U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFF ICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS

BJA NI J OJJDP BJS OVC

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

National Institute of Justice

Jeremy Travis, Director October 1995

continued . . .

Issues and Findings

Discussed in this Research in

Brief: How eight State and Federal

prisons have dealt with riots and

what strategies and procedures are

effective during the stages of a

prison riot.

Key issues: Safety of prison employees, inmates, and residents of

the area in which the facility is located, plus the financial cost of

prison riots makes their prevention

and containment a critical issue.

Factors that must be addressed include such criminal justice issues as

how prisons are administered (and

how command is divided during riots), race relations in prisons, how

prisons are built and renovated,

how prisons are staffed, and how

staff are utilized and augmented

during riots.

Findings: On the basis of an

indepth examination of eight disturbances, the study concluded

that proactive planning and preparation along with reactive problem

solving is the most effective approach to prison riot resolution. A

prison’s riot plan should include:

● A command structure with welldefined lines of authority.

● Clear guidelines on the use of

force, including staff and weapons

assignments.

● Interagency cooperation terms

that specify the roles of such units

Resolution of Prison Riots

by Bert Useem, Camille Graham Camp, George M. Camp, and Renie Dugan

Because prison riots have occurred all

too often, they can be anticipated in

the future. An indepth study sponsored

by the National Institute of Justice and

the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)

examined eight disturbances to understand how prison riots have been resolved and to consider strategies to

prepare for, settle, and recover from

them more effectively at the lowest

cost to all parties. Roadblocks to the

successful resolution of prison riots

often stem from the same misunderstandings and miscommunications experienced in ordinary life, multiplied by

the pressures of the event. Successful

resolutions require a controlled, measured response: an orderly command

post, clear lines of authority, effective

communication, appreciation of the

consequences of alternative lines of

action, and a sense among corrections

staff that their skills and training are

adequate to the challenge at hand.

This Research in Brief highlights what

was learned from prison administrators

and from reports, interviews, and historical data from the eight incidents. A

brief description of each event is followed by a discussion of strategies and

procedures to use during the three

phases of a prison riot: before, during,

and after.1

The incidents

Kirkland Correctional Institution

(Kirkland)—South Carolina. The

Kirkland facility was generally well managed at the time of the disturbance of April

1, 1986, and so was the riot’s resolution.

The riot began in a housing unit holding

the prison’s most violent and disruptive inmates. Inmates seized control of this unit,

scaled the fence around it, and then used

construction tools left on the grounds to release 700 general-population inmates. The

riot command post functioned smoothly,

resolving the disturbance in 6 hours.

U.S. Penitentiary (Atlanta)—Georgia. On

November 10, 1987, the U.S. State Department announced that Cuba had agreed to

reinstate a 1984 accord that would permit

the repatriation of up to 2,500 Cuban nationals. Included would be Cubans who

had fled in the 1980 Mariel boatlift but

who, once released on “immigration parole,” had been convicted of a crime and

were now detained in one of two Federal

prisons. Three days after the announcement, the detainees seized control of the

U.S. Penitentiary in Atlanta (part of the

Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Department of Justice). Their principal demand was that they

not be repatriated to Cuba. The uprising

lasted 11 days, involved more than 100

hostages, and required protracted negotiations to resolve.
2

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Issues and Findings

continued . . .

Mack Alford Correctional Center (Mack

Alford)—Oklahoma. The riot that occurred at this medium-security institution between May 13 and 15, 1988, was

preceded by a 6-hour period during

which black and white inmates milled

about in crowds, expressing antagonism

toward each other and toward authorities. Despite attempts to defuse the situation, a corrections official was taken

hostage late in the evening, marking the

start of the riot. Over a 2-hour period, inmates seized seven more hostages and

took over two-thirds of the prison. No

substantive issues were raised during the

3-day disturbance, which was eventually

resolved through a combination of negotiation, exhaustion on the part of the inmates, and defection by inmates who no

longer wanted to participate.

Coxsackie Correctional Facility (Coxsackie)—New York. Coxsackie houses

primarily maximum-security inmates;

the institution’s Special Housing Unit

(SHU) is for inmates segregated from the

others to serve disciplinary terms for serious violations of the rules. For approximately 14 hours, on August 1 and 2,

1988, 32 SHU inmates held several officers hostage and destroyed much of the

SHU facility. The riot began when an inmate assaulted an officer in the exercise

yard; the five officers working in the

SHU that day were not regularly assigned to this unit, so they were not as

familiar with procedures as those who

worked there routinely. Staff from the facility and the central office established

communications with the inmates almost

immediately after the SHU was overtaken and remained in contact during

the time it took negotiators to bring

about resolution.

Idaho State Correctional Institution

(ISCI). ISCI houses medium-custody inmates as well as close-custody inmates

(those who are dangerous and difficult to

manage), inmates in administrative segregation and detention, and those awaiting execution. On September 28, 1988,

inmates in a close-custody housing unit

refused to return to their cells after having been observed drinking a homemade alcoholic beverage. They then

used an unsecured table to break into

the unit’s control center. The riot was

eventually brought under control by an

ultimatum and riot squad deployment.

Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill (Camp Hill). Since

1975 Camp Hill had been an adult correctional facility, housing minimum- and

medium-security inmates. On October

25, 1989, inmates returning from an exercise yard in the late afternoon overwhelmed correctional staff and seized

eight hostages. The riot ended through

negotiations, and inmates were confined

to cells. The next day the superintendent

met with the inmates to discuss their

grievances. In a development unknown

to him, many of the cells to which the inmates had been confined were not secure, permitting the start of a second riot

later that same day. Five more hostages

were taken. Negotiations were again attempted, but the riot finally ended when

State police forcibly entered the

compound.

Arizona State Prison Complex

(Cimarron) Cimarron Unit. This onehour disturbance by inmates at the

Cimarron Unit of the Arizona State

Prison Complex at Tucson initially pitted

inmates against inmates. It began as a

fight over a cigarette lighter and escalated into a large, racially divided brawl.

When prison administrators intervened,

inmates turned on them, and force had to

be used to end the disturbance.

Federal Correctional Institution

(Talladega)—Alabama. Changes

prompted by the 1987 Cuban detainee

as the State Police and the local fire

department.

● Training programs that address

tactical strategies and mental readiness for emergencies.

Strategies to prevent and deal with

riots must address many factors,

including:

● Maintaining supervision of an experienced staff who follow sound security practices.

● Ensuring the security of the physical plant and equipment.

● Discerning the signs of a probable

riot from false clues and relaying reliable information up the chain of

command.

● Selecting the most appropriate

means of resolving a riot: use of

force, negotiations, or a combination

of tactics.

● Using strategies that range from

immediate use of force to waiting

until inmate leaders are ready to

negotiate.

● Addressing issues of staff morale

and emotional support after a riot

ends.

● Incorporating the lessons learned

from experiences with disturbances

into revised riot plans.

Target Audience: Prison administrators, State and local policymakers,

law enforcement practitioners.
3

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

riots at the U.S. Penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia, and at the Federal Detention Center in Oakdale, Louisiana,

were put to the test 4 years later when

Cuban detainees rioted at Talladega

between August 21 and 30, 1991. After hostages had been held for 10 days,

prison administrators concluded that

their health and safety were at increasing risk and prospects for a negotiated

settlement were dim. A carefully

planned and rehearsed assault, maximizing the element of surprise, ended

the incident without serious injuries to

the hostages or detainees.

Procedures and strategies:

before the riot

All prison administrators make efforts

to avoid disturbances but also prepare

for their occurrence. In the riots studied, various planning and avoidance

measures were used with varying degrees of success.

Riot preparation includes the acquisition of resources (organization, equipment, and information) for use in a riot

situation, the development of a strategy for the use of these resources, and

the mental readiness to respond to an

incident. The importance of advance

preparation in all its manifestations

cannot be overstated. Three elements

are especially important: command,

planning, and training.

Riot preparation: issues of

command

Crucial to the resolution of any riot is

command—the ability to exercise authority and direction over the forces

and resources available. This encompasses the capacity to deploy the

forces at hand, monitor their actions in

the field on a continuous basis, deliver

orders promptly and effectively, coordinate operations with other State and

he level of command during a

prison riot depends on several factors:

• Knowledge of the facility.

• Effects on the chain of command.

• Breadth of experience, responsibility,

and communication.

• Links between responsibility and

authority.

• The administrative framework.

Some of these factors favor assigning

command to the warden, but others indicate the central office administrator or

the commissioner may be more appropriate in particular situations.

The warden

Because details vary from one facility to

the next, one unit to the next, and one

shift to the next, some agencies feel that

overall authority should remain in the

hands of the warden, who has greater

overall knowledge of the facility. This

knowledge may enable him or her to

more quickly assess the situation and

recognize the consequences of different

courses of action.

To many corrections administrators, another compelling argument for keeping

riot resolution in the hands of the warden concerns maintaining the chain of

command in the aftermath. Taking away

the warden’s authority during a disturbance, it is argued, may undermine his

or her subsequent authority; midlevel

managers, correctional officers, and inmates alike will view the central office,

not the warden, as the real authority.

Allowing the warden to remain in command for the riot’s duration reaffirms

the commitment of the central office to

his or her leadership.

However, if the warden is new, someone

else who has spent more time at the facility (a central office administrator, for

example) may be more familiar with it.

Each situation must be weighed individually. In some cases, a team approach may

be warranted to capitalize on the knowledge and skill of each individual.

Central office administrator

Because of their experience across a

range of situations, central office administrators may have a more developed understanding of resolution strategies. They

are more likely, as well, to have greater

insight into the effects of disturbances on

the department or corrections as a whole

than those whose primary identification

may be with a particular facility. Additionally, their experiences in dealing with

agencies and resources outside the department can be brought to bear, if

necessary.

The commissioner

In other cases, it is argued that because

the commissioner bears ultimate responsibility for the resolution, decisionmaking

authority should reside in his or her

hands. Moreover, in agencies in which

the decisionmaking power tends to be

concentrated in the central office, existing practice may dictate that the commissioner take direct charge of the

resolution. The commissioner can follow

the procedures he or she and others in

the central office have established. By

contrast, in decentralized departments in

which wardens have greater latitude, it

may be more advantageous for the warden to remain in command.

T

Who Should Take Command in a Prison Riot?
4

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Federal agencies, and gather and interpret information on what inmates

are doing and intend to do. The longer

a riot lasts, the more agencies that become involved, and the larger the area

and the number of hostages held by inmates, the more complex command becomes. The challenge is met, in part,

through achieving unity of command

and determining the necessary level

and location of command.

Unity of command. Unity of command

refers to the principle that members of

an organization are accountable to a

single superior vested with the requisite authority to coordinate personnel

efforts to achieve common objectives.

In its absence, coordination may still

be achieved through voluntary mutual

cooperation, but this may break down

if disagreements arise.

Unity of command was not fully

achieved at Camp Hill. Although the

State Police had traditionally assumed

control over the resolution of Pennsylvania prison riots, the division of authority between the State Police and

the Corrections Department had not

been clearly delineated before the incident. During the disturbance, tension developed between the two

agencies, and issues that should have

been settled before the disturbance

(such as the particular type of ammunition that the State Police would

carry) had to be resolved on the spot,

taking up precious time. Since the riot,

great strides have been taken to establish a firmer working relationship

among State agencies.

Unity of command can be impaired by

divisions among command personnel.

Although one individual is formally in

charge, command is almost always a

team effort. One task in riot preparation is to forge a team and develop

trust among its members. In the riots

studied this was achieved to varying

degrees. At Kirkland, the command

group evidenced a strong level of trust

within the group. Members supported

each other and allowed open expression of views and impartial exploration

of options. As a result, the command

team could focus on the task at hand

and act decisively.

Level and location of command. Directly related to unity of command is

level of command (which official in the

correctional hierarchy will be in

charge) and location of command

(where the key command post will be

established). With regard to level of

command, decisionmaking authority

may reside in the prison, usually with

the warden, or within the agency’s

larger administrative framework, with

either a regional or agency director.

(See “Who Should Take Command in

a Prison Riot?”) Additionally, a prison

riot is the sort of public emergency in

which higher officials may feel the need

to step in and exercise command

themselves.

With regard to location of command,

offsite decisionmakers may choose to

go to the facility or may choose to remain offsite, either in their administrative offices or a preestablished

emergency operations center.

Location and level of command should

be determined as part of overall emergency planning. Arguing in favor of local control, both in level and location,

is the need for the commander to

readily size up the situation. This requires knowing the layout of the facility, the obstacles that might be

encountered in an assault, the backgrounds of the inmates involved, the

multitude of standing orders, and the

capabilities of onsite staff.

In instances in which it is decided that

authority for the resolution of the riot

resides outside the prison, an additional decision must be made regarding where to situate the command post.

Some of the same advantages of local

command may be gained by situating

the command post at the facility itself.

On the other hand, it takes time to establish and staff a command post in

the field, and the resources (for example, communication networks and

office equipment), if mobilized rapidly,

may be inadequate. If decisionmakers

operate from an existing offsite facility,

the amount of time and effort needed

to establish the field command post

may be focused on the incident itself.

At both Coxsackie and ISCI, the commissioner took direct control of the

resolution of the riots. Significant decisions were deferred (to the extent feasible) until the commissioner arrived

on the scene. The commissioner became, in effect, both the final authority

and the field commander. At Mack

Alford, the warden was given the primary responsibility for designing and

executing the resolution. The commissioner saw his role as establishing a

framework to assist the warden. He

served as a sounding board for the warden, providing advice and direction; he

met with State political leaders to assure

them that all that could be done was being done, thus insulating the warden

from political pressure; and he mobilized resources to put at the warden’s

disposal. The commissioner allowed the

warden to make key decisions so long as

he continued to have confidence in the

warden’s performance.

Kirkland, Atlanta, Talladega, and

Camp Hill each represents a somewhat

different approach. At Kirkland the

commissioner and members of his

executive staff met with the warden.
5

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Although it was clear that the commissioner was the ultimate authority, the

group functioned more like an executive committee working jointly to develop a solution. Command was

somewhat fluid, allowing discussion

of the options based on their merits.

At Atlanta both the Federal Regional

Director and the warden were at the

prison soon after the riot began. It was

decided to give local authority to the

Regional Director, but because of the

duration of the riot, it was necessary to

develop teams to rotate in and out of

leadership positions. In Washington,

the Attorney General and the Director

of the BOP maintained direct oversight

of the resolution.

At Camp Hill, the commissioner took

the position that responsibility for the

riot’s resolution rested with the superintendent. In practice, however, he

involved himself in a number of

important decisions that resulted in

some fracturing of command.

Riot preparation: planning

A riot plan should be a comprehensive

guide that describes the special responsibilities to be met, the resources

to be used, and the contribution of

each individual or group involved. It

should embody the correctional

agency’s principles and strategies for

resolution.

Riot plans are too often a weakly integrated compendium of policy statements, advice, memos, and agreements

among agencies. Cumbersome plans

are likely to receive lip service but be

ignored during a disturbance. Plans

should be well-organized, clearly written, and concise. They should include

procedures for how the riot plan book

is to be used during an incident; the

book itself is often left behind in the

heat of the moment. Guidelines for developing a riot plan, produced as part

of this study, are highlighted on the

following pages.

Use-of-force guidelines. A critical element of emergency planning is a useof-force policy. Which staff members

are authorized to order the use of

force? What responses are appropriate

in various situations? What weapons

and less-than-lethal munitions (e.g,

tear gas) are appropriate for use in

specific situations? These policies

should be based on both sound correctional practices and evolving law on

the use of force to quell prison riots.

Interagency cooperation. In the event

that the assistance of other agencies is

required (for medical care, additional

security forces, or investigative teams,

for example), the riot plan should include contact names and telephone

numbers and an outline of existing

agreements between agencies. These

would have been useful at Camp Hill

to clarify the roles and responsibilities

of the State Police and at Idaho, where

a municipal fire company hesitated in

responding to a call for help.

Riot preparation: training

Although planning can be conducted

in an agency’s central office for the

agency as a whole or in the warden’s

office for a particular facility, mental

readiness can be achieved only

through field practice and instruction.

The South Carolina Department of

Corrections has developed a rigorous

training program for its wardens,

deputy wardens, and other senior

prison managers. An annual 3-day

training seminar combines classroom

instruction with field practice to ensure readiness to handle emergencies.

In addition, demanding, unannounced

onsite riot scenarios are conducted in

South Carolina facilities. Participants

later write up their experiences and offer recommendations for improving the

department’s emergency procedures.

These training efforts had observable

payoffs in the incidents examined in

this study.

In training it is important to ensure

that different components of the response team will work to assist one another. Exercises should integrate the

activities of command, hostage negotiation teams, and tactical teams; otherwise these components will be

unfamiliar with the operation of the

others. If a riot plan calls for the assistance of State Police or other agencies,

much can be gained from joint training

with those agencies.

Riot avoidance

Some riots come as a complete surprise; others flow rather directly from a

snowballing set of events in which the

forces of disorder gain momentum.

Still others take place in situations

known to be unusually dangerous and

with a significant degree of warning.

These three configurations present different opportunities for riot avoidance.

Riots with no warning. The riots at

Talladega, Kirkland, Coxsackie, and

ISCI occurred without significant

warning. All but the ISCI riot occurred

in high-security units. The ISCI riot

began in a unit that had been constructed as medium-security housing,

but the inmates housed there were

classified as close-custody (more dangerous and difficult to manage than the

medium-security inmates).

In units where violent and rebellious

inmates are concentrated, prison

administrators rely in large part on the

physical elements of security to prevent violence. When riots do occur,
6

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

officer should and should not carry

when entering the unit. The keys to the

cell doors were not needed when entering the unit, but the officer first

taken hostage was carrying them, and

this permitted the incident to expand.

• Physical plant and equipment. Physical plant weaknesses allowed disturbances at some of the institutions to

spread. At Coxsackie, the wire-reinforced glass surrounding the control

center was easily broken by inmates.

Funds that had been requested for replacing the glass had not yet been approved. At Talladega the line of vision

to the small recreation yard where inmates first gained control was obscured by an electrical transformer.

ISCI’s dayroom contained heavy furniture that inmates used to break into

the control room.

Escalation of existing conflict. The

disturbances at Mack Alford Correctional Center and the Cimarron Unit of

the Arizona State Prison at Tucson

both resulted from escalating events.

The events leading to the two riots followed a common pattern. First, on the

day of the disturbances a dispute

among inmates inflamed preexisting

intergroup tensions. Second, the conflicts gained momentum because of a

series of retaliatory moves. Third, opposing groups of inmates mobilized,

leading to the confrontation.

The two riots actually began when staff

intervened and inmates redirected

their hostility against them. At Mack

Alford this occurred when an officer

without backup pursued an inmate

who resisted his transfer to another

prison. The inmate took the officer

hostage; shortly thereafter, other inmates joined the disturbance, seizing

additional hostages and territory. At

Cimarron the riot began when a fight

between two inmates broke out along

racial lines in the chow line and then

turned into a brawl in the cafeteria before spilling into the yard.

Riot avoidance in these situations lies

in managing the stages of escalation.

At Mack Alford the administration

had, over a 6-hour period, skillfully

managed a potentially explosive situation (made more difficult by a shortage

of detention cells). Only late in the

process was an officer taken hostage.

At Cimarron, once the conflict had

reached the intensity of a brawl in the

cafeteria, there was little opportunity

to reverse the process because the officers on the scene were quickly

overwhelmed.

Riots with warning. It is common for

facility administrators to hear rumors

and predictions of riots. Of course,

from time to time the warnings are

genuine. Often, however, such rumors

are exaggeration or hearsay. They may

even be deliberate attempts to create a

crisis, either for its own sake or to

force change.

How may prison administrators recognize a facility that is truly on the brink

of a disturbance? The American Correctional Association identifies 27

“indicators of prison tension that often

precede riots and disturbances.”2

They include an increase in disciplinary hearings, warnings by inmates to

officers that they should take vacation

or sick leave, and an increase in

employee turnover.

Yet no such list is infallible. The presence of “traditional indicators” might

well signal danger, but their absence

does not necessarily ensure safety—

not in the face of other “nontraditional” evidence, nor in a situation in

they are primarily a function of opportunity; that is, they take place when

one or several inmates are able to initiate a disturbance by taking advantage of a weakness in or a momentary

lapse of the security system and are

subsequently able to spread the disturbance by defeating other security systems. While no system is absolutely

foolproof, riot avoidance can be

achieved through a combination of constant vigilance and physical control.

• Experienced staff and supervision. In

a high-security unit, the continuous

presence of experienced staff, both

line officers and supervisors, is a

sound security practice. This was not

fully achieved at Coxsackie, where the

officers regularly assigned to the highsecurity Special Housing Unit were

absent on the day of the disturbance.

The replacement officers were not as

familiar with the unit’s procedures.

Moreover, responsibility for supervising the unit, normally vested in a sergeant assigned full time to the unit,

had been temporarily transferred to a

sergeant whose regular assignment was

elsewhere in the facility. One of the

postriot procedural changes was to require that a sergeant be present in the

unit at all times. Relief officers were

also given more thorough orientation to

SHU procedures.

• Post orders. All post orders, especially for posts in restricted units,

should anticipate the possibility of an

incident. At ISCI, correctional administrators removed an inmate from a

unit while other inmates in the same

unit were not confined to their cells.

Had the post orders required that all

inmates be in their cells before an

inmate was removed, the rebellion

could not have developed. At Kirkland’s Unit D, the post orders did not

specify the keys the evening duty
7

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

which tensions are known to be high.

Moreover, evidence obtained from

within the prison needs to be combined with an understanding of what

kinds of situations or grievances are

likely to produce riots.

The events leading up to the start of

the riot at the U.S. Penitentiary at Atlanta on November 23, 1987, illustrate

the difficulties of distinguishing valid

warnings from false ones. During the

2-day period immediately preceding

the Atlanta riot, there was evidence

that a riot might be impending. Detainees in one unit had remained

dressed overnight, the volume of outgoing mail was reported to be several

times heavier than normal, and much

of it contained photographs.3

 In retrospect it appears that inmates were

mailing these photographs to avoid

their being lost or destroyed in the

riot.4 At the time, the increased volume was explained as the result of a

new program allowing detainees to

have pictures taken of themselves.

However, the staff had observed detainees removing their family photographs from their lockers.

The Atlanta officials were mindful of

the possibility of a riot. The warden

met several times with his executive

staff and department heads to determine whether a lockdown was warranted. Still, the evidence they had

obtained was never quite sufficient.5

Thus, in some contexts, warnings really do predict riots; in others, they

may be discounted. Warning signs

should be the starting point of an investigation, not the basis on which

conclusions are drawn and policy is

formulated. Questions such as these

should be asked and answered in detail: Is the source of information reliable? Are such warnings out of the

ordinary? Are predictions of trouble

widely shared or are they held by only

a few? Do the signs indicate serious

unrest among inmates or merely routine grumbling? Administrators are

much better prepared to interpret the

answers to these questions if they

know their institutions and inmate

populations thoroughly.

During the riot

Prison administrators have three main

options to attempt to bring about resolution. They may forcibly retake the

prison (the tactical solution), they may

end the riot through talking (the negotiation solution), or they may let the

riot die of its own accord (the waiting

solution).

In actual riots, such as those studied,

the boundaries between these strategies may become indistinct. Negotiations can be used to collect information

for a tactical assault or to tire and demoralize the inmates so they will surrender. A waiting policy can be used

to strengthen the administration’s tactical capabilities or, if used in conjunction with deprivation of food,

water, or electricity, to force inmates to

bargain seriously. A visible tactical

mobilization may permit inmates to

see more clearly the consequences of

failed negotiations or it may wear them

f there appears to be a high probability that a riot is imminent, administrators may take administrative or diplomatic

actions to prevent it.

Administrative actions include a lockdown

of a unit or the entire facility; transfer of

suspected instigators to a segregated unit

or another facility; cancellation of activities

that give inmates the opportunity to congregate, such as recreation or work; an increased presence of correctional officers

who, by posture and words, convey that

they will not permit a disturbance; and a

search for contraband.

Diplomatic actions include efforts to convince inmates that a riot would be costly to

them personally, counterproductive to reform, or unnecessary because their grievances will be addressed in the future.

Administrative and diplomatic actions can

be used in combination. Potential instigators may be removed from prisons and the

issues around which they are mobilizing

resolved. Sometimes, however, strategies

I conflict. At Atlanta, administrators felt

themselves forced to choose between a

primarily administrative strategy and a primarily diplomatic strategy. They reasoned

that a lockdown could not be counted on

to be effective. Some detainees were

housed in dormitory units that could not

be locked down, and the cell doors in the

administrative segregation section were

old and possibly defective. At the same

time, a lockdown might further inflame

already angry detainees and precipitate

“the very riot a lockdown [was] intended

to prevent.”25 Had the BOP had the

names of the inmates who were slated

for deportation, it could have locked

down those inmates in secure cells and

used its skills in persuasion to convince

others not to start trouble. This information, however, was not available. Forced

to choose between the two strategies,

the administration selected a primarily

diplomatic approach.

Responses to Riot Warnings
8

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

down. Still, at any given time prison

administrators must commit themselves

to one course or another based on the

costs and benefits of each option.

Tactical solutions: the use of

force

In general, a riot can be terminated at

any time by using overwhelming force.

Nevertheless, such a deployment of

force can be costly. (This is one of the

lessons of the 1971 Attica riot that retains its force today. In the assault at

Attica, 39 people died.) As a consequence, commanders must develop

strategies to minimize the risks to hostages, assault forces, and inmates, as

well as to ensure that the assault force

is invulnerable. Such strategies depend upon the type of force used.

Three types of force were observed in

the riots under study.

Immediate force. Force may be used

as a first response to a disturbance.

Armed personnel may be rushed in to

defend or retake specific areas without

waiting for the riot to expand to its potential territorial limit. The key element in achieving the desired result is

the speed with which sufficient numbers of staff can be mobilized,

equipped, and organized.

There are advantages to the early use

of force. As noted above, riots may begin without plan or organization. The

immediate use of force may prevent inmates from becoming organized, from

fashioning weapons, from fortifying

their position, and from recruiting additional participants and expanding

the territorial limits of the riot. It will

also limit the pain and suffering of the

hostages already taken.

Moreover, force used immediately may

deny inmates the opportunity to promise to themselves and to the authorities

that they will harm the hostages unless

their demands are met. Once such

threats are made, inmates may find it

psychologically difficult to back down

from them. The Atlanta detainees, for

example, consistently promised to kill

hostages if an assault were made. Even

though they may have realized the dire

consequences of such acts, their public commitment to this course of action

might have psychologically obligated

them to make good on it. One of the

disadvantages of negotiations, compared to the early use of force, is that

inmates are given an opportunity to

make threats to which they then may

become committed.

The greatest challenge in the early use

of force is assembling the necessary

personnel and equipment with sufficient speed. A riot control squad deployed too quickly runs the risk of

being overrun and taken hostage. The

tension between the opportunities presented by and dangers posed by early

use of force grew to extraordinary proportions at Kirkland. In the riot’s

opening stages, correctional officers in

a housing unit reported to the control

center that armed inmates were breaking into the unit, which was filling with

smoke. Officers were arriving at the facility, but their numbers were insufficient to deploy a squad to rescue the

trapped officers. When the number

reached 35 (command had wanted at

least 100), an assault force was dispatched to rescue the trapped officers.

Once this was achieved, momentum

was behind the riot squad and they began to clear the yard of inmates.

By contrast, at Coxsackie, prison administrators had a compelling reason

to use force immediately because inmates were observed assaulting correctional officers. However, the SHU’s

high-security design impeded quick

access. Therefore, no immediate action

was taken because the inmates threatened to kill the hostages if authorities

tried to use force to resolve the situation, and officials could not have prevented this.

Planned tactical strike. The essence

of the tactical strike is to maximize the

element of surprise. Administrators

deploy staff in an attempt to release

hostages or retake the facility before

inmates can react. The assault at

Talladega was this type. Its key elements were:

• Intelligence. There was a continuous

effort to gather intelligence. Released

hostages were debriefed, and the information obtained from them was used to

assess the inmates’ leadership and the

location of hostages.

• Drills and rehearsals. Rehearsals

were conducted that accurately simulated the planned mission. This was

accomplished by conducting drills in a

nearby housing unit that was similar in

construction to the one being held by

inmates.

• Timing. The assault was timed to occur when there was a maximum opportunity of success—in the predawn

hours when inmates were asleep or

generally more subdued. The team’s

entry was made under cover of night.

• Unity of command. The assault

force’s command unity was at its maximum level. One assault force (the

FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team) assumed

sole responsibility for regaining the

building. Other tactical teams from the

FBI and BOP were used in support

roles.

• Weaponry. Arsenal weapons were

used to further diminish the capacity
9

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

of inmates to react. Stun grenades confused and disoriented the detainees.

• Speed. The attack was executed with

great speed. Explosives were used to

breach the entry doors quickly with

minimal injury to those inside. Using

the intelligence that had been gathered, the hostages were quickly located and freed.

• Surprise. No warnings or ultimatums

were issued to the inmates. A meal

was served to the inmates to foster

their feelings of success in negotiations and to lower their vigilance.

The disadvantages of using a tactical

strike to resolve a hostage situation are

twofold. First, it might be unnecessary

because negotiations may resolve the

incident. Even if they do not, inmates

given a choice between surrender and

having force used against them may

choose the former. The problem is that

they cannot make that choice unless it

is offered to them, either implicitly or

explicitly. The purpose of an ultimatum is make the warning explicit.

Second, material conditions and the

vigilance of inmates may make a tactical strike too risky. If inmates hold a

large number of hostages, disperse

them, and threaten to harm them in the

event of an assault, as the Atlanta detainees did with more than 100 hostages, it may not be possible to

overcome their tactical advantage. An

assault under those conditions, however well-executed, would be perilous

at best.

Riot squad formations. A third type of

force is akin to that used by police to

quell an ongoing urban riot. Riot

squads move in unified groups to force

clusters of inmates to move in one direction or to disperse. The essence of

this type of force is reliance on the

size, discipline, and firepower of the

assembled force to overwhelm inmates

and make them back down. Unlike a

tactical strike, in which an assault

force’s presence is concealed as long

as possible, a riot squad’s presence is

deliberately established. Batons and

shotguns may be carried not only as

weapons, but also to convince inmates

that resistance is futile.6

The general strategy is to establish a

cordon around the riot area, using existing geographic breaks (e.g., buildings, exterior or interior fences) where

possible. The purpose of the cordon is

to prevent the riot from expanding in

area and to prevent other inmates from

joining the riot. Once sufficient forces

are in place, the cordoned area is partitioned into smaller zones, which are

then retaken one after another. The

riot ends when the last zone is secured. The force used to end the second riot at Camp Hill was primarily a

riot squad movement. The Cimarron

riot ended through the use of a riot

squad, and at Kirkland a riot squad

was deployed to ensure that the surrender of inmates was orderly.

Negotiations

In a prison riot the term “negotiation”

refers to a dialog between inmates and

authorities that focuses on achieving

an end to the incident. Four of the riots under study ended through negotiations: Camp Hill (the first riot),

Atlanta, Mack Alford, and Coxsackie.

Negotiations were also conducted at

Talladega and (very briefly) at Kirkland

but later abandoned in favor of other approaches. The negotiations observed can

be divided into three types.

Negotiation as bargaining. The dialog

between inmates and prison authorities may be primarily an exercise in

bargaining. Inmates believe they have

put themselves in a position to bargain

with the State. They may see their hostages and the portion of the facility

they occupy as “chips”; they want to

trade those chips for publicity, amnesty, improved conditions, or other

benefits. The government may respond

to inmates’ demands with counter-demands. The resolution comes when the

right bargain is struck. At Atlanta, this

was the release of the hostages in return for a new review process and a

promise not to prosecute. At Camp

Hill (the first riot), inmates released

the hostages after the superintendent

promised to meet with them the next

day to discuss their grievances and to

issue a press release announcing that

meeting.

Negotiation as problem solving.

Inmates may take territory or hostages

simply because they can. In those situations, negotiations become a dialog

aimed less at bargaining and more at

solving actual and perceived problems

posed by the situation and the individuals involved.

Inmate leaders in the Coxsackie riot

issued personal demands that seemed

disproportionate to the disturbances

they created. The main instigator’s

principal demand was to speak over

the phone to his stepfather. Apparently, none of the other inmate participants challenged his pursuit of the

issue. Inmates also sought assurances

that staff would not retaliate for the

beatings they inflicted on their hostages or for the riot itself.

Over the years, law enforcement hostage negotiators have learned that it

is usually best to respond as if the

hostage holder’s demands are authentic, however odd or seemingly disconnected from the situation, and never to

dismiss them as trivial.7

 At Coxsackie
10

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

these strictures were followed with

success. Administrators arranged for

the inmate leader to talk on the phone

with his stepfather. An agency negotiator spent much of his time trying to

calm the inmates and reassure them

that they would not be injured when

they gave up. A videocamera was put

in place to record the surrender. These

concessions were sufficient to solve

the problems and end the disturbance.

Negotiations as situation management.

State authorities may use negotiations

primarily as a means to manage the

situation. The measure of success is

not whether an agreement is reached

(either through bargaining or by meeting inmates’ personal needs), but

whether other goals are achieved: stabilizing the situation, obtaining information about conditions in the unit,

and/or lowering inmates’ vigilance

against an assault.

At Talladega, negotiations aimed at

bargaining reached a dead end after

several days. After this, they became

primarily an instrument to manage the

situation. BOP and FBI negotiators

tried to calm the detainees and thereby

reduce the threat to the hostages. In

the riot’s final stages, negotiations

were used primarily to support a tactical operation. They were used to obtain information and try to render the

inmates less vigilant.

The distinction among negotiation as

bargaining, as problem-solving, and as

situation management should not be

overdrawn. The first definition sees

resolution as being achieved by bringing together the interests of the agency

and the inmates. The second views

resolution as being achieved by meeting the immediate needs (especially

the emotional needs) of the inmates as

they articulate them. The third sees

negotiation as a means to stabilize the

situation and, if necessary, to prepare

for a tactical assault. Negotiations always involve all three components.

The distinctions among them are a

matter of emphasis.8

Parties to negotiations

In approaching negotiations, administrators may assume that they are pitted

against a single, unified group of inmates when, in fact, there may be

schisms among the inmates or no organization whatsoever. Over time, inmates may fuse into a coherent group;

fractionate into competing groups; or

dissolve into small, antagonistic

“pockets.”9

In many types of negotiations, such as

labor-management bargaining, the distinctions between individuals at the

negotiating table are relatively clearcut, with managers on one side and

elected representatives of the workforce on the other. Prison riots are

more complicated, and identifying who

should sit at the bargaining table is

more difficult.

Inmate negotiators. For progress in

negotiations to occur, there must be an

inmate or group of inmates with whom

officials can talk with a measure of

continuity. These negotiating inmates

must be able to sway other inmates;

otherwise an agreement to end a riot is

of little value. At Mack Alford the inmates who initiated the disturbance

continued to exercise control over the

disturbance and negotiated with prison

administrators. At Camp Hill (the first

riot), a group of inmates also emerged

as leaders with whom prison authorities could negotiate. At Coxsackie one

inmate took responsibility for negotiations, but toward the end of the disturbance he seemed to be losing control

over the others.

In the early stages of the Atlanta incident, no individual inmate or group

emerged with whom officials could negotiate, although on the first day four

inmates presented government negotiators with a list of demands, claiming

that they represented the rest. Soon,

however, other inmates contacted government negotiators asserting their authority. At that stage none of the

groups seemed genuinely interested in

reaching a settlement.10 This absence

of leadership took government negotiators by surprise. Eventually, a loose

coalition of inmates formed and bargained with government officials in

good faith. By the 11th day of rioting,

the coalition had gained sufficient leverage among the rioters to effect the

release of the hostages after signing

the agreement.

The problem of inmate leadership was

more grave at Talladega. The detainees argued among themselves from the

beginning. Administrators attempted

to create a leadership group among the

detainees. In one instance they acceded to a demand made by a relatively moderate detainee in the hope

that he would gain stature in the eyes

of the other detainees. However, a

moderate leadership group never

coalesced; the detainees and the administration remained far apart on the

issues.

Agency negotiators. The theory behind hostage negotiation teams is now

well established. A small group of administrators receives special training

in hostage negotiations. They are chosen carefully, on the basis of intelligence, levelheadedness, verbal skills,

ability to think on their feet, and over-
11

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

all appearance. Their job during a disturbance is to negotiate a settlement

through bargaining and problem

solving. Those with command

(decisionmaking) authority refrain

from talking directly to inmates.

The separation between commander

and negotiators is said to have several

advantages. The commander can make

decisions under less stressful conditions. Negotiators can stall for time by

referring requests and demands to a

higher authority. If negotiators become

overinvolved in the process, begin to

lose objectivity, or experience high

levels of stress, command personnel

can take corrective action. There may

be information the negotiators should

not have because they might inadvertently reveal it (for example, that an assault is imminent) but which the

person in command knows. Additionally, the division between command

and negotiation may allow negotiators

to develop greater rapport with hostage

holders. The government negotiator

can appear to the inmates to be taking

their side in gaining concessions from

command and so develop the inmates’

goodwill.11

This model was followed at both Atlanta and Talladega. At Atlanta, several hours after the riot began, a BOP

lieutenant made the first contact with a

detainee and arranged for a face-toface negotiation session. He was soon

joined by FBI negotiators, who then

assumed control over the negotiations

for the duration of the event. At

Talladega a counselor assigned to the

unit made the initial contact with the

detainees and started negotiations.

Later that evening, he withdrew from

the negotiations; and trained negotiators from the prison, the FBI, and the

BOP took over.

Coxsackie and Mack Alford followed

different sequences. At Coxsackie, the

first conversations occurred between

the inmates and the department’s negotiators as well as the deputy superintendent of the institution. About 5

hours into the disturbance, the Assistant Commissioner for the department

began to talk to the inmates in response to their demand that they speak

to an official “from Albany”; that is,

someone with authority from the central office. From that point on, the Assistant Commissioner became the lead

negotiator, although he worked closely

with the department negotiator and the

deputy superintendent.

At Mack Alford, two trained department negotiators were brought to the

prison. After about an hour, however,

the inmates broke off the dialog,

claiming that the negotiators had lied

to them. They then insisted that they

would speak only with a particular

captain, whom they trusted. The captain remained the chief negotiator

throughout the disturbance.

The Coxsackie and Mack Alford negotiations, while successful, did not follow the model. In both cases, however,

important principles were preserved.

Neither the assistant commissioner at

Coxsackie nor the captain at Mack

Alford exercised authority in the situaI

Third-Party Negotiators

agreement. To overcome a last-minute

snag in the negotiations, Bishop Roman

assured the detainees that BOP personnel

who signed the agreement had the authority to make a binding commitment.

• As mediators searching for middle

ground. At Atlanta, a legal services attorney worked to develop a solution that was

acceptable to both sides. He raised substantive issues with BOP administrators,

and they responded in a written memo

clarifying the Bureau’s position. At the

same time, the attorney helped persuade

the Cuban detainees to accept the agreement without a clause declaring that deportations would cease.

• As government bargaining chips. At

Talladega, the BOP allowed a reporter to

talk to the detainees and report their story

in return for the release of a hostage. At

Coxsackie, commanders allowed the inmates’ leader to have a 2-minute telephone conversation with his stepfather.

n some instances, bringing in an

individual from outside the correctional

agency may prove useful in negotiations.

Third parties were used in negotiations at

Atlanta, Mack Alford, and Talladega.

They played several roles:

• As initiators of conversations. At

Mack Alford, two popular inmate leaders

who were not participating in the riot

were recruited during its opening stages

to initiate conversation with the rioting

inmates who (at that point) refused to

talk to the administration.

• As guarantors to a promise. At

Mack Alford, three State legislators were

present at the surrender to reassure inmates that they would not be mistreated

by corrections staff.

• As guarantors that an agreement is

authentic and in the inmates’ interest. At Atlanta, Bishop Agustin Roman

(auxiliary bishop of Miami) made an audiotape stating that he supported the
12

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

negotiation sessions as an “opportunity

to express their longstanding frustrations”15 rather than achieve a settlement. However, this changed during

the course of the disturbance. Government negotiators noted that the detainees became increasingly punctual at

negotiation sessions, sometimes even

arriving early, which was taken as an

indication that they had become increasingly serious about them.16

On the other hand, a similar cycle

did not develop at Talladega. The

Talladega detainees and the government were as far, if not farther, apart

at the end of the disturbance than at

the start. Likewise, at Coxsackie inmates seemed more anxious and hostile as the incident progressed. In

cases like these, issuing an ultimatum

may be in order when negotiations

appear unproductive.

Ultimatums

When negotiations deadlock or are not

taken seriously, commanders may

decide to issue ultimatums. In prison

riots they can be categorized as useof-force ultimatums and issues

ultimatums.

The use-of-force ultimatum. A useof-force ultimatum can be given in the

expectation that inmates, given a clear

choice between surrender and an

armed assault, will choose surrender.

In the riots studied, such ultimatums

were issued at Camp Hill (the second

riot) and at Kirkland and led to successful resolutions.

At Camp Hill, the State Police declared over a public address system

that inmates were to release their

hostages, surrender by exiting the

cellblocks, and lie face down on the

yard. At Kirkland, the warden

tion. Thus, the advantages that come

with splitting the command and negotiation functions were not forfeited. An

additional advantage was the increased credibility of the negotiators

in the inmates’ eyes.

Third-party involvement. In some

situations, the assistance of parties

from outside the agency may advance

the negotiation process. The purpose

of third-party involvement must be

kept clearly in mind by administrators,

who must be certain they make the decision to implement it on the basis of

merit alone. Other criteria (such as

the political prominence of the individual volunteers) must not be factors in

the decision. Third-party negotiators

must be carefully screened and agree

not to raise new issues or to act as advocates for inmates.12

Cycles of negotiation

Studies of negotiations in other domains, especially labor-management

bargaining, have found that they tend

to follow a common cycle. Initially,

both parties make exaggerated demands. This is followed by a period of

withdrawal and a return to negotiations

with more moderate demands. When

parties try to circumvent this ritual,

negotiations tend to break down.13

Even concessions made too early in

the negotiation process can be counterproductive because parties “need

the opportunity to experience exhaustion of their demands before they can

be satisfied that they had drained what

was there to be had. Premature movement robs them of this experience.”14

This pattern seems to have been followed at Atlanta. During the first several days, government negotiators

perceived the detainees were not interested in making progress in the negotiations. The detainees used

announced over the public address

system that the riot squad had been

deployed, that it was instructed to use

force if necessary, and that the inmates should lie face down on the

ground. The warden used language

that was simple, direct, and forceful.

In both instances there were no retaliations against hostages, and the riots

ended shortly thereafter.

Issues related to the use-of-force ultimatum concern how to handle the

transition from negotiation to force.

Should government negotiators be

alerted that an assault will occur?

Many say no, because the negotiators

might inadvertently reveal the plan.

Others point to possible advantages:

The negotiators might be able to distract the subject at the start of the assault, provide reassurances that would

lower his or her defenses, or position

him or her for a sniper shot.17 None of

these advantages was foreseen by commanders at Talladega, and the Regional Director elected not to inform

the government negotiators of the

planned tactical strike.

What are the consequences if inmates

refuse to surrender? At Kirkland and

Camp Hill, use-of-force ultimatums

were successful; in both instances riot

squads were visible to inmates as they

were deployed, a situation that may

have contributed to the inmates’ willingness to choose surrender. But a

use-of-force ultimatum should be issued with every intention of following

through. Otherwise, future ultimatums

will have less credibility.

The “issue” ultimatum. The principle

behind issue ultimatums is that once

inmates are told that some or all their

demands will not be met, they will stop

making these demands and focus on

matters that can be negotiated. Police
13

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Exhibit 1: Key Factors of Eight Prison Riots Studied

Institution Duration Number of Method of

Hostages Resolution

Kirkland 6 hours 22 Ultimatum

Correctional and riot squad

Institution

U.S. Penitentiary, 11 days More than 100 Negotiations

Atlanta, Georgia

Mack Alford 3 days 8 Negotiations and

Correctional “waiting” strategy

Center

Coxsackie 14 hours 5 Negotiations

Correctional

Facility

Idaho State 1 day None Ultimatum and

Correctional riot squad

Institution

Pennsylvania State 3 days First riot: 8 First riot:

Correctional (two riots) Second riot: 18 negotiations

Institution Second riot:

at Camp Hill State Police Force

Arizona State About 1 hour None Immediate force

Prison Complex by riot squad

(Cimarron Unit)

Federal 10 days 11 Negotiations used

Correctional and abandoned in

Institution, favor of planned

Talladega tactical strike

negotiators generally discourage the

use of this type of ultimatum and advise: “Never tell the subject ‘no.’”18 Instead, negotiators should try to recast

demands so that they can be met or so

they pose no immediate threat.

This advice seems reasonable for

prison riots. An exception was the

situation observed at Atlanta. Over the

course of 6 days, the detainees, Cuban

nationals, demanded assurances that

they could remain in the United

States. Administrators were reluctant

to tell the detainees that this issue was

not negotiable because they feared

they might retaliate against the hostages. The detainees refused to drop

the issue, however, and the negotiations reached an impasse. Finally, a

government negotiator told the inmates

that their demand would not be met

under any conditions. In this instance,

a straightforward “no” broke the impasse without provoking retaliation

against the hostages and allowed the

negotiations to go forward.

Waiting

A third strategy for handling a prison

disturbance is to wait it out, usually

while maintaining a dialog. In law enforcement, hostage negotiators often

stall for time.19 The theory behind this

strategy holds that hostage-takers tend

to develop sympathy for their hostages,

develop a rapport with police negotiators, or just get tired of doing what

they are doing. In light of this theory,

police hostage teams are encouraged

to avoid the temptation to “get it over

with” but rather to patiently wait out

the situation unless material threats to

a hostage’s safety or other considerations force a reassessment of tactics.

At Talladega continued waiting may

have endangered the hostages because
14

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

hostility among the detainees was beginning to increase. Negotiations formally ended the disturbance at Mack

Alford, but in large measure the disturbance succumbed to massive defection and inmate exhaustion. After 3

days of rioting, only a fraction of the

original participants remained on the

yard.

Although a waiting strategy may imply

passivity on the part of the administration, usually the opposite is the case.

Research on police hostage negotiations,20 as well as negotiations in other

contexts,21 emphasizes the importance

of active listening: paying careful attention to what is said, asking the

speaker to clarify what she or he meant,

and communicating to the speaker that

she or he was understood. Active listening can be extraordinarily demanding. The regional director in charge of

Talladega’s resolution reported that officials at the scene were continuously

trying to discern what the detainees

wanted and what they were trying to

do, and to gather clues about their tactical situation.

A waiting strategy can employ tactics

that will, by increasing inmates’ discomfort, directly motivate them to end

the incident more quickly or create

needs that prison administrators can

then use to effect a bargain. At Atlanta

helicopter overflights put pressure on

inmates, and water and heat to the

compound were cut off. At Talladega,

food, which was in short supply to

begin with, was denied. At Coxsackie

and Mack Alford, the electricity was

turned off. Each of these deprivations

became negotiating points for the

government.

Hostages, however, have to endure the

same deprivations as inmates. At

Talladega detainees and hostages went

10 days with very little food. Administrators were also concerned about a

breakdown of order among hungry detainees. In this situation, rather than

follow the theory of “increasing situational stress if the subject is too comfortable,” it seemed more prudent to

follow the corollary of “decreasing

stress if the subject is very anxious.”22

Since the detainees at Talladega were

showing signs of increasing tension and

hostility toward the hostages, food was

provided to ameliorate that situation, to

lower the detainees’ defenses, and,

hopefully, get food to the hostages.

After the riot

A riot’s aftermath consists of shortterm problems such as securing the

prison, medium-term problems related

to repairing the damage and returning

staff to work, and long-term problems

related to restoration and change. The

specific short-term tasks should be included in the riot plan.

The short term

After the inmates surrender, commanders must coordinate a search for

contraband, move inmates to secure

units, conduct damage assessments,

and ensure that all inmates are accounted for. Medical care must be provided to injured hostages and inmates.

Evidence must be collected for future

prosecutions. If outside staff or law enforcement personnel were requested,

they must be released from duty as order is restored.

The importance of performing these

tasks cannot be overstated. Having resolved the riot, the temptation to lower

vigilance and assume that the worst is

over may be premature. Therefore, riot

plans should contain checklists and

guidelines for the immediate postriot

period.

After the first disturbance at Camp

Hill, some of the essential post-riot

tasks were not completed. The count

was not cleared,23 and weapons and

other debris were left in the hallways

of blocks to which inmates were returned. Although the locking mechanisms of cell doors had been

compromised, inmates were returned

to them, and inmates were observed

wandering outside their cells throughout much of the night after the first

riot. The institution’s administrators

were largely unaware of these problems because the information never

reached them. In hindsight it seems

that they should have gone to the

blocks to assess the damage themselves instead of relying on the reports

of others. Unaware of these problems,

the superintendent at Camp Hill dismissed all but 25 of the 260 State Police officers who had been called to

help quell the first disturbance. The

25-officer contingent fell far short of

the number needed to prevent the far

more destructive riot that began the

next day.

In the other disturbances studied,

these tasks were handled without major problems. At Cimarron, a pressing

issue in the immediate aftermath was

the provision of medical care to the inmates who had been injured. One was

evacuated by helicopter for emergency

surgery, and 10 others were transported to hospitals by ambulance. The

remainder of the inmates were

searched and locked in their cells, and

a count was taken. The inmates identified as being most active in the riot

were placed in the facility’s detention

unit. The entire prison was searched
15

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

for weapons, but no buildup of weapons was found.

At Coxsackie the immediate aftermath

of the incident was handled with an

especially high level of control and,

therefore, a greater certainty of results.

Inmates not requiring immediate

medical attention were moved to the

gymnasium, separated from one another by 20 feet of space, instructed

not to talk, and supervised by one, and

later two, correctional officers per inmate. Each inmate was examined by

medical staff and then interviewed by

the State Police, staff members from

the department’s Inspector General’s

Office, and staff members from the

Commission of Correction. Five hours

after the riot’s resolution, they were

transferred in small numbers to other

facilities.

Immediate postriot tasks at Atlanta

mainly involved transferring the detainees to other facilities. Over a 24-

hour period, they were escorted out of

the compound one at a time. BOP staff

searched detainees with the aid of a

fluoroscope, placed them in restraints,

and put them on a bus for transfer to

another facility.

One of the immediate responsibilities

of the governing agency is to help employees overcome the short- and longterm traumas of the disturbance.

Mental health professionals may play a

crucial role in debriefing staff after

disturbances.24 In general, prison administrators and officers interviewed

for this study stated that such debriefing sessions were useful. In some departments, such as South Carolina’s,

they are mandatory. At Coxsackie each

of the released hostages was accompanied by a mental health professional

and a close friend during initial medical treatment and debriefing.

The medium term

In the medium term, prison administrators must provide continued support

to employees in coping with their experience, repair the damage done to

the facility, work toward normalization

of institutional operations, and undertake the administrative followup associated with a disturbance.

Public recognition of the sacrifices

made by hostages, as well as an expression of appreciation for the exemplary action of staff during the riot,

may be important in reintegrating the

corrections community. Following

Talladega, for example, the Acting Attorney General commented that he felt

“grateful beyond words and proud beyond measure.” This recognition can

also be made at public ceremonies

such as one held by the Oklahoma

State Legislature. Ongoing counseling

and support for former hostages may

be necessary as well.

Damage to the structural integrity of

the facility must be addressed. At Coxsackie the inmates destroyed the control center of the SHU so they could

not immediately be returned to their

cells. The inmates at Idaho knocked

holes between cells, rendering many

of them unusable. In the largest, most

destructive riots, such as those at

Atlanta and Camp Hill, major reconstruction was needed.

During the medium term, a report may

be commissioned to find out why the

incident occurred. The report may

help corrections officials, policymakers, and the public understand what

the riot was about, thereby helping to

establish a long-term reform agenda. It

may help answer the question of

whether systemwide changes are

needed or only minor policy adjustments. Official inquiries into the eight

riots under study varied in several

ways, discussed in the following

sections.

Issuing agency. At Camp Hill the Governor commissioned a blue-ribbon

panel to investigate the disturbance,

and two legislative committees each

wrote independent reports. Following

the Cimarron incident, the Director of

Corrections requested that another

State agency, the Department of Public

Safety, conduct the investigation to ensure objectivity, in light of the fact that

there had been racial tensions at the

unit. The investigations of the ISCI

and Mack Alford riots were conducted

by members of the respective States’

central offices. At Coxsackie, the New

York State Commission of Corrections

(the body responsible for monitoring

all correctional facilities in New York)

conducted the investigation (its staff

had been on the scene soon after the

riot started). In response to both the

Atlanta and the Talladega riots, the

BOP established teams consisting primarily of senior staff and representatives from the other Federal agencies

involved in the riot’s resolution.

Scope of the investigation. The reports on the Camp Hill disturbance

were the most far reaching, raising issues about the riot’s management and

related concerns such as prison crowding and alternatives to incarceration.

The reports at Coxsackie, Mack

Alford, and ISCI focused primarily on

the riots themselves rather than any

far-reaching implications. The authors

of the reports on Atlanta, and to a

lesser extent Talladega, used the opportunity to rethink the BOP’s entire

emergency preparedness effort. At

Cimarron the focus was primarily on

whether the use of force was justified

and complied with department policy.
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R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Audience. The results of the investigations at Cimarron, ISCI, and Mack

Alford were intended primarily for use

by those in the central offices of the

State agencies. The reports on Coxsackie, the two Federal prison disturbances, Atlanta and Talladega, and

Camp Hill were written for those

within the agency, policymakers concerned with corrections, and to some

degree, the general corrections

community.

Long-term solutions

A prison riot, by definition, means loss

of control by prison administrators.

Once they are resolved, prison riots

can provide an opportunity for correctional leaders to develop policy that

reflects what they have learned, provided they listen carefully and think

clearly about the events. A corrections

department can become stronger, less

likely to lose control, and more effective in resolving disturbances when a

prison riot is followed by one or more

of the following outcomes.

Gains are made in the ability to forecast a disturbance, and the flow of information is improved. Corrections

officials, having experienced a disturbance, may be more aware of and better able to interpret future warning

signs.

Previously unrecognized problems

are remedied. Riots may reveal weaknesses in facilities, operating procedures, or organization. It is better to

ask how the problems can be resolved

than argue about whether certain actions contributed to the riot.

The outcome of innovations made

during the disturbance are reviewed

and incorporated into riot plans. During the Atlanta disturbance, for example, the BOP developed the idea of

setting up a center for the hostages’

families—a place where they could

obtain information and support. Its

success led the Bureau to make this a

standard feature of its response.

Relationships with other agencies are

improved. During a riot new relationships among agencies may emerge or

the need for them may be demonstrated, as at Camp Hill. After a disturbance, gains should be consolidated

and relationships strengthened.

Innovations are made in the reconstruction process. The postriot period

can be used to restore what existed before the disturbance or to depart from

tradition. For example, after the Mack

Alford disturbance, the employees, including correction officers, case managers, and maintenance workers,

became involved in developing plans

to reconstruct the prison. A delegation

was sent to several prisons in another

State to develop ideas about architectural design. This break with tradition

(previous architectural planning had

been conducted only in the central office) helped create a sense of ownership among Mack Alford staff.

Morale is addressed. A riot is unlikely

to leave employees’ morale untouched.

Much depends on what happened during the riot and the outcome. If the

resolution went well, if employees perceived that corrections management

faced the crisis squarely and with

adequate resources and preparation,

and if the responses of the political

community and media were positive,

then the disturbance may actually enhance the prison staff’s sense of mission, loyalty, and confidence in their

agency. Where these factors are absent, morale may plummet.

Camp Hill provides an example of

some serious problems facing corrections administrators in a prison riot’s

wake, but also shows how such challenges can be met. A new commissioner of corrections and a new

superintendent were hired. The commissioner reorganized the central office, secured a grant from the National

Institute of Corrections to revamp the

department’s system for emergency

preparedness, and improved relationships with other State agencies involved in emergency planning. The

new superintendent helped direct the

rebuilding of the facility.

Conclusion

The eight riots in this study are obviously not representative of every

prison disturbance. The unique characteristics of each institution, its staff,

administration, and inmate populations, as well as the State or Federal

agency to which it belongs, shape the

precipitating conditions, resolution,

and aftermath of a riot. Comprehensive

planning based on awareness of other

incidents and lessons learned from the

past cannot prevent all prison riots. It

can, however, help correctional administrators avoid some disturbances, take

action to prevent the small incident

from expanding into a full-scale riot,

limit the extent of damage of riots in

progress, and terminate riot situations

in the least costly way.

Notes

1. The study is reported in full in Bert

Useem, Camille Camp, and George

Camp, Strategy and Outcome in U.S.

Prison Riots, New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

2. American Correctional Association,

Causes, Preventive Measures, and
17

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Methods of Controlling Riots and Disturbances in Correctional Institutions, Third

Edition, Laurel, Maryland: American Correctional Association, 1990.

3. Federal Bureau of Prisons, A Report to the Attorney General on the Disturbances

at the Federal Detention Center, Oakdale, Louisiana, and the U.S. Penitentiary,

Atlanta, Georgia, February 1, 1988, Atlanta-52 (Hereinafter referred to as Report,

1988. The site name and numbers indicate page numbers).

4. Report, 1988, Atlanta-52.

5. Report, 1988, Atlanta-50–Atlanta-52.

6. American Correctional Association, Controlling Riots and Disturbances: 42.

7. Bolz, Frank, and E. Hershey, Hostage Cop, New York: Rawson, Wade, 1979:

240; Dolan, John T., and G. Dwayne Fuselier, “A Guide for First Responders to

Hostage Situations,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 58, 4 (April 1989):12.

8. Fagan, Thomas J., and Clinton R. Van Zandt, “Lesson from Talladega: Even in

‘Non-negotiable Situations,’ Negotiation Plays an Important Role,” Corrections Today, 55, 2 (April 1993):12, 134, and continuing.

9. For a general discussion of negotiations involving multiple parties, see Howard

Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation, Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

1982:251–55.

10. Report, 1988, Atlanta-62.

11. Fuselier, G. Dwayne, “What Every Negotiator Would Like His Chief to

Know,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (March 1986):14; Wargo, Michael G., “The

Chief’s Role in a Hostage/Barricade Subject Incident,” The Police Chief (November 1989):59–62.

12. Report, 1988, Atlanta-62–Atlanta-63.

13. Boulding, Kenneth E., Conflict and Defense: A General Theory, New York:

Harper and Row, 1962:319–320; Walton, Richard E., and Robert B. McKersie, A

Behavior Theory of Labor Negotiations, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965;

Schellenberg, James A., The Science of Conflict, New York: Oxford University

Press, 1982:203–219; and Friedman, Raymond A., Front Stage, Backstage: The

Dramatic Structure of Labor Negotiations, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1994.

14. Douglas, Ann, Industrial Peacemaking, New York: Columbia University

Press, 1962:42.

15. Bell, Roger et al., “Hostage Negotiations and Mental Health: Experiences

from the Atlanta Prison Riot,” American Journal of Preventive Psychiatry and

Neurology, 3:2 (Fall 1991):8–11.

16. Bell et al., “Hostage Negotiations and Mental Health”:10.

17. Fuselier, “What Every Negotiator Would Like His Chief to Know”:15.
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R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

18. Dolan and Fuselier, “First Responders to Hostage Situations”:12.

19. Lanceley, Frederick J., “The Antisocial Personality as a Hostage-Taker,”

Journal of Police Science and Administration, 9, 1 (1981):32.

20. Dolan and Fuselier, “First Responders to Hostage Situations”:11.

21. Fisher, Roger, and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In, New York: Penguin, 1981: 35–37; Ury, William, Getting Past No:

Negotiating With Difficult People, New York: Bantam, 1991:37–40.

22. Fuselier, “What Every Negotiator Would Like His Chief to Know”:15.

23. “Clearing the count” means accounting for all inmates.

24. Van Fleet, Fred, “Debriefing Staff after the Disturbances Can Prevent Years

of Pain,” Corrections Today (July 1991):102, 104, 106, 107.

25. Report, 1988, Atlanta-48.

NCJ 155283

Bert Useem, Ph.D., is Professor of Sociology at the University of New Mexico.

Camille Graham Camp and George M.

Camp, Ph.D., are Principals and Renie

Dugan is a Research Associate at the

Criminal Justice Institute. This study was

performed under NIJ Grant 90–IJ–CX–

0026.

Findings and conclusions of the research reported here are those of the authors and do not

necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

The National Institute of Justice is a

component of the Office of Justice

Programs, which also includes the Bureau

of Justice Assistance, Bureau of Justice

Statistics, Office of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for

Victims of Crime.
19

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Selected NIJ Publications in Corrections

Listed below are some NIJ publications related to the issue of corrections. These publications can be obtained free, except where indicated, from the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS): telephone 800–851–3420, e-mail askncjrs@ncjrs.aspensys.com, or write to NCJRS, Box 6000, Rockville, MD

20849–6000.

Please note that when free publications are out of stock, they are available as photocopies for a minimal fee

or through interlibrary loan. They are also usually available on the NCJRS Bulletin Board System or on the

Department of Justice Internet gopher site for downloading. Call NCJRS for more information.

Buchanan, R.A. and K.L. Whitlow, Guidelines for

Developing, Implementing, and Revising an Objective Prison Classification System, NIJ Research

Report, 1987, NCJ 108408.

Clark, Cheri L., David W. Aziz, and Doris L.

MacKenzie, Shock Incarceration in New York: Focus on Treatment, NIJ Program Focus, August

1994, NCJ 148410.

Cronin, Roberta C., with assistance of Mei Han,

Boot Camps for Adult and Juvenile Offenders:

Overview and Update, NIJ Research Report, October 1994, NCJ 149175.

Greenwood, Peter W., Three Strikes, You’re Out:

Benefits and Costs of California’s New MandatorySentencing Law, VHS Videotape, NCJ 152236,

$19, includes postage and handling.

Hammett, Theodore M., 1992 Update: HIV/AIDS

in Correctional Facilities, NIJ/Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention, NIJ Issues and Practices,

January 1994, NCJ 143398.

Inciardi, James, A Corrections-Based Continuum

of Effective Drug Abuse Treatment, Research in

Progress Seminar, VHS Videotape, NCJ 152692,

$19, includes postage and handling.

Inside Prisons, Crime File Series, VHS Videotape, 1985, NCJ 100743, $17, includes postage

and handling.

Jacobsen, V.J., R. Miller, and G.E. Sexton,

Making Jails Productive, NIJ Research in Brief,

1991, NCJ 132396.

MacKenzie, Doris Layton and Claire Souryal,

Multisite Evaluation of Shock Incarceration, NIJ

Research Report, November 1994, NCJ 150062.

McDonald, Douglas, Managing Prison Health

Care and Cost, NIJ Issues and Practices, March

1994, NCJ 152768.

Prison Crowding, Crime File Series, VHS Videotape, 1985, NCJ 097229, $17, includes postage

and handling.
20

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

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