IDENT/IAFIS: 

THE BATRES CASE AND THE STATUS OF THE INTEGRATION PROJECT 

I. INTRODUCTION 

In January 2002, Border Patrol agents in the Immigration and 

Naturalization Service (INS) apprehended Mexican citizen Victor Manual Batres 

(Batres) twice within two days as he crossed the border from Mexico into the 

United States. Only during his second apprehension did the agents learn, 

through a check of INS databases, that a warrant had been issued for Batres’ 

arrest in Oregon for possession of dangerous drugs. When contacted by the 

Border Patrol, the Oregon authorities declined to seek Batres’ extradition to 

Oregon on the warrant. 

As a result, the Border Patrol returned Batres to Mexico. Yet, during 

both apprehensions Border Patrol agents never queried Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) databases for criminal information on Batres. Had they 

done so, the databases would have showed that Batres had a significant 

criminal history in the United States, including several aggravated felony 

convictions and at least one prior deportation from the United States. If the 

agents had learned of this criminal history and prior deportation, under Border 

Patrol policies they should have detained Batres for prosecution for the felony 

offense of Reentry After Deportation. This felony offense is easily proven and 

generally carries a substantial prison term for individuals such as Batres with 

prior aggravated felonies and deportations. Consequently, Batres likely would 

have been incarcerated rather than being voluntarily returned to Mexico. 

Instead, after his voluntary return to Mexico, Batres illegally reentered 

the United States and traveled to Oregon September 2002 where he brutally 

raped two Catholic nuns, resulting in the death of one of the nuns. Batres was 

arrested, pled guilty to murder and rape, and was sentenced to life in prison 

without the possibility of parole. 

The Batres case was reminiscent of a 1999 case in which the Border 

Patrol voluntarily returned Rafael Resendez-Ramirez to Mexico, unaware that 

the FBI and local authorities had outstanding arrest warrants for him for 

murder and that he had a significant criminal history. Shortly after Resendez’s 

voluntary return to Mexico, he illegally reentered the United States and 

committed four more murders before he surrendered to law enforcement 
authorities.1 In the Resendez case, we found that INS employees had not been 

trained adequately on IDENT, the INS’s automated fingerprint system, and had 

failed to put in IDENT a lookout for Resendez when the FBI and local 

authorities informed them about his outstanding warrant. Because IDENT and 

IAFIS, the FBI’s separate automated fingerprint identification system, were not 

linked, the Border Patrol officers who detained Resendez did not know he was 

wanted for murder and released him, which allowed Resendez to commit 

several more murders.2

The INS’s database, called IDENT, began operating in 1994.3 The FBI’s 

database, known as IAFIS, began operating in 1999. In several reports over the 

past few years, however, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) has reported 

extensively on the efforts to integrate these databases and found that 

integration has been moving slowly and still may take years to fully 

accomplish.4

The Batres and Resendez cases both demonstrated the urgent need to 

integrate the separate FBI and INS automated fingerprint identification 

databases. In these two cases, had the immigration agents been made aware 

of the information in the FBI databases, both Batres and Resendez would have 

been detained and likely incarcerated instead of being voluntarily returned to 

 1 The facts of the Resendez case are detailed in a March 2000 OIG report entitled “The

Rafael Resendez-Ramirez Case: A Review of the INS’s Actions and the Operation of Its IDENT

Automated Fingerprint Identification System.” 

2 The full name of IAFIS is the “Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification

System.” IAFIS is an automated ten-fingerprint matching system run by the FBI that contains 

in its Criminal Master File over 43 million ten-print fingerprint records. IAFIS records can be

electronically compared against submitted fingerprints. 

 3 The full name of IDENT is the “Automated Biometrics Identification System.” To

enroll an alien in IDENT, an immigration employee places the alien’s right and left index fingers 

on the IDENT fingerprint scanner, takes the alien’s photograph with the IDENT camera, and 

enters certain biographical information into the computer. IDENT then electronically compares

the alien’s fingerprints to fingerprints in two IDENT databases: 1) a “lookout” database that

contains fingerprints and photographs of approximately 1 million aliens who have been

previously deported or who have a significant criminal history; and 2) a “recidivist” database

that contains fingerprints and photographs of approximately 6 million illegal aliens who have

been apprehended by the INS and enrolled in IDENT since it was deployed. 

 4 These OIG reports include a March 1998 report entitled “Review of the Immigration

and Naturalization Service’s Automated Biometric Identification System”; a March 2000 report 

entitled “The Rafael Resendez-Ramirez Case: A Review of the INS’s Actions and the Operation

of Its IDENT Automated Fingerprint Identification System”; a follow-up inspection report issued 

in December 2001 entitled “Status of IDENT/IAFIS Integration”; and another follow-up 

inspection report issued in June 2003 entitled “Status of IDENT/IAFIS Integration.” 

2
Mexico, where they subsequently were able to return to the United States and 

commit additional crimes. 

 

The OIG began its investigation of the INS’s handling of the Batres case 

when the INS was still part of the Department of Justice (DOJ). This report 

summarizes the results of the OIG’s investigation as well as the status of the 

DOJ’s and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) efforts to integrate 

IDENT and IAFIS. As the Batres case tragically demonstrated again, an urgent 

need continues to exist to integrate the IDENT and IAFIS databases as 

expeditiously as possible. 

Yet, the DOJ Justice Management Division’s (JMD) September 2003 

response to the OIG’s latest recommendations for integration raises continued 

concerns about the pace of integration. The response indicates that the 

March 1, 2003, transfer of the INS from the DOJ to DHS, the reassignment of 

key INS employees who were involved in the integration effort, and continued 

budgetary hurdles could result in additional delay in the integration efforts. 

In this report, we summarize the history of IDENT and IAFIS, discuss 

how each system operates, describe early efforts to merge the systems, and 

examine the reasons for the delay of those efforts. The report then summarizes 

the Resendez case in 1999 and how that case generated a greater impetus to 

merge the two systems. The report also summarizes several OIG reviews that 

emphasized the need for integration of the two databases. 

Next, the report details the handling of the Batres case by immigration 

authorities. We discuss the history of Batres’ entries into the United States in 

January 2002, his criminal and deportation history, and his outstanding arrest 

warrant in Oregon for possession of dangerous drugs which resulted in a 

lookout for him being placed in IDENT. We then examine why the Border 

Patrol failed to discover Batres’ criminal or deportation history during either of 

his apprehensions in January 2002. Finally, the report describes the current 

status of the efforts to integrate IDENT and IAFIS. 

 

II. BACKGROUND ON FBI AND INS AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT 

IDENTIFICATION DATABASES 

United States immigration authorities have long recognized the need for 

an automated fingerprint identification system to quickly determine the 

immigration and criminal histories of aliens apprehended at or near the border. 

More than one million aliens are apprehended each year attempting to enter 

the United States illegally. Many of these aliens are apprehended in large 

groups, and the Border Patrol lacks the resources to detain all of them for 

extended periods of time. Consequently, the vast majority are voluntarily 

returned to their country of origin, mostly to Mexico, without any criminal 

charges being filed. 

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At the same time, immigration authorities need to be able to quickly 

determine which of these aliens should be detained for prosecution based on 

multiple illegal entries, reentering the U.S. after a prior deportation, alien 

smuggling, a current arrest warrant, or an aggravated criminal record. 

Historically, in order to identify which individuals to detain for possible 

prosecution or deportation, the INS had to rely on the names provided by the 

apprehended aliens and check them against its databases or other paper 

records. This method was ineffective because aliens often use false or different 

names. Also, many aliens have similar names, and spelling errors result in 

problems identifying individuals accurately. 

Therefore, in 1989 Congress provided the initial funding for the INS to 

develop an automated fingerprint identification system that eventually became 

known as IDENT. While one of the main purposes of IDENT was to identify 

and prosecute repeat immigration offenders, another significant purpose was to 

identify criminal aliens who should be detained. The 1989 conference report 

described Congress’s rationale for funding the project: 

Illegal immigration continues at alarming rates, and criminal 

alien statistics provided by the INS indicate that a growing 

proportion of aliens are drug smugglers, known criminals, and 

suspected terrorists. Emerging technology in the area of 

automated fingerprint identification systems has the potential 

for providing empirical data to clearly define the problem of 

recidivism as well as immediately identify those criminal 

aliens who should remain in the custody of the INS (emphasis 

added).5 

At about the same time, the FBI began to overhaul its paper-based 

fingerprint card system, which it had maintained since the 1920s, to create a 

new automated fingerprint identification system that would allow electronic 

searches for fingerprint matches. Since the 1920s the FBI’s Identification 

Division has maintained a central repository of ten-prints of criminal offenders’ 

fingerprints. In 1967, the FBI created the National Crime Information Center 

(NCIC) to provide a national database of information on wanted individuals and 

stolen articles, vehicles, guns, and license plates. Fingerprint information is 

submitted by participating federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. 

The Interstate Identification Index (III), which contains criminal history 

information on arrests and dispositions, was added to NCIC in 1983. 

 5 See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 100-979 at 30, accompanying H.R. 4728, 100th CONG., 

2d SESS. (1988).

4
In February 1990, the NCIC Advisory Policy Board recommended that the 

FBI update its paper-based fingerprint identification system and create a new 

automated system, which eventually became known as the FBI’s Integrated 

Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS). During 1990 and 1991, 

the INS and FBI met to discuss possible coordination of their planned 

automated fingerprint identification systems. Memoranda summarizing some 

of these meetings stated that the INS and FBI were coordinating the 

development of an integrated automated fingerprint identification system to 

determine if the integrated system could satisfy the INS’s needs. The 

memoranda also included preliminary diagrams and narratives of how the 

FBI’s IAFIS and the INS’s proposed system could be linked in an overall 

automated fingerprint identification system network. There also was 

discussion of how to ensure common high-quality fingerprint image and 

electronic transmission standards for fingerprints and identification data so 

that they could be transmitted among different fingerprint identification 

systems. 

From the start, the INS and the FBI recognized that integration of their 

separate automated fingerprint identification systems would benefit both 

agencies. An integrated system would reduce the likelihood that INS would 

release an alien who had a serious criminal record and prior deportations. It 

also would enable federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities to 

search fingerprints from a crime scene against an immigration database of 

illegal border crossers, especially if ten prints are taken. 

III. IMPLEMENTATION OF SEPARATE FBI AND INS DATABASES 

During the early planning meetings, the INS and FBI discussed whether 

the FBI would be willing to store fingerprint records of criminal and noncriminal aliens or whether the INS should establish a separate system if the 

FBI system could not support all of the INS’s requirements. In the discussions, 

both the INS and the FBI believed that the INS would not need to check all 

apprehended aliens against the FBI’s databases. Rather, they believed that the 

INS would check only those aliens the INS identified as potential criminals. 

They assumed that the FBI’s IAFIS could handle only a small volume of INS 

requests within a quick response time. The INS emphasized that a fast 

response time was critical because the INS could not detain large numbers of 

apprehended aliens for long periods of time while waiting for responses to 

criminal checks. 

An early difference of opinion between the INS and the FBI was whether 

the INS should take two fingerprints or ten fingerprints from the aliens it 

apprehended. The FBI, along with state and local law enforcement agencies, 

believed that the INS should take ten fingerprints so that they could be 

matched against ten-fingerprint records in the law enforcement databases or 

any latent fingerprints obtained at crime scenes. Because fingerprints at crime 

5
scenes may be from any finger, the long-established law enforcement standard 

requires that officers take prints from all ten fingers. But the INS believed that 

taking ten fingerprints of all apprehended aliens would take too long and 

adversely affect its ability to carry out its mission, because large numbers of 

aliens would have to be detained for increased lengths of time while waiting for 

fingerprint checks. 

Between 1991 and 1993, the INS operated a pilot Automated Fingerprint 

Identification System (AFIS) project in the San Diego Border Patrol Sector, and 

in 1994 Congress allocated funding for the INS’s automated system. During an 

April 1994 meeting regarding the deployment of IDENT, the FBI told the INS 

that without additional development time and money, which the FBI did not 

have, the FBI’s planned IAFIS system could not meet the INS’s need to handle a 

high volume of fingerprints (for more than one million aliens apprehended 

annually), and the INS needed a quick response time (two minutes or less) for 

each encounter. Further, the FBI said that the alternative of searching and 

matching the two fingerprints captured by IDENT against the FBI’s planned 

IAFIS ten-fingerprint database would require much more computer power than 

the FBI had in order to provide the response time that the INS needed. 

Therefore, in 1994 the INS decided to move forward with implementation 

of its separate IDENT system, independent from the FBI’s IAFIS system. In 

order to meet its own needs, the FBI decided that its automated fingerprint 

system, IAFIS, would contain all ten fingerprints and provide a response in two 

hours for high priority electronic requests and a longer time for lower priority 

and non-electronic requests. 

 

IDENT was first deployed in 1994. As noted above, IDENT matches the 

fingerprints of the detained individual against the corresponding fingerprints of 

all individuals in two central IDENT databases: the recidivist database (now 

referred to as the apprehension database) and the lookout database. The 

apprehension database documents the apprehensions of illegal border 

crossers, reflecting the time, date, and circumstances of each recorded 

apprehension. As of January 2004, approximately 6 million different aliens 

were enrolled in the IDENT apprehension database. 

A primary purpose of the IDENT database is to advise the processing 

agent as to the number of times that an alien has been apprehended for illegal 

entry. Because of resource limitations, including detention space and 

prosecutorial resources, Border Patrol sectors or stations, in conjunction with 

the local United States Attorney’s Office (USAO), set a “threshold” number of 

apprehensions for illegal entry that would be required before detained aliens 

are prosecuted for Entry Without Inspection (8 USC § 1325). Generally, unless 

that threshold is reached, or there are aggravating factors associated with the 

aliens’ apprehensions (such as persistent false statements, combativeness, 

indications that the alien has been previously incarcerated, or indications that 

6
the alien is a smuggler), Border Patrol agents voluntarily return aliens to their 

country without further inquiries of other immigration or criminal databases. 

The second IDENT database, called the lookout database, contains 

information on deported and criminal aliens. Alien ten-print fingerprint 

records are entered into the lookout database at a central location in 

Washington, D.C., from ten-print cards sent by INS offices from around the 

country. Ten-print cards are generally prepared whenever immigration 

personnel process aliens for deportation or prosecution. Index fingerprints, 

photographs, and basic text information are scanned and retyped from the 

fingerprint cards to create individual lookout records in the IDENT database. 

The INS’s IDENT system was designed to automatically alert personnel at 

the Western Identification Network Automated Fingerprint Identification Center 

(WIN/AFIS) whenever IDENT returned a lookout hit indicating an outstanding 

warrant for an apprehended alien.6 INS procedures required WIN/AFIS 

personnel to contact promptly by telephone the apprehending Border Patrol 

personnel to confirm the lookout match and to inform the Border Patrol agents 

of the nature of the warrant and the contact numbers for the appropriate law 

enforcement officials regarding the warrant. This contact generally occurs 

within one hour. A Border Patrol supervisor then should make the appropriate 

contact with the law enforcement officials who issued the warrant to determine 

whether they want to transport the alien to their jurisdiction for prosecution. 

The burden and expense for such transportation falls on the requesting 

agency. 

Typically, if the issuing authorities do not want the alien transported, 

and there is not any other reason to detain the alien, the Border Patrol 

voluntarily returns the alien across the border. However, some circumstances 

warrant further detention and investigation. For example, if a processing agent 

learns – usually from the alien himself, or through prior IDENT entries from 

previous apprehensions – that the alien has a prior criminal history, the Border 

Patrol may seek the prosecution of the alien for the offense of Entry Without 

 

 6 Formed in 1989, WIN/AFIS contains information from state and federal criminal 

justice agencies in seven Western states. Its database contains about 2.5 million arrest 

records from those member states and from the INS. Its fingerprint search capabilities are 

provided by a large-scale AFIS installation in Sacramento, California. An additional unit called 

the INS WIN/AFIS Service Center provided technical support to INS facilities performing 

criminal searches on WIN and handled WIN registrations. During the time period under review

in this report, the INS WIN/AFIS Service Center operated 7 days per week, 24 hours per day,

and was staffed by contract employees who were qualified fingerprint examiners and who could 

make fingerprint matches. 

7
Inspection.7 Also, if the agent learns that the alien has a prior deportation, the 

law requires reinstatement of the prior order of deportation, and the alien is 

not eligible for voluntary return to Mexico. See 8 USC § 1231(a)(5). Upon 

learning of the prior deportation, the processing agent should confirm the 

alien’s prior criminal history. Moreover, an alien likely will be prosecuted for 

the felony charge of Reentry After Deportation if the alien has a record of a 

prior felony or aggravated felony. A conviction for Reentry After Deportation 

carries a potential sentence of up to 10 years’ imprisonment for an alien with a 

prior criminal record of a felony or three misdemeanors, or a sentence of up to 

20 years’ imprisonment for an alien with a prior “aggravated felony” conviction 

pursuant to § 1326(b). 

However, Border Patrol agents in the El Paso Sector’s Deming and Santa 

Teresa Stations did not have direct access to the FBI’s records or databases to 

determine the alien’s criminal history, and the FBI’s criminal records are not 

linked to IDENT.

8

 Rather, in order to conduct criminal record checks on 

apprehended aliens, Border Patrol agents in these stations had to telephone 

the Border Patrol sector’s communications office, commonly known as the 

“radio room,” which has direct links to various criminal and immigration 

databases. These databases include the FBI’s NCIC, which contains criminal 

history information and outstanding warrants submitted by participating 

federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies on millions of individuals;9

immigration databases containing records of prior immigration contacts with 

the alien, such as deportations; and a United States Customs Service 

(Customs) database, the Treasury Enforcement Communications 

System/Interagency Border Inspection System (TECS/IBIS), that is typically 

used by inspectors at ports of entry to check incoming travelers. 

The Border Patrol lacks the manpower to conduct separate criminal and 

immigration history checks for every apprehended alien. Accordingly, these 

additional database checks are requested for only the small fraction of the 

apprehended aliens whose behavior, appearances, outstanding warrants, or 

 7 While the Border Patrol technically could bring this charge for every illegal entry, it is 

not feasible to bring charges on each apprehended alien because of the effect on prosecutorial, 

judicial, and detention resources. 

 

8 The Deming and Santa Teresa stations did not have IDENT/IAFIS workstations at the

time of Batres’ apprehensions in January 2002. IDENT/IAFIS workstations were deployed to 

Deming in August 2003, although not yet to Santa Teresa. 

 

9 NCIC contains information on active wants and warrants. Criminal history 

information is maintained in the Interstate Identification Index (III). Fingerprint information is 

maintained in IAFIS. Information in III can be accessed by name or FBI number through an 

NCIC terminal. The same III information also can be accessed via a fingerprint submission to 

IAFIS. 

 

8
other information in IDENT raises concerns with the Border Patrol agents 

processing the aliens. 

Thus, while the IDENT database is a useful tool for identifying recidivist 

aliens who continue to enter the United States illegally, its lack of integration 

with the FBI’s IAFIS database results in significant problems. First, IDENT

contains only a fraction of the Criminal Master File fingerprint records in the 

FBI IAFIS database – limited to the “wants and warrants” that the FBI and 

United States Marshals Service (USMS) have entered into IDENT since August 

2001 and the criminal history fingerprint records of aliens from certain 

countries believed to pose a security risk to the United States. Second, 

because IDENT is not integrated with IAFIS criminal history files, it does not 

apprise Border Patrol agents of aliens with serious criminal records which, in 

combination with prior deportations, would warrant prosecution of the alien for 

Reentry After Deportation or on other grounds. Further, Border Patrol agents 

may fail to take the extra steps needed to query the alien’s criminal history 

information, particularly when the alien has a limited number of 

apprehensions. Fourth, even when criminal history checks are initiated by 

Border Patrol agents, the results may not be communicated to the processing 

agent (either by WIN/AFIS, the radio room, or assisting agents) in an accurate 

or timely manner. Finally, federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies 

have a limited ability to access IDENT fingerprint records through their 

systems in order to make use of the information in their investigations. 

 

The selected input of FBI criminal records into the IDENT database over 

the past few years has illustrated the large number of criminal aliens who are 

regularly apprehended by the Border Patrol. The USMS “wants and warrants” 

were added to IDENT in August 2001. From December 2001 to April 2003, 

152,000 FBI “wants and warrants” fingerprint records were entered into 

IDENT. From January 2002 to April 2003, immigration authorities 

apprehended 4,820 aliens who were wanted for criminal offenses based on 

these records. Fifty of these aliens were wanted in connection with murder. 

During the same period, an additional 179,500 IAFIS criminal history 

fingerprint records of aliens from countries believed to be a threat to the United 

States were entered into IDENT and immigration personnel have matched these 

criminal records to 3,440 apprehended aliens. 

Beginning in the mid-1990s, several significant events illustrated the 

problems resulting from separate INS and FBI databases. First, controversy 

arose regarding the way fingerprint checks were conducted for aliens applying 

for citizenship under the INS’s “Citizenship U.S.A.” (CUSA) program. This 

program was designed to reduce substantially the backlog of citizenship 

applications by expediting the processing of citizenship applications, including 

the processing of fingerprints. Under CUSA, the INS sent ten-fingerprint cards 

of citizenship applicants to the FBI to be checked for evidence of criminal 

histories in the FBI’s files. If the INS did not receive a response from the FBI 

9
after 60 days, the INS assumed that the alien had no criminal record. This 

practice led to many instances in which the INS did not receive timely notice 

from the FBI that aliens had a disqualifying criminal record and nevertheless 

granted the alien citizenship. 

 

As a result, the Attorney General established a Fingerprint Coordination 

Working Group, which included representatives from the INS and the FBI, to 

address problems in fingerprint procedures. As part of this effort, the DOJ 

Justice Management Division (JMD) reviewed issues of integration of the INS 

and FBI automated fingerprint identification systems and attempted to 

coordinate the integration of their separate systems. 

Subsequently, in March 1998 the OIG issued a report evaluating the 

INS’s implementation of IDENT.10 The OIG found that the INS was enrolling 

less than two-thirds of the aliens apprehended along the U.S.-Mexico border 

into the IDENT system. In addition, the INS was entering into the IDENT 

lookout database the fingerprints of only 41 percent of the aliens deported and 

excluded in Fiscal Year (FY) 1996. Of these aliens, only 24 percent had 

accompanying photographs entered into IDENT, even though the INS relied on 

photographs as an important method of confirming identification. The OIG 

found virtually no controls in place to ensure the quality of data entered into 

the IDENT lookout database, which resulted in duplicate records and invalid 

data. The OIG report also raised concerns that the INS had not provided 

sufficient training to its employees on the use of IDENT, and that these failures 

hampered the INS’s ability to make consistent and effective use of IDENT. 

Two months later, in May 1998, in response to a letter from 

Congressman Alan Mollohan urging that consideration be given to integrating 

the IDENT and IAFIS systems, JMD issued a report recommending that the INS 

retain IDENT to meet INS internal requirements, but that the INS adopt tenprinting as a long-term policy goal. The JMD report concluded that properly 

funded, this option would permit the Border Patrol to maintain processing 

times while providing other law enforcement agencies with a fingerprint 

database that could be searched. The report also recommended a 12-month 

pilot study, to begin in the fall of 1999, of a ten-fingerprint system in selected 

Border Patrol stations. 

IV. THE RESENDEZ CASE 

In 1999, the consequences of INS’s inability to identify criminal aliens 

without integrated IAFIS and IDENT databases were illustrated tragically by 

the case of Rafael Resendez-Ramirez (Resendez). In 1998, Resendez, a Mexican 

 10 See “Review of the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s Automated Biometric 

Identification System,” March 1998.

10
citizen with an extensive criminal record, was apprehended by the Border 

Patrol in Texas and New Mexico seven times while crossing the border illegally. 

Each time he was voluntarily returned to Mexico. 

Unbeknownst to the agents who apprehended and voluntarily returned 

Resendez in accord with normal Border Patrol policy, Resendez had an 

extensive criminal history in the United States. He had been convicted 

previously on at least eight separate occasions for crimes such as: 

(1) destroying private property and leaving the scene of a crime; (2) burglary, 

aggravated battery, and grand theft auto; (3) making a false representation of 

U.S. citizenship; (4) making false statements to federal officials, falsely 

representing to be a U.S. citizen, being a convicted felon in possession of a 

firearm, and Reentry After Deportation; (5) burglary; (6) evading arrest; 

(7) trespassing, carrying a loaded firearm, and receiving stolen property; and 

(8) a separate conviction for trespass. Resendez also had been previously 

deported to Mexico at least three times and voluntarily returned to Mexico by 

the INS at least four times. 

 

During each of the seven apprehensions in 1998, the Border Patrol 

agents who processed Resendez through IDENT did not learn of his criminal 

record or past deportations. Because IDENT was not integrated with IAFIS, 

and because IDENT only included information about apprehended aliens on a 

day-forward basis, IDENT did not contain any information about Resendez’s 

past convictions and deportations. Also, because Resendez had been 

apprehended less than the threshold number of times for prosecution for Entry 

Without Inspection, the Border Patrol agents simply enrolled Resendez in 

IDENT on each of these encounters and voluntarily returned him to Mexico. 

They were not required to check, and did not check, FBI databases for criminal 

history information and outstanding warrants on him. 

In early 1999, evidence linked Resendez to several brutal murders in 

Texas and Kentucky, and warrants were issued for his arrest. At least four 

times, other federal and local law enforcement authorities contacted INS 

personnel to discuss the warrants and the evidence against Resendez, and to 

ensure that the INS placed a lookout for Resendez in the event that he was 

apprehended again while illegally entering the country. Yet, none of the INS 

investigators who were contacted by the law enforcement officers thought to 

have a lookout placed for Resendez in IDENT based on the warrants, either 

because the INS investigators were unfamiliar with IDENT or because they 

thought it was the job of others to enter the warrants. Two INS investigators 

even referred the law enforcement officers to Customs Service employees to 

place a lookout for Resendez in the Customs Service’s TECS database, which is 

typically used by inspectors to check incoming travelers at ports of entry. 

While TECS was useful for aliens attempting to enter the United States at a 

port of entry, it was not useful for lookouts on aliens like Resendez who had a 

pattern of crossing the border illegally in remote areas between ports of entry. 

11
On June 1, 1999 – at the same time that state and federal warrants for 

Resendez were outstanding and law enforcement officers were searching for 

Resendez in connection with several murders – Border Patrol agents in Santa 

Teresa, New Mexico, apprehended Resendez again crossing the border illegally. 

They processed him in IDENT according to their standard practice. IDENT

identified Resendez as a recidivist border crosser, but nothing in IDENT alerted 

the Border Patrol agents that he was wanted for murder by the FBI and local 

law enforcement authorities. Nor did IDENT disclose Resendez’s extensive 

criminal history. Therefore, the Border Patrol did not detain Resendez and, 

following its standard policy, voluntarily returned him to Mexico. Within days, 

Resendez illegally returned to the United States and committed four more 

murders. 

In mid-June 1999, a Border Patrol Intelligence Officer in Texas enrolled 

Resendez into the IDENT lookout database to ensure that he would be detained 

if encountered again by the INS. At that time, the Border Patrol discovered 

that its agents had recently released Resendez despite the outstanding warrant 

for his arrest for murder. 

Finally, On July 13, 1999, Resendez surrendered to U.S. law 

enforcement authorities. On May 18, 2000, he was convicted of capital murder 

and sentenced to death. The verdict was affirmed by a state appellate court on 

May 21, 2003. 

V. RENEWED EMPHASIS ON INTEGRATION OF IDENT AND IAFIS 

In July 1999, a House Committee on Appropriations report, with the 

Resendez incident clearly in mind, stated: 

[T]he Committee continues to be concerned about the 

inadequacies of this system [IDENT], specifically with regard 

to its ability to identify wanted criminals who may be 

apprehended by INS Border Patrol agents and inspectors 

along the border...the Committee repeatedly raised concerns 

that the IDENT database was not integrated with FBI’s IAFIS 

database. 

The House Report expressed the belief that federal, state, and local law 

enforcement should have access to INS fingerprint information and that the 

INS should have the full benefit of FBI criminal history records. The House 

report directed the INS to suspend further deployment of IDENT until DOJ 

submitted to the House Appropriations committee a plan for integration of 

IDENT and IAFIS. The Conference Report for the DOJ FY 2000 appropriations 

included this provision. 

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In response to the Congressional directive, DOJ assigned JMD to 

coordinate the efforts to develop an integration plan. On August 12, 1999, 

JMD convened a “Fingerprint Summit” meeting, attended by representatives of 

the FBI and INS, to discuss a plan for integrating IDENT and IAFIS. The 

conceptual model agreed to at that meeting required that federal, state, and 

local law enforcement agencies be able to access the INS’s fingerprint records 

through IAFIS, and that the INS be able to check fingerprints of apprehended 

aliens against all fingerprint records in IAFIS. 

On March 1, 2000, JMD’s Management Planning Staff issued a report 

entitled “Implementation Plan for Integrating the INS’ IDENT and the FBI’s 

IAFIS Fingerprint Data.” The report stated that “The INS and FBI have 

acknowledged that integrating IDENT with IAFIS would greatly benefit both 

agencies, as well as federal, state, and local law enforcement.” The report 

further stated that such integration: 

has the potential to: reduce the likelihood that a wanted 

individual would be released from the INS’ custody; provide 

federal, state, and local law enforcement an integrated 

picture of the criminal activity known by agencies in DOJ, 

including the INS histories of illegal border crossers; and 

enable federal, state, and local law enforcement to search 

latent prints against additional illegal border crossers, 

especially if ten-prints are taken. 

The report discussed various options for integration, but directed that 

before any recommendation would be finalized, the INS, FBI, and JMD would 

conduct three studies: 

(1) a criminality study that would estimate the percentage of 

apprehended illegal aliens who had been charged with more serious 

crimes; 

(2) an engineering study that would produce a cost analysis for the 

integration, including alternative query response times; and 

(3) an operational impact study that would assess the effect that such 

changes as taking ten prints would have on operations and 

procedures at the border. 

Also in March 2000, the OIG issued its report on the Resendez case.11 

The OIG report noted that integration of IDENT and IAFIS would provide what 

 

 11 “The Rafael Resendez-Ramirez Case: A Review of the INS’s Actions and the

Operation of Its IDENT Automated Fingerprint Identification System.”

13
the IDENT lookout database did not – a check of all apprehended aliens to 

determine whether they have serious criminal records, prior orders of 

deportation, or any outstanding arrest warrants. The report recommended that 

DOJ and its components should aggressively and expeditiously link the FBI 

and INS automated fingerprint systems. 

From June 2000 through July 2001, DOJ conducted the three studies in 

support of the integration project. First, the Operational Impact Study 

concluded that it might be feasible for the INS to take 10 fingerprints in many 

locations and check them against the FBI’s IAFIS files if the INS could receive a 

response from the FBI within 10 minutes, except for high volume workload 

periods. Second, the Engineering/System Development Study concluded that 

IAFIS could not be searched using the IDENT two-fingerprint system in the 

volume and within the response time that the INS required. This study 

proposed an alternative approach requiring the INS to collect 10 fingerprints (in 

addition to continuing to separately take 2 fingerprints for IDENT). Third, the 

Criminality Study projected that a total of 136,000 (8.5 percent) of the 

approximately 1.6 million aliens apprehended each year by the Border Patrol 

and allowed instead to voluntarily depart would be detained if their fingerprints 

were matched against IAFIS and their criminal histories were checked. 

In January 2001, JMD issued its FY 2002 budget request which stated 

that incremental versions of the IDENT/IAFIS database would be deployed in 

FY 2001, with a fully integrated version deployed in FYs 2006-7. The JMD 

plan called for deployment during FY 2001 of Version 1, a single ten-fingerprint 

workstation capable of querying IDENT using index fingerprints and IAFIS 

using ten fingerprints. The electronic IAFIS response would indicate a match 

or no match. When there was a match, IAFIS would electronically transmit the 

criminal history Record of Arrests and Prosecutions (RAP) sheet to the 

workstation from which the query was made. 

However, in August 2001 JMD revised its plan to slow the pace of the 

integration project because of concerns about operational issues relating to 

DOJ’s ability to handle the additional workload and the costs of detaining 

criminal aliens as projected by the criminality study. JMD also sought the 

delay to further study the additional workload and costs and to monitor 

developing biometric technologies to ensure that DOJ did not commit large 

sums of money to an integration plan that would not take advantage of future 

technological advances. As a result of this revised plan, JMD reduced its 

original FY 2002 budget request for the integration project from $38 million to 

$9 million.12 Also, the anticipated time frame for completing the first integrated 

version was delayed one year – from December 2001 until December 2002. 

 12 The $38 million included $10 million for IDENT system operation and maintenance

costs, but no funds for increased operational costs for the INS. 

14
In October 2001, in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks on 

the United States, Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, Public Law 

107-56 (the Patriot Act). The Patriot Act directed the expedited implementation 

of an integrated exit and entry data system, including the use of biometric 

technology. The Patriot Act also required that the FBI share with the INS 

wanted-persons information in IAFIS to determine whether an applicant for 

admission at a port of entry has a criminal record. Finally, the Patriot Act 

required that the Department report to Congress on enhancing IAFIS and other 

identification systems to better identify aliens who may be wanted before their 

entry to or exit from the United States.13 Subsequent DOJ responses to 

Congress regarding the Patriot Act indicated that an integrated IDENT/IAFIS 

was an integral tool to identify terrorist or criminal aliens attempting to enter 

the United States. 

 

In December 2001, the OIG issued another follow-up report examining 

the status of the continuing efforts to integrate IDENT and IAFIS.14 The report 

concluded that DOJ had moved slowly toward integrating the two fingerprint 

systems. As of December 2001, JMD’s plans for the deployment of the final 

version of the integrated database had been delayed another year (for a total of 

2 years). The OIG report recommended that DOJ continue to seek expeditious 

linkage of the FBI and INS automated fingerprint systems, and to continue to 

use IDENT while the integration was proceeding. The OIG report also 

supported the interim measure of immediately adding to the IDENT lookout 

database IAFIS fingerprint records for aliens with outstanding “wants and 

warrants,” as well as adding fingerprint records for known or suspected 

terrorists. 

VI. THE BATRES CASE 

In 2002, another high-profile case demonstrated the urgent need for 

integration of IDENT and IAFIS. In this section of the report, we describe the 

Border Patrol’s handling of two apprehensions of Victor Manual Batres in 

January 2002. Like the earlier Resendez case, this case tragically illustrated 

the danger of requiring immigration agents at individual Border Patrol stations 

to decide when they should research an apprehended alien’s criminal history 

rather than relying on an integrated database that matches an alien’s 

fingerprints and automatically transmits a criminal history RAP sheet to the 

Border Patrol station within 10 minutes. 

 

 13 As of January 2004, the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division had not 

completed the Attorney General’s report. 

 14 See OIG report entitled “Status of IDENT/IAFIS Integration,” December 2001. 

15
A. Batres’ Criminal and Immigration History 

Batres was born in Mexico on September 17, 1969, and before he was 20 

years old had developed an extensive criminal record in the United States. 

According to NCIC, Batres was charged and convicted of numerous crimes in 

the United States under a variety of aliases. NCIC’s III reflects convictions in: 

• September 1987 in Wenatchee, Washington for theft; 

• November 1987 in California for selling marijuana and/or hashish 

(an aggravated felony under 8 USC § 1101(a)(43)(B)); 

• June 1988 in California for sale of controlled substances (an aggravated 

felony under 8 USC § 1101(a)(43)(B)); 

• December 1988 in California for kidnapping and Second Degree robbery 

(for which he served 4 years’ imprisonment and was deported) (an 

aggravated felony under 8 USC § 1101(a)(43)(F)). 

NCIC also showed that Batres was arrested in the United States for 

additional offenses. Some of these charges were dismissed, some may not have 

been pursued in lieu of more serious offenses in other jurisdictions, and the 

outcome of other charges could not be determined. Among the additional 

arrests were: 

 

• May 1987 for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle; 

• February 1988 for purchasing cocaine; 

• March 1988 for robbery and possession of narcotics; 

• April 1988 for possession of controlled substances; 

• August 1988 for grand theft from a person; 

• August 1988 for robbery.15

 

 15 Mexican law enforcement records show that Batres was convicted and jailed in 

Mexico for additional crimes, although the records of these convictions would not have been 

available to the Border Patrol or contained in the FBI’s criminal databases. Batres was 

arrested and incarcerated in Mexico in 1993 for the crime of theft of a vehicle and damages, 

and in September 1995 for the crime of theft of an automobile. Batres also acknowledged in an 

interview with the OIG being convicted in 1997 in Mexico for the attempted rape of his 

stepdaughter, and a 1999 or 2000 conviction for the attempted rape of a family friend in 

Mexico. A 2002 arrest warrant also was on file in Mexico for Batres for the crimes of rape and

bodily injuries. 

16
In January 1993, a warrant was issued in Multnomah County, Oregon, 

for Batres’ arrest for possession of dangerous drugs, and this information was 

entered into the FBI NCIC Wants and Warrants database and IAFIS. A lookout 

for Victor Batres-Martinez Batres was electronically downloaded into IDENT by 

NCIC on December 28, 2001, as part of a download of all outstanding state and 

federal warrants from the WIN network into the IDENT database. This was the 

second time that criminal warrants had been added to IDENT.

16 The IDENT

entry stated that Batres may have an outstanding warrant and provided an FBI 

number to be queried in III. 

The Interstate Identification Index and immigration records also reflect 

that prior to January 2002 the INS had deported Batres at least once – on 

January 31, 1992, following the completion of his incarceration for robbery and 

kidnapping. In addition, INS A-File records indicate that following Batres’ 

apprehension by El Paso Border Patrol Sector agents in June 1992, the INS 

processed Batres again for “Formal Deportation,” although the disposition of 

that case was not included in the A-File or in other INS databases. 

 

B. El Paso Border Patrol Records Check Policy 

On August 16, 2001, the El Paso Sector Border Patrol sent via e-mail to 

all sector employees a policy memorandum regarding updates to the IDENT

lookout database. The memorandum stated that the USMS had entered into 

the IDENT lookout database approximately 7,600 sets of fingerprints of alien 

fugitives with outstanding warrants it had taken from its Warrant Information 

Network (USMS-WIN) database. The memorandum stated that all of these 

warrants were for serious felonies listed in NCIC. 

The memorandum provided instructions to Border Patrol agents who 

encountered in IDENT a “lookout” message stating, “Subject may be a United 

States Marshals Service (USMS) Fugitive. Check FBI number in NCIC for 

current warrants.” The Border Patrol memorandum instructed agents that if 

they encountered such a lookout they should: (1) confirm the individual’s 

identity by immediately submitting all of the alien’s ten fingerprints to the INS 

WIN/AFIS Center; (2) once WIN/AFIS verified the lookout hit, use the 

individual’s FBI number to query NCIC for “wants and warrants” for the alien;17

(3) notify the USMS of the apprehension and warrant number via telephone or 

 16 The first download of criminal warrants occurred in August 2001, with the transfer

from IAFIS of records for federal fugitives being sought by the USMS. 

 17 The NCIC “wants and warrants” database is different from the NCIC Criminal History 

Check. The wants and warrant database does not necessarily chronicle the offenses for which 

an individual has been convicted.

17
through NLETS;18 (4) document appropriately the transfer of the alien to the 

USMS; and (5) follow the Border Patrol procedures relating to the creation of 

A-Files and the retention or forwarding of all documentation relating to these 

cases. 

On December 14, 2001, the El Paso Sector Chief Patrol Agent issued 

another memorandum entitled “Alien Fugitives in IDENT” to all Sector Border 

Patrol Agents in Charge and Unit Supervisors. This memorandum stated: 

If an agent processes an individual through IDENT and gets 

a “lookout” candidate from any of the law enforcement 

agencies registered with WIN AFIS, the Agent will receive a 

call from WIN AFIS. At the time of notification, the “hit” will 

be brought to the attention of a supervisor. The supervisor 

will make the appropriate contact with the agency requesting 

the detention for resolution and/or disposition of the suspect 

being detained. 

A supervisory Border Patrol agent at the Santa Teresa, New Mexico 

Border Patrol office told the OIG that the December 14, 2001, memorandum 

from the El Paso Chief Patrol Agent was placed on the “muster board” in that 

station and was still there at the time of Batres’ apprehensions in January 

2002. A Patrol Agent in Charge stated that the memorandum had been 

discussed at shift briefings. We found no evidence that the memorandum was 

distributed individually to agents. 

C. First Apprehension of Batres – January 18, 2002 

At approximately 4:30 a.m. on January 18, 2002, a Border Patrol agent 

apprehended a group of four illegal aliens near Santa Teresa, New Mexico. The 

agent transported the aliens to the Santa Teresa Border Patrol Station for 

processing. At the station, the agent entered each of the aliens into IDENT. At 

approximately 5:00 a.m., when the agent processed the fingerprints of an alien 

who identified himself as Maximiliano Silerio-Esparza, the IDENT apprehension 

database did not indicate any prior illegal entries for the alien, but the IDENT

lookout database provided a “red-line” hit for a wanted alien named Victor M. 

Batres-Martinez.19

 

 18 The National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System is an international, 

computer-based message system that links state, local, and federal law enforcement agencies 

and allows them to exchange data. 

19 A “red-line” hit referred to a lookout in IDENT. 

18
The agent told the OIG that he had not received the memoranda 

described above detailing the process for handling IDENT lookouts for wanted 

aliens. He said, however, that he handled this situation based on his 

knowledge of the El Paso Sector Border Patrol policy, which he said had been 

explained to him in an oral briefing by a Border Patrol shift supervisor in 

December 2001. The agent said that, based on this briefing, his understanding 

was that when he received a lookout for an alien in IDENT, WIN/AFIS 

personnel would compare the fingerprints of the detainee against those of the 

wanted fugitive, and the agent was supposed to await a telephone call from 

WIN/AFIS for confirmation of the match. 

 

WIN/AFIS personnel confirmed the agent’s understanding of this policy. 

They explained that in the case of a lookout entered from NCIC, the WIN/AFIS 

Center is notified of the hit automatically (at the time that the alien is being 

processed in IDENT) via a digital pager. WIN/AFIS personnel then were 

required to confirm or deny the match and to contact the Border Patrol station 

where the alien’s fingerprints were entered into IDENT to advise of the 

confirmation or denial of the match and provide information about the match. 

This contact is expected to occur within an hour of the hit. As a courtesy, 

WIN/AFIS personnel also routinely send the processing Border Patrol station a 

facsimile that includes the alien’s NCIC criminal history printout, warrant 

information, and a WIN/AFIS worksheet. 

The agent who processed Batres and received the lookout hit in IDENT

said that, when he received the hit, the IDENT “fingerprint score” (which rates 

the strength of a fingerprint match) that appeared on the IDENT screen was 

insignificant to him. He said he had not yet received any training as to the 

meaning of this score.20 Further, there was no available photograph in IDENT 

to compare the lookout to Batres. The agent said he manually compared 

Batres’ fingerprints to the fingerprints provided with the lookout. The agent 

conducted his comparison on a 17-inch computer monitor, which showed the 

two sets of prints side by side, one from the lookout and one from Batres, 

whose prints he had just entered into IDENT. The agent explained that he 

counted the lines from the delta to the center of the left index finger on both 

sets of prints. He conducted this count twice and both times found a difference 

of one line between the prints. He therefore thought that it was not a match, 

and at approximately 5:10 a.m. he rejected the match in IDENT. 

 

The agent said that because he was not completely comfortable with 

rejecting the lookout hit based on his fingerprint comparison alone, he took the 

additional step of interviewing Batres. The agent stated that during the 

interview, Batres was cooperative and exhibited no signs of deception. Batres 

did not acknowledge being the person wanted in Oregon, although the agent 

 20 The fingerprint score was a high one, indicating a likely match.

19
said he did not press him on this issue. The agent told the OIG that based on 

the totality of the circumstances – the absence of a return call from WIN/AFIS, 

the agent's personal comparison of the fingerprints, and Batres' cooperative 

demeanor during questioning – he did not believe that Batres was the person in 

the lookout, and he therefore processed Batres for a voluntary return to 

Mexico.21

 

The agent finished processing the entire group of aliens at about 

5:30 a.m. and locked them in the holding cell at the Santa Teresa Border 

Patrol Station. The agent said that at approximately 6:30 a.m., he encountered 

a supervisory Border Patrol agent who was beginning his shift. The agent 

explained to the supervisor that Batres had a lookout hit, but that there was 

no positive identification from WIN/AFIS, and the agent therefore did not think 

that Batres was the person in the lookout. The agent said that the supervisory 

agent did not question this conclusion. 

The supervisory Border Patrol agent acknowledged having a conversation 

in which the agent told him that he had apprehended four aliens and that two 

had returned red-line hits in IDENT. He said that the agent informed him that 

one of the hits had a low matching fingerprint score and no picture, the other 

hit had high scores and no picture, and that the prints did not appear to match 

in either case. The supervisor said that this information was insufficient to 

lead him to believe that “either of these aliens would fall under the directive 

concerning WIN/AFIS aliens.” He stated that he believed that there was “no 

problem,” and that another supervisor who was working with the agent during 

his shift would have “taken care of anything that might have turned up in 

accordance with the procedures.” In fact, this was the only supervisor whom 

the agent informed of the hit regarding Batres. 

 

 21 We asked the agent to reconcile how he could have been confident that WIN/AFIS 

was not going to report a match within the 10-minute time frame, according to IDENT records, 

from 5:00 a.m. when the agent entered Batres' fingerprints in IDENT, until 5:10 a.m. when he

rejected the match in IDENT. The agent could not readily explain this time frame, and said

that he remembered interviewing Batres at length, and waiting a longer period of time before

denying the hit. The agent said it is possible, however, that he may have interviewed Batres to 

some degree prior to processing him in IDENT, although he had not initially remembered it 

that way. Regardless of the precise timing, as discussed below and in Section VI(F)(2)(A), 

below, we do not believe that the agent contravened established Border Patrol policies in 

voluntarily returning Batres to Mexico since he informed a supervisor of the lookout and of his 

proposed actions before Batres was returned. Moreover, WIN/AFIS did not contact the Border

Patrol until after Batres had been released. 

20
At approximately 8:00 a.m., an INS Detention Officer picked up the 

group of aliens, including Batres, and transported them to the Paso del Norte 

processing station, where they were voluntarily returned to Mexico. 

 

We determined, however, that WIN/AFIS had confirmed the lookout for 

Batres and had attempted to contact the Border Patrol to advise it of the 

match. But WIN/AFIS did not have a current telephone number for the Santa 

Teresa Border Patrol Station because the station had recently moved from a 

temporary location to a new, permanent location, and the Border Patrol had 

failed to provide the updated telephone numbers to WIN/AFIS. Consequently, 

WIN/AFIS did not make contact with the agent to inform him of the match, and 

Batres was voluntarily returned to Mexico without his true identity being 

discovered and confirmed. 

 

 At approximately 8:55 a.m., four hours after the agent had received the 

IDENT hit for Batres, and after Batres already had been returned to Mexico, 

WIN/AFIS personnel paged a supervisory Border Patrol agent who works on an 

IDENT user group and was detailed to Washington, D.C., at the time. 

WIN/AFIS informed this supervisory Border Patrol agent that around 5:00 a.m. 

WIN/AFIS had received automatic IDENT notification that the agent in Santa 

Teresa had entered an alien into IDENT and received a red-line alert. The 

WIN/AFIS personnel told the supervisory Border Patrol agent that their 

fingerprint comparison confirmed that Batres was the person wanted in Oregon 

on an outstanding warrant. The WIN/AFIS personnel explained that they had 

been attempting to call the processing agent since 5:00 a.m. to inform him of 

the confirmation, but they had been unable to reach him. The supervisory 

Border Patrol agent provided WIN/AFIS with the new telephone number of the 

Santa Teresa Station. 

The supervisory Border Patrol agent said he immediately telephoned the 

supervisory agent in Santa Teresa whom the apprehending agent had informed 

of the red-line hit, and informed him of the situation. The supervisor in Santa 

Teresa attempted to contact the apprehending agent by radio, but another 

Border Patrol officer reported that Batres already had been turned over to 

Mexican immigration officials and released.22 

In addition to confirming the lookout match, WIN/AFIS ran a criminal 

history check on Batres on January 18, which included a “wants and 

warrants” check. At the request of El Paso Sector Border Patrol officials, 

 

 22 That same day, the processing agent, the supervisory Border Patrol agent whom he 

had informed of the hit prior to Batres’ release, and the Santa Teresa Patrol Agent in Charge all 

were required to write memoranda documenting their actions with respect to Batres and

explain why he had been returned voluntarily to Mexico. 

21
WIN/AFIS personnel faxed all of this information concerning Batres to the 

EL Paso Sector Intelligence Unit. Acting Deputy Chief Danois Montoya 

assigned the new El Paso Sector Intelligence Officer, Stuart Gary, to review the 

materials, as well as any other relevant information that he could gather 

through INS databases, to determine the extent of Batres’ criminal and 

deportation record and to assess the significance of the mistake that had been 

made in releasing him. Montoya stated that while Gary had just recently 

transferred to the El Paso Sector Intelligence Unit, he was selected for this 

assignment based on his reputation as an agent with the INS Office of Internal 

Audit (OIA). 

After reviewing the information, Gary informed Montoya that Batres did 

in fact have a significant criminal record as well as a prior deportation, and 

that the release of such an individual – who also had an outstanding arrest 

warrant – was a significant error by the Border Patrol. Montoya stated that he 

believed that the arresting agent was at fault for failing to bring the red-line hit 

to the attention of his immediate shift supervisor, and that based on that he 

believed that disciplinary action should be initiated against the arresting agent. 

Montoya next relayed the information about Batres’ record and his 

release to the El Paso Sector Chief Patrol Agent and the Patrol Agent in Charge 

(PAIC) of the Santa Teresa Station, James Gonzales. Following standard 

Border Patrol protocol, Gonzales directed the Border Patrol personnel involved 

in the incident to write official memoranda to the Chief Patrol Agent 

documenting their actions regarding the apprehension and release of Batres. 

This included the arresting agent, the Assistant PAIC for the Santa Teresa 

office, and the supervisory Border Patrol agent whom the arresting agent had 

informed of the hit prior to Batres’ release. Montoya said that given the scope 

of the mistake that had been made, the Border Patrol immediately forwarded 

all of the relevant information to the Border Patrol’s Labor Management 

Relations personnel to review for appropriate disciplinary action against the 

arresting agent. Montoya stated that he did not request any further 

investigation by the INS OIA because he felt that his office had gathered all of 

the relevant information in connection with the incident.23

 23 Four months later, on April 25, 2002, the INS suspended the agent who had

detained and processed Batres. The INS charged him with failing to follow El Paso Sector 

Border Patrol instructions, policy, and procedures by not bringing the possible lookout match 

to the attention of a supervisor. The agent contested the charges, asserting that: (1) he did not 

receive Chief Barker’s December 14, 2001, memorandum; (2) even if he had received the 

memorandum, it does not require an agent to affirmatively pursue an answer from WIN/AFIS

as to the identification of the detainee; (3) the agent had informed a supervisor of the IDENT

lookout and the supervisor had nevertheless approved the release of Batres; and (4) the El Paso

Sector did not require that NCIC criminal history checks be conducted on all aliens. We

discuss these issues later in the report. 

22
Unfortunately, despite clearly recognizing the significant mistake that 

had been made in releasing Batres and discussing the simple steps which 

could have avoided further mistakes with respect to Batres, Border Patrol 

officials did not take these steps. Montoya said that on January 18, 2002, he 

specifically discussed with PAIC Gonzales and perhaps other officials the 

possibility of posting in IDENT and elsewhere a warning about Batres, 

reflecting his aggravated criminal record, prior deportations, current arrest 

warrant, and the fact that he had been improperly released before this 

information was discovered. In fact, it was possible to enter such a warning 

into Batres’ ENFORCE/IDENT records, and such a warning would have alerted 

any agent who apprehended Batres about his extensive criminal record and 

therefore would have resulted in his detention for prosecution. 

However, for reasons that he could not fully explain, Montoya never 

assigned anyone to post such a warning about Batres. Montoya explained that 

Border Patrol officials were focused on addressing the issue in a broader 

context by disciplining individuals who made mistakes and planning a policy 

that would require the posting of an IDENT warning for all aliens who are 

improperly released, not just Batres. Unfortunately, Batres was erroneously 

released again the very next day. Remarkably, Montoya acknowledged that as 

of early February 2004 this policy of posting warnings in IDENT for improperly 

released aliens has been communicated only orally and has not been 

documented in writing. 

D. Second Apprehension of Batres – January 19, 2002 

 

The next evening, on January 19, 2002, another Border Patrol agent 

encountered Batres several miles west of the Columbus, New Mexico, port of 

entry, as Batres again was attempting to illegally enter the United States. The 

agent apprehended Batres without incident. Batres once again provided his 

name as Maximiliano Silerio-Esparza. The agent took Batres to the Columbus 

Border Patrol Processing Center, where the agent was assisted by a second 

Border Patrol agent in processing him. 

When the second agent entered Batres into IDENT, a lookout hit 

appeared for Batres. Unlike the previous day, WIN/AFIS contacted the 

arresting agent a short time later and advised her that there was an open 

arrest warrant for Batres in Oregon. The agent then contacted the Multnomah 

County Sheriff’s Department in Oregon, where the warrant had been issued. 

Because of the nature of the offense underlying the warrant – possession of 

dangerous drugs – the judge issuing the warrant had only authorized 

extradition within a limited “shuttle range” due to the expense of transporting 

and detaining arrestees. At the time of the Batres case, the “shuttle range” 

23
area included Oregon, Washington, western Idaho, and western Montana.24 As 

a result, the Sheriff’s Department advised the Border Patrol agent that it would 

not extradite Batres. 

The arresting agent then advised the acting supervisory Border Patrol 

agent of the situation. The supervisor authorized the voluntary return of 

Batres to Mexico, and instructed the agent to create a brief summary on 

Batres’ I-213 Form (Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien), noting the 

reason for the return of Batres. The agents then voluntarily returned Batres to 

Mexico. 

The narrative on the I-213 Form, written by an agent who assisted in 

processing Batres on January 19, stated that the Oregon authorities declined 

extradition and that the Border Patrol supervisor approved Batres’ voluntary 

return to Mexico. Under the section of the I-213 for Batres’ Criminal Record, 

“none known” was filled in. Although the arresting agent completed the 

information blocks on the I-213 Form, she noted that she did not actually enter 

the words “none known” in the box for Criminal Record; rather, the system 

automatically enters this phrase in the absence of an entry from the agent. 

 

In a memorandum to Border Patrol Headquarters following Batres’ attack 

on the two nuns in Oregon, Chief Patrol Agent Barker stated that the standard 

operating policy for the El Paso Sector was to thoroughly check the background 

of any subject who returns a lookout in the IDENT system. This was not a 

written policy, at least at the time that Batres was arrested. However, the 

Border Patrol agents involved in processing Batres on January 19 said that in 

the case of a confirmed lookout hit they would have either conducted the 

criminal history checks themselves or ensured that they were conducted. Yet, 

none of these agents had any memory of doing a check or ensuring that it was 

done in the Batres case, and all said they had no knowledge that Batres had a 

criminal record. 

 

The supervisory Border Patrol agent who approved Batres’ voluntary 

return stated that in Batres’ case, where the lookout resulted in a confirmation 

from WIN/AFIS and a valid FBI number, it was his responsibility to “ensure 

 24 In Multnomah County, judges set the terms of extradition at the time they issue a 

warrant. There is no standard formula for this decision. Rather, the decision is based on the

judge’s discretion, taking into account the seriousness of the offense at issue and any

recommendation made by the prosecutor in the particular case. The three possible terms for

extradition within Multnomah County included: (1) extradition within Oregon only; 

(2) extradition within a standard “shuttle range” of several states (the option selected in this 

case); and (3) nationwide or unlimited extradition. Once the warrant is issued, the terms for 

extradition do not change absent a motion from a prosecutor or another party of interest. The 

record did not indicate that prosecutors made any recommendations regarding the extradition 

range in Batres’ case. 

24
that a further records check for any additional criminal history on [Batres] 

were conducted.” He said that both he and the apprehending agent “knew 

from experience that an individual with a “Red-line Alert” requires a lot more 

investigation into his background and criminal history before making a 

decision to allow that individual a voluntary return.” 

The arresting agent stated that she was unsure whether Chief Barker’s 

December 14, 2001, memorandum was posted at the time that Batres was 

apprehended, but she acknowledged understanding that criminal history 

checks should be made when a red-line hit was confirmed. However, she could 

not recall specifically querying NCIC herself or requesting another agent to 

make the query. She said that she believed that the criminal history checks 

were done and that the results were negative, based on the fact that the I-213 

contained the entry “none known” in the Criminal Record block. 

The Border Patrol agent who assisted the arresting agent in processing 

Batres stated that she was aware of Chief Barker’s December 14, 2001, policy 

statement and that she believed that she complied with it. While she could not 

specifically recall querying Batres’ FBI number for criminal history or asking 

anyone to do so, she stated that it was her practice to routinely conduct 

criminal history inquiries based on confirmed WIN/AFIS lookouts. She also 

said that she would not have processed Batres for a voluntary return if she had 

information about his prior deportation or criminal convictions. 

Yet, the evidence we found shows that no criminal checks were done. A 

search of the NCIC and TCIC databases did not identify any queries by the 

Border Patrol on January 18 or 19, 2002, for the name Batres, his known 

aliases, or the FBI number provided by IDENT.25 A review of the Sector radio 

logs also shows no indication that a criminal history check was requested or 

conducted. Further, the I-213 Form does not address in any detail what steps, 

if any, were taken with regard to determining Batres’ criminal history. Finally, 

neither the arresting agent, the processing agent, nor anyone else in the office 

had any recollection of either checking Batres’ criminal history record or of 

asking anyone else to do it. 

 

E. Batres’ Attack on the Two Nuns 

In an interview with the OIG after his conviction for murder, Batres said 

that after being returned to Mexico on January 19, 2002, he went to 

Chihuahua City and illegally returned to the United States in August 2002. He 

said he entered the United States with several other aliens near Polomas, 

 25 TCIC is the Texas Criminal Information Center. It is a database managed by the 

State of Texas that contains criminal history information and outstanding warrants for those

individuals arrested and wanted in Texas. 

25
Mexico. Batres said he hid in the desert area near Columbus, New Mexico, for 

one day and then returned to Mexico because he was unable to find a means to 

travel into the interior of the United States. 

Batres said that a few days later, he and two other Mexicans illegally 

entered the United States near Polomas, New Mexico. He was able to reach 

Deming, New Mexico, where he sneaked on a freight train traveling west 

through Deming. Batres rode the train to San Bernardino, California. From 

there, Batres went onto another train going to Los Angeles. After about three 

days, he went on a freight train traveling north and onto several other trains, 

finally arriving in Klamath Falls, Oregon. 

Batres said that he intended to travel on trains to Portland, Oregon, but 

was impeded due to a large number of law enforcement officers working in the 

train yard. Batres therefore decided to stay in Klamath Falls for a time and 

look for work until he could make it to Portland. On September 1, 2002, 

Batres encountered two Catholic nuns as he was walking through a local park. 

Batres raped and assaulted both of the nuns, killing one of them. Batres was 

quickly identified by the local Sheriff’s Department and arrested for the crimes. 

Upon his arrest, he confessed to the rapes and murder. Batres subsequently 

pled guilty to the murder and rape of one of the nuns and was sentenced to life 

imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 

F. OIG Analysis of the Batres Case 

Based on Border Patrol practice and policies, Batres’ criminal record, if 

known to the agents, should have resulted in his detention and prosecution. 

Such prosecution likely would have caused Batres to be incarcerated for a 

significant period of time, rather than being voluntarily returned to Mexico, 

where he returned to the United States to commit his rapes and murder. 

Although our investigation found that some of the agents and 

supervisors who handled Batres did not follow Border Patrol policies, we 

believe that blaming them for this tragedy would not address the underlying 

problems revealed by this case. Unless their technological support is 

improved, it is inevitable that individual Border Patrol agents, who often are 

overwhelmed by large numbers of aliens and cumbersome procedures, will not 

be able to consistently determine the full criminal history and prior 

deportations of all of the aliens they apprehend. Therefore, as we describe 

below, we continue to believe the integration of immigration and FBI databases 

is urgently needed to eliminate the potential for the breakdowns and problems 

that this and other cases reveal. 

26
 1. Batres’ record warranted his detention for prosecution 

As noted above, the FBI’s database showed that Batres was convicted of 

the aggravated felony of selling controlled dangerous substances in 1987 and 

1988, and a third aggravated felony of kidnapping and second-degree robbery 

in 1988. After serving the majority of his six-year sentence for the latter crime, 

he was deported from the United States in 1992. 

An integrated IDENT and IAFIS database would have revealed these 

convictions and Batres’ extensive criminal history, as well as his prior 

deportation, when he was arrested by the Border Patrol agents in January 

2002. However, while the IDENT lookout database provided these agents with 

a lookout hit that enabled them to learn of Batres’ outstanding warrant in 

Oregon, it did not contain any information about Batres’ criminal history or 

prior deportation. The criminal conviction records contained in IDENT are 

limited to immigration records that contain certain categories of convictions, 

the automatic “wants and warrants” updates, the criminal history fingerprint 

records of aliens from certain countries believed to be a threat to the United 

States, records received and uploaded manually from other law enforcement 

agencies, and the limited comments that Border Patrol agents have added to 

IDENT based on their review of the alien’s NCIC records during prior 

apprehensions. In order to access Batres’ criminal history records at the time 

of his apprehensions, Border Patrol agents would have had to seek his criminal 

records by asking for a check of the FBI’s III or IAFIS database. 

If the agents who processed Batres had learned of his record – his three 

aggravated felonies and his prior deportation – under Border Patrol policies, 

they should have detained him and sought his prosecution for Reentry After 

Deportation (8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)).26 This statute provides felony penalties for 

aliens who have been deported or removed from the United States and 

thereafter reentered the country illegally, which applied to Batres. This statute 

provides for harsh punishment – up to 20 years’ imprisonment – for aliens 

such as Batres “whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission 

 26 Batres also could have been prosecuted for Entry Without Inspection, pursuant to

8 U.S.C. § 1325. The Border Patrol charges aliens with the misdemeanor offense of “Entry 

Without Inspection” (EWI), pursuant to 8 USC § 1325, when (1) the alien is apprehended for 

illegal entry a certain number of times (While EWI charges can be brought based on just one

entry, each jurisdiction sets its own “threshold” guidance as to when to bring these charges.); 

(2) the alien has been previously deported; or (3) the alien has an aggravated criminal record, 

such as a prior felony. The latter two conditions were both present in the Batres case. 

Moreover, the charge of EWI is easy to prove. It only requires presentation of the I-213 Form

and evidence that the alien at the hearing is in fact the same person listed in the 

I-213. 

27
of an aggravated felony.” (8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2)). Batres’ prior deportation was 

subsequent to convictions of at least three aggravated felony convictions. 

According to the prosecutors from New Mexico and Texas who we 

interviewed in the Resendez case, aliens with a prior aggravated felony record 

typically received at least a 3-year prison sentence upon conviction for Reentry 

After Deportation. Moreover, the crime of Reentry After Deportation is easy to 

prove. It simply requires proof of a prior order of deportation (in which a 

Detention and Deportation employee certifies that the alien exited the country 

on a particular date), and evidence that the alien is the same individual who 

previously was deported. 

2. Actions of agents who processed Batres 

 a. January 18 apprehension

On January 18, 2002, the arresting agent learned of the lookout hit for 

Batres but did not receive confirmation from WIN/AFIS that Batres was the 

person in the lookout. The agent therefore did no records check on Batres and 

voluntarily returned him to Mexico. The Border Patrol disciplined the agent for 

allegedly failing to follow procedures. However, it is not clear that he 

contravened established and communicated Border Patrol policies, and we 

believe solely blaming the agent in this case misses the larger point. 

The Border Patrol alleged that the agent “failed to follow proper 

procedures in processing a possible fugitive and/or Want and Warrant Hit.” 

The Border Patrol stated that he failed to notify a supervisor of the “lookout 

hits” and voluntary return of Batres to Mexico. Yet, the agent did not violate 

the December 14 policy memorandum, which states in pertinent part: 

If an agent processes an individual through IDENT and gets a 

“lookout” candidate from any of the law enforcement agencies 

registered with WIN AFIS, the agent will receive a call from 

WIN AFIS. At the time of notification, the “hit” will be brought 

to the attention of the supervisor. The supervisor will make 

the appropriate contact with the agency requesting the 

detention for resolution and/or disposition of the suspect 

being detained. [Emphasis added.] 

The agent did, in fact, bring the hit to the attention of a supervisor. He 

informed a supervisory Border Patrol agent who was entering the next shift 

that Batres had a red-line lookout hit, but that there was no positive 

identification received from WIN/AFIS. The supervisor acknowledged that the 

agent told him that Batres and another alien had returned lookout alerts in 

IDENT, that the agent had reviewed the fingerprints but did not think they 

matched the fingerprints associated with the lookouts, and that the agent 

28
processed the aliens for voluntary return. The supervisor said he did not 

intervene or suggest any further action because he believed that if there had 

been any problem, a supervisor from the prior shift would have taken care of it 

in accordance with procedures. 

 

Moreover, the December 14 policy statement does not even appear to 

require agents to contact supervisors about all lookout hits, only those in 

which WIN/AFIS confirms the lookout match. In this case, WIN/AFIS did not 

call the agent back to confirm the lookout, because it did not have the current 

telephone number for the station. 

Finally, we question the actions of the Border Patrol supervisors after 

they were informed by WIN/AFIS that Batres was the person in the lookout. 

While Batres had already been released, we believe they should have at least 

noted in IDENT that Batres had been released before the criminal history check 

had been received, and that the check showed that he had an aggravated 

criminal record and a prior deportation. This would have been important 

information to alert any other Border Patrol agent who apprehended Batres 

that he should be detained rather than mistakenly released, which happened 

again the very next day. Although the Border Patrol asked the agents involved 

to write memoranda that same day on what had happened, no one took the 

initiative to have the information about Batres entered into IDENT. They 

explained this deficiency by stating that they were focused on discipline for the 

arresting agent, as well as considering a policy requiring the posting of an 

IDENT warning for all aliens who are improperly released, not just Batres. Yet, 

this does not explain why they did not also take the simple step of posting an 

alert on Batres in IDENT. This was a significant and unjustified failure. And, 

as noted above, the Border Patrol still has not issued any written policy 

addressing this issue as of early February 2004. 

 b. January 19 apprehension 

During the second apprehension of Batres, on January 19, 2002, the 

Border Patrol agents received confirmation that Batres was the person wanted 

in the IDENT lookout. The agents appropriately followed Border Patrol 

procedures and contacted the Oregon authorities. The Sheriff’s Department in 

Oregon advised that they did not want Batres extradited to Oregon, and the 

Border Patrol therefore voluntarily returned Batres to Mexico. 

But the evidence shows that the Border Patrol agents failed to check 

Batres’ criminal history before returning him to Mexico. The agents 

acknowledged understanding that they should ensure that criminal history 

checks are performed for any alien, such as Batres, with an outstanding 

warrant. Both of the agents involved in processing Batres asserted that they 

believed that the check was done, although they could not say who did it. 

Despite the notation on Batres’ I-213 Form of no known criminal history, a 

29
review of Sector radio logs, and NCIC and TCIC search results, showed no 

indication that there was a call to perform a criminal history check on Batres 

on January 18 or 19, 2002. 

 

While we cannot know with certainty why the Border Patrol did not 

conduct criminal history checks in connection with the second arrest, it is 

likely that the check slipped through the cracks, perhaps after the Oregon 

authorities declined to extradite Batres. While not excusing this failure, we 

believe that such omissions are inevitable, given the large volume of aliens 

apprehended, the time pressure on individual agents to process many aliens, 

the imprecise and changing Border Patrol procedures, the lack of 

comprehensive training for agents on these procedures, the multitude of 

information and forms that have to be completed for each alien, and the 

cumbersome procedures required to complete criminal history checks. In our 

view, without integrated databases, problems like the Batres and Resendez 

cases will recur. 

We cannot determine with certainty how many dangerous aliens with 

serious criminal records the Border Patrol continues to voluntarily return 

because it does not learn of their criminal records from information in FBI 

databases. However, the experience with the downloads of FBI criminal 

records into immigration databases suggests the number is large. Since 

August 2001, 152,000 IAFIS “wants and warrants” fingerprint records have 

been added into IDENT, and from January 2002 to April 2003, immigration 

employees have matched to these records and apprehended 4,820 aliens who 

were wanted for criminal offenses, including many for drug trafficking and 

violent crimes. Fifty of these aliens were wanted in connection with murder. 

Since entering into IDENT during the same period an additional 179,500 IAFIS 

criminal history fingerprint records of aliens from certain countries believed to 

pose a security risk to the United States, immigration personnel have matched 

criminal records to 3,440 apprehended aliens. But these are incomplete 

downloads of criminal information, and many aliens who have criminal records 

are detained and released without any check of their records. 

The security concerns raised by these numbers are clear. Inputting 

fingerprint records into IDENT has demonstrated the potential value of a fully 

integrated system, but it falls well short of the capability offered by full access 

to all IAFIS fingerprint records. Until the integration is complete and 

immigration authorities, the FBI, and other law enforcement agencies can 

simultaneously query both immigration and FBI fingerprint records, we believe 

dangerous aliens who should be detained may not be. 

VII. STATUS OF IDENT/IAFIS INTEGRATION

Since the OIG’s June 2003 report on the status of the IDENT/IAFIS 

integration, the integration project has made some progress but it continues to 

30
move slowly. As of January 2004, all aliens apprehended by the Border Patrol 

still are not checked against FBI criminal fingerprint records and the FBI and 

other law enforcement agencies using the FBI’s fingerprint records still cannot 

access the DHS’s criminal alien fingerprint records. Further, the transfer of 

the INS to the DHS has created additional issues relating to the management of 

the integration project. This section of the report summarizes the current 

status of the IDENT/IAFIS integration project. 

A. June 2003 OIG Report 

In June 2003, we reported that the IDENT/IAFIS integration project had 

fallen at least 2 years behind schedule.27 At that time, the next major project 

milestone was deployment of the initial integrated version of IDENT/IAFIS, 

Version 1.2. Originally scheduled for December 2001, that deployment 

experienced a series of delays while JMD studied the operational costs of the 

integration (called the Metric Study) and while the INS focused on developing 

the National Security Entry/Exit Registration System (NSEERS).28

We also reported that the integration project was at risk of further delays 

because JMD had not developed a transition plan for continued management of 

the project after the INS transferred to the DHS in March 2003. Moreover, 

JMD had not prepared a revised schedule for completing the full integration of 

IDENT and IAFIS. We found that the lack of planning resulted in confusion 

over whether JMD or the DHS would manage the development and deployment 

of the integration project. We also noted the potential loss of expertise as the 

DHS reassigned individuals experienced in IDENT away from the stalled 

integration project. 

The delays and lack of planning we noted for the integration project were 

troubling because the interim enhancements made to IDENT had resulted in 

an impressive record of helping to identify wanted aliens. For example, from 

January 2002 to April 2003 the INS identified 4,820 apprehended aliens 

 27 See the OIG report entitled “Status of IDENT/IAFIS Integration,” June 2003. 

28 NSEERS is a national registry for nonimmigrant aliens arriving from certain 

countries to the United States, or aliens meeting intelligence-based criteria and identified as 

presenting an elevated security concern. NSEERS, which collected background, travel, and 

departure information and fingerprints, was the first step taken by DOJ and then DHS to

comply with the congressionally mandated requirement for a comprehensive entry-exit program

by 2005. However, NSEERS ended on December 1, 2003, and on January 5, 2004, was 

superseded by the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US VISIT)

program at 115 airports and 14 seaports. DHS officials plan to implement US VISIT at all ports 

of entry by December 31, 2005. US VISIT requires that most foreign visitors traveling to the

United States on a visa have their two index fingers scanned and a digital photograph taken to

verify their identity at the port of entry. US VISIT also will begin pilot testing departure

confirmation systems at several locations.

31
wanted in connection with a variety of serious criminal offenses, including at 

least 50 aliens wanted in connection with murder, after 152,000 NCIC “wants 

and warrants fingerprint records were added to the IDENT lookout database. 

Our June 2003 report recommended that JMD coordinate with the DHS 

to identify the management, deployment, and operational issues raised by the 

INS transfer to the DHS; prepare a revised project deployment plan; and report 

quarterly on the progress and interim results of the Metric Study. 

B. Progress Since June 2003 

In its response included in the OIG’s June 2003 report, JMD said that it 

initiated communication between the Chief Information Officers of DOJ and 

DHS to discuss project integration issues; prepared a revised deployment plan; 

briefed Congress and DOJ officials on the project status; and issued the first 

quarterly report from the Metric Study. However, in a September 17, 2003, 

follow-up response JMD identified several critical issues it said threatened the 

progress of the IDENT/IAFIS integration effort. We discuss these issues and 

the progress made by the DOJ and DHS in addressing the issues as of January 

2004. 

 

• Project Leadership and Responsibilities. DOJ and the DHS have 

assigned lead responsibility for the integration project to specific offices 

in each agency – for the DOJ, JMD’s Management Planning Staff and for 

the DHS, its ENFORCE/IDENT Program Office.29 However, as of 

January 2004, the DOJ and DHS still had not developed an interagency 

memorandum of understanding to clarify the roles, responsibilities, and 

funding for the IDENT/IAFIS integration project.30

• Funding. The DOJ’s FY 2004 appropriation, passed by Congress in 

January 2004, included $5.1 million for the integration project, 

$4 million dollars less than requested by the DOJ. The DHS received no 

direct funding for the integration project in its FY 2004 appropriation. 

JMD officials told the OIG that it believes this level of funding will slow 

down the deployment of Version 1.2 of IDENT/IAFIS, but at the time of 

this report JMD had not yet estimated the extent of the delay. 

 29 ENFORCE is a case management system that documents and tracks the

investigation, identification, apprehension, detention, and removal of immigration law violators. 

The ENFORCE/IDENT Program Office reports to the managers of US VISIT within the DHS. 

30 The Conference Report accompanying the FY 2004 omnibus appropriations 

legislation directed the DOJ to develop a memorandum of understanding with the DHS and

other appropriate federal agencies regarding the continued integration of fingerprint systems. 

32
In addition, the DOJ and the DHS disagree on whether any of the 

$330 million Congress has provided for the DHS’s US VISIT program in 

FY 2004 could be used appropriately to advance the IDENT/IAFIS 

integration project. 

Finally, the President’s FY 2005 budget request includes $21.5 million 

for the IDENT/IAFIS project – $5.1 million for JMD to continue 

development and $16 million for IAFIS to support anticipated increased 

transactions from DHS sites. According to JMD officials, the DHS is 

responsible for the expense and scheduling of further development and 

deployment of Version 1.2. 

• Interoperability. As of January 2004, issues related to the compatibility 

of the two-print US VISIT system with the ten-print records in the IAFIS 

database were unresolved, as was the issue of whether and how IAFIS 

would access the US VISIT fingerprint records. As of January 2004, it 

has not been determined yet how IDENT/IAFIS will interface with the 

structure of the new US VISIT biometric system implemented to track the 

arrival and departure of foreign visitors to the United States. 

On January 26, 2004, the first meeting of the US VISIT Federal 

Stakeholders Advisory Board was held, chaired by the DHS 

Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security, followed several 

days later by a meeting attended by many of the IDENT/IAFIS principals. 

At this second meeting, the DOJ and DHS officials agreed to formally 

present positions on providing the FBI access to US VISIT fingerprint 

records and on existing policies that would restrict the sharing of this 

information. DHS was tasked with researching the possibilities of 

sharing US VISIT data with DOJ and the FBI. Both groups are 

scheduled to meet again in March 2004. 

• Development Schedules. We were informed by DOJ in September 2003 

that DHS staff working on the IDENT/IAFIS integration have been 

redirected to the US VISIT program, which continues to be a DHS 

priority. Further, we were told that implementation of US VISIT required 

changes to IDENT, which resulted in delay of IDENT/IAFIS integration 

efforts until the US VISIT changes were completed and a “stable software 

baseline” (i.e., a version not undergoing revision) was established. The 

DHS staffing issues were resolved by October 2003 with implementation 

of the integrated BTS/US VISIT/ENFORCE IDENT Program Office and 

the hiring of additional DHS personnel whose work on US VISIT 

accelerated necessary modifications to IDENT/IAFIS. JMD officials told 

us that the stability of the IDENT/ENFORCE software baseline remains a 

potential concern for the duration of the development of US VISIT

33
through FY 2005. DOJ officials stated that they considered Version 1 (as 

represented by Version 1.2) to be completed. DHS officials stated that 

DOJ and DHS have not yet completed development of Version 1.2 as 

defined in its requirements document. 

DOJ and DHS officials also noted the importance of a Fingerprint Vendor 

Technology Evaluation being conducted by the National Institute of 

Standards and Technology on behalf of JMD and in conjunction with the 

FBI. This evaluation is responsive to a requirement in the Department’s 

FY 2003 appropriations bill directing that $1 million be spent on a pilot 

program for software for IAFIS capable of expediting background checks 

using ten or less fingerprint comparisons.31 

• Fingerprint Image Quality. According to DOJ and DHS officials, 

fingerprint image quality is currently the most important operational 

issue in the IDENT/IAFIS integration project. According to DHS officials, 

this issue has temporarily slowed further deployment of Version 1.1+. 

The recent image quality problems coincide with deployment of Version 

1.1+ and its new fingerprint scanner. 32 In late 2003, 20 to 30 percent of 

IDENT fingerprint quality indicator scores began falling into the 

unacceptable range. DHS staff suspect three possible overlapping 

causes: the new scanners; the cropping of the fingerprint images after 

the fingerprint has been scanned and before the image is searched 

against the IDENT database; and inadequate training. Since discovering 

the problems, DHS officials said that they are testing another scanner to 

see if it gets better results, adjusting the area of the fingerprint that is 

scanned and examining the effectiveness of their training.

• Data Completeness. According to JMD, as of September 2003 the DHS 

had identified discrepancies in the data that JMD was collecting from 

various sources to estimate “front line” and “downstream” costs of the 

 31 DOJ also issued a Request for Information for fingerprint technology that could

capture the equivalent of 10 rolled fingerprints in less than one minute. 

32 Version 1.1+ workstations can take 10 rolled fingerprints and simultaneously query 

the IDENT and IAFIS databases to provide a rapid response for potential matches from IAFIS in 

less than 10 minutes. Version 1.1+ also modified the IDENT photograph for the purposes of 

electronic booking. DHS officials stated that Version 1.2 also will automatically submit 10 

fingerprints to the DHS Biometric Support Center (which maintains the lookout database) in 

order that the aliens’ fingerprints be entered into the lookout database. Version 1.2 also would 

enable certain IAFIS data to be automatically entered in the associated ENFORCE record. The

next version, Version 2, will create within IAFIS an Immigration Apprehension file, consisting of 

both flat and rolled IDENT fingerprints, which will allow other federal, state and local law 

enforcement agencies to submit ten-rolled prints for criminal checks against the IDENT

fingerprint records. 

34
integration project for the Metric Study.33 As of January 2004, the DHS 

and JMD still were in the process of identifying and resolving these 

discrepancies. 

 

We concluded that as of January 2004, some progress has been made in 

deploying the initial integrated versions of IDENT/IAFIS, but the integration 

process continues to proceed slowly. IDENT Version 1.1+ workstations have 

been deployed to approximately 56 DHS sites, including 25 ports of entry and 

31 Border Patrol stations. That represents about 12 percent of all ports of 

entry, and about 20 percent of all Border Patrol sites.34

The first Metric Study report sent to Congress on July 18, 2003, 

estimated that, as a result of improved IAFIS access, the Border Patrol was able 

to obtain additional criminal history information that it would not have known 

about for between 8.8 percent and 10.3 percent of the aliens it apprehended at 

the metric sites. Preliminary Metrics data from October through December 

2003, with all sites deploying Version 1.1+, suggested that access to IAFIS 

provided criminal history information to the Border Patrol on between 8.5 and 

11.8 percent of apprehended aliens that would not have been known by 

searching IDENT alone. From October 1, 2003, until January 31, 2004, the 

Border Patrol had 9,650 criminal hits from IAFIS that, including hits for aliens 

wanted in connection with 13 murders. 

The FBI continues to electronically update every two weeks the “wants 

and warrants” file that goes into the IDENT lookout database. Every month, 

the FBI also provides to the lookout database an updated Terrorist file, which 

includes fingerprint records the FBI has acquired from various law enforcement 

and security sources. From October 2003 until January 31, 2004, the DHS 

has received 3,034 hits on apprehended aliens from the updated “wants and 

warrants” file, including 399 hits for aliens wanted for violent crimes. 

Finally, JMD has revised the official project schedule to reflect the delays 

that had been incurred through September 2003. According to the revised 

schedule, IAFIS will be expanded to handle the additional workload generated 

by the nationwide deployment of Version 1.2 by September 30, 2005. 

 33 The front line cost refers to the additional resource requirements for DHS that would

result from the increased apprehension of identified criminal aliens. The downstream cost is 

the operational cost to other agencies that would be affected by the increased apprehension 

and processing of illegal aliens, such as the United States Marshals Service, Federal Bureau of 

Prisons, Executive Office for Immigration Review, and the United States Attorneys’ Offices. 

34 In addition, another 56 locations (ports of entry, Border Patrol stations, and District

Offices) have received the unintegrated Version 1.1.1, which requires that aliens be processed 

twice in order to check both the IDENT lookout database and the IAFIS criminal history 

records. 

35
According to JMD officials, DHS will determine the date by which Version 1.2 is 

deployed nationwide. The revised schedule indicates that the final version, 

Version 2 – which will provide the important capability for the FBI and local 

law enforcement agencies to access the DHS’s fingerprint and criminal history 

databases – will not be completed before August 2008. That is more than 

5 years later than Version 2 originally was scheduled to be deployed, and 

almost 2 years behind the original scheduled completion date for the entire 

integration project. However, according to JMD officials, the scope and 

phasing of the entire project has undergone a thorough revision. Version 2 will 

incorporate what was referred to as Versions 2, 3, and 4 in the original project 

plan. 

Thus, while there has been some progress at deploying an integrated 

version of IDENT/IAFIS, full integration of the two systems remains years 

away. The FBI, the DHS, and local law enforcement agencies still are far from 

a fully integrated system that will automatically check the fingerprints of 

apprehended aliens against all IDENT and IAFIS records. According to the 

latest schedule, the deployment of a fully integrated fingerprint system is at 

least 4 years away. We believe this continues the significant risk that aliens 

who should be detained, such as Resendez and Batres, instead will be released 

because Border Patrol agents will not learn of their significant criminal or 

deportation history. 

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS 

1. The DOJ should develop and implement a memorandum of 

understanding (MOU) with the DHS to guide the integration of 

IDENT and IAFIS. 

In its September 17, 2003, response to the OIG Report, JMD stated that 

it would develop an MOU between DHS and DOJ detailing the roles and 

responsibilities pertaining to the IDENT/IAFIS integration project. Since then, 

in the FY 2004 Omnibus Appropriations Act, Congress specifically directed 

DOJ to develop and implement such an MOU with DHS, including cost-sharing 

agreements, to ensure continued coordination on this and other initiatives. 

As of January 2004, JMD managers told the OIG that they have made 

little progress on drafting such an MOU. They said that JMD is waiting for 

more information from DHS about how the entry-exit control requirements of 

US VISIT will be integrated with IAFIS. In addition, the FBI and DHS have not 

agreed on the extent of access that the FBI will have to fingerprints collected by 

US VISIT. DHS managers also told us that they have been preoccupied with 

deploying the first phase of US VISIT, although they indicated that an MOU 

does not have to hinge on whether the issues revolving around US VISIT have 

been resolved. 

36
 

We believe that DOJ, in collaboration with DHS, should resolve these 

issues and ensure that an MOU detailing the duties and responsibilities for the 

IDENT/IAFIS project be completed soon. 

 

2. The DOJ should assign responsibility for coordinating and 

overseeing the integration project to a senior DOJ official. 

We believe that the participation of high-level officials – at both DOJ and 

DHS – is needed to resolve cross-agency issues so that this critical joint project 

can move forward in a timelier manner. At DOJ, we recommend that the Chief 

Information Officer (who is now meeting monthly with his DHS counterpart on 

the IDENT/IAFIS integration project) be assigned to lead this integration 

project on behalf of DOJ and to oversee the efforts of JMD’s IDENT/IAFIS 

Integration Project Office. JMD should retain the daily operational 

responsibility within DOJ for directing and assuring the successful integration 

of IDENT and IAFIS databases. In light of JMD’s history and experience in 

coordinating this initiative, as well as the working relationships it has 

developed with the critical offices and individuals within the DHS and the FBI, 

we believe that JMD remains the most capable and appropriate entity to 

oversee completion of the project. Nevertheless, we believe that one senior 

official assigned ultimately should be responsible for ensuring that the project 

moves forward and any difficulties are addressed timely. 

3. The DOJ should pursue expeditiously the development of Version 2 

of the IDENT/IAFIS Integration Project, which will provide the DHS 

apprehension and criminal history information to other federal, 

state, and local law enforcement agencies. 

To date, the IDENT/IAFIS integration project has focused on providing 

FBI fingerprint and criminal history information to immigration agents at DHS 

to enable them to identify criminal aliens. Conversely, federal, state, and local 

law enforcement officials will benefit greatly from ready access to DHS 

fingerprint and criminal history information, including information on prior 

deportations. 

According to officials at the DOJ and DHS, significant policy questions 

remain concerning how the FBI will access certain IDENT fingerprint records 

and how the records will be made available to other law enforcement agencies. 

These questions must be resolved before work on Version 2 of the Integration 

Project can proceed. We believe that these decisions should be made as soon 

as possible, because they will affect the ability of local, state, and other federal 

law enforcement agencies to receive information from IDENT records. 

37
4. The DOJ should work with the DHS to update the FBI’s “wants and 

warrants” information with IDENT on a daily, rather than bi-weekly, 

basis until IDENT and IAFIS are fully integrated. 

 

IDENT is currently updated with FBI “wants and warrants” information 

every two weeks. This creates the obvious risk that wanted aliens may be 

released inappropriately because a “want or a warrant” has not been placed in 

IDENT between the biweekly update. We believe the FBI should work with the 

DHS to ensure that its “wants and warrants” are transferred automatically to 

IDENT every day; that the IAFIS records in IDENT are timely, accurate and 

complete; and that records be modified or deleted when a change is made in III. 

5. The DOJ should coordinate with the DHS to establish procedures to 

ensure that the criminal histories of all aliens who have a lookout or 

IAFIS hit are provided to and reviewed by the Border Patrol. In 

addition, we urge the DHS to make these criminal history records 

part of the official record of its encounter with the alien. Further, 

we encourage the Border Patrol to create a uniform policy for all 

Border Patrol sectors and stations that outlines appropriate 

procedures for handling lookout hits. 

In response to lookout hits, WIN/AFIS currently faxes an alien’s criminal 

history RAP sheet to the Border Patrol station even though they are not 

required to do so. We believe this should become a formal procedure because 

the Batres case demonstrated the tragic consequences that can occur when 

unclear procedures result in a failure to review an alien’s criminal history 

record, even when that alien is the subject of a lookout hit. If the records are 

not reviewed, aliens with serious criminal histories may be voluntarily returned 

rather than being held for further law enforcement action. Moreover, we 

believe that the Border Patrol should develop clear and uniform policies that 

detail when a Border Patrol agent should obtain a full criminal history check 

on an alien and that when the RAP sheet check is done the response be placed 

in the alien’s file.35

IX. CONCLUSION 

The Batres case, like the Resendez case before it, demonstrated the 

critical need for rapid integration of immigration and criminal fingerprint 

identification databases. These cases illustrated that cumbersome and 

imperfect manual processes inevitably will permit the criminal and deportation 

record of dangerous criminal aliens, such as Batres and Resendez, to remain 

undetected. Immigration agents cannot perform such manual checks on all 

 35 JMD’s response to these recommendations is included in the Appendix to this report. 

38
apprehended aliens. Rather, an automated system to check such records 

through integrated databases must be implemented as expeditiously as 

possible. 

Both the DOJ and DHS recognize this need. Yet, while the integration 

project has made progress, it continues to move slowly and still is years from 

completion. Recently, it has been slowed by the attention placed on other 

technology projects, such as US VISIT. In addition, the transfer of the INS to 

the DHS has caused delays in the integration project. Uncertainty also 

remains as to who will be responsible for the overall management of the 

integration project. Significantly, the DOJ and the DHS have yet to enter into a 

memorandum of understanding delineating the specific roles and 

responsibilities of each agency in the project. 

We believe that the integration project should remain a critical priority 

and should receive close attention and adequate resources, notwithstanding 

other important tasks facing both agencies. We continue to believe that 

expeditious integration is essential to providing immigration and law 

enforcement agents adequate access to information about criminal aliens, 

which could help avoid recurrences of cases like Batres and Resendez. We 

therefore continue to recommend that the DOJ ensure that the IDENT/IAFIS 

integration project receives close attention and proceeds expeditiously. 

39
Appendix 

Department of Justice Response 
u.s. Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

J:r:~ 24

MEMORANDUM FOR GLENN A. FINE

Inspector General

Office of Inspector General

FROM: Paul Assistant R. Corts Atorney 17 General fZC '-') 

for Administration

Comments on DIG Draft Report: illENT/lAFIS: The Batres Case and The

Status of the Integration Effort

SUBJECT:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) draft report

entitled, "IDENT/IAFIS: The Batres Case and The Status of the Integration Effort." As you

requested, we have identified a number of factual inaccuracies that are present in the report, and they

are noted in an attachment to this memorandum. Below are comments regarding the recommendations

contained in the draft report.

The DOJ should develop and implement a memorandum of understanding (MOU) With

the DHS to guide the integration of mENT and IAFIS.

1.

We agree that a MOU with DHS is needed and, as you report, it has been our intention to

develop such a document since last summer. However, that MOU must include a cost-sharing

agreement that will require DHS to contribute funds to this effort if significant progress is to be

accomplished in a timely manner. Since our Department's appropriation was just passed, it has

been unclear until just recently as to how much direct funding would be available to the project.

Furthermore, as you also report, a number of significant policy decisions must be made

regarding the US VISIT system and its relationship to IAFIS. These decisions will directly

affect the contents of an MOU and the associated cost sharing agreement. We are having ongoing discussions with DHS about all of these issues, and an MOU will be prepared as soon as

possible.

The DOJ should assign responsibility for coordinating and overseeing the integration

project to a senior DOJ official.

2.
Glenn A. Fine ?

We agree that the participation of high-level officials in both DOl and DHS is needed to

resolve a number of critical issues. I am satisfied, however, that the current assignment of

responsibilities within JMD is sufficient to move this project forward; we just need to reach

agreement within DHS on many of these issues and obtain the necessary funding. The

personnel assigned to the IDENT/IAFIS Integration Project Office are working closely with the

CIO on these matters, and I am being kept apprised of issues that need to be brought to the

attention of senior Departmental officials. I have had conversation with Asa Hutchinson, Under

Secretary for Border and Transportation Security (with responsibility for this project at DHS),

and we will communicate on these issues when necessary or appropriate.

3. The DOJ should pursue expeditiously the development of Version 2 of the

IDENT/IAFIS Integration Project, which will provide the DDS apprehension and

criminal history information to other federal, state, and local law enforcement

agencies.

As mentioned previously, a number of critical I issues are being discussed with DHS and US

VISIT officials. We agree that these issues mtst be resolved before work on the next phase of

the integration project can proceed. This will ensure that the greatest degrees of interoperability

and effectiveness are achieved at the least cost and within the shortest possible timeframe.

4.

The DOJ should work with the DHS to update the FBI's "wants and warrants"

information with IDENT on a daily, rather than bi-weekly, basis untillDENT and

IAFIS are fully integrated.

Consistent with your recommendation, the FBI is already responding to a DHS request for

daily updates of the "wants and warrants" exttacts that are loaded into IDENT. We expect

that to be achieved within three months.

5. The DOJ should coordinate with the DHS to establish procedures to ensure that the

criminal histories of all aliens who have a lookout or IAFIS hit are provided to and

reviewed by the Border Patrol. In addition, we urge the DHS to make these criminal

history records part of the official record of its encounter with the alien. Further, we

encourage the Border Patrol to create a uniform policy for all Border Patrol Sectors

and stations that outlines appropriate procedures for handling lookout hits.

Today, using the most cuuent IDENT/IAFIS workstations, DHS can take 10 rolled prints and

simultaneously submit searches to both IDENT and IAFIS. An IAFIS "hit" will automatically

return a rap sheet to DHS in 10 minutes, often within 3-5 minutes. Future deployment of this

workstation will be done by DHS, at its expense and according to its schedule because

Congress deleted funding for this purpose from the DOJ budget.
Glenn A. Fine 3

When using IDENT only, DHS is able to detect "wanted" aliens if those records have been

extracted from lAPIS and placed in IDENT. When there is an IDENT hit on these individuals,

DHS is provided the relevant FBI record number. As your report states, a Border Patrol

Agent can obtain the criminal history through a phone call to his or her radio room. This would

have been an easier task to perform than was the 45-minute interview with Mr. Batres that was

conducted by the agent who first apprehended him. The rap sheet that could have been

obtained might have provided physical characteristics (e.g., scars, marks and tattoos) that

would have helped to confirm Mr. Batres' real identity.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to comment on this draft report. I share your view that this project

offers significant law enforcement benefits and that it should proceed as expeditiously as possible.

Please be assured that we are working with officials from DHS to ensure the integration/interoperability

oflAFlS and IDENT/US VISIT in the most effective and efficient manner.

Attachment