The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear 

Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of 

Classified Missile Components: 

An Assessment 

by

Michelle Spencer 

Aadina Ludin 

Heather Nelson 

Advisor: 

Col. Larry Chandler (USAF, ret.)

The Counterproliferation Papers 

Future Warfare Series No. 56 

January 2012 

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 
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iii

The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear 

Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of 

Classified Missile Components: 

An Assessment 

Michelle Spencer 

Aadina Ludin 

Heather Nelson 

The USAF Counterproliferation Center was established to provide education, research 

and analysis to assist the understanding of the U.S. national security policy-makers and USAF 

officers to help them better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. The 

USAF Counterproliferation Center is funded jointly by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

and the United States Air Force. 

Copies of this report and other publications are available on the USAF 

Counterproliferation Center website: http://cpc.au.af.mil or by contacting them directly by mail 

at USAF Counterproliferation Center, 325 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6427; 

phone: (334) 953-7538 / DSN 493-7538; fax: (334) 953-7530 / DSN 493-7530; or email: 

CPC.Admin@maxwell.af.mil.

USAF Counterproliferation Center 

Air University 

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6427 
iv

DISCLAIMER 

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect 

the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, U.S. Air Force or 

the USAF Counterproliferation Center.
v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 

This report is the result of a year-long Air University research project funded by 

Headquarters Air Force, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (AF/A10). We, the 

authors of this report, appreciate the support of AF/A10 and the USAF Counterproliferation 

Center for this important project. We would also like to extend our sincere appreciation to all 

workshop participants and interviewees, who took time out of their hectic schedules to 

brainstorm on this critically important issue. 

The authors especially would like to thank Gene Moseley, Buck Buchanan, Mark Stout, 

and Dale Hill for their tireless support and editorial assistance for this project. Finally, this 

project would not have been complete without the exceptional advice and assistance of Larry 

Chandler. 

Michelle L. Spencer 

Aadina Ludin

Heather Nelson 
vi 
vii 

TABLE OF CONTENTS 

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................................ v

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ 1

PROLOGUE ................................................................................................................................. 11

The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons ................................................................. 11

The Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile Components to Taiwan .................................... 13

The Response: Investigations ................................................................................................... 14

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 17

Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 17

Study Findings .......................................................................................................................... 19

DEFINING THE PROBLEM ....................................................................................................... 22

Leadership ................................................................................................................................. 22

Management .............................................................................................................................. 23

Expertise ................................................................................................................................... 24

HISTORY ..................................................................................................................................... 26

The Deterrence Mission ............................................................................................................ 26

Organization and Culture of SAC ............................................................................................. 27

Air Force Organization and Missions ....................................................................................... 28

Comparing Air Force and Navy Nuclear Operations ............................................................... 29

The Demise of the Soviet Union and SAC ............................................................................... 31

ROOT CAUSE 1: POLICY AND OVERSIGHT CHANGES ..................................................... 32

Strategy and Policy ................................................................................................................... 33

The Power of the Atom and the Aging Scientific Community ................................................. 34

Congress .................................................................................................................................... 35

Arms Control Reduces Bureaucratic Clout ............................................................................... 36

ROOT CAUSE 2: ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND OPERATIONAL EVOLUTION .... 39

Office of the Secretary of Defense............................................................................................ 39

USSTRATCOM and Headquarters Air Force .......................................................................... 42

Nuclear Goes Conventional ...................................................................................................... 42

General McPeak‘s Revolution .................................................................................................. 43

Goldwater-Nichols Overhauls Service Structure ...................................................................... 45

ROOT CAUSE 3: INSTITUTIONAL FOCUS ........................................................................... 47

Signs of Nuclear Enterprise Decline Were Ignored .................................................................. 47
viii 

Air Force Cultures of Compliance and Self-Assessment Are Gone ......................................... 48

Nuclear Education and Training De-emphasized ..................................................................... 50

ROOT CAUSE 4: FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP ........................................................................ 51

Nuclear Weapons Lose Their Advocates .................................................................................. 51

Inaction Can Be As Harmful As Action ................................................................................... 52

ROOT CAUSE 5: FAILURE TO FOCUS EXPERTISE ............................................................. 54

Nuclear Weapons are a ―Sunset Business‖ ............................................................................... 54

Loss of Intellectual Capital ....................................................................................................... 56

Every Airman a Leader? ........................................................................................................... 58

RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................................................. 60

Expertise ................................................................................................................................... 60

Put the Nuclear Mission Back into the Hands of the ―Experts‖ ........................................... 60

Reestablish Operational Competence ................................................................................... 61

Incentivize Change and Ensure Retention ............................................................................ 62

Leadership ................................................................................................................................. 63

Reinstitute Core Principles: Communication and Responsibility ......................................... 64

Motivate Managers to Be Leaders ........................................................................................ 64

Require Responsibility at the Highest Levels ....................................................................... 65

Management .............................................................................................................................. 66

Enable Nuclear Staff to Learn From Past and Focus on the Future ...................................... 66

Reinstitute Unity of Command ............................................................................................. 67

Make Change Work .............................................................................................................. 68

Culture....................................................................................................................................... 69

Reestablish the Culture of Excellence .................................................................................. 70

Explain Why the Mission is Vital ......................................................................................... 71

Inform Up; Educate Down .................................................................................................... 71

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 73

APPENDIX A: Bibliography ........................................................................................................ 75

APPENDIX B: Interview Statistics .............................................................................................. 80

APPENDIX C: investigations resulting from The Nuclear Incidents .......................................... 81

APPENDIX D: Acronyms and Abbreviations .............................................................................. 89

 
1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Background 

 On August 31, 2007, a U.S. Air Force B-52 plane with the call sign ―Doom 99‖ took off 

from Minot Air Force Base (AFB), North Dakota, inadvertently loaded with six 

Advanced Cruise Missiles loaded with nuclear warheads and flew to Barksdale AFB, 

Louisiana. After landing, ―Doom 99‖ sat on the tarmac at Barksdale unguarded for nine 

hours before the nuclear weapons were discovered. Below you will read the details of 

that 36-hour period with six primary mistakes highlighted. 

 While the Air Force was reeling from the investigations of the unauthorized movement of 

nuclear weapons, it was revealed that Taiwan had received classified forward sections of 

the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile rather than the helicopter batteries it 

had ordered from the U.S., bringing to light a second nuclear-related incident. 

 These two incidents resulted in six major investigations and studies: 

1. Air Combat Command Commander Directed Investigation (CDI) 

2. Blue Ribbon Review of Nuclear Weapons Policies and Procedures 

3. Defense Science Board Report on the Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons 

4. Report of the Investigation into the Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the 

Accountability for, and Shipment of, Sensitive Missile Components to Taiwan 

(Admiral Donald Report) 

5. Report of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons 

Management, Phase I: The Air Force‘s Nuclear Mission and Phase II: Review of the 

DoD Nuclear Mission (Schlesinger Commission Report) 

6. Headquarters Air Force Report: Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise 

 The studies cited, ―a failure of leadership‖ and a significant ―erosion of nuclear expertise‖

as primary causes of these incidents. Even after the 2007 incidents, the Air Force 

continued to experience senior leadership failures culminating with the Secretary of the 

Air Force (SECAF) and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) being forced to resign 

and six other senior officers either being fired or reprimanded. 

 This report is the result of a year-long Air University research project funded by 

Headquarters Air Force (HAF), Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (A10). The 

study team was tasked with ―researching and writing a case study to investigate how the 

Air Force can reinvigorate the handling, operation, and maintenance discipline of nuclear 

weapons that characterized nuclear operations standards and culture at the height of the 

Cold War.‖
2

 The goal of the study was to provide a deeper understanding of the context of internal and 

external forces that led to the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons and mistaken 

shipment of classified forward sections. The methodology was to: conduct a literature 

review of existing studies, reports, policies, and procedures; hold workshops to review 

direction and findings, both at the operational and senior leadership levels; and conduct 

interviews with senior Air Force, Department of Defense (DoD) and national security 

experts who played a role in our nuclear mission between 1986 to the present. 

 Our research led to the conclusion that while the events of 2006-2007 are significant in 

and of themselves, the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons and mistaken 

shipment of classified forward sections are merely symptoms of greater institutional 

problems. The Air Force nuclear enterprise has been in a state of decline and has been 

for most of the last two decades. With the standup of Air Force Global Strike Command 

(AFGSC) and HAF/A10, the Air Force is working to reestablish the enterprise on 

positive footing. It is clear from our interviews and research that the leadership has a 

long and challenging path ahead of them and some significant adjustment in the current 

course needs to be considered. 

 Through workshops and interviews with numerous senior leaders and experts from the 

nuclear enterprise, five factors were identified as the most significant ―root causes‖ that 

set the stage for the two events. Unfortunately, a true root cause analysis cannot be 

completed; it is not possible to return to the past and change key decisions to determine 

new outcomes. Thus, historical root cause analysis relies on logic and inference from 

experts in the field.

Root Cause 1: Policy and Oversight Changes 

 The evolution of national nuclear strategy and policy had a dramatic effect on the Air 

Force nuclear enterprise in four key areas: a lack of focus at the policy and strategy level; 

an aging and shrinking scientific community responsible for nuclear weapons 

development; a lack of awareness or understanding on nuclear-related issues in Congress; 

and the impact of arms control measures. 

 The linkage between the perceived lack of national-level commitment to a ―robust 

nuclear deterrent‖ by senior national security officials and its detrimental effect on the 

nuclear workforce was identified by previous studies. 

 The problem was compounded by the integration and evolution of nuclear issues into the 

broader spectrum of weapons of mass destruction and growing requirement for the 

conventional wars being waged. 

 The role of nuclear weapons in the national security strategy underwent a gradual 

evolution, which was highlighted in strategy documents after the events of September 11, 

2001 changed the focus of security and deterrence. Terrorism and rogue state concerns 

ascended as the primary threats to the United States, dramatically altering the perceived 

utility of nuclear weapons in our national strategy. 
3

 The political advocates of nuclear weapons programs are retiring from the scene and have 

been replaced in the Pentagon, Capitol Hill, and White House by leaders who do not 

focus on nuclear preparedness and nuclear deterrence as the most important issues of the 

day. This decline in the number of nuclear advocates and the clout they hold has 

reflected itself in the Air Force‘s lax approach that led to the unauthorized movement of 

nuclear weapons and mistaken shipment of classified forward sections. A 1998 report by 

AF/XON noted many of the same issues that were cited a decade later. The report also 

noted that Airmen in the nuclear field maintained adherence to high standards. 

Root Cause 2: Organizational Change and Operational Evolution 

 Lack of attention, clarity, and financial support by the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

has been detrimental to the Air Force‘s nuclear enterprise. 

 In addition to command and control of U.S. strategic forces, the Commander of U.S. 

Strategic Command was assigned numerous non-nuclear missions. 

 Operation Desert Storm highlighted American dominance in conventional weapons, 

specifically in the areas of weapons-guidance and communications technologies. 

 General McPeak was Chief of Staff at a time when the economy was in decline and the 

services were being forced to make dramatic budget cuts. General McPeak‘s vision was 

a streamlined, flat organization that moved power out of headquarters and into the hands 

of commanders in the field. 

 The Strategic Air Command (SAC) construct fit with the Cold War, but the inflexible, 

―checklist-following‖ nature of SAC and thus the Air Force, did not mesh with the 

dynamic conflicts in Iraq and the Balkans. 

 In 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act to address the issue of service 

interoperability. The legislation forced the services to take meaningful steps to improve 

joint operational capability. Goldwater Nichols changed the services role in combat and 

non-combat operations. Under the new law, the armed services became force providers 

to joint commanders. While this addressed the problem of inter-service rivalry, it 

changed the mission construct of the services. 

Root Cause 3: Institutional Focus 

 While the decline in nuclear competence occurred steadily, many red flags were raised, 

but ignored. Conscious decisions were made to alter training and education requirements 

to the point that most airmen did not receive any nuclear-related training. Policies were 

ignored or revised to meet new challenges, in the ever-flattening Air Force organization. 

 There were numerous signals for the Air Force that the nuclear mission was failing. Even 

internal reports warned of diminished standards of nuclear weapons security. 
4

 The Air Force allowed local changes to the once standardized practices that were 

consistent throughout SAC and other commands for nuclear-related activities. Officially, 

these were to be reviewed at command headquarters; but in practice few requests for 

change were sent to higher headquarters or sister units because neither the command staff 

nor the unit staff was held accountable for changes. This issue is highlighted in the 

unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons when the load crew failed to follow their 

checklist and perform the missile safe status check; however, the loading checklist no 

longer required the load crew to check the missile safe status. The step had been 

removed sometime during the past 10 years. There is no indication whether this change 

was shared with headquarters personnel. 

 Both the CDI and Schlesinger Reports noted a dramatic change in Air Force nuclear 

education and training. The use of strategic bombers in conventional roles in conflicts in 

Kosovo and Iraq highlighted the ascendency of conventional forces and the declining 

relevance of the nuclear mission to the operational Air Force, reflecting changes not only 

on the platform and its mission, but also on training requirements. 

Root Cause 4: Failure of Leadership 

 The most prominent finding from this study was that of leadership failure. 

 Air Force leadership waited to relieve anyone of command until after the 30 day CDI 

investigation. This is usually interpreted one of two ways: Air Force senior leaders 

waited for all the facts before making their decision, or senior leader demonstrated a lack 

of focus on the issue. 

 Interviewees suggested the events and the ramifications of Air Force senior leader 

decisions throughout the years were cumulative in effect, building one upon another, 

forcing additional harmful decisions. 

 In the SAC era, experience and expertise were developed through years of technical 

training, practice and documented on-the-job training under experienced supervision. 

However, General McPeak‘s flat organization method changed such a practice of strict 

compliance and clear guidance. 

 There are some leaders with little, no, or dated nuclear experience who hold key positions 

in the United States Air Force nuclear enterprise, including supervisors and senior 

enlisted members as well as squadron, group and wing commanders. 

 One study found that the lack of ―visible leadership‖ at senior levels makes maintaining 

rigor and focus at all levels ―to meet demanding proficiency standards‖ all but 

impossible. 

 The merging of Air Force Specialty Codes and merging of major commands significantly 

reduced the Air Force‘s overall focus on nuclear force capability. 
5

Root Cause 5: Failure to Focus on Expertise 

 Structural changes affected the development of officer technical expertise in operations 

and logistics maintenance. Through reductions in the force, several officer career fields 

were merged, and leadership positions required ―generalists‖ rather than ―specialists.‖ 

Rather than train officers for what were becoming considered ―niche‖ jobs such as 

nuclear munitions officer, career paths within combined AFSCs were designed to make 

officers able to perform adequately the wider set of jobs subsumed within these new 

―generalist‖ AFSCs. 

 The message to nuclear-capable Airmen was both subtle and direct. There were 

numerous instances following the September 11th attacks when troops at nuclear bases 

were told directly by Air Force and joint commanders that they were in a sunset business 

that would not provide career enhancement and most importantly, that they were not 

contributing to the fight that mattered. 

 There is an expectation; both by the individual and organization that every Airman 

should strive to reach the highest position of which he is capable. Air Force education 

and training requirements support the idea that all Airmen should strive to be leaders. 

The problem with this expectation is that it diminishes the value of, or even punishes 

those who choose to develop a depth of expertise by remaining in a single career, 

functional specialty (such as the nuclear enterprise) or location(s) (the nuclear enterprise 

is concentrated at just a few bases and largely precludes deployment ―downrange.‖) or 

 The manpower cuts that occurred across the Air Force had a dramatic impact on many 

career fields, especially those smaller pools that generally required higher levels of 

expertise. 

 As one interviewee explained, ―people from the highest ranks down were  ̳making the 

system work‘ instead of demanding that it be fixed. 

 While it is an accepted fact that the Air Force nuclear knowledge and experience pool 

had been drained, nuclear career fields were not protected from personnel cuts through 

reductions in force or selective early retirement boards. 

 The Air Force personnel assignment system is perceived to be based on fairness and 

equity or individual career needs rather than on assigning the most qualified officer to 

support mission requirements. 

Recommendations in Four Focused Areas: Expertise, Management, Leadership, & Culture 

Expertise 

The foremost issue is declining technical competence and expertise in Air Force ranks. That 

expertise, along with nuclear leadership, management and culture, are central to the Air Force‘s 

ability to execute its nuclear mission. 
6

 Put the Nuclear Mission Back into the Hands of the “Experts” 

o Airmen must have faith in a system that values (that is, promotes) competent 

experts. 

o One of the results of downsizing the force is that nuclear experts currently are not 

in the most mission-essential billets. Instead, the best and the brightest are placed 

in jobs that are ―great for their career but terrible decisions for the Air Force.‖ 

Most significantly, they are unable to influence the culture of their specialty, 

leaving it to founder. 

o The ―right‖ people must make the manpower decisions in order to grow expertise 

in the field, who will then grow to be competent leaders. 

o In the past commanders handpicked their staff and major commands had more 

control over the upward mobility of officers. This model needs to be recreated. 

 Reestablish Operational Competence 

o Nuclear units must do more than prepare for inspections; they must return to a 

level of competence that sustains and enhances their contribution to national 

security. 

o The Air Force needs to determine how to grow specific and particular 

competencies for its future officers. 

o The Air Force should provide and encourage an educational and experiential path 

that leads to technical competence for Airmen who are then likely to become 

better nuclear commanders in the days ahead. 

 Incentivize Change and Ensure Retention 

o Just as leadership is not the right metric for career advancement, neither is 

deployability the best measurement for nuclear readiness. The concept that 

nuclear competence is a distinct and necessary skill must be reinstituted in Air 

Force personnel and supported through training and education. 

Leadership 

As long as the Air Force has a nuclear mission, the service needs to focus on how to develop 

and even inspire its leaders to advocate for the mission‘s fulfillment. Good leaders require 

technical competence in their craft. Without competence, a leader cannot have the respect of his 

subordinates nor will he be able to extract superior results from those under his command. 

 Reinstitute Core Principles: Communication and Responsibility 

o Former CSAF General Fogleman explained the importance of communication to 

leadership skills, ―Good leaders are people who have a passion to succeed...To 
7

become successful leaders, we must first learn that no matter how good the 

technology or how shiny the equipment, people-to-people relations get things 

done.‖ 

 Motivate Managers to Be Leaders 

o Air Force commanders must to be taught the principles of leadership and 

management; then held accountable for both. 

o The Air Force needs to delineate between management and leadership skills, then 

foster and support the development of both. 

 Require Responsibility at the Highest Levels 

Leadership requires responsibility and accountability –factors that the Air Force nuclear 

enterprise has lacked for the past two decades. 

Management 

Air Force leaders need to move stewardship into the hands of subordinates with their full 

understanding of responsibility, accountability and authority. 

 Enable Nuclear Staff to Learn From Past and Focus on the Future 

o Airmen must be required to follow checklists and procedures rigorously and 

without deviation until changes are approved by the respective headquarters. 

However, senior officers must still be open to innovative suggestions and change 

procedures that can be improved. Subordinates should not be discouraged from 

offering innovative ideas for change. 

o The Air Force needs to make the nuclear-incident investigation reports available 

to officers in nuclear essential billets, as most have not yet read the investigation 

reports. In order to learn from the past commanders need to understand what 

happened and what actions have been taken to correct the errors. 

 Re-Institute Unity of Command 

o The split between AFGSC command and control of nuclear forces and Air Force 

Material Command responsibility for maintenance, storage, sustainment and 

custody of nuclear weapons was viewed as a violation of unity of command. 

This split was considered by most study participants as untenable and requiring 

change. 

 Make Change Work 

o Over the last two decades people from the highest ranks down were "making the 

system work" despite its flaws, instead of demanding that it be fixed. 
8

o Determining appropriate metrics to measure success has always been 

challenging. This is even more true for nuclear organizations. The Air Force 

must determine the correct ways to measure success or failure as it continues to 

make changes to the nuclear enterprise.

Culture 

A successful organization requires three elements for its people, and thus the organization 

itself: 1.) People need to believe in their work which is a product of inspirational leadership and 

self motivation; 2.) People need to see visible progress toward the organization‘s stated goal, no 

matter how incremental the improvement; and 3.) People need recognition and appreciation for 

their contributions toward the goal. Without these the organization will fail. 

 Reestablish the Culture of Excellence 

o Clarity of mission is a requirement and would go a long way in buttressing the Air 

Force‘s efforts to re-establish a culture capable of executing the mission. 

o The Air Force must analyze the culture that is being developed and shape by the 

current environment and determine what must be changed through the 

organizational development process. This may include making changes above 

those required in AFGSC. 

 Explain Why the Mission is Vital 

o The SECAF and the CSAF have made a concerted effort to show a level of 

continued interest not seen since the end of SAC and foster the concept of an 

engaged leadership. It is this level of continued support that will help shape the 

culture surrounding the nuclear mission. 

 Inform Up; Educate Down 

o The lack of understanding of nuclear deterrence, a core Air Force mission, is at 

the heart of the problem. Air Force leaders need to understand and explain why 

the nuclear mission remains core to the Air Force. The service needs to educate 

Airmen on this mission and its criticality to the nation. 

In addition, the Air Force needs to educate personnel at all levels in order to influence the 

attitudes and actions of personnel. Additionally, the Air Force must make the most of the 

opportunity to influence how nuclear weapons are viewed at the national level. 

Conclusion 

 The Air Force must be committed to valuing and sustaining its nuclear enterprise as long 

as nuclear weapons are part of the U.S. arsenal. 

 Personnel in the nuclear enterprise cannot be told that their work is valued as billets go 

unfilled, resources continue to wane and their supervisors continue to focus on 
9

deployments in conventional wars. This study found that resoundingly, Air Force nuclear 

personnel believed in their work, but they need inspiration to focus their efforts and 

improve their capabilities. They need advanced training, deliberate placement, 

leadership, and competent management. 

 Without a true root cause analysis of the systemic problems, much of what the Air Force 

has accomplished has been movement without direction or focus. Without determining 

the fundamental questions that need to be answered, the capability of the Air Force to 

sustain its nuclear capability remains in question.
10
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

Components: An Assessment

11

“This was an unacceptable mistake and a 

clear deviation from our exacting 

standards. We hold ourselves accountable 

to the American people and want to ensure 

proper corrective action is taken.”

- Michael Wynne,

Secretary of the Air Force 

PROLOGUE 

On August 31, 2007, a U.S. Air Force B-52 plane with the call sign “Doom 99” took off 

from Minot AFB, North Dakota, inadvertently loaded with six Advanced Cruise Missiles loaded 

with nuclear warheads and flew to Barksdale AFB, Louisiana. After landing, “Doom 99” sat on 

the tarmac at Barksdale unguarded for nine hours before the nuclear weapons were discovered. 

Below you will read the details of that 36-hour period with six primary mistakes highlighted. 

The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons 

As part of an Air Force re-positioning program, B-52 flights were scheduled to move 12 

Advanced Cruise Missiles with nonnuclear Tactical Ferry Payloads (TFPs) from the 5th Bomb 

Wing (BW) at Minot Air Force Base (AFB), North Dakota to the 2 BW at Barksdale AFB, 

Louisiana. This process is called ―tactical ferry.‖ In preparation for the move, the 5th Munitions 

Squadron personnel at Minot prepared two cruise missile pylons, with each pylon to be loaded 

with six TFPs in the Minot weapons storage area. Prior to the planned shipment, the munitions 

control section changed the selection of cruise missiles to be ferried but failed to coordinate the 

change with the nuclear weapons maintenance shop responsible for preparing the missiles for the 

move. Standard preparation for the cruise missiles required removing nuclear warheads and 

installing TFPs. There were two trailers of missiles containing two pylons each scheduled to be 

transferred but due to poor coordination, only one trailer of missiles had been prepared and 

placarded with the verbiage ―Ready for Tac 

Ferry.‖ The remaining trailer of missiles still 

had nuclear warheads that had not yet been 

replaced with TFPs. At the time, limited 

storage capacity required co-mingling 

nuclear and nonnuclear warhead cruise 

missiles in the storage structures even though 

visually recognizing the difference between 

nuclear and nonnuclear requires close 

inspection. The only way to identify a 

nuclear from a nonnuclear payload in a cruise missile is to look through a small observation 

window to check for the appropriate markings. Intermingling of nuclear and nonnuclear 

weapons was prohibited until at least 1992. At the time of this incident, there was no written 

policy prohibiting intermingling of weapons and there was no record of when the policy had 

changed. 

The Minot munitions control section issued a work-order to move the two pylons to the 

flightline and to load the missiles on the aircraft. However, the munitions crew changed one of 

the two scheduled pylons for reconfiguration with another to eliminate an upcoming periodic 

inspection on that pylon but did not formally coordinate the schedule change. The handling crew 

entered the storage structure but did not to perform the missile safe status check as required by 

technical orders to verify the missiles TFPs. The crew drove the two trailers, one with TFP 

loaded missiles and, unknowingly, the other with nuclear warhead loaded missiles to the 

flightline where the B-52 aircraft crew chief accepted the load. The aircraft crew chief, unlike the 

weapons loaders, was not trained to work with nuclear weapons but local procedures called for 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

12

the aircraft crew chief to sign for the missiles. At Barksdale, the procedure was to have a 

nuclear-knowledgeable load team chief sign for the load. The reason for having two separate 

procedures for the same function at different bases is unclear. The Minot crew chief did not 

check the status of each missile, but there was no technical order requirement to do so as this 

mission was expected to be nonnuclear, thus having far less stringent requirements. The 

weapons load crew loaded the two pylons of missiles for the flight to Barksdale. 

Technical Order procedures dictate that both the Radar Navigator and Navigator are 

responsible for verifying the status of the missiles during preflight inspections of the aircraft 

when dealing with nuclear weapons. However, only the Radar Navigator on ―Doom 

99‖performed preflight inspections on the missiles. The Radar Navigator continued to ignore the 

checklist by only checking one missile on one pylon, which happened to be the nonnuclear 

pylon, and assuming that all the missiles were nonnuclear. ―Doom 99‖ arrived at Barksdale and 

sat on the tarmac unguarded for nine hours before the aircraft maintenance squadron personnel 

downloaded the missiles. When the handling crew came to transport the missiles to the storage 

area, they correctly followed their checklist and looked through the small access window in each 

missile. They discovered the nuclear warheads on the missiles and immediately alerted 

leadership. While the weapons were secured on the flightline, the incident was reported up the 

Air Force chain of command. 

Mistakes were made by numerous personnel on August 31, 2007. Each assumed that 

since the task was mundane – moving Advanced Cruise Missiles with TFPs from one base to 

another – and that no special effort was required. The first mistake was the simple oversight to 

label a trailer with weapons appropriately. This mistake, while clearly at the individual level, 

can be tied to the loosening of procedures regarding the storage of nuclear and nonnuclear 

weapons together. Thus, even at the first step, both an individual and the institution were at 

fault. The second mistake was the ―scheduling error‖ where the munitions personnel did not 

coordinate with the maintenance shop to assure that the correct weapons were chosen for 

transfer. This too highlights both personal and institutional errors. Airmen at Minot did not use 

the published squadron maintenance schedule. The decision not to use the schedule was made in 

order to avoid complexity and to work around possible classification issues. In the end, 

however, Airmen at Minot ignored important details and failed to properly coordinate last minute 

changes. This resulted in oversimplification and reliance on a single inexperienced Airman to 

provide complex information via a PowerPoint slide. Several interviewees noted that 

―management via PowerPoint‖ has become commonplace throughout the Air Force. 

The third and fourth mistakes occurred when the munitions personnel did not monitor the 

move nor did the handling crew follow the checklist and confirm that the weapons they were 

moving were indeed nonnuclear. The weapons were driven past a security checkpoint, but again 

since the weapons were presumed to be nonnuclear, no one checked them as they passed. The 

fifth mistake took place on the flightline when the aircraft crew chief signed off on the weapons 

without confirming their status. The sixth and final mistake occurred when the radar navigator 

checked only one of the nonnuclear missiles and considered that spot check acceptable for all 

weapons loaded on the plane. 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

Components: An Assessment

13

The Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile Components to Taiwan 

While the Air Force was reeling from the investigations of the unauthorized movement of 

nuclear weapons, it was revealed that Taiwan received classified forward sections used on the 

Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile rather than the helicopter batteries it had 

ordered from the U.S., bringing to light a second nuclear-related incident. 

Twice a year, the Air Force supply system automatically conducts Air Force-wide 

adjustments to level supply inventory using a computer-based process called Readiness Based 

Leveling. In February 2005, the system identified a requirement for 11 forward sections of MK12 reentry vehicles used on Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) at F.E. 

Warren AFB, Wyoming. As there was only one at F.E. Warren, the supply system generated an 

automatic transaction to ship 10 units. When the shipment arrived via Federal Express special 

ground service in March 2005, the MK-12 forward sections were properly received and stored in 

segregated storage due to their controlled-item status.

Four days later, an inexperienced (three months on the job) Air Force Item Manager at 

the 526th ICBM Systems Group at Hill AFB, Utah determined that F.E. Warren had too many 

MK-12 forward sections and notified its base personnel to ship four of the forward sections to 

the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) warehouse at Hill AFB. The F.E. Warren Traffic 

Management Office prepared the forward sections for shipment, placing the shipping documents 

inside the shipping container but failing to properly mark the exterior with the stock number per 

the Special Packaging Instructions (SPI). These classified items are shipped with all 

documentation packed inside the container. Procedures require the recipient to open the 

container, review the shipping documents, verify the contents, sign a receipt and return that 

receipt to the shipper. 

The F.E. Warren personnel did not properly mark the outside of the shipping container 

and shipped the hazardous, classified forward sections to Hill AFB. When the shipping 

container arrived at the warehouse, personnel did not open it, review its shipping documents, or 

return the receipt to F.E. Warren; nor was there follow-up on the missing return receipt at F.E. 

Warren as is required. They were delivered to the unclassified warehouse instead of the 

classified storage area. At some later time, DLA warehouse personnel attempted to scan the 

barcode on the unopened shipping container to identify the contents. When the scan failed (for 

no known reason) to produce a stock number, warehouse personnel simply used the hazard 

classification for the nomenclature and the number they arbitrarily selected was for a helicopter 

battery. They marked the unopened shipping container accordingly and shelved it in the 

warehouse. 

In 2005, as part of the Foreign Military Sales Program, the government of Taiwan 

requested 135 helicopter batteries. In June 2006, the DLA warehouse at Hill AFB shipped the 

mismarked MK- 12 forward sections as helicopter batteries. The error was noted by the 

Taiwanese government in January 2007, but only after repeated requests by Taiwan did the U.S. 

government acknowledge the error (fourteen months later). 

An investigation immediately ensued. It was determined that although the errors were 

made by a junior civilian item manager and government warehouse personnel, the major general 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

14

“The Air Force is currently investigating an 

error made last Thursday in the transfer of 

munitions ... from Minot Air Force Base to 

Barksdale Air Force Base aboard a B-52 

Stratofortress...”

– Pentagon Press Briefing

in command of the Hill AFB Air Logistics Center, the colonel who was the ICBM system 

program office director, and the lieutenant general Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, 

Installations and Mission Support at Headquarters Air Force (HAF/A4/7) were disciplined and/or 

retired. These actions stand in stark contrast to the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons 

where no general officers were disciplined, although numerous personnel with the rank of 

enlisted through colonel were held accountable. 

As in the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons, individual mistakes were 

compounded by institutional complacency and lackadaisical attitude toward the mission. The 

first mistake was the mismarking of the shipping container by personnel at F.E. Warren. The 

second mistake occurred upon arrival at the warehouse at Hill AFB where the container was 

never opened so that the paperwork could be examined and the contents effectively managed. 

The third, related mistake was that when the bar code on the outside of the package could not be 

properly identified, staff simply made up a determination as to its contents rather than opening 

the container to confirm the contents. The fourth mistake was that personnel at F.E. Warren who 

had shipped the forward sections did not follow up when no return receipt was received. The 

fifth and final mistake was that the error was confirmed only after numerous efforts by the 

Taiwanese government to rectify the situation. 

The Response: Investigations 

Initially Air Force senior leaders 

believed there would be no public interest 

in the incidents. This fact indicates the 

decline in understanding and acceptance of 

the nuclear mission by Air Force leadership. 

As the Washington Post summarized: 

The Air Force decided at first to keep the mishap under wraps, in part because of 

policies that prohibit the confirmation of any details about the storage or 

movement of nuclear weapons. No public acknowledgment was made until 

service members leaked the story to the Military Times, which published a brief 

account Sept. 5. Officials familiar with the Bent Spear report say Air Force 

officials apparently did not anticipate that the episode would cause public 

concern. One passage in the report contains these four words:  ̳No press interest 

anticipated.‘1

 

With hindsight, it is difficult to imagine why Air Force leadership would assume there 

would be no interest in a flight during which, according the Air Force Chief of Staff (CSAF), ―at 

no time was the public in danger.‖

2

 However, this was not the first nuclear weapon related 

incident for the Air Force.3

 There had been other mishaps, both in the Air Force and the Navy, 

 

1

 Joby Warrick and Walter Pincus, ―Missteps in the Bunker,‖ The Washington Post, September 23, 2007. 

2

Ibid.

3

 A book published in early 2011, 15 Minutes: General Curtis LeMay and the Countdown to Nuclear Annihilation

[New York, NY: St. Martin‘s Press, 2011] details numerous accidents early in the U.S. nuclear program. The book 

relies heavily on recently declassified information. A recently declassified example can be found at 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

Components: An Assessment

15

“...lack of attention to detail, a lack of 

effective leadership and supervision”

-Pentagon Press Briefing, describing the 

findings of the Minot investigation

for which little attention was paid. Some received minor local press coverage and an occasional 

inquiry by the representative from the congressional district. In 2003, commanders at the Navy‘s 

Strategic Weapons Facility, Pacific at Bangor, Washington, were fired after a ladder was left in a 

Trident missile tube. The local paper carried a story and the respective congressional office was 

briefed on the incident and Navy remediation. 

In August 2009, the Navy fired the commander at the same base because his superiors 

had ―lost confidence is his ability to lead.‖ Unlike the Air Force, the Navy has maintained 

steadfast willingness to hold its nuclear sailors accountable. However, within the Air Force, the 

limited talent pool sometimes determines the outcome of the incident investigations.4 

Air Force senior leaders clearly 

believed that unauthorized movement of 

nuclear weapons was a onetime event of 

little consequence. The immediate 

investigations reaffirmed the U.S. Air Force 

(USAF) position that there was no institutional problem but rather localized issues at the Minot 

and Barksdale bases. The events surrounding the mistaken shipment of classified forward 

sections to Taiwan were considered basic logistics errors. 

As a result of the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons and mistaken shipment of 

classified forward sections, six separate investigations or reviews were conducted:5

1. Air Combatant Command, Commander Directed Report of Investigation, September 

2007 

General Ronald Keys, Air Combat Command (ACC) commander, tasked Major General 

Douglas Raaberg to lead an investigation of the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons to 

determine how events transpired and to identify personnel who should be held accountable. The 

investigation began on August 31, 2007 and was completed by the end of September 2007. 

2. Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Air Force Blue Ribbon Review Of Nuclear Weapons 

Policies and Procedures, February 2008 

On 9 October 2007, the CSAF appointed Major General Polly Peyer to chair an Air Force 

Blue Ribbon Review (BRR) of nuclear weapons policies and procedures. The CSAF tasked the 

team to take an enterprise-wide look at Air Force nuclear responsibilities. Specifically, the CSAF 

highlighted a need to examine organizational structure, command authorities and responsibilities, 

personnel and assignment policies, and education and training associated with the operation, 

 

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/NC/nh4_1.gif which details a B-47 crash into a missile storage area in 1956 at 

RAF Lakenheath, UK. 

4

 Following the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons and misshipment of sensitive missile components, two 

of the general officers who were reprimanded were kept in essential nuclear leadership positions because of their 

knowledge and experience. Walter Pincus, ―4 Colonels Lose their Air Force Commands,‖ The Washington Post, 

October 20, 2007, Warrick and Pincus, ―Missteps in the Bunker,‖ op cit, and Michael Hoffman, ―Minot Nuke 

Handlers Still Not Ready for Inspection,‖ Military Times, January 14, 2008.

5

 For more detail on the investigations see Appendix 2. 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

16

maintenance, storage, handling, transportation, and security of Air Force nuclear weapons 

systems. 

3. The Defense Science Task Board Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety, 

Report on the Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons, April 2008 

The Secretary of Defense commissioned General Larry D. Welch, retired Air Force Chief 

of Staff, to lead a team of senior officials to conduct an independent and objective review of 

nuclear surety practices. The task force re-examined the circumstances and systematic causes of 

the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons from Minot. 

4. Admiral Kirtland Donald, Investigation into Shipment of, Sensitive Missile Components 

to Taiwan, May 2008 

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expressed his lack of confidence in the Air Force‘s 

ability to self-assess these nuclear weapons related problems. As a result, he appointed Admiral 

Kirtland Donald, Director of Navy Nuclear Power and Nuclear Reactors to lead a new 

investigation. 

5. Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, Phase I: The 

Air Force’s Nuclear Mission, September 2008 and Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear 

Mission, December 2008 

After the Defense Science Board and Admiral Donald reports, Secretary Gates asked Dr. 

James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and Energy to provide an independent review of 

Department of Defense (DoD) organizational, procedural and policy improvements necessary for 

the stewardship and operation of nuclear weapons. The review was conducted in two parts: the 

first part focused on the Air Force nuclear mission; the second reviewed the nuclear mission in 

DoD as a whole. 

6. Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise, October 

2008 

 In the summer of 2008, shortly after the ACC Commander Directed Investigation (CDI), 

BRR and Admiral Donald reports were completed, the Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) and 

CSAF directed the establishment of a 90-day Air Force Nuclear Task Force to ―develop a 

strategic roadmap to rebuild and restore capabilities and confidence in our stewardship of the Air 

Force nuclear enterprise.‖ The resulting strategic plan synthesized recommendations from 

internal and external investigations that occurred following the two nuclear-related events. 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

Components: An Assessment

17

INTRODUCTION 

This report is the result of a year-long Air University research project funded by 

Headquarters Air Force, Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (A10). The project 

included researching and writing an academic case study reviewing the unauthorized movement 

of nuclear weapons and mistaken shipment of classified forward sections. Specifically the study 

team was asked to: 

[R]esearch and write a case study to investigate how the Air Force can 

reinvigorate the handling, operation, and maintenance discipline of nuclear 

weapons that characterized nuclear operations standards and culture at the height 

of the Cold War. The study should compare and contrast past and current world 

affairs and how the present Air Force can re-establish an environment that will 

revive Air Force nuclear operations standards and culture in the mid-term to longterm, beyond what has been or is being done already in the wake of the 

Schlesinger report.6

In the conduct of these studies, we did not attempt to reinvestigate the events surrounding 

the nuclear-related incidents that occurred in 2006-2007, but sought a deeper understanding of 

the context of internal and external forces that led to those events. Since 2008, the Air Force has 

done much in reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise and sustaining the posture of nuclear forces. 

This study is a review of the status of the nuclear enterprise as it existed at the time of the 

unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons and mistaken shipment of classified forward 

sections and includes recommendations for the Air Force to consider as it continues to strengthen 

the nuclear enterprise. 

Methodology 

The methodology was to: 

1. Conduct a literature review of existing studies, reports, policies, and procedures. 

2. Hold workshops to review direction and findings, both at the operational and senior 

leadership levels. 

3. Conduct interviews with senior Air Force, DoD and national security experts who 

played a role in our nuclear mission between 1986 to the present.7

4. Condense the views of the interviewees into a ―root cause analysis‖ of the nuclear 

incidents. A true root cause analysis of historical events is difficult, since it is 

impossible to go back and show what would have happened had alternate decisions 

been made. However, the insights of the interviewees have been consolidated into 

 

6

 GSA Mobis Task Order GST0408BF0076. 

7

 1986 was chosen as a starting point for the review given the influence of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the 

political events that followed in 1989-1991. 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

18

five ―root cause‖ areas that need to be addressed in order to improve the Air Force 

nuclear enterprise. 

This study relied heavily on previous research and studies, building upon what has been 

written and applying it to the current situation. Thus, we did not limit our review to the 

investigations following the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons and mistaken shipment 

of classified forward sections, but looked at research on Air Force culture, leadership, and 

organization. The reader will see numerous quotes from Air Force sources, particularly 

research papers conducted at Air University, The RAND Corporation, and other academic 

sources. Also, new archival information from the Cold War era is being declassified and 

published almost daily. This information helps to provide a context for the past previously not 

publicly available. 

Two workshops provided an early foundation for the interviews and research that 

followed. The first event was held in late January 2010, at Air University with students and 

faculty from several Air Force schools resident at Maxwell AFB. This group provided an initial 

―vector check‖ for the direction of the project. We queried the views of the participants, each of 

whom had relevant nuclear expertise. The results contributed both to the depth and breadth of 

the project. 

For the second event and to more broadly support this effort, Northrop Grumman 

organized a Nuclear Advisory Board and held a workshop with participants in the Washington, 

D.C. area in April 2010. Six retired general officers who commanded nuclear forces or held 

strategic leadership roles, five from the Air Force and one from the Navy, met for six hours to 

discuss their views and experiences. Participants offered a number of ideas during the workshop 

focusing on issues such as: the core missions and relevance of the Air Force; the involvement of 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in Air Force nuclear matters; the understanding of 

the United States‘ current deterrence posture; and Air Force leadership, expertise and personnel 

management. 

For each event, a brief overview of the research project was followed by discussion of the 

two primary questions: How could these two nuclear related incidents have occurred? What do 

you consider to be the primary root causes? 

Finally, the study team conducted more than 100 interviews with U.S. personnel who 

played a role in the nuclear mission between 1986 and the present. The purpose of the interviews 

was to capture and incorporate the collective knowledge and insight developed over years of 

performing the strategic nuclear deterrence mission. While the focus was on the Air Force, we 

also engaged former and current officials from OSD, the Department of Energy‘s (DoE) National 

Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the 

DoE national laboratories, the Navy, and staff and members of Congress to gain a perspective 

not previously included in a single document. 

The study looked at how oversight affected the Air Force‘s nuclear mission, both from 

inside its leadership ranks and from OSD and Capitol Hill. Several of the congressional staffers 

interviewed had previous relevant military or government experience, which increased the depth 

and breadth of their knowledge and insight. 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

Components: An Assessment

19

The study team chose interviewees specifically in order to compare experiences and 

views on the evolution of national level policy and strategy which drove the Air Force decisionmaking processes. We confirmed that the institutions addressed have an influence on each other, 

both through the classical forces of legislation and oversight, but also in reverse where Air Force 

experiences and presence influenced policy decisions. 

We talked to many individuals who contributed to the post-incident investigations to get 

an idea of the circumstances in which they were conducted and to ask the participants‘ views on 

the choices the Air Force has made in its effort to reinvigorate the nuclear mission. It is 

important to understand that the Air Force‘s internal reviews and plans – the CDI, BRR and 

Nuclear Enterprise Roadmap – were created with very specific guidelines, scope and generally 

with only 30-90 days for each effort. The Defense Science Board (DSB) report, as well as the 

Donald and Schlesinger reports focused on specific aspects of the incidents, albeit from an 

outside perspective. None of the earlier reports had the benefit of drawing on so many of the key 

U.S. leaders and their hindsight that this study captured. 

Our not-for-attribution interviews were candid discussions that contributed greatly to this 

report. Those we interviewed spoke in great detail about the cultural roadblocks that exist within 

the Air Force and the challenges that arise from them. Current Air Force leaders were very frank 

about the challenges they face, some admitting that they themselves were in part culpable for the 

current state of the nuclear enterprise. Many telling anecdotes were shared about problems of the 

past and the uncertainty of whether the corrective actions will truly address the health and 

welfare of the nuclear mission and support those that execute it each day. What was clear is that 

there is no shortage of opinions on the problems or solutions. We believe we were able to 

capture most of the excellent ideas we heard along the way. While we understand the Air Force 

has only started on the path of ―reinvigorating the nuclear enterprise,‖ one interviewee put it very 

succinctly: ―Don‘t let mere movement, even in what is perceived as a positive direction, give us 

a false illusion that it is directly proportionate to progress or eventual success.‖ 

Study Findings 

Our research led to the conclusion that while the events of 2006-2007 are significant in 

and of themselves, the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons and mistaken shipment of 

classified forward sections are merely symptoms of greater institutional problems. The Air 

Force nuclear enterprise is in a state of decline and has been for the last two decades. With the 

standup of Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) and A10, the Air Force is working to 

reestablish the enterprise on positive footing. It is clear from our interviews and research that the 

leadership has a long and challenging path ahead of them and some significant adjustment in the 

current course needs to be considered. 

In 1986, events and senior Air Force leader decisions began shaping the contextual 

setting for the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons and mistaken shipment of classified 

forward sections. There was a consensus among those with whom we spoke on the cumulative 

detrimental effect of various events and decisions, building one upon another, forcing other 

decisions that were only relevant because of the decisions made previously. Participants 

believed the cumulative effects were well known throughout the service and that a major incident 

was not unanticipated. Many interviewees wondered openly why no one in senior leadership had 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

20

opposed the continuous onslaught of personnel reductions, reorganizations, and concurrent 

addition of new missions, tasks, and deployments. Comments from the most senior flag rank 

officers suggested the Air Force had immediately launched into major corrective actions before 

they understood the underlying problems or how to address them. Those same officers stated 

they did not believe there had been rigorous root cause analysis because the most significant 

corrective actions did not address the most clearly documented failures. 

All of the issues added to the complex contextual background in which the unauthorized 

movement of nuclear weapons and mistaken shipment of classified forward sections occurred. 

The lack of a clearly articulated national nuclear strategy and policy allowed the Air Force to 

neglect the nuclear mission in order to focus on the urgent counterterrorism and conventional 

warfare requirements without oversight or criticism. With little legislative or executive branch 

interest in nuclear forces, Air Force senior leadership followed in the same path until they were 

forced to accept responsibility for the events. If one or two of the external factors had not 

existed, their absence would likely have not prevented either the unauthorized movement of 

nuclear weapons or the mistaken shipment of classified forward sections. However, these 

conditions had a corrosive effect on the nuclear culture of strict compliance that was so 

fundamental to daily activity during the Cold War. The effects were factors at all three levels of 

organization: tactical, operational, and strategic. 

Through the workshops, interviews, and research, the following factors were identified as 

the most significant underlying areas, or ―root causes‖ that set the stage for the two incidents: 

1. Policy and oversight changes 

2. Organizational and operational evolution 

3. Institutional focus 

4. Leader accountability 

5. Failure to maintain and foster expertise 

It is on these areas which we focused our attention. Many of the issues discussed in this 

study are complex and do not readily lend themselves to being easily organized. You will see 

the issues of institutionally favored missions, leadership, management, and expertise repeatedly 

arise throughout the root cause analysis sections. Some issues were placed in one section while 

they might have easily been in another. The best example of this is CSAF General Merrill 

McPeak‘s organizational changes, which we grouped under ―Organizational and operational 

evolution.‖ It could also be grouped in ―Institutional focus,‖ given the dramatic role it played in 

changing the culture of the Air Force. 

Following the analysis of the root causes, we offer recommendations for the Air Force to 

consider as it continues to address the problems facing the nuclear enterprise. Our 

recommendations are organized into four areas: 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

Components: An Assessment

21

1. Expertise 

2. Management 

3. Leadership 

4. Culture 

It is hoped these recommendations will help re-establish an environment that will revive 

Air Force nuclear operations standards and culture. 

One anecdote highlights the problems of the Air Force nuclear enterprise prior to the 

unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons and mistaken shipment of classified forward 

sections: in the spring of 2007 the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot AFB had identified the possibility 

that a nuclear warhead could be mistaken for a nonnuclear one. Staff present at the meeting 

dismissed the issue outright saying there were too many safeguards in place for that to ever 

occur. That was true in the days of a ―compliance culture‖ before Strategic Air Command 

(SAC) was disbanded in 1992. Since that time, the world has changed and along with it Air 

Force policy, procedures and attitudes. What has not happened was a marrying of political, 

economic, and cultural realties of the present with the unchanged requirements demanded by 

nuclear weapons. 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

22

DEFINING THE PROBLEM 

Following the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons and mistaken shipment of 

classified forward sections there were hearings before the Senate and House Armed Services 

Committees. During the Senate hearing Lieutenant General Daniel Darnell, Deputy Chief of 

Staff, HAF Plans and Operations, was asked to explain why the events had occurred. According 

to General Darnell: 

The root causes identified for the specific incident were unit-level leadership and 

discipline breakdown at Barksdale AFB and Minot AFB. These breakdowns were due to 

leadership failures and a declining focus on the strategic nuclear bomber mission. Over 

time, the breakdown of leadership and discipline among a small group of Airmen at 

Barksdale AFB and Minot AFB fostered an environment which eroded the strict 

adherence to established procedures.8

Through our research we have found the problems to be far more systemic than the Air 

Force leadership admitted in 2008. The problems were at all levels of the Air Force and 

institutionalized through years of change at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The 

post-incident investigations identified two major causes of unauthorized movement of nuclear 

weapons and mistaken shipment of classified forward sections: 

1. A lack of senior Air Force leadership focus on the nuclear mission as a result of the 

end of the Cold War and intense demand for conventional mission capabilities over 

the course of over 20 years of consistent deployments. 

2. The Air Force had not effectively addressed the previously identified and continuing 

decline in nuclear weapons expertise. 

From our research, we see the problem in three areas: leadership, management, and 

expertise. Each of these elements is critical to the other and without improvement in all three the 

nuclear mission will likely fail again. 

Leadership 

One of the inherent issues in any complex problem is how to define it. How well a 

problem is defined determines how well it will be solved. This report along with those that 

preceded it state that the Air Force had a failure in leadership, but we have not adequately 

defined what that means. The fundamental issue is that there is a difference between leadership 

and management. One definition of leadership is the process of social influence to obtain the 

cooperation of other people in the attainment of a goal.‖9

 Leadership requires a vision to inspire 

a team and having the credibility to back it up. It is effective leadership and team building, 

together with excellent management that forms a solid organizational culture. 

 

8

 U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, Hearing on Air Force Nuclear Security, [transcript], February 12, 

2008, p. 8. 

9

 Martin Chemers and Roya Ayman, ed., Leadership Theory and Research: Perspectives and Directions, p. 295. 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

Components: An Assessment

23

The Schlesinger Commission noted that there was a failure of leadership at the national 

level to inform the Air Force of the continuing importance of nuclear weapons in U.S. national 

security. The report concluded that there was also a failure of leadership at the highest levels of 

the Air Force and at the component level to do the same. This failure will be discussed in detail 

in later chapters, but the lack of leadership direction created a void in Air Force strategic culture 

that will require significant attention and time to fill. 

We will talk in the next section about General Curtis E. LeMay and his leadership of 

SAC. General LeMay had a distinct leadership style based on principles that became the 

bedrock of SAC, and as CSAF, he instilled these principles across the whole Air Force. His 

leadership tenets persisted until there was a generational shift from bomber generals in primary 

Air Force leadership positions to fighter pilots – a move that began in the 1960s with the 

Vietnam War. When fighter pilots took the helm, they instilled their culture on the Air Force, 

resulting in massive changes. For those in the nuclear enterprise, the change was detrimental to 

their culture and institutions, especially as the Cold War ended and the articulated relevance of 

nuclear weapons was declining. Those who understood the nuclear value to national security 

were fading into the background. 

The institutional change from the bomber to the fighter culture was fundamental to the 

ability of the Air Force leadership to continue to espouse the concept that the nuclear mission 

remained a core mission of the service. The result was a generation of Airmen without 

inspirational leadership that could motivate an organization to believe in the deterrent value of 

the nuclear forces. 

Management 

Management includes planning, organizing, staffing, leading or directing, and controlling 

an organization. Much of what was described as a lack of leadership by previous studies we 

have grouped under management. The wings may have been badly led, and thus uninspired; 

however, poor management is the cause of the lost of institutional focus on nuclear weapons. 

This loss of focus – even within the nuclear community -- was often demonstrated by personnel 

who did not follow or understand the need to follow regulations or technical orders. Units were 

allowed to create their own procedures and processes; which meant that not only were operations 

locally specialized, but those transferring between bases were likely to have a significant 

learning curve to accomplish the same mission. 

Confusion as to what background or preparation officers need to lead and manage nuclear 

weapons organizations has long been a controversial issue and workshop participants expressed 

strong opinions on this topic. The CDI report, the BRR, and Admiral Donald‘s report determined 

that the Air Force had ―leaders with little, no or dated nuclear experience who held key positions 

in the Air Force nuclear enterprise, including supervisors and enlisted members as well as 

squadron, group and wing commanders.‖

10 The CDI observed that the munitions maintenance 

squadron commander and operations officer were disengaged from day-to-day weapons storage 

 

10 Schlesinger, James R. Report of the Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, Phase I: The Air Force‘s 

Nuclear Mission. Arlington, VA: Secretary of Defense, September 2008, p. 22, Air Combatant Command (ACC) 

Commander Directed Investigation (CDI), September 2007, p. 44, US Air Force Blue Ribbon Review Nuclear 

Weapons Policies and Procedures, February 12, 2008, App. H. 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

24

area work and were ―focused up the chain of command‖ instead of down on the squadron‘s 

mission work. 

Effective leadership and management remain critical in repairing the cultural issues as 

well as the operational ones. In addition to the issues of leadership and management is one that 

goes to the very heart of the decline of the nuclear enterprise: expertise. 

Expertise 

Just as leadership and management required definitions so does expertise. The Air Force 

had tried to lump significantly different specializations into a single unit labeled as ―nuclear 

expertise;‖ however, through our research we found that the best operational definition of 

expertise is technical competence. This term includes knowing your craft so well that you can 

pass it to others –to sustain or even grow the knowledge base. ―Expertise‖ therefore, requires 

experience. In the Air Force that means time in a specific job. Many interviewees felt that the 

Air Force had lost the focus on technical competence in favor of career progression. There are 

several reasons for this that we will address in the following chapters. 

One of the key reasons for the loss of expertise was the Air Force decision to compensate 

for decreased total manpower by ―generalizing‖ the officer corps. Rather than train officers for 

niche jobs such as nuclear munitions officer, career paths were designed to make officers able to 

perform adequately in a wider set of jobs. Many of the underlying problems that led to the 

incidents were management responsibilities of the munitions officer career field. 

The logical foundation for this strategy is that of the ―whole-person‖ concept that officers 

who are identified as ―good leaders‖ can succeed in any leadership position. This strategy has 

been largely discredited based on both scholarly research and repeated failures of the wholeperson concept in practical application.11

 From 1986 through 2007, the gradual effect of the 

whole-person officer model of professional development and assignments was to align the entire 

wing‘s senior leadership with officers who were good leaders, but not expert enough in nuclear 

weapons functions to recognize continual substandard performance before the wing underwent 

what could have been catastrophic failure. 

The decision to adopt the whole-person officer model was based on the need to 

compensate for reduced manpower availability. Since less than one percent of the officer corps 

are generals, it is logical these officers would be generalists and possess skills and knowledge 

required to perform successfully in positions of high command over a broad spectrum of 

functional specialties. However, their success and the success of the entire Air Force depend on 

marshalling the efforts of the most expert officers available in every key specialty under their 

command. As Peter Drucker, renowned management expert, explained, ―The idea that there are 

 

11 See John J. Gabarro, The Dynamics of Taking Charge, [Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1987] and 

―When a New Manager Takes Charge,‖ Harvard Business Review, 85(1), 104-117, Diane Vaughn, The Challenger 

Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA, [Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago 

Press, 1996], Admiral Kirkland Donald, Report of the Investigation Into The Facts And Circumstances Surrounding 

The Accountability For, And Shipment Of, Sensitive Missile Components To Taiwan, (Report N00N/08-0051), 

Washington DC: Department of the Navy, 2008. 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

Components: An Assessment

25

“Individuals in leadership positions lacked 

the technical and professional experience 

necessary to effectively analyze problems 

and develop solutions.”

- 2008 Admiral Donald Report

well-rounded people, people who have only strengths and no weaknesses (whether the term used 

is the whole-person or the generalist) is a prescription for mediocrity if not incompetence.‖

12

Would the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons and mistaken shipment of 

classified forward sections have occurred if the Air Force had not altered the existing officer 

leader/manager model? There is no absolute answer to this question. However, according to Air 

Force munitions officers we interviewed, if the 5th Munitions Squadron commander, operations 

officer, and squadron officers had been deeply expert in munitions and missile maintenance, it is 

unlikely they would have allowed nuclear and nonnuclear cruise missiles to be co-mingled in 

storage. They would not have allowed an 

inexperienced airman to be the only 

squadron member relaying the formal 

maintenance schedule. It is unlikely they 

would have allowed the daily, weekly, and 

monthly scheduling meetings to be 

conducted as a ―loose confederation of shop 

non-commissioned officers who never used the formal schedule during planning meetings‖ as 

described in the CDI.13 It is also unlikely they would have allowed munitions control to be 

manned by non-commissioned officers (NCO) who had never even been inside the facility and 

who were not knowledgeable of the munitions operations they were supposed to be controlling. 

If one or two people make a serious mistake, it may be written up as personal error, but 

when an entire organization fails there must be more fundamental systemic causes in 

organization, training, equipment, management, and leadership. If the real problem is 

supervision, management or leadership, then Air Force policy for the development of these skills 

must be examined. 

An important conclusion is that officers and senior NCOs at the unit level must be 

expected to become technically competent. All officers cannot be generalists and some have to 

be responsible for managing technical functions. These officers managing and leading munitions 

and nuclear weapons technicians, weapons loaders, at the section, flight, and squadron levels 

must be sufficiently expert to ensure the safety, security and reliability of these technical 

operations and, if necessary, to intervene effectively to prevent organization or mission failure. 

Lack of expertise and specifically a depth of the knowledge base is one of the biggest 

considerations for repairing the nuclear enterprise. This dearth flows upward and affects the 

ability of managers and leaders to effectively lead and manage an organization whose processes 

and procedures are unfamiliar to them. 

The Air Force failed in all three aspects, leadership, management, and expertise in the 

newly termed ―nuclear enterprise.‖ While the service has spent significant time and resources to 

address reorganization, and thus, management, all three issues still remain inadequately 

addressed. 

 

12 Peter F. Drucker, Managing in the Next Society, [New York, NY: Truman Talley Books], 2002, p. 72. 

13 CDI, p. 15. 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

26

HISTORY 

In this section we will explore some of the underpinnings of the Air Force nuclear 

enterprise. Specifically, we will review SAC, both from the role it played in deterrence, but also 

the influence its culture and organization had on the Air Force as a whole. Comparisons will be 

drawn between Navy and Air Force nuclear foundations, most notably in their respective leaders, 

Admiral Hyman Rickover and General Curtis E. LeMay. These two individuals, more than any 

others, laid the foundation for nuclear forces in their service, but a differentiating question is 

why the Navy has been seemingly more capable of retaining its culture of nuclear excellence. 

We will also review the evolution of organizational culture in the Air Force and set the stage for 

the in-depth discussion of organization and operations in later chapters. Finally, we will assess 

the impact on the end of the Cold War on the manner in which the Air Force conducted its 

nuclear business. 

The Deterrence Mission 

The Air Force was established as a separate service in 1947 with three commands: SAC, 

Air Defense Command (ADC), and Tactical Air Command (TAC). A primary reason for an 

independent Air Force was that the nation needed alternatives to having to fight the Soviet Union 

conventionally. An alternative was to deter the Soviet Union from attacking with the threat of 

nuclear retaliation. Thus, the primary reason for an independent Air Force was SAC‘s strategic 

bombing mission. According to some historical reports, CSAF General Carl ―Tooey‖ Spaatz did 

not want to have TAC. He wanted to leave TAC in the Army; however, General Dwight D. 

Eisenhower disagreed, telling General Spaatz that TAC would provide a link between the SAC 

mission and the Army.14

SAC was created in 1946, a year before the formal establishment of an independent Air 

Force. General Spaatz, who would later serve as the Air Force‘s first Chief of Staff, chartered 

SAC with the following missions in support of the U.S.‘s strategic deterrent: ―conduct long range 

offensive operations in any part of the world, either independently or in cooperation with land 

and naval forces; conduct maximum range reconnaissance over land or sea, either independently 

or in cooperation with land and naval forces; provide combat units capable of intense and 

sustained combat operations employing the latest and most advanced weapons; train units and 

personnel for the maintenance of the strategic forces in all parts of the world, and; perform 

special missions as the command general, Army Air Forces may direct.‖15

In effect, the original mission of SAC was to disrupt the ability of the Soviet Union to 

wage war. A February 1947 Joint Planning staff assessment concluded that if the Soviet Union 

attacked, they would be able to overrun Europe.16 Joint Staff planning documents from later in 

1947 assumed Soviet aggression against the U.S. within three years, a move that placed great 

 

14 Lt Col. James Slife, Creech Blue: Gen. Bill Creech and the Reformation of the Tactical Air Forces, 1978-1984, 

[Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press], p. 7-8. 

15 Herman Wolk, The Struggle for Air Force Independence 1943-1947, [Washington, DC: Air Force History and 

Museums Program, 1997]. 

16 http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/labs/prim_us_nuc_pol.pdf, page 28 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

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27

reliance on long range strategic bombardment.17 So while SAC‘s primary mission was 

deterrence, its secondary mission was to prevail in conflict should deterrence fail. SAC 

Commander General Curtis E. LeMay‘s goal was to build a force ―so professional, so strong, so 

powerful, that we would not have to fight.‖18

 However, were deterrence to fail, SAC ―could win 

war at any level through relentless strategic bombing. Furthermore, a force designed to defeat the 

Soviets...would provide a  ̳strategic umbrella‘ under which limited wars could be controlled.‖19

The creation of SAC was a response to the existential threat of the Cold War and it 

became an Air Force within the Air Force. The Eisenhower Administration felt that nuclear 

weapons were the low-cost defense alternative to a more balanced, capable, and robust national 

security force. The creation of SAC was a continuation and confirmation of the leadership 

decisions observed in World War II, where bomber pilots, having commanded the most powerful 

combat units and consistent with air power doctrine, were viewed as the natural and preeminent 

embodiment of airpower and strategic bombardment philosophies. 

Organization and Culture of SAC 

In 1948, General Curtis E. LeMay assumed command of SAC and instituted a ―culture of 

accountability.‖ Standardization became the hallmark of SAC‘s ability to ensure the viability of 

the nuclear deterrent mission. General LeMay informed its members that they were no longer 

planning for war, rather they were at war.20

 This comment was meant to reshape an 

organizational culture that had so far yielded poor results. General LeMay noted organizational 

problems with high accident rates, poor aircrew procedures, lack of realistic training missions, 

and, excessive temporary duty assignments and extra-curricular flying activities that interfered 

with the primary mission of training for nuclear operations (similar to what is happening now). 

General LeMay instituted regulations, policies, and procedures that brought much-needed 

discipline to the fledgling command. He also reorganized maintenance functions for improved 

efficiency. Standardization, which became a SAC hallmark, meant that everyone followed 

standard operating procedures and performed their jobs quickly and with precision. The SAC 

method of doing business was based on checklists and redundancy in order to minimize 

accidents and avoid unintended actions that could be misinterpreted and generate a devastating 

response from the Soviet Union. It also ensured SAC readiness if called upon to go to war. 

General LeMay instituted the no-notice Operational Readiness Inspection as well as realistic 

training exercises. These served to produce bombing crews that were more effective, efficient, 

and drilled to preparedness. Under General LeMay‘s command, bombing accuracy increased 

 

17 Ibid.

18 Col Mike Worden, USAF, Rise of the Fighter Generals, [Air University Press: Maxwell AFB, AL, 1998] pg. 59. 

Worden is quoting Richard H. Kohn and Joseph Harahan, eds. Strategic Air Warfare: An Interview with Curtis E. 

LeMay, Leon W. Johnson, David A. Burchinal, and Jack J. Catton [Washington, DC: OAFH, 1988], p. 75. 

19 Ibid., p. 61. 

20 As LeMay described it, ―We had to be ready to go to war not next week, not tomorrow, but this afternoon, 

today...We had to operate every day as if we were at war.‖ Ibid., p. 59. 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

28

dramatically and accident rates dropped to the lowest levels they had been in the Air Force for a 

decade. 21 

SAC gave airmen enormous responsibilities. They and their bombers and later, missiles 

stood between the country and foreign threats that otherwise could have caused the nuclear 

extinction of the United States. SAC held officers accountable for their actions and those of their 

subordinates. The accountability, responsibility, and authority for nuclear weapons were clear as 

were the consequences of failure. It was understood that a commander would lose his job if 

there was a mistake, even if that mistake was beyond his direct control. 

SAC airmen knew they were an elite cadre whose mission was vital to U.S. national 

security. Most SAC personnel did not complain about the stringent requirements. They 

understood the nature of the work they were doing, and the command continually fostered a team 

ethic and a sense of community. General LeMay explained, 

If you removed the plate from the body of SAC, you could look in and see people 

and instruments. They would be as the intricate electronic physiology of an 

airplane today; each functioning, each trained, each knowing his special part and 

job—knowing what he must do in his groove and place to keep the body alive, the 

blood circulating. Every man a coupling or a tube; every organization a rampart or 

transistors, battery of condensers. All rubbed up, no corrosion. Alert.22

Air Force Organization and Missions 

When General LeMay was appointed CSAF in 1961, he promoted SAC personnel to all 

major operational commands and most Air Force leadership positions, including TAC. General 

Walter Sweeney, newly in charge of TAC, initiated a program of ―high standards to 

professionalize the command including a centralized management control system which 

quantified, measured, and evaluated every element of TAC‘s supply, maintenance, and 

operations.‖23 The SAC way became the Air Force way. General LeMay‘s methods did not win 

him friends among the tactical fighter community. As one expert described the relationship 

among the operational commands during the early 1960s, ―SAC and TAC were like 

rattlesnakes.‖24

 However, ―might equaled right‖ and General LeMay and SAC held all the cards. 

Given the emphasis placed on the nuclear mission and the consequences should the United States 

be unprepared, ―The SAC-dominated Air Force consumed itself so much with its chief 

challenges—the growing nuclear target list, the missile threat, alerts, and dispersals—that it had 

little time for conventional or nonstrategic considerations.‖

25

 The opposite can be said about the 

Air Force today. The weight of fighting (and winning) two conventional wars outstrips nuclear 

requirements in every way—in budgetary, operational, and doctrinal terms. 

 

21 When Gen. LeMay took over SAC it had an accident rate of 65 per 100,000 flying hours. When he left it was 3. 

Barrett Tillman, LeMay: Lessons in Leadership [New York: NY, Palgrave MacMillan, 2007] p. 102. 

22 Ibid, p. 62 

23 Worden, p. 105. 

24 Ibid., p. 104. 

25 Ibid., p. 108. 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

Components: An Assessment

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As we will describe in future chapters, the evolution between the bomber and fighter 

generals had a profound effect on the leadership and execution of the nuclear mission. Much has 

been written about tribal competition inside the Air Force; however, SAC had a loyalty as a 

command, not as a tribe.26

 This loyalty affected the ability of the Air Force to address 

organizational changes. In 1992, General Merrill McPeak explained, 

While I can‘t prove it, I suspect the absence of a clear mission statement 

contributed to our reluctance to organize ourselves properly. People built 

loyalties around their commands – intense loyalties in fact rather than loyalties to 

air and space power as a whole...so the commands enjoyed support that made it 

difficult for us to think clearly about our purposes and hence, our organization.27

Doctrinally, SAC was very narrowly focused, which worked to prevent its leaders from 

pondering the complexities of limited war. Today‘s Air Force leaders have no experience with 

the regimental culture of SAC and the requirements demanded by that mission. They are so far 

removed from the nuclear mission and its lack of technological advancement that it is difficult to 

place the strategic mission in a modern context given political, operational and budgetary 

realities. 

Comparing Air Force and Navy Nuclear Operations 

In assessing the welfare of the Air Force nuclear enterprise, it is instructive to look at two 

of the most influential leaders of the Navy and Air Force nuclear programs. General LeMay‘s 

name is virtually synonymous with SAC. The same can be said of the ―father of the nuclear 

navy‖ Admiral Hyman G. Rickover. Both men had similar personalities: smart, decisive and 

determined. They understood the vital nature of their respective nuclear missions and were able 

to institutionalize safety and security standards. Both maintained ultimate control over 

personnel and made it their responsibility to grow expertise. General LeMay was known for spot 

promotions while Rickover‘s detailed interviews for the nuclear Navy are legendary. 

General LeMay was the definitive combat operator. ―He knew his profession literally 

from the ground up, and he seldom if ever allowed his ego to interfere with the results.28 He 

continually educated himself on every minute detail of his organization and every tool at SAC‘s 

disposal. He demanded nothing less that perfection from his staff. ―[T]o ensure nothing ever 

went wrong, SAC wrote manuals for every job, demanded strict adherence to checklists, and 

drilled aircrews in a rugged routine of training and alerts that created a body of  ̳perfect 

specialists‘ who were consumed with executing their mission flawlessly...‖

29

Admiral Rickover had similar personal qualities. Rickover was the consummate 

professional and did not accept ―stupidity.‖ He had congressionally mandated authority over the 

navy‘s nuclear capabilities which gave him the ability to remove a submarine or warship from 

active service –a power he did not hesitate to use.30

 Rickover created his own job and in 1949, 

 

26 See Worden, op cit. 

27 CSAF Merrill McPeak letter to OSD, Nov 1992, as quoted in Worden, p. 235. 

28 Ibid., p. 178. 

29 Ibid., p. 61. 

30 December 1964 60 Minutes Interview, accessed at www.people.vcu.edu/~rsleeth/Rickover.html. 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

30

“I have little tolerance for mediocrity, none 

for stupidity.”

- Admiral Hyman G. Rickover

“I don’t have time to distinguish between 

the unfortunate and the incompetent, the 

end result is always the same.”

- General Curtis E. LeMay

he ―made a deal‖ with the Navy and the Atomic Energy Commission to create a new division for 

naval reactor development, placing him at the helm of both the technical and military sides of the 

equation.31 From that point on in his 63-year naval career, he commanded the U.S. Naval 

nuclear program. By 1984, one out of every four admirals commanding ships had been trained 

by Rickover.32 His influence on the Navy‘s nuclear program was at least the equivalent of 

General LeMay‘s on the Air Force. General LeMay held command of SAC from 1948-1957, the 

longest any officer presided over an Air Force command in the 20th century.33

Admiral Rickover developed the 

underlying principles in naval nuclear 

propulsion organization in the early 1950s. 

Rickover managed the development and 

operation of the first nuclear powered 

submarine, the Nautilus.34

 Admiral 

Rickover‘s focus was on preventing a nuclear reactor accident, and this singular focus pervaded 

the nuclear Navy organizational culture during his 33-year tenure as the head of naval nuclear 

programs. He was aboard almost every nuclear submarine as it was being completed, placing his 

personal stamp of approval on the ship. Rickover instituted a safety program founded on officer 

experience, expertise and human redundancy.35

 There were, and are today, extremely 

demanding officer selection standards for the nuclear propulsion program. While he led the 

nuclear propulsion command he personally interviewed and selected every candidate.36

 The 

nuclear propulsion organization is responsible for managing high-risk, complex, technical, and 

highly interdependent processes. The Navy‘s nuclear propulsion organization has retained 

Rickover‘s stringent standards and today remains error-intolerant and operates virtually accident 

and incident-free.37

Given that General LeMay and 

Admiral Rickover had so much in common, 

why was the Navy able to institutionalize 

Admiral Rickover‘s standards long-term, 

while the Air Force allowed General LeMay‘s SAC standards to decline? Both men were 

equally reviled by some in their respective services, and yet Admiral Rickover‘s standards 

 

31 See: ―Science: The Man in Tempo 3,‖ Time, January 11, 1954, 

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,819338,00.html#ixzz1FVlKasee 

32 December 1964 60 Minutes Interview, op cit. 

33 Air Force Magazine, October 2008. 

34 For a detailed account see Clay Blair Jr., The Atomic Submarine and Admiral Rickover [New York, NY: Holt, 

1954]. 

35 P. Bierly, and J.C. Spender. ―Culture and High-Reliability Organization: The Case of the Nuclear Submarine.‖ 

Journal of Management 21(4), (1995): 639-656.

36 Some of the most telling Rickover anecdotes come from his selection process. See 

http://bubbleheads.blogspot.com/2009/02/rickover-stories-needed.html 

37 Statement of Admiral F. L. "Skip" Bowman, U.S. Navy Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program before the 

House Committee on Science, 29 October 2003, Accessed February 28, 2011. 

http://www.navy.mil/navydata/testimony/safety/bowman031029.txt 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

Components: An Assessment

31

remain the hallmark of the Navy nuclear program.38 One of the fundamental differences 

between Navy and Air Force is that the nuclear mission was never a core mission for the navy; 

however, it was a core capability. Propulsion ensured that the nuclear mission would remain 

stable because it played an inherent role in naval capabilities. 

According to interviewees, the perception is that the Navy is not perfect but it maintains 

high standards with less generous budgets. The naval nuclear enterprise was deemed 

fundamentally sound partially due to the fact that the Navy‘s strategic stewardship model stayed 

distinct. The Air Force made conscious choice to de-emphasize the nuclear mission, reduce 

manpower and cut budgets.39

 

The Demise of the Soviet Union and SAC 

The collapse of the Soviet Union changed the primary national security dynamic around 

which the U.S. Armed Services, especially the Air Force, had been structured since World War 

II. Throughout most of the Cold War the Warsaw Pact outnumbered NATO conventional forces 

in Europe. The West countered the Soviet conventional superiority with strategic nuclear 

weapons provided by SAC and tactical nuclear weapons deployed in NATO countries. After the 

collapse of the Soviet Union and establishment of more friendly relations with Russia, the United 

States had less of a rationale to maintain the large number of deployed weapons. There was 

tremendous public pressure for a peace dividend. The U.S. military forces and their costs had to 

be reduced. In June 1989, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell 

unveiled ―The Base Force‖ concept. The Base Force required a 20 percent reduction in 

personnel, a 25 percent reduction of force structure and a 10 percent budget reduction. In the 

midst of these rapidly changing world and domestic events, Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 

1990. 

Although SAC had dominated the Air Force for most of its 46-year tenure from 1946-

1992, SAC was inactivated a year after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. SAC was the initial 

raison d‘être for an independent air force and that fact drove the early culture and organization of 

the service. When political realities changed, SAC lost its dominance in Air Force hierarchy. 

Dominance, however, was a large part of its identity and thus, the identity of the service. With 

the absence of a nuclear foe, the mission of the Air Force changed from preventing war through 

deterrence to fighting and winning the nation‘s wars.40 SAC‘s responsibilities and assets were 

divided between ACC (missiles and bombers), Air Mobility Command (tankers) and U.S. 

Strategic Command (a unified command which replaced SAC which had been a specified 

command). The ICBM mission would transfer from ACC to Air Force Space Command a few 

years later.

 

38

 Rickover truly hated by many of his fellow officers and was twice passed over for Admiral and only received it 

after congressional and presidential intervention."Unsinkable Hyman Rickover,‖ Time, May 23, 1977, 

http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,911955,00.html?iid=chix-sphere. 

39 Schlesinger I, op cit, p. 26 

40 See Secretary of Defense, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, [Washington, 

DC: Department of Defense, 1995], www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/reading_room/734.pdf. Also CSAF McPeak repeatedly 

used the ―fly, fight, and win‖ terminology in his speeches. See Selected Works of the CSAF Merrill McPeak, 1990-

94, [Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1994] pp. 66, 261, 270 & 273. 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

32

ROOT CAUSE 1: POLICY AND OVERSIGHT CHANGES 

In this section we discuss the effects of strategy and policy evolution on the Air Force 

nuclear enterprise in four key areas: a lack of focus at the policy and strategy level; an aging and 

shrinking scientific community responsible for nuclear weapons development; a lack of 

awareness or understanding of nuclear-related issues in Congress; and, the impact of arms 

control measures. Strategically, one of the most detrimental factors to the perceived value of 

nuclear weapons was the rise of terrorism and rogue states seeking weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) as the primary threats to U.S. national security. Additionally, the cadre of nuclear 

scientists, strategists and experts who experienced Hiroshima, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the 

Cold War decreases every day. Their expertise and interest affects the entire nuclear enterprise - 

in the halls of Congress, across DoD and in Air Force decisions on missions, manpower, and 

money. Finally, the influence of arms control treaties and reductions in the numbers of nuclear 

weapons and their delivery vehicles impact the Air Force‘s ability to retain the required expertise 

and focus is explored. 

Workshop participants and interviewees agreed that too little top-level guidance was 

provided on which to base an effective nuclear strategic policy, and advocacy at all levels was 

not sufficient to support the modernization and sustainment of nuclear forces and the deterrent 

mission. Participants and interviewees pointed out that neither the executive branch nor OSD 

appeared to be involved or interested in the nuclear mission until after the unauthorized 

movement of nuclear weapons and mistaken shipment of classified forward sections.41

 This lack 

of engagement by DoD and Air Force leadership was perceived by those interviewed as a 

significant contributing factor to the lack of diligence that led to the unauthorized movement of 

nuclear weapons and mistaken shipment of classified forward sections. It was noted that some 

DoD leaders who were demanding that Air Force leadership be held accountable for their 

inattention to nuclear matters had themselves been disinterested until the nuclear incidents 

occurred.42

 The linkage between the perceived lack of national-level commitment to a ―robust 

nuclear deterrent‖ by senior national security officials and its detrimental effect on the nuclear 

workforce was identified in a 2008 Defense Science Board report.43

 The report expressed the 

concern that ―adequate nuclear competency... [would not]...be sustained to meet future 

challenges.‖

The problem was compounded by the integration of nuclear issues into the broader 

spectrum of WMD. The threat of nuclear attack was no longer treated differently than the threat 

of chemical or biological attack from terrorists or rogue states. This change was a result of 

several events. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union created fifteen new countries, many of 

which contained elements of the Soviet WMD infrastructure. As former scientists left the Soviet 

 

41 See conclusions from both the Welch, Larry D., The Defense Science Task Board Permanent Task Force on 

Nuclear Weapons Surety: Report on the Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons (DSB), April 2008 and 

Herman Wolk, The Struggle for Air Force Independence 1943-1947, [Washington, DC: Air Force History and 

Museums Program, 1997], and Schlesinger, Phase II reports. 

42 This fact was noted in the DSB and Schlesinger, Phase II reports. 

43 The Defense Science Task Board Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety: Report on Nuclear 

Deterrence Skills, September 2008, p. 10, 

http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/DSB%20Nuclear%20Deterrence%20Skills%20Chiles.pdf 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

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Union, the extent of its chemical and biological programs were shown to be much greater U.S. 

intelligence had discovered. Second, investigations after Desert Storm showed that Iraq‘s WMD 

capabilities, especially its nuclear program, were more advanced than previously thought. 

Additionally, WMD incidents such as the Aum Shinrikyo use of sarin gas in Tokyo and the 

anthrax mailings in 2001 highlighted the effects that WMD use by small groups could have on 

society. All of these events led to increased focus and funding on homeland defense against 

chemical and biological weapons, to the neglect of the nuclear deterrent mission that was also 

included in the WMD spectrum. 

Strategy and Policy 

After the end of the Cold War, the U.S. nuclear force structure changed dramatically – 

bombers and tankers were taken off alert, Minuteman II ICBMs were deactivated and all Army 

and surface Navy nuclear weapons were removed from service. George W. Bush‘s 

Administration moved away from arms control treaties that had been the centerpiece of nuclear 

policy since Richard Nixon was in the White House, but continued to reduce the nuclear 

weapons arsenal. 

The role of nuclear weapons in the national security strategy was gradually evolving, but 

changed dramatically after the events of September 11, 2001 changed the focus of security and 

deterrence. Terrorism and rogue state concerns ascended as the primary threats to the United 

States, altering the perceived utility of nuclear weapons in our national strategy. The first major 

change was contained in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review released in December 2001, which 

stated that 

[P]lanning for America's strategic forces [is moving] from the threat-based 

approach of the Cold War to a capabilities-based approach.... Terrorists or 

rogue states armed with weapons of mass destruction will likely test America's 

security commitments to its allies and friends. In response, we will need a range 

of capabilities to assure friend and foe alike of U.S. resolve ...U.S. strategic 

forces need to provide the President with a range of options to defeat any 

aggressor.44 

The 2002 National Security Strategy further articulated the Administration‘s focus on 

WMD. It is this change from threats to ―capabilities‖ that led those in policy circles to question 

the ability of the government to counter WMD threats with the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Nuclear 

weapons went from an existential greatest threat to United States national security to being one 

of a spectrum of a potential aggressor‘s WMD capabilities. Traditional nuclear deterrence was 

not likely to work against an adversary that has no known fixed location, no major assets at 

immediate risk, and who may have an inclination toward martyrdom. 

Although President Bush‘s Administration focused largely on responding to the terrorist 

attacks of September 11, 2001 and toppling of Saddam Hussein‘s regime in Iraq, nuclear force 

sustainment was not ignored. The Administration developed a ―New Nuclear Triad‖ concept and 

 

44 Nuclear Posture Review, [excerpts] emphasis added. Document submitted to Congress, 31 December 2001 

accessed at www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2001/010302-npr.htm. 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

34

pushed Congress to fund both the Reliable Replacement Warhead and the Robust Nuclear Earth 

Penetrator programs. The Bush Administration also withdrew from the ABM Treaty and 

modernized U.S. ballistic missile defenses out of concern for possible future nuclear missile 

attacks. President Bush also signed the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) early in 

his administration.45

The focus of the United States and its national security teams was first and foremost on 

the Global War on Terror (now called Overseas Contingency Operations) in Iraq, Afghanistan, 

and elsewhere, and where nuclear weapons and deterrence were seen as largely irrelevant. Thus, 

DoD and Air Force budgets went most heavily in the direction of improving and sustaining 

conventional capabilities relevant to current operations, and not on strengthening or even 

maintaining nuclear forces. 

The Power of the Atom and the Aging Scientific Community 

A serving U.S. general or admiral who started his career in the 1970s and served 30+ 

years was born shortly after World War II ended. They would have had no personal knowledge 

of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They were likely too young to have political knowledge of the 1962 

Cuban Missile Crisis. Many would have not seen or even heard of any nuclear weapon tests in 

the atmosphere, even though they served through the height of the Cold War. Thus, a significant 

majority have forgotten or never understood the power of the atom. Former Secretary of 

Defense Harold Brown, who once worked on nuclear weapons testing at Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory, stated that you could read a newspaper at three AM from fifty miles away 

at the Nevada Test Site when the United States tested a nuclear weapon above ground. His view 

was that it might be useful for all world leaders to witness such tests from time to time to impress 

upon them the extraordinary power of nuclear weapons and bring home to them that these were 

indeed weapons that could inflict almost unimaginable levels of damage and needed to be treated 

as such. It is likely that this appreciation has been somewhat lost and may account for some the 

diminished attention paid to nuclear matters since the end of the Cold War. 

During the interviews we heard numerous harrowing stories of personnel making 

operational changes to nuclear weapons from using the wrong type of gas to stabilize the weapon 

to generally ignoring detailed tasks and safety measures in the presence of nuclear warheads. 

While the safety of nuclear weapons has dramatically improved since the early days of the U.S. 

nuclear program, one need only to read some of the stories about ―mistakes‖ or errors in 

calculations from those days to be cognizant of their power while in the presence of nuclear 

weapons.46

 

45 SORT is also known as the Moscow Treaty. 

46 In his book 15 Minutes: General Curtis LeMay and the Countdown to Nuclear Annihilation, [New York, NY: St. 

Martin‘s Press, 2011], L. Douglas Keeney describes numerous accidents and incidents during the early days of the 

U.S. nuclear program. One story is particularly germane: the chapter on the runaway bomb. The ―runaway bomb‖ is 

not what we think of in the present day—a weapon that has been stolen, rather it represents one whose explosion 

was significantly greater than scientists expected and caused great damage to the Bikini Islands test site. It is the 

lack of understanding of nuclear weapons capabilities that existed in the early days of development that is now seen 

in the Air Force. 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

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35

Most of the scientists who have conducted nuclear tests are no longer working, and many, 

like the World War II generation, have passed. No such tests have been conducted since 1992, 

when the United States unilaterally chose to discontinue testing.47 Similarly, the political 

advocates of such nuclear weapons programs are retiring from the scene and have been replaced 

in the Pentagon, Capitol Hill, and White House by leaders who do not focus on nuclear 

preparedness and nuclear deterrence. This decline in the number of nuclear advocates and the 

clout they held was reflected in the Air Force‘s lax approach that led to the unauthorized 

movement of nuclear weapons and mistaken shipment of classified forward sections. 

The leadership cadre at the executive, legislative and military levels has changed from 

one with direct experience in the Cold War to one whose war experience is in conventional wars 

in Iraq and Afghanistan where nuclear weapons played no role. This generational shift plays a 

significant part in the relevance of nuclear weapons in U.S. national security strategy today. The 

same has been true in the Air Force. During the Cold War, leaders with World War II ―total 

war‖ combat experience relinquished control to Vietnam-era generals with only ―limited war‖

experience. The Vietnam generation has now given way to those whose experience is based on 

conventional operations, not nuclear deterrence. 

Congress 

Generally, congressional interest in a particular issue is driven by constituents in a 

member‘s district and current events. From 1945 to 1991, there were many members of 

Congress who focused on nuclear weapons and their role in U.S. national security, a reflection in 

some cases of their experience or of the large military installations resident in their districts. 

Throughout the Cold War there were many hawks and doves in the halls of Congress who paid

close attention to nuclear weapons. The Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committee and 

related appropriations committees in the Senate and House of Representatives have always been 

coveted positions, and thus, increased the requirement to be knowledgeable on national security 

affairs. Committee members required personal as well as committee staff expertise in national 

security issues and many times the staff consisted of retired or active duty military. 

Over a span of almost two decades (1991-2008) the field of national security evolved 

from a focused bi-polar struggle to a multi-polar world with a wide range of existing and 

potential security issues including terrorism, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, regional 

instability in the Balkans and the Middle East, as well as the rising power of China. This 

evolution made it difficult for members of Congress to maintain in-depth national security 

expertise on nuclear issues given the sheer range of topics and interests they and their staffers 

must cover. Today, it is rare for committees to hold lengthy hearings about nuclear weapons and 

their deterrent value, in which Congressional members ask detailed and sometimes pointed 

questions of those testifying.48 Instead today‘s members usually focus on the terrorist threat to 

the U.S. homeland and issues relating to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

 

47 The Clinton Administration made this decision after the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty failed Senate 

ratification. 

48 Kay King argues that Congress has abdicated its oversight responsibility in the national security realm. See Kay 

King, Congress and National Security, Council Special Report No 58, Council on Foreign Relations, November 

2010.
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

36

Adding to the declining attention and expert focus on nuclear matters by the Congress 

was the fact that fewer military officers with nuclear backgrounds were assigned to the 

legislative branch as legislative fellows or liaison officers. First, this was because deployments 

to Iraq and Afghanistan made fewer military available to Congress. Second, those that were 

assigned to Capitol Hill were now predominantly from the Air Force fighter pilot community 

with little or no nuclear understanding or experience. 

As membership in both chambers evolved, fewer members of Congress now have 

experience or perhaps even concerns regarding nuclear weapons as an element of national 

security . Instead, members‘ formative war experiences are increasingly from the era of the 

Persian Gulf, Balkan, Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. Terrorism and the wars in Afghanistan and 

Iraq are the dominant issues of today; nuclear weapons concerns are mostly seen as something 

from a bygone era. The result is a decline in the number of Congressional hearings and 

decreased individual member attention towards maintaining U.S. nuclear weapons preparedness 

in the two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union.49

Compounding the already diluted nuclear expertise or interest, is the fact that 

congressional oversight of nuclear issues are governed by multiple committees in the House and 

Senate which may serve to diminish the total focus needed for the nation‘s nuclear enterprise. 

Nuclear policy and legislation does not reside in a single executive branch department, as 

weapons design, development and maintenance is managed by DoE and its corresponding 

oversight committees while delivery systems and manning of weapons systems falls under the 

purview of DoD and the Armed Services Committees. Both have related defense and energy 

appropriations subcommittees. This split oversight affects the ability of policymakers to see the 

interconnectedness between stockpile sustainment and how the DoE and DoD programs affect 

the overall capability of the nuclear deterrent. 

As our interviewees stressed, this is not to suggest that committee staff are unconcerned 

with nuclear issues. The Senate Armed Services Committee, for example, spent a significant 

amount of time reviewing Air Force organizational changes, specifically with regard to strategic 

forces and space. Hearings were held and comparisons made between the Air Force and Navy 

nuclear operations. Following the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons and mistaken 

shipment of classified forward sections, both chambers held hearings on the events and as one 

staffer explained, it became clear that ―no one was watching the store‖ and that Air Force 

training and discipline had suffered from overzealous cutbacks and damaging reorganizations. 

However, the erosion of congressional oversight is obvious to the services and has direct 

ramifications on their budgets. 

Arms Control Reduces Bureaucratic Clout 

During the past four Administrations, the U.S. government has signed arms control 

agreements including the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), START II, SORT and 

New START. The U.S. has also has undertaken unilateral actions that have dramatically 

 

49 An exception to this was seen in the fall 2010 Senate debates that preceded the new START treaty ratification. 

Several members demanded that the Administration move forward with modernization of the nuclear warheads and 

their delivery systems precisely due to their concern over the health of the U.S. nuclear deterrent. 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

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37

reduced the number of strategic nuclear forces.50 For example, U.S. nuclear delivery vehicles 

will have shrunk from approximately 2,200 in 1991 to approximately 800 in 2010.51

In 1992, the United States signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and 

declared a moratorium on further nuclear testing. Ratification of the CTBT failed in October 

1999, but the Obama Administration promises to bring the treaty up for another vote. 

Meanwhile the unilateral U.S. moratorium is in effect. 

The overall effect of such arms control and disarmament is to reduce U.S. nuclear forces 

and the resources available to sustain them. However, direct economies of scale are not realistic 

and some amount of nuclear government-industrial base is required even with a very low 

weapons count. Part of the literal price the Obama Administration paid for New START 

ratification was to agree to support approximately $80 billion worth of additional modernization 

and maintenance of U.S. nuclear infrastructure than previously planned or approved by the Bush 

or Obama Administrations.52

These arms control reductions have been paralleled by the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review 

that reduced the role of U.S. nuclear weapons to largely, but not completely, a retaliatory role 

against any nuclear aggressor, reversing the Bush Administration‘s intentional ambiguity 

regarding use of a nuclear weapon in response to a WMD attack. The Nuclear Posture Review 

also declared the United States would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty who were in 

compliance with nuclear non-proliferation obligations. 

The effect of arms control has been to shrink the size of U.S. nuclear forces, and thereby 

reduce its bureaucratic clout in the Air Force, DoD, and congressional budgetary process. 

Interviewees spoke of the struggle to get appropriate attention to nuclear issues by their superiors 

and Congress. Staff in the Pentagon could see that the notion of the nuclear deterrent and its 

value for national security was undergoing changes. The evolution of the strategy was a 

contributing factor especially with budget dollars scarce and emphasis on winning the wars of 

today versus deterring the wars of tomorrow. 

Terrorism and rogue state concerns have ascended as the primary threats to the United 

States, dramatically altering the perceived utility of nuclear weapons in our national strategy. 

These perceptions affect doctrine, policy and structures across DoD and the Air Force. Taken 

together the changes in oversight, strategy, and policy have had a dramatic effect on the Air 

Force. One interviewee summed it up by saying: 

It became clear officers and enlisted men have interpreted that there is a lack of 

care for nuclear matters. If I was a new officer I would really think do I want to 

make a career of this when there is a lack of interest in the Pentagon and White 

 

50 The first START treaty was proposed by President Ronald Reagan in 1982. 

51 These numbers include ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, 

http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/start1/news/strtdata.htm. For a total number of Russian and U.S. warheads 1945-

2010 see www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Magazine%January%202011/0111chart.pdf 

52 The fact that funding for the early stages of the modernization programs was not in President Obama‘s 2012 

budget submission to Congress did not go unnoticed by Senators who had voted for ratification on that promise. 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

38

House? There is a response to that stimuli or lack of stimuli. For years the only 

issues that came up were warhead life extension, delivery, and scientific 

expertise.53 

 

53 Several studies have looked at the demise of nuclear expertise at DOE labs. See for example, Department of 

Energy, Commission on Maintaining United States Nuclear Weapons Expertise, March 1999, 

http://www.doeal.gov/LLNLCompetition/ReportsAndComments/chilesrpt.pdf and Defense Science Board, Nuclear 

Deterrence Skills, op cit., September 2008.
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ROOT CAUSE 2: ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE AND OPERATIONAL 

EVOLUTION 

In this chapter we will discuss how DoD and Air Force organizational changes moved the 

focus away from nuclear deterrence missions, including the influence of the aforementioned role 

of the fighter pilots to senior leader positions as conventional wars and counterterrorism took 

priority over nuclear weapons. During our discussions, interviewees consistently referred to 

several important historical events, including the fall of the Berlin Wall, the implementation of 

the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and CSAF General Merrill McPeak‘s dramatic organizational 

changes, which led to a ―lean organization‖ that prioritized some missions at the expense of 

others, as having dramatic affect on Air Force organization and operations. 

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act was viewed as 

a massive inhibitor to service progress. Participants mentioned that Goldwater-Nichols‘ effects 

are still being felt today, especially in the role change of the services from planners to 

programmers, requiring them to focus on the funding programs, rather than planning and 

executing the mission. The other impact of Goldwater-Nichols was the Air Force‘s perceived 

requirement to rush officers through to command billets quickly so that all of the mandatory 

general officer joint experience requirements could be attained before promotion boards 

determined future careers. The result has been that officers are not in squadron, group, or wing 

command long enough to learn their jobs or to be properly tested to ensure they are ready for 

more senior command. Similarly, for the purpose of career development, a number of officers 

have been placed into nuclear leadership roles that are ill-matched to their experiences and 

background. 

The OSD level of involvement in the Air Force‘s nuclear mission was another major 

factor mentioned by the workshop participants. All contributors concurred that without 

increased financial support and greater attention given by OSD to clarify and advocate for a 

strong U.S. deterrence posture and the associated role of the Air Force‘s nuclear enterprise, the 

service‘s nuclear capabilities will continue to deteriorate. Though the participants also believe 

that the capability to fight a nuclear war is critical to ensure deterrence, they believe most Air 

Force personnel no longer understand the importance of the nuclear mission or believe that 

nuclear war is a realistic possibility. One general stated that deterrence has become synonymous 

with maintenance and sustainment rather than the capability to execute the nuclear mission. 

Another participant questioned whether the Air Force should maintain its current strategy. All 

agreed that if the answer is yes, Air Force personnel should understand the deterrence mission, 

know it in depth, and demonstrate competence consistently and frequently to be credible. All 

agreed that these major questions of what deterrence means for the Air Force must be answered 

to effectively maintain the capability to execute the Air Force nuclear mission. 

Office of the Secretary of Defense 

After the Berlin Wall fell in October 1989 and the Soviet Union crumbled in December 

1991, DoD was finalizing its Annual Report to Congress for fiscal year 1993. Then-Secretary of 

Defense Richard Cheney made the decision to remove discussion of the nation‘s nuclear 

capabilities from the document. There were two reasons for this decision. First, the United 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

40

States did not want to flaunt its power before the collapsing Soviet empire. Second, the annual 

report details programs the Pentagon wants to highlight to either maintain or increase 

congressional funding. Nuclear weapons were no longer in that category. This seemingly minor 

decision initiated a cascade of changes for nuclear weapons in U.S. policy. 

The Department of Defense and the Nuclear Mission in the 21st Century, a study at the 

Center for Strategic and International Studies led by Clark Murdock, found that organizationally, 

nuclear weapons had been relegated from a position of preeminence to its new place as just one 

of so many missions for most commands and offices in OSD. 

In Washington, effective policy representation of any issue requires 

organizational and bureaucratic stature. Over the past 15 years, the bureaucratic 

actors focused on nuclear weapons have either disappeared or been incorporated 

(aka ―mainstreamed‖) into other agencies. Moreover, the time and attention of 

senior policymakers—the scarcest resource in official Washington—has 

precipitously declined when it comes to nuclear issues.54

As threats to U.S. national security evolved, so too did the missions of the offices within 

OSD. However, given increasing budget constraints the expanding missions rarely came with a 

commensurate increase in staff. Instead, existing staff were expected to expand their mission 

and expertise areas. For example, within the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, space and 

information operations were added to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for 

Forces Policy office, although they have since been separated out again under the current 

Administration. Mergers between offices required a broadening of mission for each office. 

Another example is the 2006 reorganization that created the DASD Office for Counternarcotics, 

Counterproliferation, and Global Threats. 

From 1951 until 1982 the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy 

(ATSD [AE]) focused on the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal. It was in 1982, under the Reagan 

Administration, that the mission of the office began to change. As one study summarized: 

From 1982-1996, the role of the ATSD (AE) expanded to include issues associated with 

chemical and biological weapons, implementation of arms control treaties and agreements, 

counterproliferation programs, and the Cooperative Threat Reduction program to assist in the 

elimination of WMD in the former Soviet states. In addition, the ATSD (AE) was given control 

over the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) in 1994. (DNA was one of several defense 

organizations that were merged to form DTRA in 1998)...Between 1997 and 2001, the 

Administration declined to nominate anyone to serve as the ATSD for Nuclear , Chemical and 

Biological (NCB) programs, having determined, as part of the Defense Reform Initiative, that the 

position should be eliminated. Congress, however, continued to maintain during this time that the 

position was necessary to ensure appropriate senior-level policy oversight and implementation 

guidance within the Department.55DoD changes in policy, structure, and most importantly 

emphasis under the Clinton and G.W. Bush Administrations clearly sent a message to the 

 

54 Clark Murdock, The Department Of Defense And The Nuclear Mission in the 21st Century, Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, March 2008, p. 24-25. 

55 ―Nuclear Matters History,‖ Office of the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters, 

accessed September 26, 2010 at http://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/nmhistory.html 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

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services that nuclear weapons were on the back burner. While a mission requirement remained, 

little effort was exerted to preserve the capability within the civilian DoD or military force 

structure. The 2008 Schlesinger Commission recognized this fact and stated that OSD senior 

leadership needed to be more involved with nuclear-related decision making and that oversight 

be consolidated and unified. The panel recommended that the responsibility of the NCB Defense 

Programs be brought under a newly created Assistant Secretary of Defense for Deterrence (ASD 

[D]), saying that: 

The Secretary of Defense should establish an ASD (D) in the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD [P]). The Principal Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Deterrence should be an acquisition professional and should be 

dual-hatted within the OUSD (AT&L). All existing OUSD (P) offices that deal 

with nuclear, chemical, biological and missile defense issues should be realigned 

under the new ASD; similarly, the functions of the ATSD (NCB) (to include 

oversight of DTRA should be assumed by the new ASD.56

For all the changes that occurred, it seems that the term ―nuclear‖ is back in vogue in 

organizational nomenclature. Under the Obama Administration, an Under Secretary of Defense 

for Policy and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs offices include a 

DASD for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy. The mission of the office includes ―developing 

strategies, policies, and oversight of national nuclear policy, treaty negotiations, and missile 

defense policy,‖ although much of the focus is on arms control implementation and supporting 

missile defense. 

DoD oversight of DTRA highlights the challenges. DTRA falls organizationally under 

ATL; however, most of its programs are monitored by offices within OSD Policy. This lack of 

unity of effort hinders execution. When OSD oversight offices disagree on a policy or program, 

it stagnates until a compromise can be reached. Sometimes a deadlock can exist for years. 

Finally, it is not clear how much oversight of military programs has changed or what if anything 

OSD is doing to affect the deteriorating nuclear culture internally or in the services. 

There are many other examples of ―mainstreaming‖ of nuclear weapons within DoD and 

military command structures. Here DTRA provides another good example. DTRA began as the 

DNA in 1971. It was renamed in 1996 when the word ―nuclear‖ was no longer in vogue. The 

newly named Defense Special Weapons Agency‘s (DSWA) — also a descendant of the Armed 

Forces Special Weapons Project — was the first move away from the ―uniqueness‖ of nuclear 

weapons; although it was seen as a way of consolidating all of the nuclear-related threat 

reduction agencies under one roof. DSWA‘s mission was expanded to include ―advanced 

conventional weapons support programs.‖ The organization struggled for effectiveness. In 

1998, DSWA, the On-Site Inspection Agency, the Defense Technology Security Administration, 

and selected elements of OSD were combined to form DTRA. Today, DTRA‘s mission is to act 

as DoD‘s ―official Combat Support Agency for countering weapons of mass destruction.‖ 

DTRA is co-located with the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) Center for Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

 

56 Schlesinger, James. R. Report of the Task Force on DOD Nuclear Weapons Management, Phase II: 

Review of the DOD Nuclear Mission. [Arlington, VA: The Mitre Corporation, McLean, VA., 2008], pg. v. 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

42

USSTRATCOM and Headquarters Air Force 

More evidence of the DoD inattention to nuclear affairs is the addition of new missions to 

USSTRATCOM. Shortly after the end of the Cold War in 1992, the U.S. Strategic Air 

Command, a specified command whose sole responsibility was the nuclear deterrence mission, 

was inactivated and its responsibilities redistributed. In the same year, a unified command, U.S. 

Strategic Command, was created. Unfortunately, in addition to command and control of U.S. 

strategic forces, the commander of USSTRATCOM was later assigned numerous non-nuclear 

missions. Clark Murdock explains: 

The recent history of USSTRATCOM illustrates how far the nuclear mission has 

declined in organizational status. On October 1, 2002, U.S. Space Command was 

merged into USSTRATCOM, and, since that time, USSTRATCOM picked up 

many new responsibilities, global strike, computer network operations, 

information operations, global intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 

(ISR), strategic warning and intelligence assessments, and combating weapons of 

mass destruction. In the summer of 2002, the highest-ranking individual at 

USSTRATCOM who thought about nothing but nuclear issues was its four-star 

commander; today, it is a retired lieutenant colonel who heads up the Nuclear 

Command and Control office. This loss of bureaucratic status has been mirrored 

in OSD and the military services.57

While General Ronald Fogelman was CSAF, he created an office in Headquarters Air 

Force specifically focused on nuclear weapons (XON). However, that mission expanded over 

time. When Major General Roger Burg took over the office in 2004, the title had changed to 

―Strategic Security,‖ and the mission included nuclear arms control, space issues, and counterchemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear issues including the Air Force‘s detailed concept 

of operations for dealing with chemical and biological attacks. The office was realigned in 2006 

as A5XP as part of the air staff restructuring.58

 

Nuclear Goes Conventional 

Operation Desert Storm highlighted American dominance in conventional weapons, 

specifically in the areas of precision weapons guidance and communications technologies, 

especially command and control. This movement was accelerated in the next decade in conflicts 

in the Balkans (specifically Kosovo) and the post-September 11th attacks on the Taliban in 

Afghanistan. Most significantly, the U.S. military and the Air Force in particular, was evolving 

its role in national security. 

During the Cold War, the mission was to maintain the peace, as evidenced in the SAC 

motto: ―Peace is our Profession.‖ The emphasis after the end of the Cold War was on fighting 

and winning limited conventional wars as quickly and as bloodlessly as possible. This was a 

fundamental change for the Air Force and its hierarchy. Those who upheld the importance of the 

nuclear mission became less important and those who commanded or fought in contemporary 

 

57 Clark Murdock, op cit.

58 U.S. Department of Defense News Release, ―Air Force Reorganizes Staff Structure,‖ No. 082-06, January 30, 

2006. www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=9268 
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wars rose to preeminence. The lopsided success of American combat forces in Iraq in 1990-91 

led to theorizing that stealth technology, precision conventional weapons, and information 

technology were creating a ―revolution in military affairs‖ that would require changes in 

organizations, culture and expertise to sustain. This led to a shift in the bomber community‘s 

focus to becoming conventional mission experts. Leadership in the B-52 community made this 

their priority and the crews followed their leaders. The focus on the B-52‘s nuclear mission 

received much less emphasis. 

The expanding role for conventional weapons and decrease in the perceived utility of 

nuclear weapons continues today. Precision guided conventional bombs and missiles can

effectively strike a whole class of targets without the political and physical costs of using nuclear 

weapons. Further, under the Prompt Global Strike concept, conventional warheads have been 

considered that could be delivered by missiles and strike so quickly and accurately that even 

time-critical targets can be destroyed. Improvements in hardened target penetrators may allow 

conventional warheads to be used against targets previously reserved only to the nuclear forces. 

This is not to suggest that nuclear weapons will be completely replaced in their mission to deter 

nuclear attacks but rather that conventional weapons may further erode the perceived utility of 

nuclear weapons. 

General McPeak’s Revolution

Much like the current economic conditions, General McPeak was Chief of Staff at a time 

when the economy was in decline and the services were being forced to make dramatic budget 

cuts. General McPeak‘s vision was a streamlined, flat organization that moved power out of 

headquarters and into the hands of commanders in the field. 

We redistributed power inside our Air Force—shoved it down and out from the 

headquarters. We empowered the people who were working on the actual 

problem. To support this initiative, we started replacing regulations with policy 

guidance—the ―what and why‖ of something that needs to be done. We leave the 

―how‖ part to the people who know the mission best—and we provide metrics to 

help measure operational performance.59

General McPeak replaced Air Force Regulations (AFRs) with what was intended to be a broader, 

less prescriptive set of Air Force Instructions (AFIs) to give commanders more flexibility. AFIs 

were limited to less than 10 pages. Interviewees told us stories of personnel simply cutting and 

pasting one section of an old AFR into the ―new‖ document so that it would pass the test. Then, 

the knowledgeable Airman would retain the AFR in his own personal file for reference. This 

held true in many units across the service for many years. However, eventually the ―old guys‖

who had understood why the AFRs were necessary for the nuclear mission were gone. A new 

generation moved in and ―old files‖ disappeared or were no longer used as reference. Today, 

many in the service do not know the full extent of the ―LeMay‖ regulations nor how to execute 

their mission according to such prescriptive methods. Continuous change in itself became a 

culture. 

 

59 ―The Quest for Quality,‖ Speech, First Quality Air Force Symposium, Montgomery, Alabama, 21 October 

1993,Selected Works of the CSAF Merrill McPeak 1990-94, p. 265 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

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General McPeak‘s goals were clear: ―By restructuring, we seek to better integrate Air 

Force functions. ACC integrates combat squadrons, ending the artificial strategic-tactical 

division of our forces. Air Mobility Command (AMC) integrates the airlift and tanker units that 

deploy and sustain our forces, enhancing the mobility we need to defend America‘s interests 

around the globe.‖ By 1992, General McPeak declared his Air Force was ―a more streamlined, 

agile organization. Most important, we have created a more operational, more combat-oriented 

Air Force.‖

60

One of the unforeseen consequences of the flat organization, according to our interviews 

was the ―erosion of the authority of the NCOs.‖ As one retired Airman explained, ―Lieutenants 

took over jobs previously held by Technical and Master Sergeants, taking the NCOs out of the 

management chain of command, experience they required.‖61

 Another stated, ―It also created a 

generation of Senior NCOs that were trained not to think, get their hands dirty or take 

responsibility.‖

62

To some at the time, General McPeak‘s efforts to streamline the Air Force seemed 

necessary. The Air Force budget was being slashed and the end strength declining from 607,000 

in 1987 to 371,000 in 1994.63

 General McPeak correctly identified that the organizational 

structure had outgrown the mission. The Air Force was top heavy and needed to cut 

organizations and dollars. He knew he had to change the culture as well. The SAC construct fit 

with the Cold War, but the inflexible, ―checklist-following‖ nature of SAC and thus, the Air 

Force, did not mesh with the dynamic conflicts in Iraq and the Balkans. The CSAF needed a 

thoughtful, nimble force able to execute expeditionary missions. According to one source, 

General McPeak was successful in his goal. 

[His] skillful management of these two Air Force cultures allowed him to make 

sweeping changes and begin altering the basic assumption of the Air Force—

strategic bombing. It opened the door to his vision  ̳...the world’s most respected 

air and space force-global power and reach for America.’ His vision requires a 

culture that is innovative, flexible, able to operate in dynamic environments, and 

responsive to operators in the field, all elements of the TAC culture.64

What General McPeak and Air Force senior leaders did not consider was the distinct 

nature or needs of the nuclear mission. While, the CSAF was correct that nuclear weapons are 

no longer central to the fight, deterrence—which includes, nuclear weapons — remained a core 

Air Force mission. As another former CSAF we interviewed stated, ―Nuclear is THE mission 

we can‘t screw up.‖ While General McPeak intentionally changed the culture—for what he 

 

60 ―Air Force Materiel Command Stand-Up,‖ Speech, Official Activation, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, 1 July 1992 

from Selected Works of the CSAF Merrill McPeak, 1990-94, p. 163. 

61 ―General Merrill McPeak destroyed the Air Force,‖ Military Times [poll], July 2010. 

62 Ibid. 

63 William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and Congress, ―The FY 1999 Defense Budget And Future 

Years Defense Program,‖ Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 1998, 

http://www.dod.gov/execsec/adr98/chap21.html 

64 Charles H. McGuirk (LTC), USAF, ―Two Air Force Subcultures Collide as General McPeak Sets a New Course 

for the Air Force, Strategic Research Project, U.S. Army War College, 15 April 1996, p. 19-21.
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thought was the better — he did not consider the long-term unintended consequences that would 

lead to failure of the nuclear mission. 

Goldwater-Nichols Overhauls Service Structure 

One of the greatest challenges for the armed services is operating in concert with one 

another. As the Vietnam War showed, inter-service rivalry affected operational effectiveness. 

This fact was also highlighted in the 1980 ill-fated attempt to rescue American hostages from 

Iran and the 1983 U.S. invasion of Grenada. The latter operation, and in particular anecdotal 

stories such as soldiers having to use calling cards to talk to other services because of 

incompatible radio systems, proved to be the last straw in allowing services to plan and operate 

independently. After retiring as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force General 

David Jones detailed the conflicts of interest and history of service rivalries that encouraged the 

practice of placing service priorities ahead of those of the nation.65

 

In 1986, Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act to address the issue of service 

interoperability. The legislation forced the services to take meaningful steps to improve joint 

operational capability. The successful results of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm 

provided evidence the Goldwater-Nichols Act had met its objectives. However, there were some 

unintended consequences. One significant effect was that the armed services had to move 

officers more quickly through a series of positions, including a joint service assignment, to meet 

the mandated requirement that officers complete at least one joint position before promotion to 

brigadier general. This forced the Air Force to identify high potential officers much earlier in 

their careers and to move these officers quickly through command assignments and in-residence 

Professional Military Education courses prior to their brigadier general board. Shorter command 

tours did not allow officers to become experts in their unit‘s mission. Some commanders even 

completed their tours without ever becoming combat qualified in their unit‘s aircraft. 

The Air Force continued to perform well as legacy officers and NCOs who had been 

trained and developed under the ―pre-1990‖ policies continued to serve, but as they retired 

problems began to surface.66 The time period 1986-2007 is approximately the length of an 

officer‘s career. According to at least one theory, this is also a reasonable time horizon for 

institutional-level executive decisions; the results of decisions made often have a 20 year 

incubation period before the consequences are fully evident.67 

According to several interviewees, the joint requirement played a direct role in the 

demise of the Air Force‘s nuclear mission. In 2008, the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot was 

commanded by Colonel Joel Westa, a rising star in the Air Force. Col. Westa was expected to be 

on the next brigadier general promotion list. However, he had yet to accomplish the joint 

training and education requirement specified in the Goldwater Nichols Act. Against his own 

 

65 David C. Jones, "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change," Armed Forces Journal International, March 1982, 

pp. 68, 72. 

66 T. Kluntz, Wanted: Nuclear Officers. Exceptional Release, (12). Arlington, VA: Maintenance Officer Association, 

October 12, 1984 and J. Trebon, Can Somebody Tell Me What Happened at Minot? The Munitions Insider. Issue 1, 

September. Alexandria, VA, 2009. 

67 E. Jacques, ―The Development of Intellectual Capability: A Discussion of Stratified Systems Theory,‖ Journal of 

Applied Behavioral Science, 22(4), 362-383. Arlington, VA: NTL Institute, 1986. 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

46

wishes, Col. Westa was sent to a 10-week joint officer training course at a crucial time - the wing 

was preparing for its Nuclear Surety Inspection recertification. 68 The wing failed the inspection 

and Col. Westa was relieved for ―failure to develop a culture of excellence.‖ While anecdotal 

evidence can lead to overstating facts, this suggests that the Air Force valued career objectives 

over the mission of the wing, at least in this particular case. This example is but one of many 

tales of the Air Force‘s nuclear cognitive-dissonance that interviewees relayed to the Study 

Team. 

In addition to addressing joint operations, Goldwater Nichols changed the services role in 

combat and non-combat operations. Under the new law the armed services became force 

providers to joint commanders. While this addressed the problem of inter-service rivalry, it 

changed the mission construct of the services. They moved from direct involvement in planning 

and executing the mission to focusing on the budgetary requirements to organize, train, and 

equip forces for combat. One workshop participant explained: 

Goldwater-Nichols finally happened... [the] services are force providers [with the 

primary task of] train, organize, and equip... It put the services, particularly the 

service planners, in an entirely different role. Now you are busy worrying about 

the bottom line and who is going to defend what on the hill, which begs the 

question, ―What are we trying to do here?‖ This is a cultural change that is very 

large...it has finally come to fruition... 

The changes from above, both from the legislative and executive bodies have had a profound 

effect on the way the Air Force does business. Many of the consequences have taken years to be 

realized; however, the service must now try to address the problems within a context that is 

largely beyond its control. 

 

68 At least two interviewees corroborated the fact that the AF denied Col. Westa‘s request to delay his 10-week joint 

officer training, until after the inspection. The reason, according to our sources, was that the previous Brigadier 

General promotion list was delayed due to several candidates not having their joint requirements fulfilled and AF 

leadership did not want that situation repeated. 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

Components: An Assessment

47

“I think that now we have seen, with the 

event between Minot and Barksdale, that 

we took our eye off the ball with the nuclear 

mission...I don’t think that any unit on the 

29th of August or the 30th of August [2008] 

would have said their nuclear mission was 

not job 1, but I think that the tempo of their 

conventional mission had an adverse 

consequence on their nuclear mission.”

- Maj. Gen. C. Donald Alston, 

Assistant Chief of Staff, Strategic 

Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (A10)

ROOT CAUSE 3: INSTITUTIONAL FOCUS

While the decline in nuclear competence occurred steadily, many red flags were raised, 

but ignored. Conscious decisions were made to alter training and education requirements to the 

point that most Airmen did not receive any nuclear-related training. Policies were ignored or 

revised to meet new challenges in the ever-flattening Air Force organization. 

Signs of Nuclear Enterprise Decline Were Ignored 

There were numerous signals for the Air Force that the nuclear mission was failing. 

Internal reports warned of diminished standards of nuclear weapons security.69 In 2001, the 

Advanced Systems and Concepts Office at DTRA released a study on DoD staff nuclear 

expertise. While it focused primarily on the ICBM community, the report pointed to several 

aspects of concern within Air Force programs, specifically the dilution of nuclear expertise due 

to career field mergers. It stated that the end users of the Air Force personnel (USSTRATCOM 

and others) were satisfied with the skills and knowledge of Air Force officers, but there was a 

great concern that the nuclear career field was a dead end career. Therefore the best and the 

brightest were moving to other fields in order to advance.70 In 2003, the Air Force's inspector 

general found that half of the nuclear surety 

inspections conducted that year resulted in 

failing grades – the worst performance since 

inspections of weapons-handling began. 

Minot's 5th Bomb Wing was among the units 

that failed, while the 2nd Bomb Wing at 

Barksdale garnered an unsatisfactory rating 

in 2005.71

Between 2001 and 2007 more than 

235 nuclear safety deficiencies were reported 

by ACC.72 Many of the deficiencies were 

routine issues with personnel or equipment; 

however, it is noteworthy that of the 237 

reported almost 100 were at Minot or 

Barksdale. At the very least, it was clear that the ―culture of compliance‖ was seriously impaired 

and that leadership was aware of the fact. In 2003, Air Force pass rates for nuclear inspections 

were at an all time low, but by 2006 and 2007 bases were receiving 100 percent ratings. Many 

have questioned why there was such an improvement. Did inspectors lessen the intensity or 

scope? Interviewees have denied that accusation. They explain the change instead as a function 

of personnel changes that not only had an impact on the 2006-07 ratings, but on those following 

 

69 Warrick and Pincus, op cit.

70 Thomas Neary, John Preisinger, Lisa Ludka, Joseph Sutter, Nuclear Deterrence Issues and Options Study: A 

Baseline Assessment of DOD Staff Experience: Final Report, DTRA Advanced Systems Concepts Office, December 

21, 2001. 

71 Ibid.

72 Michael Hoffman, ―237 Nuke Handling Deficiencies Cited since 2001,‖ Military Times, February 12, 2008 

accessed September 9, 2010. 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

48

the events at Minot. Commanders realized that often personnel were being moved shortly before 

inspections, leaving less experienced personnel to be tested after only days or weeks on the job. 

Subsequently, trained personnel were retained for the inspection periods, and only permitted to 

move after an inspection occurred. This raised the rate of inspection passage, but the inspection 

results did not necessarily represent the true capability of a unit across time.

The Defense Science Board reported that the major command (MAJCOM) inspector 

general (IG) nuclear surety inspection teams failed to identify the types of problems that caused 

the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons, but it did not address the expertise of the 

inspectors. One interviewee told us of his experience briefing inspection teams before they 

conducted an inspection. He noticed that he did not recognize a single person on the team. 

When asked, the IG staff stated that it was impossible to get access to qualified Air Force 

personnel; instead the IG had reached out to other agencies with ―nuclear experts‖ to fill gaps. 

Additionally, there is a DoD IG report on the oversight of nuclear weapons which states 

that OSD had ―abdicated‖ leadership of nuclear policy and that both the Air Force and Navy 

were failing in their respective missions on numerous fronts. According to our interviews, the 

Chief of Naval Operations made several changes to address the Navy‘s problems. OSD and the 

Air Force did nothing. In June 2003, the President released National Security Presidential 

Directive 28 titled ―United States Nuclear Weapons Command and Control, Safety, and 

Security,‖ which further raised the bar on nuclear security. The National Security Council 

followed the directive with an instructional memo. However, OSD did not respond. 

Interviewees told us that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld declared that if the President wanted 

him to change something, he would tell him to do so directly. 

President Bush was briefed on the Air Force and Navy nuclear inspection failures by 

DoD staff, but Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld did not address the issue. Anyone who worked in 

the Rumsfeld Pentagon lived in fear of the ―snowflake‖ missive sent down from above requiring 

an immediate response. Rumsfeld snowflakes required in-depth, thoughtful, time-consuming 

answers to difficult questions. However, not one Pentagon official we spoke with could 

remember addressing a single snowflake on a nuclear issue during Rumsfeld‘s six-year tenure as 

Secretary, although he was known to send as many as 60 a day.73

Air Force Cultures of Compliance and Self-Assessment Are Gone 

The Air Force allowed local changes to the once standardized practices that were 

consistent throughout SAC and other commands for nuclear-related activities. Officially, these 

were to be reviewed at command headquarters (ACC for the nuclear bomber units); but, 

according to study participants, in practice few requests for change were sent to higher 

headquarters or sister units, because neither the command staff nor the unit staff was held 

accountable for changes. Local deviations became normal and were even encouraged through 

the Air Force Smart Operations 21 (AFSO 21) initiatives designed to spur best practices. For 

example, the decision to intermingle nuclear and nonnuclear weapons in the weapons storage 

 

73 Robin Wright, ―From the Desk of Donald Rumsfeld . . .,‖ The Washington Post, November 1, 2007, accessed 

September 25, 2010. 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

Components: An Assessment

49

structure at Minot AFB was a local procedure adopted because storage space was limited. This 

policy was not challenged by the headquarters staff, although according to interviewees, senior 

leaders were aware the change had been made. 

Several interviewees told us that the Minot load crew failed to follow their checklist and 

perform the missile safe status check; however, others clarified that the loading checklist did not 

have a step requiring the load crew to check the missile safe status and that the step had been 

removed sometime during the past 10 years. There is no indication whether this change was 

shared with headquarters personnel. 

In answer to the question of how the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons could 

have happened, one interviewee explained that NCOs did not follow technical data and the 

organizational culture that allowed the mistakes was ―a very loosely managed operation‖ and had 

been for years. Another described his amazement that when he assumed command of a nuclear 

unit prior to the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons there were no checklists (e.g. 

storage structure door opening checklists, towing checklist, munitions control checklists, etc.). 

Procedures and processes were not written; or if they were written they were outdated or 

inadequate. Therefore, people had become accustomed to not using them. 

Yet another former commander at a nuclear wing detailed his efforts to change the 

noncompliance culture. He shared his frustration that even after he had worked at changing the 

culture for two years many of the NCOs ―did not get it.‖ One story was particularly telling; a 

maintenance team sergeant found a ―ding‖ in a nuclear weapon during a maintenance inspection 

and rightly began to prepare an unsatisfactory report. His supervisor told him there was no need 

to submit a report because it was clear that this was ―not a serious problem and you don‘t have to 

report every little thing.‖ The reason this anecdote resonated with our team was that the incident 

occurred at Minot in 2010, two years after the unauthorized weapons movement. Incidentally, 

the sergeant did not accept his supervisor‘s direction and went around him to the next person in 

command, who agreed that an unsatisfactory report should be submitted. 

These stories show the depth of the problem facing the Air Force in addressing its 

organizational culture. However, our interviewees cautioned that simply stating the Air Force 

should have a ―culture of compliance‖ will have little effect on personnel performance of daily 

requirements. All jobs are not equal; nuclear tasks require exact compliance. Though none of 

the participants suggested a return to SAC, they acknowledged SAC‘s discipline and culture of 

strict compliance and agreed that the concerted effort by the tactical operators to kill the SAC 

culture hurt the Air Force‘s ability to properly sustain the nuclear enterprise. 

Interviewees confirmed that the Air Force had little tolerance for bad news. Commanders 

did not encourage reporting failures; no matter how small or insignificant. Examples from our 

interviews included a case where self-reported missile crew sleeping was punished; in contrast to 

the intent of the self-reporting system that is geared toward identifying warning signs in time to 

devise a process, and procedure to prevent problems, such as crews not getting enough sleep 

before an alert shift. Another example was the punishment of crews who reported lost tools. The 

effect was the discouraging of reporting an incident. Interviewees stated they experienced many 

instances of commanders trying to demand compliance but without understanding of the intent of 

self-reporting programs, and the negative consequences of punishing an honest admission. 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

50

Another interviewee explained that a lack of compliance and self-reporting has led to a 

culture of complacency – people chose not to learn or execute the things they know are vital to 

the mission. Why? Because they do not comprehend the ramifications of failure of the nuclear 

mission; ―deterrence‖ has become only a theory and not a mission in the eyes of many Airmen. 

Nuclear Education and Training De-emphasized 

Both the CDI and Schlesinger Reports noted a dramatic change in Air Force nuclear 

education and training.74 The use of strategic bombers in conventional roles in conflicts in 

Kosovo and Iraq highlighted the ascendency of conventional forces and the declining relevance 

of the nuclear mission to the operational Air Force. This was reflected in changes not only to the 

platforms and their mission, but also in training requirements. Conventional missions utilizing, 

for example, precision guided munitions, required additional training and acumen. However, 

with funding restrictions and the need to prepare for a diversity of missions, the Air Force 

reduced training hours allocated to the nuclear missions in order to increase hours for pressing 

conventional missions. 

A few decades ago, many young captains and majors who were to become general 

officers were either attending or instructing at the USAF Weapons School at Nellis AFB, Nevada 

where nuclear operations and weaponeering were a significant part of the coursework. However, 

nuclear curriculum at the USAF Weapons School had been removed, a change that required 

four-star approval. Steven Covey‘s ―The Law of the Farm‖ says you reap what you sow: it is 

noteworthy that the instructor pilot who flew the ―Doom 99‖ mission from Minot to Barksdale 

did not receive any nuclear training during her USAF Weapons School training.75 If the Air 

Force is increasingly focused on preparing generalists with broad range of experiences, the price 

to be paid is a corresponding loss of experiential depth within a given field. There is significant 

anecdotal evidence of this detriment to the nuclear mission. Between 1999 and 2001, seventy to 

eighty percent of officers in the crew force at F.E. Warren were on their first ―nuclear‖

assignment; by 2007 that number had risen to 98 percent. In 2008, eighty percent of Minot 

security forces were in their first assignment. As requirements rose for overseas deployments, 

security forces were undermanned at nuclear posts. In at least one instance, a lieutenant general 

approved a memo declaring ICBM security forces need only be manned at the sixty percent 

level, given the strain of expeditionary requirements. 

Just as previous investigations found, the study team came to the conclusion that choices 

were made by senior Air Force and other national security officials that dramatically altered the 

state of the Air Force nuclear enterprise. At times the signs were clear that expertise and culture 

had declined to the point that the enterprise was in danger of catastrophic failure. But even 

among the most senior level officers we interviewed, none had openly raised the alarm to their 

superiors. Most officers said they ―just made do‖ with the circumstances. 

 

74 CDI, p. 44, Schlesinger, p. 44-45.

75 CDI, p. 44. Although the instructor pilot did not receive any nuclear training at the USAF Weapons School, she 

had received training periodically throughout her B-52 qualification and upgrade training. Nuclear training has been 

added back into the USAF Weapons School curriculum. 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

Components: An Assessment

51

ROOT CAUSE 4: FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP

The most prominent finding from this study was that of leadership failure. While this 

finding is in agreement with previous investigations, it must also be stated that this failure was 

not one of omission. Conscious, corporate-level decisions were made by senior leadership at 

national and Air Force levels to lessen the importance of nuclear weapons and focus resources on 

other priorities.76 Consensus from study interviews and workshop participants was that in 

today‘s Air Force everyone wants to be in charge, but few want to take responsibility or to be 

held accountable for the nuclear mission. Workshop participants clearly identified that one of 

the greatest problems for the Air Force is that that the requirements of leadership are not well 

defined. This study earlier defined leadership as the ―process of social influence in which one 

person can enlist the aid and support of others in the accomplishment of a common task.‖

Many Airmen thought that ―killing‖ the SAC culture was a step forward for the 

expeditionary Air Force. The nuclear career field, where one worked where one‘s weapon 

system was based, was thought to be unrewarding, while the rise of the fighter generals showed 

that deployability was more essential for a successful Air Force career. Mantras supporting these 

facts reverberated across the Air Force. Missileers were told, ―If you aren‘t in Space, you aren‘t 

in the race‖ and the entire force was repeatedly reminded by senior leaders, ―If you aren‘t 

deployed, you are not in my Air Force.‖ The changes in the Air Force nuclear mission were 

organizationally driven and culturally institutionalized. 

Nuclear Weapons Lose Their Advocates 

Between 1990 and 1994, Air Force personnel, doctrine, and procurement shifted to focus 

on conventional forces. Leadership was the logical next step. In a 1990 study at Air 

University‘s School of Advance Air and Space Studies that characterized 36 senior Air Force 

leadership positions, 53 percent had fighter experience, an increase of 29 percent from 1975 and 

a dramatic 382 percent from 1960. Meanwhile, only 18 percent of the senior staff and major 

command slots were filled by bomber generals, a decline of 58 percent from 1975 and 77 percent 

from 1960. Also remarkable was the rise in non-rated leadership which rose 127 percent from 

1975, and 108 percent from 1960.77

 This change in leadership not only altered the structure and 

organization of the Air Force, but also the culture. The fighter pilot world viewed U.S. 

conventional supremacy as making nuclear weapons all but obsolete. 

The 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review restricts the role of nuclear weapons by stating 

that the U.S. will not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state or one that is a signatory 

and in compliance with the 1973 Non-Proliferation Treaty.78

 Since nuclear weapons have not 

been used in conflict since 1945, their relevance has been called into question by some military 

leaders. As one observer noted: 

 

76 Schlesinger, p. i. 

77 Maj. James M. Ford, Air Force Culture and Conventional Strategic Air Power (thesis), School of Advanced Air 

and Space Studies, [Maxwell AFB, AL, Air University, 1993], p. 47-48.

78 Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, Washington, DC: The Pentagon, April 2010, 

www.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20nuclear%20posture%20review%20report.pdf 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

52

The predominant view in today‘s military, where the operational perspective of 

the  ̳warfighter‘ is dominant, is that nuclear weapons lack utility because they are 

not  ̳useable.‘ Nuclear weapons are not  ̳interesting‘ (particularly from a career 

perspective) because they are not needed (since the United States is the world‘s 

only conventional superpower) and will not ever be used (by a U.S. president).79 

Interviewees described Air Force leaders‘ views on nuclear weapons as ranging from 

―outright contempt‖ to simply having a complete ―lack of interest.‖ One CSAF is remembered 

for saying, ―if you are not deploying, you are not in my Air Force.‖ Another openly expressed 

his view that the U.S. should not have nuclear weapons in Europe. As one interviewee 

explained, ―if you are a missile wing commander and you are being told that your guard force are 

volunteering to go to Iraq and is seen as important; but oh by the way you have just made your 

contribution to the cause and you are not going to get a back fill for his position. It sends a 

message that whatever you are doing is not important.‖ 

We were told by one participant, ―The nuclear mission in the Air Force became the 

mission you did not want. Many are willing to give up nuclear and other areas because it is too 

much of a headache.‖ Another interviewee told us that at one point ACC was considering direct 

management of all nuclear weapons storage areas in the U.S.; all but one local commander chose 

to give up responsibility for weapons storage areas in order to avoid nuclear command, as the 

perception was nuclear errors are more dangerous to one‘s career. 

There are some leaders with little, no, or dated nuclear experience who hold key positions 

in the USAF nuclear enterprise, including supervisors and enlisted members as well as squadron, 

group and wing commanders. Only half of the 22 commanders and vice commanders (0-6 and 

above) at the pertinent operational, engineering and maintenance commands had a background in 

a missile-related field.80

 Only those interviewees working at AFGSC and A10 could discern a 

positive change. Those not in HAF or AFGSC felt this situation had actually worsened since 

2008. 

The DSB study on nuclear deterrence skills found that the lack of ―visible leadership‖ at 

senior levels, makes maintaining rigor and focus at all levels ―to meet demanding proficiency 

standards‖ all but impossible.81 Put simply, you cannot have the required level of nuclear 

competence without the commensurate level of leadership and management of the enterprise. 

The Air Force has expended a great deal of effort to recover the management of its nuclear 

mission. However, what remains to be accomplished is a leader-established vision and the 

expertise growth to sustain a healthy nuclear enterprise. 

Inaction Can Be As Harmful As Action 

The inaction of senior Air Force leaders immediately following the unauthorized 

movement of nuclear weapons was seen by some as a clear sign of leadership failure. No one 

was relieved of command until after the CDI was completed. Investigators had to request that 

the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot be de-certified while they conducted the review. While these 

 

79 Clark Murdock, op cit.

80 Adm. Donald Report, op cit, p. 47. 

81 DSB, Nuclear Deterrence Skills, Sept. 2008, p. vii. 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

Components: An Assessment

53

inactions can be explained as wanting to get the full story before acting, it sent a signal to some 

Airmen that the nuclear mission was not fully understood or valued as highly as it once had been. 

As one interviewee stated, the ―strategic inflection‖ was unmistakable. The harm this indecision 

caused to the nuclear culture of the Air Force is incalculable. It did not go unnoticed. Many in 

nuclear career fields saw it as the final indication that the nuclear mission was no longer valued. 

Approximately 70 U.S. Air Force personnel were disciplined, fired, and/or retired as a 

result of this single event. Many of those lost their certification in the Personnel Reliability 

Program. However, not a single general officer lost his job over the unauthorized movement of 

nuclear weapons, a fact that many in and outside of the Air Force questioned. Several of the 

retired general officers we interviewed for this project felt that the reason was simply favoritism 

of certain individuals and a lack of will by Air Force leaders to ―upset‖ the retired four star 

generals who exert significant influence over Air Force decisions long after they are out of 

service. 

As the details of the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons and mistaken shipment 

of classified forward sections were unveiled, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said he had lost 

confidence in the leadership of the Air Force and asked Secretary of the Air Force Michael 

Wynne and Chief of Staff General Moseley to resign. During the press conference Gates said: 

[I]ndividuals in command and leadership positions not only fell short in terms of 

specific actions, they failed to recognize systemic problems, to address those 

problems, or – where beyond their authority to act – to call the attention of 

superiors to those problems. 

One strong criticism of the Air Force from interviewees was that current leadership focus 

is to ―not make history‖ by repeating mistakes and highlighting errors rather than addressing the 

inherent problems that led to both of the nuclear-related events. The response from those 

currently in command is that they are trying to fix the problems at hand. The Air Force 

Roadmap guiding current initiatives focuses almost exclusively on governance of the amorphous 

―nuclear enterprise.‖ Thus, many of the core issues related to personnel, expertise, deployment 

pressures, and training were not addressed by the investigations and few effective 

recommendations have been provided. The leadership does not seem to know how to address the 

lack of expertise and dearth of qualified personnel. Instead, the focus is on inspections and 

requiring those in place to give their very best effort, adhering to the new DoD motto of ―Do 

more without more.‖82

 

82 A phrase coined by Dr. Ashton Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. 

Carter first used this term in June 2010 and made it his theme for ―obtaining efficiency and productivity in defense.‖ 

See Carter‘s Memorandum to acquisition professionals from September 14, 2010 his speech at the Cowen 

Investment Conference, February 9, 2011, as well as the recent Center for a New American Security keynote 

address, Feb 22, 2011, http://www.cnas.rsvp1.com/node/5871?mgh=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnas.org&mgf=1. 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

54

ROOT CAUSE 5: FAILURE TO FOCUS EXPERTISE 

In the SAC era, experience and expertise were developed through years of technical 

training and practical and documented on-the-job training under experienced supervision. 

Commissioned officers and NCOs were instructed not to memorize anything; ―we want you to 

use the book,‖ learn how to find the right regulation, manual, or technical order, and then always 

―use the book.‖ As one interviewee described, ―A young officer had no ambition to become the 

squadron commander but he knew more about that B-52 than Orville did and he was the role 

model at the tactical level. He didn‘t pretend to be a great strategist, he didn‘t even want to be 

great strategist, but he knew what that [B-52] could do and he encouraged young guys who were 

coming up  ̳hey you can really learn how to do this stuff and let me show you.‘‖ 

However, the General McPeak flat organization method changed the strict guidance to a 

platitude: ―Tell them what to do but not how to do it and they will surprise you with their 

innovation.‖ In the nuclear weapons mission this loosely controlled culture was not well 

received. Given all the changes, officers and NCOs in nuclear units began to flounder due to 

lack of guidance, experience and training. Like new recruits, they no longer knew how to find 

the right regulation, manual or technical order. Their lack of knowledge and proficiency in their 

jobs hampered their own performance and in teaching those under their supervision. 

Career broadening has been identified as a primary cause of the dilution of expertise in 

munitions and missile maintenance, officer nuclear maintenance, and logistics—the lack of 

which accounted for five of the six major mistakes made during the unauthorized movement of 

nuclear weapons. The initial decision to merger the career fields was not supported by many Air 

Force leaders. Major General Lew Curtis, San Antonio Air Logistics Center wrote a letter to 

Brigadier General Philip Metzler, Air Force Headquarters Director of Maintenance and Supply, 

on April 21, 1987 arguing that merging the career fields would produce only superficially 

qualified officers. He called the merger ―dangerous.‖ 

Interviewees suggested there had been a marked change in how senior officers are 

leading their operations. Too many senior leaders appear to have little background, knowledge 

or preparation for the organizations they manage and lead, as reported in the investigations. The 

requirement for joint assignments in order to make flag officer rank, while broadening senior 

leaders‘ experience, further decreases their expertise. The perception exists that senior officers 

stay too busy to make informed decisions. This issue seemed related to the manpower, continual 

deployments and mission growth that perhaps drive senior leaders to depend on short bursts of 

condensed and highly filtered information, leading them to make poor decisions. 

Nuclear Weapons are a “Sunset Business”

There were numerous unintended consequences of the Air Forces organizational changes, 

many of which were not visible to Air Force leadership until more than a decade later. One of 

the most significant was that it structurally changed how officer technical expertise was 

developed in both operations and logistics maintenance. Through reductions in the force, several 

officer career fields were merged as requirements for ―generalists‖ rather than ―specialists‖

increased. 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

Components: An Assessment

55

The transition from SAC to ACC moved quickly; smart officers and NCOs were looking 

for ways to excel and they noticed which missions were rewarded and thus acted in their best 

career interests. The message to those in the nuclear field also was clear, as SAC personnel 

transitioned to the ―TAC-like‖ ACC, senior leaders began encouraging career broadening. 

Especially in the munitions maintenance field, the message was constant and seemed accurate, 

―get to the flightline if you want to get promoted...don‘t get stuck behind the fence (in a 

weapons storage area) or in munitions.‖ Critics characterized the Air Force reorganizations as 

making the entire Air Force a big fighter squadron. In flying units, it was common for 

commanders to be brought in to ―get their command ticket punched‖ for promotion 

requirements, but not stay long enough to get qualified in the squadron‘s assigned aircraft.83

 

This significantly reduced the commander‘s operational credibility with their pilots. In support 

officer career fields, some senior leaders encouraged officers to broaden into other Air Force 

Specialty Codes (AFSC) as they championed the ―generalist‖ officer model.84 General McPeak 

was quoted as saying there were only two officer AFSCs, ―fighter pilots and shoe-clerks,‖ and 

one of the reorganizations based on that philosophy was to realign the aircraft maintenance 

function under operations squadrons. This organizational structure discouraged ―growing‖ or 

developing deeply expert maintenance officers.85

 Instead of a 20-yearmaintenance expert, 

maintenance officers began working directly for pilots who had little interest or expertise in 

maintenance. 

The message to nuclear-capable Airmen was both subtle and direct. There were 

numerous instances following the September 11th attacks when troops at nuclear bases were told 

directly by Air Force and Joint Commanders that they were in a sunset business that would not 

provide career enhancement and most importantly, that they were not contributing to the fight 

that mattered. There also were more subtle messages. Given the day-to-day requirements of 

executing the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, many interviewees told us that the nuclear 

mission was ―placed on auto-pilot‖ by the Air Force. Personnel that deployed from nuclear units 

to the desert were often not backfilled while those who were left behind were encouraged to step 

up to the task as best they could. Many saw this manpower attrition as intentional to further 

reduce the significance of the nuclear mission. 

Given the clear signals from leadership, many highly skilled NCOs and officers left the 

nuclear field. The elite of the USAF must have joint positions on their resume. Therefore, every 

effort is made to fill joint billets, often to the detriment of the nuclear career fields. Nuclear 

billets, including those in the Air Force Inspector General or the DTRA inspections team were at 

the bottom of the list and were certainly not career-enhancing. 

Study participants cited the overall Air Force culture as a source of disruption in not only 

the nuclear mission but in many other Air Force mission areas. Careerism was a widely held 

concern. Participants expressed the belief that Airmen are being taught to focus on what is best 

 

83 C. Evans, Growing Tomorrow’s Leaders in Today’s Environment. [Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, Air 

University, 1998]. 

84 M. Zettler, Air Force Logisticians: Generalist or Specialist? Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF), 

Washington, DC: National Defense University. 

85 C. Webb, Why a Ph.D. in Maintenance? Maxwell Air Force Base, Al: Air War College, 2002.
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

56

for their personal career rather than what is best for the mission, the Air Force, or the nation as a 

whole. 

Loss of Intellectual Capital 

Reorganizations and budget cuts have reduced the number of personnel. As a result, there 

are fewer officers and enlisted personnel, and the smaller force is far less experienced in the 

organization as a whole, bringing the greater concepts of ―nuclear expertise‖ and collective 

competency into question. Therefore commanders and supervisors are reluctant to de-certify 

incompetent officers or enlisted because there will be no one to replace them. 

The manpower cuts that occurred across the Air Force have had a dramatic impact on 

many career fields, especially those smaller pools that generally required higher levels of 

expertise. The Air Force has recognized its decrease in qualified personnel, but as of yet has no 

solution to the problem. For now, personnel are being asked to accomplish jobs for which they 

often lack the requisite experience. Junior nuclear crew members are covering more of the tasks, 

which increases the risk of incidents. They are attempting to offset these deficiencies by 

constant inspections to review performance. This process of ―buying down‖ the risk, leaders 

admit, does not set the airman up for success because they are not being provided with any 

method to ―accelerate their experience‖ through additional education, training, mentoring or 

developmental assignments. Perhaps the main skill being learned is in how to pass an 

inspection. 

As one interviewee explained, ―people from the highest ranks down were  ̳making the 

system work‘ instead of demanding that it be fixed. Sometimes we try hard to be good team 

members and things happen.‖ The Air Force has added ―2300 new positions to the nuclear 

enterprise;‖ mostly at HAF, AFGSC and the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center (AFNWC), all 

of which oversee the nuclear mission. Few positions were added to nuclear operations, even 

though severe personnel shortages were identified by the Schlesinger panel in 2008. According 

to the Phase I report, ―B-52 and Minuteman ICBM forces are suffering from severe shortages of 

experienced personnel in key nuclear mission areas.‖ The report continued, 

 Nuclear squadrons and wings are significantly undermanned, especially in numbers of 

qualified maintenance personnel and missile wings‘ security forces. 

 Maintenance manpower shortages at B-52 wings: 

o One wing commander said he was short 300 maintenance personnel; another was 

short 100.

o One wing commander cannot generate all its aircraft due to maintenance crew 

shortages. 

o One wing only has 66 percent of its assigned crew chiefs; the wing is 130 

personnel below its authorized manning level.86

 

86 Schlesinger Report Phase 1, op cit., p. C-1.
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

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The merging of AFSCs and merging of major commands significantly reduced the Air 

Force overall nuclear force capability. Two participants noted that by merging AFSCs, the 

knowledge base has been diluted, with one function always dominating the other. However, 

another suggested that it was not the merging of AFSCs but rather assigning those merged 

AFSCs as interchangeable parts that resulted in officers being placed in positions/jobs for which 

they have little or no background, experience, or expertise. At the same time, it is clear that the 

merging of commands created unintended consequences, such as the dilution of ICBM expertise 

as missileers spent more time in space assignments. From either perspective, participants 

acknowledged that the significant reduction in specialization and moving toward generalist 

officers and NCOs is a major challenge to the Air Force‘s nuclear enterprise, which requires 

great specialization in order to achieve mission success. 

Many will argue that the merger between space and missile career fields has been as 

detrimental to space as it has to missileers. The 2000 Congressionally mandated Space 

Commission reported that USAF senior leadership was unqualified to command vital space 

missions due to a lack of depth of expertise.87

 Specifically, the Space Commission found that 

―the Air Force treats space as a supporting capability that enhances the primary mission of the 

Air Force, which is to conduct offensive and defensive air operations.‖88 The report also stated 

that the ―current career path does a poor job of developing technical or operational depth within 

any of the four space mission areas.89 Conversely, an officer trained mostly in space operations 

has a lot to learn in a short time if given a missile command or other missile assignment. 

While it is an accepted fact that cumulative Air Force nuclear knowledge and experience 

pool has been drained, nuclear career fields are not being protected from personnel cuts through 

reductions in force or selective early retirement boards. Commanders are recognizing that they 

do not have the experienced personnel to fill all essential billets, but they are powerless to 

change that fact. In the past, major commands had more control over the upward mobility and 

promotion of officers. However, now the Air Force Personnel Center, acting with limited 

MAJCOM input, has the power to place individuals into billets. Requirements are often 

deployment-driven and thus, filling an empty billet ―in the desert‖ trumps filling requirements at 

home, even if they support the nuclear mission. Many nuclear experts remain in the contractor 

world, but those with the greatest knowledge are likely to be out of the workforce in the next 5-

10 years and their knowledge will be lost. Those that come behind them do not have the same 

depth in nuclear matters. 

The Air Force personnel assignment system is perceived to be based on fairness and 

equity for individual career needs rather than on assigning the most qualified officer to support 

mission requirements. Interviewees stated that one of the main reasons there was a significant 

decline in nuclear expertise was that officers were intentionally assigned to other duties to 

 

87 Rumsfeld, Donald H. Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and 

Organization, in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (P.L. 106-65), the 

commission submitted the report of the Commission to Assess United States Security Space Management and 

Organization. December 2000. 

88 Lt Col J. Kevin McLaughlin, ―Military Space Culture,‖ Space Commission Background Papers, Appendix to the 

Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization, op cit, 

December 2000. 

89 Ibid.
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

58

develop breadth instead of depth of technical expertise. One of the long-term results of this 

assignment concept is that after several assignments, officers said they found themselves 

working for a commander who was not knowledgeable in the unit‘s mission area. The officers 

themselves might be in a career broadening assignment and not particularly knowledgeable with 

their subordinates in the same situation. This was the case at Minot in August 2007, where the 

munitions squadron commander had not been on a nuclear weapons base since he was a 

lieutenant and the group commander rotated all the company grade officers from job to job 

throughout the maintenance complex to broaden their experience. The result is there were no 

experienced officers in the weapons storage area.90

According to one of the senior leaders we interviewed, the Air Force has ―adjusted the 

personnel system for the convenience of the personnel system.‖ He added that some career 

fields were merged to avoid the ―additional management challenge‖ of managing several smaller 

career fields. Another retired general officer had assisted in the creation of a Human Capital 

Management plan to address many of the nuclear personnel issues, but it languished at HAF for 

more than a year. There is a ―lack of understanding of our own capabilities and expertise 

because the system is not set up to make sure the right people are in the right position.‖ 

Every Airman a Leader? 

One of the personnel challenges is that every new recruit is told that he, too, one day can 

become the Air Force Chief of Staff. This is a bit of an exaggeration but there is an expectation, 

both by the individual and the organization that every Airman should strive to reach the highest 

position of which he is capable. This phenomenon is not new or original to the Air Force. 

Admiral Rickover chided the Navy over his perception of careerism in 1961. Admiral Rickover 

cynically declared, ―We should at once knock off this infernal rotation of military people. The 

character of warfare has changed. It is becoming more and more scientific. The Navy seems to 

exist for officer career planning, to make certain that every naval officer has exactly the same 

chance to become the Chief of Naval Operations."91

 His point was that especially in the nuclear 

realm, experience is a requirement for technical proficiency. It is a point that may not be well 

understood or embraced in the Air Force today. 

Air Force education and training requirements support the idea that all Airmen should 

strive to be leaders. The problem is that conceptually it diminishes the value of (or even 

punishes those who are) remaining in a single location or career and developing a depth of 

expertise. This is particularly true when promotion boards seem to reward a breadth of 

experience, rather than recognize that nuclear career fields have limited locations for personnel 

to develop their expertise and restricted opportunity to deploy overseas. 

Interviewees told us that the personnel system is structured and operates in the same 

manner it did when the Air Force was comprised of over 600,000 personnel. It is not agile 

enough to manage today‘s requirements. Air Force Personnel refuses to treat any career 

specialization as a ―boutique‖ that requires different execution from rest of the force. In 

 

90

 Both the CDI and Admiral Donald investigations noted the absence of experience in the Weapons Storage Area. 

91 Rickover testimony before the House subcommittee on defense appropriations, June 1961 as quoted in Time, 30 

June 1961. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,895416,00.html#ixzz1FVo5Aj7O 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

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addition, personnel tend to change positions every two years, which research proves, is not 

enough time to solidify expertise. 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

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RECOMMENDATIONS 

As one retired general officer interviewed stated, ―It‘s not a complicated story; the issue 

is how to restore the culture of accountability for everything that has to happen for your mission 

to succeed.‖ If this is true, the Air Force must be committed to valuing and sustaining its nuclear 

enterprise as long as nuclear weapons are part of the U.S. arsenal. In his report, Admiral Donald 

suggested the Air Force, ―Re-examine the Chief of Staff Recommendation Matrix that resulted 

from the August 2007 Minot/Barksdale nuclear weapons transfer incident to gain a more 

thorough understanding of the underlying systemic issues, and revise the actions accordingly.‖

92

 

The study team agrees. We believe the foremost issue is declining technical competence 

(expertise) in the Air Force ranks. That expertise, along with leadership, management, and 

cultural factors, are central to the Air Force‘s ability to execute its nuclear mission. Thus, we 

offer recommendations in the four areas of expertise, management, leadership, and culture. 

There are no simple solutions to these complex problems. Instead, the Air Force will need to 

think through the problems to determine the best avenues to mitigate them. The first step is to 

acknowledge that the issues remain real and urgent. 

Expertise 

Put the Nuclear Mission Back into the Hands of the ―Experts‖

According to our interviewees, one of the results of downsizing the force is that nuclear 

experts currently are not in the most mission-essential billets. Instead, the best and the brightest 

are placed in jobs that are ―great for their career but terrible decisions for the Air Force.‖ Most 

significantly, they are unable to influence the culture of their specialty, leaving it to founder. 

One of the biggest problems noted by interviewees was the practice of allowing people to 

volunteer for jobs. They stated that it ―sounds good‖ but should not be the basis for assignments. 

Instead, interviewees stressed the importance of ―deliberate‖ assignments in order to guarantee 

that the right officer with the required expertise is assigned to critical nuclear weapons posts. 

Rotations must be determined by the mission and those who can fulfill it, rather than the current 

focus on what is best for an officer‘s individual career. One senior participant acknowledged that 

due to force reductions, leadership has been placed in a position where they must compromise on 

getting the right officers in place, but all participants agreed that the Air Force needs to 

determine which missions are the priority and not compromise on those. 

This is not easy. Headquarters Air Force Manpower, Personnel and Services (A1) must 

keep in mind that their job is to fulfill the Air Force mission and not to keep people happy, as has 

been perceived in the past. This is especially true for the demanding requirements of the nuclear 

mission. As one interviewee stated, ―what you owe [Airmen] is that you are faithful to them; 

giving them the opportunity to gain mission-essential knowledge they can pass to their 

subordinates. If you are faithful to that, the perception by the troops is that your institution is 

credible.‖ 

 

92 Adm. Donald, op cit., p. 54. 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

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In the past, commanders handpicked their staff and MAJCOMS had more control over 

the upward mobility of officers. This model needs to be recreated. Specifically, Airmen must 

have faith in a system that values (that is, promotes) competent experts. The Air Force must 

determine how to foster nuclear expertise by managing single individuals and small numbers of 

people. Who are the best and the brightest in a given specialty? In which jobs are they needed? 

How do you foster the growth and development of more like them? Unless the Air Force moves 

to institutionally value and perhaps  ̳set aside‘ the skills and knowledge required for success in 

the nuclear enterprise, senior leaders must recognize that the nuclear mission may fail again, 

perhaps much more catastrophically. 

We were told by study participants that AFGSC and A10 have been frustrated with the 

lack of change in A1‘s assignment processes. The ―right‖ people must make the personnel 

decisions in order to grow expertise in the field, who will then grow to become competent 

leaders. One example told to us is the three ICBM wing commanders, the Hill AFB depot 

commander, and AFGSC leadership periodically meet to review personnel decisions and to try to 

steer the ―right people in the right slot.‖ It was not clear yet how much influence they have, but 

it is a move in the right direction. 

Reestablish Operational Competence

The Air Force needs to think about how to grow specific competencies for its future 

officers; leadership cannot be the only metric. One interviewee put it succinctly, ―In all Air 

Force careers except for pilots, the professional requirements for competency, skills, and 

attention to detail are sacrificed in favor of leadership. Yet the Air Force seems to understand 

and accept that to be a pilot, leadership skills are secondary to technical skill.‖ It is this 

statement that codifies the fundamental issue. Expertise (technical competence), management, 

and leadership are not the same things. The nuclear enterprise requires all three and even 

profound leadership skills cannot serve as a substitute for an absence of the other two. Expertise, 

acquired initially through knowledge but matured through experience, is the most essential tool 

leading to effective management of a complex organization. 

During the SAC era there was a concerted effort to grow nuclear weapons knowledge 

through experience. Educational advancement through fellowships at U.S. nuclear laboratories 

and degrees from educational institutions such as Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the 

University of California, Berkeley, was encouraged. Through this effort, Airmen were able to 

gain hands-on experience with the weapon and the design process. It is this type of knowledge 

that is required today of Air Force leaders. 

That is not to say that every wing commander need be a nuclear physicist. Rather, it is 

recommended that the Air Force provide and encourage an educational and experiential path that 

leads to technical competence for Airmen who will then become better nuclear commanders in 

the years ahead. The ability to place those with high levels of knowledge and experience in each 

of the relevant wings will increase the overall knowledge level, and thus capability, of the units. 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

62

As earlier stated, during a 2001 survey military, ―end users‖ of the Air Force nuclear staff 

were satisfied with the force‘s skills and knowledge level.93 The end users, as well as the 

nuclear-focused Directorate of Nuclear and Counterproliferation (XON, now A5XP) were able to 

guide essential nuclear personnel to the billets where their knowledge and expertise was 

required. Additionally, early in the decade the office had encouraged the growth of nuclear 

expertise through fellowships and providing the proper experience.94 However, as the 

deployment requirements for war increased, those decisions were no longer under the control of 

those that understood what the requirements were. 

Headquarters Air Force Manpower, Personnel and Services has the responsibility to 

fulfill deployment requirements, and those took precedence over all other needs. Even 

fellowship slots were allotted based on the views of A1, not of end users, which meant the best 

and the brightest went to the Iraq or Afghanistan wars where their nuclear skills were not 

utilized, a move that further diluted the expertise pool. Several end users interviewed were 

concerned over the lack of nuclear contenders for the billets they currently had empty, or would 

have open over the next 16 months, and they have no power to address the shortage. 

Nuclear career fields continue to face personnel cuts, with little or no reference to the 

requirements to fulfill the mission. At best, end users are trying to assure those in the nuclear 

career fields are not disadvantaged during force reductions, as they have been in the past. Still, 

A1 has yet to adopt the perspective of the end users. The view, according to interviewees, is that 

―one offs‖ threaten the system that supports the 332,000-man force. However, to succeed, the 

nuclear mission needs to be seen as not just ―viable,‖ but ―special.‖

Incentivize Change and Ensure Retention 

Many interviewees suggested that Airmen need added rewards for doing the necessary 

nuclear jobs at home, just as those in battle abroad are rewarded, in order to sustain their morale 

and retention. While it is unlikely the Air Force will reinstate special monetary incentives to 

draw personnel into nuclear positions, AFGSC has reinstituted competition for promotion to 

leadership positions, which it believes is necessary to promote excellence. In addition, it has 

programs to support nuclear officer education both in and outside of the Air Force, including 

educational fellowships at the National Defense University and the Los Alamos and Oak Ridge 

National Laboratories, among others. 

Just as leadership should not be the only metric for career advancement, neither can 

conventional deployments be a measurement for nuclear readiness. In fact the two are 

diametrically opposed. However, promotions, and selection for leadership positions seem to 

reward those who deploy. Equivalent ―deployment‖ credit should be given to the Airmen who 

maintain the nuclear deterrent. This will allow nuclear units to maintain a level of competence 

 

93 Thomas Neary, op cit. 

94 According to BGen. Robert L. Smolen, the Nuclear Technology Fellowship Program, a 21-month Air Force 

program at Sandia National Laboratory, gave younger officers a ―fairly significant amount of nuclear experience 

working with some of the gray beards ... the fathers of the nuclear business in the U.S. ... those who have done 

underground testing.‖ Geoff S. Fein, ―U.S. Needs to Preserve Nuclear Expertise,‖ National Defense Magazine, 

August 2003. 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

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that sustains their contribution to national security while ensuring equal opportunities for 

advancement across the Air Force. 

Leadership 

General LeMay understood leadership. He knew that a good leader required technical 

competence in his craft. Without competence, a leader could not have the respect of his 

subordinates nor would he be able to extract superior results from those under his command. In 

Table 1 below there are three variations of the traits expected of a leader. There has been a 

change in leadership traits. Technical competence has decreased in importance over the years. 

Principles for General 

LeMay’s Leadership

Success95

Air Force Pamphlet 35-

49, 1985, p. 5

Air Force Leadership 

Development Model, 2004

 Thoroughly mastering his 

craft

 Leading by example 

 Providing accountability 

 Identifying and 

producing subordinate 

leaders

 Communicating with his 

people

 Encouraging teamwork

 Responsibility.

Former Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 

General Maxwell D. 

Taylor stated, ―One 

expects a military leader to 

demonstrate in his daily 

performance a thorough 

knowledge of his own job

and further an ability to 

train his subordinates in 

their duties and thereafter 

to supervise and evaluate 

their work.‖

Leadership competencies 

are:

Personal – Exercise sound 

judgment, adapt & 

perform under pressure, 

Inspire trust, lead 

courageously, assess self &

foster effective 

communication 

Leading people/teams –

drive performance through 

shared vision, values & 

accountability, influence 

through win-win 

solutions, mentor & coach 

for growth & success, 

promote collaboration & 

teamwork, partner to 

maximize results.

Table 1. Comparison of Air Force Leadership Traits 

The 2006 version of AFDD 1-1 adds that leadership qualities can be innate; however, 

they are built upon a solid foundation of ―experience, education, and training‖ and improved 

with ―deliberate development.‖96

 The Air Force has placed a premium on leadership qualities. 

However, what this study shows is leaders require technical competence gained through 

experience in order to have credibility to lead an organization. 

 

95 Tillman, p. 187-88, 191. 

96 Op cit., p. vi. 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

64

Reinstitute Core Principles: Communication and Responsibility 

Many current senior Air Force leaders interviewed were cynical about the nuclear 

mission, its future, and its true (versus publicly stated) priority to the Air Force. As long as the 

Air Force has a nuclear mission, the service needs to focus on developing and inspiring its 

leaders to advocate for the mission‘s fulfillment. Study participants made it clear that 

commanders must listen to those around them, even if they are being told things they do not want 

to hear. One interviewee pointed out that communication between squadron and group 

commanders is minimal because the former does not want to give bad news and the latter does 

not want to receive it. These filters continue to the highest ranks of the Air Force, which receive 

false or distorted information about the reality on the ground. The misinformation allows small 

problems to fester into larger issues. Bad news, as the saying goes, seldom ages well. 

Former CSAF General Fogleman explained the importance of communication to 

leadership skills, ―Good leaders are people who have a passion to succeed...To become 

successful leaders, we must first learn that no matter how good the technology or how shiny the 

equipment, people-to-people relations get things done.‖ In the case of nuclear weapons it may 

be the ―dull sheen‖ of communication skills that requires additional emphasis. 

Nuclear leadership requires continuous responsibility and accountability – factors that 

had been lacking in the Air Force nuclear enterprise up to the time of the unauthorized 

movement of nuclear weapons and mistaken shipment of classified forward sections. In the 

Navy, a 4-star admiral with 8-year tenure, who reports directly to the Chief of Naval Operations, 

oversees the nuclear mission. The mission is his responsibility and he is held accountable for its 

success. The Air Force should consider implementing similar tour lengths for senior leaders in 

the nuclear enterprise, rather than moving individuals every year or two. 

Motivate Managers to Be Leaders

Three of the investigations found that the Minot munitions maintenance squadron 

commander and the maintenance operations officer were disengaged from the squadron‘s 

nuclear weapons management. Such lack of involvement could have resulted from the officers 

viewing their roles as ―leadership‖ exclusive of the requirement to actively manage nuclear 

weapons maintenance. Air Force commanders must to be taught the principles of leadership and 

management; then held accountable for both. Officers must be capable of inspiring their 

subordinates, stimulating a team environment and earning trust through personal accountability. 

They also must be capable managers which require an in-depth understanding of the task and a 

level of expertise that is not currently widely available. It would help if time in nuclear jobs was 

extended by a year or more beyond traditional Air Force rotations. This would allow for less 

time spent in the ―on-the-job-training‖ and transition modes and the nuclear enterprise would 

likely be better as a result. 

The events of the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons and mistaken shipment of 

classified forward sections are management failures, wherein the Air Force failed to properly 

manage the nuclear mission. However, it was also a failure of leadership at all levels. At the 

most senior levels, the U.S. government has failed to communicate the importance of nuclear 

stewardship and its importance to national security, even while we were fighting conventional 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

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wars and preventing terrorism. DoD failed to maintain its own expertise and did not adequately 

foster a culture of expertise and compliance within the Air Force. In turn, the Air Force failed to 

inform Airmen why the nuclear deterrence mission was still important, not simply for those 

directly involved in the nuclear enterprise, but more importantly, in the conventional and dualtasked forces. 

In several of the studies, ours included, we were reminded of the chain of command and 

how it affects the mission. The clearest explanation for this concept is an anecdote that in 

various forms was repeated to us many times during interviews. When General Larry D. Welch 

led the Defense Science Board investigation, the group visited several Navy and Air Force 

installations. While on a nuclear capable submarine, General Welch asked a sailor if the 

President was aware of what he did. The sailor responded, ―No Sir!‖ General Welch followed 

up by asking, ―If the President does not know what you do, how do you know what you do is 

important?‖ In reply the sailor said, ―Because my skipper does, sir.‖ The same is true in every 

wing, squadron and base across the Air Force. Enlisted and junior officers care about what 

concerns their immediate supervisors. They know their jobs are reliant on what their 

commanders think. This study found that most dual-tasked Air Force officers do not understand 

or do not place value in the nuclear mission. This must change. 

Require Responsibility at the Highest Levels

One of the most contentious decisions in structuring the nuclear enterprise was deciding 

the appropriate grade of the AFGSC commander. As recently as July 2010 the Chief of Staff 

named the nuclear mission as his top priority. However, when it came to organizational 

structure, the Air Force chose to stand up the new command with a three-star commander. With 

the exception of the unity of command question, this was the most contentious decision among 

those we interviewed. The decision was viewed by many as proof that the Air Force is not 

serious about the nuclear mission, and that the service will, at some point, fold the nuclear 

mission back under another command. 

Those currently in senior leadership positions state that the SECAF and CSAF are 

focused on the nuclear mission and engaged in its progress, as are the commanders of AFGSC 

and USSTRATCOM. All the interviewees currently holding senior leadership positions spoke of 

the high level of personal interaction and respect among the leadership team. However, the 

question remains: What will happen two CSAFs from now when all of the current personnel are 

out of the Air Force? Is it possible to create such institutional focus that will sustain the high 

level of commitment? With the current move by Defense Secretary Gates to reduce the number 

of general officers, it is unlikely the Air Force will acquire another 4-star billet. In fact it is far 

more likely there will be fewer four stars. For the Air Force nuclear enterprise, this is likely to 

be an advantage if the other MAJCOMs are downgraded to three stars. However, regardless of 

the numbers, the Air Force must change the way it does business. Four-star generals are in a 

club all their own, making decisions as a group on promotions, requirements and even force 

structure. This club needs to open its members to three stars, specifically major command 

commanders to truly make decisions that affect the Air Force today and long into the future. 

Most importantly for AFGSC is the challenge of any new organization. Its charter must 

be recognized and accepted by the rest of the Air Force community. Simply stated, not only the 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

66

CSAF and SECAF, but also the conventional Air Force must accept and support AFGSC and its 

vital nuclear mission.

When we asked workshop participants their views on Air Force leadership development 

one participant answered, ―We have created a generation of officers who did not learn how to be 

leaders.‖ The question remains, have recent mission changes outstripped the Air Force‘s 

attention to Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, & Personnel in the 

development of its leaders? This study did not definitively answer this question, but it is one that 

the USAF leadership needs to consider. 

Management

While the newly established Nuclear Oversight Board, led by the SECAF and CSAF, was 

founded on a quarterly schedule, the fact it has met 18 times in 12 months highlights two things. 

The first is that the executive leadership of the Air Force is very interested in how the mission is 

being executed and will continue their close scrutiny of the process. However, it also sends the 

message that the senior leaders do not yet trust their subordinates to accomplish the tasks at 

hand. As AFGSC and A10 move into their third year, Air Force leaders will need to move 

stewardship into the hands of subordinates with their full understanding of responsibility, 

accountability and authority. One of the most significant problems with this concept is that it 

remains unclear who ―owns‖ which issues. While A10 was formed to shepherd the nuclear 

mission, it does not have clear authority over some of the most significant aspects of the 

problem, namely personnel and manpower issues. Until there are clear lines of authority, Air 

Force senior leaders will continue to attend regular meetings in the Pentagon without a means to 

resolve the primary issues facing the nuclear enterprise: how to ―fix‖ the lack of expertise. 

Enable Nuclear Staff to Learn From Past and Focus on the Future

Numerous participants stated that most officers currently in nuclear essential billets have 

not yet read the investigation reports due to a variety of reasons. The reasons may include that 

the Admiral Donald report has very limited access and all the reports have classified sections. It 

is understandable that the Air Force does not want to rehash its mistakes publicly, but in order to 

effectively manage commanders need to truly understand what happened in the past and how 

current policies and procedures are trying to address the failures. How can commanders learn 

and not continue to repeat mistakes? Currently they are being asked to learn from the past by 

intuition, not study and the warning is: ―don‘t make history.‖ This needs to change. 

Airmen must be required to follow checklists and procedures rigorously without 

deviation until changes are approved by the respective headquarters. However, senior officers 

must still be open to innovative suggestions and change procedures that can be improved. 

Subordinates should not be discouraged from offering innovative ideas for change. Airmen at 

Minot were trying to improve their ability to execute the mission under difficult circumstances. 

While this led to failure, other innovations such as the scheduling system that had been instituted 

at Barksdale AFB were successful. Neither Minot nor Barksdale shared their experiences. 

AFGSC should initiate a process to allow innovative ideas to be shared with others, vetted by 

experienced commanders and approved by the chain of command. New ideas should be carefully 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

Components: An Assessment

67

processed and not instituted until vetted. Finally, AFGSC should ensure that the best ideas are 

operationalized, no small task for a substantial bureaucracy. 

Since we have delineated between management and leadership, we must also realize that 

both concepts must be supported and fostered. Field grade commanders need to be encouraged 

and trained to recognize problems, and then taught to manage them through their team‘s personal 

skills and experience. One possibility that was raised was that of outside help. 

The AFNWC currently has a team that supports units that are struggling either due to 

manpower or experience shortages. Nuclear units need broader options for asking for and 

getting assistance without being punished. Outside teams can take advantage of contractor, 

retired or other government expertise in a teaching environment. A fresh set of eyes assessing 

without judgment can do wonders for team building and learning. However, such an approach 

needs to be seen as not as putting yourself or your team on report, but as being a proactive leader 

and asking for help before a problem exists. 

Reinstitute Unity of Command 

One of the biggest disagreements with the choices Air Force leaders made was the 

division of command between AFGSC and AFNWC under the Air Force Materiel Command 

(AFMC). Air Force Doctrine Document 1 states that: 

Unity of command ensures concentration of effort for every objective under one 

responsible commander. This principle emphasizes that all efforts should be 

directed and coordinated toward a common objective. Air and space power‘s 

operational-level perspective calls for unity of command to gain the most effective 

and efficient application. Coordination may be achieved by cooperation; it is, 

however, best achieved by vesting a single commander with the authority to direct 

all force employment in pursuit of a common objective.97

Study participants viewed the split as a violation of the age old ―principle of unity of 

command‖ represented by placing the command and control of nuclear forces under AFGSC and 

the maintenance, storage, sustainment and custody of the nuclear weapons under the commander 

of AFMC. The concept of unity of command is a hallmark U. S. military principle of war. We 

were told by interviewees involved in the process that a group of approximately 10 general 

officers with the relevant leadership roles met to discuss how the nuclear enterprise would be 

organized. All, according to our interviewees, agreed that command and control of nuclear 

weapons should not be split between two commands. However, when CSAF General Schwartz 

briefed the new structure to the Corona meeting in the fall of 2008, many were surprised to 

discover that their decision had been reversed by the CSAF.98

Why then, was this founding Air Force principle of unity of command rejected? When 

AFMC was established by General McPeak in 2002, its goal was to ―provide seamless life-cycle 

management for our equipment.‖ The idea was to have that cradle to grave sustainment, the 

 

97 www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/afdc/afdd1-chap3.pdf 

98 This statement was corroborated by three of the meeting‘s participants. 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

68

result, however, in this case is to take control out of local commander‘s hands. According to 

interviewees the Air Force made the decision to allow AFMC to have this role as it seemed to 

follow the Navy Strategic Systems Programs model by leaving the maintenance and sustainment 

of the weapons in the acquisition chain to provide end–to-end stewardship of the weapon. 

However, the Air Force model does not take into account the lack of command and control by 

the commander on whose base the nuclear weapons storage areas lay. He will be held 

accountable, yet, officially what happens inside the facility is not his responsibility. 

Only one interviewee for this study defended the decision to separate the responsibilities. 

In that discussion we learned that although AFMC does not allow AFNWC to communicate 

directly with AFGSC, it has taken ownership of the weapon and therefore is more adept at 

meeting milestones that are the organization‘s own requirements. That said, most of our 

participants said they expect the Air Force nuclear enterprise to fail again and thought it would 

most likely be related to the ―broken chain of responsibility‖ for nuclear weapons between 

AFMC and AFGSC. 

Many of the investigations cited that an ―end-to-end nuclear sustainment enterprise does 

not exist‖ within the Air Force. Given the current split of unity of command, many argue that 

this division still exists. Virtually everyone we interviewed strongly suggested that the Air Force 

reexamine the decision, which prevents direct communication between the maintainers/sustainers 

(AFNWC) and the end users (AFGSC). While no one wants to interrupt a process that seems to 

be working, the question still stands: In the end, who will be accountable?‖ 

The Air Force needs to determine whether the existing unity of command split is 

maintainable. Is there a point in the near future where transition from AFNWC to AFGSC is 

feasible? One interviewee suggested that the AFNWC director be dual-hatted as the Vice 

Commander of AFGSC with a dotted line to AFMC. One interviewee stated, ―...at least we 

know where the seam is and we watch it closely.‖ Whatever the answer, innovative solutions 

need to be considered. 

Make Change Work

Over the last two decades people from the highest ranks down were "making the system 

work" despite its flaws, instead of demanding that it be fixed. Sometimes individuals tried too 

hard to be good team members rather than speaking out for change. That said, holding officers 

―accountable‖ for mistakes will not alone solve the enterprise problems. Structural problems 

need to be corrected. 

AFGSC has rewritten 195 Air Force documents on nuclear procedures and processes in 

one year. The changes were meant to update the documents for relevance. However, AFGSC 

will now stand up an AFSO 21 office to look at all aspects of the nuclear enterprise, including 

efficiencies within the updated regulations. The Air Force should proceed with caution. Part of 

the reason for the devolution of the nuclear mission was the alteration of guidance. While some 

instructions and regulations were seemingly randomly changed for brevity, others that were in 

need of review were not altered for years. Now that AFGSC has had the opportunity to examine 

the regulations, it should move forward with highly experienced veterans to understand 

requirements and avoid another unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons. 
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The Air Force must determine: ―How do we measure success?‖ Success can be measured 

by the inspection results, a lack of incidents, the number of ―green‖ items on a PowerPoint slide, 

or even by the number of boxes checked in a database. Progress against the roadmap can be 

audited, but what cannot be seen are the root causes identified in this study, some of which are 

beyond the control of the Air Force. Nonetheless, the Air Force needs to place the highest 

priority on the personnel and expertise issues and attempt to mitigate those factors beyond its

purview. 

Culture 

Few of the Airmen interviewed, who experienced the transition to SAC‘s successor 

organizations, agreed with the handling of the nuclear forces by the generation of fighter pilots 

who ascended to lead the USAF and decimated the SAC‘s ―culture of perfection.‖ SAC was far 

from perfect. Indeed, there are many documented mishaps during its almost 50 year history, 

particularly in early years; however, SAC provided the organizational basis for a culture of 

responsibility and accountability. It is this culture the Air Force would like to rebuild, but 

without the monolithic structure. Instead, the Air Force believes that it can re-create the ―good‖

aspects of the organization while leaving behind those that don‘t fit today‘s threat environment. 

The question is, however, can a SAC-like culture of accountability be re-generated, nurtured and 

maintained in today‘s conventional deployment-focused Air Force? 

AFGSC stood up in thirteen months with a workforce of 800. The speed at which tasks 

were accomplished required a significant amount of attention. However, standing up large 

organizations quickly focuses attention on funding and billets. In the view of interviewees, these 

changes have all happened at the strategic level when the investigations and the Air Force agreed 

that the primary problems were at the squadron level and lower. Standing up the additional 

headquarters staff, according to interviewees, has actually damaged operational units by taking 

the most qualified officers and Senior NCOs away from the units. Since the command is new, 

there are no mentors, no predecessors, no grey beards from which to learn. Through AFGSC‘s 

stated values - individual responsibility, adherence to procedures, pride in your work, respect and 

safety – the organization is trying to reestablish responsibility and accountability. What is 

unclear in this nascent organization is what culture will be established over time and whether 

AFGSC will be capable of spreading that culture beyond the headquarters at Barksdale AFB. 

The early years of SAC provide yet another example of an Air Force case relevant to 

today‘s challenges. In its heyday under General Curtis LeMay, SAC was the best operation in 

the Air Force. However, this was not how SAC began; initially SAC was ill-prepared for war 

under its first commander, General George C. Kenney, as Major General Mike Worden describes 

in Rise of the Fighter Generals. In 1946-47 SAC was ―purged‖ of non-flying officers and 

aircrews were forced ―to absorb those non-flying duties, as well as to cross-train into other crew 

duties, often before they were adequately trained in their primary duty.‖99 Following the end of 

World War II, the newly minted organization was downsizing, much as the Air Force did at the 

end of the Cold War. 

 

99 Col Mike Worden, USAF, Rise of the Fighter Generals, [Air University Press: Maxwell AFB, AL, 1998] pg. 56. 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

70

The goal then was to do more with less and increase efficiencies. Support staff and 

organizations were consolidated at the headquarters further increasing demands on crews. After 

learning that only two of SAC‘s 11 groups were combat ready in 1947, the CSAF asked Charles 

Lindbergh to investigate. Lindbergh reported that standards for professionalism were low, that 

there was ―low morale, low proficiency, personnel disruptions, and command training policies 

that  ̳seriously interfered with training in the primary mission of the atomic squadrons.‖100

If the names and dates were removed one might think that Lindbergh‘s report could have 

followed the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons and mistaken shipment of classified 

forward sections. The same problems are cited, and to some extent the same solutions have been 

proffered. Even under the command of General Curtis LeMay, SAC had serious mishaps and 

organizational problems. However, the underlying difference between then and the post-SAC 

era was the role that Air Force culture played. Pride and loyalty were encouraged, as were being 

accountable and responsible. No one questioned the importance or even relevance of the 

mission. The question is, can the Air Force rebuild the culture of accountability and excellence in 

today‘s environment? 

Reestablish the Culture of Excellence

The Air Force must analyze the culture that is being developed and shaped by the current 

environment and determine what must be changed through the organizational development 

process. There may need to be changes above those required in AFGSC. Respect for the nuclear 

mission, a stated value of AFGSC, must be developed across the board in the Air Force, and not 

just today. Those in the nuclear field are hearing leaders verbally support the nuclear mission; 

however, outside the direct line of command there is still significant grousing about ―much ado 

about nothing.‖ This lack of understanding of nuclear deterrence, a core Air Force mission, is at 

the heart of the problem. The Air Force needs to educate personnel at all levels in order to 

influence the attitudes and actions of personnel. Additionally, the Air Force must make the most 

of the opportunity to influence how nuclear weapons are viewed at the national levels. For years, 

fighter pilots pushed the F-22 through virtually every discussion Air Force leaders had with 

Congress or DoD personnel. They should adopt the same stance with nuclear weapons. 

Congressional delegations like to travel to interesting places – including missile and bomber 

wing bases. These trips provide the Air Force the opportunity to show members of Congress and 

their staffs not only how the weapons operate, but also explain their role in national security. 

In any organization–particularly in the military—the ―why‖ is important. Understanding 

the ―what‖ is easy, but the ―why‖ can be a greater challenge. At SAC, as one participant 

explained, ―the sign outside the main gate said,  ̳Peace is our profession‘ and every kid on that 

base from kindergarten up to the wing commander understood what that meant.‖ Today in the 

era of ever declining budgets and pressing conventional requirements, Air Force leaders need to 

understand and explain ―why‖ the nuclear mission remains core to the Air Force. Several 

interviewees admitted that few Air Force leaders can articulate strategic deterrence policy of the 

U.S. The Air Force needs to reclaim the issue and elevate deterrence back to a core mission in 

the eyes of the force. 

 

100 Ibid, pg. 56. 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

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Explain Why the Mission is Vital

In order to accomplish this recommendation, information has to flow downward. Over 

the last two years Air Force senior leadership has maintained a level of direct participation and 

interest not previously demonstrated since the late 1980‘s. As one interviewee stated, they are 

focused on the ―ministry of presence‖ which goes a long way in proving they believe in what the 

CSAF calls the Air Force‘s ―number one priority.‖

101

Both the SECAF and CSAF have made a concerted effort to show a level of continued 

interest not seen since the end of SAC and foster the concept of an engaged leadership. At the 

2010 change of command for the 20th Air Force at F.E. Warren AFB, the CSAF and the 

commanders of USSTRATCOM and AFGSC were all in attendance. It is this level of continued 

support that will help shape the culture surrounding the nuclear mission. What has not changed 

is the vision and understanding of the value of the nuclear mission by the conventional Air 

Force. 

One general officer we interviewed said, ―We still need to educate our people on this 

mission and its criticality to the nation – we are STILL not there yet.‖ Several interviewees 

questioned whether the Air Force is currently creating the notion that the nuclear mission is vital, 

or simply a required task that must be accomplished correctly to avoid the embarrassment and 

penalties of a similar incident. They explained the Air Force should focus on leadership and in 

detailing the value of the mission, not simply ―Nuclear 101.‖ Anyone can become a better leader 

with proper instruction and practice. However, effective management and command requires 

skills, knowledge and experience. Both enlisted and officer need to be taught how to make sure 

mission areas are not neglected just because they are not central to today‘s fight or they won‘t be 

inspected next week. 

There are numerous examples of drastic cultural changes that have succeeded. Within 

the military, the Navy‘s decision to deploy women on ships and now submarines is worth 

exploration. It has not been an easy transition for many, but it has happened successfully. It is 

an interesting question why the Navy never suffered from the nuclear cultural struggles that 

plagued the Air Force. As discussed earlier, some argue that nuclear propulsion guaranteed that 

the Navy would have a nuclear component for the foreseeable future, regardless of the status of 

weapons. However, according to interviewees, the Navy as a whole never looked down upon the 

nuclear mission or those within their ranks that executed it. 

Inform Up; Educate Down

Defense Secretary Gates has made a concerted effort to visit the nuclear forces and 

reaffirm their vital role in U.S. national security. However, the legislative branch and the Obama 

Administration are virtually silent on the issue, as was the Bush Administration. During a twoyear follow up hearing on the USAF nuclear enterprise at the House Armed Services Strategic 

Forces Subcommittee, few substantive questions were asked of the Air Force. Several bases had 

recently failed their surety inspections, but not a single question was raised about the issue. 

 

101 Gen. Norton A. Schwartz, Chief of Staff, USAF, ―Chief of Staff‘s Vector: The Way Ahead,‖ July 4, 2010. 

http://www.af.mil/information/viewpoints/csaf.asp?id=603 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

72

The President has been focused on ridding the world of nuclear weapons, while stating 

that as long as the United States possesses weapons we want them to remain safe, secure and 

effective. The phrase ―effective weapons‖ denotes not only a warhead that is capable, but also 

corresponding delivery systems and a military force that is capable of execution, as described in 

the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. This concept needs to be institutionalized and supported with 

policy and resources. Clarity of mission is a requirement and would go a long way in buttressing 

the Air Force‘s efforts to re-establish a culture capable of executing the mission. 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

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CONCLUSION 

The study team was tasked with identifying how the Air Force can ―re-establish an 

environment that will revive Air Force nuclear operations standards and culture in the mid-term 

to long-term, beyond what has been or is being done...‖ To a great degree the study found that 

Air Force senior leadership understands the problems it faces. The Air Force has gone to great 

lengths to address the management and oversight of nuclear weapons, but the efforts in 

leadership and expertise have been underwhelming. Additionally, the problems have not been 

prioritized, yet efforts are underway to fix the problems writ large. It is essential that Air Force 

leadership understands that expertise continues to decline and that if this key area is left 

unaddressed all of the other substantive efforts will be undone. Addressing the expertise issue 

requires senior leadership to take significant action that includes spreading the vision and a 

willingness to drive the discussion up to OSD and Capitol Hill and down to the youngest enlisted 

Airmen. 

According to General LeMay a successful organization requires three characteristics: 

 People need to believe in their work; a product of inspirational leadership and self 

motivation. 

 People need to see visible progress toward the organization‘s stated goal, no matter how 

incremental the improvement. 

 People need recognition and appreciation for their contributions toward the goal.102

It is these three concepts which the future of the Air Force nuclear enterprise must aspire 

to attain. Personnel in the nuclear enterprise should not be simply ―told‖ that their work is 

valued, as billets go unfilled, resources continue to wane, and their supervisors continue to focus 

on deployments in conventional wars. This study found that resoundingly, Air Force nuclear 

personnel believed in their work, but they need inspiration to focus their efforts and improve 

their capabilities. They need advanced training, deliberate placement, leadership, and competent 

management. 

According to the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS), one of our top national security 

priorities is ―reducing our nuclear arsenal and reliance on nuclear weapons, while ensuring the 

reliability and effectiveness of our deterrent.‖ At the same time, the NSS tasks the military to 

―maintain its conventional superiority and, as long as nuclear weapons exist, our nuclear 

deterrent capability, while continuing to enhance its capacity to defeat asymmetric threats, 

preserve access to the global commons, and strengthen partners.‖ That seems like a tall order for 

a military that does not appear to believe in the necessity of the nuclear deterrent or hold it in 

esteem. 

 

102 Tillman, p. 102, quoting Maj. TJ Crowley, Curtis E. LeMay: The Enduring Big Bomber Man, [U.S. Marine Corp 

Command and Staff College, Quantico, VA: 1986]. 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

74

The nuclear mission requires a culture of compliance and dedicated focus by the Air 

Force, even as nuclear weapons numbers continue to be reduced. The two things are not in 

opposition. One interviewee described the atmosphere in the Reagan years as schizophrenic. 

While some high-level Administration officials had moral issues about the dramatic build up of 

weapons, they were able to deal with those issues at the personal level while maintaining their 

full professional commitment to implementation of Reagan‘s nuclear strategy. In looking to the 

future, the Air Force must adopt the same approach. While it is clear that the U.S. Government 

is drawing down its nuclear capabilities, we must be able to execute the mission. In order to have 

that capability, leadership must reinforce the understanding that regardless of the number, 

working with nuclear weapons is a tremendous responsibility, and requires special leadership, 

management, and accountability at the personal, unit, and national level. 

Since 2008, the Air Force has conducted numerous investigations, established new 

organizations, and re-structured nuclear forces. However, without a root cause analysis of the 

systemic problems, much of what the Air Force has accomplished has been movement without 

direction or focus. The questions surrounding expertise - how to recognize it, to grow it, 

maintain it, and value it - have not been addressed. Without answers to these fundamental 

questions, the Air Force nuclear enterprise remains on the same trajectory as it has been for the 

last two decades –in ever-increasing decline—which places the capability of the Air Force to 

sustain its nuclear capability at risk. 

 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

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Worden, Col. Mike. Rise of the Fighter Generals. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 

1998. 

―World at Risk,‖ The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and 

Terrorism, [Washington, DC, 2008]. 

www.documents.scribd.com/docs/15bq1nrl9aerfu0yu9qd.pdf 

Wright, Robin. ―From the Desk of Donald Rumsfeld . . .‖ The Washington Post, November 1, 

2007. Accessed September 25, 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/10/31/AR2007103103095.html 
The Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons and Mistaken Shipment of Classified Missile 

Components: An Assessment

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Webb, C., Why a Ph.D. in Maintenance? Maxwell Air Force Base, Al: Air War College, 2002. 

Zettler, M. Air Force Logisticians: Generalist or Specialist? Industrial College of the Armed 

Forces (ICAF), Washington, DC: National Defense University. 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

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APPENDIX B 

INTERVIEW STATISTICS 

Overall Interview Statistics

Air Force 72

Navy 4

DoD 22

DoE 6

Congress 11

Department of State 3

Exec Level (SES or 

Above) 12

Total 107*

Air Force Interview Statistics

SecAF 1

CSAF 4

General officer 28

Colonel 29

Field grade officer 5

Enlisted 10

Total 72

*The numbers add up to more than 107 individuals because some participants counted in more 

than one category (e.g. retired Navy officer who is a congressional staffer) 
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APPENDIX C 

INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING FROM THE NUCLEAR INCIDENTS 

1. Air Combat Command, Commander Directed Report of Investigation, September 2007 

The Commander of Air Combat conducted an investigation on August 31, 2007, 

immediately following the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons, in order to precisely 

determine how events transpired and to identify personnel who should be held legally 

accountable. The CDI report was completed by September 2007. The investigation found the 

following: 

The weapons were stored in a weapons storage area at Minot Air Force Base under the 

management of the 5th Munitions Maintenance Squadron, commanded by a lieutenant colonel. 

The squadron had a total of five authorized munitions and missile maintenance officers, four of 

whom were in management positions subordinate to the squadron commander. The operations 

officer was a major; the remaining officers were lieutenants and a captain. The senior captain 

served as the weapons maintenance flight commander. Subordinate to the maintenance 

operations officer, one of the lieutenants was serving as the Munitions Accountable Systems 

Officer. The flight commanders (lieutenants) were each responsible for 20 to 30 enlisted 

maintenance personnel. The weapons maintenance flight commander was responsible for 

managing the weapons storage area and oversaw the maintenance, storage, and handling of the 

nuclear cruise missiles. 

The unwritten nuclear weapons storage policy of the 5th Munitions Maintenance 

Squadron allowed co-mingling of nuclear and nonnuclear missiles in the same storage structure. 

A trailer loaded with six nuclear warhead cruise missiles was stored side by side with an 

identical trailer loaded with six inert warhead cruise missiles. A fairing covered the warheads, so 

the only way to differentiate a missile with an inert warhead from a missile with a nuclear 

warhead was to climb up on the trailer and visually inspect each missile through an observation 

window the size of a U.S. quarter for a unique marking. 

The storage management system used to differentiate nuclear from nonnuclear missiles 

consisted simply of a piece of paper identifying the trailer as ―prepared for logistics tactical 

ferry.‖ The 8.5x11 inch placard was affixed to the trailer by tape, which subsequently fell off, 

removing any visible difference between the missiles with inert warheads and those with nuclear 

warheads. The tow team of weapons handlers was required to verify each missile-safe status by 

looking through the quarter-size observation window in the missiles‘ fairings, but the team 

members did not complete this verification, because the procedure was thought to be ―too time 

consuming.‖

Most weapons storage area handling, storage, and flightline delivery tasks are performed 

by 2W0 conventional munitions technicians. The 2W2 weapons maintenance technicans are 

trained to perform weapons maintenance that requires extensive nuclear weapons knowledge. 

The 2W2 job was considered a higher status position than the conventional munitions job. The 
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2W2s assigned to the breakout trailers from storage structures to perform tow team duties, 

transferring the trailers of missiles out to the flightline, might have considered this to be an 

unimportant and time-consuming task compared to performing actual nuclear weapons 

maintenance operations. 

In addition, the investigation found that the training and exercise program at Minot had 

been changed. Those involved considered exercises as merely ―going through the motions.‖

Often significant players were ―exempted‖ from participation to avoid overtaxing essential 

personnel. This training modification varied from the regimen at Barksdale and had been 

approved by ACC. 

In summary, the CDI report found that a series of mistakes occurred. First, due to a 

poorly coordinated scheduling change, munitions control gave the weapon handlers/tow crew an 

incorrect trailer number, and the trailer had not been prepared for ―logistics tactical ferry.‖ 

Second, the weapons handlers/tow crew selected the wrong missiles from storage because 

of scheduling, storage and mislabeling errors. They also did not check the missile-safe status 

through the visual access window as written directives required. 

Third, the aircraft crew chief signed for the two trailers of missiles without checking their 

serial numbers or the missile-safe status. There was no written guidance for the custody transfer 

of missiles without nuclear warheads, and that is what the crew chief expected, inert warheads. 

Fourth, the weapons load team loaded the pylons/missiles onto the B-52 aircraft without 

checking the serial numbers or missile safe status verification because their checklist did not 

require such a check. This was a staff officer policy-procedure writing mistake, as this 

verification had previously been required in the loading checklist. This missile safe status check 

requirement had been removed at some point, for reasons unknown. 

Finally, the radar navigator failed to check each missile's status as required by the 

checklist. 

What the CDI does not conclude is that with the exception of the radar navigator‘s failure 

to perform the required missile-safe status verifications, all of the mistakes made during the 

unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons were the management responsibility of a single 

officer AFSC, the 21M munitions and missile maintenance officer. However, this officer career 

field was not examined during any of the investigations as a potential root cause. A quote from 

the CDI report was particularly revealing: ―The catalyst for the failures began in the scheduling 

process. It further broke down because the supervisors, predominantly the non-commissioned 

officers and the senior non-commissioned officers, did not do their jobs.‖ 

In the same report, CDI investigators described the officers as dependent on the noncommissioned officers for information on work performed by the squadron. For example, ―The 

squadron commander, operations officer, and the superintendent were not given the correct 

information.‖ This statement implies that, since the enlisted personnel did not provide the 

correct mission-related information to the officers, the officers could not take the initiative to 

obtain the required mission-related information or to provide mission oversight, which is a 

management responsibility. 
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2. Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Air Force Blue Ribbon Review Of Nuclear Weapons 

Policies and Procedures, February 2008 

On 9 October 2007, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) appointed Major General 

Polly Peyer to chair an Air Force Blue Ribbon Review (BRR) of nuclear weapons policies and 

procedures. The CSAF tasked the review to take an enterprise-wide look at United States Air 

Force nuclear responsibilities. Specifically, the CSAF highlighted a need to examine: 

organizational structure; command authorities and responsibilities; personnel and assignment 

policies; and education and training associated with the operation, maintenance, storage, 

handling, transportation, and security of Air Force nuclear weapons systems. 

The report contained 36 observations which lead to 5 general conclusions: 

 Nuclear surety in the USAF is sound, but needs strengthening 

 USAF focus on the nuclear mission has diminished since 1991 

 The nuclear enterprise in the USAF works despite being fragmented 

 Declining USAF nuclear experience has led to waning expertise 

 USAF nuclear surety inspection programs need standardization 

Of significance, the BRR team observed that ―solid nuclear expertise exists with the 21M 

officers who are in missile maintenance positions. But 21M munitions officers serving in aircraft 

units do not, as a whole, have the same degree of nuclear expertise as those in missile 

maintenance units.‖ 

 However, that does not mean that officers from one unit or another have more or less 

expertise – simply different. Nuclear expertise relevant to the unauthorized movement of nuclear 

weapons included managing munitions control, plans and scheduling, maintenance, storage, 

handling, transportation, and weapons loading. Unless officers at an ICBM wing are assigned to 

manage the weapons storage area, they do not develop expertise in nuclear weapons storage, 

handling, maintenance, plans, and scheduling (in which critical mistakes were made at Minot in 

2007), transportation/towing, and weapons loading. 

The investigation report, finalized in only 30 days, concluded that while risks exist, ―the 

USAF has a sound nuclear surety program.‖ Additionally, the Blue Ribbon Review team stated 

that it was ―confident that it has highlighted the relevant areas for improvement. The way ahead 

must reaffirm the Air Force long-standing commitment to the nuclear enterprise and prove an 

unequivocal dedication to supporting both deterrence and response.‖

3. The Defense Science Task Board Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety, 

Report on the Unauthorized Movement of Nuclear Weapons, April 2008 

The Secretary of Defense was not confident that the Air Force could critically examine 

itself, and he commissioned General Larry Welch, retired Air Force Chief of Staff, to lead a team 
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of senior officials to re-examine and investigate the circumstances surrounding the unauthorized 

movement of nuclear weapons. General Welch led the Defense Science Board team that 

produced a report focusing on the organizational and institutional shortcomings. 

The Defense Science Board investigation identified two primary causes of the 

unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons. First, Air Force senior leaders had not sufficiently 

focused on the nuclear mission, and second, the Air Force had not effectively addressed the 

overall decline in officer and enlisted nuclear weapons expertise. This decline in nuclear 

weapons expertise was attributed to the prevailing assumption that nuclear weapons duty was a 

low-priority mission that lacked promotion potential. 

The Defense Science Board task force identified deficient weapons-loading checklists 

and a lack of clear technical guidance to prohibit storing nuclear weapons in the same storage 

structure as training, inert, and test systems, but failed to examine the headquarters staff 

members‘ role or expertise in these problems. There is no consideration of the fact that before 

the 1991 career field merger, munitions officers had to have previously managed munitions 

functions successfully and be technically competent in developing Air Force-level policies on 

technical nuclear weapons storage procedures, loading checklists, and technical orders before 

they could get a ―selectively manned unit‖ assignment as an Air Staff officer. The decline in 

munitions officer nuclear expertise in managing critical nuclear weapons logistics and 

maintenance functions also degraded the headquarters staff members‘ ability to produce effective 

policy and procedures. 

The Defense Science Board also reported that the major command inspector general (IG) 

nuclear surety inspection teams failed to identify the types of problems that caused the 

unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons, but it did not mention the expertise of the 

inspectors. One interviewee told us of his experience briefing inspection teams before they 

conducted an inspection. He noticed that he did not recognize a single person on the team. 

When asked the IG staff stated that it was impossible to get access to qualified Air Force 

personnel; instead the IG had reached out to other agencies with ―nuclear experts‖ to fill gaps. 

4. Secretary of Defense Task Force on DoD Nuclear Weapons Management, Phase I: The 

Air Force’s Nuclear Mission, September 2008 and Phase II: Review of the DoD Nuclear 

Mission, December 2008 

In addition to the Defense Science Board investigation, Secretary Gates asked Dr. James 

Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and Energy to lead a review of both Air Force and 

Department of Defense nuclear efforts. In examining the Air Force actions, Dr. Schlesinger 

reported that ―Air Force leaders failed in their leadership responsibilities to shift priorities and 

adjust policies and resources in ways needed to maintain robust nuclear stewardship, resulting in 

the inattention that led to the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons and mistaken shipment 

of sensitive missile components.‖ The task force report specifically mentioned the ICBM 

operations officer and space officer career field mergers but failed to examine the 

munitions/maintenance career field which had significant responsibility in the unauthorized 

movement of nuclear weapons. The list of task force membership yields a possible explanation: 

there was no experienced munitions officer on the task force, and thus no one may have even 

been aware of the 1991 officer career field merger and its impact. 
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The unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons sparked an international incident 

because the United States‘ nuclear deterrent that had been the foundation of security for U.S. 

allies since the end of World War II, suddenly seemed in question. The Secretary of the Air 

Force and the Air Force Chief of Staff were forced to talk publicly of the mistakes, airing the 

dirty laundry of the Air Force and emphasize corrective actions taken. However, before the 

investigations had been completed, it was revealed that Taiwan had received sensitive 

components used on the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile rather than the 

helicopter batteries it had ordered from the U.S., bringing to light a second nuclear-related 

incident. 

The Task Force determined that that the Air Force needed to update Air Force deterrence 

doctrine and restore pride in the nuclear mission. To date, A10 and Air Education and Training 

Command (AETC) have reviewed all nuclear-related doctrine; however, changing doctrine will 

not change how Air Force personnel or their leaders view the mission. 

The task force reaffirmed that it would take a concerted and sustained commitment by the 

Air Force leadership at all levels to restore the culture and ethos of nuclear excellence. 

Interviewers found the Air Force reticent about the events, but more importantly dismissive of 

the nuclear mission altogether. Air Force officers saw the nuclear requirements as a waste of 

their time; taking time and resources away from their true mission to support the wars in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. Repeatedly, interviewers for this study and the Schlesinger panel were told that the 

unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons and mistaken shipment of classified forward 

sections were insignificant and overblown and that there were no real national security 

ramifications, with the exception of the resulting reallocation of resources. 

5. Admiral Kirtland Donald, Investigation into Shipment of, Sensitive Missile Components 

to Taiwan, May 2008 

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates appointed Admiral Kirkland Donald, Director of Navy 

Nuclear Power and Nuclear Reactors, a four-star admiral position with eight-year tenure to lead 

the investigation. Donald‘s tenured position precluded any perception of promotion or political 

pressure that might affect an incumbent‘s willingness to manage critical nuclear functions on 

technical merit alone. The Air Force offers no such position. As a result, the nuclear mission has 

to compete for resources with special operations and other missions during a post-Cold War 

time, when the nuclear mission is seen as much less relevant to current defense requirements. 

Admiral Donald used a Navy team of nuclear experts to investigate. The Navy staff of 

officers and civilians averaged over 20 years of nuclear experience, working in essentially the 

same organization and with the same coworkers. They had deep expertise, continuity, and strong 

credibility. 

Donald observed that the Air Force had a complex command and control network with 

many overlapping and dispersed responsibilities. Although Admiral Donald examined ICBM 

sustainment organizations (to include the Defense Logistics Agency) and logistics actions, he 

commented on the similarities between the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons and 

mistaken shipment of classified forward sections. Donald identified the specific marking, 
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shipping, and logistics procedures and practices that were either ineffective or not followed, and 

he also identified a systemic lack of technical competence. 

The Donald Report, more than any of the other studies, highlighted the issue of declining 

nuclear expertise. Donald identified that ―there are some leaders with little, dated, or no nuclear 

experience who hold leadership positions in the Air Force nuclear enterprise, including 

supervisors and enlisted members as well as squadron, group, and wing commanders.‖

103

Additionally, ―a lack of wing, group, and squadron leadership on the floor of the Weapons 

System areas where build-up and disassembly of reentry systems occurs‖ was identified. The 

same observation was made during maintenance operations at the depot level. Essentially, 

Admiral Donald identified the lack of senior leader‘s technical competence as a systemic 

problem for the Air Force. 

6. Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Reinvigorating the Air Force Nuclear Enterprise, October 

2008 

In the summer of 2008 shortly after the CDI, BRR and Donald reports were completed, 

the Secretary and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force directed the establishment of an Air Force 

Nuclear Task Force to ―develop a strategic roadmap to rebuild and restore capabilities and 

confidence in our stewardship of the Air Force nuclear enterprise.‖ The resulting strategic plan 

synthesizes recommendations from both the internal and external investigations that occurred 

following the two nuclear-related events. 

The reports converged on six recurring themes reiterated in the Schlesinger Task Force 

Report: 1) underinvestment in the nuclear deterrence mission is evident, undercutting the 

nation‘s deterrence posture - no comprehensive process exists to ensure sustained investment 

advocacy; 2) nuclear-related authority and responsibility are fragmented; 3) processes for 

uncovering, analyzing, and addressing nuclear-related compliance and capability issues are 

largely ineffective; 4) nuclear-related expertise has eroded; 5) a critical self-assessment culture 

is lacking; and 6) Air Force nuclear culture has atrophied resulting in a diminished sense of 

mission importance, discipline, and excellence. 

The primary goal of the roadmap was to correct governance of the newly termed ―nuclear 

enterprise‖ of the Air Force. Most of the tasks identified in the roadmap were divided among the 

three new nuclear organizations: Headquarters Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic 

Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (A10); AFGSC; and AFNWC. All told, the Air Force 

nuclear enterprise received 2,500 billets and millions of dollars to refocus the mission.

Assessment of the Investigations and Reports 

Although the investigations generated numerous recommendations, dismissals and 

reorganizations, most of this study‘s workshop participants and interviewees remained skeptical 

of the investigative process and the results. Many of those interviewed had much to say about 

the conduct and results of the investigations. The most significant objection was that they did 

not explore how and why the incidents occurred. 

 

103 Donald, p. 47. 
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One interviewee suggested that the Defense Science Board report was the clearest in 

pointing the Air Force in the proper direction. Others suggested the Blue Ribbon Review did the 

opposite, providing a superficial checklist-focused assessment that stated the Air Force was 

doing the job correctly but could use some improvement in certain areas. The BRR claimed that 

only minor issues existed, but the Air Force nuclear enterprise was sound. Not a single 

interviewee had a positive word for the BRR. The kindest words were that it was not a 

―courageous document‖ and that it represented a ―failed opportunity‖ for the Air Force to 

address issues it had known to exist for some time. 

Many of those interviewed had participated in the different reviews and found that the 

primary motivation within the Air Force was to finish the reviews as quickly as possible, with as 

little further embarrassment as possible and move on. This mood was palpable and noted among 

study and review team members, as well as investigators. The two internal Air Force reviews 

were given only 30 days to complete their tasks. Participants suggested that the organizational 

climate was so tense immediately after the unauthorized movement of nuclear weapons that no 

one dared question findings or oppose the suggested ―improvements‖ – even those within Air 

Force senior leadership. Interviewees shared their concerns that the investigations‘ findings 

were never validated. The Air Force task force had 90 days to produce the nuclear roadmap 

from the recommendations of the other studies. Staff officers quickly discovered there was to be 

no questioning the sometimes conflicting findings; rather they were told, ―Just do it.‖ There was 

a conspicuous sense of urgency to be seen making significant changes in organization, personnel 

and policy, and it was made clear that funding was readily available. 

None of the investigations examined the management functions of the munitions and 

missile maintenance officer career field (21M); nor did they specifically address what actions or 

inactions constituted ―a failure of leadership.‖ The ACC Commander Directed Investigation, 

Defense Service Board, and Air Force Blue Ribbon Review study teams indicated that the Minot 

Air Force Base 5th Munitions Maintenance Squadron commander and the maintenance 

operations officer were disengaged from the squadron‘s nuclear weapons maintenance 

management. Such lack of involvement could have been a result of these officers viewing their 

roles as ―leadership‖ exclusive of actually managing nuclear weapons maintenance and being 

able to recognize poor NCO performance before that poor performance resulted in major 

organizational failure. 

The investigations did not define nuclear expertise in operational terms. There is 

considerable literature to suggest that career broadening and the whole-person, general manager 

concept reduces the depth of expertise.104

 However, the Blue Ribbon Review recommended 

expanding career broadening as a corrective action even though there was no supporting 

evidence to conclude that this would help. Admiral Donald explained that only about half of the 

22 senior leaders involved had the technical background and experience for the positions they 

held and that these leaders were seldom present where the nuclear weapons work was being 

completed in the weapons system areas, depots, or missile sites. 

Such findings highlight the fundamental issue of the generalist versus expert question. 

Officers may believe their role to be that of the titular organization head and assume that all the 

 

104 Drucker, 2002. 
Michelle Spencer, Aadina Ludin, and Heather Nelson

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information they need to manage the organization will be provided by subordinates. If so, they 

must be sufficiently knowledgeable and technically competent to recognize whether the 

information they are provided is correct. Alternatively, officers may believe that their role 

requires active management of their organization. This active officer role would require 

sufficient functional competence to differentiate between good and poor organizational 

performance. 

A final definitive comment came from a member of one of the outside reviews. The 

interviewee suggested that it was clear to the investigators that the Air Force as a service no 

longer valued its nuclear role and mission. Nuclear capable wings were undermanned, overtaxed (over tasked?) and complained about having to conduct the nuclear mission in a time when 

conventional war was so prevalent and vital to the nation‘s security. 
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APPENDIX D 

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 

A1 Headquarters Air Force Manpower, Personnel and Services 

A4/7 Headquarters Air Force Logistics, Installations and Mission Support 

A5XP Headquarters Air Force Strategic Plans and Policy 

A10 Headquarters Air Force Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration 

ABM Anti Ballistic Missile 

ACC Air Combat Command 

ADC Air Defense Command

AETC Air Education and Training Command 

AFB Air Force Base 

AFDD Air Force Doctrine Document 

AFGSC Air Force Global Strike Command 

AFI Air Force Instruction 

AFMC Air Force Materiel Command 

AFNWC Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center 

AFR Air Force Regulation 

AFSC Air Force Specialty Code 

AFSO Air Force Smart Operations 

AMC Air Mobility Command 

ASD (D) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Deterrence 

ATL Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

ATSD (AE) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy 

ATSD (NCB) Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological 

BRR Blue Ribbon Review 

BW Bomb Wing 

CDI Commander Directed Investigation 

CSAF Chief of Staff of the Air Force 

CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 

DASD Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
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DLA Defense Logistics Agency 

DNA Defense Nuclear Agency 

DoD Department of Defense 

DoE Department of Energy 

DSB Defense Science Board 

DSWA Defense Special Weapons Agency 

DTRA Defense Threat Reduction Agency 

HAF Headquarters Air Force 

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 

IG Inspector General 

MAJCOM Major Command 

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer 

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration 

NSS National Security Strategy 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

OUSD (AT&L) Office Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

OUSD (P) Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

SAC Strategic Air Command 

SECAF Secretary of the Air Force 

SORT Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty 

START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 

TAC Tactical Air Command 

USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 

USAF United States Air Force 

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 

XON Air Force Directorate of Nuclear and Counterproliferation