Deputy Commandant, 

Combat Development and Integration ............................................................... 1 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces ............................ 39 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 37 

Stackley, Hon. Sean J., joint with VADM Joseph P. Mulloy and LtGen 

Robert S. Walsh ............................................................................................ 42 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 87 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 87 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Byrne .......................................................................................................... 98 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 91 

Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................ 99 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 96 

Mr. Peters ......................................................................................................... 101 

Mrs. Walorski ................................................................................................... 102 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 2017 BUDGET REQUEST 

AND SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, 

Washington, DC, Thursday, February 25, 2016. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:01 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. FORBES. I want to welcome all of our members and the distinguished panel of Navy and Marine Corps leaders for today’s 

hearing. 

We are in a little bit of a time crunch because they will be calling 

votes and—just actually did. See, instead of being prophetic, I 

guess I am a historian. They just called the votes, so Mr. Courtney 

and I both are simply going to submit our opening statements for 

the record. I think Joe has agreed with that. 

[The prepared statements of Mr. Forbes and Mr. Courtney can 

be found in the Appendix beginning on page 37.] 

Mr. FORBES. So, with that, Mr. Stackley, if you could provide us 

your opening remarks—it is my understanding that you are the 

only one to provide opening remarks—and then we will recess, take 

the votes, and come back and begin with our questions. 

So, Mr. Stackley, we are glad to have you here today. 

As all of you know, Sean Stackley is the Assistant Secretary of 

the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition. 

Thank you for being with us here today, and we look forward to 

your remarks. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND 

ACQUISITION; ACCOMPANIED BY VADM JOSEPH P. MULLOY, 

USN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, INTEGRATION 

OF CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES (N8), AND LTGEN ROBERT S. WALSH, USMC, DEPUTY COMMANDANT, COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION 

Secretary STACKLEY. Thank you. 

Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Courtney, distinguished 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to address Department of the Navy acquisition programs. 
2 

Joining me today are Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Capabilities and Resources, Vice Admiral Joe Mulloy, and Deputy 

Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, Lieutenant 

General Bob Walsh. 

So, with the permission of the subcommittee, I propose to provide 

brief opening remarks and submit a formal statement for the 

record. 

Mr. FORBES. Without objection, your full remarks will be submitted as part of the record. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Thank you, sir. 

On behalf of our Navy and Marine Corps, I would like to start 

by thanking this committee for your strong support in the 2016 defense authorization and appropriations bills. Not only has Congress 

fully supported our request, the committee increased funding for 

our most critical programs, sending a strong signal regarding the 

priority you place on the role of our Navy and Marine Corps. 

We are committed to making good on that investment, to uphold 

our end of our shared responsibility to protect the Nation, to take 

care of our men and women in uniform, and to do so in the most 

cost-conscious manner possible and protect the taxpayer. 

We have been faithful to our fiscal responsibilities, leveraging 

every tool available to drive down cost. We have tightened requirements, maximized competition, increased the use of fixed-price contracts, and capitalized on multiyear procurements. And we have attacked our cost of doing business so that more of our resources can 

be dedicated to making warfighting capability. 

However, fiscal challenges remain. Across the past 4 fiscal years, 

the Department of the Navy’s budget has been reduced by $30 billion compared to the funding that we determined was necessary to 

fully meet the Defense Strategic Guidance. This fiscal environment 

continues to drive tough choices and requires new thinking in order 

to improve the balance between capability, capacity, readiness, and 

the vital industrial base. 

Because, independent of this fiscal environment, the demand for 

naval presence remains high. Today, greater than half of our fleet 

is at sea, and nearly 80,000 sailors and marines are deployed. So, 

from the Sea of Japan to the eastern Mediterranean, they are our 

first defense against the threat of ballistic missiles. And from the 

Straits of Hormuz to the Straits of Malacca, they are the providers 

of maritime security. And below the surface of the sea, they are our 

Nation’s surest deterrent against the use of strategic weapons. 

They are engaged in expeditionary maneuver from the Western 

Pacific to West Africa, ready to move ashore should conditions on 

the ground call for it, or provide humanitarian assistance wherever 

a disaster may occur. 

Therefore, we have placed a priority on forward presence, nearterm readiness, investment in those future capabilities critical to 

our long-term technical superiority and stability in our shipbuilding program. We are well on the way to a 300-ship Navy in 2019 

and to meeting our overall requirement for a 308-ship Navy by 

2021. In 2015, we delivered 6 ships to the Navy, but, more impressively, we launched an additional 9 and laid keels for 11 more 

ships. 
3 

We are preparing CVN 78, the Gerald Ford, our first new-design 

aircraft carrier in 40 years, for sea trials in June and continue construction on her sister ship, CVN 79, the John F. Kennedy. And in 

doing so, we have been successful to drive cost control and improved cost on these capital ships, and we will continue to do so. 

We are also proceeding with planning material procurement to 

refuel CVN 73, the George Washington, scheduled to start next 

year. Meanwhile, DDG–1000, our first new destroyer design in 30 

years, successfully completed her first at-sea trials in December 

and is readying to return to sea next month. 

Meanwhile, DDG–51 construction is progressing well with the 

first restart ship, DDG–113, on track to deliver this year and follow 

ships 114 and 115 into the water. Equally important, we are on 

track to award the first Flight III destroyer with the air and missile defense radar later this year. And we look forward to working 

with you as we seek to award the additional DDG–51 that was incrementally funded by the 2016 defense bill. 

The Littoral Combat Ship [LCS] reached a significant milestone 

in 2015 with the deliveries and commissioning of Milwaukee and 

Jackson. The construction program continues its strong cost improvement, and we are on track to award three LCS ships in 2016. 

As you are aware, we revised the program 1 year ago to upgrade 

the LCS with increased capabilities. The first of these frigates is 

to be procured not later than 2019. But, as a result of the budget 

reductions since that decision, this year’s budget downsizes the program from 52 to 40 ships. The two ships requested in 2017 are the 

minimum necessary to maintain a healthy industrial base until we 

can run a down-select competition for the frigate. We will keep you 

advised as we formulate the acquisition strategy for this revised 

program. 

In submarines, the Virginia program continues to deliver below 

budget and ahead of schedule. The next major upgrade, Virginia 

Payload Modules, is on track to replace the undersea strike capability of the SSGNs, guided missile submarines, as they retire in 

the next decade. 

And we continue to pick up the pace on design and development 

on the Ohio replacement program to support her critical schedule, 

releasing the contract solicitation for detail, design, and construction of the lead boat earlier this year. 

In other major programs, the big-deck amphibious assault ship, 

Tripoli, LHA–7, is on track towards her 50 percent complete milestone. We are on schedule with LPD–17 class construction. And we 

are off to a good start building Hershel ‘‘Woody’’ Williams, our expeditionary stage base at NASSCO [National Steel and Shipbuilding Company] shipyard. 

Meanwhile, we have commenced ordering material for a 12th 

LPD [Landing Platform/Dock] and are evaluating proposals for 

three major new programs to be awarded this year—the fleet oiler, 

T–AO(X); the next big-deck amphib, LHA–8; and the design for the 

LSD [Dock Landing Ship]–41/49 class replacement, LX(R). And, 

separately, we commenced procurement of our newest Ship-toShore Connector to provide high-speed surface transfer of the Marine Corps from the sea. 
4 

Now, this committee has long been interested in sustaining the 

Navy’s cruiser force, and we are proceeding with the planning, material procurement, and execution for our cruiser and our LSD 

modernization programs. The first 4 of 11 remaining cruisers enter 

modernization this year in accordance with congressional legislation. 

This budget requests an additional $521 million across the Future Years Defense Plan [FYDP] in addition to the prior appropriated funding to support cruiser modernization, including $183 

million in 2017. But it proposes an alternative modernization plan 

within this funding profile to ensure the long-term capability and 

capacity for the air defense commander platforms. 

Approximately $3.5 billion would have been required in the 

2017–2021 years to continue cruiser modernization per congressional direction. We are unable to fund this approach while our top 

line was decreasing. Nonetheless, we are committed to retaining 

these ships to perform the air defense commander mission into the 

2040s. And the Navy’s submission provides a path to do so while 

respecting previously approved global force management decisions 

for these ships. 

In major aviation programs under the subcommittee’s purview, 

the Navy’s new maritime patrol aircraft, the P–8A Poseidon, is 

demonstrating its game-changing abilities today on deployment. 

Production continues smoothly, and we complete procurement of 

the 109 aircraft by 2019. 

We continue to field the Navy’s E–2D Advanced Hawkeye, replacing legacy early-warning aircraft with this new capability that 

would provide air defense far beyond that available to today’s 

Navy. And, meanwhile, the Navy’s high-endurance unmanned maritime surveillance aircraft, the Triton, is continuing integration activities and flight-testing at Pax River. 

In summary, the Department’s 2017 budget request has balanced 

the resources provided by the Bipartisan Budget Act [BBA] with 

our requirement to provide the capability, the capacity, and readiness necessary to uphold national policies, to protect our Nation, 

and assure our allies. We look for your continued strong support 

for this budget request, as you have shown in this year’s 2016 

budget. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before 

you today, and we look forward to answering your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Stackley, Admiral 

Mulloy, and General Walsh can be found in the Appendix on page 

42.] 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, thank you so much for those remarks. 

And I want to reiterate what the Secretary said. We also have 

with us today Vice Admiral Joe Mulloy, who is the Deputy Chief 

of Naval Operations for Integration of Capabilities and Resources. 

Admiral, thank you for your service to our country, but thank 

you for always being willing to testify before us. 

And, also, Lieutenant General Robert Walsh, who is the Deputy 

Commandant for Combat Development and Integration. 

General, we appreciate you being here too. 
5 

To all three of you, as Mr. Courtney and I told you beforehand, 

we would each consider it a privilege to call any one or all three 

of you our friends. And we appreciate the service you have done for 

our country. 

We do have a series of questions we have to ask, so please don’t 

feel that those questions are in any way at you as much as they 

are to this budget and making sure we understand. This is probably one of the most bipartisan committees in Congress. It is probably one of the most bipartisan subcommittees. The range of expertise we have, each of our members are going to be able to ask you 

some very good questions on their subject matter. 

But I want to kind of begin with an overview. I normally defer 

mine to the end, but I want us to start off—and I told you each 

this question a few minutes ago so you would have to time to think 

about it. 

Tell us, if you would, is this budget a budget whereby you come 

before us and say, ‘‘This is the absolute best we believe we can do 

with the dollars that are given to us,’’ or is this the budget that 

you have analyzed and looked at and said, ‘‘This is the budget we 

need to defend and protect the United States of America’’? 

And either one. This is a tag-team match, so you can have it. I 

am not trying to put anybody on the spot. We just want to get the 

answers. So whoever wants to handle that, we will let you do it. 

Secretary STACKLEY. I will start. 

First, it absolutely is the best we can do for the dollars that we 

have. I mean, that is just fundamental. The real question that you 

are asking, though, is whether this is sufficient, and that is obviously a tough question to answer. 

And I would just go back historically and start with the Defense 

Strategic Guidance that we described goes back to the 2012 timeframe and that since then our budget has dropped by $30 billion. 

So, back in the 2012 timeframe, I think we laid out a strategic 

guidance that informed our investments, what we would need nearterm, long-term, current readiness, future readiness, to provide for 

the security of the Nation. 

Inside of the Department of the Navy, when you pull $30 billion 

out of that, you have to be extraordinarily judicious to make those 

moves and not impair the security of the Nation. So, each year, 

each year, we have had to come back and reduce what our projection would be for defense of the Nation and do that in the best riskbalanced way we can. 

So it is a—you are looking at a smaller budget and, therefore, reductions across every account—operations, maintenance—— 

Mr. FORBES. So I don’t want to cut you off because I told you at 

the end you could have all the time you want, but I just want to 

get clarity for us. When you guys are coming here, you are basing 

this budget primarily on the dollars that you have been allocated 

as opposed to an assessment that says, ‘‘This is what we need overall to defend and protect the United States of America.’’ Is that a 

fair statement? 

Admiral, you look anxious to get in there. 

Admiral MULLOY. Yes, sir. I would say that is a fair statement 

of looking at the dollars we have, especially in light of the 2017 Bipartisan Budget Act. And despite getting money in 2021 for the 
6 

Ohio, the incremental costs to Ohio replacement, we are constrained. 

I will also tell you it takes time to analyze. We are looking at 

the world ahead, and one of the items we will talk later is the 

Force Structure Assessment, I am sure, is that we are going to 

start a new one. And the 308 Navy is based upon a force structure 

that was set back in 2012 and amended in 2014. At that point, 

there was a man named Putin who wasn’t quite so active in the 

world, the Chinese hadn’t grown as big, and all these five threats. 

So we are going to take a hard look at it. What I will tell you 

is that we have done the best we can with what we have. But the 

projections will tell you is the threats to the United States of America are growing. And it is mirrored by myself talking to Admiral 

Haney and Admiral Harris in the last couple days. I think they will 

tell you the same thing from the combatant commander viewpoint. 

Mr. FORBES. And they have been telling us that. And, as I said 

and I preface it and I will continue to say it because it is just true, 

you guys are the good guys. You guys are wonderful guys. But we 

just need to know what we are looking at with these dollars. 

And the reality, Mr. Secretary, as we looked at that strategic 

guidance in 2012, the world has gotten a whole lot more threatening, I guess is the best way we can say, since 2012, and yet our 

numbers have gone down. 

We looked at the fact Admiral Harris testified that we can only 

meet 62 percent of his needs for submarines right now. But, in addition to that, we all know in 2007 the Navy could meet 90 percent 

of the verified or validated requirements of our combatant commanders around the globe. This year, my understanding is we will 

be below 45 percent, give or take. That means we have cut it in 

half. 

Are either of those two numbers acceptable numbers? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Clearly not to the combatant commanders. 

Mr. FORBES. Clearly not to—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. They set the requirements. Therefore, the 

answer you are going to get here is ‘‘clearly not.’’ 

Mr. FORBES. Good. 

And the second thing is—and, again, you guys are good guys, so 

this is not directed at you. You are doing the best with what you 

have. We just need to know what we need. 

When you talk about 308 ships, Mr. Secretary, by 2021, with the 

dollars that we currently have allocated and based on the dollars 

we have had, can we get to 308 ships with those dollars, or are we 

going to need more dollars to be able to get there? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Here is the fact. We are going to 

get to 308 ships independent of the 2017 budget; 2017 and beyond 

determines what size Navy we will have after 2021 because that 

is how long it takes to build a ship. 

So the ships that will be delivered by 2021 have been authorized 

and appropriated in the years prior to this budget year. What we 

are setting in 2017 and beyond is the course for the size of the 

Navy past 2021. 

Mr. FORBES. And as you heard and we talked about before this 

hearing, Eric Labs, in his testimony from the Congressional Budget 

Office [CBO]—and I don’t think you refute that, that if we continue 
7 

with the degree of spending we have had for shipbuilding and ship 

construction on an average over the last 30 years, instead of increasing the number of ships, we will ultimately be down to 237 

ships. 

Is that a fair assessment that he made, or is that inaccurate? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Let me put it in context. As we go forward, 

starting in 2021, you see a significant increase in our funding required to support a shipbuilding program due in large part to the 

Ohio replacement. 

And I think Dr. Labs’ assessment and the Navy’s long-range 

shipbuilding plan both say the same thing. If we constrain our 

shipbuilding account to historic levels, then, due to the cost associated with building an Ohio replacement—and we are going to build 

it—other shipbuilding production lines are going to have to be cut 

significantly. And that will drive a significant reduction in the size 

of our Navy. 

Mr. FORBES. Would his projection of 237, 238 ships be in the ballpark of what the Navy would assess it to be if we continue on 

course? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I would say it is very close. You would have 

to make some assessment in terms of which ships would be built 

and not, but I would tell you that my number is probably in the 

240 to 250 range. 

Mr. FORBES. So we have a huge delta that we have to make up 

somewhere. Does the Navy have any idea where that delta would 

be made up today if we were to try to say how do we get those dollars? 

Admiral MULLOY. Sir, it comes back to be a balance. I would not 

constrain it to shipbuilding, but then you have to pressurize every 

other aspect of the Navy. And what I will tell you is we would not 

be able to totally within the Navy come up with all that money. 

So it goes back again to my discussions with the Secretary of Defense’s staff, is that with that level of shipbuilding necessary and 

from to 2021 on to 2035 to do Ohio replacement and all the other 

aspects we need for the combatant commanders is going to require 

very likely an effort from the Department of Defense and very likely from the whole country to raise. 

Because, historically, when we built the Trident-class submarine, 

the Navy and Department of Defense budget went up, to a certain 

extent, to cover strategic forces. We saw the first inclination of that 

this year. In 2021, what you will see is that the first increment of 

that budget was funded with an increase in the Navy budget from 

OMB [Office of Management and Budget]. We need more of that 

from OMB and from Congress to be able to build the strategic 

force, build the Navy, operate the Navy, and then be part of the 

joint force, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, let me ask you this. Obviously, part of 

what we have to do in looking at our force structure is what we 

project some of our peer competitors to have in their force structure. 

Let’s go out to, let’s say, 2025. The number of submarines we 

would be looking at then as a Navy if we stay on the current projections we have compared to the number of submarines that China 
8 

would have, let’s say, in 2025, do we have any kind of estimate of 

the disparity between those two numbers? 

Admiral MULLOY. Well, I mean, right now, we know they are 

somewhere around 70. And we can come back with a classified 

brief on the numbers. But our numbers will be dropping to below 

48 by 2025 and going to a nadir of 41. 

Mr. FORBES. By 2025, wouldn’t we be at 41? 

Secretary STACKLEY. No. By 2025, we will be at 48 submarines. 

Mr. FORBES. About 2021 we will be at 41. 

Secretary STACKLEY. In 2025—— 

Mr. FORBES. Oh, 2029 we will be at 41. 

Admiral MULLOY. 2029, we will be at 41. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. And do we have any unclassified projection of where 

they will be at that time? 

Admiral MULLOY. At least 70, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

Admiral MULLOY. At least 70, and they are building. So, I mean, 

without a doubt—now, you get back into a whole quality-versusquantity issue. But, at the same time, the Russians are also building—we talked about the other country there—is they are continuing building. They build much higher-end submarines. To their 

numbers, I am not ready to forecast—— 

Mr. FORBES. I gotcha. 

Admiral MULLOY [continuing]. What they would have, but they 

are certainly building as well. So the threats on the undersea environment continue to go up with the number of submarines being 

built by everyone else. 

And that comes back to this whole point about shipbuilding that 

I think we will start with and end on this day, is that the number 

of submarines we have was put in motion a long time ago, with not 

building and then not going to two a year, that we don’t want to 

take that a case with DDGs [destroyers] or other ships is we need 

to continue to build or we will have a falloff in all our classes of 

ships if we don’t on a regular basis. 

So, once again, to support the Marines, we have to build the 

amphibs on a regular basis. And that is that competition Mr. 

Stackley talked about. Shipbuilding has to be able to go up, and 

is it coming out of the rest of the Navy, or is it coming out of DOD 

[Department of Defense], or is it coming as a conscious effort of 

this country to say shipbuilding is important enough? But the submarine program, is it asomatic or directly related to decisions made 

10 to 15 years ago? 

Mr. FORBES. Good. 

Well, let’s spin off from there, then, to the general, because, General, we don’t want you to not play a role in this. The LPD–28, was 

that crucial to the Marine Corps, to get that LPD–28? 

General WALSH. Thank you for the question, Chairman Forbes, 

and also Ranking Member Courtney and all of you for having us 

here and all you do for the Nation and for the Marine Corps. 

I was in a unique position last year because I was up on the 

CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] staff, on the OPNAV staff, working the LX(R) [amphibious assault ship] program and working the 

LPD–28, trying to bridge that gap from LSD to the LX(R). So I 

think the LPD–28 will provide us that capability now that we have 
9 

made that decision to the LX(R) to be that derivative of the LPD– 

17, to use that common hull form, that the LPD–28 certainly provides us, you know, additional amphib capability in a great, you 

know, ship that we needed because of the amphib numbers. As you 

know, we are at 30 amphib ships right now, far below the requirement that we have. 

So the committee helping us to add that 12th LPD is certainly 

going to be well-appreciated out in the operating forces. 

Mr. FORBES. And, General, can you tell me what the Marine 

Corps requirement currently is? 

General WALSH. Our requirement has always been 38 amphib 

ships. 

Mr. FORBES. And how many do you have today? 

General WALSH. And today, as we speak, we have 30. 

Mr. FORBES. Was the LPD a luxury or was it a necessity for the 

Marine Corps? 

General WALSH. Well, to get up to the requirement that we need, 

I think it certainly is one of those things that is required. So, going 

back to your sufficiency question, we are basing our numbers, you 

know, really on what the Department can afford. 

Mr. FORBES. And I understand—and, you know, again, you guys 

are the good guys. We appreciate that. What we are trying to find 

out is whether the budget is driving what we are doing or whether 

our strategy is driving what we are doing. 

And the main thing I am saying—you have a 38 requirement. 

General WALSH. Right. 

Mr. FORBES. Was that LPD a luxury or was it a necessity for the 

Marine Corps? 

General WALSH. No, I would say it was a necessity to get us— 

so I think, if I could put it into perspective, we talked about combatant commander demand. Combatant commander demand is 

very high. But how to put that in perspective from our perspective 

would be, it has been a long time since we have really ever had 

any ships in the Mediterranean. We used to have Guard MEUs 

[Marine expeditionary units] in the Mediterranean. 

We have been focused pretty much on the Central Command 

AOR [area of responsibility] for a long time, but as you look around 

in the AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command] AOR and certainly the 

EUCOM [U.S. European Command] AOR, what is going on in 

Ukraine, Crimea, what you see taking place in North Africa with 

ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] spreading, the disorganization there in Libya, there is no question about it that the presence that we would like to have would be on amphibious warships 

in the Mediterranean. 

Right now, as you are well aware, we have our Special Purpose 

Marine Air-Ground Task Force-Crisis Response-Africa that is bed 

down in Moro ́n, Spain. Works between Moro ́n, Spain; Sigonella, 

Sicily; and Souda Bay, Crete—back and forth between those places. 

We would much prefer to be on an amphibious warship to be able 

to provide that capability. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, you just heard the general say that 

the LPD–28 was a necessity to the Marine Corps, but it wasn’t included in the Navy’s budget when you submitted it to us last year. 
10 

Why wasn’t it included? Or do you disagree with the general that 

it was a necessity? 

Secretary STACKLEY. No, we did include it in last year’s budget. 

The 2016 budget included the funding required for the LPD—the 

balance of funding required for the LPD–28. We have the material 

on order. We expect to have that ship on contract at the end of this 

year. 

The program of record that preceded the LPD–28, General Walsh 

is correct that 38 is the number of amphibs required to provide a 

full two Marine expeditionary brigade lift for major combat operations. That is 38 ships. 

The CNO and the Commandant for 6 years now have agreed that 

34 would be the objective number of amphibs for the force which 

takes on some risk. Of that 34, the mix of ships would be—at that 

time was decided to be 11 large-deck amphibs, 11 LPD–17-class 

ships, and 12 LSD–41/49 class. 

By adding the LPD–28, one, that greatly relieves the risk associated with 34 versus 38 amphibs; two, it does provide a bridge for 

the industrial base between the end of construction of the LPD–17 

and the LX(R); and most importantly was the Department of the 

Navy’s decision that we would make LX(R)—we would design and 

build LX(R) as a modification to the LPD–17 hull form, for all the 

right reasons. And so now that LPD–28 helps to provide the bridge 

for the industrial base, for the design base, for the vendor base, as 

well as alleviating some of the lift considerations. 

So now we will have 12 LPD–17s, the 11 big-deck amphibs, and 

then the LX(R) program, getting us up to about a 34-amphib force 

for the foreseeable future. 

Mr. FORBES. Two last questions from me, and then we will go to 

Mr. Courtney. 

The proposal you have is to take out a carrier air wing. What is 

the current statutory requirement for the number of carrier air 

wings that we are supposed to have? 

Admiral MULLOY. Sir, the current statutory requirement is to 

have 10 air wings. 

Mr. FORBES. And if we took one out, what would be down to at 

that point in time? 

Admiral MULLOY. Yes, sir, we would be down to nine. And we intend to submit a legislative proposal requesting relief from that. 

Mr. FORBES. Without that legislative proposal passing, are you 

able to take that carrier air wing out? 

Admiral MULLOY. No, sir. It would be blocked by congressional 

action. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. And do you not have a proposal to begin 

doing that by October 1? 

Admiral MULLOY. The proposal was to put that in motion, but 

none of the squadrons would actually be deactivated at that time. 

We funded the air wing and the squadron for what is called halfyear, so the people and the operations are funded for half a year, 

with the anticipation we would have some time to be able to coordinate that. 

Mr. FORBES. So the Navy is in a position to begin to put something in motion that statutorily they are prohibited from doing? 
11 

Admiral MULLOY. Yes, sir. We have to—that is why we send over 

the leg [legislative] proposal when the law was subsumed, was that 

we would be able to be able to come over and make that case, that 

we think that with the current lay-down of 11 nuclear aircraft carriers and their maintenance structure and the way they cycle 

through life, that 9 air wings actually lines up appropriately, such 

that they don’t have air wings that don’t have a carrier to go to, 

and we have had some air wings that have spent 4 years—— 

Mr. FORBES. How many carriers are we required to have statutorily? 

Admiral MULLOY. Required to have 11, and we have 10 currently 

on a waiver, and we are building the Ford, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. And if you have 10 carriers that are operational and one that is being refueled, how many air wings would 

you need to supply—— 

Admiral MULLOY. Normally, in the previous part of the Navy, 

that would be required to have one less. It would be 10. But as you 

look at the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier and the maintenance structure they go through, which is one of them is always in a 4-year 

refueling overhaul, one is always in the 16-month docking maintenance availability, and two are in 6-month availabilities, as you 

cycle through, right now, as we have laid out the carrier plan 

through 2025, at no time does an aircraft carrier that would be 

operational not have an air wing that would be part of their full 

what we call the Optimized Fleet Response Plan [OFRP]. This actually lines up that, in that plan, there are actually 3 air wings 

that will spend 11 to 22 months doing basic maintenance training 

and planning without an aircraft carrier to be attached to, given 

I only have 9 of the 11 aircraft carriers. 

Mr. FORBES. So your testimony is, then, that you need to reduce 

the air wing not because of budgetary restraints but because you 

just don’t need that carrier. 

Admiral MULLOY. It is a combination of primarily—it aided me 

as a cost reduction there, but it was really lined up. We had looked 

at this a couple years when I was doing the transition of the squadrons, the flexibility of having an air wing offline long enough to 

change the airplanes from the Prowlers to the Growlers, the helicopters to new design, and the more Hornet—the Hornet E and Fs. 

But, at this point in time, given the 11—or 10 and going to 11 

aircraft carrier nuclear maintenance strategy—and the way air 

wings deploy is they don’t go off like the Air Force AEF [air expeditionary force]—9 air wings actually lines up as the right business 

case, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, the last question for mine is: Navy 

came over a few years ago and they wanted to do away with some 

of our cruisers. Then they came back to us and said that, oh, we 

rethought that, and we really just want to modernize them, we 

don’t want to kill them. And now they are coming back and want 

to lay them up again. 

And we have a requirement for 88 high-end surface combatants. 

How do you get to that 88 without those cruisers? And, secondly, 

where is the money to bring those cruisers back? Is there any 

money proposed to do that, or is this just another way of saying 

we are going to euthanize these cruisers? 
12 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, let me start with the number of large 

surface combatants. In fact, with our build rate today, we do have 

a period of time where we not just meet our large surface combatant requirement, which is cruisers plus destroyers, but we do have 

excess, we have additional capacity. And so we actually get up to 

a number of about 100 surface combatants in the mid-2020s. 

So that is not where our area of risk is. Our area of risk, in 

terms of the air defense commander, the capability that the cruisers provide, is when they start coming—they start decommissioning as early as 2020. So, in 2020, we start to decommission the 

first 11 cruisers. And the discussion that we are having today and 

the issue that we have been wrestling with the last several years 

is the modernization program for the last 11 cruisers. So we have 

four of them off and going, and by congressional legislation we 

would be allowed to induct two more in the 2017 budget. 

The proposal that we have coming across in the budget provides 

some operations and maintenance, some operation in 2017, to allow 

the cruisers that are not in the modernization program to complete 

their deployments and their operational commitments. But after 

completing those, it would then bring those into the modernization 

program to then be allowed to harvest, frankly, the savings associated with demanning the ships, pulling them out of the operational 

cycle, and then offset some of the costs for modernization. 

So we would not be modernizing them all at the same time. We 

would be doing that in a phased fashion, starting with the four 

that are already in the modernization program. We would be reactivating them, bringing them back in service, as the first 11 

cruisers retire. 

Mr. FORBES. Is this a change from the proposal you had last 

year? 

Secretary STACKLEY. It is a marginal change, marginal change. 

Mr. FORBES. That is a pretty big margin to me. 

But, Mr. Courtney, you are recognized for any questions you 

might have. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you to the witnesses for being here today. And I want 

to—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, I am sorry. Just to clarify, when you 

say the proposals—just to be clear, we had a proposal to Congress 

in the past to bring all of the 11 cruisers in the modernization at 

the same time. And you provided the legislation, what is known as 

2–4–6. 

Mr. FORBES. So what was your additional—what was your first 

proposal that you had for those cruisers? The very first one that 

the Navy came over with. Was it to modernize the cruisers? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I think 3 years ago the proposal cut the 

funding and proposed to decommission seven of the cruisers. 

Mr. FORBES. And then all of a sudden you came back to us, I 

think fair, and said, ‘‘No, we really don’t want to get rid of them. 

We have seen the error of our ways. We want to keep them in. We 

need them. We are going to modernize them.’’ 

And now you are coming back and saying, ‘‘We are going to put 

them all up. We just don’t have any money to take them back out.’’ 

Is that a fair statement? 
13 

Secretary STACKLEY. Well, the dollars to put them back in service are all beyond the FYDP. So we would be putting them back 

in service on a one-for-one basis—— 

Mr. FORBES. But, Mr. Secretary, is this decision being driven by 

dollars or by strategic concerns? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Well, I would tell you, frankly, first, it is by 

dollars. 

Mr. FORBES. That is what we thought. 

Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, again, thank you to the witnesses for being here today. 

I think as I mentioned to you beforehand, you know, the testimony we have had just in the last 2 days from two of our major 

combatant commanders, Admiral Harris and General Breedlove, 

has really underscored the seapower challenges that are out there 

and the importance of this subcommittee’s portfolio, which is going 

to go first in this whole process of the four committees. And so, obviously, the testimony here today could not be of more critical nature for our Nation. 

I also want to recognize Tom Crowley, who is here, the Director 

of [Naval] Programs for [the Navy Office of] Legislative Affairs, 

who has been really an incredible asset to this subcommittee over 

the last 10 years or so. I think this is going to be, if not the final, 

close to the final appearance here with us. 

And I just want to thank you for your amazing advice that you 

gave to all of us and wish you good luck at NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration]. Now you can save the planet, you know, serving over there. And, again, we all appreciate your 

input and good guidance over the years. 

Secretary Stackley, in your testimony, on page 11, you stated 

that it is the Navy’s intention to contract for up to 10 boats in the 

Block V contract, which, again, we are in Block IV right now. Block 

V will commence in 2019. You know, that is a critical time period, 

given the decline in the submarine fleet size that was discussed 

earlier with Mr. Forbes. 

And I think all of us appreciate the fact that you stated that that 

is the Navy’s intention, is to really not slip from that two-sub-ayear build rate that we, you know, scratched and clawed so hard 

for starting in 2011. But, frankly, it is not about us. It is really 

about what the combatant commanders told us in the last 2 days 

about the critical need for as many undersea platforms as they 

could possibly acquire. 

And so, I guess, you know, maybe you could talk for a little bit 

about how you plan to find, you know, the authorities, the savings, 

so that we can, again, protect that build rate which our combatant 

commanders desperately need. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

First, you start with the requirement. As has been discussed, we 

have a compelling need for additional attack submarines. Today at 

52 boats; requirement of 48. We hit a valley of 41 boats in the 

2030s. We start falling below the line in the late 2020s. That valley 

exists because of years that we didn’t build any submarines and a 

long period of building one submarine a year. 
14 

We got up to two boats a year starting in 2011. Everyone has 

witnessed the improved performance, through learning curve, 

through economic order quantity, everything that has come together on the Virginia program to drive costs in the right direction. 

And now those boats are delivering two per year, ahead of schedule, under budget. And they are out there performing. They are our 

leading edge. 

When the Ohio replacement starts construction, our long-term 

plan has one Virginia a year and one Ohio a year in those years. 

We still continue with two boats per year, but one of those is going 

to be the Ohio replacement. That helps to contribute to the shortfall in submarines, frankly. And the first time we hit that is going 

to be in 2021. 

So we will be at two boats per year for a 10-year period, and then 

we are going to dip back down to one, come back up to two, and 

then we are going to dip back down to one as we build Ohio replacements. And we will be at one a year for a good while. That 

is not good for the Nation. 

So that has been the long-term plan. It is as much about affordability as anything else because of the significant investment that 

Ohio replacement is going to require. 

But as we sit here today with the 2017 budget being submitted 

and we are looking ahead to 2021, we are looking at the shortfall 

in the out-years, we have to do something different. We have to 

find an alternative to try to stave off that shortfall. 

So, last year and the year prior, working with Congress, we have 

had the discussion about the types of authorities and the way that 

we would design and build the Ohio replacement to drive affordability into the program and to balance the industrial base. So we 

are looking at that now. 

We have the design technical baseline done. We have the build 

plan that we have worked out with industry. We are going into the 

details. And as we do this, we are trying to identify, can we generate savings in the way we build the Ohio replacement to help to 

fund and finance that additional submarine in 2021? 

It is not a part of the program of record. But if we don’t work 

hard today, we will miss the opportunity entirely. And the most important boat in terms of trying to mitigate the impact associated 

with that shortfall is the 2021 boat, that second Virginia in that 

year. If we miss that opportunity, we will not be able to regain that 

later. 

So we are working today—it is not a part of the program of 

record. That is why it says ‘‘up to.’’ But we are working today, and 

we hope and expect that you will work with us, to determine how 

can we keep two Virginias per year proceeding within all the fiscal 

constraints and within the limitations of the industrial base to address this compelling requirement for the Nation. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. 

I mean, obviously, this subcommittee is going to be all in, as far 

as trying to achieve that goal. In fact, I would say we were maybe 

a little bit ahead of the curve in terms of, you know, the measures 

that we passed the last couple of years in terms of the Sea-Based 

Deterrence Fund, which Dr. Labs and his team analyzed at the end 

of last year and said that, with the authorities that we incor-
15 

porated into that fund, you know, multiyear authorities, economic 

order quantity savings, you know, buying across, you know, various 

ship programs, that he calculated $10 billion in savings. 

So maybe you could just talk a little bit about, you know, what 

you were thinking over, you know, down the street in terms of utilizing that as the mechanism to try and, again, protect these build 

rates down the road. Because, again, the message came through so 

loud and clear the last couple days about the fact that we really 

can’t let that production rate slip. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

So, as I described, this past year, we have locked down the technical baseline for the Ohio replacement and the build strategy with 

our industrial base. So, this year, what we are doing is we are 

going to the next levels of details to identify: how are we going to 

procure the material; what are the material procurement items 

that we are going to go after first, in terms of long lead; what are 

the advance construction activities that we want to put in place not 

just for affordability but also to manage risk on the Ohio replacement schedule. 

And, as we do that, we are looking side-by-side with the Virginia 

program, and, frankly, we are also looking at the carrier program 

going through these two shipyards at the same time. And so we are 

trying to identify where can we get savings associated with procuring material across multiple programs, but going for these large 

procurements that we get to leverage the volume on behalf of the 

government; exercise the advance construction authorities that you 

provided. We have already—in our budget exhibit, you see where 

we are requesting—we are laying out a new incremental funding 

profile consistent with the authorities that you provided. 

We think that the tools that you have put in place, as we work 

through these details, we will be putting those tools to work to get 

those savings that the CBO has highlighted. And we think that is 

going to contribute greatly to trying to finance this additional submarine in 2021. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Byrne is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BYRNE. Mr. Stackley, 2 years ago you remember that the 

Secretary of Defense recommended a reduction of the LCS program 

from 52 ships to 32 ships, and the Navy went through a severalmonth period of study to determine what the future was going to 

be for the LCS program. As a result of that, the decision was to 

go back up to the 52-ship buy, and the last 20 ships would be the 

upgraded frigates. And we funded it in the omnibus that year and 

the omnibus bill this past year. So we followed that, along with 

what the Navy and the Department of Defense asked us to. 

Now, we are abruptly going back down to 40. So I am wondering 

if a similar analysis was performed in your decision to recommend 

going from 52 to 40 as you did when we decided to go back up to 

52 and to upgrade to the frigate. Did you do a similar study or 

analysis to get to that? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, Admiral Mulloy made reference to a 

document that we refer to as the Force Structure Assessment. It 

is the CNO’s document to take a look at what size and shape does 

our Navy need to be—numbers of ships by types. 
16 

And the most recent update to the Force Structure Assessment 

was done in 2014. And in there we outlined, by type of ships, small 

surface combatants—which the LCS is a small surface combatant— 

that we require 52 of these ships to perform our missions. 

The decision a couple of years ago to stop construction of the LCS 

at 32 ships and then move to a more lethal, more survivable ship 

consistent with a frigate, we have procured 20 of those. That keeps 

the total number of small surface combatants at 52: 32 LCSs, 20 

frigates. 

We completed that design activity. The frigate is going to be a 

modification to the LCS, so we still meet our 52 requirement. 

In this budget cycle, the decision was made—again, it comes 

down to the reductions in the budget. Reductions in the budget 

drove trades in terms of capability, near-term, long-term. And the 

decision was made, not based on Force Structure Assessment, the 

decision was made to reduce the number of small surface combatants to 40. 

That would mean a reduction inside the FYDP from 14 down to 

7. It drives it down-select to the program. And what we have tried 

to do with that decision is tried to stave off the down-select until 

we can we get to that frigate design, because that is what we do 

need for the balance of our small surface combatants. 

Mr. BYRNE. But your decision was to go to 52, and now we have 

gone abruptly down to 40. So you have made the decision based 

upon what analysis, if any analysis, that is similar to what we did 

2 years ago to do the 52 buy-in, to have the last 20 be the frigates? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Navy’s analysis is captured by the 

Force Structure Assessment, which still requires 52 small surface 

combatants. The decision to go from 52 to 40 becomes a budgetdriven decision and accepts risk with the small surface combatants. 

Mr. BYRNE. So you still need the 52 surface combatants. 

Secretary STACKLEY. In accordance with our Force Structure Assessment, yes, sir. 

Mr. BYRNE. So, by recommending we go down to 40, you are not 

meeting your requirement for surface combatants, small surface 

combatants. 

Secretary STACKLEY. The answer is we are taking risk in small 

surface combatants. 

And, frankly, the Secretary of Defense, you know, he looked at 

the total force structure and described large surface combatants— 

we are going to get up to 100. So, in fact, we have more large surface combatants during this period of time. So he decided, well, we 

will take risk, we will use the large surface combatants to offset 

the small. 

In the long term, what we have to do is make sure that that decision, in the long term, we don’t end up going south in both large 

and small surface combatants. 

Mr. BYRNE. And have you done a study about what this is going 

to do to the industrial base? 

Secretary STACKLEY. We are working with the industrial base 

right now. Well, the clear statement—the clear statement is, with 

the numbers that we are talking about, we have to go to a downselect. So, while today we have two shipbuilders who have been in 

this program from day one—— 
17 

Mr. BYRNE. And driven down costs. 

Secretary STACKLEY [continuing]. And have invested in their facilities, have driven down costs, and are delivering in accordance 

with contracts and plans, once you go to this level of construction, 

you have to down-select. There is not enough workload there to 

sustain two shipyards. 

Mr. BYRNE. But your request for the next year is for two ships, 

and we have been doing three ships, plus one forward-funded. So 

what is going down to two ships, even in the interim, going to do 

to the industrial base when you have two shipyards still operating? 

Secretary STACKLEY. There will be a cost impact associated with 

going to two versus three, but it won’t break the industrial base. 

What will break it will be the decision to down-select. That will 

drive, likely, one of those shipyards out of business, based on their 

other workload. 

Mr. BYRNE. But it was—I am going to run out of time, but it was 

your decision, the Navy’s decision, that you liked having two competing shipyards because that helped drive down your costs. Are 

you concerned it is going to drive your prices back up? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Wherever we have competition we have better outcomes in terms of not just cost but also in terms of innovation. 

And so what we would have to do—again, we are formulating the 

acquisition strategy. But, in that down-select, we would likely 

down-select for the balance of the program, so we exit the program 

with competition and not end up in a sole-source scenario. But 

when you do that, you add risk—you add significant risk to the 

program. 

Mr. BYRNE. My time is out, but I have some further questions 

to submit to you later in writing. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. And I think, for clarification, what Mr. Byrne was 

asking, it would be an increase of about 20 percent in cost in fiscal 

year 2017, correct, for both? 

Secretary STACKLEY. There would be two sources of cost increase. 

There is going to be cost increase to the ships that you are procuring. But also, recognizing that one of those shipyards is going 

to go out of business, and that is going to drive cost to all the ships 

under construction. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. 

The gentlelady from Guam is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, thank you for your testimony here today and for 

your service. 

I do applaud the work of our Navy in providing forward-deployed 

capabilities and continuous global force projection despite significant fiscal constraints. For example, I know I am not alone in this 

subcommittee in supporting robust U.S. freedom of navigation operations [FONOPs]. 

Admiral Mulloy, yesterday, Admiral Harris testified that Chinese 

intent to militarize the South Pacific region is very clear. Beyond 

continued FONOPs and given the restrictions we face, not being 

claimants in the territorial disputes, how can we continue to 

counter Chinese influence in the South and East China Seas? And 
18 

what resources, authorities, or funding does the Navy need to do 

so? 

And, further, how can we leverage partnerships in the region as 

a multiplier effect to strengthen our posture and reduce costs? 

Admiral MULLOY. Yes, ma’am. I would like to formally answer an 

area of the authorities that are outside of my area as the N8 for 

the Navy. But I would like to answer your question now and then 

propose a longer answer once I coordinate with other parts of Navy 

staff. 

From my area, one of the biggest items I think we have to do 

is continue to maintain that forward presence. We just put our 

fourth submarine in Guam. We are moving the second submarine 

down there. We need to have the continued operations of the Pacific Fleet out there. We need to develop those high-end weapons 

and develop and test them out there, because when we test them 

we demonstrate to the world we have the capability to hold Russia, 

China at risk. 

So it is building those forces, it is building the weapons, it is 

building the aircraft necessary to operate and continue to operate 

with our allies. We have no territorial aspersion there. We do 

FONOPs against all the countries over there because we don’t 

agree with any of their particular claims. We want them all to 

solve it as group. 

So, for all the attention we are getting through FONOPs against 

China, we drive past all of the islands claimed by all the countries 

out there and remain an ongoing program around the world of 

wherever there is pressure, because we view it as—part of our maritime history of this country is we provide freedom of the seas and 

ensure it for all countries. 

And in terms of—so we have to build the ships, we have to build 

the aircraft, we have to build the weapons, and we have to demonstrate their use, and we have to work with our allies in that 

area, from smaller navies such as the Philippines, to working with 

our Malaysian allies, and primarily with our—our clear allies by 

treaty are also Japan and Korea. 

So, as we work around that area, that is what we have to do, 

ma’am, is continue to be operating with presence, which requires 

support from Congress and our efforts to have the ships and weapons to go forward. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Admiral. 

Now, for any of our witnesses, the CSIS [Center for Strategic and 

International Studies] recently released another independent assessment on the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region. Among their 

recommendations, a few seem pertinent to this hearing. The report 

calls for a second carrier to be positioned in the Asia-Pacific region, 

ostensibly in Japan, as well as greater presence from small surface 

combatants. The report also calls for increased undersea capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Now, I am concerned that this year’s budget will challenge the 

Navy to address these recommendations from the report. What 

steps is the Navy taking to address the recommendations from the 

CSIS? And how, broadly speaking, does this year’s Navy’s budget 

support the rebalance strategy? 

I guess, Admiral, that would be a question for you. 
19 

Admiral MULLOY. Yes, ma’am. 

As I indicated, we are taking—the study has been evaluated. We 

are looking at other options. 

First off, this forward-deployed aircraft carrier is an easy-to-recommend solution but tremendously expensive. Even if I was beyond a Budget Control Act maybe, we are talking an investment 

of, if we had permission in places, $2 billion to $5 billion just to 

be able to have the ability to have a carrier air wing and deploy 

things. So that is a significant change fundamentally going forward. 

In terms of the other items, as I said, we are putting two extra 

DDGs in Japan that are the fully, you know, what we call Baseline 

9 ballistic missile and cruise missile defense ships. We are putting 

four LCS in Singapore by 2018. We are continuing to put in extra— 

the LPD–17 class you heard about earlier, the first increment of 

that ship is actually going over to replace in the amphibious ready 

group in Japan. 

So, across the board, all our forces, the submarine force we 

talked about is—the concern is the size. We put a fourth one in 

Guam so that we have that fantastic location to operate from. We 

get significant presence and the ability to rapidly be in the waters. 

You leave Guam, and within a couple of days you are in somebody 

else’s waters. That is not lost on the Navy; it is not lost upon other 

people over there. 

So, once again, forward basing is important to us. We just continue to do that, and we need to continue to build the Virginia 

class and also build the Virginia Payload Module. So I get from 12 

to 40 strike weapons on every SSN [attack submarine]. So every 

SSN can do all those missions but bring a much larger firepower 

and punch on board. Those are all steps we have to do as we look 

forward to it. 

It includes, you know, basing and building our P–8s, to build 

109. Our first squadron will now have airplanes in Whidbey Island 

by the end of the year, and we will start being able to do detachments out of Hawaii. Those all are steps the Navy takes to lean 

forward in the Pacific, ma’am. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, thank you very much, Admiral. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. The chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee, Mr. 

Wittman, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you so much for joining us, and thanks for 

your service to our Nation. 

Secretary Stackley, I want to build on a comment that you made 

concerning LPD–28 and LX(R). I just returned from PACOM [U.S. 

Pacific Command], along with Ms. Bordallo. As we talked to PAC 

[Pacific] Fleet commanders, PACOM commanders, one thing was 

clear: Amphibious ships are in dire need in the Pacific, and I know 

as well as throughout other areas where our MEFs operate MEUs 

and our MAGTFs [Marine air-ground task forces]. 

What I want to get from you is this. We are looking at how do 

we keep things on track. And I think General Neller put it well. 

This is a program with LX(R). We are using the LPD–28 as a 

prototype. So we are moving things quicker, we are building a ship 
20 

less expensively, and we are delivering it faster. So all those 

things—very, very necessary. 

In the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, we provided $250 million to move that program to the left, from 2020 to 2018. 

And I appreciate your testimony to say that you are doing longlead-time material acquisition as well as advance design work to 

move that to 2019. 

As we look at shipbuilding programs, I think it is critical, the 

spacing in programs and how those programs come into being and 

how we fund ships. You heard from Mr. Courtney, ORP [Ohio replacement program] is extraordinarily important. But we have to 

make sure, too, that we have the timing on these programs correctly. That is why I believe it is extraordinarily important to be 

able to move LX(R) to the left to begin in 2018. I think that is critical because that makes space to where ORP can come online and 

we don’t have to worry about unbearable cost at any one time. So 

making space for that with what we know is coming with ORP I 

think is critical. 

My question is this. I think it is necessary to move LX(R) to the 

left, to start in 2018. What can we do in the fiscal year 2017 and 

NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] deliberations to make 

that happen, to truly make what was in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, and that is moving the start from 2020 to 

2018? Give me your perspective on how we can make that happen. 

Because I think the industrial base capacity is there. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

The flow is, first, the decision to use the LPD hull form for the 

LX(R). That was the first key decision here, and that was just a 

little bit over a year ago. And so, with that decision, everything 

flows from that. 

The second thing then came down to the LPD–28, using that as 

a bridge platform. And so we have the LPD–28 material on order, 

and that ship will be under construction here in about the 2017 

timeframe. 

Then the third piece is the design itself for the LX(R). We have 

what is called contract design going on right now, which is the 

level of detail that you need in order to put the actual ship under 

contract. But we have to go from contract design to detail design 

that the shipbuilders will need to do before they start construction. 

So I can’t look at you today and say—other than providing additional funding for more material and risk reduction, things of that 

nature, I can’t say today that we will be able to accelerate another 

year. But what I can say is that we will work with industry and 

determine can we accelerate that design activity, which is the thing 

that next needs to be done, alongside the material procurement, in 

order to get the construction going a year earlier. 

I know it is a top priority for industry because of the industrial 

base concerns. I think the decision to reuse the LPD–17 hull form 

greatly reduces the amount of design activity that is going to be required. 

Now what we need to do is just carefully make sure that we are 

not rushing into construction before we have completed the design 

sufficient enough that we don’t end up losing what we have today, 

which is good cost control, good performance by the shipyards. 
21 

Mr. WITTMAN. Seems like to me, though, that what we are learning on LPD–28, we have made much of that transition, so we 

should be able to capitalize on the time advantages that we are 

gaining from that. We are using the same hull form. The onboard 

ship systems and determining what we are going to have on the 

LX(R), to me, is that linchpoint. To me, you can still get to a mature design, do long-lead-time acquisition, as well as accelerate design. I think the industrial base has the capacity to do that. 

So I am wondering if—you seem to be somewhat hesitant to say 

that the Navy can actually move it to the left. Is there some impediment to be able to do that? Because it seems like the capacity 

is in the right places, so what I am asking is what do we need to 

do to make that happen. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Well, let me first—you mentioned the LPD– 

28. We are using that as a bridge ship not just for construction but 

for design, because it will be an interim between the LPD–17 hull 

form and the LX(R). And we did that for that exact reason. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Uh-huh. 

Secretary STACKLEY. But today our schedules don’t arrive at a 

design that is going to be 2 years early, you know. So we go ahead 

and pull the material ahead so we can at least get a year out of 

there. But I can’t look at you today and say we can accelerate that 

activity by a year. 

Now, you know, a bridge, a mitigating strategy might be let’s go 

ahead and bet that we can and put the mechanics in motion to support that and then have an exit strategy if, in fact, the design is 

not ready. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Gotcha. Very good. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Moulton, is 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much for being here. 

I think it is very important on this subcommittee that we talk 

about numbers of ships and capacity and whatnot, but sometimes 

I get a little frustrated when we seem to focus exclusively on that. 

My experience in the Marines, you know, if I had a platoon going 

up against a bunch of Taliban, I wouldn’t much care whether there 

were 40 or 50. I would care a lot about whether they had IEDs [improvised explosive devices], whether or not they had just rifles or 

automatic weapons, whether they had active cellphone networks so 

they could provide intelligence on what we were doing or whether 

they had no idea where we were maneuvering. 

So I think it is hard to talk about the number of ships we need 

when you don’t talk about the relative capabilities of those ships 

versus our adversaries. I know that is something that you look at 

in your planning, but I think it is something we also need to talk 

about here in the committee. 

I am new to Congress, but I understand we have statutory requirements for the number of aircraft carriers that we have. We 

don’t seem to have statutory requirements for spending on research 

and development [R&D] or spending on intelligence or cyber or 

meeting the hybrid warfare capabilities of Russia. Is that correct? 

Secretary STACKLEY. That is correct. 
22 

Mr. MOULTON. You know, if we had canceled the Manhattan 

Project during World War II so that we could build a few more aircraft carriers, I don’t think it would have been a good decision. 

Now, this Congress recently passed a science bill, really just a 

thinly veiled attack on climate science, but it prevented funding for 

NSF [National Science Foundation] projects that are not in the, 

quote, ‘‘national interest.’’ Now, this sounds great. We want to fund 

things that are in the national interest. But if that bill had been 

passed a long time ago, I don’t think that Einstein would have able 

to get his funding, back at Princeton, for the basic research that 

led to our strategic nuclear capability. 

So my question really gets to the heart of this debate about capability versus capacity. Do you think that our capability lead over 

Russia and China is growing or shrinking? 

Secretary STACKLEY. I would describe it as we have two curves. 

Since World War II, our curve in terms of capability has been the 

steepest curve on the chart. However, in the last, say, 5 years, 

what we are seeing is China and Russia, their curve, frankly, looks 

like it is going to cross ours, and in certain areas it has crossed 

ours. 

Mr. MOULTON. So how many times has China attacked us here 

at home with aircraft carriers or cruisers in the last 20 years? I 

think we know the answer. How many times has China attacked 

us here at home with cyberattacks? 

Secretary STACKLEY. It is ongoing. 

Mr. MOULTON. It is ongoing. 

So my question is this: What can we do on this committee to help 

you better balance investing in capacity versus investing in capability? 

If it is true that these lines are about to cross and this historic 

lead that we have enjoyed for half a century over our biggest allies—adversaries, rather, is going to go away. So what can we do 

to free you from the parochial, political concerns of Congress to 

make sure that you can make the smartest decisions about where 

these investments go, not just in capacity but in the capabilities of 

our forces? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, I would tell you, in building our budget, 

there is intense effort to try to get the right balance in terms of 

capacity and capability. There truly is. And when we deliver the 

budget to Congress, what we owe you is an explanation of how we 

believe this strikes the right balance so that, in fact, we are not 

shorting capability or readiness in exchange for capacity. 

Mr. MOULTON. It is hard to believe that if your statement about 

our lines crossing, about China’s technological acceleration approaching or exceeding ours is indeed true. It doesn’t seem that we 

are going to be able to protect the United States of America if Russia and China are catching up as quickly as they are. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Well, yes, sir, let me describe. I said our 

lines are crossing in certain areas. And I think these areas folks 

are well familiar with. We can talk about the DF–21D [Chinese 

anti-ship ballistic missile], which, frankly, caught us by surprise, 

and other areas where China and Russia have invested. They are 

targeting specific what they consider to be vulnerabilities in terms 
23 

of the United States Navy or the United States military. And we 

have either fallen behind or are playing catchup there. 

Today, in our budget, we look across our weapons systems in 

terms of what we are developing, investing in for future capabilities, as well as the capacity that we will need. Because we do not 

believe that it is a choice, that it is one or the other. We believe 

we need both. And we are trying to deliver both within the constraints of the budget that we have. 

Admiral MULLOY. Sir, what I would say is, in terms of the vectors and crossing, there are some areas where some may have 

crossed and we come back. The ballistic missile defense, we have 

certainly made a lot of efforts that are highly classified to be able 

to work on that. 

One thing, what can Congress do? Lift the Budget Control Act, 

without a doubt. I mean, I go back again to the PB12 [President’s 

budget for fiscal year 2012] levels, what we had, what a very much 

different world we would be in right now. 

When you come down to it, how much R&D? There is no floor 

to R&D or no limit to it. However, as we develop our science and 

technology budget, that is one area that is protected, that it must 

be the same as inflation or greater. So we have always had a 2 percent growth. Independent of all my other projects going down, the 

baseline what we call budget activity 1, 2, 3 has always gone up 

to match inflation. We have never lost an erosion on that. That is 

coordinated through OMB and all the services. 

So we maintain a minimum. That is certainly not where we want 

to have it. But we have laid out for our Chief of Naval Operations 

the vectors of the Russian and Chinese submarine forces, missile 

systems, other items. Where can we bend our curve? And that is 

where we are starting to make some of these investments: to buy 

the SM–6 missile and the test the Secretary of Defense just announced last week, be able to make a weapon that goes at tremendous speed and range to launch off a large number of platforms 

suddenly puts a large number of Chinese and Russian ships at 

greater risk from us, and the more modes we can create for that 

weapon. 

So to unleash the innovation of the American engineer and the 

American worker is where we really need to be. That is what restores some of that. But it comes down to being the resources, so 

Mr. Stackley is right. We are attempting to balance as we can. We 

have fully funded, have not cut any of the cyber teams. The Navy 

has to provide 40 cyber teams, sir, to the Cyber commander and 

to the President. Those are all fully funded in this budget. We are 

developing all those tools. We wish we had more money. We are 

looking at our platforms that we have to. 

So we do try to find balance. But what can Congress do is, either 

your tremendous level of effort in 2016 to lift what was essentially 

a BBA cut to restore us to what we asked for, despite what could 

have been less, was an effort. But we need that across the board 

to actually lift that act through 2021. Otherwise, we are back every 

year again. We need a BBA for 2018 and 2019—— 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

And since he thinks it is parochial, we will try to get some people—maybe you weren’t in the briefings when they said that the 
24 

number-one thing we could do to stop a conflict from going to 0– 

3 was a carrier strike group. That is why they think it is so important. And the number one they thought we could do to actually win 

that conflict was having a carrier strike group. So let’s try to get 

those guys back over here to brief us again. 

But, with that, the gentlewoman from Missouri, Mrs. Hartzler, 

is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. Conaway, the chairman of Agriculture, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. CONAWAY. I have kind of an in-the-weeds kind of question, 

Secretary Stackley. 

In the 2016 NDAA, we had put a restriction in place that prevented the Navy from buying bulk biofuels—it wasn’t competitive 

with conventional fuel prices—in the attempt to try to bring some 

rationality to budget constraint in the area rather than spending 

a lot of extra money on fuel that you can buy conventionally for 

less. 

Did you guys work with the USDA [U.S. Department of Agriculture] to have the USDA buy down the feedstock costs so that 

you could turn around and look like the Navy is buying the fuel 

at a much reduced price to get around the NDAA? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, I have not heard anything to that. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. Would you take that one for the record? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 87.] 

Mr. CONAWAY. Secretary Mabus and I have had a long-running 

gentleman’s disagreement on algae-based jet fuel in particular. And 

I am concerned that you guys may have tried to get around the 

NDAA, and I would be very disappointed if you did. I am hopeful 

you will get back to us and say, no, that didn’t happen, we are fully 

compliant with the NDAA, and we have not circumvented the spirit 

of that restriction. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Sir, I am going to make a statement exactly 

to that effect, because we would not do that. Now, I will go back 

and confirm it for you, but there is no way that the Department 

of Navy would have circumvented the NDAA or created some mechanics with the Department of Agriculture to undercut the—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, the mechanics are already in place because 

that whole effort was a joint effort between Department of Defense 

and Department of Agriculture to build that refinery and invest in 

it. And so I am concerned that there would be some games being 

played there. So if you will check that, I would appreciate it. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Graham, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you. Thank you all for being here. 

I represent NSA [Naval Support Activity] Panama City, and a lot 

of the countermeasures for mines are being developed there. I am 

very proud to represent that part of Florida. 

I understand that there is a transition going on with our countermeasures for mines from older processes to the new LCS, off of the 

LCS ships. What is the status of that? 
25 

And I have a followup question. 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. 

There absolutely is a change to the way we are conducting mine 

warfare. First and foremost, we want to get the ships out of the 

minefield, in terms of searching for, identifying, and neutralizing 

the mines. And that is how the LCS concept is structured. 

So, rather than put the ship in the minefield, what the LCS carries is what is referred to as mine countermeasures mission package, which is a series of systems that first locate a mine or a minelike object, then verify that it is a mine, and then go out and neutralize the mine. 

It is one of the toughest things that we do, because if you can 

imagine a large expanse of the ocean, that you are just looking for 

anything that might be a mine-like object, and then you have to 

verify that it is before you go out and neutralize it, without you entering the minefield. 

So we do that through use of unmanned vehicles. Today, what 

is referred to as the mine countermeasures missions package is 

going through testing. We spent virtually all of last year off of Panama City testing this package. And, frankly, we met our requirements, where the requirement is how long will it take you to clear 

a minefield of a certain area as well as a channel of a certain 

length of mine-like objects. 

We met our requirement, but along the way of meeting the requirement we also determined that the principal vehicle that we 

use for towing a sonar that spots the mines, that vehicle does not 

meet our requirements in terms of level of reliability. So we have 

put procurement of that vehicle on hold while we go out and look 

at other alternatives for the vehicle. 

But all the other elements of the mission package are working 

well. The sonar works well. We have what is referred to as an airborne laser mine detection system, which is virtually a laser detector that is carried on a helicopter. That is working well. The neutralization system is working well. 

But what is referred to as the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle— 

it is unmanned—its reliability is unsatisfactory. So we are going to 

go ahead and make some modifications to the 10 of those that we 

have and have a mission package that is available for deployment. 

We are already deploying elements of the mine counter mission 

package today in theater as they prove effective, and then we are 

going to go off and look for a longer-term alternative solution for 

the vehicle that will tow the sonar. 

Ms. GRAHAM. So the plan that had been put in place to phase 

out the old process has been modified until we have developed a 

new process for the vehicle, the unmanned vehicle, that will be 

using the countermeasures package, if I am—— 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, ma’am. We expect we will have these 

mine countermeasure mission packages available for deployment 

on LCS by 2019. This will be with the current vehicle. 

We want to get to an alternative. We think it is going to take 

an extra approximately 2 years to get to this alternative and complete its initial operational testing for its deployment. 

Ms. GRAHAM. Well, terrific. You answered all my questions. 

Thank you. I really appreciate it. 
26 

And come back down to Panama City as frequently as you would 

like. It is wonderful down there. 

Thanks. Appreciate it. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Knight is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

I have just a couple questions. I will start off with General 

Walsh. 

And let’s talk a little bit about the transition that we are going 

through from Hornets to JSF [Joint Strike Fighters]. Where are 

we? How is it going? We went out to Quantico a couple days ago; 

we talked to some Marine aviators and talked to them about the 

Joint Strike Fighter. Can you give us an idea? 

General WALSH. I think, yeah, the program is going real well. I 

mean, the Marine Corps, we are on the front edge of the rest of 

the Department of Defense on this. And so VMFA–121 is our first 

IOC [initial operational capability] squadron that stood up this last 

year and has gone out to sea. So we have our first operational 

squadron. 

They are going to be able to deploy here next year. They deploy 

in 2017 to Iwakuni, Japan, and then be forward deployed on the 

USS Wasp. So they will be really the first deployed fifth-generation 

capability in the Department of Defense that we have had. So, very 

excited about that. 

The program, if you get a chance to talk to any of the aircrew 

that were there or maintainers, they are very excited about putting 

the airplane through a lot of tactics, training. And it is doing phenomenally well. It is exactly what we thought it would be doing. 

Obviously, we have delays between—we made a decision to go 

from Prowlers, Harriers, and Hornets to get to fifth generation in 

the F–35. I made that decision a long time ago. In the interim, we 

were on the front edge of this as the Marine Corps, and there have 

been some delays in the program, as there is in most programs, 

where you work through this. But we are really confident on where 

we are at. 

Now, the legacy side, back to the F–18s, is we are struggling 

with that piece because the airplanes are getting older, and, if you 

have seen the readiness levels, I think about half the fleet right 

now is in a depot awaiting depot-level maintenance. Thanks to the 

committee and Congress is helping us a lot with those readiness 

dollars to get the readiness up, to get that plug in there while we 

transition to the F–35. 

But I think we are very confident that we are on the right path 

by going to the F–35 and that fifth-generation capability—not because of its stealth and precision capabilities. I think those are 

given. I think what people are going to really start to see in this 

aircraft—and we are seeing it in our exercises and operations that 

we have right now—is for the Marine air-ground task force, the 

ability to sense—the airplane is just a sensor. And it is able to take 

that information, sense it, bring it in, and now the ability to start 

sharing that around the battle force with the United States Navy, 

also the joint force, and certainly our marines on the ground. 

That is the area that we have to continue to spiral up and get 

better at, not only on the aircraft to be able to share that informa-
27 

tion down to marines on the ground, but also to our ships. Certainly on the amphib ship side, we have not had that type of capability in our Harriers, to be able to downlink, share that type of information off the aircraft like we have in the past. 

So I think the F–35 is going to bring tremendous capability. Now 

we have to leverage that capability throughout the battle force, 

both on the ground and with the ships. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Super. Super. Thank you. Thank you, General. 

Admiral—and I know the Chair is adamant about this, and I 

know most of Congress is. But if the air wing was disbanded, what 

would happen to that air wing? Would we still have that air wing? 

Would we keep that as a ground force or as a relief force? Or what 

would we do with that air wing? 

Admiral MULLOY. Well, sir, if we retained the air wing, it would 

stay into the cycle. We would end up with gaps, because air wings 

don’t deploy to the ground, so we would not go to Japan or Guam 

with an air wing—— 

Mr. KNIGHT. Right. 

Admiral MULLOY [continuing]. Because it is contingent upon 

fighting on the aircraft carrier as a unified force. 

So what happens with the air wing is we are going to what we 

call deactivate. The airplanes will move to other squadrons. The pilots and mechanics will go to other squadrons. The colors and the 

flags of the squadron will be basically put in a museum on hold in 

case we are going to go back and grow the Navy in the future. As 

we do another future force assessment, we would be able to reactivate the squadron. 

But not a single airplane will be taken out, and not a pilot or 

mechanic will leave the Navy. Where we will actually get the savings from is, at this point in time, we don’t have to bring as many 

people in to relieve them by the end of the FYDP. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Right. 

Admiral MULLOY. So that is the cycle where the savings come 

from. 

And there is a little bit in terms of operations. When I give—let’s 

say he is the commander of the next squadron; I give him my airplanes. He needs a little bit of O&M [operation and maintenance] 

dollars to keep them running but not the same I had to do to keep 

the whole squadron running. 

So there is an operations savings and a manpower savings. But, 

once again, that is merely more, to my mind, a cost avoidance. But 

the air wing itself would not have a place to go if we don’t have 

an aircraft carrier for it, other than it flies at its home base. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you, Admiral. 

I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, I want to thank you for your testimony today 

and your service to the country and for your willingness to speak 

with us today about the Navy’s budget for fiscal year 2015. 

I hadn’t planned to ask this question, but to the chairman’s question and to the last line of questioning on the air wing that would 

be retired, given the national security challenges that we face, 
28 

aren’t you taking a capacity out of the system in the event that we 

have to surge? 

I mean, doesn’t that allow you to, for example, utilize that 10th 

air wing, even if they are not deployed on a carrier, that if we need 

them, that allows the carriers to shift down there, to allow more 

sorties to be flown, et cetera. And if you retire that 10th air wing, 

aren’t you taking capacity out so it doesn’t therefore have that in 

reserve, you know, should conflict break out? 

Admiral MULLOY. Well, sir, it all comes back to the ergonometrics of an air wing in the Navy design, unlike an Air Force 

AEF, you would have, I guess, an absolute level, you would be 

missing a few squadrons of airplanes. But you don’t fight a group 

like that from a land base. That is the difference between us and 

the Air Force, is they come together as a group to be on the carrier 

to be synchronized as a combat element. 

And so we don’t really view this one as that, quote, ‘‘hard choice.’’ 

It really lays out, given that we need to get that air wing back if 

we build the 12th aircraft carrier, then we need to go back to the 

10th air wing. Our cycle is we need to be with a modern nuclear 

aircraft fleet, given the way these operate and design, the right 

number of air wings is two less, not one less, because we are no 

longer in that—the carriers are designed to last 50 years, but we 

need to do that long-term maintenance on them. That freed up that 

point of having that air wing anymore. 

So it is not a whole air wing right now, in fact, because it has 

been shrunk over time. It was a couple of—it is really four squadrons and an air wing commander. It was never a full air wing. And, 

at this point in time, we don’t think it is an artifact that we really 

need to keep. We think it is a good business decision to put those 

airplanes in the operational squadrons and line ourselves up to 

being two air wings less the number of nuclear aircraft carriers we 

have. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. Thank you, Admiral. 

I want to get to other questions I have. So we heard yesterday 

morning from Admiral Harris before the full committee that 

PACOM does not have a sufficient number of submarines to conduct the scale of operations that they would like in the Indo-AsiaPacific region. And this is just one example highlighting our need 

for sophisticated undersea capabilities. 

How is the Navy leveraging cost-saving measures and supporting 

growth in key investment areas to achieve the desired force structure? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Well, let me start specifically with submarines. We have spent a fair bit of time here discussing the submarine dilemma that we have in terms of the number of submarines that combatant commanders demand and then the challenges in terms of, when Ohio replacement comes, can we or can 

we not sustain a two-Virginia-boat-per-year capacity. So I don’t 

want to replay that tape. 

But the other element that Admiral Mulloy referred to earlier is 

adding the Virginia Payload Modules with the Block V submarines, 

basically add another mission for the Virginia submarines. It takes 

up their payload capacity from 12 up to 40 Tomahawks for strike 

capability. So one of the demand signals for Virginia under certain 
29 

scenarios—or for a submarine force under certain scenarios is that 

strike mission. And so we are increasing capacity per boat in that 

regard. 

So we are struggling with, can we sustain two Virginias per year 

to mitigate the shortfall; growing capability in terms of missile capacity in this particular case; as well as increasing the capacity of 

our weapons systems, the acoustic superior program that we have 

that we are introducing into Block V to make that force as capable 

and effective as possible. So it is both a capacity issue as well as 

grow-the-capability issue. 

Overall, though, we have described the 308-ship force, and I will 

tell you that, by way of driving stability into our shipbuilding program and designing for affordability where we can, I think we have 

done a great job in terms of delivering on, frankly, the promise of 

getting to that 308-ship Navy. What we have to do is sustain that 

focus and that effort across all of our programs. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Secretary. 

I have long been an advocate of directed energy weapon systems, 

and I am glad that the knowledge is beginning to transition out of 

the lab into operational units, such as the 30-kilowatt laser on the 

USS Ponce. 

Moving forward, how can we best couple our naval platforms 

with our strategic weapon systems when it comes to areas such as 

directed energy or cyber? 

Mr. FORBES. And I am going to ask you if you can take that for 

the record and submit it, because we only have a few minutes before our votes, and Mr. Hunter is recognized for 5 minutes because 

the gentleman’s time has expired. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 87.] 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yeah, and they close 

those votes down quick now. We have become prompt. 

First question, you brought this up in the beginning about the 

Mediterranean. Is it a strategic decision to not have amphibs in the 

Med right now? 

Admiral MULLOY. Sir, it comes back to what is called global force 

management [GFM]. And so there are amphibs in the Mediterranean when they are transiting but also when need to be repositioned based upon world activities. It does come down to do you 

have the number of forces you have, and everyone wants them. So 

right now that comes down to be, yes, sir, a strategic decision at 

an actual level to where we put our forces that we have forward. 

Mr. HUNTER. Is there a threshold in Europe and Northern Africa 

on what would have to happen to have a permanent rotation in the 

Med again? 

Admiral MULLOY. I don’t know if what I would call as a threshold. I mean, it comes back, again, the forces we have go where we 

need to be. We have been clearly using our amphibs to operate, if 

necessary, off Libya on a number of occasions, and other ships, 

whether it is on a national mission, grabbing the terrorists in 

Libya, or other events that happened over there. 

But, no, I don’t know of any one threshold to say I have to be 

stationed there. That is really—I imagine it came up with General 

Breedlove talking to your committee earlier about how does he 
30 

view the world in Europe, and then also the AFRICOM commander 

when he comes. 

Mr. HUNTER. General, do you have any comments on that? 

General WALSH. Congressman, I think, you know, as you look at 

that situation, it is in that global force management. So as it goes 

into that GFM system, you know, we have an ARG [amphibious 

ready group]—— 

Mr. HUNTER. We have been hearing that a whole bunch. I am 

sure it is a great analytical program that determines where a ship 

should be, right? That is what it is? 

General WALSH. So I guess what I could look at right now is, because of the number of amphib ships we have right now, they get 

deployed as an ARG. As you are aware, an ARG gets deployed to 

CENTCOM. CENTCOM right now gets the highest vote; they get 

the ships. As Admiral Mulloy said, there are times in there, based 

on the situation, they will chop over one of those ships—could be 

more—as the situation directs. 

What we are looking at right now, though, is because of that, the 

situation in the Med, is whether we should be doing that more on 

a full-scale, permanent basis. You know, as before we had always 

kept the ARG together, now we are doing split and disaggregated 

operations where they deploy together and now we split them up. 

We are now looking at should we even look inside the GFM process 

on whether we should split them before they even deploy, because 

we don’t have the number of ships to put in the Med. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thank you. 

Second question, I chair the Coast Guard Subcommittee, so we 

do all the Coast Guard acquisition—OPCs [offshore patrol cutters], 

FRCs [fast response cutters], NSCs [national security cutters]. Secretary Stackley, we are trying to give the Coast Guard the same 

ability that the Navy has—advance procurement, block buys, 

multiyear procurement, and lead-time materials, just like the Navy 

does. Robert Work testified on this. GAO [Government Accountability Office] just did some stuff where they said they could save 

a lot of money, like, a billion dollars over the life of any of their 

programs. 

Do you see any complications with giving the Coast Guard the 

same—I mean, you are all building ships, and, in the end, it is you 

are going to build the ships. So that is my question. Do you see any 

problems with that? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Absolutely not. I think that is a great tool 

that we have been able to use to generate savings. And the savings 

we use go back in the shipbuilding program so we can get more of 

what we need. The key is to have stability in terms of requirements and design before you make those long-term commitments 

in terms of block buys. 

Mr. HUNTER. Inherently, what is OMB’s—if OMB were to have 

an issue with doing multiyear procurement and block buys, what 

would it be, besides they get locked in? 

Secretary STACKLEY. That is it. Yes, sir. 

Well, there are two things. One, have stability so you know 

that—if you change, if you make significant changes in the middle 

of a block buy or multiyear, then it is going to be destructive and 

it is going to eat up the savings you are going after. From a comp-
31 

troller perspective, making that long-term commitment in the 

budget takes away flexibility. So if there are other requirements 

that emerge, you don’t have as much flexibility in the budget to address the new requirements. 

Mr. HUNTER. Roger. 

Okay, and my last question is about a thing called ATRT, automatic test and retest. Mr. Moulton talked about this a little bit, but 

there is a lot of money spent on integration and testing. Aegis is 

an example. I have a quote from Secretary Kendall, who is calling 

the ATRT program ‘‘unprecedented success for SBIR technology’’; 

record ATRTs, savings of cost and time to the Navy. I have a thing 

here where it says an Aegis test, 80 hours, nine analysts to do it 

manual; ATRT does it in 7 hours with one analyst. 

So all of these great, glowing things about ATRT, and I am look- ing at the President’s budget. ATRT had, let me see, $7 million in 

2015; $23 million in 2016; now, zero for 2017. 

And the name has changed to ATA. Usually, that portends bad 

things for a program, like it is going to be dumped off to a large 

corporation-type contractor that is not an SBIR [Small Business Innovation Research] firm and not the inventor of this. 

Do you have any comments on this? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Well, first, I am a strong fan of the ATRT. 

I am the one who brought it into the Navy programs. 

Mr. HUNTER. Right. 

Secretary STACKLEY. And so it is always—what we want is ATRT 

not to be something separate and different. We want all of our programs to be incorporating ATRT just like they do open systems. 

Mr. HUNTER. Sure. 

Secretary STACKLEY. You will see a budget line item for open systems. We make that a part of the standard by which we design—— 

Mr. HUNTER. But it is zero, though. Why would it be zeroed out, 

then, for this budget, for the 2017 budget? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Well, we actually have a continuation of the 

ATRT efforts. So I will find the budget line item where we are 

doing it. I literally just met with the organization about 3 months 

ago going over this before we submitted the budget. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. 

Secretary STACKLEY. What we have done is we have taxed programs to fund the effort, as opposed to a separate budget line item. 

We want the programs vested in the effort. We want them to be 

directly involved in identifying where the efforts go to provide the 

biggest—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Mandated to be in the effort, too, I would say, 

right? For different programs. 

Secretary STACKLEY. We directed it. Yes, sir. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

Gentlemen, I told you all you would have time to put something 

on the record. Unfortunately, we only have a few minutes left. So, 

rather than make you wait an hour and come back, if it is okay, 

I am going to let you put any comments that you want in the 

record that might elaborate or clarify any statement you have 

made, if that is agreeable with each of you. 
32 

And, with that, let me just thank you so much for your being 

here and for your service to our country. 

And, with that, we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:28 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 25, 2016 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 25, 2016 

(37) 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

FEBRUARY 25, 2016 

(87) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

Secretary STACKLEY. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Energy’s September 2015 alternative fuel contract award fully complied with applicable law, including the Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). While the FY 2016 

NDAA was not signed into law until November 25, 2015, DLA Energy’s award was 

also compliant with its requirements. 

The law requires that the fully burdened cost of alternative fuel purchased for 

operational purposes be cost competitive with the fully burdened cost of traditional 

fuel. That determination of cost competitiveness is made by DLA, not by the Department of the Navy or the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). 

DLA Energy’s April 2015 Rocky Mountain West Coast (RMWC) bulk fuel solicitation stipulated that alternative fuel producers who used U.S. agricultural feedstocks 

might be eligible for up to $0.25 per gallon in USDA Commodity Credit Corporation 

(CCC) funding. 

In September 2015, DLA issued a contract award to AltAir to supply a total of 

77.6 million gallons of F–76 containing a blend of 10 percent alternative fuel and 

90 percent traditional fuel. The amount paid by the Department of Defense for the 

AltAir fuel blend is approximately $2.04 ($2.00 per gallon to AltAir for the fuel 

blend plus $0.04 per gallon for transportation of the fuel). AltAir qualified for just 

under $0.16 per gallon in USDA CCC funding. 

To determine cost-competitiveness, DLA compared the alternative fuel blend offered by AltAir with traditional fuel offers for both the 2015 and 2014 RMWC solicitations. AltAir’s offer was not reduced or otherwise lowered by the amount that 

would be paid with CCC funds. Rather, DLA’s cost competitiveness analysis considered the full $0.16 per gallon in CCC funding. [See page 24.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Secretary STACKLEY. Directed Energy (High Energy Laser [HEL] and High Power 

Radio Frequency [HPRF]) Weapon Systems offer significant potential benefit to the 

Department of the Navy’s warfighting capability and will complement traditional kinetic weapons (such as guns and missiles) in a layered defense scheme. Much has 

been learned from the Navy’s design, development, deployment, and operation of the 

Laser Weapon System (LaWS) onboard USS PONCE. Lessons learned from the 

LaWS deployment feed the Solid State Laser Technology Maturation (SSL–TM) development; which will design, build, test, and demonstrate a 150-kW Laser Weapon 

System Demonstrator that will mature component technologies of the laser system 

and subsystems. SSL–TM is scheduled to conduct an at-sea test onboard the SelfDefense Test Ship (SDTS) in FY18, which will be the first time a laser weapon is 

connected to ship’s power and cooling, and the first time system tracks and laser 

weapon source tracks are integrated. 

Ship integration studies were completed in 2012 for preliminary assessment of 

HEL integration on various ship classes, including DDG 51 Flt IIA. The studies determined that integration of a 125-kW HEL on DDG 51 Flt IIA is feasible with moderate modifications to ship’s structure, power and cooling. A follow-on ship integration study for DDG 51 Flt IIA will be completed in Summer 2016 to provide a more 

detailed understanding of 150-kW HEL integration, to include integrated topside design and combat systems integration. Ship integration studies for other ship classes 

(including aircraft carriers and amphibious ships) have not been performed, but it 

is likely that integration of a 150-kW class HEL on these platforms is feasible. 

A Simulation Experiment (SIMEX) with live operators was conducted in Nov 2013 

to explore HEL capabilities to defeat asymmetric threats such as FAC/FIAC and 

UAVs; and help define TTPs and duty cycle requirements. A future SIMEX is 

planned for Aug 2016 to leverage lessons learned from the prototype LaWS system 

deployed on the USS PONCE, to incorporate the findings of the 2016 ship integration study, and to further refine TTPs for a 150-kW class laser. 

For cyber, Navy is making limited initial investments in operational capabilities 

on our platforms which have the potential to be utilized for strategic effects in support of national, theater, or Fleet authorities. More information can be provided at 

the classified level upon request. [See page 29.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 25, 2016 

(91) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. If Congress retains the current ‘‘2–4–6’’ modernization process for the 

Cruisers, when will Navy need to initiate a replacement design for the retiring 

cruisers? How does the Navy’s ‘‘Future Surface Combatant’’ requirements assessment support the replacement of the cruiser force structure? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Under the 2–4–6 construct, the Navy will retire the final 

eleven Cruisers (CG 63–73) between FY35 and FY37. The ongoing Future Surface 

Combatant Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) is examining potential solutions 

to close the capability and capacity gaps created by the retirement of the CG–47 

class. The CBA is scheduled to be completed in FY16 and its results will inform the 

way ahead. 

Mr. FORBES. It has been reported that costs are programmed to increase as Navy 

reduces the funding profile associated with the Littoral Combat Ship. What are the 

increased costs associated with a reduced funding profile that have been assumed 

in the fiscal year 2017 budget request? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The President 2017 Budget Request reduced the quantity of 

LCS procurements from six ships in FY 2017–FY 2018 (three per year) to a total 

of three ships in FY 2017–FY 2018 (two in FY 2017/one in FY 2018). This quantity 

reduction will result in increased costs per ship due to loss in material savings, reduced labor efficiencies, and increased overhead. These impacts will be experienced 

resulting from a reduction in shipyard workload for both shipyards. 

With the reduction in FY 2017–FY 2018 ship quantities, the Navy estimates that 

both the FY 2015 and FY 2016 ships will experience increased costs for Cost to 

Complete funding by $83.7 million in FY 2019 (for the FY 2015 ships) and $34.3 

million in FY 2020 (for the FY 2016 ships) as reflected in the President’s 2017 

Budget Request. 

The Average unit cost for the FY 2015–FY 2018 ships has grown by $30.8 million 

per ship from the FY 2016 to the FY 2017 Budget Request due to the reduction in 

quantity of three ships across FY 2017 and FY 2018. The total increase for the nine 

ships being procured in FY 2015–FY 2018 is $277.5 million. 

Mr. FORBES. Navy has indicated their intent to transition to a Frigate design for 

the small surface combatant and down select to a single production yard in fiscal 

year 2019. How does Navy retain the two production yards and what is the acquisition strategy that Navy intends to employ with the reduced funding profile? What 

is the most cost beneficial, minimum sustaining rate to maintain two production 

yards for the Littoral Combat Ship? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The President’s 2017 Budget Request contains funding for 

two LCS in FY 2017 and one LCS in FY 2018, and assumes a transition to the Frigate beginning with one ship in FY 2019, one Frigate in FY 2020 and two Frigates 

in FY 2021. The Navy plans to continue the procurement of both LCS designs in 

FY 2017 in preparation for the transition to the Frigate and the downselect decision 

as soon as FY 2018. 

This down-select decision will place one of the shipbuilders and the supporting industrial base at risk of closure. The Navy assesses that the minimum sustaining 

rate to maintain affordable production at both LCS/Frigate yards would be nominally 1.5 ships per yard per year. 

Mr. FORBES. What steps could the Navy suggest to remove the high level of concurrency associated with the Littoral Combat Ship and the Mission Modules? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The LCS is designed to defeat growing littoral threats and 

provide assured access and dominance in coastal and open waters. Each LCS hull 

can be tailored and configured for a single focused mission by embarking a Mission 

Packages (MP). A Mission Package (MP) consists of a MM containing hardware, a 

mission crew, and required support aircraft. Three MPs are available to cover specific warfare areas, Mine Countermeasures (MCM), Surface Warfare (SUW), or Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW). The Fleet selects the MP to embark based on anticipated 

employment of the ship for a specific deployment or mission. MPs can be swapped 

out if the need arises. Additionally, the LCS MM program is structured to improve 

MM capability via planned increments. As Mission Systems are developed and fielded, they will be added to MMs. 
92 

The Navy is procuring the quantity of mission systems and packages needed for 

system integration, crew training, developmental testing, operational testing, and 

operational deployments. Mission package components are procured when the system development is mature enough to transition to production. The mission systems 

have all been demonstrated in a relevant environment prior to mission package integration. The Navy, as planned, is delivering operationally effective mission package capability to the fleet, preventing delays from waiting to acquire all mission systems needed to meet the full baseline requirement. 

LCS’s open architecture enables rapid and cost-effective technology insertion and 

spiral development capability delivering proven warfighting capability. One benefit 

of this approach is that LCS does not require lengthy modernization periods to 

change mission focus or incorporate new technology. 

An example of successful MM development and integration is the deployment of 

USS FORT WORTH (LCS 3) with the SUW MP. The SUW MP is designed to provide the capability to detect, classify, track, and engage multiple groups of small 

boats, and supports the conduct of maritime security operations and maritime interdiction operations (compliant and non-compliant visit, board, search, and seizure). 

The MP is currently equipped with the Gun Mission Module and the Maritime Security Module. Meanwhile, the program office continues to integrate and test the surface-to-surface missile module (Longbow Hellfire missile). This allows the deployment of needed capability without waiting for full development and integration of 

future capability. 

This modular approach, which allows, for incremental addition of capability as 

technology matures, is wholly consistent with the House version of the Fiscal Year 

2017 National Defense Authorization Act. 

Mr. FORBES. Should Navy retain the legacy Mine Counter Measure Ships until 

sufficient capability is provided to support Mine Counter Measure requirements that 

begin to retire starting in 2019? 

Secretary STACKLEY. No, the extension of the AVENGER Class (MCM–1) Mine 

Countermeasure Ships is not the most cost efficient approach to support the operational requirement. The Navy’s current plan for retirement provides flexibility for 

delayed replacement of mine countermeasures capability through 2023 in Bahrain, 

and 2024 in Sasebo. This will provide a significant overlap between the scheduled 

LCS MCM Mission Package deployments and the retirement of the legacy Mine 

Countermeasure Ships. Also, recent successes with operational integration of unmanned technologies within the Expeditionary Mine Countermeasure Companies already deployed to Bahrain will provide additional MCM capacity during the transition to the LCS MCM Mission Package. 

Aging and specialized vessels such as the AVENGER Class (MCM–1) ships continue to experience rising costs of upkeep and declining operability. Extending the 

expected service life of the AVENGER Class (MCM–1) beyond the current plan 

would require increases in funding investments to achieve minimal added years of 

service. If Mine Countermeasure capacity is required for mitigation during the transition, the Navy intends to leverage the demonstrated effective and flexible unmanned technologies employed by the Expeditionary Mine Countermeasure Companies as adaptive force packages to provide the most cost-efficient delivery of future 

warfighting capability. 

Mr. FORBES. Navy has proposed to reduce the Virginia-class submarine procurement concurrent with the Ohio-class submarine. In the Navy’s estimation, does the 

industrial base have sufficient capacity to support a 2 Virginia-class submarine 

build rate concurrent with the Ohio-class submarine construction? What are the 

challenges that the industrial base needs to overcome to support a revision to the 

30 year shipbuilding plan that would allow 2 Virginia class submarines per year 

during the next 10 years? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The long-range 30-year shipbuilding plan proposes that the 

Navy build two VIRGINIA Class Submarines (VCS) per year for the next 30 years, 

with the exception that only one VCS is procured in the years that OHIO Replacement (OR) Submarines are authorized (Fiscal Years 21, 24, 26–35), due to fiscal constraints. 

The Navy’s Block V VCS contract is planned for FY19 through FY23 with two 

ships per year, except for FY21. The Navy is evaluating an option to add a second 

VCS ship in FY21. To ensure construction of the additional ship is executable, additional funding in FY19 with advance procurement (AP) and economic order quantity 

(EOQ) funding would be needed to commence long lead time material activities and 

optimize savings from EOQ material procurements. Adding a second VCS in FY21 

can be accomplished with minimal change in current submarine shipyard capacity 

and would improve manpower loading. 
93 

Sustaining VCS production at two per-year consistently beyond FY23 concurrent 

with OR production requires a thorough study to ensure that submarine programs 

are executed affordably, sustain the industrial base, provide required capabilities to 

the Fleet and are balanced with other shipbuilding requirements in the next 30-year 

shipbuilding plan. 

Mr. FORBES. Navy has proposed to replace the 14 Ohio-class submarines with 12 

Ohio-class replacement submarines. There has been some discussion as to whether 

the requirement could be reduced even further. For example, a June 2010 report 

by a group known as the Sustainable Defense Task Force recommends reducing the 

SSBN force to 7 boats; a September 2010 report from the Cato Institute recommends reducing the SSBN force to 6 boats, and a September 2013 report from 

a group organized by the Stimson Center recommends reducing the force to 10 

boats. Can you explain the requirement to procure 12 ballistic missile submarines 

vice some reduced requirement? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Last year the CNO approved the requirement for 12 OR ballistic missile submarines and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated 

the requirement in order to meet the USSTRATCOM requirements for conducting 

the strategic deterrence mission. The Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, 

released by the CNO in January 2016, includes a line of effort to ‘‘Maintain and 

modernize the undersea leg of the strategic deterrent triad. This is foundational to 

our survival as a nation.’’ 

The combatant commander requirement of 10 operational SSBNs is the minimum 

force structure needed to meet operational requirements in two oceans and support 

the Nation’s strategic deterrent mission. The current 14 OHIO-class SSBNs and the 

planned 12 OR SSBNs deliver the required 10 operational submarines in 2080. The 

requirement to procure 12 OR SSBNs allows the Navy to provide 10 operational 

SSBNs at any given time, while two SSBNs will be non-operational during their required mid-life maintenance overhaul periods. 

The SSBN force is sized to keep the required number of platforms properly positioned, postured, and survivable at all times—geography, survivability and target 

coverage all play a role. The stealth, force structure, and CONOPS are what make 

the SSBN survivable. Any change to one of these affects the survivability of the 

SSBN fleet. Maintaining a sufficient force size contributes to SSBN survivability by 

enabling operational flexibility. The force structure requirement is the minimum 

number of SSBNs operating in large open ocean areas to remain survivable against 

a determined and persistent adversary, and is not tied to the number of warheads 

carried by each submarine. 

Reducing the fleet below 10 operational SSBNs will significantly reduce survivability, degrade the strength of the sea-based strategic deterrent, and limit flexibility to respond to an uncertain strategic future (a more aggressive threat, for example). A smaller force structure is less survivable because operations become much 

more constrained and therefore more predictable. 

Mr. FORBES. Congress provided expanded authorities as part of a National SeaBased Deterrence Fund that would support the SSBN(X) program. CBO has assessed that should the Navy fully utilize the current authorities in the Fund, a savings of ‘‘several hundred million dollars’’ would result. Does the Navy concur with 

CBO’s savings estimate? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Navy’s initial cost assessment aligns with CBO’s projections, and these projections will be validated in August 2016 as part of an updated 

Cost Estimate to support OHIO Replacement SSBN Program Milestone B decision 

Mr. FORBES. Congress provided $250 million to support the accelerated construction of the LX(R) class ship from fiscal year 2020 to fiscal year 2018. However, the 

administration did not provide sufficient funding in the fiscal year 2017 budget request to support continued acceleration efforts. What is the funding profile to support a construction award of the LX(R) class ship in fiscal year 2018? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Congressional addition of $29M in FY16 RDT&E funding enables the Navy to accelerate the contract specification and technical data 

package development process such that a competitive Detail Design and Construction (DD&C) contract can be awarded in late FY18. The lead ship construction option exercise is currently budgeted in FY20. The Congressional add of $250 million 

for accelerated construction advances the production planning and enables early 

procurement of long lead material in support of an accelerated production timeline 

(by approximately one year) following contract award. 

An additional $19M in FY17 is required to support full completion of Contract Design. Contract Design requires the development of subsystem details and a completed design, all to support the development of a final ship specification to be included in the technical data package for a competitive Request for Proposal release. 
94 

Mr. FORBES. With regards to ship to shore connector and the LCAC service life 

extension program, the administration has truncated the LCAC service life extension program in fiscal year 2017 and has reduced the procurement of the ship to 

shore connector from four ships to two. How does this reduction in amphibious lift 

support amphibious operations in a contested environment? What risk is the Marine 

Corps bearing to support these diminished requirements? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Reductions to the LCAC Service Life Extension Program 

(SLEP) and Ship to Shore Connector (SSC) procurement in PB17 will not affect amphibious lift requirements in a contested environment. 

An inventory of 72 LCACs is the requirement for steady state (CONUS/FDNF) operations and to deploy 62 LCAC craft (62 required to make 52, assuming 85 percent 

operational availability) to meet the 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade Assault Echelon lift requirements. 

These actions should not result in the USMC accepting additional risk. The LCAC 

SLEP reductions in PB17, coupled with a reduction in the LCAC 100/SSC program, 

will result in a five year ‘‘bath tub’’ with a low point of 66 craft. This remains above 

the minimum requirement for a major contingency and meets most of the steady 

state requirement. To fully meet steady state requirements, properly timed and 

funded Post SLEP Extensions are required to ensure the 72 LCAC retain the required service life. 

Mr. FORBES. Navy has previously indicated a requirement of 10 Joint High Speed 

Vessels. Congress provided an 12th Joint High Speed Vessel in the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016. Does the Navy need additional Joint High Speed Vessels? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Navy’s 2014 Force Structure Assessment update re-validated the requirement for Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF), formerly Joint High 

Speed Vessels (JHSV), at ten ships. The Navy did not request any additional EPFs 

in the FY 2017 President’s Budget because the battle force inventory will reach ten 

ships in FY 2018. EPF inventory will increase to 12 ships by FY 2020, due to the 

additional EPFs that Congress included in the FY 2015 Appropriations Act and 

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016. 

Mr. FORBES. Navy has proposed to replace the UCLASS program with a new unmanned Carrier Based Aerial Refueling System (CBARS). However, the name denotes that the CBARS program will be exclusively devoted to refueling with little 

support to a long held ISR requirement by the carrier aviation community. Does the 

Navy intend to provide ISR capability on this new CBARS capability? If so, should 

Congress rename this capability to more adequately denote the desired capabilities? 

Secretary STACKLEY. CBARS (MQ–25A) is a restructure of the UCLASS program. 

The MQ–25A program is envisioned to be an integral part of the future Carrier Air 

Wing, providing organic refueling and a tactical sea-based long-endurance Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capability. To reflect a re-prioritized mission set, the Department has already initiated the re-designation process for Type/ 

Model/Series from RAQ–25 (R-reconnaissance, A-attack, Q-unmanned) to MQ–25A 

(M-multi-mission, Q-unmanned). 

Mr. FORBES. The P–8 Poseidon is a long range anti-submarine warfare aircraft 

and the MQ–4 Triton is a maritime surveillance UAV. How are the P–8 Poseidon 

and MQ–4 Triton related? Do the acquisition program objectives need to be synchronized to be effective? How the CBARS and MQ–4 Triton programs related and 

are their missions compatible? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The P–8A Poseidon and MQ–4C Triton programs are related 

through a common analysis of alternatives initiated to find the best materiel solution to recapitalize the Navy’s Maritime, Patrol, and Reconnaissance Force (MPRF). 

The analysis showed that a mix of manned and unmanned aircraft could not only 

continue the MPRF missions in a way that could pace the threat, but could also add 

persistence, meeting more of the warfighter’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) demand, enabling the Navy to hold maritime targets at risk earlier 

and over longer periods of time. Subsequently, the unique requirements for each capability were identified and acquisition program objectives defined, enabling each 

program to focus on its primary mission area. The P–8A Poseidon and MQ–4C Triton are complementary, with P–8A primarily performing cue-to-kill Anti-submarine 

Warfare (ASW) and Anti-surface Warfare (ASuW) missions and the MQ–4C providing persistent maritime ISR. Each program’s acquisition objectives remain focused to achieve optimal capability. The fleet integration of each program is managed by the MPRF community to ensuring appropriate synchronization of these 

complementary capabilities. 

The MQ–4C Triton and MQ–25A programs are independent of each other. The 

MQ–25A program will deliver a high-endurance unmanned aircraft to fulfill the aerial tanker role for the Navy’s Carrier Air Wing (CVW), thus preserving the strike 

fighter’s flight hours for its primary mission. It will also leverage the inherent range 
95 

and payload capacity of high endurance unmanned aircraft to provide criticallyneeded, around the clock, sea-based ISR capability in support of the Carrier Strike 

Group and the Joint Forces Commander. The Navy envisions that the open standards to be employed in the system design will enable greater flexibility and affordability for any future modifications to the aircraft after it has been fully integrated 

into the CVW. 

Mr. FORBES. MQ–4 Triton provides a shore based maritime surveillance capability. However, Triton maritime surveillance does not provide direct support for the 

aircraft carrier strike group. How does Navy intend to provide sufficient ISR capability in direct support of a carrier strike group and specifically, how does the MQ– 

4 Triton or CBARS capability support this effort? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Carrier Strike Group and the Joint Force Maritime 

Component Commander require intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 

capability that is persistent and provides both multiple sensor coverage and depth 

of surveillance from the vital areas of the sea base to beyond the maximum striking 

range of potential adversaries. MQ–4C Triton and MQ–25A will provide complementary support for this effort. MQ–4C Triton will provide land-based, multiple sensor, 

persistent maritime airborne ISR independently or in direct support to Fleet and 

Strike Group Commanders. While the Navy anticipates MQ–4C Triton will primarily be tasked independently to areas at great distances from an aircraft carrier, 

Triton will provide its correlated sensor data directly to the Carrier Strike Group 

via tactical communications networks. Simultaneously, Triton’s sensor data will be 

available for follow-on processing at exploitation nodes which also feed the Carrier 

Strike Group’s operational picture. The MQ–25A program is envisioned to be an integral part of the future Carrier Air Wing (CVW), providing organic refueling and 

a tactical sea-based long-endurance Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 

capability. The Navy envisions that the open standards to be employed in the system design will enable greater flexibility and affordability for any future modifications to the aircraft after it has been fully integrated into the CVW. 

Mr. FORBES. Are 50 Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASM) that have been proposed between fiscal year 2017 and 2019 sufficient to support PACOM joint urgent 

operational requirement? Why has Navy proposed to truncate the production line 

of LRASM in fiscal year 2020? What options are being pursued to provide a submarine/surface launched LRASM variant? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, the PACOM joint urgent operational requirement is sufficiently supported by the procurements in FY 2017 through FY 2019 of 110 LRASM 

missiles (50 missiles for USAF and 60 for USN). This is referred to as the Offensive 

Anti-Surface Warfare (OASuW) Increment I piece of the Department’s Cruise Missile Strategy, which is the material solution to meet the near to mid-term threats. 

Procurement of additional weapons beyond FY 2019 will be competitively awarded 

as part of the Department’s OASuW Increment II program, which will also address 

future threats. Funding for this program was part of the Department’s budget submission as a new start in FY 2017. It is expected that a LRASM variant will be 

part of the competition for this OASuW Increment II program. 

There is currently no government-funded activity to provide a submarine/surface 

launched variant of LRASM. DARPA conducted a single vertical launcher demonstration at the White Sands Missile Range as part of its LRASM demonstration 

program and the prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, intends to pursue a companyfunded demonstration from a Navy ship in the near term. 

For submarine/surface launched cruise missiles, the Department’s Cruise Missile 

Strategy includes the following efforts: support of Tomahawk Land Attack Block III 

and Tactical Tomahawk (TACTOM) Block IV through anticipated service lives; integration of modernization and obsolescence upgrades to TACTOM during a mid-life 

recertification program (which adds 15-years of additional missile service life); and 

development of the Next Generation Land Attack Weapon (NGLAW). Tomahawk 

upgrades will include development of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD), navigation 

improvements and communication upgrades, as well as commencement of the development of a seeker to enable maritime engagements. NGLAW will be the submarine/surface launched weapon to address future threats under the broader Next 

Generation Strike Capability and is projected to reach Initial Operational Capability 

in the 2028–2030 timeframe. 

Mr. FORBES. The Harpoon missile is the largest Navy anti-ship missile with over 

7,500 missiles having been built through the program. However, the range of this 

older missile and the capability of the seeker put Navy ships at risk as compared 

to other nation’s anti-ship missiles. Even the United States export variant is more 

capable than the United States Navy’s Harpoon missile. What are the Navy’s plans 

to correct this significant deficiency? 
96 

Secretary STACKLEY. To mitigate this capability gap in the near- and mid-term, 

the Navy is leveraging current systems to enhance over-the-horizon (OTH) anti-ship 

capability, adding capacity across the surface force by increasing the number of surface ships that can hold potential adversaries at risk over extended ranges. –The FY17 budget submission includes $439M across the FYDP to develop a maritime strike capability for the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) (IOC no later 

than FY22) in addition to other planned communications and navigation upgrades. 

–The Department is making affordable investments to the family of Standard missiles that significantly increase warfighting capability. These improvements provide 

multi mission capability to existing in-service weapons, planned incremental upgrades and future weapon procurements. 

–These investments in multi-mission Vertical Launch System (VLS) capable 

weapons provide additional OTH anti-ship capabilities with minimal investment 

in RDT&E and ship integration. 

–Additionally, the Navy is conducting demonstrations of two different OTH missile systems onboard two Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) during FY16 to inform potential backfit for both variants of LCS as well as informing future Frigate (FF) requirements. Our plan is to then investigate full and open competition opportunities 

to deliver an LCS/FF OTH anti-ship missile capability. 

To address long-term capabilities, the Navy will commence an analysis of alternatives in FY16 to support development of a next generation surface-launched long 

range strike weapon which will have both land attack and anti-ship capability. The 

resultant multi-mission weapon will address long-term land attack and anti-ship capability gaps to counter emerging anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats and increasing adversary surface ship capabilities while leveraging common technologies. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I have long been an advocate of Directed Energy weapons systems, 

and I am glad that technologies are beginning to transition out of the lab into operational units, such as the 30-kilowatt laser on the USS Ponce. Moving forward, how 

can we best couple our naval platforms with our strategic weapons systems when 

it comes to areas such as Directed Energy, or cyber? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Directed Energy (High Energy Laser [HEL] and High Power 

Radio Frequency [HPRF]) Weapon Systems offer significant potential benefit to the 

Department of the Navy’s warfighting capability and will complement traditional kinetic weapons (such as guns and missiles) in a layered defense scheme. Much has 

been learned from the Navy’s design, development, deployment, and operation of the 

Laser Weapon System (LaWS) onboard USS PONCE. Lessons learned from the 

LaWS deployment feed the Solid State Laser Technology Maturation (SSL–TM) development; which will design, build, test, and demonstrate a 150-kW Laser Weapon 

System Demonstrator that will mature component technologies of the laser system 

and subsystems. SSL–TM is scheduled to conduct an at-sea test onboard the SelfDefense Test Ship (SDTS) in FY18, which will be the first time a laser weapon is 

connected to ship’s power and cooling, and the first time system tracks and laser 

weapon source tracks are integrated. 

Ship integration studies were completed in 2012 for preliminary assessment of 

HEL integration on various ship classes, including DDG 51 Flt IIA. The studies determined that integration of a 125-kW HEL on DDG 51 Flt IIA is feasible with moderate modifications to ship’s structure, power and cooling. A follow-on ship integration study for DDG 51 Flt IIA will be completed in Summer 2016 to provide a more 

detailed understanding of 150-kW HEL integration, to include integrated topside design and combat systems integration. Ship integration studies for other ship classes 

(including aircraft carriers and amphibious ships) have not been performed, but it 

is likely that integration of a 150-kW class HEL on these platforms is feasible. 

A Simulation Experiment (SIMEX) with live operators was conducted in Nov 2013 

to explore HEL capabilities to defeat asymmetric threats such as FAC/FIAC and 

UAVs; and help define TTPs and duty cycle requirements. A future SIMEX is 

planned for Aug 2016 to leverage lessons learned from the prototype LaWS system 

deployed on the USS PONCE, to incorporate the findings of the 2016 ship integration study, and to further refine TTPs for a 150-kW class laser. 

For cyber, Navy is making limited initial investments in operational capabilities 

on our platforms which have the potential to be utilized for strategic effects in support of national, theater, or Fleet authorities. More information can be provided at 

the classified level upon request. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I have long been an advocate of Directed Energy weapons systems, 

and I am glad that technologies are beginning to transition out of the lab into oper-
97 

ational units, such as the 30-kilowatt laser on the USS Ponce. Moving forward, how 

can we best couple our naval platforms with our strategic weapons systems when 

it comes to areas such as Directed Energy, or cyber? 

Admiral MULLOY. Directed Energy (High Energy Laser [HEL] and High Power 

Radio Frequency [HPRF]) Weapon Systems offer significant potential benefit to the 

Department of the Navy’s warfighting capability and will complement traditional kinetic weapons (such as guns and missiles) in a layered defense scheme. Much has 

been learned from the Navy’s design, development, deployment, and operation of the 

Laser Weapon System (LaWS) onboard USS PONCE. Lessons learned from the 

LaWS deployment feed the Solid State Laser Technology Maturation (SSL–TM) development; which will design, build, test, and demonstrate a 150-kW Laser Weapon 

System Demonstrator that will mature component technologies of the laser system 

and subsystems. SSL–TM is scheduled to conduct an at-sea test onboard the SelfDefense Test Ship (SDTS) in FY18, which will be the first time a laser weapon is 

connected to ship’s power and cooling, and the first time system tracks and laser 

weapon source tracks are integrated. 

Ship integration studies were completed in 2012 for preliminary assessment of 

HEL integration on various ship classes, including DDG 51 Flt IIA. The studies determined that integration of a 125-kW HEL on DDG 51 Flt IIA is feasible with moderate modifications to ship’s structure, power and cooling. A follow-on ship integration study for DDG 51 Flt IIA will be completed in Summer 2016 to provide a more 

detailed understanding of 150-kW HEL integration, to include integrated topside design and combat systems integration. Ship integration studies for other ship classes 

(including aircraft carriers and amphibious ships) have not been performed, but it 

is likely that integration of a 150-kW class HEL on these platforms is feasible. 

A Simulation Experiment (SIMEX) with live operators was conducted in Nov 2013 

to explore HEL capabilities to defeat asymmetric threats such as FAC/FIAC and 

UAVs; and help define TTPs and duty cycle requirements. A future SIMEX is 

planned for Aug 2016 to leverage lessons learned from the prototype LaWS system 

deployed on the USS PONCE, to incorporate the findings of the 2016 ship integration study, and to further refine TTPs for a 150-kW class laser. 

For cyber, Navy is making limited initial investments in operational capabilities 

on our platforms which have the potential to be utilized for strategic effects in support of national, theater, or Fleet authorities. More information can be provided at 

the classified level upon request. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I have long been an advocate of Directed Energy weapons systems, 

and I am glad that technologies are beginning to transition out of the lab into operational units, such as the 30-kilowatt laser on the USS Ponce. Moving forward, how 

can we best couple our naval platforms with our strategic weapons systems when 

it comes to areas such as Directed Energy, or cyber? 

General WALSH. The Marine Corps is interested in directed energy weapons. 

Through our Science and Technology (S&T) portfolio, as well as the Office of Naval 

Research (ONR) and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), we 

continue to evaluate advances in directed energy technology in conjunction with 

challenges faced by the USMC. We have identified challenges in our Ground Based 

Air Defense (GBAD) portfolio where we are interested in evaluating potential solutions provided by directed energy technology. For instance, a future battlefield presents unique hybrid challenges where an enemy may use small Unmanned Aerial 

Systems (UAS) to ascertain our disposition on the battlefield in order to enable 

massed fire on our formations. Small UAS present a particularly difficult problem 

for traditional weapons systems and targeting assets. The Ground/Air Task Oriented Radar (G/ATOR) coupled with a directed energy weapon could provide an expeditionary and lethal solution. We will continue to investigate our entire portfolio 

for areas where this technology can provide superior capabilities to the warfighter. 

To address your cyber comments, we are fully committed to the importance of this 

domain in the current and future battlefield. The Commandant has directed a force 

structure review termed ‘Marine Corps Force 2025’ where we are evaluating the entire force structure against the future operating environment and threats, inclusive 

of cyber warfare. We have also stood up Marine Forces Cyber (MARFORCYBER) to 

provide operational forces in this arena. Finally, the Marine Corps has created on 

office for the Assistant Deputy Commandant for Information Warfare (ADC, IW) 

through which we are evaluating future cyber capabilities and supporting information related capabilities such as information operations, maneuver in the electromagnetic spectrum, signature reduction, and big data analytics to rapidly assess 

myriad sensor inputs. The intent is to effectively integrate and synergize all capabilities so commanders can ‘‘make sense and act’’ at a tempo unmatched by our adversaries. 
98 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BYRNE 

Mr. BYRNE. The Office of the Secretary of Defense paused the LCS program for 

about 9 months to allow the Navy, the shipbuilders and service providers to do an 

in depth analysis. This analysis came up with a shipbuilding plan and stated the 

need for 52 LCS/Frigates and included the dual supplier buy strategy which kept 

the cost of the ship down and ensured stability in the industrial base. Abruptly the 

proposed plan is to decrease from 52 to 40 and includes a single supplier. Has the 

Navy engaged in any preliminary actions to begin the down select process? If so 

please explain to what extent this has occurred? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Navy plans to competitively award one LCS to each 

shipbuilder in 2017, and proceed with completion of respective Frigate designs to 

support a competitive down-select to a single shipbuilder in 2018 based on the proposed Frigate design. This acquisition strategy sustains competition for the single 

ship awards in 2017 and delivers the desired Frigate capability ahead of the original, approved schedule. However, it is recognized that this down-select decision also 

places one of our shipbuilders and much of the support industrial base at risk of 

closure. The Navy will use this current period of stable production—prior to the 

down-select decision—to thoroughly assess the impact of such potential closure on 

our strategic shipbuilding industrial base, the cost of our shipbuilding program, and 

our ability to support in-service ships, in order to identify appropriate actions to 

mitigate these impacts to the extent practical. 

Mr. BYRNE. The Navy’s stated goal in the Shipbuilding Plan is a fleet of 308 

ships. While other classes of ships are seeing cuts as well, cutting the total number 

of LCS from 52 to 40 is a move in the wrong direction at a time when we need to 

grow U.S. naval presence around the world. With the expected cuts to the LCS program will the Navy be able to meet their stated goal of an end strength of 308 

ships? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Yes, the Navy will reach 308 ships by the end of FY 2021. 

Shipbuilding plans for FY 2017 and beyond will determine the size of the Navy after 

2021 because of the time necessary to build a ship. The ships that will be delivered 

by the end of FY 2021 to reach a total of 308 ships have already been authorized 

and appropriated in prior years. However, the reduction in the LCS program will 

impact the fleet size after 2021. 

Mr. BYRNE. The President’s Budget calls for the decrease of the LCS from 52 total 

ships down to 40. This type of unexpected change will undoubtedly increase the cost 

of these ships. Is it true that the President’s Budget accounts for this at about a 

20% cost increase per ship? 

Admiral MULLOY. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 President’s Budget Request shows 

an approximate 20 percent cost increase per ship as reflected in the end cost average unit costs between FY 2016 and FY 2017. While most of this premium is due 

to procuring one less ship, some of the premium results from the new contract 

award in FY 2017 (the original block buy contract completed in FY 2016). 

The quantity reduction results in increased costs per ship due to loss in material 

savings, reduced labor efficiencies, and increased overhead. These impacts will be 

experienced as a result of a reduction in shipyard workload for both shipyards for 

FY 2017. 

Mr. BYRNE. Admiral Harris, the PACOM Commander, mentioned at a Full Committee hearing on February 24th that the Expeditionary Fast Transport (EPF) has 

an incredible ability to not only move people and machines but also have the capacity to build out other capabilities such as adding an expeditionary field hospital and 

turn it into a mobile hospital ship. The original need for Joint High Speed Vessels 

was 18 and in recent years the number has significantly decreased. What caused 

this decrease and what is the need by the Marine Corps for this type of capability 

moving forward? 

General WALSH. Of the original 18 Expeditionary Fast Transports (EPF), 13 were 

designated for the Navy and 5 were for the Army. The 01 November 2012 Gate 6 

Sufficiency and Configuration Steering Board (CSB) memo for the EPF stated that 

PB13 truncated the program from 18 to 10 ships. The PB13 30-year shipbuilding 

report to Congress identified this drop as a function of two things. First, the overall 

requirement for JHSVs fell to 10 ships. Second, the Department of the Army transferred the 5 JHSVs it procured to the Department of the Navy as an efficiency 

measure. These two actions prompted the DON to halt planned JHSV production 

at 10 ships. Subsequently, the 2014 interim update to the Force Structure Assessment (FSA) revised the requirement to 11 vessels. OPNAV N81 is currently revising 

the FSA for 2016, the results of which are expected at the end of summer 2016. 

The MARFORs will continue to work with their respective NAVFORs to utilize 

EPFs for intra-theater lift requirements and support of the Geographic Combatant 
99 

Commander’s (GCC) theater security cooperation (TSC) plan. To date EPF ships 

have been used in conjunction with Marine Detachments for Southern Partnership 

Station, TSC operations along the west coast of Africa, evacuation contingency for 

the Sochi Olympics, as well as fleet experimentation. The EPF provides intra-theater troop/equipment lift options which allows the conduct of alternative platform 

missions such as providing mobility for elements of a Special Purpose Marine Air 

Ground Task Force–Crisis Response (i.e. TSC-sized force) while meeting presence/ 

deterrence/assurance in the GCC’s purview. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER 

Mr. HUNTER. The Navy invests billions of dollars every year to acquire, sustain, 

modify and extend the service life of many different types and sizes of weapon systems. Paramount in protecting these investments and ensuring the effectiveness of 

these weapon systems is the challenge of managing all of the data, through Product 

Lifecycle Management (PLM). 

Naval Aviation is taking the role as Lead Systems Integrator for the UCLASS unmanned aircraft and other programs, and I’m hopeful this will result in cost savings 

over relying on prime contractors to act as the LSI. 

Do you see the Navy assuming more lead system integrator roles, as shown by 

the designation of the UCLASS program in the future? 

Secretary STACKLEY. In all cases the Department of the Navy (DoN) seeks to optimize management structures to best support program outcomes through all phases 

of acquisition and sustainment. This is a key consideration in the preparation of our 

acquisition strategies and life cycle sustainment plans. We support and comply with 

the provisions of Public Law 110–181, Section 802, which limits assignment of the 

Lead Systems Integrator (LSI) once low rate initial production has been achieved. 

DoN has undertaken initiatives which ensure the acquisition workforce is capable 

of filling the role of the LSI, where appropriate. These initiatives include the development and advancement of the organic technical capability that resides within the 

Naval Research & Development Establishment. This technical capability provides a 

solid foundation for DoN acquisition efforts and supports the acquisition workforce 

in successfully executing the LSI role. 

In the case of UCLASS and the restructured MQ–25A program, PMA–268 is serving as government LSI for the Unmanned Carrier Aviation (UCA) program. The 

Navy is using the LSI construct in an attempt to: improve affordability across the 

system of systems life cycle; speed of capability delivery to the warfighter; increase 

government agility to react to and manage emerging technology; and the maximization of system of systems value over time. 

As government LSI, PMA–268 has developed and manages a government-owned 

enterprise UCA architecture that includes open architecture interface standards. 

This approach has enabled the program to leverage significant prior DoN and joint 

investments across over 70 stakeholder systems, programs of record, and SYSCOMs 

(e.g. networks, TCPED, communications, avionics, etc.), and may provide further affordability opportunities after an Air System contractor is selected. 

Mr. HUNTER. Does NAVAIR have a need to conduct timely readiness, oversight, 

and cost assessments in support of technical and programmatic reviews for Program 

Executive Officers, program managers and resource sponsors to improve Navy procurement, design, production, logistics and readiness productivity on both Navy-led 

and Contractor-led programs? 

Secretary STACKLEY. NAVAIR conducts a variety of assessments in support of our 

acquisition and in-service programs. 

The Department of the Navy policy requires that ACAT I–IV programs have an 

Independent Logistics Assessment (ILA) conducted at each major program milestone, at two years POST-Full Rate Production (FRP) and every five years thereafter. The purpose of each major milestone ILA is to provide the milestone decision 

authority (MDA), program manager, program sponsor, customer, and other stakeholders with an effective measure of the program’s integrated product support (IPS) 

planning and execution. Assessments independent of the system developers ensure 

an impartial evaluation of a program’s product support status. The ILA process provides an effective method for evaluating risk, life cycle cost, supportability, and system product support performance from a total ownership cost perspective. The purpose of the Post FRP ILAs is a multi-disciplined product and process assessment 

to ensure that the system under review is operationally employed with well-understood and managed risk. The Post FRP ILA is intended to characterize the in-service health of the deployed system. It provides an assessment of risk, readiness, technical status, and trends in a measurable form. These assessments substantiate in- 
100 

service support budget priorities. The consistent application of sound programmatic, 

systems engineering, and logistics management plans, processes, and sub-tier inservice stakeholder reviews will help achieve the Post FRP ILA objectives. 

In a similar manner, the Weapons Maintenance Readiness Review (WMRR) process follows an enterprise model that includes NAVAIR, fleet and resource sponsors. 

The semi-annual reviews assess all weapons and target program supportability 

risks and issues. Risk mitigation or issue resolution recommendations are considered, business cases are analyzed and recommendations are forwarded to the 

WMRR stakeholders for adjudication. The vast majority of weapons are direct production to long term storage with little recurring/scheduled maintenance. Weapons 

maintenance and readiness status is generally assessed by Original Equipment 

Manufacturer (OEM) periodic All Up Round (AUR) or sub-system factory testing or 

LOT/age sample AUR fleet firings. 

Additionally, all Program Executive Offices (PEOs) have processes in place to 

manage their program portfolios. Examples include semi-annual or annual program 

reviews (e.g., Program Management Reviews, Executive Steering Reviews, etc.) to 

include facets and attributes of logistics and supportability. These reviews report on 

readiness and cost drivers and initiatives to address program risk and issue resolution. 

NAVAIR also utilizes the Naval Aviation Enterprise (NAE) construct to conduct 

readiness reviews on Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) on a yearly cycle. The T/M/S reviews bring together the program manager with the fleet T/M/S Navy lead Commodore and/or Marine Air Group (MAG) Commander, resource sponsors, engineering, maintenance, supply, and logistics providers to examine readiness, cost, procurement, design and inventory management issues. This rigorous approach involves a three-step review: 1) an O–6 level Type Commander (TYCOM) Readiness 

Workshop (TRW); 2) a two-star flag-level Current Readiness Cross Functional Team 

(CR CFT) review; and 3) a three-star NAE Air Board review that includes the Commander, Naval Air Forces (CNAF), Deputy Commandant for Aviation (DCA), and 

the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR). Each T/M/S and its associated readiness posture is thoroughly analyzed, leading to recommendations and 

implementation of current and future readiness approaches that optimize support 

to fleet operational/training requirements. Additionally, a weekly Executive Communication (EXCOMM) is conducted at the three-star level to discuss and address 

pressing cost, procurement, design, production, logistics, and readiness productivity 

issues affecting Navy and Marine Corps organic and contractor-led programs. 

In addition to NAVAIR-lead reviews and assessments, NAVAIR also supports numerous reviews and assessments conducted for major programs by the office of the 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition and the 

office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. 

Mr. HUNTER. With Naval Aviation in charge of a large complex program like 

UCLASS, and in other programs in the future, and with so much data produced 

from design to disposition, do you see challenges in managing all of this data produced from disparate commercial and government IT sources? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Both government and industry are faced with today’s challenge of properly managing the complexity and volume of data found in today’s systems. NAVAIR has recognized the need to manage data as an asset so data can be 

turned into actionable information. Guidance, standards, and policy are being developed to make data more transparent, reusable, integrated and accessible. For example, a metadata standard has been developed to enable NAVAIR to manage data 

throughout its life cycle and improve interoperability. Information exchange standards and methods are being developed to improve data accessibility and security. 

Efforts are underway to investigate methods to providing a digital thread of data 

across the product life cycle from design to disposal. 

Mr. HUNTER. With the rapid growth of Additive Manufacturing (3D printing) in 

NAVAIR, do you believe managers and engineers have the software tools they need 

to produce accurate digital data sets and a digital twin of Navy products and Parts 

throughout its lifecycle? Is that a looming problem for NAVAIR and other Navy 

agencies that are beginning to engaged in Additive Manufacturing? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Significant commercial investment in Additive Manufacturing (AM) technology and expanded use in commercial industry have exponentially improved the quality of components made via multiple AM processes and expanded its use to include multiple materials. Department of Navy (DoN) and 

NAVAIR have leveraged this commercial investment to develop the processes and 

data using AM technology to directly manufacture needed parts and components for 

our systems. 

NAVAIR’s concept and use of AM technology for everything from polymer prototypes to metal safety critical components has highlighted a number of requirements 
101 

that must be met to ensure that AM parts can be produced with consistent quality 

and be safely used with NAVAIR weapons systems. 

‘‘Digital Thread/Digital Twin’’ capabilities are needed to enable broad use of AM 

and manage the digital data required—including computer aided design and manufacturing, product life cycle management and data management software, digital 

data architectures to ensure we have a standardized set of data components, and 

cyber security tools to protect AM data. 

Early in 2016, a Department of Navy AM Implementation Plan was developed to 

focus research and development activities for AM and accelerate AM implementation for the operational and logistics communities. The AM Implementation Plan 

identifies five primary goals to enable AM implementation and provides detailed 

roadmaps to meet each of them; digital AM data and the framework and tools to 

manage that data are called out specifically in the AM Implementation Plan. 

NAVAIR has begun developing Digital Thread capabilities at our Aviation Depots 

to enable use of AM and other digital manufacturing technologies to improve readiness. Initial development of cyber security approaches for AM and standards for 

managing AM technical data will be completed in 2016. Detailed planning for implementation of ‘‘Digital Thread’’ capabilities is occurring now and is in accordance 

with the DoN AM Implementation Plan. 

Mr. HUNTER. Is there a cost savings if the Navy procured an overarching Product 

Lifecycle Management (PLM) Software system that could read multiple IT disparate 

data sets, and allow stove-piped contractor provided software systems to be consolidated and reduced? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Department of Navy continually reviews its defense 

business systems, including logistics information technology systems and product 

lifecycle management technology, to optimize the balance of investment and 

warfighting effectiveness. This investment management process, governed by 10 

U.S.C. 2222, allows the Department to make informed investment decisions that are 

aligned to strategy while enhancing interoperability though common architectures 

and computing infrastructure. As a part of the investment approval process, the 

Navy continually assesses opportunities to phase out legacy systems and consolidate 

functionality to achieve maximum efficiency in all portfolios, to include logistics. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PETERS 

Mr. PETERS. What is being done to assess and solve the problems related with 

future use of the SEALs underwater delivery vehicle, namely that the Virginia-class 

submarines will only be able to have one of them attached, as opposed to the Ohioclass that can fit two? Is the issue being studied on what can be done, other than 

prolonging the life of the Ohio-class subs, to ensure capabilities and redundancies? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The first four OHIO Class SSBNs were converted within 

their service life to SSGNs because they were no longer required for strategic deterrence. The SSGNs will be at their maximum 42 year service life starting in 2026 

and cannot be prolonged. The remaining OHIO Class SSBNs are necessary for strategic deterrence and will have reached their maximum service life as they are replaced by the OHIO Replacement SSBNs, and therefore, will not have service life 

remaining to convert to SSGNs. 

The VIRGINIA Class submarine mission areas include Special Warfare and the 

VIRGINIA Class Operation Requirements Document (ORD) requires support for one 

Dry Deck Shelter (DDS). VIRGINIA Class submarines currently accommodate Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions including the capability to deploy one SEAL 

underwater delivery vehicle. The VIRGINIA Payload Module (VPM) planned for 

Block V and later VIRGINIA Class submarines will retain these same SOF capabilities, including deploying one SEAL underwater delivery vehicle. 

The Submarine Fleet Commanders and COMNAVSPECWARCOM, along with 

OPNAV and NAVSEA recognized the impending loss of the unique SSGN capability 

and established working groups in early 2015 to review operational requirements 

and develop strategies to utilize VIRGINIA class submarines to replace the SSGN 

capability. These studies are expected to complete later this calendar year and inform the number of VIRGINA Class SOF host submarines required to meet known 

and future mission requirements, including those involving the SEALs underwater 

delivery vehicles. 

Mr. PETERS. Some shipyards in San Diego, particularly General Dynamics 

NASSCO, build, repair, and maintain both U.S. Navy and U.S.-flag commercial 

ships. Can commercial shipbuilding in fact help to lower the costs of U.S. Navy ship 

construction in the same facilities as well as help to maintain skilled workers for 

Navy shipbuilding? Can you give us an example and describe any other benefits? 
102 

Secretary STACKLEY. The Navy’s military preparedness depends on the private 

sector for shipbuilding and maintenance of the Fleet. The Navy has encouraged the 

shipbuilders to explore commercial shipbuilding opportunities, where feasible, to 

help reduce the costs of Navy shipbuilding programs. If the shipbuilder is able to 

obtain new commercial shipbuilding projects, the Navy will potentially benefit on 

existing contracts and any future Navy work. The benefits may include the reduction of some portion of fixed overhead expenses and retention of a critical skilled 

workforce for existing and future Navy work. 

Gaps in shipbuilding due to Navy shipbuilding profile changes can result in engineering and production work force gaps with our industry partners that impact the 

cost of future Navy new construction and repair work. These gaps may cause companies to lay off significant numbers of its production workforce, which will potentially 

force them to re-hire and re-train employees, with negative effects on productivity 

and quality. Absent commercial work, remaining Navy shipbuilding and repair work 

will be left to fund all shipyard overhead, driving up costs of Navy work as available 

yard capacity is underutilized. 

The production gap at General Dynamics National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) resulting from the Navy Expeditionary Sea Base (ESB) (formerly 

MLP) shipbuilding profile is a good example. The Navy has implemented a Shipbuilding Capability Preservation Agreement (SCPA) with NASSCO to promote future growth in commercial shipbuilding work at NASSCO. NASSCO was able to obtain commercial work to fill its production gap and likely avoided the potential layoff of significant numbers of its production workforce. In addition, the commercial 

work allowed for a cost sharing of shipyard overhead costs with commercial customers. 

Mr. PETERS. What is being done to assess and solve the problems related with 

future use of the SEALs underwater delivery vehicle, namely that the Virginia-class 

submarines will only be able to have one of them attached, as opposed to the Ohioclass that can fit two? Is the issue being studied on what can be done, other than 

prolonging the life of the Ohio-class subs, to ensure capabilities and redundancies? 

Admiral MULLOY. The first four OHIO Class SSBNs were converted within their 

service life to SSGNs because they were no longer required for strategic deterrence. 

The SSGNs will be at their maximum 42 year service life starting in 2026 and cannot be prolonged. The remaining OHIO Class SSBNs are necessary for strategic deterrence and will have reached their maximum service life as they are replaced by 

the OHIO Replacement SSBNs, and therefore, will not have service life remaining 

to convert to SSGNs. 

The VIRGINIA Class submarine mission areas include Special Warfare and the 

VIRGINIA Class Operation Requirements Document (ORD) requires support for one 

Dry Deck Shelter (DDS). VIRGINIA Class submarines currently accommodate Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions including the capability to deploy one SEAL 

underwater delivery vehicle. The VIRGINIA Payload Module (VPM) planned for 

Block V and later VIRGINIA Class submarines will retain these same SOF capabilities, including deploying one SEAL underwater delivery vehicle. 

The Submarine Fleet Commanders and COMNAVSPECWARCOM, along with 

OPNAV and NAVSEA recognized the impending loss of the unique SSGN capability 

and established working groups in early 2015 to review operational requirements 

and develop strategies to utilize VIRGINIA class submarines to replace the SSGN 

capability. These studies are expected to complete later this calendar year and inform the number of VIRGINA Class SOF host submarines required to meet known 

and future mission requirements, including those involving the SEALs underwater 

delivery vehicles. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. WALORSKI 

Mrs. WALORSKI. The Navy’s maritime surveillance fleet is reaching the end of its 

service life and the Navy is recapitalizing this mission. Given the critical importance 

of maritime surveillance to our national security and our economy, we cannot afford 

a gap in this capability. A big part of the recapitalization plan is the MQ–4C Triton 

unmanned system, which will provide persistent surveillance with an advanced 

maritime radar capable of providing detailed surveillance of millions of square miles 

of ocean. Does the Navy have sufficient resources to meet its global requirements 

for maritime surveillance? How do unmanned systems like Triton help address some 

of the perennial ISR shortfalls we frequently hear about? 

Secretary STACKLEY. Unmanned systems like MQ–4C Triton help address the 

ever-increasing demand for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) by 

leveraging their inherent reach and persistence and integrating with manned plat-
103 

forms to hold potential adversaries at risk earlier and over longer periods of time. 

Sufficient resources exist within the President’s Budget to meet our commitments 

for the Navy’s contribution to global ISR as prioritized by the Department. By the 

end of 2020, the Navy’s Maritime ISR capacity fielded in support of the Global Force 

Management Allocation Plan will exceed that which is currently fielded. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. This committee has recently heard from General Breedlove, Commander of EUCOM, and Admiral Harris, Commander of PACOM. Both described 

the challenges posed by operating in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environments 

and that we must keep the focus on improving our EW ability. From your perspective, what portfolio capability gaps currently exist and what can installations like 

Crane and other Navy Labs do to further enhance this mission and their contribution? 

Secretary STACKLEY. While specific Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare (EMW) 

gaps are classified, it is critical for our Naval Laboratories, Warfare Centers and 

Systems Centers to continue the work they are executing to develop and sustain 

Electronic Warfare (EW) and EMW systems. 

Several examples include: 

–Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane provides surface EW expertise for the 

SLQ–32 and its Surface EW Improvement Program (SEWIP) version 6 and 7; the 

Advanced Off-board EW system; and Nulka Decoys. 

–Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren provides development of the Real-Time 

Spectrum Operations system for surface platform management and deconfliction of 

the Electromagnetic Spectrum fleet usage, as well as deployment of the Electromagnetic Railgun. 

–Naval Undersea Warfare Center Newport provides expertise for undersea platform EMW systems and platform integration including work related to the BLQ– 

10 Electronic Support Measure as well as Electro-optics, antenna and communications systems. 

–Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, Point Mugu provides air EW selfprotect and stand-off jammers, infrared countermeasures, threat simulation and 

jamming technique optimization, also platform integration for EA–18G. 

–Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center Pacific provides integrated Command, 

Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 

(C4ISR) solutions integrating forces, platforms, and functions into coordinated operational capabilities. 

–Naval Research Laboratory provides research expertise across all facets of EWM 

including radar systems, optical sensors and optics-based sensors, advanced electronic support measures techniques; and electronic warfare systems, techniques, and 

devices. 

In recent years the addition of Congress’ authorization for Naval Innovative 

Science and Engineering, Section 219, funding has become especially important to 

ensuring our Naval Laboratory, Warfare Centers and Systems Centers and their respective workforce have state of the art technology and the means to physically and 

virtually collaborate in exploration of critical EMW Naval Gaps and to create a 

stream of innovation in this critical mission area. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. This committee recently heard from General Breedlove, Commander of EUCOM, and Admiral Harris, Commander of PACOM. Both expressed 

their need for more submarines and more long-range weapons in order to address 

the ever growing threats posed by Russia and the threats in the Indo-Asia-Pacific 

region. What role does the Navy’s Virginia Payload Module program play in the development and acceleration of delivering the right weapons to address these growing 

threats? 

Secretary STACKLEY. The VIRGINIA Payload Module (VPM) will eventually recapitalize the loss of undersea strike capacity when the nation’s four guided missile 

submarines (SSGN) retire. The VPM will enable the Navy to increase the volume 

of strike capacity over non-VPM VA Class boats and provides further options for delivery of future payloads to address growing threats around the globe. 

Mrs. WALORSKI. The Navy’s maritime surveillance fleet is reaching the end of its 

service life and the Navy is recapitalizing this mission. Given the critical importance 

of maritime surveillance to our national security and our economy, we cannot afford 

a gap in this capability. A big part of the recapitalization plan is the MQ–4C Triton 

unmanned system, which will provide persistent surveillance with an advanced 

maritime radar capable of providing detailed surveillance of millions of square miles 

of ocean. Does the Navy have sufficient resources to meet its global requirements 

for maritime surveillance? How do unmanned systems like Triton help address some 

of the perennial ISR shortfalls we frequently hear about? 

Admiral MULLOY. Unmanned systems like MQ–4C Triton help address the everincreasing demand for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) by 
104 

leveraging their inherent reach and persistence and integrating with manned platforms to hold potential adversaries at risk earlier and over longer periods of time. 

Sufficient resources exist within the President’s Budget to meet our commitments 

for the Navy’s contribution to global ISR as prioritized by the Department. By the 

end of 2020, the Navy’s Maritime ISR capacity fielded in support of the Global Force 

Management Allocation Plan will exceed that which is currently fielded. 

Æ