HEW 'I

ANNUAL REPORT

TO CONGRESS

Lllili!. i il:liidJI Iii Uiilill

DEFENSE NUCLEA.R FACILITIES

SAFETY BOARD

FEBRUARY 1991
John T. C~lliway, Chllln'llilli

Api. E~g{~lll)erger, Vicl,' Cl'iillrilliln

.fohn W. Ct!lwfmd, Jr.

HNlwrt Johll (~~cil KOllts

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES

SAFETY BOARD

625 Indiall(~ A......enue, NW, S~llte 700. W«~hlngton. D,C. 20004

(202) 208-1;100 • I'TS 268-6400

February 8, 1991

To the Congress of the United States:

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board is pleased to submit to the Congress its

first full annual report, covering the activities of the Board from the start of operations on

October 18, 1989, through December 31, 1990. Last year, the Board submitted to Congress

a report on its initial lIctivities during the first three months of opemtion.

An independent executive branch establishment, the Board provides advice and

formal recommendlltions to the President and the Secretary of Energy regarding public

helllth and safety issues at Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear facilities. The

Board also reviews and evaluates the content lind implementlltion of health and safety

standards, as well as other requirements, relating to the design, construction, operation, and

decommissioning of DOE dcfense nuclear facilities.

As required by statute, the Board's report to Congress summarizes activities during

the past year, assesses improvements in the safety of DOE defense nuclear facilities, and

identifies outstanding safety problems at DOE defense nuclear facilities.

Our annual report also contains the results of the Board's preliminary study required

by statute on whether or not DOE facilities outside the statutory definition of defense

nuclear facilities should be subject to independent external oversight.

Dlll'ing this reporting period, the Board made progress in discharging its health and

safety review responsibilities while addressing the many managerial issues associated with the

start-up of a new agency.

J~ffdrr;/q;Y a;!~:: T. Co£:;-iY- t7

Chairman

9~~~ '~<~/

A. . Eggenberger

Vice-Chairman

4:f(J

/ EdSOnG.~ Member

t7'"~~~~~i John W.• Crawford, . /"

Member

Herbert John Cecil Kouts

Member
CONTENTS

Page

PART 1 REPORT OF BOARD ACTIVITIES DURING FIRST

FULL YEAR OF OPERATION

INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................... 1

A. Overview of Board Functions.................................................................................. 1

B. Reporting Requirements Under 42 U.S.C. §2286e and §2286e Note............. 2

REPORT TO CONGRESS REGARDING SAFETY AND HEALTH.............. 2

A. Board Activities During 1990................................................................................... 2

1. Recommendations................................................................................................ 3

a. Recommendation 90-1, Operator Training at Savannah River

Facilities Prior to Restart of K, 1..., and P Reactors................................ 3

b. Recommendation 90-2, Design, Construction, Operation and

Decommissioning Standards at Certain Priority DOE Facilities.......... 4

c. Recommendation 90-3, Safety at Single-Shell Hanford Waste

Tanks................................................................................................................ 5

d. Recommendation 90-4, Operational Readincss Review at

Rocky Flats Plant........................................................................................... 6

e. Recommendation 90-5, Systematic Evaluation Program at the

Rocky Flats Plant........................................................................................... 7

f. Recommendation 90-6, Criticality Safety at Rocky Flats Plant............ 8

g. Recommendation 90-7, Safety at the Single-Shell Hanford

Waste Tanks.................................................................................................... 9

2. Board Criteria for Judging the Adequacy of DOE Responses and

Implementation Plans.......................................................................................... 11

3. Public Hearings, Public Comment, and Interaction with Board................. 11

4. Official Site Visits................................................................................................ 13

B. 1991 PLANS FOR EXPANSION OF AC'TIVITIES......................................... 14

C. SAFETY AND HEAI:n-I STATUS OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR

l'ACILITIES............................................................................................................... 15

1. Board Perspective on Outstanding Issues of Health and Safety................ 15

a. Overview.......................................................................................................... 15

b. Importance of Qualified DOE Technical Staff........................................ 16

c. Development and Implementation of Safety Standards........................ 17

2. Overview of Improvements in Safety at DOE Defense Nuclear

Facilities................................................................................................................. 18

3. Board Activities Leading to Improvements at More Than One

Facility 19

a. Operator Training......................................................................................... 19

b. Operational Readiness Review................................................................... 19

c. Standards......................................................................................................... 20

d. Discipline of Opcrations............................................................................... 22

e. Seismic Engineering for Nuclear Waste Tanks........................................ 23
4. Board Activities Leading to Improvements at the Rocky Flats Plant........... 24

a. Systematic Evaluation Program....................................................................... 24

b. Safety Analyses................................................................................................... 24

c. Plutonium Removal Program........................................................................... 25

d. Seismic Engineering Programs......................................................................... 25

5. Board Activities Leading to Improvements at the Savannah River Site....... 25

a. Emergency Cooling System............................................................................... 26

b. Vessel and Piping Integrity of the K, L, and P Reactors............................ 26

c. Seismic Engineering............................................................................................. 26

6. Board Activities Leading to Improvements at the I-Ianford Waste Tanks..... 28

a. Single Shell Tanks................................................................................................ 28

b. Double-walled Tanks........................................................................................... 29

7. Secretary of Energy's Initiative to Improve Safety and Health

Programs at DOE...................................................................................................... 29

Co Administrative and Management Issues...................................................................... 31

1. Budget.......................................................................................................................... 31

2. Recruitment of Technical Personnel...................................................................... 32

3. Contracting for Technical Expertise....................................................................... 33

4. Management Reviews and Audits.......................................................................... 34

5. LitigatIon..................................................................................................................... 34

6. Regulatory Agenda................................................................................................... 36

7. Office Space in Washington, D.C.......................................................................... 36

PART 2 REPORT OF THE BOARD ON DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES

SAFETY BOARD JURISDICnONAL ISSUES

INTRODU(.'TION................................................................................................................ 37

SCOPE OF THE BOARD'S JURISDICTION.............................................................. 37

A. Public Health and Safety Matters................................................................................. 37

B. The Limits of Defense Nuclear Facilities................................................................... 39

Co The Three Basic Categories of DOE

Defense Nuelear Facilities.............................................................................................. 40

1. Production Facilities.................................................................................................. 41

2. Utilization Facilities................................................................................................... 43

3. Nuclear Waste Storage Facilities........................................................................... 44

D. Enabling Act Exclusions................................................................................................. 45

REPORT ON NEED FOR INDEPENDENT EXTERNAL

OVERSIGHT OF ADDITIONAL DOE PROGRAMS AND FACILITIES.......... 46

ENDNOTES.......................................................................................................................... 50

APPENDIX

II
Part 1

REPORT OF BOARD ACTIVITIES DURING

FIRST FULL YEAR OF OPERATION

INTRODUCTION

A. Ovcrvicw of Board Functions

The Defense Nuclear Fucilities Sufety Board (Board) was creuted to provide advice and

formal recommendations to the President and the Seeretaty of Energy regurding public

health and safety issues at Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear facilities, By

statute, the Board is required to review and evaluate the content and implementation

of health and safety standards, as well as other requirements, relating to the design,

construction, operation, and decommissioning of DOE defense nuclear facilities, The

Board must then recommend to the Secretary of Energy any specific measures, such as

changes in the content and implementation of those standards, that the Board believes

should be adopted to ensure that the public health and safety are adequately protected,

The Board is also required to review the design of all new defense nuclear facilities

before construction begins, and rccommend modifications necessary to protect health

and safety. Board review and advisory responsibilities continue throughout the construction, testing, and operation of new facilities,

More broadly, the Board reviews operations, practices, and occurrences at DOE defense

nuclear facilities and makes appropriate recommendations to protect health and safety,

In the event that any aspect of operations, practices, or occurrences reviewed by the

Board is determined to present an imminent or severe threat to public health or safety,

the Board transmits its recommendations directly to the President

All of the ancillary functions of the Board and its staff are related to the accomplishment

of the Board I s primary function, which is to assist in identifying and correcting health

and safety problcms at defense nuclear facilities. The Board may conduct investigations,

hold public hearings, guther information, conduct studies, establish reporting requirements for DOE, and take other actions in furtherance of its review of health and safety

1
issues at defense nuclear facilities. The Secretary of Energy and contractors at the

various facilities are required to cooperate fully with the Board.

B. Reporting Reqnirements Under 42 U.S.C §2286e and §2286e Note

By statute, the Board must submit an annual report to the Committees on Armed

Services and on Appropriations of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of

Representatives at the same time that the President submits the budget to Congress.

The report must include a review of the activities of the Board during the preceding

year, including all recommendations made by the Board. An assessment is required of

the improvements in safety at DOE defense nuclear facilities during the previous year.

The report must also assess outstanding safety problems remaining at DOE defense

nuclear facilities.

The statute also required that the Board, during its first year of operation, study the

question of whether or not DOE facilities outside the statutory definition of defense

nuclear facilities should be subject to independent external oversight. The Board was

required to report on its findings at the time of the annual report.

This report is intended to fulfill the Board I s Congressional reporting requirements in

all these areas.

REPORT TO CONGRESS REGARDING SAFETY AND HEALTH

A. Board Activities During 1990

During 1990 the Board made seven formal sets of recommendations with a total of 35

individual recommendations to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§2286(a)(5). All of the Board's 1990 recommendations are included in this report for

completeness aud to provide an account of the many developments that have occurred

since th>: recommendations were issued. The Secretary has responded to, and accepted,

each of thesc sets of recommendations. Attachment I-I lists the status of all Board

recommendations and DOE's implementation of those recommendations.

The Board's recommendations involved (1) site visits by the Board, its staff, and its

contractor personnel; (2) review of documentation concerning particular problems at the

2
site; (3) review of DOE or Board contractor reports in appropriate cases; (4) discussions

with DOE officials and DOE contractors; and (5) deliberation and technical review by

the Board. A review of the Board I s site visits and other activities leading to the

development of formal recommendations is included later in this report.

1. Recommendations

a. Recommendation 90-1, Operator Training at Savannah River Facilities

Prior to Restart of K, L, and P Reactors

The Board has given high-priority attention to the contemplated restart by DOE of the

three Savannah River reactors that remain operable. The Board I s review of these

reactors and of related operations at the Savannah River site is compatible with the

intention of the Board to perform its duties on a schedule consistent with the

Department I s defense missions, to the extent such harmonization of activities remains

compatible with the Board's statutory obligations.

Recommendation 90-1, issued on February 22, 1990, addressed the Board's concerns on

the training of reactor plant operators for the K, 1., and P reactors at the Savannah

River Site (SRS). The Board recommended the following actions:

• That DOE determine and specify the qualifications that reactor plant operators

and supervisors will be required to demonstrate before restart of the K, 1., and

P reactors;

• That DOE identify any differences between its approved qualifications and those

prescribed by NRC for analogous positions in the civilian nuclear power field;

that where differences, if any, exist, DOE identify any supplemental measures that

have been adopted in view thereof;

• That DOE conduct a comprehensive review of the currcnt level of qualifications

of each reactor operator and supervisor employing both written and oral

examinations, to insure that the scope and contcnt of the prescribed training

program is capable of imparting the knowledge necessary for restart;

• That the reactor plant operator and supervisor training programs be modified as

neccssary to takc into account the required qualifications and the current state

of knowledge and experience of the operators and supcrvisors as indicated above;

3
• That DOE accelerate implementation of a configuration management program

to help assure that as-built drawings of safety-related systems are available for

training of operators and supervisors in procedures and for discipline of

operations (e.g. valve line-ups); and

• That the operators and supervisors be qualified in use of the revised procedmes

that will be in place for normal operations and for emergency situations.

On April 10, 1990, the SecretalY of Energy accepted the Board's recommendation. The

Secretary's plan to implement this recommendation was received by the Board on July

13, 1990. The Board has requested quarterly reports on DOE I S progress in

implementing Recommendation 90-1. The Secretary intends to issue a supplement to

the implementation plan on February 6, 1991; the supplement is intended to rectify

deficiencies which the Board has identified in the initial response and implementation

plan for Recommendation 90-1. The Board will recommend any necessary corrective

action to DOE on its final implementation plan and continue to monitor DOE progress

in the area of operator training at Savannah River during the coming year.

b. Recommendation 90-2, Design, Construction, Operation and

Decommissioning Standards at Cel·tain Priority DOE Facilities

The Board's enabling legislation requires review and evaluation of the content and

implementation of standards relating to the design, construction, operation, and

decommissioning of DOE defense nuclear facilities, including all applicable DOE orders,

regulations, and requirements. Based on these reviews, the Board is required to make

recommendations on necessary changes in the content and implementation of such

standards, as well as matters on which additional data or research is needed, to ensure

that public health and safety are adequately protected.

On March 8, 1990, the Board issued Recommendation 90-2 on the subject of safety

standards for the K, L, and P reactors at SRS, and for other selected DOE facilities at

Rocky Flats, Hanford, and the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. In addition to recommending

that DOE identify the applicable standards, DOE ordcrs, and other requirements, the

Board mcommended that DOE provide its view on the adequacy of the standards and

requirements and determine the extent to which the standards and requirements have

been implemented at these facilities. The Board received the Secretary of Energy I s

response on June 11, 1990, containing a commitmcnt that the Department's Task Force

on Nuclear Safety Direetivcs would establish a DOE-wide foundation for nuclear safety

requiremcnts at all DOE defense nuclear facilitics. Based on Board comments on

4
DOE I S response, DOE issued a supplemental response and implementation plan on

September 14, 1990, which included additional information and a detailed plan for

meeting the Board I s recommendation. As discussed later in this report, the Secretary

has changed and strengthened the arrangements for managing DOE I S nuclear standards

program and provided a briefing to the Board pertaining to those modifications.

c. Recommendation 90-3, Safety at Single-Shell Hanford Waste Tanks

During the confirmation hearings for the Board Members in October, 1989, before the

Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Glenn expressed his concern that the

contents of certain single-shell nuclear waste tanks at the Hanford site might be

susceptible to spontaneous or ignited chemical explosions, which could disperse the

radioactive contents of the tanks. In December, 1989, members of the Board visited

Hanford and were informed of an analysis by the Hanford contractor supporting an

opinion that the possibility of an explosion in these tanks is low.

In March, 1990, tcchnical experts retained by the Board visited the Hanford site in

continuation of the Board I s review. They subsequently informed the Board that they

saw no imminent safety concerns rclated to the single-shell tanks, but added that, in their

view, the monitoring of the conditions in the tanks needed upgrading. They also

reported on the problem of slurry growth and associated hydrogen generation in some

double-walled tanks, an issue that had surfaced as a result of questions they had asked.

On March 27, 1990, the Board forwarded Recommendation 90-3 to the Secretary of

Energy for his consideration. The Board stated its opinion that the probability of an

explosion in the single-shell tanks is low. However, the Board had residual concerns

regarding the lack of information on the chemical composition and physical conditions

of the contents of the tanks. These led to certain rccommcndations:

• That a study be undertaken of the possible chemical reactions that could be the

source of hcat gcneration locally or globally in the single-wall tanks, thereby

elevating the temperature to a level where explosive ferrocyanide reactions can

take place rapidly.

• that the DOE develop a program for continuous monitoring of those conditions

in the single-shell tanks that can serve to indicate development of conditions

indicating an onset of instability in their contents. These conditions might include

such features as abnormal temperatures in local areas, physical deformation of

5
the surface of the waste, or unusual components of the surface of the waste, or

unusual componcnts (including hydrogen) in the cover gas within the tanks.

• That the instruments used in monitoring the tanks be provided with alarm

indicators at a location where decisions can be made and action taken to start a

series of measures to neutralize a perceived abnormality.

• That an action plan be developed for the measure to be taken to neutralize the

conditions that may be signaled by alarms.

The Recommendation also stated that the Board considers the conditions in the doublewalled tanks experiencing slurry growth and associated hydrogen generation to be

potentially serious.

In a letter to the Board dated May 16, 1990, the Secretary of Energy accepted the

Board I s recommendations. On August 10, 1990, he forwarded a plan for implementation. This led to further discussions between the Board and DOE staff, and eventually

to Recommendation 90-7, as discussed later.

d. Recommendation 90-4, Operational Readiness Review at Rocky Flats Plant

The Board has reviewed several aspects of plant operations and related activities at

Rocky Flats. These reviews have been directed toward ensuring adequate protection of

public health and safety, especially those matters bearing on DOE's planned resumption

of plutonium processing operations.

In May 1990, the Board issued Recommendation 90-4 which urged that DOE conduct

an operational readiness review at Rocky Flats prior to resumption of plutonium

processing opcrutions. The Board recommended that the readiness review include, but

not be limited to, the following items:

• Independent ussessment of the adequacy and correctness of process and utility

systems operating procedures. Consistent with the contractor I s operating

philosophy, these procedures should be in sufficient detail to permit the use of

the "procedurul compliance" concept.

• Assessment of the level of knowledge achieved during operator requalification as

evidenced by review of exumination questions and exumination results, and by

selective oral examinations of operators by members of the review group.

6
• Examination of records of tests and calibration of safety systems and other

instruments monitoring Limiting Conditions of Operation or that satisfy

Operating Safety Requirements.

• Verification that all plant changes including modification of vital safety systems

and plutonium processing workstations have been reviewed for potential impact

on procedures, training and requalification, and that training and requalification

have been done using the revised procedures.

• Examination of each building I s Final Safety Analysis Report to ensure that the

description of the plant and procedures and the accident analysis are consistent

with the plant as affected by safety related modifications made during outage

periods.

In June 1990, DOE accepted this recommendation. The Board reviewed a draft

implementation plan, and on September 24, 1990, provided comments for the plan I S

improvement prior to DOE I S issuance of the final plan.

e. Recommendation 90·5, Systematic Evaluation Prot,'l'am at the Rocky Flats

Plant

Also in May 1990, the Board issued Recommendation 90-5 which requested that DOE

develop and establish a Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) at Rocky Flats to assure

proper evaluation and coordination of proposed long-term safety improvements. The

Board recommended that the Rocky Flats SEP address all outstanding safety issues and

include, but not be limited to, consideration of the following items:

• Effects ofseveral external events, with particular emphasis on seismic events and

high winds;

• Effects of severe internal events, with particular emphasis on fire;

• Ventilation system performance under severe external and internal events,

including redundancy considerations;

• Interaction of equipment and structures due to severe internal and external

events; and

7
• The basis and procedures for making backfit decisions on which the facility

changes identified under the new program will or will not be implemented and,

where appropriate, the schedule for completion of these improvements.

In June 1990, DOE accepted this recommendation. The Board, its staff, and DOE met

several times during the summer regarding the development of DOE's implementation

plan, which was submitted on October 17, 1990.

f. Recommendation 90-6, Criticality Safety at Rocky Flats Plant

In June 1990, the Board issued Recommendation 90-6 which recommended that DOE

prepare a written program with commitments to address the accumulation of fissile and

other materials in ventilation ducts and related systems prior to the resumption of

plutonium operations at Rocky Flats. The short-term objectives of the recommended

action are to prevent a criticality accident and to make an initial reduction in the

amount of fissile material in these ducts to protect the public health and safety. The

long-term objective of the DOE program is to remove or substantially reduce the

remaining amount of fissile material in the ducts. This program should also address and

include the following:

• Description of remediation actions, including the scheduling and basis for same,

that are deemed necessary prior to resumption of plutonium operations by DOE.

• Descriptions and justification for non-destructive assay techniques, calibration,

modeling, and assay methodology.

• Estimation of radiation levels in areas of occupancy, both from gamma rays and

fast neutrons.

• Detcrmination of the effects of accumulation of fissile and other materials on the

functionability of the ventilation ducts and related systems which must act to

protect the health and safcty of the public, including plant opcrating personnel.

• Description and justification of procedures and schedules, both short term and

long term, for removal or reduction in amount and concentration of existing

fissile and other unidentified debris in the ventilation ducts and related systems.

• Determination of any design and operational changes in the ventilation ducts and

related systems necessary to prevent further accumulation of significant amounts

8
of fissile and other materials therein and to ensure continued operability of

systems installed to protect the health and safety of the public including plant

operating personnel. This includes a thorough study of the glovebox filters and

ventilation and alarm systems.

• Establishment of a monitoring program for the ventilation ducts and related

systems to establish that design and operational changes and modifications are

effective in preventing significant additional accumulation of fissile and other

materials.

In July 1990, DOE accepted this recommendation. Members of the Board visited Rocky

Flats several times subsequent to receipt of the response and discussed aspects of the

problem. DOE I S implementation plan was submitted on November 11, 1990.

g. Rccommcndation 90·7, Safcty at the Single·Shell Hanford Waste Tanks

Following receipt of the Implementation Plan for Recommendation 90-3, on August 10,

1990, members of the Board, its staff, and its technical experts again visited the Hanford

site on several occasions, and held additional discussions in Washington, D.C. After

careful consideration, the Board decided that the Implementation Plan was not

adequately responsive to the Recommendation 90-3. It did not reflect the urgency that

was merited by the circumstances, and that was implicit in the Board I s

recommendations. It also did not appear that the contractor involved had been required

to marshall the managerial and technical resources required, nor to focus those resources

on the problem in a measure commensurate with its gravity.

The Board made a number of additional recommendations, that were more specific than

those provided in Recommendation 90·3:

• Immediate steps should be taken to add instrumentation as necessary to the

single-shell tanks containing ferrocyanide that will establish whether hot spots

exist or may develop in the future in the stored waste. The instrumentation

should include, as a minimum, additional thermocouple trees. Trees should be

iptroduced at several radial locations in all tanks containing substantial amounts

of ferrocyanide, to measure the temperature as a function of elevation at these

radii. The use of infra-red techniques to survey the surface of waste in tanks

should continue to be investigated as a priority matter, and on the assumption

that this method will be found valuable, monitors based on it should be installed

now in the ferrocyanide bearing tunks.

9
• The temperature sensors referred to above should bave continuous recorded

readouts and alarms that would signal at a permanently manned location any

abnormally high temperatures and any failed temperature instrumentation.

• Instrumentation should also be installed to monitor the composition of cover gas

in the tanks, to establish if flammable gas is present.

• The program of sampling the contents of these tanks should be greatly accelerated. The proposed schedule whereby analysis of two core samples from each

single-shell tank is to be completed by September, 1998, is seriously inadequate

in light of the uncertainties as to safety of these tanks. Furthermore, additional

samples arc required at several radii and at a range of elevations for the tanks

containing substantial amounts of ferrocyanide.

• The schedule for the program on study of the chemical properties and explosive

behavior of the waste in these tanks is indefinite and does not reflect the urgent

need for a comprehensive and definitive assessment of the probability of a violent

chemical reaction. The study should be extended to other metallic compounds

of ferrocyanide that arc known or believed to be present in the tanks, so that

conclusions can be generalized as to the range of temperature and other

properties needed for a rapid chemical reaction with sodium nitrate.

• The Board had recommended "that an action plan be developed for the

measures to be taken to neutralize the conditions that may be signaled by

alarms." Two types of measures are implied: actions to respond to unexpected

degradation of a tank or its contents, and actions to be taken if an explosion were

to occur. Your implementation plan stated that "the current contingency plans

... will be reviewed and revised if needed." We do not consider that this

proposed implementation of the Board I s recommendation is adequately

responsive. It is recommended that a written action plan founded on

demonstrated principles be prepared as soon as possible, that would respond to

indications of onset of abnormal temperatures or other unusual conditions in a

ferrocyanide-bearing tank, to counter any perceived growth in hazard. A separate

e,mergency plan should be formulated and instituted, covering measures that

would be taken in event of an explosion or other event leading to an airborne

release of radioactive material from the tanks, and that would protect personnel

both on and off the Hanford site. The Board believes that even though it is

considered that the probability is small that such an event will occur, prudence

dictates that steps be taken at this time to prepare the means to mitigate the

10
unacceptable results that could ensue. On December 3, 1990, the Secretary

accepted the recommendations in 90-7. The Board is now awaiting the

implementation plan.

2. Board Criteria for Judging the Adequacy of DOE Responses and

Implementation Plans

In addition to issuing seven sets of health and safety recommendations during 1990, the

Board developed a policy statement which established criteria for reviewing the

adequacy of DOE responses to recommendations and of subsequent DOE

implementation plans.

The Board issued its first formal policy statement entitled "Criteria for Judging the

Adequacy of DOE Responses and Implementation Plans for DNFSB

Recommendations," on October 19, 1990. The statement will guide the Board and its

staff in evaluating the adequacy of DOE responses and implementation plans, as well

as assist the Board in structuring appropriate follow-up action in the event a

recommendation is not fully or adequately addressed in DOE I S response and

implementation plan. Furthermore, the statement formally identifies, for the benefit of

DOE and the public, the Board I s expectations regarding the elements the Board

believes are necessary for an adequate response and implementation plan. Due to the

importance of this policy statement to the continuing operation of the Board, a copy is

appended as Attachment 1-2.

3. Public Hearings, Public Comment, and Intcraction with Board

From the start of operations in the Fall of 1989, the Board has been sensitive to the

need for public involvement and awareness of defense nuclear issues. The Board I s

enabling legislation contains a detailed outline of the formal process whereby the Board

makes recommendations to the Secretary of Energy for his consideration, and promptly

publishes each recommendation in the Federal Register for public comment. Each

recommendation to the Secretary is published in its entirety in the Register, triggering

a 30-day public comment and a 45-day period for receiving the Secretary I s written

responw to the Board I s recommendation. The response of the Secretary is also

published in the ..E.clllil Register with an additional 30 days for public comment on the

Secretary I sresponse. The Board has carefully adhered to these requirements during the

development of its seven sets of recommendations during 1990, and has considered all

of the comments received.

11
Consistent with its public health and safety mandate, the Board has also provided

opportunities for interested groups or persons, both public or private, to express their

concerns about the DOE facilities directly to the Board members in informal and in

open discussions near the sites. These discussions were held with federal, state, and

local officials, labor leaders, DOE facility workers, and area residents to exchange

information and to assure that the Board's review plans were known to all parties. The

Board conducted the first of these public discussions in Boulder, Colorado, in January

1990, regarding the Rocky Flats Plant. During this discussion, the Board listened to

comments and accepted information from a wide range of participants, including union

representatives, environmental groups, state officials, and concerned residents and

workers. Additional public discussions with the Board Members on public health and

safety concerns at Rocky Flats were held in Boulder, Colorado in February and May

1990.

The potential danger to the public of the Hanford waste storage tanks has been a matter

of concern to the communities in and around Richland, Washington. During the

Board I s visits to the area on April 10~ 11 and July 12, 1990, members of the Board met

with the press and interested members of the public to exchange information concerning

the problem. The several detailed DOE and contractor briefings of the Board and its

expert advisors have included, by invitation of the Board, representatives of the

Governors of Oregon and Washington, in addition to the State and Federal

Environmental Protection Agencies and the GAO to insure that responsible government

officials are fully informed.

In June 1990, the Board held a public hearing in Aiken, South Carolina, on

Recommendation 90-1 concerning the training ofreactor plant operators and supervisors

at the Savannah River site. This hearing was attended by local citizens, employees of

the facility, environmental groups, and local officials, as well as DOE officials and their

contractor for the site. Interested persons or groups were invited to present comments,

technical information, or data pertaining to the Board's recommendation on this subject

or the Secretary of Energy's response to this recommendation.

In August 1990, the Board held a public hearing in Westminster, Colorado to receive

additional public comments, tcchnical information, and data on Recommendations 90-2,

90~4, 90-5, and 90-6 regarding DOE's Rocky Flats PIant, and on the Secretary of

Energy I s response to these recommendations. These recommendations covered such

issues as the specific standards applicable to the design, construction, operation, and

decommissioning of specific buildings at the Rocky Flats Plant, as well as criticality

safety in ducts and related systems at the plant, the operational readiness review, and

12
the systematic evaluation program. Presentations were made by DOE and its contractor.

Approximately 200 people attended this evening public hearing, with 23 groups or

individuals filing additional statements with the Board.

As required by law, the Board has promptly sent all its recommendations to the

Department of Energy's regional public reading rooms. To ensure that the Board 's

recommendations are readily available to the public, the Board I s staff has confirmed

their availability in the reading rooms.

The Board has accumulated extensive technical files that are open to public review at

the Board I s offices in Washington, D.C. Numerous requests for documents have been

met by the Board I s staff on a routine basis. In the first year of operation, the Board

logged more than 1,300 documents, and has responded to more than 60 oral or written

requests for information concerning the Board I s health and safety reviews.

4. Official Site Visits

From the establishment of the Board in October, 1989 through December 31, 1990,

Board Members, its staff, or its contractor experts have made 64 site visits to DOE

defense nuclear facilities. These visits focused on selected facilities that both the Board

and DOE consider to be urgent in light of DOE I s mission, primarily the Savannah River

Site, the Hanford Site, the Rocky Flats Site, and the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. Board

Members have also visited the Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Lawrence

Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Idaho National

Engineering Laboratory, Mound Laboratory, and the Fernald Feed Material Processing

Center to begin the Board I s initial assessment of health and safety issues at these

facilities.

The Board has reviewed firsthand the health and safety issues at each of these sites. In

1990 the Board spent more than 20 percent of its time in travel associated with these

reviews. During these visits, the Board has attempted to avoid unduly interfering with

DOE I S program to manage the site or facility, while preparing the basis for its

recommendations to the Secretary of Energy and monitoring the implementation of

recommendations that have been made.

13
B. 1991 PLANS FOR EXPANSION OF ACTIVITIES

The Board intends to expand its activities during 1991 within the scope of its current

jurisdiction. During its first year of operation the Board coordinated its activities with

priorities of the Secretary of Energy and the Congress. TIlis action resulted in the Board

focussing upon health and safety issues at the Savannah River Site (SRS) near Aiken,

South Carolina; the Rocky Flats Plant near Denver, Colorado; Waste Storage Tanks at

the Hanford, Washington, site; and the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New

Mexico. The Board will continue to review safety and health issues at those sites and

will monitor DOE I S accomplishments relative to implementation plans for the first

seven sets of recommendations issued by the Board. Continuation of Board review of

operations at the four sites listed above is expected to result in further recommendations.

Issues requiring Board attention at the SRS in 1991 include, but are not limited to,

standards, seismic design, training of plant operators, waste operations and storage,

discipline of operations, vessel and piping integrity, thermal hydraulics, closure items,

and reactor power level. The Board also intends to expand its review to other aspects

of programs at Rocky Flats while continuing to monitor long-term improvements in the

problem areas described earlier. Topics at Rocky Flats that will receive increased

emphasis in the future include, but are not limited to: nuclear and hazardous waste

management and site remediation; safety analyses; safety upgrades to existing plutonium

processing facilities; and facility decontamination.

In addition to continued and expanded activities at the sites focused on during 1990, the

Board currently plans to begin or continue its initial assessment of health and safety

issues at other DOE facilities including:

• Non~reactor facilities at the Savannah River Site

• Mound Plant

• Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge

• Fernald Plant

• PUREX Plant al Hanford

• Plutonium Finishing Plant at Hanford.

• Isotope Separation Facilities

• Weapons Laboratories

• Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL)

The Board has also begun a review of the DOE design criteria for the New Production

Reactor. As required by law, the Board intends to review DOE standards relating to the

14
design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of other DOE facilities, paralleling

its current standards evaluation program at the SRS, the Rocky Flats Plant, the Hanford

Site, and the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. The Board's standards evaluation will include

an a~sessmentof the development and implementation ofstandards for common natural

phenomena such as earthquakes and floods, at all DOE defense nuclear facility sites.

Should an imminent or severe threat to public health and safety be identified at a DOE

facility, the Board will respond and change the priorities of other work as necessary.

The Board assigns priorities for oversight activities at specific sites on the basis of (1)

urgency in terms of any imminent threat to public health and safety; (2) potential risk

to public health and safety; (3) effectiveness of DOE management in managing those

risks; and (4) timeliness in relation to DOE programmatic or operational goals and

objectives. In assessing priorities, the Board also will continue to consider problems

brought to its attention by members and staff of Congress, GAO, and the public.

The Board I s ability to expand its coverage is directly related to DOE performance in

taking prompt and effective remedial action on safety problems which are called to its

attention by the Board. If Board personnel must make repeated assessments of one

facility or activity in order to assure that needed improvements are made, the Board's

ability to expand its activities may be curtailed. Further, the Board is sensitive to the

need to ensure that its resources are not used as a substitute for DOE activities to detect

safety problems, both in line and internal oversight organizations.

In establishing its oversight program, the Board gives particular attention to those

important functions such as review of the adequacy and implementation of safety

standards, which are mandated in the legislation. Also, the Board makes a special effort

to evaluate issues which appear to be generic in nature. Examples are lack of adequate

training, lack of written procedures, or a lack of formalized disciplined approach to the

operation of facilities and safety to workers.

C. SAFETY AND HEALTH STATUS OF DEFENSE NUCLEAR I?ACILITIES

1. Board Perspective on Outstanding Issues of Health and Safcty

a. OVCl-view

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has been in operation for slightly more

15
than a year. The Board has worked with DOE during this period to develop an

understanding of what the Board believes are adequate responses and implementation

plans for its recommendations. While some progress has been made in the limited

number of problem areas identified by the Board, or addressed by DOE on its own

initiative, major safety and health issues remain. DOE acknowledges the serious nature

of these problems. In a recent letter to the President, dated December 21, 1990, the

Secretary of Energy stated:

Many of the Department I s facilities have safety deficiencies that impair

our ability to ensure the health and welfare of both our workers and the

public. These include nuclear facility safety analyses that are out of date,

flawed in their analytical methods or conclusions, and inadequate to

demonstrate the required degree of protection from nuclear safety

hazards. Without valid justification for continued operations, including

upgraded operational practices, it is very possible that many more nuclear

operations within DOE will be curtailed temporarily or permanently. In

some cases, facilities that are no longer operating continue to pose safety

and health risks. . .. Other deficiencies involve nonconfonnances with

basic Occupational Safety and Health Administration standards for

industrial safety, as well as fundamental tenets of radioactive

contamination controls....

Congress also, through reports of the General Accounting Office and legislative history

of the Board I s enabling statute, has identified many of the major safety and health

problems at defense nuclear facilities. Rather than recount the outstanding health and

safety problems identified by others, the following presents the Board I s views on two

critical issues that underlie many of the specific health and safety problems at defense

nuclear facilities.

b. ImpOl·tance of Qualified DOE Technical StafT

The most important and far-reaching problem affecting the safety of DOE defense

nuclear facilities is the difficulty in attracting and retaining personnel who are adequately

qualified by technical education and experience to provide the kind of management,

direction, and guidance essential to safe operation of DOE defense nuclear facilities.

There is a need for additional technical expertise in both Hcadquarters and field

organizations. Until this problem is solved, DOE will continue to have difficulty in

developing and applying nuclear standards, in assessing the performance of contractors,

and otherwise canying out its responsibilities for assuring safe operation of faeilities.

16
The Board is aware of the efforts of the SecretalY to correct the situation regarding

insufficiently qualified technical staff. As stated in Secretary of Energy Notice

SEN-1l-89, The Secretary intends "to establish permanent positions and put into place

DOE people with the capabilities necessary to support line managers in the execution

of their oversight responsibilities in both headquarters and field positions." It is

appropriate to note that in building up its own technical staff the Board, too, has

encountered problems similar to those encountered by DOE. The similarities are

heightened by the fact that both agencies are attempting to recruit from the same sectors

of the nuclear community. The Board found at an early date that it needed to acquire

authority to except the hiring of scientific and technical personnel from the rules and

procedures that apply ordinarily. It requested such authority and, in late 1990, Congress

passed the needed legislation.

The Board recognizes that the shortage of qualified technical personnel at DOE has

been long-standing, going back to the time of the Energy Research and Development

Administration and the Atomic Energy Commission. Alleviating these shortages will be

a difficult job. While the Secretary has already filled some key positions, much remains

to be done and the effort must be carried forward as rapidly as possible.

c. Development and Implementation of Safety Standards

The development and implementation of sound safety standards, orders, and directives

are the foundation of any nuclear safety program. Congress considered DOE's safety

standards program to be critical to ensuring the public health and safety at defense

nuclear facilities. Therefore, it directed the Board to review and evaluate the content

and implementation of the standards relating to the design, construction, operation, and

decommissioning of defense nuclear facilities of the Department of Energy at each of

its defense nuclear facilities, and to make appropriate recommendations to DOE in light

of its review.

The DOE and its predecessor organizations have always found it difficult to develop and

implement nuclear safety standards. This difficulty has been well documented in

indepcndent studies of nuclear safety at DOE facilities, including two reports by the

National Academy of Sciences. The reasons given are complex and include: lack of

understlmding among DOE managers of the importance ofstandards to safety; resistance

by national laboratories and contractors to the use of standards; and lack of authority

over DOE field offices by appropriate DOE officers in Headquarters.

17
For reasons such as these, a set of coherent nuclear safety standards is neither welldeveloped nor in use at DOE defense nuclear facilities, in contrast to commercial

nuclear power plants being licensed and regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission. The Board I s assessments of DOE nuclear standards include appropriate

comparative evaluations of DOE standards and requirements with those of the NRC.

The Board does not imply that nuclear standards in commercial practice meet all DOE

needs.

DOE today faces several kinds of difficulties regarding safety standards and

requirements. First, there has been a decision to develop and issue a set of nuclear

safety rules following formal rulemaking procedures, a process that will be timeconsuming. Second, there is the need to issue safety directives that are substantially

more numerous than the rules planned for issuance. DOE recognizes both the nced for

rules and for directives and is making efforts to meet those needs. The Board believes

that the issuance of these more numerous and urgently needed safety directives should

not be unnecessarily delayed by protracted formal processes.

Beyond the problem of developing the rules and directives themselves, there is the

formidable one of assuring that they are put into effective use. The Secretary has stated

his intention to establish a new safety culture for nuclear activities within DOE.

Improved nuclear standards are indispensable to the establishment of this culture.

It is also difficult in many cases to identify the standards used in designing and

constructing existing defense nuclear facilities. Many of these facilities were built in

years past and in certain respects cannot and, in some cases, need not be expected to

meet current nuclear standards. DOE will need a policy for modifying such structures

or otherwise compensating for inability of those facilities to meet current standards.

This policy would be similar in purpose to the "back-fitting" policy used by NRC for

commercial nuclear power plants.

2. Overview of Impl'ovements in Safety at DOE Defense Nuclear Facilities

The Board's endeavors to ensure the health and safety of the public are channeled most

directly. through its process of issuing formal recommendations to the Secretary of

Energy. Nevertheless, this is not the only way in which the Board I s actions and

activities have had an impact on the status of nuclear safety in the Department of

Energy. Questions and comments by individual members of the Board and its staff and

technical experts during briefings and site inspections also have their effects, These

18
frequently highlight issues and lead to self-initiated changes and improvements in

DOE I S practices and technical directions.

In the following sections, improvements arc listed in which Board recommendations,

actions, and activities played substantial parts. It is seldom possible to define which

organization has primary and which has subsidiary responsibility for initiating

improvements that take place. The process that was defined in the enabling legislation

empowers the Board to recolIllIlend, while the decisions and the actions to implement

belong to DOE. Some improvements are the results of parallel initiatives in the DOE

and the Board.

3. Board Activities Leading to Improvements at MOl'e Than One Facility

a. Operator Training

The emphasis which the Board has assigned to the qualifications and training of

operators at the Savannah River production reactors and of workers at the plutonium

fabrication facilities at the Rocky Plats Plant has contributed to raising qualification

requirements and strengthening training programs and methods at both sites. A~ a

consequence, DOE sees the need to give more attention to such matters across the full

range of its defense nuclear facilities.

At the Rocky Plats Plant, the Board reviewed DOE and contractor progress in preparing

training course materials, establishing level of knowledge requirements for operator

qualification, and developing revised operating procedures. The Board determined that

procedures had been prepared without first insuring that the configuration ofthe process

work areas covered by the procedure was correctly taken into account. These discrepant

procedures, therefore, had to be revised extensively. Similarly, training materials

prepared, and training conducted based on those procedures, had to be redone. DOE

and the contractor are now developing procedures and training materials in a more

systematic manner.

b. Operational Readiness Reviews

. The Board has found numerous safety-related deficiencies at the Rocky Flats Plant.

Those deficiencies lead to a need for a comprehensive operational readiness review prior

to resumption of operations, a step that the Board has recommended in

Recommendation 90-4, which is described in this report.

19
The Board called special attention to the need for a readiness review group composed

of experienced individuals whose backgrounds collectively include all facets of the

unique operations involved. The names and qualifications of these individuals will be

carefully reviewed by the Board.

Board evaluations of operator knowledge at Rocky Flats included reviews of

examinations and also interviews of a number of operators. Based on these evaluations

and those at SRS, the Board recommended that the readiness review include assessment

of operator knowledge both as shown by written examination and also by selective oral

examination of operators by members of the review group. The Board attaches special

importance to oral examinations because they often disclose weaknesses not evident

from the written examination process.

DOE has informed the Board that it also intends to carry out an operational readiness

review prior to restart of the reactors at SRS.

c. Standllrds

Activities of the Board have contributed to DOE's increased attention to the

development and use of standards for defense-related nuclear facilities. The impetus

given by the Board is in part a result of two factors: (1) the requirement in the law that

the Board review and evaluate the content and implementation of DOE standards

including all applicllble DOE Orders, regulations, and requirements at each of the DOE

defense nuclear facilities and (2) widespread awareness of inadequacies and nonuniformities in the content and use of DOE Orders and standards affecting public health

and safety.

The Board's approach has been two-fold: (1) a comprehensive review of safety

standards and requirements for all DOE defense nuclear facilities as required and, (2)

lin immediate focus on standards at those facilities having high priority.

The Board has contracted with the MITRE Corporation for technical assistance in its

review of DOE standards. Under the Board's direction, the contractor developed a

comparative review ofsafety standards in DOE Orders and Savannah River Supplements

20
and the corresponding requirements for nuclear facilities regulated by the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC). The comparative review included the following safety

areas:

• design standards

• quality assurance

• safety analysis

• operations

• fire protection

• maintenance

• radiation protection

• radioactive waste management

• emergency planning

• safety issue identification, notification and resolution.

The contractor's Report to the Board identified numerous desirable corrective actions

for the standards and requirements program and was transmitted in draft form to the

Secretary of Energy and the Chairman of the NRC for comment on June 8, 1990, and

in final form to DOE on November 2, 1990. The Board received comments on the draft

Report from both DOE and NRC. The Board is currently evaluating the final report

and considering what recommendations or other actions are appropriate in light of the

Report. MITRE has also been tasked to support the Board and its staff in extending

this initial assessment to cover, in sequential fashion, DOE I s standards and

requirements efforts at other defense nuclear facilities, including review of the means

of implementing DOE requirements used by the Management and Operations

contractors of DOE facilities. This assessment effort continues at Savannah River and

is underway at the Rocky Flats, Hanford, and WIPP sites.

The second approach in the Board I s standards effort, directed toward high priority

facilities, was initiated by its Recommendation 90-2, referred to in an earlier section of

this report. The Secretary stated his agreement with the thrust of the recommcndation

and later provided an implementation plan and schedule.

The actions recommended by the Board to correct the deficiencies in DOE's safety

standards constitute a formidable task which will require much time and effort to

complete. It will be even more difficult to assure that standards are effectively

implemented at DOE defense facilities in design, construction, operation, and

decommissioning. Nevertheless, that implementation is required in the new and

improved safety culture which the Secretary is endeavoring to establish in DOE.

21
The Secretary has committed to placing safety standards on a sound foundation for DOE

defense nuclear facilities. To this end, he has reorganized DOE management in an

effort to focus responsibility, assigned higher priority to standard development, and kept

the Board informed of actions being taken.

d. Discipline of Operations

Operations are conducted in a disciplined manner when facilities are constructed in full

accordance with approved plans and instructions; when drawings accurately portray the

facilities as they actually have been built; when approved procedures are available and

are used for testing, operation, and maintenance; when training and qualification of

operators are accomplished using these procedures; and when quality assurance activities

provide independent confirmation that all the foregoing have been and are being

accomplished. Improvements have been made in the discipline with which facHities are

being readied for resumption of operations at the Savannah River reactors and the

Rocky Flats plant.

Following are some examples. At Rocky Flats the Board ascertained in May 1990 that

the operator and DOE did not plan to verify the operability of all systems as a

prerequisite to the contractor stating his readiness to resume operations. As late as

October, 1990, the plans for activities required for approval of resumption of plutonium

operations included only tests of modified equipment and verification of the operability

of parts of some systems stated as essential in the existing Final Safety Analysis Report.

Thorough checkout and operational tests of equipment were to have been postponed

until after approval by DOE to resume plutonium operations. Subsequently, and after

questioning by the Board, DOE decided that all equipment that could reasonably be

operated would be tested before resumption of operations is approved. This will bring

Rocky Flats practice in conformity with commercial practice for resuming operations

after a lengthy outage.

There is a process, used in the commercial nuclear field, called configuration control.

That process includes maintaining the drawings and written descriptions of the plant and

its components and keeping them up to date. For older plants it was necessary to

confirm,that the configuration of the plant was correctly reflected by the drawings and

the descriptions and, where this was not the case, to correct the erroneous information.

This process is called configuration control.

At Rocky Flats the Board found that the contractor's program to confirm the validity

of the as-built configuration of systems, essential to satisfying the requirements for the

22
Final Safety Analysis Report, was flawed. Subsequent to this finding, DOE and the

contractor replaced the existing program with a new one and the Board will evaluate the

new program I s adequacy.

At Savannah River it was observed that there was no adequate plan for systematically

transferring operational control of systems and equipment to the Reactor Opcrations

Dcpartment at the completion of outage work. The Board's continuing queries about

this problem were a factor in the development of a procedure for establishing proper

system conditions for operation following an outage.

Also at Savannah River reactors, it was observed that there had been a pattern offailure

to maintain a current master copy of drawings and diagrams as plant modifications were

made over a span of several years. The contractor had developed an ambitious plan to

correct this deficiency. As a result of the Board I s review, the contractor introduced

priorities into this plan. The sequence of corrective actions has now been focused in

such a way as to better support restart, by placing greater and earlier emphasis on those

system diagrams and descriptions needed to develop operating procedures and to

prepare plans and materials for training.

e. Seismic Engineering for Nuclear Waste Tanks

The Board is examining the adequacy of the design of nuclear waste tanks to resist

seismic and other external events. This is being done in conjunction with the Board's

activities at SRS, the Hanford Site, and the remainder of the DOE complex.

The design, construction, and contractor evaluations of the nuclear waste tanks at the

Savannah River Site and the Hanford Site are being examined to assess the adequacy

of these tanks to resist seismic events. This requires establishing the standards which

were used for the original design and construction and those used for upgrades and

modifications. The Board and its experts will continue this activity; to date, the activity

has been effective in impressing upon DOE the importance of adequate designs.

At the Board's suggestion, DOE has initiated an effort to develop a common rationale

for the design, construction, operation, maintenance, and decommissioning of nuclear

waste tanks across the complex. Seismic engineering is the first focus. This was initiated

by a workshop involving the Board, the Savannah River Site, the Hanford Site, the Oak

Ridge Site, the Idaho Site, the West Valley Site, and DOE Headquarters. Continuing

this activity will enhance nuclear safety across the complex. The Board is reviewing the

design and construction of the new waste tanks being constructed at the Idaho Site.

23
4. Board Activities Leading to Improvements at the Rocky Flats Plant

a. Systematic Evaluation Program

It is expected that DOE I S actions related to establishment of a Systematic Evaluation

Program (SEP) at Rocky Flats and at the Savannah River Reactors will result in

significant safety improvements if these programs are suitably implemented. The

purpose of such programs is to provide a framework within which long term safety

improvements to existing facilities can be evaluated, coordinated, and prioritized, taking

into account, among other factors, the length of time the facility will continue to be

operated. This addresses the problem referred to earlier, of devising a process for

upgrading old facilities that were not built to meet current standards. The Board

recommended on May 18, 1990, that a SEP be established at Rocky Flats (see

Recommendation 90-5 above), and was informed by the Secretary of Energy in letters

dated June 13 and October 15, 1990, that DOE not only agreed with the Board I S

recommendation to establish a SEP at Rocky Flats, but also that DOE would, on its own

motion, establish and implement a similar program at Savannah River.

In doing so, the Secretary demonstrated that he shared the Board's expectation that

establishment and implementation of suitable Systematic Evaluation Programs at the

Rocky Flats and Savannah River Reactor Facilities would lead to significant safety

improvements.

b. Safety Analyses

In discussions between the Board Members and representatives of the Rocky Flats

contractor, the Board made clear that it does not find the existing safety analyses of the

Rocky Flats facilities to be satisfactory or convincing. The analyses develop estimates

of the probable annual rate of consequences from accidents, but they do not provide an

estimate of the effects ofsingle accidents that are thought to have small though non-zero

possibilities of occurrence. Furthermore, the analyses do not extend to the largest of the

natural events that are considered possible, such as earthquakes and storms. Finally, in

places they assume the mitigating effects of equipment that in a number of cases has

been found to be inoperative or unreliable.

As a result of the Board I S concerns in this arca, DOE and its contractor have convened

a group of expert advisers to review and improve the safety analyses. The tentative

results of their review of Building 559, the analysis laboratory at Rocky Flats, is presently

under review by the Board, its staff, and its technical advisers. It is expected that this

24
review, when extended to the rest of the Rocky Flats establishment, will have a

significant impact on safety of the Rocky Flats Plant.

c. Plutonium Removal Program

DOE I S actions to remove fissile and other material from the duct work at the Rocky

Flats Plant will improve nuclear safety. These DOE actions are in response to the

Board's Recommendation 90-6. Completion of actions required by the accompanying

implementation plan should prevent a nuclear criticality event in the ducts, reduce the

potential for adversely effecting the health and safety of the pUblic, and reduce the

potential radiation exposure to the plant work force. Included in the actions are an

ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) program. Hence, safety will be improved at

the site.

d. Seismic Engineering Programs

The Rocky Flats facilities were designed and constructed using early building codes and

standards. Several seismic and structural upgrades have been implemented over the

years to improve seismic safety. However, these upgrades have not been implemented

through a systematic review and evaluation. As part of DOE I S response to

Recommendation 90-5, the seismic capabilities and upgrades are to be assessed and

improvements undertaken as necessary. Proper implementation of this program should

improve safety at the site.

5. Board Activities Leading to Improvements at the Savannah River Site

The Board has concentrated on several technical issues that require resolution prior to

restart. These are, prhnarily, operation of the Emergcncy Cooling System (ECS), the

integrity of the vessel and piping systems containing the coolant for the reactors, and the

ability of the reactors to resist seismic events. Other technical issues are also under

review: the adequacy of the probabilistic safety assessment and the insights to be gained

from it, the reliability of the electronics used for control and safety systems, and the

character and adequacy of the Supplementary Safety System (SSS). The BOltrd has also

been giying careful attention to the closure of the numerous issues that the Savannah

River contractor has identified as requiring resolution before restart and later, and to

Unusual Occurrence Reports arising from operations about the reactors. The focus by

the Board on all of these matters has had a significant impact on the attention being

devoted to them by DOE and its contractor.

25
a. Emergency Cooling System

The effectiveness of the ECS to cool the reactor after an accident caused by brcaking

of a large pipe would depend on the power level of the reactor over the period

preceding the accident. If that power level were too high, the effectiveness of the ECS

would not be sufficient to prevent damage from being so severe as to dcstroy the core

of the reactor. with extensive release of fission products. It is important to determine

a maximum power level at which the reactor can be al10wed to operate without risking

such a result. Members of the Board and its staff and technical experts have had

numerous briefings by personnel represented by DOE and its contractor, to explore the

technical basis for a maximum power level for future operation of the Savannah River

reactors. This crucial issue has not yet been resolved to the satisfaction of the Board,

and DOE and its contractor are being pressed to provide and justify a high level of

assurance.

b. Vessel and Piping Integrity of the K, L, and P Reactors

The vessels to contain the cores of the K, 1., and P reactors are being examined by

ultrasonic means to determine if they have flaws or cracks that might grow to become

leakage paths for the reactor coolant. Similar ultrasonic examination is being made of

the stainless steel piping in the process water system. Members of the Board, its staff,

and its technical experts have met frequently with representatives of DOE and its

contractor to ascertain the methods and the results of these examinations. A meeting

was held with members of an expert review committee which DOE had convened to

advise on the adequacy of this program. The Board has not yet reached a judgment

relative to the adequacy of the examinations and the acceptability of their results.

Nevertheless, the recognition that the Board considcrs this general topic to be one that

must be resolved prior to restart has increased the attention being given to it by DOE

and its contractor.

c. SeIsmic Engineering

Since the formation of the Board, considerable Board attention has been focused on the

ability of the K, P, and L nuclear reactors at the Savannah River Site (SRS) to resist

seismic and other external events. Considerable efforts are being made by DOE's

contractor to confirm and establish the seismic design adequacy of these nuclear rcactors

prior to restart. Members of the Board and its staff meet with DOE and its contractor

on scismic topics at least once a month. This allows a detailed examination and

understanding of thc scismic program and upgrades being implemented by thc DOE.

26
Both a short-term and a long-term detailed seismic engineering program had been

established at the Savannah River Site prior to the formation of the Board. The Board

has been effective in enhancing safety by careful examination of the details of the SRS

program. As a result, DOE has moved to adjust and accelerate the program. Included

in these actions for safety enhancements are:

• Acceleration of the procurement of seismically upgraded containment filters and

installation of the upgraded filters as soon as available. The new filters are

expected to be available in approximately 18 months (42 months previously).

• Continuation of the efforts to upgrade the current filter design by means of

bracing and testing, during the short term pending procurement of new design

filters.

• Acceleration of the walkdown of the confinement system to begin no later than

July 1, 1990. The modifications resulting from these walkdowns would be

initiated prior to restart and the modifications would be complete in the 3 year

time frame (5 years previously).

• Implementation of a soils characterization program at SRS. Comments

concerning "grout take" tests and "resonant column" tests will be incorporated

into the work, and the Board will be kept informed on the status and results of

this effort.

• Performance of additional analysis of the cooling water basin. This analysis was

to be completed in approximately 5 months.

• Performance of stress analyses of the cooling water system piping and other safe

shutdown system piping prior to restart and keeping the Board informed on the

status of this effort.

• Documentation of the bases for selection of the Design Basis Earthquake at a

level of content similar to Section 2.5 of commercial reactor safety analyses

~eports. This documentation will include the evaluation of thc Pen Branch fault.

• Provision of an expanded evaluation of the margins of safety indicated by

calculations for the allowable bearing pressure under the basement of the Stack

and Reactor buildings.

27
• Establishment of a baseline for applicability of codes, standards and engineering

practices applied in thc restart effort. This effort will include review of past and

current activities to preclude inappropriate use of partial code requirements.

• Review and revision of the load combinations for seismic evaluation to assure

that loadings typically analyzed under an operating basis earthquake loading for

commercial reactors are adequately considered.

Recommendation 90-5 resulted in the development and establishment of a Systematic

Evaluation Program at the Rocky Flats Plant. In its response to the Board for this

recommendation, DOE also committed to develop and establish a Systematic Evaluation

Program at the Savannah River Site. Included in this program will be the long term

seismic engineering program.

6. Board Activities Leading to Improvements at the Hanford Waste Tanks

Two safety problems stand out at the Hanford Site regarding storage of high level waste

from reprocessing activities in the past. The first concerns certain single shell tanks

which contain a ferrocyanide residue from extraction of fission product cesium a number

of years ago. It was suggested some years ago that under certain circumstances the

ferrocyanide might explode, causing large amounts ofresidue containing fission products

to be ejected from the tanks. The second problem involves some double-walled tanks,

where a phenomenon known as slurry growth occurs. This process is especially

pronounced in one tank, 101-SY, where periodically large amounts of hydrogen and the

oxidant nitrous oxide are generated and released. This mixture is flammable, and

potentially explosive. At least partly in response to concerns expressed by the Board I s

members, staff, and technical experts during a number of discussions over the past year,

DOE has assembled a high level advisory group to monitor all issues concerning high

level waste tanks at DOE establishments, and has formed a project staff to oversee the

programs for resolution of problems. The I-Ianford contractor has reorganized and

elevated the importance of the groups assigned to surveillance of high level waste tanks

and resolution of problems associated with them.

!l. Single Shell Tanks

The Board I s activities regarding the single shell tanks containing ferrocyanide

compounds are discussed in other sections of this report. ''rwo sets of recommendations

on the single shell tanks, numbered 90-3 and 90-7, were transmitted to the Secretary of

Energy during the year. In effect, it was pointed out that the Board cOllsidered the

21\
probability of an explosion in the ferrocyanide tanks to be low, but in the light of

consequences that might be high, recommended an extensive monitoring program to

ensure that conditions increasing the chance of an explosion will not develop. More

extensive sampling of the contents of the tanks and enlargement of a related research

program needed for better evaluation of the probability and consequences of an

explosion were also recommended. The research is especially needed because of the

results of a GAO-sponsored review of the single shell tank issue, which found that the

consequences of an explosion in these tanks could be greater than the DOE and the

contractor had earlier believed. The DOE and the Hanford contractor are now

committed to introducing the monitoring, sampling, and research programs

recommended by the Board. The Board continues to follow this program, and in

discussions between some of its members and the DOE staff has made it clear that the

schedule for implementation as it has been formulated so far is not rapid enough.

b. Double-Walled Tauks

Although the slurry growth problem was recognized interually by the Hanford

establishment, it was questions by the Board I s technical experts that brought it out into

the open and led to an intensive program to address it. The technical problem

of resolving this slurry growth issue has been made more difficult by the inability to

identify a single specific phenomenon as its cause, and by uncertainty as to the chemical

composition and physical distribution of material within the tanks, especially 101-SY.

In particular, it is necessary to make sure that the thick crust in the tank does not have

a chemical composition that might also cause the crust to ignite or explode if a hydrogen

event took place. In discussions with representatives of the DOE and the Hanford

contractor, members of the Board have made it clear that they believe sampling should

be done as soon as possible, to find out why the slurry growth phenomenon occurs and

to lay to rest any concerus that the crust may burn or explode. Samples have now been

taken of the surface of the crust and they show that if the remainder of the crust has the

same composition as the surface, concerns as to its adding to any explosive release are

allayed. The Board is still of the opinion that the implementation of the sampling

program at Tank 101-SY is too slow, and that it is being delayed by a safety analysis

process that is too complex.

7. Secretary of Energy's Initiative to Improve Safety and Health Programs at DOE

There arc a number of areas where the Secretary of Energy has independently attempted

fundamental improvements in DOE I S health and safety culture. In September of 1989,

the Secretary issued Notice (SEN-11-89), "Setting a New DOE Comse". This Notice

29
established a comprehensive set of objectives, many of which must be achieved to assure

protection of public health and safety at defense nuclear facilities. These objectives

provide a useful framework against which to measure DOE safety accomplishments in

the future.

Addressing the issue of DOE accountability for such matters as health and safety, the

Secretary noted that "the very large majority of our work in the field is actually carried

out by contractors." "But," he continued, "this fact in no way relieves DOE managers

of their governmental responsibilities to assure that contractors I primary duties are

performed in accordance with expected high standards of professional excellence." This

acknowledgement of DOE responsibility is offundamental importance to assuring health

and safety. It is a much-needed reversal of traditional DOE perceptions and practices,

which placed inordinate reliance on contractor intentions and capabilities. During 1990,

the Secretary and key management made significant progress in developing recognition

among DOE staff of their responsibilities for health and safety.

The Notice emphasized the need for Federal employees in line managers to have

sufficient skills. "Accordingly," the Secretary wrote, "I intend to establish permanent

positions and put in place DOE people with capabilities necessary to support line

managers in the execution of their oversight responsibilities in both field and

headquarters positions." It is evident to the Board that during 1990 many well-qualified

individuals have been added to DOE defense nuclear organizations, both from outside

DOE and by reassignment from within DOE. Also, the Secretary has established a new

organization to strengthen the acquisition, training, and development of such personnel.

DOE cannot be expected to bring technical capabilities of DOE defense nuclear

organizations up to needed levels in a year t s time. Rather, where appropriate technical

strength has been achieved in DOE, as, for example, in the Naval Reactors organization,

the effort to reach this goal has been sustained over a period of years by determined top

management, giving priority attention to personnel selection and training.

Another objective of the Secretary was to "[s]trengthen independent internal oversight

responsibilities within Environment, Safety, and Health (EH) and other designated

offices ... as required to monitor effectiveness of DOE management in execution of

policies set by DOE, particularly in areas of environment, safety, health, and security."

Progress toward achieving this objective has been evident. For onc thing, there is

improved understanding of the proper relationship between line organizations in

achieving safety and health objectives, and the internal oversight organizations in

providing independent confirmation that objectives are being pursued or have been

achieved.

30
Complementing the objective concerning internal oversight, the Notice called for effort

to "Work constructively with external oversight bodies to build a system that will provide

proper external checks of the Department I s line and oversight management practices. "

In working toward this objective the Secretary, key managers, staff, and contractors have

all given the Board their full cooperation.

TIle Notice called attention to the need for a "major overhaul" in the DOE I s system

for reporting, analyzing, and following up on abnormal situations affecting, or with the

potential for affecting, environment, health, safety, and security. The stated purpose was

to "minimize unwarranted surprises and maximize operational effectiveness." A new

system was developed promptly and promulgated by DOE Order 5000.3A on December

21, 1990. Progress toward effective implementation has been observed and the Board

has called DOE's attention to areas where further progress is needed.

The requirement for a strong incident reporting system as set forth in the DOE Order

is itself a significant safety step forward. It has the potential for providing both DOE

and contractor management with a tool of major importance in assuring safe operation

of defensc nuclcar facilities. Although this potential has been well known in principle,

DOE and its predecessors had not taken advantage of it previously.

C. Administrative and Management Issues

While addressing the complex task of selecting both the DOE sites and the safety issues

at these sites on which the Board concentrated its early reviews and evaluations, the

logistics associated with the organization of a new Executive Branch establishment

proved to be equally challenging. Issues such as personnel hiring authority, office space,

records management, procurement oftechnical experts, and travel to DOE sites required

immediate attention if the Board was to quickly initiate its health and safety review

activities.

During 1990 the Board made significant progress in building the support structure

needed to ensure that the management and administrative necessities of a new

organization were properly in place to support the full range of technical review

activitie,s required in our enabling legislation.

1. Budget

The Board's fiscal year 1990 funding availability was $8,865,000. Obligations totaled

approximately $6,956,000 and were divided into four major categories:

31
• Salaries and benefits totaled $1.4 million or nearly 20 percent of all

expenditures.

• Fixed costs, such as building rents and utilities, and other support costs,

such as postage, telephones and telecommunications, data processing and

printing, and supplies and materials amounted to $1.5 million or about 22

percent of obligations.

• Contracts, primarily for technical expertise and interagency support

agreements, amounted to $3.9 million or almost 56 percent of obligations.

• Travel to the DOE defense nuclear facilities for site reviews and

investigations totaled $168,000.

2. ReCl'uitment of Technical Personnel

One of the most critical administrative challenges that the Board encountered during

"start-up" was the recruitment of senior scientific and engineering staff with expertise

in one or more fields, as well as experienced administrative personnel.

As a starting point, the Board arranged for the temporary use of two senior managers

and a senior trial attorney from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to plan and

organize the required administrative support functions of the Board. The Board entered

into an interagency support agreement with the General Services Administration for

logistical support in areas such as payroll processing, accounting, commercial payments

of vendors, official travel, and the processing of personnel actions. The Board also

arranged with the National Science Foundation for support in the preparation of the

Board 1 s contracts for technical experts, and with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) for the testing of applicants and employees for illegal drug use.

The task of locating and hiring esscntial technical personnel proved to be formidable.

The technical nature of the work, coupled with a short supply of talent, placed the Board

in direct competition with other government agencies and with private industry for

individuals possessing the required technical skills. Under these circumstances, the

ability to extend immediate job offers to selected individuals with the requisite technical

expertise is important to the operation of the Board.

The Board found that the competitive hiring and job classification rulcs of the Civil

Service System could not support the Board's accelerated recruiting program. The

32
Board was limited to the salary level for senior scientific and engineering personnel to

the GS 15, Step 10 pay level.

In late December 1989 the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) granted the Board

temporary direct hire authority as an interim solution to the Board I s recruiting

problems. While this authority was a step in the right direction, it did not convey some

of the benefits of "excepted service" appointments that other technical agencies such

as the NRC have used to attract their scientific and engineering staff. The need for this

appointment authority and its impact on the Board I s ability to build a highly competent

staff were emphasized in our FY 1991 appropriations and oversight testimony.

Recognizing the unique requirements for scientific and engineering personnel of the

highest calibre to address the health and safety questions associated with the design,

construction, operation, and decommissioning of DOE's defense nuclear facilities,

Congress amended the appointment and compensation authorities of the Board for

scientific and engineering personnel in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

year 1991. Thnt statute now provides the Board with the necessary excepted

appointment authority.

The recruitment of scientific and engineering experts will continue to challenge the

Board, but considering the serious national health and safety issucs that must be

addressed, the task of hiring personnel with the prerequisite experience and skill must

be a deliberate one. With the "exempted appointment" authority to hire scientific and

engineering staff given to the Board by Congress in the FY 1991 Defense Authorization

Act, the Board has significantly strengthened its nbility to compete with other Federal

agencies and the private sector for the talent to properly perform its mission.

3. Contracting for Technical Expertise

The need for scientific and engineering expertise to assist the Board in its oversight of

the defense nuclear facilities required the immediate use of specialized contractor

experts. During this "starHlp" phase, the Board initiated 14 technical contracts with

leading experts in such fields as thermal hydraulics, seismic engineering, probabilistic risk

assessment, system piping integrity, and safety of waste tanks. Each technical expert with

which t}1e Board contmcts is carefully screened for possible conflicts of interest.

These experts have provided valuable assistance to the Board on public health and safety

issues while the Board actively recruits staff with the desired technical experience to

meet the Board's statutory mission. While the Board will continue to make every effort

33
to hire staff as quickly as is reasonable, the technical nature of the subject matter and

issues that the Board must address warrant continued use of outside experts.

The Board has a broad mandate to carry out oversight functions to help assure public

health and safety. While the Board intends to recruit and maintain a capable and

diversified technical staff, it is not practical or desirable to have permanent staff skilled

in every specialty for which needs might occur. For example, the evaluation of safety

at the Hanford tanks requires, among other factors, a knowledge and understanding of

the explosive potential of materials in those tanks. But, such skills are not needed for

the Board to make evaluations, except in rare cases. Thus, we see the need on a

continuing basis to obtain contractor support in highly specialized areas or other areas

where the staff resources of the Board are insufficient.

4. Management Reviews and Audits

In August 1990, the Board contracted with the Institute of Public Administration (lPA),

a not-for-profit entity, for a review of the Board I s statutory charter and for

recommendations that would foster maximum management effectiveness. The IPA

review was conducted by a team of former senior level Federal government officials.

The review centered on the Board's start-up activities, including such areas as

personnel, procurement, and general administrative services of the Board. Specific

attention was focused on the Board I s system of internal financial controls.

The IPA review presented the Board with an excellent examination of the areas outlined

above. The report contained specific recommendations on areas where the Board could

strengthen its operations through internal actions or through legislative initiatives. The

Board received IPA' s formal written report in November 1990, and is carefully

evaluating their findings and recommendations on ways to improve or strengthen the

operations of the Board.

5. Litigation

Shortly after the Board was created, the Natural Resources Defense Council and the

Energy,Research Foundation notified the Board, on January 23, 1990, that those groups

intended to bring suit against the Board for alleged noncompliance with the Freedom

of Information Act (FOIA) and the Government in the Sunshine Act (Sunshine Act).

When the groups actually brought their civil action in Federal District Court in

Washington, D.C. on March 8, 1990, they sought, among other relief, a preliminary

injunction enjoining the Board from meeting until the Sunshine Act was complied with,

34
including the promulgation ofBoard regulations governing meetings pursuant to 5 V.S.c.

§552b(g). At the time the complaint was filed, the Board was formulating

recommendations regarding the potential for explosion in certain Hanford tanks, and was

also considering serious health and safety issues at the Rocky Flats Plant, the SRS, and

other defense nuclear facilities. Since injunctive reliefwould have seriously damaged the

Board I s ability to ensure health and safety at defense nuclear facilities, the Board and

its staff expended considerable time in successfully opposing the imposition of the

preliminary injunction.

This case is the only judicial action filed against the Board to date. In the complaint,

the plaintiffs requested that the Court declare that the Board (a) was subject to the

Sunshine Act but was not complying with any of its requirements; (b) was subject to the

FOIA but was failing to promulgate regulations and make agency records available to

the public as required by FOIA; and (c) was unlawfully withholding and unreasonably

delaying agency action, and was acting arbitrarily, capriciously, and contrary to law, in

violation of the APA. Plaintiffs later amended their unconditional demand that the

Court enjoin Board meetings until the Board had first published rules. In March of

1990, the Board agreed to treat all FOIA requests for documents as if that Act applied.

On March 30, 1990, the District Court granted the Board I s motion for summary

judgment and dismissed the complaint, stating neither the Sunshine Act nor FOIA

applied to the Board because it was not an "agency". The Court of Appeals reversed

the district court, holding that the Board was an "agency" for purposes of FOIA and

Sunshine Act.

After reviewing the Circuit Court's opinion, the Board requested the Department of

Justice (DOJ) to seek a rehearing on those portions of the decision relating to the

Sunshine Act. Constructive consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General and

DOJ indicated that although the Board I s position was sound, the Board I s best interest

would not be served by arguing the extent of the Act's applicability to Board activities

within the framework of the record developed for this case. Accordingly, the Board

receded from its request for further appellate review. The Board awaits the District

Court's order.

Pending the decision on rehearing, the Board took a number of steps to fully comply

with all applicable law. While the Board believed that the Court erred, and that

rehearing was warranted, it nevertheless promptly took steps toward implementing the

Sunshine Act. The Board's General Counsel began reviewing other agency regulations

as possible models for the Board's FOIA and Sunshine Act regulations; he advised the

35
Board of the changes in Board operations that would be necessitated by full

implementation of those two laws. The Board's staff explored the feasibility of installing

permanent recording devices for its meetings. The Board arranged for an attorney to

be detailed to the Board from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to, among other

things, assist in taking the necessary actions to bring the Board into compliance the

Circuit Court's ruling.

Since the decision to not seek rehearing, the Board has issued its proposed Sunshine Act

regulations in the Federal Register and is awaiting pUblic comment. The Board has

conducted public meetings pursuant to the Sunshine Act. The Board anticipates that its

proposed FOJA regulations will ready for Federal Register notice by March, 1991. In

the meantime all requests for non-public Board records will continue to be treated in

accord with FOIA requirements.

6. RegulatolY Agenda

The Board has developed a regulatory agenda which calls for the promulgation of

regulations mandated by law in addition to the Board's FOIA and Sunshine rules.

Preliminary work has been completed for rules covering the Board's hearing practices

and procedures, the Privacy Act, conflicts-of-interests, the Equal Employment

Opportunity Act, and employees standards of conduct.

7. otUce Space in Washington D.C.

The process of locating sufficient office space to accommodate the needs of the Board

and completing the design and construction process proved to be a slow and difficult

task. In September 1990, after almost a year in temporary quarters as a result of two

interim moves, the Board began operations from its new facilities at 625 Indiana Avenue,

N.W., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. The Board now has the necessary office space to

accommodate the Board's technical, legal and administrative staff and to provide

sufficient space for conferences, meetings, and hearings, as wen as its technical library.

36
Part 2

REPORT OF THE BOARD ON

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES

INTRODUCTION

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's (Boa(d) enabling statute, 42 U.S.C. §2286

et seq., September 29, 1988, establishes the boundades of the Boa(d I s jurisdiction

rega(ding public health and safety issues at Depa(tment of Energy (DOE) defense

nuclear facilities. Delineation of the Board's cunent jmisdiction under its enabling

legislation (equi(es an in"depth analysis of the definitions and terms of art relevant to

Board operations. The following analysis ofthe Board's current jmisdictionallimits will

serve as a springboard for an assessment, required by Congress, of "whether nuclear

facilities ... that are excluded from the definition of I Department of Energy defense

nuclear facility' in section 318(1)(C) ... should be subject to independent external

oversight. " I

SCOPE OF THE BOARD'S JURISDICTION

A. Public Health and Safety Matters

The Board I sjmisdiction extends to "public health and safety" issues at "United States

Department of Energy defense nuclear facilities. ,,2 The various provisions of the statute

and their attendant legislative history indicate that Congress ~eneraIlY intended the

phrase "public health and safety" to be construed broadly. For example, both

Congress and the Board have interpreted the public to include workers at defense

nuclea( facilities.

The principal unresolved issue in this regard is the extent to which environmental issues

are also public health and safety issues. While Congress refused to expressly include

37
"environment" with the term "public health and safety" in the Board's statutory grant

ofjurisdiction, the legislative history indicates that Congress knew that the lines between

environmental and health issues were unclear.4 Furthermore, the principal Senate

Committee report on the Board's enabling statute indicates that Congress intended to

be flexible on the issue, and allow the Board to consider environmental issues related

to production operations where the Board saw connections with public health and safety

issues. At the samc time, the Committee emphasized that most environmental

remediation or cleanup was to be conducted pursuant to other laws. The report

language itself is significant enough to warrant repetition here:

SAFETY VERSUS ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES

Compounding this problem is the frequent confusion between production

safety issues at the DOE complex and the environmental waste problem

that has been building up since the Manhattan Project. There is no

question that the defense nuclear complex's managers made serious

mistakes, beginning years ago, in ignoring the long-term implications of

disposal practices for radioactive and toxic waste. The magnitude of the

problem, although not yet fUlly documented, is enormous.

• • •

Despite the tendency to lump safety and environmental issues together,

the two are distinct in existing law and should be kept so in any proposed

legislation....The Govern-mental Affairs Committee, the GAO, and the

NAS have all asserted that a safety board is needed to ensure that meeting

production requirements docs not overshadow the need for safe

production. The Armed Services Committee agrees completely with that

rationale. DOE's environmental legacy is a separate issue that is being

dealt with under existing law.

• • •

The Committee believes that it is both unnecessary and inappropriate to

extend a safety board I s mandate to include environmental restoration

matters. This belief stems not from a view that the Department I s

cnvironmental problems are unimportant or insignificant in scope; nor

does the Committee deny that the distinction between safety issues and

environmental issues can in some instances be blurred. The Committee

emphasizes, however, that a distinction exists, and that other legislative

remedies and oversight of environmental problems are already in

existence. Environmental matters in DOE--the management of waste

operations and the cleanup of existing waste sites·oare already heavily

38
regulated by EPA and the states under the Superfund and RCRA

legislation.

Given the existence of a comprehensive regulatory regime, It IS not

neccssary to assign an cnvironmental ovcrsight role to a safety board. For

one thing, the technical issues are quite different, requiring different--and

additional--expertise within the Board. Second, it would needlessly dilute

the focus and mission of the Board. Third, insofar as the Board's basic

mission is to ensure that, in satisfying production requirements, the

commitment to safety is not compromised, it is hard to discern a rationale

for including environmental restoration in the Board's charter or for

citing environmental problems in the justification for creating the Board

in the first place.

The distinction between safety and environmental issues, in the

Committee's view, should be that safety includes unintended releases

from on-going production opcrations, which is a concept that would

exclude normal waste management operations and remedial actions

associated with existing waste storage sites. The Committee stresses that

a safety board should not be prohibited outright from crossing that

potentially elusive line; the Committee seeks only to clarify its intention

that safety of production operations must be the Board I s primary

concern.s

Thus, Congress recognized a need for Board oversight of the environmental

consequences of production operations, while reserving for other segments of the

government the primary responsibility for environmental restoration and cleanup. The

Board, however, has explicit jurisdiction over nuclear waste storage facilities, such as the

Hanford tanks which were the subject of Board recommendation 90"3 and 90-7 reported

upon in a previous section. The Board is also reviewing health and safety issues at the

DOE I S Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The scope of the Board I sjurisdiction over

environmental issues is subjected to further analysis in the report on the Board's

oversight of certain nuclear waste storage facilities.

B. The· Limits of Defense Nuclear Facilities

The enabling statute limits Board purview to health and safety issues at DOB "defense

nuclear facilities," the key jurisdictional term in the Act. The precise contours of the

Board I s jurisdiction relative to "defense nuclear facilities" can only be determined by

inquiry into the definition and exclusions contained in the enabling statute:

39
As used in this chapter, the term "Department of Energy

defense nuclear facility" means any of the following:

(1) A production facility or utilization facility (as defined in

section 2014 of this title) that is under the control or

jurisdiction of the Secretary of Energy and that is operated

for national security purposes, but the term does not

include--

(A) any facility or activity covered by

Executive Order No. 12344, dated February 1,

1982, pertaining to the Naval nuclear

propulsion program; (B) any facility or

activity involved with the assembly or testing

of nuclear explosives or with the

transportation of nuclear explosives or nuclear

material; or (C) any facility that does not

conduct atomic energy defense activities.

(2) A nuclear waste storage facility under the control or

jurisdiction of the Secretary of Energy, but the term does

not include a facility developed pursuant to the Nuclear

Waste Policy Act of 1982 (42 U.S.c. §101O1 et seq.) and

licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

42 U.S.c. §2286g.

C. The Three Basic Categories of DOE Defense Nuclear Facilities

A first reading of the Board I s jurisdictional statement indicates there are three basic

types of defense nuclear facilities covered by the enabling statute: certain production

facilities, utilization facilities, and waste storage facilities.

However, not every DOE production, utilization, and waste facility falls within the

Board's purview. Each of these three terms itself contains qualifiers which limit the

term I s reach to certain facilities within the entire DOE complex.6 Furthermore, the

statute contains explicit exclusions of some facilities that otherwise meet the definition

of defense nuclear facilities. Therefore, to actually delineate the Board's jurisdiction

requires not only a detailed analysis of the relevant definitions, together with their

qualifiers and exclusions, but also a careful tracing of the definitions through their

development in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, collateral definitions, and listings of

40
facilities. The process requires an unravelling of nested definitions and terms to

determine the extent of the Board I s jurisdiction.

1. Production Facilities

The first category of defense nuclear facilities encompasses "production facilities" that

are (1) under the control or jurisdiction of the Secretary of Energy, and (2) that are

operated for national security purposes.? The term "production facility" itself is defined

elsewhere in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, to which the Board I s enabling statute was

appended:

(1) any equipment or device determined by rule of the

Commission to be capable of the production of special

nuclear material in such quantity as to be of significance to

the common defense and security, or in such manner as to

affect the health and safety of the public; or (2) any

important component part especially designed fOf such

equipment or device as determined by the Commission.

42 U.S.c. §2014(v).8

It is clear from this definition that a "facility" includes equipment, device, or

component. Thus, a single DOE site might possess defense nuclear production facilities,

even if the site is not dedicated solely to production activities. The production device

or equipment must, however, be operated for "national security purposes" to meet the

enabling Act I s criteria for a defense nuclear facility.

As a reading of this section indicates, there are five othef tenns, defined by statute, that

shape, by inclusion and exclusion, the profile of a DOE production facility: "special

nuclear material", "common defense and security", "component", "produce", and

"source material",9

The term "produce" when used in relation to "special nuclear material" means:

(l) to manufacture, make, produce, or refine special nuclear

material; (2) to sepamte special nuclear material from other

substances in which such material may be contained; Of

(3) to make or to produce new special nucleaf material.

42 V.S.c. §2014(u).

41
The term "special nuclear material" is dcfined as:

(1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the

isotope 235, and any other material which the

Commission,1O pursuant to the provisions of section 2071 of

this title [42], determines to be special nuclear material, but

does not include source material; or (2) any material

artificially enriched by any of the foregoing, but does not

include source material. 42 U.S.c. §2014(aa).

The definition ofspecial nuclear material excludes raw ores or other "source materials"

which are defined as:

(1) uranium, thorium, or any other material which is

determined by the Commission pursuant to the provisions of

section 2091 of this title to be source material; or (2) ores

containing one or more of the foregoing materials, in such

concentration as the Commissionll may by regulation

determine from time to time. 42 U.S.c. §2014(z).

Since source materials are excluded from the definition of special nuclear materials,

mining operations and other source material acquisition activities are excluded from the

jurisdiction of the Board, because they are not production facilities.

The term "common defense and security" means:

the common defense and security of the United States.

42 U.S.C. §2014(g).

Although undefined by statute, "components,,12 are included with devices and

equipment in the definitions of both "production facilities" and "utilization facilities".

When all the relevant dcfinitions are read together, and simplified for ease of

understanding, a defense nuclear fucility dedicated to production is a device or other

equip1l\cnt capable of manufacturing or producing special nuclear materials, or

components, which are significant to the common defense and security of the United

States. The Atomic Energy Act authorizes DOE to further delineate defense production

facilities by rule, but has done so only in very limited contextsY No definitive rule or

listing of production and utilization facilities under the Board's jurisdiction has been

adopted by DOE. Under Supreme Court doctrine, the Bourd's interpretation of the

42
scope of the jurisdiction provision contained in its enabling statute is entitled to great

deference.14

2. Utilization Facilities

The second category of defense nuclear facilities encompasses utilization facilities that

(1) are under the control or jurisdiction of the Secretary of Energy, and (2) that are

operated for national security purposes.IS The term "utilization facility" is defined in

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 as the following:

(1) any equipment or device, except an atomic weapon,

determined by rule . . . to be capable of making use of

special nuclear material in such quantity as to be of

significance to the common defense and security, or in such

manner as to affect the health and safety of the public, or

peculiarly adapted for making use of atomic energy in such

quantity as to be of significance to the common defense and

security, or in such manner as to affect the health and safety

of the public; or (2) any important component part

especially designed for such equipment or device as

determined by the Commission.16 42 U.S.c. §2014(cc).

The definition of utilization facility incorporates or excludes certain subgroups of

facilities by reference to five other terms. Four of these terms are identical to the

qualifiers placed on production facilities, while two others are unique to utilization

facilities. The terms "special nuclear material", "source material", "component", and

"common defense and security" are the definitions used to delimit both production and

utilization. "Atomic weapons" and "atomic energy", when added to the four common

definitions, shape, by inclusion and exclusion, the precise contours and reach of the term

utilization facility.

The term "atomic energy" means:

all forms of energy released in the course of nuclear fission

or nuclear transformation. 42 U.S.c. §2014(c).

The term "atomic weapon" means:

any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means

for transporting or propelling the device (where such means

43
is a separable and divisible part of the device), the principal

purpose of which is for use as, or for development of, a

weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device. 42

V.S.C §2014(d).

Reading these various subsidiary definitions together, the Board has adopted a

traditional, working definition of a utilization facility: nuclear reactors and other

facilities which use atomic energy for defense purposes other than propulsion. As stated

previously, atomic weapons are expressly excluded from the definition of a utilization

facility. In addition, some utilization reactors are also production facilities because they

are capable of producing special nuclear materials such as plutonium or uranium

enriched in the isotope 233 or 235.17 For example, the Savannah River reactors, which,

when operational, produce tritium (which is.llill a special nuclear material) are also

capable of producing plutonium and therefore are also production facilities.18

The most comprehensive list of production and utilization facilities subject to Board

oversight was prepared by the Board and submitted in response to Congressional

questioning during hearings last year. A revised version of that preliminary list is

included as Attachment II-2.

3. Nuclear Waste Storage Facilities

The third category of DOE defense nuclear facilities encompasses nuclear waste storage

facilities that are under the control or jurisdiction of the Secretary of Energy. The term

does not include a facility developed pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982

and licensed by the Nuclear Regulato.ry Commission.19

Congress, recognizing the need for permanent repositories for the disposal of high-level

radioactive waste and spent fuel, required the President to locate appropriate sites and

develop them for permanent nuclear waste disposal.20 Such facilities, which presently

include only Yucca Mountain,21 are to be licensed by the NRC.

Most DOE defense nuclear facilities which store nuclear waste are not covered by the

Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982:

Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section,

the provisions of this chapter shall not apply with respect to

any atomic energy defense activity or to any facility used in

connection with any such activity.22

44
Subsection (c) makes the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 applicable to "any repository

not used exclusively for the disposal of high-level radioactive waste or spent nuclear fuel

resulting from atomic energy defense activities, research and development activities of

the Secretary.,,23 Moreover, if the President determines that high-level radioactive

waste from defense activities should be segregated into separate repositories, those

repositories would also be covered by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982:

Any repository for the disposal of high-level radioactive

waste resulting from atomic energy defense activities only

shall (A) be subject to licensing [by NRCl..., and (B) comply

with all requirements of the Commission for the sitin~

development, construction, and operation of a repository.

Thus, reading these three provisions together, permanent repositories for high-level

radioactive waste from atomic energy defense activities are covered by the Nuclear

Waste Policy Act of 1982, and subject to NRC licensing. Therefore, they do not fall

within the Board I s jurisdiction.

Temporary storage of DOE nuclear waste from defense activities is not covered by the

Nuclear Waste Policy Act and, therefore, falls under the Board I s jurisdiction.:lS

The Board also interprets its enabling statute as conferring jurisdiction over permanent

low-level waste storage (what the Nuclear Waste Policy Act terms a repository), if such

repositories are controlled exclusively by DOE and not subject to NRC licensing under

the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Finally, the Board I s enabling statute refers to nuclear

waste storage26 and does not distinguish between materials which eventually will be

recycled, or reused for other purposes, and materials targeted for ultimate disposal.

Thus, the Board interprets the Act to grant jurisdiction over waste storage regardless of

the intended fate of the waste.

The MITRE Corporation has prepared a draft report for the Board which lists DOE

nuclear waste storage facilities based on definitions of "storage" and "storage facility"

adopted by the Department of Energy, NRC, and EPA.27 That report lists sites that

store five categories of nuclear waste-- high level, transuranic, low-level, mixed, and byproduc~ wastes.28

D. Enabling Act Exclusions

Expressly excluded from the definition of defense nuclear facilities are (1) any facility

or activity covcrcd by Exccutive Order No. 12344, dated February 1, 1982,29 pertaining

to the Naval nuclear propulsion program; (2) any facility or activity involved with the

45
assembly or testing of nuclear explosives or with the transportation of nuclear explosives

or nuclear material; and (3) any facility that does not conduct atomic energy defense

activities. Disassembly was not specifically addressed by the statute.

These exclusions are relatively clear-cut. The Naval nuclear propulsion program is a

defense-related activity which is well-defined by Executive Order 12344.

Although the Advanced Test Reactor (A1R), which is operated under the authority of

the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy, does work for the Naval nuclear propulsion

program, it has other defense production and utilization capabilities that subject the

ATR to some level of Board oversight.

The exclusion of "any facility that does not conduct atomic energy defense activities"

probably carves out little more than what is already excluded by virtue of the definition

of a defense nuclear facility. However, it does emphasize that DOE facilities

involving non-nuclear or non-defense devices or equipment are excluded from Board

jurisdiction.30

The Conference Report indicated that the exclusion regarding assembly was intended

to exclude only "final assembly" of nuclear weapons and devices.3l According to the

Conference Report, the only facility in that category is the Pantex plant.32 Also,

according to the conferees, the only facility involved in the testing of nuclear explosives,

under current practice, is the Nevada test site. However, as implied previously, even the

Nevada site may include facilities dedicated to production or utilization activities, or

provide for unlicensed storage of wastes which fall under the Board's oversight

responsibility.

REPORT ON NEED FOR INDEPENDENT EXTERNAL OVERSIGHT OF

ADDITIONAL DOE PROGRAMS AND FACILITIES

By virtue of section 320 of the Board's enabling statute, Congress required that the

Board study the question of whether nuclear facilities "excluded from the definition of

'Department of Energy defense nuclear facility' in section 318(1)(C)'"')should be subject

to independent external oversight.,,33 Accomplishing thc health and safety work of the

Board, as detailed in Part 1 of this report, has been so demanding that it precluded a

facility-by-facility investigation of the need for oversight beyond the Board's current

jurisdiction.

46
Nevertheless, to fulfill its statutory reporting obligation, the Board has preliminarily

studied available documents and information concerning the desirability of some form

of independent oversight of non-defense DOE nuclear facilities, as well as defense

nuclear facilities currently exempted from Board jurisdiction. Among other things, the

Board reviewed several comprehensive analyses performed in the 1980s which assessed

DOE I S nuclear safety activities. The reports reviewed include, but are not limited to,

the following: "A Safety A~sessment of Department of Energy Nuclear Reactors"

(DOE/US-ODDS. 1981); NAS study on production reactors in 1987; and NAS study on

non-production reactors, 1.988. All these reports were severely critical of nuclear safety

deficiencies found in both defense and non-defense facilities.

Certain GAO reports and legislative background materials that formed the basis for the

Board's enabling statute are similarly critical of both defense and non-defense DOE

nuclear facilities.

With regard to nuclear weapons, it is noted that an independent Blue Ribbon Task

Group, chaired by Judge William T. Clark in 1.98S, and the 1988 DOE Nuclear Weapons

Safety Review Group reported on long-standing safety problems.34 In December 1990,

the Panel on Nuclear Weapon Safety, chaired by Sidney D. Drell, prepared a report for

the House Committee on Armed Services which cited these earlier studies and expressed

the view "...that although many problems have been, or are being fixed, still more

remain to be addressed." 35 The three-member panel stated "We are concerned, as

were these earlier panels, that serious issues that had been known for at least a decade

remained unattended for so many years. ,,36

As a general principle, the Board believes that public assurance of health and safety at

DOE nuclear facilities that may pose public risks would benefit from some form of

independent external safety oversight. However, any unit charged with oversight of

nuclear facilities, particularly those related to weapons activity, must be carefully

structured to protect national security and sensitive nuclear weapons information.

Indeed, it is the Board's view that an oversight group that does not have the requisite

degree of technical and administrative capability, or that lacks the sensitivity and

judgment necessary to deal effectively with complex national security issues, may do

more harm to public safety than good.

,

The Board examined other DOE documents that tend to support the conclusion that

competent oversight of nuclear facilities is important and useful, including the recent

report, mentioned earlier, which the Secretary sent to the President in December, 1990.

The Secretary reported that DOE had completed the required comprehensive evaluation

ofits management control systems, which disclosed material deficiencies in eleven mujor

categories. The report cited serious management weuknesses which impuir DOE I s

47
ability to ensure safety of workers and publie at defense nuclear and non-defense nuclear

facilities alike. It is particularly worthy of note that the nuclear safety deficiencies cited

are known to have persisted within DOE for a long period of time.

As aeknowledged elsewhere in this report, the Secretary has initiated many actions to

correct the deficiencies cited in his report to the President. Removing these weaknesses

for defense nuclear facilities can be accomplished only by the continuing strong efforts

of the Secretary, the fullest sustained support from the Congress, and continued strong

external oversight. Competent external oversight for non-deferu;e facilities or defense

facilities exempted from Board jurisdiction would probably accelerate and maintain

health and safety improvements at those facilities.

In carrying out activities which are within its purview, the Board has gained insights

which bolster its conclusion that oversight of other nuclear facilities should result in

safety improvements. For example, the Board's comprehensive study of the DOE I S

nuclear safety standards (orders, guidelines, regulations, and the like) indicates that at

least the issues related to standards are essentially the same for both defense and nondefense facilities. The Board expects that its continuing review of safety requirements

and other activities related to standards will result in further improvements which will

help assure that public health and safety are protected at defense facilities. However,

these improvements in standards will not necessarily be translated to facilities outside

the Board I s responsibility.

Absent external oversight, DOE has been unable, in many instances, to establish its

nuclear activities on a sufficiently sound basis to provide adequate assurance that public

health and safety are appropriately protected. When DOE's nuclear activities have

come under external scrutiny, as, for example, by the activities of the Board, safety

deficiencies have been noted and corrective actions recommended and later commenced.

In the absence of independent external oversight, concerns remain that reforms being

carried out by a Secretary may not endure beyond his period of tenure. There have

been reforms undertaken within DOE and its predecessor organizations in the past by

the agent)' head and carried forward effectively, only to be canceled out by later policy

reversals. Thus, the gains that result from current strengthening actions need to be

institutionalized; that is, put in place so firmly that they cannot be weakened easily at

a later ,date. Establishment of appropriate independent external oversight can help

prevent erosion of nuclear safety over time.

The foregoing considerations are generally applicable, but they may require modification

or extension in specific cases. There is a need for further studies to establish whether

independent external oversight ought to be established for discrete categories of facilities

outside the Board's jurisdiction.

48
The Board has observed certain characteristics which bear upon the effectiveness of any

safety oversight organization. An external oversight group must possess the requisite

technical and managerial competence and experience to carry out its responsibilities.

The oversight organization must possess a level of technical capability at least equal to

that ofthe organization subject to oversight. First, the oversight group must be managed

and directed at its top-most level by individuals with strong technical and managerial

qualifications. Second, it must be staffed at all levels by individuals with qualifications

appropriate to their responsibilities. Assessments made by weak oversight organizations

often permit safety deficiencies to continue uncorrected. Stated another way, unskilled

or inappropriate oversight may be worse than no oversight at all.

49
ENDNOTES

142 U.S.C. §2286e note (Sept. 29, 1988).

242 U.S.C. §§2286a, 2286g.

3The term "public health and safety" is undefined by the Act, and

therefore should be given its ordinary meaning.

4S • Rep. No. 232, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, 19-20 (1987).

SId. (emphasis added)

6See Attachment rr-1 for a graphic illustration of how the DNFSB's

current coverage of certain facilities fits into the entire DOE

complex.

742 U.S.C. §2286g(1).

8As will be seen in other definition sections of the Atomic Energy

Act of 1954, Congress provided the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)

with authority to amend, by rule, the definition of "production

facility". In 1974 the AEC was abolished and all functions of the

Commission were vested in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, an

independent agency for regulating commercial nuclear power and an

Executive Branch organization, the Energy Research and Development

Administration (ERDA), with certain exceptions, by Pub. L. 93-438,

Oct. 11, 1974, 88 stat. 1233. See 42 U.S.C. §5814. The functions

vested by law in ERDA or in the Administrator, officers, and

components of the ERDA, were transferred to and vested in the

Secretary of Energy, unless otherwise specifically provided, as

part of the creation of the Department of Energy by Pub. L. 95-91,

Aug. 4, 1977, 91 Stat. 565. See 42 U.S.C. §7151. Consequently,

the AEC's authority to amend key definitions in the Atomic Energy

Act, is now shared by both the NRC and the DOE, and both have

exercised that authority in their respective jurisdictions.

While useful to our purpose, neither agency's modifications to the

definitions are controlling. The NRC has acted to modify several

of the terms as part of its regulation of the domestic licensing of

commercial production and utilization facilities. 10 CFR Part 50

(1990). However, by its own terms these regulations are not

intended to reach DOE's facilities. 10 CFR §50.11(b) (2) (i) (1990).

The DOE has acted to further define these terms but for limited

purposes. See, 48 CFR Part 950--Extraordinary Contractual Actions

§950.7002 Definitions (1989). The DOE intends to remove and delete

the terms and definitions of "production facility" and "utilization

50
facility" because the coverage (indemnity clauses of the PriceAnderson Amendment Act of 1988) cannot be limited to production and

utilization facilities and must include, for example, "nuclear

waste facilities". 55 FR 33730, at 33732, August 17, 1990.

Further, DOE I s Office of Enforcement advises that they are now

developing a list Of facilities (including production and

utilization facilities) within their jurisdiction and that they are

relying upon the definitions set forth in the Atomic Energy Act of

1954, as amended. However, they may recommend to the Secretary

amending the definitions of "production facility" and "utilization

facility" by rule. Additionally, DOE'S Advisory Committee on

Nuclear Facility Safety (Ahearne Committee) recites in the Purpose

section of their pUblic notices that: "The Committee was

established to provide the Secretary of Energy with advice and

recommendations concerning the safety of the Department I s

production and utilization facilities, as defined in section 11 of

the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. §2014). See,

55 FR 28435 (July 11, 1990).

9Both the Enabling statute and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as

amended make use of "nested definitions." For example, "production

facility" is defined in 42 U.S.C. §2014(v). Within that definition

is the term "special nuclear material" which in turn is defined

separately at 42 U.S.C. §2014(aa). Within that definition is found

the term "source material" Which in turn is defined separately at

42 U.S.C. S2014(2).

10See supra note 8.

l1 Id •

12But see, 10 CFR S1017. 3 (d) . DOE has defined the term in Part

1017, Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations --Identification

and Protection of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information.

These regulations implement section 148 of the Atomic Energy Act

Which prohibits the unauthorized dissemination of certain

unclassified government information. The term "component" is

defined as:

[A]ny operational, experimental, or

research-related part, subsection, design,

or material used in the manufacture or

utilization of a nuclear weapon, nuclear

explosive device, or nuclear weapon test

assembly.Id.

This regulatory definition of component probably is incompatible

with the use of the term in the Board's enabling statute, since it

51
While the

equipment,

inoludes utilization of nuolear weapons and explosives.

definition of a utilization faoility includes devices,

and components, it expressly excludes nuclear weapons.

13See supra note 8. The definitions relied upon here are those set

forth in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. All references

to the "Commission" should be read, unless otherwise indicated, as

referring to the United States Department of Energy and the NRC.

DOE has issued rules defining the term "special nuclear material"

in several different oontextsi however, none are related to

advancing the definitions of production facility or utilization

facility. The various instances are set forth below:

Defense Programs issued regulations in connection with " ••• arrest

authority and use of foroe by protective foroe officers". See 10

CFR part 1047, §1047.3. The language tracks the definition of 42

U.S.C. §2014(aa).

Under 10 CFR Part 710 --Criteria and procedures for determining

eligibility for aocess to classified matter or signifioant

quantities of special nuclear materials-- the DOE defined

significant quantities of special nuolear material at §710.5.

Under 48 CFR Chapter 9, Subpart 904.70--Foreign Ownership, Control,

or Influence Over Contractors at §904.7001 Applicability:

The provisions of this subpart shall apply to

all offerors/bidders, contractors, and

sUboontractors who will or do have access to

classified information or a significant

quantity of special nuclear material as

defined in 10 CFR Part 710. In this subpart, ... the term "special nuclear material" shall

also mean signifioant quantity of speoial

nuolear material as defined in 10 CFR Part

710.

Under 48 CPR Chapter 9, Subpart 945.3--Providing Government

Property to Contraotors, §945.303-1:

The DOE has established specific polioies

ooncerning special nuolear material

requirements needed under DOE contracts for

fabrioating end items using special nuclear

material, and for conversion or sorap recovery

of special nuclear material. These speoial

nuclear material needs means 'uranium enriched

52
in the isotope U233, U235 and plutonium other

than PU238.'

Under 48 CFR Chapter 9, Part 952--solicitation Provisions and

Contract Clauses, §952.204-2 Security requirements.

(g) Definition of Special Nuclear Material.

(The language tracks 42 U.S.C. §2014(aa).)

Under 10 CFR part 810--Assistance to Foreign Atomic Energy

Activities. This Part implements section 57b of the Atomic Energy

Act which empowers the Secretary of Energy to authorize U. S.

persons to engage directly or indirectly in the production of

special nuclear material outside the united States. Section 810.3

Definitions

'Special nuclear material' means (1)

plutonium, (2) uranium-233, or (3) uranlum

enriched above 0.711 percent by weight in the

isotope uranium-235.

DOE Order 5633.3 (Control and Accountability of Nuclear Materials)

defines special nuclear material by listing. They are as follows;

Enriched Uranium, plutonium-242, plutonium239-241, Uranium-233, and Plutonium-238.

l4see , e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc. 322 U.S. 111

(1944) (agency interpretation of jurisdictional provisions entitled

to deference) and Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 37 (1984).

(Agency has authority to construe its statutory mandates, so long

as reasonable.)

15 42 U.S.C. §2286g(1).

16See supra note 8.

17See supra notes 5-14 and accompanying text.

l80f course, the Savannah River tritium facilities could be

converted to the production of special nuclear material.

Therefore, since it is "capable of the production of special

nuclear material," it too may be a production facility within the

definition of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

1942 U.S.C. §2286 et seq.

m42 U.S.C. §10132 et seq.

53
21 42 U.s. C. A. §10101 (30) (1990 Pocket Part).

2242 U.S.C. §10107(a). The term "atomic energy defense activity"

includes most of the nuclear production and utilization activities

subject to Board oversight:

The term 'atomic energy defense activity'

means any activity of the Secretary performed

in whole or in part in carrying out any of the

following functions:

(A) naval reactors development;

(B) weapons activities including defense

i.nertial confinement fusion;

(C) verification and control technology;

(D) defense nuclear materials production;

(E) defense nuclear waste and materials

by-products management;

(F) defense nuclear materials security

and safeguards and security investigations;

and

(G) defense research and development.

§10101 (3) •

8 42 U.S.C. §10107(c).

2442 U.S.C. §10107 (b) (3).

(42 U.S.C.

25Neither the Atomic Energy Act nor the Board's enabling statute

defines "nuclear waste" or "nuclear waste storage". The Nuclear

waste Policy Act of 1982 defines storage as "retention of highlevel radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel or transuranic waste

with the intent to recover such waste or fuel for subsequent use,

processing, or disposal." This particular section of the Act's

definiti'ons technically may not be operative for purposes of the

Board's enabling statute.

26Neither the Atomic Energy Act nor the Board's enabling statute

defines "nuclear waste" or "nuclear waste storage".

27Mi tre Report, u. S. Department of Energy Nuclear waste storage

Faciliti.es (Draft, March 1990).

54
29Executive Order No. 12344, dated February 1, 1982, is set out

under 42 U.S.C. §7158.

30See supra notes 5-18 and accompanying text.

31a. Conf. No. 989, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2602 (1988).

32I d.

33This reporting requirement was contained in a note to section

2286e of the enabling statute. The full text of the note reads as

follows in the United States Code:

Historical and statutory Notes

Reporting Requirements. Section 1441 (c) , (d) of Pub.L. 100-456 provided that:

'(c) Requirements for first annual report.·-

(1) Before submission of the first annual

report by the Defense Nuclear Facilities

Safety Board under section 316(a) of the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954 [subsec. (a) of this

section) (as added by subsection (a», the

Board shall conduct a study on whether nuclear

facilities of the Department of Energy that

are excluded from the definition of

'Department of Energy defense nuclear

facility' in section 318(1) (C) of such Act

(section 2286g(1) (C) of this title) (hereafter

in this subsection referred to as 'non-defense

nuclear facilities') should be subject to

independent external oversight. The Board

shall include in such first annual report the

results of such study and the recommendation

of the Board on whether non-defense nuclear

facilities should be SUbject to independent

external oversight.

'(2) If the Board recommends in the report

that non-defense nuclear facilities should be

subject to such oversight, the report shall

include a discussion of alternative mechanisms

for implementing such oversight, including

mechanisms such as a separate executive agency

and oversight as a part of the Board's

responsibilities. The discussion of

55
alternative mechanisms of oversight also shall

include considerations of bUdgetary costs,

proteotion of the seourity of sensitive

nuclear weapons information, and the

similarities and differences in the design,

construotion, operation, and decommissioning

of defense and non-defense nuclear faoilities

of the Department of Energy.'

Title I of S. 1085, as originally reported by the Governmental

Affairs Committee, would have given the Board a mandate over DOE

nuclear facilities, both defense-related and civil. Senate Report

100-232 at 18-19. The Armed Services committee amendment, which

was eventually passed, limited the Board's safety and health

responsibilities to certain defense-related activities. Id. See,

also House Conference Report No. 100-989 at p. 492: "Section

3141(0) requires the Board's first annual report to include the

results of a study by the Board and its recommendation on whether

non-defense nuclear facilities should be subject to independent

external oversight."

34See "Nuclear Weapons Safety," a Report of the Panel on Nuclear

Safety of the Committee on Armed Servioes of the House of

Representatives, 101st cong., 2d Sess. 1, 8 (Dec. 1990).

35I d. at 1-2.

36I d. at 2.

56
Attachment 1-1

Attachment 1-2

Attachment II-I

Attachment 11-2

APPENDIX

Status Report of Recommendations

Board Policy Statement, "Criteria for Judging the Adequacy of

DOE Responses and Implementation Plans for Board

Recommendations

Diagram of Facilities Under Board Jurisdiction

DOE Facilities Under the Jurisdiction of the Board
RECOMMENDATIONS CALENDAR

1/17/91 Update

l DNFSB iDeadline Date I

Recommendation Date I Date Public Date I For Imple- Imple- I

Number, Deliver- IRecomme. Comments Sec'y Response I Public menta- mentaDOE Site Involved ed To iAppears To Rec. Of DOE Appears IComments tion tion Public

And Sec'y I In Fed. Deadline Response In Fed. I To SOE Plan Plan Is Hearing

'Subject In Brief Of OOE Register Date Due Date Register IResponse Due Date Received Date 1 -

90-1 Savannah

03/31/90104/15/90

V

River, Reactor 02/22/90 03/01/90 04/13/90 05/14/90 07/12/90 07/13/90 06/28/90.

Operator Trng.

90-2 All sites I

1/

I standards 03/08/90 03/14/90 04/13/90 06/12/90 06/12/90 07/12/90 09/10/90 09/17/90 08/30/90

!

90-3 Hanford y

Future Tank 03/27/9°1°3/30/90 04/30/90 05/14/90 OS/23/90 06/22/90 08/13/90 08/13/90

Monitoring

90-4 Rocky Flats I

Operational 05/04/90 05/10/90 06/11/90 06/25/90 06/25/90107/25/90 09/24/90 11/30/90 08/30/90

Readiness Review I

90-5 Rocky Flats I

Systematic Eval- 05/18/90 OS/24/90 06/25/90 07/09/90 06/20/90 07/20/90 09/18/90 10/17/90 08/30/90

, uation Program

I 90-6 Rocky Flats

I

I

I Plutonium In The 06/05/90 06/11/90 07/11/90 07/26/90 07/26/90 08/27/90 10/24/90 11/30/90 08/30/90

i Ducts , , ! 90-7 Hanford ±!

I Modif. To Imple. 10/12/90 10/18/90 11/19/90 12/03/90 12/11/90 01/10/91 03/04/91 I Plan For 90-3

1/ Secretary's response originally due 4/25/90; Board granted 45-day extension to 6/12/90.

Y Implementation plan due date figured from 5/14/90.

V Supplement plan pending.

±! Implementation plan due date figured from 12/3/90.

ATTACHMENT I-I
A'ITACHMENT 1-2

Fedeml Register / Vol. 55, No. 209/ Monday, October 29, 1990 / Notices 43399

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

Criteria for Judging the Adequacy of DOE Responses and Implementation Plans for

DNFSB Recommendations

AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

ACTION: Notice of Board Adoption of Policy Guidance.

SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has unanimously adopted a

policy statement which establishes the criteria that the Board will use for judging the

adequacy of Department of Energy (DOE) responses to, and implementation plans for,

Board recommendations.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION (.'ONTACT: Robert M. Andersen, General

Counsel, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana Avenue, N.W., Suite 700,

Washington, D.C. 20004, (202) 208-6387.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board

issues recommendations to the Secretary of the Department of Energy and to the

President regarding public health and safety at DOE's defense nuclear facilities. The

Board's enabling statute requires the Secretary of Energy to either accept or reject Board

reCOlUmendations and to subsequently develop ilUplelUentation plans for those portions

of Board recolUmendations which are accepted. The Board has now received DOE

responses to six of the first seven recommendations made to the Secretary and has

reviewed the first five ilUplementation plans sublUitted by DOE.

This Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Policy Statement (PS-l), the Board's

first, will guide the Board and its staff in evaluating the adequacy of DOE responses and

implelUentation plans, as well as assist the Board in structuring appropriate follow-up

action in the event a recommendation is not fully or adequately addressed in DOE's

response and implementation plan. Furthermore, the statement formally identifies, for

the benefit of DOE and the public, the Board's expectations regarding the elelUents the

Board believes are necessary for an adequate response and implementation plan.

Policy Statement

Oiteria jor Judging the Adequacy of DOE

Respomes and Implementation Plans for

DNFSB Recommendations

The Board's authorizing statute requires the Secretary of Ener!,'Y to respond to

each Board recommendation and to subsequently prepare an implementation plan for
those portions of the recommendation that DOE accepts. The statute allows the Board

to use its discretion and Judgment in assessing the adequacy of DOE responses and

implementation plans.

I. Evaluating DOE Responses

The statute requires the Secretary of Energy to "transmit his response to the

Board within 45 days after the date of publication [in the Federal Register] ... of the

notice with respect to such recommendation or within such additional period, not to

exceed 45 days, as the Board may grant." The Act anticipates responses which accept

the Board's recommendations, and responses which reject the Board's recommendations,

in whole or in part. As we have already learned from DOE's responses to the Board's

first six recommendations, however, there is a whole range of possible written responses

that the Board must be prepared to deal with in the future.

For example, DOE may choose to rely upon a response letter which simply states

that the Secretary agrees with or accepts a recommendation of the Board. Such action

constitutes an unconditional acceptance of the Board's recommendation, and acquiesces

in the Board's interpretation of the recommendation's terms and requirements. Any

subsequent contradiction or retrenchment from the response's unconditional acceptance

.in the implementation plan will ordinarily be unacceptable to the Board. Therefore, it

is far preferable to air any real differences that DOE may have with the recommendation

in the response itself. Moreover, preliminary discussions between the Board, its staff,

and DOE prior to the Secretary's issuance of a final response can avoid confusion,

disputes, misunderstanding, and wasted effort later in the process.

It should be noted that a response which rejects portions of a recommendation

may be an adequate response if, in the Board's Judgment, sound reasons are given for

rejecting the recommendation, and alternative means of protecting public health and

safety are specified. On the other hand, an evasive, nonresponsive, ambiguous, or

unclear response which is labeled an acceptance by DOE is not adequate. The Board

recognizes that a flawed response, if left uncorrected, will only lead to further problems

in the implementation plan.

The following types of DOE responses may be encountered by the Board:

1. A response which says it is an acceptance, but by its

language or terms in fact rejects part of the recommendation.

2. Ambiguous responses that could be interpreted either as acceptance or

rejection of the recommendation.

3. Failure to address certain issues.

4. Unqualified rejection of the entire recommendation.

5. Silence, or no response.

6. Unconditional acceptance of the entire recommendation consistent with the

terms set by the Board.

Comparing DOE responses against this list of response types will assist the Board

in sorting oul actual DOE acceptances from rejections. A valid acceptance is filed in a

timely manner and cxhibits three key features: (1) an understanding of what is being

asked or recommended; (2) a commitment by DOE to take action to meet the

recommendation; and (3) specification of what DOE intends to do so that the Board can

determine if all material terms of the recommendation will be met, rather than avoided.

2
DOE's response need not be detailed or long, provided the Board is satisfied that

DOE understands what is being asked and intends to accomplish the recommended

action in a timely manner. If a response satisfies the above three requirements, however,

it need not present the details of how and when the recommendation will be met-- that

is the purpose of the implementation plan.

II. Evaluating DOE's Implementation Plan

As with responses, the statute, for the most part, gives the Board discretion to use

its judgment in assessing the adequacy of implementation plans. The statutory language

expresses one major substantive measure of an implementation plan's effectiveness,

which is perhaps self-evident. Since the Secretary must ordinarily "carry out" and

"complete" implementation in one year, it necessarily follows that the plan must schedule,

and otherwise assure, that action is taken to accomplish the recommendation. The

statute also imposes two procedural requirements. First, the Secretary must "transmit

the implementation plan to the Board within 90 days after the date" of the Secretary's

final decision on the recommendation. If additional time is necessary to write the plan,

the Secretary may take an additional 45 days, provided he submits the reasons for the

delay to the appropriate congressional committees. Second, ifthe Secretary cannot carry

out and complete the implementation plan within one year, he must report the reasons

for the delay to the appropriate congressional committees.

The purpose of the implementation plan is to provide a basis and a schedule for

assuring that accepted recommendations are accomplished.

A. Substantive Ctitmia

1. Does DOE understand the Board's recommendation?

DOE's responses give the first indication of whether or not the Board's

recommendations have been communicated and understood. If a response is adequate,

the implementation plan should track the response in this regard and clearly demonstrate

an understanding of the recommendation. If there is a clear restatement by DOE in the

implementation plan of the recommendation's goals, or of the underlying issues or

problems identified by the recommendation, the Board can then reasonably assume that

its initial recommendation was understood. DOE, however, maintains latitude to

implement recommendations in a wide variety of ways so long as the Board's

recommendations are achieved. Ultimately, the totality of all the terms of plan will

exhibit the level of DOE's understanding and acceptance of the recommendation.

2. What does DOE intend to do to accomplish the recommendation?

A clear acceptance of the Board's recommendation in DOE's response is the

initial indicator that DOE is committed to achieving the recommended action. On the

other hand, if an initial implementation plan incorporates a response which docs not

signal DOE's intent to fUlly meet the recommendation, the Board has grounds for serious

concern. A specific description of DOE's intended course of action, in the

implementation plan itself, is the best indicator of whether DOE is committed to the

accomplishment of the recommendation. Such a description can also resolve questions

raised by ambiguous or unclear DOE responses, and clarify how DOE has chosen to

interpret the recommendation.

3
If DOE's response meets the terms of the recommendation, and that response is

incorporated in the implementation plan by reference, or restated, the Board has reason

to believe that DOE intends to comply. That intent must be confirmed, however, by a

full review of the details of how DOE plans to accomplish the recommendation.

3. What are DOE's baseline assumptions?

The depth and type of baseline assumptions can vary greatly depending on the

recommendation. Most implementation plans will be based on engineering or technical

assumptions. Some implementation plans, if not all, will embrace administrative and

legislative assumptions also, i.e. compliance provided sufficient funds are appropriated.

Important assumptions should be presented in the plan.

4. Has DOE adequately outlined its approach?

DOE's approach must be outlined in sufficient detail to enable the Board to

independently assess the approach without doing the underlying work. The plan should

address the questions of how the goals relating to safety will be achieved and maintained.

The Board should be able to assess whether the approach is reasonable and achievable

within the specified time period.

5. H~ls DOE adequately justified a course of action proposed in the implementation

plan?

The plan should contain a sound evaluation of the problem first identified in the

recommendation, including a root cause analysis (or summary thereof), so that it is clear

why DOE is taking the proposed action. The causes of any technical problems should

be identified, when appropriate, not just the administrative controls (or lack thereof) that

allowed the situation to occur. Reasons should be given for agreeing with the

recommendation, based on DOE's own analysis.

6. Has the plan truly called for completion or closure?

The plan should clearly provide a method for demonstrating completion or closure

in a manner that can be easily verified by the Board.

B. Procedural Requiremellls

1. Has DOE submitted the plan to the Board in accordance with statutory deadlines?

2. Has DOE established a realistic and achievable schedule for completion?

Final deadlines, as well as intermediary milestones or checks and deliverables with

measures of accomplishment, should be identified in the implementation plan.

3. Has DOE adequately provided for implementation course corrections or process

change in appropriate cases'!

Complex, long range plans must bc f1exihle enough to accommodate change if

necessary. A process should be dcfined for configuration management or change control

so that the proposed action can be modified if additional information dictates, or changes

in the assumptions occur.

4
4. Has DOE provided for quality assurance in appropriate cases'!

The Board may require a plan to specify how the quality of the proposed action

will be assured. Quality issues include qualifications of people involved, internal checks

on the implementation as the task is completed, final verification,

independent oversight, and chain of custody on records, samples, other critical data and

documentation.

5. Does the Plan provide for adequate reporting in appropriate cases'!

A reporting scheme and schedule should be specified to assure the Board remains

informed of the status of the progress and any new related issues that may appear.

John T. Conway, Chairman

Appendix-Transmittal Letter to the Secretary of Energy

October 19, 1990

The Honorable James D. Watkins, Secretary of Energy,

Washington, DC 20585

Ref: DNFSB Policy Statement No.1: Criteria for Judging the Adequacy of DOE

Responses and Implementation Plans

Dear Mr. Secretary: Enclosed please find policy criteria which the Board unanimously

adopted for judging the adequacy of DOE responses and implementation plans for

Board recommendations. We have previously circulated draft criteria with DOE staff

responsible for preparing responses and implementation plans. The use of the criteria,

together with the close cooperation of DOE and Board staff, have resulted in more

complete and sound responses and implementation plans.

Sincerely,

John T. Conway,

Chairman.

(FR Doc. 90·25507 Filed IO·:U;·90; 8:45,011

lllUJNG CODE 6820-KD-M

5
ATTACHMENT II-1

ALL NUCLEAR FACILITIES IN THE UNITED STATES

I ALL DOE NUCLEAR FACILITIES I

NON-DEF EN SE {CI VIL}

NUCLEAR FACILITIES

DEFENSE NUCLEAR

FACILITIES

ASSEM SLY AN D TESTING FACILITIES

FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONSIE XPLOS1VES

TRANSPORTATION FACI LITIES FOR

NUCLEAR MATERIALS, WEAPONS, EXPLOSIVES

*NAVAL NU CL EAR PROPULSION PROG RAM

DNFSB JURISDICTION

DOE DEFENSE NUCLEAR

PRODUCTION a. UTILIZATION

FACILITIES

I

' CERTAIN DOE NUCLEAR 'WASTE

STORAGE FACILITIES

I '

*The Naval Propulsion Program is a joint program of the Department of Defense and the

Department of Energy.
AT'l'ACllMI'.NT II-2

DOE FACILITIES UNDER 'l'HE JURISDICTION OF THE BOARD'"

Los Alamo,@ Nation;?;t Laboratory;

o Plutonium Processing Facility (TA~55)

o CMR Building (TA~3~29)

o U Storage Facility (TA'-3-164)

o Main Storage Vault (TA-41~1)

o Waste Disposal Sit~ (TA~54)

o Tech Shops Addi't;ion ('l'A-3-102)

Machining of uranium parts in excess of 2 I(g is performed in

this facility.

o Icehouse (TA-41~1)

Routinely handles SNM parts and tritium

o Omega West Reactor (TA~2)

o Critical Experiment Facility (TA-18)

Facilities no't yet cons'tructed and/or star·ted up

o Nuclear Materials Storage Facility (TA-55)

o Speciul Nuclear Materials R&D Laboratory ('I'A-55)

o SW/R Complex

~.§.fldia N;~~tional I.abQ£I;ltories

o Hot ,Cell Facility (Building. 6580), SNLA

o ArUlular Core Research Reactor ('l'A-5), SNLA

o Sandia Pulse Reactor ('l'A-5), SNLA

"'Note: The Board's jurisdic·tion enCOlllpasses bo·th 1;l1e faciLi:l:ies

listed herein and any p.iping OJ:' other systems 'that may connect

the f uciJ.j_'ties
o Waste lIandU.ng Bui.lding

o Underground

o Idaho Chemical Processing plant (ICPF), Production

Facility/Nuclear waste Storage Facility

o Radioactive Waste Management Complex (RWMC)

Nuclear Waste Stor~ge Facility

Transuranic Waste Storage Facility

o Mi)ced Was·te Storage Facility (MWSF), Nuclear Waste Storage

Faci.U.ty

)\1though the Advanced Test Reac'tor may be considered a

utilization facility by definition, it ·technically does not

"operate for national security purposes," but ra'ther supports the

Naval Reactors program which is excluded from Board oversi.ght by

E.O. 12344 and P.L. 100-456.

Proposed Defense Nuclear Facil.i'ties

o

o

o

o

CPP-69l

High Level Wast:e '1'ank

Farm Upgrade

Calcined Solids Storage

Facili.ty 118

Transuranic Storage

Modules (4)

Fuel Processing Restoration

Faci.l.ity

New CPP Nuclear waste Storage

Facili·ty

New CPP Nuclear Waste Storage

Facil.ity

New Nuclear Was'te Storage

Facility
Y-12 Plant, Oak,Hig,g§.

0 BUi.lding 9212 Enriched urani.um operations

0 Building 9206 Enriched uranium operations

0 Building 9215 Enriched urani.um operations

0 Building 9215 Depleted uranium operations

0 Building 9998 Depleted uranium casting

operations

0 BUilding 9201-5 Depleted uranium operations

0 Building 9204-4 Depleted uranium ope:cations

0 Building 9204-4 Weapon disass<:>.mbly & weapon

quality evaluation

0 Building 9204-2 Lithium operations

0 Building 9204-2 E Assembly operations

Proposed Defense Nuclear Facility

o Low Level Was'te Disposal Faci.lity (Bear Creek)

Fee<;L):'l!'l.-terial Produ9tion Cen·ter~, ,y~rnald, Ohio

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Plant 1

Plant 2/3

Plant 4

Plun):; 5

Plant 6

Plan't 8

Plun't 9

Sampling Plan't

Refinery

Greensalt plant (blending

opera't5.ons only)

Metul pr.oduction plan·t

Metal £ubr.ica·tion plunt;

(pi.ckling & inspection only)

Scrap recovery plan't

Special pl:oducts plant (salt

batch only)
(> Thorium t:>to:r::-age area Approximately 13,000

con.tain(.~:r::-s of tho:eium

o 1<-25 Waste St;orage Building

pak Ri.dge Nat:!,,9nal [.aboratoll

o

o

o

Building 0319

Solid was'te storage area i/5

Melton Valley storage tanks

U233 storage warehouse

Remote transuranic waste

storage

LOW level li,quid defense waste

Proposed Defense Nuclear Facility

o Remote Handled 'rRU Was'te Handling and Packaging Plant

o N Reactor Complex (100 Area)

,

105N

109N

l07N

I63N

l8IN

l82N

I8'1N

Reactor Building

Heat Exchanger BUilding

Receive~' Cooling Building

Deminera,U,zer Plant

rZiver Pump House

High [.:i.f"t Pump House

Plant Service Boiler House

o N Reactor Fuel Fabrication Facili:ty (300 Area)

313 13Ui.lding

333 Building

fuel Manufacturing Facilit;y

Fuel Manufacturing Facili:ty

o lOOKE and 100 KW fuel basins and support; facilit:ies

o Pmeex Plant: Complex (200 Arc3)

207.A

7.24U

Cnnyon 13l,1 '.i.1.di.nq
o Plutonium Finishing Plant Complex (200 Area)

234-SZ

236-Z

242-Z

o T Plant Complex (200 Area)

2706T

Plutonium Finishing

Plu'l;onium Reclamat:ion

waste Treatment

Canyon Building

0 Waste Managemen'l; Facilities

0 Operational Tank Fauns

0 B Plant Complex

0 Grou1; Treatmen'l; Facility

0 Waste Receiving and Handling Facilities

0 242A Evaporator

0 2228 Labora'cory

Facility not yet started up

o Hanford Waste Vitr:if:i,ca'l:i,on Plant

R2Q~Y Flats Plant

o Plutonium Recovery (Building 371)

o Was'l;e 'l'reatment (Building 374)

o Plu'tonium An<ilytical Lab (Building 559)

o Plutoniunl Manufac'l;uring and Assembly (Building 707)

o Plutonium Recovery (Bui1d5.ng 771)

o Plutonium Recovery and Wast;e Management (Building 776)

o Manufacturing (Building '7'77)

o Plutonium OevBlopmen1; (Building 779)

o Product Sl;aging (Building 991)

o Waste Treatment (8\Ji.ldj.119 774)

o Waste Storage/Staging (Bujldjng 664)
o

o

Building 332

Building 625

Plutonium Facility (contains

SIS Engineering Demons'tration

Facili'ty)

Transuranic Waste Storage

Facility

Savannah R~ver Site

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

P, K, and L Reactors

C and R Reactors

I' Canyon

H Canyon

F Ar.ea Outside F<lcilities

H Area Outside Facilities

F Area A Line

HB Line

FB Line

PU Fuel Form Fabrication

Act;i.nide Billet Fabrication

Multipu:r.-pose Processing

Faci,lity

'l':citium facilities

Receiving Basin for

Offsit;e Fuels

Buri'~l."l. GrOl,lnd

Production operations

l~ong-terJ1\ shutdown

Chemical separations

Chemical separations

Ancillary operations to F

Canyon

Ancillary operations to H

Canyon

Reduction of U-238 U03 to

powder

Pu-238 Production

Pu-239 Production

Pu-238 heat source production

Rx 'l'arget material fabrication

Plutoni\lm processing

Tr.i.'tium processing

Pool st;orage

High level liquid red. waste

st:or,<:lgc.

Low le.ve.l. rnd. ~~,>olid wH~,:.:tC.

di~:;pos("l.l
o

o

o

o

o

o

Expc.r.-iment;al THU Waste

Assay Facility

Production Control Facility

Building 32l-M

Building 773-A

Plu·tonium Experimental

Facility

F&H Effluen't 'l'rea·tment

F8CiU,ty

Ce.r.'tification of dJ.-ummcd

tr.ansu::canic was1;e for. long-

'term sto:r;-age

Process laboratory

Rx fuel fabd,cation facility

Savannah River Laboratory

Developmental work glove box

line.

Low level liquid rad. waste

treatmen't

Facilities not yet constructed and/or s'tarted up

o

o

o

o

o

o

o

Defense Waste Processing

Facility

Saltstone Facility

Uranium SOlidification

Facilii;y

Consolidated Incineration

Facil:i:ty

Y Area Solidifica-ti.on and

Disposal Facili'ty

Mixed Waste/Hazardous

Waste Di-sposal Facility

TRU Waste Facilii;y

High level liquid radioac'tive

waste vitrification

Concrete forms for low level

fraction of high level liquid

rad. waste

Uranium reclamation from

Uranyl Nitrate

Incineration of low level

soLid radi-oactive waste

Preparation of fuel

fabrication waste sludge for

burial

Stabi-lizati-on of mixed/

hazardO\lS was'te forms and

vault burial.

Retri-eval and repackaging of

s'tored transuranic waste drums

and certi-fied for long 'term

storage

o New Production Heactors and nucleax' faeilities dedicated to

supporting thef3e reaetor:s.

o Speci.al Iso"tope Scpa'J~(Jt:i.on