S. Hrg. 110–235

EXCESSIVE SPECULATION IN THE NATURAL

GAS MARKET

HEARING

BEFORE THE

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 25 AND JULY 9, 2007

Available via http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

(

EXCESSIVE SPECULATION IN THE NATURAL GAS MARKET

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36–616 PDF 2008

S. Hrg. 110–235

EXCESSIVE SPECULATION IN THE NATURAL

GAS MARKET

HEARING

BEFORE THE

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 25 AND JULY 9, 2007

Available via http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

(

(II)

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

JOHN E.SUNUNU, New Hampshire

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BRANDON L. MILHORN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

BARACK OBAMA, Illinois 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico 

JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire

ELISE J. BEAN, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

ELISE J. BEAN, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

DAN M. BERKOVITZ, Counsel 

KATE BITTINGER, Detailee, GAO 

MARK L. GREENBLATT, Staff Director and Chief Counsel to the Minority 

MARK D. NELSON, Deputy Chief Counsel to the Minority 

MARY D. ROBERTSON, Chief Clerk 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Opening statements: Page 

Senator Levin .................................................................................................... 1, 61

Senator Coleman .............................................................................................. 6, 65

Senator McCaskill ............................................................................................ 20

WITNESSES 

MONDAY, JUNE 25, 2007

Arthur Corbin, President and CEO, Municipal Gas Authority of Georgia, 

Kennesaw, Georgia, on behalf of the American Public Gas Association ......... 9

Paul N. Cicio, President, Industrial Energy Consumers of America, Washington, DC ............................................................................................................. 10

Sean Cota, Co-Owner and President, Cota and Cota, Inc., Bellows Falls, 

Vermont, President, New England Fuel Institute, Watertown, Massachusetts, and Northeast Chair, Petroleum Marketers Association of America, 

Arlington, Virginia ............................................................................................... 12

Vincent Kaminski, Professor, Rice University, Jesse H. Jones Graduate 

School of Management, Houston, Texas ............................................................. 31

Michael Greenberger, Law School Professor, University of Maryland School 

of Law, Baltimore, Maryland .............................................................................. 32

Shane Lee, Former Natural Gas Trader at Amaranth, LLC, Calgary, Alberta, 

Canada .................................................................................................................. 46

MONDAY, JULY 9, 2007

James Newsome, President and Chief Executive Officer, New York Mercantile 

Exchange, Inc., (NYMEX), New York, New York .............................................. 68

Jeffrey C. Sprecher, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Intercontinental 

Exchange, Inc. (ICE), Atlanta, Georgia .............................................................. 71

Walter Lukken, Acting Chairman, and Michael Dunn, Commissioner, Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), Washington, DC ..................... 88

ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES

Cicio, Paul N.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 10

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 120

Corbin, Arthur: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 90

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 107

Cota, Sean: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 12

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 123

Dunn, Michael: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 88

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 178

Greenberger, Michael: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 32

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 137

Kaminski, Vincent: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 31

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 133

Lee, Shane: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 40

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 147

Page

IV

Lukken, Walter: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 88

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 178

Newsome, James: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 68

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 152

Sprecher, Jeffrey C.: 

Testimony .......................................................................................................... 71

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 167

APPENDIX 

‘‘Excessive Speculation in the Natural Gas Market,’’ staff report with additional Minority staff views, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations ....... 196

EXHIBITS 

1. Natural Gas Futures Prices Were Higher and More Extreme in 2006,

chart prepared by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Staff ... 711

2. In mid-August of Each Year 2002-2006, the Difference in Contract Prices 

for Future Delivery of Natural Gas for the Next October and January,

chart prepared by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Staff ... 712

3. Amaranth’s Purchases Increased Prices, chart prepared by the Permanent 

Subcommittee on Investigations Staff ............................................................ 713

4.a. Amaranth’s Size Increased Prices, chart prepared by the Permanent 

Subcommittee on Investigations Staff ......................................................... 714

b. NYMEX Could Not See Amaranth’s ICE Positions, chart prepared by 

the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Staff ................................ 715

5. Amaranth Held Very Large Amounts of Outstanding Natural Gas Futures 

Contracts (Open Interest), chart prepared by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Staff ................................................................... 716

6. Amaranth Positions on NYMEX and ICE Before and After NYMEX Order 

to Reduce (August 8, 2006) September Natural Gas Future, and Swaps,

chart prepared by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Staff ... 717

7. ‘‘Until They Monitor Swaps No Big Deal,’’ chart prepared by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Staff .................................................... 718

8. Natural Gas Futures Prices Fell As Amaranth Collapsed, chart prepared 

by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Staff ............................. 719

9. Selected Excerpts from Instant Messages and Emails related to Amaranth Advisors LLC .......................................................................................... 720

10.a. Chronology of NYMEX Oversight of Amaranth in 2006, prepared by 

the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Staff ............................... 800

b. Summary of NYMEX Correspondence about Amaranth in 2005 and 

2006, prepared by NYMEX .......................................................................... 802

c. Anthony Densieski/Corey Traub (NYMEX) emails, dated January 30/

February 4, 2006, re: AVD Accountability Issues in NG, NR, CI .............. 804

d. Anthony Densieski/Corey Traub (NYMEX) emails, dated March 23, 

2006, re: Natural Gas Accountability Issues ............................................... 806

e. Andrew Murphy/Anthony Densieski (NYMEX) email, dated April 4, 

2006, re: Accountability Issues ..................................................................... 808

f. Corey Traub/Anthony Densieski (NYMEX) email, dated April 7, 2006, 

re: NG Accountability Issue ........................................................................... 810

g. Anthony Densieski/Andrew Murphy (NYMEX) emails, dated April 4/

May 3, 2006, re: Accountability Issues ........................................................ 811

h. Corey Traub/Anthony Densieski (NYMEX) email, dated May 10, 2006, 

re: Natural Gas Accountability Issues ......................................................... 813

i. Anthony Densieski/Corey Traub (NYMEX) emails, dated May 17, 2006, 

re: Natural Gas Accountability ..................................................................... 815

j. Letter from NYMEX to Amaranth LLC, dated May 31, 2006, re: Violations of Exchange Rule 9.28 .......................................................................... 817

k. Anthony Densieski/Corey Traub (NYMEX) emails, dated June 1 and 

14, 2006, re: Natural Gas Accountability Issues ......................................... 818

Page

V

l. NYMEX Compliance Department emails, dated July 5, 2006, re: All 

Month Accountability (TC, NX & PG) ......................................................... 821

m. Letter from NYMEX to Amaranth LLC, dated July 11, 2006, re: Warning Letter Revision, Violation of Exchange Rule 9.28 ............................... 823

n. Anthony Densieski/Corey Traub (NYMEX) emails, dated July 12, 22, 

25, and 26, 2006, re: Natural Gas Accountability (Amaranth) ................. 824

o. Letter from NYMEX to Amaranth LLC, dated August 2, 2006, re: 

The Compliance Department of the New York Mercantile Exchange (‘‘Exchange’’) has commenced Investigation Number MS-04-06 to review 

Amaranth’s LLC’s (‘‘Amaranth’’) NYMEX Natural Gas futures trading 

activity . . . .................................................................................................... 826

p. Corey Traub/Anthony Densieski (NYMEX) emails, dated August 3, 

2006, re: Natural Gas Options Accountability ............................................ 827

q. Anthony Densieski/Corey Traub (NYMEX) emails, dated August 4, 

2006, re: Natural Gas Accountability Issues ............................................... 830

r. NYMEX emails, dated August 4 and 7, 2006, re: TC Accountability 

for Amaranth, LLC ........................................................................................ 832

s. NYMEX Memo, undated, re: Amaranth LLC September 2006 and October 2006 Natural Gas Open Positions .......................................................... 834

t. Letter from Amaranth LLC Compliance Director to NYMEX, dated 

August 15, 2006, NYMEX Investigation Number re: MS-04-06 ............... 837

u. Letter from Amaranth LLC Compliance Director to NYMEX, dated 

August 30, 2006, re: . . . concern about trading yesterday in the 

NYMEX Natural Gas futures contract . . . ................................................ 840

11. Timeline summarizing JPMorgan Chase’s interactions with Amaranth 

2003 through September 21, 2006, prepared by JPMorgan Chase .............. 842

12.a. Amaranth’s CP Leverage Funds Due Diligence, prepared by JPMorgan 

Chase. 2001 .................................................................................................... 846

b. Amaranth’s CP Leverage Funds Due Diligence, prepared by JPMorgan 

Chase. 2004 ................................................................................................... 850

c. Amaranth’s CP Leverage Funds Due Diligence, prepared by JPMorgan 

Chase. 2005 .................................................................................................... 861

d. Amaranth’s CP Leverage Funds Due Diligence, prepared by JPMorgan 

Chase. 2006 ................................................................................................... 879

13. Amaranth April 2006 Update to investors, prepared by Amaranth ............. 898

14. Amaranth May 2006 Update to investors, prepared by Amaranth .............. 900

15. Excerpt from Intercontinental Exchange Inc. (ICE) Form 10-K ................... 902

16. Excerpt from Remarks of Commissioner Michael V. Dunn before the National Grain Trade Council’s Mid-Year Meeting, Kansas City, MO, September 8, 2006 ................................................................................................... 904

17.a. Amaranth Hedge-Fund Losses Hit 3M Pension, Goldman,

Bloomberg.com, September 20, 2006 ............................................................ 906

b. Amaranth Seeks to Dismiss Pension Fund’s Lawsuit, San Diego Business Journal Online, June 8, 2007 .............................................................. 908

18. Exempt Commercial Markets, 2001-2006 ........................................................ 909

19. Performance and Net Asset Value Report—September 2006 YTD, prepared 

by Amaranth LLC ............................................................................................. 910

20. Letter from NYNEX, dated March 13, 2006, to Amaranth, re: Violation 

of Exchange Rule 9.28 ...................................................................................... 911

21. JPMorganChase emails, dated May 19, 2006, re: Amaranth LLC June06 

Natural Gas ....................................................................................................... 912

22. Additional Selected Excerpts from Instant Messages and Emails Related 

to Amaranth Advisors LLC .............................................................................. 913

23. Correspondence received by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations from Shane Lee’s counsel, clarifying Mr. Lee’s June 25, 2007, testimony .................................................................................................................. 998

24. Responses to questions for the record submitted to Shane Lee .................... 1000

25. Response to supplemental question for the record submitted to Arthur 

Corbin, American Public Gas Association ...................................................... 1004

(1)

EXCESSIVE SPECULATION IN THE NATURAL 

GAS MARKET 

MONDAY, JUNE 25, 2007

U.S. SENATE, PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:03 a.m., in 

room 106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Carl Levin, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Levin, McCaskill, and Coleman. 

Staff Present: Elise J. Bean, Staff Director and Chief Counsel; 

Dan Berkovitz, Counsel; Kate Bittinger, Detailee, GAO; Ross 

Kirschner, Counsel; Mary D. Robertson, Chief Clerk; Mark L. 

Greenblatt, Staff Director and Chief Counsel to the Minority; Mark 

D. Nelson, Deputy Chief Counsel to the Minority; Clifford C. Stoddard, Jr., Counsel the Minority; Timothy R. Terry, Counsel to the 

Minority; Emily T. Germain, Staff Assistant to the Minority; Jeremy Kress, Law Clerk; David Weinberg, Law Clerk; Genevieve 

Citrin, Intern; Edmund Zagorin, Intern; Peg Gustafson, McCaskill 

staff; Ruth Perez, Detailee, IRS; and Kunaal Sharma, Intern. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN 

Senator LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. Our Subcommittee 

meets today to look into the question of excessive speculation in 

natural gas prices. 

In recent years, allegations of price manipulation and excessive 

speculation have erupted in almost every sector of our energy markets, from the ongoing litigation over Enron’s distortion of electricity prices, to price manipulation charges in the propane market, 

to allegations of price gouging in gasoline. 

Just one year ago our Subcommittee released a report showing how rampant speculation was inflating crude oil prices by $20 per 

$70 barrels of oil. When manipulation or excessive speculation distorts our markets, it is the American public that pays the price. 

Today’s hearing examines one case history that illustrates the 

current chaotic and dangerous vulnerability of U.S. energy markets 

to price manipulation and excessive speculation. Our focus is on an 

$8 billion hedge fund called Amaranth Advisors, LLC which, before 

its collapse in September 2006, was the dominant speculator in the 

U.S. natural gas market. 

Natural gas is a vital U.S. energy source. It heats the majority 

of American homes, is used to harvest crops, powers 20 percent of 

2

1See Exhibit 2 which appears in the Appendix on page 712. 

our electrical plants, and plays a critical role in many industries 

including manufacturers of fertilizers, paints, and medicines. It is 

one of the cleanest fuels we have and we produce most of it ourselves, with only 15 percent being imported, from Canada primarily. In 2005, alone U.S. consumers and businesses spent about $200 

billion on natural gas. For much of 2006, until Amaranth collapsed, 

futures prices for winter gas were unusually high despite ample 

natural gas supplies. To understand why prices remained high despite ample supplies and why Amaranth went from billions to 

broke overnight, the Subcommittee subpoenaed and reviewed millions of trading records from the two leading U.S. commodity exchanges that trade energy, the New York Mercantile Exchange, 

(NYMEX) and the InterContinental Exchange, (ICE) as well as 

from Amaranth and other traders, all of whom cooperated with our 

inquiry. 

The trading records show that in 2006 until its collapse, Amaranth dominated trading in the U.S. natural gas market. It bought 

and sold thousands of natural gas contracts on a daily basis and 

tens of thousands on some days. It used those trades to accumulate 

massive natural gas holdings called ‘‘positions.’’ 

The lead Federal agency that oversees energy trading, called the 

Commodity Futures Trading Commission, (CFTC) defines ‘‘large 

traders’’ for reporting purposes as any trader with 200 natural gas 

contracts. NYMEX examines a trader’s position if it exceeds 12,000 

natural gas contracts in a month. Amaranth at times held 100,000 

natural gas contracts in a month, an amount equal to one trillion 

cubic feet of gas. 

During 2006, Amaranth held about 40 percent of all of the outstanding natural gas contracts on NYMEX and as much as 75 percent of the natural gas contracts in a single month. 

The report we are releasing today is filled with charts showing 

how Amaranth trades affected natural gas prices as far out as 5 

years. Amaranth’s trades had a common focus—that winter gas 

prices would be unusually expensive compared to summer and fall 

prices. In prior years, for example, futures contracts delivering natural gas in January cost $1 to $1.50 more than futures contracts 

delivering natural gas in October due to the higher demand that 

comes in January, the peak of the home heating season. 

As Exhibit 2 shows,1 however, in 2006, January futures contract 

prices skyrocketed, exceeding October prices by $4, more than twice 

the historic norm. This price difference is the largest between these 

two contracts in 5 years. 

Amaranth’s large scale trading, which went on day after day 

throughout the spring and summer of 2006, was the key driver in 

this $4 difference. At times during the summer, for instance, Amaranth held 75 percent of the outstanding futures contracts to deliver natural gas in November, 60 percent of those delivering natural gas in January, and 60 percent of those delivering natural gas 

in March. It was often the largest trader in winter gas futures. 

Other traders told the Subcommittee staff that during the summer of 2006 the relative winter futures prices were ‘‘clearly out of 

3

whack’’, ‘‘at ridiculous levels’’ and unrelated to supply and demand. 

They also told the Subcommittee that they were reluctant to bet on 

falling winter prices given Amaranth’s demonstrated ability to 

boost prices through large trades. 

The result was that anyone who used the futures market during 

the summer of 2006 to buy natural gas for delivery in the following 

winter paid unusually high winter prices compared to fall and summer prices. Natural gas consumers like utilities told the Subcommittee that when they went on the market in the summer to 

buy their winter gas and hedge against future price increases they 

knew the winter prices were very expensive and higher than made 

sense, given ample supplies. But they had to buy. 

As one municipal utility told us, they could not afford to ‘‘roll the 

dice’’ and wait to see if natural gas prices fell later on. Their budget required them to make a decision during the summer. They paid 

the inflated prices and so did their customers. 

Market prices are supposed to be the result of the interaction of 

many buyers and sellers, not the result of massive trades by a 

dominant speculator with market power to affect prices. But in 

2006, Amaranth dominated the market and winter prices remained 

at extreme levels despite ample supplies. 

It is one thing for a speculator like Amaranth to gamble on natural gas futures, in this instance, betting on unusually high winter 

prices. It is another thing for Amaranth to make that bet with such 

large-scale trades that it pushed up prices and, in effect, put heavy 

pressure on consumers in the market to take the same gamble and 

pay sky-high prices for future winter purchases. 

Later, as Amaranth collapsed in September, winter prices fell 

dramatically, but by then many natural gas consumers were already locked in and could not take advantage of the lower prices. 

Where were the regulators in all of this? Hamstrung by the law. 

The key law, the Commodities Exchange Act is riddled with exceptions, exemptions, exclusions, and limitations that make policing 

energy markets almost impossible. The biggest problem is the socalled Enron loophole which, at the request of Enron and others, 

was inserted into a bill at the last minute during a Senate-House 

conference in 2000. 

The Enron loophole exempts from government oversight energy 

and metals commodities traded on an electronic exchange by large 

traders. This exemption has never made any sense. Why should 

U.S. regulators protect virtually every type of commodity against 

trading abuses—corn, pork bellies, you name it—but not energy 

when energy is so vital to our economy? Why should regulators 

have authority to police regulated markets like NYMEX but not 

unregulated markets like ICE when both affect energy prices? 

Some argue that the exemption makes sense because large traders can take care of themselves on electronic exchanges and do not 

need government protection. But government protection is not for 

the traders, it is aimed at protecting the public from price shocks 

due to market manipulation and excessive speculation. 

An example from the Amaranth case history shows how the 

Enron loophole makes it nearly impossible for regulators to prevent 

large-scale trading from triggering price spikes. By August 2006, 

Amaranth had huge natural gas holdings in the September and OcVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:27 Jan 25, 2008 Jkt 036616 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\36616.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
4

1See Exhibit 6 which appears in the Appendix on page 717. 

tober futures contracts. NYMEX officials were alarmed. They were 

alarmed that Amaranth might try to make last-minute large-scale 

trades that would affect these contract prices. So they ordered Amaranth to reduce its holdings in both the September and the October contracts. 

In response, Amaranth reduced its NYMEX holdings, but at the 

same time increased its holdings in those same contracts on ICE. 

Natural gas contracts are called futures on NYMEX and swaps on 

ICE, but there is no functional difference between them. 

Exhibit 6 1 shows Amaranth’s September natural gas holdings 

before and after NYMEX ordered it to reduce its size. The data 

shows that, in response to NYMEX’s order to reduce, Amaranth 

simply switched its holdings to ICE where neither NYMEX nor the 

CFTC could limit its trading. 

Over the next 2 weeks Amaranth then increased its holdings, 

outside of the scrutiny or regulatory reach of NYMEX and CFTC. 

By the end of August, Amaranth held almost 100,000 September 

contracts and 90,000 October contracts, mostly on ICE. Those holdings are so large that, for 100,000 contracts, a change of one penny 

in the price of the contract translates into a profit or loss of $10 

million. 

NYMEX’s order, in the end, did nothing to reduce Amaranth’s 

holdings; it just caused Amaranth’s trading to move from a regulated to an unregulated market. 

NYMEX also ordered Amaranth to refrain from large-scale trading during the final half hour of trading on the September contract, 

again to prevent any chance of price manipulation or excessive 

speculation. The last day for trading on that contract was August 

29. The last half hour was from 2 to 2:30 p.m. 

The last half hour is important because NYMEX calculates the 

final price for its futures contracts using a formula that focuses on 

the prices paid in the last 30 minutes of trading. The final contract 

price is important because many natural gas contracts, both on and 

off the exchanges, incorporate the ‘‘final settlement price’’ of the 

relevant NYMEX futures contract. 

Amaranth stopped trading the September contract on both 

NYMEX and ICE around 1:15 p.m. on August 29. Amaranth explained that it stopped trading on ICE as well as NYMEX because 

its traders coordinate their trading on both markets and it did not 

want to trade on one without the other. In the days before August 

29, Amaranth had engaged in a torrent of trading, selling tens of 

thousands of the September contract. On August 29, Amaranth 

continued making large sales all day, but its sales were 

counterbalanced by other traders buying those contracts, the largest of which was a hedge fund called Centaurus. In the last half 

hour of trading, Amaranth stopped selling, but Centaurus and 

other traders continued buying and the September contract price 

shot up 10 percent. 

Altogether, on August 29, Amaranth sold about 16,000 September contracts while Centaurus bought about 12,000, almost all 

on ICE using swaps. NYMEX rules bar traders from holding more 

than 1,000 contracts in the last 3 days of trading on a contract. The 

5

ICE trading not only made a mockery of that limit, it clearly affected the NYMEX final price. For Amaranth, the last-minute price 

spike dropped the value of its holdings by nearly $500 million. 

Amaranth appears to have gotten a dose of its own medicine on 

August 29, and it did not like it. On August 30, Amaranth wrote 

to the CFTC that the sudden September price increase did not reflect supply and demand but large scale trading by market participants who are not ‘‘trading in a responsible manner.’’ 

It demanded an inquiry. Amaranth’s lead trader predicted in an 

e-mail to another trader: ‘‘boy, I’ll bet you see some CFTC inquiries’’ into the September trading. The other trader reminded him, 

however, that most of the trades were on ICE, using swaps which 

were outside CFTC authority. He wrote: ‘‘until they monitor swaps, 

no big deal.’’

‘‘No big deal.’’ That is what one trader thought of CFTC oversight 

in the face of a torrent of trading and a huge last minute price 

spike. Why? Because current law strips the CFTC of any authority 

to regulate ICE, even though ICE is a major U.S. energy exchange. 

Right now the law requires U.S. energy market regulators to 

work blind to ICE trades and powerless to limit ICE trading, even 

when that trading threatens U.S. consumers with price manipulation and excessive speculation. 

Now understanding swaps, hedges, price spreads, and margin requirements is no easy task. Proving price increases were caused by 

excessive speculation is also difficult, especially since regulators 

have not provided clear criteria defining excessive speculation. But 

what is crystal clear and easy to understand is that Amaranth 

dominated the U.S. natural gas market in 2006. It used massive 

trades to bet the store that winter prices would be twice as high 

as summer and fall prices compared to previous years. When Amaranth made that bet, it forced a lot of natural gas consumers to 

make the same bet and pay sky high prices for winter gas because 

they could not take a chance and wait to see if prices fell. 

When Amaranth collapsed in September, it was too late for many 

U.S. consumers to take advantage of the lower prices that followed. 

Congress needs to do much more to safeguard U.S. energy markets from price manipulation and excessive speculation. The first 

step is to close the Enron loophole. Closing this loophole would 

make NYMEX and ICE subject to the same market oversight and 

put the cop on the beat in all U.S. energy markets. It would also 

level the regulatory playing field between the two exchanges. 

Last week, the CFTC issued a proposed rule that would curb but 

not end the ill effects of the Enron loophole. The proposed rule 

would require all traders on regulated exchanges like NYMEX to 

disclose upon request from a regulator all holdings on unregulated 

exchanges like ICE. The CFTC notes the ‘‘close relationship’’ between regulated and unregulated commodity markets and the need 

to get a complete picture of a trader’s holdings in order to prevent 

price manipulation and excessive speculation. The proposed rule is, 

in essence, a belated acknowledgment of the Amaranth facts. If finalized, this proposal would increase regulators’ access to key market information. But getting key information is not enough if regulators remain powerless to act on what they see. Regulators must 

also be able to reduce holdings and limit trades to prevent price 

6

manipulation or excessive speculation. Only Congress can eliminate 

the Enron loophole once and for all, and restore regulatory authority over all U.S. energy markets. 

In 2006, excessive speculation by a single hedge fund, Amaranth, 

altered natural gas prices, caused wild price swings, and socked 

consumers with high prices. It is one thing when speculators gamble with their own money; it is another when they turn U.S. energy 

markets into a lottery where everybody is forced to gamble with 

them, betting on prices driven by aggressive trading practices. Amaranth is not the only hedge fund to use large-scale trading in U.S. 

energy markets. To stop the abuses, we have got to put a regulatory cop back on the beat in all U.S. energy markets and give 

them stronger tools to stop price manipulation and excessive speculation. 

Let me turn it over to Senator Coleman, again with thanks to 

him and his staff for their cooperation in working with us on a very 

complicated and very detailed investigation. As always, he has 

been helpful and we very much appreciate that kind of support. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Today’s hearing represents the culmination of the Subcommittee’s extensive bipartisan investigation into the impact of speculative trading on U.S. energy markets. Our inquiry builds on the 

Subcommittee’s prior focus on this issue, including a February 

2006 field hearing held in my home State of Minnesota that focused on the impact of high natural gas prices on American consumers as well as the Subcommittee’s June 2006 staff report. 

These efforts, including today’s hearing, have been bipartisan 

from their inception. I want to thank Chairman Levin and his staff 

for their hard work and dedication in ensuring the fairness and integrity of our energy markets. 

I am not going to go through a recitation of the Amaranth facts. 

The Chairman did a very good job of that. In fact what he did, as 

I listened and made some notes, he took something that is very 

complicated and really simplified it. In its essence what we have 

heard and what we saw is when you have part of a market that 

is regulated, in this case by NYMEX, and you have part of a market that is not regulated, what happens is when the regulated market responds the activity shifts to the unregulated market. The 

question becomes what is the impact on American consumers? 

As we noted in the Minority’s views attached to the Subcommittee’s report, different conclusions can be drawn from the same set 

of facts. Amaranth accumulated such large positions and traded 

such large volumes of natural gas that at times Amaranth appears 

to have moved the entire futures market. At other times, however, 

Amaranth appears to have been responding to the market rather 

than driving it. Nevertheless, when last year’s hurricane season 

ended without a major event, it became clear that market fundamentals no longer supported Amaranth’s bet on winter gas and 

traders moved quickly and aggressively against Amaranth’s positions. 

In just a couple of weeks from the end of August through midSeptember, Amaranth’s natural gas positions lost more than $2 bilVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:27 Jan 25, 2008 Jkt 036616 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\36616.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
7

lion in value. These tremendous losses ultimately necessitated 

Amaranth’s liquidation of its entire natural gas portfolio. When the 

dust finally settled on September 20, Amaranth reported the greatest single losses ever by a hedge fund, more than the losses of Long 

Term Capital Management (LTCM). 

Remarkably, the financial markets met one of the largest individual losses in financial history with relative calm. Amaranth privately negotiated the takeover of his positions. In contrast to the 

debacle involving LTCM, the Federal Reserve did not have to intervene to prevent financial panic. 

The markets’ ability to absorb Amaranth’s losses is a sign of 

their vitality and strength. But to shrug off Amaranth’s collapse as 

a rare and victimless event is both short-sighted and irresponsible. 

Amaranth’s collapse fired a warning signal, illuminating a troubling level of high risk speculative trading that occurs on U.S. energy markets and underscoring the need for greater transparency 

on the over-the-counter electronic energy exchanges. 

Today more than 500 energy-related hedge funds deploy a combined $67 billion in speculative capital in our energy markets. To 

be sure, these traders bring important liquidity and vitality to the 

markets in which they invest. But I am concerned that at times 

speculative trading overwhelms the real buyers and sellers like the 

utilities and industrial users of natural gas. Massive levels of speculation not only increase market volatility but also contribute to 

rising energy prices which ultimately are passed on to hard-working American families. 

I’m reminded of the testimony I heard during the Subcommittee’s 

field hearing last year in St. Paul. Too many Americans find themselves in circumstances similar to Diedre Jackson or Lucille Olson, 

two individuals who testified about the burdens caused by rising 

natural gas costs. In the case of Ms. Olson, her natural gas bill represented 30 percent of her monthly income. As a senior citizen trying to cope with the high cost of health insurance and prescription 

drugs, last year’s spike in natural gas prices made it increasingly 

difficult for her to make ends meet. 

Ms. Jackson, a hard-working mother of three and a college student, shared with me the financial jeopardy she faced as a result 

of a home heating bill that had increased by more than 100 percent. 

These examples serve as powerful reminders of the real-world 

impacts of large spikes in natural gas prices. We must not forget 

that high energy costs place millions of Americans in financial jeopardy every year. 

Nor should we overlook the impact that unchecked and unregulated speculation can have on the financial markets themselves. I 

am concerned that, last year, several large speculative traders appear to have impacted the natural gas market as a whole. Our financial system depends on investor confidence in the fairness and 

efficiency of our markets. If investors believe that speculative trading is able to separate prices from supply and demand fundamentals, or worse that a few dominate traders are able to cause unwarranted price changes, then the very integrity of our financial markets is threatened. 

8

More than ever before it is imperative that the CFTC and other 

market regulators have the statutory authority and budget necessary to police our energy markets. Despite this pressing need for 

oversight, however, the CFTC’s ability to conduct market surveillance has been eroded. Its ability to prevent excessive speculation 

and price manipulation has been diluted. This is a direct result of 

the fact that more and more energy trading takes place on unregulated over-the-counter electronic exchanges. It is simply unacceptable that this rapidly increasing segment of our energy markets remains largely unchecked. 

As I stated earlier, Amaranth fired a warning shot that market 

participants and market regulars must not ignore. If they do, I can 

assure you that Congress will not. As a threshold matter, regulators should develop a clear definition of excessive speculation. 

Otherwise they will continue to have difficulty monitoring and preventing price distortions. 

More important, as we noted in the Minority’s views in the Subcommittee’s report, Congress must ensure that any proposed cure 

is not worse than the disease. If we extend CFTC oversight and 

regulation to electronic over-the-counter exchanges, we must avoid 

unintended consequences. These exchanges have brought vital liquidity and increased transparency to our energy markets. Therefore, we cannot create incentives for traders to shift their business 

from the over-the-counter electronic exchanges like ICE to far less 

transparent and unregulated energy markets. Moreover, we cannot 

create incentives for the exchanges to move to less regulated offshore markets. 

I look forward to the testimony from today’s witnesses. And 

again I thank the Chairman for leading this important bipartisan 

effort. Today’s hearing is an important reminder that the fairness 

of energy prices and the integrity of our financial markets are neither Democrat nor Republican issues. They are American issues. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman. 

Today’s hearing is going to lay out what happened on the market 

and we are going to have a second day of hearings on July 9 to 

hear from the CFTC and from NYMEX and from ICE. 

Let me now call our first panel of witnesses for today’s hearing. 

We have with us Arthur Corbin, the President and CEO of the Municipal Gas Authority of Georgia in Kennesaw, Georgia. 

Paul Cicio, the President of the Industrial Energy Consumers of 

America here in Washington, DC. 

And Sean Cota, the Co-Owner and President of Cota and Cota, 

Inc. in Bellows Falls, Vermont, the President of New England Fuel 

Institute, in Watertown, Massachusetts, as well as the Northeast 

Chair of the Petroleum Marketers Association of America, in Arlington, Virginia. 

We very much appreciate each one of you being with us today 

and we welcome you to the Subcommittee. 

Pursuant to Rule 6 of this Subcommittee, all witnesses who testify before it are required to be sworn, and at this time I would ask 

all of you to please stand and to raise your right hand. 

9

1The prepared statement of Mr. Corbin appears in the Appendix on page 107. 

Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give before 

this Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing 

but the truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. CORBIN. I do. 

Mr. CICIO. I do. 

Mr. COTA. I do. 

Senator LEVIN. We will use our usual timing system here today. 

About one minute before the red light comes on you will see the 

lights change from green to yellow and that will give you an opportunity to conclude your remarks. Your written testimony will be 

printed in the record in its entirety and we would ask that you 

limit your oral testimony to no more than 5 minutes. 

Mr. Corbin, I think we will have you go first. 

TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR CORBIN,1 PRESIDENT AND CEO,

MUNICIPAL GAS AUTHORITY OF GEORGIA, KENNESAW,

GEORGIA, ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN PUBLIC GAS 

ASSOCIATION 

Mr. CORBIN. Chairman Levin and Ranking Member Coleman, I 

appreciate this opportunity to testify before you today on the important issue of natural gas market transparency. My name again 

is Arthur Corbin and I am President and CEO of the Municipal 

Gas Authority of Georgia. The Municipal Gas Authority of Georgia 

is a non-profit natural gas joint action agency that supplies all of 

the natural gas requirements of its 76 member municipalities. 

I am testifying today on behalf of the American Public Gas Association. All of our member cities are members of APGA. APGA is 

the national association for publicly-owned not-for-profit natural 

gas distribution systems. These retail distribution systems are 

owned by the public agencies and accountable to the citizens they 

serve. There are approximately 1,000 public gas systems in 36 

States and almost 700 of these systems are APGA members. 

Natural gas is a lifeblood of our economy and millions of consumers depend on natural gas every day to meet their daily needs. 

It is critical that the market for natural gas be fair, orderly, and 

transparent so that the price consumers pay for natural gas reflects the fundamental forces of supply and demand and are not the 

result of manipulative or abusive conduct. 

An appropriate level of transparency currently does not exist and 

this has led to a growing lack of confidence by our members in the 

natural gas market. 

The economic links between the natural gas futures contracts 

traded on NYMEX and those financial contracts in natural gas 

traded in the over-the-counter markets are beyond dispute. Without question a participant’s trading conduct in one venue can affect 

and has affected the price of natural gas contracts in the other. 

The impact of the activities of the Amaranth Advisors hedge fund 

is a perfect example of these economic links between markets. 

When the excessively large positions accumulated by Amaranth 

began to unwind gas prices decreased. Unfortunately, many gas 

distributors, including the Municipal Gas Authority of Georgia, had 

already locked in prices prior to the period Amaranth collapsed at 

10

1The prepared statement of Mr. Cicio appears in the Appendix on page 120. 

prices that did not reflect fundamental supply and demand conditions but rather were elevated due to the accumulation of 

Amaranth’s very large positions. As a result of Amaranth’s activities, the Gas Authority members were forced to pay an $18 million 

premium and pass it through to their customers on their gas bills. 

Today the Commodity Futures Trading Commission has effective 

oversight of NYMEX, and the CFTC and NYMEX provide a significant level of transparency. But despite the economic links between 

prices on NYMEX and the OTC markets, the OTC markets lack 

such transparency. The simple fact is that the CFTC’s large trader 

reporting system, its chief tool in detecting and deterring manipulative market conduct, generally does not apply with respect to 

transactions in the OTC markets. This lack of transparency in a 

very large and rapidly growing segment of the natural gas market 

leaves open the potential for a participant to engage in manipulative or other abusive trading strategies with little risk of early detection by the CFTC until after the damage has been done to the 

market. It simply makes no sense to have transparency with respect to one small segment of the market and none with respect to 

a much larger and growing segment. 

Accordingly, APGA believes that transparency in all segments of 

the market, including those transactions that take place off exchanges and platforms is critical to ensure that the CFTC has a 

complete picture of the entire market. We believe that the CFTC 

does not currently have these tools necessary to police its beat. 

The CFTC has done a good job in catching market abuses after 

the fact. However, by the time these cases are discovered using the 

tools currently available to government regulators, our members 

and their customers have already suffered the consequences of 

those abuses in terms of higher natural gas prices. Greater transparency with respect to large positions, whether entered into on a 

regulated exchange or in an OTC market in natural gas will provide the CFTC with the tools to detect and deter potential manipulative activity before our members and their customers suffer 

harm. 

The current situation is not irreversible. Congress can provide 

American consumers with the protection they deserve by passing 

legislation that would turn the lights on in these currently dark 

markets. APGA looks forward to working with you to accomplish 

this goal and I will be happy to answer any questions you may 

have. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you so much, Mr. Corbin. 

TESTIMONY OF PAUL N. CICIO,1 PRESIDENT, INDUSTRIAL 

ENERGY CONSUMERS OF AMERICA, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. CICIO. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Coleman, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify. 

The Industrial Energy Consumers of America is a non-profit 

trade association whose membership are significant consumers of 

natural gas from every major energy intensive sector. At the heart 

of the matter is that every consumer in the country assumes that 

the government is protecting their interests, and that markets are 

11

working and operating on a level playing field. Nothing could be 

further from the truth. 

The subject of excessive financial speculation, market power, 

market manipulation, first came to our attention in 2001 with the 

implementation of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act and 

concerns have continued to grow. The signs were obvious but because of the lack of market data transparency we could never prove 

it. This all changed with the implosion of the Amaranth Advisors 

hedge fund. 

Amaranth provides a clear and troubling picture of how easy it 

is for large hedge funds, Wall Street trading companies to manipulate the market to the benefit of investors and to the detriment of 

every consumer in the country. Amaranth completely dispels the 

Wall Street myth that the market is too large for any one company 

to manipulate. 

There is excessive financial speculation in the natural gas market but we can deal with it if we have transparency for the regulators to monitor the size of the natural gas volumes that any one 

individual is controlling. All market inefficiencies are paid for by 

us, the consumer, and even a relatively small increase in the price 

of natural gas such as 25 cents can result in a $5.5 billion price 

tag for consumers; 25 cents, $5.5 billion over the course of the year. 

And unlike many other commodities such as currencies, gold, excessive speculation in natural gas has a direct impact on homeowners, farmers and manufacturers. And because natural gas supply is fragile it is particularly vulnerable to manipulation. 

To illustrate the importance of natural gas, one only needs to 

look at two product examples. Natural gas represents 85 percent 

of the cost of making anhydrous, which is used to make fertilizer 

for our farmers, and it is 93 percent of the cost of making plastic, 

something we all consume. The majority of manufactures are dependent upon natural gas as a fuel and there is virtually no substitute. 

We can assume that had Amaranth not continued to increase 

their control of the price by continuing to add to their positions 

market conditions would have driven the price lower. In fact, after 

Amaranth collapsed, so did the price. In September 2006 the price 

was $6.81. After the Amaranth collapse the price fell to $4.20, a 

difference of $2.61. If we assume that only one dollar of the $2.61 

price was due to Amaranth it would have cost consumers an estimated $9 billion over the time period of April through August 2006. 

The Amaranth event raises several important questions that 

Congress should address. The CFTC has known for a long time 

that a significant market oversight gap exists. Why hasn’t the 

CFTC stepped forward to address the problem? Why isn’t the 

CFTC responsive and accountable to the public interest? Did the 

Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 go too far? Did it 

weaken CFTC’s market oversight accountability? Is the relationship between the CFTC and the exchanges too cozy? Why isn’t 

there time limits to prevent CFTC officials from taking top positions in the exchanges? 

It is not without notice that last year large Wall Street-type companies weighed in on Congress to oppose the same reporting and 

transparency that would have prevented Amaranth’s activities. InVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:27 Jan 25, 2008 Jkt 036616 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\36616.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
12

1The prepared statement of Mr. Cota appears in the Appendix on page 123. 

terestingly, these same companies do mark-to-market position accounting at the end of each trading day for internal financial management. Our question is what are they trying to hide? 

IECA recommends that Congress take immediate action to give 

CFTC regulatory authority over NYMEX, ICE, and OTC market in 

general, require large traders to report their positions daily to the 

CFTC, give CFTC the ability to aggregate positions on both exchanges, establish daily trading volume limits, increase monitoring 

in all months, increase CFTC enforcement funding, and lastly, of 

course, increase the supply of natural gas. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Cicio. Now Mr. Cota. 

TESTIMONY OF SEAN COTA,1 CO-OWNER AND PRESIDENT, 

COTA AND COTA, INC., BELLOWS FALLS, VERMONT, PRESIDENT, NEW ENGLAND FUEL INSTITUTE, WATERTOWN, MASSACHUSETTS, AND NORTHEAST CHAIR, PETROLEUM MARKETERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 

Mr. COTA. Hon. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Coleman, 

thank you for having me testify before you today. 

I currently serve in the Petroleum Marketers Association of 

America, as its Northeast Regional Chair. PMAA is a national federation of 45 States, regional associations representing some 8,000 

independent fuel marketers that collectively account for approximately half of the gasoline and 80 percent of the heating oil sold 

in the United States. I am also President of the New England Fuel 

Institute, (NEFI), a trade association outside of Boston. And as 

such, I represent 1,000 fuel dealers and related service companies 

located throughout New England. NEFI members deliver approximately 40 percent of the Nation’s home heating oil. 

I am President of one of those companies, Cota & Cota of Bellows 

Falls, Vermont, a third generation family business operating in 

Southern Vermont and Western New Hampshire. Unlike larger energy companies, heating fuel dealers like me are mostly small second and third-generation family-run businesses. Also unlike large 

energy companies, we deliver directly to American homes and 

small businesses. 

Energy consumers are affected by excessive speculation and price 

volatility in the energy commodity markets in profound ways. We 

and our customers need public officials, including those in Congress 

and on the CFTC, to look after us and take a stand against profiteering traders and hedge fund managers that seek to artificially inflate prices for their own personal gain. We deserve to be made 

aware. In fact, we deserve to know the truth behind what is driving these prices, especially pertinent to market forces that may be 

contributing to volatility and price spikes. 

The CFTC is currently not collecting data on a series of legislative and regulatory loopholes which exempt the over-the-counter 

exchanges and foreign boards of trade with U.S. destined contracts 

from Federal oversight. It is in these dark exchanges that traders 

may be tempted to engage in dubious manipulative trading practices free from the reach of U.S. regulators. 

13

My grandparents began serving the community with heating 

fuels in 1941. We have been offering fixed-price programs to our 

consumers for the past two decades. At first we filled our fuel 

tanks in the summertime and sold those gallons until our consumers ran out of those gallons. However my storage, although 

large by industry standards, is still very limited. We have 6 days 

of January supply. 

It quickly became apparent that due to customer demand that we 

would need a different method for providing fixed-price programs. 

It was at that time that we began to enter into NYMEX-based futures contract with our suppliers so we could continue to offer 

these programs to our customers. These independent suppliers of 

wholesale fuels would purchase NYMEX contracts for future delivery and then, in turn, resell these contracts to us after a profit was 

added. This is typical for the industry. 

Since we first began purchasing NYMEX-based contracts, volatility has increased dramatically. Traditionally when we purchased 

futures contracts, the coldest winter month, January, was more expensive than the warmest month of August. The rate of difference 

is usually a half a cent per gallon per month. In the past few years 

we have seen the difference between summer months and winter 

months be as high as 23 cents per gallon. 

Up until about 4 years ago, it would have been abnormal to have 

a daily market move of more than one half cent per gallon. Today 

it is typical to see 5 cent daily moves and moves as high as 12 

cents. 

We used to offer insurance programs as an alternative to fixedprice programs for our consumers. These option-based programs 

have had the highest increase in volatility. Four years ago we were 

able to purchase an ‘‘at the money’’ put or call at a reasonable cost 

to our consumers. Four years ago the cost of this type of transaction for a January contract purchased in the summer would have 

been between 4 and 6 cents per gallon. Today the same program 

would cost me in the area of 40 cents per gallon. 

Currently fixed-price programs make up 70 percent of my total 

sales. In a business that makes profit in cents per gallon, it is 

much more difficult to continue to offer these fixed-price programs 

to our consumers. Unlike many players in the market who make 

their commodity investments for pure financial gain, we as an industry are hedging directly for the consumer. 

The annual U.S. heating oil industry volume for consumption is 

between 8 and 10 billion gallons per year. With ICE and other exchanges entering into this energy market in a large way, it is having the same effect as an elephant jumping into the bathtub. 

These dark exchanges are expanding both offshore in Dubai and 

other countries and with ICE purchasing ChemConnect. Congress 

and enforcement authorities need to now rein in the excessive speculation and out of control profiteering on the energy commodity 

markets, including these dark exchanges. 

Congress should, one, encourage the CFTC to revisit its use of 

no action letters. Two, investigate whether or not the Atlanta-based 

ICE intentionally established its operations in London to circumvent U.S. regulations. Three, require large position data collected on all U.S. destined contracts. Four, fully fund CFTC levels 

14

as appropriate to upgrade infrastructure and collect capacities and 

increase personnel. Encourage the CFTC to be vigilant in its data 

collection. And hold these dark exchanges to the same rule of law 

that NYMEX and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange have. 

Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to share 

my insight into this issue. I am open to any questions you may 

have. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you all for very valuable testimony. 

Some people say that when Amaranth made these huge purchases and sales and had these massive trades, they only hurt 

themselves. They only lost their own investors’ money, and no one 

else got hurt when those billions went down the drain. 

But will you tell us in your own words whether, in your judgment, the massive purchases, trades, and sales by Amaranth of 

these future contracts hurt you and your customers? And, if so, 

how? Mr. Corbin, let me start with you. 

Mr. CORBIN. Thank you. One of the things that we do as part of 

our function of providing gas supply to our member municipalities 

is to try to hedge or try to manage the risk of prices spiking, going 

a lot higher. The bulk of what we do buy is in the wintertime. 

And so what we do is try to take a very managed approach and 

do not simply let our purchases ride and come to find that prices 

have, in fact, spiked and harmed our members. And so we try to, 

in advance, hedge against that price risk. 

In 2006, when you look at what we are doing in our hedge program, we have some parameters that require us to go in and hedge 

those prices in advance of the winter. And we have time parameters because we have found that hope is not a good strategy. So 

you cannot wait until the last minute hoping that prices are going 

to come down. You need to go ahead and take a disciplined approach. 

And so over the course of the summer of 2006 we are placing 

hedges for our members for the winter of 2006–2007. It is very 

clear to us, certainly even more clear today having the report that 

this Subcommittee has put forward, that through the very excessive positions that Amaranth had the winter price of 2006–2007 

was well beyond what would be supported by underlying market 

fundamentals of supply and demand. 

And so when we looked at what our positions were that we ended 

up putting on for the winter of 2006–2007, those positions versus 

where the market settled to when Amaranth was effectively required to exit through the meltdown, you take the difference and 

that is $18 million that it cost our members, which ultimately cost 

their consumers. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Mr. Cicio. 

Mr. CICIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To answer your question 

we have to put it in context, that in 2006 national natural gas inventories were at a 5-year level or above the 5-year level, and natural gas production was stable. 

It is really impossible to put a definitive number on what it cost 

consumers. This is why in our testimony we used an example. We 

know that in the report that was put together by the Subcommittee 

that Amaranth significantly and continually increased their posiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:27 Jan 25, 2008 Jkt 036616 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\36616.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
15

tions throughout the period of April through August 2006. We 

know that after Amaranth collapsed the price fell over $2.60. 

So there is some portion of that $2.60 drop that was an artificial 

price, that was artificially higher than what it would have been 

had those large purchases not continued. 

This is why we have come up with an illustration. If one dollar 

of that $2.60 higher price was the result of Amaranth’s continually 

buying, owning as much as 100,000 contracts—and by the way let 

me give you a perspective. This morning I checked for the amount 

of open interest on the New York Mercantile for the last trading 

day, Friday, there were 90,500 open interests. What we saw in the 

Subcommittee report is that Amaranth was controlling at one point 

100,000 contracts all by itself. 

So a one dollar impact for Amaranth’s purchases over the course 

of that time period of the spring would have amounted to a $9 billion premium that consumers would have paid. 

Senator LEVIN. That is $9 billion across the entire industry? 

Mr. CICIO. For the United States. 

Senator LEVIN. For the United States, consumers in the United 

States paid $9 billion according to that estimate, which you acknowledge is an estimate. 

Mr. CICIO. It is an estimate. 

Senator LEVIN. Would you judge that is a fair estimate, a conservative estimate? How would you assess it? The best you can? 

Give us your best judgment. Is that a fair division of the $2.60? Is 

it an allocation that you think is a reasonable allocation? 

Mr. CICIO. To be honest with you, we just do not know. 

Senator LEVIN. How do you know then that there was an impact? 

Just from that action that occurred after they collapsed? That is 

what you deduced the impact from? 

Mr. CICIO. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. Is there other evidence of an impact beyond that? 

In other words, is the fact that there were huge purchases that 

were made by Amaranth and that winter price then went up with 

those huge massive purchases, is that part of the evidence of impact? 

Mr. CICIO. Absolutely. The fact is that we had ample supply. The 

fact is that we had such a significant drop after the collapse illustrates that the price was higher than it should have been given 

basic laws of supply and demand. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Mr. Cota. 

Mr. COTA. The impacts are dramatic and across the board. We 

have had a lot of discussion here with regard to natural gas. But 

the entire energy complex moves in unison. Movements in natural 

gas translate immediately into movements in heating oil, movements in gasoline, movements in all of the crude oil products and 

all of the derivative contracts that come off from that. 

These future exchanges are the price discovery point for the energy industry in the United States instantly. In volatile energy 

markets I get price changes on a replacement cost basis from my 

suppliers as often as three times a day in a volatile market. Those 

things are translated to the consumer the next day. I do not do it 

three times a day but the next day. 

16

So one way of measuring the impact of these volatile markets on 

the consumer is immediate in these pricing mechanisms. 

Longer term, the consumers are paying. I am in a cents above 

business. Our profit margin, as a percentage, goes down as commodity prices go up. The consumers pay cent for cent. Everything—

if my cost goes up, their cost goes up. So the direct impacts are immediate and direct to the consumer. When they buy futures contracts for futures purchase and there is added cost due to volatility, 

those consumers pay for that. 

Currently the market has been in contango because of these 

large volatile trades. But when this thing turns, if it ever does 

turn, perhaps in response to oversight, the opposite could have an 

effect. Contango encourages inventories. We could be in a situation 

very rapidly where people short the market and inventories disappear within a matter of a month, at which point you are going 

to have another supply disruption which is going to again distort 

the market from another perspective. Again, the consumer will pay. 

Your question that you had earlier with regard to is there evidence? Well, there is no data. Most of the data is not traded. The 

entire heating oil industry is 8 to 10 billion gallons per year in the 

United States. I would not doubt if you added up all these dark exchanges in addition to the NYMEX that is traded several times per 

day. 

We need speculation. I could not offer my consumers price protection without speculators in the market. They are a key part. But 

at what point do you allow speculation to just run rampant? 

So if there is no data, it is the same thing as having no cops with 

a judiciary. You cannot go to court if there is no cops to collect the 

evidence. I do not think, for a huge chunk of the market, that there 

are any cops on the beat. Where are the cops? 

Senator LEVIN. In terms of setting natural gas prices in the futures market, how important is ICE? Just quickly, Mr. Corbin. Can 

it affect the price on NYMEX, the ICE prices? 

Mr. CORBIN. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. Are they interrelated? 

Mr. CORBIN. Yes. And we see, frankly, the entire natural gas 

marketplace, not just NYMEX, ICE, but also the bilateral market 

and voice broker, that activity can have an impact on the broad 

marketplace. 

Senator LEVIN. Would you agree with that, Mr. Cicio? 

Mr. CICIO. Absolutely. These markets and these exchanges, they 

are all interrelated. 

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Cota. 

Mr. COTA. It is a very close correlation. 

Senator LEVIN. So would you all agree that we have to eliminate 

the Enron loophole in order to have regulation across the board? 

If it is going to have any impact in one place, it has got to have 

impact in all places? Would you agree with that Mr. Corbin? 

Mr. CORBIN. Yes, except I am a little concerned that the focus is 

on simply electronic exchanges and believe that the CFTC needs to 

see the entire market. 

Senator LEVIN. All over-the-counter market, including ICE? 

Mr. CORBIN. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Mr. Cicio. 

17

Mr. CICIO. We agree entirely with that. Just looking at the electronic exchange still is not giving us the necessary oversight. You 

need to go beyond that. 

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Cota. 

Mr. COTA. Nobody knows what the data is. Until the CFTC 

starts collecting data on the entire traded U.S. based energy commodity markets, you are not going to have any idea what is occurring in the market. Every market needs, in order to have a well 

regulated market and a clear functioning market, you need to see 

what the data is. That data is not being seen. 

Senator LEVIN. In addition to seeing it, once you have the data 

is it also important they be able to issue the same kind of an order 

on ICE as they do on NYMEX? 

Mr. COTA. The only thing that is more fungible than my commodity is the money that instantly changes from one market to another based upon regulation. 

Senator LEVIN. I am not sure what the answer is. 

Mr. COTA. Yes, you need to have an oversight on all markets. 

Just doing it on one will cripple the only regulated market and 

force it all into these offshore regulated United Kingdom based or 

wherever based commodity markets. 

In the NYMEX, despite that they are frustrating if you trade 

every day, they are the best of what you have got. 

Senator LEVIN. The NYMEX. 

Mr. COTA. The NYMEX. And you do not want it to go to foreign 

exchanges without any regulation. 

Senator LEVIN. When you say regulation and oversight, that includes having an order issue to reduce one’s position as being excessive speculation? 

Mr. COTA. Absolutely. I am concerned about the consumer. But 

if you are only concerned about the trader, to protect the traders 

you still need to have oversight, margin requirements that reflect 

volatility in the markets, and large trader positions that are limited so that they cannot sway a market. And you do not have that 

in huge amounts of the trade that is currently occurring. 

Senator LEVIN. That is to protect the consumers, not just the 

traders? 

Mr. COTA. I would like to protect the consumer but we are not 

protecting anybody. 

Senator LEVIN. I have got you. Thank you. Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am trying to figure out how to get our arms around all of this. 

Mr. Cota, you talked about these dark markets. So we have 

NYMEX which is clear, it is regulated, we know what is going on, 

it has the transparency that we talk about. 

We are now talking about ICE, but ICE is only a piece of it. So 

we have the bilaterals and we have the foreign markets. One of the 

concerns we have seen generally with financial transactions is that 

there is a lot of movement, IPOs and everything, to other markets. 

Is it your sense that the CFTC can regulate all of these? I will 

walk by each one. Is that the vision here? I am trying to figure out 

can we get our arms around all of it? Is it your sense that the 

CFTC is the body that should be regulating all of these transVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:27 Jan 25, 2008 Jkt 036616 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\36616.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
18

actions, the bilaterals, anything that is done, even on foreign markets? Can you give me a sense of how you accomplish that? 

Mr. COTA. I would think that, as with any transaction, if I have 

a contract with my consumer, those contracts need to be kept. Current data collection requirements do not exist in a lot of these dark 

markets. I think that is an easy thing to accomplish. 

If there is something fishy in the market that is done on one of 

these bilateral dark exchanges, some derivative deal, if you have 

got the data and the data is not destroyed, then you have got the 

ability to investigate it later. 

The amount of these trades are huge. The money that moves into 

this market is a huge part of the world economy that moves in and 

out daily. 

I no longer look at supply and demand when I am trying to judge 

for my consumers. I am looking at what is occurring in the currency market, what is occurring in the bond market. If there is a 

move in the bond market or the equity market, then I know commodities are going to go down for a little bit because of the amount 

of money that is moving in and out of these markets. It is no longer 

supply and demand. Even if you are a technical trader it does not 

follow technical trading. It is an imbalance of greed and fear, in my 

opinion. 

Senator COLEMAN. I want all of you to respond, but I want to go 

to Mr. Corbin. Do you agree that it is not just about supply and 

demand today? If it is not, how do you protect your consumers? 

What is it that you can bring to the table that gives you the ability 

to maneuver through these markets? 

Mr. CORBIN. I think taking it back to your previous question 

about can the CFTC get a handle on this huge market that has got 

a lot of different pieces to it, the CFTC has a large trader reporting 

system today, a very good one. They are only being reported to 

daily from NYMEX transactions. 

Our view is that if you have somewhat—clearly, also ICE is voluntarily providing that information daily today, which we certainly 

applaud ICE for taking that step to do it voluntarily. If you have 

large traders that are in the bilateral market, we feel strongly that 

those folks, in managing their own business, they have very effective information systems to where they can mark-to-market on a 

daily basis literally their position in order to manage it. 

And so we believe that they can plug into that large trader reporting system that we now have NYMEX reporting to daily, ICE 

voluntarily reporting to daily. We believe the other players in the 

market that are large players can also plug into that system. 

That is going to help the CFTC to see positions across the market daily that we think will improve the authority they have today 

to do the special call for additional information and investigations. 

But if you do not really see that you really do not have enough information to go in and pursue something that you suspect is abusive or could be creating a problem in the market. 

And so then, going to your second question, us as consumers, 

how do we get confidence? Well, we do not in the existing structure 

because we do not feel like the regulator has what he needs to do 

his job. He has got the authority to pursue it and he has pursued—

the CFTC has done a good job pursuing bad actors in our business. 

19

It just comes 2 and 3 years later, hundreds of millions of dollars 

in penalties and fines have been paid, as much as $2 billion. None 

of that goes to the consumer though. Those that have been harmed 

do not see any of that. It has gone back into the U.S. Treasury. 

So we would like to get them more information, get them that 

information on a current daily basis so that they can see this stuff 

as it is occurring and can react a lot more quickly. Then the consumer does not pay for a position that got way to big. 

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Cicio, is there anything you want to add 

to that? 

Mr. CICIO. Yes, sir. The large trader report is the solution. The 

CFTC keeps this information confidential. The common denominator of all trading is volume, the volume of natural gas that any 

one entity is buying or selling. And that is the kind of information 

that the CFTC needs to determine whether there is a significant 

enough volume that any one player is impacting the price. 

And so we would agree with the others on that point. Thank you. 

Senator COLEMAN. We are talking here about reporting requirements in terms of size. What about position limits? 

Mr. CICIO. Yes. We believe that there should be limits to how 

many contracts a single entity should be able to control. What we 

saw in the Subcommittee report was that Amaranth controlled 

100,000 contracts in 1 month. And what I shared with you just a 

moment ago is that for the August contract there is only 90,500 

open interest contracts. That shows how significant Amaranth’s position was and looks like market power. 

If a manufacturer had that much market power for their product 

that they were selling, whether it is plastic or steel or aluminum, 

it would raise huge concerns by the antitrust and FTC people. 

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Corbin, is there benefit to having liquidity in the markets? 

Mr. CORBIN. There is a great benefit. And so we would like—we 

think we need to be careful here in what you just asked Mr. Cicio. 

And that is with regard to limits. We think what is critical is let 

us get the transparency. Let us get the information in the hands 

of the CFTC across the market so they can see these positions 

across the market. And if the CFTC determines that there needs 

to be limits imposed because they are seeing the effects of larger 

positions held in order to make sure that we can get ahead of any 

kind of negative behavior and how it impacts the price of gas, then 

we think that information would help them make that determination. 

At this point we are not advocating limits. We are advocating 

transparency through expanding the large trader reporting system. 

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Cota, two questions. One is are there benefits to having liquidity in the market? If so, what are they? And 

do you advocate position limits? 

Mr. COTA. Without liquidity and speculation—speculation and liquidity are directly linked. You need to have speculation in the 

market in order to hedge anything out in the future. 

What you want is to enable all speculators to have an even hand 

in taking a risk in that market, much like I, as a retailer, am taking risks in that market. 

20

So the number and the margin and the percentage of the total 

market are all very relevant in order to have a well regulated market, in my opinion. 

Senator COLEMAN. Position limits though, is that part of it? 

Mr. COTA. Position limits, to me, may or may not necessarily be 

related to the actual numbers of contracts. As markets increase 

and decrease I think it needs to be relative to what the percentage 

of the total market is. 

If I recall reading some of the study here on the Amaranth holdings, if they actually had to have those contracts delivered, one of 

their positions was almost equivalent to the entire natural gas industry. So if that were a smaller percentage yet it was over a trigger amount, it may not be as relevant. So I think it needs to relate 

to the total amount of contracts being traded in that market and 

how big is that market? 

And I believe that the New York Mercantile Exchange does do 

evaluations on that and the other markets do not. 

Senator COLEMAN. So it would be beneficial to have a definition 

of what excessive speculation is? 

Mr. COTA. I think positions and margin, as measured through options or whatever other mechanism, would be a better indication of 

how to limit the volatility and speculation in the market. Speculation is important. You need to have speculation in order to have 

futures exchanges. 

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Corbin, would it be beneficial to have a 

definition of excessive speculation? 

Mr. CORBIN. Yes. 

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Cicio. 

Mr. CICIO. Yes, it would be helpful. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Senator McCaskill. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MCCASKILL 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you. 

In reviewing all of the materials, I apologize, I was not here for 

your testimony although I heard most of it in my office, as I was 

listening with one ear to a conference call and listening to you with 

the other ear. 

It strikes me that regulation in this area is really driven by common sense in light of what happened with this one incident that 

has been the focus of the hearing today. And I have learned in the 

short period of time I have been here that ideas that sound so simple and have so much common sense behind them, it is unbelievable how difficult it is to move them forward in terms of legislation 

and actually to get the votes necessary to pass. What would appear 

to anyone who heard this story, would say well fix that, for gosh 

sakes. If you are going to do anything, fix that. 

And there is this invisible force always behind everything, and 

that is the people who are lobbying the other side of the equation, 

the people who are saying do not go there, the people who are visiting member’s offices and saying stop, stop, do not do this, you 

have no idea what you are doing. It will be bad. 

All of those people generally have people they have hired to help 

them do that, to spread that information. 

21

Who is working against this? Who is paying the lobbyists to oppose what would appear to be common sense at this point in terms 

of some kind of regulatory oversight in this area of a commodity 

that is an essential and not a luxury? Any of you? 

Mr. CORBIN. I will take a shot at that. I do not know that I can 

answer and say who, but I think we have heard some of the things 

that are the difficult balancing act. And that is the question of liquidity. You do not want to restrict the market. It is very important that we have a well functioning liquid natural gas market. 

And so you want to be careful that you do not, in some way, inhibit 

it. 

But I think you have also got to be careful that you do not have 

regulation in one place and then push people into a less transparent market segment. 

The approach we have taken, and as far as expanding the large 

trading reporting system, the objection that we have heard is that 

it may be time consuming and costly. From our perspective, the 

CFTC already has a large trading reporting system that exists. Expanding it to include the over-the-counter market activity, we do 

not think it is a tremendous expense for them. I think they have 

got it and it is largely electronic and they can accept electronic 

transmissions to go almost straight into their system. 

I think the people with large positions also have electronic systems to manage their position. And so providing the information 

should not be costly and, we do not believe, difficult. 

I think what you do have is a lot of activity over the counter and 

the reason that the over-the-counter market exists is that NYMEX 

is a very standard product. It is at one point in the natural gas 

grid only and it is a fixed amount of gas. Well, people do not buy 

gas just at that one point and they do not just buy gas in that fixed 

quantity. And so the issue is how do you make it at all comparable 

in that reporting system? 

And so Paul’s point about you can break it down to volume, and 

I think you can break transactions down to whether they are a long 

position or a short position in the scheme of things, which I think 

could be done. 

I do not think it is as difficult as the opponents make it to be 

but I think— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, who are the opponents though? I am 

trying to figure it out who is against expanding the CFTC authority to be able to regulate large speculation in an essential commodity market? Who are these people? 

Mr. CICIO. May I take a crack at that? Add up all the consumers 

and add up all of the producers of natural gas, and together they 

are, by the best data that I have seen available, insignificant players in this marketplace, insignificant. So it is all of the others. 

All that consumers want to do is buy gas at a price, with a certainty. We hedge to get increase predictability of price so that we 

can price our product and reduce our risk. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Mr. CICIO. Producers primarily want to set a price so that they 

can sell and that they have certainty in terms of profitability. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

22

Mr. CICIO. To answer your question, all other entities who want 

to take large positions for speculating, larger positions than, for example, that are available in the limits through NYMEX, are the organizations who oppose reporting. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So gamblers? 

Mr. CICIO. Well, people who are speculating to make a profit on 

speculation. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Because they are not getting anything for 

what they are doing good. They are not receiving anything. They 

are just gambling that something might happen. 

Mr. CICIO. They are speculators. And as we have all agreed, speculation is a necessary part of the marketplace. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I do not quarrel that speculating is a necessary part of the marketplace. But I am trying to hone in on who 

is against this kind of regulation in order to provide some kind of 

certainty to consumers and suppliers which, by the way, is who we 

should be looking after here, not the gamblers. I mean, our job I 

think in this building is to look after the consumers and the suppliers as it relates to using a product that they have to have to 

heat their homes and to eat. 

So it seems weird to me that the invisible hand of opposition are, 

in fact, the gamblers, not the consumers or the suppliers. 

Mr. COTA. Senator McCaskill if I can take a stab at that, as well, 

your point on gamblers is right on. It seems to me sometimes the 

Nevada Gaming Authority has more authority— 

Senator MCCASKILL. No question about it. 

Mr. COTA [continuing]. Than what we see in this market. The financial players of all sorts worldwide are all players in this market. They are the ones that would like the least amount of regulation so that they can move money around quickly. The larger the 

player the more interest they have in having less oversight. 

These financial players are also significant holders of physical 

product and that is very important. I actually trust major oil companies in my business less than I do some of the banks that actually hold product. I may not like the price that I pay, but they will 

always have product whereas the major oil companies will just, if 

things get too complex, they will shut it down. In my business, if 

I am out of fuel for a day, people freeze to death. So I need to have 

product and these people are important players in the market. But 

those are the people that are generally interested in not having 

oversight. 

I have hope because the CFTC is the CFTC and not the SEC. 

CFTC, by being an agricultural based group means you have got 

a lot more folks across the country that will have a different perspective. So I think there is more hope in regulation in the commodities market because they relate——

Senator MCCASKILL. There is more diversity of interest. 

Mr. COTA. Well, it is your internal politics, it is the Ag Committee’s jurisdiction. So I think I have got more hope in the Ag Committee than I do in perhaps the other committees. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank god for pork bellies. 

Mr. COTA. Exactly. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 

23

1See Exhibit 6 which appears in the Appendix on page 717. 

Let me see if I can boil this down in this way: Senator McCaskill 

talked about common sense so let us start with the commonsense 

issue. We have got a NYMEX market. NYMEX told Amaranth they 

had to reduce its holdings. They have that power under law. They 

said there was excessive speculation going on or that the price impacts were going to be great if there were a lot of sales on a certain 

date. For whatever reason, NYMEX issued an order, reduce your 

holdings. 

Now Exhibit 6,1 that chart shows what happened on that day 

when NYMEX told Amaranth to reduce its holdings. At the time 

of the order the yellow was the holdings of Amaranth on NYMEX. 

The blue was on ICE. So the regulators said reduce your holdings 

and all they did was shift to ICE? Is that correct? Is that Exhibit 

6? 

That does not make commonsense, I assume, to anybody. I mean, 

if it is excessive under the law, and we have a law, Commodities 

Exchange Act, which directs the CFTC to prevent excessive speculation. And it says ‘‘Excessive speculation in any commodity under 

contracts for future delivery causing sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price of such commodity. 

It is an undue and unnecessary burden on interstate commerce and 

the CFTC shall fix such limits on the amount of trading as the 

Commission finds are necessary to diminish, eliminate or prevent 

such burden.’’ 

So they are carrying out the law and they tell their agent, 

NYMEX, CFTC tells NYMEX, you are our agent. NYMEX reaches 

a conclusion. We can be totally all overwhelmed and swamped with 

all of the words which all have to use swaps, margin requirements, 

price spreads, hedges, manipulation, speculation. We have lost 

probably most of our audience already or if we have not lost them 

before that. 

But cut to the chase. The cop on the beat said reduce your position. They did not reduce their position, they shifted their position. 

So this is a glaring loophole we have in the law. It is called the 

Enron loophole. It does not make any sense to have a cop over on 

this side of the street say you are out of business, quit selling liquor to minors, and then the liquor store or whatever, the bar, goes 

across the street and sells liquor to minors. That is what we have 

got here. When you strip all of the complexity away, that is what 

we have. 

And the question is whether or not we are not only going to give 

the regulator, CFTC, the power to get the information which you 

all have talked about but also the power to do on the over-thecounter exchanges what they do with NYMEX. That is the question. 

Now I recognize what Senator Coleman said. I think we all have 

to appreciate you need some speculation in the market, otherwise 

you are not going to be able to hedge in the future. The question 

is excessive speculation. And should the CFTC be able to stop it 

wherever it occurs? That is the question, on the over-the-counter or 

whether it is NYMEX or ICE. I guess ICE is a form of over-thecounter because it is an electronic exchange. 

24

Mr. Corbin, I do not know if I have a question somewhere in 

there or not, but would you agree with that? 

Mr. CORBIN. If there was a question in there, I agreed with it. 

The only thing I would caution against, because I think we saw 

it here. We have one loophole today and we see very pronounced 

how they shifted over to one exchange. 

I would just caution, that we need to make sure that whatever 

structure we are putting in place does not have them just go over 

to another place——

Senator LEVIN. Another exchange. 

Mr. CORBIN [continuing]. That is not transparent that we have 

not necessarily thought about. 

So that is why we have used the broad term over-the-counter 

market entirely so that we do not have a future loophole. You have 

done a lot of work. We do not want to have another loophole after 

you are done. 

Senator LEVIN. Jump into another block, across the street to another block. 

Do you think that we are able to do that technically? Could we, 

given the technology out there, given the global economy, given exchanges in various parts of the world, are we able, do you believe 

as a practical matter, to prevent that from happening? 

Mr. CORBIN. If you change the law? 

Senator LEVIN. Yes. 

Mr. CORBIN. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. We can rewrite the law so we can stop it and not 

just push it somewhere else? 

Mr. CORBIN. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Cicio. 

Mr. CICIO. I would agree with everything that Mr. Corbin has 

said and I would like to strengthen it by making a statement that 

I said in the testimony that brings it all home. 

Remember, it is how much volume that any one entity controls 

that is important. Every company that is in this market does a 

mark-to-market position for their internal financial purposes at the 

end of each trading day. They look at how many positions they are 

long, how many positions they are short, and they see whether 

they are making money or not making money. 

So this data is available and it is available on a daily basis and, 

from our perspective, there is no reason why any company, including those on the OTC market, could not report. 

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Cota, would you agree, if you can figure out 

what I said, with what I said? 

Mr. COTA. I think I figured it out, Senator. The money that 

moves around in the world will continue to move around the world 

instantly and immediately based upon a market reaction. Will we 

be able to stop speculation, excess speculation? I am unclear as to 

whether or not we will be able to. 

I do believe that what we do have a chance to do is to deal with 

U.S. based transactions. So if you have any commodity that is destined for the United States, I do think you can have oversight. I 

do think you can have a transparent market in those areas. And 

the transparency in itself, because we are defining the U.S. market, 

will have a worldwide impact. 

25

I am sure the Russian commodity market would take whatever 

money wants to be thrown at it for speculative purposes. But we 

are a unique market, both because of our size, because the products 

are destined here, and because the world has had a faith in our 

regulatory oversight so that money continues to flow. And I think 

that is the way that you will be able to reduce the excessive speculation. 

Senator LEVIN. This testimony is very important. We have had 

a debate on this very issue. We had a vote on this very issue. We 

had an amendment which would have covered all over-the-counter 

transactions. We lost that vote and we had to remove it and just 

go more limited. We had to go after the electronic exchanges and 

not the other over-the-counter exchanges, the bilateral exchanges. 

So we have to figure out, can we get to those bilateral exchanges 

without creating bad consequences? We can get to the electronic exchanges; it was in the vote we lost. But can we get to the other 

over-the-counter exchanges, the bilateral exchanges, for instance? 

Can we do that, Mr. Corbin? 

Mr. CORBIN. I would like to comment on that. The CFTC has the 

authorization, where they believe there has been manipulation, 

they currently have the authority to go in, investigate, dig into it, 

figure it out, prosecute. And they have done that in some prior instances. 

I think what we are talking about here is can we get the information in those other over-the-counter, the broad over-the-counter 

market, with regard to large positions so that they can be tracking 

what is happening across the entire complex. 

Again, I say the answer is yes, you can do that. 

Senator LEVIN. Do they have the power to act under current law 

if they have the information? 

Mr. CORBIN. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. So the CFTC could stop this if they had the information, if there is excessive speculation with large purchases and 

sales? 

Mr. CORBIN. Yes, they have the authority to investigate if they 

see. But right now they do not see that information so they do not 

have it until you have a very big event that they can then go in 

and investigate and 3 or 4 years later then you have fines and 

prosecution and all those. It didn’t do anything. 

Senator LEVIN. And that includes all over-the-counter exchanges? 

They have that authority now? 

Mr. CORBIN. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. So it is just the information that is lacking? Do 

either of you want to comment on this before I call on Senator 

Coleman? Can we do this? 

Mr. CICIO. I would agree with what Mr. Corbin says. 

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Cota, do you agree with that? 

Mr. COTA. I would agree with it. Until you find the data, until 

you count how much money you made you cannot charge any tax. 

It is the same sort of thing here. 

Senator LEVIN. But my point is a little different. After you have 

the data, do you need any additional authority in law? 

Mr. COTA. I think the current law is sufficient, provided that you 

have the data. 

26

Senator LEVIN. For CFTC to stop excessive speculation with an 

order to reduce your speculation or to reduce your holdings? 

Mr. COTA. I think they have the authority. Fraud is fraud. If you 

have got data, you can prove it. The BP example of attempting to 

corner the propane market is one example. And I personally believe 

that came out because the data was being collected. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you have the power to limit a holding? A position? Under current law? 

Mr. COTA. Again, I am a tiny little oil company in the middle of 

nowhere. I don’t know. 

Senator LEVIN. We will find out from the next panel. 

Is it your understanding that CFTC has that authority under 

current law? 

Mr. COTA. I am unclear as to whether they do or they do not. 

Mr. CORBIN. Just to clarify, I would not say that the CFTC has 

the current authority to establish limits in the over-the-counter 

market, but they certainly do have the authority to go in and investigate and prosecute when they believe there has been manipulation. But they do not have the limits that you are talking about. 

Senator LEVIN. OK. Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, important questions. Just a couple of observations. 

I think it is both an authority and a resource issue, and that has 

to be addressed. 

I do not want to defend the gamblers but my concern is we will 

get the gamblers and that we do not hurt the consumers. So consumers are the ones that, if they can hedge, if you can buy in August, against costs in January, if you are forced to wait until January, if you do not have the market, if we dry up liquidity, it is consumers who get hurt. Is that fair, Mr. Corbin? 

Mr. CORBIN. Yes. 

Senator COLEMAN. So as we look at the ‘‘gamblers’’ out there, it 

is the consumers who benefit by having liquidity in the market. 

The question about regulation then always becomes a question of 

do we do it in a way that allows consumers to benefit? Or in the 

guise of doing something that we think is positive, do we do something that is negative? It is this law or rule of unintended consequences, one of the great sins that we in Congress do. 

I reflect on Sarbanes-Oxley, absolutely critical, absolute important, need to do it. Just a piece of it, Section 404, we are talking 

about right now. Originally we thought that it would cost small 

business $93,000. And after a study they said it would cost small 

business $930,000, 10 times the estimated cost of complying with 

something that had to be done. 

My only concern in this area, and I am in accord with the Chairman, is we need to close the Enron loophole. I think the CFTC can 

certainly, we can move over into the ICE. My concern though, and 

it is perhaps the point you raise, Mr. Cota, is do we drive folks to—

can we regulate the bilaterals? And if we can regulate the 

bilaterals, then do we drive them to London, easily London, and 

perhaps Russia and others? And then what is the impact on the 

consumers? 

So just as we walk through this, I think we can get our arms 

around some of it. I just want to make sure we understand, as we 

27

get our arms around it, what is the impact? Do you think, Mr. 

Corbin, we can deal with the bilateral? There are bilateral trades 

that go on. Do we have the ability then for CFTC to oversee what 

happens in bilaterals? 

Mr. CORBIN. I think that we could have the bilaterals included 

in their large position reporting system, where the CFTC starts 

when they are looking at behavior in the market that potentially 

is abusive. 

Senator COLEMAN. Those are all electronic. What about non-electronic? Are you presuming everything is electronic? 

Mr. CORBIN. I am assuming that the folks that have large positions in the bilateral market have electronic systems to manage 

their position and that they know every day what their position is. 

Senator COLEMAN. What about the offshores? 

Mr. CORBIN. I do not have much experience with that so I can’t 

really speak to that. 

Senator COLEMAN. One of the problems that we see now on the 

Wall Street side of it, 24 of the last 25 IPOs are not done in this 

country. They are going offshore. Has anyone done a study regarding the possibility of that here? Is there any way for us to have 

some control or some transparency in the offshores transactions? 

Mr. Cota. 

Mr. COTA. Senator Coleman, I agree with a lot of your concerns. 

CFTC, even if they had the data, does not have enough money to 

do anything, in my opinion. 

You are going to need a new financial—again, this is coming 

from a small company in the middle of nowhere. I think that you 

are going to need a different sort of overreaching world financial 

oversight in order to prevent anything like that. 

The one advantage that we have got is that for U.S. destined 

products you can define what is a U.S. destined product. 

I think that the speculation has been critical for the U.S. energy 

markets. In the energy business, in my industry, we used to have 

rationing and lines. The financial markets, as much as the market 

volatility is distasteful, it has ensured that we have had product 

at every day. And to me that is critical to serve the consumer. 

So yes, I agree with your comments that the consumer can be 

hurt by unintended consequences. But having a market where a 

few players can manipulate the outcome is not in anyone’s interest, 

neither the consumer nor the industry. 

Senator COLEMAN. And we can certainly deal with that here in 

this country if it takes place here? 

Mr. COTA. Yes. 

Senator COLEMAN. Absolutely. Mr. Cicio. 

Mr. CICIO. Senator Coleman, I always try to keep it very simple 

on this very complex issue, but even for the bilaterals, the common 

denominator is volume. It does not matter where that entity is located that is buying that natural gas, whether they are sitting in 

New York, Houston, Texas, San Francisco, or Dubai. 

If that product is going to be for the U.S. consumption, then I 

would believe that it is responsible policy for the CFTC to be able 

to collect that information. I think it is that simple. And because 

these companies all do mark-to-market transactions for themselves, 

28

it appears to us that it would not be costly and would not be unreasonable to provide that information to CFTC. 

Senator COLEMAN. Again, I am trying to get my arms around all 

of this. I think the work that the Chairman has done in this area 

has been extraordinary. This is complex and I think you have simplified this. And we understand there are some big gaps here and 

we have to deal with those. 

I am thinking about the next step. It is one thing to get information. How do you enforce bilateral swap market positions? What 

kind of limits do you put on them without causing crippling effects 

on the market? I think we need this definition of excessive speculation. Even in the Amaranth investigation, there were some who argued that this is not excessive speculation. We need to have that 

so we have a marker in front of us. 

If the markets are not electronic—Mr. Corbin presumes it is electronic and I agree with him—but if they are not electronic or there 

are bits and pieces out there, maybe we just have to tolerate that. 

Tolerate—maybe we get our arms around what we can get our 

arms around and provide protection where we can but understand 

it is not going to be a perfect system. 

But I just think we have to be clear what we are doing and not 

tell people we have got our arms around this whole thing when, in 

fact, it is difficult and there is great cost. 

Mr. Cota, you have brought the great gift the good lord gave us, 

common sense, to this. You bring it to this discussion. It does not 

matter how big you are. You are right. But there is an enforcement 

piece that we have not even talked about. And there is a cost to 

that enforcement. Two of us up here are former prosecutors. There 

is a cost to enforcement. And we, in the Congress, have to look that 

in the face and determine if we are prepared to do that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Coleman. Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Most of the questions I have I want to save 

for the academics on the next panel but I would just comment, Senator Coleman, that if we continue to use the analogy about the casino and whether or not we have a sufficient oversight, which is 

the set of rules that people feel like if they come to that casino they 

are not going to get cheated, they do more business. Because it is 

kind of what Mr. Cota referred to in terms of our markets here are 

attractive to international players because they have a sense that 

there is not corruption and cheating, that they can rely on a free 

market force. 

If you are going to speculate or gamble, then you sure as heck 

do not want the house to be rigged. And that is attractive to the 

international gambler in this area and so I think we need to make 

sure we continue to promote that image that we have got a regulated market so no one thinks they are going to come and get 

cheated. 

There is a certain irony to saying that we do not have enough 

money to do anything, the CFTC, when you realize the kind of vig 

we should be charging here. This is a reason everyone tries to beat 

each other to get casino licenses in the United States because the 

house is in a great position. 

29

It seems to me we ought to figure a way to charge a high enough 

vig on these speculative ventures because the excessive speculation 

is driven by greed. That is the only thing behind excessive speculation is just greed. People thinking they are going to make more 

money. That is why they are excessive. 

So it seems to me we ought to figure a way to charge a healthier 

vig on the excessive speculation in order to make sure we have 

enough money to go after the people that are putting the consumer 

in the worst position of all, and that is being held captive to somebody’s greed. 

So if any of you have a comment about the house charging a little higher vig to make sure they have enough money to go after 

bad guys, I would welcome your comments before I close for this 

panel. 

Mr. CORBIN. I would agree with you that CFTC needs to have 

adequate amount of resources to do its job. So I think that is important in this whole equation. 

Mr. CICIO. Without question it is very clear that the CFTC has 

not been funded appropriately to do the kind of enforcement. But 

quite frankly, our organization has not addressed the issue of fees 

so I really cannot respond to your question. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I would be interested in your organization’s 

perspective if you all have an opportunity to give it some thought. 

Coming from State Government that has become very dependent 

on the lottery I realize that kind of position government has in 

gambling right now and it appears—I used to think it ironic that 

we used to take children to the Kansas City Board of Trade to 

learn about gambling while we were busy opposing gambling in 

Missouri. I always thought that it was ironic that most people in 

Missouri did not understand that all they had to do if they wanted 

to gamble was go down there and get them a seat on the Kansas 

City Board of Trade and they could gamble with the big guys, so 

to speak. 

Mr. COTA. Senator, I am not sure how are you going to get the 

vig balance correct. That is out of my area of expertise. But nobody 

likes a fixed table. And a well regulated market, no matter how 

much—speculation and gambling have a lot in common. But you 

need to know what the rules are well enough to be able to play 

with some consistency. 

If certain players are controlling the rules on the table that day 

for that moment, that is not in anyone’s interest. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. Thank you all very much. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. 

I am just going to sum up the conclusion I am drawing very 

quickly. Everybody believes that we need a regulator to go after excessive speculation. It does not do any good to have a regulator on 

NYMEX that can prevent excessive or end excessive speculation 

and then just have that move over to say the electronic exchange. 

We will start with that. I think you all would agree with that? 

Is that fair enough? 

Mr. CORBIN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CICIO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COTA. Yes, sir. 

30

Senator LEVIN. And then the question would be whether or not 

we can stop the excessive speculation, which everyone agrees is 

wrong. Speculation is necessary, but we all agree excessive speculation is bad for the market and bad for your consumers. 

And the question then is can we go beyond the electronic exchange to get the over-the-counter bilaterals which are not on the 

electronic exchange? This seems to me to be an important issue but 

a different issue. 

But at a minimum, what we saw happening in Amaranth makes 

utterly no sense. You have NYMEX saying stop, not that you did 

something illegal, not that you manipulated something illegal, but 

that you are doing something which must stop for the benefit of the 

market under the law which we have written. 

What we saw with Amaranth, with just a shifting from NYMEX 

to the electronic market, makes no sense at all, and that at a minimum we can act to stop that. Would we have that kind of a consensus on the panel? 

You are all nodding your heads yes. 

Mr. COTA. I think that some of the oversight as it relates to excessive speculation is revealed by perhaps the New York Mercantile Exchange. NYMEX does a lot of the regulation it does by 

itself on its own and not as a direct result of what the CFTC requires. CFTC requires certain things but NYMEX has its own 

rules. The other markets do not. 

Just having a market like the New York Mercantile Exchange in 

the other areas where there is no oversight, I think, will enhance 

both the market for the consumer and the speculators, as well. 

Senator LEVIN. Do either of my colleagues have any other comments? 

We thank you all very much, a very helpful panel and we excuse 

you with our gratitude. 

Let us now welcome our second panel of witnesses for today’s 

hearing. We have with us Vincent Kaminski, Professor at the Jesse 

Jones Graduate School of Management, Rice University in Houston, Texas; and Michael Greenberger, Law School Professor, University of Maryland School of Law in Baltimore. 

We appreciate both of you being with us this morning. We welcome you to the Subcommittee. 

As you know, we have a rule that requires all witnesses who testify before the Subcommittee to be sworn and we would ask you 

now to stand and raise your right hand. 

Do you swear that the testimony you are going to give before the 

Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 

the truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. KAMINSKI. I do. 

Mr. GREENBERGER. I do. 

Senator LEVIN. You were here, I believe, when we described the 

timing system. I will not repeat that. Professor Kaminski, let us 

have you go first, and then Professor Greenberger. 

31

1The prepared statement of Mr. Kaminski appears in the Appendix on page 133. 

TESTIMONY OF VINCENT KAMINSKI,1 PROFESSOR, RICE UNIVERSITY, JESSE H. JONES GRADUATE SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, HOUSTON, TEXAS 

Mr. KAMINSKI. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, 

my name is Vince Kaminski and I work currently at Rice University in the Jones Graduate School of Management in Houston 

where I teach courses related to energy markets, energy derivatives, and energy risk management. 

My testimony today will address some of the issues that you 

identified in your invitation letter to this hearing. Those issues 

deal with the organization of the U.S. natural gas markets and the 

scope and consequences of excessive speculation I witnessed the 

last few years in those markets. 

My opinions are based on 14 years of experience of working for 

energy trading corporations, including merchant energy companies, 

an independent power producer, a very big hedge fund, and one of 

the biggest financial institutions. I have also been consulting recently for FERC, helping the staff to analyze market related issues. 

The opinions expressed today are my own and I do not necessarily represent the views of the institutions with which I am affiliated. 

The energy markets have undergone a fundamental transformation during the last 14 years I spent working in the merchant 

energy business. In 1992, the year in which I made the transition 

to energy trading, the markets for different energy commodities 

were relatively isolated with limited linkages between different locations and physical products. Today the landscape of the energy 

business is much different. Energy markets are evolving towards a 

highly integrated global system with shocks propagating across different local markets and markets for specific physical commodities 

at a very high rate and through rapidly changing transmission 

channels. 

The energy markets represent a network of related physical, financial, and credit markets with very complex interactions and 

interdependencies. And it is a flaw, in my view, to look at the physical markets in isolation from the financial markets. 

In the coming years the energy markets will be affected by growing demand pressures from the fast growing emerging economies 

and the necessity to access more costly supply alternatives. The upward pressure on prices will increase the importance of efficient 

and transparent energy markets as sources of information about 

the costs and relative scarcity of different energy commodities and 

benefits of alternative production technologies. 

Given growing integration of the markets any distortion of the 

price formation process will propagate and reverberate across the 

entire system and will affect both investment and consumption decisions. Well functioning energy markets will become ever more 

critical not only to the welfare of the U.S. citizens but also to the 

energy security of the United States. The integrity of energy markets deserves the same level of protection as the pipelines, refineries, ports, and other components of the physical infrastructure. 

32

1The prepared statement of Mr. Greenberger appears in the Appendix on page 137. 

The energy markets and the commodity markets in general, 

given their complexity and rapid transformation, are often vulnerable to market manipulation. Nobody can deny this given our recent experience with the U.S. Western energy markets crisis of a 

few years ago. 

What is more important is to recognize that the nature of market 

manipulation evolves and mutates over time as the energy markets 

become more complex. In the past, market manipulation was typically associated with squeezes, corners, and withholding of physical 

supplies from the market. Today market manipulation can be accomplished in many different ways by taking advantage of a variety of trading platforms and leverage offered by derivative instruments. A typical scheme evolves around taking positions on different trading platforms, platforms that often receive different levels of regulatory scrutiny. 

Subsequently, a potential manipulator may engage in bursts of 

rapid fire trading in one market around specific contract expiration 

time when market liquidity dries up in order to influence the prices 

used for settlements of outstanding contracts on other platforms 

and in other markets. The losses incurred through such trading 

would be typically offset by gains on the positions taken on other 

platforms and other instruments. 

Also, a potential manipulator can use different platforms to decompose a scheme into different pieces and the regulators, who can 

see only one part of the bigger scheme, will not detect the manipulation in time. 

I am getting close to my time limit so I shall briefly summarize 

the recommendations I would like to make. In my view, the efficiency and transparency of the U.S. energy markets can be increased without sacrificing the risk-taking culture and the spirit of 

innovation. The critical element of the market reform is, in my 

view, an improved access to information. Such initiatives may be 

initially opposed by many market participants but in the long run 

the industry will benefit from them. Less opaque, more transparent 

markets will grow and flourish in the long run, as evidenced by 

many other examples. 

My recommendations include regular reports of large transactions executed in the OTC markets; elimination of the Enron exemption; regular reports of trading activity on the ICE exchange 

available to the trading community. 

Thank you. I will be glad to answer any questions. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Professor Kaminski. 

Professor Greenberger. 

TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL GREENBERGER,1 LAW SCHOOL PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND SCHOOL OF LAW, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 

Mr. GREENBERGER. Good afternoon and thank you for inviting 

me to the hearing. I would submit my testimony. 

I really wanted to cut to the chase on this. I am more than happy 

to answer questions. You have asked excellent questions of the 

prior panel. 

33

Senator Klobuchar, who is on the other side of this? 

Senator MCCASKILL. McCaskill, but that is OK. 

Senator LEVIN. McCaskill. 

Mr. GREENBERGER. McCaskill, I am sorry. Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. We get mistaken all the time. It is OK. 

Mr. GREENBERGER. It is interesting that you are from Missouri 

because you should be talking to Congressman Graves, who got the 

Enron loophole largely undone on a floor vote on the House of Representatives when the Republicans controlled the House and natural gas was at $14 per million BTU. It is at $7 today. Why did 

he do that? Because the farmers of Missouri were dependant on 

natural gas and were dying on the vine, paying $14. 

Who is on the other side of this? Go look at the advisory committees that the CFTC sets up to advise them. You are not going to 

find the prior panelists on those advisory committees. You are not 

going to find your constituents who are paying 35 percent of their 

income from natural gas. Go down the list. It is Goldman Sachs. 

It is Morgan Stanley. 

The CFTC is a captive of the industry it regulates. There is just 

no doubt about it. And I am under oath and I take that position. 

When Mr. Cicio went to the CFTC in June 2005 to talk about 

the Inter Continental Exchange and the question of whether they 

should continue to be regulated as a United Kingdom company, 

which for purposes of crude oil they are, Osama bin Laden could 

not have been treated any worse by the CFTC because that was a 

consumer voice coming in to an agency that is dominated by the 

International Swaps Dealers and Derivatives Association, the Futures Industry Association, the Securities Industry Association, the 

Bond Market Association, and I could go on. 

And Senator McCaskill, you will meet those people believe me, 

if you want to do away with the Enron loophole. And they will give 

you every reason under the sun not to do it. 

Amaranth. Nobody got burned besides the investors of Amaranth. Well, your prior panel made it clear and your constituents 

are telling you that they got burned. People locked in to prices that 

were artificially high in the summer of 2006 and turned around 

and the spot price was at least one-third lower than what they had 

to charge their consumers. 

If you talk to people like the New England Fuel Institute, these 

are small businessman. When you ask them what is the global impact that is going to be, that is not what they are dealing with. 

And I will tell you what the global impact is going to be. But their 

consumers are furious with them. And they are not controlling this 

situation. They are trying to hedge. 

Yes, you need speculators in this market. The markets could not 

function without speculation. But these are not casinos. Amaranth 

turned it into a casino. If you want to have gambling, go to Las 

Vegas. 

This is for a commercial purpose to allow farmers and producers 

to hedge and the speculators are invited in to create liquidity. And 

the statute, because of the farmers who were taken to the cleaners 

by the Chicago Board of Trade at the turn of the 20th Century, the 

farmers were the ones who insisted there be no excessive speculation. 

34

And by the way, the Enron loophole does not apply to the agricultural interests. If it did, you have wheat producers here complaining about what is happening on these markets. And the farmers are too smart and too vigorous to allow this to happen to them. 

Agriculture remains completely under the control of the CFTC. 

Now with regard to people going over to London, the Inter Continental Exchange bought the British International Petroleum Exchange. And with that fig leaf, they present themselves as a U.K. 

company. And they want to take advantage of that. 

But are they going and buying up London exchanges? No. They 

have just made a $12 billion bid for the Chicago Board of Trade. 

They bought the New York Board of Trade. They want to do business in the United States. These kinds of contracts are not—you 

cannot go to Dubai and hedge for natural gas that is going to be 

delivered in the United States. The United States is the industry 

here. ICE is dying. They want to take over the Chicago Board of 

Trade. They do not want to go to London. 

The Enron loophole, if I might just conclude, Alan Greenspan, 

Secretary Summers, Chairmen Levitt and Rainer, the Chair of the 

CFTC, each told Congress do not pass the Enron loophole. The 

market is too much subject to manipulation. The House did not 

pass it. How did the Enron loophole get here? It was introduced in 

cover of darkness. It suddenly appeared. 

And Senators Feinstein and Cantwell, after seeing the manipulation caused by EnronOnline, raising the price of electricity $40 billion for the consumers of California, ask them about these exchanges and what impact they do. You will hear their answer and 

you will hear Amaranth’s people, they have an economist today 

who has testified in 83 different proceedings. I counted them. Your 

constituents do not have an expert who has testified in 83 different 

proceedings. You are the expert. 

Yes, there should be speculation. There should not be excessive 

speculation. If you are worried about prosecution, cut it off in the 

beginning the way NYMEX tried. NYMEX told them do not go 

afar. We do not know what this is going to do, but you are going 

to cause a dysfunction in the market. Stop. That was not prosecution. That was prescriptive regulation that avoided prosecution. 

This can be stopped in a flash. 

And finally, with regard to bilateral, that is a very dangerous 

word, bilateral. Because EnronOnline, which needed the Enron exemption—by the way, Enron predefunctness set up their 

EnronOnline before they got the Enron exemption, they were so 

confident they were going to get it. It was grossly illegal and criminal but they had it running. 

And by the way, when you look at this report and see who the 

Amaranth traders were, they were old Enron officials, traders rather. They brought Enron on. And Amaranth may have gone, Brian 

Hunter took home $75 million the year before the collapse. He does 

not have to give that back. And the next time we have a crisis like 

this, you are going to find the Amaranth traders have been hired 

by somebody else. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Professor, very much. Thank you 

both for your testimony. 

35

Let us get to the point—we have tried very hard, some of us, to 

close the Enron loophole. We had a vote on it on the floor. We were 

not able to persuade our colleagues. We limited it at that time to 

the electronic exchanges, to add the electronic exchanges to 

NYMEX. We thought we could get that done. We have been unable 

to get that done. 

If that is all we can do this, does that do the job? If we could 

cover the electronic exchanges, does that do the job? 

Mr. KAMINSKI. Probably not. In my view, it is necessary to put 

in place reporting requirements for the OTC transactions which are 

typically arranged by the voice brokers. It is a challenging task because, unlike the NYMEX and ICE transactions, many OTC transactions are highly structured and nonstandardized. And also, in 

many cases, they extend over longer time periods and contain proprietary information. 

But at the end of the day any trading corporation has to summarize the positions. They have to know how many MMBtus they sold 

or bought, what is the position, what is the tenor of the positions. 

If they do not have this information, they should not be in the business. 

And this information can be aggregated, summarized, and reported. I do not see any technical challenges related to it? 

Senator LEVIN. There is no technical challenge to getting to the 

whole over-the-counter market? Is that what you are saying? 

Mr. KAMINSKI. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. You agree with that, Professor Greenberger? 

Mr. GREENBERGER. My own personal view is, and it is not based 

on any scientific study, is I think the voice brokers play such a 

small role in this. If voice brokering was OK, you would not have 

ICE and you would not have had EnronOnline. I sat in meetings 

with people when the CFMA was discussed and people from Goldman Sachs and the financial markets said, oh my God, you are 

going to make us do things by voice brokerage? That takes time. 

I am one call. I want to go to a computer screen and press a button. 

If I could just interrupt, Senator Levin, they call that bilateral 

trading because it is bilateral. They have entered into an agreement by pressing a button. That is multilateral trading. That must 

be covered and can be covered and should be and would be covered 

if the Enron loophole were eliminated. 

Senator LEVIN. So that you basically believe we could technically 

write a law which would cover the trading which you just described 

if it were described by either electronic or by size? 

Mr. GREENBERGER. Yes. The technical word has already been 

multilateral transaction execution facility. And you must be careful 

because the industry will come to you and say oh no, what we are 

doing is bilateral. But you want to look in what they are doing. 

Senator LEVIN. I understand. But now if we are able to finally 

get the regulators into that area, will there be a move to true bilateral trading? Or is that so impractical for the traders that they will 

not move to a true bilateral trade? 

Professor Kaminski. 

Mr. KAMINSKI. I agree with my colleague. The days of market 

based on voice brokers are probably counted. The markets across 

36

the world are moving to electronic trading. And even if we have an 

initial reaction and some migration of trading from the electronic 

exchanges like ICE back to the broker market, it will not last long. 

Senator LEVIN. And you agree with that, Professor Greenberger? 

Mr. GREENBERGER. Yes, absolutely. You want to get to the multilateral computerized trading. 

Senator LEVIN. And you have no concern that if we cover that, 

there will be a return to the true bilateral voice brokering? That 

is not a concern? 

Mr. GREENBERGER. That is not a concern and my own view is it 

would be impractical to try and reach the bilateral voice brokering. 

Senator LEVIN. Now who is going to be the enforcer? Who is the 

regulator here? Is it CFTC through NYMEX and through ICE? 

Mr. GREENBERGER. The important point that I think has been 

lost in all of this is that each exchange, once they are regulated by 

the CFTC, is a self regulatory organization. They are the front line 

of protecting the consumer. The CFTC cannot do it all. 

Senator LEVIN. Can ICE do it? 

Mr. GREENBERGER. Yes, absolutely. But they are not required to 

right now. 

Senator LEVIN. And who is going to do the multilateral trading 

regulation? 

Mr. GREENBERGER. In that case you are quite correct, there 

would not be a self regulatory organization. But the multilateral 

transaction execution facility would report directly to the CFTC, as 

EnronOnline would have had they not achieved this still-of-thenight exemption. 

Senator LEVIN. So they would report to the CFTC. Do you agree 

with that? 

Mr. KAMINSKI. Yes, I do. 

Senator LEVIN. Now, that then puts at least that part of the 

trading into the hands of an organization that you say is captured 

or owned by the people who are being regulated. Is that a problem? 

Mr. GREENBERGER. Well, as I understand it—I may have misread 

things. But on Thursday there is a confirmation hearing for two 

commissioners. One of them is a former lobbyist for the International Swaps Dealers and Derivatives Association. 

I do not know this is a fact, but I would bet that person has written more testimony in opposition to taking down EnronOnline than 

any person in the United States. 

Senator LEVIN. I am not disagreeing or agreeing with you. 

Mr. GREENBERGER. And she is being paired with a former aide 

of Senator Daschle, and that is the way it is done. But there are 

three vacancies on this commission, including the chair. 

Senator LEVIN. I am not agreeing or disagreeing with your point, 

in terms of controlling CFTC. I am simply saying if that continues, 

then would there be a problem in relying on CFTC regulating that 

part of the market which is not self-regulating? 

Mr. GREENBERGER. I think with Congressional direction, and I 

think you are seeing a little bit on that what happened Friday 

afternoon with this new proposed rule, with Congressional direction, the CFTC would be responsive. And I think in terms of oversight—and I know that is not your function, if the CFTC could be 

encouraged to welcome the people like who were on the former 

37

panel and put them on their advisory committees so they have a 

voice in the regulatory process, I do believe that eliminating the 

loophole with good Congressional oversight the CFTC could handle 

this. 

Senator LEVIN. Have you had a chance to read our entire report, 

either or both of you? 

Mr. GREENBERGER. I have. 

Senator LEVIN. Have you Mr. Kaminski? 

Mr. KAMINSKI. No, I started reading the report last night on the 

plane. I read about 40 percent of the report and so far I agreed 

with practically every statement contained in the report. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Professor Greenberger, could you give 

us reaction to the report? 

Mr. GREENBERGER. I have worked in this area for 10 years. And 

what comes a close second to this report is the report that was put 

out under Senator Coleman’s auspices a year ago dealing with the 

crude oil industry. This report had the advantage of market data. 

Leaving aside where it comes out, it is the most full complete report giving you a major understanding of the markets, the need for 

hedging, the role of speculation, the problem with excessive speculation, and the way the statute works. I think is a first-rate piece 

of work and the Subcommittee is to be congratulated. 

Senator LEVIN. We and our staff thank you both for those comments. 

Now, let me go on to the final question that I have, and this has 

to do with that chart we had up there before. 

There was a direct order to Amaranth to reduce its holdings. And 

the reason for that order was that the NYMEX saw a danger in 

what was about to happen. It was preventive. 

Would you agree that we have got to act in order to prevent 

harm? And that it is not enough to simply rely on the manipulation 

provisions of law, which then punish actions that have taken place? 

Would you agree with that? 

Mr. GREENBERGER. Absolutely. 

Mr. KAMINSKI. Yes, I fully agree with this. The problem is that 

one could argue that there is no problem with excessive market 

manipulation and speculation if the losses are limited to a group 

of highly sophisticated investors who should know better when they 

invest in the hedge funds. 

The problem is that in a market economy prices have consequences. And if prices are distorted through excessive speculation, this has a systemic impact on the markets. And I worry not 

so much about this unfortunate incident. I worry more about the 

systemic impact the excessive speculation will have on the future 

of the energy markets. This would be a greater concern to me than 

the specific case of consumers overpaying for natural gas last winter. 

Senator LEVIN. I did have an additional question. That is, the 

CFTC rule last week, and whether or not by requiring traders on 

regulated exchanges to disclose their holdings on the unregulated 

markets, whether or not that goes anywhere close to what we are 

talking about here. 

Mr. GREENBERGER. It goes a little bit of the way but not the 

whole way. For one thing, I am sure what the CFTC is saying to 

38

people now is they are getting data that they are required to get 

from NYMEX. ICE has ‘‘voluntarily’’ agreed to give them data. 

What are they going to do with the data? They have got to have 

some standard. And the standard is excessive speculation. Congress has to tell the CFTC, you can deal with expressive speculation on ICE and multilateral exchanges like ICE, and what is excessive speculation. 

Look, bookies even stop taking bets at some point because they 

are worried about what is going to happen. NYMEX stopped taking 

bets not because NYMEX was worried about the consumer interest. 

This was all done on borrowed money. Using a contract, you only 

put down 10 percent of the funds. Banks are funding the rest. 

Clearinghouses are guaranteeing the banks. 

What NYMEX was worried about was Amaranth was going to 

fail and their clearing function would collapse. 

So there is an economic measure here that needs to be followed. 

Clearly eliminating the Enron loophole would bring ICE into the 

measure. No prosecution, no enforcement. Just when you get to a 

certain level, thank you, you have provided liquidity to the market. 

Now you have to step back. Which is what NYMEX told Amaranth. 

It would have been in Amaranth’s best interest to step back. 

Senator LEVIN. It is going to take some direction from Congress. 

It is not enough that the information simply be available, that it 

is going to take the removal of the Enron loophole essentially, if 

we are going to cure this problem. You both agree with that? 

Mr. GREENBERGER. Yes. 

Mr. KAMINSKI. I do. 

Mr. GREENBERGER. One other point about that rule is it does not 

require—NYMEX can get information about a trader under that 

rule, what the person is doing on ICE. If the person says hey, like 

Amaranth said, I do not want to get into this regulatory thing. I 

am just going to trade on ICE, that rule does not call for the information to be gathered. It only helps NYMEX. It does not help the 

regulator or the policymaker understand if all of the traders decide 

to do what Amaranth did and go to ICE. It does not affect that 

trading. 

Senator LEVIN. It is only if they decide to continue on NYMEX 

that they would be covered. 

Mr. GREENBERGER. Exactly. 

Senator LEVIN. Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Professor Kaminski, I appreciate your reflections on systemic impact. And certainly the first panel’s discussion talked about systemic impact. It is not just the traders who are impacted. 

We have had a lot of discussion about excessive speculation. To 

both of you gentlemen, how difficult is it to define that? Is this accepted? And who does that? Is this something that Congress does? 

Can we leave it to the CFTC? Both of you gentlemen, Professor 

Kaminski. 

Mr. KAMINSKI. Yes. It is very difficult to define excessive speculation and the term itself is a bit fuzzy and ambiguous. I would identify three or four different types of players in the energy markets. 

We have pure speculators and they are critical to the process because they provide the necessary lubrication to the process. 

39

We have big market makers and the financial institutions which 

take proprietary positions and in this sense they speculate. But 

they also offer the risk management tools to the producers and consumers of energy. And they are a critical component of the system 

because they help to reduce the risk to those participants in the industry who are risk averse. 

And finally, we have producers and consumers of energy who are 

interested in reducing somewhat the returns they get in return for 

reduction in risk. 

My long-term concern is that the natural hedgers, the producers 

and end-users of energy, will depart this market if they are scared 

by excessive speculation. And we already have a lot of evidence 

that this is taking place. 

Senator COLEMAN. Professor Greenberger. 

Mr. GREENBERGER. I think you do not have to define it. I think 

you can give guidance. I think the CFTC can do it by rule. And the 

assurance here is NYMEX had already done it. They had accountability rules. That is what led NYMEX to tell Amaranth to stop. 

This is not rocket science. This can easily be done. 

Do not forget a large trader is someone who trades 200 contracts. 

Amaranth had 100,000 contracts. As Mr. Cicio said, all of the contracts on NYMEX for the contract month he is talking about, by 

everybody buying contracts on NYMEX for the month he referred 

to is 90,000. Somewhere we can come to an agreement where speculation is good but you cross a line. 

This is the kind of thing financial regulatory agencies do every 

day, capital rule requirements, what have you. You pick a figure 

based on guidance from Congress. 

Senator COLEMAN. Professor Greenberger, you raise questions 

about CFTC that are not just legislative direction issues or regulation issues. It goes to basic structure, mindset. 

Mr. GREENBERGER. That is correct. And I think there is a great 

opportunity for the U.S. Senate to put the right consumer oriented 

mindset. You have three vacancies coming up. It has been traditional that anybody who supports the industry gets passed on the 

Senate floor by a voice vote with no discussion. Senator Feinstein 

went to the floor in the last hours of the 109th Congress to stop 

the lobbyist from ISDA because she knows what ISDA’s concept did 

to the electricity payers in California. 

You have got three vacancies now. This is a great opportunity to 

reshape that agency. 

Are there going to be industrial consumers represented in the 

Commission? Are there going to be regular consumers in the Commission? Are there going to be academics? Today, if the Financial 

Industry Association, the International Swaps Dealers Association, 

and the Bond Market Association give their blessing, the history 

has been the person goes through. 

And even Republican commissioners, Joe Dial being the most famous, a former Texas Ranger, policeman not baseball player, and 

good friend of Phil Gramm from Texas was held on the floor of the 

Senate because he dared to question practices in the Chicago Board 

of Trade. 

If you represent the consumer, you get stopped. If you are helping the banks, you sail right through. You have got to put a stop 

40

to that. These people who testified in the first panel and your constituents deserve representation. And if not representation, a majority interest in what the CFTC does. 

It is no longer a backwater agency. This hearing shows that. 

Hundreds of millions of dollars are at stake, hundreds of millions 

and billions out of consumers’ pockets. 

If you let this sail through thinking it is some backwater agency, 

your constituents are going to pay through the nose and the Brian 

Hunter’s of this world are going to take home $75 million a year. 

Senator COLEMAN. Could you talk a little bit about financing regulation? There was some discussion about user fees a little while 

ago. I would be interested in your perspective. 

Is there a point at which those user fees, in fact, drive folks to 

other markets? Is this something we should be concerned about? 

Mr. GREENBERGER. There are user fees in every market except 

the futures market. I think user fees, let me tell you, if you try and 

put user fees in the CFTC, you are going to hear who the other 

side of the common sense because it will eliminate silk linings in 

suit jackets if they have to pay those user fees. 

But I think user fees should be explored. I have not thought it 

through very carefully. There is no reason the U.S. public should 

have to pay to make sure that Brian Hunter keeps his trading limited to speculation as opposed to excessive speculation. 

Senator COLEMAN. Do you have any concerns, Professor, about 

any shifting to opaque markets, any shifting to the bilateral or 

non-electronic markets? Is your sense that those are either small 

percentages or not practical questions? 

Mr. GREENBERGER. I sat and heard people from Goldman Sachs 

tell me 10 years ago, voice brokering is a dying art. It is still done 

but that is not the way you make your silk lining in your suits. I 

am not worried about that. 

And I think ICE is the primary example. They portray themselves, even though they are in Atlanta and even though the investment banks own large portions of it, U.S. investment banks, 

even though they are trying to buy Chicago Board of Trade, they 

can say to themselves we are going to go to London. They are not 

going to London. This is where, these markets are where things are 

being done. 

I remember the Chicago Mercantile Exchange had a contract 

that paid off depending on what the interest rates that Russian 

banks paid. You won if you guessed right, you lost money if you 

guessed wrong. And they called up one day and said guess what, 

the Russian banks are meeting before the contracts closed and they 

are lowering their interest rates for a day. So that when the contract has to get paid, the interest rate drops, then the contract expires, they go back and meet and raise it again. 

Do you think people are going to trade natural gas contracts in 

Russia? No. 

Senator COLEMAN. Professor Kaminski, you have talked about a 

globalized market. You have raised concerns about balkanized regulatory infrastructure. Can you talk a little bit about the offshore 

markets, about the bilaterals and something that we should be concerned about as we move forward? 

41

Mr. KAMINSKI. I do not believe that any responsible corporate entity will move to migrate to trading on an exchange established in 

a banana republic. The U.S. market is too big and too important 

and too sophisticated to really lose the business to other trading 

platforms. 

If this happens, the business will go to the countries which have 

a regulatory infrastructure which is similar to ours if not more 

complete. The regulatory institutions in those countries, like for example FSA in the U.K. will cooperate with the U.S. Federal agencies. 

So I do not see a big danger in U.S. energy trading, energy exchanges losing business in the long run to other platforms. If this 

happens, it will be more—it will happen on a relative basis and 

will be just a manifestation of the fact that other markets outside 

the United States are growing and catching up. 

So the U.S. market is not going to shrink in size. It will continue 

to grow. It may be relatively smaller compared to other markets 

but it will not go away. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Professor Kaminski, in your testimony I 

looked at your written testimony, and you talked about the various 

aspects of manipulation. The second one you talked about was the 

aggressive rapid and large volume trading near the expiration of 

a contract talking about the excessive speculation, which we have 

talked about at some length at this hearing today. 

The first one that you talked about, however, was the exploitation of market power control by the control of physical assets or 

physical supply. I would like both of you to address what, if anything, can be done in that area by Congress? 

It is interesting to me because most businesses there is an incentive to invest in the capital infrastructure. There is a bottom-line 

business incentive to keep the infrastructure strong, to keep the 

capital investment at peak performance. 

The irony is in this area there is a disincentive because if you 

can fig leaf a lack of supply because of a problem with the delivery 

in terms of the capital infrastructure, then it is a way that you can, 

in fact, manipulate the market to your advantage. 

What, if anything, can we do in terms of that manipulation issue 

as it relates to market control of the physical assets and then 

therefore of the physical supply? 

Mr. KAMINSKI. Well, one fact to be recognized is that the energy 

market is global integrated. But at the same time there are local 

pockets of market power which have been due to the rigidities and 

imperfections of the physical infrastructure. 

And often at the specific trading location, far away from NYMEX 

and ICE, is a company which is relatively small in size can establish a dominating position because it controls the transmission 

lines or it controls the pipelines in a given region and takes advantage of the fact that it dominates a local market. And then it may 

engage in very similar strategies, taking positions in the derivatives and trading high volumes in the physical markets to influence 

the benchmarks which are used for settlement, cash settlement of 

derivative transactions. 

42

Senator MCCASKILL. What can we do in Congress to address that 

kind of manipulation? 

Mr. KAMINSKI. Information and information again. Just reporting 

the positions taken in the OTC markets and on ICE will preclude 

it, because this form of manipulation happens typically outside 

NYMEX, happens through the OTC markets, and happens through 

the ICE. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So the prescription for the second kind of 

manipulation will also cure the first kind? 

Mr. KAMINSKI. In my view it will go a long way to address this 

problem. 

Senator MCCASKILL. You both have kind of addressed this, and 

that is that the attractiveness of our market, in fact, is due to the 

regulation, which is not what you hear from people who are working against regulation. You hear oh, if we regulate, they are going 

to run off someplace else. 

But essentially what both of you are saying with your expertise 

in this area is that it is the certainty that regulation provides that 

is the magnet for the investment in this regard because people 

know it is not going to be a fixed house. Is that a fair way of summarizing your position on that issue? 

Mr. GREENBERGER. Certainly in the financial area that is absolutely true. The proof in the pudding is after this report came out 

today, NYMEX started putting out press releases saying you want 

to invest securely, invest in a regulated exchange. Yes, that is the 

answer. 

When Long Term Capital Management failed, the Chicago exchanges put out a full-page ad in all of the financial newspapers 

saying this would have never happened if this trading had happened on the Chicago Board of Trade or the Chicago Merc. 

And yes, you do not want having indices arbitraged in advance 

of payments on these contracts like it happened in Russia with 

their bank thing. That would not happen in the United States, 

even with the most minimal regulation. Good regulation does attract interest. 

I would also say, with regard to the IPOs going over to Europe, 

I would look at the percentage U.S. investment banks take to put 

out an IPO. I think it is 7 percent versus 4 percent in Europe. That 

may have a big explanation why IPOs are being done in Europe. 

Senator MCCASKILL. As opposed to it is a less stringent regulatory environment? 

Mr. GREENBERGER. Absolutely. And the other point is, about this 

arbitrage, potentially Congress passes a law, does things strictly. 

There is something called the International Organization of Security Commissions. And by and large, I remember when Long Term 

Capital failed, they put out a report about what needed to be done 

to control hedge funds. Many of the securities commissions want to 

look to the United States for how to regulate effectively, and on 

their own adopt procedures to try and stop these malpractices from 

happening. 

Now they do not have somebody buying 100,000 contracts over 

there. They have not been exposed to this kind of massive excessive 

speculation, if not manipulation. But they would be very sympathetic to the kind of discussion that you are having here today. 

43

Senator MCCASKILL. Let me finally address the comments you 

made, Professor Greenberger, about the CFTC and the oversight 

function that it has or has not based on the compilation of the 

board. I will tell you that it was fascinating to me maybe last week 

or the week before when we had a hearing in the Commerce Committee with the FCC. The commissioner from the FCC said well, 

the reason that they have not acted on this, if we can just talk the 

next panel into all agreeing, they would probably move forward. Of 

course, the next panel were all the industry players. 

It was an absolute confession in a Senate hearing that the FCC 

was not capable of acting unless all of the people making money 

could, in fact, join hands and agree. 

Are you saying that the CFTC has that same kind of dynamic, 

that they are dependent upon agreement of the big financial players in this area in order for them to do what they need to be doing 

right now? 

Mr. GREENBERGER. I am going to be very candid with you, it is 

worse than that. It is a very small agency. It started out as an agricultural agency. And all of a sudden Goldman Sachs, Morgan 

Stanley, J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and all of these 

prominent people walked in the door and essentially unless you 

watch what happens, they take over. 

If you look at the Wall Street Journal, I think it was December 

13, 2001, there is a story there which I believe the protagonist 

agreed to where a lawyer from Sullivan and Cromwell called the 

commissioner over to the Washington, DC office of Sullivan and 

Cromwell and instructed that commissioner on how he should vote. 

Now that would not happen at the FCC. It would not happen at 

the SEC. By the way, the commissioner came back and reported it 

immediately, and so maybe it did not happen at the CFTC either. 

But the fact that they thought that they could do that——

Senator MCCASKILL. They could. 

Mr. GREENBERGER [continuing]. And by and large if somebody 

from Goldman Sachs or the Managed Funds Association, which is 

the industry association for hedge funds, needs an appointment 

with a commissioner my experience was, in the 2 years I was there, 

the appointment happens that day. 

By the way, there is a lot of talk about the fact that the CFTC 

should be part of the SEC because a lot of these instruments it is 

hard to tell whether they are futures, derivatives, or securities. So 

why have a fight over it? Let us put them all in one——

Senator MCCASKILL. Put them all one place. 

Mr. GREENBERGER. But I will tell you something, the people I am 

talking about do not want that to happen because they know that 

even with the present SEC that some people may think is more 

laissez-faire than traditional, they are not going to be able to say 

jump and hear the question back how high. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Professor Kaminski, do you think it would 

be a good idea to move the CFTC under the SEC? 

Mr. KAMINSKI. I did not think about it. Given the growing integration of the U.S. financial markets, it definitely makes sense to 

improve coordination between different agencies, including FERC, 

SEC, and CFTC. Whether it makes sense to create one big institution, regulatory institution, regulating all the markets, looking at 

44

all the markets, I have not been thinking about it so I cannot give 

you an informed opinion. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I would welcome both of your comments 

about both a user fee structure so that we are getting the vig that 

we need to run the place. 

And second, whatever thoughts you have about if, in fact, due to 

the changing and evolving financial transactions as it relates to 

these kinds of products, particularly in light of the global nature 

and electronic transactions, if it does make sense for all of this to 

be under the umbrella of one regulatory realization as opposed to 

being split up the way it is. I would appreciate your input on that. 

Finally, I will just say that the biggest enemy we have here is 

complexity. Invariably the public can be the best lobbyist in the 

world, if they are aware, informed and understand. Unfortunately 

in this area this is so complex that most people do not understand 

the relationship between what they are paying on their gas bill and 

hedge funds and the speculative market. And frankly, until 2 days 

ago, I had no idea what ICE even was. I did not even understand 

ICE. 

To the extent that you all can present the view of consumers 

from a very educated position is invaluable to this Subcommittee. 

I only wish that you could, in fact, multiply and fan out throughout 

the capitol and begin to do one-on-one visits with all the senators 

that have votes because I can assure you the other side will do exactly that. Thank you very much. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. Just a couple 

more questions to get this on the record. 

The size of the Amaranth position on the market and the significance for the market when the traders get to be that large, is that 

a significant matter? 

Mr. KAMINSKI. It is a very significant matter and Amaranth’s position were known to the market. The market knew about it. And 

when I was watching the situation last year it was like watching 

a train wreck in slow motion. It was obvious that it would end up 

in a crash. 

Senator LEVIN. Does it also affect future prices when someone 

can dominate the market to that extent? 

Mr. KAMINSKI. Absolutely. 

Senator LEVIN. Professor Greenberger. 

Mr. GREENBERGER. Absolutely. The futures markets, to the extent they are transparent, are used for price discovery. If you are 

affecting them, these kind of trading affects the market. The collapse of Amaranth and the drop in natural gas, you do not have 

to be a rocket scientist or have an algorithm to figure out why that 

happened. 

Senator LEVIN. To get a direct answer for the record, then the 

size of the Amaranth trades affected future prices? 

Mr. GREENBERGER. Absolutely. 

Mr. KAMINSKI. Yes, it did. 

Senator LEVIN. In terms of CFTC, does it pay to—end the Enron 

loophole—close it, even with the current CFTC? Even if we cannot 

do these kind of changes, we are not the people who appoint them 

and whether or not they are confirmed is kind of a different issue, 

and an important one. But is it worth pursuing and following the 

45

road that we are on, even if we cannot impact the makeup of the 

CFTC? 

Mr. GREENBERGER. I think it definitely is. I think that as captive 

as it sometimes is, that the direction from Congress will have an 

influence. 

And also, the Commodity Exchange Act has a private right of action point in it. I say that hesitantly. I do not want to look to private lawsuits to protect these things. But if you put down these 

mandates and all these malpractices are happening, Amaranth’s 

lawyer was quick to point out there was no intent here, trying to 

stay one step ahead of manipulation. I am not so sure that they 

are one step ahead. 

But yes, you definitely should do this. It is an easy fix. Alan 

Greenspan would agree with you on it. He did not want this to 

happen in 1999–2000. It should be fixed immediately. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you agree with that Professor Kaminski? 

Mr. KAMINSKI. I agree that removing the Enron exemption will 

be very helpful. But at the same time, CFTC should be given more 

firepower. It may be underfunded and understaffed currently. 

I have been watching the energy markets not only in the United 

States but also in other markets. And the common denominator is 

complexity. This is what was mentioned a moment ago. 

There were many cases of manipulation in other countries. The 

regulators came. They looked at the complexity of the trades and 

volume of the data and they threw their hands up in the air and 

left. They did not have resources to investigate the issues. 

Senator LEVIN. Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Nothing. Thank you. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you both. You have been a tremendous 

panel and we are very appreciative. 

Let us now welcome our final witness for today’s hearing, Shane 

Lee, who is a former natural gas trader at Amaranth, appearing 

here today at Amaranth’s request, to answer questions about its 

trading. 

Let me just clarify what I just said, that even though Amaranth 

is the one that selected Mr. Lee to represent them and to answer 

questions today, we obviously are the ones that asked Amaranth to 

identify a witness who could answer questions about its trading, 

and Mr. Lee was identified by Amaranth as that person. Mr. Lee 

worked at the Calgary office of Amaranth where the energy trading 

was carried out. 

Mr. Lee, we appreciate your being with us this morning. We welcome you to the Subcommittee. As you have heard, all witnesses 

who testify before the Subcommittee are required to be sworn so 

we would ask that you stand at this time and please raise your 

right hand. 

Do you swear that the testimony you will give before this Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 

truth, so help you, God? 

Mr. LEE. I do. 

Senator LEVIN. We have that system there where that light will 

go on a minute before the 5-minute mark, where we would hope 

that you could keep your oral testimony to. And we, again, appreciate your coming here. We know that you are coming here volunVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:27 Jan 25, 2008 Jkt 036616 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 P:\DOCS\36616.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
46

1The prepared statement of Mr. Lee appears in the Appendix on page 147. 

tarily and we have had your cooperation in terms of getting information. We will ask you now to proceed. 

TESTIMONY OF SHANE LEE,1 FORMER NATURAL GAS TRADER 

AT AMARANTH, LLC, CALGARY, ALBERTA, CANADA 

Mr. LEE. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member Coleman, thanks for 

the opportunity today to appear to discuss the important issues 

that the Subcommittee is considering. As a bit of a background, I 

have been trading natural gas for 9 years now. During my career 

I have traded pretty much most conceivable products in the gas 

market at one time or another, including both physical and financial gas. 

In April 2006, I began working at Amaranth. My job at Amaranth was to trade Northeast markets but I also did trade futures, 

swaps, and options. I managed my own portfolio, which was separate from Amaranth’s much larger natural gas portfolio managed 

by my boss, Brian Hunter, who was the head of the natural gas 

desk. 

I worked principally in the offices in Calgary, Alberta, and I was 

strictly a trader. I did not have any contact with investors and I 

did not play any role in the management of the company. 

The Subcommittee has asked whether I believe Amaranth engaged in so-called excessive speculation. First, there is a common 

media misconception that Amaranth lost over $6 billion in wrong 

way energy bets and therefore must have engaged in speculation 

to absolute extremes. This is not necessarily true. 

By mid-September 2006, Amaranth energy portfolios had given 

back around $2 billion it had been up at the end of August. My understanding was that Amaranth senior management became concerned it did not have the cash on hand to deal with any further 

margin calls and chose to sell its portfolios to competitors to remain solvent. The undeniable fact is that only a small portion of 

Amaranth’s actual $4 billion, just a little bit over $4 billion, in real 

losses were truly a result of the energy trading losses. The rest was 

the sale of a distressed asset in a high volatility market due to a 

fundamental cash problem. 

I commend the Subcommittee for making this extremely important inference in page one of its own report. 

Was Amaranth’s trading excessive? There is no question, the volume of Amaranth’s trading was very large, compared to many of 

the other market participants. However there are a number of 

other players whose trading was probably just as large, just expressed in different forms of risk. 

Whether Amaranth’s trading was excessive is a question I really 

cannot answer and that is for two reasons. First of all, as a trader 

I have never had access to sufficient information about the activity 

of all market participants. Although regulatory agencies and exchange officials have access to some of the information, which is 

namely the information on NYMEX only, they do not have everything. A trader’s position on NYMEX is typically only one part of 

a trader’s position and they usually have a wide variety of products 

that are not traded or cleared on NYMEX exchange. 

47

And second, there is no clear definition for me as a trader for the 

term excessive speculation. Even if I complete information about 

everyone’s positions, including my own, it would be impossible to 

say whether one is excessive or not because I do not have any point 

of reference. I need hard numbers as a trader, or at least further 

guidelines from a regulator or exchange personnel. 

The Subcommittee’s report suggests Amaranth’s trading was the 

predominant cause of increased natural gas prices and wider 

spreads during the summer of 2006. I respectfully disagree with 

that. In my view, as the minority staff suggests, Amaranth was responding to the market rather than driving it. The market is driven by a lot of fundamental forces, such as weather, supply and demand, storage levels, producer hedging activity, cross commodity 

values, and multitudes of other factors. But in particular, in 2006 

there were some sound fundamental reasons for why spreads did 

what they did and I would be very happy to answer questions 

about those at length. 

The financial market for natural gas derivatives has a virtually 

unlimited supply and unlimited capacity to absorb trading activity. 

It would be impossible to corner, dominate, or otherwise exert any 

type of control on a financial market without access to the physical 

commodity, or at least another product that mimics that physical 

commodity. Prices are determined by fundamentals, whether those 

fundamentals happen to be financial or physical, and by the collective judgment of many participants in a large and efficient market. 

The Subcommittee also asked me about my views on whether position permits and other regulatory requirements should be extended to cover unregulated exchanges. I absolutely support reporting requirements and accountability limits on ICE, the general 

over-the-counter market, and even the physical markets to some 

extent. But it must include all facets of the market to be effective. 

In particular, reporting requirements would benefit market participants by making more information available to the public, the 

traders, and the regulatory agencies, and would make the market 

more transparent to all. 

In terms of limits, policymakers must be very careful to evaluate 

the important pros and cons to make sure we do not have a capital 

flight from the market. 

I have included further discussion of some of these issues in my 

written statement and I would be happy to elaborate on my views 

today. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Lee. How many natural gas traders did Amaranth have when you were there? 

Mr. LEE. In terms of pure natural gas traders, I believe it had 

five. 

Senator LEVIN. The head gas trader was Brian Hunter? 

Mr. LEE. Yes, it was. 

Senator LEVIN. Did you work with him? 

Mr. LEE. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. Who designed the natural gas trading strategies 

for Amaranth? 

Mr. LEE. Each one of those traders, or at least three of the five 

traders, had their own strategies. They could pretty much do whatever they wanted as long as they were concentrating the core of 

48

their strategies in what they were hired to do. Two of those five 

traders executed trades for the more senior traders. 

Senator LEVIN. Amaranth bought or sold tens of thousands of 

natural gas contracts over the course of a single day; is that correct? 

Mr. LEE. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. For instance, on July 31, you bought nearly 

26,000 March 2007 futures contracts and you sold about 24,000 

April 2007 contracts, according to your information. Does that 

sound right? 

Mr. LEE. I recall them buying a lot of March/April contracts. I 

do not know the exact numbers. 

Senator LEVIN. Did you know at the time how large Amaranth’s 

trading was? 

Mr. LEE. My only frame of reference at the time was relative to 

other companies I had worked at, and the relative sizes I had been 

able to take at other companies, as well. That was my only frame 

of reference. But I did not know exactly how they compared to the 

rest of the larger traders in the market. 

Senator LEVIN. What was the size of the biggest trades that you 

made when you were at Amaranth? 

Mr. LEE. When I was at Amaranth trades for my own portfolio, 

I would say would have been less than 5,000 at any time for a total 

position, let alone trading in a day. 

Senator LEVIN. Could they be 5,000 at a time? 

Mr. LEE. No, not for myself. But I was asked to execute for Brian 

Hunter at points during the summer when they were extremely 

busy. And at those times definitely we traded 5,000 at a time or 

more. 

Senator LEVIN. What was the largest trade you ever made before 

going to Amaranth? 

Mr. LEE. I would say something to the tune of about 5,000 lots. 

Senator LEVIN. You made trades that large before you went to 

Amaranth? 

Mr. LEE. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. Where was that? 

Mr. LEE. At Citadel, an other hedge fund. 

Senator LEVIN. What year would that have been? 

Mr. LEE. That would have been 2005. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you think that Amaranth’s trading volumes 

were basically large? 

Mr. LEE. I thought they were more than basically large. They 

were larger than I had ever seen, to be quite blunt about it. But 

relative—I mean, that was a part of the market I had never seen 

before, in terms of what I could call the big boys. So I did not know 

how large they compared to everyone else. 

Senator LEVIN. Why did Amaranth engage in these scale 

tradings? 

Mr. LEE. My understanding was it was simply a matter of capital. At a hedge fund you are given an amount of capital to trade 

with. It may not be so clear in those terms, maybe either as risk 

or capital. But you simply have to put that capital to work one way 

or the other. And Amaranth, for whatever reasons, because I only 

49

got there of April 2006, had given a lot of money to the energy 

trading side of the business. 

Senator LEVIN. Did Amaranth believe that the January prices 

were going up? 

Mr. LEE. Not necessarily. There were times during the year 

when they believed that. I think this is a chance for me to clear 

up one of the common misconceptions about—as I have seen in the 

report—about these January/October spreads and these January/

November spreads, in particular. Buying one of those spreads does 

not necessarily represent a view of the market going up. 

In fact, at least in my—you will have other traders disagree—but 

I think a good majority would agree when you buy one of those particular spreads, that typically means you think the market is going 

to go down. So it was more a view of October was going to go down 

rather than January was going to go up. 

Senator LEVIN. Did you not overall, at that firm when you were 

there, believe that January prices were going to go up? 

Mr. LEE. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. Did you trade on both the NYMEX and ICE? 

Mr. LEE. Yes, I did. 

Senator LEVIN. Did you consider natural gas contracts on ICE 

and NYMEX to be equivalent for risk purposes? 

Mr. LEE. Those contracts were equivalent for risk purposes up 

until the point of settlement, at which point there are some extremely important fundamental differences. But if you were hedging in the future you could consider them identical for the most 

part. 

Senator LEVIN. On August 8 and 9, NYMEX telephoned Amaranth, told it to reduce its positions in the September and October 

contracts. Is that correct? 

Mr. LEE. That is my understanding, that is correct. 

Senator LEVIN. Did Amaranth take issue with NYMEX’s determination that your position was too large? 

Mr. LEE. To be honest with you, I was not part of those conversations. That would have been done at the compliance level and 

maybe with whoever’s position it involved, which would have likely 

been Brian’s obviously. So I was not party to those conversations. 

Senator LEVIN. But did you, in fact, comply? Did your company 

comply? 

Mr. LEE. My understanding is that they complied and reduced 

their NYMEX holdings. 

Senator LEVIN. And you were not given any instruction by anybody in terms of reductions at that time? 

Mr. LEE. That would have not concerned my position. That would 

have concerned Brian’s position at that point and I only executed 

for him from time to time. 

Senator LEVIN. Were you aware of the fact that NYMEX gave 

that order? 

Mr. LEE. I do not recall being aware of that order in particular. 

That would not be considered an extremely important event at the 

firm. 

Senator LEVIN. How often did it happen that NYMEX would give 

an order that you have to reduce your position? 

Mr. LEE. Not very often. 

50

Senator LEVIN. So it would be considered an unusual thing, 

would it not? 

Mr. LEE. I think from a compliance perspective they would have 

considered it unusual. But from a general market perspective—

there is an entire market that exists to allow you to move between 

NYMEX and other exchanges. And it is a very liquid market. So 

from that perspective, being asked to do it caused no hardship on 

the company per se and it was something they were very easily 

able to do. 

Senator LEVIN. Well, that is the point, it was too easy to do. But 

as a matter of fact, it was an unusual event, was it not, to be ordered to reduce your holdings? 

Mr. LEE. Yes, it is unusual. There is usually rules in place on 

an exchange, and they are usually very set rules, that once you hit 

those rules you are going to get a talking to. The part that was unusual, though, is that over the course of the year—this is from my 

understanding only—was that those initial accountability levels 

were breached earlier on in the year and NYMEX continued to increase those for Amaranth and then eventually decided to have 

them liquidate. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you know of any other time when NYMEX 

has issued an order like that? 

Mr. LEE. I would never know about that because I believe those 

are private conversations with companies. 

Senator LEVIN. Have you ever heard of a time from other companies, people you work with? 

Mr. LEE. No. 

Senator LEVIN. Now you say it was easy to comply with, and that 

is not the question. The question was whether or not it was unusual for NYMEX to issue that kind of an order. There may be 

other times that you do not know of, but you do not know of any 

other time when NYMEX has ever issued an order like that? 

Mr. LEE. Correct. 

Senator LEVIN. You did not reduce your position. What you do is 

shift your position to ICE, is that correct? 

Mr. LEE. Yes. My understanding was that the order was to reduce their position of NYMEX contracts, not natural gas positions. 

Senator LEVIN. Did they have any control over ICE? 

Mr. LEE. Any control? 

Senator LEVIN. NYMEX? Could they order——

Mr. LEE. No, they are separate companies. 

Senator LEVIN. So you interpreted that to be just reduce your 

NYMEX position? 

Mr. LEE. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. Were you involved in that discussion? 

Mr. LEE. No, I do not recall being involved in that discussion. 

Senator LEVIN. So that when the company was told to reduce its 

positions in these futures, you do not know whether there was discussion in the company as to whether to just simply shift over to 

ICE or to reduce its overall position? 

Mr. LEE. For the reasons you explained yourself, from a risk 

management standpoint, there was essentially no difference between the two markets. So from that perspective it would not have 

been a big deal to do it. 

51

Senator LEVIN. It would not have been a big deal for you to be 

able to implement but it is a very big deal in terms of what your 

holdings are in the overall market; and the impact on that market 

when you would sell them on all at one particular point. So that 

is where the difference lies. You say it was easy for you to shift. 

That is the problem. It was too easy for you to shift. 

Should you be able to shift, do you believe, from one market to 

another? You are told you must reduce on this market, your position endangers the market, and then to be able just to simply shift 

to another market? Does that give you any kind of pause? 

Mr. LEE. I believe it depends on the circumstances. I believe one 

of the reasons that NYMEX has specific limits in place and accountability levels is because during the settlement process if you 

do not get rid of your futures contract position you have to make 

or take delivery of the actual physical natural gas. The difference 

with the swap market is you do not do that. One settles, one references the settle. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you think your positions have an impact on 

market prices? 

Mr. LEE. Do positions have an impact on market prices? 

Senator LEVIN. Yours. Do you think those positions, given the 

size of those positions, that they could have a significant impact on 

market prices? 

Mr. LEE. To answer your question I think I have to explain it 

like this: There is no question that any time there is a capital infusion into a market or a flight from that market, that there is an 

initial temporary price change. But once the market has had the 

ability to react to that price change, I do not believe that any position in a market, as long as it is not the physical commodity, can 

have an overlasting effect on price. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you think it has an impact on price, a large 

holding such as yours, 50 percent of the market, up to 75 percent 

in 1 month; could it have a significant impact on price, at least in 

the short term? 

Mr. LEE. In the extreme short term I would agree with you. You 

also must remember you are talking about some of the open interest levels that were in NYMEX only. And in the greater context of 

the market, Amaranth was not as large as their holdings on 

NYMEX would have indicated. 

Senator LEVIN. At the time that you wrote to Brian Hunter on 

September 7 last year, just before the collapse that ‘‘things were 

fine when we were holding the risk for the market because we 

could handle it. That risk in 30 other hands is a much more dangerous proposition.’’

What does it mean to ‘‘hold the risk for the market?’’ 

Mr. LEE. As a speculator, that is exactly what you are doing out 

there. You are taking risks that your typical producer or consumer 

is not going to take. And it is going to react different in the hands 

of different people. 

Senator LEVIN. Would the size of your holdings have an impact 

on that? 

Mr. LEE. In the immediate. Yes, immediately. That is a liquidity 

issue. 

52

Senator LEVIN. What is the problem with risks being in 30 other 

hands? 

Mr. LEE. It is not a problem for the market. That could have 

been a problem for us at the time. We were talking about a point 

where we were getting ready to liquidate a distressed asset. The 

question I was asking there was do you want to do this all at once 

or do you want to give it to the market to do it for you? What do 

you think is the better option? 

Senator LEVIN. But you were talking about holding the risk for 

the market and then you said ‘‘that risk.’’ 

Mr. LEE. Yes. The particular risk I was talking about— 

Senator LEVIN. ‘‘That risk in 30 other hands is a much more dangerous proposition.’’ 

Mr. LEE. The particular risk I am talking about I am not sure. 

I believe it had to do with one of the spreads that I was describing 

at that time. But yes, I was insinuating that we were holding a 

good portion of that risk at that time and that our behavior might 

be different than if 30 other players held that exact same risk at 

that point in time. 

Senator LEVIN. You also said in one of your e-mails that ‘‘there 

is no catalyst right now. That is the problem. You exit this size 

without one, without exiting every position in your book, and we 

have got a big problem.’’

What did you mean by the word ‘‘catalyst?’’ 

Mr. LEE. By catalyst I meant a liquidity event. There is not a 

constant liquidity in natural gas markets, especially natural gas 

markets, due to its reliance on such fundamental things such as 

weather. To trade large positions you need liquidity events to sometimes enter them and sometimes exit them. Typically in the time 

period that we are talking about, like a September, you’re in a low 

demand period, there was no hurricanes at the time, there is not 

a lot of weather. It is not a great time to do anything one way or 

the other if you want to get a good price for what you want to do. 

Senator LEVIN. So the word catalyst in that context meant an external event such as a hurricane? 

Mr. LEE. It would not have to be necessarily an external physical 

event. This could be something as simple as a buyer coming in. It 

could be physical or financial. 

Senator LEVIN. But without that, if you sold all of your positions, 

the prices would fall sharply? 

Mr. LEE. I am insinuating that, yes. But to fully answer that 

question you have to keep in mind the context of the time. Amaranth was dealing with an extremely big problem with their cash. 

And it was a decision whether to get rid of part of the position and 

see if the company could remain solvent or get rid of all of the positions so that there was no question that the company was solvent. 

I am pretty sure that is what I was referring to there. 

Senator LEVIN. Your next sentence, ‘‘that things were fine when 

we were holding the risk,’’ does that not mean, in context then, 

that as long as you were the dominant holder of those positions 

and did not sell, that the prices would then not crash down? 

Mr. LEE. No, I do not think I am insinuating that. I think I am 

insinuating that if one very large player with different risk perspectives than say other types of participants in the market is 

53

holding the risk, they are going to do something differently with it 

and they can handle greater swings and things like that. 

There is different parts of the market that can not handle volatility. We are able to handle it for the most part up until September and I think that is what I am insinuating. 

Senator LEVIN. So you did not believe at that time that your positions were so large that if you sold them all at once the prices 

would fall sharply? You did not believe that? 

Mr. LEE. I do believe that because I do— 

Senator LEVIN. Did you believe that? 

Mr. LEE. Yes, I did believe that because of a liquidity event and 

because, as I said, I do agree that any trade in the market does 

have a short-term effect on prices. 

Senator LEVIN. Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. I just want to get to a discussion of what is 

excessive. Do you have a definition of what constitutes excessive 

speculation? 

Mr. LEE. I do not. 

Senator COLEMAN. So it was not unusual for Amaranth to hold 

as much as 40 and sometimes 50 percent of the NYMEX open interest in certain contracts? Is that something you would consider 

excessive? 

Mr. LEE. Postmortem, looking at that, it looks like they did that 

all the time. In terms of excessive, excessive relative to what? Relative to one exchange? You could make an argument for that. 

But you have to take this in the context that there was more 

than just NYMEX trading. There was times when they had greater 

positions on ICE than NYMEX and to look at just one facet of the 

market and determine whether it was excessive, that is not for me 

to decide. That is for the exchange to decide or for the regulator 

to decide. Was it large? Sure. Was it large relative to the whole 

market? I would not know because I have no clear definition of 

what the entire market looks at, because only one part of the market reports. 

Senator COLEMAN. So it is not up to the trader, but if the trader 

was given that definition by NYMEX or others, that is something 

you could deal with? 

Mr. LEE. That is something I could deal with and abide by. 

Senator COLEMAN. If NYMEX was so concerned about the size of 

the positions that they tell you to get out of your positions by August, is this an indication that speculation might be excessive? 

Mr. LEE. It was at least an indication that they felt it could 

cause some problems for their market integrity. I do not know if 

it necessarily insinuates that the entire market could not handle 

that particular amount of speculation. 

Senator COLEMAN. I am just trying to put myself in your frame. 

When NYMEX says you have to get out you move to ICE because 

you can do it. Was there ever any thought or discussion that you 

were doing this because NYMEX was coming down on you and you 

had another place you could go without transparency, without people knowing what you were doing? 

Mr. LEE. That would not have been the business decision at the 

time. You have to keep in mind that Amaranth was running obviously very large positions in, I believe, upwards of 67 or 69 months. 

54

1See Exhibit 14 which appears in the Appendix on page 900. 

To just get rid of two positions from a risk perspective could be extremely damaging, especially if you are only given—I do not know 

what the notice was to get out of those positions but let us say 24 

hours. From a business perspective, because they were allowed to 

do this, it was best to move to the rest of the market and then they 

could therefore have more time to decide what to do from a risk 

perspective with their overall position rather than just dealing with 

one or two positions. 

Senator COLEMAN. Was there ever any discussion about 

Amaranth’s position and its effect on market liquidity? 

Mr. LEE. Yes. I remember times when—I mean, it is a simple 

concept. If you hold a large position in one particular contract, 

there is obviously some disagreements with you on that price from 

a market participant standpoint. So if you need to get out of that 

contract very quickly there could definitely be a liquidity issue for 

you. 

Senator COLEMAN. If you go to Exhibit 14,1 if you have a copy 

of that. I believe it is Amaranth’s May 2006 update to investors. 

The middle of the second paragraph. Do you have a copy of that? 

Mr. LEE. I will momentarily. OK. 

Senator COLEMAN. In the middle of the second paragraph, almost 

exactly in the middle. It says ‘‘In this case, as we endeavored to 

monetize gains and reduce risk within the portfolio, liquidity in the 

middle part of the natural gas forward curve seized up due to high 

volumes of producer hedging that oversaturated market demand 

for forward natural gas. While this was a humbling experience that 

led us to recalibrate how we assess risk in this business, we believe 

certain spread relationships involving natural gas remain disconnected from their fundamental drivers.’’ 

I want to get back to whether Amaranth’s natural gas positions 

and trading volumes were large relative to the average. Is this document telling you that? 

Mr. LEE. I do not think it is necessarily telling you that. It is just 

saying that any position—when you have an event like we had in 

May, and just let me kind of explain the background of it. We saw 

an amount of producer hedging that we had not ever remembered 

seeing since about 2001. I think the market, in general, had outsized itself for that type of event, us included, and prices rated accordingly. 

Senator COLEMAN. So you do not believe that one of the lessons 

of Amaranth’s collapse is that when a fund’s positions are large relative to the average trading volume, the fund’s risk model should 

account for the effect of its own activity on prices and liquidity? 

Mr. LEE. I cannot say I disagree with that. I think that is a pretty novel concept and I think it is something risk managers should 

look at. 

Senator COLEMAN. I am not sure whether your personal opinions 

have much impact but do you think that ICE and NYMEX should 

be regulated differently? 

Mr. LEE. From a reporting standpoint and an accountability level 

standpoint, they should absolutely be the same. I see no reason 

55

why not. I do not think it creates that much of an administrative 

burden on anyone to do it. 

Senator COLEMAN. But if they were the same, then perhaps you 

would not have been able to move from NYMEX to ICE and simply 

literally reverse your positions. When I say you, I mean Amaranth. 

If they were the same, you would not do that. 

Mr. LEE. That is true. 

Senator COLEMAN. Perhaps it tells us sitting here, that in part 

your motivation was to move from something that has regulators 

squeezing you to an area that you are not going to be squeezed because there is not transparency. 

Mr. LEE. Keep in mind you are discussing the concept of limits, 

though, which is a lot tougher question to deal with. That is the 

part of the question, I think, where you could risk flight from market. Whereas with accountability levels and reporting, I do not 

think you take that risk or I cannot honestly believe anyone that 

would tell me that would be a risk. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LEVIN. On September 17, John Arnold of Centaurus 

wrote to the head of natural grass trading at Amaranth, Brian 

Hunter, saying that ‘‘In my opinion, fundamentally, the March/

April spread is still a long way from fundamental value. . . . Even 

though that spread has collapsed over the last 2 weeks, the only 

reason it is still above $1 is because of your position.’’

That is what Arnold wrote to Hunter. Do you agree with Arnold’s 

view now? 

Mr. LEE. No, I do not. I believe this is John Arnold posturing. 

He was trying to buy a distressed asset for the cheapest price he 

could. And if I was in his position, I would have said the exact 

same thing. 

Senator LEVIN. Did Hunter want to take that offer? 

Mr. LEE. Yes, he did. 

Senator LEVIN. Even though Arnold was posturing? 

Mr. LEE. Yes. The total cost to Amaranth at that point, I had estimated, would have been in the $600 million to $800 million 

range, rather than the $4-plus billion that they eventually lost. But 

that is all in hindsight. 

Senator LEVIN. A former colleague of yours at Amaranth wrote 

another energy trader about a different contract, ‘‘Boy, I will bet 

you see some CFTC inquiries for the last 2 days.’’ The trader replied to Brian Hunter, ‘‘Until they regulate swaps, no big deal.’’ 

That trader told us that he thought manipulation can occur because there is no regulatory oversight of natural gas swaps on ICE. 

Do you agree? 

Mr. LEE. I would agree. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you think the regulators should be able to 

view both futures and swaps? 

Mr. LEE. Yes, I do. 

Senator LEVIN. And if there had been regulation of ICE, as I understood the answer to the question that was asked by Senator 

Coleman, you would not have switched over to ICE. Did I hear you 

correctly? 

56

Mr. LEE. We would not have been allowed to. We would have had 

to follow the rules and Amaranth always followed the rules, and we 

would not have done the swap. 

Senator LEVIN. Would you have tried something else? Looked for 

some other over-the-counter way to do it? 

Mr. LEE. I do not think we would have, as a company—I mean, 

I cannot speak for the company. This was not my trade. But I do 

think the fact if there was certain other rules in the over-thecounter markets that do not exist today, that it is possible that 

some of our trading may not have been what it had and we may 

not have had that issue that we would have had to move because 

of limits. 

Senator LEVIN. So you do not object to the limits that we have 

talked about on ICE? 

Mr. LEE. In terms of limits, I would have to have some hard 

numbers to understated it. I believe there is a fundamental difference between the swap and the future but in terms of accountability and all that sort of stuff, absolutely. I think we should do 

it. I do not think it causes any administrative burden to anybody. 

Senator LEVIN. In terms of excessive speculation being prohibited, do you have a problem with that? 

Mr. LEE. No, as long as it is defined. 

Senator LEVIN. Well, if it is defined by the regulator using all the 

factors before the regulators—is it defined now on NYMEX? 

Mr. LEE. Postmortem, I have an idea what they think is excessive speculation. But at the end of the day as a trader, what I need 

as a trader is a hard fast number to abide by. 

Senator LEVIN. Is there a hard fast number on NYMEX now? 

Mr. LEE. There is only accountability limits. There is limits during the settlement period, the 3 days going into settlement period. 

But otherwise, it is just a matter of if you are going to get a phone 

call and they will ask you why. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you have objection to the current approach on 

NYMEX relative to excessive speculation? 

Mr. LEE. No. 

Senator LEVIN. Even though there is no hard and fast——

Mr. LEE. No. I think as long as the regulators or exchange personnel is calling and telling you that they think it is going to cause 

a market integrity problem, then I think you need to listen to 

them. I do not think any trader would have a problem with that. 

Senator LEVIN. If ICE had that same power? Do you have a problem with that? 

Mr. LEE. If you had it? 

Senator LEVIN. If they enforced it the same way that NYMEX 

does. 

Mr. LEE. Then that would be no problem, as long as everyone 

knows the rules beforehand. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you know the rules beforehand on NYMEX? 

Mr. LEE. On NYMEX, yes, you do. 

Senator LEVIN. If ICE enforced the same rules in the same way 

as NYMEX, would you have a problem with that? 

Mr. LEE. No, I would not. 

57

1See Exhibit 23, Note 1, which appears in the Appendix on page 998. 

2See Exhibit 23, Note 2, which appears in the Appendix on page 998. 

3See Exhibit 23, Note 3, which appears in the Appendix on page 998. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you think that if we had the same regulatory 

system on ICE as we do on NYMEX that you or other traders 

would do bilateral deals over-the-counter? 

Mr. LEE. I do not think that is going to happen so much as it 

would have 10 years ago. Everyone wants to sit in front of a computer screen now. It is the easiest thing in the world to do is, to 

trade on ICE or the NYMEX. To call up a voice broker or to call 

up someone directly, I think is such a smaller part of the market—

you can still deal with a voice broker but it still gets cleared 

through these other exchanges. But to do a trade directly with another counter party through the voice brokers is becoming smaller, 

and smaller, and smaller by the day. so I think the main concern 

would be ICE. 

Senator LEVIN. It is becoming smaller because there is another 

place where you can do unregulated trades. 

Mr. LEE. Both are unregulated, yes. 

Senator LEVIN. If ICE is put under regulatory regime the way 

NYMEX is, would there be a move then away from ICE, in a sense, 

to strictly bilateral trades, do you believe? 

Mr. LEE. I think that comes down to how strict you make the 

limits or reporting. If it ends up creating a big burden on these 

speculators in the market, yes, I guess there is a chance that it 

could flee there. It could flee to another country. I am not sure. But 

as long as they are reasonable, I do not think you are going to see 

any flight away from the exchanges. 

Senator LEVIN. I understand that you and Brian Hunter are 

working together to set up a new hedge fund called Solengo,1 is 

that correct? 

Mr. LEE. Yes, it is. 

Senator LEVIN. Did I pronounce that correctly? 

Mr. LEE. Yes, you did. 

Senator LEVIN. Does that hedge fund intend to engage in energy 

trades? 

Mr. LEE. Yes, it does. 

Senator LEVIN. In natural gas and oil? 

Mr. LEE. Yes, it does. 

Senator LEVIN. Will it engage in large-scale trading? 

Mr. LEE. No. We have addressed two of the problems that happened in the Amaranth situation with our new fund to reduce that 

possibility.2 And one of those ways is to limit the amount of capital 

that can go into any one market. Two, is to limit the amount of 

margin you are allowed to put in any one market so that you do 

not have a cash situation, as well. 

Senator LEVIN. So there will not be as large-scale trades in that 

hedge fund as there was with Amaranth? 

Mr. LEE. No, there will not. 

Senator LEVIN. Will there be significantly smaller trades? 

Mr. LEE. Yes, there will.3

Senator LEVIN. The media has reported that potential investors 

in the new hedge fund include investors from the Middle East. 

Could you describe those investors in general terms, particularly 

58

1See Exhibit 23, Note 4, which appears in the Appendix on page 998. 

this, I do not need the names, but does it include persons from oilproducing companies that might have an interest in high U.S. energy prices? 

Mr. LEE. To be quite blunt, I have never spoken to any of those 

investors. I have not been part of the fundraising process. I am not 

sure. I know some of the countries that these peoples live in and 

yes, they would have an interest in high oil prices.1 But you must 

understand, we are talking to investors from all over the world and 

not just a few countries in the Middle East. 

Senator LEVIN. But some of them are from the Middle East that 

would have that interest? 

Mr. LEE. That is my understanding. 

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Lee, we thank you. We thank you for your 

cooperation with our Subcommittee. We have gotten a lot of data 

from Amaranth and it has been helpful to us. You are excused. 

Let me just briefly close by saying that it is obvious that Congress must do more to safeguard U.S. energy markets from price 

manipulation and excessive speculation. The first step is to close 

that Enron loophole, which never should have been opened. Closing 

the loophole would make NYMEX and ICE subject to the same 

market oversight, put the cop on the beat in all U.S. energy markets. It would also level the regulatory playing field between the 

two exchanges. 

The new CFTC proposal goes a ways in the right direction, but 

we have got to close the Enron loophole because that is the critical 

step which has to be taken to avoid the excessive speculation and 

to prohibit manipulation in advance, not just to try to catch up 

with people who engage in it afterwards. So getting the key information is just not enough if regulators do not have the power to 

act on what they see. They have got to be able to reduce holdings, 

limit trades to prevent price manipulation and excessive speculation. And Congress alone can eliminate the Enron loophole which 

we created and restore regulatory authority to all U.S. energy markets. 

The second step that we should take in safeguarding U.S. energy 

markets is to invigorate the statutory prohibition against excessive 

speculation. It must be enforced much more effectively with better 

criteria. The CFTC and exchanges need to police contracts in all 

months where speculative trading is affecting prices, not just in 

contracts about to expire. 

The third step is for Congress to provide the funds that CFTC 

needs to do its job. Right now the CFTC’s entire budget is $98 million per year to oversee commodity trades that are in the billions. 

It is one-eighth of the size of the SEC’s budget of $880 million. The 

CFTC suffers from antiquated technology, shrinking staff, and inadequate oversight resources. To obtain the needed funds, Congress 

should authorize the CFTC, I believe, to collect user fees from the 

market that it oversees in the same manner as every other Federal 

financial regulator, including the SEC. 

The CFTC has been starved for resources for too long and one 

way or another, whether or not it is from collection of user fees or 

59

in some other authorization and appropriation, the CFTC must be 

provided the resources. 

What we have seen here is that excessive speculation by a single 

hedge fund, Amaranth, altered natural gas prices, caused wild 

price swings and really hit consumers with high prices during 

2006. 

As I said before, it is one thing if gamblers gamble with their 

own money and if speculators gamble with their investors money. 

But it is a totally different thing when the U.S. energy markets are 

turned into a casino. Everyone is forced then to walk into that casino and gamble, betting on prices that are driven by highly aggressive trading practices. Amaranth is not the only hedge fund 

which uses large-scale trading in energy markets in the United 

States, but we have got to get the regulatory cop back on the beat 

in all of our energy markets in the United States. We have got to 

give them stronger tools to stop excessive speculation and prevent 

price manipulation. 

So that is the chore before us. We are grateful to all of our panels. Our staff has done a terrific job in terms of putting together, 

I think, one million documents. I hedged; it is two million documents. It took, I believe, almost a year to do that. It is a lot of 

work. It has never been done before. It produced a report which we 

are very proud of because I think it really illuminates a problem 

here, which is you have regulation in one place and not in another. 

And without regulation in a much more competitive way, covering 

all of the bases, in effect, we are not really regulating it all. 

The prices that our consumers pay is higher as a result. The 

swings in these prices are greater as a result. And it is up to Congress now to correct the problems that we have. This testimony 

today will hopefully help Congress do exactly that. 

We will stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 2:16 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(61)

EXCESSIVE SPECULATION IN THE NATURAL 

GAS MARKET 

MONDAY, JULY 9, 2007

U.S. SENATE,

PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS,

OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m., in room 

SD–342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Carl Levin, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Levin and Coleman. 

Staff Present: Elise J. Bean, Staff Director and Chief Counsel; 

Dan Berkovitz, Counsel; Kate Bittinger, Detailee, GAO; Ross 

Kirschner, Counsel; Mary D. Robertson, Chief Clerk; Mark D. Nelson, Deputy Chief Counsel to the Minority; Jeremy Kress, Law 

Clerk; David Weinberg, Law Clerk; Genevieve Citrin, Intern; and 

Edmund Zagorin, Intern.. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LEVIN 

Senator LEVIN. Good afternoon, everybody. At our hearing 2 

weeks ago, we laid out the case history of Amaranth Advisors LLC. 

A lengthy staff report and testimony from witnesses told the story 

of how this large hedge fund dominated the U.S. natural gas market in 2006, until it collapsed in September 2006. 

In 2006, Amaranth traded thousands of natural gas contracts 

daily, sometimes traded tens of thousands of contracts in a single 

day, and accumulated as many as 100,000 natural gas contracts for 

delivery of natural gas in a single month. At times during the summer, Amaranth held about 40 percent of all outstanding NYMEX 

natural gas contracts for the winter of 2006–2007, including 75 percent of the outstanding futures contracts to deliver natural gas in 

November 2006, 60 percent of those delivering natural gas in January 2007, and 60 percent of those delivering natural gas in March 

2007. We heard at that hearing how Amaranth’s trades and holdings were way beyond the norm and way beyond the economic capacity of most natural gas traders. 

We also heard how Amaranth’s trading practices pushed up 

prices for winter gas, contributed to price spikes, and socked consumers with extra costs. One public gas company in Georgia testified at the last hearing that it paid $18 million more than it should 

have for winter gas because of Amaranth’s excessive speculation. 

An industry association told the Subcommittee that Amaranth’s 

62

trading in winter gas likely cost consumers billions of dollars in 

extra costs. 

The Amaranth hedge fund gambled on the natural gas market. 

It lost that gamble, but Amaranth’s losses are not our concern. The 

real issue is that, by using massive trades to bet on natural gas 

prices, Amaranth raised relative 2006 winter prices for the whole 

market and caused consumers hedging their winter gas purchases 

to pay inflated prices. Those consumers could not afford to roll the 

dice and wait to see if prices came down later. They had to lock 

in their winter gas prices during the summer to ensure a stable 

supply and in order to carefully budget for the cost. Amaranth 

upped the cost, which means the public ultimately paid the price. 

Just 1 year ago our Subcommittee released a report showing how 

widespread speculation in contracts for the future delivery of oil 

was inflating crude oil prices by about $20 per barrel of oil. The 

Amaranth case shows how a single hedge fund—backed up by large 

amounts of capital—produced an equally dramatic effect in the natural gas market. At our last hearing, I asked one of the Amaranth 

traders why they engaged in such large-scale trades, and he answered: ‘‘[I]t was simply a matter of capital. At a hedge fund you 

are given an amount of capital to trade with . . . [Y]ou simply 

have to put that capital to work one way or the other.’’

To Amaranth, it was simply a matter of putting capital to work. 

It had billions to invest and decided to invest those billions in the 

natural gas market. Amaranth did not produce natural gas, it did 

not supply natural gas, it did not use natural gas. It simply wanted 

to speculate and hopefully make a lot of money in the natural gas 

market. And they took users and consumers of natural gas along 

for the ride. 

Excessive speculation and price manipulation are not confined to 

the natural gas market—they taint many sectors of the U.S. energy 

market, from Enron’s distortion of electricity prices, to alleged price 

manipulation in the propane market, to alleged price gouging in 

gasoline. Unfair energy prices are causing real pain for the people 

we represent. The causes demand a remedy when they reflect manipulation or excessive speculation. 

Today’s hearing focuses on the role of market regulators to protect the public from unfair energy prices. The Commodity Futures 

Trading Commission (CFTC) is the key cop on the beat charged 

with policing U.S. commodity markets to stop price manipulation 

and excessive speculation. To carry out its mission, the CFTC has 

delegated authority to a number of exchanges, such as the New 

York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) to establish rules to monitor 

trading and prevent manipulation and excessive speculation. The 

CFTC has, for example, authorized regulated exchanges to impose 

trading limits on individual traders to prevent speculators from engaging in misconduct. These regulated exchanges provide the first 

line of defense against market misconduct; the CFTC provides the 

backup. 

When it comes to energy, however, Congress has thrown the 

CFTC a curve that has made its oversight job much harder. In 

2000, at the request of Enron Corporation and others, Congress 

amended the key Federal law, the Commodity Exchange Act, to exempt CFTC oversight of energy and metals commodities traded on 

63

1See Exhibit 6 which appears in the Appendix on page 717. 

the electronic energy exchanges which are used by large traders. 

The result of this so-called ‘‘Enron loophole’’ is that a leading U.S. 

electronic energy exchange, known as the Intercontinental Exchange, or ICE, is exempt from the normal regulatory system that 

applies to regulated exchanges. That means, unlike NYMEX, ICE 

has no authority or obligation to monitor trading, no authority or 

obligation to prevent price manipulation, and no authority or obligation to prevent excessive speculation from distorting prices. And 

due to the Enron loophole, the CFTC has no authority to limit trading on ICE to prevent price manipulation or excessive speculation. 

NYMEX and ICE are the two biggest energy exchanges operating 

in the United States today. It makes no sense that one market is 

regulated and the other is not. Worse, the Amaranth case history 

shows how the operation of an unregulated market can make it impossible for a regulated market to effectively prevent price manipulation and excessive speculation. 

That is because the current system allows traders to avoid restrictions against excessive speculation imposed by NYMEX, the 

regulated market, simply by switching their positions to ICE, the 

unregulated market. This switch costs a trader virtually nothing, 

and enables the trader to engage in unlimited trading on the unregulated market. 

That is exactly what happened in August 2006, when NYMEX 

ordered Amaranth to reduce its holdings of the September 2006 

NYMEX futures contracts. As this chart, Exhibit 6,1 shows, when 

NYMEX gave that order on August 8 to Amaranth to reduce its 

holdings of the September 2006 futures contracts, on that date Amaranth held a short position of about 60,000 September contracts 

on NYMEX—which is a huge position. Concerned that Amaranth 

might engage in last-minute large-scale trading that could affect 

the final settlement price of the September contracts, NYMEX ordered Amaranth to reduce its September contracts, in an orderly 

manner, by the end of August. 

In response, Amaranth reduced its NYMEX position down to 

about 10,000 contracts by the end of August. However, Amaranth 

also increased its position on ICE to about 80,000 September contracts, in trades that took place without NYMEX or CFTC scrutiny 

or limitations. In making the switch from NYMEX to ICE, Amaranth took advantage of the Enron loophole. The end result was 

that NYMEX’s order did not cause Amaranth to reduce the size of 

its holdings. It, instead, led Amaranth to move from a regulated to 

an unregulated market. 

Now consider the trading that took place on August 29, 2006, the 

last day of trading allowed on September contracts. On that date, 

Amaranth sold tens of thousands of contracts during the day, primarily on ICE. Despite those sales, the contract price did not fall 

much, because Amaranth’s trades were counterbalanced all day by 

other traders, including another large hedge fund, Centaurus, that 

bought the September contracts that Amaranth was selling. In the 

last hour of trading, Amaranth stopped trading on NYMEX in response to the NYMEX directive that it refrain from trading during 

the final 30 minutes. Other traders, however, continued buying the 

64

September contract. Without Amaranth’s sales to counterbalance 

the pressure on the contract price, in the last hour of trading the 

final contract price shot up 10 percent. 

Almost all of the trades made by Amaranth and Centaurus on 

August 29 took place on ICE. Amaranth sold about 16,000 September contracts that day, while Centaurus bought about 12,000—

10,000 of which were in the final 45 minutes of trading. NYMEX 

rules bar traders from holding more than 1,000 contracts in the 

last 3 days of trading on a contract. The torrent of ICE trading during those same 3 days not only nullified NYMEX’s efforts to limit 

trading near the contract deadline, but also clearly affected the 

NYMEX final price. For Amaranth, because of all the short sales 

it made, the last-minute upward spike in the contract price 

dropped the value of its holdings by nearly $500 million. 

Some of the questions we will examine today are, first, why any 

organized exchange with energy trading is exempt from routine 

CFTC oversight and regulation. Energy is a vital commodity to the 

United States. There is no rational reason to exempt energy commodities from normal market oversight to prevent price manipulation and excessive speculation. Second, we will examine why ICE 

is treated differently from NYMEX. Both exchanges affect energy 

prices. Both exchanges are used by the same traders whose trades 

lead to virtually identical energy prices on both markets. Both exchanges are vulnerable to misconduct that can inflate energy 

prices. And as the Amaranth case history illustrates, regulating 

one U.S. energy exchange without regulating the other is a recipe 

for failure since speculators restricted on NYMEX can simply move 

to ICE and carry out the very same trades. 

The flaws in the current regulatory structure for U.S. energy 

trades are painfully obvious, but the CFTC has been slow to call 

for reform. For years, the CFTC has resisted requesting authority 

to monitor energy trades taking place outside the regulated markets. It has resisted recognizing the role of unregulated markets in 

affecting prices on regulated markets and the impact of excessive 

speculation in pushing up energy prices. It has also resisted asking 

for explicit authority to prevent price manipulation and excessive 

speculation on ICE. 

Amaranth’s excesses may have finally broken down some of that 

resistance. In late 2006, after Amaranth collapsed and the scale of 

its trading became widely known, the CFTC used its special call 

authority to require ICE, for the first time, to begin turning over 

daily trading data. Last month, the CFTC proposed a rule that 

would require traders on NYMEX, the regulated exchange, to disclose upon request their holdings on all exchanges, whether regulated or not. That would enable the CFTC to get a more complete 

picture of a trader’s relevant holdings. But unless the CFTC can 

obtain the same information from ICE traders that it can from 

NYMEX traders, and unless ICE is subject to the same rules prohibiting excessive speculation as NYMEX, the ultimate effect of the 

proposed rule may be to create one more incentive for traders to 

choose trading on the unregulated ICE market over the regulated 

NYMEX market. 

While the CFTC’s recent innovations will help expand its access 

to essential energy trading data, they do not give the CFTC the auVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:27 Jan 25, 2008 Jkt 036616 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\36616.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
65

thority needed to protect U.S. energy markets from price manipulation and excessive speculation. The CFTC must not only obtain the 

information it needs, it must also be able to act on that information 

to protect the public. 

Our report presents three bipartisan recommendations to enable 

the CFTC to effectively police U.S. energy markets. The first is to 

close the Enron loophole by giving the CFTC equal oversight and 

regulatory authority over NYMEX and ICE energy trades. Second, 

the CFTC needs to strengthen enforcement of the prohibition 

against excessive speculation, including by monitoring speculative 

trades of contracts in all months, not just the contracts nearing expiration. Third, Congress needs to give the CFTC more funds to do 

its job, including, if necessary, authorizing the CFTC, like every 

other U.S. financial regulator, to collect user fees from the markets 

it oversees. 

Right now, U.S. energy markets are dangerously vulnerable to 

price manipulation and excessive speculation. Regulators charged 

with protecting the public are hobbled by laws that create irrational rules for energy commodities, establish an uneven regulatory 

playing field between NYMEX and ICE, and render market regulators powerless to effectively stop inappropriate trading on electronic exchanges from affecting contract prices. We can and we 

must do more to protect the public. We must put the cop back on 

the beat in all U.S. energy markets. 

Let me close by thanking Senator Coleman, the Subcommittee’s 

Ranking Republican, for his continued support of these efforts. We 

also, I am sure, join in thanking his staff and my staff for their 

dedication and assistance in this truly joint effort. 

Finally, I would like to thank each of our witnesses today—the 

CFTC, NYMEX, and ICE—for their cooperation with the Subcommittee’s investigation. NYMEX and ICE, for instance, provided 

extensive data and responded to many Subcommittee requests in 

a timely manner. We appreciate their assistance, and we appreciate the assistance of the CFTC in unraveling the Amaranth case 

history. 

Senator Coleman. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLEMAN 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Senator Levin. 

Today’s hearing is the culmination of an extensive Subcommittee 

investigation into the impact of excessive speculation on the natural gas market. These efforts, including today’s hearing, have 

been bipartisan from their inception, and I want to thank Chairman Levin and his staff for their hard work on these important 

issues. 

As Senator Levin noted in his opening statement, the evidence 

reviewed by the Subcommittee reveals fundamental flaws in our 

current regulatory structure. Section 2(h)(3) of the Commodity Exchange Act exempts from CFTC oversight and regulation a massive, and growing, volume of energy transactions that occurs on 

electronic, over-the-counter exchanges. In stark contrast to regulated exchanges, exempt exchanges have no responsibility to monitor trading, no responsibility to prevent excessive speculation or 

price manipulation, and no responsibility to ensure that trading is 

66

fair and orderly. The end result is a bifurcated regulatory regime. 

Futures exchanges like the New York Mercantile Exchange—

NYMEX—are both self-regulated and regulated by the CFTC; 

whereas other, increasingly significant segments of our energy 

markets—namely, electronic OTC exchanges like the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE)—are neither self-regulated nor regulated by 

the CFTC. 

The Amaranth case history illuminates the inadequacy of this bifurcated regulatory structure and underscores the need for greater 

transparency and regulation on electronic OTC energy exchanges. 

And the Chairman has gone into the history. I will just touch upon 

it briefly. 

From early 2006 until its September collapse, Amaranth traded 

heavily on both NYMEX, a regulated futures exchange, and on 

ICE, an unregulated OTC exchange. As a regulated exchange, 

NYMEX was required to monitor Amaranth’s trading and prevent 

Amaranth’s holdings from becoming too large. As an exempted 

OTC exchange, ICE shared no such responsibility and made no attempt to limit Amaranth’s speculative trading. 

On numerous occasions in 2006, Amaranth exceeded NYMEX accountability levels and CFTC position limits for natural gas contracts. In August, NYMEX finally took action and directed Amaranth to reduce its holdings in the natural gas futures contracts for 

September and October. Amaranth complied with NYMEX’s order 

and, as the Chairman has set forth in the chart illustrated, by the 

end of the month, had exited its positions in the two contracts. But 

rather than reducing its overall natural gas holdings, Amaranth 

simply shifted its trading to ICE, where accountability levels and 

position limits do not apply. Through trades on ICE, Amaranth not 

only maintained but actually increased its positions in September 

and October natural gas contracts. As a result, NYMEX’s instructions did nothing to reduce Amaranth’s size, but simply caused Amaranth to move its trading from a regulated market to an unregulated one. 

I believe the Amaranth facts demonstrate the need for greater 

transparency and regulation on electronic OTC energy exchanges 

and raise serious concerns about the ability of the CFTC to prevent 

excessive speculation and price manipulation in our energy markets. Speculative energy traders should not be able to skirt CFTC 

oversight by simply shifting their positions to unregulated electronic energy exchanges. Yet this is exactly what our current regulatory scheme allows. 

Amaranth’s collapse revealed a troubling level of high-risk, speculative trading that occurs on U.S. energy markets. Indeed, more 

than 500 energy-related hedge funds deploy a combined $67 billion 

in speculative capital to our energy markets. These traders bring 

important liquidity and vitality to the markets in which they invest. At the same time, however, we must ensure that speculative 

capital does not overwhelm the real buyers and sellers, like utilities and industrial users of natural gas. Again, it is the consumers 

who are impacted. It is the public that pays the price, and clearly 

Amaranth upped the cost. More than ever before, it is imperative 

that the CFTC and other market regulators have the statutory authority and budget necessary to police our energy markets. 

67

Despite this pressing need for oversight, the CFTC’s ability to 

conduct market surveillance has been eroded; its ability to prevent 

excessive speculation and price manipulation has been diminished. 

This is a direct result of the fact that more and more energy trading takes place on unregulated electronic over-the-counter exchanges. I am concerned that incomplete information and inadequate authority make it difficult, if not impossible, for the CFTC 

to effectively monitor and prevent excessive speculation and price 

manipulation in our energy markets. 

As we move forward, however, we must not overlook the fact 

that, like the traders who use them, electronic OTC exchanges 

have brought increased competition and liquidity to our energy 

markets. Nor should we overlook the fact that, in many cases, 

these exchanges offer far greater transparency to both traders and 

regulators than do other OTC markets. For example, pursuant to 

its ‘‘special call authority,’’ the CFTC now receives significant market disclosures from ICE, including position reports for all traders 

of certain natural gas contracts. The enhanced transparency offered 

by ICE’s comprehensive position reports is in stark contrast to the 

opaque off-exchange, OTC market, where there are not only no position limits but also no reporting requirements. 

Therefore, as we noted in the Minority’s Views on the Subcommittee’s Report, Congress must ensure that any proposed cure 

is not worse than the disease. If we extend CFTC oversight and 

regulation to electronic over-the-counter exchanges, we must avoid 

unintended consequences—namely, creating incentives for the exchanges themselves to move to less regulated commodities markets 

offshore. And, again, the concern is the movement from regulated 

to unregulated. We must avoid creating incentives for traders to 

shift their business to far less transparent and unregulated OTC 

markets. This is a real concern. In fact, according to a recent piece 

from Dow Jones, there has been a ‘‘recent groundswell in off-exchange transactions’’ and ‘‘hundreds of little-known, under-theradar brokerage shops . . . are fast gaining currency—and notoriety—in energy-trading strongholds.’’ And, again, the concern is 

with the lack of transparency, the lack of regulation. In the end, 

it is the consumers who are hurt. This is not about the kind of 

money being played with and the ethos and somewhere out in a 

place that the average person isn’t impacted. We heard in the testimony at the last hearing that Amaranth’s trading had an impact 

on prices consumers paid. And so the concern as we move forward 

is to make sure that we do not push from regulated to unregulated. 

I look forward to hearing the testimony from today’s witnesses, 

and, again, I thank the Chairman for leading this important bipartisan effort. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman. 

Let me now welcome our first panel to this afternoon’s hearing: 

James Newsome, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the 

New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX); and Jeffrey Sprecher, 

Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Intercontinental Exchange, also known as ICE. 

Gentlemen, we appreciate both you being here this afternoon. We 

welcome you to the Subcommittee, and, again, we appreciate the 

68

1The prepared statement of Mr. Newsome appears in the Appendix on page 152. 

cooperation that you have shown and your staffs have shown to the 

Subcommittee. 

Pursuant to Rule VI, all witnesses who testify before the Subcommittee are required to be sworn. At this time I would ask both 

of you to please stand and raise your right hand. Do you swear 

that the testimony you are about to give before this Subcommittee 

will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so 

help you, God? 

Mr. NEWSOME. I do. 

Mr. SPRECHER. I do. 

Senator LEVIN. We will use the usual timing system today. About 

1 minute before the red light comes on, you will see the light 

change from green to yellow, giving you an opportunity to conclude 

your remarks. Your written testimony will be printed in the record 

in its entirety, and we would ask that you limit your oral testimony 

to no more than 10 minutes each. 

Let me start with Mr. Newsome. We will have you go first. 

TESTIMONY OF JAMES NEWSOME,1 PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, NEW YORK MERCANTILE EXCHANGE, 

INC., (NYMEX), NEW YORK, NEW YORK 

Mr. NEWSOME. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member. 

I am Jim Newsome, President and CEO of the New York Mercantile Exchange. NYMEX is the world’s largest forum for trading 

and clearing physical commodity-based futures contracts, including 

energy and metals products. NYMEX has been in the business for 

more than 135 years and is a federally chartered marketplace. 

NYMEX is fully regulated by the CFTC both as a clearing organization and as a designated contract market, or DCM, which is the 

highest and most comprehensive level of regulatory oversight to 

which a derivatives trading facility may be subject under current 

laws and regulations. 

Prior to joining NYMEX, I served as a CFTC Commissioner and, 

subsequently, from 2001 to 2004, as chairman. As chairman, I led 

the CFTC’s implementation of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. The CFMA streamlined and modernized the regulatory structure of the derivatives industry. It also provided legal 

certainty for over-the-counter swap transactions. Specifically, the 

CFMA created new exclusions and exemptions from CFTC regulation for bilateral transactions between high net worth participants 

in financial derivatives and exempt commodity derivatives, such as 

energy. 

As the designated contract market, NYMEX has an affirmative 

responsibility to act as a self-regulatory organization and to monitor and to police activity in its own markets. Thus, a DCM must 

monitor trading to prevent manipulation, price distortion, and disruptions of the delivery or cash settlement process. Furthermore, 

to reduce the potential threat of market manipulation or congestion, the DCM must adopt position limits or position accountability 

for a listed contract, where necessary and appropriate. 

The principal tool that is used by DCMs to monitor trading for 

purposes of market integrity is the large trader reporting system. 

69

For energy contracts, the reporting position levels are distinct for 

each contract listed by the exchange for trading. The levels are set 

by NYMEX and are specified by rule amendments that are then 

submitted to the CFTC, following consultation and coordination 

with the CFTC staff. 

The CFMA also permitted bilateral trading on energy electronic 

platforms. Under CFTC rules, these electronic trading platforms 

are called ‘‘exempt commercial markets’’ and are subject only to the 

CFTC’s anti-fraud and anti-manipulation authority. Unlike the 

DCM, the exempt commercial markets are completely unregulated 

by the CFTC and, thus, have no self-regulatory obligations to monitor its own markets. 

A series of significant changes have occurred in the natural gas 

market since the passage of the CFMA, including advances in trading technology, such that NYMEX, the regulated DCM, and ICE, 

an unregulated ECM, have become highly linked trading venues. 

As a result of these changes, which could not have been reasonably 

predicted only a few short years ago, the current statutory structure, in my opinion, no longer works for certain markets now operating as ECMs. Specifically, the regulatory disparity between the 

NYMEX and ICE, which are functionally equivalent, has created 

serious challenges for the CFTC as well as for NYMEX in its capacity as an SRO. 

In August 2006, NYMEX proactively took steps to maintain the 

integrity of its markets by ordering Amaranth to reduce its open 

positions in the natural gas futures contract. However, as you 

pointed out, Mr. Chairman, Amaranth then increased its positions 

on the unregulated and nontransparent ICE electronic trading platform. Because the ICE and NYMEX trading venues for natural gas 

are tightly linked and highly interactive with each other, they are 

in essence components of a broader natural gas derivatives market. 

Therefore, Amaranth’s response to NYMEX’s regulatory directive 

did not reduce Amaranth’s overall market risk. Furthermore, the 

integrity of NYMEX markets continued to be affected by and exposed to Amaranth’s outsize positions in the natural gas market. 

Finally, NYMEX had no means to monitor Amaranth’s positions on 

ICE or to take steps to have Amaranth reduce its participation in 

that trading venue. 

As in the past, I do not believe that the case has been made, and 

thus do not support regulation of derivatives transactions that are 

individually negotiated and executed off-exchange in the traditional 

bilateral OTC market. On the other hand, based upon recent experiences, I do believe that ECMs such as ICE that function more 

like a traditional exchange and trade products that are linked to 

established exchanges should be subject to regulation of the CFTC. 

Consequently, legislative change may be necessary to address the 

real public interest concerns created by the current structure of the 

natural gas markets and the potential for systemic financial risk. 

I will turn to the three specific recommendations, Mr. Chairman, 

included in the report and respond to each. 

First, the report recommends the elimination of the exemption 

from regulatory oversight for electronic exchanges that host trading 

and exempt commodities such as energy. It is NYMEX’s view that 

these changes in the natural gas market structure provide clear 

70

support for legislative change. These developments include the exchange-like aggregation of financial risk in OTC energy products; 

the reality of a broader linked market that currently include the 

regulated and the unregulated trading venues; the contribution to 

or creation of price discovery for natural gas prices in the unregulated trading venues; and the ripple or spillover effects of activity 

on the unregulated venue onto the regulated trading venue, among 

others. 

NYMEX believes that these changes in the natural gas market 

trigger a series of fundamental public policy and public interest 

concerns that necessitate appropriate oversight. The proper legislative response is a judgment for this Subcommittee and for Congress 

to make. However, where a market does manifest the characteristics just mentioned, NYMEX believes that a comparable regulatory 

level to that of a DCM would be appropriate. 

Upon triggering the public interest concerns noted, an electronic 

trading facility becomes sufficiently comparable to a traditional organized exchange that CFTC oversight and regulation becomes appropriate. However, it is clear to NYMEX that these public policy 

issues necessitate mandated large trader reporting and position 

limits and position accountability requirements for ECMs that are 

highly linked to and functionally equivalent with regulated DCMs. 

Such ECMs should also be assigned SRO duties to police their own 

markets as a front line. NYMEX believes strongly that such regulations are necessary and would not negatively impact the core price 

discovery and hedging functions provided currently by derivatives 

markets. 

Given the complexity of derivatives markets, it can be difficult to 

state with real precision when speculation may be deemed ‘‘excessive.’’ Moreover, speculators do provide liquidity and other positive 

effects to derivatives markets. NYMEX agrees with the view expressed in the Minority Staff opinion that it is not necessary to 

make a final determination about whether Amaranth’s trading was 

excessively speculative in order to conclude that legislative change 

in the form of greater authority for the CFTC may be necessary 

and appropriate. 

On the second recommendation, given NYMEX’s conclusion that 

NYMEX and ICE natural gas trading platforms essentially form a 

broader linked market, NYMEX believes that the CFTC should be 

given additional legal authority and should use such authorization 

to monitor aggregate positions on both ICE and NYMEX. 

The CFTC began to receive certain data from ICE commencing 

last fall through use of the CFTC’s ‘‘special call’’ procedures. These 

procedures, however, only commenced several months after the 

Amaranth meltdown had occurred, and thus long after any market 

impact resulting from Amaranth’s trading. 

As to the final recommendation, the report stated that the CFTC 

budget should be increased, and I express that I may be a bit biased on this as a former chairman. But it should be increased to 

provide staff and technology needed to monitor, integrate, and analyze real-time transactional data from all U.S. commodity exchanges, including NYMEX and ICE. NYMEX agrees with this assessment and supports an expanded budget for the CFTC so that 

it may properly carry out its regulatory mission. However, the reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:27 Jan 25, 2008 Jkt 036616 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\36616.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
71

1The prepared statement of Mr. Sprecher appears in the Appendix on page 167. 

port went on to recommend that necessary funding ‘‘should be obtained from user fees imposed on commodity markets.’’ NYMEX respectfully disagrees with this component of the recommendation 

and notes that Congress has previously rejected such a user or 

transaction tax as bad public policy. The user fee or transaction tax 

being recommended by the Subcommittee would not be imposed on 

foreign boards of trade that are currently offering direct electronic 

access to their markets to market participants based in the United 

States. Additionally, the U.S. markets already impose a user fee on 

contracts to fund the National Futures Association, which is the industry-wide self-regulatory organization that performs a function 

on behalf of the industry that the CFTC would have to perform if 

it was not funded by the markets users itself. 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, I appreciate the opportunity to share the viewpoint of the New York Mercantile Exchange with you today, and I look forward to questions after my 

colleague’s testimony. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you so much, Mr. Newsome. Mr. Sprecher. 

TESTIMONY OF JEFFREY C. SPRECHER,1 CHAIRMAN AND 

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, INC. (ICE), ATLANTA, GEORGIA 

Mr. SPRECHER. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Coleman, Subcommittee Members, and staff members. My name is Jeff 

Sprecher, and I am the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of 

Intercontinental Exchange, and as the Chairman mentioned, we 

are also known as ‘‘ICE.’’ 

I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before you 

today to share with you our views on the regulation of the natural 

gas trading markets and the recent report of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations regarding the collapse of Amaranth 

and the related events in the markets. ICE was pleased to cooperate with the Subcommittee and the staff in providing the voluminous trading data and other market information that staff requested in preparing the report, and we commend the Subcommittee and staff for the thoroughness and diligence that they 

exhibited in the report’s preparation. It is our hope that the report, 

together with the views of the various persons who have been invited to testify at these hearings, will serve to enhance the integrity of the energy markets and assist Congress in a better understanding of how these markets serve the interests of a broader 

marketplace. 

ICE operates a leading global commodity marketplace, comprising both futures and over-the-counter markets, across agricultural and energy commodities, foreign exchange and equity indices. 

ICE owns and operates two regulated futures exchanges: ICE Futures, a London-based futures exchange overseen by the U.K. Financial Services Authority, and the Board of Trade of the City of 

New York, also known as the ‘‘NYBOT,’’ which is a futures exchange regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 

ICE’s electronic marketplace for OTC energy contracts serves 

customers in Asia, Europe and the United States and is operated 

72

under the Commodity Exchange Act as a category of marketplace 

known as an ECM. As an ECM, these markets are subject to the 

jurisdiction of the CFTC and to regulations of the CFTC imposing 

recordkeeping, reporting, and other requirements. And in the past 

year, ICE has established a daily position reporting program for 

the CFTC that we continue to enhance and support. 

ICE has always been and continues to be a strong proponent of 

open and competitive markets in energy commodities and the related derivatives and of regulatory oversight of those markets. As 

an operator of global futures and over-the-counter markets and as 

a publicly traded company, we strive to ensure the utmost confidence in the integrity in our marketplace and in the soundness 

of the trading business model. To that end, we have continually 

worked with the CFTC and other regulatory agencies in the United 

States and outside the United States in order to ensure that they 

have access to relevant information available to ICE regarding 

trading activity in our markets. We will continue to work with relevant agencies in the future. 

I want to take this opportunity to provide you with important 

background on the structure, operation, and regulatory status of 

ICE and to share with you our thoughts on the regulation of the 

natural gas markets and the PSI Report. I want to clarify a number of misunderstandings and inaccuracies in the report, which I 

will discuss in more detail. 

First, ICE does not operate—nor have we ever operated—pursuant to an ‘‘Enron loophole’’ under the CEA. Enron Online, the electronic marketplace operated by Enron pursuant to a separate provision of the CEA, has nothing whatsoever to do with the operations of ICE. That provision was available to Enron because 

Enron Online was a ‘‘one to many’’ marketplace in which Enron 

was both a market participant as well as the market. Parties traded with a single counterparty—Enron. In stark contrast, ICE offers 

a transparent ‘‘many-to-many’’ electronic marketplace, where buyers and sellers of OTC energy contracts can transact in a fair and 

efficient marketplace, where no distinction is made between one 

market participant and another, and where the best executable 

price is available to any participant in the market, no matter how 

large or how small. It is simply erroneous and misleading to use 

the label ‘‘Enron loophole’’ to characterize ICE as somehow being 

connected to the Enron debacle. 

Second, there are a number of fundamental distinctions that 

need to be drawn between the OTC markets in general and ICE’s 

market in particular, on the one hand, and the futures markets, on 

the other hand, including the distinction between ICE’s cash-settled natural gas swaps and physically delivered natural gas futures 

that are traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange. An understanding of these distinctions is essential to any analysis of potential regulatory changes, particularly the need for position limits, 

which the CFTC itself has said are unnecessary as they are designed to prevent squeezes on physically delivered products. Indeed, while the report criticizes the absence of position limits on 

ICE natural gas swaps, it completely ignores the fact that 

NYMEX’s cash-settled natural gas swap—which is identical to the 

ICE contract and which was also traded by Amaranth—was not 

73

subject to position limits. If there is to be a ‘‘level playing field,’’ 

it should be between comparable contracts. 

Third, ICE is not ‘‘unregulated’’ nor is it a ‘‘dark’’ market. While 

ICE is not a ‘‘designated contract market,’’ it is already subject to 

the oversight of the CFTC and to CFTC regulatory requirements, 

including reporting requirements. 

Fourth, under current law, the CFTC and NYMEX have the legal 

authority and the ability to obtain any available information regarding trading by market participants on ICE, and no additional 

legislation or regulation is needed to fill this perceived ‘‘gap’’ in the 

system. 

Finally, the ability of Amaranth to trade on ICE in no way 

‘‘caused’’ its collapse, any more than its ability to trade on NYMEX 

did so. 

ICE strongly supports several recommendations of the PSI Report, particularly the proposed increase in the CFTC’s budget and 

the enhancement of its access to trading information. We also support the advancement of regulatory certainty by eliminating the 

‘‘Enron loophole’’ although, as I pointed out, that provision has 

nothing to do with ICE. We do not believe that a complete overhaul 

of the current regulatory structure is either warranted or advisable. Moreover, any legislative or regulatory changes that are made 

need to reflect the nature of ICE and its market, the significant differences between ICE and the many other venues for trading OTC 

in the United States and outside the United States that exist 

today. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Sprecher. 

Let me ask both of you, do you agree with the finding of our report that prices on one exchange affect prices on the other exchange? Do you agree with that, Mr. Newsome? 

Mr. NEWSOME. I do agree with that, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Sprecher. 

Mr. SPRECHER. I believe they are very related, yes. 

Senator LEVIN. Now, the key Federal law in this area, the Commodity Exchange Act, directs the CFTC to limit trading to prevent 

excessive speculation. Would you both agree that excessive speculation can cause sudden unreasonable or unwarranted price changes 

that affect U.S. energy prices paid by consumers? Dr. Newsome. 

Mr. NEWSOME. I think trading by any market participant in an 

individual contract has the ability to move prices. Certainly if 

someone is concentrated in one position, it can move the market in 

that direction. But that is how markets operate. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you think we should have prohibitions on excessive speculation the way the law—should we keep that prohibition? 

Mr. NEWSOME. I think in the case of NYMEX and the CFTC 

rules, we currently have rules to limit excessive speculation. 

Senator LEVIN. And is the reason for that rule that excessive 

speculation, more than just normal speculation, can cause large unreasonable or unwarranted price changes? 

Mr. NEWSOME. Yes. I think if someone is allowed to have a massive position without any kind of oversight, that adds strength to 

74

1See Exhibit 6 which appears in the Appendix on page 717. 

that position and that market, and definitely once they have that 

strength, then they can push other market participants around. 

Senator LEVIN. All right. Now, Mr. Sprecher, do you disagree 

with any of that? 

Mr. SPRECHER. No, I do not. I will make the footnote that I think 

speculation itself is a very important particular of a market, a 

functioning market. But anything in excess, whether it is speculation or hedging, is something that we all need to be aware of and 

make sure that we try to prohibit. 

Senator LEVIN. Now, as we have both talked about and you both 

have spoken about, NYMEX told Amaranth in August 2006 to reduce their position in NYMEX futures contracts to deliver natural 

gas in September. Amaranth at that time had 60,000 NYMEX September futures contracts, or 45 percent of the outstanding contracts 

for that month. 

In response to the NYMEX order, Amaranth reduced its holdings 

on NYMEX to 10,000 contracts but increased its ICE holdings, as 

Exhibit 6 shows,1 to about 80,000 September contracts for a grand 

total of 90,000 September contracts. 

Now, at NYMEX, was it your opinion that this was a necessary 

action on your part in order to either prevent excessive speculation 

or to overcome one or the other either? 

Mr. NEWSOME. Mr. Chairman, we were concerned that the size 

of their position could be very disruptive to our markets. We were 

concerned with that size and their ability to push markets in their 

direction. Therefore, we chose to ask them to start unwinding positions. 

Senator LEVIN. Now, would you both agree—and I will ask both 

of you this—that Amaranth’s ability to shift its position from 

NYMEX to ICE meant that Amaranth could still conduct largescale trading right up to the final settlement of the NYMEX contract? 

Mr. NEWSOME. Yes, sir. They have the ability to do so. 

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Sprecher. 

Mr. SPRECHER. Yes, and I actually think that it was an important function of the market, that when Amaranth was asked to liquidate a large position that has never been explained how it was 

allowed to be accumulated well above these accountability levels, 

shifted its position in the over-the-counter market and then orderly 

liquidated it, which I think ultimately was probably better for the 

market than a single-day liquidation on a single exchange. 

Senator LEVIN. I think it was both—it was ordered to be an orderly reduction, as I remember the NYMEX order. Is that correct? 

Mr. NEWSOME. That is correct. 

Senator LEVIN. Now, under the current rules, there was no prohibition on Amaranth’s shifting its position to ICE. Is that correct 

under the current rules? 

Mr. NEWSOME. That is correct. 

Senator LEVIN. Now, let me ask you, Dr. Newsome, was the 

CFTC informed in August that NYMEX was going to order Amaranth to reduce its position? 

75

Mr. NEWSOME. We recognized the situation, became uncomfortable with that; we took action with Amaranth, made the Commission aware of the action that we were taking. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. Did the CFTC support your determination that 

Amaranth should reduce its position? 

Mr. NEWSOME. The CFTC seemed very satisfied in the action 

that we were taking with regard to Amaranth and the reduction 

of positions. 

Senator LEVIN. Is ICE a competitor of yours, Dr. Newsome? 

Mr. NEWSOME. A very good competitors of ours, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LEVIN. Does that mean also a strong competitor? 

Mr. NEWSOME. Yes, absolutely. 

Senator LEVIN. Do you believe it should be subject to the same 

rules that you are? 

Mr. NEWSOME. I do so. 

Senator LEVIN. Why? 

Mr. NEWSOME. Because I think—a couple of reasons. I think the 

markets have changed very rapidly since the passage of the CFMA, 

and no one could have envisioned how rapidly the change would 

take place. 

What, in a nutshell, happened is that you had the ECMs, as stated in the document, and OTC markets have also at the same time 

become more standardized over time versus being individually negotiated as they traditionally have been. 

So I think the fact that you have got an exchange-type entity 

that is aggregating risk, aggregating positions thereby aggregating 

risk, versus that risk being spread among participants in a bilaterally negotiated marketplace, have led to changes that I think require oversight just because of the aggregation of risk and the opportunity for that risk to be systemic. 

Senator LEVIN. Now, let me ask you, Mr. Sprecher, did you know 

in August 2006 that Amaranth had been asked by NYMEX to reduce its position in the September futures contract? 

Mr. SPRECHER. We did not. 

Senator LEVIN. If you had known of the NYMEX order, would it 

have affected your actions in any way? 

Mr. SPRECHER. Most likely, frankly, not, because we, as you 

know, don’t have any legislative authority to take action to prevent 

people from—or to order people to liquidate on our platform. 

Senator LEVIN. Nor do you want it. 

Mr. SPRECHER. No, that is not——

Senator LEVIN. Do you want legislative authority? 

Mr. SPRECHER. I think there are things that we could do, yes, 

that would give us a better view. 

Senator LEVIN. Not just a better view, but would you want the 

same responsibility in terms of position limits and in terms of the 

accountability levels that NYMEX has? 

Mr. SPRECHER. Potentially, if we were given the commensurate 

ability to enforce those by doing the kinds of things that NYMEX 

does—ordering people to liquidate, taking action to fine people, to 

basically throw people off your exchange, which I do not have the 

ability to do right now. 

Senator LEVIN. So you would welcome that authority? 

76

Mr. SPRECHER. Yes, if Congress believes that we are the appropriate people to take it on. I think also one could argue that the 

CFTC could get a complete view of the market and take on those 

responsibilities in a manner further from what it is doing today. 

Senator LEVIN. So you do not have any objection to Congress giving you the same authority that NYMEX has? You have no objection to Congress telling CFTC to give you that same authority? 

Mr. SPRECHER. I don’t, if I could give one footnote. In saying 

that, we are against and I think it would be a mistake to say we 

should be a DCM, or designated contract market. And the reason 

is I don’t think retail customers should be trading these large commercial contracts. I don’t think that Congress should say these are 

the sources of price discovery. These are large markets. Today on 

ICE you have to have $100 million in assets to trade. I think bringing that other element into these markets would be a mistake. 

That being said, the core principles that govern DCMs and futures exchanges, which we operate in futures exchanges as well, I 

think could be adapted to the OTC markets. And we have proposed 

some legislation that your staff is aware of to try to bring it along, 

if you will, and serve this intermediary role between these dark 

pools and the regulated futures exchanges. 

Senator LEVIN. Well, let me be very clear. CFTC has told 

NYMEX that they are to take action to prevent excessive speculation and manipulation. Do you have any objection to NYMEX being 

authorized and directed by Congress to give you that same responsibility? 

Mr. SPRECHER. No. 

Senator LEVIN. Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just sort of stepping back historically, looking at Amaranth I 

presume the concerns that arose in August did not just crop up at 

that point in time. Did Amaranth have, by the way, preset accountability levels and position limits? 

Mr. NEWSOME. Yes. Everyone that trades on the exchange has 

accountability levels and limits. 

Senator COLEMAN. And do you know how many times Amaranth 

before August 2006, they exceeded the accountability limits and position limits? 

Mr. NEWSOME. No, I do not have the direct answer to that today, 

Senator, but I would be glad to——

Senator COLEMAN. But it would be fair to say that they had prior 

to August 2006 exceeded the accountability and position limits. 

Mr. NEWSOME. Correct. 

Senator COLEMAN. At the time then that you moved to have Amaranth limit its positions—and you said CFTC, they thought that 

was a positive move—do you have any doubt in your mind that 

Amaranth had the ability or were you aware that Amaranth was 

simply able to move over to maintain its positions with ICE? 

Mr. NEWSOME. Not only did we know that they had the ability 

to do so, they actually told us that they were going to do so when 

we were asking them to liquidate their positions. 

Senator COLEMAN. So what is your reaction to that? If you have 

a concern that they are overextended, you want them to limit their 

position, they are just going to move over, was there any reaction 

77

to that? Was there any call to anybody to say, ‘‘Hey, this does not 

make sense’’? 

Mr. NEWSOME. Well, we reached out to the CFTC to make them 

aware of the actions that we were taking, and we had no other opportunity or authority to do anything beyond that. 

Senator COLEMAN. What do you think the CFTC should have 

done, knowing that they simply are going to move over? You are 

issuing an order to—you have concerns, legitimate concerns. You 

give a directive to limit your positions. You now know that they are 

going to say, that is fine, we are just going across the street. What 

should CFTC have done at that time? 

Mr. NEWSOME. Well, I do not think that the CFTC currently has 

the authority to impose any position limits on ICE. So I think the 

CFTC became aware of it, and I think that is what has led us to 

this hearing today to talk about making the regulatory changes 

that would give CFTC that authority. 

Senator COLEMAN. Can we talk about playing it out then beyond 

ICE? I presume there are other markets out there; there are foreign markets out there. One of the concerns—I will touch on user 

fees in a second—is that if we take a certain action to shine the 

light on, we move from the NYMEX to ICE, there are other markets out there. Is there a concern that we are simply shifting, that 

we are not—let me back it up. Are we able to get our arms around 

this issue? Are we able to provide consumers and others with some 

sense of confidence that there really is transparency and accountability? Are we simply in a position where folks are going to shift 

over to another market? Mr. Newsome and then Mr. Sprecher. 

Mr. NEWSOME. I think certainly that could be a potential risk, 

but I think when we focus strictly on the natural gas market, 

which we are primarily talking about, in talking to major market 

participants they estimate that roughly 90 percent of the over-thecounter gas markets are now cleared. And in order to do that trading, today you come to ICE or you come to NYMEX. You have the 

opportunity to do either. 

First of all, there are no other energy exchanges that would even 

come close to the kind of volume and expertise at either ICE or 

NYMEX, none that have the opportunity to clear these over-thecounter trades. So I think while it is a risk, I think the likelihood 

of that happening is very low. 

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Sprecher. 

Mr. SPRECHER. I respectfully disagree. In fact, I think in the report there is actually an episode that is dialogued where Amaranth 

called directly one of the other major funds and sought to move 

that position directly between market participants. And it was only 

after they could not successfully find the market participant did 

they come to ICE. And I am not sure any of us here knows what 

other positions they may have taken in the marketplace because it 

is as a result largely because ICE has recordkeeping requirements 

that we can see what happened on ICE. But we really don’t know 

outside of ICE what happened. We have some anecdotal information as a result of somebody saving call records or other things. 

There are 75 execution venues other than ICE in North America. 

Many of these are public companies, multi-billion-dollar public 

companies, euphemistically called ‘‘voice brokers,’’ but generally 

78

using technology, not the telephone. And I think you have correctly 

pointed out we want to make sure if we move to more accountability, we move the entire marketplace and we do it in a method 

that will keep it in the United States and not move it offshore. 

Senator COLEMAN. And I want to get my arms around this. Mr. 

Sprecher, I am troubled by the fact that you have a regulatory 

agency that directs Amaranth to limit positions and that we know 

and they know that as they are saying that, literally they are moving to ICE——

Mr. SPRECHER. Right 

Senator COLEMAN [continuing]. In contravention of whatever the 

hopes, the desires were in terms of dealing with this regulatory 

issue. That troubles me greatly. 

Mr. SPRECHER. It does me, too, by the way. 

Senator COLEMAN. So the question is how do we get our arms 

around it. One of the other issues that has come to us was user 

fees, and, Mr. Newsome, you have expressed concern. I have talked 

to others who have expressed that concern. The question with user 

fees, I presume, is in this global market, financial markets that we 

have, that we drive people to other markets. We had a panel at the 

first hearing in which a number of professors said that we are not 

going to drive people to other markets, that they want the accountability, they want the transparency. And so my sense was that they 

would have concluded that user fees would not be problematic if 

they were being used for greater enforcement. 

Could you respond to that, both Mr. Sprecher and Dr. Newsome, 

on that issue, on the impact of user fees? Dr. Newsome. 

Mr. NEWSOME. I think the impact of user fees could be relatively 

widespread. Again, I think a lot of people miss the point that a 

user fee is already charged to customers trading futures contracts 

on designated contract markets, and those fees go to fund the National Futures Association, which does a fantastic job of recordkeeping, a lot of enforcement cases that the CFTC would have to 

do, would have to handle if it was not self-funded by the industry. 

So this would be a double tax that we would be asking the market 

users again to pay to fund increases in the CFTC. 

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Sprecher. 

Mr. SPRECHER. I probably differ with most of the people in my 

industry in that I don’t think it is such a bad idea. But I am sympathetic to the issue that is raised, which is how do you tax foreign 

entities. About half of ICE’s revenue comes from outside the United 

States in energy trading, and there is no question that increasingly 

these 500 hedge funds that you are talking about are not necessarily American funds. And we are seeing a large shift in energy 

trading moving to London, which seems to be the city of choice. 

And so the issue is do we create an unlevel playing field by charging some—just simply U.S. customers. If we could solve that issue, 

then I think it is a good idea. If you cannot solve that issue, then 

I think it is a bad idea. 

Senator COLEMAN. We faced the same issue, by the way, with 

IPOs, I think 25 being done in London markets. Again, I am trying 

to figure out where we go with this. There is a problem. I do not 

want to create a bigger problem in terms of what we do. 

79

Could you give us some direction as to how far can we go in ensuring greater transparency and accountability at the same time 

without moving markets overseas? 

Mr. SPRECHER. Sure. I think the one benefit we all have as the 

underpinning of these markets is that they work best when people 

have confidence in them, and confidence usually comes by having 

government oversight. So I do not believe that they necessarily will 

move just because there is more oversight. And as has been widely 

talked about here, ICE is now providing every trade electronically 

to the CFTC so that they can see what is going on in our markets. 

I think we could try to bring the rest of the markets into that 

venue, and I think the CFTC would have a unique view of what 

is going on in the market. 

I do think that, really largely as a result of ICE, there has been 

a greater interplay between the CFTC and the FSA in London for 

information sharing. It is not that the London regulators don’t have 

the same concern about transparent markets and what is going on 

under their jurisdiction. 

So I do think we can evolve to a regulatory umbrella of the major 

economic centers and bring more transparency and information 

sharing in. Then with a full view of things the CFTC sees the next 

Amaranth, I think they are really the uniquely positioned entity to 

have that view, which means de facto they need more staff, they 

need more funding. 

Frankly, ICE trades over 1,000 OTC swap markets. The CFTC 

right now is only looking at something like 960, 970 futures markets. Just bringing ICE into that purview will double the size of 

the view that they will have to have. So, clearly, they are going to 

need more funding. 

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Chairman, are we going to have a second 

round? 

Senator LEVIN. Of course. 

Senator COLEMAN. My time is up now, but I look forward to another round of questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. 

Well, first of all, I am delighted, Mr. Sprecher, that ICE is going 

to support Congress giving the CFTC the same authority to impose 

position limits on the ICE exchange in the same way that CFTC 

imposes them now on NYMEX. It comes as very good news, I believe, for consumers. I do not think ICE has ever taken that position before. I do not think NYMEX has ever heard ICE take that 

position before. But we are delighted to hear that. 

There was a distinction which was drawn by ICE until now, and 

maybe still is drawn, between a contract which is financially settled and a contract which is physically settled—the contracts on 

NYMEX being contracts which presumably are physically settled 

until they are mainly financially settled. As I understand it—and, 

Dr. Newsome, give us some statistics on this—the vast majority, 

perhaps—what percent?—99 percent of the contracts on NYMEX 

are financially settled, would you say? 

Mr. NEWSOME. Yes, 99.9 percent. 

Senator LEVIN. All right. So that there is a distinction without 

a difference. The other attributes are pretty much the same. And 

as you said, Dr. Newsome, they are functionally equivalent. 

80

I just wonder whether or not ICE has ever discussed with the 

CFTC what you have said here today. 

Mr. SPRECHER. Let me be clear in making my case to you. I believe that ICE and NYMEX can take more accountability and have 

accountability limits. I don’t think position limits for the swaps and 

derivatives market is a good idea because, really, position limits 

are in place to prevent squeezes of physical products—the old play 

that trades had years ago to try to squeeze a market going to delivery. There is no ability to do that on cash-settled markets, and as 

NYMEX in its own testimony says, on its cash-settled products it 

does not have position limits. 

But what it does have and what I do think would be valid is 

some accountability for large traders. And I think just as Dr. 

Newsome has pointed out the problem with him seeing the whole 

market, ICE will also not be able to see the whole market. And I 

think that has to be aggregated to a senior view of most likely the 

CFTC so that somebody can see the market. 

Senator LEVIN. Would you respond to that, Dr. Newsome, that 

distinction? 

Mr. NEWSOME. Well, I think it is very critical for someone—the 

CFTC being the appropriate entity—to see the entire marketplace. 

I am very confident in NYMEX’s ability to manage risk of what we 

can see, but, again, you can only manage what you can see. And 

there are a number of pieces of the pie, and the two pieces of the 

pie in which risk becomes aggregated are NYMEX and the Intercontinental Exchange. 

So I think to me it is common sense that somebody should be 

able to see what is going on in both of the markets so that we can 

manage potential systemic risk. 

Senator LEVIN. Would you comment on Mr. Sprecher’s distinction 

relative to the position limits between the two exchanges? 

Mr. NEWSOME. Well, we have hard limits on our physical contracts, and I want to make it clear that because we choose to trade 

the physical contracts, we know that there is a higher level of regulation that comes with that, because even though less than onetenth of 1 percent gets delivered upon, it is the threat of that physical delivery that we use as a tool to keep people honest in the marketplace. 

In the past, our financial contracts, the position limits were all 

aggregated into one, both the physical and the financial. We went 

to the CFTC last fall and asked them to allow us to disaggregate 

from hard position limits. So now we have the position accountability on our financial contracts, but the CFTC view was that it 

was very important for us to have that accountability because of 

the ability to see what was going on in our underlying physical contract. So they felt comfortable with the accountability because we 

could see the physical on our own market. 

Senator LEVIN. Is the accountability level what triggers your prohibition against excessive speculation and manipulation? Is that 

what triggers it, that specific mandate to you? 

Mr. NEWSOME. Well, either one can trigger what we consider to 

be excessive speculation. There is a bit more flexibility given to the 

exchange on accountability levels to determine when they develop 

81

discomfort and when they don’t. The hard limits are hard limits, 

and they are what they are. 

Senator LEVIN. But you go after excessive speculation or you are 

required to go after excessive speculation, at least in part because 

of those accountability levels. Is that correct? 

Mr. NEWSOME. Correct. 

Senator LEVIN. And you are willing to undertake that, Mr. 

Sprecher? 

Mr. SPRECHER. Yes. Let me just say, I am not sure—with great 

respect to Dr. Newsome, I am not sure the current system, however, is working. So to just replicate it does not sound like a good 

idea. 

Senator LEVIN. Well, whether the current system is working or 

whether it is going to be improved, you are willing to operate under 

that same system relative to accountability levels. 

Mr. SPRECHER. Certainly, and just let me point out——

Senator LEVIN. That is new. 

Mr. SPRECHER. Well, no, because what——

Senator LEVIN. You have not until now, have you? Are you bound 

by those accountability levels now? 

Mr. SPRECHER. The debate that has always been presented to us 

is should these OTC swaps markets become designated contract 

markets; in other words, contract markets where retail investors 

can trade and where the government has specifically said they are 

designated as the source of price discovery. I really don’t think 

these OTC markets, which are major dealers interchanging risk 

and hedging risk, is a place that we should say is the designated 

source of price discovery. Dr. Newsome’s market really is that market. It is the price of natural gas that we read about in the paper, 

that we have all come to rely on, and I don’t think that that should 

change, and that has been a consistent position. 

Senator LEVIN. And that your swaps ultimately rely upon, right? 

Mr. SPRECHER. They do. Absolutely. 

Senator LEVIN. All right. Let me get to the specific question. 

Right now, the NYMEX, as a result of its mandate from CFTC, 

must go after excessive speculation under one of two requirements. 

Do you have any problem being required by CFTC to go after excessive speculation? 

Mr. SPRECHER. No. 

Senator LEVIN. All right. That would be new. That kind of requirement would be new, would it not? 

Mr. SPRECHER. It would be new. 

Senator LEVIN. All right. 

Mr. SPRECHER. And what we are talking about, I think, is a common ground on how to bring these OTC markets into some accountability. 

Senator LEVIN. All right. That is not only new, it is important 

new. And I think we are making progress here. 

Mr. SPRECHER. It took an Amaranth. 

Senator LEVIN. It took a long investigation, and maybe Amaranth, in order to get to this point, but at least we are making 

some progress. And we will have CFTC in front of us in a few minutes, and I hope they are willing to accept the responsibility now 

to make recommendations for changes in law because they are long 

82

overdue and we have paid a real heavy price for the failure of our 

law to have this mandate of the CFTC upon ICE. 

There is a reference that you have made to the Enron loophole, 

and I want to just clarify that because we have a different definition of the ‘‘Enron loophole,’’ and let me state it for the record. 

How ICE defines the ‘‘Enron loophole’’ is one part of the Commodity Exchange Act that applied to Enron Online, a type of exchange called, as you put it, a ‘‘one-to-many’’ exchange, because all 

traders have to trade through one party—Enron—in the case of the 

Enron Online Exchange. And that is the way you define the ‘‘Enron 

loophole.’’

But we define it in a broader way, to include all of the provisions 

that others got included in the Commodity Futures Modernization 

Act to exempt energy and metals commodity trading from normal 

CFTC oversight. Those changes in the law created exemptions and 

exclusions that made it much tougher to police energy markets. 

And for this hearing, and for my opening statement, that is the 

way I used the Enron loophole, and I just want to get that out for 

the record, and I don’t think you would disagree that there is a difference of definition here. 

Mr. SPRECHER. I absolutely agree 

Senator LEVIN. Your definition is a narrower one than mine. 

Mr. SPRECHER. I agree. But we should for the record say that my 

understanding is Enron had absolutely no oversight by the CFTC; 

whereas ICE does and, in fact, pursuant to the ‘‘special calls,’’ is 

now actually providing daily records to the CFTC. 

Senator LEVIN. Records, but still no authority to direct. 

Mr. SPRECHER. Correct. 

Senator LEVIN. The way NYMEX has, not only the authority but 

the responsibility to direct in order to prevent excessive speculation 

and manipulation. 

As I understand the question of swaps, there are accountability 

levels for NYMEX swaps. Is that correct, Dr. Newsome? 

Mr. NEWSOME. That is correct for back month positions 

Senator LEVIN. And the accountability levels are triggers for your 

reviews, and if a trade exceeds the accountability, NYMEX could 

order that trader to reduce its position in that contract. Is that correct? 

Mr. NEWSOME. That is correct. 

Senator LEVIN. All right. And are the NYMEX natural gas swaps 

any different from the ICE natural gas swaps? 

Mr. NEWSOME. I think they are virtually the same. 

Senator LEVIN. All right. I think you have already answered this 

question functionally, but let me ask you again. In your written 

testimony, Dr. Newsome, you said that the NYMEX price of a futures contract and the price of a related ICE swap typically differ 

by perhaps a tenth of a cent. Is that correct? 

Mr. NEWSOME. Typically no more than that. 

Senator LEVIN. Now, that would be about one-hundredth of a 

percent of the price of a futures contract. Is that correct? 

Mr. NEWSOME. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEVIN. OK. I think, Mr. Sprecher, you have already indicated that the price of the NYMEX contract and the price of the 

ICE contract stay very close to each other. 

83

Mr. SPRECHER. They are definitely interrelated, yes. 

Senator LEVIN. And as a matter of fact, the NYMEX price, the 

final NYMEX price, is indeed part of your swaps contract. 

Mr. SPRECHER. Yes. In other words, they converge absolutely. 

Senator LEVIN. Right. Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. I just want to make sure that we all agree on 

what we have here. As I understand it, NYMEX does not have set 

position limits on its natural gas swaps. Is that correct? 

Mr. NEWSOME. We have position accountability on the back 

months. 

Senator COLEMAN. Accountability. 

Mr. NEWSOME. Yes. 

Senator COLEMAN. So there are not limits, but there are kind of 

triggers that you look at. 

Mr. NEWSOME. There are ranges that we set for market participants. Again, you have a bit more flexibility in the position accountability versus the hard position limits. But we have used that 

authority to talk to market participants and require an appropriate 

response. 

Senator COLEMAN. And, by the way, does ICE in that sense have 

a regulatory—do they have a competitive advantage in having less 

regulatory costs? 

Mr. NEWSOME. Well, I would certainly say yes. 

Senator COLEMAN. What do you spend on regulation? 

Mr. NEWSOME. In our Compliance Department, we spend over $6 

million a year just on our direct costs at the exchange. 

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Sprecher. 

Mr. SPRECHER. In that area of our business, we have much lower 

costs, although we do have a ‘‘know your customer’’ kind of responsibility in the OTC markets. 

Senator COLEMAN. But trading ahead and market oversight are 

two different things. You have a market oversight responsibility, 

Dr. Newsome. Is that correct? Tied to working with CFTC. 

Mr. NEWSOME. Correct 

Senator COLEMAN. So I understand, in response to the Chairman’s questions, ICE then is receptive or open to what I would call 

‘‘market oversight.’’ Is that correct, Mr. Sprecher? 

Mr. SPRECHER. Yes. And I also, though, want to follow on with 

a line that has been consistent in your conversation, and that is, 

I don’t think it should end at ICE. I think we really should try to 

bring the entire over-the-counter market into an accountability 

standard, because in a way we are pushing mercury around the 

table. If they come off of NYMEX onto ICE and off of ICE, where 

do they go next? I am not sure we have solved the problem. And 

because ICE has been a successful company, and a public company 

as well, sometimes we are viewed as a euphemism for the OTC 

market. We are just one part of the market. 

Senator COLEMAN. And having somebody have that big picture—

we will talk to the CFTC about that, but somebody needs to have 

the big picture; otherwise, we will be pushing mercury around. Dr. 

Newsome, do you agree with that? 

Mr. NEWSOME. I agree completely with that. 

Senator COLEMAN. And just so I understand, position limits, accountability limits, NYMEX right now, your natural gas futures, 

84

futures contracts, those are physically settled. Do they have a different standard in your natural gas swaps? 

Mr. NEWSOME. Yes. Until the fall, it was all aggregated into hard 

limits. 

Senator COLEMAN. I understand. But the point is that with your 

futures, you have got hard limits. 

Mr. NEWSOME. Right. 

Senator COLEMAN. With your swaps, you have got triggers. 

Mr. NEWSOME. We have accountability in the back months. 

Senator COLEMAN. Is there a reason why they should not be the 

same? 

Mr. NEWSOME. I think that all financial contracts should have 

position accountability at least in the back months. 

Senator COLEMAN. Again, my concern as I sit here is I want to 

make sure that accountability does not result—first of all, that it 

has impact, that we have a big picture, and we are not simply 

pushing mercury around somewhere else. That is clearly a concern 

that I have. But the idea that—I mean, it is clear that, economically speaking, the physically settled, the futures, and the swaps 

are essentially the same economically. Mr. Sprecher, do you agree 

with that? 

Mr. SPRECHER. The swaps settle on the final settlement price of 

NYMEX so they absolutely converge. But there is a distinct difference, and that is, if you hold the physical contract, ultimately 

you end up with natural gas. If you hold a swap contract, ultimately you end up with the final settlement price. 

Senator COLEMAN. But 99.5 percent of those contracts are supposed to physically settle or financially settle, so maybe the word 

‘‘functionally equivalent’’? 

Mr. SPRECHER. They are, but I want to be clear, they are used 

differently. The swaps are used by the very people I think we are 

trying to protect, which are hedgers who want to make sure that 

they hedge the exposure to the NYMEX price, and they want the 

final settlement price, and they cannot get that at NYMEX because, by default, you must trade out of the contract at least a 

minute or two before it finally settles; otherwise, you end up with 

natural gas. 

So the hedgers use the swaps. The people that are actually discovering the price of natural gas use NYMEX’s physical. 

Senator COLEMAN. Let me just ask, so I understand where we 

are at today as we look to the future. Under current law, what responsibility does ICE have to monitor traders’ energy positions and 

to ensure that they are not excessive? 

Mr. SPRECHER. We have sort of a broad anti-fraud, anti-manipulation responsibility, which generally is passing on to the CFTC 

things that we may see, not because of specific oversight but just 

in the general course of things, and also more often the comments 

we get back from the marketplace, so we are more of a conduit for 

information that then gets passed up. But because we don’t have 

any specific remedy capability, all we can do is pass that up to the 

CFTC. 

Senator COLEMAN. And if we can just look back to Amaranth and 

look back at what happened and try to look to the future so it does 

85

not happen again, what changes then in terms of remedy capability 

do you think ICE should have and who should give it to you? 

Mr. SPRECHER. Well, I think today, as we sit here, the CFTC 

would have a pretty good view of ICE and NYMEX, and my hope 

would be we could bring others into that. And, it may well be because a company may be, let’s say, long 10,000 contracts on 

NYMEX, short 10,000 contracts on ICE, and technically be flat or 

have no position, in which case neither Dr. Newsome would see 

that nor would we see that. 

So I think it would be up—the CFTC would have to help us have 

the view, and then one of the two of us, and maybe our other colleagues in the OTC market could ask for those positions to be 

brought down. 

Senator COLEMAN. The last line of questioning. ‘‘Excessive speculation’’—we use that phrase a lot in our analysis, in our view. We 

found substantial disagreement in the definition of ‘‘excessive speculation.’’ There are those who looked at Amaranth and said that 

was not excessive speculation. I think the Amaranth trader may 

have testified to that. 

To both witnesses, Dr. Newsome and Mr. Sprecher, I will put all 

the questions together. Can you define ‘‘excessive speculation’’? 

Should Congress define it, or should the CFTC define it? Dr. 

Newsome. 

Mr. NEWSOME. I think it is very difficult to define because it depends on the market that is being traded, and markets that are 

very liquid and deep and have multiple positions across months, it 

is just extremely hard to get a handle on. 

I think one of the lessons that we learned from the Amaranth 

scenario was we—and the CFTC, I think, for the most part as 

well—concentrated on the front months because that was the price 

discovery component that everyone relies upon. We wanted to make 

sure that that was not disrupted. 

We did not concentrate as much on the back months, and I think 

the lesson we learned from Amaranth was, as entities start building up these much larger positions in the back months, we have 

already taken corrective steps to look at flexibility limits. We have 

already started reaching out to customers to ask them to decrease 

positions because of the importance of the back months as well. 

But when you start looking at speculation and limits, whether 

they are short one month, long another month, it is not just the 

fact that they have a position; it is what that position is that 

makes it very difficult to just, I think, draw a one-liner about what 

is excessive in terms of speculation. 

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Sprecher, could you take a shot at it? 

Mr. SPRECHER. I certainly can’t define it. Without putting words 

in your mouth, I suspect you would have difficulty defining it. I 

think by default it is going to have to be the CFTC. 

The CFTC has in the past, for example, said that if a company 

has 25 percent of the contracts in a market, that is an alarm bell 

for them. We know from this report that Amaranth had 40 percent, 

even 60 percent of the contracts in a market. So I think that just 

seems like a big amount going into delivery of a contract. So 

whether 25 percent is the right number or something around 

that—we certainly, I think, could probably all agree that having 60 

86

percent of the open contracts in a delivered contract is potentially 

a problem. 

Senator COLEMAN. I would hope that the industry—I would hope 

that the CFTC would move forward in this area. If Congress defines it, you are probably not going to be happy with the way we 

define it. We tend to operate with lead gloves when surgical gloves 

are needed to—again, understand to keep markets vibrant, which 

was, I think, mentioned just briefly in the opening statement. The 

consumer benefits from the ability to speculate, from the ability to 

hedge. The consumer benefits from liquidity in the market. The 

consumer benefits from speculation. It is not just a gambler’s game 

and for Wall Street bigwigs to make money. The consumer benefits 

if the markets function. But if they do not function, then we get 

concerned. And so I would hope that we would get a little help on 

that issue, which I know is a difficult one. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, and I think we probably would all 

agree—and I want to make sure Senator Coleman would agree 

with us because I would not want to suggest anything that he does 

not—give his last statement. But if there is excessive speculation, 

the consumer gets socked. Would you agree with that? Or could get 

socked. 

Mr. NEWSOME. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. And that if there is manipulation, the consumer 

gets socked. 

Mr. NEWSOME. Absolutely. 

Senator LEVIN. And that is why you folks are given a responsibility to oversee the market to prevent excessive speculation and 

manipulation. Is that fair? 

Mr. NEWSOME. That is fair. 

Senator LEVIN. And that you, Mr. Sprecher, are willing to support that change to give you that same responsibility? 

Mr. SPRECHER. Yes. 

Senator LEVIN. I think that is very helpful. And I agree, by the 

way, with Senator Coleman, that we want folks to be able to hedge; 

we want folks to be able to speculate; we want liquidity. It is the 

excessive speculation and manipulation which our law is intended 

to stop and which that loophole allowed. And that is why I think 

now there is a growing—will be a growing momentum coming out 

of today’s hearing. Hopefully, CFTC, who is here today, will join 

the momentum, but we will find out in a couple of minutes. 

In any event, one question, and this follows up on something 

Senator Coleman also said, and that is the unintended consequences. Is the way that we could make sure there are no unintended consequences and we are not pushing mercury around to at 

least cover the organized electronic markets in any over-thecounter coverage? Would that be a way to describe it, organized 

markets or electronic markets which are organized? You do not 

want to get to the bilateral one-on-one conversation, right? No one 

is trying to get to that. 

Mr. SPRECHER. Well, I think that your report shows that the first 

thing that Amaranth tried to do was a bilateral one-on-one deal to 

get out from underneath these. So I am not so sure we shouldn’t 

try to bring that in. It may be slightly different——

87

Senator LEVIN. Of a certain size. 

Mr. SPRECHER. Of a certain size or certain—I mean, just because 

these people are voice brokers doesn’t mean they don’t know what 

the position is. For crying out loud, they invoice the market participant for putting that trade together. 

Senator LEVIN. Will you folks, both of you, be willing to submit 

suggestions as to how we could define that for possible legislation? 

Are you willing to do that, Dr. Newsome? 

Mr. NEWSOME. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LEVIN. Would you do that, Mr. Sprecher? 

Mr. SPRECHER. Sure, absolutely. 

Mr. NEWSOME. And I think if I could just follow up on that, I 

talked about the aggregation of risk earlier and how these markets 

are linked, and the reality is that the same customers that trade 

ICE trade NYMEX. They trade the positions for predominantly the 

same reason. But when you get the aggregation of risk—and then 

the CFTC has already spent quite a bit of time looking at when a 

market starts to serve a price discovery function, that should be a 

trigger as well for transparency and openness as to the positions 

in that market. 

So I think some work has been done, Mr. Chairman, and we will 

be more than happy to assist. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you both. We appreciate it. 

We will now move to our second panel. Let me now welcome our 

second and final panel of witnesses for this afternoon’s hearing 

from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC. We are 

pleased to have the CFTC’s Acting Chairman, Walter Lukken, and 

one of the CFTC’s Commissioners, Michael Dunn. 

Gentlemen, we are pleased to have you with us this afternoon. 

We welcome you to the Subcommittee. We again appreciate the cooperation of you and your Commission. You have heard the rule. 

I think you were both here before, so you know what the rules are 

of the Subcommittee, and I would like to at this point ask you both 

to stand and raise your right hand. Do you swear that the testimony you are about to give before this Subcommittee will be the 

truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, 

God? 

Mr. LUKKEN. I do. 

Mr. DUNN. I do. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. We will follow the same rule for timing. One minute before the red lights comes on, then you will see 

a yellow light, and that will give you an opportunity to complete 

your remarks. As I said before, we will print your entire testimony 

in the record, and we ask that you limit your testimony to no more 

than 10 minutes. 

Mr. Lukken, why don’t you go first. 

88

1The joint prepared statement of Mr. Lukken and Mr. Dunn appears in the Appendix on page 

178. 

TESTIMONY OF WALTER LUKKEN,1 ACTING CHAIRMAN, AND 

MICHAEL DUNN, COMMISSIONER, COMMODITY FUTURES 

TRADING COMMISSION (CFTC) 

Mr. LUKKEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Coleman. Commissioner Dunn and I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with 

you the CFTC, our role with respect to the energy markets, and 

your report’s conclusions. 

Under the Commodity Exchange Act, the concept of ‘‘excessive 

speculation’’ is based on trading that results in ‘‘sudden or unreasonable fluctuations or unwarranted changes in the price’’ of commodity futures. This language has provided helpful guidance for 

the agency in protecting the price discovery process. There is a distinction, however, between excessive speculation and manipulation. 

Manipulation of market prices is a clear and undeniable threat to 

the integrity of the marketplace and to the fundamental purposes 

of futures markets, risk management, and price discovery. 

A longstanding body of law defines the parameters of futures 

market manipulation. Excessive speculation, on the other hand, is 

a more fluid concept which Congress has enabled the Commission 

and the exchanges to address by adopting rules or regulations establishing position limits or position accountability levels. 

Futures markets require both speculators and hedgers. Speculators provide the market liquidity to allow hedgers to manage various commercial risks. Placing limitations on the amount of speculation that an individual or entity may engage in necessarily limits 

the amount of liquidity in the marketplace and may limit the ability for hedgers to manage their risks, as well as the flow of information into the marketplace. This in turn could negatively affect 

the price discovery process and the hedging function of the marketplace. 

The Commodity Exchange Act provides that the Commission has 

exclusive jurisdiction with respect to commodity futures and options trading on designated contract markets, also known as 

DCMs, which can list for trading any type of contract and are open 

to all types of traders, including retail participants. DCMs are selfregulatory organizations subject to comprehensive oversight by the 

CFTC. 

In the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Congress 

included a provision permitting a new type of trading facility 

known as an exempt commercial market, or ECM, on which exempt 

commodities such as energy products may be traded. Only eligible 

commercial entities, generally institutional traders, may trade on 

ECMs, ensuring that these markets are open only to sophisticated 

parties that understand the risks associated with them. 

ECMs, as well as transactions executed on them, are statutorily 

exempt from most provisions of the act. The Commission does retain fraud and manipulation authority over ECMs. 

ECMs are subject to certain limited reporting requirements. In 

addition, ECMs must maintain for 5 years and make available for 

inspection upon request by the Commission certain records, including audit trail information sufficient to enable the Commission to 

89

reconstruct trading activity. The Commission also has the authority to issue what is known as a ‘‘special call’’ for any information 

from an ECM the Commission may deem appropriate. 

Due in part to the lessons learned from the fall of Amaranth, the 

CFTC has been utilizing its special call authority to receive daily 

trader position information from ICE. This information helps us to 

get a more comprehensive picture of the marketplace and, given 

the similarities of ICE’s natural gas contracts to those traded on 

NYMEX, assists us in overseeing the energy trading activities on 

that exchange. 

Despite the difference in regulatory authorities over DCMs and 

ECMs, the Commission is aware that when markets trade similar 

products or products that can be arbitraged, information regarding 

activity in one market tends to be incorporated into the other. This 

is almost certainly the case when large numbers of traders operate 

in both markets, as is the case with NYMEX and ICE. This growing linkage of the markets along with the PSI’s report on Amaranth is the basis for our regulatory discussion today. 

After Amaranth’s collapse, the CFTC’s Office of the Chief Economist analyzed the situation using statistical evidence, including 

data obtained from ICE. Amaranth has positioned itself to profit on 

a spread position between the prices of natural gas contracts expiring in the winter and the natural gas contracts expiring in nonwinter months. Such a strategy would have been profitable if the 

prices for winter delivery futures contracts had risen relative to 

prices for non-winter delivery contracts. 

Amaranth began significantly ramping up this spread position in 

the spring of 2006. As the spread price began to fall during the last 

week of August 2006 through September, Amaranth’s losses 

mounted. The unusually large spread price began to appear around 

the time of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. As the PSI report points 

out, this was the largest March/April spread ever observed. However, Amaranth did not begin accumulating its large position in 

this spread until the spring of 2006. In other words, the March/

April spread was at a historically high level for many months before Amaranth began accumulating its large position. 

The chief economist’s analysis of Amaranth’s trading data failed 

to conclude that Amaranth’s trading was responsible for the spread 

price level observed during 2006. The study found that changes in 

Amaranth’s positions influenced market prices, and at the same 

time changes in market prices influenced Amaranth’s positions. If 

Amaranth were dominating markets, our economist would have expected these tests to have shown one-way causality where changes 

in Amaranth’s positions would have influenced the market prices, 

but market prices would not have influenced Amaranth’s positions. 

However, the study showed that Amaranth and the market appeared to have been reacting with each other reciprocally. 

In the analysis, these changes in spread prices were consistent 

with market fundamentals at the time. Amaranth established a 

large spread position that could have only been profitable if the unusually high spread price had become even more unusually high. 

Such a profitable scenario would have occurred if winter natural 

gas supplies had been disrupted by, for example, an active hurricane season in the Gulf of Mexico. In fact, the Gulf hurricane seaVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:27 Jan 25, 2008 Jkt 036616 PO 00000 Frm 00097 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\36616.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
90

son proved to be less active than predicted, and instead of a widening price relationship, the price difference narrowed considerably, resulting in significant trading losses to Amaranth. 

There are more details about Amaranth in our written statement, but I would like to note that the Commission was aware of 

Amaranth’s on-exchange activities in the months leading up to September through our regular financial and market oversight surveillance, and that Amaranth’s account at its clearing broker was fully 

margined at all times. 

The Commission does not pick winners and losers in the futures 

markets, but does work diligently, and did so in the case of Amaranth, to ensure market integrity and the protection of the price 

discovery process. 

The futures markets have changed dramatically since the passage of the CFMA in 2000 and the creation of the exempt commercial markets. Congress established these institutional markets 

while calibrating the amount of oversight to the risks associated 

with them. However, as the Subcommittee’s staff report lays out, 

the regulated futures markets and exempt commercial markets 

have become increasingly linked, and as a result, the public risks 

associated with these markets have changed. The CFTC has recognized this and has exercised its existing statutory authorities in 

order to keep pace with this industry growth. I mentioned earlier 

our special call for ICE trader information. More recently, the 

CFTC has proposed an amendment to clarify that our existing regulations require large traders on regulated DCMs to keep information relating to all of its positions in a commodity, including OTC 

trading information, and to provide that information to the Commission upon request. 

However, the Commission is nearing the outer limits of its authority and it is appropriate to have this open dialogue with Congress and our fellow regulators about what other tools may be 

needed to adequately oversee this marketplace and ensure fair 

competition and integrity. 

In closing, we appreciate the Subcommittee’s inquiries into this 

complex and important area. The Subcommittee staff report looks 

at a number of issues related to the CFTC and makes recommendations and conclusions that warrant further debate, which 

we look forward to discussing with you today. 

Thank you very much. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much, Chairman Lukken. I understand that statement represents the views of both of you. Is 

that the note I was given? Or, Mr. Dunn, would you like to give 

your own statement? You are free to proceed either way. 

Mr. DUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to both 

associate myself and disassociate myself with my colleague at certain times. But at this particular time, I do associate with both the 

written and oral statement. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, and thank you both. 

Do you agree with our report that the prices on one of the two 

exchanges in front of us today affects the prices on the other? 

Mr. LUKKEN. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LEVIN. Why don’t we do this: If you differ with a statement, if you want to interrupt at any time, feel free to do so. 

91

1The chart referred to appears in the Appendix on page 190. 

Mr. DUNN. I may never get to speak. [Laughter.] 

Senator LEVIN. We will call on you at the end, then, to clean up 

all of the comments you want to correct or make reference to. 

The key law here which is being discussed is the Commodity Exchange Act, which directs you folks to limit trading to prevent excessive speculation, and I want to ask you: Do you have any problem with that mandate? Congress has told you this. You are supposed to be stopping excessive speculation. Do you have any difficulty in enforcing that law? 

Mr. LUKKEN. Absolutely not. I think as you have noted, excessive 

speculation, that leads to unwarranted price fluctuations and unreasonable price fluctuations. So I think that modification of that 

term is important because it talks about how excessive speculation 

leads to potential manipulation and artificial prices in the market. 

That is really where we have focused on our attention. In the expiration month of these contracts where we have seen in the past experience of corners and squeezes in these physically delivered products, that is how we have interpreted that provision of our act. 

Senator LEVIN. Now, the NYMEX has adopted position accountability levels in order to avoid excessive speculation. That is one of 

the methods that has been used. They have also adopted position 

limits. 

Does it make sense to you that when they order a speculator or 

trader to reduce its holding in order to avoid excessive speculation, 

that speculator can just move to an unregulated exchange and do 

the same thing? Does that make sense to you? 

Mr. LUKKEN. I think when we looked at the situation, our mandate is to protect the benchmark, which, as your last hearing pointed out very effectively, is utilized by utilities, public utilities and 

others. That benchmark is NYMEX. They are the primary price 

discovery market that we try to protect. And certainly we do that 

through position limits, through surveillance, through our other authorities in that area. However, when these speculators, as you 

have noted through this chart,1 have moved to ICE, even though 

these prices are interrelated, we still believe—I personally believe 

that we are still protecting the primary price discovery mechanism 

in NYMEX by putting position limits on those areas. 

Now, we did recognize, as you have noted that——

Senator LEVIN. By putting position limits at NYMEX. 

Mr. LUKKEN. Correct 

Senator LEVIN. But there is no position limits at ICE. 

Mr. LUKKEN. There is no position limits at ICE. 

Senator LEVIN. OK. And there is no accountability levels at ICE. 

Mr. LUKKEN. That is correct. 

Senator LEVIN. So nothing is triggered at ICE, so all they do is 

run over to ICE and engage in the very trades which your agent, 

NYMEX, said they could not do anymore at NYMEX, and you just 

acknowledged again that the price that is set—or the price that is 

achieved at ICE affects the NYMEX price, right? They are interrelated. 

Mr. LUKKEN. They are interrelated, correct. 

92

Senator LEVIN. So then let me ask you again. Is there any way 

that CFTC should not be supportive of a rule which avoids the circumvention of the NYMEX order? 

Mr. LUKKEN. Well, I think, like I said, it has been our position 

that through the physical delivery of contract, the primary contract 

that is being utilized on ICE—or on NYMEX, excuse me, is protected by these position limits. Now, we have noted that there is 

interrelationship between these markets, and now we receive daily 

trading information to provide the transparency that your report 

talks about that is needed in these markets. Since that transparency has been provided to this marketplace, we have not seen 

shifting between regulated markets and unregulated markets, according to our surveillance staff. 

So I think for the time being, we seem to be——

Senator LEVIN. Do you want to wait until that happens? 

Mr. LUKKEN. Well, we are monitoring it right now and——

Senator LEVIN. And then what happens when you see it? 

Mr. LUKKEN. Well, as noted, we do have full manipulation authority——

Senator LEVIN. No. I am talking about excessive speculation. 

Mr. LUKKEN. Correct, but excessive speculation that leads to unwarranted price fluctuations that really is getting at manipulation 

in these markets. So we are not limited in any way in our manipulation authority and can bring any type of enforcement action 

against participants in these markets that may be trying to manipulate through moving positions around. 

Senator LEVIN. Let us go back to excessive speculation. You keep 

going to manipulation. I keep talking about excessive speculation, 

so let’s talk about excessive speculation. Your agent, NYMEX, entered an order, OK? Amaranth evaded that order by going on to 

ICE. 

Mr. LUKKEN. Correct. 

Senator LEVIN. It did so on an exchange which had an effect on 

the NYMEX price, and you agree to that. 

Mr. LUKKEN. Correct. 

Senator LEVIN. I am going to ask you again. By taking the position you have, which apparently is either neutral or non-involved 

or—well, I will leave it at that. Aren’t you, in effect, putting your 

stamp of approval on the circumvention of the NYMEX order, your 

agent’s order? 

Mr. LUKKEN. Well, as I mentioned, I think that the positions that 

were on ICE, because we are trying to protect the benchmark, 

which is NYMEX, that was effective, the position limits on that 

contract. The ICE contracts, really the Amaranth positions that 

were put forward, were outer-month contracts. They weren’t the 

nearby contracts that we were trying to protect, and that is one of 

the lessons that NYMEX had mentioned, is we need to start looking at some of these outer-month contracts as well, and we have 

started to do that. We have the software and resources now to try 

to do that. 

Senator LEVIN. If you look at them and there is no authority to 

do anything about it, all you are doing is coming in after the fact 

and trying to find somebody after the damage has been done. Why 

not prevent it? You have told NYMEX, we have told you to tell 

93

NYMEX, ‘‘Prevent it.’’ Why should we not tell you to tell ICE to 

prevent it in order to sustain the NYMEX order? Why should you 

resist that? You seem to be resisting something, and I do not know 

why. You keep changing the subject when I talk about excessive 

speculation. You change it to manipulation. I am trying to find out 

why there is resistance on CFTC from supporting the NYMEX 

order that there be a reduction in the holdings by somebody—Amaranth—in order to avoid excessive speculation. Why are you resisting it or appear to be resisting it? 

Mr. LUKKEN. I am not resisting it. What I am trying to say is 

that the hard limits, the position limits that typically are put on 

physically delivered contracts, such as the NYMEX position, are effective at ensuring that the futures and cash prices converge so 

that those prices function correctly, as they should. 

ICE links itself to that benchmark. They in some ways freeload 

off of that price discovery mechanism. So by doing so, we are not 

as concerned with that influence and those prices because we are 

really concentrating on the physical delivered contract that is happening in ICE. 

Senator LEVIN. Which occurs in one-hundredth of 1 percent of 

the time. You are concerned about a delivery that occurs almost 

never and seem not to be concerned when your agent, NYMEX, 

issues an order based on accountability levels. It was not a position 

limit. It was based on an accountability level which triggered an 

order. And if an order means something, and if we are going to protect the consuming public—I am not worried about, frankly, protecting the hedge fund or the speculator one darn bit. I am very 

much concerned about protecting the public that is affected by the 

prices which are impacted by that excessive speculation. They are 

impacted by it. They have to have a stable price. They have got to 

figure out what is it going to cost for winter gas because they are 

running an institution or they are running a utility, so they want 

a hedge. And it is a legitimate thing. They are the user, they are 

the consumer. They are not the speculator. 

So I am trying to figure out—again, you talk about position limits; I talk about accountability levels which trigger an order. And 

I want to find out why the CFTC, if you speak for the CFTC, seems 

to be resisting something which even ICE accepts, at least as of 

today. Try me again. 

Mr. LUKKEN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do not want to come over like 

I am being resistant to this idea. What I am trying to say is after 

the Amaranth situation, we decided that these markets were 

linked, as you had noted. We started to get more information, more 

transparency in these markets, and to date that seems to have 

been effective in these markets. 

I think obviously, as a Commission, we have to adapt as these 

markets evolved and as these markets evolve. And certainly Commissioner Dunn and I want to try to address these, and certainly, 

as was noted by the prior panel, even on regulated exchanges, 

there is some uncertainty on what is the most effective manner in 

order to prevent either manipulation or excessive speculation that 

leads to unwarranted prices. 

So I think this is something we need to be open to. I certainly 

think as a Commission we should discuss these ideas. But what I 

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am trying to tell you today is that we have changed our practices 

to address this type of situation, that it has been effective, and that 

I think that we have the authority to address these things in the 

future. 

Senator LEVIN. You say it has been effective, but a disaster has 

not come yet. You are going to wait for another disaster to give authority and direction to the market, which has these huge speculators in it—ICE. 

Mr. LUKKEN. Sure. 

Senator LEVIN. You are going to wait for the disaster, but you 

are not going to prevent the disaster because you are not willing, 

apparently, to tell ICE what you have told NYMEX: Prevent excessive speculation. Don’t just clean up the act after the damage is 

done. Prevent it. 

And so the way NYMEX has prevented it, your agent, is they 

have adopted an accountability level which triggers an action on 

their part. And then that action is subverted by the inability of ICE 

to take action to do exactly the same thing. ICE is willing, as of 

today, to be given the responsibility to stop that subversion and to 

protect the consumer. And yet you want to talk about openness and 

transparency. That is fine. That gets you halfway there. That gets 

you the information. But unless ICE does something about it and 

can do something about it to stop excessive speculation, you are not 

preventing the next Titanic, the next Amaranth. 

Mr. LUKKEN. Right. And I think it is important to note, too, that 

even though we are discussing ICE, a lot of this occurred also on 

NYMEX, which does have these accountability levels, that they 

were exceeded several times, as they noted in the prior panel. So 

there is diligence that has to be on both fronts here, and we look 

forward to talking about these issues and determining how to best 

approach accountability levels, position levels, on both regulated 

and non-regulated exchanges. And hopefully I could talk to—someday we might have a few more—you mentioned Mr. Dunn is one 

of our Commissioners. He is our only Commissioner at the time. 

Hopefully we might have a few more Commissioners that we could 

talk about this, because obviously diversity of views is important 

as a Commission, as it is in the Senate, and also I want to mention 

my regulatory colleagues who are part of the President’s working 

group. They have views on this. These decisions will affect some of 

their markets as well. So I think it is important that we talk. 

As Senator Coleman had mentioned, there may be consequences 

to doing some of these actions. As you squeeze the balloon, where 

does it go? I think these are all important things to talk about. I 

don’t want to sound resistant to ideas. I am open to all these ideas. 

But I am trying to say is that as of today, this seems to have 

stopped the activity that your report points out. And if more is 

needed, then we are open to those ideas. 

Mr. DUNN. Mr. Chairman, if I may? 

Senator LEVIN. Please. 

Mr. DUNN. This is one of the times I would like to disassociate 

myself a bit from my colleague. I am very concerned when on the 

first panel the first day of these hearings, I read with a great deal 

of interest of what those LDCs and others had to say. The primary 

function for me of the futures and options market is to provide for 

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risk mitigation and price discovery. Very clearly, those people that 

testified before you thought that did not happen, and the reason 

they thought it did not happen is because they thought there was 

excessive speculation as you point out in your study. 

I gave a speech back on September 8, 2006 in which I said I 

wished that the Commission would do that type of study. But at 

the end of that, I said I don’t really know if we would be in a position to pick among different economic uses of particular futures 

contracts, decide what should be discouraged, and what should not 

be discouraged. 

But very clearly, there is a problem here based upon testimony 

that this Subcommittee has already seen, and that calls for us to 

take some type of action, and you have had a great deal of discussion between spec limits and the accountability level. Clearly, spec 

limits are hard and fast. It is something that the exchanges put together and say here is where you have got to go. They run it by 

us for our concurrence on this. 

That doesn’t happen with accountability levels. That is something that is more dynamic. It is an ongoing thing. We are not told 

when those accountability levels change out there, and that is because it is dynamic, and what happens is an exchange will call in 

that particular trader and say, ‘‘What is your game plan? What are 

you trying to accomplish here?’’ And then they have to consider as 

an SRO that what that individual is doing and whether or not it’s 

going to have an impact in the marketplace. 

I think your study points out that there were spikes in this market that took place that had an impact, especially on those other 

people that were using this market for risk mitigation, and the result of that alone should say we ought to take some type of action 

to make sure this doesn’t happen in the future. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much. Senator Coleman. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. I have been pretty consistent 

about raising the issue of assessing the unintended consequences 

of extending CFTC regulation to electronic over-the-counter exchanges like ICE, because I think it is important that we have to—

let’s understand the impact of what we do. 

Having said that, what is troubling, Mr. Lukken, from your testimony is when you talk about protecting the benchmark and feeling 

that you accomplished that when NYMEX told Amaranth that they 

have got to lessen their position, you do not seem at all troubled 

that Amaranth’s response to that was to essentially disregard it by 

simply moving to another market. 

So NYMEX says lessen; they do not lessen at all. They simply 

move from physical to swap; they move from regulated to unregulated, which clearly the economic distinctions are little—at least at 

that time. And so my concern is, as we move forward, that I want 

to make sure that the CFTC has a concern about if directives are 

given in one market that their folks can simply move somewhere 

else. And you do not seem troubled by that because ‘‘the benchmark is protected.’’ I find that very troubling. 

Mr. LUKKEN. Let me clarify what I meant, and I apologize if I 

came across as not caring that these positions may be moving. 

We have, as I noted, adopted these positions—or this large-trader-like information that we are now receiving from ICE. My suggesVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:27 Jan 25, 2008 Jkt 036616 PO 00000 Frm 00103 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 P:\DOCS\36616.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PAT
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tion would be that when we see these types of movements, our surveillance staff in essence call these folks up and say, Well, why are 

you doing this? You were once on ICE—or NYMEX trading these 

positions. Now you are on ICE with the same speculative behavior. 

Why are you doing this? We have enforcement authorities that we 

can take against you. Do you have economic justification for doing 

this? 

That sort of deterrence I think would be very effective. Again, we 

may not have every regulatory tool in the toolbox, but we have a 

big hammer with our manipulation authority that we can send subpoenas, we can bring these people into court, if we find that their 

activities are problematic. 

So it is not that we are ignoring this information now. We see 

it. It is transparent, and we can take action with our enforcement 

authorities to go after this type of behavior. 

Senator COLEMAN. So if NYMEX has accountability limits, if 

NYMEX allowed Amaranth to trade above its own established accountability limits, does it make sense for ICE to adopt the same 

accountability limits? I am trying to figure out where we go with—

and, again, understanding that at a certain point someone has got 

to have the big picture. And you are the folks with the big picture. 

Mr. LUKKEN. Right. 

Senator COLEMAN. But you have got to be willing to use the authority. You have to be willing to say if there is a problem, we are 

going to deal with it, rather than simply saying we have protected 

a benchmark and anything beyond that does not seem to be our 

concern. You have clarified that somewhat. 

Mr. LUKKEN. Yes. 

Senator COLEMAN. But should NYMEX have the same accountability limits for its natural gas futures contracts and natural gas 

swaps, there is a distinction. NYMEX at least has some accountability; they have some triggers. Should ICE have the same triggers? 

Mr. LUKKEN. Well, there should certainly be someone watching, 

whether it is ICE or us. And so, yes, if they are exceeding accountability levels on NYMEX and we feel that the activity on ICE is 

affecting NYMEX, that is a problem for us. We need to make sure 

that we are policing that correctly by calling those folks up—a lot 

of what we do in our surveillance activity is called ‘‘jawboning,’’ 

where we just call them up and say, ‘‘What are you doing here? 

Why are you doing it?’’ It proves to be very effective. It is very limited that we have ever used our emergency authority to try to liquidate positions. It has only happened four times back in the 

1970s, in fact. But most of the time it is this deterrent activity, this 

jawboning that allows us to get people to back away from these 

types of positions. 

I would certainly, as Acting Chairman, encourage our staff to 

make those types of phone calls. When people exceed accountability 

levels on NYMEX and move those beyond into ICE, that is troubling. It should be troubling, and I think Commissioner Dunn and 

I both find that activity troubling. 

Senator COLEMAN. I think Mr. Sprecher testified that accountability levels are needed on ICE and should be extended to that exchange. Do you agree with that? 

97

Mr. LUKKEN. I think that is something we should be open to, certainly. 

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Dunn. 

Mr. DUNN. I definitely think there ought to be accountability levels, and I think there also should be some exploration of actually 

putting in spec limits. 

Senator COLEMAN. ‘‘Excessive speculation’’—is there a clear definition of ‘‘excessive speculation,’’ Mr. Lukken? 

Mr. LUKKEN. I think it has to be tailored to the markets that you 

are looking at. It really depends on whether it is nearby months, 

outer months, the types of markets, physically delivered, cash settled. I think it really should be given to the experience of our surveillance economists who have hundreds of years of experience 

looking at these markets. But it is something that I think is worthy 

of a discussion. I think it is something that we as a Commission 

should look at to determine, OK, where is the guidance here, because we really haven’t until this has happened, we really hadn’t 

put forward much effort to look into what is excessive speculation. 

Certainly as a Commission, I think it is worthy of discussion and 

study to determine if there is guidance in this area that is necessary to help us go through this, to help us provide some principles in this area so that we combat excessive speculation that 

may lead to unjustified or unwarranted price fluctuation. 

Senator COLEMAN. There has been some discussion about the 

image of moving mercury around, so if we move forward with ICE 

having not just greater reporting requirements, which they have, 

but, in fact, some enforcement and account limits, which they do 

not have presently but appear to be open to, what is the danger 

of trading moving elsewhere? And how do you get yourself in a position to kind of see the big picture and to make sure that we are 

simply not moving something from a regulated to an unregulated 

environment? Mr. Lukken and then Mr. Dunn. 

Mr. LUKKEN. Well, most of the natural gas trades are on an exchange-like facility. I think it is only 10 percent that happens in 

the bilateral market. So I don’t think there is an enormous impact 

of things pushing into the bilateral market. These markets want 

exchange-like transparency, and the clearing that is available to 

them. That is important. But, this is always a concern I think you 

need to have, is how much regulation is necessary, and it needs to 

be tailored to the risks associated with them. I think your Subcommittee has adequately pointed out what the risks are here and 

how best to do that without pushing these markets either overseas 

or into these dark markets, as you have talked about. But, regulation shouldn’t—we should make sure that we are meeting the 

risks, and unintended consequences, we should be aware of them, 

but unless we are addressing the risks to these marketplaces, that 

is the most important thing that we should consider here. 

Senator COLEMAN. Mr. Dunn. 

Mr. DUNN. Senator Coleman, I think a very important point that 

I thought I heard Mr. Sprecher say in his testimony was that he 

was open to having core principles apply to ICE, which they currently don’t. That would imply to me that they would also have a 

compliance staff similar to what we currently see at NYMEX. That 

gives us someone with our staff to bounce things off of and so that 

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we can talk about these situations. Since they don’t have a compliance staff now, it is very difficult to call up and—do we call Mr. 

Sprecher and say, ‘‘We have got a problem here’’? Just the makeup of how do you go about doing some of this I think would be 

taken care of if, in fact, we did have some kind of core principles 

that would apply to them as well. 

Now, remember, there are only about 12 of these acting ECMs 

out there right now, and when we look at the future, I mean, we 

didn’t think there would be one this big at this time when the 

CFMA was passed back in 2000. So we have to look at unintended 

consequences: What is it going to be in the future? What are we 

going to do when there are 10 or 20 ICEs out there? And how do 

we do our work? This is certainly something that you later make 

a recommendation on near and dear to my heart, is that we have 

adequate staffing and technology to be able to conduct oversight 

over what Congress has given us. 

Senator COLEMAN. Let us make sure that we get a response to 

that. We have not had a lot of discussion about staffing and technology. But I presume all this comes at a cost. 

Mr. LUKKEN. Absolutely. We are struggling to maintain our current mission at the agency of regulating DCMs. So anything that 

we add to the table means something drops off. I am happy to see 

that the Subcommittee for Appropriations that oversees our agency 

is marking up a bill tomorrow. Hopefully they give us appropriate 

resources to do our job. But certainly if other markets come into 

our purview, that is going to come at a cost. But, technology is 

something that is so important. We are a technology agency. Technology gives us the tools to do this type of surveillance. It is from 

Amaranth that we learned we need to start looking at these outer 

months, and now we have the surveillance technology to help do 

that. That I think was part of Recommendation 2. That is something that is important. But resources is definitely an issue for us, 

and whatever authorities are provided, it has to be matched with 

the resources to adequately uphold those authorities. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Lukken, do you think it is important to prevent another episode like Amaranth or just punish a perpetrator who violates the 

law? 

Mr. LUKKEN. I think preventing is always the first priority at our 

agency. 

Senator LEVIN. Why is it that you talk about your agency 

jawboning but seem to be resisting giving to ICE the same authority and responsibility that they are willing to accept that NYMEX 

has to do the jawboning and action themselves? Why differentiate 

there? 

Mr. LUKKEN. Well, what I am saying is that we can accomplish 

much of what giving that to ICE would accomplish. 

Senator LEVIN. But why? Why not tell ICE to do what NYMEX 

does? 

Mr. LUKKEN. I think that is certainly an option. 

Senator LEVIN. But why not exercise it? What is your reluctance? 

Mr. LUKKEN. It is not reluctance. 

99

Senator LEVIN. I am trying to get to—there is a resistance. I am 

trying to understand it, and I do not. 

Mr. LUKKEN. Well, I think what we are trying to do is make sure 

that we accomplish the goal of preventing an Amaranth-type situation, either its collapse or the fact that maybe unreasonable prices 

may have happened as a result of that. 

Senator LEVIN. Why wouldn’t assigning ICE and other exchanges 

to do that, giving them responsibility the way you have NYMEX, 

achieve that goal? 

Mr. LUKKEN. It would be one way of achieving it. Another way 

is, as I mentioned, us receiving information about this and using 

our own jawboning and surveillance techniques to prevent that 

type of build-up on an ICE-type platform. 

Senator LEVIN. Why not do that with NYMEX? Why not take 

away their authority, their responsibility? Take it on yourself to 

jawbone the NYMEX speculators. Why not do it that way with 

NYMEX? 

Mr. LUKKEN. Well, I think this is a legacy of self-regulatory organizations that—self-regulation existed before we existed in those 

exchanges, 200 years or 150 years ago. So this is a legacy issue. 

But, as these markets evolve, as I mentioned we need to make 

sure that we are on top of these. There may be a point in time 

where we need to ask ICE to do this, but what I have said today 

is that the trading information that we receive, our ability to jawbone them as a result of that trading information has been shown 

to be effective so far. 

Senator LEVIN. It was not shown effective with Amaranth. You 

received that information, didn’t you? 

Mr. LUKKEN. We were not receiving that information at the time 

of Amaranth. 

Senator LEVIN. You did not know anything about the move to 

Amaranth? None of your staff was aware of that? 

Mr. LUKKEN. I don’t believe——

Mr. DUNN. Not until after the fact. 

Mr. LUKKEN. Not at the time, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LEVIN. What about leveling the playing field between 

NYMEX and ICE? Do you support those efforts? 

Mr. LUKKEN. As long as it is done on a regulatory basis. I think 

we are trying to match what the risks of each marketplace might 

be and the type of regulation we put on them. As I mentioned, 

ECMs are only institutional markets. There is no retail participation directly on those marketplaces. There is only principal-to-principal trading. A lot of what we do as an agency is try to prevent 

trading abuses where traders brokering for other traders may trade 

ahead of people. That doesn’t exist on ICE, so those authorities are 

not necessary. 

So, there are certain parts of these markets that are different, 

as Mr. Sprecher pointed out, that they are different, requiring a 

different tailoring of regulation than a full-blown DCM designation. 

Senator LEVIN. But the speculation that occurs on ICE has an effect on the NYMEX price. You have agreed to that. 

Mr. LUKKEN. It can. 

Senator LEVIN. So how are you then protecting the NYMEX 

benchmark? If the speculation occurs unregulated on ICE and the 

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ICE price affects the NYMEX price, how is the NYMEX benchmark 

protected? 

Mr. LUKKEN. Well, I think, as I mentioned, if this Amaranth-type 

situation would occur today, our staff would see that. 

Senator LEVIN. How was it protected before? 

Mr. LUKKEN. Well, it wasn’t. As these markets have evolved and 

become more linked, this is something, a lesson that we learned 

from Amaranth. 

Mr. DUNN. Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Dunn. 

Mr. DUNN. Could I address your first questions about what do we 

do and, in essence, how do we prevent this? I think in your first 

study that came out—and, by the way, let me commend the staff 

for both studies. But the first study, which said there has got to 

be a cop on the beat, is really something that bothers me, that 

there is a perception out there, in large part in the energy markets, 

that we are not watching, that no one is paying attention. In fact, 

we have got folks on tapes giggling about nobody’s watching us, 

they can do whatever they want. And we don’t have a cop on the 

beat, I think, in real time, in this particular instance, but we do 

have a very good enforcement group that can go back and look at 

fraud and manipulation. 

I think a great deterrent to this is for us to be able to bring some 

cases, and certainly we did that in the Enron issues. We only have 

civil money penalties that we can give them. I have asked our enforcement people to share information with the Department of Justice, States’ Attorney Generals, and others so that some criminal 

actions can take place in some of these issues as well so that there 

is a real consequence being paid by the individuals that partake in 

things that are purely and very clearly fraud and manipulation. 

Mr. LUKKEN. I would just like to join my colleague, too. What is 

troubling—and your report points it out—is the perception out 

there that these markets are somehow not policed. And perception 

is very important in this. People are basing prices off of these markets, and I think that is something as a Commission we need to 

be more active in making sure to educate folks what we do, what 

the limitations are, are we doing enough, to talk with industry 

groups, to talk with other regulators in this area. 

I have been on the job a week as acting chairman, so I hope to 

hit the ground running with Commissioner Dunn and hopefully a 

couple other commissioners once they get confirmed and try to look 

into some of these issues. Are we doing enough? Should more happen in this area? We have done some, but maybe more is needed. 

And I think it is important to keep the perception that we are 

doing our job. It is important that is the perception, that we are 

doing our job. 

Mr. DUNN. There is a way, Mr. Chairman, Senator Coleman, that 

we can get that attention. According to the regulations, anytime 

that ICE gets a formal complaint, that is supposed to be passed on 

to the CFTC so that we can go out and examine that. So there are 

opportunities out there for someone who thinks that there has been 

manipulation or they have been damaged as a result of activities 

that take place on ICE, that it can get to us. And certainly, as I 

read those testimonies of those folks that were on your first day of 

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hearings out there, there were a lot of people out there that feel 

that us going after somebody after the fact is too late, they have 

already spent too much money that affects them for their businesses and their heating of their home. 

Senator LEVIN. Well, that is exactly right. Most of the function 

of the cop on the beat is to deter crime, not to chase the guy after 

he has shot somebody. And this is the way the CFTC describes its 

authority. This is CFTC now. ‘‘In contrast to its authority over designated contract markets and registered derivatives transaction facilities, the CFTC does not have general oversight authority over 

exempt commercial markets. Exempt commercial markets are not 

registered with or designated, recognized, licensed, or approved by 

the CFTC.’’

What I am afraid hearing today is you maybe want to keep it 

that way. I have to tell you, that is what comes through from your 

testimony today—not from Mr. Dunn’s. From your testimony today 

where you draw some kind of a distinction, which I fail to understand, between why it is important that NYMEX have the authority to prevent, to deter, to go after excessive speculation before it 

causes damage, and your insistence that, well, you would rather 

the CFTC, when it comes to ICE, be the one that is going to get 

reports and oversee it does not give me much confidence that that 

is the way to go. And I do not understand the distinction. They are 

functionally equivalent. There is no difference about that. They are 

functionally equivalent markets. And yet CFTC, you are the cop ultimately, and you seem to say, hey, get NYMEX on those trades, 

but when that action of NYMEX is subverted by what is allowed, 

just move it over to an unregulated market, you are saying, well, 

we will get reports on that, and if there is a claim of fraud or manipulation, then we will move in after the shark is gone. 

Mr. LUKKEN. It is not that I oppose that idea. I think it is something that we should be discussing as a Commission, also with 

other regulators. So as you mentioned, these markets have evolved 

over time. What was true 5 years ago is not true today. It is something we should discuss. Maybe that is needed. But there are consequences to adding additional regulation, as you have pointed out 

today. 

Senator LEVIN. There always are. But there is regulation with 

NYMEX. That is a regulated market. 

Mr. LUKKEN. Correct. 

Senator LEVIN. It has got consequences. This is what the Amaranth head energy trader had to say in an e-mail: ‘‘Everybody is 

high on ICE these days.’’ He is writing to somebody. ‘‘You think it 

had its day or more to go?’’

And then he says, ‘‘One thing that’s nice is there’s no expiration 

limits, like NYMEX, clearing.’’ In other words, this is a lot easier. 

‘‘And this alone,’’ he says, ‘‘will keep it—ICE—strong.’’ No limits 

like NYMEX, and that is going to keep ICE strong. And I hope we 

are going to hear back from CFTC. If you say it is worthy of discussion, we hope you will take it up, discuss it, and let this Subcommittee know what you are going to do, if anything. 

Senator Coleman.

Senator COLEMAN. Just to follow up, just to be optimistic, and I 

want to be optimistic that this report and these hearings hopefully 

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have generated discussion, and obviously the concern that we have, 

the ability to simply move from regulated to unregulated is something that has to be dealt with. It puts consumers at risk. 

It is interesting, because I have a different e-mail that I was 

looking at, again, from the Amaranth trader, who also talked 

about—said that we have exchange limits, and then somebody responded, ‘‘You got me confused.’’ He says, ‘‘On NYMEX, not on 

ICE.’’ And then he says, ‘‘For June expiration.’’ But then he says, 

‘‘They settle the same.’’ And so, clearly, they get it. It is important 

that we get it. 

Just one other area that I want to touch upon, and we are assuming—and I think we are moving at a path that—giving ICE the 

ability, the authority to regulate. If a concern is resources, wouldn’t 

it make sense to extend some regulatory oversight responsibilities 

to ICE so that it is less of a burden on you at CFTC? 

Mr. LUKKEN. That would make some sense, yes. 

Senator COLEMAN. And if you do that—just, again, because I am 

concerned about squeezing the balloon, as you talked about—how 

do we handle the other 17 exempted electronic OTC energy exchanges? What can you do with that? How do you bring them into 

the mix? 

Mr. LUKKEN. A lot of these markets are not in any way linked 

to our regulated markets. They are very innovative exchanges, in 

some ways incubator exchanges. There would be some way to have 

to distinguish between those markets and a market like ICE that 

really has become an exchange-like facility. And I am not sure—

it is difficult to draw that delineation, but somehow that would 

have to be done. 

Senator COLEMAN. One of the concerns—we have used this 

phrase ‘‘unintended consequences.’’ I think perhaps we should discuss it. I presume a concern is that if we raise the cost of regulation to a certain degree, these exchanges, the small ones, simply 

move offshore. 

Mr. LUKKEN. Correct. 

Senator COLEMAN. And then we have no control, no transparency. 

Mr. LUKKEN. Yes, the one in London—this is happening in our 

capital markets in some respect. So I think the concern is making 

sure that the regulation fits the risks, and that is, I think, what 

this Subcommittee is trying to do, what we as a Commission try 

to do. I want to say that I am optimistic, too. I don’t want to sound 

like we are being resistant or I am personally being resistant. This 

is new territory for me, so I am hopeful that we can get together 

as a Commission to talk about these ideas and come back to this 

Subcommittee if we can reach some conclusions about what needs 

to be done in this area. 

Senator COLEMAN. And raise the issue of the voice-brokered markets, with electronics today there are a lot of things that can go on. 

It was clear in Amaranth that they were looking to move, if they 

could have done a voice-brokered deal bilateral, they would have 

done that. Can you talk to me a little bit about monitoring preventive excessive speculation price manipulation when you are dealing 

with something as opaque as the voice-brokered markets? 

103

Mr. LUKKEN. Some of it has to do with whether these are standardized contracts or individually negotiated contracts. It would be 

very difficult for us and very resource-intensive for us to take every 

individually negotiated bilateral contract and try to make some 

regulatory use of it. It would be sort of garbage-in, garbage-out 

type of a problem for us. 

So we want to make sure that whatever we are getting has some 

relevance to the price discovery process. I think there are maybe 

some areas that have some relevance, but it is of limited use. So 

I think it is going to have to be a question of resources and cost/

benefit analysis in that area. 

My personal feeling is that bilaterals haven’t been really impactful on the price discovery process. It has mainly been these 

standardized exchange-like facilities that have been linked. 

Senator COLEMAN. And I look forward to that discussion. In a 

simplistic sense, we can regulate all of this, but there is then a cost 

and there is a price. And is it worth the price? And what is the 

cost? And, again, does it ultimately drive things to a more opaque 

place? 

I look forward to the discussion, but it is very clear to me—and 

I have, again, been very concerned about the unintended consequences. But to listen to the Amaranth people and to listen to 

the ICE and NYMEX folks, who we issue an order—NYMEX issues 

an order, says to Amaranth, ‘‘You have got to lower your position,’’ 

and it is like me telling my kids to do something and knowing that 

they are just going to go over and totally ignore that, and have people have a sense that we have accomplished something. 

I would suggest that does not provide the protection that you 

were talking about and that piece has to be dealt with, and I think 

the question is how do we deal with it in a way that actually 

makes a difference. 

Mr. LUKKEN. Right. 

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you very much. 

Just a couple questions. Do you know if the President’s Working 

Group has taken a position on this matter? 

Mr. LUKKEN. I am just a recent member of the President’s Working Group, so I am not sure if they—on the matter of position limits or——

Senator LEVIN. No. On whether or not we should have ICE being 

given responsibility the way NYMEX has to enforce our laws. 

Mr. LUKKEN. I am not aware. Not being a member of the President’s Working Group until recently, I am unaware of whether they 

have. 

Senator LEVIN. Whether there have been any discussions between CFTC and the working group on any of the issues we have 

discussed today? 

Mr. LUKKEN. I think there has been discussion on Amaranth and 

the follow-up from Amaranth. The President’s Working Group, I 

think, what were the concerns that arose out of Amaranth, including many of the issues we discussed today. 

Senator LEVIN. And CTFC, have you had discussions on this? 

Mr. LUKKEN. We have had some follow-up on Amaranth itself, 

and——

104

Senator LEVIN. No. In terms of the subject that we talked about 

today. 

Mr. LUKKEN. We have not. 

Senator LEVIN. How come? It has been a year. 

Mr. LUKKEN. On the authority of whether 2(h) should be——

Senator LEVIN. Yes, how to avoid another Amaranth. 

Mr. LUKKEN. Well, we certainly have taken measures since Amaranth within our existing authority to try to prevent that type of 

a situation in the future. 

Senator LEVIN. In terms of additional authority, though, you 

have not discussed that? 

Mr. DUNN. I have discussed it with my staff on what would be 

some——

Senator LEVIN. As a Commissioner, have you done it? 

Mr. DUNN. I have not done it as a Commissioner. 

Senator LEVIN. OK. Let me just summarize. Amaranth engaged 

in excessive speculation. The victims were consumers who got hit 

with inflated prices, distorted prices. CFTC did not realize what 

happened at the time. The Subcommittee has spent a lot of time 

analyzing this. We have analyzed the NYMEX and the ICE data 

to figure out what happened. It is clear what has happened here 

and that when a speculator or trader was told by the agent of the 

government agency to reduce its position, instead of carrying out 

that order, it bypassed it, undermined it, circumvented it by just 

going to an unregulated market. It seems to me that totally 

thwarts the purpose of our statute. It thwarts the purpose of the 

CFTC giving NYMEX the responsibility that you have given it to 

stop excessive speculation. 

I do not see from what I have heard today that at least the acting chairman is aggressively interested in doing what apparently 

ICE is willing to do, which is to step into the breach and to enforce 

some rules against excessive speculation. There is a willingness to 

talk about it, apparently, but that does not seem to be very responsive to what is an obvious willingness on the part of ICE to do 

what NYMEX does, which is to stop something which hurts people. 

We all agree excessive speculation hurts consumers. Everyone 

agrees with that. There is a law against it. It may not be defined 

in the law. It is enforced. And if it needs definition, you folks 

should give it definition. That is your responsibility. We have not 

heard any murmurs from you folks about defining ‘‘excessive speculation.’’ If it needs to be defined, go ahead and define it. But it is 

not acceptable to this Senator to just have the independent agency 

which is supposed to be enforcing law against excessive speculation 

to take a fairly lukewarm response, to give a lukewarm response 

when there is such a proven problem here which has cost a lot of 

people, a lot of consumers, a lot of users a lot of money. 

I hope that the CFTC will do what you, the acting chairman, now 

say it will do. Long overdue, as far as I am concerned. I hope you 

will take it up, discuss the possibilities, give us your thoughts and 

your recommendations in terms of legislation. These have been extremely valuable reports and hearings. I think everybody will acknowledge that, regardless of what position they are in or what 

view they take of the issue. Our staffs have done an extraordinary 

job of digging for over a year. Millions of transactions have had to 

105

1See Exhibit 16 which appears in the Appendix on page 904. 

be analyzed, and what has been demonstrated is something which 

is pretty shocking and which has got to be prevented, not just responded to after the fact. 

So I will turn to Senator Coleman and see if he has any final 

comment. 

Senator COLEMAN. I think you have done an excellent job of summing up. I look forward to the ongoing conversations and, beyond 

that, subsequent action to increase accountability and increase 

transparency. Clearly, there are lessons to be learned from Amaranth, and I would hope—and I firmly believe that we all understand the key is to make sure it does not happen again, to use the 

powers that we have, and if there is additional power that is needed, either the agency itself or, again, even working with ICE and 

others, that we would move forward in that direction. 

I thank the Chairman and again want to applaud the staff, who 

I think has done a tremendous job. Thank you. 

Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you all. 

Mr. DUNN. Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LEVIN. Excuse me. Please, Mr. Dunn. 

Mr. DUNN. In earlier testimony, one of the folks that testified 

here used an excerpt of a speech that I gave back on September 

8 of last year. I would like for the record to insert the entire excerpt that I gave on the energy matter during that speech, if I may, 

please.1

Senator LEVIN. Of course. That will be made part of the record. 

Mr. DUNN. Thank you, sir. Thank you both. 

[Whereupon, at 4:59 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(107)

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36616.718
825


36616.719
826


36616.720
827


36616.721
828


36616.722
829


36616.723
830


36616.724
831


36616.725
832


36616.726
833


36616.727
834


36616.728
835


36616.729
836


36616.730
837


36616.731
838


36616.732
839


36616.733
840


36616.734
841


36616.735
842


36616.736
843


36616.737
844


36616.738
845


36616.739
846


36616.740
847


36616.741
848


36616.742
849


36616.743
850


36616.744
851


36616.745
852


36616.746
853


36616.747
854


36616.748
855


36616.749
856


36616.750
857


36616.751
858


36616.752
859


36616.753
860


36616.754
861


36616.755
862


36616.756
863


36616.757
864


36616.758
865


36616.759
866


36616.760
867


36616.761
868


36616.762
869


36616.763
870


36616.764
871


36616.765
872


36616.766
873


36616.767
874


36616.768
875


36616.769
876


36616.770
877


36616.771
878


36616.772
879


36616.773
880


36616.774
881


36616.775
882


36616.776
883


36616.777
884


36616.778
885


36616.779
886


36616.780
887


36616.781
888


36616.782
889


36616.783
890


36616.784
891


36616.785
892


36616.786
893


36616.787
894


36616.788
895


36616.789
896


36616.790
897


36616.791
898


36616.792
899


36616.793
900


36616.794
901


36616.795
902


36616.796
903


36616.797
904


36616.798
905


36616.799
906


36616.800
907


36616.801
908


36616.802
909


36616.803
910


36616.804
911


36616.805
912


36616.806
913


36616.807
914


36616.808
915


36616.809
916


36616.810
917


36616.811
918


36616.812
919


36616.813
920


36616.814
921


36616.815
922


36616.816
923


36616.817
924


36616.818
925


36616.819
926


36616.820
927


36616.821
928


36616.822
929


36616.823
930


36616.824
931


36616.825
932


36616.826
933


36616.827
934


36616.828
935


36616.829
936


36616.830
937


36616.831
938


36616.832
939


36616.833
940


36616.834
941


36616.835
942


36616.836
943


36616.837
944


36616.838
945


36616.839
946


36616.840
947


36616.841
948


36616.842
949


36616.843
950


36616.844
951


36616.845
952


36616.846
953


36616.847
954


36616.848
955


36616.849
956


36616.850
957


36616.851
958


36616.852
959


36616.853
960


36616.854
961


36616.855
962


36616.856
963


36616.857
964


36616.858
965


36616.859
966


36616.860
967


36616.861
968


36616.862
969


36616.863
970


36616.864
971


36616.865
972


36616.866
973


36616.867
974


36616.868
975


36616.869
976


36616.870
977


36616.871
978


36616.872
979


36616.873
980


36616.874
981


36616.875
982


36616.876
983


36616.877
984


36616.878
985


36616.879
986


36616.880
987


36616.881
988


36616.882
989


36616.883
990


36616.884
991


36616.885
992


36616.886
993


36616.887
994


36616.888
995


36616.889
996


36616.890
997


36616.891
998


36616.892
999


36616.893
1000


36616.894
1001


36616.895
1002


36616.896
1003


36616.897
1004


36616.898
1005

Æ


36616.899