United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Report to Congressional Committees

DEFENSE 

ACQUISITIONS 

Opportunities Exist to 

Improve DOD’s 

Oversight of Power 

Source Investments 

December 2010 

GAO-11-113 
 United States Government Accountability Office 

Accountability • Integrity • Reliability 

Highlights of GAO-11-113, a report to 

congressional committees 

December 2010 

DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS 

Opportunities Exist to Improve DOD's Oversight of 

Power Source Investments 

Why GAO Did This Study 

Virtually all Department of Defense 

(DOD) weapon systems and 

equipment rely on power sources, 

such as batteries. In response to a 

mandate in the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2010, GAO determined (1) DOD’s 

approximate investment in power 

sources, (2) the extent to which DOD 

coordinates its power source 

investments, and (3) the extent to 

which DOD’s policies facilitate the 

use of standard power sources. To 

address these objectives, GAO 

obtained and analyzed DOD 

investment data, met with DOD 

officials and industry representatives, 

and attended DOD conferences 

aimed at facilitating power source 

coordination. 

What GAO Recommends 

To increase oversight of power 

source investments, GAO 

recommends that DOD consider how 

to best aggregate departmentwide 

investment data. To improve 

interagency coordination of S&T 

projects, DOD should determine 

ways to strengthen agency 

participation in coordination 

mechanisms. To increase emphasis 

on standardization, DOD should 

develop a standardization plan and 

enforceable departmentwide policies 

and identify opportunities to retrofit 

existing systems with standard power 

sources when cost effective. DOD 

concurred with the first 

recommendation and partially 

concurred with the other four. It was 

unclear from DOD’s response what 

actions it plans to take in response to 

GAO’s recommendations. 

What GAO Found

GAO determined that DOD has invested at least $2.1 billion in power sources 

from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010. However, DOD lacks 

comprehensive, departmentwide data for its total investment in the power 

sources area. Availability of complete data varies across the three investment 

categories: science and technology (S&T), logistics support, and acquisition 

programs. While DOD appears to have adequate departmentwide data on S&T 

efforts, it does not have departmentwide data for all logistics support 

investments. DOD lacks sufficient data on its investments in power sources 

when they are developed or purchased for acquisition programs. The 

$2.1 billion amount includes investments in S&T and logistics support that 

GAO was able to identify, but not power source investments as part of 

acquisition programs because of the difficulty in obtaining investment data in 

that area. This lack of complete, departmentwide investment data hinders 

DOD’s oversight and future planning in the power sources area, adversely 

affecting its ability to ensure basic accountability, anticipate future funding, 

and measure performance. 

DOD’s mechanisms for coordinating power source S&T—including 

interagency working groups, conferences, informal networks, and information 

technology resources—are generally effective. However, in some of these 

activities participation by pertinent member agencies is voluntary and could 

be more complete. Agencies may be missing opportunities to coordinate 

activities—such as avoiding initiation of similar research projects—and 

leverage resources because agency participation is voluntary and the level of 

participation by pertinent agencies varies. In addition, DOD’s strategic 

planning process to facilitate the allocation of S&T funds for power source 

technologies could be improved. The S&T planning efforts can also be 

complicated by external factors, such as the additions Congress makes to 

DOD’s budget. 

Although DOD power source experts GAO staff spoke with agree that the 

department needs to increase its emphasis on power source standardization, 

DOD lacks departmentwide policies to help emphasize power source 

standardization. Existing policies have demonstrated limited effectiveness 

because of compliance problems and because they may only apply to specific 

power source applications. Although it is generally more economical to 

address standardization early in the acquisition process, according to DOD 

officials, power sources are generally not considered early in the process, 

potentially hindering standardization efforts. DOD has also not evaluated 

departmentwide opportunities for retrofitting deployed weapon systems and 

equipment with standard or other preferred power sources when cost 

effective. 

View GAO-11-113 or key components. 

For more information, contact Michael J. 

Sullivan at (202) 512-4841 or 

sullivanm@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-11-113 

Contents 

Letter 1

Background 3 

DOD Lacks Comprehensive, Departmentwide Data on Some Power 

Source Investments 8 

S&T Coordination Mechanisms Are Generally Effective, Though 

Opportunities Exist to Improve Strategic Planning 17 

DOD’s Power Source Standardization Efforts Are Not 

Departmentwide and Lack Robust Enforcement 21 

Conclusions 28 

Recommendations for Executive Action 28 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 29 

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 32 

Appendix II DOD Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 

(RDT&E) Budget Activities 37 

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 38 

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 41 

Table 

Table 1: Principal DOD Coordination Mechanisms for Investments 

in Power Source S&T Projects 18 

Figures 

Figure 1: Sample of the DOD Power Source Inventory 5 

Figure 2: Approximate Investment in Power Source S&T by DOD 

Component from Fiscal Year 2006 through Fiscal Year 

2010 10 

Figure 3: Approximate Investment in Power Source S&T by Type 

from Fiscal Year 2006 through Fiscal Year 2010 12 

 Defense Acquisitions
Figure 4: Minimum DOD Investments through DLA in Power 

Sources for Logistics Support 14 

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Page ii GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

Page 1 GAO-11-113 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548 

December 30, 2010 

The Honorable Carl Levin 

Chairman 

The Honorable John McCain 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate 

The Honorable Ike Skelton 

Chairman 

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon 

Ranking Member 

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives 

Virtually all Department of Defense (DOD) weapon systems and 

equipment rely on power sources such as batteries. We estimate that DOD 

invested at least $2.1 billion in power sources from fiscal year 2006 

through fiscal year 2010 in three investment areas: science and technology 

(S&T) activities such as research, logistics support such as providing the 

warfighter with supplies, and acquisition programs such as those for 

weapon systems or equipment. This amount will likely rise because of 

growing warfighter energy and power demands as well as interest in 

smaller, lighter, and more capable power sources. Power sources are a 

mission-critical technology and may ultimately affect the warfighter if 

DOD is unable to meet demand. For example, severe shortages of some 

types of batteries during initial combat operations in Iraq threatened to 

significantly degrade the operational capabilities of the United States 

military.1

 During the shortages, caused in part by industrial base 

limitations and initial reliance on one supplier, the Marines reported 

 

1

 The batteries that were in short supply are used by United States troops to communicate, 

acquire targets, and gain situational awareness on the battlefield. Specifically, these nonrechargeable batteries provide a portable power source for nearly 60 critical military 

communication and electronic systems, including two radio systems, a missile guidance 

system, and a transmission security device. 

 Defense Acquisitions
 

having less than a 2-day supply of certain mission-critical batteries rather 

than the required 30-day supply.2

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 mandated 

that GAO determine DOD’s power source investments and coordination 

efforts.3

 In this report, our specific objectives were to (1) determine, as 

completely as possible, DOD’s total investment in power sources; 

(2) assess the extent to which DOD coordinates power source S&T 

investments departmentwide as well as with the Department of Energy 

(DOE); and (3) assess the extent to which DOD has policies that facilitate 

power source standardization. In consultation with congressional staff, we 

limited the scope of the term power sources to include tactical power 

sources used for soldier-carried equipment and vehicle applications as 

well as power sources for munitions (e.g., missiles) and satellites. Our 

scope excludes power sources used to support installations such as 

temporary or permanent military facilities. In terms of specific 

technologies, we focused on batteries, fuel cells, and capacitors. This was 

based on the predominance of batteries among tactically deployed power 

sources, the level of investment in fuel cells, and congressional interest in 

capacitors. 

To determine DOD’s total investment in power sources for S&T, logistics 

support, and acquisition programs, we interviewed officials within the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and across DOD component 

organizations to determine an appropriate methodology for collecting the 

most complete set of investment data possible. We analyzed DOD 

investment data extracted from DOD research and logistics support 

databases and also other data that we gathered from pertinent DOD 

components. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the 

purposes of providing approximate or minimum investment amounts in 

S&T and logistics support in this report. To assess the extent to which 

DOD coordinates power source S&T investments, we interviewed officials 

across the military services, other pertinent DOD components, DOE, and 

the power source industry. In addition, we attended private sector and 

 

2

 GAO, Defense Logistics: Actions Needed to Improve the Availability of Critical Items 

during Current and Future Operations, GAO-05-275 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 8, 2005). 

Batteries have also presented logistical challenges in previous military conflicts. For 

example, the Army faced difficulties providing sufficient quantities of batteries during the 

Vietnam War and the Persian Gulf War. 

3

 Pub. L. No. 111-84, § 243 (2009). 

Page 2 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

federal government conferences related to power sources, took part in 

training sessions related to DOD-wide information-sharing resources, and 

collected information from the membership of a power sources industry 

association. We also drew extensively on other GAO work related to 

interagency coordination.4

 In order to assess the extent to which DOD’s 

policies facilitate power source standardization, we interviewed officials 

across the military services and other pertinent DOD components and 

reviewed existing policies and standardization efforts. A more detailed 

description of our scope and methodology is presented in appendix I. 

We conducted this performance audit from December 2009 to December 

2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

DOD invests in power sources such as batteries, fuel cells, and capacitors 

to support the warfighting effort by powering weapon systems and 

equipment.5

 DOD’s power source investment is expected to rise because 

of an increased reliance on advanced weapon systems and equipment an

ongoing efforts to develop new technologies that are smaller, lighter, and 

more power dense.

Background 

d 

 

6

 Batteries are devices that convert chemical energy 

into electrical energy. The two main types of batteries are primary (nonrechargeable) and secondary (rechargeable). Primary batteries, which are 

discarded after their charge has been depleted, are the most common 

battery type for soldier-carried applications. A subclass of primary 

4

 GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005).

5

 The term power sources spans numerous technologies with a wide range of functions, 

including energy storage and power generation. Energy may be stored chemically, 

mechanically, or electrically within a power source. In general, power sources generate 

power by transforming energy stored within the power source device (in the case of 

batteries) or energy that is stored external to the power source (in the case of fuel cells). 

The power output may be pulsed, burst, or continuous depending on the specific 

application. 

6

 In light of DOD-wide power source needs, the Duncan Hunter National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 mandated that DOD submit a roadmap on this topic. 

This document has not yet been published. Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 218 (2008). 

Page 3 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

batteries called thermal batteries is used for short-term, high-power 

applications (e.g., missiles). While primary batteries typically selfdischarge available energy when not in use, thermal batteries have a 

longer shelf life because they remain inert until activated. Secondary 

batteries, which can be reenergized after their charge has been depleted, 

are less commonly used by deployed units than primary batteries. 

However, the Army has undertaken educational campaigns to increase 

their use in light of some cost efficiencies and operational advantages—

including overall weight reduction of soldiers’ equipment.7

 Further, the 

military services are interested in transitioning from non-rechargeable 

batteries to secondary batteries because their use by deployed units may 

decrease the number of vehicle convoys needed to supply batteries in war 

zones. DOD is also interested in limiting the proliferation of battery types 

to reduce the number of different battery types the soldiers have to carry 

and limit soldier confusion over which battery is required to operate a 

device—thus simplifying operations and resupply. See figure 1 for a 

sample of DOD’s power source inventory. 

 

7

 DOD projects this total weight to increase as soldiers are equipped with additional 

electronic equipment. 

Page 4 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

Figure 1: Sample of the DOD Power Source Inventory 

Source: Naval Surface Warfare Center, Crane (NSWC, Crane). 

In general, fuel cells and capacitors are less mature technologies than 

batteries with respect to defense applications. Fuel cells are 

electrochemical devices that convert the chemical energy in a fuel, such as 

hydrogen, into electrical energy. Fuel cells look and function very similar 

to batteries. However, the available energy of a battery is stored within the 

battery—and its performance will decline as that energy is depleted—

while a fuel cell continues to convert chemical energy to electricity as long 

as it has a supply of fuel. Capacitors are passive electrical components 

that store energy and may be used for a wide range of commercial and 

defense applications. Although most capacitors are used for small, 

primarily consumer-oriented electronic devices, they are increasingly 

being developed for high-power weaponry. DOD research organizations 

Page 5 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

have ongoing S&T efforts focused on maturing fuel cell and capacitor 

technologies so they can be deployed. Given the developmental nature of 

these technologies—as well as the predominance of batteries among 

tactically deployed power sources—this report principally discusses 

batteries. 

DOD invests in power sources in three broad, interrelated investment 

categories: (1) S&T efforts related to developing and improving power 

source technologies, (2) purchasing power sources for logistics support as 

part of routine warfighter resupply, and (3) developing or purchasing 

power sources for integration into a weapon system or equipment as part 

of an acquisition program. Ideally, technologies developed as part of S&T 

efforts will ultimately be incorporated into new or existing weapon 

systems or equipment. These three investment categories are described 

below. 

1. S&T: DOD research, development, test and evaluation investment is 

separated into seven discrete investment categories known as budget 

activities. The first three categories represent basic and applied 

research and technology development activities and are collectively 

known as S&T activities.8

 These can include activities such as 

developing or improving upon different chemical combinations that 

enhance energy storage or power output capabilities, developing 

lighter components, and identifying and incorporating novel material 

components. This research may be conducted by many different 

entities, including DOD research centers and other government 

laboratories, power sources manufacturers, and academic institutions. 

According to DOD officials, these projects may be funded through a 

variety of mechanisms, including a DOD component’s base budget; 

small business programs, such as the Small Business Innovation 

Research (SBIR) program; and additions Congress makes to DOD’s 

budget (i.e., congressional add-ons).9

 

8

 The latter categories include product development and support activities. The majority of 

the investment data we gathered from the research organizations were in the S&T category. 

An explanation of these activities can be found in app. II. 

9

 The SBIR program is a competitive program designed to increase the participation of the 

nation’s small, high-tech, innovative businesses in the federal government’s research and 

development efforts. 

Page 6 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

2. Logistics support: This category includes the provision of logistical 

services, materiel, and transportation required to support the military 

in the continental United States and worldwide. Power sources are like 

any other materiel requirements of military units, such as food and 

clothing, in that they are a consumable commodity that must be 

reordered and resupplied according to military service needs. Power 

sources for logistics support are typically purchased through the 

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), which is the primary supplying agent 

for DOD. 

3. Acquisition programs: This category includes the selection of a 

military standard power source, the selection of a commercial-off-theshelf (COTS) power source, or the design, development, and 

production of a program-unique power source as part of a DOD 

acquisition program. This process may be managed by the program 

office responsible for the weapon system or equipment acquisition, the 

contractor developing the system, or both. Since virtually all weapon 

systems and equipment include a power source, most acquisition 

programs have to undergo this process. 

For the purpose of this report, we define coordination as any joint activity 

by two or more organizations that is intended to produce more public 

value than could be produced when the organizations act alone. As we 

have previously reported,10 interagency coordination is important to avoid 

carrying out programs in a fragmented, uncoordinated way in areas where 

multiple agencies address a similar mission. Standardization, which is a 

form of coordination, includes efforts to expand the use of common or 

interchangeable parts by developing and agreeing on compatible 

standards. With respect to power sources, this may include developing 

standard shapes to facilitate the use of common, nonproprietary power 

sources in a range of weapon systems and equipment. 

 

10 GAO-06-15. 

Page 7 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

DOD lacks comprehensive, departmentwide data for its total investment in 

the power sources area and no single DOD office aggregates these data 

across all investment categories. Further, availability of complete data 

varies across the three investment categories: S&T, logistics support, and 

acquisition programs. We determined that DOD invested at least 

$2.1 billion in power sources from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 

2010. While DOD appears to have adequate departmentwide data on S&T 

efforts, it does not have departmentwide data for all logistics support 

investments. DOD has limited data on its investments in power sources 

when they are developed or purchased for acquisition programs. The $2.1 

billion amount includes the investments in S&T and logistics support that 

we were able to identify but not power source investments as part of 

acquisition programs because of the difficulty in obtaining investment data 

in that area. In general, a lack of investment information can adversely 

affect DOD’s ability to avoid unnecessary duplication; control costs; 

ensure basic accountability; anticipate future costs and claims on the 

budget; measure performance; maintain funds control; prevent and detect 

fraud, waste, and abuse; and address pressing management issues.11

DOD Lacks 

Comprehensive, 

Departmentwide Data 

on Some Power 

Source Investments 

 

11 GAO, DOD’s High-Risk Areas: Actions Needed to Reduce Vulnerabilities and Improve 

Business Outcomes, GAO-09-460T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 12, 2009). 

Page 8 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

We determined that from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010 DOD 

invested approximately $868 million in the development of power source 

technologies through many individual power source S&T projects. 

However, this amount is approximate as it may not include all power 

source S&T project funding.12 Figure 2 depicts DOD’s approximate 

investment in power sources S&T by DOD component. In the period from 

fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010, the Army was the largest investor 

with a total investment of about $361 million and the Navy was the second 

largest investor with a total investment of about $342 million. During that 

same time period, the Air Force invested about $90 million, the Defense 

Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) invested about $51 million, 

and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) invested about $26 million. 

DOD Has a High Level of 

Data on Power Source 

S&T Investments 

 

12 Creating an exhaustive list of all power source S&T projects was not possible because of 

the lack of centralized DOD management of data on these projects. We had to rely on data 

gathered by each research organization identified by DOD, and the potential exists that 

some pertinent organizations were not identified. Additionally, since some organizations 

involved in this area are funded by other DOD customers, it is difficult to accurately track 

the precise amounts of funding for specific projects. 

Page 9 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

Figure 2: Approximate Investment in Power Source S&T by DOD Component from 

Fiscal Year 2006 through Fiscal Year 2010 

Dollars (in millions)

Fiscal year

MDA

DARPA

Air Force

Navy

Army

Source: GAO analysis of data from the Army, Navy, Air Force, DARPA, and MDA.

0

75

150

225

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

DOD’s investment is largely concentrated within two power source 

technology areas: batteries and fuel cells. There is also significant 

investment in projects that involve more than one type of technology, 

which we refer to in figure 3 as multiple types. We found that the total 

Page 10 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

investment for capacitor-related research was small relative to the other 

areas. This may be because capacitors for high-power defense applications 

are an emerging and still immature technology.13 Officials informed us that 

DOD-wide interest in capacitors has increased along with an interest in 

high-power weaponry. As shown in figure 3, the largest investment—about 

36 percent of the total for fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010—was in 

fuel cells. 

 

13 Capacitors have been used for consumer-oriented electronic devices and other 

commercial applications for a long time, but the types required for these DOD applications 

are still an immature technology. 

Page 11 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

Figure 3: Approximate Investment in Power Source S&T by Type from Fiscal Year 

2006 through Fiscal Year 2010 

Dollars (in millions)

Fiscal year

Multiple types

Capacitors

Fuel cells

Secondary batteries

Primary batteries

Source: GAO analysis of of data from the Army, Navy, Air Force, DARPA, and MDA.

0

75

150

225

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Page 12 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

We identified a suite of DOD-wide information technology resources that 

includes a database used for tracking DOD-wide S&T activities.14 This 

database does not categorize projects in such a way that one could readily 

and reliably extract all activities for a certain research area (such as 

batteries). Despite these limitations, we were able to obtain suitable data 

from each research organization, which enabled us to present an 

approximate investment figure. 

DOD Has Data on Some 

Logistics Support 

Investments, but Not All 

Investments Are Tracked 

We found that DOD invested at least $1.2 billion in power sources for 

logistics support from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010. Though 

DLA supplies the nation’s military services with critical resources needed 

to accomplish their worldwide missions, there are additional methods 

outside of DLA’s procurement processes by which the military services 

may purchase power sources.15 For example, a service might purchase a 

power source outside of DLA’s procurement processes if that service is 

the only consumer of the power source item. However, we found no DOD 

effort to aggregate and analyze these investments, even though DLA and 

military service logistics databases track investments using a standard 

governmentwide federal supply coding system that could be used for this 

purpose. 

We collected data from DLA and military service databases for 

investments in power sources for logistics support from fiscal year 2006 

through fiscal year 2010. We determined that military service purchases 

through DLA likely account for the majority of logistics support 

investments captured by DOD databases.16 However, while the $1.2 billion 

investment amount we compiled includes data from these databases, DOD 

officials informed us that not all of these databases track power source 

purchases made as part of contractor-performed maintenance for weapon 

 

14 The Defense Technical Information Center maintains a database called the Research and 

Engineering Database. The purpose of the database is to make information on S&T projects 

available to researchers and engineers across DOD. 

15 The military services purchase power sources from the DLA inventory according to their 

needs. The prices at which DLA sells power sources to the military services are marked up 

from what DLA originally paid to account for the cost of managing supply and distribution 

of these items. 

16 We obtained logistics support investment data from the military services. The data came 

from multiple databases and acquisition program sources. We did not include the services’ 

data in the total amount because we lacked sufficient information about the reliability of 

these data. However, the amounts were very small compared to the DLA total. 

Page 13 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

systems and equipment—known as contract logistic support. As we have 

previously reported, DOD has extensively relied on contractors for 

activities such as logistics support.17 Thus, the minimum investment 

amount we generated does not include what is likely a substantial amount 

of power source investments for logistics support. Figure 4 depicts DOD’s 

minimum investment in power sources for logistics support. 

gistics support. Figure 4 depicts DOD’s 

Figure 4: Minimum DOD Investments through DLA in Power Sources for Logistics 

Support 

Dollars (in millions)

Source: GAO analysis of DLA data.

Fiscal year

0

100

200

300

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

DOD Lacks Sufficient Data 

on Its Total Investment in 

Power Sources for 

Acquisition Programs 

Though virtually all DOD weapon systems and equipment rely on a power 

source, DOD has little data on its total investment in power sources for 

acquisition programs. DOD officials told us that neither the department 

nor individual DOD components have information showing the total 

amount invested in power sources for acquisition programs, although this 

information may be retained by individual program offices. We asked 

some program offices if they could provide basic cost information on the 

 

17 GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Reexamine Its Extensive Reliance on 

Contractors and Continue to Improve Management and Oversight, GAO-08-572T

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 11, 2008). 

Page 14 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

principal power sources used by their programs. Some program offices 

provided this information, but others did not. Some offices that could not 

provide this information provided an explanation; for example, one 

program office told us that the cost for the power source was built into the 

overall cost for the system and thus was not broken out as a specific 

expense. Other program offices simply provided no cost data and no 

explanation. 

We also asked a number of senior DOD officials—including officials from 

OSD and from the services at the assistant or deputy assistant secretary 

level18—whether they could provide data on total investment in power 

sources for acquisition programs at the departmentwide or service levels, 

but none were able to do so. Officials from the Office of the Director of 

Operational Energy Plans and Programs, an office within OSD that serves 

as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and others regarding 

operational energy, concurred.19 They stated that since these costs are not 

aggregated, DOD would have to require each acquisition program office to 

identify power source investments and then consolidate them. They stated 

that this would be a labor-intensive data collection effort given the large 

number of DOD acquisition programs.20

In order to gain an understanding of how some acquisition programs 

determined which power sources would be used by their programs, we 

asked several Army, Navy, and Air Force acquisition program offices to 

provide us with information on this process.21 Although these offices 

provided responses with varying levels of detail, we determined that there 

 

18 Each service has an assistant or deputy assistant secretary who has responsibility for 

energy and power issues. 

19 This position was established by the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2009, Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 902 (2008). Operational energy is the energy 

required for moving and sustaining DOD’s forces and weapons platforms for military 

operations. 

20 DOD is currently managing about 100 Acquisition Category (ACAT) I programs, which 

are programs at or above a funding threshold of more than $365 million in fiscal year 2000 

constant dollars or, for procurement, of more than $2.190 billion in fiscal year 2000 

constant dollars. GAO, Defense Acquisition: Observations on Weapon Program 

Performance and Acquisition Reforms, GAO-10-706T (Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2010). 

21 We spoke to officials in 12 program offices for major acquisition programs designated 

ACAT I. We also attempted to identify smaller acquisition programs for the purpose of 

assessing how some programs acquired power sources. However, we were unable to 

identify active programs below the ACAT I level. 

Page 15 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

are several methods by which a program office may acquire power 

sources. For example: 

• Selection of existing military standard power sources: The 

program office for the V-22 Osprey, a tilt rotor aircraft developed by 

the Navy in the 1980s, followed a mandatory Navy specification for 

rotary aircraft that required the use of government-furnished batteries 

made to DOD military standards. According to the program office, the 

V-22 program tested two military standard batteries already used in 

two other aircraft and determined that they met the power source 

requirements of the V-22. As such, the program selected these two 

batteries for use by the V-22. Because the V-22 selected preexisting 

batteries, the program incurred no development costs; the combined 

unit costs provided were $3,688. 

• Selection of COTS power sources: Officials from the Navy’s P-8A 

Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft told us the program uses a COTS 

battery as the principal power source for its electronics systems.22 The 

P-8A is derived from a Boeing 737 commercial aircraft and has roles in 

antisubmarine and antisurface warfare as well as intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance. The program office assessed the 

suitability of the power source used by the Boeing 737 and found that 

this COTS solution met their requirements and selected it for use by 

the program. Because the P-8A selected a preexisting COTS battery, 

the program incurred no development costs associated with programunique power sources. The unit cost provided was $11,500. 

• Development of program-unique power sources: Officials in the 

Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile program office told us that they 

determined that the program required the design, development, and 

production of a program-unique thermal battery because of the 

missile’s strict design parameters in terms of internal space available 

for the power source. The program developed a new battery, but the 

program office was only able to provide limited cost information 

because the costs involved were included in the overall cost of the 

missile. The unit cost provided was $3,775. 

 

22 Although some programs may select a COTS power source, they are not suitable for all 

defense applications, especially those that are highly specialized (e.g., missiles) or for 

programs that require reliability and survivability in adverse environmental conditions. 

Page 16 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

S&T Coordination 

Mechanisms Are 

Generally Effective, 

Though Opportunities 

Exist to Improve 

Strategic Planning 

DOD coordination mechanisms for power source S&T activities are 

generally effective in facilitating coordination across pertinent DOD 

components and with DOE, but opportunities exist for improvement. We 

also found that DOD’s strategic planning process for appropriately 

directing S&T investment for power source technologies could be 

improved. DOD also generally has deficiencies in strategic planning for 

critical technologies, processes for technology transition, and tools that 

support transition. Further, S&T planning efforts can be complicated by 

external factors. For example, congressional additions to DOD’s budget 

account for just over half of the total S&T funding we identified for power 

sources. Since this process can be informal and lack transparency, 

outcomes in this area may be unpredictable and difficult to incorporate 

into strategic plans. 

S&T Coordination 

Mechanisms Are Generally 

Effective 

DOD uses various mechanisms to facilitate the coordination of power 

source S&T activities across pertinent DOD components, DOE, and in 

some cases industry. According to DOD power source researchers, the 

principal means for coordinating is the Chemical Working Group of the 

Interagency Advanced Power Group (IAPG). The Chemical Working 

Group is part of the long-standing IAPG interagency working group and 

brings together researchers from relevant DOD components, DOE, and 

other federal stakeholders to exchange information about power source 

projects and avoid unnecessary duplication of effort. In addition, the 

Defense Technical Information Center—an organization responsible for 

providing information services to DOD—has a number of information 

technology resources related to S&T that were developed to facilitate 

information sharing between stakeholders across the DOD research and 

engineering community. Table 1 lists the principal ways DOD coordinates 

S&T projects. 

Page 17 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

Table 1: Principal DOD Coordination Mechanisms for Investments in Power Source S&T Projects 

Select 

coordination mechanisms Description 

Interagency groups Interagency groups provide a forum in which researchers, acquisition personnel, and other pertinent 

stakeholders can share information and leverage resources. Key groups related to power sources 

include the Chemical Working Group of the IAPG and the Power Sources Technology Working 

Group of the Joint Defense Manufacturing Technology Panel. 

Conferences There are several major conferences in the power sources area that provide a forum for information 

sharing and professional development in the power sources community, which includes DOD, DOE, 

and other agencies. One such conference is the Power Sources Conference, which has been held 

44 times and brings together government, academic, and commercial researchers to discuss 

research projects. 

Information technology 

resources 

The Defense Technical Information Center provides a suite of databases and Web 2.0 services to 

facilitate information sharing and professional development. One example is the Research and 

Engineering Database that compiles ongoing research and development projects throughout DOD. 

Source: GAO analysis. 

As an example of the efficacy of these mechanisms, no power source 

projects presented at the 2010 annual Chemical Working Group meeting 

were identified as involving duplicative research within DOD or between 

DOD and DOE, though the meetings have been effective in identifying 

instances of project duplication in the past. Additionally, both DOD and 

DOE participate in several other coordinating groups together to leverage 

common efforts, and in July 2010 DOD and DOE signed a memorandum of 

understanding developing a framework for cooperation and partnership 

on energy issues. Both organizations agreed to collaborate on S&T 

projects at research institutions sponsored by either agency, to 

synchronize S&T to expand complementary efforts, and to develop joint 

initiatives for major energy S&T programs of mutual interest. 

Though we found these mechanisms to be generally effective, agencies 

may miss opportunities to fully coordinate because attendance at these 

interagency groups and conferences is voluntary and the level of agency 

participation varies. Further, conversations with officials from DOD 

component organizations suggest that there may be limited awareness 

within the DOD power sources community of the coordination services 

available through the Defense Technical Information Center. In areas 

where multiple agencies address a similar mission, interagency 

coordination is important to collectively meet common goals and avoid 

carrying out programs in a fragmented, uncoordinated way. As we have 

Page 18 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

previously reported,23 this lack of coordination can waste scarce funds, 

confuse and frustrate program customers, and limit the overall 

effectiveness of the federal effort. Agency officials informed us that the 

community of power source experts from the federal government, 

industry, and academia is small and well-connected by interpersonal 

relationships. Although it is not possible to accurately estimate the impact 

of these often informal relationships, officials believed that such 

relationships facilitate information sharing, which is beneficial to DODwide power source S&T. 

S&T Strategic Planning 

Could Be Improved 

We found that though DOD has generally effective S&T coordination 

mechanisms, its strategic planning process to facilitate the allocation of 

S&T funds for power source technologies could be improved. Most DOD 

components generate strategic plans to guide S&T investments, though we 

found no current Air Force plan. We found that existing military servicelevel S&T strategic plans are not specific and typically do not discuss 

investments in power sources in depth, if at all. There have also been 

several technology roadmaps developed or initiated specifically for the 

power sources area.24 However, we have been told by DOD researchers 

that these roadmaps may quickly become irrelevant without frequent 

updating because necessary investment levels and the maturity of the 

pertinent technologies may evolve over time. Further, unless roadmapping 

efforts are coordinated, DOD cannot be assured that they will be 

complementary and fully assist agencies in addressing shared 

technological challenges. Additionally, though DOD has established the 

Energy and Power Community of Interest to focus on power source issues 

as part of its broader Reliance 21 program,25 representatives of this group 

told us that it is a relatively new organization and is still finalizing 

organizational planning. They said that the community of interest will 

develop strategic planning documents specific to power sources that will 

enable DOD to better plan in this area. 

 

23 GAO-06-15. 

24 One such example is the October 2009 Power Sources Technology Roadmap sponsored 

by the Power Sources Technical Working Group of the DOD Joint Defense Manufacturing 

Technology Panel. 

25 The Reliance 21 program was established to perform integrated strategic planning for 

DOD S&T and encourage transparency across components. 

Page 19 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

We have previously reported that DOD lacked a single executive-level OSD 

official who is accountable for operational energy matters and 

recommended that one be designated.26 We also noted that DOD lacked a 

comprehensive strategic plan for operational energy. As a result, in 

October 2009 DOD established the Director of Operational Energy Plans 

and Programs. According to officials from this office, they will, among 

other things, coordinate departmentwide policy, planning, and program 

activities related to operational energy demand and relevant technologies. 

Further, officials told us that this office will also include power source 

technologies in its purview. The Director was recently confirmed, and the 

office is currently working to gather the personnel required to support its 

efforts. The Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2009 requires the office to submit an Annual DOD Energy 

Management Report on departmentwide operational energy.27

We have previously reported that DOD generally faces problems with 

deficiencies in strategic planning for critical technologies, processes for 

technology development and transition, and tools that support transition.28

Similarly, some DOD officials told us about challenges in transitioning a 

new power source technology from the laboratory to an acquisition 

program. We identified some efforts that support power source technology 

transition within the services. However, DOD researchers said that the 

overall problem still occurs in this area and that promising technologies 

may be forgotten or overlooked if they are not transitioned into an 

acquisition program. In addition, DOD’s lack of oversight and 

comprehensive data on power source investments for acquisition 

programs may further complicate technology transition efforts. 

External Factors Can Pose 

Planning Challenges 

S&T planning efforts can be complicated by external factors. We found 

that DOD investments in power source S&T come from several sources, 

including base budget funds, small business programs (such as the SBIR 

program), and congressional add-ons—that is, additions Congress makes 

to DOD’s budget. From the data we collected, we determined that 

 

26 GAO, Defense Management: Overarching Organizational Framework Needed to Guide 

and Oversee Energy Reduction Efforts for Military Operations, GAO-08-426 (Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 13, 2008).

27 Pub. L. No. 110-417, § 331 (2008). 

28 GAO, Best Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD Technology Transition 

Processes, GAO-06-883 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 14, 2006). 

Page 20 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

congressional add-ons account for approximately 55 percent of the DOD 

total investment we identified in power source S&T from fiscal year 2006 

through fiscal year 2010. While these add-ons provide funding for S&T, 

officials at DOD research organizations told us that these add-ons may 

pose a challenge to strategic planning for two reasons. First, research 

organizations may lack complete discretion over how to apply the funds—

while they may be able to accept or decline an add-on, these add-ons do 

not give them full control over the project. Second, since this process can 

be informal and lack transparency, outcomes in this area may be 

unpredictable and difficult to incorporate into strategic plans. 

Though DOD officials agree that the department needs to increase its 

emphasis on power source standardization, it lacks a departmentwide 

policy to emphasize or compel early consideration of standard power 

sources. Absent emphasis on early standardization, profit incentives can 

often lead companies to develop unique, proprietary power sources. The 

Army has a policy to encourage standardization, but the other services 

lack comparable policies. Although it is generally more economical to 

address standardization early in the acquisition process and prior to the 

deployment of weapon systems or equipment to the field, opportunities 

may exist to increase standardization by retrofitting weapon systems or 

equipment for which a proprietary power source has already been 

developed. This was recently done successfully with the TALON bomb 

disposal robot. DOD’s lack of emphasis on power source standardization 

limits opportunities to obtain potential benefits, including reduced item 

unit costs and a smaller logistical footprint. 

DOD’s Power Source 

Standardization 

Efforts Are Not 

Departmentwide and 

Lack Robust 

Enforcement 

Efforts to Standardize 

Lack Sufficient Emphasis 

and Oversight 

It is important to emphasize standardization early in a program before 

certain system decisions are made. Without early consideration of the 

available standard power source, the design parameters of a system may 

become more constrained as other parts are developed and integrated. As 

a result, remaining space may not be sufficient to fit the shape of 

appropriate standard power sources. Although in some cases developing a 

program-unique power source is necessary because of legitimate 

constraints, such as necessary limitations on the space available for a 

power source, officials told us that companies may develop programunique power sources unnecessarily. Not requiring power source 

standardization can result in unnecessary proliferation that may ultimately 

have downstream implications in terms of resupplying the warfighter. 

DOD officials we spoke with agree that the department needs to increase 

its emphasis on power source standardization. However, DOD lacks a 

Page 21 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

departmentwide policy to help emphasize power source standardization 

and compel early consideration of standard power sources. We found that 

without policies requiring standardization, programs may choose to 

develop or select nonstandard power sources when an existing military 

standard or other preferred item could have been used, potentially 

hindering standardization efforts. 

DOD and industry officials told us that power sources are often not 

considered by program offices, or are thought of by acquisition officials as 

a peripheral concern because of the low costs relative to overall program 

costs. Additionally, according to the Defense Standardization Program, 

DOD’s performance-based acquisition policies give contractors primary 

responsibility for recommending the use of standard components to meet 

performance requirements. DOD officials and power source company 

representatives have told us that program managers may choose not to 

exercise oversight of these contractor decisions. Further, during these 

discussions, we were told that companies have a profit motive to develop 

proprietary power sources as part of the acquisition of a weapon system or 

equipment because they would prefer to be sole-source suppliers. Thus, 

they may not consider standard options that would provide more optimal 

solutions for DOD customers. 

According to DOD officials, an instance of a contractor choosing a 

proprietary power source over an existing battery occurred with the 

batteries for two radio systems used by the Army and the Marine Corps—

the AN/PRC-148 Multiband Inter/Intra Team Radio and the AN/PRC-152 

Falcon radio. Though the radios are functionally similar, they each use a 

program-unique proprietary battery instead of an existing battery or a 

battery common to both radios. Further, although the batteries are very 

similar in design and each will fit in the other device, a superficial design 

characteristic on one battery prohibits the battery from powering the 

other manufacturer’s radio. In addition, the charger interfaces are not 

compatible, so the batteries cannot be charged using a single charger 

without modification, such as through an adapter. As a result, the service 

users of the two radios must manage inventories for two types of batteries 

and chargers, and the soldiers in the field have to ensure that they take the 

correct battery for their radio since the other battery will not be 

compatible. Also, the military services are unable to competitively procure 

the batteries because each is a proprietary device and the services must 

rely on the sole-source supplier of each battery—potentially increasing the 

risk of item shortages or delays. 

Page 22 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

Though DOD officials we spoke with in the power sources area agree that 

the department needs to increase emphasis on power source 

standardization early in programs, existing organizational efforts lack 

authority and resources to implement any policies. For example, DOD’s 

Defense Standardization Program established the Joint Standardization 

Board for Power Source Systems to focus specifically on power source 

standardization.29 According to the board’s charter, it serves as a standing 

technical group for power source standardization efforts.30 Its specific role 

is to participate in the development of an overarching DOD 

standardization strategy for power sources and to promote commonality 

of component parts or interfaces by facilitating a coordinated approach 

with joint programs. However, the Chairman of the Joint Standardization 

Board for Power Source Systems told us that though the board is part of 

the Defense Standardization Program, it does not have the funding it needs 

to function and thus has had little impact. He added that other joint 

standardization boards have significant user funding because particular 

acquisition program managers, or sponsors, have a vested interest in the 

results of their work. 

Officials from this board also noted that while emphasizing 

standardization early in acquisition programs will undoubtedly yield future 

benefits, DOD lacks a comprehensive plan for creating an appropriate 

level of emphasis on power source standardization and that DOD also 

lacks a policy for ensuring the achievement of standardization goals. 

Accordingly, these officials recommended in a Defense Standardization 

Program publication that DOD establish a plan (in conjunction with power 

source experts from throughout the federal government, industry, and 

academia) to create an appropriate level of DOD-wide emphasis on 

standardization. Further, they recommended that DOD create a policy that 

addresses the use of nonstandard power sources and that might articulate 

 

29 The Defense Standardization Program is a program established by DOD and is 

responsible for promoting standardization throughout DOD. Department of Defense, Office 

of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology and Logistics, Defense 

Standardization Program (DSP): Policies and Procedures, DOD 4120.24-M (March 2000). 

30 The Joint Standardization Board for Power Source Systems is one of nine chartered joint 

standardization boards under the Defense Standardization Program that are focused on 

different technology areas. Each board is responsible for advancing interoperability, 

logistical readiness, and cost efficiency within its technology focus area. These boards also 

provide standardization advocacy, guidance, and executive-level support, ensuring highlevel oversight and advocacy of strategic standardization initiatives. OSD Memorandum for 

Joint Battery Technical Working Group, Subject: Joint Standardization Board for Power 

Source Systems (June 8, 2006). 

Page 23 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

a process of senior-level review to determine if requests to use 

nonstandard power sources are justified. 

Army Policy Encourages 

Standardization, but Other 

Services Lack Comparable 

Policies 

The most significant DOD power source standardization policy we found 

related to acquisition programs is section 8.8 of Army Regulation (AR) 70-

1.31 Two main objectives of this policy are to decrease the number and 

types of batteries the Army uses and limit the development of unique 

batteries except where necessary. The regulation prioritizes use of military 

or commercial standard rechargeable batteries in acquisition programs, 

with a particular emphasis on using rechargeable batteries. Program 

managers are supposed to coordinate system battery requirements with 

Army power source subject matter experts, who we were told are 

currently in the Army Power Division.32 For programs where military or 

commercial standard rechargeable battery types are not practical, 

program offices can choose from a list of military-preferred batteries. The 

regulation requires that program managers obtain an Army acquisition 

executive approval—which we were told is the responsibility of the 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and 

Technology—if a program manager intends to use batteries other than 

those articulated in the regulation. This approval is based on a favorable 

technical evaluation by Army Power Division officials. 

Army Power Division officials stated that there are several difficulties 

associated with ensuring that acquisition programs consistently follow the 

regulation. They said that section 8.8 of AR 70-1 can only succeed if there 

is an effective mechanism for ensuring that acquisition programs comply 

with it, and they identified challenges that may compromise effective 

implementation of the regulation. First, Army Power Division officials told 

us that program managers might not be aware of the requirements. They 

said that they do not know how many Army acquisition programs comply 

with section 8.8 of AR 70-1 since they are only aware of the programs to 

which they provide consulting services as part of the regulation. They 

could not tell us if any programs did not comply with the regulation and 

 

31 Army Regulation 70-1, Research, Development, Acquisition: Army Acquisition Policy, 

para. 8-8 (December 2003). 

32 These experts formerly made up the Power Sources Center of Excellence, but now this 

responsibility has been transferred to the Army Power Division of the Army 

Communication-Electronics Research, Development, and Engineering Center. 

Page 24 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

therefore did not request a technical evaluation before developing a 

program-unique battery. 

Second, they said that program managers may not comply with AR 70-1 

because they do not understand the potential downstream logistical issues 

that can occur when battery decisions are not made early in the 

acquisition process. Army Power Division officials said they prefer to get 

involved with an acquisition program early in the process so they can help 

identify the best battery solution before system decisions restrict potential 

choices. They said that to do so they have to earn the respect and trust of 

program managers so that these programs will seek technical consultation 

early in the process. They added that the Army Power Division proactively 

tries to establish and maintain good relationships with the different Army 

program offices that might have battery needs. 

Third, the Army Power Division receives approximately half of its funding 

via customer reimbursement, meaning that it receives funding from 

program offices when it provides consultative services. These variables 

put the Army Power Division in a difficult position when current and 

potential acquisition program customers of their technical services request 

a favorable technical evaluation to support use of a program-unique 

battery. Army Power Division officials told us that their evaluation may be 

influenced by their desire to avoid compromising existing relationships 

with program offices. They added that an unfavorable evaluation may lead 

the program manager to forgo consultation with the Army Power Division 

in the future, meaning the Army Power Division would lose a customer 

and associated funding. Further, these officials told us that if a program 

were to request an evaluation of a nonstandard battery late in the weapon 

system or equipment development process (such as right before the start 

of production), the Army Power Division might suggest approval of the 

battery to the Army acquisition executive to avoid delaying production. 

While Army officials acknowledge compliance issues, the Program 

Manager-Mobile Electric Power has recently established the position 

Product Director for Batteries to help facilitate central coordination to 

reduce battery proliferation in the Army based on a perceived lack of 

central coordination in the Army on battery issues.33 This position has just 

been established and thus has not yet had much impact, but the Product 

 

33 This position is in the office of the Program Manager-Mobile Electric Power, which has 

traditionally dealt with attempting to create DOD-wide standards for military generators. 

Page 25 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

Director for Batteries told us that pending approval he intends to 

eventually take over and update section 8.8 of AR 70-1—including 

enforcement and approving or denying of waiver applications—as well as 

any other Army battery standardization efforts. He told us that because he 

is a program manager he will have more authority than the Army Power 

Division to promulgate and enforce policies applicable to increasing the 

emphasis on standardization.34

Aside from the Army efforts, we found limited power source 

standardization efforts in the other military services. In general, they are 

limited to specific applications, such as aircraft, and are not applicable to 

the whole service or are not departmentwide. The Navy has several 

platform-specific efforts within the Naval Air Systems Command to 

develop military performance specifications for multiple battery types to 

limit proliferation of aircraft battery types. The Marine Corps Systems 

Command has developed an interactive computer-adaptive tool to help 

acquisition personnel in selecting appropriate, existing batteries for their 

programs. Also, the Marine Corps Systems Command has a topic paper on 

electrical connectors—including connectors for batteries—that is 

intended to reduce proliferation of the connectors that connect the battery 

to weapon systems or equipment. However, use of these tools is voluntary. 

We did not find any Air Force-wide processes for encouraging the use of 

existing standard or other preferred power sources. 

DOD Has Not Evaluated 

Departmentwide 

Opportunities to 

Standardize Power 

Sources in Deployed 

Weapon Systems and 

Equipment 

Although it is generally more economical to address standardization early 

in the acquisition process and prior to the deployment of weapon systems 

or equipment to the field, opportunities may exist to increase 

standardization by retrofitting weapon systems or equipment for which a 

proprietary power source has already been developed. However, DOD has 

not undertaken a departmentwide assessment to identify other weapon 

systems or equipment that use a nonstandard power source but that could 

be retrofitted with a more efficient and lower-cost standard power source 

with a relatively small investment. Such efforts may provide significant 

 

34 Before his position was established, the Product Director for Batteries discussed the 

possibility of establishing such a position with relevant organizations throughout the Army. 

Officials in these organizations thought that the idea of a having battery director was 

warranted to facilitate improving management in this area. Though a charter is still 

forthcoming, the mission of his office will be to facilitate central coordination in this area. 

Page 26 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

cost savings and operational benefits.35 For example, Army and Navy 

research organizations replaced the expensive proprietary batteries used 

by TALON bomb disposal robots with military standard batteries that are 

already in the DLA inventory. Army officials noted that their 

standardization effort for the TALON robot generated a cost savings of 

about $7,000 per unit of the system. A Navy effort to retrofit TALON robots 

with military standard batteries extended the robot’s battery life by 23 

percent. Because of the success of the standardization effort in terms of 

cost and operational advantages, the Marine Corps and the Army replaced 

proprietary battery packs with the retrofitted military standard batteries 

for deployed units of the system. 

Standardization May 

Provide Benefits to Both 

DOD and the Industrial 

Base 

DOD’s lack of emphasis on power source standardization limits 

opportunities to obtain potential benefits, including reduced item unit 

costs and a smaller logistical footprint. According to a Defense 

Standardization Program case study of an effort by the Army to 

standardize batteries, standardization may enable DOD components to 

offer manufacturers greater production volumes and avoid reliance on 

sole-source suppliers for mission-critical items, which may result in a 

healthier industrial base and improved operational readiness.36 In general, 

the military battery industrial base in the United States is characterized by 

small and midsized companies that operate in an environment with lower 

sales volume compared to the commercial battery industry. One study of 

the industry characterized the United States military battery industry as 

struggling for survival with some companies relying solely on government 

sales for income.37 Further, DOD demand is irregular because of 

fluctuations based on periods of increased or decreased military activity. 

For example, a surge in demand for some non-rechargeable batteries 

related to the initiation of combat operations in Iraq exceeded the amount 

that the industrial base could produce—which threatened to reduce 

military capability.38 Though representatives from a major DOD battery 

supplier told us that they would prefer to develop and be the sole-source 

supplier of proprietary power sources, they noted that absent this option 

 

35 In some cases, retrofitting may be achieved through the use of an adapter cable that 

enables a system to use a standard battery.

36 Defense Standardization Program, Army Battery Standardization: Rechargeable 

Batteries Power the Future Force (2002). 

37 Department of Defense, Battery Manufacturing Gap Study (July 2004). 

38 GAO-05-275. 

Page 27 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

they would prefer a scenario where companies could compete to produce 

standard power sources in order to stabilize their production volumes and 

revenue. Actions that could contribute to the health of the industrial 

base—such as providing for greater production volumes through 

increased standardization—could be beneficial to DOD in ensuring the 

continued availability of military battery producers and mitigating future 

potential production and supply shortfalls. 

The goal of any acquisition program is to provide the warfighter with the 

best possible weapon system or equipment. However, in light of increasing 

dependence on power sources, supporting the warfighter’s power needs 

with more power, longer life, and less weight—as well as ease and 

sufficiency of supply—is also crucial. The proliferation of unique battery 

types could become more pronounced and ultimately affect the warfighter 

as military power demands increase. The current manner in which DOD 

manages its power source investments and translates them into products 

that meet warfighter needs is less than optimal. Specifically, DOD is not 

able to efficiently and effectively plan future investments if it lacks 

strategic investment knowledge of its total power source investment in 

S&T, logistics support, and acquisition programs. Further, while DOD 

mechanisms for coordinating S&T power source projects appear effective, 

their success depends on voluntary participation by all pertinent agencies. 

DOD agencies not fully participating in coordination mechanisms limit 

opportunities to leverage common efforts. Though DOD has some 

standardization efforts, decisions on what power sources will be put into 

new equipment and ultimately the hands of the warfighter and the supply 

system are often not made by DOD program managers and hence these 

programs may unnecessarily use proprietary power sources. Improving 

management and coordination of the power sources area could help DOD 

achieve optimal return on its investment. Without sufficient, 

departmentwide investment data; more effectively coordinated 

investments; and increased power source standardization, optimal DOD 

outcomes in this area cannot be expected. 

To increase oversight of power source investments and to allow for 

enhanced strategic planning, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 

consider how to best aggregate departmentwide investment data (from 

S&T, logistics support, and acquisition programs) in the power sources 

area and develop a mechanism to aggregate power source investment data 

across these investment categories at a level sufficient to guide decisions 

and policy. 

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action 

Page 28 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

To ensure a high level of interagency participation and coordination in the 

power sources S&T area, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense 

determine methods to strengthen pertinent member agency participation 

in interagency coordination mechanisms. 

To increase DOD-wide emphasis on power source standardization both 

during design of weapon systems and equipment as well as for deployed 

systems, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense identify and direct 

the appropriate office(s) to take the following actions: 

• Develop a plan to optimize use of standard power sources for weapon 

system or equipment types that are more amenable to such 

standardization. 

• Develop a DOD-wide policy—based on the above standardization 

plan—similar to section 8.8 of Army AR 70-1 that requires senior 

acquisition executive approval before allowing acquisition programs to 

use a power source that is not standard or preferred. As part of this 

new policy, consider requiring an independent review of the 

appropriateness of using the nonstandard or nonpreferred power 

source. 

• Identify opportunities to cost effectively retrofit deployed weapon 

systems and equipment that use a proprietary power source with an 

existing military standard or other preferred power source. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD concurred with one of 

our five recommendations and partially concurred with four. The 

department stated that it had already taken or plans to take specific 

actions in response to our recommendations, but it is unclear from DOD’s 

response what these actions entail. 

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 

DOD concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense 

consider how to best aggregate departmentwide investment data (from 

S&T, logistics support, and acquisition programs) in the power sources 

area and develop a mechanism to aggregate power source investment data 

across these investment categories at a level sufficient to guide decisions 

and policy. We believe that aggregating these data is important to inform 

decision making and investment in the power sources area. 

DOD partially concurred with our recommendation that the Secretary of 

Defense determine methods to strengthen pertinent member agency 

participation in interagency coordination mechanisms. DOD commented 

Page 29 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

that existing coordination mechanisms are generally effective and have 

been improving since the office of the Director, Operational Energy Plans 

and Programs (DOEPP) was established. DOD added that the DOEPP 

office will continue to seek ways to strengthen interagency coordination. 

However, DOD did not provide specific information on how it believes 

coordination mechanisms have improved or what additional methods 

might be used to strengthen coordination. Our review identified voluntary 

attendance and varying participation in interagency groups that if 

enhanced could further improve coordination. 

DOD also partially concurred with three recommendations related to 

power source standardization, namely, that the Secretary of Defense 

(1) identify and direct appropriate office(s) to develop a plan to optimize 

use of standard power sources for weapon systems or equipment types 

more amenable to standardization; (2) develop a DOD-wide policy similar 

to section 8.8 of Army AR 70-1 that requires senior acquisition executive 

approval before allowing acquisition programs to use a power source that 

is not standard or preferred; and (3) identify opportunities to cost 

effectively retrofit deployed weapons systems and equipment that use a 

proprietary power source with an existing military standard or other 

preferred power source. DOD indicated that ongoing activities led by the 

DOEPP office are adequately addressing all these needs and no expansion 

of effort is necessary. However, DOD did not provide any details related to 

specific, ongoing DOEPP activities addressing these needs, and we found 

no evidence of any such DOD or DOEPP actions while conducting our 

review. While DOD established the DOEPP office in October 2009, it has 

only had a Director since June 2010. In late August 2010, DOEPP office 

officials informed us that they were still writing position descriptions and 

working to gather the personnel required to support their efforts, but gave 

no indication that any substantive work had been undertaken. Our review 

revealed there is no DOD-wide plan or policy to emphasize power source 

standardization, even though DOD officials told us that DOD needs further 

emphasis in this area. Without a departmentwide plan to emphasize or 

compel early consideration of standard power sources, the use of unique, 

proprietary power sources will likely continue and DOD will not be able to 

obtain the full benefits of standardization, such as reduced item unit costs 

and a smaller logistical footprint. 

By not identifying specific actions the department has taken or plans to 

take to implement our recommendations, we believe that DOD may not 

have appropriately considered our recommendations, and as a result we 

are concerned that in the coming months it will not seek ways to fully 

implement these recommendations. 

Page 30 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
 

DOD’s written comments are reprinted in appendix III. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, 

and Air Force; the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Director, Office 

of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. The report also is 

available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the 

last page of this report. Key contributors to this report are listed in 

Michael J. Sullivan 

appendix IV. 

Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

Page 31 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

For the purposes of this report, we limited “power sources” to tactical 

power sources used for soldier-portable and vehicle applications (e.g., 

motorized land vehicles, aircraft, and ships) as well as munitions and 

satellite power sources. We excluded power sources for operational or 

strategic applications, including power sources used to support 

installations such as temporary or permanent military facilities, because of 

the size and complexity of the tactical power sources portfolio and its 

significance to the efforts of the warfighter. We focused on batteries, fuel 

cells, and capacitors based on (1) language in the congressional mandate, 

(2) predominance of batteries among tactically deployed power sources, 

and (3) the recommendations of Department of Defense (DOD) experts.1

To determine DOD’s total investment in power sources, we met with 

officials from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and across 

DOD component organizations to determine an appropriate methodology 

for collecting as complete a set of investment data as possible. We divided 

investment into three categories generally based on the three main defense 

technology life cycle areas: (1) science and technology (S&T); (2) logistics 

support, or the provision of logistics, materiel, and transportation 

according to military needs; and (3) power sources for DOD weapon 

systems or equipment acquisition programs. Based on a review of the 

budget and on discussions with OSD officials, we found that there was no 

central repository for DOD investments in power source S&T. DOD 

officials told us that one would have to request the data from each 

pertinent S&T organization. As a result, we developed a data collection 

instrument asking each research organization to provide data on all power 

source projects within our scope. Specifically, we requested project-level 

information, including the project name, purpose, budget activity, and 

funding history from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010. We also 

requested data on projected future funding, but not all organizations were 

able to provide this information. The Office of Naval Research (ONR) 

compiled the data for the Navy since ONR manages all Department of the 

Navy S&T funds, including those for the Marine Corps. The Army Deputy 

Director for Technology from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the 

Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology’s Research and 

Technology Division compiled the data from the Army research 

organizations. The Air Force Research Laboratory compiled data for Air 

 

1

 We conducted an analysis of the total weight of power sources carried by soldiers during 

a typical mission based on initial information that the combined weight of these power 

sources is overly burdensome. We found that the total weight of power sources carried by 

soldiers is not as significant as has been suggested by some sources. 

Page 32 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

Force power source S&T projects. We assessed the reliability of these S&T 

data by (1) performing electronic testing of required data elements and (2) 

obtaining responses from agency officials knowledgeable about the data. 

We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 

presenting an approximate total of S&T investments in this report. This 

investment amount is approximate because creating an exhaustive list of 

all power source S&T projects was not possible because of the lack of 

centralized DOD management of this area and the fact that we had to rely 

on data gathered by each research organization. Additionally, since some 

organizations involved in this area are funded by other DOD customers, it 

is difficult to accurately track the precise amounts of funding for specific 

projects. 

We also interviewed officials from each service and its component 

research organizations about S&T efforts in the power sources area. For 

the Army, we met with the Army Deputy Director for Technology from the 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and 

Technology, Research and Technology Division; officials from the Army 

Research, Development, and Engineering Command; officials from the 

Army Research Laboratory; officials from the Army CommunicationsElectronics Research, Development and Engineering Center’s Army Power 

Division; and the Program Manager-Mobile Electric Power Product 

Director for Batteries. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for 

Installations and Environment, and the Army Tank Automotive Research, 

Development and Engineering Center both provided written responses to 

our questions. For the Navy, we spoke with officials from ONR; Navy 

Surface Warfare Center Crane Division; the Naval Undersea Warfare 

Center Newport Division; the Naval Air Systems Command’s Power and 

Energy Division; and the Marine Corps Systems Command. The Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment provided 

written responses to our questions. For the Air Force, we spoke with 

officials from the Air Force Research Laboratory, and we obtained written 

responses from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 

Energy, Environment, Safety and Occupational Health and the Air Force 

Materiel Command. We also obtained written responses from the Defense 

Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). We also spoke with 

officials from U.S. Special Operations Command and obtained data on 

their power sources S&T investments. 

To assess the involvement of the defense power sources industry in DOD 

investments in power source S&T, we met with representatives of Saft 

America Inc. (Saft), Advanced Thermal Batteries, and EaglePicher 

Technologies, LLC (EaglePicher). According to the companies, Saft and 

Page 33 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

EaglePicher are two large DOD battery suppliers. We also attended an 

annual power sources technology conference as well as two meetings of 

the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) Military Power 

Sources Committee and spoke with representatives from additional 

companies, including Alion Science and Technology, Dow Kokam, and 

Yardney Technical Products. We also gathered information through 

interviews with and written responses from the membership of the NDIA 

Military Power Sources Committee in order to gain additional perspective 

from the industry. We also met with members of the South Carolina 

Research Authority’s Defense Advanced Battery Manufacturing Coalition. 

To determine DOD’s investments in power sources as part of a DOD 

weapon systems or equipment acquisition programs, we initially searched 

DOD budget requests to locate power source investment data related to 

acquisition programs. This method demonstrated that power sources are 

typically not broken out as specific cost elements of budget request line 

items related to acquisition programs. We were told by cognizant DOD 

officials that this information was not available in an aggregated format. 

Though we judged that the scope of DOD’s existing acquisition programs, 

which includes around 100 major defense acquisition programs and 

smaller programs, was too large for us to obtain information from every 

program, we decided to obtain information from selected programs. We 

did not assess the reliability of acquisition program data because we 

determined that it would not be feasible for DOD to generate these data to 

enable us to determine the investment in this area for this report. We 

selected weapon systems and equipment from each of the military services 

to provide a cross section of weapon system and equipment types (e.g., 

aircraft, satellites, ships, vehicles, and portable electronics). As part of this 

effort, we spoke with program office officials and obtained data from the 

following programs: 

• Army: Patriot/MEADS missile and Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. 

• Navy: Joint Program Executive Office for the Joint Tactical Radio 

System, DDG 1000 destroyer, AGM-88E Advanced Anti-Radiation 

Guided Missile, P-8A Poseidon, Joint Multi-mission Submersible, MineResistant Ambush Protected vehicle, and the V-22 Osprey program 

offices. 

• Air Force: Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile, Navstar Global 

Positioning System (GPS) GPS III, and Advanced Extremely High 

Frequency satellites program offices. 

To determine DOD’s investments in logistics support, we requested 

Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) data on sales of power sources to the 

Page 34 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

military from fiscal year 2006 through fiscal year 2010. Though these data 

do not include power sources that DLA might have procured as part of its 

inventory management processes, they do include all power sources that 

the military services bought from DLA during this period. To obtain data 

on military service power source procurements that occur outside of DLA, 

we obtained data from the Air Force Materiel Command, the Naval Supply 

Systems Command, and the Army Materiel Command. We assessed the 

reliability of logistics support data by (1) performing electronic testing of 

required data elements and (2) obtaining responses from agency officials 

knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of presenting a minimum investment 

in this area in this report. Our investment total for logistics support 

represents a minimum amount because, as DOD officials informed us, the 

data we obtained from DLA and military service logistics databases do not 

capture power source purchases made as part of contract logistics 

support—a type of contracting activity on which DOD has relied 

extensively. 

To assess the degree to which DOD coordinates power source 

investments, we spoke with cognizant officials from each of the military 

services, research organizations across DOD, and DLA—including DLA’s 

Battery Network group. For information on coordination of S&T 

investments, we spoke with the Army Deputy Director for Technology 

from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 

Logistics and Technology, Research and Technology Division; officials 

from the Army Research, Development, and Engineering Command; 

officials from the Army Research Laboratory; officials from the Army 

Communications-Electronics Research, Development and Engineering 

Center’s Army Power Division; and the Program Manager-Mobile Electric 

Power’s Product Director for Batteries. The Assistant Secretary of the 

Army for Installations and Environment and the Army Tank Automotive 

Research, Development and Engineering Center both provided written 

responses to our questions. For the Navy, we spoke with officials from the 

ONR, the Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane Division, the Naval 

Undersea Warfare Center Newport Division, the Naval Air Systems 

Command’s Power and Energy Division, and the Marine Corps Systems 

Command. We also received written responses to our questions from the 

Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and 

Environment. For the Air Force, we spoke with officials from the Air 

Force Research Laboratory, and we obtained written responses from the 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Energy, Environment, 

Safety and Occupational Health. In addition, we obtained written 

responses from DARPA. We also spoke to officials from the DOD ManTech 

Page 35 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology 

office and officials involved with the DOD Reliance 21 program and the 

Energy and Power Community of Interest. We also took part in a training 

session related to DOD-wide information-sharing resources. 

To assess the effectiveness of some of DOD’s coordinating mechanisms, 

we attended the 44th Power Sources Conference where industry, 

academic, and DOD power source researchers and other experts 

discussed ongoing power source S&T efforts. We attended the annual 

meeting of the Chemical Working Group of the Interagency Advanced 

Power Group as well as a meeting of the Power Sources Technology 

Working Group. In addition, we spoke with members of the Lithium 

Battery Technical/Safety Group. To assess DOD coordination with the 

Department of Energy (DOE), we spoke with representatives of the Joint 

DOD/DOE Munitions Technology Development Program and the DOE 

Office of Vehicle Technologies. We also drew extensively on other GAO 

work related to interagency coordination. 

To assess the extent to which DOD’s policies facilitate the use of standard 

power sources, we met with cognizant officials from each of the military 

services, including officials from the Army Communications-Electronics 

Research, Development and Engineering Center and the Program 

Manager-Mobile Electric Power’s Product Director for Batteries. We 

received written responses to questions from an official from the Defense 

Standardization Program’s Joint Standardization Board for Power Source 

Systems. We also received written responses from the Assistant Secretary 

of the Navy for Energy, Installations, and Environment; the Assistant 

Secretary of the Army for Installations and Environment; and the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Energy, Environment, Safety and 

Occupational Health. We also reviewed applicable standardization policies 

and regulations. 

We conducted this performance audit from December 2009 to December 

2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Page 36 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix II: DOD Research, Development, 

Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Budget Appendix II: DOD Research, Development, Activities 

Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Budget 

Activities 

Budget activity Description of activity 

1 Basic Research Systematic study directed toward greater knowledge or understanding of 

fundamental aspects of phenomena without specific applications toward 

processes or products in mind. 

2 Applied Research Systematic study to understand the means to meet a recognized and specific 

need. 

3 Advanced Technology Development Development of subsystems and components and efforts to integrate 

subsystems and components into system prototypes for field experiments, 

tests in a simulated environment, or both. 

4 Advanced Component Development and 

Prototypes 

Efforts necessary to evaluate integrated technologies, representative modes 

or prototype systems in a high-fidelity and realistic operating environment. 

5 System Development and Demonstration Conducting engineering and manufacturing development tasks aimed at 

meeting validated requirements prior to full-rate production. 

6 RDT&E Management Support RDT&E efforts and funds to sustain, modernize, or both, the installations or 

operations required for general RDT&E. 

7 Operational Systems Development Development efforts to upgrade systems that have been fielded or have 

received approval for full-rate production and anticipate production funding in 

the current or subsequent fiscal year. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOD Financial Management Regulation DOD 7000-14R, Volume 2B, Chapter 5, July 2008. 

Page 37 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix III: Comments from the Department Appendix III: Comments from the of Defense 

Department of Defense 

Page 38 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 39 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense 

Page 40 GAO-11-113 Defense Acquisitions
Appendix IV: 

A

GAO Contact and Staff 

cknowledgments 

Page 41 GAO-11-113 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Michael J. Sullivan, (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov 

In addition to the contact named above, Art Gallegos, Assistant Director; 

John Oppenheim, Assistant Director; Frederick K. Childers; John 

Dell’Osso; Rosa Johnson; John Krump; C. James Madar; Bill Solis; Don 

Springman; Bob Swierczek; and Mark Viehman made key contributions to 

this report. 

 Defense Acquisitions 

GAO Contact 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

(120872) 
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