Affirmed in Part, Reversed and Remanded in Part and Memorandum Opinion filed 

October 25, 2011.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

___________________

NO. 14-10-00540-CV

___________________

YOLANDA SANDRIA SAQUI AND ROSALINA REYES RAMIREZ, 

INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES OF MIGUEL 

ANGEL BARRAGAN SANDRIA, DECEASED, Appellants

V.

PRIDE INTERNATIONAL, INC., MEXICO DRILLING LIMITED, L.L.C., PRIDE 

CENTRAL AMERICA, L.L.C., PRIDE CENTRAL AMERICA, L.L.C. (MEXICAN 

BRANCH), AND GULF OF MEXICO PERSONNEL SERVICES, S. DE R.L. DE

C.V., Appellees

On Appeal from the 234th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2010-01480

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellants, Yolanda Sandria Saqui and Rosalina Reyes Ramirez, Individually and 

as Personal Representatives of Miguel Angel Barragan Sandria, Deceased, appeal from the 

trial court’s granting of the motion for summary judgment filed by appellees Pride 
2

International, Inc. (―Pride‖), Mexico Drilling Limited, L.L.C. (―Mexico Drilling‖), Pride 

Central America, L.L.C. (―PCA‖), Pride Central America, L.L.C. (Mexican Branch) 

(―PCA-Mexico‖), and Gulf of Mexico Personnel Services, S. De R.L. De C.V. 

(―GOMPS‖). We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

PCA owns the Pride Mississippi, a mobile offshore drilling unit. In 2004, 

Petroleos de Mexico (―Pemex‖), Mexico’s national oil company, leased the Pride 

Mississippi from PCA in order to drill a well off the eastern coast of Mexico. Pemex 

controlled the well operations, and it provided the drilling crew to manage and operate the 

rig.

GOMPS, a Mexican corporation, supplied the maintenance crew to assist Pemex 

with its drilling operations and to work aboard the Pride Mississippi. The maintenance 

crew included Mexican nationals Christian Spinoso Sandria (―Spinoso‖) and Miguel Angel 

Barragan (―Barragan‖).

On September 13, 2004, crew members engaged in storm preparation measures, 

including tying down heavy equipment. While Barragan and Spinoso were working on 

tying down a heavy ―burner boom,‖ it became disconnected from the rig and fell into the 

water, pulling them and one other crew member overboard. Barragan and Spinoso were

both killed in the incident. The Mexican Ministry of Labor and Social Security assumed 

jurisdiction over the accident and investigated its cause.

On September 12, 2006, appellants and Maria Luisa Saqui, individually and as the 

purported representative of Spinoso’s estate (―Spinoso Plaintiffs‖) filed a lawsuit in federal 

district court in Galveston, Texas. Among the defendants were Pride, Mexico Drilling, 

PCA, PCA-Mexico, and GOMPS. Appellants and the Spinoso Plaintiffs alleged the 

defendants were liable for the accident under the Jones Act and General Maritime Law.
3

Appellants and the Spinoso Plaintiffs never served PCA-Mexico and GOMPS with 

process. Pride and Mexico Drilling filed a motion for summary judgment in which they 

argued they had no connection to or involvement with the operations that gave rise to the 

lawsuit. The federal district court eventually granted their motion and dismissed both 

entities with prejudice. After the federal district court granted Pride and Mexico 

Drilling’s motion for summary judgment, only PCA remained as a defendant in the federal 

district court litigation.

PCA eventually filed a motion to dismiss the federal district court litigation on 

forum non conveniens grounds. PCA asserted that Mexico was the more appropriate 

jurisdiction for appellants and the Spinoso Plaintiffs’ lawsuit. On February 14, 2007 the 

federal district court denied PCA’s motion.

On January 10, 2008 the federal district court scheduled a status conference. At the 

conference the ―Court was notified by Mr. Musslewhite and Mr. Schwartz that they, along 

with the other counsel of record for the Plaintiffs had been discharged by the Plaintiffs 

Rosalinda Reyes Ramirez, Yolanda Sandria Saqui and the Estate of Miguel Angel 

Barragan.‖ Based on that, on January 22, 2008, the federal district court dismissed 

appellants’ lawsuit without prejudice.

On July 27, 2007 PCA filed a renewed motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens. 

On September 29, 2008, approximately eight months after appellants had been dismissed

from the federal district court litigation, the trial court granted PCA’s motion and 

dismissed the Spinoso Plaintiffs’ lawsuit without prejudice.

On April 21, 2008, once again represented by Musslewhite and Schwartz, 

appellants re-filed their lawsuit in state district court in Jefferson County, Texas.

Appellants once again filed suit against each of the appellees. Appellants’ lawsuit was 

eventually transferred to Harris County. After appellants’ lawsuit had been transferred to 
4

Harris County, appellees filed ―Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment or 

Alternatively, Defendant Pride Central America, LLC’s Forum Non Conveniens Motion to 

Dismiss.‖

In the traditional motion for summary judgment, Pride and Mexico Drilling asserted 

they were entitled to summary judgment on two grounds. First, they argued appellants’ 

claims were barred by res judicata since appellants had sued the same defendants in federal 

district court and both had been dismissed from the lawsuit while appellants were still 

parties to the federal district court litigation. Second, they argued they were entitled to 

summary judgment because they had no connection with any of the events underlying 

appellants’ lawsuit. PCA-Mexico and GOMPS also asserted they were entitled to 

summary judgment for two reasons. First, they argued they had no connection with the 

events underlying appellants’ lawsuit. Next, PCA-Mexico and GOMPS asserted 

appellants’ claims against them were barred by limitations because they were never served 

with process in the federal district court litigation. The trial court granted summary 

judgment in favor of Pride, Mexico Drilling, PCA-Mexico, and GOMPS without 

specifying the grounds.

PCA moved for summary judgment asserting appellants’ lawsuit should be 

dismissed pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. According to PCA, since the 

federal district court had previously dismissed the Spinoso Plaintiffs’ lawsuit after 

determining Texas was an inconvenient forum, collateral estoppel barred re-litigation of

that issue. The trial court granted PCA’s motion solely on the basis of PCA’s collateral 

estoppel argument.1

 

1 Because the trial court granted PCA’s motion for summary judgment, it did not rule on PCA’s 

alternative forum non conveniens motion to dismiss.
5

DISCUSSION

Appellants bring four issues on appeal. In those issues, appellants challenge the 

granting of summary judgment in favor of PCA and the trial court’s denial of their motion 

for continuance and motion for new trial.

I. The Standard of Review

In a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant has the burden to show 

there is no genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 

Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex. 1985). In determining whether 

there is a genuine fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the 

non-movant is taken as true and the reviewing court makes all reasonable inferences and 

resolves all doubts in the non-movant’s favor. Id. at 548–49. If there is no genuine issue 

of material fact, summary judgment should issue as a matter of law. Haase v. Glazner, 62 

S.W.3d 795, 797 (Tex. 2001). A defendant who conclusively negates at least one of the 

essential elements of a plaintiff’s cause of action is entitled to a summary judgment on that 

claim. IHS Cedars Treatment Ctr. of DeSoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 798 

(Tex. 2004). A defendant is entitled to summary judgment on an affirmative defense if 

the defendant conclusively proves all of the elements of the affirmative defense. 

Rhone-Poulenc, Inc. v. Steel, 997 S.W.2d 217, 223 (Tex. 1999). Once a defendant 

establishes its right to summary judgment, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to come 

forward with summary judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. 

Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. 1995). We review a trial court’s 

summary judgment de novo. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 

(Tex. 2005).

II. Pride, Mexico Drilling, PCA-Mexico, and GOMPS

We turn first to the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of Pride, 

Mexico Drilling, PCA-Mexico, and GOMPS. Pride, Mexico Drilling, PCA-Mexico, and 
6

GOMPS moved for summary judgment on multiple grounds. The trial court granted their 

motion without specifying the basis for doing so. Appellants have not challenged on 

appeal the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of Pride, Mexico Drilling, 

PCA-Mexico, and GOMPS. Accordingly, appellants have waived any potential error, and 

that portion of the trial court’s summary judgment is affirmed. Jacobs v. Satterwhite, 65 

S.W.3d 653, 656–57 (Tex. 2001).

III. PCA

We turn next to the trial court’s granting of summary judgment in favor of PCA. 

The trial court specified it was granting PCA’s motion solely on the basis of PCA’s 

collateral estoppel argument. In its order, the trial court noted that because appellants 

―were in a similar factual posture (same accident, facts) as the Spinoso Plaintiffs; had the 

same counsel; and are related by blood — the Court finds that [appellants] are in privity 

with the Spinoso parties.‖ The trial court then determined that collateral estoppel applied. 

As we explain below, we disagree.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel prevents re-litigation of particular issues already 

resolved in a prior suit. Barr v. Resolution Trust Corp., 837 S.W.2d 627, 628 (Tex. 1992). 

To invoke the doctrine of collateral estoppel, a party must establish that (1) the facts sought 

to be litigated in the current lawsuit were fully and fairly litigated in a prior action; (2) 

those litigated facts were essential to the judgment in the prior action; and (3) the parties 

were cast as adversaries in the prior action. Eagle Properties, Ltd. v. Scharbauer, 807 

S.W.2d 714, 721 (Tex. 1990). The supreme court has determined that although this 

definition does not require mutuality for the invocation of collateral estoppel, it is 

necessary that the party against whom the plea of collateral estoppel is asserted have been a 

party, or in privity with a party, in that prior litigation. Id. Due process requires that the 

rule of collateral estoppel operate only against persons who have had their day in court 

either as a party to the prior suit or as a privy. Benson v. Wanda Petroleum Co., 468 
7

S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. 1971). There is no general definition of privity and the 

determination of who are privies requires a careful examination into the circumstances of 

each case. Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Childress, 650 S.W.2d 770, 774 (Tex. 

1983); Benson, 468 S.W.2d at 363. The word privy includes those who control an action 

although not parties to it, those whose interests are represented by a party to the action, and 

successors in interest. Benson, 468 S.W.2d at 363, Getty Oil Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 845 

S.W.2d 794, 800–01 (Tex. 1992); Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co., 650 S.W.2d at 774. 

Privity connotes those who are in law so connected with a party to the judgment as to have 

such an identity of interest that the party to the judgment represented the same legal right. 

Benson, 468 S.W.2d at 363. Privity is not established by the mere fact that persons may 

happen to be interested in the same question or in proving the same state of facts. Id.

Since the resolution of this appeal turns exclusively on the issue of whether 

appellants are in privity with the Spinoso Plaintiffs in the federal district court litigation, 

we need not concern ourselves with the first two elements of the collateral estoppel 

doctrine. In addition, because the trial court explicitly based its collateral estoppel 

determination on privity, we need not consider PCA’s contention that appellants and PCA 

were adversaries in the federal district court action.2 Therefore, we examine the grounds 

listed by the trial court in its summary judgment order.

 

2 Even if PCA had raised a cross-issue on appeal making this argument, and we were required to 

address whether PCA and appellants were cast as adversaries in the federal district court litigation, we 

would conclude they were not. Appellants were initially plaintiffs in the federal district court litigation, 

but they were dismissed without prejudice on January 22, 2008. The federal district court noted in its order 

that ―the Court was notified by Mr. Musslewhite and Mr. Schwartz that they, along with the other counsel 

of record for the Plaintiffs, had been discharged by [appellants].‖ At the time appellants were dismissed 

from the federal district court litigation, PCA’s forum non conveniens motion had already been denied. 

While PCA had asked the federal district court to reconsider its forum non conveniens ruling, it had not yet 

done so as of January 22, 2008. In fact, the federal district court did not reverse itself and grant PCA’s 

forum non conveniens motion until September 29, 2008, almost exactly eight months after appellants were 

dismissed. Therefore, at the time the federal district court granted PCA’s forum non conveniens motion, 

we conclude appellants and PCA were no longer cast as adversaries in the federal district court litigation.
8

A. Similar Factual Posture

The trial court initially determined appellants were in privity with the Spinoso 

Plaintiffs because their cases presented a similar factual posture: Barragan and Spinoso 

were killed in the same accident. However, the Supreme Court has addressed this issue 

under similar facts and determined no privity relationship existed.

In Benson v. Wanda Petroleum Co., two separate lawsuits were filed against Wanda 

Petroleum following an automobile collision involving one of Wanda Petroleum’s trucks. 

468 S.W.2d at 362. The plaintiffs in one of the lawsuits were Mrs. Benson on behalf of 

herself and her husband, the owners and passengers of the car hit by the Wanda Petroleum 

truck. Id. The plaintiff in the second lawsuit was Mr. Porter, the driver of the Benson 

automobile. Id. The two lawsuits were eventually consolidated. Id. When the 

consolidated lawsuit was called to trial, Mrs. Benson took a voluntary non-suit. Id. 

Porter’s case against Wanda Petroleum went to trial and the jury found in favor of Wanda 

Petroleum and against Mr. Porter. Id. The trial court entered a take-nothing judgment in 

favor of Wanda Petroleum. Id.

Mrs. Benson re-filed her lawsuit against Wanda Petroleum. Arguing the fact 

findings and judgment in the Porter lawsuit were binding on Mrs. Benson, Wanda 

Petroleum eventually moved for summary judgment on the basis of collateral estoppel. 

The trial court granted Wanda Petroleum’s motion for summary judgment and the court of 

appeals affirmed. Id.

The Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that 

privity is not established by the mere fact that persons may happen to be interested in the 

same question or in proving the same state of facts. Id. at 363. The Supreme Court 

continued:
9

The suit at bar is a separate and distinct action for redress for personal 

injuries. Mrs. Benson was not a party to the former action instituted by the 

Porters following her non-suit and they did not represent her in her claims 

against Wanda, respondent here. It was not shown that Mrs. Benson 

participated in, or exercised any control over, the trial in the Porter suit, or 

that she had any right to do so. She was not shown to have any beneficial 

interest in the recovery of damages for personal injuries on behalf of the 

Porters. In our view, the requirements of due process compel the 

conclusion that a privity relationship which will support application of the 

rules of res judicata does not exist under these circumstances. 

Id. at 364.

We fail to recognize, and PCA has not pointed out, any legally significant difference 

between the facts found in the Benson case and the facts present in this appeal. Like Mrs. 

Benson and Mr. Porter, appellants and the Spinoso Plaintiffs sought redress for personal 

injuries arising out of the same incident. Like Mrs. Benson, because they had been 

dismissed from the lawsuit, appellants were not parties to the federal district court 

litigation at the time the district court reversed its forum non conveniens decision. In 

addition, PCA has not established as a matter of law that the Spinoso Plaintiffs represented 

appellants’ interests in the federal district court litigation. Also, PCA has not established 

as a matter of law that after appellants were dismissed from the federal district court 

litigation, they participated in, exercised any control over, or had any right to do either in 

the federal district court litigation. Like Wanda Petroleum before it, PCA has not 

established as a matter of law that appellants have any beneficial interest in any recovery 

by the Spinoso Plaintiffs or the reverse, the Spinoso Plaintiffs have any right to any 

recovery made by appellants. Because we can perceive no legally significant difference 

between the present case and Benson, we conclude the fact the two cases arise out of the 

same maritime accident does not establish as a matter of law that appellants and the 

Spinoso Plaintiffs were in privity.
10

B. Same Counsel

The trial court also found that appellants and the Spinoso Plaintiffs were in privity 

because they were represented by the same attorneys. However, the mere fact that 

appellants and the Spinoso Plaintiffs were represented by the same group of attorneys does 

not prove privity between them as a matter of law. Texas Capital Securities Management, 

Inc. v. Sandefer, 80 S.W.3d 260, 267 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. stricken).

C. Related by Blood

Finally, the trial court determined the fact that Barragan and Spinoso were cousins 

established appellants and the Spinoso Plaintiffs were in privity. PCA has failed to cite to 

any legal authority holding that the mere fact that two persons killed in an accident were 

cousins establishes as a matter of law that appellants’ and the Spinoso Plaintiffs were in 

privity. This is especially true when it was undisputed that appellants had been dismissed 

from the federal district court litigation and had already re-filed their lawsuit in state 

district court in Jefferson County, Texas.

When a defendant moves for a traditional motion for summary judgment on an 

affirmative defense, it has the burden to prove all elements of the affirmative defense as a 

matter of law. See Commint Technical Service, Inc. v. Quickel, 314 S.W.3d 646, 653–54 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no pet.). We conclude PCA failed to meet its 

burden to prove as a matter of law that appellants and the Spinoso Plaintiffs were in privity, 

an essential element of PCA’s collateral estoppel affirmative defense. Since PCA did not 

prove each element of its collateral estoppel affirmative defense as a matter of law, we 

conclude the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of PCA. 
11

Therefore, we sustain appellants’ first issue on appeal as it relates to the summary 

judgment in favor of PCA.3

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Pride, Mexico Drilling, 

PCA-Mexico, and GOMPS. We reverse the summary judgment in favor of PCA and 

remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

/s/ John S. Anderson

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Anderson, Brown, and Christopher.

 

3 Because we have sustained appellants’ first issue, we need not address appellants’ remaining 

issues on appeal.