Joint Special Operations University

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JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

Improving the Sustainment of 

SOF Distributed Operations in 

Access-Denied Environments

Robert Haddick

JSOU Report 16-2

In this monograph, Robert Haddick examines a variety of 

emerging technologies and techniques that could improve 

the sustainment and effectiveness of distributed SOF operations, especially in access-denied environments. He begins 

by describing a challenging yet plausible notional unconventional warfare campaign scenario. He describes how current 

SOF planners would attempt to cope with this scenario under 

current doctrine and sustainment capabilities, explores current 

and emerging technologies that could provide new options 

and capabilities, and evaluates new technologies that promise 

to reduce logistic demand for distributed SOF operations. Haddick proposes research and development recommendations 

that provide SOF with capabilities that improve their capacity 

to execute clandestine UW campaigns in denied areas. This 

monograph helps close the gap between current conditions 

and what will be necessary in an access-denied future.

JSOU Report 16-2 Improving the Sustainment of SOF Haddick

ISBN 978-1-941715-07-9
Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D., Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

Robert Nalepa, Lt. Col., U.S. Air Force, Ret., Editor in Chief

Will Irwin, MMAS, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; 

Peter McCabe, Ph.D., Political Science, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.; Gregory Salomon, Colonel, U.S. Army; 

Paul Lieber, Ph.D., Mass Communication & Public Affairs; Resident Senior Fellows

Anna-Marie Wyant, M.A., English, JSOU Press Editor 

Frederick Zimmerman, Master Sergeant, U.S. Marine Corps, Ret., JSOU Press Editor

Editorial Advisory Board

Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Mario Forestier

Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director, Joint Special Operations Command 

Center for Counterterrorism Studies

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence 

Ph.D., War Studies

Director, CANSOFCOM Professional 

Development Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

Senior Research Fellow and adjunct professor, 

Middlebury Institute of International Studies at 

Monterey and JSOU Senior Fellow

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and Space 

Studies, Air University and JSOU Associate Fellow

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow

Louis Alberto Ordóñez Rubio,

Vice Admiral, Colombian Navy, Ret.,

Ph.D., Education, Director, Centro Regional de 

Estudios Estrategicos en Seguridad

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Bryan C. Price

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, Combating Terrorism Center at 

West Point

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Joint Special Operations University

and the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 

science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the 

men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 

and interagency environment. 

JSOU conducts research through its Center for Special Operations 

Studies and Research (CSOSR) where effort centers upon the USSOCOM 

mission: 

USSOCOM mission. USSOCOM synchronizes the planning of Special 

Operations and provides Special Operations Forces to support persistent, 

networked, and distributed Global Combatant Command operations in 

order to protect and advance our Nation’s interests.

Press publications are available for download from the JSOU Library 

web page located at https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications.
JSOU Report 16-2

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2016

Improving the Sustainment 

of SOF Distributed 

Operations in 

Access-Denied Environments

Robert Haddick
This monograph and other JSOU publications can be found at https://jsou.

libguides.com/jsoupublications. Click on Publications. Comments about this 

publication are invited and should be forwarded to the Director of the Center 

for Special Operations Studies and Research, Joint Special Operations University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB FL 33621.

*******

The JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research (CSOSR) is currently 

accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For 

more information, please contact the CSOSR Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. 

Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

ISBN 978-1-941715-07-9

Printed in January 2016.
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the 

author and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position 

of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United 

States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations 

University.

Authors are granted academic freedom provided their work does not 

disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or 

misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers 

authors to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the 

interest of furthering debate on key issues.
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

The Collapse of Iraq and Syria: The End of the Colonial Construct in the 

Greater Levant, December 2015, Roby C. Barrett

Tactical Operations for Strategic Effect: The Challenge of Currency Conversion, 

November 2015, Colin S. Gray

Countering Violent Extremism in Mali, November 2015, Mark Moyar

The 2005 Iraqi Sunni Awakening: The Role of the Desert Protectors Program, 

October 2015, William Knarr

2016 Special Operations Research Topics

Saudi Arabia: Modernity, Stability, and the Twenty-First Century Monarchy, 

June 2015, Roby C. Barrett

Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, Fourth Edition, 2015

2015 Special Operations Essays, May 2015

Building Partner Capacity, February 2015, Harry R. Yarger

Islam: Ideology and Conflict, December 2014, Roby C. Barrett

On the cover. Photo illustration by Clairvoyant Media Services. Original 

photo by Air Force Staff Sergeant Chris Griffin.
v

Contents

Foreword......................................................................................vii

About the Author...........................................................................ix

Introduction................................................................................... 1

1. The Struggle for Greenville Province: A Pacing Scenario for a 

Distributed UW Campaign in an Access-Denied Area ................... 5

2. Technologies and Techniques for Delivering Supplies, 

Equipment, and Personnel to Distributed SOF Executing a UW 

Campaign in a Denied Area ........................................................ 19

3. Technologies and Techniques for Reducing the Logistics 

Demand of SOF Distributed Operations...................................... 37

4. Recommendations for Improving the Sustainment of SOF 

Distributed Operations in Access-Denied Environments.............. 51

5. Conclusion.............................................................................. 65

Appendix A: Acronym List ........................................................... 67

Endnotes...................................................................................... 69

vii

Foreword

In his monograph, Improving the Sustainment of SOF Distributed Operations in Access-Denied Environments, Robert Haddick examines a variety 

of emerging technologies and techniques that could improve the sustainment 

and effectiveness of distributed SOF operations, especially in access-denied 

environments. This is a terrific piece of scholarly work. The writing style 

is compelling, well sourced (directly drawing from historical contexts to 

frame proposed solutions), contains realistic technology assumptions, and 

most importantly, actionable recommendations. The monograph begins by 

describing a challenging yet plausible notional unconventional warfare (UW) 

campaign scenario. The first chapter describes how current SOF planners 

would attempt to cope with this scenario under current doctrine and sustainment capabilities. Haddick finds that SOF units and planners assigned 

to the campaign would benefit from emerging technologies and techniques 

that could reliably overcome the access barriers in the campaign scenario. 

In addition, these technologies and techniques provide sustainment and 

mobility to distributed SOF and insurgent forces in the UW operating area, 

and reduce their demand for outside sustainment, which would ease the 

burden on whatever logistics system emerged from the planning process.

The second chapter explores current and emerging technologies that 

could provide new options and capabilities for resupply, especially for clandestine distributed SOF operations in denied areas. This is important to note 

because a non-standard logistics operation that can move meaningful quantities of supplies and equipment across a denied frontier offers the potential 

of a substantial competitive advantage for the guerrilla force and thus an 

acceleration of its insurgency. Haddick, in the third chapter, describes and 

evaluates emerging technologies that promise to reduce logistic demand for 

distributed SOF operations and thus the burden on a prospective clandestine 

UW sustainment system. These technologies include viable aerial, seaborne, 

overland, and subterranean delivery channels that SOF logisticians could 

exploit to support a UW campaign inside an access-denied area. Finally, 

Haddick proposes research and development recommendations that provide 

SOF with capabilities that improve the capacity of SOF to execute clandestine UW campaigns in denied areas. The 15 recommendations presented 
viii

address a gap in what Haddick argues is the lack of attention in recent years 

devoted to the UW mission generally, and the sustainment of challenging 

UW missions in particular.

This monograph is not just for the SOF logistician. It will be of interest to 

those in the conventional force as well as SOF who are tasked with supporting a friendly guerrilla force inside an access-denied area. Haddick provides 

a holistic view of what it takes for SOF operational success. This monograph 

helps close the gap between current conditions and what will be necessary 

in an access-denied future. If nothing else, it is a reminder for the reader of 

the challenges ahead.

Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D.

Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research
ix

About the Author

Robert Haddick is a former U.S. Marine Corps officer. He served in 

infantry and field artillery units in the 3rd Marine Regiment and commanded a rifle company in the 23rd Marine Regiment. While on deployment he conducted security force assistance activities with host nation and 

partner military forces in the Western Pacific, East 

Asia, the Indian Ocean region, and Africa. He served 

on a battalion staff and participated in the Personnel 

Reliability Program.

In the private sector, Haddick is a Visiting Senior 

Fellow at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. 

The Mitchell Institute is an independent, non-partisan 

national security policy research institute specializing 

in the study of aerospace power and strategy, and is 

affiliated with the Air Force Association located in 

Arlington, Virginia. He was Director of Research at The Fremont Group, the 

investment affiliate of Bechtel Corporation. He led Fremont’s economic and 

investment research team, founded and led its proprietary trading unit, led 

one of Fremont’s overseas subsidiaries, and established a trading network 

that spanned the United States, Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Australia.

From January 2009 to September 2012, Haddick was the author of This 

Week at War, a weekly column on national security affairs for Foreign Policy. 

His column covered the counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, 

and elsewhere; the Pentagon’s budget and reform efforts; the evolution of 

U.S. military doctrine and operational concepts; and adaptation to emerging security challenges. Simultaneously, Haddick was the managing editor 

of Small Wars Journal, a leading intellectual resource on modern conflict, 

irregular warfare, and emerging threats. 

Haddick’s essays on national security issues have appeared in the New 

York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Air & Space Power Journal, The National Interest, War on the Rocks, and other publications. He 

has conducted numerous interviews with media outlets such as the BBC, 

various NPR affiliates, CNBC, and others. Haddick has been a paid adviser 
x

to the U.S. State Department, U.S. Central Command, and the National 

Intelligence Council.

Haddick is the author of Fire on the Water: China, America, and the 

Future of the Pacific (Naval Institute Press). Fire on the Water discusses how 

China’s reemergence as a great power is leading to a growing clash of interests 

in the Asia-Pacific region. The book explains how China’s strategy, based 

on non-military assertiveness and its exploitation of the missile and sensor 

technical revolution, is taking advantage of vulnerabilities in longstanding U.S. and allied operational concepts in the region, which current U.S. 

policies and programs are struggling to address. Fire on the Water provides 

a detailed description of diplomatic, military, and acquisition reforms the 

U.S. and its partners in the region should undertake if they are to maintain 

stability and protect their interests.

Haddick’s previous JSOU Press monograph is Challenges in the AsiaPacific Theater for U.S. and Partner Nation Special Operations Forces (2014).
1

Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

Introduction

Since 2001 the majority of United States Special Operations Forces 

(USSOF) operations occurred with the nearby presence and support of 

conventional military forces and their logistics and sustainment infrastructure.1

 However, SOF should prepare for missions of significant size and duration where such conventional combat service support will not be present.2

There may be an increasing possibility that policymakers will task SOF 

to execute unconventional warfare (UW) missions. The U.S. Department of 

Defense (DOD) defines UW as:

activities to enable a resistance movement to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or 

with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.3

The DOD has also stated the role UW plays in the national strategy of 

the United States:

UW is a politico-military tool which, under certain circumstances, 

may provide the most feasible, acceptable and suitable option by 

which the U.S. Government can achieve its objectives. National 

objectives may be to influence, coerce, disrupt, replace, or overthrow an adversarial governing authority by affecting the competition for legitimacy. UW is a combination of the direct and indirect 

application of national power that leverages relevant foreign resistance movements or insurgencies opposing a governing authority 

to achieve the U.S. national objectives. A UW operation renders 

national strategy into an appropriate and relatively inexpensive 

policy option for decision makers. UW operations contain political 

risks; however, those risks may be considered less than those associated with inaction or the introduction of large-scale military forces.4

UW is an offensive yet indirect military technique, and an option that 

may be increasingly sought by U.S. policymakers in the future. As a result, 

SOF leadership has assigned a high priority to bolstering Special Operations 

Forces (SOF) UW capabilities in the period ahead.5 Such missions could find 

SOF detachments operating for sustained periods at long distances from 
2

JSOU Report 16-2

friendly bases of support. Such operations are also likely to be ‘distributed,’ 

with small autonomous detachments operating beyond the range of mutual 

support. Political, diplomatic, and operational security considerations may 

require that some UW campaigns remain clandestine.6

The falling relative costs and increasing availability of highly effective 

anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles and associated sensor networks will in 

many cases greatly compound the challenge of executing distributed UW 

missions.7 The increasing presence and effectiveness of such ‘anti-access’ 

technology will greatly increase the risk of moving SOF units into and 

around an unconventional warfare operating area (UWOA). The proliferation of access denial technology will similarly increase the costs and risks 

of sustaining UW detachments and friendly guerrilla forces during the long 

interval normally required to successfully execute a UW campaign.

Despite these strenuous challenges, SOF planners have an obligation to 

be ready to operate and succeed in these environments. SOF planners need 

to prepare for the likelihood that policymakers will call on them for options 

when other alternatives are impractical. It may be the case that diplomacy, 

political pressure, economic sanctions, and other forms of nonviolent coercion will have failed to achieve the effects that policymakers have sought. 

Likewise, conventional military operations may be impractical, or may have 

been tried and similarly failed. When policymakers have concluded that a 

national security objective remains important, they may turn to SOF commanders and planners for options such as UW, found in the irregular portion 

of the conflict spectrum.8 SOF commanders and planners have an obligation 

to be prepared for the increasing likelihood of such circumstances.

For these reasons, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 

headquarters expressed interest in a research study that would provide 

background and recommendations for how that command and the SOF 

community can better prepare for distributed operations in access-denied 

environments and scenarios. Specifically, Special Operations Research Topics 

2015, published by Joint Special Operations University Press, described this 

research interest:

The majority of SOF operations during the last ten years of conflict 

have been conducted in the context of substantial general purpose 

force presence and support. As SOF look toward 2020 and beyond, 

more distributed operations will likely become the norm. What 
3

Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

capabilities and technologies can be used to perform distributed 

operations and sustainment functions in the future? What options 

could enable support to units operating in a global, complex environment in response to emerging anti-access and area-denial security 

challenges to joint operational access concept, as well as support to 

dispersed special operations units? In this context, describe technology and advanced systems solution that: Reduce drivers for logistics 

requirements, particularly power and energy, maintenance, fuel and 

water by fundamentally changing the demand characteristics of the 

force and increasing capabilities that allow demand to be satisfied at 

the point of need; improve intra-theater mobility and distribution; 

and improve near real-time visibility of logistics information. Is 

there a logistics-centric research and development (R&D) investment strategy that could achieve these objectives?9

This monograph responds to this interest and will examine a variety of 

emerging technologies and techniques that could improve the sustainment 

and effectiveness of distributed SOF operations especially in access-denied 

environments. 

The first SOF Truth states, “Humans are more important than Hardware.”10 That truth certainly remains intact. Better technology will never 

substitute for high standards of SOF training, leadership, experience, and 

teamwork. What some of the emerging technologies in this study may provide are new capabilities that will allow mission success in scenarios where 

such confidence would not otherwise have been present. 

The monograph will begin by describing a challenging yet plausible 

notional UW campaign scenario. This ‘pacing’ UW scenario will feature a 

prospective substantial, distributed, and clandestine UW campaign executed 

without an overt conventional military logistics infrastructure and against 

an adversary possessing sophisticated access-denial capabilities. This chapter will describe how current SOF planners would attempt to cope with 

this scenario under current doctrine and sustainment capabilities. It will 

also illuminate some of the gaps between what such a pacing scenario will 

demand and the doctrine and logistic capabilities that exist today. 

The second chapter will explore current and emerging technologies that 

could provide new options and capabilities for resupply, especially for clandestine distributed SOF operations in denied areas. This chapter will discuss 
4

JSOU Report 16-2

new technologies for aerial, water-borne, terrestrial, and subterranean resupply methods, and examine technologies and techniques that could aid nonstandard resupply operations for clandestine UW operations.

The third chapter will describe and evaluate emerging technologies that 

promise to reduce logistic demand for distributed SOF operations and thus 

the burden on a prospective clandestine UW sustainment system. The chapter will discuss technologies that could improve the efficiency and reduce 

the demand for stored electrical power, electrical generation, nutrition, and 

munitions.

The final chapter will propose research and development recommendations that will provide SOF with capabilities that will improve the capacity 

of SOF to execute clandestine UW campaigns in denied areas. The chapter 

will make specific recommendations to SOF commanders and planners on 

ways to implement the concepts, techniques, and technologies discussed 

in the previous chapters. A conclusion will then sum up the findings of the 

monograph.

The acquisition of access-denial technology by adversaries of the U.S. and 

coalition partners will in some cases raise the barriers to SOF success. At the 

same time, policymakers are likely to increasingly turn to SOF for options 

to resolve many national security challenges. The emerging technologies 

examined in this study could allow SOF to keep up in this competition and 

provide the options that policymakers will demand.
5

Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

1. The Struggle for Greenville Province: 

A Pacing Scenario for a Distributed UW 

Campaign in an Access-Denied Area

This chapter will describe a fictional insurgency against a geostrategic 

adversary of the United States and its partners and a UW campaign U.S. 

policymakers have requested in support of that insurgency. The purpose of 

this descriptive and fictional chapter is to orient the reader to the challenging 

pacing scenario SOF planners may have to prepare for when contemplating 

future distributed UW operations in denied areas. The chapter will also 

illustrate the limitations and shortcomings of existing UW sustainment 

doctrine and technology. This chapter will lay the path for the monograph’s 

subsequent chapters, which will describe emerging technologies and techniques that promise to improve the sustainment capacity for challenging UW 

campaigns such as the one described in this chapter. The fictional scenario 

begins below.

Legal authority for a UW campaign in the People’s Democratic Republic of Redland

The United States National Command Authority has directed USSOCOM 

and other government agencies to conduct a UW campaign in support of a 

resistance movement opposing the government of the People’s Democratic 

Republic of Redland (hereafter simply “Redland”). The president has signed 

a covert action finding relating to Redland, and Congress has authorized and 

appropriated DOD and intelligence service funding for a clandestine UW 

campaign inside Redland.

Description of Redland

Geography. Redland is a mid-sized country in Asia, with roughly the same 

land area and half the population of France. Redland enjoys access to the 

ocean to its east. On this coast the broad Green River drains into the ocean. 

The Green River traces its way upstream through roughly the geographic 

center of Redland to the large capital city of Redville, and then through 

Redland’s foothills and mountains to the river’s origin on Redland’s north 
6

JSOU Report 16-2

and west borders. The Green River is navigable to commercial traffic from 

the ocean to just beyond Redville. 

Redland’s climate, terrain, and vegetation are diverse. The mountainous 

north and west is alpine while the hilly midsection around Redville is temperate with humid summers and cool winters. The port city of Greenville, 

found at the mouth of the Green River, is warm and humid year-round. The 

terrain in Greenville Province and around the mouth of the Green River is 

mainly swamp, jungle, and farmland. 

Redland’s mountainous borders on its north and west are impassible 

in the winter and with the exception of a few roads, are passable only by 

foot or pack animals in the summer. Redland’s eastern coast is populated 

by numerous small and medium-sized fishing villages. Redland’s southern 

boundary is marked by mostly heavy forest and numerous major and minor 

roads leading into the neighboring country Orangeland. 

Ethnography and demographics. Redland is composed of two major ethnic 

groups: the Omegas (thought to be about 55 percent of the population and 

found mainly in the southern and eastern provinces), and the minority 

Alphas (estimated at 35 percent of the population), found mostly in the center 

and in the foothills to the north and west. The ethnic makeup of the population of the capital is thought to resemble that of the country, although no 

formal ethnic census has been conducted in over two decades, when a military coup brought the current governing structure to power. Before the coup, 

ethnic tensions were very rare and Alphas and Omegas lived in every region 

of the country. That is still the case today, but the concentrations in their 

respective regions have increased since the military coup two decades ago.

Of Redland’s 25 million inhabitants, 5 million live in Redville and 3 

million live in Greenville, Redland’s two major cities. About 60 percent of 

Redland’s population lives in mainly agricultural villages, with the majority 

of these peasants belonging to the Omega ethnic group. Redland is economically underdeveloped with recent corruption and economic mismanagement 

causing its per capita income to decline, especially outside Redville.

Government. Two decades ago a military coup, led by Colonel Red of the 

Redland Air Force, overthrew the constitutional monarchy and parliament. 

The junta began its reign with high popular approval, especially among 

ethnic Alphas, which are heavily represented in Redland’s officer corps, 

its business elite, and the government technocratic class. Omegas did have 
7

Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

representation in the early years of the military government. Today, however, there are very few ethnic Omegas in leadership positions in Redland’s 

institutions.

Military governance inevitably led to economic mismanagement, incompetent public administration of civilian functions, a drop in foreign investment, and increasing corruption, which transformed from being a petty 

feature of Redland’s culture to become a major economic disease. Ethnic 

Alphas increasingly carved the shrinking economic pie in their favor and 

embittered disaffected Omegas as they did so.

Five years ago Colonel Red died, leaving his son, a weak and unserious 

man, as his appointed successor. In fact, a fractious and avaricious cabinet, 

composed entirely of Alphas, has attempted with diminishing effect to hold 

the government together. Omegas are left out of governance and much of 

the value-added sectors of the economy; the standard of living in the south 

and east has been in a sharp decline for at least a decade.

Foreign and military policies. Redland’s external policies became sharply 

more aggressive following the military coup. After consolidating its position, Colonel Red’s government greatly strengthened its ties to Blackland, 

a major power and a peer competitor of the United States. Over the past 15 

years, Blackland has provided military and technical advisers to Redland’s 

military forces and military-related industries. With Blackland’s technical 

assistance, Redland has built a small but growing inventory of short- and 

medium-range ballistic missiles. Redland has also managed to acquire a 

world-class integrated air defense system, high-end anti-ship cruise missiles, 

and precision land-attack cruise missiles. Redland began a chemical weapons 

program and has built up militarily useful inventories of nerve agents, which 

it openly tests on animal subjects at a proving ground in the northwest. 

The main mission for Redland’s ground forces is to patrol and defend its 

southern border with Orangeland. Redland’s army backs up its customs and 

border patrol forces and is responsible for the country’s air defense network. 

Redland maintains several combined arms mechanized brigades at a high 

state of readiness which are thought to be capable of short-notice offensive 

operations, at least for potential punitive operations into Orangeland.

Finally, Redland has been contemptuous of several international legal 

norms. Interpol and numerous foreign intelligence services suspect that 

Redland provides safe haven for numerous Islamic terror figures with open 
8

JSOU Report 16-2

international arrest warrants. Redland does not participate in either the 

Missile Technology Control Regime or the Proliferation Security Initiative. 

Finally, although it is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, 

Redland refuses to allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy 

Agency to inspect what is suspected to be a heavy water reactor (capable of 

eventually producing bomb-grade plutonium) under construction at one of 

Redland’s military bases.

The United States lost its diplomatic and human intelligence presence in 

Redland a decade ago, when the government declared the entire U.S. embassy 

staff (in both Redville and Greenville) persona non grata.

Insurgency in Greenville Province

Shortly after Colonel Red’s death, an armed insurgency began to self-organize in Greenville Province. This rebellion featured both urban elements in 

the port city of Greenville and rural components in the agricultural territory elsewhere in the province. Representative guerrilla activities include 

small arms ambushes on police and military convoys in the countryside 

and improvised explosive attacks on police and government facilities in 

Greenville. The responses by government security forces have been harsh 

but disorganized due to low troop morale and the ability of Omega forces 

to occasionally suborn officers in the security forces. On the other side, a 

lack of weapons, supplies, and secure communications equipment is severely 

limiting the potential capacity of the Omega insurgency.

Orangeland

Orangeland is a mid-sized and rapidly growing neighbor south of Redland. 

Orangeland is a successful, if fractious, parliamentary democracy, and has 

pursued a strictly nonaligned diplomatic strategy, coupled with a minimal 

investment in defense forces and supporting institutions. 

The northern provinces of Orangeland (adjacent to Redland) are majority 

ethnic Omega. Until recently, this fact had little bearing on Orangeland’s 

domestic politics. However, the recent deprivations suffered by Omegas in 

Redland have increasingly become an issue in northern Orangeland, with 

pressure building on the Orangeland government to revisit its longstanding 

policy of nonalignment and noninterference. 
9

Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

During a recent crackdown on insurgents in Greenville Province, three 

Orangeland citizens, all Omegas, were arrested and convicted of aiding the 

insurgency, a capital crime in Redland. The Orangeland government eventually traded a Redland intelligence officer it had convicted several years ago 

for the three Orangeland citizens. The Redland intelligence officer returned 

to a hero’s welcome. The three Orangeland Omegas also returned to hero’s 

welcomes in northern Orangeland. Their criticism of their government’s 

failure to support Redland’s Omegas and its seeming indifference to the 

threat posed by Redland sparked an intense debate on national security 

inside Orangeland.

United States’ assessment of a prospective UW campaign in 

Redland

The president of the United States very reluctantly signed the finding that 

authorized the UW campaign in Redland. He did so after concluding that 

all the alternative courses of actions were worse. In a briefing in the White 

House Situation Room, the USSOCOM commander explained to the president and his national security team that the proposed UW campaign inside 

Redland would risk the capture and exposure of U.S. military and intelligence personnel. He also explained that given current technology and techniques, support and sustainment of the UW campaign inside Redland would 

be highly challenging.

The growing menace and instability inside Redland caused the Orangeland government to reexamine its longstanding policies of neutrality and 

noninterference inside Redland. The Orangeland government quietly 

approached the U.S. Government about its concerns. After a lengthy period 

of discussions, the Orangeland government agreed to provide covert and 

nonvisible support to the U.S.’s proposed UW campaign across its northern 

border into Redland’s Greenville Province, the heart of the insurgency. This 

was an important success for USSOF planners. However, the USSOF support 

presence in north Orangeland would necessarily have to be invisible and 

likely small in scale. This ruled out the large conventional combat service 

support presence SOF had grown accustomed to during recent campaigns 

in Central Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere.

The good news for U.S. policymakers and SOF planners was that there 

seemed to be abundant room for expanding the friendly insurgency inside 
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JSOU Report 16-2

Redland. U.S. policymakers, intelligence officials, and SOF commanders 

held meetings with insurgent representatives in the city of North Orange, 

near the Orangeland-Redland border. These meetings established working 

relationships and provided an exchange of information about the status of 

the insurgency, its future plans, and its support requirements. 

After these meetings the guerrilla high command agreed to host a small 

team of USSOF and intelligence personnel, who clandestinely came ashore 

on a remote stretch of Greenville Province’s coastline. There the team linked 

up with an insurgent escort and traveled to a meeting site with the resistance 

movement’s leadership. After touring several guerrilla camps and meeting 

with commanders and soldiers, the SOF team exfiltrated and subsequently 

delivered a positive report to SOF commanders and U.S. policymakers. 

Should the U.S. UW campaign successfully enable a much larger and 

more effective insurgency inside Redland, there seemed to be a reasonably strong prospect of toppling the increasingly unpopular and malignant 

Redland government. That outcome would greatly support U.S. interests. It 

would remove a regime that supported international terrorism and was a 

likely proliferation source of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear 

weapons. Finally, a friendly regime in Redland would presumably curtail 

Blackland’s expanding influence inside the country and the nearby region, 

one of the highest concerns of U.S. policymakers.

Planning a UW campaign inside Redland

U.S. policymakers and SOF planners had concluded that a UW campaign 

in Redland, although risky, offered the best chance of bolstering U.S. interests in the region. An assessment of the prospective campaign’s potential, 

based on numerous meetings with insurgent leaders and an onsite inspection by USSOF and intelligence personnel, delivered a positive report. The 

U.S. Army’s 1st Special Forces Group assigned specific detachments to the 

prospective UW campaign and began focused preparation for the forthcoming mission.

Unfortunately, SOF planners found doctrine for logistically sustaining the 

upcoming distributed UW campaign inside denied territory to be vague and 

superficially brief. Combat service support doctrine as it relates to UW has 

not kept pace with the development of other aspects of UW doctrine.11 United 

States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) has a specialized 
11

Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

organization—the 528th Sustainment Brigade, Special Operations (Airborne) 

(SBSO(A))—designed to provide logistics, medical, and communications 

support to its deployed SOF units.12 However, it has been over four decades 

since the U.S. Government last attempted a significant UW campaign into 

a defended, access-denied area. 

We should assume that commanders and planners in the 528th SBSO(A) 

and the broader SOF community are aware of the unique challenges of such 

a scenario and consider it in their planning. But there are questions about 

whether SOF sustainment units currently have personnel adequately trained 

to conduct nonstandard UW logistics in challenging access-denied environments, and whether these personnel have the experience in planning and 

resourcing UW operations in denied or semi-denied areas.13

The SOF community had long become used to operating alongside 

conventional military forces and their abundant combat service support 

infrastructure. The highly successful UW campaign in Afghanistan in late 

2001 benefited from a relatively secure rear area controlled by the Northern Alliance, which SOF sustainment elements were able to access without 

opposition. As a result, SOF planners have had no recent experience with 

the scenario presented by the upcoming UW operation in Redland. Planners 

at Special Operations Command—Pacific (SOCPAC) and 1st Special Forces 

Group, supported by a permanently assigned liaison team from the 528th 

SBSO(A), concluded that they would have to improvise a logistics sustainment plan, using their own judgment and resources to do so.14

Planning logistics support for a UW campaign in Redland

SOCPAC, 1st Special Forces Group, and Army Special Operations Forces 

(ARSOF) Liaison Elements (ALEs) from the 528th SBSO(A) began their 

logistics planning by referring to Chapter III, Section F (Logistics) of Joint 

Publication (JP) 3-05.1/Unconventional Warfare (Initial draft).15 This doctrinal publication provided a very basic outline for organizing logistics support 

to a UW campaign, but provided little detail or guidance on how to actually 

execute such a sustainment effort.

From JP 3-05.1, the planners were reminded that they would have to 

establish a logistics support operation that would have to execute the following functions:16
12

JSOU Report 16-2

1. Supply chain infrastructure. For supply and equipment items that 

the guerrilla force could not procure from its own indigenous sources 

or through battlefield recovery, SOF planners would have to establish supply chains from product origin (the U.S. or elsewhere) to the 

guerrilla’s base camps.17 One critical link in these chains would be 

intermediate staging facilities in both northern Orangeland and at 

sea. Major considerations regarding supply chain infrastructure would 

include operational security and storage security.

2. Supplies. SOF planners would have to establish several categories of 

supplies, systems for tracking their demand, and systems for tracking their location in the supply chain and for custodial responsibility. Categories would include supplies and equipment required by 

U.S. forces and those required by the guerrillas. Further categories 

would include supplies procured through battlefield recovery, from 

indigenous sources, from U.S. sources, and from third-party sources.18

3. Transportation. The first phase of the transportation problem would 

be the inter-theater shipment of supplies and equipment to intermediate staging facilities. A paramount concern would be techniques and 

procedures for inter-theater shipment that would preserve operational 

security. The second and far more challenging phase would be transportation of supplies and equipment into Redland, which would require 

clandestinely and repeatedly transgressing Redland’s border and its 

access-denial military defenses. The transportation challenge would 

only intensify as the insurgency grew in strength, a fundamental goal 

of the UW campaign plan.19

4. Communications. SOF planners and insurgent forces would need to 

establish a communication network that eventually would span from 

the United States through intermediate points in the chain of command 

and logistics chain and all the way to SOF detachments operating with 

insurgent forces inside Redland. Redland’s relatively sophisticated 

military forces would present a challenge to communication planning; 

planners would have to contend with Redland electronic attack and 

electronic intelligence capabilities.20

5. Medical. Sustaining the insurgency would require increasing the 

quality and quantity of medical support (for humans, pack animals, 
13

Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

and livestock), especially in anticipation of the insurgency’s hoped-for 

growth. Supported medical functions would include preventive care 

(especially for tropical diseases), battlefield care, local aid stations, and 

guerrilla hospitals and convalescent facilities. The medical and transportation plans would also have to account for the rapid evacuation 

of certain casualties out of Redland in order to receive required care.21

6. Financial. SOF will rely heavily on various financial resources to successfully execute a UW campaign. SOF will have to establish procedures for transporting banknotes, informal currencies, barter goods, 

precious commodities, and electronic funds into the proposed UWOA 

for use in procuring supplies and equipment, paying for labor, and 

suborning Redland security forces. Financial arrangements will also 

require procedures for accounting and custody.22

The UW logistics planning and execution cycle

After understanding the six logistics functions they would have to execute, 

the SOF planners at SOCPAC, 1st Special Forces Group, and 528th SBSO(A) 

ALEs concluded that they would have to formulate for themselves a generalized model of UW campaign resupply action, since no such model currently exists in doctrine.23 A six-phase generalized resupply model serves as 

guidance for what the Joint Special Operations Task Force in and around 

Redland will have to execute during the forthcoming UW campaign.24 These 

six phases are:

1. Receive the mission, namely to establish and operate comprehensive 

logistics networks to support SOF and guerrilla forces executing a 

UW campaign in Redland.

2. Conduct a multi-category UW logistics feasibility assessment. This 

phase will be explained in more detail in the next section.

3. Determine nonstandard resupply approaches. The Redland UW campaign will occur in denied territory protected by high-end accessdenial forces and networks. This will require nonstandard resupply 

approaches through the air, by water, over land, and underground in 

order to deliver supplies and equipment to SOF and guerrilla forces 

inside Redland.
14

JSOU Report 16-2

4. Incorporate a coordinated, supporting military deception plan with 

the resupply approach. Deception will be required to access Redland 

and to maintain the secrecy of the campaign.

5. Execute the UW resupply operation.

6. Incorporate feedback into future resupply operations as necessary.

This generalized model of nonstandard UW logistics operations illuminates some of the substantial differences that exist between conventional 

military logistics operations and those in support of UW campaigns. UW 

logistics operations require the assessment of unique factors (explained in the 

next section). UW logistics operations require the application of nonstandard 

resupply techniques (smuggling and tunneling are such examples). Finally, 

UW logistics operations require unique forms of deception that greatly differ 

from those required for conventional operations.

A four-factor UW logistics assessment model

The SOF planners began to assemble their improvised sustainment plan by 

referring to a four-factor UW logistics assessment model. The model’s four 

factors are the security situation in UWOA; the physical environment of 

the UWOA; infrastructure in the UWOA; and the status of the supported 

guerrilla force.25

1. Security situation in the UWOA. The SOCPAC, 1st Special Forces Group, 

and 528th SBSO(A) ALE planners produced a mixed assessment of the security situation in Greenville Province, the heart of the insurgency and the proposed UWOA. On the favorable side of the ledger, planners concluded that 

a large majority of the population in the province either actively supported 

the guerrillas or avoided taking sides. In doing so they did not supply intelligence and support to the government’s security forces. Redland’s police, 

especially in Greenville Province, were mostly inefficient and easily corrupted, factors which the guerrillas used to their advantage. Over a decade 

ago, the late Colonel Red had organized a brutally efficient secret police 

force responsible for internal security. However, owing to fears of a palace 

coup led by the secret police, the current collective leadership of Redland 

has largely disbanded the force, much to the benefit of the guerrillas. As a 
15

Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

result, the insurgency has been able to establish havens for training and rear 

area operations in Greenville Province’s cities and rural areas.

More worrisome for the planners was the high quality of Redland’s border 

security and conventional military forces. Redland possessed an advanced 

and dense integrated air defense system. Its border patrol and customs officials were more efficient and less corrupt than the common police. Redland’s 

navy and coast guard efficiently patrolled Redland’s coast and harbors. 

The UW logistic planners concluded that Redland had a ‘hard shell and 

soft interior.’ It would be difficult and risky to move people, equipment, and 

supplies across Redland’s frontiers, but once inside, the insurgents would be 

able to make good use of the support they thus obtained.

2. Physical environment of the UWOA. The physical geography and climate 

of Greenville Province was mostly favorable to the insurgency. The province’s tropical climate allowed year-round operations while the swamps and 

jungle provided cover for small insurgent bases. The province’s agricultural 

output could also sustain a cadre guerrilla force should a surge in government security activity force the insurgency into deep hiding. That said, a 

monsoon season and periodic cyclones would threaten potential aerial and 

seaborne resupply techniques. 

3. Infrastructure in the UWOA. The infrastructure of Greenville Province—

its road network, seaports, coastline, facilities along the Green River, and its 

airports—on balance were not helpful for the insurgency. Greenville City’s 

seaport and airport were firmly in government hands, with the customs 

officials and inspectors efficient and generally not open to subornation by 

the insurgency. This ruled out these facilities as significant access points for 

supplying the insurgency. There were numerous stretches along the ocean 

coast and along the banks of the Green River where insurgents could recover 

supplies. But surface landing craft would first have to get past naval and coast 

guard patrols to reach these points. Similarly, the SOF planners discovered 

numerous farm fields and open patches of terrain where guerrillas could 

recover supplies delivered by air. But these air deliveries would first have to 

get past Redland’s robust air defenses. 

Finally, the road network in the rural area of Greenville Province was 

sparse. The SOF planners concluded that this on balance favored the government’s security forces. The limited number of roads made it easier for 

the security forces to monitor the movement of the guerrillas. Although the 
16

JSOU Report 16-2

shortage of roads made it more difficult for the government to access the 

province, its helicopter-borne capabilities mitigated this shortfall, a capability the guerrillas completely lacked.

4. Status of the guerrilla force. The status of the insurgent force is the final 

factor in the assessment model. The SOF planning team concluded the insurgency was well organized to accommodate an expansion in its order of battle. 

It enjoyed operating havens inside the province even as access through the 

‘hard shell’ remained a problem. Also notable was the support the insurgency 

enjoyed among the population in northern Orangeland. This could prove 

helpful to supporting the insurgency across Redland’s southern border.

Study of historical U.S. UW campaigns

The SOCPAC, 1st Special Forces Group, and 528th SBSO(A) ALE planners 

then looked to past U.S. UW campaigns in denied areas. A review of historical case studies of logistical support to UW operations inside denied areas 

revealed a universal reliance on aerial delivery of equipment and supplies 

to U.S. adviser teams and the guerrillas they supported.26 The cases studied 

in this historical review included an Office of Strategic Services (OSS) unit 

operating in Burma during World War II; support to an anti-Communist 

partisan unit operating north of the 38th Parallel during the Korean War; 

the Central Intelligence Agency’s support from 1956 to 1974 to an insurgency in Tibet; and support to various anti-Communist resistance forces in 

Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War (1960 to 1975). In all of these cases, 

resistance forces were unable to sustain themselves purely by living off the 

land or through battlefield captures of equipment, weapons, and supplies. In 

all cases, the United States provided support through aerial delivery, usually 

on a large scale.27

In the case of the forthcoming UW campaign in Redland, SOCPAC, 1st 

Special Forces Group, and 528th SBSO(A) ALE planners were very skeptical 

that aerial resupply, at least with current technology and techniques, would 

be a feasible way of supporting and sustaining the planned expansion of 

guerrilla forces in Greenville Province.28 Redland’s integrated air defense 

system seemed to preclude aerial supply to meet the goals of the UW campaign they contemplated. Supply by sea seemed equally problematic due to 

the patrolling efficiency of Redland’s navy and coast guard.
17

Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

That left Redland’s southern border and the employment of nonstandard 

supply techniques across that border, a euphemism for smuggling.29 A modest 

amount of smuggling activity occurred across the border. This smuggling 

activity was limited to mainly illicit consumer goods such as drugs, banned 

media, and consumer items that were in short supply inside Redland due to 

strict price controls. Heretofore there was little history of smuggling weapons and military items through Redland border checkpoints and so there 

remained great uncertainty about whether Redland border inspectors could 

be suborned to accommodate weapons smuggling to the extent that they 

were suborned to permit the smuggling of consumer products.

In summary, SOCPAC, 1st Special Forces Group, and 528th SBSO(A) 

ALE planners faced significant challenges formulating a feasible plan to 

logistically support the planned expansion of the insurgency in Greenville 

Province. Ever since the 1942 behind-the-lines effort conducted by the OSS 

in Burma, United States UW campaigns have heavily relied on aerial delivery of equipment and supplies through airspace that was either uncontested 

or that was dominated by U.S. airpower. Redland’s integrated air defense 

system ensured that would not be the case over Greenville Province, at least 

as it applied to the aircraft technology and techniques available to SOF. 

There were seaborne and riparian approaches into the province. But planners doubted that surface craft would be able to get past Redland’s naval and 

coast guard patrols in the numbers and reliability needed to support the UW 

campaign plan. The U.S. Navy was unwilling to risk its submarines for the 

campaign, and they were unsuited in any case for the sustainment mission. 

That left smuggling across the southern border, an unfamiliar and largely 

untried practice for SOF on the scale that the campaign would require.

USSOCOM, SOCPAC, and 1st Special Forces Group had the other elements of the campaign plan in place. It had assessed the internal prospects 

for the insurgency and found them favorable. Congress had appropriated 

funding for the mission. 1st Group detachments were trained and ready to 

infiltrate Greenville Province to support the expansion of the insurgency. The 

Group Support Battalion, assisted by 528th SBSO(A) ALEs, formed forward 

logistic element teams to support deployed operator detachments from sites 

in northern Orangeland and inside Greenville Province.30 Other U.S. Government agencies were standing by to provide their supporting functions. 

The final barrier to success was logistics tactics and techniques that could 
18

JSOU Report 16-2

clandestinely penetrate Redland’s hard shell, supply and equip the buildup 

of the insurgency, and sustain it across the years of campaigning ahead. 

The SOF units and planners assigned to the campaign would benefit 

from emerging technologies and techniques that could reliably overcome 

the access barriers into Redland, provide sustainment and mobility to distributed SOF and insurgent forces in the UWOA, and reduce their demand 

for outside sustainment, which would ease the burden on whatever logistics 

system emerged from the planning process. 

The remainder of this monograph will discuss emerging technologies 

and techniques that promise to address the logistics and sustainment barriers described in the Redland scenario. The monograph will conclude 

with recommendations for a research and development agenda focused on 

improving the sustainment of SOF distributed operations in access-denied 

environments.
19

Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

2. Technologies and Techniques for 

Delivering Supplies, Equipment, and 

Personnel to Distributed SOF Executing a 

UW Campaign in a Denied Area

Unconventional warfare is distinctive for the challenges it presents to 

logisticians tasked with supporting such an operation in potentially 

non-permissive environments and perhaps on a large scale.31 Logistics systems for conventional military operations are typically designed to function 

within optimized supply chains. Logistics support to UW campaigns, however, is carried out through nonstandard supply networks, the consequence 

of executing clandestine operations in access-denied areas.32

Due to constraints on access to a UWOA and the need to maintain 

secrecy, guerrilla forces and SOF operators supporting a UW campaign will 

be inclined to look first to foraging; battlefield recovery of weapons, ammunition, and supplies; and indigenous sources to supply guerrilla formations.33

Relying on purely internal sources of sustainment reduces the insurgency’s 

dependence on outside provision, mitigates the consequence of a sudden and 

unexpected cutoff of outside support, and reduces the political exposure of 

the United States and its partners who would otherwise have to run higher 

risks in order to support a guerrilla force from the outside. 

These advantages can come at a price, however. A nonstandard logistics 

operation that can move meaningful quantities of supplies and equipment 

across a denied frontier offers the potential of a substantial competitive 

advantage for the guerrilla force and thus an acceleration of its insurgency. 

Such an outside-source logistics capability could tilt the initiative to the 

insurgency and provide it the opportunity to culminate the campaign, a 

prospect it might not otherwise have if it had to depend solely on foraging, 

battlefield recovery, and other internal sources.

Finally, certain items and services—such as high-quality medical 

equipment and supplies, secure communications equipment, night vision 

equipment, certain advanced weapons and optics, and intelligence and 

early warning—may only be available in quantity to the guerrillas from 

a SOF-operated logistics system. These types of items may be critical for 
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JSOU Report 16-2

maintaining the morale of the guerrilla force and for providing the competitive advantages it will require to prevail over government security forces.

SOF planners should thus prepare to establish multi-dimensional and 

multi-modal nonstandard logistics networks for the UW campaigns they 

have been ordered to support.34 The following sections of this chapter will 

examine aerial, seaborne, terrestrial, and subterranean methods of delivering supplies, equipment, and personnel to SOF operators and guerrilla 

forces operating inside an access-denied UWOA. Each of these sections will 

describe current capabilities as they relate to the UW mission requirement 

explained in Chapter 1 and discuss the shortcomings of current techniques 

and technology. The sections will then explain new research, development, 

and engineering approaches that could close gaps between current capabilities and what potential pacing UW missions will require.

Aerial delivery

As with past UW campaigns since 1942, SOF logisticians executing future 

UW campaigns are very likely to rely on aerial delivery as the primary means 

of delivering routine and bulk supplies and equipment to guerrilla forces 

and the SOF operators supporting them. The United States is one of the 

few countries to possess a variety of air power forms with global reach. Air 

power, including various forms of aerial delivery, is a competitive advantage 

possessed by U.S. forces. In addition, U.S. military forces are the leaders in 

low-observable (stealth) technology and the tactics and techniques required 

to penetrate sophisticated air defense systems. As a result, with the exception 

of unusual situations, aerial delivery is likely to be the method that offers the 

greatest resupply capacity, promptness, reliability, and flexibility compared 

to alternatives such as seaborne delivery or smuggling across borders or 

through tunnels (techniques discussed later in this chapter).

Helicopters and their limitations for UW campaigns

Until the recent advent of precision guided parachutes, helicopters have been 

the U.S. military’s most-used technique for bringing supplies and personnel 

into and away from distributed outposts. However, in a scenario where the 

adversary possesses a sophisticated integrated air defense system, we should 

not expect helicopters to be the routine method of sustaining SOF operators and friendly guerrilla forces operating inside an access-denied UWOA. 
21

Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

In such a case, helicopters will have a role for the rare insertion or extraction of personnel. An example of such a rare use of helicopters would be 

emergency evacuations of casualties. But given the importance of such 

instances, it will be critical to avoid overusing the helicopter option for 

routine resupply tasks in order to deny the adversary opportunities to learn 

and adapt his air defense system to countering helicopter operations. SOF 

commanders and logisticians executing a UW support campaign should 

thus develop other methods of cross-border transport in order to preserve 

the helicopter option for truly critical missions.

It is unlikely that cargo helicopters, due to their size, shape, and characteristics inherent to rotary wing aircraft, can be made as stealthy as fixedwing aircraft.35 In addition, stealth is not a yes or no proposition, but a matter 

of degree that air mission planners consider when assessing a particular 

adversary’s air defense capability, and when planning ingress and egress 

routes in and out of hostile airspace.36 Thus the utility of helicopters, including those with reduced signatures, will depend on particular circumstances 

that must account for adversary air defenses in the mission area, surprise, 

the mission’s importance, and the willingness to accept risk. The utility of 

helicopters for the support of UW campaigns can thus vary widely based 

on these and other factors. 

Beginning in 2011, the U.S. Marine Corps began using the K-MAX 

unmanned autonomous cargo helicopter to deliver supplies and equipment 

to distributed combat outposts in Afghanistan. K-MAX can carry 6,000 

pounds of cargo at sea level and 4,000 at 15,000 feet density altitude.37 K-MAX 

unmanned helicopters flew 1,730 resupply sorties for the Marine Corps in 

Afghanistan, delivering four million pounds of cargo.38

We should expect all of the services to continue developing unmanned 

aerial systems (UAS) technology, including more capable successors to 

K-MAX. USSOCOM logistics planners should monitor these developments 

and look for applications to distributed UW operations. However, unmanned 

autonomous cargo helicopters still possess roughly the same signature problems and vulnerabilities as manned versions. Although there would not be 

a risk to a flight crew with such a UAS, high signature systems, manned or 

unmanned, may not be a clandestine, reliable, or affordable delivery method 

to forces operating inside an access-denied UWOA. 

As a planning rule, SOF commanders and logisticians should prepare 

other transport means for routine deliveries of bulk supplies and equipment, 
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JSOU Report 16-2

and reserve helicopters for only the most critical and emergency missions 

involving (generally) the evacuation of personnel from access-denied 

UWOAs.

SOF fixed-wing aircraft and their limitations for UW 

campaigns

Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) operates several fixedwing aircraft types with missions to support SOF in high-threat or accessdenied areas. The MC-130J Commando II aircraft is a variant of the C-130 

cargo and troop transport aircraft and is modified to perform special operations missions. According to its U.S. Air Force fact sheet, the MC-130J:

flies clandestine, or low visibility, single or multiship, low-level air 

refueling missions for special operations helicopters and tiltrotor aircraft, and infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply of special 

operations forces (SOF) by airdrop or airland intruding politically 

sensitive or hostile territories.39

The MC-130J will achieve covert infiltration and exfiltration from 

defended airspace by flying at night and at low altitudes, using terrain to 

Figure 1. U.S. Marines with Combat Logistics Battalion 5 return from familiarizing themselves with the downward thrust of a K-MAX unmanned aerial 

vehicle during initial testing in Helmand province, Afghanistan. 

Source: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Corporal Lisa Tourtelot
23

Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

mask adversary radar coverage. The MC-130J’s ability to safely fly at low levels 

at night and in bad weather will be enhanced after these aircraft receive new 

terrain-following/terrain-avoidance radar, which has yet to be installed on 

this variant.40 When it is fully capable, the MC-130J (along with its MC-130 

predecessors) will be able to deliver 42,000 pounds of payload or dozens of 

personnel to ongoing special operations missions and exfiltrate battlefield 

casualties and personnel from expeditionary air strips.

AFSOC also operates the CV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft. The CV-22 combines vertical takeoff and landing with the long range, fuel efficiency, and 

speed of fixed-wing turboprop aircraft. According to its U.S. Air Force fact 

sheet, the CV-22 is:

equipped with integrated threat countermeasures, terrain-following 

radar, forward-looking infrared sensor and other advanced avionics 

systems that allow it to operate at low altitude in adverse weather 

conditions and medium- to high-threat environments.41

The CV-22 can deliver up to 32 personnel or 10,000 pounds of cargo, and 

exfiltrate battlefield casualties without the need for an air strip on which to 

land.

These two aircraft are likely the most capable cargo aircraft in AFSOC’s 

inventory for supporting distributed SOF operators executing a UW campaign inside an access-denied UWOA. With their advanced night vision 

equipment, avionics, navigation tools, terrain-following/terrain-avoidance 

radar, advanced communications equipment, defensive sensors, and other 

features, they are the best equipped U.S. cargo aircraft to infiltrate and 

exfiltrate from heavily defended airspace. However, such missions, when 

repeated, will become increasingly risky as adversary air defense forces inevitably adapt to their operations. As with helicopter usage, SOF commanders 

and logistics planners will likely tightly ration the employment of these 

fixed-wing capabilities in a prospective UW campaign against an adversary 

possessing a capable integrated air defense system. AFSOC’s fixed-wing/

tiltrotor resupply assets will be a highly important benefit for a UW campaign. But SOF logisticians should not plan on relying on these capabilities 

for routine resupply into a denied UWOA. SOF logisticians should plan on 

reserving these capabilities for the most critical and infrequent situations 

that occur during the course of a long UW campaign.
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JSOU Report 16-2

Precision delivery of supplies by parachute

Experience derived from the first few years of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan (October 2001 to December 2014) indicated the 

need for a much better method of delivering supplies and equipment to the 

growing number of coalition outposts in that country. Parachute airdrops of 

humanitarian aid and supplies to Afghan citizens occurred on the very first 

night of the war.42 But OEF soon faced numerous logistics challenges. Many 

combat outposts were eventually established on steep and remote terrain that 

was in most cases either inaccessible to surface transport or located in ways 

that made supply convoys highly vulnerable to enemy attack. A shortage of 

helicopters greatly hampered the logistics effort. Unguided parachute airdrops were employed in the early years of OEF, but the results were deemed 

unacceptable to ground warfighters.43

The solution was the Joint Precision Airdrop System (JPADS), which 

became a Rapid Combat Fielding Initiative program in 2004, managed by the 

U.S. Army Natick Soldier Research, Development, and Engineering (RD&E) 

Center’s Aerial Delivery Directorate.44 JPADS employs a steerable parachute 

canopy, an attached airborne guidance unit that receives global positioning system (GPS) telemetry, electro-mechanical steering actuators to guide 

the canopy, and a mission planning kit to program the rig where to land.45 

The result is the capacity to airdrop cargo bundles of varying sizes (from 10 

pounds to 42,000 pounds) from as high as 25,000 feet mean sea level and 

20 miles horizontally from the target, and deliver these bundles precisely 

to soldiers in the field.46 The accuracy experience of JPADS with a standard 

2,000 pound load is 80 percent of such attempts land within 80 meters of 

the target.47

JPADS made its combat debut in Afghanistan in August 2006.48 It proved 

critical to supplying numerous combat outposts in Afghanistan. Before U.S. 

Army planners fully realized the high utility of the JPADS concept, they 

expected that a purchase of 5,300 units would satisfy Army needs for 20 

years. Instead, in 2011 the Army was purchasing a JPADS variant (the Low 

Velocity-Low Cost Aerial Delivery System) at a rate of 10,000 units per month 

in order to sustain over 29,000 soldiers at 42 forward operating bases in 

Afghanistan.49 In 2011, over 85 million pounds of cargo were delivered by 

precision parachute airdrop in Afghanistan.50
25

Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

Research to improve the JPADS concept continues. Planned refinements 

to the concept include further improvement in accuracy (rooftop landings to 

be regularly achieved by 2020), reduced costs for JPADS units, and reducing 

or eliminating the reliance on GPS telemetry for aerial delivery operations 

in denied areas.51

Using stealthy aircraft for JPADS delivery in denied areas

Executing aerial delivery through sophisticated adversary air defenses will 

require SOF logisticians, the joint force, and contractors to adapt aerial delivery packaging for low-observable aircraft such as the F-35 A/B/C (operated 

by the U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, respectively) and the B-2A 

operated by the U.S. Air Force.52 These aircraft have been designed to penetrate and operate inside adversary air defense systems in order to precisely 

deliver numerous ordnance types on a variety of targets. Aerial delivery of 

supplies should be added to this list of missions and capabilities for these 

strike aircraft. 

Figure 2. A JPADS guides itself to the ground following its drop from a C-130 

aircraft at Normandy Drop Zone in Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Source: U.S. 

Army photo by Sergeant Amanda Tucker
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JSOU Report 16-2

The U.S. Air Force’s F-35A has two internal weapon bays, each of which 

can carry one 2,000-pound GBU-31 guided bomb (weapons must be carried 

only in the internal bays in order for the F-35 to retain its low radar observable characteristic).53, 54 Alternatively, the F-35A will be able to carry four 

GBU-39B small diameter bomb units in each of the two weapons bays. The 

GBU-39B is a 250-pound weapon.55 The U.S. Air Force’s B-2A long-range 

stealth bomber can deliver 16 GBU-31s or 80 GBU-38s.56 These two stealthy 

strike aircraft are platforms USSOCOM and its service and contractor partners could seek to employ as a delivery method for resupply missions inside 

areas defended by high-end integrated air defense systems.

As discussed above, the 2,000-pound air delivery bundle became the 

most frequent JPADS size employed during parachute resupply operations in 

Iraq and Afghanistan. To make use of the F-35 and B-2 aircraft for resupply 

through air defense systems, designers would have to fabricate a safe, highly 

reliable, and balanced casing that could mate to the weapon deployment 

hardware and software in the two aircraft. The casings would also have to 

support the parachute equipment and deployment method associated with 

JPADS. The Air Force has long experience with this particular requirement 

since its nuclear gravity bombs (including the B61-11, still in the inventory) 

have for decades been equipped with parachutes to slow their descent after 

release.57

The result of this development effort would be a container that could be 

deployed from F-35 and B-2 aircraft inside an adversary air defense system. 

The container would use JPADS to deliver the cargo precisely to friendly 

forces on the ground. Engineers should develop 2,000-, 500-, and 250-pound 

containers resembling the GBU-31, GBU-38, and GBU-39B sizes of bomb 

casings. With this variety of container sizes, one aircraft sortie could deliver 

resupply containers to several distributed SOF elements operating with guerrilla forces across a UWOA. 

Engineers would face several challenges implementing this concept. The 

JPADS-adapted parachute system would have to meet the high safety standards aircraft operators would demand for cargo deployed from the weapon 

bays of very high-value aircraft. Logisticians would have to learn how to 

properly load these containers in a manner that meets weight and balance 

and safety requirements. Finally, UW logisticians would have to take into 

account the environmental extremes (such as air temperature and pressure) 

that such cargo would have to endure during flight and deployment. 
27

Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

Low-observable aircraft with small radar signatures are not invisible to 

radar. But small radar cross sections increase the difficulty for air defense 

systems to reliably engage such aircraft when the attacking stealthy aircraft 

crews properly plan their routes. For a UW campaign, the adversary government would likely know that the U.S. Government was employing stealthy 

aircraft to deliver supplies; U.S. policymakers would have to be prepared if 

the adversary government publicly raised objections. 

But in spite of these challenges, aerial delivery from stealthy aircraft such 

as the F-35 and B-2 offers the potential of a flexible, prompt, reliable, and 

high-volume resupply delivery channel to distributed SOF supporting a UW 

campaign inside a denied area.

Using micro unmanned aerial vehicles to deliver supplies

Very small unmanned aircraft, applied with scale, have the potential to 

clandestinely deliver low-weight, high-value supplies and equipment across 

defended borders. For decades, recreational hobbyists have flown radiocontrolled small model aircraft. These aircraft have been powered by small 

liquid-fueled or battery-powered motors. Using such aircraft to deliver illicit 

supplies across a defended border would not be a new development; drug 

smugglers in Mexico have employed micro unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 

to deliver contraband cargo across the U.S. southwestern border.58

Commercially available and off-the-shelf hobbyist micro UAVs can easily 

be fitted with auto-pilot systems directed by GPS signals. The unit cost of 

such a micro UAV would range from $500 to $1,000. Given their size and 

composition, these micro UAVs would be difficult for air defense radars to 

detect. They could be vulnerable to small arms fire, but resupply operations 

could take place at night using remote egress routes.59

Current micro UAVs are capable of delivering one kilogram (2.2 pounds) 

at a delivery radius of 30 kilometers. New micro UAVs will soon be available 

that will deliver two kilograms to points 50 kilometers distant. These are 

admittedly small loads per aircraft. But given the low unit cost of the aircraft, it is feasible to scale up the delivery effort into a micro UAV ‘conveyer.’ 

Logisticians could organize the launch and recovery of up to 200 aircraft 

during one night, which would deliver over 400 pounds of cargo to one or 

more destinations inside a UWOA.60
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JSOU Report 16-2

The micro UAV concept could be employed on a small scale to deliver 

high-value items such as medical supplies, vaccines, cash, and water purification equipment. On a larger scale, the concept could deliver routine supply 

classes to combat outposts, patrols, and remote guerrilla and SOF operator 

sites. Although preparing 200 micro UAVs for a night mission would be a 

tedious task and would risk creating an unfavorable signature in the host 

country, spreading the load among that many delivery vehicles would mitigate the risks when delivery aircraft are lost to malfunction or enemy action. 

In sum, micro UAVs are another affordable and practical method for 

delivering some classes of supplies and equipment across a defended frontier. Improving electronics, batteries, and small motors now make it feasible to fashion and employ very small unmanned systems as cargo delivery 

aircraft. This will provide one more tool for SOF logisticians to consider 

when designing a nonstandard logistics system to support UW campaigns 

in access-denied areas.

Seaborne delivery of supplies and equipment to a denied 

UWOA

Throughout history, cargo ships have been used to deliver supplies, equipment, and personnel to war zones to support military campaigns. However, 

in the case of a UW campaign occurring in an access-denied area, traditional maritime shipping techniques are unlikely to be suitable. Against an 

adversary with significant naval power, maritime surveillance capability, and 

coastal patrol and defense capacity, even the delivery of supplies by small 

vessels at night to remote coastlines may not be feasible. Even so, seaborne 

approaches offer the potential for delivering substantial amounts of supplies 

to SOF operators and guerrilla forces. Innovative techniques may be able to 

exploit this potential.

SOF logisticians should develop the concept of using small unmanned 

autonomous submarines to deliver supplies to SOF operators and friendly 

guerrilla forces operating inside a denied zone. These undersea vehicles could 

be deployed in international waters by Navy or leased commercial ships (or 

by parachute from cargo aircraft). They would then autonomously sail to a 

preset destination to rendezvous with SOF operators and guerrilla forces. 

After delivery of the cargo, the unmanned undersea vehicle (UUV) would 

return to a preset point in international waters for recovery and reuse. 
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Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

The U.S. Navy is developing UUVs for missions centered mainly on 

reconnaissance and expanding maritime domain awareness. UUVs will also 

be increasingly used for dangerous missions such as countering adversary 

naval mines. As with unmanned vehicles in other domains, the Navy foresees 

using unmanned vehicles for “dull, dirty, dangerous, and distant” operations, freeing up manned platforms to perform higher-complexity missions.61

Logistics operations are almost never mentioned as possible roles for UUVs. 

In its unclassified “U.S. Navy Program Guide 2015,” the U.S. Navy 

describes two UUV programs. The first program is the Large Displacement 

Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (LDUUV), which the Navy is developing 

to achieve “robust, long endurance, persistent, multi-mission, unmanned 

undersea vehicle capability for the Navy,” presumably for a variety of reconnaissance, anti-submarine, and counter-mine missions. The LDUUV is still 

under development with fielding expected by 2022.62

A possible example of the LDUUV concept might include the Proteus 

mini-submarine developed by Huntington Ingalls Industries. In unmanned 

autonomous mode the Proteus mini-sub can deliver 3,600 pounds of cargo 

to a destination 350 nautical miles distant at a speed of 10 knots and a depth 

Figure 3. Members of Submarine Development Squadron Detachment 5 

(SUBDEVRON 5 Det.) Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV), Keyport Undersea Warfare Center, and Penn State University lower SUBDEVRON 5 Det. 

UUV’s first UUV LTV-38 into the water to conduct its first in-water training. 

Source: U.S. Navy photo by Breanna Zinter
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JSOU Report 16-2

of up to 200 feet. Proteus has 170 cubic feet of cargo space, enough for six 

swimmers, thus providing an infiltration and exfiltration option from a 

UWOA for SOF operators.63

A second Navy program is the Littoral Battlespace Sensing-Unmanned 

Undersea Vehicles (LBS-UUV). These vehicles comprise both long-endurance buoyancy-powered undersea gliders and electrically powered UUVs. 

The missions of the LBS-UUVs include oceanography, anti-submarine operations, mine countermeasures, expeditionary operations, naval special warfare planning and execution, and persistent intelligence preparation of the 

environment. The LBS-UUV set of vehicles is operational at several overseas 

locations.64 These UUVs in service may be candidates for adaptation as cargo 

carriers for UW sustainment.

There are several additional UUVs that have been developed in the private 

sector. Commercial firms such as oil exploration and telecommunication 

companies need advanced and persistent access to their undersea assets. As 

mentioned above, utilizing commercial technology could contain development costs, speed acquisition of needed capabilities, and provide plausible 

deniability for clandestine operations. The Bluefin UUV, developed by the 

Battelle Company, is a large autonomous UUV being developed for both 

military and commercial applications. In September 2013, a Bluefin UUV 

prototype autonomously sailed underwater from Boston Harbor to New York 

Harbor, a distance of over 500 miles, in 109 hours.65 There are similarities 

between this achievement and a mission a SOF logistician might assign to 

a cargo delivery UUV.

We can thus see that UUV technology has advanced to the point where 

cargo delivery by such vehicles to SOF supporting UW campaigns could 

become a feasible operational concept. USSOCOM should partner with the 

Navy and outside contractors to develop this concept and deliver the capability to SOF planners and logisticians.

Overland and subterranean delivery of supplies and equipment to a UWOA

SOF and guerrilla forces will likely have to establish and use terrestrial and 

subterranean cross-border channels to move supplies and equipment into 

a UWOA, and to infiltrate and exfiltrate personnel from the campaign. 

For a UW campaign against an adversary with robust border defenses and 
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Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

access-denial capabilities, the terrestrial and subterranean movement of 

supplies, equipment, and personnel will essentially constitute smuggling, 

an ancient art dating back thousands of years. 

The employment of pack animals across unpatrolled portions of borders, 

along with cash and in-kind payments (bribes) to border security personnel, 

might be the most ancient smuggling techniques of all, and will undoubtedly need to be employed by SOF and guerrilla forces in a future prospective 

UW campaign.66 However, SOF UW logistics planners should examine several emerging technologies that could be useful in exploiting terrestrial and 

subterranean movement opportunities. These technologies include additive 

manufacturing or 3-D printing; the manipulation of adversary databases 

through cyber intrusion; and the development of an expeditionary tunneling 

capability. The following sections will discuss these approaches.

Using 3-D printing to support smuggling

In situations where the use of pack animals is not practical or provides 

insufficient capacity, UW logisticians will usually have to employ cars and 

trucks to smuggle cargo across borders. That in turn will almost certainly 

require concealment preparation of the vehicle prior to attempting a crossing 

through a controlled border checkpoint. In order to conceal illicit cargo on 

vehicles, smugglers have long used false compartments to hide cargo from 

border security personnel.67

Additive manufacturing, or 3-D printing, can greatly ease the task of 

fabricating customized panels, containers, concealment vessels, and other 

such modifications to vehicles in order to hide cargo from border inspectors. 

Examples of such modifications include car and truck batteries with most of 

the cells removed to free up space for contraband and fuel tanks similarly 

subdivided with panels to conceal illicit cargo.68 Logisticians employing 

vehicles to smuggle cargo through border checkpoints will likely have to 

use a wide variety of vehicle types during a campaign; improvisation rather 

than standardization will likely be the norm. For this reason, a 3-D printer’s 

ability to fabricate one-off customized parts will be a valuable feature for 

such a line of effort.

SOF UW logisticians located at an intermediate logistics point on the 

friendly side of the border could use 3-D printing equipment to fabricate 

concealment parts that would be customized for each vehicle and transport 
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JSOU Report 16-2

mission requirement. The use of 3-D printing technology would allow logisticians to quickly and easily prepare numerous vehicles for customized mission requirements. 3-D printing is an increasingly ubiquitous technology, a 

characteristic that would support plausible deniability for those inevitable 

occasions when border security personnel uncover a smuggling attempt. 

Finally, 3-D printing could be used to create license plates, passport covers, 

false documents, and spare parts supporting the UW logistics line of effort.69

Using cyber intrusion techniques to manipulate adversary 

security databases

It is becoming standard for national security forces to employ biometric data, 

collected in databases available to security personnel at border crossings and 

points of entry, to reliably verify the identities of people attempting to enter 

their countries. For example, the U.S. Government requires visitors to the 

United States to submit 10 fingerprints during pre-travel visa interviews. 

These fingerprints enter a permanent database that U.S. Customs and Border 

Protection personnel later access when a person appears at a U.S. point of 

entry.70 Other biometric information now commonly used includes computerized facial recognition and scans of irises.71

The use of biometric databases by border security personnel will greatly 

reduce the ability of people attempting to illicitly cross through border 

checkpoints through the use of forged travel documents and disguises.72 

This development will have deleterious implications for SOF logisticians and 

guerrillas who are attempting to smuggle supplies, equipment, and personnel 

through hostile and controlled border crossing. Prospective smugglers who 

cannot obtain prior clearance in a target country’s biometric database may 

find it difficult or impossible to obtain low risk access through controlled 

points of entry. In the past, smugglers used forged documents, disguises, and 

bribes to obtain access. But biometric databases threaten to greatly reduce 

the utility of at least forged documents and disguises.

Cyber intrusion capabilities may in some cases offer a solution to this 

problem. In this case, DOD or other U.S. Government cyber forces would 

clandestinely access the target country’s border security databases and create 

approved files for prospective SOF, other government agency, and guerrilla 

border crossers. These files would include the required biometric data that 

border security personnel will collect at the point of entry to compare to the 
33

Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

approved database. When successful, this use of clandestine cyber intrusion 

will facilitate the movement of SOF operators, other government personnel, 

and friendly guerrilla personnel through border checkpoints, along with 

concealed supplies and equipment they may be transporting in vehicles.

Subterranean supply channels into access-denied UWOAs

Highly sophisticated tunnels are increasingly used by non-state military 

forces and transnational criminal organizations as techniques to move supplies, equipment, and personnel. Tunnels should also be useful for sustaining 

UW campaigns across defended frontiers.73 In 1990, U.S. border security personnel discovered the first tunnel constructed and employed by drug cartels 

across the southwest border. Through 2011, security personnel exposed 154 

illegal tunnels across the U.S. frontier.74 How many were constructed during 

this period or are still in use is unknown, but is likely substantial.

One tunnel revealed in San Diego in 2010 was 2,200 feet long at 90 feet 

below the surface and featured shoring, electricity, ventilation, and a rail 

track. The tunnel began in a kitchen in a house in Tijuana, Mexico, and 

terminated in a warehouse in Otay Mesa, California. This particular tunnel 

likely took one year and $1 million to construct.75

In the Middle East, the non-state military group Hamas at one time possessed over 500 tunnels spanning the Egyptian and Israeli borders, including 

Figure 4. Seized drugs from a sophisticated smuggling tunnel from Tijuana, 

Mexico to Otay Mesa, California. Source: U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement
34

JSOU Report 16-2

one tunnel that was 1.5 miles long, 66 feet deep, and cost $10 million to construct.76 Although they can be expensive to build, border security personnel 

will find it difficult to discover all the tunnels crossing under a border; deep 

tunnels are not vulnerable to discovery by ground-penetrating radar, which 

can peer only a few feet down.77

SOF logisticians should work with U.S. Army engineering elements and 

outside contractors to develop an expeditionary tunneling capability. An 

example of an expeditionary effort to rapidly drill a deep tunnel was the 2010 

rescue of 33 Chilean miners who became trapped underground after a partial 

cave-in occurred. Arizona-based International Drilling Services (IDS) was 

called in to quickly drill a targeted, directional tunnel 28 inches wide from 

the surface to the mine workshop where the miners were gathered 2,300 feet 

below the surface. IDS achieved this objective in 53 days.78

The expeditionary tunnel IDS drilled for the Chilean mine rescue roughly 

approximates the width and length that would be useful for moving supply 

bundles and small or disassembled equipment across a defended border 

into a UWOA. As a lateral resupply tunnel, an expeditionary tunneling 

system should include the installation of shoring as the drilling advances, 

the construction of a rail track and winch-driven pull-cable to facilitate the 

movement of bundles, and a pump system to evacuate water. The system 

should be designed to permit drilling, tunnel system installation, and the 

removal of soil, all performed from a concealed position inside a building on 

the friendly side of the border. And of course the tunnel should terminate at 

a pre-designated point under the reliable control of guerrilla forces.

Once in operation, such a tunnel would permit the movement of large 

quantities of supplies and equipment. Indeed the limiting factor for guerrilla 

sustainment would not likely be the throughput capacity of the tunnel but 

rather the guerrilla force’s ability to further move and distribute received 

supplies without creating a signature at and around the tunnel terminus. 

SOF logisticians and the guerrilla force would thus have an interest in 

constructing as many tunnels as would be practical. Numerous tunnels 

would ease distribution signature problems in the UWOA. And it would 

diversify the risk of occasional but inevitable discovery of tunnels by hostile 

security forces. We should conclude that expeditionary tunneling promises 

to be an effective additional tactic for supplying SOF operators and guerrillas 

executing a UW campaign.
35

Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

Conclusion

U.S. policymakers and military planners should not conclude that sophisticated adversary anti-access forces automatically rule out the prospect of 

supporting friendly guerrilla forces opposing that adversary regime. As we 

have seen in this chapter, there are viable aerial, seaborne, overland, and 

subterranean delivery channels that SOF logisticians could exploit to support a UW campaign inside an access-denied area.

If any further evidence is needed that logistics support to guerrillas operating inside an access-denied UWOA is feasible, one need only consider the 

ongoing problems the U.S. Government endures as it attempts, with mixed 

results, to maintain the security of its borders. In spite of large and growing 

border security forces, budgets totaling tens of billions of dollars annually, 

and the employment of the most advanced technologies, every year transnational criminal organizations and petty smugglers are able to transport 

thousands of illegal migrants and thousands of tons of illicit cargo into the 

United States. Persistence, ingenuity, and perhaps structural advantages 

favoring the offense are in this case able to offset the well-funded efforts of 

U.S. border security agencies. 

SOF logisticians charged with supporting a UW campaign inside an 

access-denied area can similarly take advantage of persistence, ingenuity, the 

structural advantages accruing to the offense, and a multiplicity of options 

available to deliver support to guerrilla forces. The final chapter of this monograph will discuss organizational reforms and a research and development 

agenda that will prepare SOF for the types of challenges a ‘pacing’ UW 

campaign would present.

37

Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

3. Technologies and Techniques for 

Reducing the Logistics Demand of SOF 

Distributed Operations

Chapter 2 discussed the variety of channels—aerial, seaborne, terrestrial, 

and subterranean—by which SOF logisticians could provide supplies 

and equipment to SOF operators and guerrilla forces, and also move personnel in and out of a UWOA. The feasibility of each of these potential channels 

and the capacity of each will depend on the particular circumstances defined 

by the security situation in the UWOA (the threat posed by the adversary 

government’s security forces), the physical environment of the UWOA, the 

state of the infrastructure in the UWOA, and the status of the guerrilla 

force.79 The influence of these factors will determine the adequacy of the 

planned logistics operation for the prospective UW campaign.

But even when such resupply capacity is adequate at one moment during 

the campaign, such logistics channels are bound to be fragile. Enemy action, 

security breaches, and environmental effects can quickly degrade what were 

once adequate or even robust resupply channels. A guerrilla force that has 

become highly dependent on outside sources of supplies and equipment 

risks finding itself cut off and vulnerable should such a reverse in external 

resupply capacity suddenly occur.

It will thus always be desirable for SOF planners and guerrilla commanders to mitigate this risk by carefully monitoring the insurgency’s external 

dependency level, categorized by supply class. As mentioned in Chapter 

2, guerrilla exploitation of foraging, battlefield recovery, and other indigenous sources will reduce dependency on outside SOF-supplied items. On the 

other hand, it is likely that certain items that will be important to deployed 

SOF operators and the guerrilla force will need to be substantially supplied 

through the external SOF-organized nonstandard logistics channels and 

networks. Regarding these items, SOF operators and the guerrilla force can 

reduce risks to the insurgency by taking active measures to minimize their 

consumption, and thus reduce demands on the external logistics networks. 

This will reduce external dependency, reduce risk, and increase the likelihood of the insurgency’s success.
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JSOU Report 16-2

This chapter will examine some emerging technologies and techniques 

that offer the prospect of reducing the consumption of a variety of supply 

classes by deployed SOF operators and guerrilla forces, with a goal of reducing demand pressure on a nonstandard UW supply system. This chapter will 

also describe emerging technologies that could allow deployed SOF operators 

and guerrilla forces the ability to fabricate several classes of supplies in the 

UWOA, thus satisfying at least some logistics requirements at the point of 

need. When developed and successfully employed, these technologies and 

techniques will increase the combat capacity of a guerrilla force, reduce its 

risk exposure to external sustainment, and thus increase the probability of 

a UW campaign’s success.

Reducing demand for electrical power and batteries

SOF operators deployed to a UWOA in support of a friendly guerrilla force 

will require electrical power to execute their mission. These operators will 

deploy with radios, night vision equipment, navigation tools, small computers, lighting, and other devices that will require batteries, which run down 

and thus require replacement or recharging. If batteries are recharged from 

generators, those generators will require fuel, lubricants, and spare parts to 

remain in service during an extended campaign.

The supported guerrilla force will also have a requirement for electrical 

power and batteries, especially if it hopes to become competitive with the 

hostile government’s military and security forces, which are likely to enjoy 

advantages in funding, technology, equipment, and training. Increasing 

the military competence of the guerrilla force will likely require improving 

the command and control of its combat forces in the field. That in turn will 

very likely require the acquisition and fielding of secure tactical communication equipment, which in turn will require electrical power and batteries. 

Guerrilla forces will increase their combat effectiveness when they are able 

to maneuver reliably and confidently (through the use of GPS navigation 

devices) and at night and in poor visibility (using night vision devices and 

other powered optics). Finally, command and staff elements of the guerrilla 

force could improve their efficiency through the use of small computers. All 

of these improvements will require electricity sources and batteries.

SOF operators and the guerrilla force will benefit greatly from locally 

based and generated electrical power sources that reduce the dependency 
39

Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

on the external SOF-managed logistics network. The remainder of this section will discuss emerging technologies and techniques for generating and 

storing electrical power in the field and at the point of need, thus reducing 

the demand placed on the nonstandard logistics networks supporting the 

UW campaign.

Expanding the use of photovoltaic cells for electrical power 

generation

U.S. expeditionary forces in Afghanistan made increasing use of solar power 

and photovoltaic (PV) cells at various forward operating bases. As early as 

2011, two forward operating bases in Afghanistan were entirely powered 

by solar energy, with several others receiving at least 90 percent of their 

electrical power from this source.80 Solar panels and associated batteries at 

these bases powered large computer networks and lighting arrays during the 

night. The increasing use of solar power devices and technology has already 

reduced logistics system demand for conventional forces, a trend that will 

grow in the future. 

SOF operators executing distributed UW operations can also employ 

these techniques at the detachment level and in support of guerrilla forces. 

New PV products under development at the U.S. Army Natick Soldier RD&E 

Center’s Expeditionary Basing and Collective Protection Directorate can 

apply directly to such a distributed UW campaign.

One such product is the PowerShade, a 22-foot by 40-foot flexible and 

foldable pole-supported shade that has PV cells woven into its fabric. This 

product serves two purposes: it provides shade to soldiers in the field while 

also generating two kilowatts of electrical power (in context, a laptop computer consumes 0.05 kilowatts-hours per hour; lighting a typical room 

consumes 0.1 kilowatt-hours per hour).81 The PowerShade is simple to use, 

requires minimal maintenance, and comes with the equipment to convert 

the PV energy to standard 120 volt alternating current.82

SOF operators can direct the electrical output from the PowerShade to a 

variety of small battery charging adapters also developed by Natick and outside contractors. These battery charging adapters connect to the BB2590 and 

BB390 rechargeable lithium-ion batteries, which are the standard batteries 

for a wide variety of U.S. military tactical radios and other field equipment.83

In addition to the PowerShade, the size and power of which is appropriate for 
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JSOU Report 16-2

a SOF detachment at a small expeditionary camp, Natick has also developed 

small, foldable, and man-portable PV arrays suitable for recharging requirements on foot-mobile operations.84

Further improvements of PV cells are under development. These emerging PV cells will have two features that will be important for SOF distributed operations. First, Natick engineers are greatly increasing the physical 

flexibility of PV cells with the goal of incorporating these flexible cells into 

fabrics like a tarpaulin that can be bent and shaped around other objects. 

Second, Natick engineers are colorizing PV cells in order to camouflage 

their appearance. Such flexible and colorized PV fabrics offer the potential 

to provide at least four simultaneous benefits to SOF operators: shade, protection from wind and rain, camouflage, and electrical power generation.85

Improved expeditionary storage batteries

Maximizing the benefits of solar power and PV cells for small SOF 

detachments operating in mobile or distributed forward sites will require 

Figure 5. Marine Corps solar energy equipment undergoing testing at Marine 

Corps Air Ground Combat Center, Twentynine Palms, California. 

Source: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Corporal Michael Nerl
41

Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

improvements to base electrical storage and centralized battery arrays. Tesla 

Motors, known for its high-end electric-powered sports car, is introducing 

the Powerwall home battery. Powerwall is a rechargeable lithium-ion battery 

fashioned as a decorative panel able to be hung on a wall. The highest-end 

version of Powerwall can deliver 10 kilowatts of electrical power during the 

night when PV cells don’t produce electricity. Nine such panels can be linked 

together to produce a larger panel with 90 kilowatts of capacity. Powerwall 

is a residential consumer product (price $3,000-3,500) and not suited for 

military use. But it is likely technically feasible to reengineer the Powerwall 

technology to make it rugged enough for expeditionary field use and employable either by foot-mobile teams or at small operating bases.

When used in conjunction with products such as PowerShade, such a 

combination could be especially appropriate for small SOF detachments 

conducting distributed operations such as a UW campaign.86 Detachments 

possessing such a small but powerful central electrical storage device could 

use PV cells to charge the unit by day and harvest its charge during the night, 

for lighting and small computers or to recharge smaller batteries used in 

radios, night vision devices, GPS receivers, optics, etc. Improved and more 

efficient PV cells and storage batteries at small distributed forward bases will 

allow SOF operators and guerrilla forces the ability to conduct sophisticated 

combat operations day and night; with reduced or even zero dependence on 

a nonstandard SOF logistics network for a continuous supply of batteries 

and diesel fuel for generators.

High-powered and long-lasting batteries powered by 

radionuclide decay sources

Recent experience in Afghanistan and Iraq shows that U.S. infantrymen 

and SOF operators have routinely been required to carry loads exceeding 

100 pounds, with batteries and power packs accounting for 20 to 30 percent 

of these loads.87 Batteries currently used by small unit military forces produce power through electrochemical reactions, a longstanding technique 

considered safe and reliable. However, such batteries suffer from very low 

energy density and the laws of chemistry and physics hold out little hope of 

dramatic improvements in their efficiency.

By contrast, batteries powered by radionuclide decay generate an energy 

density over a million times greater than the electrochemical batteries (such 
42

JSOU Report 16-2

as rechargeable lithium-ion cells) now in use. Radionuclide batteries have 

long been used to power building exit signs and are particularly well-suited 

for continuous long-duration power generation.88 Although care must be 

used in handling the radioisotope sources that would form the inner workings of radionuclide batteries, the technology is well known and has been in 

use for many decades in industrial and medical settings. Such batteries can 

easily be produced and distributed by supply chains and safely employed 

by SOF.89

There are several design concepts in hand for radionuclide batteries 

useful for SOF detachments. Such a battery would be approximately the 

size of a current D-cell chemical flashlight battery but would weigh less than 

one pound and would produce one to five watts of power continuously for 

many years.90 A foot-mobile SOF operator or infantryman could use such a 

radionuclide battery to power his entire suite of battery-powered devices for 

months or years. The radionuclide battery could be connected to a bus-bar 

into which the soldier would plug his various devices (radios, GPS device, 

night vision goggles, optics, etc.). Alternatively, radionuclide batteries could 

be scaled down in size and power and be embedded by manufacturers into 

each device, with battery replacements not required for years.91

The implications of radionuclide batteries for both SOF operators and 

logisticians would be dramatic. The load carried by SOF operators, especially 

those deployed on foot patrols lasting more than 72 hours, would be substantially reduced since these operators would no longer have to carry spare batteries. SOF logisticians would be free to almost completely eliminate batteries 

and electrical power generation as a supply planning consideration. It could 

also make the provision of devices such as power generators, PowerShade, 

Powerwall, PV arrays, central electrical storage arrays, and associated equipment unnecessary. For SOF logisticians supporting a UW campaign with 

a nonstandard resupply system, eliminating batteries and electrical power 

from the requirements would free up logistics capacity for other needs while 

also reducing the overall demands and risks placed on the logistics system.

There are perceived risks attached to radionuclide batteries that have thus 

far prevented their employment by U.S. military forces in the field. Existing 

designs include very hard casings that both protect soldiers and the environment from radiation and that prevent damage and possible radiation leakage 

from the battery. Batteries that were destroyed in combat would release a 

small amount of low-level radiation; if necessary such points could be located 
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Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

and cleaned up.92 Finally, the amount of radioisotope used in each battery is 

tiny and would not in any way constitute a nuclear proliferation problem.93

Even so, the military supply chain, to include a nonstandard resupply system 

for a UW campaign, would have to adapt to handle such a product. This 

would include accounting in the distribution system, custody and receipt 

responsibility, prevention of loss in the field, and return to the supply chain 

for storage, reuse, and eventual decommissioning.

More broadly, U.S. policymakers and military commanders will have 

to overcome fears and visceral reactions that come with the employment 

of any nuclear materials. That is likely the highest hurdle that has thus far 

prevented the DOD from exploiting this technology for the benefit of SOF 

operators and infantrymen who have otherwise had to endure large loads of 

replacement batteries. Adoption of this technology, although understandably 

difficult, could provide a major benefit to SOF operators and logisticians.

Improving the efficiency of combat feeding in UW campaigns

As mentioned previously, organizing principles such as simplicity, sustainability, and risk mitigation will argue for supplying guerrilla forces and supporting SOF operators from local sources to the maximum extent practical.94 

This dictum would seem to apply especially heavily to the task of combat 

feeding. 

There are numerous reasons SOF commanders and planners should 

expect the supported guerrilla force to provide its own food and water, not 

only for its own fighters but also to the SOF operators deployed with the 

guerrilla force. Guerrilla fighters will already be familiar and adapted to 

the local food and diet. It is likely that as the guerrilla force has formed and 

grown, it will have developed its own techniques and processes for acquiring, 

distributing, and preparing food for its fighters. Next, it would seem highly 

impractical for a likely fragile nonstandard SOF supply network to take on 

the task of supplying food to the guerrilla force, especially in the early stages 

of a UW campaign. Finally, USSOF operators are taught from the earliest 

phases of Special Forces training of the need to gain the acceptance and 

respect of the supported guerrilla force. A critical method of gaining this 

acceptance and respect is living with the guerrilla force and partaking in its 

camp activities, including meals.
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JSOU Report 16-2

These principles and assumptions are likely to dominate the planning 

for food and nutrition for a UW campaign. However, SOF commanders and 

planners should keep in mind some of the risks and drawbacks attached to 

these principles and assumptions, especially as they relate to long-lasting 

UW campaigns.

SOF planners and operators should consider the safety of indigenous food 

and water consumed by the guerrilla force and presumably by the SOF operators supporting that force.95 There is likely to be a substantially increased 

risk of food-borne and water-borne diseases and maladies suffered by guerrilla fighters and SOF operators when living off indigenous food and water 

sources in remote and unsettled areas of relatively undeveloped countries. 

The risks of such contamination will compound after guerrilla fighters begin 

concentrating in camp settings, especially if camp sanitary procedures are 

not strictly enforced. 

Throughout history, camp diseases, many tracing back to food and water, 

have been more debilitating to armies than combat action. Although Western 

conventional armies have largely solved this problem through modern base 

camps and logistics systems, those solutions might not apply to prospective 

UW campaigns such as those described in this monograph. In spite of the 

large burden it would place on the nonstandard UW logistics system, the 

external provision of food and water purification methods could substantially increase the manning level and combat effectiveness of the guerrilla 

force. SOF planners should consider whether such a benefit would be worth 

the cost, expense, and risk it would place on the logistics system.

Should guerrilla commanders and SOF operators solve the problem of 

food-borne and water-borne diseases, SOF planners will have to consider 

whether indigenous food will supply the guerrilla force and SOF operators 

with the high amounts of protein, calories, and other nutritional characteristics that soldiers will require to be effective during an open-ended combat 

campaign. This could be a particular risk for SOF operators who are deployed 

for weeks or months with a guerrilla force during a UW campaign. These 

operators, having likely established a substantial level of muscle mass, along 

with protein and calorie consumption rates in a Western military training setting, may find the indigenous guerrilla diet over a prolonged period 

leading to dissipation and malnutrition.96 SOF planners will have to decide 

whether SOF operators deployed in support of a guerrilla force will require 

supplemental nutrition supplied through the UW logistics network.
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Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

In addition, nutrition is directly linked to soldier physical performance, 

cognitive performance, and metabolic recovery from exertion and stress.97 

These are critical factors in the performance of military forces, especially 

during long-term campaigns. Nutrition is thus likely to be a competitive factor relative to the government security forces the guerrillas will be 

fighting. 

Nutrition and its bearing on guerrilla physical and cognitive performance 

will thus be either a competitive handicap or a competitive advantage during 

the ensuing campaign against government security forces. SOF planners 

should make an assessment of guerrilla nutrition and compare it with the 

nutrition supplied to the adversary government forces. If a gap exists, these 

planners will then have to decide whether the nonstandard UW logistics 

system should be used to close the nutrition gap the guerrillas suffer compared to the government security forces. Alternatively, SOF planners could 

also decide that improved guerrilla nutrition, supplied through the SOF UW 

logistics network, could create an important competitive advantage over the 

adversary government forces.

Emerging technologies supporting combat feeding in UW 

campaigns

The Combat Feeding Directorate at the U.S. Army Natick Soldier RD&E 

Center is developing several technologies that could be useful to SOF operators and logisticians executing a UW campaign in an access-denied area. 

These technologies focus on reducing the food load carried by foot-mobile 

SOF operators and infantrymen; reducing the load food resupply places 

on a logistics system; reducing the risk of food and water-borne infections; 

increasing the ability of expeditionary SOF operators and units to create 

nutrition locally through foraging; and improving the physical and cognitive 

performance of SOF operators through better nutrition. As a result of these 

combat feeding RD&E efforts, SOF operators and soldiers should expect to 

see significantly different combat rations and feeding techniques by 2025.98

Concepts and technologies under development at Natick to achieve these 

goals include:

• A handheld device that will allow a SOF operator in a foraging situation to determine which local species are safe and nutritious;
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JSOU Report 16-2

• Expeditionary equipment that will convert locally gathered biomass 

into edible food;

• 3-D printing of food products at forward bases and camps;

• Highly concentrated and compact rations that provide high quality 

nutrition while greatly reducing logistics weight, cube, and soldier 

load;

• Bio-engineered, single-cell proteins designed to maintain muscle 

mass;

• Biometric identification of the nutrient needs of individual soldiers, 

along with the capability to subsequently produce nutrition to meet 

identified gaps.99

In summary, feeding a military force in the field is frequently the single 

greatest burden on a logistics system. This will likely be the case regardless of whether the military force consists of conventional units or guerrilla 

formations. A guerrilla force is unlikely to enjoy the benefits of a modern 

military logistics system that in recent decades has allowed Western armies 

to virtually eliminate ancient military-logistic maladies such as malnutrition 

and widespread disease. Adversary government security forces are likely to 

enjoy greater camp cleanliness, better preventive measures, and better access 

to the nutrition needed for sustained physical and cognitive effectiveness. 

Finally, a nonstandard UW logistics systems operating inside an accessdenied area will likely be hard-pressed with other resupply requirements 

besides combat feeding.

Nevertheless, there are emerging technologies and techniques that SOF 

operators supporting a UW campaign may soon be able to employ to boost 

the prospects of supported guerrilla forces. These developments include the 

ability to concentrate and reduce the size and weight of nutrition and to 

improve the ability to forage and produce better food in the field at the point 

of need. When developed and available to SOF operators, these technologies 

and techniques will reduce the burden on the UW logistics system while 

also improving the nutrition and combat effectiveness of the guerrilla force.

Use of precision munitions to reduce demands on the UW 

logistics system

SOF commanders and planners supporting a guerrilla force should consider 

the benefits (along with the risks) of supplying precision munitions through 
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Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

the nonstandard UW logistics system. A guerrilla force (as with any military force) employing precision munitions should be able to achieve desired 

battlefield effects with a far lower expenditure of munitions. This would, all 

else being equal, greatly reduce the amount of ammunition a UW logistical 

system operated by SOF logisticians would have to transport and distribute 

to SOF operators supporting a guerrilla force.

For example, a guerrilla force operating 120 millimeter mortars might 

increase battlefield effects and reduce logistic demand if supporting SOF 

operators supplied the guerrilla force with GPS-guided mortar rounds for 

these systems. In March 2011, U.S. Army mortar crews in Afghanistan began 

employing the XM395 GPS-guided mortar round. The XM395 is a modification to the standard unguided M934 high explosive 120 mm mortar round. 

The modifications include a fuze with a GPS receiver and small guidance 

fins, along with additional folding guidance fins in a tail attachment. Soldiers use a mission planning computer and input device to program impact 

coordinates into the fuze before firing. The XM395 has a Circular Error 

Probable (CEP) of less than 10 meters at any range.100 This compares very 

favorably with a CEP of 136 meters for the unguided M934 round at maximum range. Use of the XM395 will give a 120 mm mortar crew a ‘first round, 

fire for effect’ capability and thus greatly reduce the amount of ammunition 

required to reduce a target.101

Another example would be the choice of a direct-fire weapon to counter 

armored vehicles, other vehicles, and bunkers. For a supported guerrilla 

force, the standard choice for such a direct fire weapon would seem to be 

the Soviet-era rocket propelled grenade (RPG), the unguided, shoulder-fired 

rocket now found seemingly on every battlefield. Keeping with its Soviet origins, the RPG is rugged and simple to use. It would be an especially attractive 

choice for SOF operators clandestinely supporting a guerrilla force because 

its employment by any guerrilla force would be expected and thus would 

maintain the plausible deniability of a clandestine UW campaign. 

Even so, SOF commanders and planners could also consider the benefits of employing a precision-guided alternative such as the fire-and-forget 

Javelin missile or some internationally produced equivalent shoulder-fired, 

precision-guided missile. As with the GPS-guided 120 mm mortar, using a 

precision missile like the Javelin instead of the unguided RPG would, all else 

equal, greatly reduce the quantity of such munitions the nonstandard UW 
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JSOU Report 16-2

logistics system would have to transport and distribute in order to achieve 

the same or better battlefield effects. 

Policymakers and SOF commanders will naturally have to weigh the 

benefits against the risks of distributing precision-guided munitions to a supported guerrilla force. Depending on the status and fragility of the nonstandard UW logistics system, it may be a paramount consideration to deliver to 

the guerrilla force the greatest level of firepower and battlefield effectiveness 

per weight and cube transported by the system. This would argue for the 

delivery of precision-guided weapons. On the other hand, policymakers 

and commanders could be understandably concerned about the delivery of 

such powerful munitions into a situation where ongoing custody, control, 

and eventual recovery could be questionable. Precision munitions employed 

against adversaries today might be employed against allies or U.S. forces 

in the future. Finally, it is likely to generally be the case that the higher the 

sophistication of the weapons supplied to the guerrillas, the greater the risk 

the U.S. Government will run in terms of plausible deniability.

In the late 1980s, the U.S. Government faced this same dilemma regarding 

its support to Afghan guerrillas opposing government forces and the Soviet 

army. After much internal debate, U.S. policymakers decided to supply the 

Afghan guerrillas with the Stinger advanced precision-guided shoulder-fired 

surface-to-air missile. By that point in the conflict, maintaining plausible 

deniability was no longer a policy concern. But concerns about proliferation and possible future threats to civilian air traffic remained. Fortunately, 

custody and technical measures successfully mitigated this risk. Meanwhile 

the introduction of the Stinger missile created favorable shifts in Soviet air 

power tactics and effectiveness with substantial benefits to the guerrilla force. 

And the logistics system supporting the Afghan guerrillas was able to easily 

support the transport and distribution of Stinger missiles to guerrilla forces 

in the field.

Policymakers and SOF planners managing another prospective UW campaign will face these and other considerations that balance the tradeoffs 

between logistics capacity, battlefield effectiveness, political risk, and proliferation risk. The existence of precision munitions will give policymakers 

and SOF planners more choices, along with some challenging decisions.
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Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

Conclusion

Many factors are required to achieve success in combat. In keeping with 

the SOF Truths, the quality of warfighters—reflected in attributes such as 

training, conditioning, leadership, tactical skill, morale, teamwork, the will 

to prevail, etc.—will usually be more reliable predictors of success than the 

equipment and technology employed by those warfighters.102 This precept 

applies equally to an insurgent guerrilla force fighting to defeat government 

security forces, which are likely to be better funded, equipped, and supplied 

than the guerrillas.

Applying the SOF Truths, guerrilla commanders and the SOF operators 

supporting them will attend first to the guerrillas’ training, leadership, tactical skill, conditioning, morale, and other human factors that bear closely 

on battlefield success. But while focusing on those tasks, SOF operators will 

boost the guerrillas’ chances of success when they strive to supply the guerrillas with weapons and equipment that can provide a more even matchup 

against the government security forces. And that in turn will require an 

improvised, nonstandard, and likely fragile logistics system to get equipment and supplies to the guerrillas. When the UW campaign occurs in 

an access-denied area, the challenges placed on the nonstandard logistics 

system only compound.

This chapter has described several techniques and technologies that a 

guerrilla force and supporting SOF operators can employ to create required 

supplies and resources in the field and at the point of need, thus reducing the 

demands placed on the UW logistics system. These techniques and technologies range from the mundane yet critical supply of nutrition, to higher-end 

combat enablers such as electrical power for radios and night vision devices, 

and finally, to relatively exotic items such as precision-guided missiles and 

munitions. 

Some of these technologies are available now while others remain under 

development and could be available over the medium term. The characteristic they all have in common is how their employment will reduce the 

demands placed on the nonstandard logistics system supplying the guerrilla force. This risk reduction benefit will occur even as some of the items 

described in the chapter, such as secure radios and other electronic devices 

and precision missiles and munitions, will multiply the combat power of 

the guerrilla force. Achieving both of these benefits presents a strong case to 
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JSOU Report 16-2

SOF commanders as they make difficult decisions on how to sustain a UW 

campaign inside an access-denied area.

Successfully supplying UW campaigns will require SOF planners to 

design and execute a fully-integrated logistics strategy. Such a strategy will 

subsequently require these SOF planners and logisticians to assess what 

they will supply to the guerrilla force; the establishment of channels and 

routes by which supplies and equipment will reach the guerrillas; and active 

measures and techniques that will allow the guerrilla force to both provision 

itself locally and to reduce the demand for support that can only be supplied 

externally. 

The first three chapters of this monograph have discussed how SOF planners and logisticians should approach these challenges for a UW campaign 

occurring in an access-denied area. The final chapter of the monograph will 

list and discuss recommendations USSOCOM and USASOC commanders 

and staff planners should consider in order to better prepare SOF to sustain 

a UW campaign in an access-denied area. These recommendations will act 

as both a summary of the monograph and guidance for actions the SOF 

community can take to prepare for the most challenging UW missions.
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4. Recommendations for Improving 

the Sustainment of SOF Distributed 

Operations in Access-Denied 

Environments

There are numerous reforms USSOCOM and DOD can implement that 

would improve the prospect of sustaining distributed UW campaigns 

in access-denied areas. A portion of this reform agenda should focus on 

various RD&E initiatives that would expand the capacity of SOF to resupply 

operational UW detachments and friendly guerrilla forces by exploiting the 

full range of resupply channels and that would reduce consumables demand 

by SOF operators and guerrilla forces operating in a UWOA. This chapter 

will discuss a detailed RD&E agenda for improving the sustainment of distributed UW campaigns operating in access-denied areas.

However, SOF logistics reforms should extend beyond just RD&E initiatives. DOD, USSOCOM, and USASOC should implement institutional 

reforms that will raise the awareness of UW logistics operations and remedy 

existing shortfalls in UW logistics doctrine. In addition, there is much 

USSOCOM and USASOC should do to prepare for UW operations in denied 

areas, to improve the training of SOF logistics personnel to support UW 

operations, and to expand the capacity of the SOF enterprise to execute 

substantial UW operations, especially in the most challenging scenarios. 

This chapter will also discuss recommendations in these dimensions.

Training logisticians to support UW campaigns

USSOCOM and USASOC appear to lack a comprehensive and well-organized 

training program and training establishment to prepare SOF logisticians to 

support UW campaigns, especially those that would require nonstandard 

logistic techniques. Joint UW logistics training in the SOF community is 

almost completely ad hoc.103 There are few structured training opportunities for logisticians operating within the USASOC and USSOCOM enterprises.104 UW logistics experience within the SOF enterprise is developed 

almost entirely through on-the-job training and improvisation.105 Worst of 
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JSOU Report 16-2

all, due to security classification, unit barriers, and the lack of a UW logistics 

structure, knowledge and best practices on UW logistics techniques is almost 

never shared within the SOF community or across the joint force.106 As a 

result, there is no opportunity or structure within the SOF community to 

pass on lessons learned or to advance the art and science of the sustainment 

of UW operations in denied areas.

A review of existing schoolhouse syllabi revealed one brief course dedicated to SOF logistics operations for UW campaigns. As of June 2015, the 

course catalogs at the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare 

School and Center (USAJFKSWSC) listed no courses on logistics and sustainment of UW operations, or any courses on nonstandard resupply techniques.107 At Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), a new pilot course 

on nonstandard logistics appeared for the first time in May 2015. The course 

is five days in length and is continually developing.108

JSOU’s addition of a new course on nonstandard logistics is commendable and a large step forward. However, as this monograph has attempted 

to explain, the nonstandard techniques required to sustain UW campaigns 

in denied areas are complex, multifaceted, and involve risk. Much larger 

amounts of training, resources, and practice across the SOF community will 

be required to master these techniques and technologies. If USSOCOM and 

DOD are serious about preparing for a future that will call on readiness for 

UW campaigns, these institutions will have to dedicate greater leadership 

attention and resources to training future cadres of SOF logisticians who will 

be prepared to support challenging UW campaigns. There presently seems 

to be little organized preparation for such contingencies.

Recommendation 1: USSOCOM and USASOC should establish 

formal training programs to prepare SOF logisticians for UW campaigns in denied areas. 

First, USSOCOM, and USASOC in particular, should develop a comprehensive training program to prepare SOF logisticians to support UW campaigns 

in denied areas. This would mean extensively preparing SOF logisticians to 

clandestinely manage the inter-theater movement of supplies, equipment, 

and personnel; establish clandestine intermediate supply and transit points 

in an operational theater; establish procedures for clandestinely and efficiently acquiring locally sourced supplies and equipment; the clandestine 

movement of supplies, equipment, and personnel across hostile borders 
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Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

defended by challenging access-denial networks; and the movement, distribution, and storage of these items to benefit SOF and friendly guerrilla 

forces inside a UWOA.109

Mastering these tasks and building a SOF cadre skilled in their employment would be a challenging training mission. However, it is one that 

would build a highly valuable capability not only for SOF but for top-level 

policymakers in the U.S. Government. Building this training program 

would, however, require a substantial commitment of talent, funding, time, 

and leadership attention from USSOCOM and USASOC.110 USASOC, in 

coordination with the leadership at the 528th SBSO(A), should establish a 

dedicated UW sustainment curriculum, course list, and instructor cadre 

at USAJFKSWSC. AFSOC should establish UW sustainment programs at 

its schoolhouse in ways appropriate for its roles and missions. USSOCOM 

should have the staffing necessary to coordinate these training efforts into 

a comprehensive UW sustainment capability.111

USSOCOM and USASOC should establish a four-phase training program 

for future SOF UW logisticians.112 The first phase would consist of indoctrination and would have the SOF logistician trainees interface with SOF 

operators in order to fully understand UW combat service support (CSS) 

requirements and associated mission planning. The second phase would 

consist of cross-training in all aspects of CSS functions with an emphasis on 

UW mission requirements, operations in austere and clandestine conditions, 

and operations that involve independent action and minimal supervision. 

The third phase would expand trainee exposure to operations with joint 

and interagency partners with a goal of establishing these relationships and 

operational synergies. The fourth phase would consist of a high-fidelity capstone UW logistics training exercise, conducted at a national training center. 

The training exercise would have the trainees implement the techniques they 

learned in the first three phases to support a challenging UW scenario in 

an access-denied area.

Second, after the various SOF components have established their schoolhouse UW sustainment programs and instructor cadre, USSOCOM should 

establish a joint UW sustainment mobile training and support team capacity. 

The purpose of this mobile training and support team would be to support 

and reinforce theater special operations command (TSOC) planners when 

regional combatant commands are assigned a significant UW mission and 
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JSOU Report 16-2

require additional technical and planning capacity to execute UW sustainment support.

Third, USSOCOM should establish a global UW sustainment information network that would share best practices, lessons learned from operations, and logistician experiences.113 Feedback from these experiences would 

benefit SOF logisticians operating elsewhere. This feedback would also be 

crucial in maintaining and improving the instructor cadre and curricula at 

SOF schoolhouses. 

Institutional reforms to support the UW sustainment function

The previous section discussed the shortfalls in USSOCOM and USASOC 

training as it relates to preparing logisticians for distributed UW campaigns 

in denied areas. The absence of formal training programs for this complex mission reveals larger institutional shortcomings in USSOCOM and 

USASOC regarding preparations for UW sustainment. The broad SOF community lacks the formal institutions, careers paths, personnel management, 

staffing, and senior-level advocacy the UW sustainment function requires. 

Until this institutionalization of UW sustainment occurs, it is unlikely that 

complex UW campaigns in denied areas will become a realistic option available to senior military leaders and policymakers.114

Recommendation 2: Establish USSOCOM and USASOC institutions that will advocate for the UW sustainment mission, create a 

rewarding career path for UW-specialized logisticians, and advance 

and propagate knowledge in this field.

First, both USSOCOM and USASOC should establish staff sections that specialize in nonstandard UW sustainment.115 At USSOCOM, this staff section 

would be located within the J4 and would support active UW campaigns 

globally. The USSOCOM J4 UW sustainment staff section would support 

regional TSOCs actually executing UW campaigns by deploying mobile 

training and support teams that would provide expertise and planning 

resources to the regional commands and through the coordination of the 

various service-level SOF logistics functions. This staff section would be the 

single point of contact at USSOCOM for UW sustainment and would also 

coordinate U.S. sustainment efforts with other government agencies and 

international and nongovernment partners.116
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Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

At USASOC, a dedicated UW logistics staff section would be located 

in the 528th SBSO(A) which would oversee UW sustainment schoolhouse 

training (in partnership with USAJFKSWSC) and the advancement and 

distribution of UW sustainment knowledge throughout the global Special 

Forces community. This staff section should also contribute to the expansion of useful UW sustainment doctrine, which currently is very limited 

and provides inadequate guidance to practitioners in the field.117 After taking 

ownership of UW logistics doctrine development, and schoolhouse and 

field training, the 528th SBSO(A) UW logistics staff section would then 

take responsibility for transferring this knowledge and expertise to operational units in the field through the training, preparation, and deployment 

of 528th’s ALEs assigned to TSOCs and other commands around the world.

Second, USSOCOM and USASOC should establish a rewarding career 

path for logisticians who learn nonstandard logistics techniques and apply 

them in operational missions.118 The U.S. Army and perhaps the other services 

could create a specific military occupational specialty code for UW-trained 

logisticians or alternatively an additional skill identifier designation.119 The 

USSOCOM J1 staff and the USASOC G1 staff should establish processes for 

tracking the training and careers of UW-qualified logisticians and create 

upward career paths for soldiers who receive this training and perform these 

duties.120

Third, USSOCOM and USASOC should establish RD&E centers that 

would focus on the development of equipment and techniques that will 

advance nonstandard UW sustainment capabilities, especially for the most 

challenging distributed UW missions in denied areas. As the previous chapters and this chapter will make clear, there is now a substantial gap between 

the equipment and tools SOF operators and logisticians currently possess to 

execute challenging distributed UW campaigns in denied areas and those 

they will require to successfully execute these missions. UW sustainment 

RD&E centers would work with other military RD&E commands (such as 

Natick Soldier RD&E Center) and outside contractors to develop improved 

equipment solutions for UW sustainment.

Fourth, USSOCOM and USASOC should create appropriate billets to 

command this multifaceted UW sustainment enterprise, which will comprise personnel management, intelligence assessment of adversary accessdenial capabilities, training, field operations, strategic planning, research 

and development, and program management. Creating a serious UW 
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JSOU Report 16-2

sustainment capability will require significant staffing, complex training, 

global operational capacity, expanding engineering and technical knowledge, and significant budgets. Such an enterprise would require an officer of 

requisite rank to command it and be an advocate for the enterprise within 

the SOF community and beyond. 

As mentioned above, USASOC should create a dedicated UW logistics 

staff section within the 528th SBSO(A) to oversee these duties and functions 

within ARSOF. Given these wide-ranging responsibilities and large budget, 

the dedicated UW sustainment staff section should probably be commanded 

by a lieutenant colonel (O-5) who would report to the commander of the 

528th SBSO(A). USSOCOM should likewise consider creating an O-5 billet 

at the J4, with responsibility for coordinating UW logistics training, preparation, and execution across the SOF global enterprise and in coordination 

with other government agencies, partner governments, and nongovernment 

entities.

Research, development, and engineering agenda

This section will discuss specific technologies and techniques USSOCOM, 

USASOC, and other parts of the SOF community should develop in order to 

create the sustainment capabilities that will be necessary to successfully execute a distributed UW campaign inside a denied area. The author’s site visit 

to Natick Soldier RD&E Center and interviews with skilled and dedicated 

engineers and program managers revealed some impressive work aimed at 

improving the support soldiers in the field will receive in the future. 

However, this research also revealed the gap between what these programs will deliver and what the most challenging UW sustainment missions will require. The main explanation for this gap is the lack of attention 

in recent years devoted to the UW mission generally, and the sustainment 

of challenging UW missions in particular. We can hope that renewed toplevel command attention on UW and UW sustainment will result in greater 

leadership attention, a focus on the search for solutions, and an interest in 

a new RD&E agenda for UW sustainment challenges.
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Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

Recommendation 3: Managers of the RD&E agenda for UW sustainment should to the extent feasible adapt existing technology for 

their purposes and use, and adapt equipment widely available in 

the international marketplace, maintain operational security, and 

look to incremental improvement to remain competitive against 

adversaries.

Four general principles should guide program managers and decision makers 

regarding the development and acquisition of equipment and technology for 

nonstandard resupply techniques of SOF executing distributed UW campaigns in denied areas.

First, program managers should maintain a preference whenever possible 

for adapting existing technologies rather than endeavoring to create wholly 

new equipment and technologies. Developing new systems is risky, almost 

always expensive, and usually very time-consuming. The typical result is 

solutions, if they ever arrive in the field, do so late and in quantities too small 

to meet operators’ needs. When existing systems can be adapted to UW sustainment needs, program managers should almost always prefer this path.

Second, (and related to the preceding point) program managers should 

have a preference for employing and adapting equipment and technologies 

openly found in the civilian market and widely available to foreign civilian 

customers. As a corollary, program managers should welcome, and even have 

a preference for, foreign-supplied equipment. A clandestine UW campaign 

will under some circumstances benefit from plausible deniability. Should 

SOF personnel executing a UW campaign be captured, the U.S. Government 

should not have a policy of denying their status as U.S. soldiers, in order to 

improve the prospect of better treatment during their captivity. But regarding 

the use of unmanned vehicles for resupply operations, plausible deniability 

would be useful should such equipment be captured. The U.S. Government 

will be able in a better position to plausibly deny an operation in such a case 

should it use equipment widely available in the international marketplace.

Third, UW logisticians and program managers should establish and 

maintain operational security over the technologies, equipment, and techniques they develop through RD&E efforts, concept development, and training. UW sustainment into access-denied areas is a competitive, multi-move 

process that planners should assume will be executed against a smart and 

determined adversary. Individual UW sustainment technologies and techniques will therefore be perishable. The maintenance of operational security 
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JSOU Report 16-2

should extend the lives of technologies and techniques, a valuable outcome 

for UW logisticians and SOF operators.

Fourth, the broad SOF UW sustainment enterprise should operate under 

a principle of continuous incremental improvement in both its equipment 

and its operational techniques. Competitive adversaries will place constant 

pressure on UW sustainment techniques, which means that UW logisticians 

will themselves be compelled to improve in order to execute their missions. 

However, spending resources on large ‘leap-ahead’ improvements is a risky 

approach that could result in shortfalls in needed capabilities in the future. 

UW logistics planners can mitigate such risks by opting for incremental 

improvement approaches.

Recommendation 4: USSOCOM should work with the U.S. Army, 

Air Force, and outside contractors to develop new aerial delivery 

techniques that use low-observable characteristics to deliver supplies and equipment by air through access-denied barriers.

Specifically, USSOCOM J4 should contact the Aerial Delivery Directorate at 

the U.S. Army Natick Soldier RD&E Center to establish such a project and 

request Natick’s experience and guidance in executing such a program. As 

described in Chapter 2, the product from such a program should be 250-, 

500-, and 2,000-pound containers that stealth strike aircraft such as the 

F-35A/B/C, B-2A, and forthcoming Long Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B) 

could carry internally and then deploy by parachute, utilizing JPADS equipment technology to deliver precisely to SOF operators supporting a guerrilla force during a UW campaign in an access-denied UWOA. The Aerial 

Delivery Directorate at Natick has long experience with this type of project 

and should be the first resource for project management.

Recommendation 5: USSOCOM J4 should work with all four services and outside contractors to investigate the potential of employing micro UAVs in large scale ‘conveyor’ arrays to deliver supplies 

and equipment (especially high value, low weight items) to SOF 

operators and guerrilla forces operating in access-denied UWOAs.

USSOCOM J4 should initially make contact with the Aerial Delivery Directorate at the U.S. Army Natick Soldier RD&E Center to obtain an initial 

feasibility assessment of this concept. Over the past two decades, USSOCOM 

and all four services have acquired extensive experience operating a wide 
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Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

variety of small UAS in many different environments and settings. These 

operations, however, have largely focused on intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance missions and tasks. That said, there should be broad experience within operational small UAS units across the joint force that should 

be available for adaptation to UAS logistics operations. USSOCOM J4 staff 

and Natick Aerial Delivery personnel should be able to make an assessment 

of the applicability of this experience for the employment of small and micro 

UAVs for resupply operations in an access-denied UWOA.

Recommendation 6: USSOCOM J4 should work with the U.S. Navy 

and outside contractors to develop unmanned undersea cargo 

vehicles to clandestinely deliver supplies and equipment to SOF 

and friendly guerrilla forces.

USSOCOM J4 should contact the U.S. Navy Sea Systems Command and the 

U.S. Navy Office of Naval Research to establish the feasibility of employing 

cargo UUVs in support of clandestine UW campaigns. These three entities 

should develop and establish a program to develop cargo UUVs that can 

support SOF operators and friendly guerrilla forces operating in accessdenied areas.

Recommendation 7: USSOCOM J4 and the 528th SBSO(A) UW 

logistics staff section should work with the U.S. Army Research, 

Development and Engineering Command, other relevant government agencies, and outside contractors to develop expeditionary 

additive manufacturing tools and techniques that could support 

the movement of supplies and equipment through hostile border 

checkpoints. 

USSOCOM J4 and 528th SBSO(A) UW logistics staff section personnel 

should contact other relevant government agencies that likely have experience with the infiltration and exfiltration of equipment, supplies, and 

personnel through border checkpoints under hostile control in order to 

acquire knowledge of current techniques and best practices. After acquiring 

this knowledge and experience, USSOCOM J4 and the 528th SBSO(A) UW 

logistics staff section should establish contact with the U.S. Army Research, 

Development and Engineering Command and appropriate outside contractors to develop expeditionary 3-D printing tools and techniques that could 

be employed by SOF logisticians in clandestine settings to prepare cargo 
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and vehicles for crossings through hostile border checkpoints in support of 

UW campaigns.

Recommendation 8: USSOCOM J3, J4, and J6 personnel should 

work with U.S. Cyber Command and other relevant government 

agencies to develop intrusive cyber tools that could facilitate the 

infiltration and exfiltration of personnel and equipment through 

hostile checkpoints. 

USSOCOM personnel should establish partnerships with these U.S. Government cyber agencies to establish intrusive cyber capabilities, such as the 

manipulation of adversary databases, which could enable SOF operators 

and other personnel to safely transit border crossings controlled by hostile 

security forces, in order to support UW campaigns in access-denied areas.

Recommendation 9: USSOCOM J4 and 528th SBSO(A) UW logistics 

staff section personnel should work with the U.S. Army Research, 

Development and Engineering Command and outside contractors to 

establish an expeditionary tunneling capability. 

USSOCOM and 528th SBSO(A) UW logistics staff section personnel should 

establish a working group with U.S. Army engineers and outside tunnel and 

drilling contractors to develop an expeditionary tunneling capacity that 

could support the sustainment of SOF operators and guerrilla forces operating on the far side of a hostile border. The working group should establish the 

feasibility of this concept, conduct realistic experiments, and then develop a 

deployable expeditionary capability that would create useful supply tunnels 

in a low profile, clandestine manner.

Emerging technologies to reduce consumables demand by 

SOF and guerrilla forces

Chapter 3 discussed technologies that are currently available or will be in 

the near term that could reduce many types of logistics demand during UW 

campaigns, and thus ease the burden on prospective nonstandard resupply 

programs that UW logisticians would have to execute. This section will 

discuss specific recommendations USSOCOM should consider in order to 

exploit the techniques and technologies discussed in Chapter 3.
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Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

Recommendation 10: USSOCOM J4 and component SOF should 

work with the Expeditionary Basing and Collective Protection 

Directorate, U.S. Army Natick Soldier RD&E Center to improve and 

expand the options and usage of PV devices and materials by SOF 

operators, focused on generating electrical power at the point of 

need for distributed operations in UW campaigns. 

USSOCOM and component SOF should establish a program to develop variants of the PowerShade PV tarpaulin for employment by small foot-mobile 

teams and in small- and medium-sized base camp settings. The goals of such 

a program should be to produce PowerShade devices in various sizes; to field 

flexible PV cells embedded in tarpaulin-type products; to field colored PV 

cells in order to produce camouflaging PowerShades; to ensure the connectivity of PowerShade devices to converters, electrical buses, and central and 

distributed rechargeable batteries; and to continuously improve the efficiency 

of PV cells for SOF usage.

Recommendation 11: USSOCOM J4 should work with the Expeditionary Basing and Collective Protection Directorate, U.S. Army 

Natick Soldier RD&E Center to determine the feasibility of developing a ruggedized, military-grade central storage battery, perhaps 

based on technology similar to the Tesla Powerwall, to provide 

power to small SOF expeditionary bases for nighttime operations 

and device recharging. 

USSOCOM and the U.S. Army Natick Soldier RD&E Center should establish a research program to explore a Powerwall type concept to provide 

rechargeable centralized electrical power to small SOF outposts. This feasibility study should determine whether a ruggedized, parachute-deployable 

centralized battery can be fabricated at scale; whether such a battery can 

be made either man or pack-animal mobile; whether the battery can be 

linked to PowerShade or similar PV devices; whether such batteries could 

be linked to increase storage capacity; and whether the number of times it 

can be recharged will make it useful for military operations. If the feasibility can affirm these and other basic questions of viability, USSOCOM and 

component SOF should then consider prototyping and field experimentation.
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JSOU Report 16-2

Recommendation 12: USSOCOM J4 should find appropriate government, academic, and scientific partners to explore the design, 

experimentation, and possible fielding of very long endurance 

radionuclide-powered batteries for SOF operations.

The USSOCOM J4 staff should establish a partnership with the U.S. Army 

Natick Soldier RD&E Center, the Defense Advanced Research Projects 

Agency (DARPA), engineering universities such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and outside contractors to develop radionuclide powered batteries as described in Chapter 2. The goals for such an effort should 

include developing a safe, ruggedized, field-ready prototype; developing 

buses and power distribution methods adapted to existing soldier devices; 

establishing custody and tracking systems and protocols for such batteries; 

and achieving leadership acceptance of the field use of radionuclide batteries.

Recommendation 13: USSOCOM J4 and USASOC G4 should 

work with the U.S. Army Natick Soldier RD&E Center to develop 

advanced, highly concentrated food and nutrition products 

designed to enhance physical and cognitive capacity while also 

reducing the weight and cube demands on a nonstandard UW 

logistics system.

The SOF community should work with Natick researchers and program managers to develop, experiment with, and eventually field highly concentrated 

food and nutrition products that are specifically designed for open-ended 

UW campaigns that require SOF personnel to have extended endurance and 

that have to be sustained through nonstandard logistics networks. A working group composed of SOF operators and Natick combat feeding specialists 

would establish nutritional requirements for such scenarios, likely logistic 

system constraints and characteristics, and then fashion feasible nutrition 

product options in response to these design criteria. The working group 

should consider coordinating its research and trials with Army resiliency 

and fitness centers such as those located at U.S. Army War College and the 

U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Prototyping and experimentation in 

field settings should then follow.
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Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

Recommendation 14: USSOCOM J4 and USASOC G4 should work 

with the U.S. Army Natick Soldier RD&E Center to develop devices 

and tools that would allow SOF operators and supported friendly 

guerrilla forces the capability to safely forage for nutrition from 

local sources, especially in survival and expeditionary situations, 

and to produce nutrition from locally acquired biomass.

As discussed in Chapter 3, the U.S. Army Natick Soldier RD&E Center 

Combat Feeding Directorate is researching devices and tools to assist survival foraging and the conversion of locally acquired biomass into human 

nutrition. USSOCOM J4 and USASOC G4 should partner with Natick, 

DARPA, and outside contractors to expand and deepen this RD&E line of 

effort with a goal of developing prototypes for these devices. Experimentation and eventual fielding of these capabilities should follow.

Recommendation 15: USSOCOM should consider the merits and 

risks of supplying supported guerrilla forces with precision-guided 

rockets, mortars, and missiles with the goals of improving the 

combat effectiveness of the supported force and to reduce the 

munition demands on the nonstandard UW logistics network.

All appropriate staff sections at USSOCOM should participate in a working group to examine this issue and make recommendations regarding its 

suitability. If the concept is approved, USSOCOM and USASOC should 

identify candidate munitions and weapon systems generally available in the 

international market for prospective transfer and use by supported guerrilla 

forces (the purpose of this point is to retain plausible deniability by the U.S. 

Government). After identifying such candidates, SOF operators should train 

on their employment and be ready to train and equip supported guerrilla 

forces. USSOCOM and DOD should then acquire appropriate inventories 

of these munitions and systems in order to be prepared for prospective UW 

campaigns.

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Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

5. Conclusion

Experience over the past two decades should indicate to U.S. policymakers and military planners that irregular warfare in its various forms will 

persist and perhaps expand in areas of the world important or vital to U.S. 

national interests. Indeed, all U.S. geographic combatant commands are currently engaged directly or indirectly in some form of irregular warfare. The 

prospective return of great power competition involving the United States 

and other major powers would likely add to this trend; should the United 

States and another competitive great power maintain respective nuclear and 

conventional military deterrence, the competition could spill out into forms 

of irregular warfare, a pattern observed during the Cold War.121 Thus U.S. 

policymakers and planners must prepare for an unending era of irregular 

warfare and be prepared to achieve U.S. national security objectives under 

these conditions.

It is a longstanding principle of war, and a cornerstone of U.S. military 

doctrine, that offensive action is eventually necessary to achieve military 

success.122 This principle applies to irregular warfare as to any other form of 

warfare. U.S. policymakers and military planners confronting the challenges 

of irregular warfare will thus need offensive options in order to achieve U.S. 

objectives in such circumstances.

UW is an offensive military operation. In the larger realm of irregular warfare, UW will likely be the military option U.S. policymakers and 

military commanders will need in order to achieve U.S. national security 

objectives.123 Political constraints will frequently restrict the ability of U.S. 

policymakers to employ conventional military power in ways to achieve U.S. 

objectives. In addition, emerging great power rivalries will likely impose 

practical restrictions on the employment of conventional forces. Thus policymakers are likely to increasingly turn to irregular methods to protect U.S. 

interests. UW will frequently be the offensive option that will be necessary 

to achieve success in irregular warfare.

The proliferation of long range anti-access munitions and weapons systems such as integrated air defense systems, precise and long range anti-ship 

missiles, and sophisticated sensors and other guided munitions will increase 

the difficulty of obtaining access to critical theaters of military operations.124
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JSOU Report 16-2

These anti-access difficulties will apply not only to conventional military 

forces but also to SOF operators and logisticians tasked with supporting a 

friendly guerrilla force inside an access-denied area.

In spite of these challenges, this monograph has shown that there are 

numerous techniques and technologies available and ready for development that SOF operators and logisticians could employ to make the support 

of a guerrilla force inside an access-denied UWOA a feasible proposition. 

The monograph described aerial, seaborne, terrestrial, and subterranean 

methods of resupply across hostile borders. It also described a variety of 

techniques and technologies that when employed will reduce the external 

logistics requirements of SOF operators and supported guerrilla forces, thus 

reducing the demands placed on a nonstandard UW logistics system.

Given the current and future operating environment and its propensity 

for irregular warfare, U.S. policymakers will almost certainly call on U.S. 

military commanders and planners to operate and prevail in this environment. The SOF community must prepare for this challenge, the difficulty 

of which will only compound as access-denial technology and techniques 

continue to proliferate. 

Winning in such an environment will require the execution of offensive 

options like UW. The SOF community can prepare for these challenges by 

studying the recommendations in this monograph, which will improve the 

ability of SOF logisticians to sustain SOF distributed operations, such as UW 

campaigns, in access-denied areas. Developing these capabilities will create 

options for policymakers and commanders, impose costs on adversaries, and 

deny enemies sanctuaries for their forces and preparations. The result will be 

the creation of an important tool for protecting U.S. interests and achieving 

policy goals despite otherwise challenging circumstances.
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Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

Appendix A: Acronym List

AFSOC U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command

ALE Army Special Operations Forces Liaison Element

ARSOF Army Special Operations Forces

CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

CSS combat service support

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DOD United States Department of Defense

G4 general command (U.S. Army and Marine Corps) staff 

 section responsible for logistics

GBU guided bomb unit

GPS global positioning system

J3 Joint command staff section responsible for current operations

J4 Joint command staff section responsible for logistics

J6 Joint command staff section responsible for command, 

 control, communications, and computer/cyber operations 

 and planning

JP Joint Publication

JPADS Joint Precision Airdrop System

JSOU Joint Special Operations University

LBS-UUV Littoral Battlespace Sensing - Unmanned Undersea Vehicles

LDUUV Large Displacement Unmanned Undersea Vehicle

LRS-B Long Range Strike Bomber (next-generation U.S. Air 

 Force bomber aircraft, under development)

OSS Office of Strategic Services
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JSOU Report 16-2

PV photovoltaic

RD&E research, development, and engineering

RPG rocket propelled grenade

SBSO Sustainment Brigade, Special Operations (refers to the 

 528th Sustainment Brigade, Special Operations (Airborne))

SOCPAC U.S. Special Operations Command - Pacific

SOF Special Operations Forces

TSOC theater special operations command

UAS unmanned aerial systems

UAV unmanned aerial vehicle

UUV unmanned undersea vehicle

USAJFKSWSC United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare 

 School and Center 

USASOC United States Army Special Operations Command

USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command

UW unconventional warfare

UWOA unconventional warfare operating area
69

Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

Endnotes

1. Charles T. Cleveland, “ARSOF 2022,” Special Warfare 26, no. 2 (April – June 2013), 

9, available at: http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/ARSOF2022_vFINAL.pdf.

2. Richard L. Menhart, “Logistical Support in Unconventional Warfare Operations,” 

(Carlisle, PA: Civilian research project, U.S. Army War College, 2014), Abstract, 

available at: http://nsfp.web.unc.edu/files/2012/09/AY14-CRP-COL-Menhart.pdf.

3. Joint Publication 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare (Initial draft), (Tampa, FL: 

United States Special Operations Command, 2014), I-1-I-2.

4. Ibid., I-2.

5. Cleveland, “ARSOF 2022,” 13.

6. Joint Publication 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare (Initial draft), I-4.

7. For example, see Robert Haddick, Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Theater for 

U.S. and Partner Nation Special Operations Forces, (Tampa, FL: Joint Special 

Operations University Press, 2014), 33-44, available at: http://jsou.libguides.

com/ld.php?content_id=5785088.

8. Joint Publication 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare (Initial draft), I-1-I-3.

9. “Special Operations Research Topics 2015,” Joint Special Operations University 

Press, June 2014, 19, accessed 15 May 2015 at: https://jsou.socom.mil/PubsPages/2015_SpecialOperationsResearchTopics_final.pdf.

10. United States Army Special Operations Command, Army Special Operations 

Forces Truths, available at: http://www.soc.mil/sofinfo/truths.html.

11. Menhart, “Logistical Support in Unconventional Warfare Operations,” 5.

12. See “528th Sustainment Brigade, Special Operations (Airborne),” official U.S. 

Army website, accessed 15 June 2015 at: http://www.soc.mil/528th/528th.html.

13. Menhart, “Logistical Support in Unconventional Warfare Operations,” 8.

14. Ibid., 8-9.

15. Joint Publication 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare (Initial draft), III-44-III-54.

16. Ibid., III-49-III-52.

17. Ibid., III-50.

18. Ibid., III-50-III-52.

19. Ibid., III-50.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., III-51.

22. Ibid., III-52.

23. William S. Hefron, “Unconventional Warfare Logistics: Utilizing Networked 

Nonstandard Approaches and Deception,” (Monterey, CA: Master’s thesis, Naval 

Postgraduate School, 2014), 13.
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JSOU Report 16-2

24. Ibid., 15-16.

25. Ibid., 19-20.

26. Ibid., 13.

27. Ibid., 7-11.

28. Ibid., xiii

29. Ibid., 2.

30. See Christopher G. Manganaro, “Doing More With Less: Special Forces Logistics 

in Afghanistan,” Army Logistician, Volume 39, Issue 6, November-December 

2007, accessed 19 June 2015 at: http://www.alu.army.mil/alog/issues/NovDec07/

more_with_less.html.

31. Joint Publication 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare (Initial draft), III-44-III-45.

32. Ibid., III-45.

33. Ibid., III-52-3.

34. Ibid., III-46.

35. Ibid.

36. For more on the implications of stealth on mission route planning, see Kris 

Osborn, “Air Force Upgrades B-2 Stealth Bomber as Modern Air Defenses 

Advance,” Military.com News website, 24 April 2015, accessed 28 April 2015 at: 

http://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/04/24/air-force-upgrades-b2-stealthbomber-as-air-defenses-advance.html?comp=1198882887570&rank=2.

37. “K-MAX,” Lockheed Martin website, accessed 29 April 2015 at: http://www.

lockheedmartin.com/us/products/kmax.html.

38. “The Evolution of the K-MAX Cargo UAS Technology,” Lockheed Martin website, 

accessed 29 April 2015 at: http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/kmax/

cargo-uas-technology.html.

39. “MC-130J Commando II,” U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet, 15 September 2011, accessed 

29 April 2015 at: http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/

Article/104510/mc-130j-commando-ii.aspx.

40. Aaron M.U. Church, “AFSOC Renaissance,” Air Force Magazine, April 2015, 34.

41. “CV-22 Osprey,” U.S. Air Force Fact Sheet, 6 February 2015, accessed 29 April 

2015 at: http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104531/

cv-22-osprey.aspx.

42. Richard Benney, Director, Aerial Delivery Directorate, Natick Soldier RD&E 

Center, “History and Challenges of Airdrops in Afghanistan & Army Aerial 

Delivery Overview (presentation),” 27 March 2013, 9-15.

43. Ibid., 17.

44. Ibid., 31.

45. Ibid., 33.

46. Ibid., 34.
71

Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

47. Author interview with Richard Benney, Director, Aerial Delivery Directorate, 

Natick Soldier RD&E Center, 17 April 2015.

48. Benney, “History and Challenges of Airdrops in Afghanistan,” 31.

49. Richard Benney, Director, Aerial Delivery Directorate, Natick Soldier RD&E 

Center, “ADD Timeline (presentation),” 23 March 2015, 1.

50. Benney, “History and Challenges of Airdrops in Afghanistan,” 56.

51. Ibid., 68.

52. The B-2A aircraft has been in service since the late 1990s. The U.S. Marine Corps 

declared Initial Operating Capability (IOC) of the F-35B in July 2015. The U.S. 

Air Force will declare IOC for the F-35A in 2016. See, Cheryl Pellerin, “Kendall 

Cites Progress on F-35 Performance, Schedule, Cost,” F-35 Lightning Program 

Public Affairs Release, 1 June 2015, accessed 19 June 2015 at: http://www.jsf.

mil/news/docs/20150601_KendallCitesProgress.pdf. “U.S. Marine Corps Begins 

F-35B Operational Trials,” F-35 Lightning Program Public Affairs Release, 19 

May 2015, accessed 19 June 2015 at: http://www.jsf.mil/news/docs/20150519_

USMC_Begin_Trials.pdf.

53. “F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Lightning II – Specifications,” GlobalSecurity.

org website, accessed 20 April 2015 at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/

systems/aircraft/f-35-specs.htm.

54. “Joint Direct Attack Munition GBU-31/32/38,” U.S. Air Force Fact File website, 

accessed 20 April 2015 at: http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/

tabid/224/Article/104572/joint-direct-attack-munition-gbu-313238.aspx.

55. “GBU-39B Small Diameter Bomb Weapon System,” U.S. Air Force Fact File website, accessed 20 April 2015 at: http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/

tabid/224/Article/104573/gbu-39b-small-diameter-bomb-weapon-system.aspx.

56. “B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomber Overview Fact Sheet,” Northrop-Grumman Corporation, 14 March 2007, accessed 20 April 2015 at: http://www.northropgrumman.

com/Capabilities/B2SpiritBomber/Documents/pageDocuments/B2-Fact-Sheet.

pdf.

57. “B61” GlobalSecurity.org website, accessed 20 April 2015 at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/b61.htm.

58. Hefron, “Unconventional Warfare Logistics,” 33-4.

59. Mark Jacobsen, “The Syrian Airlift Project: Swarming Airlift through Contested 

Airspace,” Leading Edge: Airpower in Theory and Practice website, 11 May 

2015, accessed 13 May 2015 at: http://leadingedgeairpower.com/2015/05/12/

the-syria-airlift-project-swarming-airlift-through-contested-airspace/.

60. Ibid.

61. “U.S. Navy Program Guide 2015,” U.S. Navy Strategic Documents website, 129, 

accessed 22 April 2015 at: http://www.navy.mil/strategic/top-npg15.pdf.

62. Ibid., 128-9.
72

JSOU Report 16-2

63. See “Proteus Specs – Undersea Solutions Groups,” Huntington Ingalls Industries website, accessed 23 April 2015 at: http://nns.huntingtoningalls.com/usg/

index. Matt Cox, “USG Shows Off its Optionally-Manned Proteus Mini-Submarine,” DefenseTech, 15 April 2015, accessed 23 April 2015 at: http://defensetech.

org/2015/04/15/usgs-proteus-mini-submarine/.

64. “U.S. Navy Program Guide,” 147.

65. “Bluefin and NRL Complete Long-Endurance UUV Mission From Boston to 

New York,” Bluefin Robotics website, accessed 23 April 2015 at: http://www.

bluefinrobotics.com/news-and-downloads/press/bluefin-and-nrl-complete-longendurance-uuv-mission-from-boston-to-new-york/.

66. Anthony J. Lecours, “U.S. Horse Detachment teaches smuggling operations at 

NTC,” Official U.S. Army website, 4 May 2012, accessed 4 May 2015 at: http://

www.army.mil/article/78982/U_S_Horse_Detachment20_teaches_smuggling_

operations_at_NTC.

67. Hefron, “Unconventional Warfare Logistics,” 54.

68. Ibid.

69. For an explanation of 3-D printing, see “What is 3D printing?” 3D Printing.com 

website, accessed 24 April 2015 at: http://3dprinting.com/what-is-3d-printing/.

70. “Safety and Security of U.S. Borders: Biometrics,” U.S. Department of State – 

Bureau of Consular Affairs website, accessed 26 April 2015 at: http://travel.state.

gov/content/visas/english/general/border-biometrics.html.

71. Ibid.

72. Colin Clark, “Biometrics May Mean the End of the Spy’s Disguise,” Breaking 

Defense website, 20 October 2014, accessed 26 April 2015 at: http://breakingdefense.com/2014/10/biometrics-may-mean-end-of-the-spys-disguise/.

73. Hefron, “Unconventional Warfare Logistics,” 41.

74. Ibid., 42.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid., 44.

78. “Chilean Mine Rescue,” IDS website, accessed 25 April 2015 at: http://idsdrill.

com/en/projects/chilean-mine-rescue.aspx.

79. Hefron, “Unconventional Warfare Logistics,” 19-20.

80. Lisa Daniel, “Marines Prove Energy Efficiencies in Afghanistan,” Armed Forces 

Press Service, 5 May 2011, accessed 6 May 2015 at: http://www.defense.gov/news/

newsarticle.aspx?id=63841.

81. “Powerwall Tesla Home Battery,” Tesla Motors company website, accessed 8 May 

2015 at: http://www.teslamotors.com/powerwall.

82. Ariana Costa and Clinton McAdams, “Expeditionary Basing and Collective 

Protection Overview (presentation),” Expeditionary Basing and Collective 
73

Haddick: Improving the Sustainment of SOF

Protection Directorate, U.S. Army Natick Soldier RD&E Center, 17 April 2015, 

10.

83. Ibid., 11-13.

84. Ibid., 11.

85. Ibid., 14-5.

86. Patrick Tucker, “Here’s What the New Tesla Battery Means for the Military,” Defense 

One Website, 5 May 2015, accessed 8 May 2015 at: http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/05/heres-what-new-tesla-battery-means-national-security/111928/

print/.

87. “Technology and Innovation Enablers for Superiority in 2030,” Report of the 

Defense Science Board, October 2013, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 48, accessed 8 May 2015 at: http://

www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/DSB2030.pdf.

88. Ibid., 49.

89. Ibid., 49-50.

90. Ibid., 51.

91. Ibid., 52.

92. Ibid., 51.

93. Ibid., 53.

94. Joint Publication 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare (Initial draft), III-48.

95. Jeremy Whitsitt, Deputy Director, Combat Feeding Directorate, “Combat Feeding Directorate (CFD) Overview (presentation),” Combat Feeding Directorate, 

Natick Soldier RD&E Center, 17 April 2015, 7.

96. Author interview with Jeremy Whitsitt, Deputy Director, Combat Feeding 

Directorate, Natick Soldier RD&E Center, 17 April 2015.

97. Jeremy Whitsitt, “Combat Feeding Directorate (CFD) Overview (presentation),” 

7.

98. Ibid., 11-14.

99. Ibid., 14-5.

100. Circular Error Probable (CEP) is a measurement of accuracy and is the diameter 

within which half a group of rounds aimed at one point are expected to impact. 

The lower the number, the more accurate the weapon system.

101. Audra Calloway, “Picatinny fields first precision-guided mortars to troops in 

Afghanistan,” Official U.S. Army website, 29 March 2011, accessed 11 May 2015 

at: http://www.army.mil/article/53988/.

102. United States Army Special Operations Command, Army Special Operations 

Forces Truths, available at: http://www.soc.mil/sofinfo/truths.html.

103. Menhart, “Logistical Support in Unconventional Warfare Operations,” 7.

104. Ibid.
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105. Ibid. 

106. Ibid., 8.

107. See: “1st Special Warfare Training Group Courses,” U.S. Army John F. Kennedy 

Special Warfare Center and School, accessed 15 June 2015 at: http://www.soc.mil/

swcs/1stSWTGCourses.html. FY2015; and “Academic Handbook,” U.S. Army 

John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, accessed 15 June 2015 at: 

http://www.soc.mil/swcs/_pdf/FY15_AcademicHandbook.pdf. 

108. “Nonstandard Logistics Course (Pilot),” Joint Special Operations University 

Courses, Joint Special Operations University, accessed 15 June 2015 at: https://

jsou.socom.mil/Pages/CourseInformation.aspx?CourseName=Nonstandard 

Logistics Course (Pilot).

109. Hefron, “Unconventional Warfare Logistics,” 53-8.

110. Menhart, “Logistical Support in Unconventional Warfare Operations,” 9.

111. Hefron, “Unconventional Warfare Logistics,” 72-3.

112. Menhart, “Logistical Support in Unconventional Warfare Operations,” 9-11.

113. Ibid., 8.

114. Ibid.

115. Ibid.

116. Hefron, “Unconventional Warfare Logistics,” 72.

117. Ibid.

118. Menhart, “Logistical Support in Unconventional Warfare Operations,” 15.

119. Ibid., 16.

120. Ibid., 15.

121. Haddick, Challenges in the Asia-Pacific, Chapter 5.

122. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, August 11, 2011, (Arlington, VA: U.S. 

Department of Defense, 2011), A1, accessed 18 May 2015 at: http://www.dtic.mil/

doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf.

123. Joint Publication 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare (Initial draft), I-2-I-4.

124. U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Operational Access Concept, Version 1.0, 

(Arlington, VA: Department of Defense, 2011), i-iii, accessed 18 May 2015 at: 

http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/JOAC_Jan%202012_Signed.pdf.