BOARD OF DIRECTORS

PRESIDENT

Charles M. Murray

Fairfax Water

VICE PRESIDENT

Scott Potter

Nashville Metro Water 

Services

TREASURER

Michael Wallis

East Bay Municipal 

Utility District

SECRETARY

Mac Underwood

Birmingham Water 

Works Board

John P. Sullivan

Boston Water & Sewer

Commission

Chuck Clarke

Cascade Water Alliance

David Modeer

Central Arizona Project

Irene Caminer

Chicago Department 

of Water Management

James S. Lochhead

Denver Water Department

William Stowe

Des Moines Water Works 

Sue McCormick

Detroit Water & 

Sewerage Department

Jun Chang

Houston Public Utilities 

Division

Douglas Yoder

Miami-Dade Water 

& Sewer Department

Carrie Lewis

Milwaukee Water Works

Angela Licata

New York City DEP 

Ron Lovan

Northern Kentucky Water 

District

John Carman

Raleigh Public Utilities 

Department

Steve Schneider

Saint Paul Regional 

Water Services

John Entsminger

Southern Nevada Water 

Authority

Julia J. Hunt

Trinity River Authority 

of Texas

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Diane VanDe Hei

LEADERS IN WATER

1620 I Street, NW, Suite 500

Washington, DC 20006

P 202.331.2820 F 202.785.1845

amwa.net

October 29, 2014

Docket ID: EPA-HQ-OEM-2014-0328

Re: AMWA comments on potential regulatory changes to EPA’s Risk Management Program 

(RMP), as authorized by Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act. 

The Association of Metropolitan Agencies (AMWA) is an organization representing the largest 

publicly owned drinking water utilities in the U.S., and together the membership serves drinking 

water to over 130 million people from Alaska to Puerto Rico.

As holders of certain chemicals, many water systems are required to develop and file a risk 

management plan with EPA under Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act. EPA’s RFI addresses 

several issues that, if changed, would present challenges and additional burdens to water systems 

without corresponding risk reductions. Further rationales and information in support of 

AMWA’s positions regarding these issues are presented in responses to particular RFI questions 

that follow.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. If there are any questions about the attached 

comments, please direct them to Scott Biernat, AMWA’s Director of Regulatory Affairs at 202-

331-2820 or biernat@amwa.net.

Sincerely,

Diane VanDe Hei

Executive Director
Leaders in Water Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies 1620 I Street, NW, Suite 500, Washington, DC 20006 • p 202.331.2820 www.amwa.net

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Association)of)Metropolitan)Water)Agencies)(AMWA)

Comments)on)potential)regulatory)changes)to)EPA’s)Risk)Management)Program)(RMP),)

as)authorized)by)Section)112(r))of)the)Clean)Air)Act.

On July 31, U.S. EPA published a Federal Register request for information (RFI) on potential 

regulatory changes to EPA’s Risk Management Program (RMP), as authorized by Section 112(r) 

of the Clean Air Act (CAA). The law requires holders of certain chemicals – including many 

water systems that use gaseous chlorine or anhydrous ammonia – to develop and file with EPA a 

risk management plan that outlines safety and security measures and responses, while also 

tasking these facilities with a “general duty” to prevent the accidental release of covered 

chemicals.

The RFI requests stakeholder comment on numerous aspects of the RMP, but AMWA would 

like to focus on four sections in particular that directly relate to drinking water facilities. These 

sections seek feedback on whether EPA should require covered facilities to further evaluate or 

implement “inherently safer technologies” (IST), whether water systems currently covered by the 

“Program 2” level of RMP oversight should be automatically reassigned to “Program 3,”

whether RMP-covered facilities should publicly post or share RMP-related information, and 

whether NAICS-classes of facilities that most frequently report chemical incidents should 

automatically be subject to “Program 3” oversight. 

Consistent with our historical position on the issue, AMWA does not think EPA should impose 

any IST review or implementation requirements on water systems subject to the RMP. 

Additionally, EPA should not automatically reclassify “Program 2” drinking water facilities into 

“Program 3,” nor should EPA place all water facilities in “Program 3” simply because of the 

absolute number of chemical incidents reported at water and irrigation systems over a period of 

years. Finally, AMWA believes that widely publicizing information about chemical names and 

quantities stored at particular RMP-covered facilities could present severe security risks and 

serve as a roadmap for those who may wish to do harm to the facility and the surrounding 

community. Below are AMWA’s responses to specific questions on these subjects posed in the 

RFI.

Selected Questions Regarding “Safer Technology and Alternatives Analysis”

a. Should EPA require a safer alternatives options analysis either as a new prevention program 

element, as part of the existing PHA/Hazard Review element, or as a separate new requirement 

under CAA section 112(r)?

A broad EPA requirement for all facilities subject to CAA section 112(r) to analyze IST

options would leave many water utilities considering unworkable approaches, either from 

cost, practicality, health or public safety standpoints. EPA therefore should not attempt 

to impose an IST review or analysis requirements through section 112(r). Also, because 

there is no consensus understanding of what methods or processes may constitute an 

“inherently safer technology” for a particular water facility, it would be impossible for 
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EPA to develop consensus definitions that could widely and meaningfully apply to water 

facilities across the country.

AMWA does not believe that an IST mandate for drinking water utilities through section 

112(r) could appropriately capture the variety of contingencies water utilities must 

consider when choosing a treatment chemical. Because section 112(r) focuses on 

preventing an accidental chemical release, any EPA definition of a “safer” chemical

alternative would presumably center on this objective. But a comprehensive 

consideration of “safer” technology from a water service point of view would also have 

to take into account the safety, health and other trade-offs for water consumers who are

located some distance away from the water treatment facility, as well as inhabitants of 

surrounding communities beyond the immediate potential release impact area. Water 

utilities would also need to be sure that an alternate treatment method would fully comply 

with the statutory and regulatory requirements of the Safe Drinking Water Act.

Any requirement for water facilities to consider or carry out replacement of a covered 

chemical with an IST alternative could also create unintended consequences incompatible

with EPA’s mandate under section 112(r). Through section 112(r), Congress granted 

EPA regulatory authority over a facility’s storage of covered chemicals, but only when 

the facility possesses the chemical in a quantity that exceeds a defined threshold quantity. 

An EPA directive based on section 112(r) to replace or eliminate inventories of a covered 

chemical, however, could drive a water utility to simply reduce inventories below the 

threshold amount – after which point the facility’s storage of the chemical would no 

longer be subject to section 112(r) oversight. If this is the result of an IST mandate via 

section 112(r), it is difficult to see how the policy would lead to a more robust chemical 

security stature overall.

For example, under normal operating conditions, maintaining smaller chemical 

inventories that would not be subject to 112(r) oversight would require much more 

frequent deliveries (especially at larger facilities) that would result in a related cumulative 

increase in public safety risk related to those deliveries. Such frequent delivery schedules 

could also be much more susceptible to potential supply chain disruptions during normal 

operations. During a disaster, the disruption of road and other transportation networks

poses an immediate risk to public health that must be considered if small, rotating 

chemical inventories cannot be replenished in a timely manner.

b. How should safer alternatives be defined if it were to be a requirement under CAA section 112(r) 

regulations? What specifically should a safer alternatives analysis require and how would this 

differ from what is already required under other provisions of the RMP?

For reasons previously stated, AMWA does not believe that mandated IST reviews or 

implementation is an appropriate use of EPA authority under section 112(r).

c. How should industries determine if a safer alternative exists for their particular process? What 

safer alternative chemicals are available for the listed RMP chemicals and for ammonium 

nitrate?
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When evaluating potential changes to drinking water treatment chemicals and processes, 

utility experts must consider a number of factors including: security risk tradeoffs; local 

ambient water quality; interactions with co-occurring constituents; generation of 

unintended treatment byproducts and the resulting public health implications; supply 

chain reliability; fiscal and economic impacts; implications for regulatory compliance

with other statutes such as the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) or Clean Water Act 

(CWA); and other factors that may not be readily apparent to those unfamiliar with the 

complex operations of an individual water utility.

d. What should facilities consider when determining if such technologies, when identified, are 

effective, available, and economically justified for their particular process or facility? Can the 

RMP national database, Lessons Learned Information System or other federal databases be 

structured to promote the exchange of information both within industry and with other 

stakeholders on potentially safer technologies?

Finished water quality, public health consequences, security risk tradeoffs or shifts, costs

(including capital, operations and maintenance, and costs to ratepayers), treatment 

byproducts, energy consumption, corrosion control impacts, reliability of inventories in 

the event of a supply chain disruption, and SDWA compliance are among the many 

factors that water utility managers must consider when evaluating the promise of a new 

technology as a replacement for an existing drinking water treatment chemical or process. 

Additionally, a water utility would have to consider the need to obtain SDWA primacy 

agency approval before moving ahead with treatment changes, and some pilot testing of 

the alternatives might be required to optimize water treatment and water quality and to 

meet all other SDWA water quality requirements.

New or existing federal information sharing databases (presuming their contents are 

adequately shielded from public disclosure) could serve as appropriate venues for utility 

professionals to share information about their experiences in evaluating and/or 

implementing different processes and help inform future (voluntary) utility decisions on 

IST implementation.

e. If EPA were to require facilities to undertake an evaluation of the potential to incorporate safer 

alternatives, what minimum criteria should this evaluation be required to meet? How would the 

evaluation determine if a particular alternative is feasible, cost effective and results in less risk? 

What requirements or incentives, if any, should there be for implementation of identified safer 

alternatives? How should any such requirements be structured and enforced?

For reasons previously stated, any requirement or incentive seeking to encourage the 

adoption of an IST would be wholly inappropriate, as certain ISTs may not represent 

workable options for drinking water utilities based on their unique circumstances. Any 

policy to require or incentivize a particular IST would therefore disadvantage a water 

system that is unable to utilize that IST for any reason. A requirement or incentive could 

lead a water system to implement an imperfect IST, thereby putting its customers at risk 

of reduced water quality, increased health risks or security risks shifted elsewhere.

f. Should EPA require facilities to use a safer alternatives evaluation method such as the CCPS
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Inherently Safer Technology Checklist?

For reasons previously stated, AMWA does not believe that mandated IST reviews or 

implementation is an appropriate use of EPA authority under section 112(r).

g. How should EPA and facilities address the risk tradeoffs that could result when changing a 

process to incorporate safer alternatives?

Numerous risk-tradeoffs may come into play when a water utility changes drinking water 

treatment chemicals, and local utility experts must consider each of these when deciding 

whether an alternate chemical may be appropriate. When contemplating a change away 

from gaseous chlorine disinfection, for example, risks to the public that must be 

considered include possible accidents and spills involving more frequent truck shipments

for replacement chemicals, effects of saline byproduct discharges into regional waters, 

the potential for increased levels of contaminants such as perchlorate in finished water, 

and supply chain breakdowns that could leave a utility that stores smaller amounts of 

disinfection chemicals on-site unable to adequately treat water until the supply chain is 

restored. In the context of natural disasters – ranging from hurricanes to earthquakes –

that could affect communities, water utility managers must ensure they keep adequate 

levels of treatment chemicals on-site to cover any delivery gaps that may follow such an 

event.

The best way to address these risk tradeoffs is for utilities to study them closely before 

making any decision to change treatment methods or processes – and building 

contingency plans to address these tradeoffs in the event an alternate treatment process is 

chosen. This decision must be made by local officials who are familiar with the needs 

and infrastructure of their own communities – and not by distant federal officials who do 

not have the benefits of this local knowledge.

h. Should EPA consider requirements similar to those used by the State of New Jersey or Contra 

Costa County, California, and if so, why? What have been the benefits of such programs in risk 

reduction or process safety for the facilities covered under these requirements? What have been 

the limitations or drawbacks of these programs?

For reasons previously stated, AMWA does not believe that mandated IST reviews or 

implementation is an appropriate use of EPA authority under section 112(r).

i. If EPA were to develop regulatory requirements for safer alternatives, which facilities should be 

subject to those requirements? Should all RMP facilities be subject to such requirements, or only 

“high risk” facilities, such as refineries and large chemical plants? How would “high risk” be 

defined? Are there particular processes or chemicals that should be targeted or prioritized for 

implementation of such requirements?

Drinking water treatment systems, because of their unique role as public health stewards, 

should be exempt from any regulatory requirement to consider or implement IST 

methods through section 112(r). Water utility managers select the most appropriate water 

treatment methods based on a variety of factors, but most importantly which chemical 

will most effectively make water safe for public consumption and achieve compliance 
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with the requirements of the SDWA. Allowing federal officials to second-guess these 

local decisions – with a focus on minimizing potential terror attack consequences off-site, 

rather than ensuring the appropriate treatment and safety of drinking water – could lead to 

inadequately treated water and even detriments to public health. Utilities could also then 

be held responsible under the SDWA for improperly treating their water supplies – even 

if the decision on the appropriate treatment method was taken out of their hands.

j. What barriers exist for industry to adopt safer alternatives? What incentives can be used by 

government to have facilities implement safer alternatives? Should the Agency provide special 

recognition to companies that implement safer alternatives?

Risk tradeoffs that include, but are not limited to, factors such changes to finished water 

quality, compliance with SDWA standards, creation of new byproducts that require 

proper disposal, cost considerations, supply chain concerns, and facility storage space 

may all serve as potential barriers to the adoption of an IST by a given water facility, 

though different facilities will each face their own unique challenges and barriers. 

While AMWA would welcome federal financial assistance to offset costs incurred by 

utilities that have independently and voluntarily decided to explore or adopt an alternate 

treatment chemical, in general we do not believe it would be appropriate for the federal 

government to otherwise incentivize the adoption of any IST by water systems. 

Incentivizing IST adoption would carry the implication that a conversion to an IST is by 

default the “correct” conclusion that a water utility should reach when completing its own 

analysis, and that offering incentives to utilities will make them reach this conclusion.

The reality of considering changes to treatment chemicals is much more complicated, and 

while many water utilities have successfully and voluntarily adopted an IST in recent 

years, many others have also evaluated their present situation and determined that 

continuing with their present treatment process is their most appropriate course of action. 

Any incentives or “special recognition” that attempts to reward utilities for making one 

decision or another about an IST would be ill-advised and fail to recognize the complex 

local factors that contribute to each decision.

k. What are other options (other than regulatory requirements) exist to encourage facilities to 

investigate, develop or implement safer alternatives and how can EPA further these efforts?

While AMWA does not advise new regulatory requirements to force water systems to 

review or implement an IST, EPA could facilitate information sharing among different 

water systems about their experiences in evaluating and (when appropriate) adopting 

alternate water treatment chemicals and processes. This will expand the water sector’s 

knowledge about various available options, and give local professionals more 

information to work with when evaluating how any given technology might or might not 

be appropriate for their utility.

l. If RMP facilities are required to perform safer alternative options analyses and implementation 

plans, should EPA require that the analyses and/or implementation plans be submitted to the 

Agency? Should EPA have any role in approving such analyses or plans? In lieu of an approval, 
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can EPA promote safer alternatives through reporting and the dissemination of information on 

potentially applicable practices?

Again, AMWA does not believe that mandated IST reviews or implementation is an 

appropriate use of EPA authority under section 112(r).

But in general, any IST review by a water system would be unique to the profile and 

circumstances of that water system, so there would be little value in requiring water 

systems to submit any such evaluation to EPA for review or approval. It would be 

inappropriate (and we believe beyond the bounds of EPA’s section 112(r) authority) for 

the agency to approve or deny each analysis from a local water utility, and it is uncertain 

whether the agency even has the capacity to collect, review, and store thousands of 

analyses from water utilities across the country – not to mention thousands of other 

analyses that could come from non-water-sector facilities subject to section 112(r). We 

also have practical concerns about EPA using the CAA to approve or deny water 

treatment processes that must be maintained to achieve compliance with separate SDWA

requirements.

Moreover, an IST analysis could serve as a roadmap for terrorists and criminals to learn 

about vulnerabilities of water system security defenses, so every effort must be made to 

protect these sensitive documents from public disclosure. Producing multiple copies of 

these documents and distributing them to federal officials would only expand the 

opportunities for a release of this information – either accidentally or through a public 

disclosure request.

In the event that a water utility ever does share an IST analysis with EPA, before it occurs 

rules must be in place to guarantee the analysis is protected from disclosure under the 

federal Freedom of Information Act or any corresponding state or local statutes. The 

Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, which 

required water systems to develop and share with EPA vulnerability assessments for their 

facilities, prohibited the federal government from releasing any enclosed information 

under FOIA. Identical protections should be in place to protect any shared IST analysis 

as well.

m. If RMP facilities are required to consider safer alternative options, what role should local 

communities have in these analyses? Should facilities be required to disclose these analyses or 

recommendations resulting from such analyses to local authorities or the public prior to the 

selection of options? Are there any other disclosure options that will ensure that decisions on 

implementing safer technologies are made with transparency? Are there any means of oversight 

other than disclosure that would ensure that safer alternatives analyses are thorough and 

implementation decisions are appropriate?

Local water utility managers across the country work with local officials and the public to 

determine the best and most appropriate water treatment methods for their communities 

based on a variety of locally unique factors. Each community has developed its own 

method for carrying out this cooperative relationship, and the same should occur when 

utilities consider potential IST options. What is not needed is a federal mandate that 
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dictates precisely how and when water utility managers and community representatives 

confer about treatment options.

n. What would be the economic impacts of requiring facilities to analyze safer alternative options? 

Are there any special circumstances involving small entities that EPA should consider?

Many drinking water utilities across the country have in the past looked at opportunities 

to replace their use of certain hazardous chemicals with an alternative. For example, a 

2008 survey of AMWA members found that about sixty-five percent of respondents had 

considered adopting an alternate disinfectant chemical within the previous five years. 

But the economic impacts of broadly mandating a similar analysis by utilities nationwide 

would largely depend on the scope of the analysis that would be required. If utilities 

were simply instructed to consider whether an alternative might be appropriate for them, 

the costs could be relatively small. But if this analysis were required to include numerous 

prescribed steps, calculations and justifications for subsequent decisions, then costs could 

quickly escalate beyond what is reasonable and affordable.

AMWA continues to believe that such a mandate from EPA (aside from not being an 

appropriate use of EPA’s section 112(r) authority) is unnecessary for the drinking water 

sector because so many utilities have already taken action to evaluate and adopt, where 

possible, alternate treatment (particularly disinfection) methods. AMWA’s same 2008 

survey found that 46 percent of respondents had actually adopted an alternate disinfectant 

within the previous five years – demonstrating the water utility community’s willingness 

to make these chemical substitutions without government prompting, as long as doing so 

is feasible and does not interfere with their primary responsibility of delivering clean and 

safe drinking water to the public.

Selected Questions Regarding Effects of OSHA PSM Coverage on RMP Applicability

1. Do you operate a water or wastewater treatment plant that is subject to the RMP regulation? If 

so, what level of accident prevention requirements do you believe are warranted for such 

facilities? If you operate a Program 2 process at a water or wastewater treatment plant, how 

much additional burden would be involved in implementing the additional RMP elements 

required for Program 3 processes?

Depending on whether their state has a delegated OSHA program, drinking water utilities

that are subject to the RMP regulation must meet the requirements of either Program 2 or 

Program 3. Public utilities in states that do not have federally delegated, state-run OSHA 

programs generally fall into Program 2, while utilities with such state-run programs are 

classified in Program 3. Moving all Program 2 water systems to Program 3 would 

require these facilities to meet new reporting standards for the first time, and would 

represent a significant burden on water systems not previously required by their state to 

meet the OSHA PSM standard.

We believe Program 2 represents an appropriate level of accident prevention 

requirements for water systems that are not otherwise required to meet OSHA (and thus 
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Program 3) requirements. EPA’s RMP Guidance equates Program 2 with “the basic 

elements that are the foundation of sound prevention practices” (safety information,

hazard review, operating procedures, training, maintenance, compliance audits, and 

incident investigation) and explains that Program 2 requires “substantially less 

documentation and record keeping responsibilities” than is required under Program 3.1

Other than suggesting some preference for requiring all water systems nationwide to meet 

the same reporting standard, EPA’s RFI includes no information on what potential safety 

and security benefits would result from imposing these new documentation and record 

keeping requirements on water systems that are in states without state-run OSHA 

programs.

2. Should RMP-covered municipal water and wastewater plants that are not eligible for

Program 1 always be subject to RMP Program 3, regardless of whether or not they are located in 

a state with a Federally-delegated OSHA program? Why or why not?

Publicly-owned water treatment facilities that are not currently subject to RMP Program 

3 should not be made subject to Program 3 simply because other water facilities in states 

that have federally-delegated state-run OSHA programs are separately subject to Program 

3.

According to the Department of Labor, 25 states (plus Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin 

Islands) currently operate OSHA-approved state plans that cover public employees.2 

Publicly owned water facilities in these states are therefore subject to Program 3 when 

they do not otherwise qualify for Program 1.

Chapter 2 of EPA’s RMP Guidance explains, “EPA placed all covered OSHA PSM 

processes in Program 3 to eliminate the possibility of imposing overlapping, inconsistent 

requirements on the same process.”3 The document also explains that these facilities 

“already complying with OSHA PSM for a process ... probably will need to take few, if 

any, additional steps and develop little, if any, additional documentation to meet the 

requirements of the Program 3 prevention elements.” Finally, chapter 7 of EPA’s 

Guidance notes “EPA used OSHA’s language verbatim” whenever possible in 

developing Program 3, as a means of streamlining Program 3 requirements with rules 

these utilities already had to meet.4

EPA’s decision to automatically assign to Program 3 facilities (including water and 

wastewater facilities) in states with OSHA-approved state plans therefore appears to be 

one focused solely on the avoidance of duplicative reporting and recordkeeping 

requirements for water facilities – NOT because of any apparent or expected 

enhancement of security due to a Program 3 classification.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 1 http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-11/documents/chap-06-final.pdf, 6-1.

2 https://www.osha.gov/dcsp/osp/faq.html#oshaprogram

3 http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-10/documents/chap-02-final.pdf, 2-12. 4 http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-11/documents/chap-07-final.pdf, 7-1.
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It would therefore be illogical to expand Program 3’s coverage to water and wastewater 

facilities that are not otherwise already required to file the OSHA PSM/Program 3 

administrative documents. This would create new, rather than reduce, documentation and 

record-keeping burdens on hundreds of water facilities nationwide.

The fact that water facilities located in the 25 states without a state-run OSHA program 

must not meet Program 3 requirements is not an oversight or a “peculiarity”; it is a 

reaffirmation of EPA’s intention to make Program 2 “the default program level”5 for 

facilities that do not fit in either Program 1 or Program 3. And because EPA’s guidance 

states outright that water facilities in states with state-run OSHA programs were only put 

in Program 3 to ease administrative burdens on those facilities, it would make little sense 

to impose new administrative burdens on the nation’s remaining public water facilities 

simply for the sake of placing all such facilities nationwide in the same program. This 

action would deliver no measurable safety or security benefit while undermining Program 

2’s status as the “default program level.”

AMWA recommends EPA make no changes to the established practice of placing water 

facilities in an appropriate program level based upon whether their state has an OSHAapproved plan.

General Comments on “Public Disclosure of Information to Promote Regulatory 

Compliance and Improve Community Understanding of Chemical Risks”

EPA’s request for information asks whether “requiring RMP-covered facilities to post on 

a company website unrestricted (i.e., non-off-site consequence analysis) RMP 

information, such as the facility’s RMP executive summary, emergency contact 

information, identity of the LEPC, or links to the local emergency response plan and/or 

the facility’s most recent EPCRA Tier II report, lead to improvements in facility safety 

and better regulatory compliance?” AMWA recommends against any new regulations 

that would mandate the widespread sharing and distribution of sensitive utility security 

and chemical inventory information.

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, EPA removed RMP database 

information from its website, where it had previously been widely available to the public. 

Among this information were facility-specific lists of covered chemicals used, 

preventative measures in place to protect against threats, and locations within a facility 

where such chemicals were used and stored. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, it 

was decided that making this sensitive information widely available in electronic form 

could provide terrorists and criminals with a “how-to” guide to attack a facility. AMWA 

supported this decision, and in the time since has continued to believe that posting such 

information online would undermine a facility’s security posture.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 5 http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2013-10/documents/chap-02-final.pdf, 2-3.
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As explained by members of the House Energy and Commerce Committee in 2012 when 

EPA earlier considered rolling back RMP data protections, “With the growth of several 

internet-search engine-based mapping tools, the [RMP information] can constitute a 

virtual terrorist roadmap into a chemical facility, triggering devastating consequences . . . 

Common sense dictates that this information must be restricted from Internet access and 

maintained under the current administrative access controls.”6

Moreover, we would remind EPA that the sharing of certain information with the RMP 

database with local first responders is already required through several statutes:

• Clean Air Act §112(r) requires entities to provide all Risk Management Plan 

information to local first responders and response planners;

• Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act §301-303 requires 

certain entities to coordinate emergency response plans with state and local 

emergency planning commissions; and,

• P.L. 109-295 §550(c) provides for sharing of sensitive chemical facility security

information with law enforcement officials and first responders.

As a result, we believe there is no need for new regulations mandating the online posting 

of RMP database information as a means to achieve necessary information sharing with 

first responders. But if EPA still seeks to ensure effective access to this information by

local first responders, then the agency should study on best practices currently employed 

by RMP-covered facilities and their local first responders to comply with these existing 

statutes, broadly identify what approaches are most effective, and then publicize this 

information and encourage adoption of these practices by other facilities across the 

country.

Conversely, promoting information sharing by mandating the publication of RMP 

database information online for all members of the public to see – regardless of their 

motivations – would invite abuse by individuals seeking to cause harm. The end result 

would make sensitive facility security information available on-demand at computers 

across the country – and strongly undercut EPA’s overarching goal of reducing chemical 

risks to local communities.

Selected Questions Regarding Program 3 NAICS Codes Based on RMP Accident History 

Data

a. Should industry sectors represented in RMP data as those with the most accidental 

releases be used to update and replace the existing set of Program 3 NAICS codes with a 

new set?

No. The absolute number of accidental releases is not a metric that reflects the actual 

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 6 http://energycommerce.house.gov/press-release/committee-leaders-express-concern-over-epa-policy-couldcompromise-chemical-facility
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risks posed by an industry sector. The absolute number of accidental releases is biased by 

the overall number of facilities in a sector and does not take into account the relative 

severity of (and corresponding risk posed by) any releases.

Even among the industry sectors represented in RMP data as those with the most 

accidental releases, the absolute number of actual releases is remarkably low and not 

enough to justify automatically subjecting all such facilities to higher oversight levels.

For example, a 2002 academic report from the University of Pennsylvania found that 

between 1994 and 2000 there were a total of 118 accidents reported to RMP*Info by 

facilities classified as “Water Supply and Irrigation Systems,” or fewer than 17 accidents 

per year.

7

The 2002 University of Pennsylvania study also contains evidence that water utilities do 

not experience a greater rate of accidental chemical releases than many other NAICScoded facilities. The 118 “Water Supply and Irrigation System” accidents reported in the 

study came from a universe of 2000 such facilities – meaning covered water and 

irrigation systems experienced an average of only 0.013 accidents per facility per year. 

This low rate of accidents compares favorably with that of other classes of NAICS-coded 

facilities examined in the study.

In sum, the available data makes clear that the elevated absolute number of accidents at 

“Water Supply and Irrigation Systems”-coded facilities is simply a function of the 

number of such facilities nationwide, and that these facilities do not experience accidents 

at elevated frequencies deserving of special scrutiny. It would therefore make little sense 

to penalize these more prevalent facilities by automatically assigning them to “Program 

3” without a more comprehensive evaluation of risks. 

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! 7 http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/risk/downloads/02-04-PK.pdf, page 34.