J-S37030-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

PORTIE A. ROBERTSON,

Appellant No. 2606 EDA 2014

Appeal from the PCRA Order August 13, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1111151-1982

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, and LAZARUS, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JULY 09, 2015

Appellant, Portie A. Robertson, appeals pro se from the order entered 

on August 13, 2014, that denied his fourth petition filed pursuant to the Post 

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

On August 26, 1982, Appellant and two cohorts fired numerous rounds 

of gunfire into a crowd of people resulting in two deaths and multiple 

injuries. On May 19, 1983, Appellant was found guilty of two counts of firstdegree murder and six counts of aggravated assault. Appellant filed timely 

post-verdict motions that were denied on June 22, 1987. On that same day, 

the trial court imposed sentences of life imprisonment for each of the 

murders followed by six consecutive five-to-ten-year terms of incarceration 

on the aggravated assault convictions. Since that time, Appellant has filed 

numerous appeals and PCRA petitions. Most recently, on April 22, 2014, 
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Appellant filed his fourth PCRA petition. On July 2, 2014, the PCRA court 

informed Appellant of its intention to dismiss the PCRA petition without a 

hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, and on August 13, 2014, the PCRA 

court dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely. This appeal followed. 

On appeal, Appellant raised the following issues, which we have 

reproduced verbatim:

I. WHETHER THE PCRA COURT DECISION ABUSED ITS 

DISCRETION OR COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW AMOUNTS TO 

GOVERNMENTAL INTERFERNCE AS AN RESULT OF THE MANNER 

IN WHICH THE COURT HANDLED JUROR MISCONDUCT 

ALLEGATIONS AND IT WAS NOT A REQUIREMENT OF DUE 

DILIGENCE FOR THE DEFENDANT TO OBTAIN EVIDENCE OF 

JUROR MISCONDUCT ONCE ALLEGATION WAS BROUGHT TO THE 

COURT’S ATTENTION.

II. WHETHER PCRA COURT DECISION ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 

OR COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW WHEN THE COURT FAILED 

TO RECUSE AND/OR DISQUALIFY HIMSELF FROM PRESIDING IN 

THE CASE WHEN THE RECORD DISCLOSES THAT THE JUDGE’S 

PRIOR JUDGMENTS EXERCISED WAS MANIFESTLY 

UNREASONABLE,PREJUDICIAL AND/OR BIAS.

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is whether the 

record supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA 

court’s determination is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Phillips, 31 

A.3d 317, 319 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citing Commonwealth v. Berry, 877 

A.2d 479, 482 (Pa. Super. 2005)). The PCRA court’s findings will not be 

disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. 
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Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Pa. Super. 

2001)).

A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date that the 

judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). This time 

requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not 

ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition. Commonwealth v. 

Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa. 2000). A judgment of sentence “becomes 

final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the 

Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 

or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(3).

However, an untimely petition may be received when the petition 

alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the three limited exceptions to 

the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), 

and (iii), is met.1 A petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed 

____________________________________________

1

 The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this 

Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown 

to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the 

exercise of due diligence; or

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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within sixty days of the date the claim could first have been presented. 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). In order to be entitled to the exceptions to the 

PCRA’s one-year filing deadline, “the petitioner must plead and prove 

specific facts that demonstrate his claim was raised within the sixty-day time 

frame” under section 9545(b)(2). Carr, 768 A.2d at 1167.

Here, the trial court imposed sentence on June 22, 1987. This Court 

affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on August 8, 1989. On March 20, 

1990, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied Appellant’s petition for 

allowance of appeal. Therefore, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became 

final on June 18, 1990, ninety days after the time for filing a petition for a 

writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired. 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9545(b)(3); U.S. Sup. Ct. R.13. Appellant did not file the instant PCRA 

petition until April 22, 2014. Thus, the instant PCRA petition is patently 

untimely.

As previously stated, if a petitioner does not file a timely PCRA 

petition, his petition may nevertheless be received under any of the three 

limited exceptions to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S. 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was 

recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the 

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in 

this section and has been held by that court to apply 

retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).
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§ 9545(b)(1). If a petitioner asserts one of these exceptions, he must file 

his petition within sixty days of the date that the exception could be 

asserted. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).

In the case at bar, Appellant baldly claims that government 

interference prevented him from asserting claims of alleged juror 

misconduct. Appellant’s Brief at 30, 34. While interference with the 

presentation of a claim by government officials can provide an exception to 

the PCRA timing requirements pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), 

Appellant has fallen woefully short in this regard as this issue was found 

lacking in merit in prior PCRA petitions. As the PCRA court noted, 

Appellant’s PCRA petition and brief constitute a “lengthy and disingenuous 

regurgitation of the alleged juror misconduct which has already been found 

to be completely devoid of merit [and devoid of] any new allegations of facts 

or evidence of [facts] with which to reassess either its merits or timeliness.” 

PCRA Court Opinion, 10/10/14, at 2-3. Moreover, while Appellant mentions 

government interference, he fails to provide any support for this claim or 

even detail how the government interfered with his claim. Accordingly, we 

agree with the PCRA court that Appellant’s fourth PCRA was untimely and no 

exceptions apply.

Because the PCRA petition was untimely, the PCRA court lacked 

jurisdiction to address the claims presented and grant relief. See 

Commonwealth v. Fairiror, 809 A.2d 396, 398 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding 
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that PCRA court lacks jurisdiction to hear untimely petition). Likewise, we 

lack the authority to address the merits of any substantive claims raised in 

the PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 

(Pa. 2007) (“[J]urisdictional time limits go to a court’s right or competency 

to adjudicate a controversy.”). Therefore, we affirm the order denying 

Appellant’s fourth PCRA petition.2

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/9/2015

____________________________________________

2

 Appellant purports to raise an additional issue concerning prosecutorial 

misconduct in his supplemental appellate brief. However, nothing in 

Appellant’s supplemental brief alters our conclusion that Appellant’s 

underlying PCRA petition was untimely. Thus, we need not further address 

Appellant’s supplemental brief.