U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFF ICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS

BJA NI J OJJDP BJS OVC

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

National Institute of Justice

Jeremy Travis, Director October 1996

continued . . .

The U.S. Department of Justice

launched Operation Weed and Seed in

1991 to demonstrate that a large array of

resources can be mobilized in a comprehensive, coordinated effort to control

crime and drugs and to improve the

quality of life in targeted high-crime

neighborhoods. The initiative’s name

was drawn from its two-pronged strategy:

to “weed out” violent offenders through

intensive law enforcement and prosecution and to “seed” the neighborhood

with prevention, intervention, treatment,

and revitalization services. An integral

part of this strategy involves community

policing, which is designed to bridge the

gap between weeding and seeding.

Despite differences in the size and nature of target neighborhoods and in the

severity of crime and drug problems, 19

cities were awarded approximately $1.1

million each for an 18-month demonstration period.1

 The programs were initiated between April and December

1992, and the national process evaluation, supported by the National Institute

of Justice, began in early 1993 to gather

information on program implementation

activities through the end of that year.

Its purpose was to document and assess

the implementation and activities of the

19 Weed and Seed demonstration

projects.

The primary data collection methods were:

• Two site visits to each project to interview key staff, steering committee members, and community representatives.

• A review and content analysis of program materials, including grant applications, progress reports, steering committee

meeting minutes, and policy memorandums.

• Surveys of program staff to gather uniform cross-site information on the key

elements of program and target area characteristics, law enforcement tactics and

arrests, prosecution tactics and case processing, community policing activities,

and seeding efforts.

This Research in Brief summarizes the

findings of the national process evaluation

by offering an overview of how the sites

structured and operated their programs

and by discussing the implications of their

efforts for future programs of this type.

A comprehensive, multifaceted

program

Goals and objectives. Based on a research

and experiential history of innovative approaches to crime prevention and control

(see “Background of the Weed and Seed

Initiative”), the goals of Operation Weed

and Seed are simple and ambitious:

Issues and Findings

Discussed in this Research in

Brief: A national process evaluation of the U.S. Department of

Justice’s Operation Weed and

Seed demonstration program. The

study, sponsored by the National

Institute of Justice, gathered information on Weed and Seed program implementation and

activities in 19 sites through the

end of 1993.

Key issues: The initiative was

launched in 1991 as a comprehensive, coordinated effort to control

crime and to improve the quality

of life in targeted high-crime

neighborhoods. Approximately

$1.1 million was provided to each

of the 19 sites selected for the 18-

month demonstration period. Each

city, working from a blueprint provided by the U.S. Department of

Justice, customized a program to

meet the needs of its targeted

communities. “Weeding” generally involves law enforcement and

prosecution efforts against criminals. “Seeding” entails prevention

and revitalization programs.

Key findings: Grant funds were

used more often to support weeding efforts and community policing

than seeding programs. Among

the evaluation’s findings were:

• The weeding emphasis in most

sites was on drug-related, gunrelated, and violent crimes. A

majority of cities targeted streetlevel dealing, but a few directed

National Process Evaluation of

Operation Weed and Seed

by Janice A. Roehl, Robert Huitt, Mary Ann Wycoff, Antony Pate, Donald Rebovich, and Ken Coyle
2

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Issues and Findings

continued . . .

• To eliminate violent crime, drug trafficking, and drug-related crime from targeted high-crime neighborhoods.

• To provide a safe environment, free of

crime and drug use, where law-abiding

citizens can live, work, and raise families.

Underlying these goals is the premise

that they are interdependent and inseparable. Often described as a strategy, not

just a grant program, the essential and

defining characteristic of Weed and

Seed is its emphasis on collective and

coordinated action (see “Weed and Seed

Objectives”).

Federal level management. The U.S.

Department of Justice did not require

the selected Weed and Seed sites to

implement specific strategies or programs. Instead, each site had to develop

its own approach to the central program

elements of weeding, including prosecution; the “bridge” of community policing; and seeding, including prevention,

intervention, treatment, and neighborhood restoration.

Within the U.S. Department of Justice, the

Executive Office for Weed and Seed and

the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA)

have been the lead agencies in administering this program at the Federal level. BJA

and the Executive Office for United States

Attorneys (EOUSA) supplied 19 demonstration sites with grant funds totaling

more than $20 million. The U.S. Department of Justice also has worked hand in

hand with other Federal agencies to provide guidance, technical assistance, and

Federal funding to participating Weed and

Seed sites because coordinated mobilization of resources from numerous government agencies is one of the central tenets

of the program.

resources toward curbing drug trafficking and high-level operators.

• People who ordinarily did not consult with one another, such as prosecutors, area residents, police officers,

and social service personnel, were

able to coordinate their efforts, share

resources, and solve problems.

• Interagency cooperation was reported to be stronger among law

enforcement agencies than among

prosecution offices in a majority of

sites.

• The most common seed programs

involved primary prevention for children and intervention strategies for

older youths. Safe Havens—multiservice centers that offered a variety

of youth and adult services—were

established in each site and were

integral parts of seeding.

Implications for the future include:

• The program’s Federal funding levels

and permissible uses should be clear

from the start, but guidelines should

continue to permit flexibility to meet

neighborhood needs.

• To enhance coordination, interagency task forces should be developed, the critical role of local

prosecutors should be recognized,

and key representatives from the district attorney’s office and participating

neighborhoods should be included in

planning the local program.

Target audience: Federal, State, and

local policymakers; criminal justice

professionals and practitioners; and

community leaders.

T he roots of the Weed and Seed initiative can be traced to several programs initiated in Philadelphia: the Violent Traffickers

Project, a Federal-State multiagency task

force for drug enforcement; the Federal

Alternatives to State Trials (FAST) program,

involving collaboration between the district

attorney’s and U.S. attorney’s offices; and

two projects implemented in the Mantua

and Spring Garden neighborhoods that involved Federal, State, and local government

agencies, community organizations, and

neighborhood residents.

Development of Weed and Seed also was

guided by the results of a number of research studies and practical experiences.

Research results on the effectiveness of

vigorous police drug enforcement efforts

have been mixed. Although crackdowns

have been shown to be effective deterrents

in the short term and to have some residual

effects,2 this evidence has been coupled

with reports of unwanted side effects,

including displacement and increases in certain violent crimes.3

 These findings suggest

that intensive law enforcement strategies

need to be supplemented by other measures, particularly citizen-based anti-drug

efforts4 and community policing.5 Other

research has pointed to the additional advantages of prosecutorial collaboration

across agencies, government levels, and

jurisdictions; cooperative investigation;

vertical prosecution; and the application of

a full range of Federal, State, and local

criminal and civil laws.6 Finally, the importance of multiagency, private/public

collaborations has been indicated by

research on community partnerships for

crime and drug control and prevention.7

Background of the Weed and Seed Initiative
3

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

W

Overview of the demonstration sites.

The 19 cities with Weed and Seed

demonstration sites, listed in exhibit

1, reflect a wide range in population

size and density. Although most cities

chose to concentrate Weed and Seed

in one area, five cities selected two localities, one site designated three sections, and two sites targeted four

neighborhoods. While the average

population of single-target areas was

11,200, they ranged from a 1-block

public housing development with 717

residents (Philadelphia) to a 15-

square-mile section with 38,770 residents (Fort Worth).

The racial and ethnic composition of

the demonstration cities also varied.

In four sites African Americans constituted more than 50 percent of the

population (Atlanta, Richmond,

Washington, D.C., and Wilmington,

Delaware); in three cities Hispanics

made up more than or nearly 50 percent of the population (Chelsea, Massachusetts; San Antonio; and Santa

Ana, California); and four areas had

predominately non-Hispanic white

populations (Madison, Omaha, Pittseed and Seed objectives focus on

a strategic, coordinated approach to crime

prevention and control:

• To develop a comprehensive, multiagency strategy to control and prevent

violent crime, drug trafficking, and drugrelated crime in targeted high-crime

neighborhoods.

• To coordinate and integrate existing

as well as new Federal, State, local, and

private-sector initiatives; criminal justice

efforts; and human services, and to concentrate those resources in the project

sites to maximize their impact on reducing

and preventing violent crime, drug trafficking, and drug-related crime.

• To mobilize residents in the targeted

sites to assist law enforcement in identifying and removing violent offenders and

drug traffickers from their neighborhoods

and to assist other human service agencies in identifying and responding to service needs in the target areas.

Weed and Seed Objectives

Exhibit 1: Population and Density of Demonstration Cities and Their Target Neighborhoods

Site City Population* City Density Number of Combined Population Average Density

(per square mile) Target Areas of Target Areas of Target Areas

(per square mile)

Atlanta 403,085 2,990 2 2,150 23,889

Charleston 82,104 1,861 1 12,542 3,136

Chelsea,

 Massachusetts 35,000 17,500 1 ——— ———

Chicago 2,811,478 11,172 1 5,660 80,857

Denver 479,468 3,050 2 8,962 11,064

Fort Worth 457,171 1,614 1 38,770 2,585

Kansas City 438,188 1,397 3 32,949 ———

Madison 193,735 3,309 2 6,034 4,310

Omaha 338,987 3,338 1 ——— ———

Philadelphia 1,596,699 11,736 4 53,710 12,788

Pittsburgh 372,349 6,653 1 17,836 ———

Richmond 206,292 3,379 2 6,881 ———

San Antonio 955,905 2,811 1 16,506 5,502

San Diego 1,133,681 3,428 1 31,337 9,793

Santa Ana,

 California 299,860 10,839 1 7,500 ———

Seattle 532,418 6,153 1 12,460 10,383

Trenton 89,017 11,516 4 ——— ———

Washington,

 D.C. 598,000 9,884 1 ——— ———

Wilmington 73,036 6,623 2 16,372 ———

* Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population and Housing: Summary Population and Housing Characteristics,

March 1992.
4

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

burgh, and Seattle). Although the target areas also varied widely in their

racial and ethnic composition, on the

whole they tended to have relatively

high concentrations of minorities.

Many of the demonstration cities have

struggled for a long time with crime,

poverty, social disorganization, and

urban decay. Others, however, have

only recently had to contend with

these problems. At the extremes were

Madison, which reported 770 violent

crimes in 1991, and Atlanta, a city

with twice the population of Madison,

which reported 21 times as many violent crimes. Crime rates in the target

areas also varied and were generally

substantially higher than the corresponding citywide rates. All the target

sites have suffered from relatively

high rates of substance abuse, drug

trafficking, and drug-related crime

and violence. Gang activity has been

prevalent and is implicated in the

drug trade in many of the sites.

Local management and structure.

Weed and Seed grantees included

mayoral and city manager offices, local police departments, State law enforcement agencies, and one nonprofit

organization.

Local steering committees were established to guide program development

and policy setting as suggested by the

Weed and Seed Implementation

Manual developed by the Office of

Justice Programs. The steering committees typically were chaired by U.S.

attorneys, who were accorded a key

role by the Justice Department. They

were often responsible for making the

Weed and Seed concept known locally

and for organizing the application process. In many sites, the U.S. attorneys

remained acknowledged leaders of local programs. In others, U.S. attorneys

played small roles and avoided major

involvement in what they saw as essentially community-based projects.

Other officials frequently found on

steering committees were chiefs of

police, district attorneys, mayors, law

enforcement coordinators in U.S.

attorney’s offices, Federal law enforcement agency representatives (e.g.,

from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Drug Enforcement Agency;

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and

Firearms; or Immigration and Naturalization Service), police officers, and

community representatives.

Putting weeding policies and strategies into daily operations was typically

the responsibility of weed committees.

They generally were composed of

high-ranking local and State law enforcement and prosecution officials

and regional representatives of Federal agencies (e.g., the special-agentin-charge, or SAC, of the FBI) with

decisionmaking and policy-setting authority. The U.S. attorney or his or her

representative often chaired these

committees. Representatives from the

FBI and Drug Enforcement Administration were typically involved, and

representatives from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; Immigration and Naturalization Service;

and U.S. Postal Service were included

in sites with crime problems appropriate to these agencies’ missions. State

law enforcement agencies were less

frequently involved.

Most sites also had a seed committee,

composed of government agency and

community representatives, responsible

for implementing seeding activities.

Each site was typically staffed by a

Weed and Seed coordinator; often

there were separate coordinators for

each phase. While some of these coordinators were newly hired, full-time

staff, others devoted a portion of their

time to the coordination of Weed and

Seed activities while working at other

positions.

Allocation of funds. At each site, the

Weed and Seed grant funds were used

mostly to support community policing

(an average of $457,352) and weeding

($434,145); less was spent for seeding

($273,177). These averages, based on

data available from 13 of the 19 programs, conceal the diversity among

the sites. The amounts shown do not

include the sizable in-kind and leveraged resources that also were devoted

to Weed and Seed activities. Police

overtime and other law enforcement

personnel costs were the major grant

expenditures for weeding and community policing. Seeding funds were used

to support staff, provide prevention

and treatment services, and develop a

variety of community activities, often

through minigrants.

The law enforcement half of

weeding

The weeding component of Weed and

Seed consists of linked law enforcement and prosecution strategies. The

central features of the law enforcement portion of weeding are interagency cooperation, targeting of

specific crimes, and development of

enforcement strategies.

Interagency cooperation. The Federal, State, and local agency members

of the weed committees developed

specific strategies of crime and drug

enforcement. In many sites a smaller

working group was created early in the

program or evolved over time to direct

day-to-day operations following the

weeding committee’s overall guide-
5

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

lines. The membership of these working groups was often dominated by local police department command staff

and appropriate Federal agency representatives.

Interagency cooperation in law enforcement strategy was reported to be

strong in the vast majority of sites.

Some sites solidified good local-Federal partnerships that existed prior to

the Weed and Seed program; others

formed new alliances. Joint strategy

development and information sharing

were the major benefits of interagency

cooperation. Although local police departments received substantial portions of the Weed and Seed program

funds, which were used to cover overtime and equipment, they also contributed large quantities of personnel

time. In-kind contributions from Federal agencies in the form of agent

time, undercover agents, key informants, and buy money also were substantial, with estimates amounting to

hundreds of thousands of dollars in

many sites.

Crimes targeted. The nature and severity of crime in Weed and Seed

neighborhoods determined the specific focus and form of the weeding efforts; in most cases the emphasis was

on drug-related, gun-related, and violent crimes. Most sites focused on

street-level dealing of relatively small

amounts of drugs, primarily crack cocaine and, in several northeastern

sites, heroin. A few directed their attention to drug trafficking and highlevel operators. State and Federal

agents were more likely to be involved

in weeding strategies directed toward

higher level dealers and organized

operations.

Enforcement strategies. Police-based

weeding activities generally consisted

of traditional drug enforcement and

investigation tactics (see exhibit 2)

that were enhanced by interagency

collaboration, targeted enforcement,

additional personnel, and coordinated

direction. Some noteworthy innovations included:

•Cross-training of patrol officers in

narcotics strategies, including search

warrant preparation, high-risk warrant

tactics, surveillance operations, buy/

bust operations, and the use of confidential informants.

•Use of civil remedies, problem solving, and community resources to close

drug houses, evict dealers, and mitigate hot spots.

•Application of state-of-the-art technologies of crime analysis, drug market mapping, offender data bases, and

video surveillance in investigations.

•Inclusion of probation/parole officers

on weeding teams.

Investigations also were helped by

data provided by task force members

and through “word-on-the-street”

information brought by community

police officers and residents.

Immediate effects of law

enforcement weeding

Weeding activities most often were

welcomed by citizens in the targeted

neighborhoods who had felt ignored

and besieged for some time and were

heartened that the police were beginning to step up the response to their

concerns. In interviews with program

officials and community leaders, few

reported any significant backlash resulting from the implementation of

weeding.

In several sites, however, the mere announcement of the weeding initiative

initially elicited negative reactions

from citizens, particularly residents of

the target areas, as well as from community and civil rights groups. They

viewed weeding’s significant law enforcement component as “targeted” at

predominantly minority neighborhoods. In response, certain sites

greatly increased the involvement of

residents in the planning process,

Exhibit 2: Law Enforcement Tactics in Order of Reported Use and Number of

Times Ranked in Top Five Most Effective Tactics *

No. of Times in

Top Five (n=18)

1. Identification and security of “trouble spots” 7

2. High visibility/saturation patrols 12

3. Search/arrest warrants 11

4. Controlled buys by informants 10

5. Identification/apprehension of felon fugitives 4

6. Buy/bust operations 13

7. Enforcement of disorderly conduct laws 3

8. Enforcement of nuisance ordinances 3

9. Identification/apprehension of probation/parole violators 5

10. Drug tip hotlines 3

* One site did not rank tactics.
6

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

T

lowered their attention to weeding,

and enhanced the program’s seeding

components.

Arrest data. Arrest statistics cannot

serve as comparable outcome measures across sites because of differences in the nature and magnitude of

problems addressed, in target area

size and composition, and in policies

and intensity of weeding activities.

The sites also shared neither a common definition of “Weed and Seed”

arrests nor a baseline measure of arrest activity in target areas that could

have been used to indicate how the

number and type of arrests were affected by weeding activities.

Sixteen of the 19 sites, however, reported arrest data for June 1992

through December 1993. A total of

38,863 arrests were reported, an average of just over 2,400 per site over the

18-month period. Arrests ranged from

149 in Omaha to 8,477 in Philadelphia.8

Prosecution: The other half

of weeding

Prosecution in the Weed and Seed initiative involved the coordinated efforts

of the offices of U.S. attorneys, local

prosecutors, and State attorneys general. The objectives of these agencies,

as designed by the U.S. Department of

Justice, were to remove “the worst offenders” from the target neighborhoods for as long as possible through

pretrial detention and incarceration.

Interagency cooperation. The nature

and strength of interagency cooperation in prosecution varied, but it was

generally weaker than the cooperation

and coordination among law enforcement agencies. Interagency cooperation for effective prosecution occurred

on two different planes: among the

three central prosecution agencies

(and primarily between the U.S.

attorney’s offices and local district

attorney’s offices) to determine strategies and criteria for prosecuting at the

Federal or State level, and between

prosecutors and law enforcement officers to work together on case preparation and investigations.

Strong preexisting relationships between the district attorney’s and U.S.

attorney’s offices were positively correlated to the level of cooperation between these offices in regard to the

Weed and Seed initiative in nearly

half the sites. In several others the

Weed and Seed initiative facilitated

interagency cooperation that had not

been a potent force earlier. In some

sites, however, effective cooperation

was not achieved even though some

progress was reported over time.

In sites with low levels of interagency

cooperation among prosecution agencies, key obstacles appeared to be:

• The exclusion of the district

attorney’s offices from planning and

subsequent decisionmaking processes.

• The absence of Weed and Seed grant

funds to support district attorney staff,

even though 92 percent of the Weed and

Seed cases were prosecuted by them.

• District attorney resistance to differential handling of cases from a specific geographical area.

• Issues surrounding the U.S.

attorney’s leadership role.

In sites with effective interagency

cooperation, district attorneys were

brought to the table early, remained

involved in policy setting, and often

received grant funds to support at

least one prosecutor dedicated to

Weed and Seed cases.

Strategy. Although the Executive

Office for Weed and Seed repeatedly

provided the sites with written definitions of a Weed and Seed case (see

“Definition of a Weed and Seed

Case”), prosecutors differed in how

they applied the definition and how

they handled Weed and Seed cases.

Some sites targeted these cases for

enhanced penalties and expedited

prosecution; others handled them no

differently from any other cases. A few

sites had dedicated Weed and Seed

prosecutors for vertical prosecution of

cases.

Cases involving large quantities of

drugs, firearms, defendants with prior

convictions, and criminal enterprises

typically were funneled to the U.S.

he U.S. attorney’s office defined

Weed and Seed reportable cases as:

(1) Any felony or misdemeanor relating to

the distribution or possession of drugs

and/or firearms within the confines of the

Weed and Seed target area.

(2) Aiding/abetting or causing such felonies and misdemeanors in (1).

(3) Conspiracy to sell or possess drugs

and/or firearms within the area.

(4) Commission of other felony offenses

within the area.

(5) Felonies or misdemeanors not committed in the target area that directly

affect the area or have a significant

connection thereto.

Definition of a Weed and Seed Case
7

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

attorney’s offices, although selection

criteria varied substantially among the

sites. U.S. attorneys applied existing

and specialized initiatives to Weed

and Seed cases, such as Operation

Triggerlock,9 but the extent of their

application is unknown.

Effects of prosecutors’

weeding activities

Signs of successful interagency

cooperation. In several sites policeprosecutor cooperation contributed to

successful prosecution of Weed and

Seed cases. In Santa Ana, for example, the assistant district attorney

in charge of Weed and Seed cases often participated in the planning and

execution of undercover buys, and the

police instituted careful video recording of buys, thus providing the prosecution with solid evidence.

One positive sign of the effect of interagency cooperation of prosecutors in

Operation Weed and Seed has been

expansion of community prosecution

activities by local district attorneys. In

many sites local prosecutors and, to a

lesser extent, U.S. attorneys opened

lines of dialog with neighborhood residents, improving community-prosecutor awareness and relations in both directions. Prosecutors obtained

information about community needs

and concerns that assisted them in establishing short- and long-term prosecution priorities and in turn

benefited from community residents’

improved willingness to assist with investigations and to serve as witnesses.

Supporting data. Data collected by

EOUSA provide some information on

prosecution outcomes, although these

data are affected by variations in case

definitions, law enforcement out-

 Exhibit 3: Prosecution Charges at State and Federal Levels



    

Other

Violent Crime

Possession of Drugs

Felony Drug

Firearms

CCE*/RICO**

Federal cases


(n=3,064)

State cases


(n=32,459)

33.0%

33.0%

19.0%

9.0%

6.0%

38.0%

41.0%

16.0%

4.0%

1.0%

 * Continuing Criminal Enterprise


** Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
8

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

comes, and prosecution approaches.

Of the 35,523 defendants charged

during the first project period (as reported to EOUSA), 92 percent were

prosecuted by local district attorneys

or prosecutors. As shown in exhibit 3,

there were no large differences in the

types of cases handled by Federal and

local prosecutors, although the majority of the cases that involved a continuing criminal enterprise and

violation of racketeering laws were

handled by U.S. attorney’s offices.

Local prosecutors reported a 21-percent conviction rate at the end of 18

months, with a large number of cases

(69 percent) pending (see exhibit 4).

Delays in reporting may account for

some of the pending cases. At the

Federal level, almost 60 percent of the

cases resulted in convictions, with 37

percent pending. More than 90 percent of Federal cases ending in conviction led to prison sentences, compared with 53 percent at the State level.

Role of community policing

There was substantial similarity across

cities in the general approach to community policing. Officers were assigned to the target areas to develop

relationships with residents and promote joint efforts to address neighborhood concerns. In some sites community policing was a new experience;

in others it was a familiar one where

existing community policing programs

were able to expand the number of

personnel. Most community police officers were not assigned to respond to

dispatched calls for service; instead

they focused on nonenforcement activities such as community contacts,

problem solving, and youth projects.

The number of dedicated officers

ranged from 1 in each of 6 neighborhoods in Madison to 22 officers and 2

sergeants in Chicago who covered 3

shifts. Other sites assigned teams of

between 3 and 12 officers to the targeted neighborhoods. Community

 Exhibit 4: Prosecution Outcomes at State and Federal Levels

Dismissals Convictions Pending

Federal cases


(n=2,152)*

State cases


(n=24,177)*

69.0%

37.4%

59.6%

21.0%

10.0%

3.0%

*No explanation was provided for the discrepancy between the 


number of cases for which outcomes were reported and the number


of cases reported as charged in exhibit 3.
9

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

police officers often worked in pairs or

teams, and they typically were linked

to or supplemented by others, such as

probation/parole officers, social workers, nurses, narcotics officers, truancy

officers, and Federal agents.

A few sites did not differentiate weeding

from community policing functions. In

these sites community police officers

conducted enforcement activities as routine parts of their work, although their

participation in undercover investigations was limited. In many sites community police officers concentrated on

community contacts and problem solving, but they participated in enforcement activities as needed. Most police

officials did not see any contradiction in

community police officers assuming two

roles, nor did the majority of community

leaders interviewed. Community police

officers were generally lauded by community leaders and residents, and their

presence was said to contribute to reducing tension between citizens and

police, solving social order problems,

and mitigating some of the public’s

distrust of weeding.

Seeding

Seeding is arguably the most diverse

and complex element of the Weed and

Seed concept. The target neighborhoods have deeply rooted social and

crime problems, and the majority contain a large percentage of residents

whose income is at or below the poverty line.

Local management. Most sites found

that a dedicated seed coordinator was

needed. Every site except one established a seed committee to plan and

oversee seeding strategies, although

authority and activities varied from

site to site. Many seed committees

were unable to function effectively in

the first project period, and they often

were dominated by local agency representatives from the police, city agencies (e.g., community development

and social services), large nonprofit

organizations (e.g., United Way), and

the mayor’s office. (Federal seed

agency representatives were active in

just two sites.) In some sites community leaders and citizen representatives were underrepresented and given

little decisionmaking authority.

The stronger, more active seed committees began with or evolved into a

membership comprising substantial

numbers of community representatives

with decisionmaking authority over

seeding funds. Although two sites

formed Federal agency seed committees comprising representatives from

the U.S. Departments of Housing and

Urban Development (HUD), Labor,

and Health and Human Services, Federal seeding agencies were usually not

involved in the program since they did

not have funds allocated for Weed and

Seed target areas and had no mandate

to give the areas priority in existing

grant funds.

Seeding strategies. An inclusive,

neighborhood-specific view of seeding

activities was adopted. The two broad

categories of seeding strategies were:

• Prevention, intervention, and treatment services.

• Neighborhood revitalization and

economic development.

Seeding activities and programs aimed

at prevention, intervention, and treatment were more prevalent in the target

areas than revitalization and economic

development strategies, and Weed and

Seed grant funds more often were allocated to them (see exhibit 5).

Prevention, intervention, and treatment

encompassed a wide range of services,

including substance abuse programs,

alternative activities for youths, health

and nutrition services, improved access to services, personal and family

development and education, victim assistance and protective services, and

community crime prevention. Primary

prevention for children and intervention

strategies for older youths were most

common. Treatment services were not

expanded by Weed and Seed, with the

exception of one site.

Safe Havens, founded in each site

through a major grant given to Cities

in Schools, Inc., were integral parts of

seeding. These centers, originally

planned as facilities within schools

but founded in a variety of community

settings, are multiservice centers

where a variety of youth and adult services are located together in a safe

neighborhood facility.

Neighborhood revitalization and economic development encompass jobs

and job training; homeownership programs; and renovation, rehabilitation,

and redevelopment. Where these

strategies were under way, most had

existed prior to the Weed and Seed

initiative. Planning was common for

physical revitalization and economic

development, including strategies for

leveraging and raising funds for support of these plans, particularly among

agency-dominated seed committees.

Funding for seeding activities. Some

activities viewed as seeding were

funded directly by grant funds, in

whole or in part; some were coordinated by seeding staff or committees;

and some were already present in the

target area and incorporated as part of

the Weed and Seed program. Approximately one-third of the seeding funds
10

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

were distributed to local organizations.

Federal funds supported several seeding initiatives directly, including Safe

Havens; Boys and Girls Clubs; and the

Race Against Drugs, Wings of Hope,

and Step-Up programs.

Many local, State, and Federal programs continued to support existing

services and resources covered by the

seeding umbrella. Examples include

HUD renovation projects, D.A.R.E.®

(Drug Abuse Resistance Education)

programs, Police Athletic Leagues offered by local police departments,

VISTA volunteers, Aid to Families

with Dependent Children, and Job

Training Partnership Act positions.

Consequences of Federal funding. Although there were no new Federal

agency seeding funds specifically allocated to the Weed and Seed sites, the

early announcements of the program

and pronouncements of Federal officials led site residents to believe that

significant funding for prevention and

treatment services, alternatives for

youths, and neighborhood revitalization would be forthcoming. The consequences of this misunderstanding

included community feeling that this

might be “just another Federal program,” decreased support from the

community and grassroots organizations, decreased citizen participation,

and difficult situations for regional

representatives of Federal agencies

that were involved with existing seeding programs.

Alterations in Federal asset forfeiture

policy financially benefited several

target communities. The U.S. Department of Justice ruled that real property, forfeited according to Federal law

because of connections with illegal activity, could be transferred to private

nonprofit organizations to support

Weed and Seed programs. Ownership

of several buildings was transferred to

Exhibit 5: Most and Least Common Seeding Activities

Number of Sites Number Using Weed and Seed Funds Type of Activity*

Found In (n=19) to Support Activity (n=19)

Most common seeding activities:

Prevention/education 19 7 P/I

Safe Havens 19 19 P/I

Boys and Girls Clubs 16 5 P/I

Cultural/entertainment activities 16 8 P/I

Community cleanups 16 5 NR

D.A.R.E.® (Drug Abuse Resistance

Education) programs 15 4 P/I

Basic education and skill

development 15 9 P/I

Victim/witness assistance 15 6 P/I

Neighborhood/block watches 15 2 P/I

Least common seeding activities:

Self-employment programs 5 0 NR

Rehabbing seized property 5 1 NR

Farmers’ markets 4 1 P/I

Scouting programs 4 2 P/I

TASC (Treatment Alternatives to Street

 Crime/Special Clients) programs 4 1 P/I

Race Against Drugs 4 4 P/I

Pediatric AIDS Service 2 0 P/I

SOS (Save Our Streets) Crime Watch 2 0 P/I

Wings of Hope 1 0 P/I

*P/I = prevention/intervention; NR = neighborhood revitalization
11

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

community organizations in several

sites; the facilities now serve as permanent locations for such seeding services as Safe Havens and victim/

witness centers.

The sites’ allocation of an average of

25–30 percent of their budgets to

seeding meant this money (from

$100,102 to $566,758, with an average of $273,177) had to cover coordinator salaries and community

projects. Pursuing major neighborhood revitalization and economic development strategies could take place

only through a variety of optimizing

strategies involving partnerships, leveraged funds, and interagency coordination. Most programs thus

completed the planning phase only.

Implications

Working from a common blueprint

drawn by the U.S. Department of Justice, each of the 19 Weed and Seed

sites customized a program to meet

each target community’s needs. Communities varied in such dimensions as

size and severity of crime and drug

problems and in their city’s history of

interagency cooperation, community

policing, and neighborhood empowerment. Yet, each site was given essentially the same amount of Federal

funding. Despite these differences

across sites, and in some instances

because of them, a number of important lessons can be distilled from the

Weed and Seed demonstration programs (see “Impact Evaluation

Under Way”).

Implementation issues. Most of the programs had slow and rocky beginnings

for a number of reasons, including:

• Problems with the organizational infrastructure, such as complex city

government bureaucracies and elaborate contracting rules.

• Phasing problems, such as the need

to complete a storefront or other facility and reliance on the implementation of Safe Havens to provide seeding

programs.

• Differences of opinion with BJA about

how funds could be used, particularly

the initial limitations placed on the percentage of Federal funds that could be

allocated toward seeding.

Good management and leadership—

with experienced, effective, and wellregarded individuals in major management positions—helped mitigate

these problems. The experience suggests that in the future, the program’s

Federal funding levels and permissible uses should be clearly stated

and consistent from the start. Guidelines should continue to be structured

with enough flexibility to enable communities to do what they think is

needed within their neighborhoods.

Interagency cooperation. Through

steering committees, community policing, community prosecution, weed

task forces, and seed committees,

groups of people who ordinarily did

not communicate with each other

(e.g., prosecutors and neighborhood

residents, police officers and recreation directors) came together to coordinate their efforts, share resources,

and solve problems. The reasons and

capacity for getting together existed

prior to Weed and Seed, but the motivation and vehicles for doing so resulted

from the program’s implementation.

Contributions of time and resources

from agencies, community organizations, and individuals undoubtedly exceeded the Federal grant funds

allocated for the program.

It is critical to bring the right people

to the table from the start. Future endeavors should include key representatives from district attorneys’ offices

and the target neighborhoods as well

as from Federal law enforcement and

s this Research in Brief indicates,

an impact evaluation is necessary to gain a

full understanding of the effects of Weed

and Seed programs. The National Institute

of Justice is supporting a multipart impact

evaluation conducted by Abt Associates.

The evaluation—examining in detail

Weed and Seed programs in Akron, Hartford, Las Vegas, Pittsburgh, Salt Lake City,

Sarasota, Seattle, and Shreveport—consists of the following four approaches:

• Residential and business surveys. Approximately 6,400 telephone surveys are

being conducted to assess views about

Weed and Seed efforts.

• Analysis of police and prosecutor records.

Records that predate Weed and Seed

funding are providing a baseline for the

weeding evaluation; records collected since

funding began are measuring the impact

of weeding activities.

• Onsite assessment of community-based

programs. Working with Weed and Seed

offices and with community service providers, researchers are conducting an intensive

examination of seeding activities.

• Regular and systematic offsite contact.

Frequent contact with Weed and Seed participants is being maintained to foster a

high level of cooperation and collaboration

throughout the evaluation.

Impact Evaluation Under Way

A
12

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

municipal agencies. The U.S.

attorney’s office is an appropriate

leader, although this does not preclude individual circumstances where

other local officials might be equally

effective. Consideration should be

given to having separate weed and

seed coordinators with substantial experience and established working

relationships with other key people.

Effective weeding. The extent to which

the program succeeded in removing

the most violent and problematic offenders from target neighborhoods is

unknown. Of the tens of thousands of

Weed and Seed arrest cases prosecuted, the majority were reported as

pending at the end of the demonstration period. Over 92 percent were

prosecuted by local district attorneys,

many of them in locations in which jail

caps and prison overcrowding may

limit the length of sentences even

where convictions were obtained. Yet

it is also certain that a number of serious criminals were convicted under

Federal law and sentenced to lengthy

prison terms.

For effective weeding the formation of

interagency task forces consisting of

all relevant Federal, State, and local

law enforcement agencies should be

considered. Future efforts should include recognition of and support for

the critical role of local prosecutors.

They should participate from the outset on interagency task forces and be

granted additional resources to address the increased caseloads and

community involvement promulgated

by the Weed and Seed program.

Community policing. The Weed and

Seed program helped spread and reinforce the idea of community policing,

which was a positive experience for

both the community and police agencies. It also helped demonstrate that

enforcement can be enhanced by close

contacts with the community and that

enforcement and service are not necessarily incompatible policing functions.

Community policing principles and

practices should be advocated and supported by police departments and city

governments, with appropriate recognition, compensation, and room for advancement for officers. Model efforts

should include training for both citizens

and police, means for officers to possess

a sense of ownership of the area they

serve, and substantial coordination

among service providers and enforcement personnel.

Effective seeding. Federal seeding

coordination and funding were much

less than Federal weeding support,

and seeding services became the primary responsibility of city agencies.

(In cities with financial problems, the

target areas received very little.) Yet

despite the problems in Federal funding of seeding activities, several communities discovered the resources

within themselves to launch a number

of significant prevention and restoration efforts. It is unlikely that they

would have done this so quickly without the focus and coordination offered

by the Weed and Seed program. It

cannot be determined by the national

process evaluation if the “right” seeding activities were supported or if

enough seeding was activated. But

generally, given the seriousness of the

target neighborhoods’ drug and social

problems, extent of physical deterioration, and severe economic problems,

seeding activities alone could not have

overcome them, especially in the limited time allotted.

The dual approach of prevention and

revitalization within seeding should be

continued, and training and technical

assistance for citizens in leadership,

planning, and program development

and management are recommended.

One of the important messages delivered by the U.S. Department of Justice

in its design and shepherding of the

Weed and Seed initiative was that a

community’s crime and drug problems

are best addressed in a comprehensive

fashion. In the context of the current

policy debate over whether to provide

funding for enforcement and incarceration or prevention, the Weed and

Seed programs serve as a demonstration that the sensible answer is both.

Seeding is necessary to rebuild and

sustain a safe and vital community; at

the same time, seeding cannot occur—

community participation cannot be

achieved, businesses will not invest,

and young people cannot be deterred

from the economic attractions of drug

dealing—until weeding results in a

basic level of security.

Notes

1. Federal funds were provided in two

stages: $613,000 in spring 1992 and

$487,000 in early 1993. In mid-1994

the demonstration sites received an

additional $750,000. This Research in

Brief does not discuss program activities and progress during this second

grant period.

2. Sherman, L.W. (1990). Police

crackdowns: Initial and residual deterrence. In M. Tonry and N. Morris

(eds.), Crime and justice: A review of

research, Volume 12, 1–48. Chicago:

University of Chicago Press.

3. See Moore, M.H. (1988). Drug trafficking. Crime File Study Guide.

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of

Justice, National Institute of Justice
13

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

(NCJ 104555); and Reuter, P., et al.

(1988). Drug use and drug programs

in the Washington metropolitan area.

Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corp.

4. Skogan, W.G. (1989). Communities,

crime and neighborhood organization.

Crime and delinquency, 35(3), 437–

457. See also Davis, R.C., A. Lurigio,

and W.G. Skogan (1991). Community

responses to crack. Report to the National Institute of Justice. New York:

New York City Victim Services

Agency.

5. See, for example, Greene, J.R., and

S.D. Mastrofski (eds.) (1988). Community policing: Rhetoric or reality? New

York: Praeger; and Rosenbaum, D.P.

(ed.) (1994). The challenge of community policing: Testing the promises.

Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

6. Coldren, J.R., and M.J. Sabath

(1992). Multijurisdictional drug control task forces, 1988–1990: Critical

components of state drug control strategies. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice

Assistance. Chaiken, J., M. Chaiken,

and C. Karchmer (1990). Multijurisdictional drug law enforcement strategies: Reducing supply and demand.

Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of

Justice, National Institute of Justice.

Schlegel, K., and E.F. McGarrell

(1991). An examination of arrest practices in regions served by multijurisdictional drug task forces. Crime and

delinquency, 37(3), 408–426.

7. Botvin, G.J. (1987). Prevention research. In Drug abuse and drug abuse

research: The second triennial report to

Congress from the Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services.

Rockville, MD: National Institute on

Drug Abuse. Cook, R., J. Roehl, C.

Oros, L. Saunders, C. Andrews, T.

Arrington, R. Hersch, G. Wisdom, R.

Huitt, and J. Trudeau (1993). National evaluation of the Community

Partnership Demonstration Program:

Third annual report. Washington,

D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and

Human Services, Center for Substance

Abuse Prevention.

8. A quarter of the arrests were for

felony drug crimes, 19 percent were

for violent crimes, 16 percent were for

possession of narcotics, 4 percent

were for firearms violations, and 35

percent were for “other crimes.” Only

47 arrests were made for organized

drug trafficking under RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) and similar Federal laws.

9. A Department of Justice project,

Operation Triggerlock uses a task

force approach, with extensive involvement of State and local law enforcement, to capture and incarcerate

violent and repeat offenders (career

criminals) who violate Federal firearms statutes.

Points of view in this document are those of the

authors and do not necessarily represent the

official position of the U.S. Department of Justice.

NCJ 161624

This project was supported under award 92–DD–CX–K044 from the

National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Institute for Social Analysis (ISA), Police Foundation, and American Prosecutors Research Institute (APRI). The principal researchers were Janice A. Roehl, Ph.D., president, and Robert

Huitt, Ph.D., associate, ISA; Mary Ann Wycoff, senior research associate, Police Executive Research Forum; Antony Pate, senior research

associate, School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Florida State

University; Donald Rebovich, Ph.D., director of research, APRI; and

Ken Coyle, Ph.D., former research analyst with APRI. For additional

information, see National Process Evaluation of the Weed and Seed

Initiative: Cross-Site Summary (Part I), NCJ 160140, and Case Studies

(Part II), NCJ 160141. These documents are available from the National

Criminal Justice Reference Service through interlibrary loan or for a fee.

Call 800–851–3420.

The National Institute of Justice is a

component of the Office of Justice

Programs, which also includes the Bureau

of Justice Assistance, Bureau of Justice

Statistics, Office of Juvenile Justice and

Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for

Victims of Crime.
14

R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

NCJ 152235—Alfred Blumstein, Ph.D., Professor, Carnegie Mellon University: Youth

Violence, Guns, and Illicit Drug Markets.

NCJ 152236—Peter W. Greenwood, Ph.D.,

Director, Criminal Justice Research Program, The RAND Corporation: Three Strikes,

You’re Out: Benefits and Costs of California’s New

Mandatory-Sentencing Law.

NCJ 152237—Christian Pfeiffer, Ph.D., Director, Kriminologisches Forschungsinstitut

Niedersachsen: Sentencing Policy and Crime

Rates in Reunified Germany.

NCJ 152238—Arthur L. Kellermann, M.D.,

M.P.H., Director, Center for Injury Control,

and Associate Professor, Emory University:

Understanding and Preventing Violence: A Public

Health Perspective.

NCJ 152692—James Inciardi, Ph.D., Director, Drug and Alcohol Center, University of

Delaware: A Corrections-Based Continuum of

Effective Drug Abuse Treatment.

NCJ 153270—Adele Harrell, Ph.D., Director, Program on Law and Behavior, The Urban Institute: Intervening with High-Risk Youth:

Preliminary Findings from the Children-at-Risk

Program.

NCJ 153271—Marvin Wolfgang, Ph.D.,

Director, Legal Studies and Criminology

University of Pennsylvania: Crime in a Birth

Cohort: A Replication in the People’s Republic of

China.

NCJ 153730—Lawrence W. Sherman,

Ph.D., Professor, University of Maryland:

Reducing Gun Violence: Community Policing

Against Gun Crime.

NCJ 153272—Cathy Spatz Widom, Ph.D.,

Professor, State University of New York—

Albany: The Cycle of Violence Revisited Six Years

Later.

NCJ 153273—Wesley Skogan, Ph.D., Professor, Northwestern University: Community

Policing in Chicago: Fact or Fiction?

NCJ 153850—Scott H. Decker, Ph.D., Professor, University of Missouri–St. Louis, and

Susan Pennell, San Diego Association of

Governments: Monitoring the Illegal Firearms

Market.

NCJ 154277—Terrie Moffitt, Ph.D., Professor, University of Wisconsin: Partner Violence

Among Young Adults.

NCJ 156923—Orlando Rodriguez, Ph.D.,

Director, Hispanic Research Center,

Fordham University: The New Immigrant Hispanic Populations: Implications for Crime and

Delinquency in the Next Decade.

NCJ 156924—Robert Sampson, Ph.D., Professor, University of Chicago: Communities and

Crime: A Study in Chicago.

NCJ 156925—John Monahan, Ph.D., Professor, University of Virginia: Mental Illness

and Violent Crime.

NCJ 157643—Benjamin E. Saunders, Ph.D.,

and Dean G. Kilpatrick, Ph.D., Medical University of South Carolina: Prevalence and Consequences of Child Victimization: Preliminary Results from the National Survey of Adolescents.

NCJ 159739—Joel H. Garner, Ph.D., Research Director, Joint Centers for Justice

Studies: Use of Force By and Against the Police.

NCJ 159740—Kim English, Research Director, Colorado Division of Criminal Justice: Managing Adult Sex Offenders in Community Settings: A Containment Approach.

NCJ 160765—Michael Tonry, Ph.D., Professor, University of Minnesota: Ethnicity,

Crime, and Immigration.

NCJ 160766—David M. Kennedy, Ph.D.,

Professor, Harvard University: Juvenile Gun

Violence and Gun Markets in Boston.

To order any of these tapes, please complete and return this form with your payment to National Criminal Justice Reference

Service, Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20849–6000. Call 800–851–3420, or e-mail askncjrs@ncjrs.org if you have any questions.

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The Latest Criminal Justice

Videotape Series from NIJ:

Research in Progress

Learn about the latest developments in criminal justice

research from prominent criminal justice experts.

Each 60-minute tape presents a well-known scholar discussing his or her current studies and how they

relate to existing criminal justice research and includes the lecturer’s responses to audience questions. The

tapes in the series now available in VHS format are:
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R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Selected Recent OJP Publications and Products

Listed below are some recent, relevant Office

of Justice Programs (OJP) publications related

to the Weed and Seed program; they concern

issues of law enforcement, community policing, prosecution, crime prevention, and neighborhood revitalization. These publications are

free, except as indicated, and can be obtained

from the National Criminal Justice Reference

Service (NCJRS): telephone 800–851–3420,

e-mail askncjrs@ncjrs.org, or write NCJRS,

Box 6000, Rockville, MD 20849–6000.

These documents also can be downloaded

through the NCJRS Bulletin Board System or

at the NCJRS Anonymous FTP site in ASCII

or graphic formats. They can be viewed online

at the Justice Information Center World Wide

Web site. Call NCJRS for more information.

Please note that when free publications are out

of stock, they are available as photocopies or

through interlibrary loan.

Community Involvement

Evaluation of Boys and Girls Clubs in Public

Housing, NIJ Research Preview, 1995, FS

000100.

Innovative Community Partnerships: Working

Together for Change, OJJDP Program Summary, 1996, NCJ 147483.

Kelley, Patricia, M.P.P., Mark H. Moore,

Ph.D., and Jeffrey A. Roth, Ph.D., Violence in

Cornet City: A Problem-Solving Exercise, NIJ

Issues and Practices, 1995, NCJ 154258.

Matrix of Community-Based Initiatives, OJJDP

Program Summary, 1996, NCJ 154816.

McGillis, Daniel, Beacons of Hope: New York

City’s School-Based Community Centers, NIJ

Program Focus, 1996, NCJ 157667.

Rising Above Gangs and Drugs: How to Start a

Community Reclamation Project, OJJDP, 1995

(third printing), NCJ 133522.

Sampson, Robert, Ph.D., Communities and

Crime: A Study in Chicago, NIJ VHS videotape, 1995, NCJ 156924, U.S. $19, Canada

and other foreign countries $24.

Taylor, Ralph B., and Adele V. Harrell, Physical Environment and Crime, NIJ Research Report, 1996, NCJ 157311.

Responses to Youth Violence and

Delinquency

Combating Violence and Delinquency: The National Juvenile Justice Action Plan, OJJDP Report, 1996, NCJ 157105; OJJDP Summary,

1996, NCJ 157105.

Curfew: An Answer to Juvenile Delinquency

and Victimization?, OJJDP Bulletin, 1996,

NCJ 159533.

Evaluation of Violence Prevention Programs in

Middle Schools, NIJ Update, 1995, FS

000094.

Gang Suppression and Intervention: Community Models, OJJDP Research Summary, 1996,

NCJ 148202.

Gang Suppression and Intervention: Problem

and Response, OJJDP Research Summary,

1996, NCJ 149629.

Harrell, Adele, Ph.D., Intervening with HighRisk Youth: Preliminary Findings from the

Children-at-Risk Program, NIJ Research in

Progress Research Preview, 1996, FS 000140.

Also available as a VHS videotape, 1995, NCJ

153270, U.S. $19, Canada and other foreign

countries $24.

Intensive Aftercare for High-Risk Juveniles: A

Community Care Model, OJJDP Program Summary, 1996, NCJ 147575.

Intensive Aftercare for High-Risk Juveniles:

Policies and Procedures, OJJDP Program Summary, 1996, NCJ 147712.

Community Policing

Community Policing and D.A.R.E.: A

Practitioner’s Perspective, BJA Bulletin, 1995,

NCJ 154275.

Community Policing Strategies, NIJ Research

Preview, 1995, FS 000126.

Sadd, Susan, and Randolph M. Grinc, Implementation Challenges in Community Policing: Innovative Neighborhood-Oriented

Policing in Eight Cities, NIJ Research in

Brief, 1996, NCJ 157932.

Sherman, Lawrence W., Ph.D., Reducing

Gun Violence: Community Policing Against

Gun Crime, VHS videotape, 1995, NCJ

153730, U.S. $19, Canada and other foreign

countries $24.

Skogan, Wesley, Ph.D., Community Policing

in Chicago, Fact or Fiction?, NIJ Research

in Progress Research Preview, 1995, FS

000105. Also available as a VHS videotape,

1995, NCJ 153273, U.S. $19, Canada and

other foreign countries $24.

Law Enforcement

Policing Drug Hot Spots, NIJ Research Preview, 1995, FS 000128.

Rich, Thomas F., The Use of Computerized

Mapping in Crime Control and Prevention

Programs, NIJ Research in Action, 1995,

NCJ 155182.

Prosecution and Courts

Anderson, David C., In New York City, a

“Community Court” and a New Legal Culture, NIJ Program Focus, 1996, NCJ 158613.

Bourque, Blair B., Roberta C. Cronin, Daniel

B. Felker, Frank R. Pearson, Mei Han, and

Sarah M. Hill, Boot Camps for Juvenile Offenders: An Implementation Evaluation of

Three Demonstration Programs, NIJ Research in Brief, 1996, NCJ 157317.

Finn, Peter, The Manhattan District

Attorney’s Narcotics Eviction Program, NIJ

Program Focus, 1995, NCJ 153146.

Johnson, Claire, Barbara Webster, and Edward Connors, Prosecuting Gangs: A National Assessment, NIJ Research in Brief,

1995, NCJ 151785.
U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20531

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