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United States District Court 

For the Northern District of California 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 

PEARSON EDUCATION, INC., a 

Delaware corporation; JOHN WILEY & 

SONS, INC., a New York 

corporation; CENGAGE LEARNING, 

INC., a Delaware corporation; and 

THE MCGRAW-HILL COMPANIES, INC., a 

New York corporation, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

DICKSON T. WONG, individually; 

DICKSON T. WONG, as Trustee of the 

SIERRA SKY REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; 

DICKSON T. WONG, as Trustee of the 

XELA REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST DATED 

DECEMBER 25, 2008, a/k/a the XELA 

REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST; and DOES 

1-5, 

Defendants. 

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Case No. 09-1889 SC 

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 

DEFAULT JUDGMENT 

I. INTRODUCTION

 Plaintiffs Pearson Education, Inc., John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 

Cengage Learning, Inc., and the McGraw-Hill Companies 

(collectively, "Plaintiffs") now seek the entry of a default 

judgment against Defendant Dickson Wong ("Wong"), both in his 

individual capacity and as Trustee to two different revocable 

living trusts. Docket No. 28 ("Motion"). Plaintiffs accuse Wong 

of infringing upon their copyrights by selling photocopies of 

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United States District Court

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instructors' solutions manuals through online marketplaces. See

Compl., Docket No. 1. Plaintiffs have been unable to locate Wong, 

in spite of repeated and varied efforts to do so. Having 

considered the papers submitted by Plaintiffs, this Court concludes 

that an award of default judgment against Wong is appropriate, and 

GRANTS Plaintiffs' Motion. 

II. BACKGROUND

 Plaintiffs are each engaged in the business of publishing 

educational textbooks. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiffs typically require 

authors to assign the copyrights for their works to Plaintiffs, or 

to grant Plaintiffs exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute 

the works in the United States. Id. ¶ 15. Plaintiffs also publish 

instructors' solutions manuals ("ISMs"), which are supplementary 

materials that aid professors in grading homework. Id. ¶ 19. 

Plaintiffs do not sell these ISMs to the general public, "and 

tightly control distribution thereof to known faculty." Id. 

Plaintiffs do this because students may use these ISMs to cheat on 

homework or tests, and professors will be less likely to select 

Plaintiffs' textbooks for use in their courses if the ISMs for 

those textbooks are widely available to students. Id.

 The history of this case involves a somewhat convoluted series 

of attempts to track down an initially unknown individual who was 

selling copies of Plaintiffs' ISMs online, and who, by all 

appearances, has gone to great lengths to keep his identity hidden. 

Alexandra Ricciardi ("Ricciardi") is employed by Pearson Education, 

Inc. ("Pearson"), and part of her job involves searching online for 

activity that infringes upon Pearson's copyrights and trademarks. 

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Ricciardi Decl. ¶¶ 1-2.1 In early- or mid-2008, while looking on 

craigslist.org (a site featuring online classified ads), she found 

two advertisements for ISMs and test banks for textbooks that 

included works published by Pearson. Id. ¶ 2. The craigslist ad 

included instructions for contacting the seller. Id. In June of 

2008, she contacted the seller via email to ask about the 

availability of a certain Pearson ISM. Id. ¶ 3, Ex. A. The seller 

responded, under the name of "Kerry Melbourne," that the particular 

ISM was available, and requested payment through PayPal, Inc. 

("PayPal"),2 if Ricciardi wanted to proceed. Id. Ex. B. The 

seller's PayPal account was under the name "Red Lionel," with a 

different email address from that used by "Kerry Melbourne." Id. 

Ricciardi complied with the request, and paid $89.97 plus shipping 

for the ISM. Ricciardi Decl. ¶ 3. 

 Shortly thereafter, Ricciardi received in the mail a copy of 

an ISM that was different from the one she had ordered from the 

seller. Id. ¶ 4. The copy was a photocopy that was not 

professionally bound. Id. ¶ 6. She informed the seller, via 

email, that she had received the wrong ISM, and the seller 

instructed her to return the incorrect copy to an address in 

Claremont, California. Id. ¶ 4, Ex. C ("Ricciardi Email Chain"). 

The address provided was that of William McVittie, and after 

investigating the address, Plaintiffs discovered that it belonged 

to a retired California state court judge who "emphatically denied 

being the Internet seller who had violated Plaintiffs' rights." 

 

1

 Ricciardi submitted a declaration in support of the Motion. 

Docket No. 30. 

2

 PayPal is an internet service that is often used to transfer 

funds for online transactions. 

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Dunnegan Decl. ¶ 5.3 After sending the incorrect ISM to the 

provided address, Ricciardi received a photocopy of the ISM that 

she had initially requested from the seller. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. While 

Ricciardi was conducting this investigation, other individuals who 

were working for Plaintiffs were ordering similar material from 

similar craigslist postings, which later turned out to be sold by 

the same seller. Id. ¶ 7. For example, Jennifer Siewert 

("Siewert"), paralegal for Plaintiffs' law firm, responded to 

similar craiglist ads, and a seller using the name "Kerry Limar" 

directed her to submit payment to PayPal accounts under the names 

of "Betty Cash" and "Jeff Howks." Siewert Decl. ¶¶ 3-4.4 She 

received photocopies of four ISMs, for which she paid $89.97 

apiece. Id. ¶¶ 3-5. 

 Plaintiffs' next step was to file a lawsuit for copyright 

infringement in the Southern District of New York against the 

various fictitious names used by the still-unknown sellers ("New 

York Litigation"). Compl. ¶ 25. Plaintiffs notified the sellers 

by sending emails to the various email addresses that they had 

collected during their investigation. Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiffs then 

sought and received permission to subpoena PayPal to determine the 

sellers' identities. Dunnegan Decl. ¶ 8, Ex. A. PayPal responded 

with voluminous business records. These records revealed a total 

of $20,563.27 worth of transactions involving thirty-five different 

works to which Plaintiffs held copyrights. Dunnegan Decl. ¶¶ 11-

18, Exs. C, D. These records also revealed that the various Paypal 

 

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 William Dunnegan ("Dunnegan"), counsel for Plaintiffs, has filed 

a declaration in support of the Motion. Docket No. 29. 

 

4

 Siewert submitted a declaration in support of the Motion. Docket 

No. 31. 

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accounts each sent some of the proceeds to a single Wachovia Bank 

account. Id. Ex. B. 

 As Plaintiffs still were not aware of the sellers' identities, 

they next sought and received permission to subpoena Wachovia Bank. 

Id. Ex. E. Wachovia Bank responded by turning over documents that 

indicate that the owner of the bank account is "Sierra Sky 

Revocable Living Trust," and that the signatory is Dickson Wong. 

Id. Ex. F. Wachovia Bank also disclosed a letter that it had 

received from "Trustee for Sierra Sky Revocable Trust," which 

requested that that Bank "Please notify the trust and the attorney 

by mail immediately if you receive a subpoena request from a 

plaintiff's attorney requesting for [sic] the trust's name and the 

physical address related to" the New York Litigation. Id. Ex. G 

("Letter to Wachovia"). The address provided in the letter was 

located in Hong Kong. Id. Plaintiffs were unsuccessful in serving 

Wong in connection with the New York Litigation, and dismissed that 

suit without prejudice. Id. ¶ 22. They learned that Wong had 

recently owned a condominium unit in the Brittan Heights 

Condominiums, located in San Carlos, California, and Plaintiffs 

therefore filed this suit in the Northern District of California. 

See id. ¶ 23. 

 Each time Plaintiffs proceeded with the third-party subpoenas 

outlined above, they sent notices to the email addresses that they 

had collected during their investigations. Id. ¶¶ 9, 20. They 

also sent notices to these email addresses after they received a 

response from PayPal, on December 28, 2008. Id. ¶ 11. The 

following day, on December 29, 2008, Wong transferred ownership of 

the Brittan Heights Condominium unit from himself to himself as 

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Trustee of the Xela Recoverable Living Trust Dated December 25, 

2008, by quitclaim deed filed in the Office of the County ClerkRecorder of San Mateo County. Id. ¶ 24, Ex. H ("First Quitclaim 

Deed"). Plaintiffs allege that this transfer was without 

consideration. Id. ¶ 24. On January 9, 2009, Wong then recorded 

another quitclaim deed transferring the same property to "Xela 

Revocable Living Trust" ("Xela") to "confirm[] a name change." Id.

Ex. I ("Second Quitclaim Deed"). 

 After filing suit in this Court, and after several varied 

attempts to serve Wong, Plaintiffs have moved for default judgment, 

and request that this Court award statutory damages against Wong 

for copyright infringement, award attorneys' fees, issue a 

permanent injunction enjoining future copyright violation and 

requiring the destruction of all copyrighted works in his 

possession. Compl. at 9-10. They also seek to set aside the 

transfer of the condominium, and claim that this was a fraudulent 

transfer that was intended to frustrate Plaintiffs' attempt to 

recover in this lawsuit and the New York Litigation. Id. 

III. LEGAL STANDARD

 After entry of a default, the Court may enter a default 

judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). Its decision whether to do 

so, while "discretionary," Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 

(9th Cir. 1980), is guided by several factors. 

 As a preliminary matter, the Court must "assess the adequacy 

of the service of process on the party against whom default is 

requested." Bd. of Trs. of the N. Cal. Sheet Metal Workers v. 

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Peters, No. 00-0395, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19065, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 

Jan. 2, 2001). 

 If the Court determines that service was sufficient, it may 

consider the following factors in its decision on the merits of a 

motion for default judgment: 

(1) the possibility of prejudice to the 

plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's 

substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the 

complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the 

action; (5) the possibility of a dispute 

concerning material facts; (6) whether the 

default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the 

strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of 

Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 

Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). "The 

general rule of law is that upon default the factual allegations of 

the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages, will 

be taken as true." Geddes v. United Fin. Group, 559 F.2d 557, 560 

(9th Cir. 1977). Therefore, for the purposes of this Motion, the 

Court accepts as true the facts as presented in the Complaint. 

 

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Service of Process

 Plaintiffs have been unable to locate Wong despite diligent 

efforts. Plaintiffs' attempts to personally serve Wong were 

previously outlined to this Court by Julie E. Hofer ("Hofer"), 

counsel for Plaintiffs. Hofer Decl. ¶¶ 4-14.5 This included 

employing a private investigator, who was able to discover two 

potential addresses for Wong. Id. Ex. D. One was the Brittan 

Heights Condominium unit that Wong transferred to Xela in late 

 

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Ex Parte Application for Order for Service by Publication. Docket 

Nos. 14, 16. 

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2008; the other was located at 403 Main Street in San Francisco, 

California. Id. Process servers repeatedly attempted personal 

service at these locations. Id. Exs. F ("Mazzocco Decl."), G 

("Galdamez Decl.").6

 One process server was told that Wong owns 

but rents out the Brittan Heights Condominium. Mazzocco Decl. at 

1. Plaintiffs attempted to mail Wong copies of the Complaint, 

summons, notices and acknowledgments of receipt at the two 

addresses they had located, pursuant to California Code of Civil 

Procedure section 415.30(c), however receipt was never acknowledged 

(the Brittan Heights Condominium was sent back with the message: 

"Return to sender -- No longer @ this address"). Hofer Decl. ¶ 14. 

 Plaintiffs next sought permission from this Court to serve 

Wong by publication, and this Court granted Plaintiffs' request. 

Docket No. 18. A notice was thereafter published in the San 

Francisco Chronicle and the San Mateo County Times on a weekly 

basis, from July 23, 2009, to August 15, 2009. Docket Nos. 23, 24. 

Such service was appropriate in light of Plaintiffs' welldocumented efforts to serve Wong and the trusts, and was authorized 

by Rule 4(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and section 

415.50(a)(1) of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Wong has 

still declined to appear before this Court, and the clerk entered 

default against Wong. Docket No. 27. The Court is mindful of 

Wong's deliberate attempt to evade service in the New York 

Litigation, and his various attempts to hide his identity through 

the use of false names and email addresses. The prior contact 

between the parties makes it clear that Wong was apprised of 

 

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process upon Wong, and submitted declarations to that effect. 

Mazzocco Decl.; Galdamez Decl. 

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Plaintiffs' accusations and went to great lengths to avoid 

confronting them. Having failed to respond to proper service by 

publication, Wong has subjected himself to the possibility of 

default judgment. 

B. Merits of the Motion

Accepting the allegations in the Complaint as true, as it 

must, the Court finds that the Eitel factors favor default 

judgment. 

 1. Prejudice

 Plaintiffs would be prejudiced absent entry of default 

judgment. If Wong is allowed to continue selling counterfeit goods 

that infringe on Plaintiffs' copyrights, Plaintiffs will suffer 

irreparable harm in a number of ways. Although it is not clear 

that Plaintiffs risk losing money from direct sales every time Wong 

sells an unauthorized copy of an ISM, professors will be less 

likely to select Plaintiffs' textbooks for use in their classes if 

the ISMs become widely available to students. Without the entry of 

a default judgment, Plaintiffs would not have another remedy for 

these harms. Such a situation qualifies as prejudice. 

 2. Merits of Plaintiffs' Substantive Claims 

 To prevail on their claims of copyright infringement, 

Plaintiffs must establish (1) they own valid and protectable 

copyrights, and (2) copying of the constituent elements of their 

works which are original. See Feist Pub'lns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. 

Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). Plaintiffs have claimed that 

they hold valid copyrights to thirty-five original works that are 

in dispute in this litigation. Compl. Exs. A, B, C, D. By 

defaulting, Wong is deemed to have admitted this. They have 

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alleged that Wong has reproduced and offered each of these for 

sale, and have submitted evidence that Wong has received payment 

for the sale of each of these works. See Dunnegan Ex. C ("Summary 

of PayPal Sales").7

 The Court concludes that Plaintiffs' claims 

for copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. are 

meritorious. 

 The Court further finds that Wong's use of the protected works 

was willful. It would be absurd to suggest that the photocopied 

material that Plaintiffs' agents received through their 

investigations could have been reproduced by accident. Wong was 

clearly cognizant of the wrongful nature of his conduct, as he was 

apparently selling the ISMs under a variety of false names. Wong 

deliberately attempted to hide his identity when he requested that 

Wachovia Bank not comply with Plaintiffs' subpoena in the New York 

litigation. See Letter to Wachovia. Wong's inexplicable attempt 

to implicate a retired state court judge in his wrongful conduct, 

by instructing his customers to return merchandise to the judge's 

address, see Ricciardi Email Chain, can be interpreted as further 

evidence that Wong was willful or even malicious in his misconduct. 

Plaintiffs have established that Wong engaged in a deliberate 

scheme to reproduce and profit from Plaintiffs' protected works. 

 Wong is also deemed to have admitted Plaintiffs' fraudulent 

conveyance claim, brought under California's Fraudulent Transfer 

Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3439-3439.12. "A transfer made . . . by a 

 

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PayPal turned over in response to Plaintiffs' subpoena. Although 

these documents are too voluminous to post on this Court's 

electronic docket, Plaintiffs have also submitted a summary report 

pursuant to Rule 1006 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See

Summary of PayPal Sales. 

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debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's claim 

arose before or after the transfer was made . . . if the debtor 

made the transfer . . . [w]ith actual intent to hinder, delay, or 

defraud any creditor of the debtor" or "[w]ithout receiving a 

reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer . . . ." 

Id. § 3439.04(a). In determining whether a transfer was 

fraudulent, the court may consider "[w]hether before the transfer 

was made . . . the debtor had been sued or threatened with suit." 

Id. § 3439.04(b)(4). Plaintiffs allege that Wong transferred 

ownership of the Brittan Heights Condominium from himself to 

himself as Trustee of Xela the day after Plaintiffs notified him 

that Paypal had complied with their subpoena. See Compl. ¶ 29; 

Dunnegan Decl. ¶¶ 11, 24. The transfer apparently allowed Wong to 

maintain control over the property, and it seems that Wong 

absconded after the transfer, as Plaintiffs have been completely 

unable to locate him in spite of their repeated efforts. All of 

these factors suggest a fraudulent transfer. See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 

3439.04(b). The Court finds that Plaintiffs' fraudulent transfer 

claim is meritorious. 

 3. Sufficiency of the Complaint

 Plaintiffs properly allege the necessary elements for their 

causes of action. The Complaint identifies the protected works in 

dispute, identifies Plaintiffs as the owner of the rights 

thereunder, details Plaintiffs' investigations of the alleged 

infringement, and describes how Wong was violating their rights. 

Plaintiffs also allege enough facts to support a claim of 

fraudulent transfer. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Complaint is 

sufficient. 

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 4. Amount of Money at Stake

 Plaintiffs are seeking statutory damages, Mot. at 10, and the 

amount at issue therefore consists of discretionary awards bounded 

by statutory minimums and maximums. These damages are authorized 

by statute. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). The discretionary nature of the 

amount at issue favors default judgment. See Elektra Entm’t Group, 

Inc. v. Crawford, 226 F.R.D. 388, 393 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 

5. Possibility of a Dispute Concerning Material Facts

 There may be a potential for a dispute concerning material 

facts. However, Plaintiffs have provided evidence of a thorough 

investigation into a series of apparently related online sales of 

infringing ISMs. In particular, the evidence received in response 

to the Paypal subpoena details specific transactions in which 

customers identify by name the particular protected ISMs that they 

seek to purchase. Plaintiffs have provided evidence that Wong was 

involved in and profited from these sales, as the proceeds were 

transferred directly to a bank account for which he was the 

signatory. This factor also favors default judgment. 

6. Whether Default Was Due to Excusable Neglect

 This Court is satisfied that Wong's failure to act is not a 

case of excusable neglect. Wong clearly had actual notice of the 

New York Litigation, and sought to interfere with a third-party 

subpoena that was served upon his bank. See Letter to Wachovia. 

Wong used false names in selling the infringing works at issue in 

this litigation, and it is clear that any difficulty that 

Plaintiffs have had in locating him and providing in-person service 

has been the direct result of Wong's own obfuscation. Because 

Wong's failure to participate in this litigation cannot be 

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considered excusable neglect, this factor favors entry of default 

judgment. 

 7. Strong Policy Favoring Decision on the Merits

 While it is preferable to decide cases on the merits whenever 

possible, this preference is not dispositive. Where a party fails 

to defend against a complaint, as Salem has failed here, Rule 55 

authorizes the Court to enter default judgment. Kloepping v. 

Fireman's Fund, No. 94-2684, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1786, at *10 

(N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 1996). 

C. Remedy

 Plaintiffs request monetary damages, fees and costs, and 

equitable relief in the form of a permanent injunction. Plaintiffs 

are also seeking to set aside Wong's fraudulent transfer of the 

Brittan Heights Condominium. 

1. Damages

 "A plaintiff may elect statutory damages 'regardless of the 

adequacy of the evidence offered as to his actual damages and the 

amount of the defendant's profits.'" Columbia Pictures Television, 

Inc. v. Krypton Broad. of Birmingham, Inc., 259 F.3d 1186, 1194 

(9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). Where, as here, plaintiffs 

establish that infringement of a copyrighted work was willful, a 

court may award statutory damages of up to $150,000. 17 U.S.C. 

§ 504(c)(2). This Court is guided by "what is just in the 

particular case, considering the nature of the copyright, the 

circumstances of the infringement and the like." Peer Int'l Corp. 

v. Pausa Records, Inc., 909 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1990). Given 

Plaintiffs' legitimate need to restrict the circulation of their 

ISMs, and to keep them away from students who may use the material 

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for cheating, the Court believes that it would be extremely 

difficult to establish actual damages in this case, and statutory 

damages are therefore particularly appropriate. Furthermore, 

Plaintiffs have satisfied this Court that Wong's infringement was 

willful and flagrant. Under these conditions, the Court finds 

Plaintiffs' request for an award of statutory damages of $15,000 

per protected work, for a total judgment of $535,000, to be quite 

reasonable. Mot. at 10. 

2. Fees & Costs

 Under 17 U.S.C. § 505, this Court has discretion to "allow the 

recovery of full costs by or against any party," and "the court may 

also award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing party as 

part of the costs." Although Plaintiffs have requested fees and 

costs as a part of default judgment, they have not yet attempted to 

establish their total costs and fees by proof sufficient to support 

a motion for attorney fees. Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 54-5, 

Plaintiffs may request fees for up to fourteen days after judgment 

is entered. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' request for fees is DENIED 

WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

3. Request to Set Aside Conveyance of Brittan Heights 

Condominium

 Plaintiffs have established that the transfer of the Brittan 

Heights Condominium unit from Wong to Xela, and the subsequent 

transfer from Xela to itself under a slightly different name, was 

likely fraudulent. Pursuant to section 3439.07(a)(1) of the 

California Civil Code, this Court may set these transfers aside. 

The Court concludes that it would be proper to set aside these 

transfers as to Plaintiffs, so that Plaintiffs may enforce this 

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default judgment against Wong through a lien on his property. 

 4. Permanent Injunction

Plaintiffs have demonstrated that Wong willfully has violated 

their rights to the copyrighted works. Plaintiffs have failed to 

locate Wong, and there is no indication that his ability or intent 

to continue infringement has been encumbered by this lawsuit. His 

willful infringement and his continued attempts to elude Plaintiffs 

make the threat of ongoing or future infringement credible. In 

such circumstances, the Court is authorized by the Copyright Act to 

issue a permanent injunction to prevent or restrain further 

infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. MAPHIA, 

948 F. Supp. 923, 940 (N.D. Cal. 1996) ("Generally, a showing of 

copyright infringement liability and the threat of future 

violations is sufficient to warrant a permanent injunction."). The 

Court finds that a permanent injunction is warranted. The 

injunction shall prohibit Wong from infringing any copyrights that 

Plaintiffs now have or may acquire in the future. See Sony Music 

Entm't, Inc. v. Elias, No. CV 03-6387, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30385, 

at *13-14 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2004) (enjoining infringement of 

existing and future works). 

V. CONCLUSION

Default judgment is hereby entered against Dickson T. Wong, 

individually, as Trustee of the Sierra Sky Revocable Living Trust, 

and as Trustee of the Xela Revocable Living Trust Dated December 

25, 2008, aka the Xela Revocable Living Trust ("Xela") 

(collectively, "Wong"), and in favor of Plaintiffs. Judgment is 

entered in favor of Pearson Education, Inc., in the amount of 

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$135,000. Judgment is entered in favor of John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 

in the amount of $90,000. Judgment is entered in favor of Cengage 

Learning, Inc., in the amount of $105,000. Judgment is entered in 

favor of the McGraw-Hill Companies in the amount of $195,000. 

Judgment against Wong in his multiple capacities is joint and 

several. Interest shall accrue from the date of this judgment 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). 

The Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs' request for 

attorney fees. 

The Court hereby sets aside two transfers of the real property 

known as Condominium Unit 042-05, Brittan Heights Condominium, Lot 

No. 5, RSM 80/18-37, City of San Carlos, County of San Mateo, State 

of California, with the address 3358 Brittan Avenue, Unit #5, San 

Carlos, California, 94070-3416, having Assessor’s Parcel No. 110-

600-050, (the "Brittan Heights Condominium") -- the first occurring 

on or about December 29, 2008 from Wong in his individual capacity 

to Wong as Trustee of Xela, and the second occurring on or about 

January 9, 2009 from Xela to Xela. These transfers are set aside 

and declared void as to Plaintiffs to the extent necessary to 

satisfy this Default Judgment, plus post-judgment interest. 

Pursuant to California Civil Code § 3439.07(c), the judgment 

entered above is hereby declared a lien on the Brittan Heights 

Condominium and Plaintiffs may levy execution on the Brittan 

Heights Condominium or its proceeds in order to satisfy their 

judgment. 

Wong is permanently enjoined and restrained from each of the 

following, either directly or acting through his agents, servants, 

employees, successors, and assigns, and all other persons acting in 

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concert or conspiracy with Wong or affiliated with Wong: 

a) Copying, reproducing, distributing, or using any 

unauthorized copies of Plaintiffs' copyrighted works; or 

b) Otherwise infringing any of Plaintiffs’ copyrights. 

In addition, Wong is hereby ordered to immediately destroy any 

and all infringing copies of Plaintiffs' copyrighted works that are 

in his possession, custody, or control. 

Plaintiffs must send an electronic copy of this Default 

Judgment to Wong via each email address that they believe Wong uses 

or has used in connection with his sale of the protected works. In 

addition, Plaintiffs must send a copy of this Default Judgment, via 

international certified mail, to the Sierra Sky Revocable Living 

Trust, 15th Floor, 21-23 Des Voeux Rd. C., Hong Kong. Plaintiffs 

must do so no later than five (5) days from the date of this Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Dated: February 2, 2010 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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