COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-14-00156-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF J.F., M.F., 

AND J.F., CHILDREN

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FROM THE 323RD DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NUMBER: 323-91486J-09

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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Appellant B.F. (Mother) appeals the trial court’s order terminating her 

parental rights to three of her children, Ja.F., M.F., and Jo.F. (collectively, the 

children).2

 Because the evidence was sufficient to show that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest, we affirm the trial 

court’s judgment.

 1

See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

2

We use aliases for the children and their relatives throughout this opinion. 

See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
2

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

Between 1995 and 2014, Mother gave birth to nine children: J.B., P.B., 

R.F., W.O.,3 Ja.F.,4 M.F.,5 Jo.F., an unnamed child,6 and L.M. J.B. and P.B. 

were removed from Mother’s care by Oklahoma Child Protective Services and 

were eventually adopted by foster parents. Oklahoma Child Protective Services 

also removed R.F. from Mother when R.F. was four months’ old, but Mother did 

not know “the end result of it” and had not seen R.F. since the removal. During 

this time, Mother had an “extensive substance abuse history” and had been 

arrested for aggravated robbery in 2002, prostitution in 2008, and possession of 

a controlled substance in 2013. Based on concerns about Mother’s drug use and 

neglect of the children, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services 

(DFPS) initiated four investigations in 2009. These investigations resulted in the 

removal of the children, but the children were eventually returned to Mother in 

late 2010 after Mother substantially complied with DFPS’s service plans. 

On June 17, 2013, DFPS received another referral regarding Mother’s

neglectful supervision of the children. The referrals noted that J.B., P.B., and 

R.F. had been removed from her care in Oklahoma, that W.O. and another child 

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W.O. was born prematurely and died shortly after birth. 

4

Ja.F. tested positive for cocaine at birth. 

5

M.F. tested positive for cocaine at birth. 

6

This child also was born prematurely at nineteen weeks and did not 

survive the birth. Mother described it as “more of a miscarriage.” 
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had been born prematurely and died, and that Ja.F. and M.F. had tested positive 

for cocaine at birth.7

 Nikki Ferrell, an investigative supervisor with DFPS, 

determined that Mother had been placed on bond due her arrest for possession 

of a controlled substance but that her bond had been revoked because she had 

tested positive for methamphetamine. Ferrell called Mother “about the 

investigation,” but Mother “was very hostile” and uncooperative. Mother was 

arrested shortly thereafter based on the revocation of her bond. Because DFPS 

believed Mother’s brother would take the children back to Oklahoma, DFPS filed 

a suit affecting the parent-child relationship (the SAPCR), requesting permission 

to take possession of the children and termination of Mother’s parental rights.

See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 262.101 (West 2014). The trial court entered an 

emergency order for the children to be removed immediately from Mother’s care. 

See id. § 262.102 (West 2014). 

A full adversary hearing was held on June 28, 2013, but Mother did not 

appear because she had not been served with the SAPCR. After the hearing, 

the trial court entered the following findings:

(1) there was a danger to the physical health or safety of the children 

which was caused by an act or failure to act of the person entitled to 

possession and for the children to remain in the home is contrary to 

the welfare of the children; (2) the urgent need for protection 

required the immediate removal of the children and makes efforts to 

eliminate or prevent the children’s removal impossible or 

unreasonable; and (3) notwithstanding reasonable efforts to 

eliminate the need for the children’s removal and enable the children 

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Mother admitted to using cocaine “within a couple of days” of Ja.F.’s birth. 
4

to return home, there is a substantial risk of a continuing danger if 

the children are returned home.

See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 262.201(b) (West 2014). The trial court also entered 

temporary orders that appointed DFPS as temporary managing conservator of 

the children, limited Mother’s access to the children, and required Mother to 

cooperate with DFPS. See id. § 105.001 (West 2014). 

Under DFPS’s subsequent service plan, Mother was required to “actively 

participate in therapy,” stay drug free, not participate in criminal activities, attend 

all scheduled visitations with the children, develop a relapse-prevention plan, 

attend Narcotics Anonymous at least three times a week, “engage” in a drugeducation group, maintain stable housing, participate in a parenting group, 

maintain a source of income, complete a parenting class, submit to a drug 

assessment, and “comply with all requests for random drug testing as requested 

by [DFPS].” Chelvalier Levels, a DFPS conservatorship worker, reviewed the 

service plan with Mother while she was incarcerated such that Mother 

understood what was required. 

Mother was released from jail in October 2013. After her release, she 

visited the children three times between November 5, 2013, and March 20, 2014. 

Mother averred that she never missed an appointment to see the children. 

Mother gave birth to L.M. on February 18, 2014. Shortly after L.M. was born, 

DFPS requested Mother to submit to a hair-strand test to determine if Mother had 

been using drugs. Mother refused to take the test and refused all subsequent 
5

requests for various reasons. DFPS removed L.M. from Mother in March 2014, 

and L.M. tested positive for cocaine.8

 Mother had no explanation for why L.M. 

tested positive shortly after his birth and did not believe that L.M. actually tested 

positive. Indeed, Mother told Ferrell that DFPS “was harassing her.” 

On March 21, 2014, DFPS—at the request of the children’s therapists and 

guardian ad litem—filed a motion to modify the temporary orders to suspend all 

visits between Mother and the children. DFPS gave several reasons for the 

requested change:

[Mother] has an alternate lifestyle and a long and violent criminal 

history with convictions for prostitution and continuous drug abuse. 

This lifestyle has contributed to the recent and rapid deterioration of 

the children’s psychological health, and two of the children, [M.F.] 

and [Ja.F.], have required psychiatric inpatient treatment. . . . [M.F.] 

is currently in outpatient treatment . . . with severe emotional 

disturbances.

The children’s therapists have concluded that further visits 

with their mother are deleterious to their psychological health. Each 

visit or discussion of a visit has triggered behaviors that are 

extremely destructive. The foster parents have reported sexual 

acting out, insomnia, rage, uncontrolled crying, and behavior swings 

before and after visits by the mother. 

These concerns arose after M.F. told her therapist that she had been sexually 

abused multiple times while in Mother’s care. There was some indication that 

this was the result of mother selling M.F. for sex in exchange for drugs. The trial 

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Levels stated that DFPS would have removed L.M. from Mother at birth 

based on Mother’s “extensive drug use and history with [DFPS]” but did not do so 

because Mother was evasive and “hid” from DFPS after L.M. was born. When 

L.M. was born, Mother was bound by the service plan, which required Mother to 

remain in contact with Levels. 
6

court immediately entered a temporary restraining order prohibiting Mother from 

contacting the children in any way. 

At trial, Mother vehemently denied the sexual-abuse allegations and 

suggested that the children had been coached to make those accusations. 

Mother also stated that she had not used drugs since December 2010. Levels 

testified that adoption of the children by the children’s foster parents would be in 

the children’s best interest. Levels also detailed that Mother had failed to attend 

parenting classes and Narcotics Anonymous meetings. Mother also failed to 

complete a substance abuse relapse plan and had not notified DFPS that she 

was employed. Levels further testified, however, that Mother attended individual 

counseling and drug-education counseling. Levels expressed concern that 

Mother intended to continue living with a man who had a violent and extensive 

criminal history, had a history of substance abuse, and had recently tested 

positive for cocaine. The children’s guardian ad litem also stated that Mother’s 

parental rights should be terminated. 

The trial court granted DFPS’s petition and terminated Mother’s parental 

rights. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that Mother 

“knowingly placed or allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings 

which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of the children” and that she 

“engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged 

in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the children.” 

The trial court further found by clear and convincing evidence that termination of 
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Mother’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. See Tex. Fam. Code 

Ann. § 161.206 (West 2014); see also id. § 161.001(1)(D)–(E), (2) (West 2014). 

The trial court appointed DFPS as the children’s managing conservator. See id.

§ 161.207 (West 2014). Mother filed an accelerated appeal. See Tex. R. App. 

P. 28.4(a)(1).

II. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PARENTAL-TERMINATION CASES

“When the State seeks to sever permanently the relationship between a 

parent and a child, it must first observe fundamentally fair procedures.” In re 

E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 554 (Tex. 2012) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 

747–48, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1391–92 (1982)). We strictly scrutinize termination 

proceedings and strictly construe involuntary termination statutes in favor of the 

parent. In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012); E.R., 385 S.W.3d at 

554–55; Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20–21 (Tex. 1985).

Termination decisions must be supported by clear and convincing 

evidence. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 161.001, 161.206(a); E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 

802. Evidence is clear and convincing if it “will produce in the mind of the trier of 

fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be 

established.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007 (West 2014); E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 

at 802.
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III. DISCUSSION

A. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In evaluating the evidence for legal sufficiency in parental termination 

cases, we determine whether the evidence is such that a fact-finder could 

reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that the challenged ground for 

termination was proven. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). We 

review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and judgment. 

Id. We consider evidence favorable to termination if a reasonable fact-finder 

could, and we disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact-finder could 

not. See id. We cannot weigh witness credibility issues that depend on the 

appearance and demeanor of the witnesses because that is the fact-finder’s 

province. Id. at 573–74. And even when credibility issues appear in the

appellate record, we defer to the fact-finder’s determinations as long as they are 

not unreasonable. Id. at 573.

In reviewing the evidence for factual sufficiency, we give due deference to 

the fact-finder’s findings and do not supplant the verdict with our own. In re 

H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We determine whether, on the entire 

record, a fact-finder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief that the 

parent committed one of the acts or omissions listed in section 161.001(1) and 

that the termination of the parent-child relationship would be in the best interest 

of the children. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001; In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 28 

(Tex. 2002). If, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a 
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reasonable fact-finder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so 

significant that a fact-finder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or 

conviction in the truth of its finding, then the evidence is factually insufficient. 

H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108.

B. SECTION 161.001(2): BEST INTEREST

Mother argues in two issues that the evidence was legally and factually 

insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental 

rights was in the best interest of the children. There is a strong presumption that 

keeping a child with a parent is in the child’s best interest. In re R.R., 209 

S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006). Prompt and permanent placement of the child in a 

safe environment is also presumed to be in the child’s best interest. Tex. Fam. 

Code Ann. § 263.307(a) (West 2014).

We review the entire record to determine the child’s best interest. In re 

E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 250 (Tex. 2013). The same evidence may be probative 

of both the subsection-(1) ground and the best-interest determination. C.H., 89 

S.W.3d at 28; see E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d at 249. Nonexclusive factors that the trier 

of fact in a termination case may also use in determining the best interest of the 

child include:

(A) the desires of the child;

(B) the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the 

future;

(C) the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the 

future;
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(D) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody;

(E) the programs available to assist these individuals to promote 

the best interest of the child;

(F) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency 

seeking custody;

(G) the stability of the home or proposed placement;

(H) the acts or omissions of the parent which may indicate that the 

existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one; and

(I) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent.

E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 807. Undisputed evidence of just one factor may be 

sufficient in a particular case to support a finding that termination is in the best 

interest of the child. C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27. On the other hand, the presence of 

scant evidence relevant to each factor will not support such a finding. Id.

As Mother points out, the evidence showed that she had completed or was 

attempting to complete many of the services required in DFPS’s service plan and 

that the charge for possession of a controlled substance, which had led to her 

incarceration in 2013, was eventually dismissed because “there was no evidence 

in the laboratory room.” She argues that this evidence precludes a reasonable 

fact-finder from concluding that termination was in the children’s best interest. 

However, the trial court also heard evidence of Mother’s criminal and substanceabuse history, which appeared to be continuing. There was also evidence that 

Mother had prostituted M.F. to fund her drug habit. Mother continued to live with 

her boyfriend who also had a criminal and substance-abuse history and who had 

recently tested positive for cocaine. Mother believed it was acceptable to 
11

continue to associate with him because “everybody make mistakes.” Mother 

continually refused to submit to required drug testing. The children had been 

removed from Mother previously and returned to her, only to be placed in the 

same dangerous environment. The children had severe emotional problems that 

required extensive therapy and hospitalization. M.F. was hospitalized after she 

threatened to do herself and others harm. Ja.F. also was briefly hospitalized 

because he threated harm to himself and others. Indeed, the children’s 

therapists and guardian ad litem believed visits with Mother were too harmful to 

the children. The children’s foster parents were able to provide them with a 

stable environment and hoped to adopt the children. They also were diligently 

providing the children with the therapies and structure that they needed. The 

children told Levels that they loved their foster parents and wanted that 

placement to be “their forever home.” 

This evidence was probative of each nonexclusive factor and buttressed 

the trial court’s conclusion regarding termination.9

 We conclude that this 

evidence was legally and factually sufficient to allow a fact-finder to reasonably 

 9

Of course, we do not recite each and every fact supporting the trial court’s 

judgment. Although the evidence we recite is legally and factually sufficient to 

uphold the trial court’s best-interest determination, the record is rife with 

additional supporting evidence. Because we are affirming the trial court’s 

judgment, however, we are not bound to include an exhaustive and meticulous 

recitation. See In re A.B., 57 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 595, 2014 WL 1998440, at *3–4, 

*6–7 (May 16, 2014). 
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form a firm belief or conviction that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in 

the children’s best interest. Accordingly, we overrule issues one and two. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Having overruled Mother’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. See 

Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(a).

/s/ Lee Gabriel

LEE GABRIEL

JUSTICE

PANEL: DAUPHINOT, GARDNER, and GABRIEL, JJ.

DELIVERED: October 2, 2014.