# FILED February 23, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate Cou rt Clerk IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE JAMES W. BYRD, ) ) Petitioner/Appell

ant, )

) Appeal No. ) 01-A-01-9804-CH- 00171 VS. ) ) Davidson Chancery ) No. 97-3206-III TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF ) CORRECTION, ) ) Respondent/Appellee. ) APPEAL FROM THE CHANC ERY COURT OF DAVIDSON COUNTY AT NASHVILLE, TENN ESSEE THE HONORABLE ELLEN HOBBS LYLE PRESIDING

JAMES W. BYRD #078204 MCRCF PO BOX 2000 Wartburg, TN

37887 PRO SE JOHN KNOX WALKUP Attorney General and Reporter MICHAEL E. MOORE Solicitor General PATRICIA C.

KUSSMANN,

BPR 15506 Assistant Attorney General Civil Rights and Claim

s Division 425 Fifth Avenue No

rth Second Floor, Cor

dell Hull Building Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0488 ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT/APPELLEE

AFFIRMED AND REMAND ED PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE CONCUR: CANTRELL , J. KOCH, J.2 

## OPINION In this appeal, a prisoner seeks revi ew of the trial co

urt’s dismissa

l of his petition for declaratory

judgment and ot

her relief in

w hich he claimed he had been wrongfully denied

sentence reduction

credits toreduce his parole e ligibility date. The trial co urt ruled t hat Plaint iff’s claim of entit lement to sente

nce credits which would reduce his par ole eligibility

date was barred by the doctrine of res judicata

. In Byrd v. Bradley , 913 S.W.2d 181 (T enn. Ct. App. 1995), this Court hel d that Mr. Byrd, the Petitioner herein, who had been sentenced to life imprisonme

ntin 1976, was not entit

led to a shortening of the

time he mu st serve before becoming eligibl

e for parole beca

use of the operation of

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-3613 (1975), which was in effect at the time of his convicti on and

sen tencing. That statute provided that anyone sentenced to life imprisonmen t would be eligible

for parole

only after serving 30 full calendar years. Therefore, the Court concluded, Mr. B yrd was not elig ible, from the

date of his incarce ration

until he signed a waiver under Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-2 1

- 236(1985), for any sentenc e reduction credits

which would ma

ke him eligible for parole prior to his se

rving thirty y

ears. The trial court quite correctly determined that any claim by Mr

. Byrd for earlier parole eligibility

which was based on t

he Departme

nt o f Correctio n’s failure to award

him sente nce re duct ion cr edits for th e time period between his inca rceration

and his execution of a section 236 waiv er was barred, u nder th e doctrine of res judicata , by the Byrd v. Bradley holding. A simp le definition of

res judicata is that it is a "rule that a final judg ment rendere d by a court of competent

jurisdiction on

the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties3

and their privies, and, as to them , constitutes an abso

lute bar to a subseque

nt actioninvolving the sa me claim, demand or cause of action". Black's Law Dictionary

1172 (5th ed. 1979), a

s quoted in Richardson

v. Tenne ssee Bd. of Dentistry , 913 S.W.2d 446 (Tenn. 1995). Mr. Byrd asserts on appeal that the trial court failed to address other issues raised in his petition.

In fact, the tri

al court specifica

lly found: Given the legal principle of res judicata and that an inmate is not entitle [sic] to earn senten ce redu ction c redits until he has signed the waiver as wel l as th e a bsen ce in the complaint of any showing w

hy the petitioner is being detained in vio lation of federal a

nd st ate constitutions , the Court determ ines that the responde nt’s motion to dism iss shallbe granted on the grounds the complaint f ails to s tate a claim upon which relief can be grant ed. (Emphasis added.) The trial court clear

ly considered the

Petitioner’s othe

r claims and f

ound them wanting. We concur in the trialcourt’s judgment in this regard. Mr. Byrd’s petition is clearly and exclusively dire cted to his current c

on tinuin g incarceration. Further, there appears to be no dispute regarding

his eligibility fo

r credits after Mr. Byrd ’s execution of a waiver on March 1, 1986 as authorized in Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-236 (1985). Mr. Byrd has not challenged the Department’s computation of sentence credits for which he is eligible, but rather challe nged th e Depart ment’s in terpret ation o f eligi bility. Mr. Byrd’s clai

ms regarding his

entitlement to “

the benefits” of al

legedly shortersentences afforde d to persons sentenced

u nder the 1989 Sentencing Reform Act are without m

erit. The con sti tutional and statutory arguments propounded by Mr. Byrd have been considered and rejected. See Wilson v. State , 980 S.W.2d 196 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998), perm.to appea l denied (Tenn. 1998); Smith v. State , 1998 WL 75288 (T enn. Crim. A

pp. 1998); State ex rel. Stewart4

v. McWherter , 857 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Tenn. Crim

. App. 1992), per

m. to appeal denied (Tenn. 1993); State ex rel. Crum v. McWherter , 1992 WL 99029 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992), perm

. to appeal denied (Tenn. 1992). We agree with the trial court that Mr . Byrd has failed to alle ge any b asis for his claims of unl

awful detention. The trial court’s j udgment dism issing Plaintiff’ s petition for failur e to state

a claim upon whic

h relief can be

granted is affirm

ed, and this case is remanded for whatever furthe

r proceedings

may b e required. The costs of this appeal should be taxed to Mr.Byrd.

_______________________________ PATRICIA J. COTTRELL, JUDGE CONCUR:

____________________________ BEN H. CANTRELL, JUDGE

____________________________ WILLIAM C. KOCH, JUDGE