PREPOSITIONED 

STOCKS

Marine Corps Needs 

to Improve Cost 

Estimate Reliability 

and Oversight of 

Inventory Systems for 

Equipment in Norway

Report to the Committee on Armed 

Services, U.S. Senate

September 2015

GAO-15-651

United States Government Accountability Office
Highlights of GAO-15-651, a report to the 

Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate

September 2015

PREPOSITIONED STOCKS

Marine Corps Needs to Improve Cost Estimate 

Reliability and Oversight of Inventory Systems for 

Equipment in Norway

Why GAO Did This Study

MCPP-N was established in 1981 as 

part of a DOD agreement to support 

the defense of Norway and global U.S. 

Marine Corps expeditionary 

operations. In 2012 the Marine Corps 

began transforming MCPP-N from an

engineering and transportation 

capability to a Marine Air Ground Task 

Force capability, which includes 

combat vehicles and other tactical 

equipment, and it expects to complete 

the transformation in 2016. 

Senate Report 113-176 included a 

provision that GAO review MCPP-N.

This report determines the extent to 

which (1) MCPP-N addresses U.S. 

European and U.S. Africa command 

requirements;(2) reliable cost 

estimates exist to fund MCPP-N’s 

sustainment of equipment to support a 

Marine Air Ground Task Force 

capability; and (3) the Marine Corps 

has quality assurance procedures in 

place to monitor the management of 

MCPP-N. GAO reviewed agency 

guidance and plans, analyzed budget 

estimates, and interviewed Marine 

Corps, Department of State, and 

Norwegian Defence officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Marine 

Corps (1) incorporate the four 

characteristics of reliable cost 

estimates in the forthcoming 

prepositioning programs budget 

development policy; and (2) develop, in 

consultation with the Norwegian 

Defence Logistics Organization, a 

means to conduct a quality assurance 

review of the Norwegian Equipment 

Information Management System. The 

Marine Corps concurred with the 

recommendations.

What GAO Found

The Marine Corps is changing its mix of equipment at Marine Corps 

Prepositioning Program – Norway (MCPP-N) to address the U.S. European and 

U.S. Africa commands’ strategic and theater-specific operational requirements. 

U.S. European Command’s posture plan identifies MCPP-N as a key program 

that can respond to contingencies. While U.S. Africa Command plans that refer 

to a need to access prepositioned equipment do not specifically identify MCPP-N 

as an asset to meet that need, both Marine Corps and U.S. Africa Command 

officials stated that MCPP-N has served and can continue to serve as a global 

support asset to meet combatant command requirements. The Marine Corps 

reported that it routinely uses MCPP-N equipment sets to support European and 

Africa training and exercises.

Marine Corps cost estimates for sustaining the equipment to support a Marine Air 

Ground Task Force capability at MCPP-N may not be fully reliable, in that they 

do not fully meet the four general characteristics for reliable cost estimating—that 

is, being accurate, well-documented, credible, and comprehensive. For example, 

the Marine Corps documented its cost estimates, but the documentation did not 

include the source data used to develop the estimates or the calculations 

performed and estimating methodologies used. Marine Corps officials stated that 

they are drafting guidance for developing cost estimates for budget plans and 

plan to issue it in the fall of 2015, but this guidance will not address the four 

general characteristics for reliable cost estimating. Without ensuring that this 

guidance fully addresses those characteristics, the Marine Corps will not be 

positioned to know whether its budget proposals will meet the goal of sustaining 

equipment for a Marine Air Ground Task Force capability at MCCP-N.

The Marine Corps could improve its quality assurance procedures for monitoring 

MCPP-N. Specifically, the service relies upon the Norwegian Equipment 

Information Management System for data needed to manage its equipment 

inventory due to limitations in its own system, such as the lack of a warehousing 

application to effectively manage MCPP-N equipment.The reliance on two 

different information systems, one of which is owned and operated by a foreign 

government, creates several management challenges and risks to data reliability 

for the Marine Corps. For example, it results in a time lag in the accuracy of 

information in the Marine Corps system until it is manually updated with 

information from the Norwegian system—a time-consuming process that 

introduces a vulnerability to errors. The Marine Corps and the Norwegians have 

taken some steps to mitigate these risks for the interim until the Marine Corps 

system is capable of replacing the Norwegian system. Additionally, relying on the 

Norwegian system for management information makes the Marine Corps 

vulnerable to any weaknesses that may exist within the Norwegian system. 

However, the Marine Corps has not conducted a quality assurance review of the 

Norwegian system. Performing such a review would constitute a key step toward 

mitigating potential weaknesses in the Norwegian system.

View GAO-15-651. For more information, 

contact Cary Russell at (202) 512-5431 or 

russellc@gao.gov.

United States Government Accountability Office
Letter 1

Background 3

MCPP-N Is Changing Its Equipment Mix to Address U.S. 

European Command and U.S. Africa Command Requirements 9

Marine Corps’ Cost Estimates for Funding MCPP-N’s Equipment 

Sustainment May Not Be Fully Reliable 12

Marine Corps Reliance on the Norwegian System Poses 

Management Challenges and Data Reliability Risks, and 

Quality Assurance Procedures Do Not Include a Review of the 

System 17

Conclusions 25

Recommendations for Executive Action 26

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 26

Appendix I Scope, and Methodology 29

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 34

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 37

Related GAO Products 38

Tables

Table 1: Marine Corps and Navya Annual Contributions to the 

Marine Corps Prepositioning Program – Norway for Fiscal 

Years 2010-2014 8

Table 2: Organizations and Their Roles and Responsibilities in 

Managing the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program –

Norway 9

Table 3: Marine Corps Prepositioning Program - Norway Budget 

Estimates for Direct Costs for Operations and 

Maintenance for Fiscal Years 2015 to 2019a 13

Table 4: GAO’s Assessment of the Marine Corps Prepositioning 

Program – Norway’s Projected Budget for Fiscal Years 

Contents

Page i GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 
2015 – 2019 Based on the Four Characteristics of a 

Reliable Cost Estimate 14

Table 5: Department of Defense Locations Visited and Contacted 30

Table 6: Non-Department of Defense Organizations and 

Individuals Visited or Contacted 30

Figures

Figure 1: Locations of the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program –

Norway Storage and Maintenance Facilities, 2014 4

Figure 2: Norwegian Constructed Pier in Hammernesodden, 

Norway, 2014 5

Figure 3: Equipment Offloading USNS Williams at Pier in 

Hammernesodden, Norway, 2014 6

Figure 4: HMMWVs at Frigard Cave, Norway, 2014 7

Abbreviations 

DOD Department of Defense 

HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 

MCPP-N Marine Corps Prepositioning Program – Norway 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

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Page ii GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 
441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

September 17, 2015

The Honorable John McCain 

Chairman 

The Honorable Jack Reed

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Marine Corps Prepositioning Program - Norway (MCPP-N) was 

established in 1981 as part of the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

agreement to support the defense of Norway, as well as to support global 

U.S. Marine Corps expeditionary operations. In 2005, the United States 

and Norway renewed the memorandum of understanding that governs 

the prepositioning of MCPP-N equipment. MCPP-N is part of DOD’s 

overall prepositioning program, whereby each of the military services 

prepositions stocks such as combat vehicles and repair parts worth 

billions of dollars at strategic locations around the world. Both afloat and 

ashore, prepositioning enables DOD to field combat-ready forces in days, 

rather than the weeks it would take if stocks had to be moved from the 

United States to the locations of conflicts. Since 1991, equipment stored 

in Norway as part of MCPP-N has been withdrawn and relocated within 

the geographic areas of either U.S. European Command or of U.S. Africa 

Command to support a variety of efforts, such as training and exercises, 

humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and contingency operations. 

Since 2005 the Marine Corps has spent about $117.6 million to support 

MCPP-N, which is its only land-based prepositioning program. Over the 

same period of time, the Norwegian Ministry of Defence has contributed 

approximately $94.5 million in support of the program. Since 2012 the 

Marine Corps has been transforming MCPP-N from an engineering and 

transportation capability to a Marine Air Ground Task Force capability, 

which includes combat vehicles and other tactical equipment, to enhance 

Letter

Page 1 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 
its relevance to DOD’s combatant commands.1 The transformation is 

expected to be completed in fiscal year 2016.2

Senate Report 113-176, accompanying the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, included a provision that we 

review MCPP-N. In this report we determine the extent to which (1) 

MCPP-N addresses U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command 

requirements; (2) reliable cost estimates exist to fund MCPP-N’s 

sustainment of equipment to support a Marine Air Ground Task Force 

capability; and, (3) the Marine Corps has quality assurance procedures in 

place to monitor the management of MCPP-N.

To determine the extent to which MCPP-N addresses U.S. European 

Command and U.S. Africa Command requirements, we obtained and 

reviewed Marine Corps plans and policies on MCPP-N detailing the 

program and its support to the Marine Corps and combatant commands; 

collected and reviewed combatant command contingency plans 

containing information on their strategic and operational requirements, 

including the need for a Marine Air Ground Task Force capability. We 

focused our review on ground equipment, rather than aviation support 

equipment, stored at MCPP-N because the program is transforming the 

ground equipment set from an engineering and transportation capability 

to a combat capability that supports a Marine Air Ground Task Force. To 

determine the extent to which reliable cost estimates exist to fund MCPPN’s sustainment of equipment to support a Marine Air Ground Task Force 

capability, we collected and analyzed projected budget data for MCPP-N 

from fiscal years 2015 through 2019 to identify the process and steps 

used to develop the budget estimates. We assessed the data to 

determine whether they were sufficiently reliable for our purposes and 

met GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide criteria for best 

practices for reliable cost estimates.3 Because the budget estimates did 

1 The Marine Air Ground Task Force is a balanced combination of ground, aviation, and 

logistics combat forces. As the Marine Corps’ principal organizational construct, it provides 

Combatant Commanders or Joint Task Force commanders with scalable and versatile 

expeditionary forces that are able to respond to a broad range of crisis and conflict.

2 U.S. Marine Corps, NAVMC 2907: Prepositioning Objective for Maritime Prepositioning 

Force and Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 

2015).

3 GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Cost, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2009). 

Page 2 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 

 
not meet all of the characteristics of a reliable cost estimate, we 

considered them not to be fully reliable. To determine the extent to which 

the Marine Corps has quality assurance procedures in place to monitor 

the management of MCPP-N, we obtained copies of quality assurance 

instruction documents and collected and analyzed quality assurance 

reports. We conducted a site visit to MCPP-N to observe base facilities, 

equipment stored in caves, and related logistics movement capabilities. 

We interviewed officials at Headquarters Marine Corps, Marine Corps 

Blount Island Command, Marine Corps Logistics Command Comptroller, 

U.S. European Command, U.S. Africa Command, Marine Forces Europe 

and Africa, U.S. Embassy Oslo, Norway, and the Norwegian Defence 

Logistics Organization to learn about their roles and responsibilities in 

support of the program in Norway. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2014 to September 

2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives, scope, and methodology. 

MCPP-N consists of six climate-controlled caves spread across central 

Norway that are used for the storage of U.S.-owned munitions and 

ground equipment.4 In addition, the Norwegian Defence Logistics 

Organization manages two aviation maintenance facilities that contain 

U.S.-owned aviation support equipment, co-located at Norwegian 

airfields, and a pier used for offloading equipment from ships. Figure 1 

identifies the locations of these caves, airfield maintenance facilities, and 

the pier.

4 The equipment maintained in Norway belongs to the U.S. Marine Corps with the 

exception of rations owned by the Defense Logistics Agency. 

Background

Page 3 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 

 
Figure 1: Locations of the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program – Norway Storage 

and Maintenance Facilities, 2014

According to Marine Corps officials, the Norwegian government 

completed construction of a new pier near the cave at Hammernesodden 

in July 2014 to facilitate the ability of large U.S. ships to transport large 

combat vehicles and other equipment into central Norway. Marine Corps 

and Norwegian officials stated that this pier was paid for solely by the 

Norwegian government at a cost of approximately $22.5 million (see 

figure 2).

Page 4 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 
Figure 2: Norwegian Constructed Pier in Hammernesodden, Norway, 2014

In August 2014 the Navy and the Marine Corps transported a large 

shipment of combat and other equipment to Norway in support of a 

transformation to a Marine Air Ground Task Force capability, according to 

Marine Corps Blount Island Command and Norwegian officials. The 

equipment transported for storage in the six caves included variants of 

the M1114 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), M1A1 

Main Battle Tanks, Tank Retrievers, Armored Breeching Vehicles, 

Amphibious Assault Vehicles, and several variants of the Medium Tactical 

Vehicle 7 1⁄2-ton trucks. The photographs below (figs. 3 and 4) show the 

offloading of the USNS Williams at the newly constructed pier at 

Hammernesodden and provide an example of the type of ground 

equipment used to support a Marine Air Ground Task Force that can be 

found at MCPP-N caves.

Page 5 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 
Figure 3: Equipment Offloading USNS Williams at Pier in Hammernesodden, 

Norway, 2014

Page 6 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 
Figure 4: HMMWVs at Frigard Cave, Norway, 2014

As part of the 2005 memorandum of understanding between the United 

States and Norway, the United States will provide military equipment to 

be stored in the Norwegian-built caves, and Norway will provide the 

infrastructure to support the program and will maintain the equipment 

provided by the United States.5 Both countries agree to share the 

program’s operations and maintenance expenses. Under the cost-sharing 

portion of the agreement, each country agrees to match the other’s 

financial contributions up to an agreed upon threshold, which in fiscal 

year 2014 was $10.5 million each. The cost-sharing agreement does set 

a maximum contribution by Norway, limiting its contribution either to half 

of the total costs incurred or to the ceiling set in U.S. dollars to be 

negotiated, whichever is less. Table 1 below illustrates the Marine Corps 

5 DOD, Memorandum of Understanding Governing Prestockage and Reinforcement of 

Norway (Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2005).

Program Costs

Page 7 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 

 
and Navy’s total annual contributions covering the actual direct and 

indirect programmatic costs for MCPP-N from fiscal years 2010 to 2014. 

According to officials from the office of the Deputy Commandant of the 

Marine Corps for Installations and Logistics, the direct costs for MCPP-N 

include all operations and maintenance expenses incurred by the Marine 

Corps for both ground equipment and aviation support equipment. In 

addition, indirect costs cover administrative expenses incurred by Blount 

Island Command and other Marine Corps organizations as part of the 

execution of the program.

Table 1: Marine Corps and Navya Annual Contributions to the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program – Norway for Fiscal Years 

2010-2014

(in thousands) FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014

Direct Costs $6,649 $5,960 $7,825 $8,736 $11,945

Indirect Costs $4,697 $4,697 $4,697 $4,697 $4,697

Total $11,346 $10,657 $12,522 $13,432 $16,642

Source: Marine Corps Logistics Command | GAO-15-651.

aNavy annual contributions to MCPP-N provide aviation support to the 2nd Marine Aircraft Wing 

which is a component of the II Marine Expeditionary Force.

Five organizations are responsible for the support and operation of 

MCPP-N. Four Marine Corps organizations are responsible for the 

planning, funding, and management of MCPP-N. The fifth organization, 

the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization, is responsible for 

providing program infrastructure and maintaining MCPP-N equipment 

prepositioned in Norway. Table 2 below summarizes the primary roles 

and responsibilities of each organization. 

Organizational 

Responsibilities

Page 8 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 
Table 2: Organizations and Their Roles and Responsibilities in Managing the Marine 

Corps Prepositioning Program – Norway

Country/Organization Roles and Responsibilities

U.S. Marine Corps

Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, 

and Operations

Serves as the Commandant’s executive 

agent and advocate for Marine Corps’

prepositioning programs. Establishes 

operational policies and procedures and 

represents the programs to the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and 

Department of the Navy.

Deputy Commandant for Installations 

and Logistics

Serves as the budget and logistics 

sponsor for the Marine Corps’

prepositioning programs. Leads the 

sequential planning process that 

determines the Marine Corps’

prepositioning objective.

Commanding General, Marine Corps 

Logistics Command

Serves as Marine Corps’ lead for 

attaining, maintaining, and providing 

logistics support for Marine Corps 

prepositioned equipment and supplies.

Blount Island Command Plans, coordinates, and executes the 

logistics efforts in support of the Marine 

Corps’ prepositioning programs.

Norway – Ministry of Defence

Norwegian Defence Logistics 

Organization

Plans, schedules, and performs 

equipment maintenance. Performs 

logistics functions, including inventory 

management, maintenance of technical 

data, facility utilization planning, training, 

and computer resource support. 

Source: GAO Analysis of Marine Corps guidance| GAO-15-651.

The Marine Corps is changing its mix of equipment to address the U.S. 

European and U.S. Africa commands’ strategic and theater-specific 

operational requirements. Both combatant commands have identified in 

their contingency plans the need for prepositioned equipment within their 

respective geographic areas to support their operational requirements 

and capabilities. The U.S. European Command’s Theater Posture Plan 

identifies Trondheim, Norway, as a stand-alone prepositioning site for 

MCPP-N capable of providing equipment to a wide variety of operations. 

In addition, officials from the U.S. European Command stated that they 

have developed and are continuing to develop contingency plans that 

specifically call upon the Marine Corps to maintain prepositioned 

equipment in Europe to support strategic and theater-specific operational 

MCPP-N Is Changing 

Its Equipment Mix to 

Address U.S. 

European Command 

and U.S. Africa 

Command 

Requirements

Page 9 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 
requirements. Although those U.S. Africa Command plans that reference 

a need for access to prepositioned equipment do not specifically identify 

MCPP-N as an asset to meet that need, both Marine Corps and U.S. 

Africa Command officials stated that MCPP-N has served and can 

continue to serve as a global support asset to meet combatant command 

requirements.

Both U.S. European and U.S. Africa Command identify prepositioned 

equipment in their contingency plans as providing capabilities to support 

efforts such as crisis response, humanitarian and disaster assistance, 

and counter-terrorism activities. The Marine Corps reported that it 

routinely uses MCPP-N equipment sets to support European training and 

exercises, including the biennial Cold Response exercise in Norway, 

which trains U.S., Norwegian, and other NATO-allied military forces to 

operate in cold weather environments; and an annual training activity to 

carry out security cooperation efforts with the Marine Corps’ Black Sea 

Rotational Force and other foreign militaries. Marine Corps officials stated 

that MCPP-N equipment has been used to support training and exercises 

across the African continent, including the Shared Accord and African 

Lion exercises, and could be used for other assistance efforts in Africa.

From February 1991 to March 2014 the Marine Corps reported that it 

withdrew equipment from MCPP-N caves in support of training, exercises, 

and operations within Europe, Africa, Iraq, and Afghanistan. These 

principal end items included tanks, amphibious armored vehicles, light 

armored vehicles, trucks, and tractors. Marine Corps officials estimated6

during this period that more than 3,000 principal end items were 

withdrawn from MCPP-N in support of various training and exercise 

events, and more than 2,000 principal end items were withdrawn in 

support of military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Further, officials 

estimated more than 150 principal end items were withdrawn to support 

other contingency operations within the European Command’s 

geographic area, ranging from supporting a Special Purpose Marine Air 

6 The Marine Corps provided us with a compilation of withdrawal data of principal and 

non-principal end items from MCPP-N storage caves from February 1991 to March 2014. 

Marine Corps officials reported that these withdrawal data were compiled from exercise 

after-action reports, available historical records from Marine Corps Headquarters and 

Blount Island Command, and other available Marine Corps correspondence identifying the 

types and quantities of equipment withdrawn. Marine Corps officials could not attest to the 

level of completeness of the estimates provided, and therefore they are of undetermined 

reliability. 

Page 10 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 

 
Ground Task Force in Spain to providing humanitarian assistance in 

Turkey and the Republic of Georgia. Marine Corps officials estimated that 

about 50,000 non-principal end items7 such as sandbags, rations, tents, 

and cots were withdrawn from MCPP-N over the same period to support 

various training and exercises as well as contingency operations in 

Europe, Africa, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In addition, Marine Corps officials 

reported that MCPP-N equipment was used to provide humanitarian and 

disaster relief assistance in response to a major earthquake in Turkey in 

2011 and wildfires in Russia in 2010. Further, Marine Corps officials 

stated that the same equipment used for training in cold weather 

environments could also support DOD’s Arctic Strategy8 for potential 

military operations in the Arctic regions, although officials stated that the 

Marine Corps has conducted no such operations to date. 

In January 2012 the Commandant of the Marine Corps issued planning 

guidance that called for MCPP-N to be able to support a Marine Air 

Ground Task Force. Subsequently, the Marine Corps began its effort to 

change the mix of equipment found at MCPP-N storage facilities. This 

change occurred as a response to DOD’s efficiency initiatives, to 

strengthen the effectiveness of MCPP-N, and to bolster the Marine Corps’

prepositioning capabilities. In addition, as a result of the Department of 

the Navy’s decision to discontinue in 2012 a maritime prepositioning ship 

squadron located within the Mediterranean, the U.S. European Command 

has heightened its reliance on MCPP-N to support its prepositioning 

requirements. The Marine Corps guidance specifically calls for MCPP-N 

to be able to support a force of approximately 4,500 Marines to respond 

to the first 2 weeks of combat at the mid-intensity conflict level of the 

range of military operations, and to support theater security cooperation 

activities. Marine Corps officials stated that the equipment set at MCPP-N 

is intended to provide the capabilities to enable a Marine Corps force to 

respond to any type of crisis or operation globally, and thus MCPP-N is 

not assigned to any specific combatant command.

7 In addition to the estimated 50,000 non-principal end items, Marine Corps officials from 

the Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations estimated that about 650,000 

non-principal end items were withdrawn to provide disaster response to the 1995 

Norwegian floods. 

8 DOD, Arctic Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: November 2013).

Page 11 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 

 
To ensure that MCPP-N effectively meets the Marine Corps’ needs and

better aligns with combatant command strategic and theater-specific 

operational requirements, the Marine Corps annually updates the mix of 

equipment found at MCPP-N storage facilities in Norway. The current 

prepositioning objective, which was last revised in February 2015, calls 

for MCPP-N to support crisis response-type missions and theater security 

cooperation engagement activities for the combatant commands.9 It also 

calls for an equipment set that includes combat equipment such as 

HMMWVs, light armored vehicles, amphibious armored vehicles, and 

Abrams tanks necessary to support mid-intensity conflicts. Marine Corps 

officials stated that as of March 2015 MCPP-N had acquired 63 percent of 

the equipment it needed to meet its current prepositioning objective. 

Marine Corps officials we interviewed observed, however, that this 

attainment level of equipment may change periodically, depending on the 

Marine Corps’ identified prepositioning needs, as the prepositioning 

objective is generally revised on an annual basis.

Marine Corps cost estimates for sustaining the equipment to support a 

Marine Air Ground Task Force capability may not be fully reliable, in that 

they do not fully meet the four general characteristics for reliable cost 

estimating—that is, being accurate, well-documented, credible, and 

comprehensive—as identified in GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment 

Guide. Reliable cost estimates provide the basis for informed investment 

decision making and realistic budget formulation and program resourcing. 

9 NAVMC 2907.

Marine Corps’ Cost 

Estimates for Funding 

MCPP-N’s Equipment 

Sustainment May Not 

Be Fully Reliable

Page 12 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 

 
Each year, the Logistics Plans and Operations Branch of the Deputy 

Commandant of the Marine Corps for Installations and Logistics 

consolidates the Marine Corps’ portion of direct program costs10 for 

MCPP-N in support of developing a consolidated and comprehensive 

budget estimate for the program objective memorandum.

11 This includes 

a 5-year budget projection to fund program initiatives—such as the costsharing agreement with Norway—and theater security cooperation 

requirements for the U.S. European and U.S. Africa Commands. Current 

Marine Corps guidance requires budget estimates to contain defendable 

funding requirements that extend across multiple fiscal years and support 

both short- and long-term program objectives. The Marine Corps’

approved program objective memorandum for MCPP-N for fiscal years 

2015 to 2019 includes budget estimates (see table 3) for direct costs for 

operations and maintenance.

Table 3: Marine Corps Prepositioning Program - Norway Budget Estimates for Direct Costs for Operations and Maintenance 

for Fiscal Years 2015 to 2019a

Fiscal Year 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Total

Dollars (in thousands) $5,353 $5,482 $5,539 $5,537 $5,631 $27,542

Source: Marine Corps Installation and Logistics, Logistics Plans and Operations Branch| GAO-15-651.

a

These estimates only include projected Marine Corps’ costs for operations and maintenance of 

MCPP-N ground equipment and do not include other projected costs, such as the Navy’s support to 

the 2nd Marine Air Wing’s aviation support equipment.

According to GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide, the cost 

estimate is a critical element in the budgeting process that helps decision 

makers to evaluate resource requirements at milestones and other 

important decision points. Cost estimates establish and defend budgets 

and drive affordability analyses.12 The guide identifies four characteristics 

10 The Marine Corps’ portion of direct program costs that we assessed is maintained 

under the 1B1B budget account that represents funds specifically allocated by Congress 

for prepositioning. 

11 The program objective memorandum is a recommendation from the services and other 

defense agencies to the Secretary of Defense concerning how they plan to allocate 

resources for a program to meet the service program guidance and Defense Planning 

Guidance. The program objective memorandum covers the 5-year Future Year Defense 

Program and presents the services’ and other defense agencies’ proposal on how they 

will balance their allocation of available resources. 

12 GAO-09-3SP.

Marine Corps Develops 

Program Objective 

Memorandum for Marine 

Corps Prepositioning 

Program - Norway

Marine Corps Cost 

Estimates for MCPP-N Are 

Not Fully Reliable 

Page 13 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 

 
of reliable cost estimates—that is, they should be accurate, welldocumented, credible, and comprehensive. Based on our review of the 

budget estimates identified in the program objective memorandum budget 

for MCPP-N for fiscal years 2015 to 2019, we found that the Marine 

Corps’ cost estimates for MCPP-N (1) partially met the “accurate”

characteristic; (2) partially met the “well-documented” characteristic; (3) 

did not meet the “credible” characteristic; and (4) partially met the 

“comprehensive” characteristic of a reliable estimate. Table 4 provides 

more information on our assessment of the program objective 

memorandum budget for MCPP-N based on the four characteristics. 

Table 4: GAO’s Assessment of the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program – Norway’s Projected Budget for Fiscal Years 2015 –

2019 Based on the Four Characteristics of a Reliable Cost Estimate 

Characteristic Best Practices

Assessment 

Ratinga Brief Explanation of GAO’s Assessment

Accurate Estimates are accurate when they are adjusted 

properly for inflation and contain few, if any, 

minor mistakes. Cost estimates should be 

updated regularly to reflect significant changes 

so that they are always reflecting the current 

status, and should be based on historical 

costs.

Partially Met The Marine Corps updates its cost 

estimates annually as part of the budget 

execution and program objective 

memorandum development process, but 

variances between planned and actual 

costs are not tracked, and source data 

and calculations for all cost elements are 

not documented.

Well-documented Well-documented cost estimates are

supported by detailed documentation that

describes how they were derived and how they 

expect funding will be spent to achieve a given 

objective.

Documentation should include discussions of 

how cost estimates were normalized and 

evidence that the cost estimates were 

reviewed and accepted by management.

Partially Met The Marine Corps described its process 

for developing the program objective 

memorandum and its approval, but did 

not provide documentation showing 

source data used to develop cost 

estimates, or a description of how the 

estimates were developed. 

Credible Cost estimates should be cross-checked to 

determine whether other estimating methods 

produce similar results.

Not Met The Marine Corps did not compare or 

cross-check the estimating methods when 

developing its estimates. 

Comprehensive Comprehensive cost estimates should include 

all costs necessary to achieve agency 

objectives; a standardized structure that allows 

a program to track cost and schedule 

consistently over time; sufficient detail to 

ensure that cost elements are neither omitted 

nor double- counted; and all cost-influencing 

ground rules and assumptions.

Partially Met The Marine Corps included all program 

costs associated with the prepositioning 

program in Norway, but did not identify a 

specific funding plan to transition the 

program to a Marine Air Ground Task 

Force; did not have a standardized 

structure for collecting detailed costs; and 

did not include all cost-influencing ground 

rules and assumptions.

Source: GAO | GAO-15-651

a

We assessed each characteristic by assigning each individual rating a number: Not Met = 1, 

Minimally Met = 2, Partially Met =3, Substantially Met = 4, and Met = 5. We took the average of the 

individual assessment ratings to determine the overall rating for each of the four characteristics. The 

Page 14 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 
resulting average becomes the overall assessment, as follows: Not Met = 1.0 to 1.4, Minimally Met = 

1.5 to 2.4, Partially Met = 2.5 to 3.4, Substantially Met = 3.5 to 4.4, and Met = 4.5 to 5.0. A cost 

estimate is considered reliable if the overall assessment ratings for each of the four characteristics 

are substantially or fully met. If any of the characteristics are not met, minimally met, or partially met, 

then the cost estimate does not fully reflect the characteristics of a reliable estimate.

We found that the cost estimates partially met the characteristic for 

accuracy in that the Marine Corps program objective memorandum 

estimates for MCPP-N are updated as part of both the budget execution 

and program objective memorandum development processes. However, 

officials at the Office of the Deputy Commandant for Installations and 

Logistics told us that while Marine Corps components maintain source 

data or calculations, the components are not required to include this 

information as part of their cost estimate submissions. In addition, the 

Marine Corps does not track the variances between planned and actual 

costs to demonstrate the accuracy of its cost estimates and how the 

program is changing over time. We, therefore, could not assess whether 

the estimates were properly adjusted for inflation, nor could we check the 

results for accuracy. Without access to cost estimate details, the accuracy 

of the estimates cannot be determined. 

We found that the cost estimates partially met the well-documented 

characteristic in that the documentation provided by the Marine Corps 

does not include the source data used to develop the cost estimates for 

the program objective memorandum process. The documentation does 

not reflect the calculations performed or the estimating methodologies 

used by the Marine Corps, and does not describe the step-by-step 

process used to develop the estimate. Without well-documented cost 

estimates that include calculations and estimating methodologies, the 

Installations and Logistics office cannot provide complete answers to 

questions about the development of cost estimates or explain the reasons 

behind changes to the estimates over time.

We found that estimates did not meet the characteristic for credibility. 

Based on our review of the program objective memorandum 

documentation for MCPP-N, we did not find documentation to 

demonstrate that systematic cross-checks of major cost elements were 

performed. Marine Corps Installation and Logistics officials stated that 

they do not perform cross-checks to assess the component and 

subordinate commands’ proposed budget estimates, and that if questions 

arise about the components and subordinate commands’ assumptions 

they engage in discussions to understand the reasoning behind them. 

However, this method used by the Installations and Logistics office to 

determine the accuracy of the components’ and subordinate commands’

Page 15 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 
assumptions cannot easily be replicated by an independent party. Such 

cross-checks of major cost elements can reveal whether applying a 

different cost-estimating method produces similar results. Without 

credible cost estimates, the Installations and Logistics office may not be 

able to determine the level of risk, uncertainty, or confidence associated 

with achieving proposed budget estimates. Consequently, management 

may have difficulty in identifying the available resources needed to 

address budget estimates in future program objective memorandum 

cycles to meet MCPP-N program requirements.

We found the cost estimates to be partially comprehensive in that they 

included all types of program costs supporting MCPP-N but did not 

include a detailed funding plan on the costs to transform the program to 

support a Marine Air Ground Task Force. Marine Corps officials stated 

that they had no specific funding plan for the transformation because it 

was not a fiscally driven event. Officials stated, however, that identifying 

all costs associated with the transformation would prove difficult because 

they do not track all funding sources that support MCPP-N, such as 

transportation costs, which are tracked through a separate budget 

account. However, we found that they did identify some costs needed to 

support the transformation. For instance, officials identify costs of about 

$750,000 for fiscal year 2016 to employ three U.S. contractors in Norway 

to manage cryptographic equipment as part of a caretaker detachment. 

They also stated that between fiscal years 2012 and 2013 about $2 

million was apportioned from another prepositioning program source to 

procure support items such as ancillary gear, lubricants, and batteries to 

operate and sustain new equipment supporting the Marine Air Ground 

Task Force.

We also found that there was no standardized structure for collecting 

costs at a level of detail necessary to demonstrate that estimates are 

acceptable and reflect justification of resources. While Marine Forces 

generally are required to submit budget requests in a specific template to 

the Marine Corps’ Logistics Plans and Operations Branch, Blount Island 

Command is not required to use any template. Further, the costestimating documentation provided within the program objective 

memorandum submission did not include specific details on all factors 

and assumptions influencing costs, such as inflation indexes and potential 

costs arising from the purchase of parts to support new equipment sets 

such as tanks, amphibious assault vehicles, light armored vehicles, and 

communication capabilities. By not having a standardized structure for 

collecting cost estimates across organizations, the Installations and 

Page 16 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 
Logistics office cannot be certain that it has all the information necessary 

to ensure that the cost estimates provided are correct.

Marine Corps officials stated that while they have taken some steps to

improve their cost estimates for developing the budget, the current DOD 

guidance for developing the program objective memorandum does not 

include procedures that embody the characteristics of reliable cost 

estimating as identified in GAO’s prior work. In their view, better guidance 

would enable them to ensure that subordinate and component commands 

understand how to develop and document cost estimates. Officials stated 

that in response to recent changes with the consolidation of the program 

objective memorandum for prepositioning programs,13 the Marine Corps 

is drafting guidance for assisting in the development of budget plans. As 

of May 2015 the draft guidance had not been finalized, but Marine Corps 

officials stated they had no plans for the new guidance, which they expect 

to issue in the fall of 2015, to address the four characteristics of reliable 

cost estimates.

The Marine Corps relies upon the Norwegian Equipment Information 

Management System for data needed to manage its equipment inventory 

at MCPP-N due to long-standing limitations in the Global Combat Support 

System - Marine Corps. Although the Marine Corps is working to improve 

its information system, these solutions will likely take several years to 

implement. The reliance on two different information systems, one of 

which is owned and operated by a foreign government, creates several 

management challenges and risks to data reliability for the Marine Corps.

For example, it results in a time lag in the accuracy of information in the 

Marine Corps system until that system is manually updated with 

information from the Norwegian system—a process that is timeconsuming and vulnerable to the risk of introduction of errors. However, 

the Marine Corps and the Norwegians have taken some steps to mitigate 

these risks for the interim until the Marine Corps system is capable of 

replacing the Norwegian system. Additionally, relying on the Norwegian 

system for management information makes the Marine Corps vulnerable 

to any weaknesses that may exist within the Norwegian system.

13 In fiscal year 2011, the Marine Corps consolidated the program objective memorandum 

for the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program – Norway and the Maritime Prepositioning 

Force. Prior to this change, the Norway Program and Maritime Prepositioning Force were 

budgeted separately.

Marine Corps 

Reliance on the 

Norwegian System 

Poses Management 

Challenges and Data 

Reliability Risks, and 

Quality Assurance 

Procedures Do Not

Include a Review of 

the System

Page 17 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 

 
Nevertheless, the Marine Corps has not conducted a quality assurance 

review of the Norwegian system. Performing such a review would be 

consistent with Marine Corps regulations and federal internal control 

standards, and it would constitute a key step toward mitigating potential 

weaknesses in the Norwegian Equipment Information Management 

System.

The Marine Corps relies on two different information systems—(1) the 

Global Combat Support System - Marine Corps, and (2) the Norwegian 

Equipment Information Management System—to maintain visibility and 

accountability over prepositioned assets stored at MCPP-N. The Global 

Combat Support System - Marine Corps is the service’s enterprise-wide 

logistics information management system designed to serve as the 

backbone for all logistics information required by a Marine Air Ground 

Task Force. The Norwegian Equipment Information Management System 

is the data system that the Marine Corps and its Norwegian counterparts 

relied on to manage the ground equipment until 2012. Since July 2012, 

Blount Island Command has used the Global Combat Support System -

Marine Corps14 as the official program of record for maintenance, spare 

parts, and cost data related to the management of MCPP-N equipment. 

However, due to limitations in the Marine Corps’ system, the Marine 

Corps continues to rely on the Norwegian system for key inventory 

management data. For example, the Global Combat Support System -

Marine Corps lacks a warehousing application and other data 

management capabilities that Blount Island Command needs to 

effectively manage MCPP-N equipment stored in the Norwegian caves. 

As noted earlier, Marine Corps equipment is distributed among six caves. 

While the current version of the Global Combat Support System – Marine 

Corps can track which cave each piece of equipment is stored in, the 

system cannot record the equipment’s specific location within the cave. 

According to Norwegian officials, given the size of the caves, having the 

equipment’s specific location within each cave is essential for efficient 

equipment management. For example, the exact location of the 

14 GAO, Defense Major Automated Information Systems: Cost and Schedule 

Commitments Need to Be Established Earlier, GAO-15-282 (Washington, D.C.: February 

26, 2015). The Global Combat Support System - Marine Corps is the primary technology 

enabler for the Marine Corps’ logistics modernization strategy and provides the backbone 

for all logistics information required by the Marine Air Ground Task Force. 

The Marine Corps

Relies on Data from the 

Norwegian Equipment 

Information Management 

System to Manage Its 

MCPP-N Equipment 

Inventory

Page 18 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 

 
equipment is critical to conducting efficient inventory checks and 

scheduled maintenance, and for withdrawing equipment for training 

exercises, humanitarian relief efforts, and contingency operations. As a 

result, the Marine Corps is reliant on the Norwegian System for this 

information.

These limitations in the capabilities of the Global Combat Support System 

– Marine Corps are long-standing issues that the Marine Corps has 

recognized and is working to address. For example, as we reported in 

March 2014, according to Marine Corps Business System Integration 

Team officials, the initial plan was for the first version of the Global 

Combat Support System - Marine Corps, referred to as Increment 1, to 

include a warehousing application.15 However, as the rollout progressed 

through 2012, the officials stated that technical challenges, cost 

increases, and schedule delays caused the Marine Corps to lack 

sufficient funds to incorporate the warehousing application in Increment 1. 

Over the past several years we have issued a series of reports on the 

acquisition of major automated information systems. Our 2014 and 2015 

reports included a review of the Global Combat Support System - Marine 

Corps and the associated challenges entailed in implementing Increment 

1.16

According to officials from Blount Island Command, when it became 

apparent that Increment 1 would lack the needed warehousing 

application, the Marine Corps explored available options with the 

Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization. They elected to continue 

using the Norwegian Equipment Information Management System 

because it contained a warehousing and inventory management 

application. Marine Corps Headquarters and Blount Island Command 

officials stated that they intend to discontinue their reliance on the 

Norwegian system once a warehousing application becomes available on 

the Marine Corps’ system. In the meantime, they will rely on the two 

information systems to provide all the computer functions necessary for 

effective inventory management. Marine Corps officials stated that they 

15 GAO, Major Automated Information Systems: Selected Defense Programs Need to 

Implement Key Acquisition Practices, GAO-14-309 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27, 2014).

The Global Combat Support System—Marine Corps Increment 1 was intended to support 

logistics planners and operators worldwide to manage combat logistics, including 

planning, warehousing, distribution, depot maintenance, and asset visibility. 

16 GAO-14-309 and GAO-15-282.

Page 19 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 

 
did not know when the warehousing application will become available but 

expect it to be incorporated into a future increment, provided that there 

are available funds.17

While Marine Corps and Norwegian officials agree that retaining the 

Norwegian system is the best available option until the Marine Corps 

system is capable of completely replacing the Norwegian system, several 

challenges exist with respect to managing the interface between the two 

independent information systems. For example, because these systems 

are owned by separate governments, security concerns prevent the 

Marine Corps from allowing the systems to directly interact electronically.

Consequently, inventory data from the Norwegian Equipment Information 

Management System is required to be manually extracted and uploaded 

into the Global Combat Support System – Marine Corps. This results in a 

time lag for the accuracy of information in the Marine Corps system, until 

it is manually updated with information from the Norwegian system—a 

process that is time-consuming and creates the risk for errors. The 

Marine Corps and the Norwegians have taken some steps to mitigate the 

risks in this process until the Marine Corps system replaces the 

Norwegian system. For example, Blount Island Command and Norwegian 

Defense Logistics Organization officials stated that they have a process 

to identify discrepancies between the two systems and then use a Marine 

Corps contractor to validate and enter inventory data from the Norwegian 

system to update the Marine Corps system.

The following overview of the flow of inventory data as equipment arrives 

and is stored in the six Norwegian caves shows how data reliability 

challenges arise from the use of these two systems. Specifically, 

equipment designated for MCPP-N is assigned to Blount Island 

Command in the Global Combat Support System – Marine Corps. After 

undergoing a maintenance process at Blount Island Command to ensure 

that it is ready for use, the equipment is shipped to Norway for storage, 

and its shipment data are entered into the Marine Corps system. As was 

explained and demonstrated to us, when equipment arrives in Norway, 

17 Global Combat Support System - Marine Corps, Business System Integration Team 

officials stated that the plan for Increment 2 of the Global Combat Support System -

Marine Corps is to develop and incorporate a modern Tactical Warehouse Management 

System. In May 2015 officials stated that Increment 2 was in the early conceptual stage, 

and a timeline for its implementation had not yet been determined.

Reliance on Two 

Information Management 

Systems to Store 

Inventory Data Creates 

Management Challenges 

and Data Reliability Risks

Page 20 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 

 
the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization records its receipt and 

inventory data in the Norwegian Equipment Information Management 

System. Once the Norwegian staff have assigned an equipment storage 

location—the designated cave and the equipment’s location within that 

cave—they transfer the key data elements that can be added to the 

Marine Corps system to an interim database known as the “Change Log.”

Norwegian officials explained that one of their former staff created the 

Change Log feature in the Norwegian system in January 2014 to provide 

a mechanism whereby Norwegian staff could resolve discrepancies in the 

inventory data between the Marine Corps and Norwegian systems, in 

consultation with the Marine Corps contractors. The contractors receiving 

data from the Change Log are responsible for reviewing and validating 

the submitted equipment’s cave location and other inventory data before 

updating the record in the Global Combat Support System - Marine 

Corps.

According to Norwegian officials, the Change Log has been instrumental 

in reducing the backlog of data discrepancies from more than 3,000 in 

January 2014 to fewer than 800 in November 2014. They explained that 

these discrepancies between the Marine Corps and Norwegian systems 

developed largely due to the changing mix of equipment prepositioned at 

MCPP-N to support a Marine Air Ground Task Force capability.

Norwegian officials also reported mismatches in equipment serial 

numbers in both systems. They stated that as a result of such problems, 

a physical check of the serial number is often required to reconcile the 

data discrepancies between the two systems. Norwegian officials 

indicated that having its maintenance personnel provide additional 

information (documentation and photographs) to reconcile inventory data 

between the two systems negatively affects Norwegian maintenance 

operations because they have limited time maintenance resources.

The Change Log serves as an application control for information entering 

the Global Combat Support System - Marine Corps. Standards for 

Internal Control in the Federal Government state that an application 

control should be installed at an application’s interface with other systems 

to ensure that all inputs are received and that valid outputs are correct 

and properly distributed.18 The Change Log constitutes a computerized 

18 GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

Page 21 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 

 
“edit” built into the interface that helps the Marine Corps to review the 

format, existence, and reasonableness of the data from the Norwegian 

system before it enters the Marine Corps system.

While the Change Log demonstrates an application control to mitigate 

data discrepancies between the two information management systems, it 

does not represent a long-term solution. Marine Corps and Norwegian 

officials anticipate that data discrepancies will continue to occur whenever 

there is a change in the cave location of equipment—such as when it 

returns to a cave after maintenance, a training exercise, humanitarian 

relief effort, or contingency operation—and also when it enters a cave for 

the first time, due to decisions to upgrade or change the mix of 

preposition equipment. Until the Global Combat Support System – Marine 

Corps is modified to include a warehousing application and can replace 

the Norwegian system, Marine Corps and Norwegian officials will 

continue to rely on two information management systems that generate 

ongoing data discrepancies and related data reliability challenges.

The Marine Corps’ Blount Island Command conducts an annual quality 

assurance inspection to monitor, measure, and analyze data to ensure 

the effectiveness of MCPP-N. This inspection includes an assessment of 

the condition of the equipment and of the maintenance processes, along 

with a review of the inventory. However, the quality assurance inspection 

does not include a review of the Norwegian Equipment Information 

Management System, which serves as one of the key reporting systems 

for managing inventory data. Performing such a review would be 

consistent with Marine Corps regulations and federal internal control 

standards and would constitute a key step toward mitigating potential 

weaknesses in the Norwegian Equipment Information Management 

System.

The data standards for information systems supporting Marine Corps 

prepositioning are provided in Marine Corps Order 3000.17 and state that 

data must be accurate and timely, must provide visibility of prepositioning 

materiel to planners at all levels, must be maintained to standards at the 

source of generation, and must be standardized for both afloat and 

ashore prepositioning programs.19 The Marine Corps Order also 

19 Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Order 3000.17: Marine Corps Prepositioning 

Programs, (Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2013).

Marine Corps’ Annual 

Quality Assurance 

Inspection Process Does 

Not Include a Review of 

the Norwegian Equipment 

Information Management 

System

Page 22 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 

 
references the Marine Corps Technical Manual for MCPP-N, which states 

that Blount Island Command is responsible for developing and 

administering the Quality Assurance Program, and that the Quality 

Assurance Program shall include a review of shelf life items, scheduled 

maintenance and inventory cycles, and the adequacy of reporting 

systems. 20 In addition, the Blount Island Command Quality System 

Manual states that Blount Island Command retains the overall 

responsibility for exercising sufficient control for processes performed by 

external organizations that provide logistics support for MCPP-N.21

Federal internal control standards also indicate the need for a quality 

assurance review of the Norwegian system. According to those 

standards, information systems have two main types of control 

activities—general and application controls.22 General controls are the 

policies and procedures that apply to all or a large segment of an entity’s 

information systems and facilitate their proper operation, to include 

system development and maintenance, security, management, logical 

and physical access, access security, and contingency planning. 

Application controls are incorporated directly into computer applications to 

achieve validity, completeness, accuracy, and confidentiality of 

transactions and data during application processing. According to the 

standards for internal controls, general and application controls over 

computer systems are interrelated. General controls support the 

functioning of application controls, and both are needed to ensure 

complete and accurate information processing. If general controls are 

inadequate, application controls are unlikely to function properly and 

could be overridden.

A quality assurance review can entail reviewing selected general and 

application controls within the information system through activities such 

as:

• reviewing operating and database management systems;

20U.S. Marine Corps Technical Manual, Logistics Support for Marine Corps Prepositioning 

Program—Norway, TM 4790-14/1G (Washington, D.C., June 2013).

21 Blount Island Command, ISO 9001:2008 Quality System Manual, Revision D, 

(Jacksonville, Florida: December 28, 2012).

22 GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.

Page 23 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 

 
• assessing security controls that protect the system and network from 

inappropriate access or unauthorized use; and

• performing tests on the system to ensure that it has the proper edit 

checks to review the format, existence, and reasonableness of data.

Further, the Local Bilateral Agreement for MCPP-N, which serves as an 

internal working document between Blount Island Command and the 

Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization and outlines roles and 

responsibilities for each organization, identifies Blount Island Command 

as being responsible for completing annual quality assurance inspections 

on the maintenance and storage of equipment managed by the 

Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization.23 Blount Island Command 

officials stated that their annual quality assurance review does not focus 

on information systems, and they further noted that the Norwegians’

system is foreign-owned and therefore not within their jurisdiction. The 

Local Bilateral Agreement does not specifically require the Marine Corps 

to conduct a review of the Norwegian System. However, as a working 

document the agreement is regularly updated and can be amended to 

incorporate additional provisions such as allowing the Marine Corps to 

conduct a quality review of the Norwegian system.

The Norwegian Equipment Information Management System provides the 

Marine Corps with capabilities not currently available in its own system, 

such as the ability to track equipment calibration and a warehousing 

function, but Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization officials stated 

that they recognized their system has certain vulnerabilities. For example, 

during our review of their information system we observed several 

weaknesses, including minimal documentation on the system, the lack of 

formal training and procedures for staff performing data entry, and the 

reliance on a single person, a retired Norwegian staff member, for the 

system’s technical programming and maintenance needs. To address 

known data entry problems, Norwegian officials are considering a 

proposal that would limit the number of data entry points into the 

Norwegian system from three locations to one centrally managed 

location. However, Norwegian officials stated that they had not conducted 

an overall quality assurance review of the information system, thus raising 

further questions as to its potential vulnerabilities.

23 U.S. Marine Corps, Local Bilateral Agreement, 2013.

Page 24 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 

 
Although the current Local Bilateral Agreement does not contain guidance 

and instructions for conducting an assessment of the Norwegian 

Equipment Information Management System, the Marine Corps is 

responsible for ensuring that the Norwegian system is providing accurate 

data on the inventory for stored assets being managed at MCPP-N. 

Further, Marine Corps officials stated that they rely on the Norwegian 

system to carry out data management functions discussed above. 

Without performing a quality assurance review of the Norwegian system, 

MCPP-N is at risk for incurring potential vulnerabilities in its inventory 

data. If the Marine Corps does not provide a quality assurance review of 

the Norwegian system, it may not be able to determine whether inventory 

data are complete, accurate, reliable, and reasonably free from error, so 

as to ensure that equipment is readily available to support the combatant 

commanders’ requirements.

The Marine Corps is transforming MCPP-N’s posture from an engineering 

and transportation capability to a balanced Marine Air Ground Task Force 

capability that supports both the U.S. European and U.S. Africa 

commands’ operational requirements to obtain prepositioned equipment 

sets capable of supporting crisis response operations and theater security 

cooperation activities. While the Marine Corps continues to develop cost 

estimates for its budget to determine the level of funding needed to meet 

current and future program obligations for MCPP-N, its current methods 

do not fully meet the four characteristics of a reliable cost estimate. The 

Marine Corps has taken some steps to improve its efforts in developing 

reliable cost estimates by drafting new guidance for subordinate and 

component commands to develop budget estimates. While this 

represents a positive step, without fully incorporating the four 

characteristics of a reliable cost estimate in their draft guidance, the 

Marine Corps cannot ensure that its budget planning efforts for MCPP-N 

are based upon sound planning that is justifiable, defendable, and 

accountable. 

Furthermore, the lack of a warehousing application in the Global Combat 

Support System - Marine Corps has limited Blount Island Command’s 

ability to provide adequate visibility and accountability over prepositioned 

inventory stored in Norway, and consequently the Marine Corps 

continues to rely on the Norwegian Equipment Information Management 

System to manage the warehousing and inventory of equipment. Without 

a quality assurance review that assesses the Norwegian system, the 

Marine Corps cannot ensure that the inventory data it provides are 

accurate and reliable.

Conclusions

Page 25 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 
To better determine the costs needed to sustain the equipment to support 

a Marine Air Ground Task Force capability, we recommend that the 

Commandant of the Marine Corps direct the Deputy Commandant for 

Installations and Logistics to incorporate the four characteristics of 

reliable cost estimates in the Marine Corps’ forthcoming prepositioning 

programs budget development policy, and specifically to take the 

following actions:

• To ensure that estimates are accurate and well-documented, require 

all relevant departments and subordinate commands to provide 

documentation of cost-estimating details that include both source data 

and calculations;

• To ensure that estimates are credible, implement management 

requirements to establish and conduct formal cross-checks of major 

cost elements among the relevant departments and subordinate 

commands to determine whether they are replicable; and

• To ensure that estimates are comprehensive, implement a 

standardized structure for collecting all the necessary details used to 

develop and support cost estimates from all relevant departments and 

subordinate commands.

As part of its quality assurance program for ensuring that the Marine 

Corps has accurate and reliable information on inventory data for stored 

assets used to support combatant commanders’ requirements, we 

recommend that the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in consultation 

with the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization, take steps to update 

the Technical Manual on Logistics Support for the Marine Corps 

Prepositioning Program – Norway and the Local Bilateral Agreement, to 

incorporate guidance and instructions on conducting a quality assurance 

review that assesses the accuracy and reliability of the Norwegian 

Equipment Information Management System.

We provided draft copies of this report to the Department of Defense and 

the Department of State. Additionally, we provided relevant portions of the 

draft report to the Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization to ensure its 

technical accuracy. In written comments for DOD on this draft, the Marine 

Corps agreed with all four of our recommendations and its comments are 

reprinted in their entirety in appendix II. The Department of State had no 

comments on the draft report. The Norwegian Defence Logistics 

Organization generally agreed with the relevant portions of the draft that 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation

Page 26 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 
we sent them and provided technical comments that we incorporated as 

appropriate.

The Marine Corps concurred with our first, second, and third 

recommendations—that the Commandant of the Marine Corps direct the 

Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics to incorporate the four 

characteristics of reliable cost estimates in the Marine Corps’ forthcoming 

prepositioning programs budget development policy, and specifically take 

actions to ensure that estimates are accurate and well-documented, 

credible, and comprehensive. The Marine Corps stated that the 

forthcoming Prepositioning Programs Budget Development Order will 

address the four characteristics of reliable cost estimates to ensure that 

estimates are accurate, credible, and comprehensive, and that the draft 

Budget Development Order will be initially staffed to the prepositioning 

community at the end of fiscal year 2015, with a target date for publishing 

by the end of the 2nd quarter of fiscal year 2016. We believe that these 

actions, if fully implemented, would address our recommendations. 

The Marine Corps also concurred with our fourth recommendation—that 

the Commandant of the Marine Corps, in consultation with the Norwegian 

Defence Logistics Organization, take steps to update the Technical 

Manual on Logistics Support for the Marine Corps Prepositioning 

Program – Norway and the Local Bilateral Agreement, to incorporate 

guidance and instructions on conducting a quality assurance review that 

assesses the accuracy and reliability of the Norwegian Equipment 

Information Management System. The Marine Corps stated that it will 

incorporate guidance and instructions on conducting a quality assurance 

review that assesses the accuracy and reliability of the Norwegian 

Equipment Information Management System into the Technical Manual 

and Local Bilateral Agreement. The Marine Corps also stated that the use 

of the Norwegian system and the Change Log are not long-term solutions 

for the Marine Corps Prepositioning Program – Norway, and that as soon 

as the Global Combat Support System adds a warehousing module, 

currently under development, the Marine Corps will implement it in 

Norway. We acknowledge the current limitations of the Global Combat 

Support System in our report, and we believe that the Marine Corps’ 

proposed actions regarding efforts to include a quality assurance review 

of the accuracy and reliability of inventory data from the Norwegian 

system address the intent of our recommendations. We further believe 

that these actions, if fully implemented, should help improve the quality of 

inventory information until the warehousing module for the Marine Corps

is in place. 

Page 27 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of the Navy, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and the 

Norwegian Defense Logistics Organization. In addition, this report is 

available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff members have any questions about this report, please 

contact Cary Russell at (202) 512-5431 (russellc@gao.gov). Contact

points for our Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 

found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key 

contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

Cary Russell 

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 

Page 28 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Senate Report 113-176, accompanying the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, included a provision that we

review MCPP-N and determine the extent to which (1) MCPP-N 

addresses U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command 

requirements; (2) reliable cost estimates exist to fund MCPP-N’s 

sustainment of equipment to support a Marine Air Ground Task Force 

capability; and, (3) the Marine Corps has quality assurance procedures in 

place to monitor the management of MCPP-N. 

To determine the extent to which MCPP-N addresses U.S. European 

Command and U.S. Africa Command requirements, we obtained, 

reviewed, and analyzed plans, policies, and guidance on MCPP-N 

detailing the program and its support to the Marine Corps and combatant 

commands, such as the January 2012 Commandant of the Marine Corps 

Planning Guidance for Marine Corps Prepositioning Program—Norway.1

We also reviewed GAO’s prior work addressing DOD’s management and 

reporting of prepositioning.2 We collected and reviewed a theater posture 

plan and contingency plans obtained from the U.S. European Command 

and U.S. Africa Command on their strategic and operational 

requirements, including the need for a Marine Air Ground Task Force 

capability. We also collected documentation from the Marine Corps 

containing the type and mix of equipment required to support a Marine Air 

Ground Task Force. Further, we reviewed the combatant command plans 

to determine the extent to which they rely on prepositioned equipment to 

meet theater-specific requirements. We also collected and reviewed unit 

after action reports and briefings that provided an evaluation of the 

equipment obtained from MCPP-N for training and annual exercises, and 

to understand how the equipment met their needs. We collected 

documents from the Norwegian Armed Forces on Norway’s role and 

relationship with MCPP-N and visited several cave sites in Norway to 

observe U.S.-owned equipment stored in support of the Marine Air 

Ground Task Force. We focused our review on ground equipment stored 

at MCPP-N because the program is transforming the equipment set from 

an engineering and transportation to a Marine Air Ground Task Force 

capability. We met with and interviewed various DOD and other 

1 U.S. Marine Corps, CMC Planning Guidance for Marine Corps Prepositioning Program –

Norway (Washington, D.C.: January 2012). 

2 A list of related GAO products on DOD’s prepositioning program is included at the end of 

this report. 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Page 29 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 

 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

organizations that directly or indirectly support MCPP-N. Tables 5 and 6 

include a list of the DOD and other organizations we met with and 

interviewed during our review.

Table 5: Department of Defense Locations Visited and Contacted

Organization Location visited or contacted 

Joint Chiefs of Staff • U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany

o J4 Logistics Directorate

o J5/8 Policy, Strategy, Partnering Directorate

• U.S. Africa Command, Stuttgart, Germany

o J4 Logistics Directorate

Marine Corps • Headquarter Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.

o Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies, and Operations

o Deputy Commandant for Installations and Logistics

• Marine Corps Logistics Command, Comptroller, Albany, Georgia

o Blount Island Command, Jacksonville, Florida

• Marine Forces Europe and Africa, Stuttgart, Germany

• Global Combat Support System Marine Corps, Business System Integration Team, Quantico, 

Virginia 

Source: GAO | GAO-15-561.

Table 6: Non-Department of Defense Organizations and Individuals Visited or Contacted

Organization Location visited or contacted 

U.S. Department of State • Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, Washington, D.C.

• U.S. Embassy, Oslo, Norway

o Office of Defense Cooperation

o Political and Economic Section

Ministry of Defence for the 

Kingdom of Norway

• Defence Staff Norway

o Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization, Trondheim, Norway

Source GAO | GAO-15-651.

To determine the extent to which reliable cost estimates exist to fund 

MCPP-N’s sustainment of equipment to support a Marine Air Ground 

Task Force capability and to identify the process and steps used to 

develop the budget estimates, we collected and analyzed projected 

budget data and supporting budget documentation for MCPP-N from 

fiscal years 2015 through 2019. We obtained a copy of the Marine Corps’

program objective memorandum program review briefings from fiscal 

years 2015 through 2019 and conducted an analysis to determine how 

each cost element associated with budget estimate data was calculated 

by examining the basis of the budget estimates and assessing the 

strength and quality of the supporting budget documentation provided. 

Page 30 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

We verified that the parameters used to create the budget estimates were 

valid and applicable by posing formal questions and conducting 

interviews with officials in the Deputy Commandant for Installation and 

Logistics, Logistics Plans and Operations Branch, to understand their 

methodology for developing budget estimates, and determining whether 

other sources were available for cross-checking those estimates. We 

verified that calculations were correct for each cost element, and verified 

that elements were accurately summed up to arrive at the overall budget 

estimate. We assessed whether the budget estimates were sufficiently 

reliable for our purposes and met GAO’s Cost Estimating and 

Assessment Guide for best practices,3 and the four general 

characteristics of a reliable cost estimate—accurate, credible, welldocumented, and comprehensive. Each characteristic consists of several 

individual assessments. We assessed each characteristic by assigning 

each individual assessment a numerical rating: Not Met = 1, Minimally 

Met = 2, Partially Met =3, Substantially Met = 4, and Met = 5. We took the 

average of the individual assessment ratings to determine the overall 

rating for each of the four characteristics. The resulting average became 

the overall characteristic assessment as follows: Not Met = 1.0 to 1.4, 

Minimally Met = 1.5 to 2.4, Partially Met = 2.5 to 3.4, Substantially Met = 

3.5 to 4.4, and Met = 4.5 to 5.0. A cost estimate is considered reliable if 

the overall assessment ratings for each of the four characteristics are 

substantially or fully met. If any of the characteristics are not met, are 

minimally met, or are partially met, the cost estimate does not fully reflect 

the characteristics of a reliable estimate. We recorded the results of our 

analysis and found that the budget estimates partially met the accurate, 

well-documented, and comprehensive characteristics, and that they did 

not meet the credible characteristic of a reliable estimate. Because the 

budget estimates did not meet all of the characteristics of a reliable cost 

estimate, we considered them not to be fully reliable. 

To determine the extent to which the Marine Corps has quality assurance 

procedures in place to monitor the management of MCPP-N, we reviewed 

the May 2009 United States Marine Corps Technical Manual on Logistics 

Support for MCPP-N,4 the 2013 Local Bilateral Agreement between 

3 GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2009).

4 TM 4790-14/1G. 

Page 31 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 

 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Blount Island Command and Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization,5

and the 2012 Blount Island Command ISO 9001:2008 Quality System 

Manual.6 We obtained examples of annual quality assurance inspection 

and work instruction reports and analyzed the reports with the Marine 

Corps’ quality assurance procedures to determine how their reviews were 

conducted. We also collected studies, reports, and briefings on the Global 

Combat Support System – Marine Corps and the Norwegian Equipment 

Information Management System to determine how the Marine Corps and 

Norwegians rely on these two information management systems to 

maintain visibility and accountability over prepositioned equipment in 

Norway. We conducted a series of interviews with Marine Corps and 

Norwegian officials using a set of standard data reliability questions to 

learn about their general and application controls for conducting system 

operations and data processing; the chain of custody used to transfer and 

record data between two information management systems that do not 

interface with each other because of jurisdiction boundaries; and the 

quality assurance procedures used to assess the reliability of inventory 

data and systems. We interviewed officials from Blount Island Command 

and Norwegian Defence Logistics Organization to learn about the 

challenges they have encountered in using two information management 

systems to support MCPP-N and the management oversight they have 

used to mitigate deficiencies. In addition, we conducted site visits at the 

Frigard cave, Hammernesodden cave and pier, and the aviation 

maintenance facilities at the Vaernes airfield. During these site visits, we 

observed and photographed their storage and maintenance facilities; 

observed the procedures Norwegian staff followed to enter data into the 

Global Combat Support System - Marine Corps and the Norwegian 

Equipment Information Management System; observed their data 

reconciliation procedures; and observed the manual record keeping they 

used to supplement their data entry procedures. While on site, we 

obtained copies or photographs of some of their training and reference 

materials and data entry procedures. Marine Corps and Norwegian 

officials provided us with system demonstrations of the Global Combat 

Support System and Norwegian Equipment Information Management 

System to acclimate us to both systems’ data management features for 

tracking, recording, and storing data on prepositioned equipment. Finally, 

we interviewed officials from the Global Combat Support System Marine 

5 U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Marine Corps, Local Bilateral Agreement, 2013.

6 Blount Island Command, ISO 9001:2008 (December 28, 2012). 

Page 32 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 

 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Corps’ Business System Integration Team to inquire about the Marine 

Corps’ plans to incorporate a warehousing application to allow Marine 

Corps organizations to collect inventory data. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2014 to September 

2015 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provided a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions. 

Page 33 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department Appendix II: Comments from the of Defense Department 

of Defense

Page 34 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 35 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 36 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Cary Russell, (202) 512-5431 or russellc@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Larry Junek (Assistant Director);

Brian Bothwell; Patricia Farrell Donahue, Ph.D.; Latrealle Lee; Felicia 

Lopez; Amie Steele; Sabrina Streagle; John Van Schaik; Cheryl 

Weissman; Erik Wilkins-McKee; and Richard Winsor made key 

contributions to this report. 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 37 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 
Related GAO Products

Prepositioned Stocks: Additional Information and a Consistent Definition 

Would Make DOD’s Annual Report More Useful, GAO-15-570. 

Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2015.

Prepositioned Stocks: DOD’s Strategic Policy and Implementation Plan. 

GAO-14-659R. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2014.

Prepositioned Stocks: Inconsistencies in DOD’s Annual Report 

Underscore the Need for Overarching Strategic Guidance and Joint 

Oversight, GAO-13-790. Washington, D.C.: September 26, 2013.

Prepositioned Materiel and Equipment: DOD Would Benefit from 

Developing Strategic Guidance and Improving Joint Oversight. 

GAO-12-916R. Washington, D.C.: September 20, 2012.

Defense Logistics: Department of Defense Has Enhanced Prepositioned 

Stock Management but Should Provide More Detailed Status Reports. 

GAO-11-852R. Washington, D.C.; September 30, 2011.

Warfighter Support: Improved Joint Oversight and Reporting on DOD’s 

Prepositioning Programs May Increase Efficiencies. GAO-11-647. 

Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2011. 

Defense Logistics: Department of Defense’s Annual Report on the Status 

of Prepositioned Materiel and Equipment Can Be Further Enhanced to 

Better Inform Congress. GAO-10-172R. Washington, D.C.: November 4, 

2009. 

Defense Logistics: Department of Defense’s Annual Report on the Status 

of Prepositioned Materiel and Equipment Can Be Enhanced to Better 

Inform Congress. GAO-09-147R. Washington, D.C.: December 15, 2008.

Defense Logistics: Improved Oversight and Increased Coordination 

Needed to Ensure Viability of the Army’s Prepositioning Strategy. 

GAO-07-144. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2007.

Related GAO Products

(351955) Page 38 GAO-15-651 Marine Corps Prepositioning Stocks 
Related GAO Products

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