Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Lieutenant Colonel Matthew B. D

The Staff Ride Handbook 

The Battles of New Orlean

23 December 1814 - 8 January 18
Cover art: http://www.history.army.mil/html/artphoto/pripos/amsoldier5.htm
The Staff Ride Handbook for The Battles of New Orleans,

23 December 1814-8 January 1815

Lieutenant Colonel Matthew B. Dale

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Dale, Matthew B. 

New Orleans staff ride handbook / Matthew B. Dale. pages cm

ISBN 978-1-940804-26-2 

1. United States--History--War of 1812--Campaigns. 2. New

Orleans, Battle of, New Orleans, La., 1815. 3. Staff rides--

Louisiana. 4. Chalmette Unit, Jean Lafitte National Historical

Park and Preserve (La.)-Guidebooks. I. Title.

E356.N5D17 2015 973.5’2--dc23

2015009418

Editing and layout by Carl W. Fischer-2015

Combat StudiesInstitute Press publications cover

a wide variety of military history topics. The

views expressed in this CSI Press publication are

those of the author(s) and not necessarily those

of the Department of the Army or the

Department of Defense. A full list of CSI Press 

publications available for downloading can be 

found at:

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/index.asp

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this

document as an official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to 

use CSI’s official seal on any republication without the express

written permission of the Director of CSI. 

ii
Foreword

 The Combat Studies Institute is pleased to publish The Staff Ride

Handbook for the Battles of New Orleans, 23 December 1814-8 January

1815, covering the final battles of the War of 1812. Interest in the details

of this often-overlooked conflict has increased as a result of recent

bicentennial observances, exposing a new generation of students to a 

unique period in ourArmy’s history. Mostsurvey course referencesto the

War of 1812 concern the demonstrably different performances of the US

Army and US Navy, the latter getting the better coverage. That

comparison however, lies at the heart of why this war and this series of

battles are crucial to understanding the development of both the Army as

an institution and civil-military relations more generally from 1815 to

1941. This handbook will help new and returning students to look at

the battles of New Orleans in the proper context, aided by a wealth of

new scholarship produced over the last 30 years.

 This handbook enables understanding of the battle by facilitating

readers’ awareness as they walk the ground. It begins with a thorough

description of the strategic objectives desired by both the British and

Americans, and an operational overview of events in the American Deep 

South and the Gulf of Mexico which set the conditions for the tactical 

engagements which occurred in December 1814 and January 1815. The

use of the plural Battles in the title denotes a focus upon all four of the

engagements fought between American and British forces just south and

east of New Orleans. Because of this, the handbook can be used to tailor

a staff ride for a single tactical engagement or as a campaign analysis.

 In keeping with our previous staff ride publications, this handbook

spends a great deal of time on the study of leadership. New Orleans

remains firmly associated in American military lore with visions of a 

victorious Andrew Jackson, in command of a composite force of fighters

from an astonishing array of backgrounds. While Jackson’sinfluence over

the battle and its outcome remain mostly undeniable, this handbook

provides equal attention to Jackson’s opponent, Sir Edward Pakenham,

the ill-starred commander of British regulars, many of whom boasted

long experience against the French armies of Napoleon Bonaparte.

Further attention is also paid to a variety of American and British

subordinate commanders at all levels, bringing these seldom-heard

voices back into the conversation two centuries after the fact.

 The Battles of New Orleans offers military organizations of all three

components and of any echelon the opportunity to study the timeless

factors that influence armed conflict to include leadership, sustainment,

iii
and domestic politics. Although the tactics and the equipment are far

different today, modern participants will still come away with a greater

appreciation and understanding of the experiences of American and

British Soldiers of all ranks in the final battle between the Unites States

and Great Britain.

Colonel Thomas E. Hanson

Director

Combat Studies Institute

iv
Acknowledgements

 Even before receiving my commission in the 1990s, the published 

works of the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) were not unknown to me.

If there was a CSI publication in a library or lying around a unit

headquarters, I borrowed it and pored over it, attempting to add to my

professional development. The most recent example was during my last

deployment in Afghanistan from 2011 to 2012 was Occasional Paper 36,

outlining the Soviet approach in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. Little

did I know that during that same tour I would be offered the opportunity

to join the fine team of Soldiers and Civilians at CSI less than a year

later, first as the Staff Ride Team Chief and then continuing asthe Deputy

Director.

 As this is my first published book in support of the Army, I wish to 

thank our daughter, Specialist Rosalee Dale, who served with her unit in

Kuwait during the time that this handbook was written. She chose the

life of her father, grandfathers, and then some in serving the Nation and

I dedicate this first work to her as my thanks for her sacrifice and the

great love and pride that her mother and I have for her. I must also thank

my wife Jane, who is always pushing me to write anything to vent my

love for the Army and its great history. I must also thank my very loving

and supporting mother who is my longest running fan and probably still

possesses a young boy’s crayon-drawn portrait of Jean Lafitte in her

collection of maternal memories.

 I am very grateful to all of the members of the CSI team, now part of

ourArmy Family.The confines ofthiswork preventme from thanking each

memberinkind.However,there are somepeople that especially deservemy

thanks. First, and foremost there is Colonel Tom Hanson, Director of CSI. 

Few are lucky enough to have a supervisor, mentor, and valued family 

friend of such worth who allowed me the time to continue being a

historian in addition to the administrative duties of deputy. Then there

is Dr. Donald Wright, the CSI Chief of Research and Publication, a man

who never failsto teach me something in the midst of many conversations, 

especially about the art and technique of academic research, writing, and

publishing. Next, is the CSI Staff Ride Team, an organization that I had

the honor of leading and working with for my first 18 months at CSI. 

The Staff Ride Team remains an asset that the Army at large needs to

know more about in order to help make leaders at all levels progressively

better. In particular, I wish to sincerely thank Mr. Gary Linhart, Staff Ride 

Team contract historian, for his help in shaping the development of this

work and guiding me along a very time compressed weekend spent at

various locations that helped clarify many assumptions and assertions on

v
how to best shape a staff ride that captures the importance of both the

overall campaign and its culminating battle. His ongoing work to revise

the original CSI-facilitated New Orleans staff ride includes the fantastic

maps provided in this book. His assistance and friendship is greatly 

appreciated and is a testament of the Staff Ride Team’s dedication to

supporting the Force. Finally, I would like to thank my Norwich classmate

and good friend, Lieutenant Colonel Brian Doyle and his ROTC cadets 

from Tulane University’s Orleans Battalion for requesting CSI’s support

of their New Orleans staff ride in April 2014, during which a detailed

reconnaissance, preparation, as well as focused discussions led to a great

Tulane staff ride, a depth of practical research, and the energy to produce

this book for future staff rides.

Matthew B. Dale

Combat Studies Institute

vi
Contents

Foreword....................................................................................iii

Acknowledgements ............................................................... v

Introduction..........................................................................xi

Part I. The Opposing Forces................................................. 1

The American Army................................................................ 1

The War of 1812.................................................................... 2 

Regulars................................................................................ 3

Militia...................................................................................... 5

Volunteers ............................................................................. 7

Organization............................................................................ 8

Sustaining the Force.............................................................. 10

The British Army .................................................................. 11

Organization.......................................................................... 12

Influence of the Peninsula Army......................................... 14

Weapons............................................................................................17

Infantry ................................................................................ 17

Artillery................................................................................. 20

Dragoons...................................................................................... 22

Sustaining the Force.............................................................. 23

American and British Tactics...................................................23

The Opposing Naval Forces................................................ 26

Conclusion .................................................................................31

Part II. Campaign Overview Introduction ......................... 35

The War’s First Two Years........................................................35

The Culminating Year: The Final Campaign of

1814-1815 ........................................................................... 36

The Canadian Theater ......................................................... 39

The Chesapeake Bay ........................................................... 39

The Southern Theater: The Creek War.................................... 41

The Campaign in the Gulf..................................................... 42

Aftermath of the Battles of New Orleans............................ 43

vii
Part III. Suggested Stands (sites) to Visit.............................49

New Orleans Staff Ride Stands........................................... 49

Stand 1, Strategic Background and Campaign 

Overview............................................................................. 51

The Rigolets........................................................................ 51

Stand 1 (Alternate), The Levee at New Orleans................. 71

Stand 2, Villere’s Canal – The British Landing, 22 December

1814............................................................................................................................73

Stand 3, The De La Ronde Plantation: 

The American Spoiling Attack............................................ 81

Stand 4, East Chalmette – The British Limited Attack......... 93

Stand 5, East Chalmette – The Artillery Duel,

1 January 1815 .................................................................. 105

Stand 6, The Rodriguez Canal – Jackson’s Line,

8 January 1815 .................................................................. 115

Stand 7, The Final Assault: 

Right Bank of the Mississippi........................................... 129

Stand 8, The Final Assault – British Left Column (Keane’s

Brigade) ............................................................................ 143

Stand 9, The Final Assault -British Right Column

(Gibbs’ Brigade) ................................................................ 151

Stand 10, Rodriguez Canal – Repulse of the

British Army ...........................................................................159

Stand 11, Aftermath of the Battle and Conclusion of the

Campaign ............................................................................165

Part IV. Integration: Final Phase of the Staff Ride ........... 177

Part V. Support: Practical Information, Conducting a

Staff Ride in the area ........................................................ 181

Appendix A: Order of Battle for the Forces Involved...... 185

Appendix B: Biographical Sketches of the

Key Participants................................................................ 187

Appendix C: Notes on Specific Sources.......................... 201

Bibliography...........................................................................207

About the Author .............................................................. 211

viii
List of Figures

Figure 1. The British Strategy for 1814.............................. 38

Figure 2. Post-Battle Actions in the Gulf ........................... 44

Figure 3. The Rigolets and Lake Borgne............................. 52

Figure 4. British Shaping Operations in the Gulf ................ 57

Figure 5. British Shift to the West............................................ 61

Figure 6. British Amphibious Operations ............................ 64

Figure 7. The British Landing and Approach March........... 66

Figure 8. Villere’s Canal looking to the northeast .............. 74

Figure 9. British Amphibious Operations

(previously seen as figure 6)................................................. 76

Figure 10. The British Landing and Approach March 

(previously seen as figure 7) ............................................... 79

Figure 11. Ruins of the de La Ronde Plantation House ..... 82

Figure 12. The de La Ronde Plantation river road ............. 83

Figure 13. The American Night Attack, 1930-2030............ 86

Figure 14. The American Night Attack, 2030-2130............ 88

Figure 15. Chalmette National Cemetery ........................... 94

Figure 16. Pakenham’s Reconnaissance in Force............... 98

Figure 17. View of the American center vicinity.............. 105

Figure 18. British Artillery Attack ..................................... 109

Figure 19. The scar of the original Rodriguez Canal ....... 117

Figure 20. Jackson’s Line ................................................. 119

Figure 21. The remains of the base of the American

defensive line .................................................................... 120

Figure 22. The far left of the American line...................... 121

Figure 23. Battery Numbers 5 and 6 ................................. 122

Figure 24. Battery Number 4 ............................................ 122

Figure 25. Composition of Jackson’s Line ....................... 123

Figure 26. Close up of a 24-pounder naval gun ............... 124

Figure 27. Jackson’s line as seen from the

modern levee..................................................................... 125

ix
Figure 28. A view of the Mississippi’s right bank............ 130

Figure 29. Pakenham’s Plan ............................................. 132

Figure 30. Attack on the Right Bank, 0315-0830............. 136

Figure 31. Attack on the Right Bank, 0830-1030............. 138

Figure 32. British Attack, 0315-0730............................... 144

Figure 33. British Attack Continues, 0730-0745.............. 146

Figure 34. The ground over which Gibb’s

column attacked ................................................................ 153

Figure 35. Location where Keane changed direction of 

attack................................................................................. 154

Figure 36. US Battery Number 6 ...................................... 155

Figure 37. Part of the ground over which Gibbs’ column

attacked ............................................................................. 160

Figure 38. British Attack Culminates, 0745-0800............ 161

x
Introduction

The legacy of the battles fought on the Plains of Chalmette, just 

down river from the city of New Orleans and which gave its name to the 

collective fighting, remains partially shrouded in a great deal of popular 

myth. Part of the issue originates from its occurrence within the span of

the War of 1812, unfairly pigeonholed as one of our least remembered and

studied American conflicts even during its bicentennial commemoration. 

Another key factor is that New Orleans has come to represent one of the

most lop-sided military victories in history, an American miracle. Rising

above it all is Andrew Jackson, the larger than life frontier Militia general

that humbled the British Army which had itself defeated Napoleon, and 

paving a way to the American Presidency.

However, there really is far more to the entire event than the Battle

of New Orleans. First of all, the “battle” really consisted of four separate

actions, taking place during the period between 23 December 1814 and 8

January 1815. Each of these engagements differed somewhat from another

based on the type of offensive operation conducted: an American spoiling

attack, two consecutive British limited attacks (the first example meeting 

the definition of a modern reconnaissance in force), and a deliberate 

British attack against a fortified defensive position. Hence, the carefully 

considered title of this work: The Staff Ride Handbook for the Battles of

New Orleans, 23 December 1814-8 January 1815.

In order to be properly understood, New Orleans must be considered

as the decisive operation of a larger operational plan designed to achieve

a strategic goal. The British campaign in the Gulf represented a clear

intent to achieve a decisive victory over the United States in order to

positively influence the terms of the peace treaty already being

negotiated.

The British campaign in the Gulf represented a highly ambitious

political undertaking embodied within an exceedingly complicated joint 

campaign plan. Within the context of the campaign in the Gulf region 

(comprising both the Creek War and the battles for Mobile, Pensacola,

and New Orleans) Andrew Jackson clearly stands out as the dominating

influence over every aspect of the campaign and its culminating battle 

on the Plain of Chalmette. His British opponent’s influence upon events

pales in comparison to Jackson because of Major General Sir Edward

Pakenham’s late entry into the already ill-proceeding campaign, making

Pakenham a sadly tragic figure. Still, the two commanders remain the

central characters of the drama and provide interesting contrasts in 

leadership on the early 19th century battlefield as experienced outside the 

concurrent Napoleonic battles seen in Europe.

xi
Ultimately, the battles fought below New Orleans were also very

much Soldiers’ battles. On both sides the common Soldier’s motivation

to fight is under constant measurement, more so with the British because

of the challenges they had to overcome in just getting to the battlefield.

The Soldiers endured weather conditions common in a Gulf coast winter: 

wet, windy, and cold. They moved through some of the most challenging

terrain offered in North America: bayous, swamps, and dense

vegetation. They endured repeated exposure to intense and highly

accurate enemy fire for prolonged periods without the slightest evidence

of success. In the end, the British Soldiers at New Orleans demonstrated

that that fighting spirit does have a breaking point, no matter how

courageous the actions of their leadership on the battlefield.

There is the challenge of providing an effectively conducted staff

ride, aligning the historical facts and analysis in order to tell an accurate

story of what happened at the time it occurred and why, while providing 

the important “so what.” The “so what” being the final analysis that 

helps make the history relevant.

As a vehicle for the education of military professionals, the staff ride 

has long proven its efficacy. Analysis of a battle or a campaign through

an examination of the actual terrain is a concept deeply rooted in military 

study. In Europe, following the Wars of German Unification (1864-1871),

Helmuth von Moltke who was referred to as the Elder in comparison to his

nephew who followed in his footsteps, integrated staff rides into the

training of German general staff officers by posing challenging questions

to them during rides of battlefields on which he had achieved his greatest

triumphs. In the United States in 1894, Captain Arthur L. Wagner, a 

leading scholar at the Army’s General Service and Staff School which is 

the forerunner of today’s Command and General Staff College CGSC

at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, made an initial proposal for the conduct

of a staff ride on Civil War battlefields for the course’s top students.

However, just as with other periods of fiscal difficulty in our Army’s

history, the exercise was seen as too extravagant and funding was denied.

In 1906, Major Eben Swift finally brought the concept to fruition with a 

staff ride focused on William T. Sherman’s 1864 Atlanta Campaign. The

essential elements of Wagner and Swift’s staff ride concept included a 

detailed classroom study of a campaign followed by an in-depth visit

to the sites associated with that campaign. In the wake of Swift’s

successful first effort, staff rides became part of the curriculum at

Fort Leavenworth and eventually the Army War College.

Unfortunately, both programs saw elimination with America’s entry in

to the First World War. Afterward, only the War College’s program saw

xii
re-institution, running through most of the Interwar Period until

America’s Second World War mobilization. Several decades came to pass

until staff rides once again saw integration within Army Professional 

MilitaryEducation (PME), with a newgeneration of contributors adding an 

integration phase in order to interconnect the classroom and field study for 

further insights. Over the course of the last 30 years the preliminary study,

field study, and integration phases have become the prime components of

the modern staff ride.

Today, the Army considers the staff ride an essential aspect of

historical education for the modern military professional throughout its

system of schools and a crucial facet in the continuing professional

development and education of its leaders. The Army War College, CGSC,

and institutions throughout the Army’s education system conduct staff

rides with the extensive resources necessary to execute the preliminary 

study, field study, and integration methodology. Organizations and units

outside of the PME environment can also benefit extensively from staff

rides but they often find resources, particularly time, to be more restricted. 

Hence the publishing of staff ride handbooks. A handbook is a tool that is

extremely useful in preparing for a staff ride. It provides background to the

opposing forces and campaign, a suggested list ofsitesto visit also referred

to as stands, subject matter topics for discussion at those stands, and

advice for administrative and sustainment support. The intent of this

handbook is not to replace the detailed study required to execute an

effective staff ride but to provide a solid starting point for the interested 

organization.

This handbook is one in a series of works from the Combat Studies

Institute (CSI) designed to facilitate the conduct of staff rides throughout

the Armed Forces of the United States. The foundational document of this

series is The Staff Ride by Dr. William Glenn Robertson (Washington,

DC: Center of Military History Publication 70-21, 1987). The Staff Ride

describes the staff ride methodology in detail and gives suggestions that

will assist in building any staff ride. In addition to The Staff Ride, CSI 

publishes handbooks focused on particular battles and campaigns from

throughout the Army’s history. These are from the American Revolution

to Pearl Harbor. The Staff Ride and CSI’s staff ride handbooks can be

electronically downloaded or requested in hard copy from the US Army

Combined Arms Center’s Military History Support website at 

http://usacac.Army.mil/cac2/historical-support.asp.

All of these publications are outstanding tools for the military

professional and for anyone interested in the detailed study of a given 

battle or campaign. New Orleans presents students of the operational art

xiii
with an excellent theater of operations in the Gulf Region which ranged

from the Gulf coast of Florida to southeastern Louisiana, including

decisive points at Pensacola and Mobile. While many of the stands in

this staff ride handbook deal directly with the tactical battles of New

Orleans, those battles also represent the decisive operation of a joint

operational campaign.

Therefore, the first stand, at the Rigolets between Lakes

Pontchartrain and Borgne, places a group in an ideal setting to discuss

the wide-ranging implications of joint campaign planning at the

operational level of war before transitioning to the tactical level as 

illustrated in the stands that follow.

The majority of groups conducting a New Orleans staff ride will

focus on the tactical level directly tied to the battles themselves. There 

are numerous lessons at the tactical level to include concepts about

leadership, doctrine, technology, and the human dimension which 

should emerge from the staff ride. For example, there is Jackson’s

building of a victorious cohesive team from an extremely diverse force 

of Regulars, Sailors, Marines, Militia, pirates, free men of color, and

Indians which attests to the power of his leadership and personality.

Similarly, the staff ride should include something of the pathos of battle. 

An example is when Lieutenant Colonel Dale (no relation to the author),

commander of the 93d Regiment, gave his watch to a surgeon requesting

that he give it to his wife because he knew that he was going to die at the

head of his regiment from attacking the American line. Individuals

developing the staff ride may have to modify the stands to fit their

schedules but they should always attempt to keep a sense of connection

between stands so that participants do not lose the context of the 

campaign.

Participants must have a chance to conduct proper research and 

prepare before actually visiting the staff ride locations. The extent of

participants’ preparation will depend on available time. At one end of the 

spectrum students might have ample time to explore numerous secondary 

sources and important primary sources. On the other end, if less time is

available for research, many secondary works provide ample overviews of 

the campaign and its culminating battle.

The Staff Ride Handbook for the Battles of New Orleans provides

a systematic approach to the analysis of this key event of the War of 1812:

Part I describes the organization of the American and British

Armies, detailing their organization, training, equipment, and tactics.

Part II consists of a campaign overview, establishing the context for 

xiv
the individual actions to be studied in the field.

Part III consists of a suggested itinerary of sites to visit in order to

obtain a more concrete view of the campaign and battlesin several phases.

For each stand, there is a set of navigational directions, an orientation to

the battle site, detailed descriptions of the action that occurred there, and

vignettes provided by campaign participants in their own words, and

suggested analysis questions and topics for further discussion. *

Part IV discusses the final phase of the staff ride, the integration.

The participating group, as the term implies, integrate the collective and 

individual actions of the preliminary study and field study phases of the 

staff ride andtoprovide relevantlessons for applicationinthe contemporary

Armed Forces – making history relevant to the warfighter!

Part V provides practical information on conducting a staff ride in

the New Orleans area, including sources of assistance and sustainment

considerations.

Appendixes A, B, and C outline the orders of battle of the opposing

forces, biographical sketches of the key participants, and historic maps.

Finally, the bibliography provides a list sources utilized in writing this

hand book, providing further options for preliminary study. Many of the

sources listed in the bibliography are easily available on the internet,

eliminating the added expense of purchasing books for preliminary study.

In sum, the battles of New Orleans, and the larger Gulf Campaign,

provides a unique view of decisive action within the joint operational level 

of warfare as it evolved during the early 19th Century and eventually

maturing as our current understanding of joint operations in the 21st

Century.

* All vignettes provided from primary sources in the bibliography

appear without changes to the original text.

xv

Part I. The Opposing Force1

 The American Army

On 1 January 1812, 11 regiments made up the regular

Army. Seven of these were infantry, one each of riflemen and

light dragoons, and two of artillery. The Army divided the

two artillery regiments into a regiment of light and a 

regiment of heavy artillery. However, because the War

Department saw horses as an expensive peacetime

expenditure, all of the companies of light artillery served as

infantry. The authorized strength of the Army was near 10,000 

but with only about 6,000 men on active service. These

veteran regiments in smaller elements, often as small as a

single company, found themselves scattered in posts and

fortifications on the coastlines or along the major rivers in

the interior. As manned, the for ce could not effectively

execute its primary missions without reinforcements of

Militia or Volunteers. Therefore, in the first months of 1812

and prior to the declaration of war, Congress approved an

expansion of the regular Army. Congress authorized 10

additional regiments of infantry, a second regiment of light 

dragoons, and two more regiments of artillery. This came to a

total authorized strength of approximately 27,000 officers and 

men. However, fewer than 12,000 had been commissioned or

enlisted by the period immediately prior to the war. Nearly

half of the regular Army amounted to newly recruited and

equally raw recruits and officers. The sudden, though slower

than anticipated, influx of manpower created an enormous

strain upon the sustainment system that failed to provide even 

the most basic of items.

The majority of the Army found itself deployed in various

locations in the newly acquired territory as a result of the

Louisiana Purchase in 1803. Over 400 Soldiers formed the

force assigned to the city of New Orleans because of lingering

uncertainty on the part of the government toward the loyalty

of the French and Spanish Creole population. However, a 

larger issue merited the Army’s presence in the new territory. 

This being Spanish possessions in Texas and Florida flanked

what had been the Spanish colony of Louisiana only a few

years before. The close proximity to New Orleans, the new

American port for exportation of goods from the emerging

American northwestern economy, made Americans

uncomfortable. When previously in control of Louisiana, the 

Spanish authorities closed the Mississippi to American traffic 

numerous times. Spanish occupied East and West Florida also

presented a potential threat to American settlers in the

Mississippi Territory (the modern states of Alabama and

Mississippi) who required the Spanish port of Mobile to export

1
their goods to market. The next several years following the

Louisiana Purchase saw the deployment of nearly 700 

American Soldiers to various outposts throughout the region

and multiple incidents between the military forces of both

nations. Though both sides avoided a larger war over the

contested territories, tensions between the two nations over 

lands continued for nearly the next 20 years.2

The United States entered the war unprepared. Despite the

labors of Madison and his supporters, the various efforts in

the past 18 months to increase the size and quality of the

American military fell gravely short. With an Army of slightly

over 6,000 men and a navy of only 16 vessels, the United

States committed itself to a conflict with one of the greatest

powers on earth. Thus, the American story of the War of 1812

is one of military unpreparedness, the great efforts made by

the nation to overcome its initial miscalculations, and the

organization of it and the military to conduct an effective war.

The first two years of the war reflected a steep learning curve

for the nation and its Army as the two reacted and persevered

to both defeat and disaster on every front. Time, however,

and the predominant British focus on their war against

Napoleon in Europe, allowed for the selection of new

military leaders and better trained formations that eventually

demonstrated a clear improvement on the battlefields in the

war’s second two years. Eventually, that time and the efforts

made by the Americans, gave the United States parity at the

negotiating table in the fall of 1814.3

The War of 1812

The beginning of the War of 1812 saw the Regular Army

dispersed in series of forts stretched along the Canadian 

boundary and the western frontier. The strength of the Army

in June of 1812 totaled 11,744 officers and men, including

an estimated 5,000 recruits enlisted for an additional force

authorized by Congress at the beginning of the year. It fell well

short of the authorized strength of 35,600. On the other hand,

the combat strength of the United States Navy consisted of 20

vessels: three large frigates, three smaller frigates, and 14 other 

vessels.

Congress quickly reacted following the declaration of war

to expand the military forces necessary to both invade British

Canada and protect the American coast from attacks by the

British Royal Navy. Nearly 20 years of concern over

standing armies as well as ineffective legislation and an

occasionally erratic economy, countered the efforts of an

instant demand. Three separate components stood at the core

of the government’s plan to mobilize the nation’s manpower

for war: the regular Army, the Militia, and Volunteers.4

2
Regulars

Immediately following the declaration of war, Congress

once again passed legislation authorizing a further increase

in the regular Army. Congress approved a standardized

organization for the infantry regiment and increased the

infantry to a total of 25 regiments. Congress offered far more

incentives for new recruits enlisting for a term of five years or

for the duration of the war. The government promised to pay

recruits a bounty of 16 dollars and, upon completion of their

enlistment, the provision of three months’ pay and 160 acres

of land. Nevertheless, the twin incentives of land and money

resulted in an insufficient number of recruits to fill the ranks 

and the established regiments fell chronically short of Soldiers.

The Army’s rapid expansion depended greatly upon the

selection of competent men to serve as officers at various

levels. Men with the right economic and social connections,

usually from amongst the upper class and having thoughts of 

military glory, contacted their congressmen. State delegations

to Congress submitted lists of their constituents for 

consideration by the Secretary of War and President Madison. 

Madison and his Secretary of War made their selections and

returned the nominations to Congress for its approval. Some

nominees possessed prior commissioned service or currently 

served in the regular Army, seeking promotion and 

assignment to a new regiment. However, despite efforts to

ensure that experienced applicants received commissions

across the regiments, most of the nominees possessed little or

no previous military service, least of all in wartime, and

started at a similar level as the privates in their charge.

The War Department established procedures for recruiting.

Typically, but not always, a captain remained most closely

associated with recruiting new soldiers. As the officers

persuaded men to enlist, they selected the most fit to serve

as non-commissioned officers, corporals, and sergeants. Upon

100 men agreeing to serve, officers mustered them into 

service and marched them to a designated training camp under

the command of a captain authorized by the War Department.

Eventually, the office of the Adjutant General assumed

direction of recruiting efforts. The War Department assigned

officers and companies to their regiments and by August, a 

shift in recruiting took place. The secretary of war turned

over responsibility for recruiting to the individual colonels

commanding the regiments. The War Department staff

established a geographic area for each regiment as its

specific recruiting zone. Therefore, an infantry regiment

would recruit within a single state or two states at most. For

example, the two regular infantry regiments present at New 

3
Orleans during the campaign in Louisiana, the 7th and 44th,

came from Kentucky and Louisiana (predominantly from the

city of New Orleans) respectively. However, recruiting

remained slow throughout the war and produced direct 

consequences at the regimental level.

With the mustering of a full company, the formation

received orders to join its regiment or to garrison a threatened

location. This resulted in the fact that regiments rarely fielded

all of their companies and officers in one location. Typically,

only a few companies served together under their regimental

colonels. Detached companies might be significant distances

from their regiment and under the local control of a different

regimental commander. On the other hand, the main body

of the regiment might be commanded by the colonel or a 

lieutenant colonel. Other regimental officers served on

recruiting duty or on brigade-level and higher staffs. Some

few served as aides to generals or on special assignment.

Often, orphan companies, those separated from their

regiments, temporarily amalgamated under whatever field

grade officer might be available. All of these circumstances

leant some confusion when attempting to understand military

reports and orders of battle. A military report noting the

presence or action of a specific regiment almost never refers to

the entire regiment. It refers to those companies of that specific

regiment collocated and acting under a single commander. It 

may also refer to an orphaned company of an infantry 

regiment or the Light Artillery temporarily amalgamated with

another regiment. This may be loosely termed a regiment or

a battalion. The term battalion referring to a grouping of

companies, usually under command of a field grade officer. 

As the war progressed, Congress adjusted the

composition of the regular Army twice more. In January

of 1813, Congress created 20 additional infantry regiments,

including the 44th, organized in New Orleans and later

present during the fighting. At first, Congress directed that

the men recruited for these new regiments would enlist for 

only one year ofservice. However, it later decreed that Soldiers

would enlist for the usual term of five years or the duration of

the war.

American military and political leaders, for the most part,

understood the extensive timeframe required to organize,

train, and equip new regiments for the Regular Army. In 

order to buy the necessary time for the Army, leaders believed 

that Militia could effectively defend the nation until the time

when the expanded Regular Army could effectively take the

offensive.

4
Militia

Militia comprised the vast majority of American Soldiers

that fought in the War of 1812. Unfortunately, the system in

place prior to the war prevented the United States from 

fielding the force necessary to effectively conduct operations.

The Constitution and the Militia Act of 1792 created divisions

of labor between the federal and state governments that

blurred the responsibility for organizing and equipping the

Militia which lead to the failure of the entire Militia system.

The federal laws and systems in place prior to the war failed to

established standards for organizing and training the states’

respective militias and provide guidance for the wartime 

integrating the Militia with the Regular Army.5

During the War of 1812, employment of Militia presented

more of a question of their ability to fight than their

willingness to fight. Despite the parameters of the Militia Act

of 1792, many sources indicated that Militia reported without

weapons and basic equipment to include shoes and blankets.

Therefore, the modern concept of the American frontiersman

coming with rifle in hand proved false. Reality presented

a different picture of a man reporting without a weapon and

even the knowledge of how to use one. An individual

Militiaman reporting to a rendezvous or camp of instruction

represented the same challenge to a Regular training a new 

recruit in the 23 separate movements required to fire a musket 

outlined in the manuals of the day. However, when properly

organized, trained, and equipped, and provided with capable

leadersthat knew how to employ them within a given operating

environment, Militia could become a formidably effective

force as demonstrated at New Orleans.6

The company represented the basic Militia unit. The

organizational standard called for 64 privates but frontier 

organizations fielded between 40 and 80. The Soldiers of

the company elected company captains and the subordinate

officers. The elected captain then appointed the

noncommissioned officers. Multiple companies made up

battalions. These formations usually fielded between four and

eightsubordinate companies, perhaps a total of 500 men. Two

or more battalions formed a regiment and two to four

regiments formed a brigade. A division, the highest level, 

consolidated between two and four brigades. State governors

appointed general officers approved by the state legislature.

The commissioned officers of the organizations elected

officers above the rank of captain in field positions in

battalions and regiments.

While many of the Militiamen in the North faced

professional British formations along theCanadian frontier, the

5
bulk of Militiamen in the south faced hostile Indians and a far

different type of warfare. However, Southern Militia

experienced the same problems seen by Northern Militia, 

especially disputes over time in service which always posed

a major friction point with senior Regular Army

commanders. Some differences came from the fact that

several states in the south entered the Union just before the

war began and still had no Militia laws on the books.

The war in the southern part of the United States

began in July of 1813 when Mississippi Territorial Militia

(the modern States of Mississippi and Alabama) ambushed

a party of Creek Indians after their return from Pensacola,

in Spanish controlled Florida, to obtain arms for use against

American settlers. The Militia, initially successful, then

scattered in the face of resurgent Creeks. The Mississippi

Militia’s actions directly led to the Creek assault on Fort

Mims resulting in the “Fort Mims massacre” which stirred the

American southern frontier to arms.7

A multitude of issues with the Militia in the south

during 1812 and 1813 reflected the overall problems with the

nation’s Militia system. This was especially in the category of

supplies in a Federal system that failed to support reporting 

Militia. Many of the issues encountered ended up being either

exasperated or partially resolved by strong personalities. All

of the issues widely experienced with Militia led Andrew

Jackson, Major General of the Tennessee Militia, to finally

withdraw his forces from the overall Federal government’s 1813

campaign against the Creeks who appeared to be a lesser

enemy than his own logistics was and those logistics that the

Federal government failed to provide.8

Following his 1814 victory over the Creeks at Horseshoe

Bend, Andrew Jackson’s commission as Major General in

the Regular Army and appointment as Commanding General

of the United States 7th Military District, facilitated the

integration and improvement of the Militia units within the

area of operations. Jackson’s new found authority also

authorized him to call out additional Volunteers from the

States within his district and from Kentucky. Jackson’s short

campaign to seize Pensacola in order to deny the Spanish city

as a base for Creek and British operations, demonstrated this 

new flexibility. Militia made up two thirds of Jackson’s 4,100-

man force of combat experienced Volunteers, Regulars, and

allied Indians.9

At the battle of New Orleans, Jackson became a standard

bearer in all of the myth-making behind the battle and the

Militia’s role in the victory. While Militia on the right bank of

the Mississippi collapsed in the face of a numerically inferior 

6
British force, representing the sole black mark on the battle

(somewhat undeserved in hindsight as will be

outlined below), the Militia on the left bank, many veterans

of the Creek War, won all of the glory and perpetuated much

of the pervading myth that surrounds the battle. However,

it also demonstrated that Militia, under the right conditions

and with strong leadership directly at hand, could contribute to

decisive victory, even in the face of an experienced veteran

Regular force.10

Despite the hard learned lessons of those leaders at the

federal levels of government and their subordinate field

commanders, news of the victory at New Orleans and the

agreeable peace that followed, restored faith in the ideals of the

Militia that most Americans held before the war. It would take

nearly another century with three further major military

conflicts for the Army to finally come to grips with its

repeatedly faulty Militia system. 11

Volunteers

Many states and territories possessed permanently

established volunteer military organizations. Companies,

organized by the leaders of the local upper class around

the, in many ways operated like private social clubs.

Members with a desire for a military lifestyle organized their

companies and then gained the governor’s recognition for

the unit to get status as an adjunct to the Militia. Volunteers

provided their own uniforms, weapons, and equipment. They

elected their own officers commissioned by the governor into

the Militia. Older states, like New York, boasted dozens of

companies of riflemen, artillery, dragoons, and hussars. The

volunteer companies trained more frequently than the 

common Militia and carried a greater martial spirit.

Louisiana, like other states in the country, possessed a 

tradition of organizing volunteer military companies.

However, with its eclectic mix of French and Spanish Creole 

culture and old world military traditions, Louisiana fielded

some unique organizations. Each of the volunteer companies

of New Orleans presented a colorful picture, dating back

to the earliest days of French colonization and parading in a 

variety of different colored uniforms of European origin.

Duplicating the social club atmosphere of other units 

throughout the country, the New Orleans Rifles consisted of

recruits from the city’s elite. These were businessmen known

for their marksmanship, honed during public target shooting

competitions.12

7
Organization

American military force organization emulated the

practices of their European counterparts. The basic

organization, the infantry regiment, comprised10 companies

organized as a single battalion, although the Army briefly 

considered a two-battalion regiment. In June 1812, Congress 

approved the establishment of a regimental organization

consisting of a small regimental headquarters and 10 infantry

companies. The regimental commander’s staff included a 

lieutenant colonel (the second-in-command), a major, an

adjutant, quartermaster, paymaster, surgeon and two

surgeons’ mates, the sergeant major, quartermaster sergeant,

and two musicians. The composition of a company included

a captain, first lieutenant, second lieutenant, ensign, four

sergeants, six corporals, two musicians and 90 privates. In 

March 1813, Congress added a second major to the

headquarters and a third lieutenant and an additional sergeant

to each company. An additional officer in each company

theoretically made it easier to support recruiting without

degrading leadership in the field. The new legislation

established the infantry regiments full authorization of 1,091

men.

Congress authorized the establishment of two regiments of 

light dragoons but the two did not share a common

uniformity. The First Regiment of Light Dragoons fielded

eight companies with an authorized strength of 672 men. The

organization of the Second Regiment of Light Dragoons,

however, differed with 12 companies and a total

authorization of 1,006 Soldiers. However, mounted forces

rarely conducted a battlefield charge during this war. The

mounted arm’s primary tasks consisted of providing a rapid

courier service and providing security between the widely

dispersed elements of the Army. Andrew Jackson’s 7th

Military District did not have regular Army dragoons but relied

upon mounted Militia from the Mississippi Territory who

conducted security operations at various times throughout the 

Gulf campaign in Louisiana.

The Regiment of Light Artillery, conceptually designed

as a horse artillery unit in which every soldier rode, proved to

be a concept that never came to fruition, although some

companies probably functioned in this manner during the war.

On the other hand, several companies of the light artillery

operated as infantry companies. Each of the 10 companies of 

light artillery included a captain, first lieutenant, and second

lieutenant. The company also included four sergeants, four

corporals, two musicians, eight artificers, and 12 drivers.

Congress never saw to the formal standardization of the

8
three heavy artillery regiments. The companies of heavy

artillery regiments served in three capacities. First, a company

could serve as a garrison of a fixed fortification with the

obvious task of manning the guns. Second, a company could

serve as field artillery with larger elements. There was no

fixed organization of a field artillery company. The company

mightserve three guns and a howitzer or a variety of other nonstandard combinations. Third, a company of artillerists could

be employed as infantrymen.

US regular artillerymen served as the core of Jackson’s

artillery at New Orleans, augmented by equally proficient

US Navy gun crews. A company of over 70 Soldiers from 

the Regiment of Light Artillery served at New Orleans, while

a second company served at Fort St. Philip on the Mississippi

River, and another served at Fort Bowyer at the entrance of

Mobile Bay. All three elements saw significant fighting

during the campaign in the Gulf. Baratarian pirates and

experienced Militia gunners provided additional gun crews.

While regulars served artillery positions along Jackson’s main

defensive line along the Rodriguez Canal, a larger contingent

manned the variety of guns assigned to the critical important 

position at Fort St. Philip on the Mississippi River.13

Engineers were staff officers and consolidated into the

professional but small Corps of Engineers. There were a 

mere 17 engineers serving on active duty when war broke

out but that number grew as the war progressed. Graduates

of West Point dominated the Corps of Engineers although

that school had only come into existence in 1802. Prior to

the war, these engineers were occupied with designing and

building fortifications, usually to protect harbors. As the War

Department designated armies and military districts, it

assigned engineers to serve on the staff of the commanding

generals. Besides building fortifications, engineer officers 

also conducted reconnaissance or opened roads. It appearsthat 

Jackson lacked regular Army engineers during the campaign

in Louisiana but greatly benefited from his selection of two

civilian engineers on his staff, Major Tatum Howell, a veteran

Revolutionary War topographical engineer and longtime

friend, and Major Arsene Lacarriere Latour, a French-born

military engineer living in New Orleans. Officers such as

these two supervised the establishment of the fortification

built at New Orleans, utilizing the non-specialized troops on 

hand to perform the necessary work.

To meet wartime demands, Congress appointed general

officers to command armies. These Army commanders

possessed the authority to organize brigades and appoint

commanders. In 1813, the War Department eliminated the

9
Army as an organization and instead divided the United

States into nine (and eventually 10) military districts. A 

general officer commanded each district as well as all the 

regulars, Volunteers, and federalized Militia within its

borders. The Seventh District encompassed the states of

Tennessee, Louisiana, and the Mississippi Territory (comprised

of the modern states of Mississippi and Alabama). When

Andrew Jackson assumed command of the district upon

accepting his commission as a Major General in the Regular

Army, it included the United States 2d, 3rd, 7th, 39th (this

regiment serving as the core of Jackson’s force in the final

campaign against the Creeks), 44th Infantry Regiments, and

various detachments of US regular artillerymen.14

Sustaining the Force

The Soldiers in the field suffered from the repeated failures

of a faulty American logistical system unprepared for war.

Prior to the declaration of war, the secretary of war and a 

handful of civilian agents in the field performed the Army’s

logistical tasks. The War Department operated a number of

permanent supply points, operated by civilian agents, under 

the direction of a Superintendent of Military Stores. In 1812,

Congress authorized an expansion of the Army’s

sustainment structure to meet the needs of an enlarged

Army. The secretary of war oversaw multiple specialized

offices responsible for acquiring, storing, moving, and 

issuing weapons, ammunition, equipment, and clothing.

Unfortunately, the secretary experienced challenges that

prevented him from clearly delineating the duties and

responsibilities of each office or how they interfaced. Little 

coordination among the three departments occurred at their

highest levels resulting in an ineffectiveness and

inefficiencies in every theater, especially the south.

The most important Congressional action led to the 

creation of a Quartermaster Department and a number of

additional subordinate quartermaster officer positions. The

Quartermaster Department also held responsibility to

procure equipment and supplies. In accordance with

congressional legislation, each regiment possessed a 

quartermaster officer assigned to the regiment, appointed by 

the commander. Still, above the regimental level, commanders

also detailed officers to serve as quartermaster officers. These 

officers answered to both the general officer they served in the

field and the Quartermaster General in Washington.

The Quartermaster Department accepted material from the

Purchasing Department and held responsibility for its

transportation and issuing to units in the field. However,

transportation problems presented a serious bottleneck in the

10
American wartime logistics system. Issues existed in

transporting equipment and weapons to units in camp and

the field, especially the Militia. With fighting fronts well

away from sources of supplies and equipment, and roads in

the United States generally poor, finding wagons, teams, and

teamsters willing to travel near an active front proved difficult.

The lack of manufacturing centers and a suitable road

network in the south made the sustainment of forces in the

region ex-tremely challenging, making a dependence on river 

borne transportation even more vital. Regrettably, the supply

of food or subsistence, suffered from chronic mishandling.

The War Department issued contracts for subsistence,

requiring each appointed contractor to serve all Army forces

within a given geographic area. Limitations, however, made

the system inflexible in the field. Contractors need not cross

international boundaries, nor did they have to provide supplies

beyond their assigned areas. During the war, forces faced a 

continual shortage of supplies which arrived late and often

spoiled. Despite repeated complaints from general officers,

the system of feeding the Army did not improve until after

the war’s completion.

Subsistence proved an Achilles heel in Jackson’s 1813

campaign against the Creeks in the sparsely developed

Mississippi Territory, causing its early termination without

decisive results. He still encountered challenging issues

during his successful concluding campaign the following

year even when taking the initiative to utilize the inland rivers 

available to him. When defending New Orleans from the

British in 1814, Jackson’sArmy received abundant provisions

directly from the city of New Orleans, less than 10 miles to its

rear.This pointstemmed from the British blockade, effectively

closing the port of New Orleans to foreign trade and leaving

stocks of various products stack along the city’s levee. The

Mississippi River provided an uninterrupted line of supply

from northern manufacturing centers. However, the

government’s fragile sustainment system failed to exploit this

fact, especially during the campaign in Louisiana. While

Jackson received sufficient manpower via the river from 

Kentucky and Tennessee, the Quartermaster Department

failed to deliver critically needed weapons and ammunition

to New Orleans until several weeks after Jackson’s victory.15

The British Army

With the declaration of war, the United States faced one of

the major powers in the world. However, by 1812, Great

Britain continued nearly 20 years of warfare with

revolutionary and then Napoleonic France. England dedicated

the majority of its economic and military power toward this

11
war, since 1808, against French efforts in Portugal and Spain.

Therefore, when the United States declared war, the British

government found little it could do to support the defense of

Canada, let alone conduct major combat operations against

the Americans. Within months of the new war, the British

Royal Navy deployed less than 50 warships in the western

Atlantic. These vessels and an equal amount of smaller craft 

focused on a multitude of missions that included escorting

merchant shipping, protecting British possessions, establishing

a blockade along the American coastline, and engaging the 

smaller US Navy.

British security of Upper and Lower Canada (today’s

modern Canadian provinces of Ontario and Quebec)

consisted of approximately 7,000 regular troops backed by a 

Canadian Militia that could be drawn from a population of

86,000 military age males. Furthermore, Canada lacked the

established infrastructure to directly support the British warfare

effort locally. However, the British made up their shortage

somewhat in manpower through their continued support of

the Indians living in American territory, one of the key reasons

for the American declaration of war. Following the American

victory over Tecumseh’s Indian confederacy at Tippecanoe,

Tecumseh led some 3,500 warriors across the border into

Canada. The pro-British tribes represented a source of

manpower lacking for the United States. Based on this

resource, the two warring nations began their war with a 

degree of parity.16

Organization

Despite several years of less than successful

campaigning against the armies of revolutionary France in

Holland and elsewhere, the British Army and primarily its

infantry, still held somewhat of a moral superiority over its

European continental foes. Though small in comparison to

its rivals, the Army established a lengthy reputation for 

fielding well-trained and disciplined formations. Men enlisted

in the British Army for a period of seven years or for life.

Typical recruits came from two common sources: the poor and

the criminal class. Hard discipline turned this unlikely

material into the finest infantry of its time, especially during

the wars of the Napoleonic period.

The majority of officers in American units new to their

positions and with little but Militia experience as preparation 

but the officers in the British Army were, for the most part,

professionals. British officers predominantly came from the

gentry and middle class, although a small percentage

actually came up from the ranks by being rewarded for 

personal gallantry. While not particularly well-educated,

12
British officers remained literate and read. Only about four

percent of the officer corps graduated from the Royal

Military College at High Wycombe. The British officer corps

still depended upon a purchase system whereby an

individual with enough money could buy a vacancy in a 

regiment. After that, an officer could continue to buy his way

up through the officer ranks or await promotion by seniority

as spaces opened by death or injury.

A proud heritage of specialized Soldiers marked the

British infantry. The infantry boasted kilted highlanders, 

green-jacketed riflemen, and whole battalions of light

infantry and of fusiliers. All of these types of regiments

would be represented at New Orleans. British infantry

regiments contained anywhere from a single to seven battalions 

but more than half of all regiments possessed only two

battalions that rarely served together. Therefore, the terms

regiment and battalion tended to be used interchangeably in

contemporary and historical sources. A lieutenant colonel

commanded the infantry battalion. The regimental colonel,

if present, often commanded a brigade or a garrison. Other

optionssaw him back in England recruiting or even on inactive 

duty.

Like the United States Army’s infantry regiments, each

British battalion consisted of 10 companies. However, the

British differed in one important distinction. British battalions 

fielded eight “battalions” (or “centre”) companies and two 

elite “flank” companies. These distinctive companies arose

from the position of the companies when arrayed in a line

formation, each company on line facing the enemy. One of the

flank companies, the grenadier company, consisted of the

tallest, most stalwart Soldiers who found their way into this

company to receive a pay bonus. Originally distinguished by

their throwing of hand bombs, grenadiers eventually came to

be equipped exactly like the Soldiers of the centre companies.

The other flank company, designated the light company,

consisted of equally stalwart Soldiers, physically tough and

particularly energetic. The light company often received the

task of scouting and skirmishing, while receiving higher pay 

like the grenadiers.

Positioning these two companies on the flanks of the

battalion made it easier to detach them for other missions

without disrupting the battalion’s line. The battalion

commander possessed the flexibility to detach the light 

company for skirmishing forward of the rest of the battalion

or detach the grenadier company to defend a weak flank or

lead an assault. Brigade and division commanders often

consolidated several light companies or grenadier companies

13
into temporary battalions to take advantage of their expertise

and high moral for special tasks. During the war, with such a 

long border to defend, senior commanders further divided

infantry battalions to provide a broader coverage. Like their

American equivalents, a British battalion seldom saw combat

with all of its subordinate companies under the regimental

colors.

Thoughtheauthorizedstrengthof a British infantry battalion

numbered 1,100 Soldiers, the British Army rarely maintained

this total. Regiments that participated in the Gulf campaign,

veterans of various periods of the fighting in Spain, averaged

between 550 and 800 men but again, not all present for duty.

Only the 93d Regiment, organized during the European wars,

numbered close to its full strength, having been stationed in

South Africa’s Cape Colony prior to its first combat action

at New Orleans.17

In terms of cavalry, the British Army’s deployment of

its mounted regiments remained limited. Only two regular

British cavalry regiments went to North America during the

War of 1812. One regiment, the 14th Dragoons, arrived

in Louisiana in January of 1814, before the final British 

attempt to penetrate Jackson’s line. However, this regiment

arrived without its horses based on a combined attempt by

the government to save money and an intelligence report that

asserted an abundant number of horses in the American

south. The organization of a British cavalry regiment

included a small headquarters and 10 troops (companies). The 

Royal Regiment ofArtillery provided the artillery batteriesthat

supported England’s armies. Some units were called Royal

Foot Artillery, consisting of 10 battalions of 10 companies

each. Companies of a specific battalion did not serve together

and might be found on several continents during the same

time frame. Artillery officers were all graduates of the Royal

Military Academy at Woolwich and were considered

specialists, like engineer officers. Unlike American

artillerists who frequently served as infantry, the British

artillerists never did so.18

Influence of the Peninsula Army

At the climax of the American repulse of Pakenham’s

final assault upon the Rodriguez Canal on 8 January 1815,

Andrew Jackson must have considered that his Army defeated

a numerically superior force of the Duke of Wellington’s

Army. At that moment he knew that he achieved a decisive

victory over, at that time, the best Army in the world.

However, several points need to be made on the accuracy in

describing the British force at New Orleans as a force of 

Peninsula veterans, not to diminish the quality of the British

14
force and its efforts but to balance the record of the campaign.

The force that landed and fought at New Orleans cannot be

considered a portion of the Peninsula Army because of one

simple fact that it lacked the leadership of Sir Arthur Wellesley, 

the Duke of Wellington. A British Army landed in Louisiana 

but it failed to conform to the high personal standards of a 

Wellingtonian Army. Even the Iron Duke held varying

opinions of the Army under his direct command in Portugal

and Spain, referring to it in 1810 as “the worst Army that was

ever sent from England” and then, at its high point, asserting

that “I could have done anything with that Army, it was in such

splendid order.”19

Twenty-one regiments received orders for North

America. Four regiments never departed. A total of 10

Peninsula regiments sailed for Canada where they played a 

minor role in the abortive 1814 campaign in the Champlain

Valley but provided the necessary force to adequately defend

the border from American attack. Four regiments, the 4th,

21st, 44th, and 85th, all destined to serve at New Orleans,

first served in the Chesapeake region by fighting at

Bladensburg and Baltimore.

Eleven regiments served in the fighting below New

Orleans from 22 December 1814 to 19 January 1815. Seven

regiments possessed moderate to longer term experience

serving in the Peninsula and six saw extensive action from

1810-1814 which was the period that saw the highest

operational tempo and Wellington’s greatest victories in the

Peninsula. This represented 63 percent of the total force. Only

the 44th missed the fighting in 1813-1814. However, roughly

42 percent of that experienced combat power that arrived

two days before the final assault never saw significant action

on 8 January 1815 (the 7th, 43rd, and 14th Light Dragoons in

reserve). Only four regiments lacked combat experience in

the Peninsula. The 1st and 5th West India, manned by former 

slaves recruited in the Caribbean, possessed good combat

recordsin the variousBritish amphibious operationsin that area

of the world and though immune to the diseases of the region,

they endured hostile winter conditions in Louisiana never 

before encountered, the 21st fought during Chesapeake

campaign, and the 93d which was a new wartime regiment from

the Cape Colony arrived without prior combat experience.20

Two basic problems that plagued the British Army as an

institution, and its Army in the Peninsula specifically, 

stemmed from a shortage of competent generals and attrition

upon the rank and file. Both factors maintained a day-today hold on Wellington’s attention throughout the war but

especially from about 1810 until 1814. Both issues extended

15
to operations in North America after Napoleon’s abdication,

and concerned Wellington later at Waterloo in 1815. These

two factors help, in some ways, dispel the aura that

surrounded the British expeditionary force when it arrived in 

Louisiana in December of 1814.

Wellington and the government found it exceedingly

difficult to supply the Army in the Peninsula back in 

Europe with effective leaders. This resulted in a youth

movement in general officers, as reflected in their Peninsula 

commander-in-chief. However, youth also influenced the high

casualties among the general officers as Wellington lost nine

generals killed in action in the Peninsula. However, at this

level most officers failed because while many adequately 

proved themselves capable of commanding a battalion or 

brigade, the command of a division usually revealed personal

shortcomings. Even commandersthat proved themselves at the

head of a division, lacked the core requirements to effectively

command larger forces. Wellington cited Sir Michael

Pakenham, his brother in law and future commander of the

New Orleans expedition, as one of those few capable officers 

by stating, “He may not be a genius but [he is] one of the best 

we have.”21

Another factor played a part in understanding the true 

nature of the British Army as a whole and the regiments

present at New Orleans in particular, that factor being 

attrition.Ofthe allied powersfighting against first revolutionary

France and then Napoleon, Britain remained the only nation

remaining in the field throughout the entire period extending

from 1793 to 1815. The physical cost of the war against

Napoleon totaled approximately 240,000. Attrition caused

tremendous turnover in the ranks of the Peninsula regiments.

At the Battle of Vittoria in 1814 where the majority of the

Peninsula-New Orleans veterans served, the extremes of unit

reporting prior to the battle extended from a minimum of 230

men fit for duty to a maximum of 800. At times, attrition made

it difficult to determine the experience of a particular 

regiment. In fact, the difference of a year’s time sometimes

proved critical in this assessment. However, sometimes the

heritage of a given regiment’s status colored the assessment, no

matter how many new and inexperienced Soldiers stood in 

formation. This might have been especially true with the

“veteran” units that ended the war in southern France in 1814

and later fought in Canada, Louisiana, and at Waterloo in 1815.

16
Weapons

Infantry

Both American and British Soldiers carried the primary 

weapon of the age, the flintlock musket and its attached 

bayonet. The smooth bore musket fired a spherical bullet 

made of lead. Tactics depended more on the volume of fire 

than on its accuracy. In order to increase the rate of fire, the 

manufacturers molded the ball so that the finished product 

measured significantly smaller than the barrel of the musket. 

Thus, the infantryman could ram the powder and ball down 

the barrel quickly. Upon firing, the ball blasted down the 

barrel and exited the muzzle on an erratic trajectory. A trained 

soldier, carefully aiming his musket, might have a reasonable 

chance of hitting a man at a distance of 40 yards but a group 

of Soldiers in formation could inflict significant casualties on 

an enemy at 125 yards or farther. With quality training and 

practice, the standard soldier could manage to fire two rounds 

per minute. Very well-trained Soldiers, as exhibited by British 

regulars under combat conditions, often achieved a rate of up 

to three and even four volleys per minute. 

Musket ammunition consisted of a ball and powder

rolled up in a paper cartridge. The paper was sometimes

pasted closed but more often tied with string. The Americans

also used a variant which consisted of three small buck shot

placed atop the ball. Buck and ball was so popular among

American Soldiers that virtually all cartridges were configured

this way by war’s end. The four pieces of lead dispersed

soon after leaving the muzzle giving a somewhat greater

probability of hitting a target. However, there is no clear

evidence that the three buck shot were effective in

incapacitating an enemy soldier unlessstriking the soldier in the

face or hands. The British considered buck and ball as

ungentlemanly.

Firing a musket produced particles of burning powder

and small fragments from the flint that thrown all directions

by the ignition of the powder in the pan. This feature of

battlefield firepower created specific uniform requirements

to protect the individual soldier with uniform coats including

high collars and military headgear which possessed low

brims, both designed to protect a soldier’s hands and face

from burns. Regimental surgeons still treated facial and hand

burns at the conclusion of an engagement. The recoil of a 

musket equaled today’s 12-gauge shotgun, leaving some

Soldiers with bruised and sore shoulders. Improper control of

the musket often injured the firer and his nearby comrades.

17
With each successive volley, dirty white smoke filled the

air, obscuring the battlefield. On a still day, with no wind

to disperse the smoke, a soldier often lost sight of his target

after just a few volleys. This presented challenges for any

soldier but especially the inexperienced Soldiers. Despite

being in a linear formation with comrades to right and left, a 

soldier could find himself “lost” in the smoke and stricken

with the fear of not seeing his comrades or the enemy. Here

is where the well-trained and disciplined of a unit came into

play.

Flint-lockmuskets, even underthe best possible conditions,

frequently suffered from misfires. In approximately 15 percent 

of firings, the powder charge failed to ignite. Misfires resulted 

from misaligned, worn, or broken flints, a disturbed charge of

priming powder, fouling in the touchhole, or poor gunpowder

quality. An experienced soldier could identify a misfire and

correct the deficiency to return his weapon to combat

readiness. On the other hand, an inexperienced soldier might

continue to load his musket with charge and ball repeatedly.

Soldiers simply became ineffective if the musket misfired at

each subsequent firing. However, if the musket eventually

fired, the barrel would explode, seriously injuring or killing the

soldier behind the weapon and potentially those Soldiers

nearby.

Bayonets added to the killing potential of the flint-lock 

musket. The bayonet represented the terror weapon of the

infantryman’s battlefield in the first half of the nineteenth

century. Approximately fifteen inches long with a triangular

cross section, the bayonet proved extremely deadly if 

brought into close action by well-trained Soldiers. Fear of 

being wounded by a bayonet persuaded inexperienced

Soldiers to often refuse the order to charge despite the urgings

of their officers. These same Soldiers often withdrew against

orders in the face of a determined charge by the enemy.

Experienced Soldiers, understanding the moral advantage that

a bayonet charge gave them, sometimes showed their

eagerness to advance against an enemy they believed to be 

less experienced and trained.

Rifles represented the precision firearm of the time, 

extremely accurate in the hands of a well-trained marksman.

Therefore, riflemen in both armies became specialists. The

United States Army established one regiment of riflemen.

The British also established a rifle regiment, the 95th. Both

armies deployed riflemen in skirmish lines forward of the 

regular infantry formations and employed them in security

18
missions or the targeting of key enemy leaders on the

battlefield. The rifleman carried fine priming powder as well

as coarser gunpowder rather than fixed cartridges musket 

ammunition used by the bulk of the British infantry. The rifle 

ball possessed a much tighter fit than the musket ball. The

rifleman wrapped a greased piece of cloth or leather patch 

around the ball. This served to seal gases behind the ball and

to assist it in gripping the barrel rifling. It took a skilled

rifleman as long as a minute to carefully load his rifle but it

often served as time well spent. The rifle was accurate up to

300 yards and represented a consistent guarantee that an enemy

officer went down.

American rifle units, both Regulars and Volunteers,

carried either the Model 1803 or Contract Model 1807 Rifle. 

The Harper’s Ferry arsenal produced the .54 caliber Model

1803 and, as the name implies, private arms manufacturers

made the Contract Model 1807. However, in the western

regions of the United States, some militiamen carried the

Kentucky Rifle (a variation of the original Pennsylvania Rifle, 

and referred to as a Tennessee Rifle because of local

mod ifications made by gunsmiths in that state). In the hands

of an experienced marksman, it could exceed ranges of

several hundred yards. Contrary to popular myth, however,

not every frontier volunteer reported for duty with a rifle. 

The popular conception of the well-armed crack shot fell to

the wayside with the hundreds of ill equipped farmers, shop

keepers, and laborers that volunteered for service.

Nonetheless, the American force at New Orleans contained

several small units equipped with rifles and many of the

Tennessee Militia in General John Coffee’s brigade also

carried the weapon. The British 95th Regiment, known as the

Rifle Regiment, represented a specialized unit on the

battlefield because of being specifically organized for the

skirmishing mission forward of the regular infantry. Riflemen 

formed an impressive obstacle to attacking French columns in

the Peninsula in Europe, dominating their French

counterparts. Riflemen could also be employed in smaller

elements, providing precision covering fires for larger specific

British units executing attacks or defenses. The British 

rifleman’s weapon, the Baker Rifle, though shorter than

American equivalents, hence shorter in maximum range, still

provided a well-balanced rifle with highly accurate capability.

Hence, the deployment of several companies of the 95th,

organized as a battalion, with the New Orleans expeditionary

force.23

19
Artillery

Artillery weapons made a major contribution to the War of

1812 land and sea battles. By 1812, artillery weapons became

specialized, depending upon the desired effect on the target. 

Artillery fell in three general types of cannon: guns, 

howitzers, and mortars, all smooth bore (lacking rifling that

appeared later in the century) and loaded from the muzzle.

Long-barreled guns shot at a flat trajectory, giving them

greater range and accuracy than howitzers or mortars. Guns

made up the majority of the most typical battlefield pieces.

Guns differentiated in the weight of their projectile. A sixpounder gun would fire an iron ball weighing six pounds. Sixpounder guns made up the majority of guns on the battlefield,

though nine, 18, and 24 pounder guns also saw employment

under certain circumstances. Larger guns, requiring heavier

carriages to absorb the recoil of firing, commonly remained

in fixed fortifications. At New Orleans, both sides initially

deployed a limitednumber ofmobile six-pounder field guns but

eventually relied upon larger caliber naval guns established in

fixed fortifications during the weeks leading up to the

culminating battle.

Guns fired a variety of common ammunition to include 

shot, grape, and case (canister). Shot (also called round shot)

consisted of a simple solid iron ball that smashed through

its target of ships, fortifications, and compact formations of

men. A six-pounder gun could fire shot up to a 1,000 yards.

Asix-pound iron ball, about three and a half inches in diameter,

could be clearly visible if fired directly at its target. Though

deemed “unmanly” to dodge an approaching shot, not many

Soldiers held themselves to that standard. Grape ammunition

served as an anti-personnel round, composed of a number of

iron or lead balls of an inch or more in diameter, and held

together in a canvas bag, tied tightly in a compact cylindrical

shape necessary for easy loading. This configuration

resembled a bunch of grapes and gave it its name. Upon

firing, the bag ruptured and the iron balls flew out of the barrel

in a conical pattern. This shot gun effect blast cut a much

wider swath through enemy lines than a solid iron ball.

Because of the heaviness of the balls making up the grape

ammunition, the range was nearly as great as that of solid

shot. Case, or canister, ammunition received its name due to

its configuration. This ammunition consisted of a thin metal

cylindrical can filled with lead musket balls. The shock of the 

gun being fired forced the collapse of the metal can and the

musket balls left the barrel of the gun in a wide pattern. With

less than half the range of solid shot, case utterly devastated

tightly packed troop formations at close range.

20
Howitzers were easy to differentiate from guns because of

theirshorter barrels. Howitzers fired at a higher trajectory

than a gun, lobbing its projectile over the walls of

fortifications and to explode above formations of enemy

troops. While a howitzer could fire shot, case, and grape, its 

specific design fired shell, a hollow iron ball filled with

gunpowder. The shell came fitted with a fuse that lit when

the explosive charge pushed the shell out of the barrel. The

gunner cut the fuse to an appropriate length so that the shell

exploded over the target, showering a blast of hot metal

fragments downward and into the designated target. Cut too

long or burned too slowly, the shot could bury itself into the

ground and its effects diminished. Nonetheless, the sight of a 

shell on the ground, fuse sputtering, terrified onlookers who

awaited the blast. Prior to the War of 1812, British Lieutenant

Colonel Henry Shrapnel of the Royal Artillery designed a 

round of ammunition that eventually bore his name. Shrapnel 

created a thin metal shell filled with gunpowder and a few

dozen musket balls. The shell, named spherical case, exploded

in the air above Soldiers with immense destructiveness.

Spherical case surprised American Soldiers when first used

early in the war but they overcame their surprise and

eventually built their own version of spherical case.

Mortars made up the last category. Mortars possessed

extremely short barrels and fired in a high arc trajectory.

Artillerists used mortars to lob shells into large fortifications.

Naval forces sometimes used gun boats armed with mortars

against large seacoast fortifications. Because mortars recoiled

downward, carriages light enough for field use proved

impractical, giving little call for mortars on the battlefield.

The Congreve rocket that the British possessed was a 

relatively new weapon that fell into the artillery category. A 

turn-of-the century British discovery encountered during wars

in India, examples made their way back to England where

British Army officer and inventor, William Congreve, built an 

improved model. Military employment began in 1806, seeing 

use in both theRoyal Navy andArmy.Rockets came in a variety

of sizes. Steel cases held propellant and the conical head, the

warhead, contained black powder. Despite having a guide pole,

rockets very often proved inaccurate. More practically, the

employment of rockets as signaling devices worked well.

However, they held a moral impact, especially over

inexperienced troops. Their greatest legacy from the War of

1812 remains the “rockets’ red glare” during the British attack

on Fort McHenry in September 1814.24

The American fortifications in the Gulf region

possessed a wide variety of guns. Guns often could be

21
found mounted on “garrison” or “truck” carriages, wooden

gun carriages found on naval vessels. Crews placed the gun

and carriage on a gun platform, a level section of timber or

stone that made it easier to allow movement to align the gun

with its designated target. The more time available for a force 

to prepare defensive positions, the more effective their

preparation of firing platforms would be. However, carriage

design made it difficult for garrison carriages to be used in the

field. Roads and ground could not support the ground pressure 

of small iron wheels. Field carriages, with large wheels,

essentially wagon wheels, allowed guns to move along dry

roads and on gentle slopes. In many cases, artillery dictated

the speed of movement of an Army. Forces along the

Canadian border generally took few guns to the field, largely

because of poor trafficability. The same can be specifically

said of the British expeditionary force that landed in

Louisiana, initially taking only a handful of light guns with

them as they advanced within a few miles of New Orleans.

Opposing forces fortified key positions in the New

Orleans area of operations with guns emplaced behind earthen

bastions, referring to them as batteries. A battery referred to

one or more guns placed together rather than a company-sized

unit of artillery. One of the most effective American batteries 

employed at New Orleans, the Marine Battery, sited on the

right bank of the Mississippi River, provided devastating

enfilading fire that greatly contributed to defeating the final

British attack. The Americans took full advantage of the time

available to them and built extremely well sited and effective

batteries. However, contrary to popular myth, they did not use

cotton bales as the primary component of their positions, only

as an element heavily reinforced with dirt. On the other hand,

the British continually suffered from ineffectively built

batteries, some of them built with sugar casks that exploded

instantly with accurate American fire, sometimes with

unanticipated results.

Dragoons

Contrary to combat in Europe, the employment of

mounted forcesremained relatively small and scattered. Small

numbers of mounted Soldiers, Regulars and Volunteers,

served on the Niagara Frontier and in the American western

territories. British and Canadian dragoons armed themselves

with sabers, pistols, and carbines. American regular dragoons 

carried pistols and sabers but not carbines. In the western

territories, Americans fielded volunteer mounted rifle units.

These units carried rifles and usually a wide collection of

tomahawks, pistols, hunting knives, and sabers. Such units

made up the Tennessee Militia brigades of William Carroll 

22
and John Coffee. However, they utilized their mounts to get

to the battlefield quickly and then dismounted to engage the

enemy with accurate rifle fire. Such units made up the bulk of

Jackson’s forces during his campaigns against the Creeks.

During the operations in Louisiana, mounted Militia from 

the Mississippi Territory conducted mounted operations

against theBritish, executing securitymissions between the two 

opposing forces while the Tennesseans fought as

conventional infantry. On the other hand, the British

expeditionary force’s 14th Light Dragoons arrived without

horses and contributed very little to the campaign and its 

results.25

Sustaining the Force

Despite possession of Canada and colonial bases in the 

Caribbean, the British suffered from an inefficient

sustainment system. Canada simply lacked the resources to

support its citizens and the Army. The Caribbean islands, far

from battlefronts until the 1814 campaign in the Gulf of

Mexico, provided little for Britain’s forces beyond its local

garrisons and forces passing through the region. Nearly every 

commodity required by British forces o riginated in Great

Britain. This predicament extended to England’s utilization

of naval-based expeditionary forces operating far from 

England and its overseas bases and adversely affected

numerous aspects of the operations conducted by these forces.

The British expeditionary force organized for the seizure of 

New Orleans suffered from an extremely fragile sustainment

system that directly influenced the morale of the common

soldier and the health of the entire force as a whole.26

American and British Tactics

Despite the fact that the exploits of Napoleon dominated

the military standards of the time, both the British and 

American armies approached warfare with the techniques and

designs of the previous generation. The objectives, however, 

remained the same to break the enemy’s will, force his

withdrawal, and pursue until destroyed. Even Napoleon found

this difficult. Neither side achieved it during the War of 1812.

However, American and British commanders still formed their

forces into firing lines of infantry and support by artillery, in 

an attempt to achieve decisive victory.

When the war began, the United States Army still relied

upon Baron Von Steuben’s tactical manual, referred to as the

“Blue Book,” derived from contemporary European practices

of the late 18th century. The value of the manual during the

Revolution stemmed from its simplifying the many standard

movements because American Soldiers did not have time to 

23
effectively train in accordance with the European standards of

the time. The regular Army retained the Blue Book after the

Revolution and Congress stipulated its use for the Militia as

well. French military success encouraged the War Department

to examine a new tactical manual to replace the “Blue Book.”

William Duane borrowed heavily from the new French

doctrine, and to a lesser extent from Von Steuben, to develop

a collection of small manuals addressing tactical doctrine for 

infantry and riflemen. However, in early 1812 the Secretary of

War ordered that the Army’s infantry adopt a tactical manual

written by Alexander Smyth. Smyth’s work also combined

aspects of the new French manual and Von Steuben’s manual,

governing regular infantry only. The Militia, however,

continued to use the “Blue Book.” Unfortunately,

commanders in the field used whatever suited them 

throughout the war: Von Steuben, Duane, Smyth, or locally

fabricated combinations, making it possible that several

regiments brigaded together might have been trained with 

different doctrinal sources.

The British Army, on the other hand, used a standard

manual since 1792 written by Colonel David Dundas. His

book, known commonly as “Dundas’ 18 Manoeuvres,”

adopted a conservative tactical approach common to the

previous generation, preferring use of the line over the 

column. British infantry repeatedly demonstrated their

expertise at the many tactical movements and proved

superior to numerically greater French armies and

comparable numbers of American infantry, at least at the

beginning of the war.

A notional battle started with the two sides facing one

anotherin line of battle. The combatant that arrived first sought

a position on higher ground with flanks protected by river or

dense forest or a body of skirmishers. The combatant arriving 

on the battlefield later typically moved on a route in column

and then deployed into a line formation, preferably out of 

musket and artillery range. American infantry formed firing 

lines in three ranks while the British preferred two ranks. With

artillery present on the field, guns might be placed on the

flanks to enfilade approaching enemy formations, inflicting

more casualties than firing perpendicularly at the thin firing 

line. Once the two sides aligned for combat, one side initiated 

the battle where the attacking force hoped to achieve a level of

moral superiority over the defender. Artillery opened fire to 

attrit the enemy both physically and morally. At approximately

100 yards distance, the two lines commenced firing. The fire 

fight aimed to break the resolve ofthe enemy to stand and fight.

As each soldier witnessed casualties to his left and right, he

faced the decision to fight or flee. The weight of fire, based on 

24
the speed of volleys, lent a major factor in eroding enemy 

resolve.

As a battle developed with the two sides trading volleys,

the force firing more frequently gained fire superiority and

a distinct advantage in morale. After just a few volleys, the

battlefield became shrouded in dense smoke. The inability to

see the enemy across the battlefield, even at a relatively short

distance, proved particularly frightening. British commanders

perceived a frailty in American units and especially in Militia 

formations that they thought they could exploit with a strong

and well placed blow. Thus even when outnumbered, the

British often looked to close with the enemy and deliver a 

bayonet assault. British commanders sought to keep their men

silent during this type of assault. While Soldiers might shout

to prove their courage and intimidate the enemy this kept them 

from hearing orders from their officers. The two lines hardly

ever made contact. With one side assaulting, two outcomes

became most common. Either the men conducting the assault

would lose enthusiasm and halt before making contact or the

defending line would break.

The breaking of a line frequently led to panic in the

ranks. Like a spreading virus, Soldiers, seeing fellow

comrades flee, threw down their weapons and ran from the

battlefield for safety. Officers and noncommissioned officers 

desperately tried to rally asmany troops as possible in the hopes

of maintaining order. The successful attackers tried to gain

victory trophies like enemy’s colors or artillery pieces.

Tangible symbols of victory made a powerful statement in

measuring a battlefield victory. At New Orleans, neither side

possessed adequate cavalry to conduct an effective

mounted pursuit. If a victorious commander kept his head,

he maintained uncommitted troops and ordered them to

pursue the enemy, capturing as many enemy Soldiers, guns,

horses, and wagons as possible. Inexperienced commanders

settled for the victory on the field and set his troops about their

next duties, policing the battlefield. However, as seen at New

Orleans, a commander may have larger reasons for not

pursuing the enemy after a battlefield victory.

In the aftermath of a large scale battle, it took time to 

consolidate the victory. Local effects on the battlefield itself

could be staggering. Burial parties gathered the dead, 

separating and sorting them by nationality, and burying them

on the site of the battle. Officers in charge of the parties

recovered personal effects from fellow officers killed in action

and arranged for them to be sent to the next of kin, who

sometimes followed their husbands on campaign. The

individual Soldiers that made up the burial party often took

25
valuables from their comrades. Groups found the wounded

and evacuated them to centralized collection points. There, 

regimental surgeons worked quickly to treat the wounds as

best they could. Eventually they loaded wounded into wagons

and evacuated them to field hospitals. Work parties collected

weapons, ammunition, and equipment to be issued again as

needed.

The Opposing Naval Forces

The War of 1812 offers an excellent period for the study of

the evolution of modern joint operations, especially along the

Canadian border centered on the Great Lakes of Erie and

Ontario and Lake Champlain where the armies and navies of

both side depended heavily upon each other in the conduct of

large joint campaigns in the war’s primary theater. However,

by 1813, as the European coalition allies began to assert their

collective will upon Napoleon’s shrinking empire, the Royal

Navy began shifting more naval assets to the American

theater of war. By early 1814, the Royal Navy established

control of the Atlantic and established a reinvigorated full 

blockade of the American Atlantic and Gulf coasts, trapping

American warships in port and denying those at sea a friendly

base for refitting. The final year of the war also marked the

first time that the British exploited their strategic mobility,

as projected by the Royal Navy, in the form of expeditionary

forces targeting various strategic points along the enemy

coastline. These included Washington, Baltimore, and

ultimately New Orleans.

The same navy made famous in recent memory by

Horatio Nelson and his victories in Egypt, Copenhagen, and

ultimately Trafalgar, also maintained a well-known reputation

for conducting expeditionary operations around the world. In 

the years leading up to the War of 1812, the Royal Navy

conducted various operations on both sides of the Atlantic, 

inside the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas, and against distant

Pacific targets. In the wars against the French and Napoleon,

Britain’s navy and Army collected an abundance of

experience during extensive operations in the Caribbean,

seizing numerous French island colonies. Therefore, by the

time theBritish gathered increased assetsfor commitment to the

North American station in 1814, England’s combined armed

forces possessed a wide body of collective joint experience.

The role of the Royal Navy in the Gulf campaign,

however, extended only so far. Once the British fleet reached

their anchorage in the Gulf, its greatest asset of its fighting

vessels, no longer had a direct bearing upon the campaign.

Several decisions made by the expeditionary force commander 

led to the near elimination of the fleet’s role in the plan to

26
seize New Orleans. The only viable option for the

employment of the fleet’s large combat vessels, forcing 

Americans to land defenses and sailing straight up the

Mississippi River to the city, fell to the wayside almost

immediately. Then the senior commanders committed to a 

landing on the west shore of Lake Borgne, followed by an

overland approach to the city. In doing so, they depended

upon their collection of smaller barges and sailing craft which 

were more capable of navigating the coastal areas and

bayous of Louisiana. Both decisions prevented any further 

direct influence upon the campaign by the fighting ships of

the Royal Navy until after the British decision to retreat from 

New Orleans.

However, the sailors and marines of the British fleet

continued to actively contribute to the campaign, leaving

their ships and serving in a variety of roles through the

campaign’s land phase. The Royal Navy overwhelmed the

American gunboat flotilla on Lake Borgne without their heavy

guns, employing practices and tactics more akin to those used

in the era of galleys that ended during the sixteenth century.

Sailors pulled the oars and navigated the smaller craft from 

the fleet’s anchorage as far inland as possible in order to land 

the navy, making numerous round trips in support of the force.

The fleet’s marines, with many sailors as well, consolidated

and joined the Army for the movement inland and for all of

the major fighting. Finally, as the British Army leaders began

to fully appreciate the strength of the American defenses south

of New Orleans, sailors once again manned their oars in

order to transport heavy naval ordnance to the battlefront, 

while comrades established firing positions and manned the

guns for the duration of the fighting.

At the beginning of the war, as the American navy

approached 40 years of service to the nation since the

American Revolution, the core of the navy’s power lay in

seven top line frigates that represented the best in naval

technology at the time, on par with their British opponents. 

The navy possessed 16 warships other than gunboats: eight

frigates, two sloops of war, and six smaller vessels. While

smaller than the frigates, numerous refits over the years

before the war created vessels with larger than normal crews

and more guns than could be normally expected compared

to their British equivalents. The ships were crewed well by

combat veteran officers and their all-volunteer crews of equally 

experienced sailors. However, the British were far more

concerned with American privateers. Over 500 privately

armed American vessels took part in the war, targeting the

British merchant fleet, including ships supporting the Duke of

Wellington’s campaign in Spain. America’s early victories by

27
the navy and privateers caused the British to overly react to 

events by reinforcing its North American station with assets 

from elsewhere.

The American navy also possessed approximately 200

gunboats at the start of the war, the legacy of the Jefferson

administration’s focus on coastal defense and economic

restraint. Examples varied between 50-80 feet in length and

carried a heavy gun, usually a 24-pounder on the bow (front).

While approximately half of the navy’s gunboats went into

storage before the war, the New Orleans station received

permission to retain all 26 of its compliment. Gunboats were

never included in American combat power assets as they were

orphans and held in great disdain by the bulk of the navy’s

officers. They were not enough to perform the defensive

missions originally envisioned for them. Nevertheless, prior

to the war, gunboats proved themselves in the New Orleans

area, under an extremely competent commander, enforcing the

Jefferson administration’s embargo and suppressing the slave

trade. They proved very good in patrolling the Mississippi

River and the adjacent bayous and lakes but had no recorded

success against illegal trade such as that conducted by the

Baratarian pirates under Jean Lafitte.

When the British initiated their joint campaign in the Gulf

of Mexico in 1814, the United States Navy in that region

amounted to Master Commandant Daniel Patterson’s flotilla

consisting of the armed schooner Carolina, the armed ship

Louisiana, and a handful of gunboats. The larger schooners

represented the Federal government’s recent acquiescence to

the demands of the Louisiana governor to provide the means

to destroy the illegal practices of the Baratarian pirates

located along the southern Louisianan coast. This relatively

small surface force suffered from manpower shortages,

principally in the crews of the two schooners. Patterson’s

one advantage came from a significant naval depot at New

Orleans that eventually supplied Jackson’s defense with

cannon, powder, and ammunition. Furthermore, like the

sailors from the American flotilla in the Chesapeake,

Patterson’s sailors later manned a large assortment of naval

ordnance positioned in a number of the batteries that

supported Jackson’s defense, most importantly in the Marine

Battery across the Mississippi River. These highly disciplined

and experienced gun crews proved their worth equally on land

as they did at sea and contributed greatly to the overall

American victory over the British.27

Primarily because the bulk of British and American

sailors and their guns saw action on land, only a brief

explanation of these naval pieces is necessary in order to

28
understand what the eventual impact their key role was in 

the two opposing armies’ fires plans. Warships of the day

carried two specific types of naval ordnance. The long gun,

firing solid shot from 18 to 32 pounds, fired a considerable

distance. The carronade, with a shorter length but large

muzzle, fired heavier shot up to 48 pounds but with shorter

range. Long guns initiated the longer range engagement as

ships closed the distance. Carronades then engaged at close

range, delivering heavy blows against an enemy ship. British

vessels carried a higher ratio of carronades to long guns than

American vessels. Therefore, American warships, with more

long guns, could potentially inflict more damage to British 

vessels before the British brought their ships into closer range 

and used their carronades to overpower the American ships.

With less than 40 years of experience behind it, the

United States Marine Corps still closely mirrored that of the

British Royal Marines they battled in various surface

engagements during Revolutionary War. Marines maintained

discipline and order aboard naval vessels, manned the ship’s

rigging during combat when they would aim their musket fire 

at individual targets on the exposed deck of the enemy’s ship

and defended their own ships against boarding parties, and

formed the core of any ship’s landing party.

At the beginning of the War of 1812, the Marine Corps 

numbered approximately 1,000 officers and men,slightly more

than half of its authorized strength. Like the Army, recruiting

presented a major challenge and effective retention proved

just as critical throughout the war. Even with moderately

successful recruiting, little adequate time existed to train new

recruits for active service. While Marines distinguished

themselves in several famous naval engagements, they could

not effectively meet the demands of the Navy on sea or land as 

ship guards, at the Navy yard as station guards, and flotilla duty

along the nation’s coastal approaches.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps’ envisioned the

Corps serving aboard ship, not defending shore facilities,

especially at the cost of serving under Army control, even

though he had few men to spare for shore assignments.

Regardless, Marines served on land with the Army along the 

Great Lakes and defended Norfolk and Baltimore from British

naval raids in 1813-14. However, their wartime legacy came

from their combat actions on land at the battles of Bladensburg

and New Orleans. At the former, an organized battalion of

Marines served with the American flotilla in the Chesapeake

and, following the elimination of that force, fought with ground

forces against the British approach march to Washington.

Marginalized by Army and Militia officers throughout the 

29
ground maneuvers, the Marines, with a contingent of sailors

manning supporting artillery, distinguished themselves at

Bladensburg by repelling three consecutive assaults by the

British before withdrawing after the American flanks gave

way and ammunition ran low.

In 1804, following the Louisiana Purchase, the United

States government established a Marine detachment at the

New Orleans naval station. For the Marines’ commanding

officer, Captain Daniel Carmick, this would be the first of

three tours in New Orleans, including the British attempt to

seize the city in 1814. Prior to the War of 1812 the greatest

threats faced by the Marines consisted of yellow fever

epidemics and occasional rumors of slave revolts.

Authorized increases in local manpower remained limited 

and yellow fever struck down approximately a third of the

command and claimed at least one Marine a day. In a unique

peacetime command and control relationship, the Marines,

governed by Naval Regulations at sea, found themselves

governed by the Army’s Articles of War ashore. Therefore,

the senior Marine officer answered to the senior Army officer

responsible for the military district. The War of 1812 initially

failed to change daily events in New Orleans and the greater

Gulf region until 1814. Despite initial British shaping

operations in the Gulf, the Navy focused on the elimination of

the Baratarian pirates under Jean Lafitte. The September 1814

naval attack on the pirates’ base of operation included

Carrmick’s Marines, reinforced by a company of the 44th US

Infantry.

As British operations closed in on the region around New

Orleans, Marine activities increased. Thirty-five Marines

served with Lieutenant Thomas ap Catesby Jones’ gunboat

flotilla in its action against the British on Lake Borgne in midDecember. The bulk of the Marines participating in Jackson’s

23 December night attack on theBritish camp,served aboard the

schooner Louisiana, on the right flank of Jackson’s defensive

line along the Rodriguez Canal throughout the fighting, and

in the Marine Battery across the river on the right bank of the

Mississippi.

While a relatively small element in Jackson’s Army, the

Marines shared in the ensuing fame of the victory. Major

Carmick’s Marines provided a professional body of

experienced regular troops accustomed to the local conditions

of the Gulf region. Their contributions at New Orleans,

combined with other Marine examples in the war, benefited

the organization in the long term. In the war’s aftermath, the

Marine Corps’ conduct elevated it to a much higher

appreciation than before, most importantly in the eyes of the

30
Navy and Congress and thus justified its existence.28

Conclusion

In providing an overview of the opposing forces engaged in

the battles south of New Orleans, it is then necessary to

examine the strategic and operational planning and

movements that placed them in opposition to one another.

With that picture in mind, conducting the staff ride will help

identify a collection of critical points that explain how the

forces fought the various engagements and differences that led 

to victory and defeat.

31
Notes

1. Unless otherwise noted, information pertaining to

the organization, equipment, and basic doctrine of the

opposing forces is provided from Dr. Richard Barbuto’s, Staff

Ride Handbook for the Niagara Campaigns, 1812-1814, 

Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth, 2014.

2. John R. Maas, Defending a New Nation, 1783-1811,

(Washington, DC: The US Army Center of Military History,

2013), 42-44.

3. Maas, 5, 57; see also, Richard W. Stewart, American

Military History, Volume I, (Washington, DC: The US Army

Center for Military History, 2005) 107-128.

4. Stewart, 132-135.

5. C. Edward Skeen, Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812,

(Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1999), 1-4; 

Stewart, 114-116.

6. Skeen, 2.

7. Skeen, 41-42, 157-158.

8. Skeen, 160, 165.

9. Skeen, 167.

10. Skeen, 170-172.

11. Skeen, 3.

12. Robert V. Remini, The Battle of New Orleans:

Andrew Jackson and America’s First Military Victory, (New

York: Penguin Books, 1999), 45.

13. Robin Reilly, The British at the Gates: The New

Orleans Campaign in the War of 1812, (Toronto: Robin Brass

Press, 1974, 177, 308, 334; Brown, Wilburt S., The

Amphibious Campaign for West Florida and Louisiana,

18141815: A Critical Review of Strategy and Tactics at New 

Orleans, (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 

1969), 23, 99.

14. Brown, 23.

15. Frank Lawrence Owsley Jr., Struggle for the Gulf

Borderlands: The Creek War and the Battle of New

Orleans, 1812-1815, (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama 

Press, 1981), 62, 64-65, 68, 72; Reilly, 278; Brown, 134, 

Remini, 123.

16. Stewart, 134-135.

17. Data on Peninsula regiments serving in the New

Orleans campaign compiled from: Fletcher, Ian, Wellington’s 

32
33

Regiments: The Men and their Battles from Rolica to Waterloo,

1808-1815, (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1994).

18. Brown, 27, 95.

19. David G. Chandler, “Wellington in the Peninsula:

a Reassessment,”in On the Napoleonic Wars: Collected

Essays, (London: Greenhill Books, 1994), 163.

20. Philip J. Haythornthwaite, The Armies of Wellington,

(London: Arms and Armour, 1994), 215-16. The total

number of Peninsula regiments sent to North America and

those fighting at New Orleans are compiled from: Fletcher,

Wellington’s Regiments.

21. Michael Glover, Wellington as Military Commander,

(London: B.T. Batsford LTD, 1968), 205-213.

22. Chandler, 156; Haythornthwaite, 7, 78-79.

23. Remini, 122; Owsley, 144; Glover, 30-31.

24. Glover, 237-238.

25. Owsley, 62, 144, 146.

26. Brown, 75-76.

27. George C. Daughan, If By Sea: The Forging of the

American Navy from the American Revolution to the War of

1812, (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 400-470; Mahon, 7-9.

28. Allan R. Millet, Semper Fidelis: The History of the

United States Marine Corps, (New York: The Free Press,

1991), 1-45 for Marine history prior to the period in question

and pages 46-51 specifically for the War of 1812 and the

Battle of New Orleans; Simmons, Edwin H., “Maj Carmick at

New Orleans,” Fortitudine: Newsletter of the Marine Corps

Historical Program, Volume XIV, No. 4 (Spring 1985), 3-7.

Part II. Campaign Overview Introduction:

The War’s First Two Years

The United States of America chose to go to war with

the British Empire in June of 1812 unprepared. This fact

became apparent almost immediately upon the attempt to fulfill

the nation’s key strategic objective, the seizure of Canada. The

first year of the war seemed to illustrate that the Army raised

by the United States could not effectively wage an offensive

war. On the other hand, British forces in Canada ably

demonstrated that they could wage both an effective defensive

war to protect Canada while successfully executing limited

offensive operations that seized American territory.

The second year of the war witnessed a slight change in

American fortunes. Tactical victories, or at least stalemates,

occurred as American forces gained in training and

experience during a series of high tempo operations along

the Canadian border. One highlight of American military

operations in 1813 was the American naval victory on Lake

Erie and the sequel invasion of Canadian territory northeast

of Detroit. In securing American control of the lake, the small

American fleet secured the crossing of an American ground

force to the Canadian side of the lake that eventually forced

an abandonment of British controlled American territory and

a decisive victory at the battle of the Thames that not only

defeated the British force but also destroyed the Indian

confederation of the northwestern tribes led by the great

Shawnee war chief Tecumseh. However, the ability to

achieve operational objectives and the strategic end state

continued to elude American policy makers that were focused

on acquiring British territory in Canada.

At the same time, repeated abortive American operations

along the eastern Niagara frontier with Canada only resulted

in limited British success and occupation of key American

defensive positions. Furthermore, with the increase of

European allied successes against Napoleon’s shrinking

empire, the Royal Navy began sending reinforcements to its 

North American station. Utilizing its strategic and operational

mobility, the world’s premier naval power relied upon a 

considerable body of experience in expeditionary warfare.

During 1813, the Royal Navy secured control of the Atlantic

Ocean which effectively neutralized the much smaller United

States Navy. With control of the seas, the British began

conducting a series of raids against key ports along America’s

vulnerable coastline, especially in New England, the

Carolinas, and Chesapeake Bay. This aggressive raiding

policy forced the American government to improve and

reinforce its coastal defenses, denying reinforcements to the

35
Canadian frontier. More menacing for the Americans, the

British now possessed a means of seizing the initiative, at the

time and place of their choosing, potentially to open a second

front in the war.

Whereas, American leaders focused strategically on the 

northern border with Canada, events in the American Deep

South began drawing the government’s attention in the

summer of 1813. A continuing territorial dispute with Spain

finally led to an American force of Regulars entering the

coastal region of what is now the Gulf coast of the modern

states of Mississippi and Alabama to seize both the territory 

and its principle port of Mobile. The Spanish chose not to

contest the aggressive move by force and peace continued

between the two nations. However, the Creek Indians of the

Mississippi Territory (modern Alabama and Mississippi) as 

well as the State of Georgia, motivated by a series of previous

grievances suffered at the hands of American settlers, started

a series of attacks against frontier settlements that threw much

of the southern frontier into chaos. The resulting American

campaign against the Creeks saw the rise of Andrew Jackson,

as military commander, to the national stage. However, while

aggressive in a constant search for decisive battle with the

Creeks, Jackson’s efforts which was part of a larger American

effort to defeat the Creeks, suffered from a fragile supply

system, overextended lines of operation, and the breakdown of

the national government system to properly address logistical

requirements in the South. The campaign ended in failure,

leaving the Creeks as still a viable threat to the security of the

American southern frontier. This was a threat rumored to be

supported by the British.1

The Culminating Year: The Final Campaign of 1814-15

The focus of both the United States and Great Britain in the

culminating year of the War of 1812 remained the Great Lakes

and the Niagara frontier. Each country, especially the United 

States in one of their political objectives in regard to Canada,

saw the capture of the other’s national territory as an advantage

to bring to the negotiating table. However, neitherside achieved

a strategic advantage over the other on this front during the

spring of 1814. The British continued to leverage their most

consistent weapon against the United States which was the

Royal Navy. The British tightened their blockade of the United

States and engaged in an array ofseaborne raids against various

American ports up and down the eastern seaboard. In the south,

the majority of American military manpower in that region

continued their campaign against the Creeks.

In England, the ministry of Prime Minister Lord Liverpool 

knew that decisive results in North America required 

36
resources sent from Europe. While the allied war against

Napoleon, especially England’s campaign in Spain, continued

successfully, doubts still existed in allied circles that the

French emperor would eventually concede defeat. However, as

early as January 1814, Lord Bathurst, Secretary of State for 

War and the Colonies, informed the Duke of Wellington, 

Arthur Wellesley, that his Peninsula Army should be broken

up and some of the regiments sent to America even as it moved

to invade southern France. While Wellington outlined the 

problems withcampaigning inNorthAmerica, he did not openly

refuse the assertion, and four regiments left for America during

January and February.

Three months later, conditions in Europe changed

radically and influenced the future of events in North America.

In April of 1814, Napoleon abdicated and accepted exile to the

island of Elba. Three days later, Bathurst notified the North

American Commander-in-Chief and Governor General of 

Canada, George Prevost, that reinforcements from Europe 

would be sent to Canada. These reinforcements destined for

employment in North America totaled some 16,000 British

Soldiers, veterans of the Duke of Wellington’s long and

ultimately successful Peninsula campaign in Portugal and

Spain. However, it took time to transport these forces across

the Atlantic. Early June saw the departure of 13,000 British

troops to Canada, reaching Quebec in the second half of

August. On 2 July 1814, 3,000 men under Major General

Robert Ross departed France for America to serve as the

expeditionary force targeting locations along the Chesapeake

shore, specifically the key port of Baltimore. The two

movements represented the strategic sealift capability of the 

most powerful navy in the world.2

37
Figure 1. The British Strategy for 1814.

CSI created.

38
The Canadian Theater

The Americans took the early initiative with a series of

limited offensives that resulted in a series of initial tactical

victories. These included Lundy’s Lane but not the necessary

strategic gains desired by either side. The American

offensive on the Niagara frontier failed to secure an American

foothold in Canada but it did deter any further British attempts

at a major offensive in the region. However, too late to influence

offensive operations in the spring, the British reinforcements

upon arrival from Europe, established a long desired force 

capable of defending Canada and eventually conducting

offensive operations into the United States in the late summer.

Despite the shock suffered by the Americans in the wake

of the capture and burning of Washington, British strategic

focus along the Canadian border remained steadfast. With

10,000 reinforcements, Prevost organized his force for a 

southern advance into the United States through the Lake 

Champlain Valley. This was the same invasion route used by

the British during the American Revolution. In such an

operation, a British advance depended heavily upon close

support from the British fleet on Lake Champlain. However,

in another decisive naval engagement along the AmericanCanadian border, the American flotilla destroyed the British

fleet on Lake Champlain on 11 September. Without naval

support for a further movement down the Champlain Valley, 

the British commander withdrew back into Canada. More

importantly, this failure added to that at Baltimore during the

same week, convinced the British government to add more

energy to the peace negotiations already proceeding in the

Belgian city of Ghent.3

The Chesapeake Bay

Three weeks after assuming command of the Royal

Navy’s North American Station, Vice Admiral Sir

Alexander Cochrane ordered the expansion of the British

blockade to encompass the entire United States coastline.

With the fall of Napoleon that same month, England eventually

increased its navalforcesin theWesternHemisphere tomeet the

objective. The reinforced blockade forced nearly half of the

small United States Navy into various east coast ports, while 

it prevented the majority of the enemy fleet from re-entering

American ports to resupply. In neutralizing the United States

Navy, the British cleared the American merchant fleet from the

Atlantic, the only time in US history when the nation

experienced full isolation from the sea. The Royal Navy

enjoyed an unquestioned dominance in the Atlantic that

allowed them to exploit their strategic and operational

mobility. In the words of one of its ship captains in reference 

39
to the Americans, “Jonathan is so confounded that he does not

know when or where to look for us.”4

Further British naval

operations included raids against key ports along the eastern

seaboard. These operations targeted locations from Maine

to the Carolinas, especially those ports building or sustaining

American privateers which were a significant threat to the

British oversees merchant trade which greatly influenced the

British desire to quickly end the war on favorable terms. One

area in particular, the Chesapeake Bay, remained an attractive

British target because it provided an avenue deep into

American territory, including the American capital of 

Washington, and the important port of Baltimore.5

Utilizing a newly released force of Peninsula veterans

to augment an already present naval force along the eastern

seaboard of the United States, the British government saw

the potential of distracting American attention from its

northern frontier and attacking the will of the nation’s citizens

by striking the economic center of Baltimore and the

American capital of Washington by means of swift seaborne

raids.

Therefore, on 19 August 1814, a British expeditionary

force with a land component of approximately 4,000 men

released from Wellington’s Peninsula Army and led by their

hand-picked commander, Major General Robert Ross,

landed at the Patuxent River in Virginia and marched on

Washington. Within five days of landing, Ross’ force 

encountered a hastily organized American force of some 5,000

Regulars, sailors, Marines, and Militia defending a key

crossing site on an extension of the Potomac River northeast

of Washington at Bladensburg, Maryland. During the initial

fighting, the Americans proved an obstinate defender

especially with the support of heavy and highly accurate

artillery fire provided by US Navy gunners. However, the

British demonstrated their ability to quickly regroup under fire 

and execute successful frontal assaults against fortified

positions. Their renewed efforts scattered the American Militia

and opened the American capital to capture, a circumstance

blamed squarely upon the poorly-led Militia who earned a 

high amount of contempt from the professional British

Soldiers. Following the fighting at Bladensburg, Ross

marched his force into Washington and burned the Capitol,

the White House (then referred to as the Presidential Mansion

or President’s House), and a number of other public

buildings. This was said to be in retribution for the America’s 

causing the burning of the Canadian city of York (present

day Toronto) the previous year. The British remained in the

city a total of 26 hours before returning to the Royal Navy’s

40
transports for follow-on operations in the Bay. 

The British next targeted the port city of Baltimore in

the northern portion of the Chesapeake Bay. However, the

Americans proved better prepared than prior to the burning

of Washington, having established a significant series of

defensive positions to counter British naval and land advances.

The eventualfailure ofthe British fleet to reduce Fort McHenry,

the principle American fortification protecting the entrance to

Baltimore’s harbor, on 13-14 September resulted in the

culmination of the British raid in the Chesapeake as well as

Francis Scott Key’s writing of “The Star Spangled Banner.” 

However, the British suffered further when, during a minor

skirmish, Major General Ross rode forward with his men

and suffered a mortal gunshot wound. The passing of Ross

threw the British into a somewhat confusing period as

government leaders in London strove to identify a proper

replacement that could be rushed to the American theater of

operations quickly and take up the next phases of the overall 

British strategy.6

The Southern Theater: The Creek War

The continuation of the Creek War forced American 

leaders to maintain a fairly significant organized military force 

in the Deep South. Though the predominant numbers of 

fighting men came from the various State Militias, a collection 

of Regular Army regiments also continued to serve in the 

region. In March of 1814, Andrew Jackson led a reorganized 

force in excess of 3,000 Militia, Volunteers, Regulars, and 

friendly Indian tribes against the Creeks. At a fortified camp 

in the Horseshoe Bend of the Tallapoosa River, the Creeks 

suffered the loss of over 800 warriors, a defeat that they would 

not recover from. In the aftermath of Horseshoe Bend, the 

remaining hostile Creek factions fled to the sanctuary of 

Spanish controlled Florida. As a result of his victory over the 

Creeks, President Madison rewarded Jackson with an 

appointment to the rank of Major General in the Regular Army 

and gave him command of the 7th Military District comprising 

the states of Tennessee, Louisiana, and the Mississippi 

Territory. Jackson’s first act in this capacity was to orchestrate 

a harsh treaty upon the Creeks, enemy and friendly alike, 

seizing millions of acres of traditional tribal lands and forcing 

more elements of the tribe into neutral Spanish territory. 

With the collapse of the northwest Indian confederation

in the wake of the death of Tecumseh at the battle of the

Thames the previous year, the British saw the value in

expanding a previously small effort in supplying the Creek

Indians into economy of force operations targeting American

interestsin the Deep South. In the past, Creeks drew on various

41
settlements in Spanish controlled Florida for supplies,

especially arms and powder. Now, the British adopted a policy

of arming theCreeks in theirwar against the Americans through

the tacit approval of their Spanish allies who still claimed a 

state of neutrality with the American government.7

The Campaign in the Gulf

Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane developed the

operational plan for the capture of New Orleans. He assumed

command of the Royal Navy’s North American station on 1 

April 1814 with a lifetime of experience in expeditionary

operations to his credit, many of them under his personal 

command in the Caribbean. Past success marked him as a 

clear minded and practical strategic thinker. Thus, before 

assuming his new command, Cochrane served as one of the

British Admiralty’s planners in developing the government’s

strategy for 1814. Within his first 100 days in command,

Cochrane dispatched a memorandum to the Admiralty entitled

“Expedition against New Orleans,” dated 20 June. The plan

closely resembled the original British concept approved by

the cabinet, later cancelled because of the manpower and

funding requirements that the cabinet proved unwilling to

commit to. However, Cochrane’s plan called for an Army

contribution to an expeditionary force of only 3,000 men, a 

significant decrease in British troops. Cochrane rationalized

that a force of thissmaller size could be augmented by Indian

allies and recruited runaway former slaves that would operate

on the Georgia frontier and the areas east of Mobile to prevent

the Americans from reaching the Gulf coast except via the 

Mississippi River.

With the support of the local tribes Cochrane asserted

that a 3,000-man force could successfully conduct an

amphibious operation to seize Mobile. Once in British hands,

Mobile would become the main British base in the Gulf, 

similar to Lisbon in Portugal in its support of Wellington’s

campaigns in the Peninsula. The British also assumed that

once they secured Mobile, the Choctaw and Chickasaw

Indians to the north would declare themselves active British

supporters and neutralize the American presence on the

Alabama River and give the British de facto control of the

territory between the Georgia frontier and the Mississippi

River. Cochrane thought that with all of this accomplished

and with the support of the Creeks, the British could then

advance overland from the Alabama River to Baton Rouge on

the Mississippi River. With the capture of Baton Rouge, the

British could isolate New Orleans from the north while the

Royal Navy blockaded its access to the Gulf. Then the Army

could advance to take control of the city. The British asserted

42
that it was impossible for the Americans to sustain operations

against them in the Gulf region because of the Royal Navy’s

support. The American record (and Jackson’s) in the war 

against the Creeks supported this assumption.

To support Cochrane’s intended plan, he requested the

charter of a large number oflight draft vessels, able to transport

100 men at a time, and flatboats in England that would be

moved to the Gulf by the Royal Navy. These vessels would

transport the British Army up the Alabama River and then be

moved overland to Baton Rouge. These boats could also be

used in the Mississippi Sound off Louisiana and on the inland

approaches to New Orleans, including Lake Borgne and Lake 

Pontchartrain. 

The cabinet approved Cochrane’s memorandum. Ross’

successful capture of Washington also influenced the cabinet’s

decision to reinforce the New Orleans expedition with an

additional brigade from England numbering over 2,000 men.

The increased force would exceed 8,000 men, still a small

financial and manpower investment compared to the original

New Orleans concept. However, a dispatch received on 17

October notifying the cabinet of Ross’s death the month before 

dictated the appointment of a new commander-in-chief. The

cabinet chose Major General Sir Edward Pakenham,

Wellington’s PeninsulaAssistantAdjutant General and brotherin-law. He was a man of proven talents as both staff officer and

combat commander. Nevertheless, Pakenham immediately

found himself well behind the operation, the various elements

of the expeditionary force already moved while he received

his orders in England. Lord Bathurst, in his instructions to the

new commander-in-chief included the warning, “It is

probable that this force will have proceeded from the

approximated rendezvous before your arrival there, in order to

carry into execution the Plans contemplated by Sir Alexander 

Cochrane.”8

Aftermath of the Battles of New Orleans

In the same week that the British struggled back along

their line of communication to the barges that took them back

to the fleet anchorage, the city of New Orleans celebrated.

Jackson, finally confirmed the British expeditionary force’s

departure, declared 21 January a day of thanksgiving and

celebration. Leaving the 7th US Infantry and the Tennessee

troops to guard against the British, Jackson marched the rest

of his Army into the city for a parade and service at the

cathedral. The celebration took place in great New Orleans

style, full of ceremony and pageantry. In the aftermath of the

celebration Andrew Jackson departed the city for home in

Tennessee and his journey to the Presidency of the United 

43
States.

Unfortunately, the enemy presence in the gulf remained.

Once the British expeditionary force re-boarded their naval

transports, the senior commanders considered their next

move. Cochrane, as the senior officer, urged a second attempt

to seize Mobile and resurrect the overland option against New

Orleans, his original plan attempted in September failed with

the successful American defense of Fort Bowyer. He 

succeeded in convincing Lambert to support this course of 

Figure 2. Post-Battle Actions in the Gulf, Jan 18-Mar 15 1815.

CSI created.

44
action. The fleet sailed on 27 January and arrived off the 

entrance of Mobile Bay the next day, landing troops and 

starting a siege of Fort Bowyer. Twelve days later, on 8 

February, the American commander, Colonel William 

Lawrence, convinced that an extended defense would be 

fruitless, surrendered the fort and 350 men to the British. On 

the verge of capturing Mobile, the British received 

dispatches from England outlining the terms of the peace 

treaty negotiated at Ghent, Belgium agreed upon on 24 

December 1814, over a month before. Though the treaty 

required ratification by the two governments, British 

operations ceased and an uneasy period filled with 

correspondence between Jackson, Lambert, and Cochrane

filled the time until their governments ratified the Treaty of 

Ghent producing a long series of correspondence between

each other, including coordination for the exchange of 

prisoners. The British fleet finally sailed home for England 

on 15 March 1815.9

However, the story of some of the British regiments

involved in the fighting south of New Orleans continued

beyond their relatively brief journey to the North American

continent. The regiments returned to Europe and found a 

reignited conflict with France brought on by the sudden

escape of Napoleon from exile. Returning from the New

Orleans expedition, the 4th, 7th, 40th (which arrived at the

fleet anchorage as the expeditionary force ended its retreat and

began is embarkation), 43d, and 95th Regiments saw action on

the field at Waterloo. Many of the key staff officers made

contributions behind the scenes and Lambert, having since

received a knighthood for his service in Spain, commanded a 

brigade near the highly contested allied center. Unlike at New

Orleans, the British, with their Dutch and Prussian allies,

fought their way to a decisive victory that influenced the path

of European history.10

Just as Waterloo influenced the path of history, so too

did New Orleans. Not only did the Americans achieve a great

tactical victory over their British enemies but they also

defeated the entire British operational plan for the campaign in

the Gulf region. In doing so, American fortunes radically

changed. An American victory prevented many of the

extreme British demands related to the negotiations at Ghent

from coming to fruition.Instead, in thewake ofBritish failures

along the Canadian frontier and after New Orleans, the British

could only end the war by agreeing with the Americans to

restore the status quo ante bellum. Most importantly, the United 

States of America, in its achievement over Great Britain,

firmly established its independence and its determination to

45
walk its own path. Manifest Destiny, encouraged by men

like Jackson, led the growing American population across

the continent and set the nation to become a global power by

the end of the century.11

46
Notes

1. Richard W. Stewart, 136-148; Lebeau, JeanFrancois, “Breaking the Stalemate: Amphibious Warfare

During the War of 1812,” Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 14,

No. 1, Winter 2013, 48, 53.

2. John K. Mahon, The War of 1812, (New York: Da

Capo Press, Inc., 1972), 257-261, 293, 317.

3. Mahon, 276.

4. Mahon, 291.

5. Mahon, 248-256, 289-291.

6. Reilly, 151-164.

7. Owsley, 72-105.

8. Henry Bathurst, “Instructions to Major-General Sir

Edward Pakenham for the New Orleans Campaign,” The War

of 1812 Magazine, http://www. napoleonseries.org/military/Warof1812/2011/Issue16/c_PakenhamOrd

ers.html; Owsley, 101-102; Reilly, 176.

9. Brown, 161.

10. Reilly, 361.

11. Brown, 168; Reilly, 367-369.

47

 Part III. Suggested Stands (Sites) to Visit

The New Orleans staff ride is composed of 11 suggested

stands to support a basic overview of the operational

campaign in the Louisiana portion of the Gulf region and a 

more detailed study and analysis of the tactical battles south

of New Orleans. The full 11 suggested stands incorporate the

bulk of the campaign that took place in Louisiana in 1814-1815

and culminated with the numerous actions fought south and 

east of the city, all in an effort that focuses on all three level of

war: strategic, operational, and tactical. An alternate first 

stand is also provided in order to provide organizations and 

units with an additional options based on time available.

However, to adjust for available time considerations a sevenstand option, entirely contained within the Chalmette National

Battlefield Park, can be adopted from this handbook beginning

with Stand 4. This option provides a strictly tactical level view

of the battle, while eliminating the potential for direct

analysis of operational aspects of the staff ride at key locations

away from the battlefield. The abbreviated option should,

however, begin with a campaign overview that includes key

information from Stands 1-3, before starting Stand 4.

New Orleans Staff Ride Stands

Stand 1, Strategic Background and Campaign Overview The 

Rigolets Stand 1 (Alternate), The Levee at New Orleans

Stand 2, Villere’s Canal – The British Landing, 22 December 

1814

Stand 3, The de La Ronde Plantation – The American Spoiling 

Attack, 23 December 1814

Stand 4, East Chalmette – The British Reconnaissance in Force, 

28 December 1814

Stand 5, East Chalmette – The Artillery Duel, 1 January 1815

Stand 6, Rodriguez Canal – Jackson’s Line, 8 January 1815

Stand 7, The Final Assault – Right Bank of the Mississippi 

(Thornton’s Brigade), 8 January 1815

Stand 8, The Final Assault – British Left Column (Keane’s 

Brigade), 8 January 1815

Stand 9, The Final Assault – British Right Column (Gibbs’ 

Brigade), 8 January 1815

Stand 10, The Rodriguez Canal – Repulse of the British Army, 8 

January 1815

Stand 11, Aftermath of the Battle and Conclusion of the Campaign 

on the Gulf Coast

49

Stand One

Strategic Background and Campaign Overview:

The Rigolets

Directions: While start locations for the staff ride can vary

based on local lodging, a general start point should be from 

downtown New Orleans. When using GPS navigation enter

the following address: 27100 Chef Menteur Highway, New

Orleans, LA. From downtown, immediately head to US

Interstate 10 (I-10) East. Travel on I-10 East 6 miles, to Exit

240B (the Chef Highway) to Louisiana (LA) State Highway

90 East, and travel for 23 miles. Note: After 10.6 miles the

highway splits; bear to the right. In 12.4 miles, turn right into

the Fort Pike parking lot. Park there and walk approximately

100 minutes to the park office in order to gain access.

Notes: The Fort Pike State Historic Site is operated by

the State of Louisiana. Admittance to Fort Pike, from which

there is an unobstructed view of the Rigolets (pronounced

Riggo-lees) and connected shores of both lakes, is $4 per

person. However, the stand could also be conducted from the 

side of the boat launch, though with a lesser view.

Visual Aids

British Shaping Operations in the Gulf, JulNov 1814 British Shift to the West

British Amphibious Operations, Dec 16-22 1814

Orientation: The route from New Orleans to this spot follows

the original path of the Chef Menteur, which still retains that

name and still passes through the Plain of Gentilly, key terrain

stretching from the lakes to New Orleans. The center of 1814

New Orleans is approximately 25 miles to the southwest.

Jackson considered it the most likely avenue of approach for

a British advance on the city and remained greatly concerned

over its defense throughout most of the campaign.

This spot, the Rigolets, was a key water avenue of

approach for British naval forces passing from the Gulf of

Mexico because its narrow channel connected Lake Borgne

in the south and Lake Pontchartrain in the north. Therefore,

control of this position denied the enemy access to the Chef

Menteur and further access to Lake Pontchartrain which

would provide the British a potential “back door” into New 

Orleans. In 1814 the Americans occupied Fort Petites

Coquilles, a position designed to deny an enemy landing on the

Plain of Gentilly and access to Lake Pontchartrain. It was

located approximately 760m to the west of this location but is

now underwater.

51
The current historical structure on this site is Fort Pike,

the first ever Third System Fort built in the United States. It 

was built after the War of 1812, in 1818, as part of the

improved American defense plan to protect New Orleans.

During the Civil War Union forces occupied the fort. Fort 

Pike was abandoned by the government in 1890. Today, it

provides an excellent platform from which to observe the

surrounding terrain during this stand.

Figure 3. The Rigolets and Lake Borgne seen from Fort Pike. 

By Author.

Description

A successful British campaign in the Gulf of Mexico

depended heavily upon support from several regional factions

that they saw as anti-American andthepossession of a localbase

from which to conduct operations against New Orleans. In 

addressing the former criteria, in addition to the Creeks, the

British approached Caribbean pirates operating from the

Louisiana coast and appealed directly to the French and

Spanish Creole population of New Orleans itself to join them

in their fight against the Americans. In the case of the latter

criteria, British leaders ruled a direct attack on the city as

infeasible. However, the base at Jamaica presented extremely

long lines of communication and supply, 1,200 miles, from the

scene of action for the Royal Navy to effectively supply an

expeditionary force in a flexibly and timely fashion. Shaping

operations therefore, required the securing of a British base

closer to New Orleans. The two closest available choices were 

the American port of Mobile, situated in the excellent bay of

the same name, or Pensacola. The latter,slightly more than 200 

miles east of New Orleans, however, came with the awkward

relationship of being England’s Spanish ally. Therefore,

Mobile, less than 150 miles east of New Orleans, became the 

52
next British military objective.

However, the British experienced a series of challenges

and shortcomings during the final preparation period. The

cabinet, in a string of cost-saving measures, directed several

key changes in fulfilling Cochrane’s various requests in order

to effectively support his approved plan. First, the original

Caribbean base of operationsmoved from Barbados to Jamaica.

Second, the cabinet ignored Cochrane’s specific request for 

specific limited draft vessels from Europe and instead

directed the purchase of light craft in Jamaica and the adjacent

islands. Third, the West Indian troops requested winter

clothing. Finally, cost cutting resulted in a limited supply of

provisions. The cabinet directed local purchase of supplies in

the Caribbean rather than spending additional funds to ship

them from England. The alternative drove up the cost of nearly

everything in an area that proved incapable of provisioning an

expeditionary force of the size assigned to seize New Orleans.

All of the Cabinet’s economiesled to a tremendous operations

security challenge for the British. It did not take long for 

information to make its way to New Orleans in the hands of

merchant seamen, via Havana in Cuba, outlining nearly every

aspect of the British plan and the objective.

The British understood that the Creek War decisively

engaged the bulk of American military assets in the South and

the Gulf region. Therefore, if the British could get the Indians

fully involved in supporting their efforts along the Gulf coast

it would continue to be a major diversion for the Americans.

However, the only means of actively supporting the Indians

involved accessing them via Spanish-controlled Florida. While

an Anglo-Spanish alliance fought against Napoleon in Europe,

Spain maintained a policy of neutrality in England’s war with

the United States. However, the European alliance convinced

British leaders that Spain would cooperate without appearing

anything other than neutral to their American enemy.

Furthermore, the Spanish realizing their position of weaknessin

the region, adopted a policy of securing specific Florida

enclaves such as St. Augustine, St. Marks, and Pensacola

while avoiding confrontation with either the United States or

England. This policy gave the British their opportunity to

establish a foothold on the Apalachicola River and direct

access to the inland tribes.

The first British effort to meet with the Creeks and other

tribes took place on the Apalachicola River in Florida on 10

May 1814, 165 miles east of Pensacola. Unfortunately, during

this first conference, the British found out about the 

Creek’s decisive defeat at Horseshoe Bend. Still, the

outcome of the meeting led to positive British reports of the

53
existence of potential Indian resistance to Americans. These

reports fed Cochrane’s confidence in his proposed plan to

seize New Orleans, leading to his order in July for a British

element to land in Spanish Florida in order to arm and train

the tribes to support future British operations. On 10 August, 

Lieutenant Colonel Edward Nicholls, a Royal Marine officer, 

landed at the Apalachicola River. Discovering that the initial

British contingent followed the Indians to Pensacola in order

for the latter to be closer to Spanish protection, Nicholls

arrived there on 14 August. Upon his arrival, Nicholls received

a request from the Spanish governor to help defend the city,

despite the orders of the Captain General in Havana refusing to

admit the access of British forces to the colony.

Another British shaping operation, this one to inform and

influence, involved approaching the syndicate of pirates led

by a French Haitian named Jean Lafitte. Called Baratarians

because of their base of operations in Louisiana’s Barataria

Bay, these self-styled privateers preyed upon the Spanish

and French merchant shipping in the Gulf and Caribbean.

Barataria Bay, located along the southern Louisiana coast,

presented a possible avenue of approach for a British

expeditionary force sent to seize New Orleans. From the bay,

via a series of interior waterways well known to Baratarian

smugglers, an invasion force could move to within a few miles

of the city. Despite a long history of aggressive counter-pirate

operations in the region, the British began entertaining a 

dialogue with Lafitte after Cochrane received Pigot’s report 

dated 8 June. Again, based on Pigot’s positive assessment of

the situation in the Gulf, the British saw an opportunity in

leveraging the Baratarians and directly approached Lafitte on

3 September.

Nicholls once again assumed the position of point man for 

the British shaping operation in the Gulf, asserting in his

correspondence to Lafitte that with the defeat of Napoleon,

England and France were once again allies. He further 

advanced promises that if the Baratarians sided with the 

British, Lafitte would be granted the rank of a naval captain and

that all of his followers would receive lands and be allowed to

pursue their practice of piracy in the Gulf. Lafitte, proving his

ability to lead such a diverse group, saw the British approach as

more of an ultimatum and a clear message that their way of life

would end after a British victory. He, therefore, requested a two

week period to consider the proposal which the British

accepted. In the interim, he in turn approached Governor

Claiborne of Louisiana, providing copies of all of his

correspondence with the British, choosing to side with the

Americans in exchange for amnesty for his followers and the 

hope that his enterprises could continue for the foreseeable

54
future. 

American policies against piracy remained inflexible,

however, especially in Louisiana where Governor Claiborne

and Lafitte appeared to conduct a personal war of wits against

one another with Lafitte maintaining the advantage.

Claiborne, attempting to enforce the laws of the United States,

continued to rely upon a policy of force in an effort to destroy

the Baratarians and their smuggling activities. Confronted 

with Lafitte’s evidence of a British attempt to enlist their aid

and Lafitte’s offer of support, the governor refused his offer,

remaining focused on his goal to end the Baratarian trade.

The governor was a ctively assisted by Master

Commandant David Patterson, the commander of the US

Navy station of New Orleans. Most secondary sources refer

to Patterson as Commodore, a common mistake. He was

named to command “the Naval Forces of the United States on

the New Orleans Station.” However, he was not promoted to

the same rank as his predecessor which was commodore. 

Patterson was charged with the American counter-piracy

mission in that part of the Gulf as well as its defense against

the British. Claiborne saw both the pirates and the British

as equal threats. With Patterson’s refusal to shift assets to

Mobile in support of Jackson prior to the British attack on

Fort Bowyer, Patterson instead focused his combat power

against the Baratarians in accordance with Claiborne’s desires.

On 16 September, the final day of the British attempt to

seize Fort Bowyer at the entrance of Mobile Bay, Patterson’s

flotilla, with a landing party of sailors and US Marines,

reinforced by the Army’s 44th Infantry Regiment, attacked

Lafitte’s base on the island of Grand Terre in Barataria Bay.

The joint operation destroyed the base and captured most of

the pirate fleet disrupting their operations in the Gulf. 

However, Lafitte, refusing to allow his men to return fire, 

successfully repositioned the bulk of his supplies inland out of 

the grasp of Patterson’s force.

Despite the American destruction of Lafitte’s main base of

operations however, Lafitte continued his appeals to the

Americans, offering the support of his Baratarians against the 

British. Despite the encouragement of the bulk of New

Orleans’ Creole leaders, Jackson adamantly refused to accept

the services of Lafitte, ruling them criminals that should be 

prosecuted by the United States. However, the Creole 

societal network orchestrated a resolution by the state

legislature that suspended legal proceedings against the

Baratarians for a period of four months on condition that they

serve in the defense of New Orleans. That action and a chance

encounter on a city street between Jackson and Lafitte, allowed

the pirate to passionately state his case and convince the 

55
general that he could support the cause with both experienced 

men and war materials.

Jackson arrived at Mobile on 22 August just as major

components of what the British government considered the

final campaign in America began. Two days later, Ross’

British force defeated an American force at Bladensburg and

captured Washington. A week later British forces in Canada

began their advance into American territory via the

Champlain Valley. Then as August gave way to September,

fortune seemed to shine on the Americans. On 11 September,

the American naval flotilla on Lake Champlain achieved a 

decisive victory that seized control of the lake and forced the

culmination of the British northern offensive. During that

same period, the British expeditionary force in the

Chesapeake suffered twin setbacks: the navy failed to

neutralize Fort McHenry, defending Baltimore harbor and the

Army failed to penetrate the landward defenses of the city,

losing Ross in the process.

During August and September, a critical development

took place in the shaping of American joint operational

relations between Jackson and his naval counterpart, Master

Commandant Patterson, which lasted through the remainder

of the campaign in the Gulf. Upon his arrival in Mobile at the

end of August, Jackson requested the movement of all naval

assets from New Orleans to Mobile in order to support its

defense. Patterson, in a reply dated 2 September, politely and

respectfully declined to do so citing his certainty that New

Orleans was the British objective and that his flotilla could best

employed to defend the various waterborne avenues of

approach to the city, especially Lake Borgne and the Rigolets.

He warned that once inside Mobile Bay, the flotilla would be

trapped by the Royal Navy’s blockade. Unused to being told

no, Jackson complained to Secretary of War Monroe, not

knowing that Monroe and the Secretary of the Navy already 

previously established that the Army and Navy forces in the

Gulf would be governed by separate chains of command.

Therefore, the joint command of the Gulf would be one of

cooperation between the senior component commanders.While

the mandate initially presented a personal affront to Jackson,

the agreed upon operational employment of Army and Navy

forces in the Gulf region, in fact, established the parameters

for what became a successful relationship that eventually

developed between Jackson and Patterson. Jackson, who 

possessed no experience with naval operations or technology

and thus suffered from a rough learning curve, instead

learned as he went from Patterson, who proved a patient

teacher and valuable joint service partner. In the end, Jackson

would not have supreme command but he would achieve the 

56
victory that he sought.

While the attention of the national government and much of

the country focused on events in upstate New York and the

Chesapeake, British efforts on the Gulf coast also accelerated.

As British support to the various groups of Indians at

Apalachicola and Pensacola progressed, Lieutenant Colonel 

Nicholls determined that the British needed a victory over the

Americansin order to increase Indian confidence and to expand

British influence further to other tribes. Nicholls decided that

an attack against Mobile offered such an opportunity. However,

Captain W.H. Percy, the Royal Navy’s senior commander in

the Gulf, wanted to attack Fort Bowyer, the American

fortification that defended the entrance to Mobile Bay. A 

successful attack against the fort would isolate Mobile from the

Gulf and the capture of the city would allow the British access

to the Indian tribes along the Alabama River. Despite Nicholls’Figure 4. British Shaping Operations in the Gulf, Jul-Nov 1814.

CSI created.

57
personal reservations, he eventually gave in to his usually 

aggressive nature and agreed with a joint assault on Fort 

Bowyer.

On 12 September, a combined force of an estimated 120

Royal Marines and Indians landed some 16 miles to the rear of

Fort Bowyer at the tip of Mobile point on the eastern side of

the entrance to the bay. Their attack met heavy resistance

from the garrison which though approximately 150 men,

consisted of all Regulars, and forced the British force to retire.

The next day, Percy and the navy tried to achieve their

intent. However, a number of natural and manmade

influences resulted in a second unsuccessful attempt where

neither side did much damage to the other. Finally, on 16 

September, Percy conducted a joint attack on Fort Bowyer.

Jackson, crossing Mobile Bay at the time, rushed back to

organize reinforcements. However, the attack proved to be as

short and ineffective as the previous attempt and the

Americans achieved a decided victory when they severely

damaged the British flagship HMS Hermes, forcing the

British to scuttle her. Casualties were slight based on relative

strength of the opposing forces. The Americans sustained four 

killed and five wounded, while theBritish casualties numbered

27 killed and 45 wounded. Yet, the combination of failed

attempts by the British to seize Fort Bowyer or Mobile resulted 

in their withdrawal to Pensacola.

The misguided decision by Nicholls and Percy to attempt

an attack against either Fort Bowyer or Mobile, resulted in an

under-resourced and ill-coordinated failure. The two

commanders demonstrated contempt for American military

capabilities while overly emphasizing their own. The 

garrison of Fort Bowyer achieved a victory that helped sustain

the morale of the American troops defending the Gulf coast. It 

gave the British cause for thought that Mobile and the indirect

approach may not be the best way to New Orleans. However,

much deeper impacts began to be felt in the wake of Fort

Bowyer. While the British could prove that they were capable

of helping the Spanish, the governor in Pensacola welcomed

them, though with reservations. After Fort Bowyer, the

underlying strain of the Anglo-Spanish relationship in Florida

began to rise to the surface. Mutualsupport ended. The British

setback at Fort Bowyer gave the Spanish governor second

thoughts about condoning the British presence in Florida

and requesting their assistance to defend the territory from the

Americans. The deteriorating relationship between the two

allies presented an ill-timed predicament. Based on his

personal assessment of the known number of British and

Spanish sympathizers and spies in Mobile, Andrew Jackson

envisioned that Pensacola represented the center of enemy

58
intentions and operations in the Gulf. He, therefore, 

determined to attack Pensacola.

James Monroe, Madison’s Secretary of State since 1811,

officially assumed the duties of Secretary of War in the middle

of October. He resigned his former position but conducted the

affairs of both cabinet positions until after the war because

Madison did not select a successor. This was in the midst of

the most difficult period of the war for the United States.

The high operational tempo that dominated the summer

months along the Canadian border and in the Chesapeake Bay

finally subsided but it shifted to the Gulf Region. In fact, the

same day that Monroe assumed his new cabinet position, 14 

October, the British expeditionary force that burned 

Washington, DC left the Chesapeake and sailed for Jamaica.

Since the resignation of Armstrong following the capture of

the capital, Monroe took over the correspondence with the

various American commanders, including Jackson. Monroe’s

greatest challenge with Jackson involved restraining the

Tennessean’s desire to invade Florida in an effort to stop

Anglo-Spanish material support to the Creeks residing in

the Spanish colony. On 28 October 1814, Monroe

unequivocally prohibited Jackson from violating Spanish 

neutrality.

Jackson, however, benefited from a simple combination

of distance and time, conducting operations some 850 miles

from the seat of government. While this adversely affected

command and control at the strategic level, it leftJackson free 

to conduct operations of his own design at the operational 

level. Two key considerations influenced his thinking and

ultimately his decision making. Jackson felt that his location in

the theater placed him in a position to collect and analyze

information quickly and then act decisively to neutralize

threats. Furthermore, as a Tennessean, he felt that he knew the

true gravity of the situation in the South and along its frontier 

far better than eastern politicians in Washington. Therefore,

Jackson willfully disobeyed Monroe’s repeated direct orders 

prohibiting an armed incursion into Spanish Florida. On 2 

November Jackson began a march into Spanish Florida with a 

force of 520 Regulars, 750 Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians,

over 2,800 Militia and Volunteers or 4,070 men. His objective

was to seize Pensacola and deny it as a base of operations in 

arming the Creeks or operating against other American

locations on the Gulf coast.

Averaging 15 miles per day during the march of

approximately 60 miles, the American force arrived outside

the city of Pensacola on 6 November. Jackson immediately

issued an ultimatum to the Spanish governor to surrender

the city and its fortifications. However, the governor replied

59
with a refusal and a demand that the Americans leave 

Spanish territory. Jackson did not possess the equipment

required for a siege. Nor did he have the requisite time to

conduct one. The longer he remained fixed at Pensacola, the

more opportunity he gave to the British to exploit their naval

mobility by attacking elsewhere. In a bid for a speedy 

capitulation, he stormed the city on 7 November. The

Spanish troops initially resisted but soon collapsed and 

surrendered the city. Jackson’s end state came to fruition the

following day, 8 November, when the British blew up the

magazine and stores in Fort Barrancas and Fort Santa Rosa, 

withdrawing its Soldiers to the fleet and leaving the harbor

defenseless. The British withdrew to their position along the

Apalachicola River. The battle’s casualties amounted to a 

small total: the Americans suffered five killed and 10

wounded with the Spanish having 14 killed and six wounded 

and no record of British casualties exists. With a successful

conclusion to his Pensacola operation, Jackson turned control 

of the city back over to the Spanish and began his movement

back to Mobile on 9 November. The destruction of the

fortifications negated the option of an occupation but also

Jackson received intelligence of the main British

expeditionary force gathered on Jamaica for operations against

New Orleans. That left few options beyond returning to

Mobile. In a matter of seven days, Jackson decisively altered

the state of the British campaign in the Gulf. The British could

no longer directly support the Creeks with arms and material 

but much worse, they no longer possessed a base inside the

Gulf to support operations along the coast or inland. The

closest major British base in the region was back in Jamaica, 

over 1,100 miles from New Orleans.

The fall of Pensacola to the Americans presented a series

of benefits to their half of the developing campaign. Jackson

disrupted large groups of Indians planning to attack American

territory. More importantly, his success discredited their faith

in the British to secure and support them. Additionally,

Jackson drove a deep wedge between the British and their

hesitant Spanish allies. Cochrane later asserted, “The attack

made by the Americans upon Pensacola has in a great measure 

retarded this service [the planned British campaign in the Gulf

region].”1

60
Jackson seized and maintained firm control ofthe initiative,

disrupting significant British shaping operations and denying

the British a major sustainable base on the Gulf coast for a 

second time. Furthermore, despite correctly seeing the larger

threat to New Orleans, Jackson continued his efforts to

eliminate any further threat originating from Spanish Florida.

He sent a force of 1,000 mounted Militia and friendly Indians

against the Anglo-Indian position on the Apalachicola River to

maintain the initiative against the enemy, preventing them

from having any further part in the campaign.

Jackson remained in Mobile only as long as it took him to

be convinced that his defensive measures would be effective in

the event of a second British attack. He and hisstaff left Mobile 

for New Orleans on 22 November. Two days later the British

expeditionary force weighed anchor and departed Jamaica for 

Louisiana.

Jackson’s arrival in New Orleans on 1 December marked

an increase in the campaign’s tempo that lasted until its Figure 5. British Shift to the West, Nov-Dec 1814. CSI created.

61
culmination. As with the Creeks and in Mobile and

Pensacola, where Jackson went, things happened. New

Orleans suffered in a state of fear and paranoia for over six 

months. The population needed a strong leader to restore

its confidence and faith. Jackson presented somewhat of a 

contradiction.

A tall, gaunt man, very erect...with a countenance

furrowed by care and anxiety. His dress was simple

and nearly threadbare. A small leather cap protected

his head, and a short blue Spanish cloak his body,

whilst his...high dragoon boots [were] long innocent

of polish or blacking...His complexion was sallow

and unhealthy; his hair iron grey, and his body thin and

emaciated like that of one who had just recovered

from a lingering sickness... But... [a] fierce 

glare...[lighted] his bright and hawk-like eye[s].2

At 48, he looked aged beyond his years being gray-haired,

thin, and frail looking. He still carried a pistol ball from a 

Nashville street fight with a political rival and suffered from a 

severe case of dysentery. However, he possessed an energy

seen only by his Soldiers and his enemies and soon

acknowledged by the citizens of New Orleans who saw cool

confidence in his demeanor and fire in his eyes.

After receiving a series of reports and updates in his

headquarters in the city where he also rested, Jackson began

an exhaustive five day reconnaissance of his new area of

operations. He personally studied every major defensive

work, directing improvements, and repositioning forces to

strengthen the overall American defense. Where he could not

go, Jackson sent members of his small staff of personally 

selected officers, demonstrating a great deal of faith in them to

keep him well informed and accomplish his intent. What they

could not tell Jackson and what no one could tell him, was

that the British expeditionary force dropped anchor off Ship

Island on 8 December 1814. This was some 60 miles east of

New Orleans.

The two opposing senior naval commanders, Cochrane and

Patterson, both saw the immense value of possessing access to

LakeBorgne andLake Pontchartrain. They also understood the

value of the American flotilla. As long as the flotilla existed

on Lake Borgne, a British landing and growing line of

communication lay vulnerable to disruption. Cochrane

explained, “It became impossible that any movement of the

troops could take place till this formidable flotilla was either

captured or destroyed.”3

However, Patterson remained

restricted in the fact that his vessels were a more critical

asset for collecting intelligence for Jackson concerning

62
British intentions leading up to a landing. Patterson’s reports 

to Jackson outlined his plans. “My idea is to station my vessels

at different points of the Lake [Borgne] to the eastward of this

and if attacked by too superior a force, to retreat to the fort at

the Rigolets, then make a stand and aid the Battery in the

defense of that important pass.”4

Patterson posted five gunboats (with 25 guns of various

caliber), a tender, and a dispatch boat, with crews numbering

over 200 men, under the command of Lieutenant Thomas ap

Catesby Jones in Lake Borgne. Patterson intended this force 

to delay British landing operations in the area surrounding

the lake in order to provide Jackson with more time to prepare

his defenses. Jones’ orders directed him to delay and attrit

British forces on the lake but avoid decisive engagement

threatening destruction of his force by withdrawing to the

Rigolets and the cover of the guns of Fort Petite Coquilles.

Patterson’s instructions to Jones became critical on 10

December when the latter’s flotilla patrolled the Pass

Christian, west of Ship Island. That day, the British fleet

identified the Americans. Because the lake presented extreme

difficulties for the larger navy ships of the line, 45 barges which 

were under Captain Nicholas Lockyer, deployed to attack the

Americans with specific orders to capture as many of the

gunboats as possible. Upon spotting the approaching British,

Jones began to reposition to the cover of the Petit Coquilles

in accordance with Patterson’s orders. In a scene more like

a naval battle from antiquity, British sailors rowed their barges

into contact with Jones’ withdrawing force. It took over 36 

hours for the British to close with the enemy, who found

themselves stranded on sandbars on the north side of 

Malheureux Island in the Pass Christian on the night of 

13-14 December when the tide lowered.

63
Jones considered his situation. The British possessed

twice the guns and a greater mobility than their American

opponents. Jones could either scuttle his gunboats or fight.

He ordered his gunboat commanders to anchor their vessels

in a line to block the channel and prepare for combat. On 14

December, the British barges closed with the Americans at

0930, engaging in a tactic of isolating each American vessel

one at a time. Just before noon, Jones suffered wounds that

forced him to turn command over to another officer. Over the

course of the next hour the British quickly captured the

remaining American vessels. By 1300 the battle for Lake Figure 6. British Amphibious Operations, Dec 16-22 1814.

CSI created.

64
Borgne ended. The Americans sustained six killed and 86

wounded while the British suffered 19 killed and 75 wounded

and lost several of their limited barges damaged or sunk.

However, the entire American squadron fell into British hands,

giving the British control of Lake Borgne and access to a 

potential landing site.

Once the British fleet cleared Lake Borgne of the

American flotilla the next step involved finding a secured

landing site for the expeditionary force. The destruction of

Patterson’s flotilla effectively eliminated Jackson’s best asset

for effective early warning of a British landing along the

eastern approaches to New Orleans. It also denied the

Americans critical firepower to add to static positions situated

around Lake Borgne. As in their amphibious operations

along the American east coast, the British could exploit their

operational mobility in the Gulf, choosing the place and time

of their landing to achieve surprise over the Americans and then 

rapidly seize New Orleans.

The British scrutinized a number of potential courses of 

action. First, there was the direct route up the Mississippi

River to New Orleans. However, natural and manmade

obstacles stood in their way because of the river’s strong

current of nearly five knots and strong American defensive

positions, especially the well sited Fort St. Philip, gave

British naval commanders cause for concern. Second, the

British fleet could utilize Barataria Bay and then utilize the

system of lakes and bayous south of New Orleans in order to

gain access to a landing site close to the city. Two points ruled

out this course of action: Lafitte’s decline to support the

operation denied the British critically necessary guides to lead

them through the confusing interior water route and, even with

experienced guides, the expeditionary force then faced the

challenge of being on the opposite bank of the river from New

Orleans. Third, with the elimination of enemy naval assets on 

Lake Borgne, the British could force their way through the

Rigolets into Lake Pontchartrain and approach the city from 

the north. This course of action gained some consensus among

the British commanders but again they faced several

challenges. Movement along this avenue of approach would

lengthen the British line of operations from the Royal

Navy’s anchorage. Furthermore, the depth of the Rigolets

prevented any vessel larger than a barge to pass through. Any

attempt to force the pass with the already limited number of

barges put them at great risk because of the threat posed by the

American position at Fort Petite Coquilles.

65
Therefore, the British also took into account additional

courses of action that included a more direct approach. Hence,

the British considered a landing at the Chef Pass, due east

of New Orleans. From there they could utilize the Chef

Menteur road directly into the city. Unfortunately, a 

reconnaissance revealed an American battery that controlled

a position canalized by a series of swamps alongside the road.

With that in mind the British finally adopted a course of

action that involved finding a water route from Lake Borgne

westward to the Mississippi River. Upon meeting the river, the

expeditionary force could utilize the local road network and

gain access to the city. With the identification of an

unguarded waterborne approach from Lake Borgne, a route

that included the potential for achieving surprise upon the

Americans, the British could move to within close proximity

of the city and then make a rapid advance to seize the New Figure 7. The British Landing and Approach March, Dec 22-23 1814.

CSI created.

66
Orleans. The British chose this course of action.

However, choosing this specific course of action did not

come without its challenges. The most important involved a 

combination of distance, lift capability, and time. Supporting

this course of action entailed moving the expeditionary force

some 60 miles one way with the limited number of barges and

other light draft vessels. The Royal Navy possessed far less

transport of this type than Cochrane requested and could,

therefore, only transport approximately one third of the force’s

troops at a time. Choosing such a route with limited

capabilities would take a number of days to accomplish,

extend the line of operation, and possibly forfeit the element 

of surprise.

Thus, with the decision made, Cochrane and Keane

agreed to land and consolidate the expeditionary force in one

location in order to organize it for the approach and landing

operation envisioned. The British commitment to a course of

action, and the immediate steps that followed that decision,

initiated a sequence of events that shaped the culminating 

period of the Gulf campaign which was a 30 day period

referred to today as the Battle of New Orleans.

Vignettes

1. Instructions to the senior commanders, Admiral Cochrane

and Major General Ross, clearly indicated that the campaign

in the Gulf, and specifically the capture of New Orleans,

remained a strategic priority in Britain’s efforts to end the war 

in a position built from strength:

Orders to Cochrane from Bathurst (11 August 1814):

First, to obtain command of the embouchure of the

Mississippi, so as to deprive the back settlements of

America of their communication with the sea; and,

secondly, to occupy some important and valuable

possession, by the restorations of which the

conditions of peace might be improved, or which we 

might be entitled to exact the cession of as the price of

peace.

5

Orders to Ross from Bathurst (6 September 1814):

If you shallfind in the inhabitants a general and decided

disposition to withdraw from their recent connection

with the United States, either with the view of

establishing themselves as an independent people or

returning under the dominion of the Spanish Crown,

you will give them every support in your power; you

will furnish them with arms and clothing, and assist

in forming and disciplining the several levies,

67
provided you are fully satisfied of the loyalty of their

intention, which will be best envinced by their

committing themselves in some act of decided

hostility against the United States.

6

2. In a colorful effort to describe the great diversity of the

population of New Orleans, an observer noted several years 

before the campaign that:

Here in half an hour you can see and speak to

Frenchmen, Spaniards, Danes, Swedes, Germans, 

Englishmen, Portuguese, Hollanders, Mexicans,

Kentuckians, Tennesseans, Ohioans, Pennsylvanians,

New Yorkers, New Englanders and a motley group

of Indians, quadroons [people of one-quarter

African descent], Africans, etc.

7

3. The British attempted to conduct aggressive information

operations as part of their shaping operations. These attempts

targeted various elements of the diverse Louisiana population

and that of the wider Gulf region as well. In particular, the

British attempted to sway the French and Spanish population

of Louisiana, as demonstrated in this proclamation addressed

to the “NATIVES OF LOUISIANA:”

ON you the first call is made, to assist in

liberating from a faithless and imbecile government

your paternal soil. Spaniards, Frenchmen, Italians,

and British, whether settled or residing for the time in

Louisiana, on you I also call to aid me in the just cause.

The American usurpation in this country must be

abolished, and the lawful owners of the soil put in

possession. I am at the head of a large body of

Indians, well-armed, disciplined, and commanded

by British Officers. A good train of Artillery, with

every requisite, seconded by the powerful aid of a 

numerous British and Spanish Squadron of Ships

and Vessels of War. Be not alarmed, Inhabitants of

the Country, at our approach; the same good faith

and disinterestedness which has distinguished the

conduct of Britons in Europe, accompany them

here...You will have no fear...your Property, your

Laws, the peace and tranquility of yourCountry,will

be guaranteed...rest assured that these brave men

only burn with the ardent desire of satisfaction for the

wrongs they have suffered from the Americans, to

join you in liberating these Southern Frontiers form

their yoke...The Indians have pledged themselves in

the most solemn manner, not to injure in the slightest

degree, the Persons and Properties, of any but

enemies to their Spanish and English fathers. A Flag

68
over any door, whether Spanish, French, or British,

sill be a sure protection.

8

4. As part of the British attempt to gain the support

of the Baratarian pirates, Major Edward J. Nicholls, the

Royal Marine officer charged with organizing and

supplying the Creek Indians in Spanish Pensacola, wrote 

to Laffite on 31 August 1814, requesting the support of 

the Baratarians: 

I HAVE arrived in the Floridas for the purpose of

annoying the only enemy Great Britain has in the

world, as France and England are now friends. I call

on you, with your brave followers, to enter into the

service of Great Britain, in which you shall have the

rank of a captain; lands will be given to you all, in

proportion to your respective ranks, on a peace taking

place, and I invite you on the following terms. Your

property shall be guaranteed to you, and your

persons protected: in return for which I ask you to

cease all hostilities against Spain, or the allies of

Great Britain.

9

Successfully delaying his response to the British, Lafitte,

as part of his drawn out correspondence with leading citizens of

New Orleansto inform them of the British offer and his loyalty

to the United States, finally wrote directly to Governor 

Claiborne:

I offer to you to restore to this state several citizens

who perhaps in your eyes have lost that sacred title. I 

offer you them, however, such as you could wish to

find them, ready to exert their utmost efforts in

defence of the country. This point of Louisiana, which

I occupy, is of great importance in the present crisis.

I tender my servicesto defend it; and the only reward I 

ask isthat a stop be put to the proscriptions against me

and my adherents.

10

5. The confusion on the part of the citizens of New Orleans

stemmed more from a simple fear of the unknown than British

information operations. The populace also lacked a strong

source of leadership until the arrival of Jackson. Once on the

scene, Jackson applied his immense charisma and will power

to restoring the confidence of the population and placing the

city on a defensive footing, as recorded separately by Majors

Arsene Lacarriere Latour and Howell Tatum, members of 

Jackson staff:

Latour:

The situation of our country at that period, owing to the

69
proximity of the enemy – the number of whose ships

of war on our coast was daily increasing – was 

critical in the extreme...It is hardly possible to form

an idea of the change which his [Jackson’s] arrival

produced on the minds of the people...on his arrival,

he was immediately invested with the confidence of

the public, and all hope centered in him.11

Tatum:

The first days of the General s arrival at New Orleans

was devoted to the acquisition of such information,

upon various points, as were deemed necessary, in

order, to enable him to adopt the most efficacious plan

for the defence of Louisiana, and of Orleans in 

particular, against threatened, and expected

Invasions, by the enemy who were at this time

ascertained to have reached our coast.12

Analysis

1. Evaluate the British operational plan. What principles of

operational art stand out most? What limitations existed that

could have created an unsuccessful outcome?

2. Compare the two opposing forces’ application of what we

today call joint operations.

3. What were the advantages and disadvantages of the British

information operations focused directly on the civilian 

population of Louisiana?

4. Did the Americans/British handle the Baratarian Pirates

properly? What contemporary examples can be compared to

such an approach in gaining allies “of convenience?”

70
Stand One (alternate)

The Levee at Woldenberg Park, New Orleans Strategic

Background and Campaign Overview

Directions: Woldenberg Park (1 Canal Street) is located

along the Mississippi River in downtown New Orleans.

When using GPS navigation enter the following address:

Woldenberg Park, 1 Canal Street, New Orleans, LA. The

best route in and out of the park is:

Enter: Approach the French Quarter from the west on North

Peters Street, turn right on Conti Street just before Landry’s

Seafood, turn right on North Front Street, pull off to the side 

of the road near the next intersection with Bienville Street

and dismount. Note that the entire route from the turn on Conti 

is one way in the desired direction of travel.

Walk across the railroad tracks at Bienville Station and enter

Woldenberg Park along the levee. Stop along the levee with

an unobstructed view of up, down, and across the river.

Exit: From North Front Street, turn right on Bienville Street

and then left on North Peters Street. Turn right on Canal Street

and proceed to Interstate 10 (I-10) and enter I-10 East.

Notes: This is a very good location to support organizations

with lodging in or adjacent to downtown New Orleans that

cannot conduct a classroom preliminary study phase.

However, this option must be completed before approximately

8:30 a.m. in order to continue movement to next stand 

without encountering increasing downtown traffic 

congestion that will adversely impact the staff ride’s timeline.

Visual Aids: Same as Fort Pike

Orientation: The levee here, more so during the campaign

than today, was part of the larger New Orleans waterfront, the

center of New Orleans’ economic value. Along the levee

merchants’ stacked various products, such as locally grown

sugar cane or raw materials from the northern states to here

moved via the river. Once the British blockade of the

American coast took full effect in 1814 there would have

been millions of dollars in goods stacked on the levee

waiting shipment, indicating the city’s economic value to the

United States and the possible wealth available to the British 

expeditionary force.

The Mississippi River empties into the Gulf of Mexico

approximately 100 miles south of this location.

Fort St. Philip on the Mississippi River is 40 miles downstream.

Barataria Bay, facing the Gulf of Mexico, is approximately

40 miles to the southeast. A waterborne avenue of approach

71
begins in at the entrance of the bay, extends through various

lakes and rivers, and ends only a few miles south here on the 

opposite bank of the river.

Lake Borgne, which opens into the Gulf of Mexico, is

approximately 15 miles due east.

Lake Pontchartrain, which is connected to Lake Borne by 

the Rigolets, is five miles north of this point and dominates

the north side of the city. 

Description: Same as Fort Pike 

Vignettes: Same as Fort Pike 

Analysis: Same as Fort Pike 

72
Stand Two

Villere’s Canal – The British Landing (22 December 1814)

Directions: Exit the Fort Pike parking lot and turn left on

LA 90 West. Travel approximately 17 miles and to I-510

South/Paris Road. Travel 7 miles and turn left on East Judge

Perez Drive. In 1mile turn left on Munster Drive.After entering

the neighborhood, cross the first small canal, and park in the

gravel area immediately on the right hand side. Dismount and

cross the street to the path that parallels the canal. Stop at the

first intersection of two canals. When using GPS navigation

enter the following addresses:

For cars/vans (no more than 6 vehicle total): 2860 Munster

Blvd, Meraux, LA

This is the last house on the right hand side of the street prior to

crossing a small canal. Immediately upon crossing the canal,

turn right on to the gravel on the north side of the canal.

Dismount and cross the street directly across to the trail and

walk back to the stand location.

For busses: 2674 Munster Blvd Meraux, LA

This is the large brown warehouse on the immediate right hand 

side after the turn. Park in the rear parking lot, dismount and

walk up the street to the canal and the trail.

Notes: The entry point to this stand is in a residential area.

Please respect private property. Also, rain can make the

walking route to this stand extremely slippery; ensure that

participants walk on the side of the trail opposite of the

adjacent canals. Finally, alligators and venomous snakes

inhabit the canals and natural waterways of the New Orleans

area. Be aware of these dangerous animals and avoid them.

Visual Aids

British Amphibious Operations, 16-22 December 1814

The British Landing and Approach March, 22-23 December 1814

Orientation: This is the approximate location of Villere’s

Canal (it is possible that it may be located more to the east of

this location), part of the Villere plantation. It was the

approximate endpoint of the waterborne route taken by the

British from Lake Borgne. It ran from Fisherman’s Village on

Bayou Bienvenue and turned on to Bayou Mazant along the

rear of the de La Ronde plantation. However, water levels

prevented the British from continuing into the de La Ronde

canal, so they continued along the Villere canal which led to

the plantation of the same name. At the plantation solid ground

existed along both sides of canal, providing a landing place

within close proximity of the Mississippi River. The Villere

73
House served as the British headquarters until 18 January

1815.13

From this approximate point the British advance guard stood

nine miles from New Orleans. Their line of communications

extended approximately 90 miles long.

Figure 8. Villere’s Canal looking to the northeast back along the British LOC.

Photo by Author.

The most important terrain feature is the still very difficult 

terrain to the northeast; even in December and January the 

foliage and vegetation in these woods and swamps can greatly

impede movement. While this is a modern canal, its narrow 

width serves as a good approximation of what the British Navy 

dealt with in navigating their boats as far as they did.

Description

After adopting a course of action that directed the British

expeditionary force to a landing on the west side of Lake 

Borgne with an intent to move inland to a point within 10

miles of New Orleans, Cochrane and Keane agreed to

consolidate the expeditionary force in one location in order

to organize it for the landing and approach operation

envisioned. They chose Pea Island, some 10 miles east of the

Rigolets and approximately 20 miles from where Bayou

Bienvenue met the western shore of Lake Borgne. The

landing at Pea Island began on 16 December. In a painstaking

and exhausting process, the Royal Navy seaman rowed

barges packed with 200 men per vessel, a total of some 6,000

Soldiers, in a 10 hour one way trip to Pea Island, completing 

that phase of the landing in five days. Once there Keane

organized the troops into three brigades and devised a plan to

send an entire brigade with each lift from Pea Island to the

74
final landing point. The British planned to move the lead

brigade in shallow draft barges that could continue the journey

down Bayou Bienvenue while moving a second brigade in 

larger barges on the lake. Once the first brigade landed, the

smaller craft would return to the lake, transfer the second

brigade, and go right back into the Bayou. The third brigade,

picked up at Pea Island, would follow suit. Once the troops

landed the British began moving artillery, ammunition, and

supplies inland to support the expeditionary force.

While intended as only a transition point, the British

Soldiers found Pea Island to be no paradise. In fact, the island

provided almost nothing to support a large camp, even if

temporary. The terrain offered no shelter and, because of the

transport limitations, the men only carried their weapons and

packs, leaving tents and other small luxuries behind. This did

not fit in with the December Gulf weather patterns. Cold 

temperatures and rain during the days and severe frosts 

during the nights made the Soldiers’ existence poor. The

West Indian troops, organized for campaigns in the Caribbean

tropics and brought along in the misguided assumption that

they would also thrive in the American Deep South, began

falling sick almost immediately.

75
During the British landing operations on Pea Island,

reconnaissance parties began investigating the inland

waterwaysandcollectinginformation on the best routes toward

the river. Captain Robert Spencer, Royal Navy, and Army

Lieutenant John Peddie discovered a local fishing village 

Figure 9. British Amphibious Operations (previously seen as figure 6).

CSI created.

76
located at the entrance of Bayou Bienvenue. There they 

collected information from Portuguese fisherman that 

inhabited what the British later referred to as Fisherman’s 

Village. Disguising themselves as fisherman, they forced the 

Portuguese to take them further up the bayou’s principle 

branch, Bayou Mazant, searching for a landing site. 

Eventually, they came to the Villere Plantation, approximately 

10 miles from New Orleans. After studying the area in more 

detail the two officers determined that the plantation provided 

a sufficient site for landing the expeditionary force. Upon 

learning of the reconnaissance and its results Cochrane and 

Keane agreed to proceed with the next phase of the landing, 

moving along the bayou to the final landing site. 

The 1st Brigade, under the command of Colonel William

Thornton, commander of the 85th Regiment of Foot, left Pea

Island on the morning of 22 December. Thornton’s brigade

consisted of his own 85th, the 95th Rifle Regiment, the 4th

Regiment of Foot, 100 sappers (engineers), and a detachment

of rocket artillery armed with Congreve rockets. Keane 

accompanied the brigade. Cochrane tracked the initial

progress of the barges from a small schooner. Weather

became a factor from the start as it began to rain, filling the

barges with ankle-deep water. Even when the rain stopped the

wind increased and the Soldiers suffering continued. They

kept small charcoal fires on the stern of each barge but these

were extinguished with the approach of nightfall. In the midst

of this anguish the flotilla halted and took a one hour pause

just before nightfall.

Returning to Fisherman’s Village in force, the British

quickly scattered a 12-man American detachment tasked with

observing potential British movements, capturing a handful

while the rest fled into the swamps. While easily overcoming

the small American detachment, the movement on Bayou

Bienvenue proved more challenging. Initially, the barges

moved at five vessels abreast but then transitioned to single

file as the bayou’s banks narrowed.When the force reached the

Bayou Mazantrowing proved impossible and sailors began to

use their oars to “punt,” pushing the riverbanks in order to

propel the craft further along the bayou. Eventually, at 0400 on

23 December, the lead brigade made landfall. With the terrain

forcing a single line of transports in the bayou, the British

troops found themselves forced to move from rear to front, 

going from barge to barge, until each group reached land that

proved to really be a marshy defile. While finally landing

somewhat cheered the formerly confined and sore Soldiers,

the ensuing ground movement proved no less demanding.

The Soldiers moved in a single file across the marshy ground,

cutting down thick forests of reeds and building bridges across

77
numerous streams. 

After an hour and a half of moving through this difficult

terrain the landscape ultimately began to open at the Villere

Plantation and the advance guard deployed for potential

action.

Prior to the British landing, following Jackson’s

personal reconnaissance of the various avenues of approach

available to the British and American defensive positions, the

American commander ordered that all major avenues be

blocked. This included Bayou Bienvenue and the Villere

Canal. Jackson entrusted this task to Major Gabriel Villere,

whose father served as the commander of the Louisiana

Militia and owned the Villere Plantation. However, Villere

chose not to execute Jackson’s orders, perhaps because the

family’s plantation depended heavily upon the bayou and canal

for moving the plantation’s sugar cane and other products.

Villere instead chose to deploy a small detachment to guard

the entrance at the Fisherman’s village, as demonstrated by

the detachment easily scattered on 21 December by the

approaching lead British brigade.

Ironically, late on the morning of 23 December, Major

Villere and his brother sat on the porch of their father’s

plantation house when the advance guard of the British

expeditionary force appeared, quickly falling prisoner.

Thornton consolidated his brigade of two thousand Soldiers

at the Villere Plantation near the Mississippi River and ten

miles from New Orleans without the enemy being aware of 

the movement.

Keane reached a decision point. Having executed an

undetected approach march to within ten miles of the city

and with a somewhat sufficient amount of daylight remaining,

he could continue the movement, exploiting his success, and

seize New Orleans. On the other hand, he could secure his

position and await the arrival of the rest of his force and then

proceed to the city. However, his current situation

represented his first independent command, even if only

temporary. Some stories assert that Colonel Thornton, an

extremely aggressive commander and perhaps trying to appeal

to his commander’s widely accepted reputation for personal

recklessness in the Peninsula, strongly pushed his commander

to continue the advance and seize the city. However, no firm 

evidence exists to support this point. One, must however,

analyze the situation that Keane found himself in at the time.

Keane considered the wider complications of his situation.

The force under his direct command stood isolated from

reinforcement, hours away on the other end of a ninety mile

long line of communication. His troops required a rest from 

78
the arduous movement through the wilderness and he

possessed only two small artillery pieces. He already knew

that an American force of unknown size operated to his rear 

but did not know what occupied his front. In considering so

much information, Keane decided, contrary to his reputation

for recklessness, to consolidatehisposition and awaitthe arrival

of the rest of the expeditionary force.

Vignettes: Lieutenant George R. Gleig, an officer in the 85th

Regiment who wrote of his military experiences in later life,

left a vivid description of the conditions encountered by the

expeditionary force during its time on Pea Island.

It is scarcely possible to imagine any place more

completely wretched. It was a swamp, containing, a 

small space of firm ground at one end, and almost

wholly unadorned with trees of any sort of

description...The interior was the resort of wild ducks

and other water-fowl; and the pools and creeks with

Figure 10. The British Landing and Approach March (previously seen as figure 7).

CSI created.

79
which it was intercepted abounded in dormant

alligators.

Upon this miserable desert the Army was assembled,

without tents or huts, or any covering to shelter them

from the inclemency of the weather; and in truth we

may fairly affirm that our hardships had here their

commencement. After having been exposed all day to

the cold and pelting rain, we landed upon a barren

island, incapable of furnishing even fuel enough to

supply our fires. To add to our miseries, as night

closed, the rain generally ceased, and severe frosts

set in, which, congealing our wet clothes upon our

bodies, left little animal warmth to keep the limbs in

a state of activity; and the consequence was, that

many of the wretched [West Indian troops] to whom

frost and cold were altogether new, fell fast asleep, and

perished before morning.

Yet in spite of all of this, not a murmur nor a whisper of

complaint could be heard throughout the whole

expedition. No man appeared to regard the present,

whilst everyone looked forward to the future. From

the General, down to the youngest drummerbow, a 

confident anticipation of success seemed to pervade

all ranks; and in the hope of an ample reward in store

for them, the toils and grievances of the moment were

forgotten.14

Analysis

1. Assess the failure to block the Villere Canal – how does a

commander ensure that tasks and intents are adhered to by their

subordinates?

2. Evaluate the contribution of the Royal Navy during this

period within the context of modern joint operations.

3. Assess Keane’s decision not to immediately advance on

New Orleans. Was this a lost opportunity? Evaluate the

situation from ColonelThornton’s perspective; how do leaders

try to influence the decision making of their commanders and

how far is too far? 

80
Stand Three

The de La Ronde Plantation – The American Spoiling

Attack (23 December 1814)

Directions: From the previous stand, turn south on Munster

Drive and return to East Judge Perez Drive, this time turning

west. In approximately 1mile turn left on Paris Road. Just

short of the intersection of Paris Road and St. Claude Avenue,

turn right into the adjacent parking lot. Then, walk west across

West St. Bernard Highway to briefly view the de La Ronde

ruins (preserved on a traffic island in the middle of the road)

and continue cross the road to the park located on the west

side of West St. Bernard Highway. When using GPS

navigation enter the following address: 200 Paris Road,

Chalmette, LA. This is a two-story white mason brick

building on the corner just before the traffic light that marksthe

intersection with West St. Bernard Highway. Pull into the

parking lot immediately off Paris Road. Dismount and

carefully proceed to the de La Ronde Plantation ruins in the

traffic island and across to the large oak tree that mark the old 

lane from the house to the levee.

Notes: The ruins of the de La Ronde Plantation are located

in close proximity of an extremely busy intersection and

along an equally busy industrial route. Groups will be

required to cross two sections of the highway in order to

gain access to the two sites that make up the stand. Therefore, 

exercise caution when moving groups across the highway

Visual Aids

The American Night Attack, 23 December,

1930-2030 The American Night Attack, 23

December, 2030-2130

Orientation: The ruins preserved between the West St.

Bernard Highway are what remain of the de La Ronde

Mansion. At this location, Andrew Jackson formed his force 

for the night attack on the British camp. From this location

the British camp was approximately 1,750 meters to the east. 

The Mississippi River is approximately 500 meters to the

south. New Orleans is 9 miles to the west.

The de La Ronde plantation

This plantation, owned by Colonel Pierre Denis de La

Ronde, topped the list of the finest plantations that stood on

the New Orleans battlefield in 1814-1815. It is also the only

house of which any evidence survives to this day. Built in

1805, this mansion, a brick construction covered in white

cement, was two stories high, contained sixteen rooms, and

had galleries and colonnades on all four sides. Jackson’s

81
engineer, Arsene Lacarriere Latour, recorded that during the

night attack on 23 December the American line “formed on

a line almost perpendicular to the river, stretching from the

levee to the garden of La Ronde’s plantation and on its

principle avenue” (marked by the two lines of oak trees on

the west side of the of the road across from the ruins). The

house and its contents suffered considerable damage

throughout the period. The British used the house as an

observation post and a hospital; during the final British attack

on January 8, Major General Samuel Gibbs died of his

wounds here and Soldiers brought Major General Edward

Pakenham’s body here following his death on the battlefield.

Fire destroyed the house in 1885 and a hurricane in 1915 blew

down the bulk of the surviving walls. Contrary to common

tourist information, no contemporary accounts of the battle

make reference to the oak trees that still stand between the

house ruins and the river. They were planted after the battle.15

Figure 11. Ruins of the de La Ronde Plantation House.

By Author.

Description

The destruction of the American naval flotilla on Lake

Borgne created a great amount of concern for Andrew Jackson

who previously depended on that asset to keep him informed 

of British naval movements to the east of New Orleans. In an

attempt to reestablish contact with the enemy Jackson sent his

engineers out to the eastern approaches of the city, a

common practice of armies of the period.

82
Figure 12. The de La Ronde Plantation river road beyond the railroad tracks. 

By Author.

Jackson also decided, on 16 December, to consolidate his

forces in New Orleans. He ordered Major General John

Coffee of the Tennessee Militia and a veteran commander of

Jackson’s campaign against the Creeks to move his 600 men 

of mounted rifles from Baton Rouge, advising Coffee that

“You must not sleep until you reach me.” He also sent

movement orders to Major General William Carroll, 

commander of the Tennessee Militia to increase his movement 

from Tennessee to New Orleans in order to assume a defensive

position guard the Plain of Gentilly along the Chef Menteur.

Finally, Jackson did something radical that did not endear

him with Governor Claiborne and the Louisiana legislature

despite their distress over the British approach. He declared

martial law in the city of New Orleans. Assuming control of

the city from elected officials, Jackson hoped to lessen the

panic of the civilian population while denying potential British 

spies access to the city and keeping it clear for his own forces.

However, in the aftermath of the campaign the local and state

government officials continued to hold a grudge against

Jackson over what they considered draconian and

undemocratic measures.

The positive break that Jackson looked for rushed into his

headquarters just after 1300 on 23 December. Major Villere,

captured earlier that morning by the British at his family’s

plantation, escaped from his captors by jumping out a window

and eluding pursuit. He informed Jackson that the British were

at his family’s plantation, nine miles south of the city. Shortly

after Villere’s arrival, Jackson’s chief engineer, Major

Latour, arrived and confirmed the same information, adding

83
that the British numbered 2,500 men.

Jackson’s consolidation of his forces at New Orleans

continued as he built an intelligence picture of the British

situation south of New Orleans. The force immediately at his

disposal consisted of a very diverse body of troops. The

backbone of his force consisted of the US regulars of the 7th

and 44th Infantry Regiments. They were joined by regular

Army artillery and a detachment of Marines assigned to New

Orleans. The Militia units included Coffee’s Tennessee

mounted riflemen and a battalion of Mississippi dragoons

under Major Thomas Hinds. The Louisiana Militia consisted

of an interesting variety of troops. Major Jean Baptiste Plauche 

led a battalion, Major Louis Daquin led a battalion of free 

men of color (free black citizens), and Captain Thomas Beale

led a company of the city’s upper class businessmen named

the New Orleans Rifles. If the force lacked sufficient diversity

then it increased with the addition of a company of Choctaw 

Indians under the command of Captain Pierre Jugeant. 

However, still concerned over the possibility of a British 

movement on the Plain of Gentilly, Jackson deployed 

Carroll’s Tennesseans and three regiments of Louisiana 

Militia, under Governor Claiborne, to defend this avenue of 

approach and his left flank. The force under Jackson’s 

immediate command numbered 2, 287 men. 

Jackson entertained only one course of action: attack the

British. His previous military operations against the Creeks

involved aggressive and rapid movements followed by equally

aggressive attacks. In this situation Jackson envisioned seizing

the initiative and destroying the British force camped at the

Villere Plantation. However, this concept involved a great risk

given the accepted difficulties inherent in a night attack. His

forces began moving at 1500 and closed on an attack position

on the de La Ronde Plantation by 1700. With the British pickets

only 500 yards away,Jackson quietly formed his attack force.

At the same time Master Commandant Patterson prepared the

schooner USS Carolina to move down river to a position

where it could bombard the British camp.

Shortly before 1930 British Soldiers in the camp noticed

what they thought was a merchant ship passing down the river.

Showing no concern, the troops began cooking dinner.

Suddenly the Carolina opened fired with her port battery,

showering the British camp with grape and shot. The

schooner’s attack served as a signal for Jackson’s larger attack.

Ten minutes later, Jackson personally led the regulars,

reinforced by two battalions of Louisiana Militia and the

Choctawsin an assault along the bank ofthe river while Coffee,

commanding his Tennessee Militia, Hinds’ Mississippians,

84
and Beale’s New Orleans Rifles advanced on the left and turned

theBritish right flank. It is noteworthy that Jackson personally

led the regulars in a holding attack against the British while

Coffee commanded the Militia in a difficult turning

movement at night. Jackson’s faith in Coffee and the

Tennessee troops made this feasible; Jackson knew that the

regulars would hold, allowing Coffee to successfully execute

the maneuver into the enemy flank. In a supporting operation

to the south, Brigadier General David Morgan of the

Louisiana Militia, commanding the American position at the

English Turn of the Mississippi River received orders to

conduct a demonstration against the rear of the British camp

Chaos reigned throughout the British camp as the

schooner’s guns continued to suppress the camp. However,

Colonel Thornton immediately tried to organize resistance and

reacted to the fire. Soldiers moved to the four foot tall levee

and began to open fire upon the ship with ineffective musket

fire. Without artillery, the British could only rely upon

Congreve rockets which resulted in little effect.

The American regulars advanced along the river levee.

The regular artillery moved forward along the exposed road

that ran along the levee, propelled by the hand of its gun crews,

covered by the Marine detachment. When the battery ran into a 

British outpost the Marines fell back, exposing the guns to

danger. The British saw the opportunity and attempted to

seize the guns only to be foiled by the actions of Jackson

himself. The American commander and his staff rode forward 

and Jackson called out, “Save the guns, my boys, at every

sacrifice,” motivating a company of the 7th Infantry to

counterattack and save the guns from capture. By then the

regulars and Louisiana Militia closed with the enemy. The

British fought in a formation of three lines, the first kneeling

and the other two firing over the shoulder of the men in front

of them. Close quarter, hand to hand fighting typified the

action. Soon, the British began to withdraw, assisted by the 

timely intervention of a building fog bank. The Americans

continued their advance and maintained contact.

85
On the American left flank Coffee’s Tennesseans also

advanced at the Carolina’s first broadside. While Jackson

made contact with the British pickets, Coffee conducted his

turningmovement to the south.The riflemen soon made contact

with mixed formations of British Soldiers from the 85th and

95th and hand to hand fighting immediately began. Beale’s

Company made its way into the center of the British camp but

withdrew under the pressure of a local counterattack.

Unbeknownst to Coffee or any of the other American

commanders, the British 2d Brigade (made up of the veteran

4th Regiment and the inexperienced 93d Regiment making

its combat debut), after its long approach movement, entered

the fight on the British right flank. Beale’s Company found 

itself isolated from the rest of Coffee’s force. Many men fell Figure 13. The American Night Attack, 23 December, 1930-2030.

CSI created.

86
into enemy hands while others dispersed into the darkness 

and eventually found their way back to the main body. 

Coffee prudently demonstrated why Jackson placed so

much trust in him. After nearly two hours of fierce fighting,

Coffee evaluated the situation on his part of the field. The

darkness, combined with large amounts of smoke, made the

confusing fight extremely difficult for leaders to command and

control.Additionally, fog started to build asitrolled offthe river.

Furthermore, the further Coffee advanced into the British

camp, the greater the threat of fratricide from the Carolina’s

guns increased. Finally, he understood the growing danger to

his force from the arriving British reinforcements.He assessed

that he had lost 200 of his Tennesseans and all of Beale’s

Company. Coffee chose to end the attack and withdraw. He sent

a message to Jackson, conveying his assessment and intent

and Jackson concurred.At approximately 2130, theAmericans

began to withdraw back to the de La Ronde Plantation where 

they started.

Two hours after Jackson withdrew his forces, Brigadier

General Morgan’s Louisiana Militia, well behind schedule,

finished their movement to the rear of the British camp.

However, not hearing any fighting on Jackson’s front, 

Morgan only conducted a slight feint and then returned to

English Turn. The American attacked ended slightly after 

midnight on 24 December. At roughly that same time Jackson

met with his staff and key commanders where he announced

that the Army would continue its withdrawal at dawn and

prepare a defensive line along the Rodriguez Canal, a naturally

defensible position that could be physically reinforced, lying

two miles to the north between the Chalmette and Macarty

plantations.

Jackson’s casualties sustained during the attack

numbered 24 killed, 115 wounded, and 74 missing. The

British sustained 46 killed, 167 wounded, and 64 missing.

However, while the British secured the battlefield in the wake

of Jackson’s withdrawal, the American commander secured

something else that being that Jackson seized the initiative 

87
Figure 14. The American Night Attack, Dec 23 1814, 2030-2130.

CSI created.

88
89

and executed an aggressive and unexpected night attack

against a somewhat numerical superior force, inflicting

physical and moral damage upon the British. The Americans 

won a moral victory.

While the armies regrouped on 24 December and prepared

for the next stage of their struggle, the American and British

diplomats negotiating the treaty to end the war, signed the

Treaty of Ghent in Belgium. Both nations need only ratify the

treaty and the war would be over. However, a copy of the

treaty would take time making its way across the Atlantic to

the American capital. Meanwhile, on Christmas Day, Major

General Sir Edward Pakenham, a month behind schedule,

arrived in camp to assume command of the British 

expeditionary force.

Vignettes

1. The fact that the British were convinced that the Americans

would not attack their camp, especially at night, set the

conditionsthat allowed the Americans to achieve such tactical

surprise and a high degree of initial success.

According to Lieutenant Gleig of the British 85th Regiment:

The dropping fire [naval gunfire from the Carolina] 

having paused for a few moments, was succeed by a 

fearful yell; and the heavens were illuminated on all

sides by a semi-circular blaze of musketry. It was now

manifest that we were surrounded, and that by a very

superior force; and that no alternative remained,

except to surrender at discretion, or to beat back the

assailants... All order, all discipline were lost. Each

officer, as he succeeded in collecting twenty or thirty

men about him, plunged into the midst of the enemy’s 

ranks, where it was fought hand to hand, bayonet to

bayonet, and sabre to sabre...the darkness and general

confusion effectually prevented me from observing

how others, except my own immediate party, were

employed.16

2. Jackson, a commander widely-known to share in the

privations of his men, moved forward along the river road

levee during the attack with his Regulars and Marines. His

chief military engineer, Arsene Lacarriere Latour,

accompanied Jackson forward and personally witnessed his

commanding general’s great moral and physical courage,

though with reasonable concern.

I may say, without fear to be taxed with adulation, that 

on the night of the 23d, Jackson exposed himself rather 

too much. I saw him in advance of all who were near
90

3. Two days after the American night attack, Major General

Sir Edward Pakenham and his staff arrived in the British

camp. Catching up with his command over a month later

than planned, the new commanding general immediately

took stock of his Army’s situation. While provided with

copies of the previous orders issued to Ross, Keane, and

Lambert, Pakenham also possessed additional guidance from 

Lord Bathurst, of a somewhat more political nature, issued 

prior to his departure:

... it is not perhaps to be expected that the

Inhabitants will be willing to take any active part

against a Government to which on the Signature of a 

Peace between Great Britain and the United States,

they might afterwards be obliged to submit but it is

probable that a general disposition may exist,

peaceably to acquiesce in our Possession of the

Country during the War.

You will give every encouragement to such a 

Disposition; and you will for that purpose cause the

force under your command, to observer the strictest

Discipline; to respect the Lives and the Property of

all those inclined to a peaceable deportment and by no

means to excite the Black Population to rise against

their Masters. There is nothing so calculated to unite

the Inhabitants against you as an attempt of this

description, while the apprehension of your being

obliged to resort to such a measure for your own 

protection may be made to act as an additional

inducement with them to make no resistance to His 

Majesty’s Forces.

You may possibly hear whilst engaged in active

operations that the Preliminaries of Peace between

His Majesty and the United States have been signed

in Europe and that they have been sent to America in

order to receive the Ratification of The President...it is

advisable that Hostilities should not be suspended 

until you shall have official information that The

President has actually ratified the Treaty and a Person 

will be duly authorized to apprise you of this event.

him, at a time when the enemy was making a charge 

on the artillery, within pistol shot, in the midst of a 

shower of bullet, and in that situation, I observed him 

spiriting and urging on the marines, and the right of 

the seventh regiment, who animated by the presence 

and voice of their gallant commander-in-chief, 

attacked the enemy briskly, that they soon forced him 

[the British] to retire.

17
Analysis

1. Evaluate Jackson’s decision to immediately attack the

British camp. What were the risks involved and how were 

they mitigated?

2. Discussthe situation in theBritish camp priorto the attack.

Did contempt for American military ability lead to a state of 

vulnerability?

3. Assess Jackson’s tactical leadership and the personal risks

that he took throughout the battle.

4. Evaluate Coffee’s performance commanding the American

turning movement in the context of modern mission 

command.

5. What was the impact of the American attack? Was it a

victory or a defeat; what influence did it have upon the rest

of the campaign?

91

As during thisinterval, judging from the experience we 

have had, the termination of the war must be 

considered as doubtful, you will regulate your 

proceedings accordingly, neither omitting an 

opportunity of obtaining signal success, nor 

exposing the troops to hazard or serious loss for an 

inconsiderable advantage. And you will take 

special care not so to act under the expectation of

hearing that the Treaty of Peace has been ratified, as 

to endanger the safety of His Majesty’s 

Forces, should that expectation be unhappily 

disappointed.18
This legend shows the disposition of forces on the American line, 27-28 December 1814.
Stand Four

East Chalmette – British Limited Attack (28 December 1814)

Directions: From the previous stand, turn right on West

St. Bernard Highway (LA 46) and drive 1.2 miles. See signs for 

the Chalmette National Cemetery. Turn left on Chalmette

Military Cemetery Road and enter the National Cemetery.

Drive to the end of the road and turn around in the circle at

the Grand Army of the Republic Civil War monument.

Backtrack along the road toward the cemetery entrance,

stopping approximately halfway, and pull off to the side of the

lane opposite of the opening in the low stone wall on the far

left hand side. Dismount and move through the gap in the wall 

and stop just past the interpretive markers.

If the Cemetery gate is closed, continue 0.3 miles up the

West St. Bernard Highway to the Chalmette Battlefield

entrance (the next left, however, if traffic is too heavy to

safely turn left proceed further north to the first traffic light 

and execute a U-turn) and drive the park loop to the southern

end of the park adjacent to the cemetery. Ensure to park

vehicles on either the right or left limits of the parking section

adjacent to the flag pole (flying a British flag when the Visitor

Center is open); attempt to avoid the center section of the

parking area to preserve a field of vision from the cemetery

to the American line at the northern end of the park.

Notes: The Chalmette National Cemetery and the Chalmette

Battlefield share the same operating hours. However, while

the battlefield park is open on Sundays there is a chance that

the Cemetery gate may be closed. Contact the Chalmette 

Battlefield Visitor Center for confirmation that the cemetery

gate will be open if conducting a Sunday staff ride. If the gate

is closed, execute the second half of the driving instructions

above to conduct Stands 4 and 5.

Visual Aids: Pakenham’s Reconnaissance in Force, 28 

December, 0730-1000.

93
Figure 15. Chalmette National Cemetery. Approximate location of

the British artillery battery number 5 was located on the far side of

the brick wall and to the left of where the tree stands. The

Rodriguez Canal is 300m forward.

By Author.

Orientation: This stand is situated along the approximate line

where the British placed their artillery, which remained

limited in number at this point, on 28 December. The British

guns were emplaced along this general line to support a British

infantry attack. From this position the American line, along

the Rodriguez Canal, is approximately 300 meters to the front 

(west). For reference, the Chalmette battlefield monument on

theAmerican side of the field is located approximately where

Lacoste’s Battalion of Louisiana Militia defended its part of

the line during the battle.

The Mississippi River is approximately 200 meters to the

left on the other side of the modern levee. It was

approximately 50 meters closer in 1814, before it changed its

course.

In 1814 the terrain on the British right flank was highly

restricted by a large cypress swamp that would have been

approximately 200 meter to the right, canalizing British

movements to a narrower front as they advanced toward the

American position.

94
The Chalmette Plantation

The largest of the local plantations that comprised the

overall battle area gave its name to the battle fought on its

grounds. Sales records indicate that this was a welldeveloped plantation with number of significant buildings.

The British occupied the plantation on 27 December. Because

of the cover provided by the buildings, which stood 500-600

yards from the American line, American artillery targeted the

structures, destroying all of them in the course of the battle.

The Chalmette Plantation property saw the fiercest fighting of

the battle on 8 January; the British concentrated their main

effort in this area and it was here that Sir Edward Pakenham

died during the battle.19 Much of its former property now

makes up the National Cemetery.

The National Cemetery was established in 1864 as the final

resting place for 15,000 Union Soldiers that died in Louisiana

and American veterans of conflicts from the War of 1812 to

the Vietnam War. Four War of 1812 veterans, including one

veteran of the fighting at New Orleans are buried here.20

Point out the Malus-Beauregard mansion, forward of the

right end of the American line, note that it was built after the

battle, and mention that it will be addressed in a later stand.

Description

Following the American withdrawal to the Rodriguez

Canal Jackson began to turn the canal into his main defensive

line. The true strength of the position, without improvements,

could be determined by the terrain and its effects. The

Mississippi River, averaging a half mile in width in some

places and maintaining a nearly four and a half knot current,

secured Jackson’s right flank. Winter conditions increased the

river’s depth to near flood stage, despite the adjacent levee,

which also provided a significant obstacle of between four to

ten feet high. On the other end of the canal a dense cypress

swamp secured Jackson’s left flank, providing a natural

obstacle for advancing infantry formations and supporting

artillery. Wet marshlands, referred to in Louisiana as

“prairies,” extended the radius of the swamp even further,

denying the British the option of a wide turning movement.

Sugar cane fields dominated the front of the American line, 

including a series of drainage ditches throughout the fields that

measured between five and six feet wide and four feet deep.

Already harvested, the fields provided excellent fields of

observation and fire. Jackson’s choice of the Rodriguez Canal

and the supporting terrain forced the British with one option in 

overcoming the American force: the frontal assault.

95
From throughout the city of New Orleans the population

provided picks, shovels, saws, carts, and other building

supplies for the troops. Slaves augmented the troops in the

construction, allowing 50 percent of the troops to provide

security while the other fifty percent worked. Jackson also

ordered that a section of the Mississippi levee be cut so that the

fields forward of the line became flooded. Eventually,

however, the river level receded and with it a significant

amount of his water obstacle. Jackson chose the nearby

Macarty House as his headquarters, on the plantation

immediately behind the right of the American line, along the

river. From here he could personally see the length of his line

and ground over which a British advance would come.

However, he did not stay there very much, choosing instead to

be constantly on the move, viewing the work. To his rear

Jackson built a defense in depth, establishing two additional

defensive lines between the Rodriguez Canal and New 

Orleans, a second line at the Dupre Plantation, and a third at 

the Montreuil Plantation.

Jackson also realigned his forces within his battle space.

He ordered Carroll and his Tennessee Militia to move forward

to the Rodriguez Canal, leaving Governor Claiborne and his

three regiments of Louisiana Militia defend the American

position on the Plain of Gentilly. With no further requirement

for defending English Turn, Jackson accepted Morgan’s

recommendation to employ his force elsewhere and ordered

him to move to a position across the river where a new

defensive position could support the main American defensive 

line.

In an effort to buy time for his defensive preparation and

harass the British, Jackson requested Master Commandant

Patterson to have the Navy schoonersCarolina and Louisiana

conduct a nearly around the clock bombardment of the British

camp. Jackson also establish an effective security zone

forward of the canal to prevent British reconnaissance efforts

and provide him with early warning in the event of an attack.

Hinds’ mounted Mississippi dragoons established a visible

screen line forward of the canal. However, the Tennessee

Militia made an enduring impact on the British pickets

throughout this period, going out at night to “hunt” British

sentries who considered it proper military conduct to cease

operations once night fell. On one particular occasion the

riflemen focused their attention on a single British post: They

watched a sentinel being posted and upon the departure of the

corporal of the guard, killed the sentinel and took everything of

value. When the next guard arrived, he too was killed. It took

a third dead sentinel for the corporal of the guard to determine

that area was too dangerous and that the post should be

96
abandoned.

In this nightly contest of predator and prey the Americans

continually increased their harassment of the British camps.

Sometimes British Soldiers died in the midst of their own

camps. On one occasion resourceful Tennesseans infiltrated a 

6-pounder artillery piece forward and fired point blank into a 

British artillery crew. However, one American force instilled

a true sense of fear in the British pickets in the form of 

Captain Jugeant’s company of Choctaw Indians. The

Choctaws controlled the swamp that extended along the

British right flank. A British picket went to his post in constant

worry that he could be attacked by a man jumping from a tree 

above him. With the death of each British soldier, the

Choctaws let out their blood curdling war cry, establishing a 

moral superiority that the British pickets never overcame. 

All of these distinctly American frontier tactics ran

contrary to the British concept of warfare. The British saw

warfare as guided by indisputable rules or a gentlemen’s

game. Not only did the American tactics shock men used to

established European standards of warfare but they also 

denied the British a natural need for security. They found 

themselves constantly under fire, called to arms several times

in the course of a night, exhausted, undersupplied, and cold.

British morale suffered almost from the beginning.

As the American line along the Rodriguez Canal continued

to develop, Jackson began assigning positions along the line to

his various formations. From right to left along the Rodriguez

Canal Jackson assigned his units: Beale’s Company occupied

the right end of the line along the river (ground that is now

under water due to the river’s many changes in course since the

fighting). The 7th Infantry Regiment formed to their left (the 

immediate landward side of the modern levee accessible by the

park walkway starting at the Visitor Center). The three

battalions of Louisiana Militia under Plauche, Lacoste, and

Daquin came next. The 44th Infantry Regiment and Carroll’s

Tennessee Militia shared responsibility for the center. Finally,

Coffee’s Tennessee Militia held the far left end of the line.

Jackson also established three separate positions for hislimited

artillery: a 12-pounder, two howitzers, and two 24-pounders.

Not satisfied to sit still, Jackson periodically shifted the

artillery and adjusted his infantry positions in an effort to 

continually improve his defense.

97
In the British camp the newly arrived commander-in-chief

took stock of his Army’s situation. With Pakenham came

Major General Samuel Gibbs, who as Pakenham’s second

in command, assumed command of the 2d Brigade. Major

General Keane, after turning over command to Pakenham,

assumed command of the 3d Brigade. Thornton retained his 

command of the 1st Brigade for the time being.

Figure 16. Pakenham’s Reconnaissance in Force, Dec 27-28 1814.

CSI created.

98
Pakenham assumed direct command of his first 

independent command with a feeling of concern overits current

situation. The terrain in which the Army leadership allowed

themselves to be positioned (a greatly confined space between

a dense swamp and the broad river located at the end of a 60

mile long line of operation) concerned him most. In his first 

meeting of senior commanders and staff he stated his regret

that the British failed to immediately move on New Orleans

when they occupied their present position on 23 December.

Pakenham also stated that he was sorry that the British had 

lost the battle on the 23d. Furthermore, he lacked cavalry for 

reconnaissance, the West Indian troops suffered increasing

casualties from sickness, and the French Creoles failed to join

the British. He considered withdrawing the Army from its

current position and trying to find another route to New

Orleans.

However, Pakenham chose to stay in his current position.

It appears that he felt committed to the course of action initially

chosen by Cochrane and Keane before his arrival. Additionally,

Pakenham assessed the enemy as substandard and no match

for disciplined and seasoned British troops. Therefore, he

reorganized his force into two brigades. Gibbs commanded the

brigade on the British right flank, consisting of the 4th, 21st,

44th, and 1st West India Regiment. Keane commanded the

brigade on the British left flank, consisting of 85th, 93d, 95th,

and 5th West Indian Regiments. Pakenham elected to conduct

a limited attack, a reconnaissance in force in today’s doctrine,

to “try” the American line. He planned to advance the two

brigades abreast in a limited attack to identify weaknesses in

the American line. If any were discovered Pakenham would

order a full attack toward those points to exploit the initial 

success.

Before Pakenham’s men could cross the open ground and

close with the enemy, he determined that the American naval

threat to his left flank had to be neutralized. The Carolina and

Louisiana continued to bombard the British positions, firing 

on any major movement in the camps and the various

plantation buildings. The British, however, lacked sufficient

artillery to challenge the vessels and support an infantry attack.

Therefore, Pakenham requested that the navy transport

additional artillery from the fleet. In another example of the

Royal Navy’s strong support to the Army, Cochrane and his

officers oversaw the laborious process of transporting the

guns to Pakenham. By the evening of 26 December, the navy

brought two 9-pounders, four 6-pounders, two 5.5-inch

howitzers, and a 5.5-inch mortar to the British camp.

Once in camp, the British seamen then helped the

99
Soldiers move the guns forward along the river bank, under

cover of darkness, and set them up for action. At 0200 on the

morning of 27 December, the British built fires to heat shot.

Called “hot shot,” the British heated solid shot artillery rounds

or cannonballs in the fires before loading them into the

barrels of their 9-pounder guns. Upon contact with the

wooden vessels, they would cause fires to break out aboard the

American schooners, doing great damage and hopefully

destroy them. Five hours later, at 0700, the British guns

opened fire on the Carolina. The 9-pounders fired “hot shot,”

the 6-pounders fired shrapnel to sweep the ship’s deck, and

the remainder of the guns fired regular shot.

The British artillery attack must have been quite a 

surprise to the Americans because very shortly aftertheBritish

opened fire the Carolina’s rigging came down and a large fire 

soon grew out of control. The ship’s commander, Captain

John Henley, ordered the crew to abandon ship. At 0930

the Carolina blew up. With a brief but loud cheer, the British

turned their guns on the Louisiana. By then Jackson personally

ordered the remaining vessel to withdraw up the river to safety 

but the wind suddenly ceased and the Louisiana became

stranded and on the verge of sharing the Carolina’s fate.

However, the Louisiana’s crew, made up mostly of 

Baratarians, quickly took to the ship’s boats, tied lines to their

ship, and rowed the vessel out of harm’s way. Jackson’s

acceptance of Jean Lafitte’s assistance served him well this 

day.

The neutralization of the American navy on the river

allowed Pakenham to conduct his attack without any threat to

his left flank. During the period of darkness on 27-28

December, the British troops began their advance, occupying

assault positions along the Bienvenue and Chalmette 

Plantations. There they drove the American pickets back to

their main line along the canal. However, before their

withdrawal, the Americans set fire to all of the buildings on

the Chalmette Plantation, denying them to the British and also

creating man-made light to illuminate the enemy as they

advanced. British batteries established the night before, an

artillery battery on the left and a rocket battery on the right,

began firing on the American line, signaling the attack.

The morning of 28 December brought bright and clear

weather. Pakenham and his staff rode in the center of the field

in order to observe the advance of both brigades. On the

British left Keane advanced in a column of regiments (one

regiment behind another). At a distance of 600 yards from 

their objective the American artillery commenced firing.

Keane’s men continued to advance but suddenly the Louisiana

100
returned to action along the river and began firing on the

attacking British troops. Quickly, officers gave the order for

the men to lie down in order to protect themselves, a proven

practice against the French in the Peninsula. Keane’s attack

ended. The troops remained in their current position until

darkness fell and then withdrew. Remaining as they did

throughout the rest of the day, under constant American

artillery fire, spoke well of the discipline of British infantry.

While the British attack on the left flank quickly

culminated, Gibbs attack on the right flank went somewhat

better. The brigade faced the weakest section of the

American line which also lacked artillery and the troops

advance much further than their comrades on the left flank.

However, Keane’s set back caused Gibbs’ column to be

ordered back to its assault position. Pakenham’s position in the

center prevented him from seeing the success of the brigade.

He erroneously assumed that Gibbs’ attack suffered from the

same punishment as Keane’s brigade along the river and

ordered the withdrawal. The apparent British retreat

temporarily demoralized the troops in Gibbs’ brigade who

thought that they were on the verge of penetrating and turning 

the American line.

Both sides sustained light casualties in the attack. The

British suffered 16 killed and 43 wounded but they also lost

two pieces of artillery and the mortar which were dismounted

by highly accurate American artillery fire and abandoned. The

American casualties amounted to seven killed and 10 

wounded. The American line stood firm. 

Vignettes: Throughout their presence south of Jackson’s line

the British experienced a nearly uninterrupted program of

harassment from American artillery, especially from the

Carolina, and riflemen. 

1. During this attack the British immediately felt the

impact of American artillery. Lieutenant Gleig described its

deadly effects against the British infantry and support artillery

during Pakenham’s first, limited, attack against Jackson’s line:

...a deadly fire was opened from both the battery and

the shipping. That the Americans are excellent

marksmen, as well with artillery as with rifles, we 

have had frequent cause to acknowledge; but,

perhaps, on no occasion did they assert their claim to

the title of good artillery-men more effectually than on 

the present. Scarce a ball passed over or fell short of

its mark but all striking full into the midst of ourranks,

occasioned terrible havoc.21

2. Throughout the fighting south of New Orleans there

101
were numerous examples of the how the Americans constantly

harassed the British picket lines protecting the camp. During

periods of darkness, parties from the Tennessee and Louisiana

Militia units, joined by Choctaw Indians, hovered around the

camp’s periphery stalking British Soldiers.

Every night since our arrival the enemy had been

incessant in their meansto harass and annoy us, as in

truth they had a right to do if they pleased but it was 

exceedingly distressing to the troops, and therefore I 

mention it. They seldom let an hour pass during the

night, that they were not firing at some of our

sentries, and on some occasions they brought the

body of irregular cavalry, before mentioned,

immediately in front of our outposts, and fired volleys,

which although it did not do much injury to our

advanced picquets, had the effect of turning out the

whole line, and that often repeated, with annoyance

from the schooner, certainly did not leave us much

time for comfortable rest.22

3. While considered highly inaccurate at the time, the

Congreve rockets used by the British were capable of 

inflicting some physical damage. During the British limited

attack on the 28th, Major Daniel Carmick, the senior Marine

Corps officer present at New Orleans, and several others fell

victim to what may be the only notable record of a Congreve

rocket inflicting casualties during the battle, as one observer 

recorded:

That gallant officer, Major Carmick, of the Marine

Corps, was among the wounded. Whilst delivering an

order to Major Plauche near the center of the

American line, he was struck by a rocket, which tore

his horse to pieces and wounded the Major in the arm

and head.

Taken to a nearby hospital, Carmick remained there

throughout the rest of the campaign, and never regained his

health, dying in New Orleans of either an infection or

inflammation of the brain 6 November 1816. He was buried

in New Orleans’ St. Louis Cemetery Number 2. The 4th

Marine Air Wing, stationed in New Orleans, commemorates

sacrifice of Major Carmick and his Marines on a regular basis

with ceremonies in the cemetery.23

Analysis

1. Analyze the surrounding terrain and itsimpact on the conduct

of British operations.

2. Evaluate Pakenham’s plan; was there enough flexibility

for his reconnaissance in force to transition to a penetration?

102
3. Discuss the combined effects of American harassment of

the British expeditionary force. What measures could the

British have taken to defeat such efforts?

4. Compare and contrast the employment of fires by the

opposing sides; how were the Americans able to achieve fires 

superiority?

5. What key points concerning the American position did

Pakenham learn from this operation?

6. Outline the options available to Pakenham after this attack.

103

Stand Five

East Chalmette – The Artillery Duel (1 January 1815)

Directions: From the previous stand walk forward to the

flag pole to observe the Rodriguez Canal.

Notes: None

Visual Aids: British Artillery Attack, Jan 1 1815, 1000-1500

Figure 17. View of the American center vicinity the battlefield 

monument and visitor center. The ship’s conning tower marks

the approximate location of the Macarty House during the 

fighting.

By Author.

Orientation: No change from the previousstand. Highlight the

newBritish artillery positions built specifically for this attack

and their orientation when describing the British scheme of 

maneuver during this attack.

Point out where the Macarty House was located near the

modern boat slip behind the Rodriguez Canal on the north

side of the park (there is usually a ship docked there to use as

reference). By Christmas Day Jackson selected this building

for his headquarters. The house, burned down in 1896 and

rebuilt, was torn down in 1912 to make room for the modern

day Chalmette Slip. The actual location of the house is in the

Mississippi River because the levee was pushed back when the

slip was constructed.24

Description

Immediately following the abortive attack on the

American line Pakenham call a council of war with his senior

commanders and staff; Captain Malcolm, Admiral and

commander of the British fleet, represented the navy, while

Gibbs, Keane, and a number of more junior officers also 

attended.25 The gathered officers offered Pakenham a 

consensus that the American line represented an extremely

well built defensive position, almost like some of the fortified 

cities encountered in the Peninsula. They, therefore,

recommended that more and heavier artillery than what was 

105
currently present was necessary to breach the enemy and

facilitate an infantry assault. Orders went out directing the

fleet to transport more than thirty of the heaviest caliber guns 

available to the Army.

Over the next three days the Royal Navy’s sailors once

again labored along the Army’s line of communication,

dismounting and moving ordnance directly from designated

warships through the bayous and into the Villere Canal to the

British camp. At the conclusion of the effort they successfully

delivered ten 18-pounder and four 24-pounder naval deck 

guns. However, based on lift capabilities the British moved

only a limited quantity of ammunition. In a realignment of

the British battlespace to make room for the artillery

positions, the Army advanced to a line along the boundary

between the Bienvenue and Chalmette Plantations and began

establishing positions for the newly arrived artillery. In order

to obtain a better view of the American positions, Pakenham 

moved his headquarters from the Villere Plantation to the main

house of the de La Ronde Plantation where Jackson staged his

men for the 23 December night assault.

However, the British situation seemed far from positive. In 

addition to nearly around the clock harassment from the guns

of the Louisiana from the left flank and the Tennessean

Soldiers and Choctaw Indians from the right, the plight of

the individual British soldier, including the officers,

increased with each passing day. Collectively, the

expeditionary force possessed little food to properly sustain

the troops and supplies required by the force suffered from 

repeated reprioritization in favor of more artillery and

ammunition. Furthermore, the troops suffered from a constant

exposure to the elements since departing the anchorage

without tents. The location of their camp lacked two of the

necessities of the moment: the plantations only grew sugar

cane and the few remaining structures still standing after

repeated bombardments provided only limited shelter, serving

as hospitals for the mounting sick lists from across the

force. Finally, Soldiers, especially in Gibbs’ brigade,

complained about the order to withdraw when they thought

they were on the verge of a victory during the abortive 28 

December attack. British morale crept toward a crisis point.

While the British prepared for a second attempt against the

American line Jackson continued his efforts to improve the

defense. Seeing that the left flank appeared to be vulnerable,

he ordered reinforcements there, including artillery. In fact,

Jackson spared no exertion in securing additional artillery,

including taking guns from the Louisiana, still responsible

for bombarding the British positions on a nightly basis. His

106
original three batteries expanded to eight, positioned along

the entire length of his defensive line. On the

recommendation of Master Commandant Patterson, Jackson

ordered his engineers to supervise the construction of a 

fortified position on the right bank ∗ of the river parallel to

the Rodriguez Canal. This position would provide enfilading

artillery fire into the left flank of any British attack on the

main line. Patterson landed cannon from the Louisiana and

manned them with his gun crews, hence christening it,

Marine Battery.

The American troops exhibited high morale during this

period. The night attack on 23 December and the successful

defense on 28 December combined to mostly eliminate any

great fear they may have had of the British. Unlike their

counterparts, the Americans found themselves under canvas,

sheltered from the same elements that sapped at the

enemy’s strength. Finally, the American line of

communication ran only seven miles to New Orleans and

Jackson ensured that his men ate well from the supplies 

provided by the city’s populace.

The British prepared for their second attack, moving

their artillery into forward positions during the night of 31

December into New Year’s Day. They moved within 600 yards

of the American position and prepared positions for their

batteries, infantrymen providing the labor to move the guns

and construct the firing positions. A major problem arose

from building firing platforms for the guns. Lacking dry

and solid ground, attempts to dig in only led to the holes

filling with water because of the area’s low water table.

Soldiers relied upon improvisation but built unstable

platforms incapable of properly supporting the heavy pieces

of naval ordnance. Additionally, they built the protective

ramparts around the guns with anything they could find,

including cotton bales and casks of sugar from the nearby

plantations. As the British continued to prepare throughout the 

night, American sentries heard the construction activity.26

∗ The right bank is that side of the Mississippi River 

opposite the main battlefield at Chalmette. The river’s erratic

flow to the Gulf of Mexico makes use of cardinal directions 

problematic. Participants used the same terminology.

107
By first light on 1 January 1815, the British had established

a total of seven artillery batteries from the bank of the river to

the far right flank to support Gibbs’ brigade. Behind the line

of batteries, along the levee, the British established a battery

of two 18-pounders (this location now being under water) to

target the Marine battery on the right bank and the Louisiana

during its sorties down river to bombard the British camp.

Just forward of the main British gun line, a battery (also

now under water) located near the levee that held two 18-

pounders, oriented on the extreme right of the American line

and Jackson’s headquarters at the Macarty House. A third

battery of three 5.5-inch mortars targeted the American

batteries that supported the right of the line. Next, a fourth 

battery containing half of the Congreve rockets in the

expeditionary force occupied the left center. The British

established their most powerful batteries in the center from

where their guns could target nearly every part of the

American line. The fifth battery contained two 9-pounders,

five 6-pounders and two 5.5-inch mortars. To its right, the

sixth battery contained four 24-pounders and six 18-pounders.

The seventh and final battery, on the far right, contained the

remaining half of the Congreve rockets.

The first day of 1815 began in the midst of a dense

morning fog that obscured the activities of both sides. The

fog cleared at 1000 and the British commenced their

bombardment on the American line, filling their camp with

shot, shell, and rocket. For approximately the first ten

minutes the British deliberately targeted Jackson’s

headquarters in the Macarty House where Jackson and his

staff ate breakfast together. Their meal interrupted, the entire

party quickly escaped from the building without harm. The

enemy artillery fire soon reduced the building to a smoking

shell. Chaos reigned throughout the rest of the American camp

as commanders attempted to form their men in their

respective fighting positions to effectively meet an attack.27

Though initially surprised by the British fire, Jackson, who

personally walked up and down the line issuing words of

encouragement, and his subordinate commanders swiftly

reestablished control inside their positions within ten

minutes of the first enemy barrage and returned fire with all

of their artillery pieces. This prompt recovery under fire 

stemmed from the hard work put into building the solid

protective cover along the American line and specifically

around the batteries which bought time for the troops and

gun crews to safely occupy their assigned positions.

Additionally, much of the British fire passed somewhat

harmlessly over the American troops.

108
Figure 18. British Artillery Attack, Jan 1 1815, 1000-1500.

CSI created.

109
Once the American artillery came into play the highly

effective accuracy and volume of its fire almost immediately

began to overwhelm the British positions. Even when rounds

missed their intended targets in the artillery line they passed

over and fell into the ranks of the infantry to the rear, causing

casualties. In a weak facet of their fires planning, the British

battery along the levee alternated between the Louisiana and

the Marine Battery, never massing fire on one threat at a time.

Patterson, on the other hand, massed the Marine Battery’s

guns on the British position and neutralized the battery. The

American guns easily penetrated the ill prepared British

artillery positions across their front. Sugar casks used in

protecting the guns, shattered on impact, throwing their

melted residue everywhere and fouling the guns. Poorly built

platforms sank in the mud. By noon the British fire began to

slacken with each firing and throwing of the laying of the guns.

Ammunition began to run short within two hours.

Approximately one hour into the artillery duel the British

attempted an attack on the American left flank where they

previously experienced some success during the last attack.

A detachment made up of the light companies from the

regiments in Gibbs’ brigade attempted to infiltrate through

the swamp on their right in order to attack what they thought

was still a weak American flank. They made contact with

Coffee’s Tennessee Militia and the company of Choctaw

Indians who quickly stopped their advance with heavy small

arms fire. The Americans even staged a local counterattack, 

continuing to confound the British with their frontier style of

warfare, darting from tree to tree for cover in between

firing. The actions of Coffee’s men quickly forced the light

column to retreat under heavy fire. 

By 1300 the American artillery silenced all but two of

the enemy batteries. The two remaining British batteries

continued the fight until the order to cease fire at 1500.

Under continued enemy fire, the British withdrew,

abandoning the guns in the positions neutralized by the

Americans. As the British moved to their rear American

musicians struck up a tune as their comrades celebrated up and

down the line.

The British sustained slightly higher casualties than the

Americans during this attempt to breach their line. They

lost 45 killed and 55 wounded. However, eight pieces of

artillery sustained serious damage. On the American side of

the field the list contained 11 killed and 23 wounded.

Included in those numbers, the Americans listed a 32-pounder,

a 24-pounder, and a 12-pounded severely damaged. Jackson,

in his well-known style, also lost his temper when at a point

110
111

during the battle his two batteries closest to the river ran out

of ammunition. He summoned Governor Claiborne,

responsible for supplying the Army, demanding the

critical supplies with the additional warning: “By Almighty

God, if you do not send me balls and powder instantly, I shall

chop off your head, and have it rammed into one of those fieldpieces.”28

However, beyond the numbers, the British suffered most

from their failed attack. For the third time, however, since

arriving in their camp the British felt that they had been bested

by an American force that they did not respect. Discipline and

morale disappeared in the night. After sunset, the British

attempted to recover their abandoned guns from the forward

positions, Soldiers refused the orders and urgings of their

officers to retrieve them. It took the personal example of Sir

Edward Pakenham himself to lead them forward to

eventually retrieve all but five of the abandoned pieces

which were merely buried next to their positions. The 

situation of the British expeditionary force spiraled out of 

control.

Vignettes

1. To illustrate the strong American joint relationship that existed,

Patterson thoroughly shared Jackson’s desire to continually improve the 

American defensive line. He also saw the value in establishing 

supporting positions on the right bank of the Mississippi that directly 

supported the line along the Rodriguez Canal, as described by Major 

Tatum in his journal: 

Commodore Patterson, about this time [between the two British

attacks on December 28 and January 1], suggested to the General

the advantages that would result from the erecting batteries on 

the Levey on the right bank of the river, which he had examined,

and tendered his services for that purpose. The General highly

approved of this plan, as it afforded an opportunity to enfilade

the enemy’s Encampment and would prove of great advantage,

in annoying the enemy in all his movements near the river. He 

immediately ordered General Morgan (who had crossed to St.

Leon) with a considerable proportion of his Command to march

up and cover the operation of the Commodore, assist in erecting

the batteries and, to throw up a line of defence, at some proper 

place, to cover his command.29

2. The highly accurate and sustained American artillery fire did

tremendous damage to both the British artillery positions and British

morale. Captain William Surtees, serving as quartermaster in the
112

quartermaster in the effectiveness of American Battery #4 as he 

observed the firing: 

Their gun, a 32-pounder, was a most bitter antagonist to our 

principle battery. This happened to be erected in front of that 

part of the line where this gun was situated, and when it fired, 

its shot always struck the battery at the first bound, then 

ricocheted into the redoubt where I had taken up my post.We 

were told the captain of the schooner, after having been deprived 

of his vessel, had been appointed to the charge and management 

of this gun, with some of his crew to work it; and indeed it 

seemed very like the bitter and determined manner of our former 

opponent, for any of the other guns seemed like children’s play to 

the unceasing and destructive fire of this heavy piece of 

ordnance. I could distinctly see that they were sailors that worked 

it.30

Directly involved in the action, British artillery officer, Captain Benson 

Hill described the effects of the American guns even further: 

Our men, both those working the guns and the infantry lying

down in the rear, suffered heavily. By half past eleven or after the

enemy’s fire had been maintained about forty minutes, five of our 

guns were dismounted completely. They had to be left on the field.

Eight more were so disabled in their carriages that they could

not be pointed. This left us with only nine serviceable guns and of

these but one was a 12-pounder.

31

3. In the wake of a second abortive British attempt to seize the American

line, British endurance and morale began to decidedly slump as compared

to its former state of collective perseverance. Lieutenant Gleig described 

his observations of the British force following the 1 January attack: 

Of the fatigue undergone during these operations by the whole

Army, from General down to the meanest sentinel, it would be

difficult to form an adequate conception. For two whole nights 

and days not a man had closed an eye, except such as were cool

enough to sleep amidst showers of cannon-ball; and during the

day scarcely a moment had been allowed in which we were able

so much as to break our fast. We retired, therefore, not only

baffled and disappointed ut in some degree disheartened and 

discontented. All our plans had as yet proved abortive; even this,
113

upon which so much reliance had been placed, was found to be 

of no avail; and it must be confessed that something like 

murmuring began to be heard through the camp.32

4. Perhaps the best illustration of the mounting strain upon the British

expeditionary force came from an episode requiring the personal 

intervention of Pakenham himself during the night of 1-2 January, 

as described by Major Harry Smith, the force’s Acting Adjutant General 

and Pakenham’s favorite staff officer. 

The troops were withdrawn, except such strong picquets as were

left to protect the guns in the [batteries].

Pakenham: “Smith, those guns must be brought back; go and do it.

Smith: It will require a great many men.

Pakenham: Well, take 600 men from Gibb’s Brigade. 

Off I started. The Soldiers were sulky, and neither the 21st nor 

the 44th were distinguished for discipline – certainly not the sort 

I had been used to. After every exertion I could induce them to

make, I saw I had no chance of success – to my mortification, for 

to return and say to Sir Edward I could not effect it, was as bad as 

the loss of a leg...so I told him as quietly as I could. He saw I was 

mortified, and said nothing but jumped up in his cloak, and says 

“Be so kind as to order my horse, and go on and turn out Gibb’s 

whole brigade quietly.”

They were under arms by the time he arrived, and by dint of

exertion and his saying, “I am Sir Edward Pakenham, etc., and 

commander-in-chief,” as well as using every expression to induce

officers and Soldiers to exertion, just as daylight appeared he had 

completed the task, and the Brigade returned to its ground.

As Pakenham and Smith rode back, the commander said, “You 

see, Smith, exertion and determination will effect anything.

Smith responded: Your excitement, your name, your energy, as 

commander-in-chief with a whole brigade, most certainly has 

done that which I failed in with 600 men but I assure you, Sir

Edward, I did all I could.

Pakenham replied: I admire your mortification; it
shows your zeal. Why I barely effected, with all the exertion of 

the commander-in-chief, and, as you say, a brigade, what I 

expected you to do with one-fourth of the men!33

Analysis

1. Evaluate Pakenham’s plan; how does it differ from the previous

attempt? Is this an isolated operation or the first phase of a deliberate 

attack; was there enough flexibility in the plan for Pakenham to identify 

the conditions and transition from one to the other? 

2.Compare and contrast the continued employment of fires by the

opposing sides; how were the Americans able to maintain their fires 

superiority despite the increase in British artillery for this attack? 

3. Assess the state of British morale after this aborted attack. Does the

incident over the recovery of the guns and the direct intervention 

of Pakenham accurately attest to the deteriorating situation of the 

British expeditionary force? 

4. Outline the options available to Pakenham after his two aborted attacks.

114
Stand Six

The Rodriguez Canal – Jackson’s Line (8 January 1815)

Directions: Walk back to the vehicles and drive to the

cemetery exit, returning to West St. Bernard Highway, and

turn left. Drive 0.3 miles and turn left into the entrance of the

Chalmette National Battlefield. If traffic is too heavy to safely

turn left in a timely manner proceed further north to the first 

light and execute a U-turn). Upon entrance to the park the

group will be dropped at Battery 5/6 (the first available

parking section on the left side of the park road). The vehicles

will then continue to the parking area on the far side of the

Visitor Center for the duration of the staff ride. Drivers can 

then rejoin the group along the Rodriguez Canal.

Notes: From this stand, until the completion of the staff

ride, all movement will be on foot. This stand will be

broken into several key locations along the American line.

Prompts and directions are listed below and imbedded in the

description section.

Visual Aids

Jackson’s Line: The Rodriguez Canal (as seen on 8 January 

1815) Composition of Jackson’s Line

Orientation: This stand will examine the bulk of the American 

defensive line built along the Rodriguez Canal. It is a more

detailed description of the construction and composition of

Jackson’s line than provided in previous stands. This is also

a walking stand. The description supports the walk and

various stops along the line during this stand. Because of the 

modern changes surrounding the battlefield, the left flank

secured by Major General Coffee’s Tennessee Militia is now 

mostly inaccessible but parts are similar to the heavily wooded

marshland that existed during the battle. Coffee’s position is

now bisected by the West St. Bernard Highway. On the end of

the right flank, the Mississippi River has reclaimed

approximately 50 meters of the American line. The start point

for this stand is the area adjacent to Batteries 5 and 6, near

what was once the center of Jackson’s line.

The American line extended approximately three quarters

of a mile from the river to the swamp. However, only 700

yards of the line saw the bulk of the fighting – an area roughly

400 by 700 yards. The Americans erected a tall flagpole near

the center of the line that could be easily seen from the British 

lines and by American positions across the river. Jackson

established his outposts 500 yards forward of the canal.

During the final attack, after the British drove in the outposts,

their line of departure lay some 400 yards to the front. 

115
Move from left to right along the remnants of the

Rodriguez Canal, making the following stops during this 

stand:

Begin at Battery 5 and 6

Move to Battery 4

Move to Battery 3 

Move to the top of the modern levee (passing Battery 2 

en route) in order to discuss Battery 1, the Redoubt (the area

around Battery 1, the Redoubt, and Beale’s Company have

been partially reclaimed by the river), and to see the far side 

of the river

Description

Since initially setting his main defensive line along the

Rodriguez on 28 December, Jackson focused on maintaining

a steady rate of improvement in its construction, the benefits

of which became apparent after the two British attempts to

breach the line. Still, Jackson urged his commanders and men

to continue improving their positions even more. Continual

pauses in British operations gave the Americans additional

time that they fully exploited. This is just one aspect of

Jackson’s leadership, the way he motivated the diverse force 

under his command. He unified a mixed force of regulars,

sailors, Marines, organized Militia, emergency Militia, free 

men of color, Indians, and pirates into a powerful and resilient

fighting force that repeatedly destroyed notions of contempt

from their British opponents.

The Rodriguez Canal originally represented a feasible

defensive position when the Americans occupied it the day

after their night attack. Eventual improvements widened the

canal to nine feet and a depth of nearly seven feet. In some

places Soldiers built abatis in the canal. The parapet itself

stood four and a half feet in height, nearly twenty-four feet

at the base and between eighteen and twenty feet at the top.

Engineers oversaw the construction of a three foot ledge at the

base of the parapet to catch loss dirt so it did not fall and fill

the canal. In some sections of the line units dug holes in the

parapet to fire through or added logs to protect themselves 

when they stood up to fire. Contrary to popular myth, the

Americans did not incorporate cotton bales into their

defensive positions, aside from a mistaken use of the

combustible material as support for the artillery platforms

(despite Johnny Horton’s popular song and the modern nom

de guerre of the US 7th Infantry Regiment being the “Cotton 

Balers”).

116
Figure 19. The scar of the original Rodriguez Canal, looking from the Center of

the American line to the right flank.

By Author.

The construction of the various artillery positions

became the cornerstone of the American engineering effort.

Once sited, Soldiers dug directly into the parapet, carving

out a position for a battery. Seven foot embrasures cut into

the parapet allowed the guns to traverse to some degree,

expanding their fields of fire. The sides and faces of the

batteries included revettes (retaining walls) with fascines

(bundles of sticks) or gabions(woven stick baskets filled with

dirt) or cotton bales. Unlike their British opponents the

Americans succeeded in constructing solid firing platforms.

Some of the batteries eventually included raised platforms that

allowed them to freely sweep the battlefield, dominating

the British field batteries as they did on 1 January. Magazines,

well-protected and full of ample ammunition, stood

approximately sixty to seventy yards behind the guns.

In order to simplify command and control over his

force, Jackson assigned his various units to three distinct

wings, left, center , and right, under the command of Major

General Coffee, Major General Carroll, and Colonel George

117
Ross of the US 44th Infantry Regiment, respectively.

The left wing, under Coffee, consisted of his 550

Tennessee Militia organized into 9 companies, now

dismounted, and Jugeant’s Choctaw Indians. Their section

of the American line extended into the wooded swamp.

These were frontier veterans of Jackson’s Creek campaign,

dressed in their rough homemade clothes and carrying their

Tennessee long rifles, knives, and tomahawks.

The center wing, under Carroll, consisted of 800

Tennessee Militia organized into eleven companies. His

section of the line began just to the right edge of the swamp

and extended to the right. Part of the Tennessee governor’s

response to Jackson’s call for more troops, the men travelled

down the Mississippi in keel boats, fell in on arms and

ammunition in Natchez, and arrived in New Orleans on 24

December. This formation of Tennessee Militia lacked the

experience of Coffee’s troops but brought the same 

combativeness from the Tennessee frontier.

Jackson posted four artillery batteries to provide direct

support to Coffee and Carroll’s troops, all located adjacent to

Carroll’s position in the American center. Two batteries,

numbers 8 and 7, anchored Carroll’s left and provided support

to Coffee’s troops. The first, a small bronze naval carronade

served by Carroll’s troops under the command of a regular

Army corporal, occupied the last gun on the line from the

river. To its immediate right, a 6-pounder and 18-pounder

stood watch, manned by a crew of regular Army artillerymen

and secured by a detachment of Marines. Further to the right,

close to the center of the open fields forward of the canal, two

more batteries, numbers 6 and 5, sat at the point where the

center and right wing of Jackson’s line met. In the left battery

of the pair, Brigadier General Garrigues Flaujeac, a member

of the Louisiana state legislature, selflessly volunteered to

command a single 12-pounder manned by a company of local 

Creoles. Regular artillerymen worked two 6-pounders in the

adjacent battery. 

The location of battery number 5 marked the left flank

of the right wing under Colonel Ross of the Regulars,

occupied by his own 44th Infantry Regiment, 350 regulars

under the command of Captain Isaac Baker. A relatively new

regiment organized in 1813, the regiment served under

Jackson during the Creek War and the operation to seize

Pensacola. [MOVE TO Battery Number 4] 

118
Figure 20. Jackson’s Line: The Rodriguez Canal (as seen on Jan 8 1815).

CSI created.

119
Figure 21. The remains of the base of the American defensive line along

the Rodriguez Canal, looking from the center to left flank. Artillery 

pieces representing the locations of Battery Numbers 5 and 6 are in 

the foreground and distance respectively. Battery Number 7 and 8 

were located further down the line beyond the existing tree line.

By Author.

Ross assigned the three battalions of Louisiana Militia to

occupy the center of his wing. Major Louis Daquin’s battalion

of 200 free men of color led by white officers fell in to the

right of the 44th. This unit predated Louisiana’s admission to

the Union and the legislature authorized its retention upon

statehood.Jackson, who needed every trained man he could get

to defend New Orleans, also saw the value of fielding an

organized unit of African-Americans to counter rumored 

British attempts to incite a slave revolt in Louisiana. A second

battalion of free men of color, with more training and

experience than their sister battalion, under Major Pierre 

Lacoste, stood to the right. Somewhat between the two

battalions, engineers established a battery, 

Number 4, for a naval 32-pounder (today the park has a 24-

pounder naval gun in the same location) commanded by

Lieutenant Charles Crawley, USN, and crewman from the

Carolina. [MOVE TO Battery Number 3] 

120
Figure 22. The far left of the American line, occupied by Coffee’s

Tennessee Militia, reclaimed by new growth that now replicates

similar vegetation conditions during the fighting.

By Author.

The final Louisiana battalion in the center of Ross’s wing 

represented perhaps the most colorful formation in Jackson’s

Army.MajorJeanBaptiste Plauche’s Uniformed Battalion of

Orleans Volunteers, 315 men in total, came from among the

natives of New Orleans. An ad hoc unit of various assembled

Militia companies, each of the five companiesreported for duty 

in different colored uniforms. This seemingly small feature

inadvertently gave the Americans an unknown advantage.

The British mistook the wide variety of uniforms to be

additional formations and overestimated the size of Jackson’s

Army. To Plauche’s immediate right sat Battery Number 3,

two 24-pounders manned by Baratarians under Lafitte’s older

brother, Dominique You, another example of the value of

integrating the experienced Baratarians into the American

force. [MOVE TO the top of the modern levee to discuss

the US 7th Infantry Regiment (left side), Battery 

Number 1, the Redoubt, and Beale’s company (right side

adjacent to river. Note: the modern levee marks the 

approximate point where the 7th Infantry’s line and

Battery Number 1 met.] 

121
Figure 23. Battery Numbers 5 (foreground) and 6 (distance).

By Author.

To the right of the three Louisiana battalions stood the

450 veteran Soldiers of the US 7th Infantry Regiment under

Major Henry Peire. Organized in Tennessee and Georgia when

the Army increased its number of infantry regiments in the

months before the war, the regiment initially served in New

Orleans before being transferred to operations in Canada. In

October 1814 the regiment returned to New Orleans in time

to serve under Jackson during his operation to size Pensacola.

Several companies and detachments of the regiment served

independently during the bulk of the fighting in Louisiana,

including a company assigned to defend Fort St. Philip. On the

extreme right of the American line Jackson posted Beale’s

Company of New Orleans Riflemen, reduced to 30 riflemen,

to cover the levee with his expert marksmen.

Figure 24. Battery Number 4 oriented on the British lines (Note that

the actual ordnance used in the fighting was a larger 32-pounder 

naval gun. Also, the two field guns currently posted to the left, 

outside the frame, do not accurately reflect actual battery positions 

at the time of the fighting.

By Author.

122
At the center and on the right of the 7th Infantry’s position,

the final two batteries of the American line covered the open

ground and the levee along the right flank. Battery Number 2,

built on a raised platform, contained a 24-pounder

commanded by a naval officer and manned by Baratarians 

from the Carolina. The final American battery, Number 1,

consisted of two 12-pounders manned by Regulars and a 6-

pounder howitzer manned by Louisiana militiamen. As the

overall defensive position evolved, Jackson approved the

recommendation to build a redoubt on the far right end of the 

line, extending forward of the canal, the intent being to

reposition battery Number 1 into the redoubt and enfilade the

length of the American line. However, time prevented the guns

from being moved and only a company of the 7th Infantry

occupied the position.

Battery Number 1, the Redoubt, and Beale’s Company

would have been positioned on the opposite side of the leveeFigure 25. Composition of Jackson’s Line. CSI created.

123
toward the river. The position of the US 7th Infantry is in the

immediate foreground.

The first set of signs on the walkway incorrectly mark the

position of Battery Number 1.

The second set of signs in the center of the picture

represent Battery Numbers 2 and 3.

 To the rear of the Rodriguez Canal Jackson established his reserve

formations. Answering the Secretary of War’s call for manpower, a force

of over 2,000 Militia from Kentucky, commanded by Major General John

Thomas, reported to Jackson on 7 January 1815. The War Department

promised arms and supplies to the Volunteers but the national level 

sustainment system failed and nothing arrived to support the Kentuckians 

during their march or after their arrival. The bulk of the men came without 

arms and Thomasfell illsoon after arriving, passing command to Brigadier 

General John Adair. Jackson immediately called on the people of New

Orleans to once again help provide weapons in their defense. Civilians 

donated nearly one thousand firearms of all types, some of them unreliable 

antiques. Thus armed, 1,000 Kentuckians, under Adair, constituted the

main reserve, positioned mostly to the rear of Carroll’s wing. Jackson

eventually transferred some 400 of these men to the right bank to support 

Morgan.

Figure 26. Close up of a 24-pounder naval gun like those employed

by the Americans at New Orleans.

By Author.

Jackson also organized his remaining horsemen as a small

mounted reserve. Hinds’ Mississippi Mounted Rifles,

Jackson’s effective pickets between the lines, numbered some

150 men and occupied the grounds of the Macarty Plantation.

Captain PeterOgden’sOrleansTroop ofDragoons, another unit

of prominent New Orleans businessmen numbering 50 men,

positioned themselves just north of the plantation. [While still

standing on the levee, reorient to look across the river and

discuss the Marine Battery and Morgan’s positions.] 

124
Across the river, on the right bank, Major General

David Morgan organized his force to defend the battery

recommended by Patterson. Morgan brought his Louisiana

troops from English Turn. Initially, Morgan commanded

Colonel Alexander Declouet’s Regiment of Louisiana Drafted

Militia, and ad hoc formation of 200 men from numerous

companies, and Major Paul Arnaud’s100-man detachment

from the 6th Louisiana Militia. Jackson’s engineer, Major

Arsene Latour, supervised construction of a defensive line

along the Boisgervais Canal on the Flood Plantation where 

Morgan established his main defensive line slightly

downstream from the Marine Battery, emplacing a battery of 

two 6-pounders and a 12-pounder to support his position. He 

deployed the units of Arnaud and Davis in a forward position

slightly over 1,000 yards in order to provide early warning in

case of attack. Patterson’s Marine Battery, set slightly behind

Morgan’s defense and extending upstream for nearly 1,000

yards, represented an impressive collection of artillery. The

battery, oriented across the river to enfilade the flank of any

British attack, consisted of three 24-pounders and six 12-

pounders served by a 106 man mixed force of Patterson’s

sailors, Baratarians, and men from Declouet’s regiment.

Figure 27. Jackson’s line as seen from the modern levee.

By Author.

125
Jackson’s span of control extended over far more men

than those units along the Rodriguez Canal and in the vicinity

of the Marine Battery. Other key areas required manpower,

including the forces on the Plain of Gentilly, at Fort St.

Philip, and in the two other defensive lines to the rear.

However, returns for 8 January 1815 indicated Jackson’s

strength as 5,437 men (4,137 behind the Rodriguez Canal and

1,300, through a final repositioning of reinforcements, on the 

right bank).

Vignettes

1. Major Tatum, Jackson’s topographical engineer described

the overall defensive line sited along the Rodriguez Canal:

The Canal, behind which the Army retired, was large,

and stretched from the river (nearly at right angle) a 

considerable distance into a thick, and almost,

impenetrable swamp, which commenced at the

distance of about 600 yds. to the left of the river. On the

upper side, and on the bank, of this Canal a Breast

Work (or parapet) was commenced, and its erection

prosecuted with great ardor, and calculated to extend a 

distance of about 800 yards to the left, from the river, 

and extending about 200 paces into the swamp. 

Proper banquets was erected to every part of this

line of defence, and batteries constructed at such

places on the line as were deemed proper, according

to the number of Ordinance that could be spared to

this work.

34

2. Major Latour, Jackson’s chief engineer described

some of the construction that built the American line:

As soon as this position was chosen, the troops

began to raise a parapet, leaving the ditch as it

was... as there was then a temporary rise of the

river. Earth was fetched from the rear of the line and

thrown carelessly on the left bank, where the earth

had been thrown when the canal was originally dug.

The bank on the right side being but little elevated

above the soil formed a kind of glacis. All the pales of

the fencesin the vicinity were taken to line the parapet,

and prevent the earth from falling into the canal. All

this was done at various intervals, and by different

corps, owing to the frequent mutations in the

disposition of the troops. This circumstance, added

to the cold and to incessant rain, rendered it

impossible to observe any regularity as to the

thickness and height of the parapet, which in some

126
places was as much as twenty feet thick at the top,

though hardly five feet high; whilst in other places

the enemy’s balls went through it at the base. On the

1st of January there was but a very small proportion

of the line able to withstand the balls; but on the 8th of

January the whole extent, as far asthe wood, was proof

against the enemy’s cannon.

35

3. Captain Benson Hill, overseeing a battery along the British

forward line described the effects of the 1 January

bombardment on the American line:

A heavy cannonading against the enemy’s lines

commenced, which was answered by him with great 

spirit but, alas! our shot made little or no impression

on the cotton-bags with which General Jackson had

so skillfully constructed his parapet; for, in spite of

our battering at it for some hours, it was apparent

that we had failed to make the impression which had

been expected added to which our ammunition was

nearly expended, and it was deemed advisable to

“husband our fire.”36

Analysis

1. Evaluate Jackson’s defensive line along the Rodriguez

Canal; identify its strengths. What were the limitations to this

position?

2. Assess the contributions made by Patterson, his sailors, and

the Marines to Jackson’s defense. Is Patterson’s example an

effective case study in how personal and command

relationships influence joint operations?

3. Jackson commanded a tremendously diverse force made up

of elements from numerous sources; discuss the challenges

he faced and how he overcame them. Are their lessons that

today’s leaders can learn from his example?

127

Stand Seven

The Final Assault – Right Bank of the Mississippi (8 January 1815)

Directions: From the initial location on the levee, walk

forward of the Rodriguez Canal along the top levee to a spot

that allows an unhindered view of both the far side of the river 

and back towards the American line.

Notes: The actions described below, after a description of

the overall British plan, are presented out of sequence. While

the British assault took place well after the main attack, this

stand will be conducted next because of the group’s present 

location on the levee facing the opposite bank.

Visual Aids

Pakenham’s Plan

Battle on the Right Bank, 8 January 1815, 0315-0830

Battle on the Right Bank, 8 January 1815, 0830-1030

Orientation: You are currently standing on the modern levee

along the bank of the Mississippi River. The old levee was the

extreme right of the American line built along the Rodriguez

Canal but has since failed to preserve the far right of the line.

This stand, on the modern levee, is on the very edge of

property owned by the NPS. The boat slip to the north of this

location is where Macarty House stood which served as

Jackson’s HQ during the battle. The Chalmette Plantation is

to the immediate front and the British camp is beyond the

plantation and would have been slightly hidden on the far

side of a bend in the river. From this point one can look to

the left and survey Jackson’s defensive position and look

across the Mississippi toward the location of the Marine

Battery on the right (southwest) bank of the river.

129
Figure 28. A view of the Mississippi’s right bank from the modern levee.

By Author.

Description

Two failed attacks in five days led Pakenham to reevaluate

his situation and conceive a new plan to defeat the

Americans. He expected Major General John Lambert to

arrive with additional two regiments within a matter of days.

However, when considering the reinforcements, Pakenham

still determined that another frontal assault unsupported by 

effective artillery fire would potentially lead to yet another

reverse. The next attack needed to be a well-coordinated

combined attack supported by heavy fires. 

Compared to the earlier two attempts, Pakenham’s new

plan called for a level of complexity previously missing from

the expeditionary force’s operations. While the direct approach

remained a necessary piece in penetrating the American line,

Pakenham integrated an element of the indirect approach as

well. Colonel Thornton, of the 85th Regiment, received 

command of a composite unit consisting of most of his own

regiment, Royal Marines, some West Indian Soldiers, and a 

rocket detachment; a total of some 1,400 men. Pakenham

tasked Thornton to conduct a nighttime crossing of the

Mississippi to the right bank and then a direct assault to seize

the American Marine Battery. Once secure, Thornton’s sailors

would reorient the captured enemy artillery to enfilade the

American position on the Rodriguez Canal, facilitating a 

successful main attack on the left bank.

The operation planned for the right bank represented an

immense challenge for the British. A major component of the

plan involved transporting the force across the river. Admiral

130
Cochrane recommended an effort to widen the Villere Canal in

order to move barges from the initial landing point to the

Mississippi River. Thornton could then stage his force in the

canal and then cross the river during the night. Though

Pakenham appeared pessimistic, he approved the project.

Soldiers and sailors worked non-stop, beginning on 2 

January, in an effort to improve the canal. However, as

work progressed the soft soil of the canal’s banks continually

collapsed back into the waterway and the struggle to improve

the canal and pass the barges through continued until

completion on 6 January.

As Cochrane oversaw the frustrating work to improve

the Villere Canal, Pakenham organized the remainder of his

force allocated for an attack on the left bank of the river. In 

the first week of January the British expeditionary forced

numbered slightly over 6,500 men. In reorganizing his force 

Pakenham, once again, gave command of the main effort to

Gibbs, assigning him the 4th, 21st, and 44th Regiments, and

a battalion formed from the light companies of those

regiments to secure Gibbs’ flank in the cypress swamp along 

the British right flank. To the 44th Regiment, under Colonel

Thomas Mullins, fell a task not unknown to British veterans of

the Peninsula, storming battalion, the critical task of storming

the American line to gain a foothold for the other regiments

to follow. The regiment would advance under fire, 

encumbered by fascines and ladders, filling the canal with the

fascines to secure easier footing, and using the ladders to

climb over the parapet.

In a supporting effort on the left flank (advancing roughly

along the line of the modern levee), Pakenham assigned

Keane the 93d, 1st West Indian regiments and a composite

battalion of light companies from the 7th, 43d, and 93d

regiments, reinforced with two additional companies from the

95th (the arrival of the first two named regiments is addressed

below). The light companies, under Lieutenant Colonel Robert 

Rennie of the 21st Regiment, received the key mission to

infiltrate and seize the American redoubt on their right flank

(reclaimed by the river), thus denying the

enemy the ability to enfilade Gibbs’ attack. The British failed

to identify that the Americans did not have artillery posted in 

the redoubt. Pakenham gave Keane discretionary orders 

concerning the deployment of the 93rd and 1st West Indian

regiments, telling him to employ the regiments where they

could do the most good.

131
Figure 29. Pakenham’s Plan.

CSI created.

132
In addition to the two companies of the 95th provided

to Rennie’s battalion, the regiment also provided three

companies to support the advance of Gibbs’ brigade. The task

of the riflemen involved establishing a skirmish line across the

British front forward of the advancing columns and attempt to

use their precision fire to disrupt American fire directed at the

British forces.

Pakenham’s confidence level rose on 6 January with the

arrival of the reinforcements under Major General John

Lambert. He arrived in camp at the head of the 7th and 43d

Regiments of Foot, both very experienced Peninsula

regiments. When these 1,800 veterans of Wellington’s

campaigns in Europe marched into camp they experienced a 

degree of shock at the situation facing their comrades over

the past weeks. Some officers questioned how “dirty shirt”

Militia held up “Wellington’s heroes” for so long when they

should be living comfortably in New Orleans. They

displayed a great bit of disdain for their rough looking and

bitter comrades, making fun of none too receptive men in

the brigades of Keane and Gibbs. Increasing the size of the

Army to over 8,500 men, the reinforcements represented the

most experienced and steady regiments in the expeditionary

force. Pakenham brigaded them with the dismounted 14th

Dragoons and the 5th West India Regiment. However, by

this time the 1st and 5th West India Regiments, still suffering

from the harsh weather conditions first encountered upon the

Army’s arrival in the region, were greatly diminished in

strength. Their inclusion in overall British combat by 8 

January 1815, proved marginal. The brigade occupied the

British center, serving as the reserve under Lambert’s 

command. Previous experience in Spain led commanders to

believe that retaining a few strong veteran regimentsin reserve

during sieges allowed them to maintain better order following

the capture of fortified cities.

Given the attrition suffered by his artillery, Pakenham

changed his fires plan. Instead of attempting to blow a hole

in the American line as he tried before, he tasked his artillery

to suppress the American position in order to allow his

infantry to maneuver. However, a few points serve to conflict

with Pakenham’s planned intent, especially when considering

contemporary military doctrine. First, he chose not to have

the navy transport additional gunsforward from the anchorage.

He instead requested additional ammunition, some of it even

carried in the knapsacks of the Soldiers in Lambert’s newly

arrived brigade (17 Soldiers of the 7th Regiment drowned

when their barge overturned on Lake Borgne, the ammunition

in their packs dragging them to the bottom). Second, a great 

deal of risk existed in the planned seizure of the Marine

133
Battery in order to turn its guns against the Americans. Finally,

all of the remaining active British batterieslay on the left flank

oftheBritish position on the left bank. They could only provide

direct support to Keane’s brigade, a supporting effort, or 

Lambert’s in the center if Pakenham ordered commitment of 

his reserve. None of the batteries supported the main effort,

Gibbs brigade.

As the British continued their preparations American

intelligence provided a valuable piece of information to

Jackson. On 6 January American forces captured a British

barge on Lake Borgne. During questioning British sailors

divulged that the improvements underway on the Villere

Canal. Patterson’s assessment of this information led him to

assume that the British meant to attack along both banks of the

Mississippi. He, therefore, moved to the Marine Battery to

personally observe the British and confirm their intentions.

Jackson, agreeing with Patterson, sent reinforcements to

Morgan on the right bank. These consisted of the 1st and 2d

Regiments of Louisiana Militia and a battalion of Kentucky

Militia. Reinforcements allowed Morgan to establish a 

forward line where he deployed Major Arnaud’s detachment 

with the task to contest any British attempt at a landing.

However, this choice proved questionable because Arnaud’s

men carried a crude collection of fowling pieces. On the other

hand, the Kentuckians, under Lieutenant Colonel John Davis,

provided more problems. At 1900 on 7 January, the men

received their orders to move to the right bank and marched

back to New Orleans. Since only half of the 400 man battalion

carried arms, 200 men remained in the city. The remaining

Kentuckians crossed the Mississippi on a ferry and marched

along muddy roads, arriving at Morgan’s line at 0200 on the

morning on 8 January, tired and hungry. Morgan ordered them

to move forward and join Arnaud where they arrived at 0400, 

completely exhausted.

Both commanders approached personal intelligence

gathering from their own unique positions on the battlefield.

The Americans possessed a distinct advantage in the fact that

they took more prisoners than the British in previous

engagements. Furthermore, the number of British deserters 

to the American lines increased daily. When not riding the

line, Jackson retired to the 3d floor of the Macarty House and

observed enemy activity through his telescope. By 7 January,

Jackson personally saw all that he needed to determine that

the British intended to attack shortly. He ordered that half of

the command man the defenses at all times. Pakenham, on 

the other hand, climbed a tree to observe the American line.

Comfortable with what he saw, he climbed down and issued

the final orders prior to execution, following which he chose

134
to get some rest before the next day’s attack.

In such a complex operation full of so many supporting

operations it is not surprising that things went wrong,

especially given the lack of British success in relatively

simple operations on previous occasions. For the critical

operation on the right bank, British leaders encountered

challenges from almost the very beginning. When Thornton 

arrived at the river at sunset he found no barges waiting for his 

troops. A collapse in the canal’s walls prevented them from 

getting to the pick-up point. The only solution available

involved physically manhandling the barges from their present

location to the river. Once again the combined efforts of the

sailors and Soldiers went to work to solve an unanticipated

problem. However, despite their exertions it took eight hours

to move barges to the river. Furthermore, in that eight hours

the men moved only enough vessels to move 450 men across

the river at one time. Rather than wait, Thornton chose to go,

selecting 350 of his own Soldiers, 50 Royal Marines, and 50 

sailors. During the entire effort to beat the clock, no one

thought to wake Pakenham and inform him of the setback in 

his plan.

Thornton’s greatly reduced force finally began crossing the

Mississippi, very much behind schedule, at 0300 on 8 

January. Fortunately, they still retained the benefit of

darkness. However, the river’s current proved stronger than

anticipated. The force landed approximately a mile and half 

downstream from their expected landing site. Two hundred

exhausted Kentuckians and 100 ill-armed Louisianans waited

for them in the forward position chosen by Morgan.

Upon arriving on the right bank, Thornton disembarked

and formed his men for the advance. Suddenly he heard the

main British attack begin on the opposite bank. Knowing that

Pakenham disregarded the fact that his attack failed to precede

the main attack, Thornton ordered his men forward at the

double. With three of the barges providing artillery support

that fired grapeshot into Arnaud’s position, Thornton

continued to advance. Arnaud’s Louisianans rapidly withdrew

under the artillery fire and at the sight of British infantry

advancing toward them, joining Davis’ Kentucky Militia.

However, Thornton’s men quickly attacked from the march

and turned the American flank. Arnaud’s men ran into an

adjacent swamp where they disappeared for the remainder

of the day. Davis’ men fired a few scattered shots at the

British before hurrying rearward to the main line, Thornton’s

men following closely behind them.

135
A brief tactical pause followed, some 700 yards forward of

Morgan’s line, when Thornton halted his men and went

forward for a personal reconnaissance. Identifying that the

Kentuckians fled to a position on the American right, he

immediately decided to exploit his initial success and continue

the attack there. After a quickly issued set of orders, Thornton

sent three companies of his 85th, under Lieutenant Colonel

Richard Gubbins, against the American right flank, while a 

detachment of sailors conducted a feint against the American

left. He retained a company of the 85th and the Royal Marines 

as a reserve.

Figure 30. Attack on the Right Bank, Jan 8 1815, 0315-0830.

CSI created.

136
Rockets from the barges opened Thornton’s attack. The

feint by the sailors encountered brutal artillery fire that killed

and wounded many of the men, including their commander.

However, Gubbins’ attack on the enemy right succeeded in

turning the American flank and the Kentuckians quickly fled

the scene. Despite the success on that flank, Thornton, seeing 

the trouble encountered by the sailors under his command,

personally led the company of the 85th in reserve to their

aid. Thornton fell seriously wounded in his effort but the

reinforced sailors succeed in capturing the American battery.

Morgan saw his line collapse and tried to stop the retreat.

He ordered Davis to stop his men but was told that it was

impossible. Morgan replied “Sir, I have not seen you try.”

Observing the retreat, Patterson attempted to turn some of the

Marine Battery’s guns toward the new threat but too late, he

ordered the guns spiked and the powder thrown into the

river. He ordered his sailors to move upstream towards the

Louisiana which moved upstream to avoid British fire from 

the right bank. From the left bank of the river Jackson

observed theAmerican retreat. He reacted to the critical change

in his situation by sending 400 men to reinforce Morgan’s

command, guided by Jean Lafitte.

At 1000 the seriously wounded Thornton sent a message to

Pakenham that his force captured the American battery on the

right bank of the river. Thornton did not know that that main

British attacked had ended in failure or that his commander

in chief died at the head of his troops. In a heavy touch of

irony, Thornton noticed that one of the captured American

guns bore a plate that said “Taken at the surrender of

Yorktown, 1781.” In the face of repeated set-backs and against

great odds Thornton’s force secured an untimely victory for 

the British but it proved bittersweet. Major General John

Lambert, now the commander of the British expeditionary 

force, not Pakenham, received Thornton’s report. Lambert sent

the Army’s chief of artillery, Colonel Alexander Dickson, to

the right bank to observe conditions. On the right bank Dickson

learned thattheAmericansrendered all of their guns inoperable

and he saw American reinforcements arriving from the far

bank. Upon returning to the left bank Dickson advised 

Lambert to recall Thornton’s men from the far bank, which

Lambert did. After destroying anything of value, the British

returned to their barges and re-crossed the river.

137
Vignettes

1. When Lambert’s brigade marched in to the British camp on

4 January, the new arrivals were stunned by the rough

appearance and demeanor of their comrades who faced the

American line for the past two weeks.

An officer of the forty-third said, “Why, Wilky, how is

it that you have not provided us with good quarters

in New Orleans, as we expected . Why, what the d--

-1 [devil] have you been about?” At this question

Wilkinson looked exceedingly vexed; and clapping

his hand to his forehead, and colouring up deeply, he

turned away, stamping his foot according to his usual 

custom when put out and giving his arm a peculiar

swing, answered, “Oh! ! Say no more about it,” And

then placing his arm within mine, we paced up and

down for a long time, when he opened such a budget

of astounding information, concerning the hesitation

shown for the fourteen previous days, as to make the

very military blood curdle in one’s veins. And, on being

further questioned, by myself, as to the greatstoppage,Figure 31. Attack on the Right Bank, Jan 8 1815, 0830-1030.

Author created.

138
answered, “ bulletsstopped us — bullets — that’s all!”

but declared that the lines in front were now grown

formidable, and that the only chance of taking them

was by a well concerted and simultaneous rush.37

2. Preparations in the British camp in the week since the attack

on the first of January reached their climax during the night

of 7 January, the early morning of the eighth. However,

Captain William Surtees, in the 95th Rifle Regiment, saw

proven British military practices being abandoned, something 

that concerned him on the eve of the attack.

After dark I went with my commanding-officer and

adjutant to view the ground over which our battalion

was to march next morning...I was sadly

disappointed at our not meeting with any other

commanding-officers engaged in this most necessary

duty, and at the time I expressed my apprehension

as to the result. I pointed out to him the different

manner in which the business had been conducted

previous to the assault of Badajos [a French-held

fortress in Spain], and previous to the attack on the 

enemy’s position on the Nivelle [one of the last major 

battles of the Peninsula campaign, fought in France], 

where every commanding-officer, or others, who 

had any particular duty assigned to them in the

next day’s operation, were brought to the ground

from which it was clearly pointed out to them how

they were to move and act: but all here seemed apathy 

and fatal security, arising from our too much

despising our enemy.38

3. Captain Surtee’s apprehension and concern garnered

merit. As the British continued to prepare for the next

morning’s attack several indicators of the impending action

came to the attention of the Americans. Latour described the

situation at Jackson’s headquarters, the McCarty House,

where Jackson was able to view the battlefield from a second

floor balcony, using a telescope:

With the assistance of a telescope in the upper

apartment of head-quarters, we perceived Soldiers

on Laronde’s plantation, busy in making fascines,

while other were working on pieces of wood, which

we concluded must be scaling ladders. The picketguards near the wood had moreover been increased

and stationed near to each other. Officers on the staff

were seen riding about the fields of Laronde’s,

Bienvenu’s, and Chalmette’s plantation, and stopping

at the different posts to give orders. Finally, on the

7th, shortly after night-fall, we distinctly heard men

139
at work in the enemy’s different batteries; the strokes

of hammers gave “notes of preparation” and

resounded even within our lines; and our out-posts

informed us that the enemy was re-establishing his

batteries: his guards were re-enforced about sunset,

probably with a view to cover the movements of the

troops.39

4. More alarming, a report from Patterson, still located on the

river’s right bank, described British work to widen the Villere

Canal and pass barges through, to Patterson, a clear indication

of a British intent to land forces on the far side of the river:

On Saturday (the 7th) in the morning Commodore

Patterson (ever on the alert) advised the

Commanding General that, the enemy had opened

Villery s Canal to communicate with the river, and had

passed a number of Armed Barges through it, into

the Mississippi. The Idea was immediately conceived

that, an attack was premeditated against the lines & 

batteries on the right bank of the river, and that a 

simultaneous attack would be made to storm the lines

on the left. Preparations were made to defeat the

enemy in both of his designs.

40

5. Patterson, supervising the gun crews in the Marine

Battery as they provided a devastating enfilading fire on the

British advance on the left bank of the river, observed

Thornton’s attack and the ensuing collapse of Morgan’s

defense on the right bank:

While thus engaged with the enemy on the opposite

shore, I was informed that they had effected their

landing on this side, and were advancing to general

Morgan’s breastwork...the enemy’s force had

approached general Morgan’s lines, under the cover

of a shower of rockets, and charged in despite of

the fire from the twelve-pounder and field-pieces

mounted on the lines... when in a few minutes I had

the extreme mortification and chagrin to observe

general Morgan’s right wing, composed... of the

Kentucky Militia commanded by major Davison

abandon their breastwork and flying in a most

shameful and dastardly manner, almost without a 

shot; which disgraceful example, after firing a few

rounds, was soon followed by the whole of general

Morgan’s command, notwithstanding every exertion

was made by him, his staff and several officers of the

city Militia, to keep them to their posts. By the great

exertions of those officers a short stand was effected 

on the field, when a discharge of rockets from the

140
enemy, caused them again to retreat in such a 

manner that no efforts could stop them. Finding

myself thus abandoned by the force I relied upon to

protect my battery, I was most reluctantly and with

inexpressible pain, after destroying my powder and

spiking my cannon, compelled to abandon them,

having only thirty officers and seamen with me.41

6. Jackson, in a letter to the Secretary of War written after the

battle, on 9 January, commented on the events on the right

bank during the battle the day before and the effect on his

intentions. Later this correspondence made its way in to

newspapers across the country, causing Jackson to be held in

great contempt by the people of Kentucky for many years to

follow.

The entire destruction of the enemy’s Army was 

now inevitable, had it not been for an unfortunate

occurrence, which at this moment took place on the

other side of the river. Simultaneously with his

advance upon my lines, he had thrown over in his

boats a considerable force to the other side of the river. 

These having landed, were hardy enough to advance

against the works of general Morgan; and, what is

strange and difficult to account for, at the very

moment when their entire discomfiture was looked

for with a confidence approaching to certainty, the

Kentucky re-enforcements, in whom so much reliance

had been placed, ingloriously fled, drawing after

them, by their example, the remainder of the forces;

and thus yielding to the enemy that most formidable

position. The batteries which had rendered me, for

many days, the most important service, though

bravely defended, were, of course, now abandoned;

not however until the guns had been spiked. This

unfortunate rout had totally changed the aspect of

affairs. The enemy now occupied a position from

which they might annoy us without hazard, and by

means of which they might have been able to defeat, in

a great measure, the effects of our success on this side 

the river. It became therefore an object of the first

consequence to dislodge him as soon as possible.42

141
Analysis

1. DiscusstheBritish preparations for the attack –did Pakenham

effectively set the necessary conditions for these operations

and the attack?

2. Discuss the problems encountered by Thornton’s assault

force; was there a specific time when this piece of the overall

British attack should have been cancelled? Should Pakenham

have cancelled the entire attack based on the challenges

encountered by such a critical shaping operation?

3. Analyze Pakenham’s decisions in designating his reserve.

Should he have retained experienced Peninsula regiments or

considered employing the inexperienced 93d? What criteria

do modern commanders use in designating a reserve?

4. Evaluate Pakenham’s final decision to attack despite the

extreme delay in Thornton’s attack. What other options did he 

have available?

5. Assess the American preparation on the right bank of the

river. What conditions led to the American defeat despite so

many challenges encountered by Thornton’s force?

6. How did the British capture of the Marine Battery influence

American and British forces involved in main assault on the

left bank of the river or was it case of too little too late?

142
Stand Eight

The FinalAssault – British Left Column Keane’s Brigade (8 

January 1815)

Directions: Remain on top of the levee to discuss Keane’s

attack. Position the group so that it can see along the front of 

the American line along the Rodriguez Canal (continue to

move down the levee and use the Beauregard House as a 

landmark if necessary).

Visual Aids

British Attack, January 8 1815, 0315-0730

British Attack Continues, January 8 1815, 0730-0745

Orientation: This position is approximately 50 meters

forward of the Rodriguez Canal. Orient the group back

toward the American line and to either side of the levee as

necessary when describing the events. The US 7th Infantry’s

position began on the immediate right of the modern levee.

Battery Number 1 was located on the immediate left of the

levee (to the approximate bank of the modern river), then the

Redoubt and Beale’s Company further to its left (reclaimed

by the river). Rennie’s battalion made its approach along a 

route along the old levee, now reclaimed by the river. Keane’s

main body advanced more closely to a line roughly along the 

modern levee.

The Malus-Beauregard House

This structure was constructed approximately 18 years after

the battle in about 1833 (exact date is uncertain). It passed

through the hands of several owners, including Rene 

Beauregard, son of Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard, 

whose family owned the property until 1904, when it was 

sold to a railway system, the New Orleans Terminal 

Company. The house went into serious decline and was 

unlivable when the National Park Service purchased it in 

1949, starting a long process of restoration efforts that

continues today.43

Description

Pakenham’s staff woke him at 0300 (all British sources

vary in approximating the timeline that morning prior to the

battle’s start) on the morning of 8 January to inform him of

the delay in getting Thornton’s force across the river. Though

he realized that the preliminary piece of his overall attack

fell far behind schedule he still decided to commence the

main attack at 0400 in order to take advantage of the darkness.

Riding forward to inspect Gibbs’ troops, however, Pakenham 

ran into more problems when he discovered that the troops

143
remained stationary. In the darkness the 44th Regiment failed

to pick up the fascines and ladders necessary to overcome

the American defenses. Still, Pakenham refused to be

dissuaded. His faith in the British regular steered him to

believe that a direct assault of these veterans would clear any 

defense manned by “dirty shirt” backwoods Militia, causing

them to run at the first sight of British bayonets advancing

toward them. Pakenham ordered his former Assistant Adjutant

General, Major Harry Smith, now serving in the same capacity

in Lambert’s brigade because of the arrival of a more senior

officer, to have the rocket fired to signal the attack.

Figure 32. British Attack, Jan 8 1815, 0315-0730.

Author created.

144
Infiltrating within striking distance of the American

redoubt along the right end of the Rodriguez Canal in the fog,

Lieutenant Colonel Rennie’s battalion of light companies,

approximately 1,000 men, upon seeing the signal close to

sunrise, rose out of the darkness and rushed the redoubt. The

British achieved the element of surprise so surely that the

American outposts fled without firing a shot, Rennie’s men

closely pursuing them. A company oftheUS7th Infantry, under

Captain Enoch Humphrey, defended the redoubt and prepared

to engage the attacking British. However, the Americans held

their fire for fear of shooting their comrades retreating from

the outposts. The redoubt, unfinished, lacked the artillery

supposed to be emplaced there. In the face of the

overwhelming attack, a single plank over the canal served as

the only means of escape for Humphrey’s men, which the

Captain elected to take, leading his men back into the main

American line. When the men from the outposts reached the

empty redoubt they turned and engaged the closely pursuing

British in hand to hand combat until they could hold out no

longer, retreating across the plank and pulling it up behind 

them.

Success, however, bred extreme complications as

Rennie’s column entered the redoubt and attempted to move

on to the main American line. Soldiers of the 1st West India

Regiment moved forward with ladders to scale the American 

parapet but scattered and took cover due to the heavy 

American artillery and small arms fire. Unbeknownst to

Rennie, no other British unit supported his assault. Keane

received new instructions from Pakenham as the commanderin-chief rode the British line before the attack. With the

delay in Thornton’s attack, Pakenham saw the Marine

Battery as a threat to Keane’s flank. In order to mitigate

that threat, Pakenham ordered Keane to redirect his brigade’s

attack across the field and attack along Gibbs’ left flank.

Keane therefore could not exploit the success achieved

by Rennie’s men. Rennie, not knowing whether to press his

successful attack or secure the captured redoubt, remained

unsupported for the rest of the battle. The American redoubt

became a deathtrap for the British. Without the scaling ladders

discarded by the 1st West India Regiment, Rennie and two

fellow officers started climbing the enemy parapet, dying with

many of his men inside the redoubt (see Figure 36 for a star

with the letter “R” that signifies the approximate location of

Rennie’s death), caught between the deadly small arms fire of

the 7th Infantry to their front and the guns of the Marine Battery

on their flank from the opposite bank of the river. The effect

of the American fire proved too great to overcome and the rest

of the column broke and ran to the rear, many of the men falling

145
in the continued crossfire.

So ended the short but extremely violent fighting on the British

left flank; another under-resourced and lost British opportunity

on the field that day.

Figure 33. British Attack Continues, Jan 8 1815, 0730-0745.

CSI created.

146
Vignettes

1. Major Harry Smith, sent to serve as the Assistant

Adjutant General under Lambert because of the arrival of a 

more senior officer to serve on Pakenham’s staff, recorded his

final personal interaction with Pakenham, as the commander

rode past Lambert’s reserve position, just before the signal 

to attack:

About half an hour before daylight, while I was with 

General Lambert’s column,standing ready, Sir Edward 

Pakenham sent for me. I was soon with him. He was 

greatly agitated. “Smith, most Commanders-in-Chief

have many difficulties to contend with but surely none

like mine. The dam, as you heard me say it would,

gave way, and Thornton’s people will be of no use

whatever to the general attack.” I said, “So impressed

have you ever been, so obvious is it in every military

point of view, we should possess the right bank of the

river, and thus enfilade and divert the attention of the

enemy; there is still time before daylight to retire the

columns now. We are under the enemy’s fire so soon

as discovered.” He says, “This may be but I have

twice deferred the attack. We are strong in numbers

now comparatively. It will cost more men, and the

assault must be made.” I again urged delay. While

we were talking, the streaks of daylight began to

appear, although the morning was dull, close, and

heavy, the clouds almost touching the ground. He

said, “Smith, order the rocket to be fired.” I again

ventured to plead the cause of delay. He said, and very 

justly, “It is now too late: the columns would be visible

to the enemy before they could move out of fire, and

would lose more men than it is to be hoped they will

in the attack. Fire the rocket, I say, and go to

Lambert.” This was done. I had reached Lambert just

as the stillness of death and anticipation (for I really

believe the enemy was aware of our proximity to their

position) [was broken by the firing of the rocket]. The

rocket was hardly in the air before a rush of our troops

was met by the most murderous and destructive fire of

all arms ever poured upon column.44

2. Patterson’s establishment of the Marine Battery on the

right bank of the river immediately demonstrated its critical

value to Jackson’s overall defensive plan, enfilading the left

flank of the British attack with heavy fire and inflicting

tremendous casualties. In a post-battle report, Patterson 

described the British attack on Jackson’s line and the part 

147
played by his battery: 

At daylight, the enemy opened a heavy cannonade

upon general Jackson’s lines and my battery, leading

their troops under cover of their cannon to the assault

of the lines, which they attempted on the right and left 

but principally the latter wing; they were met by a 

most tremendous and incessant fire of artillery and

musketry, which compelled them to retreat with

precipitation; leaving the ditch filled, and the field

strewed with their dead and wounded. My battery was 

opened upon them simultaneously with those from our

lines, flanking the enemy both in his advance and

retreat with round, grape and canister, which must 

have proved extremely destructive asin their haste and

confusion to retreat they crowded the top of the levee,

affording us a most advantageous opportunity for the

use of grape and canister, which I used to the greatest

advantage.45

3. CaptainCooke ofthe 43rdRegiment went forward during the

night with some 200 Soldiers to repair and guard the far left

British battery next to the levee, about 700 yards from the

American line. From there he witnessed the 95th Rifles go

forward to establish its skirmish line and the movement of

Rennie’s column its way to assault the American redoubt. The

column included the light company from Cooke’s 43rd 

Regiment:

These three companies [there were also two

additional companies from the 95th] formed a 

compact little column of two hundred and forty

Soldiers, near the battery on the high road to New 

Orleans. They were to attack the crescent battery

near the river, and if possible to silence its fire under

the muzzles of twenty pieces of cannon; at a point, too,

where the bulk of theBritish force had hesitated when it

first landed, and had recoiled from its fire on the

28th...and on the 1st of January...said I [to an officer

in his regiment’s light company that took part in the

assault] “you have got into what I call a good

thing...the American battery is in front at short range,

and on the left this spot is flanked at eight hundred

yards by their batteries on the opposite bank of the

river.”

46

4. Captain William Surtees, forward with the 95th Rifles,

witnessed the consequence of Rennie’s success and the failure 

of the British to exploit the capture of the American redoubt:

148
But the poor fellows on the left, who had gained

the only work which fell into our hands on this bank

of the river, were still detained there, unable either to

advance or retreat; and not one durst show his head

above the parapet, or he was instantly shot dead. The

news they now learned was most disheartening

indeed, which was, that the whole of the British

had retired, and that the Americans were coming out

of their lines, and were moving in the direction of that

work. Nothing now remained but to surrender, or to

make an attempt to retreat, at the risk of being every

man knocked down. The latter, however, they

preferred; on which Colonel Rennie, of the 21st, who 

commanded these three companies, was the first to

make the experiment, and in doing which, the

moment after he left the fort, he fell to rise no more.

They thought it better for them all to go at once, and

instantly the whole party made a rush out of the work.

The greater part of them providentially succeeded in

effecting their escape, although many a brave fellow

fell in the attempt.47

5. Upon the collapse ofRennie’s assault on the redoubt, the men

in Beale’s company, who helped defeat the assault, dragged the

bodies of three dead British officers into the lines; one 

included Rennie himself. Soon, Beale’s men, all known for 

their marksmanship, argued over who had killed the British

colonel. A man named Withers said, “If he isn’t hit above

the eyebrows, it wasn’t my shot.” They rolled Rennie’s body

over and saw a bullet wound just above the eyebrows. His

peers gave Withers credit for the shot but also the

responsibility to give Rennie’s watch and other valuables to

his wife, who, like many of the officer’s wives, sat aboard

ship with the fleet in the Gulf.48

Analysis: 

1. Discuss Rennie’s success in seizing the redoubt during the

initial minutes of the attack; what advantages did it serve

within the larger plan?

2. Evaluate Pakenham’s last minute orders to Keane changing

the brigade’s line of attack from the British left flank to the

right rather than support successful Rennie’s assault on the

redoubt. What impact did this decision have on the actions on

the British left flank? What was the overall impact?

3. Analyze the effects of the American fires plan,

incorporating the fires from the Marine Battery and the direct

fire from the Rodriguez Canal.

149

Stand Nine

The Final Assault -British Right Column Gibbs’Brigade (8 

January 1815)

Directions: Walk northeast to NPS Stop #3, vicinity the

parking pull-in. Thisis a “Walking Stand.” Orient on Stand 10,

located at Battery 6, as you walk, and end directly in front of

the battery. If the field is flooded (which it can be at times), use

the park road to walk back around to Battery 6 and then stand

behind the battery.

Notes: The transition from Stand 9 to Stand 10 consists of a 

walk across part of the battlefield from the left to the right

flank of the British attack, replicating the line of march taken

by the 93d Regiment during the battle. During periods of

inclement weather the field can be quite inundated with 

standing rain water, like the conditions present during the

battle. Based on conditions during execution, the group will 

have to determine whether to walk this section or use the park

road to walk around to the portion of the American line where

the main British attack culminated in front of the American

Battery Number 6.

Visual Aids

British Attack, Jan 8 1815, 0315-0730 (shown in Stand Eight)

British Attack Continues, January 8 1815, 0730-0745 (shown 

in Stand Eight)

Orientation: Thisisthe final approximate position that the 93rd

Regiment occupied when it was ordered to reposition to the

right and support the attack of Gibbs’ brigade. At this point in

the battle the regiment’s position was approximately 450 yards 

forward of the American Batteries 3 and 4.

Description

Asrelated in the previousstand Gibbs’ attack on the British 

right flank encountered a great deal of confusion from the

start. Many officers later observed that the chaos stemmed

from the actions, or lack of actions of the 44th Regiment, the

brigade’s primary assault regiment. Pakenham’s orders to

Lieutenant Colonel Mullins, commanding the regiment,

directed that “The Advance Guard is to carry forward with

it, six long Ladders with planks on them & ten small Ladders,

as well as the Fascines. The officer commanding the 44th

Regt. Must ascertain where these requisites are, this evening,

so that there may be no delay in taking them forward 

tomorrow to the old batteries.”49 When Mullinslearned the role 

of his regiment he supposedly said, “My regiment has been

ordered to execution. Their dead bodies are to be used as a 

bridge for the rest of the Army to march over.”50 This appalled

151
many of the officers present, including Captain William

Surtees, the 95th’s Quartermaster, who later recorded in

disgust that “In all my campaigning I have never yet heard a 

commanding-officer who did not look upon the post of danger 

as the post of honour, and who did not rejoice, as if a favour

was conferred on him, when appointed to an arduous or

hazardous duty.”51

When the rocket signaling the attack rose into the thinning

darkness that morning the 44th Regiment could not be found.

Mullins, believing that the engineers positioned the fascines

and ladders in one artillery redoubt, marched his men past

the true location. The engineer entrusted to meet Mullins in

the correct redoubt failed to arrive, possibly sleeping. Arriving

at the regiment’s final assault position without finding the

critical equipment, Mullins and his men went looking for them.

Gibbs, unwilling to wait, ordered the brigade forward. 

Officers supposedly overheard him state “Let me live till

tomorrow and I’ll hang him to the highest tree in the swamp.”52

The 21st Regiment assumed the lead position in Gibbs’ attack,

followed by the 4th Regiment, quickly forcing the American

outposts to withdraw to their main defensive line.

The American outpost troops returned to a main line filled

with their prepared comrades and reported the approach of

the British in force. Jackson’s suspicions proved correct.

During a ride along the line in the early morning hours he

consulted with Brigadier General Adair, commanding the

reserve of Kentuckians, telling Adair to place and employ the

reserve as he saw best. With that guidance Adair moved his

men to a position directly behind Carroll’s Tennesseans,

establishing four firing lines at the very point where the British 

hoped to breach.

The fog began to lift as the sun rose and the men in Battery

Number 6 saw the British advancing within 300-400 yards 

of the American line and immediately opened fire. Batteries

7 and 8 quickly combined their fires. Advancing in a column 

of regiments, Gibbs’ brigade proved an easy target for enemy

gunners. Well within range of canister rounds, the American

artillery ripped large holes in the advancing British ranks. 

However, they continued to advance, efficiently filling the

gaps with men from the subsequent ranks with parade ground

precision. Carroll, an experienced fighter, developed his 

section of the American line with some of the same principles

used in today’s military engagement area development. First,

he selected the specific location on the ground where he wanted

to engage the British, taking advantage of the range of his

Soldiers’ small arms and their defensive position. Next, he

briefed all of his officers and men on his plan and where to

152
engage the enemy. Finally, he established a method with which

he could guarantee a sustained massing of fire against the

head of the British column, utilizing his four lines of troops in

a rotating system that provided a rapid and lethal volume of

fire. 

Figure 34. The ground over which Gibb’s column attacked the left center 

of the American line (forward of the left tree line). 

By Author.

With no way to get across the canal due to the failure 

of the 44th Regiment and extremely effective American fire, 

Gibbs’ advance ground to a halt. A brief success by the lead

element of the 21st Regiment which fought its way into the

American line defended by Adair’s Kentuckians, quickly

found itself overwhelmed by small arms fire. The current

situation proved insurmountable and the British went to

ground, continuing to absorb the deadly fire to their front. 

On the British left flank, along the river, Major General

Keane observed Gibbs’ predicament. Realizing the lack of

success on both banks of the river (note that Thornton’s attack

had not yet taken place) and the availability of his 93rd

Regiment, Keane determined, within Pakenham’s newly issued

intent, to directly influence the situation on the right. Moving

to the head of the column, Keane personally led the

Highlanders across the fields at an oblique to the American

line. Keane’s decision demonstrated grave risk in exposing

the flank of the regiment to an already proven lethality on the

part of the Americans. Furthermore, the maneuver masked the

British batteries to his rear, preventing them from firing in

support of the attack for fear of hitting their own infantry. The 

regiment’s commanding officer, 

153
 Colonel Robert Dale (no relation to the author), upon

receiving Keane’s orders, summoned the regimental surgeon

and handed the man a packet containing his watch and a 

letter explaining, “Give these to my wife. I shall die at the

head of my regiment.”53

Figure 35. Location where the Keane changed the 93rd Regiment’s

direction of attack.

By Author.

Behind the American line, Andrew Jackson moved

forward when the fighting commenced and co-located his

headquarters with the 7th Infantry Regiment. Seeing the

quick termination of the British attack on his right flank and

then the halt of the attack on his left, he watched the change

in direction of the Highlanders from their left to right.

Jackson shouted encouragement to his Soldiers: “Stand by

your guns. Don’t waste ammunition. See every shot tells.”54

The band started playing Yankee Doodle. 

Upon Keane’s order, the 900 men of the 93d Regiment

advanced at the double in a 100-man front, the pipers playing

the regimental charge, Monymusk. Contrary to some

contemporary and later illustrations, the Highlanders did not

wear their kilts but wore their regimental tartan trousers.

However, the fresh regiment made an impression and upon

seeing it advance to his aid, Gibbs prepared to carry his

attack further. The Americans met Keane’s movement with

the same lethal firepower presented to the other British

columns. The regiment’s exposed flank resulted in appalling

casualties.Keane sustained severe woundsto the neck and thigh

while leading the regiment through the heavy fire (see Figure

36 for a star with the letter “K” that signifies the approximate

location where Keane was wounded). Soldiers carried him

154
from the field. The regiment abruptly halted some 100 yards

from the enemy line where the Americans continued to fire 

into their ragged formation. Colonel Dale fell within a 

moment of ordering the halt, instantly killed by grapeshot

that passed through his body. The 93d advanced with the

understanding that the 44th successfully employed the fascines

and ladders but upon discovering the 44th’s failure, the

regiment stood still, waiting for new orders from senior leaders

no longer capable of commanding. With equal suddenness,

the Highlanders broke formation and ran for the rear.

Figure 36. US Battery Number 6. The 93rd Regiment’s attack in 

support of Gibbs’ assault collapsed on the opposite side of the

Rodriguez Canal just forward of the battery.

By Author.

Vignettes

1. An American Militia soldier from Kentucky described

his point of view from a position along the American line 

defended by Major General Carroll’s brigade:

Colonel Smiley, from Bardstown, was the first one

who gave us orders to fire from our part of the line;

and then, I reckon, there was a pretty considerable

noise. There were also brass pieces on our right, the

noisiest kind of varmints that began blaring away as

hard as they could, while the heavy iron cannon,

toward the river, and some thousands of small arms,

joined in the chorus and made the ground shake

under our feet. Directly after the firing began, Capt.

Patterson, I think he was from Knox County, Kentucky 

but an Irishman born, came running along. He jumped

upon the brestwork (sic) and stooping a moment to

look through the darkness as well as he could, he

shouted with a broad North of Ireland brogue, ‘shoot

155
156

low, boys! Shoot low! Rake them rake them! They’re

comin’ on their all fours! 55

2. Lieutenant Gleig described the scene on the British right in great detail:

On the right again, the 21 and 4th supported by the 93d,

though thrown into some confusion by the enemy’s 

fire, pushed on with desperate gallantry to the ditch;

but to scale the parapet without ladders was a work

of no slight difficulty some few, indeed, by mounting 

one upon another’s shoulders, succeeded in entering he

works but these were speedily overpowered, most of

them killed, and the rest taken; whilst as many asstood 

without were exposed to a sweeping fire, which cut

them down by whole companies. It was in vain that

the most obstinate courage was displayed...The whole

of the guns, likewise, from the opposite bank, kept up a 

well-directed and deadly cannonade upon their flank;

and thus were they destroyed without an opportunity

being given of displaying their valour, or obtaining so 

much as revenge.

56

3. Lieutenant Gordon, an officer in the 93d Regiment, wrote

in his diary:

The enemy...no sooner got us within 150 yards of their

works than a most destructive and murderous fire 

was opened on our Column of round, grape,

musquetry, rifle, and buckshot along the whole

course and length of our line in front; as well as on

our left flank. Not daunted, however, we continued

our advance which in one minute would have carried

us into the ditch, when we received the peremptory

order to halt – this indeed was the moment of trial.

The officers and men being as it were mowed down

by ranks, impatient to get at the enemy at all hazards,

yet compelled for want of orders to stand still and

neitherto advance or retire, galled asthey were by this

murderous fire of an invisible enemy, for a single

American soldier we did not see that day, they kept

discharging their musquets [sic] and rifles without

lifting their faces above the ramparts.57

4. From the balcony of the de La Ronde House, Captain Benson 

Hill and Colonel Alexander Dickson, Pakenham’s chief of artillery, 

observed the initial attack and its failure, especially Gibb’s column:
157

Analysis

1. Discuss the failure of the 44th Regiment in its specified

task and how it affected the main British assault. Use

Pakenham’s order to Mullins as part of the analysis. What

modern techniques help today’s leaders prevent such

situations?

2. Evaluate the decision to shift the 93d Regiment from

supporting Keane’s attack on the British left flank to support

Gibbs’ attack on the right.

Speedily a tremendous line of fire was perceived, 

extending from one end of the enemy’s position to the 

other; and to our dismay we soon observed the 

column on our right wavering. Hastily galloping to 

the scene of confusion, we found the men falling back 

in great numbers. Every possible means were used to 

rally them; the majority of the retreating party were 

wounded; and one and all bitterly complained that 

not a single ladder, or fascine, had been brought up, 

to enable them to cross the ditch. A singular illusion, 

for which I have never been able to account,

occurred on our nearer approach to the American 

lines: the roar of musquetry and cannon seemed to 

proceed from the thick cypress-wood on our right, 

whilst the bright flashes of fire in our front were not 

apparently accompanied by sound. This strange effect 

was probably produced by the state of the atmosphere 

and the character of the ground; but I leave the 

solution of the mystery to time and the curious.

58

Stand Ten

Rodriguez Canal – Repulse of the British Army (8 January

1815)

Directions: Following the line of march of the 93d Regiment

from Stand 9, the group will stop at a point approximately

100 yards in front of the Rodriguez Canal forward of Battery

Number 6 (where the group started its original walk of the

American line). If the ground is too wet and the park road was

utilized, the stand will take place behind the Battery oriented

on the line of advance of the British main effort.

Notes: None

Visual Aids

British Attack Continues, January 8 1815, 0730-0745 (shown

in Stands 8 and 9)

British Attack Culminates, January 8 1815, 0745-0800

Description

Pakenham, once again taking a position near the center to

see as much of the battlefield as he could, watched the attack

develop. Very quickly he decided to move forward in an

effort to personally influence events on the right. Near the

head of the stalled brigade, Pakenham found the 44th

Regiment but not Mullins. The commander-in-chief,

attempting to make order of the chaotic situation, shouted as

he pointed toward the enemy’s position “Forshame! Recollect

that you are British Soldiers! This is the road you ought take!”

and took command of the regiment, leading it forward.

59

Further forward, Pakenham found Gibbs, who informed his

commander that the men would not obey him; the men would

not follow him. With anger rising within him, Pakenham

immediately galloped to the head of the column with some of

his staff to take personal command, shouting for the men to

rally behind him.

As Pakenham led the men that chose to follow him, his

horse went down,shot out from underneath him by grapeshot,

one of the balls shattering Pakenham’s knee. As his aides

attempted to help him, a musket or rifle ball struck his right

arm, rending it useless. Assisted by staff officers, the general

mounted an aide’s horse and continued forward. However,

with his right arm shattered, an aide walked alongside the

Orientation: If following the line of march of the 93d 

Regiment in support of the Major General Gibbs’ attack (the 

British main effort) orient the group on the American Battery 

Number 6. If following the park road and standing behind 

Battery Number 6, orient the group to Gibbs’ attack.

159
horse to guide his commander’s way. Continuing forward, 

Pakenham suddenly realized his Army’s situation and sent

orders for Lambert to bring up the reserve. Seeing Keane’s

movement of the Highlanders, he raised his hat above his

head and shouted “Come on, brave Ninety-third!”60 No sooner

did he utter those words when a shot suddenly struck 

Pakenham in the groin and passed through his spine,

paralyzing him (see Figure 36 for a star with the letter “P” that

signifies the approximate location where Pakenham fell). His

staff carried him out of harm’s way, beyond the American

artillery, where a surgeon pronounced the wound mortal.

\ 

Figure 37. Part of the ground over which Gibbs’ column attacked.

Pakenham suffered his mortal wounds in the lower right

foreground.

By Author.

Gibbs continued to lead what remained of his brigade

forward. He led a small detachment that reached a point within

twenty yards of the enemy line when he sustained a severe

wound and had to be carried from the field (see Figure 36 for a 

star with the letter “G” that signifies the approximate location

where Gibbs was wounded). Other small detachments made

their way to their parapet and tried to force their way into the

American line, again with no success. On the far right of the

British line the battalion of light companies attempted to

infiltrate through the swamp in an effort to reach the

American line. Coffee’s Tennesseans and the Choctaws easily

defeated the effort and soon forced them to withdraw. All

possibilities exhausted, Gibbs regiments began to succumb to

collapse and as Soldiers began leaving the field.

160
Lambert led his brigade forward in accordance with

Pakenham’s orders butsoon received the reports that Pakenham

lay dying and that both Gibbs and Keane received possibly

mortal wounds. From his somewhat rearward position in the

center of the battlefield Lambert held a clear and indisputable

view of the events surrounding him. Troops from all over the

front left their posts either individually or in small groups,

many of the men wounded. Only the troops in his brigade

remained fresh and under arms. His last message from 

Pakenham ordered his brigade to attack but Lambert, now in

command, disregarded the order and issued his own: retreat.

Lambert’s 7th and 43d Regiment’s covered the British

withdrawal and prepared to defend against an anticipated

American counterattack that never came. The British attack on

the left bank of the Mississippi ended in less than 30 minutes.

A rough estimated indicated that up to two thirds of the British

troops that went forward became casualties; among them threeFigure 38. British Attack Culminates, Jan 8 1815, 0745-0800.

CSI created.

161
generals,seven colonels, and 75 other officers of variousranks.

Vignettes

1. Major Harry Smith, now Lambert’s brigade Assistant

Adjutant General, witnessed the attack from the reserve

position occupied by the 7th and 43rd Regiments. Upon his

last glimpse of Pakenham, who rode forward to rally the men,

Smith made a powerful assertion to his new commander:

The rocket was hardly in the air before a rush of our

troops was met by the most murderous and

destructive fire of all arms ever poured upon column.

Sir Edward Pakenham galloped past me with all his

Staff, saying,” That’s a terrific fire, Lambert.” I knew

nothing of my General [Lambert] then, except that he

was a most gentlemanlike, amiable fellow, and I had

seen him lead his Brigade at Toulouse in the order of

a review of his Household Troopsin Hyde Park. I said,

“In twenty-five minutes, General, you will command

the Army. Sir Edward Pakenham will be wounded and

incapable or, killed. The troops do not get on a step.

He will be at the head of the first Brigade he comes to,

and what I say will occur.” A few seconds verified my

words. Tylden came wildly up to tell the melancholy

truth, saying, “Sir Edward Pakenham is killed. You

command the Army.”

61

2. After becoming lost in the fog just as the attack began,

Captain Cooke’s detachment, attempting to move toward the

heaviest fighting, eventually stumbled upon its regiment in its

reserve position, thereby sparing most of his Soldiers from the 

chaos encountered by Gibbs’ column:

As soon as the action was over, and some troops were 

formed in our rear, we then, under a smart fire of

grape and round shot, moved to the right, and joined

our own corps, who hadbeenordered to lie down at the

edge of a ditch; and some of the old Soldiers, with 

rage depicted on their countenances, were demanding

why they were not led to the assault.

The fire of the Americans from behind their

barricade had been indeed murderous, and had 

caused so sudden a repulse

that it was difficult to persuade ourselves that such an

event had happened, --the whole affair being more

like a dream, or some scene of enchantment, than 

reality.62

3. The same Kentucky Militia soldier who described the

fighting along Major General Carroll’sfront at the height of the

162
British assault described the scene that existed in front of the

American line once the fog and smoke fully cleared:

When the smoke had cleared away and we could

obtain a fair view of the field, it looked, at the first

glance, like a sea of blood. It was not blood itself

which gave it this appearance but the red coats in

which the British Soldiers were dressed. Straight out

before our position, for about the width of space

which we supposed had been occupied by the British

column, the field was entirely covered with prostrate

bodies. In some places they were laying in piles of

several, one on the top of the other. On either side,

there was an interval more thinly sprinkled with the

slain; and then two other dense rows, one near the

levee and the other towards the swamp. About two

hundred yards off, directly in front of our position,

lay a large dapple gray horse, which we understood

to have been Pakenham’s.

When we first got a fair view of the field in our front,

individuals could be seen in every possible attitude.

Some laying quite dead, others mortally wounded,

pitching and tumbling about in the agonies of death.

Some had their heads shot off, some their legs, some

their arms. Some were laughing, some crying, some

groaning, and some screaming. There was every

variety of sight and sound. Among those that were on

the ground, however, there were some thatwere neither

dead nor wounded. A great many had thrown

themselves down behind piles of slain, for protection.

As the firing ceased, these men were every now and

then jumping up and either running off or coming in

and giving themselves up.63

4. Lieutenant Gleig chose to ride forward and see the battlefield

for himself once the fighting ceased:

Prompted by curiosity, I mounted my horse and rode

to the front; but of all the sights I ever witnessed,

that which met me there was beyond comparison the

most shocking and the most humiliating. Within the

narrow compass of a few hundred yards, were

gathered together nearly a thousand bodies, all of

them arrayed in British uniforms. Not a single

American was among them; all were English; and

they were thrown by dozens into shallow holes,

scarcely deep enough to furnish them with a slight

covering of earth.I confess, that when I beheld the

Scene, I hung down my head half in sorrow, and half in

anger.

163
But the change of expression, visible there in every 

countenance, no language can pourtray. Only twenty

hours ago, and all was life and animation; wherever

you went you were enlivened by the sound of 

merriment and raillery; whilst the expected attack 

was mentioned in terms... of the most perfect

confidence as to its result. Now gloom and discontent

everywhere prevailed. Disappointment, grief,

indignation, and rage, succeeded each other in all

bosoms; nay, so completely were the troops

overwhelmed by a sense of disgrace, that, for a-while,

they retained their sorrow without so much as hinting

at its cause.

64

Analysis

1. Discuss the individual actions of the various senior British

commanders in attempting to lead their men from the front 

under enemy fire, especially when the attack stalled. Have

changes in warfare altered where a leader should be located on

the battlefield?

2. EvaluateLambert’s decision to end the attack and consolidate

the British expeditionary force.

3. Assess Jackson’s decision not to conduct a counterattack to

exploit the British withdrawal.

164
Stand Eleven

Aftermath of the Battle and Conclusion of the Campaign

on the Gulf Coast

Directions: From Battery 6, move directly to the Chalmette

monument. The steps around its base can be utilized for seating 

while the description of the post-battle campaign events are

covered, followed by the integration phase (unless an alternate

site for the integration is planned in advance). In the event of

inclement weather, the Visitor Center provides some shelter

with a limited view of the battlefield that can be utilized.

Notes: None

Visual Aids: Post-battle Actions in the Gulf, January-March

1815 (shown at conclusion of Section II. Campaign 

Overview)

The Battlefield Monument

Initial attempts to erect a monument to honor the victory

began in 1839. The cornerstone was laid in 1840 in the

presence of the hero of the battle and former President of the

United States, Andrew Jackson. Progress, however, slowed

because of inconsistent funding and construction flaws. Work

ceased sometime immediately before the Civil War due to

funding and for nearly fifty years a half-completed column,

about 56-feet high, stood on the former battlefield. Work

on the monument was finally completed in 1908. It stands at

a height of 100 feet.65

Description

Lambert encountered a truly chaotic situation in the

aftermath of the third failed British attack on Jackson’s

defensive line. Pakenham died before the troops returned to

their lines, Gibbs lay dying in great pain from his horrible

mortal wounds that he succumbed to the next day, and Keane

suffered from serious wounds, leaving Lambert to salvage

the situation and the Army. Dead and wounded still littered

Orientation: None is required. However, the size of the 

Chalmette battlefield offers a rare opportunity rarely seen on 

most preserved battlefields. From the monument, much of the 

battlefield, with the exception of dead space immediately on the 

British side of the Rodriguez Canal, is still visible to actively 

reference during the integration phase. A relatively similar 

perspective is available from the shelter of the Visitor Center, 

which is close to the far right of the American line but 

decreases in quality the further one looks east along the 

Rodriguez Canal toward the far left of the American line. If the 

integration takes place off site, visuals can be used to reference 

specific battlefield actions.

165
large stretches of the field and overwhelmed the hospitals to

the rear.

The returns that day listed 291 killed, 1,262 wounded, and

482 prisoners lost. All of Lambert’s initial decisions focused

on consolidating his remaining force and preparing for a major

tactical or operational transition; attack again, defend, or

retreat. Ending the attack, posting his brigade to defend the

lines, and recalling Thornton’s force from the right bank,

despite its success, all served this end. The most pressing

concern that occupied Lambert’sthoughtsinvolved whether or

not the enemy would counterattack and, if so, how would his

men react in another fight.

Behind the parapet on the Rodriguez Canal few

Americans disputed the victory just achieved over the British

Army. The evidence littered the open fields to their front 

from the canal itself to hundreds of yards beyond, a mass of

dead or dying red coated Soldiers. At first, there seemed to be

an ominous silence but when they came to the realization that

they were victorious cheers erupted up and down the line,

eventually joining as one. Even Jackson must have realized

the scope of his victory: he had defeated the Army of the Iron 

Duke (the Duke of Wellington) himself. Final casualty

returns for the battle reinforced the decisive nature of the

victory. The Americans suffered 55 killed, 185 wounded, and 

93 captured throughout the entire period spent defending New

Orleans.

However,Jackson’s personalsatisfaction ended with sound

of fighting on the river’s right bank which quickly consumed 

his full attention. Reports swiftly came in describing the new

British threat and the fast deteriorating situation among

Morgan’s Soldiers. Jackson rapidly formed reinforcements

and sent them on a forced march back to New Orleans to cross

the river and stem the reported rout. There could be no

thought of counterattacking on his side of the river when the

situation on the opposite bank posed such a danger his overall 

plan of defending New Orleans.

Lambert assisted Jackson in restoring order to the right

bank when he ordered the withdrawal of Thornton’s column

from that side of the river after a reconnaissance and estimate

of the situation by one of his key staff officers. The delayed 

British attack and the American failure on that bank provided

Lambert with time that he desperately needed. He could not

immediately order a retreat along his long line of

communication because of the large numbers of wounded that

inundated his hospitals. Into this hectic period walked

Admiral Cochrane. The admiral provided an idea meant to

take pressure off the expeditionary force. He proposed that

166
the Royal Navy become the British main effort, forcing its

way through the American defenses on the Mississippi and

sailing upstream to support the Army’s future operations

against New Orleans. Only the American position at Fort St. 

Philip prevented their access to the river.

Fort St. Philip stood thirty miles north of the river’s

mouth and eighty miles south of New Orleans. During his 

rapidly conducted personal inspection of the American

defenses upon his arrival in December, Jackson clearly saw

the importance of the fort and ordered it improved and

reinforced. The garrison consisted mostly of regulars, two

companies of artillerymen and two companies of the 7th

US Infantry, under the command of Major Walter H.

Overton, reinforced by a detachment of sailors and some

Louisiana militiamen; a total of 406 men. Thirty-four pieces

of artillery defended the river and landward approaches and the

last remaining Navy gunboat operated on the river just north 

of the fort.

On 9 January five British vessels armed with mortars 

arrived and began their bombardment of Fort St. Philip. For

nine consecutive days the British maintained their fire in an

effort to reduce the fort. Though the Americans could not

return effective fire because of the distance and heavy enemy

fire, the fort sustained very little damage. The garrison lost only

two killed and seven wounded from the nine-day

bombardment. Major Overton, in a signal of defiance, not only

nailed the garrison’s American flag to its staff but also nailed a 

British Union Jack underneath his colors. By 18 January the

British realized that they could not reduce the fort and weighed

anchor to leave the river and rejoin the fleet. The American

guns, unsuppressed, saw the British vessels off with several 

artillery volleys.

Cochrane’s attempt to force the river did nothing to change

the British operational situation. Jackson held reinforcements

and left the garrison of Fort St. Philip to defend itself,

remaining focused on the British Army to his front. In fact, the

British attempt to run the river convinced Jackson that the

British remained focused on breaching his line and planned

another attack. After the defeat of the British on 8 January,

Jackson maintained his strategy of constant harassment. The

artillery, including the Louisiana, continued bombarding the

British camp and theTennesseans and Choctaws resumed their

nighttime “hunting” trips.

Making matters worse for the British, after the battle

the weather once again turned, resulting in heavy rains. The

Mississippi overflowed its banks and flooded the British

camp, making the day to day existence of the individual

167
Soldier miserable. The supply situation, poor since the

expeditionary force’s arrival, never improved, leaving

Lambert with an irretrievable position. Lambert made the 

decision to retreat on 9 January.

Lambert’sdecisionrequired a greatdealofdetailedplanning

previously absent in the British command, primarily because of

the shattered physical and moral state of the Army. A 

haphazard retreat could lead to the destruction of the entire

British force. The capabilities on hand to support such an effort

remained limited. Lambert lacked the transport to move all of

his force at once. Therefore, he planned to conduct a 

withdrawal from contact and a general retreat over the course

of nine days. In addition to moving his wounded by barge, he

ordered the construction of a crude road all the way back to

Lake Borgne for use by hisremaining Soldiers and the walking

wounded. He even accounted for the transport of the bodies

of Pakenham and Gibbs, packing them in casks of rum for the

voyage home and burial in England.

During the darkness on 18-19 January theBritish withdrew

from their camp, aided by a thick fog bank rolling off of the

river. They spiked and abandoned the majority of their

artillery. By 0800 on the nineteenth the camp stood

abandoned, with the exception of the severely wounded and 

attending doctors, left to the care and compassion of the enemy.

However, the retreat presented another ordeal for the Soldiers as

they silently marched toward Lake Borgne. Under the

continuing poor weather conditions, the British columns

moved along the roughly cutroad. Lead regiments moved fairly

well but the further rearward elements encountered a path of

churned mud and water that greatly slowed their movement.

On 27 January the last British Soldiers joined the fleet in its

anchorage. Lambert successfully conducted the most

complicated and risky operation undertaken by the British 

expeditionary force during the entire campaign.

When the fog cleared on the morning of 19 January,

Jackson and his men learned of the British departure.

Jackson’s subordinates counseled a pursuit but he declined,

deciding to allow the British to leave unhindered. He stilled

needed to preserve his force for future operations, not knowing

where the British may strike next. He did, however, send

his mounted forces under Major Hinds to follow the retreating

British at a safe distance in order to maintain contact and assess

their potential intentions. Jackson then rode into the

abandoned enemy camp and ordered that the British wounded

receive care and prepared transport for them to housing in

New Orleans.

168
Vignettes

1. In an effort to maintain pressure on the defeated British

through nonlethal methods the Americans began a fairly

aggressive attempt at inducing British Soldiers to desert. These

efforts achieved somewhat better effects than the more

aggressive British attempts before the campaign began.

Lieutenant Glieg described the increasing challenges in the

immediate aftermath of the fighting:

To our Soldiers every inducement was held out by the

enemy to desert. Printed papers, offering lands and

money as the price of desertion, were thrown into the

piquets, whilst individuals made a practice of

approaching our posts, and endeavoring to persuade

the very sentinels to quit their stations. Nor could it

be expected that bribes so tempting would always be

refused. Many desertions began daily to take place,

and became before long so frequent, that the evil

rose to be of a serious nature.

66

2. Within a week of the final attack the Americans began to

detect indicators of the British retreat, as indicated by Major

Tatum:

About the 15th & 16th the movements of the enemy

afforded strong evidence of a disposition to

withdraw from their lines and to re-embark on board 

their Vessels at the Bayou Bienvenue. Deserters

confirmed the suspicions we had entertained, and

stated that they were daily sending off all heavy

Articles, particularly their Ball, powder, Grape shot 

&c. as well as their sick & convalescent Soldiers. This

disposition to retire was attended with increased

evidence until the night of the 18th when, under cover

of a heavy fog, common to this country, they actually

abandoned their Encampment, and retired behind a 

battery erected for the security of their retreat, at a 

strong position on Villerys Canal. A discovery of this

movement was not made until the fog had cleared

away at about 8 o clock of the morning of the 19th.67

Whether it is the purpose of the enemy to abandon the

expedition altogether or, renew his efforts at some

other point, I do not pretend to determine with 

positiveness. In my own mind, however, there is but 

little doubt that his last exertions have been made in

this quarter, at any rate for the present season, and

by the next I hope we shall be fully prepared for him.

3. Jackson wrote to the Secretary of War that same day with

an assessment of the situation following the British retreat:

169
In this belief I am strengthened not only by the

prodigious loss he has sustained at the position he has

just quitted but by the failure of his fleet to pass fort

St. Philip.68

4. Major Overton, the American commander of Fort St. Philip

reported the events surrounding the British attempt to force 

the Mississippi in a letter to Jackson on 19 January.

Early in the day of the 8th instant, 1 was advised 

of their approach, and on the 9th at a quarter past

ten A.M. hove in sight two bomb-vessels, one sloop,

one brig, and one schooner; they anchored two and a 

quarter miles below. At half past eleven, and at half

past twelve they advanced two barges, apparently for

the purpose of sounding within one and a half mile

of the fort. At this moment, I ordered my water 

battery, under the command of Lieutenant

Cunningham of the navy, to open upon them its

well-directed shot caused a precipitate retreat. At half

past three o’clock, P. M. the enemy’s bomb vessels

opened theirfire from four sea-mortars, two of thirteen

inches, two of ten, and to my great mortification I 

found they were within the effective range of my shot,

as many subsequent experiments proved; they

continued their fire with little intermission during the

10th [and through the] 17th. I occasionally opened my

batteries on them with great vivacity, particularly 

when they showed a disposition to change their

position. On the 17th in the evening, our heavy mortar

was said to be in readiness. I ordered...to open a fire, 

which was done with great effect, as the enemy from

that moment became disordered, and at daylight on

the 18th commenced their retreat, after having thrown

upwards of a thousand heavy shells, besides small

shells from howitzers, round shot and grape, which he

discharged from boats under cover of the night. Our

loss in this affair has been uncommonly small, owing

entirely to the great pains that was taken by the

different officers to keep their men under cover; as

the enemy left scarcely ten feet of this garrison

untouched.69

5. For the British Soldiers, once back aboard ship, time to

reflect upon the recent events of New Orleans began. Some

of these thoughts would continue to develop overthe following

decades as some officers put pen to paper and wrote their

accounts of the campaign and its culminating battle.

Lieutenant Gleig, with the passage of time, still 

focused on remembering the personal details of the Soldiers:

170
Our return was far from triumphant. We, who only

seven weeks ago had set out in the surest confidence

of glory, and, I may add, of emolument, were brought

back dispirited and dejected. Our ranks were wofully

[sic] thinned, our chiefs slain, our clothing tattered

and filthy, and even our discipline in some degree

injured. A gloomy silence reigned throughout the

armament, except when it was broken by the voice of

lamentation over fallen friends; and the interior of

each ship presented a scenewell calculated to prove the

short-sightedness of human hope, and human

prudence.70

Captain Surtees, with slightly more time to remember

than Gleig, adopted a deeper approach, learning the lesson of 

contempt:

Providence, which had smiled upon us in our late

operations against the most formidable Army in the 

world, the French, here taught us most painfully, that

the victory is not always to be gained by strength or

courage. Indeed it was but a just punishment for

the contempt we entertained for our opponents, and

which unfortunate feeling, I believe, was almost

universal. I own I entertained it in a high degree;

for I judged it next to a moral impossibility that an

Army of undisciplined and unmanageable peasants,

however, numerous, could for a moment withstand the

attack of those troops who had overthrown the

victorious legions of Bonaparte.71

Analysis

1. Discuss the challenges that the British faced in conducting

their retreat from New Orleans.

2. Evaluate Jackson’s reaction and the steps he took in the

wake of the British retreat. What was his assessment of the

situation?

3. Evaluate the British decision to attempt to force the

Mississippi at Fort St. Philip after the repulse of the British

attack at Chalmette. Would success have given new life to the 

British campaign?

4. How important is the idea of respecting one’s enemy?

171
172

1. Brown, 56.

2. Benton Rain Patterson, The Generals: Andrew

Jackson, Sir Edward Pakenham, and the Road to the Battle of 

New Orleans, (New York: New York University Press, 

2005), 168.

3. Lacarriere Latour, Historical Memoir of the War in

West Florida and Louisiana in 1814-1815: With an Atlas,

(Philadelphia: John Conrad and Co., 1816), cxxxviii.

4. Quoted in Brown, 77-78.

5. Quoted in Reilly, 174.

6. Quoted in Reilly, 175.

7. Quoted in Patterson, 157.

8. Quoted in Latour, vii-viii.

9. Quoted in Latour, xi.

10. Quoted in Latour, xiv.

11. Latour, 53-54.

12. Howell Tatum, “Major Howell Tatum’s Journal,” in

Smith College Studies in History, (Northampton: Smith 

College: 1921/1922), 96-97.

13. Samuel Wilson, Jr., The Battle of New Orleans:

Plantation Houses on the Battlefield of New Orleans, (New 

Orleans: The Louisiana Landmark Society, 1985), 87.

14. G.R. Gleig, The Campaigns of the British Army at

Washington and New Orle0ans, in the Years 1814-1815, 

(London: John Murray, 1827), 265-266.

15. Wilson, 60-75.

16. Gleig, 288.

17. Latour, 112.

18. These various points are quoted from three

supporting letters dispatched from London on 24 October 

1814 in Henry Bathurst, “Instructions to Major-General Sir 

Edward Pakenham for the New Orleans Campaign,” The War 

of 1812 Magazine, http://www.napoleonseries.org/military/Warof1812/2011/Issue16/c_PakenhamOrd

ers.html. 

19. Wilson, 39, 42, 44.

20. “National Park Service pamphlet for Jean Lafitte

National Historical Park and Preserve.” 

http://www.nps.gov/jela/chalmette-national-cemetery.htm, 

accessed 19 FEB 14.

21. Gleig, 210.

Notes
22. William Surtees, Twenty-five Years in the Rifle

Brigade, (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1833), 58.

23. Simmons, 7-8.

24. Wilson, 22- 32

25. Numerous sources attest to Cochrane’s presence at

this council and his ensuing argument with Pakenham when 

the latter supposedly indicated his thoughts on a withdrawal 

in order to march on New Orleans from another more viable 

approach. Cochrane supposedly objected to the idea of 

withdrawal and openly questioned the courage of the army, 

bragging that he would lead sailors and marines to seize the 

city. This led to the assertion that Cochrane bullied 

Pakenham into the events that followed. British historian 

Robin Reilly, who provides the best researched study of the 

campaign, lends that there are no credible sources to support 

this; none of the most relied upon primary sources, written by 

key staff officers in the British headquarters present that 

evening mentioned Cochrane’s presence in camp. In 

hindsight, they would have most certainly mentioned it in 

defense of their commander-in-chief.

26. Latour refers to the noise being heard by the men in

the line, but does not mention if such critical information was 

reported up the chain of command. On the other hand, Tatum 

explains, though without noting any specific time, that 

evidence of the British work led to orders to prepare to 

defend against a possible attack, which occurred shortly 

afterward. See Latour, 131-132, and Tatum, 120-121.

27. Several historians assert that Jackson chose the

morning of 1 January to conduct a grand review of his army, 

implying that this provided some opportunity for the British 

to achieve initial tactical surprise. However, Robin Reilly 

found nothing substantial to support the occurrence and ruled 

out an erroneous assertion left by Gleig who was not 

physically located to see beyond the Rodriguez Canal. There 

is no reference to such an event in the post-action memoirs 

produced by Latour and Tatum, trusted members of Jackson’s 

staff. In fact, both men described in detail the opening of the 

bombardment when the fog began to clear at approximately 

1000 and the direct targeting of the Macarty House, where 

they were eating breakfast with their commanding general. 

28. Quoted in Remini, 118.

29. Tatum, 18-119.

30. Surtees, 366.

31. Benson Earle Hill, Recollections of an Artillery

Officer, Including Scenes and Adventures in Ireland, 

173
America, Flanders, and France, (London: Richard Bentley, 

1836), 3-4.

32. Gleig, 326-327.

33. G. C. Smith, The Autobiography of LieutenantGeneral Sir Harry Smith, Baronet of Aliwal on The Sutlej, 

G.C.B, (London: William Clowes and Sons, Limited, 1903), 

232-233.

34. Tatum, 112.

35. Latour, 146-147.

36. Hill, 3-4.

37. John Henry Cooke, Narrative of Events in the South

of France and of the Attack on New Orleans, (London: T. & 

W. Boone, 1835), 169.

38. Surtees, 73.

39. Latour, 153.

40. Tatum, “Major Howell Tatum’s Journal,”124.

41. Quoted in Latour, lxii.

42. Quoted in Latour, liii.

43. Old New Orleans, “The Beauregard House,”

http://www.thepastwhispers.com/Old_New_Orleans. 

44. Smith, 235-236.

45. Quoted in Latour, lxii.

46. Cooke, 228.

47. Surtees, 376-377.

48. Quoted in Remini, 142.

49. Quoted in Reilly, 313-314.

50. Surtees, 73.

51. Surtees, 73.

52. Quoted in Remini, 143.

53. Patterson, 245.

54. Quoted in Remini, 145.

55. “They're comin' on their all fours!” 2nd Regiment

Kentucky Volunteer Militia, 

http://www.2ndkentucky1812.com/category/2nd-regimentkentucky-volunteer-militia/. This eyewitness account first 

appeared in The Louisiana Historical Quarterly, Vol. IX, No. 

1, January 1926, republished in Paul M. Angle, The American 

Reader (1958) and was partially quoted in Remini’s, The 

Battle of New Orleans..

174
56. Gleig, 335.

58. Hill, 11.

59. Quoted in Remini, 147.

60. Quoted in Reilly, 320.

61. Smith, 236-237.

62. Cooke, 238-239.

63. “They're comin' on their all fours!” 2nd Regiment

Kentucky Volunteer Militia, 

http://www.2ndkentucky1812.com/category/2nd-regimentkentucky-volunteer-militia/. 

64. Gleig, 341-342.

65. Leonard V. Huber, The Battle of New Orleans and its

Monument, (New Orleans: Laborde Printing Company, 

1983), 12, 25, 30.

66. Gleig, 348.

67. Tatum, 134.

68. Quoted in Latour, lvii.

69. Quoted in Latour, lxix.

70. Gleig, 357.

71. Surtees, 87.

57. Quoted in Reilly, 318-319.

175

Part IV. Integration: Final Phase of the Staff Ride

Introduction

As previously mentioned, a staff ride consists of three

distinct phases. The first phase is the preliminary study phase.

This phase is conducted before the visit to the battlefield and

prepares the audience for the visit to the terrain. The second

phase is the field study phase. This phase is conducted on the

actual terrain and enables the participants to understand

historical events through analysis of the actual ground on which

the events took place. The final phase of a staff ride is the

integration phase, where the work of the preliminary and field

study phases come together to provide the audience with the

fullest picture of events. No staff ride is complete without an

integration phase because it is critical for the participants to

understand what happened, why it happened, and, most

importantly, what can be learned from the study of the battle or

campaign.

There are several factors that those facilitating a staff

ride should consider when planning for and conducting the

integration phase. First, they must work with the organization

that is participating in the staff ride and select a time and

location for the integration session. Occasionally,

organizations and units may have to depart shortly after the

last stand of the field study phase. Therefore, the integration

phase must be conducted on the battlefield immediately

following the completion of the final stand, perhaps at an

important monument or in an adjacent National Cemetery.

However, when possible, participants should have some time 

for personal reflection and thought before the integration

phase. Thus, it may be best to do the integration session at

another location; informal settings that are often more 

comfortable and will encourage open discussion from all the

participants.

Those individuals tasked with planning a staff ride should

organize the integration phase based on the organization/unit,

the time available, and the learning/training objectives. It is

important to keep in mind that the integration phase is not an

after action review (AAR) of the staff ride itself (i.e., ways to

improve the ride). While it is useful to seek constructive 

criticism in order to continue to improve the staff ride, this

should be done at another time and perhapsin written format for 

future reference. Instead, the integration phase is used for the

audience to integrate their preliminary study with the fieldwork

to gain insights that are relevant to their current duties and 

enhance their development and education.

177
Onemethodthatoftenproduces a fruitful integrationphaseis

to conduct the session in two parts based on two broad

questions. Sometimes, the individual leading the integration

session need only present the general question and let others

carry the conversation, or there may be additional follow-up

questions to enhance the overall discussion. The two questions 

are discussed below:

What aspects of the overall campaign and the battle

that you developed in the preliminary study phase that 

changed or were strongly reinforced because of your study

of the ground?

This is a crucial question because seeing the terrain is

central to a staff ride, otherwise the campaign could simply be

studied in the classroom. Of course, students may develop a 

wide range of answers based on personal study and

observations in the field. Some of the more popular aspects 

of the discussion of terrain for the Battle of New Orleans

include the various waterways that facilitated or hindered

British naval superiority, the complex terrain countered by

the British expeditionary force once it landed below New

Orleans, the American cutting of the levee to flood the ground

on the Chalmette plantation, the limited maneuver space

available to the British, the effectiveness of the Rodriguez

Canal as a defensive line, and the part played by the

Mississippi River as both avenue of approach and obstacle to

the British. The facilitator can ask related questions, which

may also generate added discussion: Did seeing the terrain

alter your opinion of any key decisions made by a specific

leader? A common response to this question is that Jackson

should have emplaced command and control mechanisms that

verified to him that the Villere Canal had been effectively

blocked, per his orders, in order to deny the British a 

possible avenue of approach to the city.

What insights can the modern military professional

gain from the Battles of New Orleans that are relevant

today?

This part of the integration session can be divided into a 

number of subject matter areas, depending on the type of

organization or unit conducting the staff ride. For example, a 

military intelligence battalion might focus on reconnaissance

operations, intelligence gathering, Commander’s Critical

Information Requirements (CCIR), shared situational

awareness, and the differences between situational awareness

and situational understanding.

178
Keeping in mind that New Orleans is the decisive operation

of the larger Gulf Campaign makes the staff ride as much an

operational level effort as it is tactical, it might be useful to

prompt discussion by using the elements of operational art as a 

framework for relevant lessons. These elements are:

These terms from ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, 

are provided as a tool; the facilitator may use them, use another

framework, or simply let the audience take the discussion in

whatever direction that makes sense in achieving the training 

objectives.

The two suggested integration phase questions are meant 

to aid in sparking discussion, not to provide hard and fast

rules of warfare. Note that the handbook provides examples of

possible answers to the questions but it does not attempt to

provide a list of “schoolhouse solution” answers. The

facilitator should take time before the session to write down his

or her own answers to these questions in order to have some

potential ideas to generate further discussion. At the same

time, the facilitator should strive for the participants to develop

their own answers, and thus be prepared to let the discussion 

roam many different constructive paths.

179

End state and conditions Basing

Center of gravity

Deceive points

Tempo

Phasing and transitions 

Lines of operations and effort Culmination

Operational reach Risk

Part V. Support

Practical Information on Conducting a Staff Ride in the 

New OrleansArea

1. Information and assistance.

a. The Combat Studies Institute Staff Ride Team, Fort

Leavenworth, Kansas, has conducted numerous New Orleans

Staff Rides and can provide advice and assistance on every

aspect of the staff ride. The Team can also provide qualified

instructors to facilitators the New Orleans Staff Ride. Staff

Ride Team support includes background information, detailed

knowledge of the battle and battlefield, and familiarity with

the New Orleans campaign area. Visit the Combat Studies

Institute’s Military History Support website for information on

requesting staff ride assistance.

Phone contact:

Telephone: DSN: 

552-2131/2082

Commercial: (913) 

684-2131 Staff Ride 

Team website:

http://usacac.Army.mil/core-functions/militaryhistory/staff-rides

Contact the Staff Ride Team:

usarmy.leavenworth.tradoc.mbx.csi-srt@mail.mil

b. Various sites outlined in this hand book fall under the

authority of local, State, and Federal offices. Where

applicable, it is important to contact the respective site staffs

and let them know that a group will be conducting a staff

ride at their site. Many times this coordination assists in deconflicting staff rides with local events that can adversely

affect the staff ride. While members of the United States

military can enter National Park Service (NPS) Battlefield

Parks without entrance fees, state parks do have entrance fees 

that cannot be waived.

Fort Pike State Historic Site

For groups utilizing Fort Pike as an initial stand in a staff

ride several key points should be understood. First, individual

entry fee is $4 per person. Second, there is no visitor center

(however, there are modern restroom facilities) or museum.

Finally, a visit to the site is self-guided due to support staff

manning.

Address: 27100 Chef Menteur Highway, New Orleans, 

LA Telephone: (504) 255-9171 or 1-888-662-5703

Hours of operation: 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., Tuesday-Saturday

181
Website:

http://www.crt.state.la.us/louisiana-state-parks/historicsites/fort-pike- state-historic-site/index

Chalmette National Historic Battlefield Park and Chalmette

National Cemetery

The Chalmette Battlefield is a part of the Jean Lafitte

National Historic Park and Preserve system. Chalmette has its 

own visitor center and facilities.The VisitorCenter is closed on

Sunday. There is no admission fee but donations are

appreciated.

Address: 8606 West St. Bernard Highway, Chalmette, 

LA Telephone: (504) 281-0510

Hours of operation: 9 a.m. to 4 p.m., Tuesday-Saturday;

9:30 a.m. to 3:30 pm Sunday and Monday.

Website:http://www.nps.gov/jela/chalmette-battlefield.htm

2. Sustainment.

a. Meals. New Orleans is known for its food and there

are many restaurants in the area that are convenient for use

during a staff ride. Enjoy the local establishments; do not settle

for chain restaurants unlesstime is a factor. Meals can either be

a personal responsibility or can be taken care of at nearby

restaurants. Allow 30-45 minutes for lunch, even when the 

group carries its own.

b. Lodging. There is an abundance of hotels in New

Orleans area, especially in downtown New Orleans. However,

traffic becomes an issue when driving to various sites around

the city at peak hours. Traffic must always be a factor in

selecting a location. If the group wants to decrease lodging

costs, there is usually billeting available at the Louisiana

Army National Guard’s Jackson Barracks.

c. Travel. If the group is flying to the area, the Louis

Armstrong InternationalAirport isthe only choice. Once on the

ground, larger groups will need to contract for a bus in

advance—make sure it has a microphone and public address

system as well as a restroom. Smaller groups (less than 35) will

find it easier to use rental vans.

3. Other considerations.

a. A detailed reconnaissance of the stands and routes prior

to execution of the staff ride is critical for a successfulstaff ride.

b. Ensure that every member of the group has water.

Additionally, restrooms are only available at the Fort

Pike State Historic Site and the Chalmette National

Battlefield Park; plan for additional stops for facilities

182
as necessary.

d. Mosquitoes, chiggers, ticks, and fire ants are prevalent

insects from March to October, so the use of insect repellent is 

advised.

e. Road traffic throughout the New Orleans area is heavy

and drivers can be aggressive. Several stands are conducted

near major roads and some foot movement across or parallel to

these roads is necessary. Be sure to stress safety to group

members when getting off and on the vehicles and when 

moving across or near these busy roads.

c. Ensure that the group brings proper clothing for 

inclement weather. Thunderstorms can occur in any 

season and some local storms can be quite violent. 

Walking is required for all of the sites visited, so 

comfortable boots or hiking shoes are highly 

recommended as the standard.

183

Appendix A

New Orleans Order of

Battle On the Morning of

8 January 1815

British Forces

Sir Edward Pakenham, Commanding

1st Brigade (Lambert)

7th Regiment (Royal Fusiliers) (minus Light Company)

43rd Regiment (Monmouth Light Infantry) (minus Light Company) 

5th West India Regiment (minus Light Company)

14th Light Dragoon Regiment (Dismounted)

2nd Brigade (Gibbs)

4th Regiment (Kings Own) (minus Light Company)

21st Regiment (Royal Scots Fusiliers) (minus Light Company)

44th Regiment (East Essex) (minus Light Company)

95th Rifle Regiment (Detachment)

Battalion of Light Companies (4th, 5th, 21st, 44th Regiments)

3rd Brigade (Keane)

1st West India Regiment

93d Regiment (Sutherland Highlanders) (minus Light Company) 

95th Rifle Regiment (Detachment)

Battalion of Light Companies (7th, 43rd, 93d Regiments)

Thornton’s Column

85th Regiment (Bucks Light Infantry) Detachment, 

Royal Marines Detachment, Royal Navy

185
American Forces

Major General Andrew Jackson, Commanding

Ross’Wing (Colonel George Ross)

US 7th Infantry Regiment

US 44th Infantry Regiment

US Marine Detachment, New Orleans

Plauché’s Uniformed Militia, Louisiana Militia

Daquin’s First Battalion of Free Men of Color, Louisiana Militia

Lacoste’s Second Battalion of Free Men of Color, Louisiana Militia

Beales’ New Orleans Rifles Company, Louisiana Militia

Battery Numbers 1-5

Carroll’s Wing (Major General William Carroll)

Carroll’s Brigade, West Tennessee Militia

1st Regiment West Tennessee Militia

2d Regiment West Tennessee Militia

3d Regiment West Tennessee Militia

Detachment of Kentucky Militia Battery Numbers 6-8

Coffee’s Wing (Major General John Coffee)

Coffee’s Brigade, West Tennessee Volunteer Mounted Gunmen

1st Regiment West Tennessee Volunteer Mounted Gunmen 

2d Regiment West Tennessee Volunteer Mounted Gunmen

Jugeant’s Company of Choctaw Indians

Morgan (Brigadier General David Morgan) (Right Bank)

US Naval Battalion (Patterson)

Marine Battery (Patterson)

Declouet’s Regiment of Louisiana Drafted Militia

Arnaud’s Battalion, 6th Louisiana Militia Regiment

Davis’ Kentucky Militia Regiment

Reserves

Adair’s Brigade, Kentucky Militia

Slaughter’s Kentucky Militia Regiment

Mitchusson’s Kentucky Militia Regiment

Hinds’Battalion of Mississippi Mounted Rifles

Ogden’s Orleans Troop of Dragoons

Harrison’s Battalion, Kentucky Militia

186
Appendix B

Biographical Sketches of Key

Participants American Forces

Major General Andrew Jackson, Commanding General, US

7th Military District

Andrew Jackson was born on 15 March 1767 in the

Waxhaw Settlement in South Carolina shortly after the death

of his father in an accident. As a young teenager he supported

the patriot cause during the American Revolution, serving

as a scout, courier, and participated in several engagements.

Wounded in an altercation with a British officer and

imprisoned, he barely survived an illness contracted in prison, 

thanks to the care provided by his mother. Eventually his

mother died of illness contracted while caring for other

American prisoners of war. This event, coupled with the

deaths of two of his brothers during the war, increased

Jackson’s extremely passionate hatred for the British. After

American independence he worked for a time in a saddler’s

shop and afterward taught school. Despite never receiving a 

good formal education but demonstrating a strong eagerness to

learn, Jackson studied law in Salisbury, NC, was admitted to

the bar in 1787 and moved to Jonesboro (now Tennessee)

in 1788 and commenced practice where he began his

political rise. He received an appointment as solicitor of the 

western district of North Carolina (the modern state of

Tennessee) in 1788 and held the same position in the

Tennessee territorial government after 1791. Additionally, he

served as a delegate to the convention to frame a constitution

for the new state of Tennessee in1796 and, upon the admission

of Tennessee into the Union, became the Democratic

Republican state representative to the Fourth and Fifth United

States Congresses, serving from 5 December 1796 until his

resignation in September 1797 upon his election to the

United States Senate. He served in the senate from 

September 1797 until his resignation in April 1798. Jackson

then served as a judge of the State Supreme Court of Tennessee

from 1798-1804 while also engaging in private planting and

mercantile investments. Jackson’s political pursuits became

deeply embedded with military activities in 1801 when he

received appointment as commander of the Tennessee Militia

with the rank of colonel and later was elected major general

of the Tennessee Militia in 1802. On 4 September 1813 the

infamous Jackson-Benton Brothers duel in downtown

Nashville took place and Jackson sustained two pistolwounds

that affected his health for the rest of hislife. Despite his recent

wounds and associated ill-health, Jackson served as

commander of Tennessee forces during the Creek Warin 1813-

187
1814, earning the personal respect of his regular and Militia 

Soldiers alike and the nickname “Old Hickory.” His ultimate 

victory over the Creeks earned him a commission as major 

general of regulars in the United States Army in May 1814 

and command of the US 7th Military District. Jackson 

commanded American forces during the final campaign of the 

War of 1812 in the Gulf region of the United States, 

culminating in the victory over the British expeditionary 

force in the Battle of New Orleans, December 1814-January 

1815, for which he received the thanks of Congress and a 

gold medal by resolution. Following the War of 1812 

Jackson commanded the American expedition that seized 

Florida from Spain in 1817 and served as Governor of that 

new American territory in 1821. He returned to United States 

Senate and served from March 1823 to October 1825 when he 

resigned. Jackson made an unsuccessful bid for the 

Presidency in 1824 but won an extremely bitter campaign to 

be elected the seventh President of the United States in 1828, 

winning re-election in 1832, and serving until the end of his 

second term in March 1837 when he officially retired to his 

country home, the ‘Hermitage,’ near Nashville, Tennessee 

where he died 8 June 1845. 

Governor William C. C. Claiborne, Governor of Louisiana

William Charles Coles Claiborne’s birth date is disputed

due to poor record keeping (several dates from 23 November

1772 to August 1775) but he was born in Sussex County,

Virginia. He studied at the College of William and Mary and

Richmond Academy at a very young age and at the age of 16, 

Claiborne moved toNew York City where he worked as an 

assistant to the Clerk of the United States House of

Representatives, maintaining that position when the Federal

Government moved to Philadelphia. After studying law, he

moved to the Tennessee Territory in 1794 to practice law.

Claiborne began his political rise following his appointment by

Tennessee State Governor, John Sevier, to the Tennessee

State Supreme Court in 1796. In 1797 Claiborne successfully

ran for the seat in the US House of Representatives vacated by

Andrew Jackson, serving through 1801 when President

Thomas Jefferson appointed him governor and superintendent

of Indian affairs in the Mississippi Territory (the modern states

of Mississippi and Alabama) where his efforts in this capacity

earned him the praise of his constituents and the indigenous

Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians. In 1803 Claiborne served as

a commissioner appointed to receive the colony of Louisiana

from French authorities following the Louisiana Purchase. 

He was then appointed first governor of the new Territory

of Orleans (comprised of the modern state of Louisiana east

188
of the Mississippi River and the southern half on the west

side), serving from 1804 to 1812. The sudden ushering in of

an American government was not well received by the local 

Creole population and there were a series of political quarrels

between Claiborne, legislators, and the local aristocracy. 

However, upon the admittance of the Territory of Orleans into 

the Union in 1812 as the state of Louisiana, Claiborne was 

elected governor and served until 1816. During the War of

1812 Claiborne constantly voiced concerns over the

vulnerabilities of the American Gulf coast, especially New

Orleans. Upon the arrival of Andrew Jackson to assume

personal command of the American forces at New Orleans,

Claiborne and Jackson suffered a falling out based on the

Governor’s previous correspondence that outlined many

threats to New Orleans, real and perceived, and

misrepresented the state of the city’s defenses. Some

historians believe he abdicated his authority and responsibility

to Jackson, ultimately resulting inmartial law. Claiborne served

in his capacity as a major general in the Louisiana state Militia

and commanded state forces that secured the critical Chef 

Menteur route from Lake Borgne to the city, long a personal

concern of Jackson’s as a key avenue of approach for British

forces. After the War of 1812 Claiborne won election to the

US Senate in 1817 but served only a few months before dying

in that same year. His remains are interred at the Metairie

Cemetery in New Orleans.

Master Commandant Daniel T. Patterson, Commander, US

Naval Forces, New Orleans Station

Daniel Todd Patterson was born on 6 March 1786 on

Long Island, New York. He entered the US Navy as an acting

Midshipman in 1799, defending American shipping from 

French privateers and warships. During the war with Tripoli

pirates he served in the frigates Constitution and Philadelphia

and was taken prisoner when the latter was captured on 31

October 1803. Released in 1805, upon the cessation of

hostilities, Patterson served at New Orleans, Louisiana, for 

nearly two decades, attaining the ranks of Lieutenant in

1807 and Master Commandant in 1812. Later that year

Patterson assumed command of the New Orleans station. As

part of the Madison Administration’s policies against piracy,

in September 1814 Patterson led an amphibious attack on a 

pirate base of Jean Lafitte in Barataria Bay along Louisiana’s

Gulf coast. Anticipating eventual British designs against New

Orleans some two months before their attempt, Patterson

became one ofthe first American leadersto prepare the defense

of the city. He proved a highly competent naval advisor to 

Andrew Jackson during the Gulf Campaign of 1814-1815,

respectfully refusing to commit naval assets to Mobile Bay

189
where they could be trapped by superior British naval

forces, using his vessels to serve in critical reconnaissance

missions, and providing manpower and supplies to Jackson’s

force south of New Orleans. His decisions significantly

delayed the British approach to New Orleans and his placement

of naval guns with highly trained naval crews made a critical

contribution to the American victory. Promoted to Captain at

the end of February 1815, Patterson’s service at New Orleans

continued until 1824, when he took command of the frigate 

Constitution. From 1832-1836 he commanded the US Navy’s

Mediterranean Squadron, with the title of Commodore.

Subsequently, Patterson served as Commandant of the

Washington Naval Yard, holding that post until he died on 25

August 1839. The US Navy went on to name three ships in

honor of Daniel Patterson including the USS Patterson (DD

of 1911-1934; USS Patterson (DD 392) of 1937-1947; and

USS Patterson (E 1061) of 1970-1999. 

Major General John Coffee, Commander, Tennessee brigade

of mounted Militia

John Coffee was born on 2 June 1772 in Prince Edward

County, Virginia. He removed to Davidson County, Tennessee

in 1798 and engaged in mercantile pursuits till 1807, when he

began to survey public lands. In October 1809 Coffee married

a niece of Andrew Jackson’s wife, establishing close relations,

to include several duelsin defense ofJackson’s honor, with the

man that would guide much of the rest of Coffee’s life. At the

beginning of the War of 1812 Coffee raised and organized a 

Tennessee regiment of mounted riflemen. In December 1812,

the Governor of Tennessee called out state militia in response

to a request from the Secretary of War. Serving under

Jackson, Coffee commanded a force of 600 in the abortive

campaign against Natchez in the Mississippi Territory,

whereupon arrival of Jackson’s Militia, he discovered that

the Federal Government chose to disband his forces rather

than field them. Jackson marched them back to Nashville,

funding the effort from his personal expenses. On 4 

September 1813 Coffee was involved in the infamous

Jackson-Benton Brothers duel in downtown Nashville;

Coffee knocked future US Senator and westward expansion

champion Thomas Hart Benton down a flight of stairs after

Benton’s failed attempt to kill Jackson. A month later, Coffee

was promoted to brigadier general and placed in command of a 

brigade of mounted Militia. Jackson chose General Coffee as

his advance guard commander in the Creek War, in which he

commanded mostly militia and allied American Indians.

Coffee led his brigade at the Battles of Tallushatchee,

190
Talladega, Emuckfaw, and Enotachopo Creek, where he was

seriously wounded, and finally at the decisive American

victory at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend which served to

eliminate much of the Creek resistance and prevent British

interference in the conflict. Coffee’s brigade also actively

participated in Jackson’s seizure of Pensacola and then

executed a two-day forced march from Baton Rouge to New

Orleans upon Jackson’s order to consolidate American

forces to face the British expeditionary force. The brigade,

combined with free blacks and American Indian warriors from 

allied Southeast tribes, played a key role in securing the

woods on the left flank of the American defensive line at

New Orleans. After the War of 1812, served as SurveyorGeneral of the Southwest Territory; he laid out the town of

Florence, Alabama and established the modern boundary

between the states of Mississippi and Alabama. During

Jackson’s Presidency, Coffee served as one of his old friend’s

representatives in negotiating treaties with the Southeastern

American Indian tribes to accomplish their removal in

accordance with the Indian Removal Act of 1830. Coffee died

near Florence, Alabama in July 1834.

Major General William Carroll, Major General of the

Tennessee Militia William Carroll was born on 3 March 1788 in

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, the son of successful businessman

with strong state political ties. With little formal education,

Carroll gained practical experience working for his father.

That led to his moving to Nashville, Tennessee in 1808 to

open a branch of his father’s business, carrying a letter of

introduction to Andrew Jackson signed by Pennsylvania

politician and US Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin.

At the start of the War of 1812 Carroll received an

appointment as a captain in the Tennessee State Militia. He

served in Jackson’s campaigns against the Creek Indians

in 1813, receiving promotion to major, and serving at the

Battle of Talladega. During the lull between campaigns against

the Creeks, Carroll also became involved in the JacksonBenton Brothers feud, fighting a duel with Jesse Benton, one

of Jackson’s subordinate officers, in June 1813; Jackson

served as Carroll’s second.The duel, in which both participants

were wounded, led directly to the infamous street battle in

September 1813 where Jackson received his debilitating

wounds on the eve of his final campaign against the Creeks. 

During that final campaign, Carroll distinguished himself at

the Battles of Emuckfaw and Enotachopo Creek in January

1814 and was wounded at the Battle of Horseshoe Bend in

March 1814. In November 1814, Carroll received the 

appointment as major general of Tennessee Militia, replacing

Jackson after he accepted his Regular Army commission and

191
command of the 7th Military District. At the Battle of New

Orleans Carroll’s force defended the center of the American

line and experienced the brunt of the fighting during the

various British attacks, inflicting severe casualties upon the

enemy on 8 January. After the War of 1812 Carroll ran for the

Tennessee governorship, against an opponent endorsed by

Jackson, and won in a landslide. He ran unopposed for 

reelection in 1823 and 1825. In 1827 term limits prevented him

from serving a fourth consecutive term. Passed over for a US

Senate seat, Carroll fell out with the Jackson wing of the

Democratic Party and ran unsuccessfully against Sam

Houston in 1829. Political scandal led to Houston’s

resignation and Carroll’s easy election and successful reelections, without opposition, in 1831 and 1833. He held the

office longer than any other person and is considered one 

of the state’s most popular political figures during the 1820s

and 1830s. William Carroll died in Nashville, Tennessee on 22 

March 1844.

Brigadier General David Morgan, Louisiana Militia,

Commander of American forces on the Right Bank

David B. Morgan was born in 1773 in West Springfield,

Massachusetts. He worked as a surveyor, initially in

Massachusetts, and moved to Louisiana in 1803, served in the

territorial legislature, worked as a member of the

Constitutional convention, and served in the state legislature

after Louisiana’s admission to the Union. He also served as

Surveyor-General of Louisiana and Mississippi. As Brigadier

General, he commanded the Militia forces of those states

under Andrew Jackson during the British attempt to seize

New Orleans. Morgan initially commanded the Louisiana

Militia located on the English Turn portion of the Mississippi

River, a key position in denying the Royal Navy further

access up the river to New Orleans. During Jackson’s night

attack on 23 December 1814, Morgan received orders to also

attack the rear of the British camp. However, the force did

not arrive at the enemy camp until well after Jackson’s attack

ended and Morgan withdrew out of caution. A week later

Jackson ordered Morgan to assume command of the Louisiana

Militia, and later attached Kentucky Militia, tasked with

defending the right bank of the Mississippi River across from 

Jackson’s main defensive line along the Rodriguez Canal.

There the British experienced the only major tactical success 

encountered during the expedition, overwhelming Morgan’s

line and capturing the key artillery positions that could

enfilade the main British attack against Jackson. A court of

inquiry after the battle did not even mention Morgan’s name,

thus allowing him to escape blame or reprimand. David 

Morgan died in Covington, Louisiana, 15 July 1848.

192
British Forces

Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, commander of the

British Royal Navy’s North America station

Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane was born on 23 April

1758, the son of the eighth Earl of Dundonald. He joined the

navy at an early age, and was made lieutenant in 1778 during 

the War of American independence. In 1780, as a junior 

lieutenant, he was wounded in action off Martinique. Made

commander in December 1780, he continued on the West

Indian station and in December 1782 achieved promotion to

post captain. When war ended in 1783 Cochrane returned to

England and he remained unemployed on half pay until 1790

when he was appointed to command of a frigate. In 1793, with

war against France, Cochrane cruised against enemy

privateers off Norway during the spring and summer, and then

transferred to command of a vessel on the North American

station. In 1799 Cochrane commanded an 80 gun frigate and

in the following year he served in the Channel Fleet,

participating in a number of amphibious operations in the

Mediterranean where he earned high praise for superintending

the landing of troops in Egypt in February–March 1801 and

supporting them with a flotilla of armed boats. However,

Cochrane also began displaying a personality prone to

personal vendetta and intra-service infighting. The breakdown

of the short peace in 1803 led to a return to sea and a new

command, which he retained as his flagship when advanced

to rear admiral of the blue in April 1804. Commanding a 

squadron off the coast of Spain, Cochrane proved efficient

in sending home intelligence on Spanish armament and war 

preparations. In February 1805, he conducted an unsuccessful

pursuit of a French naval squadron to the West Indies but he

received the appointment as commander-in-chief at the

Leeward Islands. Cochrane became rear admiral of the white

in November 1805. In 1806 he participated in the battle of San

Domingo for which he received a knighthood, a vote of thanks

from both houses of parliament, freedom of the City of

London, and a sword of honor. He advanced to rear admiral of 

the red in April 1808 and in 1809 he and Lieutenant General

George Beckwith began a joint campaign against the French

in the West Indies captured the islands of Martinique and

Guadeloupe (in which Edward Pakenham also served as

commander of the 7th Fusiliers). Cochrane became viceadmiral of the blue in October 1809 and advanced to viceadmiral of the white in July 1810 and of the red in December

1813. Cochrane participated in 1813 in the joint planning for 

the 1814 campaign season in North America which included

operations in the Gulf of Mexico. By 1814, he commanded 

the North American station to direct, though not actively

193
commanding, a number of amphibious operations against the 

American coast. These would include the burning of 

Washington, the failure to seize Baltimore, and the disaster at 

New Orleans. After the war ended, Cochrane oversaw the

withdrawal of British forces from North America before his

return to England in April 1815. On his return to England

Cochrane once again became unemployed and on half pay but

became admiral of the blue in August 1819. He finished his

long naval career as commander-in-chief at Plymouth in

1821, advancing to admiral of the white in May 1825. 

Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane died suddenly in Paris on

26 January 1832 and is buried in the Paris’ Père Lachaise 

cemetery.

Lieutenant General Sir Edward Pakenham, commander of

the British expeditionary force

Edward Pakenham was on 19 April 1778 at Longford 

Castle, County Westmeath, Ireland. After a basic initial 

education he became, at age sixteen, lieutenant in the 92nd 

Regiment of Foot in May 1794; a few days later he made 

captain. On 6 December 1794, though still not seventeen, he 

became major in the 33rd or Ulster Light Dragoons. In June 

1798 Pakenham became a major in the 23d Light Dragoons, 

with which he served in Ireland during the 1798 Irish 

uprising; and in October 1799 he received an appointment as 

lieutenant colonel of the 64th Regiment of Foot, which he 

commanded during the capture of the Danish and Swedish 

controlled West Indies islands in 1801. Pakenham 

commanded the 64th at the capture of St Lucia in June 1803 

where he was wounded. After returning home, he became a 

brevet colonel in 1805. He received an appointment to the 

lieutenant colonelcy of the 7th Royal Fusiliers, whose 1st 

Battalion he joined at Weymouth in 1806, commanding 

during the expedition against Copenhagen in 1807 and at the 

capture of Martinique in 1809. Pakenham joined the Duke of 

Wellington, who married Pakenham’s sister Kitty in 1806, in 

the Iberian Peninsula after the battle of Talavera in July 1809, 

where he initially served as an assistant adjutant-general to 

the fusiliers and eventually deputy adjutant-general in the 

Peninsula in March 1810. He disliked staff work immensely 

but performed his duties in a competent and professional 

manner. However, combat requirements brought 

opportunities to command troops in the field and Pakenham 

commanded a brigade of the two battalions 7th Fusiliers and 

the Cameron Highlanders at the Battles of Busaco and 

Fuentes de Oñoro in 1810. In 1811 he received the local rank 

of major general in the Peninsula, and returned to the 

headquarters staff. Pakenham became major general in June

194
1812. At the Battle of Salamanca in July 1812, described by 

Wellington as the best managed battle of the war, Pakenham 

temporarily commanded the 3rd Division, which broke the 

French center and marked him as a proven senior combat 

leader. Then he returned to the staff, advancing to the position 

of adjutant general in May 1813. He commanded the 6th

Division, once again temporarily, in the fighting in the 

Pyrenees and received a knighthood in September 1813, 

returning to his adjutant general duties in the final campaigns

of the war. He received the gold cross and clasps for 

Martinique, Busaco, Fuentes de Oñoro, Salamanca, Pyrenees,

Nivelle, Nive, Orthez, and Toulouse. Pakenham did not care

participate in any capacity in Britain’s war against America;

his brother-in-law, the Duke of Wellington refused the

command following his part in the defeat of Napoleon. The

death of Major General Ross at Baltimore, however, led to

Pakenham’s selection to command the British forces

rendezvousing in Jamaica for the planned operation against

New Orleans. He arrived in Louisiana on Christmas Day 1814,

a month behind schedule and his Army conducted three failed

attacks against the American line commanded by Andrew

Jackson, and lost his life with many of his Soldiers during

the third attempt. Pakenham’s officers preserved his body and

brought it back to Ireland. He shares a monument with his

second-in-command, Samuel Gibbs, in St. Paul’s Cathedral in 

London.

Major General Sir Samuel Gibbs, brigade commander and

Pakenham’s second in command

Samuel Gibbs was born in 1771. At the age of twelve he

received an appointment as an ensign in the British Army with

posting to the 102nd Regiment of Foot in October 1783. In

1788 he moved to the 60th Regiment of Foot in Upper Canada

where he served until promotion to lieutenant and assignment

to the 11th Regiment of Foot in 1792. He joined this regiment

at Gibraltar, and returned with it to England in February 1793,

when he received appointment as aide-de-camp to Lieutenant

General James Grant. He served with the 11th Regiment in

Corsica and aboard Lord Hood’s naval fleet in the

Mediterranean from the spring of 1794 until the end of 1795 

when he obtained command of a company. After serving for 

some months as captain and adjutant in the garrison at

Gibraltar he returned to England in April 1796 and returned to

his former position of aide-de-camp. In May 1798 he

accompanied the expedition sent to cut the sluices at Ostend

and was taken prisoner but exchanged the following

Christmas. In 1799 he succeeded to the rank of major and

accompanied the 11th Regiment to the West Indies, where he

commanded the regiment in an attack on St. Martins.

195
Promoted to lieutenant colonel ofthe 10th West India Regiment

in 1802, he returned to England upon the declaration of peace

in the same year. Subsequently appointed to the 59th Regiment

of Foot, he commanded the regiment in the expedition to the

Cape of Good Hope in 1805-1806. FromtheCape he proceeded

to India and commanded his regiment in the Travancore War of

1808–9. He received the brevet rank of colonel on 25 July 1810

and in March 1811 accompanied the expedition to conquer

Dutch-controlled Java where he greatly distinguished himself.

Gibbs left India and in 1812 commanded two British

regiments stationed with the allied forces at Stralsund. In the

following year he served in Holland and on 4 June received his

appointment as major-general. In autumn 1814 he received an

appointment as second in command to Major General Sir

Edward Pakenham, commander-in-chief of the British

expeditionary force sent seize New Orleans, where Gibbs

arrived with Pakenham and additional troops on Christmas 

Day, 1814. Gibbs served as Pakenham’s senior ground

commander through the various British attacks and

commanded the main attack on the right flank on 8 January

1815 when he wasseverely wounded and died on the following

day. Ironically, by a proclamation of the Prince Regent, he

was made a Knight Commander of the Bath on 2 January 

1815. Gibbs’ remains were interned next to his commander,

Sir Edward Pakenham, in Westminster Abbey.

Major General Sir John Keane, brigade commander

John Keane was born in 6 February 1781 in Belmont,

Ireland, the son of a baronet Member of Parliament with

influential family connections. On 12 November 1794 he

received an appointment as captain in a new regiment that

was broken up immediately afterwards and Keane went on

half pay. In November 1799 he returned to active service

with the 44th Regiment of Foot, which he joined at Gibraltar

and accompanied to Egypt, where he served as aide-de-camp to

Lord Cavan. Keane obtained a majority in the 60th Royal

American Regiment in May 1802 but continued on the staff in

Egypt and Malta until 1803. In August 1803 he became

lieutenant colonel in the 13th Regiment of Foot, joining the

regiment at Gibraltar early in 1804 and returning home with

it in 1805. After serving several years in Ireland, Keane

accompanied his regiment to Bermuda as junior lieutenantcolonel and commanded it during the capture of Martinique in

1809. He became a brevet colonel in January 1812 and the

same year transferred to the 60th Royal American Regiment.

In April 1813 he joined Wellington’s Army in the Peninsula,

commanding a brigade of the 3rd division at Vitoria, the

Pyrenees, Nivelle, the Nive, Vic Bigorre, and Toulouse.

Promoted to major-general in 1814, Keane assumed command

196
of the units selected for operations in the American Gulf coast

region upon notification of the death of Major General Robert 

Ross during the fighting for Baltimore. Keane commanded the

British expeditionary force in the Gulf through the fall and

early winter of 1814, overseeing the British undetected

landing and approach march south of New Orleans. However,

he faced criticism for not proceeding with his advance guard

against the city instead choosing to bring up his entire force for 

a consolidated advance; and for allowing the Americans to

conduct an aggressive spoiling attack on the British camp on

the night of 23 December 1814. He was superseded by Major

General Sir Edward Pakenham, upon that officer’s arrival on

25 December 1814, and commanded the 3d Brigade of the

British force during the three British attacks on the American

defensive line. During the final assault on 8 January 1815

Keane commanded the British supporting attack on the left

flank along the Mississippi River, where he received two

severe wounds. Upon recovery from his wounds, Keane

served as commander-in-chief of the West Indian Army and

during a part of that period administered the civil government

of Jamaica. Lieutenant General Keane served as Commanderin-Chief of the Bombay Army from 1834 to 1840 and

commanded the combined British and British Indian Army --

The Army of the Indus -- during the opening campaign of

the First Anglo-Afghan and First Anglo-Marri wars. During

the former, he commanded the victorious British and Indian

Army at the Battle of Ghazni on 23 July 1839. For his service,

he was elevated to the peerage as Baron Keane, of Ghuznee

and of Cappoquin in the County of Waterford on 23 December

1839, also receiving from the East India Company a pension of

£2,000 per year. Baron Sir John Keane died in Burton Lodge,

Hampshire, England on 24 August 1844.

Major General Sir John Lambert, Brigade commander

John Lambert was born in 1772, the second son to a 

captain in the British Royal Navy. He became an ensign in

the British Army in 1791, at age nineteen, and served in 

France, Ireland, Spain and Portugal in the 16 years that 

followed. The experience helped shape a prudent and

seasoned combat leader when he joined Wellington’s Army in

1812 after a year’s experience in southern Spain. Promoted

to Major General in June 1813, Lambert received command

of a brigade that performed gallantly during the invasion of 

France in the battles of Nivelle, Nive, Orthes, and Toulouse,

earning him a vote of thanks from Parliament, a gold cross,

and a knighthood (he received notification of this last honor 

while commanding the shattered British expeditionary force in

Louisiana). Lambert commanded the brigade of 

reinforcements, comprised of the 7th Fusiliers and the 43d

197
Regiment, that arrived in Pakenham’s camp on 6 January

1815, and served as his reserve during the final British

assault. Command of the British force fell to Lambert after the

death of Pakenham and Gibbs and the serious wounding of

Keane. After gathering as much information as possible in a 

short period of time on both the British and American

situations, he ended the attack on Jackson’s line. Reorganizing

the defeated expeditionary force, Lambert eventually

conducted an extremely orderly evacuation, under severe 

conditions, to the British fleet anchorage. In the last

hostilities of the war, Lambert successfully captured Fort

Bowyer at Mobile on 12 February 1815. The next day he 

received news of peace being restored between the two nations.

During the expeditionary force’s return to England, Lambert

learned of Napoleon’s return from exile and the reinstatement

of hostilities with France. Lambert joined Wellington in

Belgium when fighting with Napoleon resumed later in 1815.

He commanded the 10th Brigade at the Battle of Waterloo,

where the brigade sustained nearly 75% casualties defending

the decisive terrain at La Haye Sainte, the highest casualties

of any brigade present. For his performance in the Battle of

Waterloo, Lambert received the personal commendation of

Wellington and high honors from Parliament. Sir John

Lambert died in 1847.

Colonel William Thornton, commander of the British 85th

(Bucks Volunteers) (Light Infantry) Regiment.

William Thornton was born in 1779 in Ireland. Little is 

known of his life before entering the British Army. He 

received a commission in the British Army in 1796 at the age 

of eighteen and experienced the patronage of a senior British 

general officer. Promotions followed, first to captain in 1803 

and then major in 1806. He rose to the rank of lieutenant

colonel by 1811 and received command of the 85th Regiment 

of Foot. He commanded the regiment through the end of the 

Peninsula campaign, participating in nearly every major 

battle, and receiving promotion to colonel. By 1814, 

Thornton possessed an established a reputation as a capable 

and daring officer. With trademark impetuousness, Thornton 

started the attack at Bladensburg, Maryland before the 

reinforcements arrived. Though initially repulsed, he 

reorganized his formation under fire and penetrated the 

American line, scattering the Militia, being wounded in the 

effort. In December 1814 Thornton commanded the British 

advance guard, landing at the Villere Plantation and marching 

without detection to a position within nine miles of New 

Orleans. As a major shaping operation in support of the main 

British assault on the American line on 8 January 1815, 

198
Thornton commanded the attack on the supporting 

American artillery position located on the right bank of the 

Mississippi River. Badly wounded, Thornton relinquished 

command and the column eventually withdrew, under orders, 

to the left bank of the river. Thornton returned to England and 

continued to amass a distinguished military career, achieving 

promotion to major general in 1825, appointment as 

Lieutenant Governor of Jersey in 1830, knighthood in 1836,

and lieutenant general in 1838. However, Thornton

developed psychological problems in his later years attributed

to hismany woundssustained inNorthAmerican.He committed

suicide in 1840 at the age of sixty-one.

199

Appendix C

Notes on Specific Sources

Though in some cases not major contributors in the

drama that culminated on the plain at Chalmette on 8 January 

1815, there are several key participants that contributed to

the primary source history of the overall campaign. Firsthand participants are critical in deciphering any battle or

campaign, providing valuable material in building as close to

a complete picture as possible. However, they must be taken

with a great deal of discretion, applying corroborating 

information from other supporting sources. Such sources are

shaped by circumstances and environment: personality,

military rank, position on the battlefield, personal agenda,

vanity, vindictiveness, or the simple passing of time into old

age when the facts are not as clear as they once were.

The British Army

There are far more British memoirs of the campaign in the

Gulf and New Orleans than American. This is because it was

not unnatural for many British Army officers, no matter

what rank they attained, to write some sort of personal

memoir at the end of a long military career, especially during

a span that included the Napoleonic Wars. In many instances

the officers in question wrote their memoirs in an effort to earn

additional income, augmenting meager retirement pensions

provided at the time. While most men were content merely to

tell their personal story in the midst of greater events, works of

this particular genre sold well and several officers became

well-established writers.

There are several personal accounts included in the 

bibliography that support the general historical narrative and 

specific vignettes that make up this handbook. A brief 

explanation of some of these individuals and their recorded 

accounts adds value to the detailed study of the battle that 

takes place. The myriad of personalities seen at New Orleans 

presents a comprehensive representation of military life in 

each of the opposing forces and a window into what appears 

to be, in some ways, the not so distant past of the military 

profession: company-grade officers are focused on the passing 

boredom, the infrequent periods of fighting, and the hardship 

of the common Soldiers, while speculating upon and 

criticizing the actions of their senior commanders; primary 

staff officers recollect the actions and decisions at the highest 

levels, yet question the actions on the battlefield; and 

commanding generals become clouded in the myth created by 

both victory and defeat.

201
MajorHarrySmith: A highly regardedveteranofWellington’s

campaigns in the Peninsula, Smith served as a primary staff

officer under Major GeneralRossin the operation thatresulted

in the capture and destruction of Washington, DC. With the fall

of the American capital, Ross chose Smith to return to

England with dispatches describing the victory, which Ross

personally delivered to the Prince Regent. Smith’s time in

England proved short. Upon receiving the news of Ross’ death

near Baltimore, in October 1814 the government appointed

Major General Sir Edward Pakenham to replace Ross.

Pakenham then personally selected Smith, a close friend, to 

serve as his Assistant Adjutant General (AAG) of the British

expeditionary force; a challenging duty assignment because

Pakenham was himself AAG to his brother-in-law, the Duke

of Wellington, for several years during the Peninsula

campaign. Therefore, Smith became one of the true inside

observers within the British headquarters throughout his

service in America, capturing many of the councils of war,

key decisions, and interactions with his commander. Smith’s

very exhaustive memoir of his long life and career was

written over a long period of time, with several extensive

breaks between writing. His recollections of the battle were 

recorded approximately 30 years after the events of 1814-

1815. Though the passage of time logically exhibited some

effect on his memory, Smith’s memoir, The Autobiography of

Lieutenant-General Sir Harry Smith, Baronet of Aliwal on the

Sutlej, still provides an insider’s perspective of Pakenham’s

short command and the operations of his staff.

CaptainBensonEarleHill: Anartilleryofficer, Hillalsohadthe

advantage of being a staff officer for the chief of artillery of the

British expeditionary force. In that capacity he had more

freedom of movement around the battlefield than most

Captains and witnessed events from unique locations. His

memoirs, Recollections of an Artillery Officer; Including 

Scenes and Adventures in Ireland, America, Flanders, and

France, provide an expert’s view and assessment of the

artillery employment by both sides during the fighting at New

Orleans. Many of these scenes remain fresh to Hill, even after

a gap some twenty years from events. From the forward gun

positions he possessed a front-row seat and afterward was

especially clear in asserting the dominance of the American

guns over the British. During the final attack he witnessed the

collapse of those regiments from the gallery of the La Ronde

House and then galloped forward with other staff officers in

a vain attempt to reform the regiments.

Captain William Surtees: Surtee’s, Twenty-five Years in the

RifleBrigade, remains one ofthe most popularBritishmemoirs

of the period. His unique position as the quartermaster officer

202
for the 95th Regiment (the Rifles) allowed him to move back

and forth from skirmish line to Army-level councils of war.

Like most of his peers that published memoirs of these events,

many of these scenes remain very fresh in Surtees’ mind,

even after a gap some twenty years from events; this may

explain his slightly more insightful tone, one developed after

deep reflection. He comments on proven practices from the

Peninsula abandoned by the British in similar situations at

New Orleans and, like Gleig, questions these failures on the

part of the senior officers. He also heavily criticizes the

conduct of the 44th Regiment’s Lieutenant Colonel Mullins on

the eve of the final attack, providing additional vent to that of

most of Mullins’ fellow officers over his conduct during the

attack. Moving forward with the 95th’s riflemen during the

final assault, Surtees provides one of the most detailed eye 

witness accounts from the very front, the British skirmish line,

where he saw key events along the American line from 

Rennie’s success in seizing the American redoubt on the left

to the final collapse of Gibbs’ brigade on the right. In this

handbook, Surtees is also allowed the last word in the final

vignette, where he cautions of the dangers of pride and holding

one’s enemy in contempt.

Captain John Henry Cooke: Another company grade officer

with extensive experience in the Peninsula campaign, Cooke,

a Captain in the 43rd Regiment, in his Narrative of Events in

the South ofFrance and of the Attack on New Orleans, provides

an eyewitness account of that captures many unique aspects

found in the British primary sources. His writing is very

descriptive yet simple, maintaining his own personal

perspective and rarely stepping out of his lane. Like Hill and

Surtees, many of these scenes remain fresh, even after twenty

years. One of his most sobering accounts involves the a 

discussion between officers of the 85th Regiment and newly

arrived 43rd Regiment, where the former tries to explain to the 

latter why the expeditionary force has not yet seized New

Orleans. Cooke also describes Rennie’s battalion stealthy

movement forward toward the American redoubt, captures

the confusion of his detachment as it is lost in the morning

fog during the British approach and initial fighting, and upon

finally reuniting with his regiment in Lambert’s reserve

position serves witness to the destruction of the British assault

force in front of the Rodriguez Canal.

Lieutenant George R. Gleig: Gleig’s memoir, under the

modern title, The Campaigns of the British Army at 

Washington and New Orleans, remains fairly popular with

modern students of the period, providing a window into the

world of the junior officer and Soldiers among the Peninsula

veterans that campaigned in America. Gleig, a lieutenant in the

203
85th Regiment, was already a veteran of campaigning in

northern Spain and southern France with Wellington’s Army.

He accompanied his regiment with the British reinforcements

to North America and participated in the campaign against

Washington and Baltimore before participating in the

operations at New Orleans. His personal account of both

campaigns, especially New Orleans, offers a great deal of

commonality with the challenges of modern precommissioning students and company-grade officers coming

to grips with the military profession and the challenges it

presents. Two points stand out in Gleig’s writing. First, he

shared with his modern counterparts the propensity to question

and criticize his seniors and their decisions that he disagreed

with or did not understand; i.e., he does not, in today’s

parlance, remain in his lane. Second, as he later became a fairly

well-known author and historian, a fair share of his

observations, though extremely keen and insightful, appear to

be shaped in hindsight over ten years after the battle.

Therefore, he presents more of an overview with his general

observations based on his experience, not the detailed

memories of his published peers.

The American Army

On the American side of the battlefield the most 

comprehensive personal accounts came from within Andrew

Jackson’s inner circle of staff officers, Latour and Tatum.

However, there is a discouraging lack of personal accounts

provided by more junior leaders or Soldiers. Therefore, the

accounts of Latour and Tatum provide an excellent portrait of

Jackson and his Army throughout the British invasion, though

with a definite sense of hero worship directed at Jackson.

Arsene Lacarriere Latour: Like Harry Smith, Latour

provides an insider’s view to the day to day operations of

Jackson’s staff. Of all of the personal works published in

the aftermath of the battle, Latour’s Historical Memoir of

The War in West Florida and Louisiana in 181415, beat the

rest to the publisher within two years of the war’s end. While

Latour, as a native Frenchman, proved to be thoroughly antiBritish in his sentiments, he was present with Jackson during

several key moments in the campaign, providing detailed

observations. The comprehensive value of Latour’s memoir is

the detailed collection of his engineering sketches and a 

lengthy appendix containing a large collection of American

and British correspondence produced during the campaign on

the American Gulf coast.

Major Howell Tatum: Another detailed view of events inside

Jackson’s headquarters and staff is provided by Major Tatum’s

personal journal, the version referenced here being published

204
in 1922. Tatum, a Revolutionary War veteran, served as the

Jackson’s acting topographical engineer from July 1814 until

the conclusion of the war. Tatum does not shy from placing

Jackson on a pedestal that puts him above making mistakes,

something built upon a friendship dating back to the

establishment of Tennessee as a territory. However, Tatum’s

journal does provide an extended window of the campaign in

the Gulf, including first-hand accounts of the British attempt

to seize Mobile and Jackson’s seizure of Pensacola, before 

concentrating on the events at New Orleans which he

presents with the detail-oriented method seen with military

engineers of the day.

205

Barbuto, Richard V. Staff Ride Handbook for the Niagara 

Campaigns, 1812-1814. Fort Leavenworth: Combat 

Studies Institute Press, 2014.

Bathurst , Henry. “Instructions to Major-General Sir Edward 

Pakenham for the New Orleans Campaign.” The War

of 1812 Magazine, Issue 16: September 2011.

http://www.napoleon-series.org/

military/Warof1812/2011/Issue16/c_PakenhamOrders

.html.

Brown, Wilburt S. The Amphibious Campaign for West

Florida and Louisiana, 1814-1815:A Critical Review

of Strategy and Tactics at New Orleans. Tuscaloosa:

The University of Alabama Press, 1969.

Chandler, David G. “Wellington in the Peninsula: a 

Reassessment,” in On the Napoleonic Wars:

Collected Essays. London: Greenhill Books, 1994.

Cooke, John Henry. Narrative of Events in the South of

France and of the Attack on New Orleans. London:

T. & W. Boone, 1835.

Fletcher, Ian. Wellington’s Regiments: The Men and their

Battles from Rolica to Waterloo, 1808-1815. 

Staplehurst: Spellmount Limited, 1994.

Gleig, G.R. The Campaigns of the British Army at

Washington and New Orleans, in the Years 1814-

1815. London: John Murray, 1827.

Glover, Michael. Wellington as Military Commander. London:

B.T. Batsford LTD, 1968.

Haythornthwaite, Philip J. The Armies of Wellington.

London: Arms and Armour, 1994.

Hill, Benson Earle. Recollections of an Artillery Officer, 

Including Scenes and Adventures in Ireland,

America, Flanders, and France. London: 

Richard Bentley, 1836.

Huber, Leonard V. The Battle of New Orleans and its

Monument. New Orleans: Laborde Printing 

Company, 1983.

Bibliography

207
Latour, A. Lacarriere. Historical Memoir of the War in West

Florida and Louisiana in 1814-1815: With an

Atlas. Philadelphia: John Conrad and Co., 1816.

Lebeau, Jean-Francois. “Breaking the Stalemate:

Amphibious Warfare During the War of 1812,” 

Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 14, No. 1, 

.Winter 2013

Maas, John R. Defending a New Nation, 1783-1811. 

Washington, DC: The US Army Center of Military

History, 2013.

Mahon, John K. The War of 1812. New York: Da Capo 

Press, Inc., 1972.

“Major Howell Tatum’s Journal.” Bassett, John Spencer, Editor,

Smith College Studies in History, Vol. VII, Nos. 1, 2, 

and 3, October 1921 to April 1922.

Millet, Allan R. Semper Fidelis: The History of the United

States Marine Corps. New York:

The Free Press, 1991.

“National Park Service pamphlet for Jean Lafitte National

Historical Park and Preserve.”

http://www.nps.gov/jela/chalmette-national-cemetery.htm.

Owsley, Frank Lawrence Jr. Struggle for the Gulf

Borderlands: The Creek War and the Battle of New 

Orleans, 1812-1815. Tuscaloosa: The University of 

Alabama Press, 1981.

Patterson, Benton Rain. The Generals: Andrew Jackson,

Sir Edward Pakenham, and the Road to the Battle 

of New Orleans. New York: New York 

University Press, 2005.

Reilly, Robin. The British at the Gates: The New Orleans

Campaign in the War of 1812. Toronto: Robin 

Brass Press, 1974.

Remini, Robert V. The Battle of New Orleans: Andrew

Jackson and America’s First Military Victory. 

New York: Penguin Books, 1999.

Robertson, William G. The Staff Ride.. Washington, DC: 

 US Army Center of Military History, 1987.

208
Simmons, Edwin H. “Maj Carmick at New Orleans.”

Fortitudine: Newsletter of the Marine Corps

Historical Program, Volume XIV, No. 4 (Spring 

1985): 3-8.

Skeen, C. Edward. Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812. 

Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1999. 

Smith, G.C. Editor. The Autobiography of LieutenantGeneral Sir Harry Smith, Baronet of Aliwal on The 

Sutlej, G.C.B. London: William Clowes and Sons,

Limited, 1903.

Stewart, Richard W. General Editor. American Military

History, Volume I: The United States Army and the

Forging of a Nation, 1775-1917. Washington, DC:

The US Army Center for Military History, 2005.

Surtees, William. Twenty-five Years in the Rifle Brigade. 

Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1833. “The 

Beauregard House.” http:// www.old-neworleans.com/NO_Beauregard_House.html.

“They’re comin’ on their all fours!” The Louisiana Historical

Quarterly. Volume IX, No. 1. January 1926.

http://www.2ndkentucky1812. com/category/2nd-regimentkentucky-volunteer-Militia/

Wilson, Samuel Jr. The Battle of New Orleans: Plantation

Houses on the Battlefield of New Orleans. New

Orleans: The Louisiana Landmark Society, 1985.

209

About the Author

Lieutenant Colonel Matthew B. Dale served as Deputy

Director of the US Army Combat Studies Institute at Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas. He previously served as the Staff Ride 

Team Chief, where he conducted dozens of staff rides for 

Army organizations and served as a military history instructor

at the Command and General Staff College. He holds a B.A. in

history from Norwich University and a Masters of Military

Arts & Science (MMAS) in Military History from the USArmy

Command and General Staff College. Since commissioning

into the Army in 1994, he served from platoon to the coalition

warfighting level in plans and operations capacities.

211


Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Visit our website at:

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/index.asp
Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

FortLeavenworth, Kansas

Staff Ride Handbook and Atlas

Battle of White Bird Canyon

17 June 1877

Charles D. Collins, Jr.

The Staff Ride Handbook for The Battles of New Orleans,

23 December 1814 - 8 January 1815 Dale

CSI

Press