IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs July 18, 2018 

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. NICHOLAS ZAMARRON

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 2016-B-552 Steve Dozier, Judge

No. M2017-02123-CCA-R3-CD

The Defendant, Nicholas Zamarron, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to deliver 0.5 gram or 

more of cocaine and to three counts of possession with the intent to deliver 0.5 gram or 

more of cocaine. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2014). He received a total effective sentence 

of ten years’ incarceration. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by denying 

alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Criminal Court Affirmed 

ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JAMES 

CURWOOD WITT, JR., J., JOHN EVERETT WILLIAMS, P.J., joined.

Manuel B. Russ (on appeal) and Jessica Van Dyke (at trial), Nashville, Tennessee, for the 

appellant, Nicholas Zamarron. 

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; David H. Findley, Senior Counsel; 

Glenn Funk, District Attorney General; and Ed Ryan, Assistant District Attorney 

General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

This case arises from the Defendant’s December 2014 arrest in connection with a 

drug trafficking organization in Nashville. The Defendant was indicted for conspiracy to 

deliver 300 grams or more of cocaine, three counts of possession with intent to deliver 

300 grams or more of cocaine, and money laundering. He pleaded guilty to one count of 

conspiracy to deliver 0.5 gram or more of cocaine and to three counts of possession with 

intent to deliver 0.5 gram or more of cocaine. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the 

Defendant received concurrent ten-year sentences and the manner of service was to be

determined by the trial court. The guilty plea hearing transcript is not included in the 

appellate record.

08/16/2018
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At the September 29, 2017 sentencing hearing, the presentence report was 

received as an exhibit and reflected that the Defendant had previous convictions for 

aggravated assault, three drug-related offenses, and making a false report. The report 

reflected that the Defendant was age twenty-six and had graduated from high school. 

The Defendant reported alcohol and marijuana use beginning at age twenty-one but no 

longer used either. 

Metropolitan Nashville Police Department Detective Robert Young testified that, 

at the time of the offenses, he was an officer on the drug task force, which was 

investigating Reginald Cooper and John Childree for selling cocaine. Detective Young 

testified that in October 2014, he observed the Defendant and the Defendant’s brother 

speak with Mr. Childree on Mr. Childree’s property. Detective Young stated that in 

December 2014, he learned that “a load of cocaine was coming in” and that Mr. Cooper 

“obtained a couple of kilos of cocaine” from Mr. Childree’s home. Detective Young said 

that after receiving the cocaine, Mr. Childree drove the Defendant and the Defendant’s 

brother to a nearby hotel and that the drug task force “established surveillance [at the 

hotel] the whole night.” Detective Young stated that he observed Mr. Childree take

“drug money” in the amount of about $30,000 cash to the Defendant and the Defendant’s 

brother at about 2:00 or 3:00 a.m. Detective Young said that the Defendant and the 

Defendant’s brother left the hotel at about 7:00 a.m. and that he apprehended the 

Defendant and the Defendant’s brother at a Nashville airport. Detective Young stated 

that the Defendant and the Defendant’s brother each gave a recorded statement in an 

airport office. Detective Young said that the Defendant and the Defendant’s brother 

admitted they transported ten kilograms of cocaine to Mr. Childree. 

Detective Young testified that about fifty search warrants were executed the 

following day and that thirty kilograms of cocaine, cash, and firearms were recovered 

during the searches. The cocaine the Defendant admitted to transporting was recovered 

from Mr. Childree’s property. Detective Young said that the Defendant and the 

Defendant’s brother had made about seventeen trips from Texas to Nashville since 

November 2013 and that the Defendant admitted transporting cocaine from Texas to 

Nashville about four or five times in the previous ten months. Detective Young stated 

that the Defendant said he had transported ten kilograms of cocaine each time and that 

the Defendant had transported about forty or fifty kilograms of cocaine in the previous

year. 

Detective Young testified that the drug task force uncovered a “large” drug 

trafficking organization, that a second drug trafficking organization was later discovered, 

and that searches related to both organizations resulted in the seizure of 100 kilograms of 

cocaine, $1.8 million cash, and “assets, houses, and . . . weapons.” Detective Young 

stated that the drug trafficking organizations greatly impacted the community and that 

more than eighty people were indicted in connection with the organizations. Detective 

Young said the investigation showed that cocaine was transported from Mexico to Texas
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to Nashville and that the delivery of the cocaine in Nashville from Texas was “directly 

attributed” to the Defendant and the Defendant’s brother. 

On cross-examination, Detective Young testified that the Defendant was not 

connected with the second drug trafficking organization. Detective Young said that he 

read the Defendant his Miranda rights before questioning him and that the Defendant was 

cooperative. 

The Defendant testified that he was arrested on December 10, 2014, and that he 

was incarcerated until his family paid a cash bond in April 2016. The Defendant stated 

that he lived in Texas with his family and worked at his family’s “transmission shop.” 

The Defendant said that his girlfriend was four months’ pregnant and that he did not have 

any other children. The Defendant stated that while incarcerated, he attended church 

services and did not commit any disciplinary infractions. The Defendant said that since 

his release, he had not received new criminal charges. The Defendant said that he 

pleaded guilty in Texas to aggravated assault in July 2017, that the offense occurred in 

2012, that he was currently serving five years’ probation relative to this conviction, and 

that he had not violated probation. 

The Defendant testified that Detective Young’s testimony was an accurate 

summary of his involvement in the drug trafficking organization and that he needed 

money to support his family. The Defendant stated that he received the cocaine in Texas 

and that he transported it to Nashville. The Defendant said that he typically earned $200 

or $300 per week at the transmission shop, that he was paid about $3000 for each trip to 

Nashville, that he paid bills with the money, and that he did not know the identity of the 

cocaine “supplier” in Texas. The Defendant said that the suppliers knew of his arrest

because they did not receive payment for the cocaine and that the money he possessed

when he was arrested belonged to the suppliers. The Defendant testified that his brother 

was the “point person” and that he helped his brother transport the cocaine. The 

Defendant stated that he did not profit financially from transporting cocaine, that he never 

purchased expensive items with the money, and that he still had unpaid bills. 

On cross-examination, the Defendant testified that he began working at the

transmission shop at age eleven and that he had worked there since his release from jail. 

The Defendant stated that he was released on bond for aggravated assault when he 

committed the current offenses and that he had prior convictions for three drug-related 

offenses and for filing a false report. The Defendant denied using alcohol or drugs.

The trial court determined that the Defendant was not eligible for split 

confinement. Relative to the Defendant’s criminal history, the court found that the 

Defendant had three prior convictions for drug-related offenses and that the Defendant 

committed the current offenses while released on bond for aggravated assault. The court 

noted that incarceration would serve as a deterrent for future criminal activity for the 
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Defendant and for others who may commit similar offenses. The court determined that 

the Defendant was acting as a “mule” by transporting cocaine, that the Defendant had 

transported “[twenty], [thirty], or [forty] kilos of cocaine to Nashville,” and that he had

transported the cocaine in exchange for money. The court found that incarceration was 

appropriate based on the nature of the offenses, the Defendant’s criminal history, and the 

quantity of cocaine the Defendant transported. The court sentenced the Defendant, 

pursuant to the plea agreement, to an effective ten years and ordered him to serve his

sentence in confinement. This appeal followed.

The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying alternative 

sentencing. The Defendant argues that the court failed to consider the purposes and 

principles of the 1989 Sentencing Reform Act. He asserts that that the court failed to 

address the Defendant’s amenability for rehabilitation and argues that he was a “good 

candidate” for alternative sentencing because he accepted responsibility for the offenses 

and had legitimate employment. The Defendant argues that he has not committed a 

“most severe offense[]” as warranted by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-102(5) 

(2014) (amended 2015), and that the court failed to explain adequately how his being 

incarcerated would serve as a deterrent to others. The State responds that this issue is 

waived on appeal because the Defendant failed to include a copy of the guilty plea 

transcript. In the alternative, the State argues that the court did not abuse its discretion 

during sentencing. 

As a preliminary matter, the State correctly notes that the guilty plea hearing 

transcript is not included in the record. The Defendant has the burden of preparing a fair, 

accurate, and complete account of what transpired in the trial court relative to the issues 

raised on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Bunch, 646 S.W.2d 158, 160 (Tenn. 1983). However, 

our supreme court has held that “when a record does not include a transcript of the 

hearing on a guilty plea, the Court of Criminal Appeals should determine on a case-bycase basis whether the record is sufficient for a meaningful review under the standard 

adopted in Bise.” State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 279 (Tenn. 2012). We conclude that 

the record is sufficient for a meaningful appellate review of the court’s determinations

because of the extensive testimony from Detective Young and the Defendant about the 

conspiracy.

The standard of review for questions related to probation or any other alternative 

sentence is an abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness. Caudle, 388 

S.W.3d at 278-79; see State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 708 (Tenn. 2012). Generally, 

probation is available to a defendant sentenced to ten years or less. T.C.A. § 40-35-

303(a) (2014). The burden of establishing suitability for probation rests with a defendant, 

who must demonstrate that probation will “‘subserve the ends of justice and the best 

interest of both the public and the defendant.’” State v. Souder, 105 S.W.3d 602, 607 

(Tenn. Crim. App. 2002) (quoting State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 259 (Tenn. Crim. 
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App. 1990)); see T.C.A. § 40-35-303(b); State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 335, 347 (Tenn. 

2008).

A sentence is based upon “the nature of the offense and the totality of the 

circumstances,” including a defendant’s background. State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 

168 (Tenn. 1991); see State v. Trotter, 201 S.W.3d 651, 653 (Tenn. 2006). A trial court 

is permitted to sentence a defendant who otherwise qualifies for probation or alternative 

sentencing to incarceration when:

(A) [c]onfinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a defendant 

who has a long history of criminal conduct;

(B) [c]onfinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the 

offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective 

deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses; or

(C) [m]easures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently 

been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant[.]

T.C.A. § 40-35-103(1)(A)-(C) (2014); see Trotter, 201 S.W.3d at 654. 

Likewise, a trial court’s application of enhancement and mitigating factors is 

reviewed for an abuse of discretion with “a presumption of reasonableness to withinrange sentencing decisions that reflect a proper application of the purposes and principles 

of our Sentencing Act.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706-07. “[A] trial court’s misapplication of 

an enhancement or mitigating factor does not invalidate the sentence imposed unless the 

trial court wholly departed from the 1989 Act, as amended in 2005.” Id. at 706. “So long 

as there are other reasons consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing, as 

provided by statute, a sentence imposed . . . within the appropriate range” will be upheld 

on appeal. Id.

The record reflects that the trial court considered the purposes and principles of 

sentencing. The court determined that incarceration was appropriate based on the 

seriousness of the offense, the Defendant’s criminal history, and the quantity of cocaine 

the Defendant transported. The record supports the court’s determination that the 

Defendant was previously convicted of three drug-related offenses and aggravated 

assault. The court found that the Defendant committed serious offenses based upon the 

amount of cocaine the Defendant transported and that he was paid money in exchange for 

his transporting the cocaine, which the Defendant admitted. The court also determined 

that incarceration would serve as a deterrent to the Defendant and to others who may 

commit similar offenses and that the Defendant had a high likelihood of reoffending. 

Although the court did not explicitly address the Defendant’s amenability to 

rehabilitation, the court found, based upon the Defendant’s testimony and the presentence 
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report, that the Defendant committed the current offenses while released on bond for 

aggravated assault. The court reasoned that committing these offenses while released on 

bond for aggravated assault was a “negative” against the Defendant. We conclude that 

the record supports the court’s determinations and that the court did not abuse its 

discretion in ordering the Defendant to serve his sentences in confinement. Caudle, 388 

S.W.3d at 278-79. The Defendant is not entitled to relief on this basis.

In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, we affirm the 

judgments of the trial court. 

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ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JUDGE