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This disposition is not appropriate for publication. 1

Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may have

(see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. See 9th

Cir. BAP Rule 8013-1.

ORDERED PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ) BAP No. CC-11-1595-DMkKi

)

MAN SOO YUN, ) Bk. No. SV 10-18057 AA

)

Debtor. )

______________________________)

)

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF )

CALIFORNIA, by and through the)

California Corporations )

Commissioner, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) M E M O R A N D U M1

)

MAN SOO YUN; DAVID SEROR, )

Chapter 7 Trustee; UNITED )

STATES TRUSTEE, )

)

Appellees. )

______________________________)

Argued and Submitted on July 20, 2012

at Pasadena, California

Filed - August 14, 2012

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the Central District of California

Honorable Alan M. Ahart, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

 

Appearances: Erik Richard Brunkal, Esq. argued for Appellant,

People of the State of California, by and through

the California Corporations Commissioner; David

Brian Lally, Esq. argued for Appellee, Man Soo Yun.

 

FILED

AUG 14 2012

SUSAN M SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
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Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter and section 2

references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532, and

all rule references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy

Procedure, Rules 1001-9037. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

are referred to as Civil Rules.

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Before: DUNN, MARKELL, and KIRSCHER, Bankruptcy Judges.

The California Corporations Commissioner (“Commissioner”)

moved for relief from the § 362(a) automatic stay to continue 2

enforcement proceedings in the California Superior Court (“State

Court Proceeding”) against an individual chapter 7 debtor under

the California Franchise Investment Law (“FIL”), Cal. Corp. Code

§ 31000 et seq. The bankruptcy court’s limited order granting

relief (“Order”) authorized the Commissioner to seek only

injunctive relief in the State Court Proceeding. Asserting that

§ 362(b)(4) excepted from the automatic stay claims under the FIL

for administrative penalties and restitution, the Commissioner

appealed the Order. We AFFIRM.

I. FACTS

Man Soo Yun was the president, chief operating officer, and

owner of Green on Blue, Inc. (“GOBI”), incorporated on September

12, 2006. Mr. Yun and GOBI, as the master franchisor in the

United States for WHOSTYLE Company, Ltd., a Korean Corporation,

were in the business of franchising “Yogurberry” frozen yogurt

outlets. GOBI did business as Yogurberry U.S.A. and as Yogurberry

Franchising Company.

The California Corporations Commission (“Commission”)

approved GOBI’s registration to sell Yogurberry franchises in

California for the periods December 21, 2006 through April 20,

2007, and April 24, 2007 through April 21, 2008. Prior to that
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approval, the Commission reviewed GOBI’s proposed Uniform

Franchise Offering Circular (“UFOC”), after it had been revised

several times by the Commission’s Securities Regulations Division. 

The UFOC provides potential franchisees with information to make

an informed decision whether to invest in a franchise opportunity. 

The FIL requires that a prospective franchisee is to receive a

copy of the UFOC fourteen days prior to signing a binding

agreement or providing any consideration to the franchisor.

Following the receipt of complaints from a number of

franchisees, the Commissioner initiated an administrative

investigation of Mr. Yun and GOBI in 2009. As part of the

investigation, the Commissioner sent questionnaires to twenty-six

“known victims;” only nine questionnaires were returned. The

Commissioner ultimately determined that Mr. Yun and GOBI had

violated the FIL by offering and/or selling franchises in

California (1) prior to registering the offers as required by Cal.

Corp. Code § 31110, (2) without providing prospective franchisees

with UFOCs as required by Cal. Corp. Code § 31119, and (3) by

means of written or oral communications containing untrue

statements or omissions of material facts in violation of Cal.

Corp. Code § 31201. Based on these findings, the Commissioner

issued a “Citation & Desist and Refrain Order” (“Commissioner’s

Order”) on January 7, 2010.

The Commissioner’s Order, issued pursuant to Cal. Corp. Code

§ 31406, directed Mr. Yun and GOBI to desist from the offer or

sale of any and all franchises in the state of California

(1) unless and until the offers had been registered under the FIL

or were exempt from registration, (2) without first providing
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prospective franchisees with a UFOC, and (3) by means of written

or oral communications containing untrue statements or omissions

of material facts.

The Commissioner’s Order contained two additional provisions

that are at issue in this appeal. The first, titled

“Administrative Penalty,” states:

Pursuant to [Cal. Corp. Code § 31406], [Mr. Yun and

GOBI] are hereby assessed and ordered to pay, jointly

and severally, an administrative penalty of [$42,500]. 

If within [60] days from the receipt of this citation

[Mr. Yun or GOBI fails] to notify the Commissioner that

they intend to request a hearing as described in subd.

(d) of [§ 31406], the citation shall be deemed final. 

Subdivision (d) of [§ 31406] provides that any hearing

requested under [§ 31406] shall be conducted in

accordance with Chapter 5 . . . of Part 1 of Division 3

of Title 2 of the California Govt. Code.

The second, titled “Ancilliary [sic] Relief,” states:

Pursuant to [Cal. Corp. Code § 31408], [Mr. Yun and

GOBI] are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally,

$2,339,400.00 for both restitution of out-of-pocket

expenses and for rescission of franchise fees, royalty

fees and other fees assessed by and paid to [Mr. Yun and

GOBI] by nine victims/franchisees.

The Commissioner asserts that because neither Mr. Yun nor

GOBI requested a hearing on the Commissioner’s Order within the

sixty days allowed by Cal. Corp. Code § 31406, the Commissioner’s

Order became final on June 9, 2010.

Mr. Yun filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on July 2,

2010. The Notice of Commencement of the Bankruptcy Case

(“Bankruptcy Case Notification”) set a deadline of October 1, 2010

for a creditor to object to the discharge of its debt. Although

three franchisees filed nondischargeability complaints against Mr.
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After trial, the bankruptcy court entered judgment in 3

favor of Mr. Yun on their exception to discharge complaint. 

Appellee’s Opening Brief at 6:13-15.

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Yun, the Commissioner did not. 3

In his Schedule F - Creditors Holding Unsecured Nonpriority

Claims, Mr. Yun listed the California Department of Corporations

(“Corporations Department”) as a creditor with a claim in the

amount of $2,384,400.00 based upon his personal liability on a

business judgment. The address Mr. Yun used for the Corporations

Department was “Consumer Services Office, 1515 K Street, Suite

200, Sacramento, CA 95814.” This is the address to which the

Bankruptcy Case Notification was mailed by the Bankruptcy Noticing

Center. The Commissioner contends that the address was not

correct. It appears that the Commissioner does not dispute the

department, office, or physical address Mr. Yun used in Schedule

F. However, he faults Mr. Yun and his counsel for not including

in the address the name of the Senior Corporations Counsel, Erik

Brunkal, assigned to enforce the Commissioner’s Order. In his

Declaration to the bankruptcy court, Mr. Brunkal averred: 

“[N]either I nor anyone else at the Department of Corporations had

actual notice of this bankruptcy until June 27, 2011 – nearly a

year after the case was filed.”

Mr. Yun received his chapter 7 discharge on March 4, 2011. 

However, approximately two weeks later, the discharge order was

vacated. We learned of this fact at oral argument, and were

informed at that time that no discharge order subsequently has
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Mr. Lally prepared Appellee’s Brief in this case. At 4

page 2, lines 24-25, it states: “The Debtor filed his Chapter 7

Petition on July 2, 2010, and received his Discharge on March 4,

2011.” Because Mr. Lally did not inform us that this discharge

subsequently was vacated, a matter relevant to our analysis of the

issues in this appeal, we prepared for oral argument under a

significant misapprehension of the facts. We since have checked

the bankruptcy court docket and have confirmed that as of the date

of this memorandum decision, Mr. Yun still has not received his

discharge. See O’Rourke v. Seaboard Sur. Co. (In re E.R. Fegert,

Inc.), 887 F.2d 955, 957-58 (9th Cir. 1989) (appellate court may

take judicial notice of bankruptcy court records); Atwood v. Chase

Manhattan Mortg. Co. (In re Atwood), 293 B.R. 227, 233 n.9 (9th

Cir. BAP 2003) (same).

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been entered. On April 8, 2011, the Commissioner filed in the 4

Superior Court of California in and for the County of Los Angeles

(“State Court”) an application (“Application”) for a judgment for

administrative penalties and an order compelling compliance with

the Commissioner’s Order. Specifically, the Application stated

that the Commissioner was applying

(1) for a judgment for administrative penalties in the

amount of $42,500.00, (2) for an order compelling

compliance with the [Commissioner’s Order], including

but not limited to the order that [Mr. Yun and GOBI]

jointly and severally pay restitution and rescission in

the amount of $2,339,400.00 to nine victim franchisees .

. . , and (3) for an award of attorney fees and costs in

the amount of $2,500.00.

The State Court set a hearing (“July 6 Hearing”) on the

Application for July 6, 2011.

On June 1, 2011, Mr. Yun’s bankruptcy attorney filed a

“Notice of Stay of Proceedings” (“State Court Notice”) in the

State Court based upon Mr. Yun’s pending bankruptcy case, and

served the State Court Notice on the Commissioner at the address

included in Schedule F with the additional language “Senior

Corporations Counsel.” In his declaration, Mr. Brunkal states

that this was not proper notice, since it was not addressed
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Mr. Brunkal states in his declaration in support of the 5

RFS Motion that “[t]he Commissioner has worked diligently since

receiving actual notice of debtor’s bankruptcy filing to get this

motion heard as soon as possible and, in fact, filed the motion

within 10 days of actual notice.” This is not true. It appears

that Mr. Brunkal may have tendered his motion for filing within 10

days of June 27, 2011, but the actual RFS Motion was not filed

until July 20, 2011, 23 days after June 27.

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specifically to “Senior Corporations Counsel, Erik Brunkal.” Mr.

Brunkal further averred that the Corporations Department mailroom

“has no record of receiving any such document.”

Mr. Brunkal states that he learned of Mr. Yun’s bankruptcy

case on June 27, 2011. After he made his flight, hotel and rental

car reservations for the July 6 Hearing, Mr. Brunkal checked the

State Court docket, at which time he discovered (1) the Stay

Notice had been filed, and (2) the State Court had taken the July

6 Hearing off the calendar.

On July 20, 2011, Mr. Brunkal, acting on behalf of the

Commissioner, filed in the bankruptcy court the “Motion of the

People of the State of California for Determination That the Civil

Enforcement Action Filed in State Court Is Exempt From the

Automatic Stay, Or, In the Alternative, for Relief From the

Automatic Stay” (“RFS Motion”). In the RFS Motion, the 5

Commissioner asserted (1) “the State of California should be

allowed to prevent this . . . debtor from profiting from fraud and

discharging his obligations to the defrauded in bankruptcy,” and

(2) “[a]ny monetary judgment award against Debtor will be enforced

in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code, although the Commissioner

believes that his claim is non-dischargeable in any bankkruptcy

action pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).”

Mr. Yun responded (“Response”) that he had listed the
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Commissioner as a creditor in the case and that the Commissioner

therefore had been served with the Bankruptcy Case Notification. 

Mr. Yun asserted that because the Commissioner did not file a

timely nondischargeability complaint, he was precluded from

asserting his claims against Mr. Yun that were based upon

Mr. Yun’s alleged fraud, because the deadline to file exception to

discharge claims had passed. Mr. Yun also filed an opposition to

the Commissioner’s motion for a determination that the State of

California was exempt from the automatic stay, in which he put

directly in issue before the bankruptcy court the question of

whether the Commissioner had constructive notice of the deadline

for filing an exception to discharge complaint, notwithstanding

the Commissioner’s alleged lack of actual notice.

Following a hearing (“RFS Hearing”), the bankruptcy court

entered an order (“RFS Order”) which provided that the automatic

stay was terminated as to Mr. Yun and his estate, “only to permit

[the Commissioner] to obtain a judgment for nonmonetary relief and

to enforce such nonmonetary judgment.” The Commissioner filed a

timely notice of appeal. The Commissioner filed his Designation

of Record on Appeal and affirmatively elected not to designate the

transcript of the RFS Hearing as part of his Record on Appeal.

II. JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334

and 157(b)(2)(G). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158.

///

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///

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We do not resolve the following issue presented by the 6

Commissioner in his Statement of Issues, because its seeks an

advisory opinion from this Panel rather than review of the RFS

Order: Whether the Commissioner will violate the discharge

injunction if it continues the State Court Action to enforce the

monetary provisions of the Commissioner’s Order?

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III. ISSUES6

Whether the bankruptcy court erred when it determined that

the Commissioner’s failure to file a dischargeability complaint by

the deadline set forth in the Bankruptcy Case Notification

precluded the Commissioner from pursuing a monetary judgment

against Mr. Yun based on the Commissioner’s Order.

Whether the bankruptcy court erred when it failed to

determine that the State Court Proceeding to enforce the

Commissioner’s claims for monetary relief against Mr. Yun were

excepted from the automatic stay pursuant to § 362(b)(4).

IV. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We previously have stated that whether a particular action is

exempt from the automatic stay is a question of law that we review

de novo. Commonwealth of Mass. v. First Alliance Mortg. Co. (In

re First Alliance Mortg. Co.), 263 B.R. 99, 106 (9th Cir. BAP

2001). In the context of this appeal, however, it is more

accurate to state that the issue is a mixed question of fact and

law. “A mixed question of law and fact occurs when the historical

facts are established; the rule of law is undisputed . . . and the

issue is whether the facts satisfy the legal rule.” Murray v.

Bammer (In re Bammer), 131 F.3d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). We

review mixed questions of law and fact de novo. Carillo v. Su (In

re Su), 290 F.3d 1140, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Bammer, 131

F.3d at 792. De novo review requires that we view the case from
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the same position as the bankruptcy court. See Lawrence v. Dep’t

of Interior, 525 F.3d 916, 920 (9th Cir. 2008).

We review a bankruptcy court’s order regarding relief from

the automatic stay for abuse of discretion. Moldo v. Matsco, Inc.

(In re Cybernetic Servs., Inc.), 252 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir.

2001). We apply a two-part test to determine whether the

bankruptcy court abused its discretion. United States v. Hinkson,

585 F.3d 1247, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). First, we

consider de novo whether the bankruptcy court applied the correct

legal standard to the relief requested. Id. Then, we review the

bankruptcy court’s fact findings for clear error. Id. at 1262 &

n.20. We must affirm the bankruptcy court’s fact findings unless

we conclude that they are “(1) ‘illogical,’ (2) ‘implausible,’ or

(3) without ‘support in inferences that may be drawn from the

facts in the record.’” Id.

We may affirm the bankruptcy court’s ruling on any basis

supported by the record. See, e.g., Heilman v. Heilman (In re

Heilman), 430 B.R. 213, 216 (9th Cir. BAP 2010); FDIC v. Kipperman

(In re Commercial Money Center, Inc.), 392 B.R. 814, 826-27 (9th

Cir. BAP 2008); see also McSherry v. City of Long Beach, 584 F.3d

1129, 1135 (9th Cir. 2009).

V. DISCUSSION

A. The Panel Has Discretion to Dismiss or Summarily Affirm

in This Appeal Where the Commissioner Failed to Provide

an Adequate Record for Review.

The lack of an adequate record in this appeal is problematic. 

Despite the fact that the bankruptcy court held a hearing on the

RFS Motion, the Commissioner made an affirmative decision not to

include a transcript of the RFS Hearing. The RFS Order contains
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no factual findings or legal conclusions by the bankruptcy court. 

Consequently, we are hampered by the lack of a record in our

review of the RFS Order.

The Commissioner’s complete disregard of Rule 8009(b) in

itself constitutes a basis to dismiss this appeal or summarily

affirm the bankruptcy court’s decision. Kyle v. Dye (In re Kyle),

317 B.R. 390, 393 (9th Cir. BAP 2004), aff’d, 170 F. App’x 457

(9th Cir. 2006). That said, we have reviewed the record, as

submitted, for the purpose of our review of the issues presented.

B. The Panel’s Review Is Limited in Scope.

Generally, an appellate court will not consider an issue

unless it was raised and considered by the trial court. The

purpose of this rule is to ensure that the parties present to the

fact finder all the evidence they believe is relevant to the

issues presented. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976);

Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 487 (2008). This rule

is collateral to the broader rule that an appellate court does not

sit as a fact finding body:

The rationale for deference to the original finder of

fact is not limited to the superiority of the trial

judge's position to make determinations of credibility. 

The trial judge's major role is the determination of

fact, and with experience in fulfilling that role comes

expertise. Duplication of the trial judge's efforts in

the court of appeals would very likely contribute only

negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a

huge cost in diversion of judicial resources. In

addition, the parties to a case on appeal have already

been forced to concentrate their energies and resources

on persuading the trial judge that their account of the

facts is the correct one; requiring them to persuade

three more judges at the appellate level is requiring

too much. As the Court has stated in a different

context, the trial on the merits should be “the ‘main

event’ . . . rather than a ‘tryout on the road.’” 

Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977). For these

reasons, review of factual findings under the
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In the record before the bankruptcy court, the 7

Commissioner stated he never received notice of the bankruptcy

case. In context, it is not apparent that this was anything other

than a generalized complaint against the actions of Mr. Yun and

his bankruptcy counsel. Nowhere does the Commissioner assert that

any failure to be served implicated his rights under § 523.

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clearly-erroneous standard—with its deference to the

trier of fact—is the rule, not the exception.

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574-75

(1985).

Mr. Yun defended the RFS Motion on the basis that any claim

the State of California may have had based on Mr. Yun’s alleged

fraud was discharged when the Commissioner failed to seek a

determination that the debt was excepted from his discharge under

a subsection of § 523(a) within the time mandated by § 523(c)(1). 

The record before us does not reflect what, if anything, the

Commissioner may have asserted before the bankruptcy court with

respect to § 523. The Commissioner did not address any defense to

application of the § 523(c)(1) deadline in the RFS Motion or in

any of his supporting papers.

The Commissioner suggests on appeal that the bankruptcy court

erred when it determined that the Commissioner had failed to file

a dischargeability complaint within the time provided by

§ 523(c)(1). He asserts before us that § 523(b)(3)(B) excuses any

failure to meet the § 523(c)(1) deadline, because Mr. Yun had not

provided him with proper notice of the pendency of the bankruptcy

case. Although the timeliness of a dischargeability complaint 7

under § 523(c)(1) appears to have been raised before the

bankruptcy court by Mr. Yun, nothing in the record reflects what

facts, if any, the bankruptcy court considered in connection with
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the timeliness of pursuing a nondischargeability determination. 

We cannot say that the bankruptcy court’s findings are clearly

erroneous when we do not know what they were.

The Commissioner alternatively asserts on appeal that the

§ 523(c)(1) deadline does not apply, because the basis for

nondischargeability of the State of California’s claim is

§ 523(a)(7), which provides that a discharge under § 727 does not

discharge an individual debtor from any debt “for a fine, penalty,

or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental

unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss . . . .”

Nothing in the record reflects that the Commissioner

presented to the bankruptcy court the issue of the applicability

of § 523(a)(7), or any other provision of § 523(a), in arguing the

RFS Motion. In the absence of a record establishing that the

bankruptcy court considered these issues, we have nothing to

review on appeal.

In the absence of an adequate record, we affirm the

bankruptcy court’s order to the extent it may be based on a

determination that no timely exception to discharge complaint was

filed within the purview of § 523(c)(1). We do not reach the

issue of whether § 523(a)(7), or any other provision of § 523(a),

applies to the alleged nondischargeability of the Commissioner’s

claim where that issue was not presented to the bankruptcy court

in the first instance.

C. The Record Is Insufficient for the Panel to Review the

Commissioner’s § 362(b)(4) Issue on Appeal.

Under § 362(a), the filing of a voluntary bankruptcy petition

operates as a stay (1) of the commencement or continuation of
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actions or proceedings against the debtor (§ 362(a)(1)), and

(2) of any act to collect, assess or recover a claim against the

debtor that arose before the commencement of the bankruptcy case

(§ 362(a)(6)).

The scope of the automatic stay is intended to be “quite

broad.” Hills Motors, Inc. v. Haw. Auto. Dealers’ Ass’n, 997 F.2d

581, 585 (9th Cir. 1993). However, Congress specifically excepted

the enforcement of a governmental unit’s “police or regulatory

powers” from the scope of the automatic stay. See § 362(b)(4).

Still, “[n]ot every police or regulatory action is

automatically exempt . . . .” Commonwealth of Mass. v. First

Alliance Mortg. Co. (In re First Alliance Mortg. Co.), 263 B.R.

99, 107 (9th Cir. BAP 2001). Under Ninth Circuit precedent, the

bankruptcy court was required to apply two tests in its effort to

determine whether the Commissioner’s proposed actions fall within

the scope of § 364(b)(4)’s exception to the automatic stay: the

“pecuniary purpose” test and the “public policy” test. In re

Universal Life Church, Inc., 128 F.3d 1294, 1297 (9th Cir. 1997). 

Satisfaction of either test is sufficient for the exemption to

apply. Lockyer v. Mirant Corp., 398 F.3d 1098, 1108 (9th Cir.

2005).

These tests are applied by analyzing the individual claims

the Commissioner intended to assert against Mr. Yun. City and

County of San Francisco v. PG & E Corp., 433 F.3d 1115, 1125 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 882 (2006) (“PG & E”). Further, in

applying the tests, the bankruptcy court was governed by three

underlying principles. First, exceptions to the automatic stay

are interpreted narrowly. In re First Alliance Mortg. Co., 263
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B.R. at 106 (citing In re Dunbar, 235 B.R. 465, 470 (9th Cir. BAP

1999), aff’d, 245 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2001)). Second, “[s]tate .

. . governmental units cannot, by an exercise of their police or

regulatory powers, subvert the relief afforded by the federal

bankruptcy laws.” Thomassen v. Div. of Med. Quality Assurance,

Dept. of Consumer Affairs, State of Cal. (In re Thomassen), 15

B.R. 907 (9th Cir. BAP 1981). Third, a debtor’s right to his

discharge is protected by a broad injunction. See, e.g., Espinosa

v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 553 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2008),

aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 1367 (2010).

As commonly stated in the case law, “[u]nder the ‘pecuniary

purpose’ test, the bankruptcy court must determine ‘whether the

government action relates primarily to the protection of the

government’s pecuniary interest in the debtor’s property or to

matters of public safety and welfare.’” In re First Alliance

Mortg. Co., 263 B.R. at 107 (quoting In re Universal Life Church,

Inc., 128 F.3d at 1297). Under the “public purpose” test, the

bankruptcy court must determine whether the Commissioner seeks to

“effectuate public policy” or to adjudicate “private rights.” 

Lockyer v. Mirant, 398 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2005). These are

both factual determinations to be made based on the presentation

of evidence.

As we noted previously, the bankruptcy court made no written

factual findings, and we have no transcript before us to determine

what findings the court may have made at the Hearing. Because our

role is to review the facts found by the bankruptcy court, we must

have those facts before us on appeal when we are asked to decide

that the bankruptcy court has committed error.
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If the bankruptcy court failed to make factual findings, as

suggested by the Commissioner at oral argument, we could remand

for it to make findings. However, in the absence of the

transcript, we cannot know that the bankruptcy court did not make

the requisite findings upon which to base its order. Because the

Commissioner did not provide a transcript of the Hearing for our

review, we may presume that nothing that happened at the Hearing

would aid his case on appeal. Gionis v. Wayne (In re Gionis), 170

B.R. 675, 681 (9th Cir. BAP 1994), aff’d, 92 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir.

1996).

VI. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing analysis, and in light of the

inadequate record provided by the Commissioner, we AFFIRM.