U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

National Institute of Justice

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFF ICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS

BJA NI J OJJDP BJS OVC

National Institute of Justice

Research Report

Policing in Emerging Democracies:

Workshop Papers and Highlights

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

Bureau of International Narcotics

and Law Enforcement Affairs

U.S. Department of State

Washington, D.C., December 14–15, 1995
U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Justice Programs

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

Janet Reno

Attorney General

U.S. Department of Justice

John C. Dwyer

Acting Associate Attorney General

Laurie Robinson

Assistant Attorney General

Jeremy Travis

Director, National Institute of Justice

Justice Information Center

World Wide Web Site

http://www.ncjrs.org

Opinions or points of view expressed in this document are those of the authors and

do not necessarily reflect the official position of the U.S. Department of Justice.

The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice

Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of

Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention,

and the Office for Victims of Crime.

NCJ 167024
Policing in Emerging Democracies:

Workshop Papers and Highlights

National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice

Bureau of International Narcotics and

 Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State

Washington, D.C., December 14–15, 1995

October 1997
iii

Contents

Workshop Overview and Highlights................................................................................................. 1

Opening Remarks ............................................................................................................................ 7

Jeremy Travis

Robert Gelbard

Paper ............................................................................................................................................... 9

Principles of Democratic Policing

Philip B. Heymann

Keynote Address............................................................................................................................ 25

American Law Enforcement Perspectives on Policing in Emerging Democracies

Raymond W. Kelly

Paper ............................................................................................................................................. 29

Toward Democratic Policing: Rethinking Strategies of Transformation

Clifford Shearing

Reflections on Day One ................................................................................................................. 39

Strategic Implications

Michael Smith

Paper ............................................................................................................................................. 45

Reflections on the Transfer of Knowledge to Support

Democratic Policing in Hungary and Romania

Deborah G. Wilson and William F. Walsh

Paper ............................................................................................................................................. 59

Who Are We Kidding? or Developing Democracy Through Public Reform

David H. Bayley

Workshop Wrap-Up....................................................................................................................... 65

Where Do We Go From Here?

Mark H. Moore

Appendixes.................................................................................................................................... 75
Preface

For some time, the United States has offered training and technical assistance to police organizations

in other countries. Over the past several years, there has been an unprecedented opportunity to do so

within the context of state reform in countries making the transition to democracy. As a result, the

agencies of the U.S. Government that administer this assistance have expanded their training activities

and changed the focus of the assistance provided.

The Department of State and the Department of Justice have built a strong and evolving partnership in

this arena. These two U.S. Government Departments seek to promote the development of effective

and accountable police services in countries where the difficult transition to democratic forms of government is taking place. Both agencies also recognize that fundamental questions remain about the

most effective strategies for fostering such reform.

To pose these questions and to challenge traditional assumptions, we hosted a workshop on policing

in emerging democracies and commissioned papers from leading academics who have reflected on

these issues. The workshop was cosponsored by the State Department’s Bureau of International

Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the National Institute of Justice, the research arm of the

Department of Justice. Attending the workshop was an impressive group of scholars and practitioners,

representing the experiences of more than 20 nations in developing democratic police functions. Also

participating were representatives of each of the Federal agencies now engaged in providing training

and technical assistance abroad. The keynote speaker was Raymond W. Kelly, former Police

Commissioner of New York City, who had recently returned from overseeing the international policing operation in Haiti.

The exchange of ideas that took place at the workshop, and the papers reproduced here, will

serve as a rich resource to be tapped in shaping policy in the future. We wish to express our

thanks to the participants, particularly those who wrote the foundation papers and who provided

the synthesis of the proceedings. It is our hope that the discussions inspired by the workshop will

continue and expand in the years to come.

Timothy E. Wirth

Under Secretary for Global Affairs

U.S. Department of State

Jeremy Travis

Director

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

v
1

Workshop Overview and Highlights

U.S. Justice Assistance for Policing in

Other Countries

Several agencies of the U.S. Government offer

justice assistance to the police in other countries. It

takes the form of training and technical assistance

to help combat such crimes as firearms and drug

trafficking, money laundering, and currency

counterfeiting; and programs aimed at improving

law enforcement techniques (by building forensics

capabilities and providing firearms training, for

example). These efforts to aid criminal justice

agencies abroad have increased dramatically in

recent years. One reason is the growth of

transnational crime, which affects domestic law

enforcement because it victimizes U.S. citizens,

and the other is the transition to democracy occurring in the newly independent states of the former

Soviet Union and elsewhere, a process the United

States supports as a foreign policy objective. That

involves support for the police as an institution

affected by the reform process. The expansion of

U.S. assistance for policing and the need for

information that can shape public policy related to

this assistance provided the impetus for the workshop on policing in emerging democracies. (A

detailed discussion of current U.S. justice assistance for policing is in appendix A.)

The Workshop and Its Goals

The 2-day workshop on policing in emerging

democracies, held in Washington, D.C., in December 1995, brought together 64 participants to

exchange information and ideas as a means of

contributing to the body of knowledge on the

topic. (A list of attendees is in appendix B.)

Complementing that exchange were presentations

Haiti, South Africa, and numerous countries in

Eastern Europe and Central America have been

working in the past several years to build democratic institutions of government to take the place

of authoritarian forms. A major government

institution in any country, the police in these

emerging democracies are a current focus of

attention. In emerging democracies as elsewhere,

the police are the government’s face—the institution citizens come into contact with on a daily

basis more often than others. In countries where

the police have been an instrument of repression

rather than democracy, building citizen confidence

in this institution is a particular challenge.

The United States currently offers technical assistance to the police in emerging democracies and

other countries. The two agencies most active in

providing this assistance, the U.S. Department of

State and the U.S. Department of Justice, are

collaborating on ways to expand and disseminate

information that can promote modern, democratic

policing practices based on the rule of law, support

international justice assistance, and help shape

future policy. One outcome of that collaboration

has been an exchange of ideas and experiences

among professionals in criminal justice research

and law from the United States and abroad, police

officials, and Federal policymakers. That exchange

took place at a workshop on policing in emerging

democracies sponsored by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,

Department of State, and the National Institute of

Justice, Department of Justice. A key component

of the workshop was a series of papers presented

by experts in law and criminology. These papers

form the basis of this report.
2

of experiences in the field and suggestions that

could be incorporated into the development of

policy on assisting police in emerging democracies. Future steps were also contemplated, as both

sponsoring agencies wish to continue these exchanges, whether through research, document

exchange, or the creation of a “virtual” organization. They are particularly interested in dissemination of information across national boundaries.

Ideas presented by several experts in criminology

and law and case studies related by professionals

experienced in assisting in police reform abroad

were a central component of the workshop. These

experts had been commissioned to prepare papers

on the principles of democratic policing and on

issues critical to the successful transfer of knowledge to support democratic policing in emerging

democracies.

A Framework for Analyzing the Issues

The notion of promoting police reform has an

almost intuitive appeal, but the discussions and

papers made evident the complexity of that notion

as it applies to emerging democracies. Even the

definition of “democracy” was debated. The

workshop was a forum for identifying this and

other issues related to policing in emerging democracies, exploring them, and bringing to light

and comparing varied and sometimes opposing

perspectives. At the workshop conclusion, Mark

Moore articulated an overall framework for analyzing the issues explored.1

A key component of the framework is a series of

“tests” or standards for measuring the viability and

utility of a government strategy for assisting the

police in emerging democracies. These are the

same tests or standards that must be met by any

other strategy adopted for use in the public sector:

■ The strategy must have some important public

value.

■ The strategy must have legitimacy and attract

support from those who are in a position to

provide resources and lend their authority to it.

■ Operational capacities must be sufficient to

achieve the goal of the strategy.

It is assumed that democratic values should be

reflected in policing and overall governance (the

first test). However, the notion of the form of

policing as itself a shaper of democratic culture

should also be considered. In other words, a

distinction can be made between a style of policing

that pursues particular values and legitimates itself

in a particular way and, on the other hand, a style

of policing that reflects or is the product of a local

democratic culture.

Stepping outside the local environment and viewing the strategy from the perspective of the U.S.

Government, assistance for policing could meet

the third test by contributing to operational capacity (for example, through technical assistance,

funding, and equipment) and it could meet the

second test by contributing to the legitimacy of

policing, when such assistance supports—or does

not support—local authorizing processes.

The basic question and its variants. The basic

question—how can we reform the police in ways

that promote the development of democracy—has

several variants. One variant proposes a more

modest objective than promoting democracy: How

do we reform the police in ways that are not

destructive of the development of democracy?

Alternatively, a middle ground is to phrase the

question as, “How do we reform the police in ways

that make them reflective of democratic society?”

The first form of the question is the “strongest,”

proposing to strengthen democracy beyond just the

boundaries of police operations.

Implied in the basic question are several others.

One is how to define the terms “we,” “police,” and

“democracy,” for their definitions are not necessarily self-evident. “We” is assumed to mean the
3

citizens or representatives of the U.S. Government

who are considering the use of public resources.

The term “police,” however, can mean either

police institutions only, criminal justice institutions, or the general security function of society.

“Democracy” too can be defined in several ways—

more traditionally, as a set of institutions; in terms

of culture as citizens’ aspirations and expectations;

or as the rule of law. Quite different from the ruleof-law definition is that of democracy as an articulation of citizens’ collective aspirations or as a

system providing equal delivery of services (not

just equal delivery of political rights) or creating

just conditions in society.

Depending on the definition, the course of reform

might vary. Thus, the way democracy is defined

would determine the perception of the role of the

police. For example, if democracy is viewed as

providing equal services, then all citizens have

equal claims on public security.

The foreign policy context and objectives. There

are several situations in which promoting police

reform in support of democracy becomes especially relevant to U.S. policy. The three most

common are where a state has collapsed, where

civil war has broken out, or where an invasion has

occurred. U.S. support for police operations is no

longer tied to Cold War objectives. Rather, our

own domestic law enforcement objectives are

gaining in importance and, where states have

collapsed, opportunities may arise to provide

humanitarian aid and support democracy.

In all these situations there is a related question,

“Whose purposes are we trying to accomplish?”

The answer, “Not ours,” presupposes that the

United States should act only in response to the

wishes of the recipient country. The alternative

answer, “It is U.S. objectives that matter,” derives

from the notion that the resources expended are

ours, although the institutions and culture of the

recipient country must be understood and its needs

accommodated.

The end or goal of U.S. assistance to policing may

be to advance U.S. law enforcement objectives or

to advance democracy. If it is the former, several

types of intervention are possible, among them

improving operational capacity—through training

and technical assistance—and there are means to

affect more than just operations. If the goal is to

advance democracy—assuming there are forces

within a country working toward that end—

support for the police becomes only one small part

of what can be done.

It should be kept in mind that the goal of advancing U.S. law enforcement objectives and the goal

of advancing democracy are sometimes incompatible. An example would be situations in which our

country supports authoritarian regimes to achieve

our own internal law enforcement objectives such

as suppression of drug trafficking.

What kind of policing will be “exported”? If the

foreign policy context and the goals of U.S. assistance vary, so will the form of policing being

exported. If the goal is to advance democracy,

protection of individual rights may be a consideration, and if so, other components of the criminal

justice system might be the objects of reform in

addition to policing. In fact, reform might extend

to the entire criminal justice system and even

beyond—to institutions in civil society that have a

security function. These are particularly important

to consider if the form of democracy pursued calls

for construction of a political culture within the

civil society.

The functions for which the police are to be responsible also need to be identified. They might

extend not just to street crime but also to antiterrorism, antisubversion, and police handling of civil

unrest. Antisubversion and antiterrorism might be

best left outside the purview of the local police, as

these functions may be closely linked to politics.

Should community policing be the form adopted?

It may be necessary to first pass through a stage of

more traditional “professional” law enforcement.
4

To be sure, focusing on community policing and

the security function of civil society would be

valuable, as it would encourage the development

of support for a local capacity for action that

would in turn support responsive democracy.

Can police reform affect democracy? There are

several mechanisms through which reform of

policing, the criminal justice system, or society’s

security function can affect the quality of democracy:

■ By bringing to the table the question of what

form of policing is to be adopted, it may be

possible to create a dialogue about democratic

principles. In other words, simply making

policing an issue for discussion might favorably affect the quality of democracy.

■ Assuming that the policing profession is a

means of upward mobility for people who join

the force, training could be a way to prepare

recruits for leadership in civil society as well

as policing.

■ Having police focus on effectively controlling

street crime and disorder might diminish any

tendency for them to support authoritarian

regimes.

■ By supporting the government, policing could

enhance government’s credibility as effective,

powerful, fair, and equitable.

■ The way policing is conducted might engage

citizens in experiences that teach democratic

values. Citizens’ experiences as victims,

witnesses, offenders, or in oversight of the

police could help construct a political culture

supporting democracy.

The value of documentation. In providing assistance to policing, the United States might have to

move quickly when the situation demanded it but

would also need to stay long enough in a particular

place to produce the desired effect. Whether the

United States is prepared to act quickly, provide

sufficient resources, stay long enough, and be

flexible are questions that need to be addressed.

In addressing them, it should be kept in mind that

in any situation, the U.S. will not have the luxury

of first being able to learn, and then acting on the

basis of what is learned. Rather, we will be learning while doing. For this reason, it may be useful

to take such preparatory steps as documenting

what is being done in a specific situation and with

what effect. That would include examining case

studies of interventions in partnership between

academics and practitioners. These case studies

would form the basis of understanding what seems

to have worked and what has not.

Highlights of the Workshop

The workshop on policing in emerging democracies opened with remarks by the directors of the

two sponsoring Federal agencies. Jeremy Travis,

Director of the National Institute of Justice (U.S.

Department of Justice), noted that the intent of the

exchange of ideas and information was to contribute to the further development of policy in support

of policing in emerging democracies. He expressed

his interest in continuing this type of dialogue in

partnership with the State Department. Ambassador Robert Gelbard, then-Director of the Bureau of

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

(U.S. Department of State), noted that there is a

lack of empirical knowledge related to policing in

emerging democracies and that his department’s

recent experiences could help provide the means to

build that knowledge base.

The four commissioned papers and other addresses

explored a range of issues related to policing in

emerging democracies, including the relationship

of policing to democracy and of democracy to

policing, how the United States defines its interests

in offering assistance, and the shifts in the role of

government in democratic societies that is in turn

shaping policing and other institutions. Some of

the addresses drew from the presenters’ own recent
5

experiences in assisting police in Eastern Europe

and Latin America.

First Paper: “Principles of Democratic Policing,” by Philip B. Heymann

It is difficult to develop a truly competent criminal

justice system by beginning with a focus on

common crimes and then slowly building competent institutions, especially if the system disregards

the crimes of the powerful. The United States

should invest in strong systems that can and will

press for equal application of the law to the powerful as well as the weak and small. That means

taking a forceful stand on corruption, bias, political violence, and intimidation.

Keynote Address: “American Law Enforcement

Perspectives on Policing in Emerging Democracies,” by Raymond W. Kelly

Raymond Kelly presented as a case study the U.S.

role in setting up a new police force in Haiti

following the intervention led by the United States.

Because Haiti under the old regime represented an

almost textbook case of the police as an unchecked

instrument of state oppression, indistinguishable

from the military, and with no tradition of public

service, the intervention included a police monitoring force. The work of the monitors revealed that

corrections and the judiciary in Haiti shared the

problems of the Haitian police and suggested that

where policing reform is called for, reform may

need to be extended to other components of the

criminal justice system.

Second Paper: “Toward Democratic Policing:

Rethinking Strategies of Transformation,” by

Clifford Shearing with the assistance of

Jennifer Wood

Established democracies are no longer viable

models to be emulated because in them the assumption of governance as a state monopoly is

now being questioned. This rethinking (or reinvention) of government has several expressions,

among them the call for more direct citizen involvement. Within law enforcement it is most

evident in community policing, while the growth

of private policing also expresses this devolution

of responsibility—to “corporate governments.” In

South Africa, Professor Shearing has been working

to promote a vision of police reform that recognizes this devolution, with programs seeking to

empower communities with the autonomy of

corporate governments.

Reflections on the First Day, by Michael E. Smith

Professor Michael Smith drew on his own experience in assisting criminal justice officials in

England, France, and the former Federal Republic

of Germany in transferring techniques and lessons

from the United States. On the basis of this experience, he concluded that direct exposure, which

permits individuals to judge the value of what they

observe, is the best practice. His comments on the

papers and discussions included the following:

■ The discussion about the conflict between

short-term domestic law enforcement needs

and a long-term interest in stable democracies

could have been more frank.

■ The United States needs to understand enough

about what policing does in this country if it is

to be able to transfer that understanding to

other countries.

■ Even relatively simple interventions in another

jurisdiction’s law enforcement take considerable time.

Third Paper: “Reflections on the Transfer of

Knowledge to Support Democratic Policing in

Hungary and Romania,” by Deborah G. Wilson

and William F. Walsh

Professors Wilson and Walsh assessed their experience in providing training to the national police of

Hungary and Romania. The factors promoting

entry and acceptance are recognition of the need

for outside assistance (which may be precipitated

by a crisis), recognition by the United States of
6

professionalism in a country’s police force, evidence of a commitment for the long term, and the

perception of education and training as a dialogue

resulting in reciprocal development.

For the two recipient nations, three major needs

became evident: (1) to increase public confidence

and create a more favorable public perception of

law enforcement; (2) to recruit and retain qualified

personnel in the face of growing market forces that

devalue the attractiveness of the policing profession; and (3) to adopt modern management techniques, which have been limited partly by the

highly centralized nature of the policing organization and partly through lack of exposure.

Fourth Paper: “Who Are We Kidding? or

Developing Democracy Through Police

Reform,” by David H. Bayley

The police cannot be an instrument of reform

because unless a government is committed to

democracy, reform of the police can do little to

bring it about. Approaches generally assumed to be

associated with democracy, such as community

policing, in fact have been adopted in nondemocratic regimes, while a centralized police, often

associated with repressive government, is the

organizational form the police have taken in many

democracies. Certain reforms are more likely to be

exported than others, and those that are least

exportable (those affecting police purpose, functions, control, and accountability) are also those

that have the least effect on democratic development.

Workshop Wrap-Up: Where Do We Go From

Here? by Mark H. Moore

Professor Moore drew on the ideas of the participants to construct a framework for understanding

and analyzing strategies to promote policing

reform in emerging democracies. The basic policy

objective of reforming the police in ways that

promote democracy may have to be modified to

less ambitious variants, among them reforming the

police in ways that are not inimical to democratic

development. Although reform of the police is a

foreign policy issue, one that raises the question of

whether the United States wishes to advance its

own domestic law enforcement ends or to enhance

democracy, those ends are not always incompatible.

The mechanisms by which policing affects democracy include sustaining a dialogue about democratic principles by raising the question of the form

policing should take, providing training for future

leaders, focusing on street crime as a way to deter

the police from supporting an authoritarian regime,

enhancing the credibility of government as fair and

equitable, and creating experiences in which

citizens who come into contact with the police are

exposed to democratic values.

Note

1. The full text of Mark Moore’s presentation is in

this report.
7

Opening Remarks

Honorable Jeremy Travis

Director, National Institute of Justice,

U.S. Department of Justice

about how to continue this exchange of information, whether it is in a research capacity, an exchange of documents, or as Clifford Shearing used

the phrase once, in the creation of a “virtual

institute.” Think about ways to share knowledge

across international boundaries.

Our second objective is to ask you to provide

policy ideas and advice to our international community gathered here today and, in particular, to

the representatives of the Federal Government

agencies who are gathered either around the table

or elsewhere in the room. We are all open to your

suggestions; your ideas are welcome.

The third specific objective is to think about the

future. When Ambassador Gelbard and I first

discussed this idea, we were very clear with each

other that we wanted more than a 1- or 2-day

gathering of people to talk about an important

topic. We are both interested in asking ourselves

and asking you how to continue these sorts of

exchanges in the future.

We are enthusiastic about today and tomorrow.

The timing of this workshop could not be more

appropriate considering many people in this room

are thinking about a very specific application of

the issue of policing in emerging democracies. We

hope, on behalf of the National Institute of Justice,

that we can make a contribution to the development of an effective policy in this regard in any of

the emerging democracies, and I include our own

as an emerging democracy. I will turn now to

Ambassador Gelbard.

All of you are here for a 2-day workshop on

policing in emerging democracies. We have much

to discuss over a relatively short period. The

purpose of our introductory remarks this morning

is to open the discussions and to get things going.

I would like to take just a moment to share with

you some of the thoughts that we have in the

National Institute of Justice about the next 2 days

and then ask Ambassador Robert Gelbard to do the

same for the Department of State.

The National Institute of Justice, as most of you

know, is the research and development arm of the

Department of Justice. Since our creation by

Congress in 1968, we have had an international

dissemination mandate, and we are now working

with a number of our colleagues in the Federal

Government to try to develop new capabilities,

capacities, and dimensions to our congressional

mission. This, I must say, is the most exciting of

our new undertakings: to bring together practitioners, researchers, and policymakers from around

the world to talk about the issue of policing in

emerging democracies.

A number of objectives have been established in

our discussions with our colleagues in the Department of State for the next 2 days, and they are

quite straightforward. However, we should all have

them clear in mind as we begin. One is to engage

in an exchange of information, ideas, and experiences. In furtherance of that objective, we asked

for four papers by five people who are here with us

today. We asked them to share their experiences,

reflect on those experiences, and assist us in

finding common elements that are worthy of our

further consideration. The second part of that first

objective is to ask each of you to help us think
8

Ambassador Robert Gelbard

Director, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement,

U.S. Department of State

As NIJ Director Jeremy Travis just noted, the

genesis of this workshop was the discussions that

he and I had about the increasing importance of

policing in emerging democracies. As we have

continued to look at the issue of building democracies, it has become clearer and clearer from the

point of view of foreign policy, particularly over

the past decade and a half, that the previous thinking—that of relying on the first presidential election in a country as the goal to achieve democracy—was extraordinarily shortsighted. But, of

course, we had very little experience in actually

trying to do this.

In fact, the first presidential election is a necessary

but insufficient condition. The longer I have been

involved with these kinds of issues, the more I am

convinced that it is the second presidential election

that becomes much more interesting. The more we

have tried to look at the kinds of issues involved in

consolidating democracy, not with creating democracy, it has become more clear how important the

justice sector’s role is in trying to build democratic

police, as well as judicial, prosecutorial, and penal

institutions and the kinds of legal frameworks that

are necessary for the public to be able to have

confidence in their systems.

Reading through the papers that have been provided for this workshop, I found subjects and

issues raised that were of great interest to me. I

was reading them on the airplane as I returned

from Bosnia yesterday, where we have been asked

to begin to establish a program of police monitors

both there and in eastern Slovenia, as well as to try

to create other kinds of democratic law enforcement and judicial institutions. We certainly hope

that we can call on some of you to help us and give

us advice as we try to take on this extraordinary

task.

But as we begin to grope our way with our friends

and allies toward better understanding of the type

of role required in order to build these kinds of

core institutions, it is very clear that the amount of

knowledge that exists based on empirical evidence

is somewhat lacking and that we will be building a

further knowledge base over time using the experiences we are having, whether in Cambodia, Haiti,

Central America, South Africa, or Namibia. We

certainly see this workshop as a very important

start to try to reinforce our efforts to create a

greater interchange of views with theoreticians,

practitioners, and others. We look forward, together, to working further with you as we try to

move along this path.
9

Principles of

Democratic Policing

by Philip B. Heymann

Weak Democracies and Strong

Democracies

GUATEMALA CITY—The United Nations

issued a damning review of Guatemalan

human rights yesterday, painting a grim

panorama of state killings, death squads and

abuses by leftist rebels . . .

The report accused police and army forces of

cold-blooded murder, running “social cleansing” death squads to kill common thieves, drug

trafficking, car thefts, and illegal logging . . .

It said Guatemala’s legal system was “virtually paralyzed,” and incapable of investigating

crimes, even threats and attacks against its

own judges and prosecutors. The main victims

of abuse continue to be human rights activists,

politicians, and public prosecutors.

– Reuters, October 31, 1995

Democracy in the contemporary world is sustained

by two primary forces. It can be the result of the

rather powerful demand of the population. For this

reason, few people thought that the military would

attempt a coup in South Africa even after President

F.W. de Klerk stunned his nation by announcing

there would be free and open elections that would

include [black] African voters. But democracy can

also be largely the result of international pressures,

especially with the end of the Cold War. Guatemalan democracy is largely maintained by such

pressures. The generals know and are reminded by

powerful economic interests of the great cost of

any coup. Many countries are now trying to impose such costs on Nigeria. In this discussion I will

call “strong” a democracy supported by the strong

I have been asked to draw on my experience

working in Guatemala, South Africa, Colombia,

and Russia and visiting criminal justice institutions

in many other countries to comment on the principles of democratic policing. I am happy to do so

but should admit at once to an unqualified commitment to one particular concept of the U.S. interest

in this area. I think our national stakes rather

plainly lie in encouraging very strong democracies

and very strong criminal justice systems—ones

that are unbiased as well as effective—even when

compromising on these ends might offer us more

immediate advantages.

But let me begin. I worry that you may expect me

to talk about the comparative merits in policing of

professionalism, problem-solving attitudes, and

close relations to local communities at early stages

of democratic development in nations of Eastern

Europe, Latin America, Africa, or Asia. These are

important questions. But other questions about the

relationship between democracy and policing or,

more broadly, law enforcement, are even more

fundamental. They are the relationships I shall

discuss. I shall describe two types of democracy—

“weak” and “strong” in the strength of support for

popular rule—and two types of criminal justice

systems—“weak” and “strong” in their ability to

handle crimes by the powerful. Then, I shall

describe how the type of democracy you get is

influenced by the type of criminal justice system

you pursue. Finally, I shall describe what outsiders

like us can do to help develop an effective and

“strong” criminal justice system and thus a strong

democracy.
10

demands of its people, and “weak” a democracy

maintained only by the fear its opponents share of

the international repercussions of either a coup or

the election of a nondemocratic party.

The distinction turns out to be important. Guatemala is a weak democracy—a country where there

always seems to be an authoritarian alternative

waiting in the wings to challenge a new democracy. The candidate winning the second largest

number of votes in the elections last month was

widely regarded as a stand-in for General Rios

Montt, who had been leading in the polls until the

courts declared him ineligible to run because of the

constitutional provision that bars the candidacy of

anyone involved in a prior coup. The President

leaving office had been put in place when his

predecessor, Jorge Serrano, attempted to suspend

the Constitution and close down the Congress. The

weakness of the democracy encourages corruption

and impunity for political violence. Guatemala is

not alone. The possibility that democratic institutions will be replaced by far more authoritarian

ones, either as the result of an election or of a

coup, is real from Santiago, Chile, to Moscow.

This talk of weak and strong democracies may

sound very abstract to you. To me, it is accompanied by a storehouse of vivid images. I was working on a U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) contract to build criminal justice

institutions in Guatemala when the first attempt at

a military coup against the first freely elected

President in decades took place. Gramajo, the

general serving as Defense Minister, ordered the

colonels who had organized the coup to return to

their bases. Then the President, Vinicio Cerezo,

called for a mass demonstration of public support

for the new democracy. President Cerezo’s call

was answered by only a few grade school students

who were brought into the capital city by bus. The

message was unmistakable: Cerezo’s survival

depended upon his retaining the good will of the

general who was chosen by the army as Defense

Minister.

A weak democracy works in the shadow of the

independent power of its military and its other

undemocratic economic and political competitors.

In Guatemala and in other weak democracies,

votes are counted every 4 or 5 years and the count

is usually fair. But there are policies that cannot be

seriously entertained, even if they would be supported by a substantial majority of the population.

And there are parties that cannot be allowed to

compete fairly in the political process. A United

Nations mission report of October 31, 1995,

described Guatemalan police and army death

squads directed both at common criminals and at

politicians, human rights activists, and public

prosecutors. It said between 10 and 12 bodies of

people who were shot with their hands tied behind

their backs were brought daily to Guatemala City’s

morgue.

A coup by a powerful and independent military is

not always the principal threat in a weak democracy. A new democracy may be weak because of

corruption or incompetence (they often go together). The problem can be so pervasive that the

electorate is likely to choose an altogether different

form of government, hoping to find efficiency and

honesty. This electoral threat to democracy is the

one that has characterized Russia and would

threaten important nations in the Middle East.

What is common to both cases is the absence of

strong citizen support for a system of popularly

chosen leaders and policies.

The existence of weak democracies poses serious

problems for U.S. foreign policy. For very good

reasons, we want stable democracies enjoying

powerful internal support. They are far more likely

to be long-term friends. They will be more secure

and reliable economic and social partners. They

can enjoy continuous domestic support and not

involve us in painful compromises of our own

ideals such as those that have recently been investigated in the CIA’s relationship with the Guatemalan killers of an American and the husband of an

American. But we also want the immediate benefits
11

of cooperation even with a weak and limited

democracy, particularly against enemies such as

communism or drug cartels. Too often, I think our

tendency has been to treat a very limited form of

democracy as if it were as valuable to us as the

stronger democracies of a South Africa or Costa

Rica. Let me pause long enough to give an example of United States ambivalence on this score.

In Guatemala, the attorney general has a small

office, poorly funded and closely connected to the

President. Still, the office has the advantage of not

being tied to the military, a primary suspect in

much political violence. Why not build an investigative capacity into the attorney general’s office

itself and then create a tradition of independence

from both the police and the President in enforcing

the law? The United States Attorney General

enjoys this capacity and independence, and I think

it serves us very well. Moreover, the idea seemed

desirable to the Guatemalan investigative judges,

who have investigative responsibilities (as is

customary in countries whose legal system is not

based on the British common law) once the police

have brought a suspect to court or have filed a

report of a crime in court. Their reaction was not

surprising. After all, many matters were dangerous to

investigate and cases were almost never successful.

Indeed, cases were dangerous to investigate. In

spring 1988, as we were exploring this idea with

Guatemalan prosecutors sent to Cambridge by

their attorney general, the chief of Guatemala’s

National Police, Julio Caballeros, seemed to have

solved the case of a “death van,” a white van that

had been cruising the streets of Guatemala City

and “disappearing” both politically active students

and drug dealers. He had ordered the seizure of a

van meeting the description of the death van, and it

proved to be full of police from a separate organization, the Treasury Police, headed by a close

associate of President Cerezo.

In due course, Caballeros delivered to the courts—

particularly to Judge Trejo, an investigative judge

of extremely questionable reputation—a number

of suspects and a file that implicated their superiors up to the head of the Treasury Police. There

were reports that Judge Trejo initially declined a

bribe offered by a military judge. Whatever his

motivations, his reward was to be kidnaped and,

during the time he was held, to receive an unmistakable message. His good friend was, on the same

occasion, seized, tortured, and killed.

For the first time, I wrote to President Cerezo

insisting that he understand the importance of a

vigorous investigation of the kidnaping, noting the

message that a failure to protect judges would send

throughout the criminal justice system. There was

no action or response. A number of Treasury

Police, including its chief, had been ordered

detained by the temporary judge who replaced

Judge Trejo during his kidnaping. On his release,

Judge Trejo was reassigned to the case, and he

quickly dismissed the charges against all of the

Treasury Police. There was no investigation of the

kidnaping, which Judge Trejo insisted was unrelated to the case. Few believed him. Under routine

procedures the file has always been kept secret.

It soon became clear that neither Attorney General

Polencia nor his successor, Attorney General

Cardenas, was anxious to assume the responsibility for such cases. I could see why not. What was

more surprising to me was the reaction of some of

the leaders in the Department of State and USAID

to my concern about all this. I was invited to

Washington to a lecture by a highly respected

senior foreign service officer about what had to be

accepted in Central America. My hints that

Harvard Law School would not work in an atmosphere in which the official perpetrators of terrible

violence were given impunity were, I was told,

naive or out of place. Later that year I received a

far less friendly letter from one of USAID’s senior

regional administrators in Central America suggesting that I would do very well to change my

advisers and staff to include those more familiar

with the violent customs and cynical ways of

Central Americans. The tone of the letter was
12

superior; its level of indifference and cynicism was

stunning.

In the meantime Jim Michel, a dedicated ambassador and the founder of the Administration of

Justice program, used every ounce of his influence

to support my futile efforts to bring the Guatemalan attorney general into the process of investigating the most notorious of crimes, including those

of political violence and corruption. All of his

influence was needed because USAID’s regional

director was successfully mounting a campaign in

Washington to prevent any such disruptive step. In

the final analysis, Attorney General Polencia and

President Cerezo—to whom Ambassador Michel

made his case in the clearest terms—decided not to

build such independence into the system. But the

divisions within the U.S. Government as to goals

and means had already become very apparent.

Weak Law Enforcement and Strong Law

Enforcement

I have argued that a deep and widespread loyalty

to democratic institutions is crucial to a strong,

stable, and lasting democracy. That loyalty depends upon two conditions. The population has to

believe that democracy works decently well in

carrying out the tasks for which people must

depend on from government. Beyond this, the

support for democracy depends upon very large

portions of the population having some measure of

political influence and a feeling of equality before

governmental institutions. Thus, for example,

loyalty to democratic institutions in Northern

Ireland was undermined among the large Catholic

minority by their inability to influence crucial

political institutions when they disagreed with the

Protestant majority.

In emphasizing that loyalty to democratic governments depends on a moderate level of effectiveness

in providing the services people require from their

governments and an adequate measure of fairness

in making decisions, I have left out respect for

human rights as a condition of loyalty to democratic institutions. Perhaps it too should be included, but populations are not tempted to turn

from democratic to authoritarian regimes in the

hope of achieving greater respect for human rights,

in the hope of ending brutality or political

repression.

Policing or, more broadly, the law enforcement

system has a crucial role in building and maintaining the sense of effectiveness and fairness on

which loyalty to democratic institutions depends.

As a start, nothing is more important to the citizens

of a country than physical security. When a democracy is unable to provide protection against the

predatory activities of other citizens, the call for

authoritarian alternatives grows. That is much of

the basis for the popularity of General Rios Montt

in Guatemala. It is much of the argument for a

return to more authoritarian regimes of the right or

left in Russia. Even in South Africa, where democracy is blessed by widespread respect and an

extraordinary leader in Nelson Mandela, an inability to control street crime was the number-one

issue in the recent municipal elections in a South

Africa that has been suffering 48 murders a day.

The consequences are felt in terms of the economy

as well as in terms of the fear of citizens. A healthy

economy does generate support for democratic

institutions, yet frightening crime statistics drive

foreign investors away from Johannesburg as well

as from the downtown areas of many American

cities. So the effectiveness of everyday law enforcement matters greatly to the strength of popular support for democracy.

Law enforcement also matters to democracy in

terms of the sense of equality on which loyalty to

democratic institutions also depends. A willingness

to pursue corruption and to examine, without

undue deference, the activities of the powerful and

the well connected is an attribute of a strong

criminal justice system that creates faith in democracy. By an extraordinary and courageous course

of investigations leading from the Mafia to the

political corruption of prime ministers, Italian law
13

enforcement will create new faith in a democratic

system that, in the time of the Red Brigades, many

citizens hardly preferred to the alternative offered

by the terrorists and which was the target of a

nearly successful coup d’état from the right.

I could provide examples from Russia, Colombia,

or Africa but, as usual, events in Guatemala are

more vivid, open, and revealing. This time, drugbased corruption is at the center of my story:

On August 1, 1989, someone gave an assistant

luggage carrier for Guatemala’s airline, Aviateca,

a green suitcase and ordered him to place it on

Aviateca’s flight to Miami, bypassing all security

channels. The assistant luggage carrier, Vasquez

Castillo, was stopped by two warehouse employees

who reported the incident to the narcotics airport

unit of the national police and to the army intelligence officers stationed at the airport. The green

suitcase was opened; it contained 25 kilos of

cocaine.

Vasquez Castillo told the police that the suitcase

had been given to him by two men who identified

themselves as representatives of the government

organization “DECAP,” an agency created to help

President Cerezo control problems of corruption

within his government. With more than 100 investigators and a larger budget than the attorney

general’s office, DECAP reported directly to the

President. Its chief at the time was Lieutenant

Colonel Hugo Moran Carranza, reported to be a

close friend of the President. The luggage carrier,

Vasquez Castillo, had identified two employees of

DECAP, Rolando Moises Fuentes and Minera

Naves, as those who had given him the green

suitcase.

In Guatemala, the only statements by a defendant

that can be used in a court are those taken by

judges, not the police. But the judges have no

training in taking statements and the interviews of

the two suspects the next day were poorly conducted by a justice of the peace. Both simply

denied their guilt. Minera Naves produced the

names of alibi witnesses; alibi witnesses are very

easy to come by in Guatemala.

The Guatemalan justice of the peace is required to

send the investigative file promptly to an investigative judge, who has only 15 days to complete the

investigation. The investigative judge is supposed

to perform many of the functions performed by

both the police and prosecutors in the United

States and to do it in a far shorter period of time

than we allot. That can be a dangerous job, and

the investigating judge did not proceed very

promptly against such dangerous suspects.

The judge questioned Vasquez Castillo again. This

time Castillo implicated his boss as well as a

representative of DECAP. Castillo was obviously

frightened. He thought that he might have been the

real target when a witness had been assassinated a

few days earlier. He said that he had been followed

by four men in a red pickup truck, an ominous sign

in Guatemala.

The investigating judge, Julio Rene Garcia, was

getting the point. He asked to be excused from the

case on the grounds that his wife was remotely

related to the luggage carrier’s boss. He was

excused. There had in any event been widespread

rumors that Judge Garcia had received money to

sabotage the investigation and, shortly after

recusing himself from the case, Judge Garcia was

fired from the court system.

What is clear from many accounts is that the chief

of DECAP, Lieutenant Colonel Moran Carranza,

had spoken quite often with the judge and with

those members of the judge’s staff who were

handling the case and that Moran had access to

the case file so that he would know exactly who

was saying what, a matter that frightened witnesses. One might wonder where the prosecutor

was all this time. The prosecution was simply

absent for the first 15 days of the investigation, not

an unusual absence in cases that can be very

dangerous.
14

The case was reassigned to a new judge with only

1 of the 15 permitted investigative days left. That

was not enough. The judge found that he did not

have enough evidence to continue detaining the

two DECAP employees, Minera Naves and

Rolando Moises Fuentes.

Under pressure from the United States, the case

was reopened. At his trial, Minera Naves, who had

by now threatened the brave female prosecutor

and investigating judge with death, defended

himself on the grounds that corruption was widespread in the Cerezo regime. He alleged that the

brother of the Christian Democratic Party’s

presidential candidate was involved in drug

trafficking and that a witness to his transactions

had been murdered. He charged that President

Cerezo’s brother had been involved in corruption,

selling passports when he was director of immigration. He said the army, the national police, and

DECAP all knew about the crimes that were

committed but refused to investigate and that

Lieutenant Colonel Moran Carranza, his boss at

DECAP, had told him he was under orders not to

investigate such cases. These charges were made

in the new form of a public hearing, causing an

immense sensation. Minera Naves and Rolando

Moises Fuentes were acquitted.

The patent inability to get to the bottom of charges

of very serious corruption against those very close

to the President and the leadership of his party,

despite an extraordinary intervention of the U.S.

Ambassador, who publicly characterized one of

the defendants as a drug suspect, stood as a reminder at the end of President Cerezo’s administration that the democratically elected government

could and would protect its own people, that

personal wealth was a central motivation of many

elected officials, and that corruption of courts and

intimidation of witnesses was sometimes, perhaps

often, part of the system of justice. For many

people and groups to support democracy strongly

enough to stand up against a military coup, the

administrations that are products of the democratic

process must be willing to pursue allegations of

corruption of the sort I have just described. If they

were, without pressure from the United States

Government, there would be far more reason to

believe in democracy.

A system that cannot effectively prosecute ordinary street crimes is hardly a criminal justice

system at all. But a system that can prosecute only

ordinary street crimes and that cannot prosecute

crimes involving prominent or powerful people is a

weak system of criminal justice. A weak system

that does not deal with corruption or extortion of

the sorts that are rampant in Moscow, that cannot

deal with the wealthy and powerful (as was true

until recently in Colombia and in Italy), and that

cannot prevent systematic violence or intimidation

by its own security forces (as has been true at one

time or another within the last decade of South

Africa, Israel, Spain, and Northern Ireland) is an

open announcement that there is inequality in

fundamental political rights and a public invitation

to disloyalty toward the democratic institutions of

each of these countries. Every country will sometimes have corruption, favoritism, and efforts at

intimidation. But a willingness to cover these up

by controlling and limiting the activities of the

crucial factfinding agencies in a democracy—law

enforcement authorities and oversight committees—is a signal to large portions of a population

to hold on to their wallets, keep their heads low,

and withhold trust.

The Complicated Relationships Between

Confidence and Fairness in Law

Enforcement

I have argued so far that a weak law enforcement

system—one that can handle only ordinary street

crime—leads to a weak democracy, one that must

operate without the spirited support of most of its

population. Even if you accept my argument,

however, a major tactical question remains: Is the

shortest path to a strong justice system in a fragile

democracy the slow building of competence in the
15

police and other law enforcement institutions, or

does it require a forceful stand on issues of corruption, bias, political violence, and intimidation?

That question is of fundamental importance for

those trying to build democratic institutions and

strong justice systems.

When I first went to Guatemala, I wrote to the

Minister of the Interior, Juan Jose Rodil, saying

that the USAID/Harvard project should begin only

if there was a commitment to proceed against

political crimes as well as ordinary crimes. He

argued strongly against this approach, saying that

the first step was to build the ordinary capacity of

the police, the prosecutors, and the courts. When

they were capable and respected, perhaps in 10 or

15 years, somehow a capacity to investigate and

try violence and corruption from the highest and

most powerful levels would emerge.

This much of Rodil’s argument is surely true. It is

hard to detect a coverup when it is buried in

massive incompetence. Thus, the political pressures to deal equally with the well connected, the

powerful, and the wealthy are hard to bring to bear

when the reason for exoneration may simply be

general incompetence of the criminal justice

system. A system that is quite competent, such as

ours, often leaves an attempt at coverup exposed

and obvious, with the devastating political results

that we saw in Watergate. But aside from this

aspect of the politics of coverup, there is little

reason to believe that the strengthening of law

enforcement institutions will, in itself, lead to an

expansion of their jurisdiction into areas uncomfortable for governmental leaders. The Israelis

would not investigate the murders of two terrorists

who had seized a bus in the Negev desert. The

British would not investigate the killings of IRA

activists in Gibraltar and closed down an investigation by a distinguished police commissioner in

Northern Ireland. For decades, the Spanish hid

from their courts governmental involvement with

“GAL” and its assassinations of Basque terrorists.

Beyond that, it is difficult to develop a truly competent system in the way that Juan Jose Rodil was

urging: by beginning with common crimes and

steering clear of the crimes of the powerful. Bias

corrodes respect for the police, and without respect, the police are denied the public assistance

they need even to deal with ordinary crime. We are

paying that price in our central cities from the

Bronx in New York to the South Central District in

Los Angeles. It is a price likely to be exacted far

more severely in the former Communist states and

in Latin America.

The issue has always been a difficult one for the

United States as it offers assistance to other governments. I can only tell you my own conclusions.

I think it is worth taking the political risks of

investing in a strong criminal justice system that is

willing to and capable of investigating the powerful and influential. A strong criminal justice

system plays a major role in developing a strong

democracy, and our national interests are much

better served by a strong democracy than by a

weak one. I think the chance of developing a

strong criminal justice system by slowly building

competent institutions without pressing for their

equal application to the powerful as well as the

weak is small—based either on extreme optimism

or on deep cynicism.

With the encouragement of President Bush’ s

friend, Ambassador to Guatemala Thomas Strook,

I ended the USAID/Harvard project when there

was no apparent effort to investigate the disappearance of 12 university students 6 years ago in

Guatemala City. I visited the Minister of Interior,

the Minister of Defense, and the President, accompanied by Embassy officials, and explained that we

would not take part in the creation of a system of

criminal justice that was designed to be weak and

not to reach the powerful and influential. This

created an immense stir in Guatemala, magnified

by the strong statements of a strong ambassador. I

think we did what was necessary. Incremental

institution-building efforts over the last 6 years
16

have left a system that the United Nations describes as incapable of protecting even its own

prosecutors and judges, let alone the ordinary

Guatemalan.

What Can the United States Do to Help?

It is simplest to begin with a reminder of the tasks

that have to be performed by any criminal justice

system. We all know that there is a very substantial

variety of systems, but the central tasks are common and, to accomplish them, each of the systems

uses some combination of police, prosecutors,

defense attorneys, judges, and juries.

The common functions are as follows. The system

must become aware that a crime may have been

committed. Then a decision has to be made

whether the matter is worth investigating. Then

there must be an investigation. Then a decision has

to be made whether the matter warrants a trial.

Then someone must present evidence to the

factfinder. There must be a process for testing the

validity of that evidence, providing contradictory

evidence, and developing alternative explanations

of what it all means. Someone must decide on guilt

or innocence and the consequences if the finding is

guilt. Very generally there is an appeal.

To describe these functions as common from

Thailand to Guatemala to Tanzania is not to deny

some immensely important variations in how they

are carried out. In much of Latin America there has

been no or very little prosecutorial role until the

last few years; and the evidence has been read, not

heard, by the factfinder. There is hardly a defense

function for the great majority of cases in South

Africa and in much of Latin America. The prosecutor is remarkably powerful in Japan and was in

the Soviet Union; the judicial function is proportionately diminished. Still, with all this variation,

it is important to remember the set of functions

that are widely recognized as essential parts of the

process of convicting the guilty, protecting the

innocent, and doing this with decency and

credibility.

Why Criminal Justice Systems Fail

It is tempting, but a mistake, to look only at the

discrete functions that a criminal justice system

must perform and conclude that fixing each of

them, one at a time, will solve the problem (i.e.,

produce a system that convicts an adequate number of the guilty, assures that the innocent are not

convicted, and does this without treating citizens

indecently or unfairly as part of the process).

Criminal justice systems fail for a number of

reasons; weaknesses of design are only one of

them. Let me review the major possibilities.

A comparison to four possible sources of malfunctioning of a clock may provide a useful mnemonic

device. If the clock doesn’t work, (1) there may be

something wrong with the system of gears; (2) it

may lack the resources—battery or winding—to

make it go; (3) someone may be tampering with it;

or (4) someone may have put it under water or in

some other environment where it is not designed to

work. Now consider the four with regard to a

criminal justice system.

First, something may be wrong with the system;

the procedures may be so badly flawed that they

can hardly work. Let me give two examples from

Guatemala. For some labor-intensive investigative

tasks, police are essential everywhere in the world.

Calling individuals before a prosecutor, grand jury,

or judge is simply not an adequate substitute, in

part because it is too cumbersome a way to identify potential witnesses. Guatemala does not use

police in this important way, and the possibility of

finding the truth suffers because of it.

Consider another example. The factfinder in

Guatemala must decide on the basis of reports

written by staff working for an investigative judge.

The staff do not generally probe witnesses or seek

additional evidence that would confirm or rebut the

statements of witnesses. As a result, the factfinding

judge is regularly left with a record that involves

several witnesses implicating the defendant,

several alibi witnesses stating that the defendant
17

was elsewhere at the time, and no way to resolve

the dispute. Worse, if some of the witnesses

worked for the victim or are related to him, the

trial judge is directed by statute to wholly or

substantially disregard their testimony. Thus, either

the normal burden of proof or the results of special

evidentiary rules make it very unlikely that anyone

will be convicted.

Second, like an unwound clock, even if the system

is sensibly designed, the processes necessary for

finding the facts and convicting the guilty may

regularly fail because of inadequate resources.

Some forms of this are obvious. Having too few

police or prosecutors or judges or, most often,

defense attorneys, is a common problem in countries pressed by tight budgets. Similarly, the

facilities, equipment, and support staff are in

general shockingly inadequate. All this is compounded where the civil law tradition purports to

require police investigation and then prosecution

and adjudication of every factually provable

criminal act without any discretionary sorting in

terms of the importance of the matter.

Another inadequate resource is intangible and

therefore less apparent although equally important.

Contempt for the police in many Latin American

countries prevents the cooperation of victims,

neighbors, and other witnesses—cooperation that

is essential in every country for the detection and

investigation of most crimes. The low status of

judges and prosecutors, reinforced by low salaries

and excessive workloads, discourages cooperation

at a later stage. It is a Herculean task to change

citizen attitudes toward police who, in a country

like Guatemala, must often buy their offices for a

sum that can only be recaptured by corruption. It is

just as difficult to change attitudes toward judges

and prosecutors in a country like Russia when they

are part of a structure whose independence has

long been suspect.

Often low status cannot be made to rise without

wholesale firings and new levels of salary. (A

distinguished member of the establishment in

Guatemala told me that the poorest and least wellconnected law students in the state university

divide their time between careers as taxi drivers

and as judges.) Just as a beginning, the task of

changing public attitudes toward police, prosecutors, and judges requires overcoming the sense of

hopelessness, helplessness, and disrepute that

pervades lower bureaucratic levels in many countries and makes indifference and corruption seem

sensible responses to the situation.

Before turning to the last two reasons why systems

fail, I should note that there are always two plausible and competing explanations of the deeper

causes of the first two reasons for failure. Foolish

design and tragically inadequate resources, including lack of credibility with the public, may be the

undesired results of societal poverty, disorganization, and despair. Alternatively, they may be what

powerful individuals want.

That no more money and attention is dedicated to

building the resources of the criminal justice

system does reflect comfort with its irrelevance in

the minds of many, some of whom enjoy the

protection and the freedom from the constraints of

law that come with control of private security

forces in Latin America. That the system does not

seem to be designed to bring out the truth is often

a planned or accepted result of the fear of lawyers

and judges that it can be turned against the innocent by a hostile government, a fear that is expressed in a set of systems that weaken the least

dangerous branch at the same time as they preserve its purity against misuse.

Like a clock that has been tampered with, a third

reason criminal justice systems fail is because they

are vulnerable to abuse by wealthy, powerful,

influential, or simply ruthless parties. Intimidation

of witnesses is a serious problem in the United

States but a far greater one in Latin America,

South Africa, and Russia. Intimidation of prosecutors and judges is rare in the United States. A

former Minister of Justice was killed on the streets

of Bogota while I was working in Colombia. A
18

judge, who had announced that he had a powerful

case for murder committed by senior leaders of a

branch of the security forces in Guatemala, was

kidnaped while we were working in Guatemala.

Corruption is more genteel than intimidation. It is

also harder to substantiate, but it is believed to be

widespread in the justice systems of many of the

countries I have been discussing. One of the judges

with whom we worked most closely in Guatemala

was relieved from his position for demanding

bribes; major drug dealers were believed to have

paid to shape the new rules of criminal procedure

in Colombia; corruption is endemic in the new

Russia.

Above all, there is a continuous entanglement of

influential political supporters with the careers of

judges in places such as Guatemala. President

Cerezo’s pleasure in the dismissal of a criminal

case against a relative was fervently, and perhaps

practically, conveyed to one of the judges working

with us in Guatemala. It took the form of later help

in obtaining credit for a business investment.

The result of all this is that the wealthy, the powerful, and the influential are rarely tried in Latin

America. Fear and greed shape or eliminate witness testimony throughout the developing world,

in Russia, and in South Africa, too. Beyond being

morally repulsive, the too obvious failure of the

rule of law undermines public acceptance of even

that part of the criminal process that could operate

by enforcing the law against those who lack the

power, wealth, or status for impunity.

Fourth, a clock can’t run under water. Correspondingly, last in my list of major reasons that criminal

justice systems fail are the special and often

overwhelming problems of severely divided

societies. A segment of the society may be in a

state of rebellion against the central government.

That was the situation in Guatemala when we were

there. It was also true in Colombia. War is a

solvent of both justice and truth. Warriors don’t

care much about either. I met with murderous

colonels in the embattled highlands of Guatemala

who asked, in bewildered tones, what I thought

they should do with people they suspected of being

supportive of guerrillas other than kill them. My

answer, to try them in court, seemed incredibly

naive to them.

Even when there is not guerrilla warfare or other

open and armed rebellion, a criminal justice

system cannot easily deal with extreme and violent

hostility by a proud group against the government.

It doesn’t work in Belfast or Kwa-Zulu. For a

group member to furnish information or evidence

of even common crimes becomes unpatriotic and

very dangerous, and without that citizen cooperation, the system either collapses or becomes brutal

and lawless. These are, I believe, laws of nature.

How Can the United States Help Build a

Stronger and Fairer Criminal Justice

System in a Foreign Country?

Our experience suggests that representatives of

other countries can help build a criminal justice

system in four ways. Broadly they can:

■ Provide financing for needed human and

material resources.

■ Provide technical advice.

■ Provide hope and energy to a system that is

despairing and immobile.

■ Bring international and domestic pressure to

bear on local elected leaders and, where necessary, leaders of the military.

The first hardly requires elaboration. Evidence in

Guatemala was recorded by interviewers who

simultaneously typed, in five copies with carbon

paper, on old mechanical typewriters. The third,

fourth, and fifth copies were rarely legible although they played an important role in the processes. The interviewers were so busy typing that

they never observed the defendant or witness

answering the question and rarely followed up
19

with probing questions. The typed reports were

bound with ribbons and stored in old file cabinets.

All this was done in an open bullpen that looked

like a movie version of a police detective squad

room. No witness enjoyed privacy as she told what

had happened. Tape recorders, word processors or

at least electric typewriters, photocopy machines,

and space dividers can and do make a substantial

difference.

But resources make a real difference only if their

provision is part of a broader plan carefully monitored and encouraged along the way. I am afraid

that is rarely true. We furnished Polaroid cameras

so that justices of the peace could photograph

crime scenes but later found them stored, along

with video recorders, in a closet, thankfully not yet

stolen. Similarly, we worked on simple forms as an

investigative checklist to be used by officials

asking questions in particular cases, such as

homicides. When we asked later why the forms did

not seem to be used, the answer was that no one

had arranged for reprinting or photocopying them.

These stories are perhaps a good introduction to

the second gap that foreigners can fill. In Guatemala, Colombia and, to a lesser extent, Russia and

South Africa, assistance provided the momentum

of hope, energy, and American impatience. The

slow pace of events in Guatemala was a constant

frustration to the Americans and a source of

friction with our judicial, prosecutorial, or police

associates in Guatemala. But our very presence

gave impetus to what had been immobile for very

long. Our expectations that something would

change proved infectious; nothing in the experience of the Guatemalans gave them reason to

believe that anything would change. Sharing in our

hopes and excitement became an adrenaline-based

reward for people who had long since stopped

caring about their work.

There is a serious problem here, one that I should

not ignore. When we departed, we left behind all

the blueprints for a continuation of a process of

step-by-step building of new courts with new

procedures. But our departure, motivated by the

desire to repudiate the indifference of the government to the killings of students, drained the energy

of the people working in institutions we had been

helping to create and let hopelessness creep back

in. Without our energy, the work hardly survived

except as a memory of a short period of hope and

innovation.

Third, the international assistance brings with it a

certain amount of political muscle. Every nation

that is at least partially democratic cares about

what its public thinks. Every nation relying on

international good will cares about its international

reputation. Those bringing assistance from influential nations or international bodies bring with them

a certain amount of political influence traceable to

both of these forces.

When we objected to the militarization of patrols

in a rural area of Guatemala in which we were

working, the Minister of Defense arranged for the

withdrawal of the military component of those

patrols. When we objected to the appointment of a

military intelligence officer to a particularly

sensitive position in the police, the appointment

was withdrawn despite considerable embarrassment to the chief of police. When we needed

meetings at a high, medium, or low level with the

officials with whom we were dealing, they would

occur. Thus, we could bring a degree of political

support to a plan worked out with the criminal

justice officials of Guatemala that they could not

muster on their own.

It was that political support, domestic and international, that I decided to expend, in one burst, when

12 students were “disappeared” in late 1989. I

demanded a serious investigation and threatened

and then delivered a quite substantial outcry in

Guatemala and in the United States when no

serious investigation took place.

I have left until last the most interesting matter.

From what source can outsiders also provide

insight toward the solution of problems that the
20

local officials have lived with much longer and

understand much better (assuming, as I trust we all

do, that it makes no sense to try to transfer American, British, French, or German institutions wholesale to a country whose politics, culture, and

economics are very different)? What do we have to

offer in the way of advice? I think there are two

different answers, one bearing particularly on

diagnosis, the other on prescription. I have included these in the appendix to this presentation

for those who are interested.

Conclusion

It is time to draw to a close this description of the

perils and prospects of undertaking law reform in

another country, particularly in countries where

democracy is new, flawed, or embattled. I have not

spoken of the gratification in the process: the thrill

of exaggerated hopes, the friendships formed, and

the sense of a shared enterprise that is not entirely

safe. They are all there. My colleagues and I have

enjoyed the process almost everywhere.

I have described why the effort is important, what

ways the “clock” of the criminal justice process

can be broken, the ways in which outsiders can

help, and how it all depends upon politics as well.

Still, at the end, I have a feeling that I have described something too difficult for frequent success, too subtle for most government work, too

frustrating for a long-term national commitment. I

hope that is not the message that I left you with.

There are wonderful successes. We brought oral

trials to Guatemala, and the enthusiasm of the

public at seeing justice done produced an irreversible effect. We helped the Russians plan jury trials.

In that country, where tradition precludes trust in

judges, jury trial has a powerful claim. We wrote

the police practices for managing demonstrations

in South Africa and brought to an end a source of

unnecessary but regular killings and resulting deep

resentment.

Assisting criminal justice systems abroad is a task

requiring thoughtfulness, openmindedness, patience, and commitment. Often the effort fails, and

to a large extent our effort in Guatemala did. But

the rewards when you succeed are immense. It is

an effort well worth our government undertaking,

well worth the participation of anyone who cares

about justice and democracy.

Appendix: Providing Advice Across Law

Enforcement Cultures

There are many ways to perform the functions of a

criminal justice system and a number of agencies a

state can use in differing ways. What are constant

are the functions that must be performed and the

obstacles that must be overcome. The role of the

U.S. adviser is to force a very American focus on

the functions and problems. Then it is up to the

officials seeking advice to design who should do

what to satisfy the need in a way consistent with

local history, fears, capacities, and beliefs about

institutions.

Diagnosis

At the level of diagnosis I believe that we do have

some knowledge that is robust enough to be of

value in very different settings. It simply has to

work at a higher level of generality than we, as

lawyers, are usually accustomed to. It does no

good to urge—as some in the U.S. Government

did—that Colombia would be better off with

prosecutors, especially if they were attached to the

executive branch rather than the judicial branch.

Prosecutors mean too many different things in too

many countries, and the nature of interbranch

relations is also too contingent for our notions of

separation of powers to be useful here. But at a

more functional level, we can talk about what

prosecutors do in different systems, see if those

functions are being adequately performed in the

criminal justice system seeking advice, and ask

whether a prosecution office in a particular country
21

can be made to operate like those in other nations

where they are effective.

To understand what I mean about the robustness of

such knowledge, consider some of the things we

know about one very important responsibility of

criminal justice systems: solving at least those

crimes for which there are witnesses. Start with a

functional description of what a working criminal

justice system requires to find the facts. The

description is, I believe, very generally true of

criminal justice systems whether in North

America, South America, Europe, Africa, or Asia.

No system can get far at solving crimes and then

providing the beneficial effects of conviction and

punishment unless it knows that the crime has

taken place. For some crimes, such as crimes of

corruption, there is no obvious complainant who

will know of the facts. These crimes are unlike

assaults, robberies, and burglaries in this regard.

But we set ourselves the task of helping with

violent crimes and these have victims or, in the

case of homicide, the families of victims who can

complain.

Even if the police, the prosecutors, or the courts

are aware of a crime having been committed, it is

relatively difficult for them to solve the crime

unless the victim or other witnesses are able to

identify one or a few suspects by observation at the

time of the crime, by providing information as to

possible motivations, or perhaps in some other

way. There is simply no efficient way for the

police to check what hundreds of people may have

been doing at the time of the crime or even to

compare the fingerprints of everyone in a neighborhood with one fingerprint found at the scene of

the crime. The police cannot search 100 homes or

interrogate 100 individuals hoping for a confession. All this is too costly in any but the rarest of

cases—costly both in terms of police resources

and also in terms of the public outrage it would

engender.

Thus, there are crucial functions that have to be

performed by victims and other witnesses in

solving crimes. Maintaining their belief in the

usefulness of providing information, appearing in

court, and subjecting themselves to whatever that

involves is the most important single requirement

of any criminal justice system. It is a mistake to

think that physical evidence, of the sort Sherlock

Holmes used, can compensate. If the police have

found fingerprints, hair, and blood at the scene of a

murder, they may be able to compare them to those

of particular suspects with devastating effect, but

only if the victim or other witnesses have already

identified the particular suspects. So trust in the

police and in the efficacy of the criminal justice

system is essential for investigative success.

In every system, because of the centrality of live

witnesses, intimidation of victims and witnesses

becomes an important possible move for violent

defendants. Preventing intimidation is a sophisticated business. It requires finding ways to use the

information from witnesses without letting the

source be known, obtaining the information before

the threat is made, or making a difficult-to-accomplish effort at protection. It also involves making

the prosecution of efforts at intimidation a serious

objective of the police, prosecutors, and courts.

I have so far been talking about what it takes to

“solve” a crime; i.e., to determine who did it to the

satisfaction of the police. Conviction takes more in

every modern system. What I have said so far

indicates that detective squads (often called “judicial police” in civil law systems) are not going to

“solve” many violent crimes. They are essential,

however, for turning the knowledge of who committed the crime into evidence and rebutting the

alibi of the defendant. This followup investigation,

at the request of a prosecutor or investigative

magistrate, is often essential to conviction if the

system truly imposes a strong burden of proof on

the government. In its absence, one is likely to be

left, as in Guatemala, with inadequate evidence to

counter even a weak alibi.
22

Even if there is an effective use of the police for

these purposes in preparation for trial, the system

must involve some effective means for choosing

among the competing stories of defense witnesses

and prosecution witnesses. In Latin America, there

has long been a reliance on rules that are intended

to separate the more credible from the less credible

witnesses by evidence of bias or inconsistency that

is apparent from the written record alone. They

cannot and do not work. In the United States, we

rely primarily upon cross-examination and the

factfinder’s observation of demeanor (the appearance of the witness as she testifies) and, to a lesser

extent, on the effect of an oath and the threat of

prosecution for lying.

The defendant himself is an important source of

evidence in most countries, even though a number

of criminal justice systems around the world deny

or limit the effect of a confession given by the

defendant while in police custody. In the United

States, where we have sharply limited the capacity

of the police to force a confession, many cases are

still solved by confessions that result from the

desire of the defendant to talk his way out of

custody or future trial. And we use deals made

with the defendant or his associates as a way of

exchanging less punishment than the crime would

otherwise warrant for either a guilty plea or testimony against a colleague. European systems

provide a substitute by enabling judges on the

court to question the defendant and others, and

giving judges or lay factfinders the freedom to

draw conclusions from the defendant’s relatively

infrequent failure to respond.

Every system must also have some way of sorting

the cases that deserve more attention from those

that deserve less. In the United States, one of our

uses of plea bargaining is to dispose of relatively

unimportant cases. France, Germany, Italy, and

Russia each have their own systems to accomplish

this, which differ sharply from ours and from each

other. The point is simply that the problem of

focusing attention on the more important crimes is

essential in almost every system.

If I now compare this list of very general requirements with how the Guatemalan, or Colombian, or

South African, or Russian criminal justice system

works, I can identify crucial weaknesses. To take a

clear example, Guatemala’s system failed to

sufficiently encourage the cooperation of victims

or other witnesses, exaggerated the potential for

using physical evidence, ignored a massive problem of intimidation, regarded the police as almost

irrelevant to investigation, lacked a way for

factfinders to choose between competing prosecution and defense stories, failed to make use of a

defendant’s knowledge, and lacked a system for

disposing of the less important cases so as to leave

time for the more important. A set of quite robust

judgments about the processes of factfinding

allows a diagnosis of the nature of the problem.

Prescription

Prescription is another matter. A comparative

perspective provides a number of alternatives that

may not have been considered. But it does not deal

with the immense importance of the political,

social, ideological, and economic context of any

legal structure or procedure nor does it deal with

the relationship of the particular alternative being

proposed to other parts of the very same criminal

justice system. How then can outsiders be of help

at the level of prescription?

In the realm of prescription, what works best is a

fairly patient dialogue. The foreign consultant

brings to the dialogue two things: a sense of the

relatively robust requirements for getting important parts of the job done and a list of alternative

ways these requirements are met in different

systems. Local practitioners bring to the conversation crucial information about what functions are

not being performed adequately now and some

knowledge of what, in their society, is the likelihood—and what would be the consequences—of

adopting one or another of the alternatives suggested. Out of the discussion can come a joint

understanding of what are the real gaps in the
23

present system and what alternatives are promising

and not dangerous.

The idea of a dialogue is so central that I should

illustrate. A Guatemalan judge might complain

that there is no way for her to resolve the conflicting stories, reduced to writing, of the victim and

the defendant. One of our team might then ask,

“Can you not get additional witnesses?” The

Guatemalan would respond, “We already called

those witnesses suggested by the victim or the

arresting officer who responded to the event.” We

would say, “Why don’t you use the police to look

for additional witnesses, as more criminal justice

systems do?” The answer might be, “We don’t

trust the police—for these reasons . . .”

Now the possible solutions are narrowed and

informed. Could we not create a special investigative unit that could be trusted, or have the investigation carried out under the supervision of the

otherwise idle prosecutors, or ask witnesses specifically whether they have been told what to say

by the police or by one of the parties? Alternatively, can we realistically hope to change the

police? The resulting prescription, whatever it is, is

attributable to both parties and is far better imagined and better assessed because it is the product

of an informed dialogue.

We used much the same process, during 3 straight

weeks of meetings, to review with Russian draftsmen their proposed new substantive code of

criminal procedure. The system works in much the

same way; dialogue is again central. I remember

our discussing the peculiar and very vague crime

of “hooliganism.” I said, “Why not eliminate that

crime completely because it is so subject to

abuse?” The Russians responded with a set of

specific problems, deeply embedded in Russian

society, that the crime was believed essential for

addressing.

Again, as a result of the dialogue, the stage is now

set. Other countries, I said, address those problems

by A, B, or C. The Russians responded that B

would not work and that A would not be acceptable. C, on the other hand, might be possible and

would only involve an amendment of the hooliganism statute.

Let me give a final example that combines the role

of diagnosis and prescription in what I think is an

especially revealing way. Intimidation of judges is

obviously a particularly serious problem in Colombia. Pablo Escobar alone was responsible for

several judges’ deaths. Colombia’s response, like

that of Peru in its trial of Abimael Guzman, has

been to maintain the anonymity of judges. The

danger is even greater, far greater, for witnesses.

Here, too, Colombia uses anonymity as a protection by allowing witnesses who testify to be

identified only by a fingerprint.

Consider the more troublesome practice: the use of

anonymous witnesses. Two problems spring to

mind. Such witnesses cannot easily be questioned

by or before a skeptical factfinder, leaving the

possibility of police concoction of crucial evidence

in a situation where the police and major drug

dealers are in a state of near war. Colombia addresses that by having questioning done by judges

through one-way mirrors and with voice distorters.

Still, that leaves the problem of biases that would

be known only to the defendant and only if he

knew who the witness was. For this there is no

present answer under the Colombian system.

Can our experience help? Intimidation of witnesses is also a serious problem in the United

States. The most important device we have for

handling intimidation is the ability to use informants as the basis for gathering other evidence

from sources not so easily harmed or intimidated.

We can promise an informant secrecy and obtain a

search warrant or a wiretap. We can try to place an

undercover operative in the organization. In each

of these cases, the ultimate witness is a police

officer and not the endangered and frightened

citizen. Beyond that, we induce the necessary

cooperation from frightened witnesses by plea
24

bargaining as well as by the use of a grand jury

with the capacity to offer immunity.

All these alternatives—as well as those used by the

British in Northern Ireland, the French, and the

Italians—come to mind as soon as the underlying

problem is carefully diagnosed. The Colombians

may object that some of the alternatives, such as

the use of undercover agents, require too great a

departure from their legal tradition. Some, they

may think, are more dangerous than the use of

anonymous witnesses at trial in the different

context of Colombian society. But the discussion

can explore the possibilities fully and in an informed way.

A Final Word About Institutions

I have emphasized the importance of diagnosing at

a functional level rather than at a level of institutions or even procedures. Still, in considering

alternatives (prescriptions), the relatively enduring

characteristics and reputations of broader institutions are also relevant. South Africa has a strong

judiciary, a relatively bureaucratic prosecution, a

weak public defense, and a police force deeply

distrusted by much of the black population and for

good reason. Expanding the control of the police

by the judiciary may thus be helpful. Russia has a

weak judiciary, a strong prosecution, a traditionally weak defense, and a police that has only

recently lost a reputation for frightening ruthlessness. Building a strong and independent judiciary

as a crucial ingredient of public trust will take

time, but in the meantime jury trials can create

trust in factfinding where there was none. Guatemala has a weak judiciary, an almost negligible

prosecution, an ineffective defense, and a hardly

competent but brutal police. You have to start there

on a very broad front.

This information about the capacity and credibility

of institutions tells you something about what

there is to build upon, what must be constrained,

what should not be granted greater powers, and

what is not operating at its full potential. Expanding prosecutorial responsibility for the police

might be wise in South Africa. In Russia, where

the prosecution has been dominant for too long,

nothing is more important than building the

strength of judicial institutions. Colombia and

Guatemala could both benefit from a stronger

defense, but only if the prosecution is built up first.

This type of judgment is also important.
25

Thanks to reformers such as President Franklin D.

Roosevelt, the police in this country are, by and

large, an apolitical group, beholden to no politicians, selected through civil service examinations,

and independent of abusive State or Federal authorities. Unlike many other places around the

world, here the police are not called upon to prop

up or defend the state. They make it almost impossible to libel a public official in the United States;

and unlike Great Britain, they make it very difficult for the state to keep an official secret. Police

in America don’t arrest people who speak against

the state. That is an obvious and important distinction to be made between law enforcement here and

in many areas of the world. Growing out of our

revolutionary experience, we are still suspicious of

a standing police authority at the national level.

Something also persists from our experience in the

American civil rights movement. Police in

America have come to accommodate even the

timing and manner of arrest used on people engaged in civil disobedience. They have shown that

accommodation frequently here in Washington

during the protest campaign to end the apartheid

government in South Africa. Civil disobedience

has become a tool of dissent, recognized both by

citizens and law enforcement of the United States.

There is yet another distinction about the police in

a democratic society. Nowhere is free speech as

vigorously protected as it is in the United States.

The police in America, as an institution, recognize

how important free speech is to the American

people, who will sacrifice a great deal to ensure it.

So when the police in America engage in brutality,

partisanship, or oppression, it is big news indeed.

In some foreign countries the police are expected

to engage in brutality, partisanship, and oppression. That is their job. In Haiti, we once asked,

hypothetically, how the police might handle a large

crowd assembled in front of the police headquarters. One of the interim Haitian officers raised his

hand and said, “Beat them?” He thought he had the

right answer, and under the old regime it would

have been. Several years ago, one of Haiti’s politicians had taken the risk of making an antiregime

speech in front of police headquarters. A plainclothes officer came outside and shot him in the

head in front of civilian witnesses.

Certainly, people in this room know that in

America we have our own problems with corruption and excessive use of force among the police,

but these never reach the level of impunity practiced in Haiti under the old regime or practiced

among dictatorships around the world. American

police problems pale by comparison with those of

emerging democracies. For one thing, we recognize corruption and brutality as problems that need

to be corrected, not as qualities in the leadership to

be accepted.

I got a sense in Haiti that the police waited in

station houses, playing dominoes, until they

received orders from higher up to go out and do

harm. There was no tradition of public service that

one could associate with the police. Police officers

were assigned to traffic duty, but little else was

done to accommodate the public. There was no

attempt to combat corruption. The police were not

expected to conduct thorough investigations of

Keynote Address:

American Law Enforcement Perspectives

on Policing in Emerging Democracies

by Raymond W. Kelly
26

accidents. We learned this early on from a bus

accident in which five people were killed and no

regular police responded with an investigation.

Police did not respond, they did not remove the

injured to hospitals, they did not remove the dead,

nor were they of much assistance. Good samaritans in the town where the accident happened took

it upon themselves to bury the unknown victims on

the spot. This was deemed a public service in light

of the hot weather.

Preparing for an invasion of Haiti, the planners

envisioned having a separate police monitoring

force. This was a good idea for two reasons. First,

Haiti’s police were notoriously bad and indistinguishable from the Haitian military. If the U.S.-led

invasion was to take out the Haitian army, it made

little sense to leave the police in place. Secondly,

the American planners recognized that it was best

to have police interacting with police rather than

with the soldiers. Instead of having only soldiers

act as police, we had police from 20 different

countries interact as monitors with the Haitian

police. It was a simple idea that turned out to be

brilliant. We have the Department of State’s Bob

Gelbard to thank for putting it together. Bob

brought professional and highly motivated police

from about 20 countries together with about 300

translators. The total package of about 1,300

international police and personnel constituted a

monitoring force. Bob also thought about simple

things like recognizing that French is not the same

as Creole. He supplied enough Creole-speaking

interpreters to accompany every patrol in Haiti.

They gave a lot of themselves. I have spent a

career in law enforcement, and I was very impressed with the caliber of the police monitors

from countries as diverse as Belgium, Benin,

Australia, and the Philippines. Each country had

made it a point to try to send the very best. As a

result, we had a professional, disciplined, experienced police force monitoring the Haitian police.

Our job in Haiti was frequently complex. First, we

had to stop human rights abuses by the Haitian

police. Second, we had to monitor the retraining of

the remaining force. Third, we had to pave the way

for the U.S. Department of Justice to set up a

program to train new people.

The first part was relatively easy. In our monitoring of human rights, the Haitian police were afraid

of us, afraid for their future, and afraid of the

public. While Haitian police were agreeable to

stopping human rights violations, they were not

particularly enthusiastic about functioning in our

new matrix until a new force was in place. Given

Haiti’s total lack of experience with police as most

democracies would know it, we should not be

surprised that the international police monitors’

experience and conditions were so harsh. The lifethreatening situations were many, especially in the

first few months of our operation. Very often this

involved stopping mobs from exacting street

justice on each other or common criminals. Sometimes a political rationale would be used to settle a

personal score.

The monitors were also directly engaged in public

services commonly associated with the United

States and not with Haiti. Such services included,

for example, responding to the bus accident that I

described earlier and disaster relief in the case of a

hurricane that struck while we were there. Very

often, police monitors put injured persons and

corpses into their own vehicles to get them to

hospitals and to provide for the dignified removal

of the dead. This is the kind of service we would

normally expect of law enforcement, but one thing

the Haitian police did not have was a tradition of

public service. They also simply lacked the vehicles. In my judgment, it was important for the

monitors to be fully engaged proactively. To do

otherwise would have undermined our credibility

and clashed with a professional police attitude that

encouraged them to act with a sense of duty in a

required fashion. To put this much in action, the

Haitians needed new vehicles, along with instructions to control the restructuring of their profession.

Initially, it was the tendency of the foreign police

monitor to sit in the front seat of the vehicle while
27

the Haitian officer and the interpreter would sit in

the back. In a two-door vehicle, this meant that the

police monitor would be the first out of the vehicle. This arrangement reinforced the Haitian

officers’ tendency to hang back and let the monitor

do most of work. Soon we insisted that the Haitian

officer sit in the front. That meant that he would be

the first out of the car and the first to engage. It

seemed a simple idea and came initially from the

Australian monitors, but it was an important

mentoring tool.

The U.S. Army, U.S. State Department, and supporting contractors established our own communications network that we maintained with the

commanding and operations officers of each

foreign contingent, who met twice a day to address

deployment issues and strategy. Unlike the United

Nations, which would integrate each of the teams

of police from various countries, we kept individual contingents—in fact, separate factions—

and assigned them to different regions. For example, the Bolivians patrolled a border town where

there was a high concentration of Spanish speakers

among the population. We assigned the Israeli

contingent to a particular area of Port-au-Prince.

All the Jordanians were assigned to the opposite

side of the town. Each contingent brought its own

strategy. In addition, the international makeup had

the advantage of conveying to the Haitians that this

was not simply an American operation. I think that

idea was better conveyed by the fact that the

national groups were deployed in force in a particular area.

All of the contingents shared democratic values,

but it was necessary to articulate the importance of

democracy. There are only so many interpreters

who can translate Arabic to Creole. Deploying the

foreign contingents in discrete units was, I believe,

essential to the integrity of our command structure

and better for morale. The police monitors were

better organized and more confident with issues.

We deployed some contingents within 24 hours of

their arrival in Port-au-Prince. Again, the foreign

contingents had a level of professionalism that

could be expected in a large American police

department. For example, the Bolivians engaged

the Haitian police in a complex narcotics investigation and even organized a sting in which Haitian

police arrested a corrupt Haitian police supervisor,

definitely a first in Haiti. The Israelis were experts

in community relations and quickly made the

public feel welcome, encouraging requests for

police services. The Belgians could organize a

local population to meet immediate needs. In one

of the few shooting incidents, we had a Haitian

government police doctor treating a Haitian suspect wounded by an American police officer.

Under the old regime the suspect would have been

allowed to die with no questions asked. Treating

him on the spot was a practical application of

democratic values.

The jails were another matter entirely. They were

medieval and presented us with a problem. After

insisting on the humane, professional treatment of

suspects, we would have to turn them over to

prisons that were overcrowded, unsanitary, and

dysfunctional. We had to deal with many issues

like making sure that the prisoners were fed. We

also investigated reports that people were held

without seeing judges or that those who were

incarcerated prior to our arrival had no record of

why they were being held and for how long. With

these issues, the problem of Haiti’s corrupt judiciary surfaced. This became the focus of a long

investigation.

We quickly learned that police monitoring is

inevitably linked to prison and judicial reform.

A prison cannot be reformed without a drastic

change in the judiciary. If a corrupt judiciary is left

in place, it will quickly undermine all the hard

work that went into reforming the police in the

first place. It is an issue that the United States

should be prepared to deal with in other emerging

democracies. America is still a young nation, but

we are the oldest democracy and have a great deal

to offer to those that are newly developed, especially when it comes to law enforcement. Most

emerging democracies are poor. We, as a wealthy
28

state, should be prepared to help equip and monitor the training. Basic equipment needs, and I will

stress basic, not high technology, should be an

integral part of training and should not be ignored.

This should include, for example, equipment for

protecting the police and citizens.

We painted the police station white, since the old

yellow color was associated with the old regime.

Together with the U.S. Army, we took machine

guns away from the Haitian police, and we helped

them get some restored, working sidearms. Again,

this was a practical application of democratic

values. Police forces armed with machine guns

actively intimidate the public. Police armed with

pistols are armed to protect themselves and others

from deadly harm. This is an important distinction

for police in an emerging democracy. Fortunately,

not every emerging democracy is as poor as Haiti,

but presumably equipment needs may still be

severe. Americans are bringing much more than

equipment to the table when it comes to police

experience. These are the intangibles of democracy

that are far more important than weapons. They

quickly become real in the hands of teachers of

organization and professionalism. Along with our

traditions of organization and professionalism for

the police are preservation of the rights of the

accused, protection of free speech, and nonpartisan

conduct of the police. These are not theoretical

issues for the people in emerging democracies.

They are very real and practical. The United Sates

can be an effective role model by showing emerging democracies how to separate the police from

the military, as difficult as that may be. We can

show them how to professionally hire and train

police, how to safeguard suspects in custody, how

to maintain order without breaking up a peaceful

demonstration, how to restrict the use of deadly

force, or how to protect voters at ballot boxes on

election day regardless of who is being elected.

American police do all these things very, very

well—probably better than just about any other

police force. For the most part, they are also done

instinctively, which is why members of American

law enforcement are first class. They are great

teachers when it comes to police issues.

President Aristide and Ambassador Gelbard said

that the second election will be Haiti’s most

important. In Haiti, or in any other emerging

democracy, how the police conduct themselves on

that second election day may be the greatest test of

all. What occurs on that day may determine

whether there will be a third election. The facilitation and maintenance of order during the peaceful

change of the legitimately elected government will

be the ultimate test for police in an emerging

democracy. American law enforcement should

proceed to teach the lessons necessary to get to

that point.
29

Toward Democratic Policing: Rethinking

Strategies of Transformation

by Clifford Shearing

with the assistance of Jennifer Wood

driving our policy initiatives and interventions. We

must, like Hegel’s Owl of Minerva, take a theoretical flight even though our philosophical wings beat

above a terrain that has long been fundamentally

transformed through our practices and the institutions in and through which they take place.

I will begin my presentation with a review of the

reigning wisdom on policing that is being used as

a basis for providing advice to emerging democracies. I will then turn my attention to an alternative

framework which recognizes and grasps the way in

which policing, and governance more generally,

have been changing within established democracies. Finally I will turn, using work that I have

been involved with in South Africa, to the implications of this alternative conception for the transformation of policing.

The Conventional Wisdom

The conventional wisdom about policing is

founded on the assumption that democratic governance is state governance and that what is required

of emerging democracies is that they develop state

institutions which operate in ways consistent with

liberal-democratic principles. Critical among these

state institutions is the police, as they are a major

repository of governmental coercion. Indeed, as

David Bayley has argued, “perhaps no other

institution is more central to the success of democratic nation-building than the police.”2

Policy initiatives to transform the police within

emerging democracies focus attention on two

principal arenas. The first is police operations.

Ronald Weitzer’s comments on the problems with

the South African Police (SAP) that the new

The question of what emerging democracies

should be doing to transform their policing is both

topical and urgent. This question has given rise to

a growing literature on the transformation of

policing within countries that are emerging from

authoritarian forms of rule. There is remarkable

agreement in this body of work as to the nature of

the problem and what should be done about it.

Whether the topic of analysis is Spain, South

Africa, Nigeria, or South Korea,1

 the analysis of

the problem and the prescription for reform are

much the same. The police in these countries are to

be transformed from authoritarian, partisan instruments of government into modern police institutions that are nonpartisan and democratically

accountable.

I will argue that this conventional wisdom is

fundamentally flawed not because it is wrong in

what it has to say about the police institutions that

exist in authoritarian countries, but because its

view of policing and the institutions through which

it is accomplished is much too limited. This flaw

arises because the conventional wisdom on policing fails to comprehend, or even recognize, the

fundamental transformations that have been taking

place within policing over the past several decades.

As a consequence, it promotes ideas and strategies

of transformation that are out of sync with the way

in which Western policing is practiced. Our practices have outstripped our theoretical understandings of democracy generally and policing in

particular.

If we are to offer useful advice and assistance to

emerging democracies, we must first get our

conceptual house in order, for it is our conceptual

frameworks rather than our practices that are
30

government has inherited are illustrative of what is

identified as the problem:

It is urgently required that the SAP reduce or

eliminate its involvement in some security

duties and take steps to blunt the abrasive

manner in which police handle other problems.

It is vital that the authorities put an end to the

trigger-happy policing of protests and riots,

surveillance of government opponents, the

misuse of police power of arrest, undercover

hit squads and torture and murders of suspects

in custody.3

Initiatives to transform police operations typically

draw attention to the institutional structures within

which police in authoritarian countries operate, in

particular their military organization, and the

occupational culture of the police that guides and

shapes police practice. The second arena singled

out for attention is the lack of accountability

outside the governing elite. Here the advice offered

is typically to promote transparency in police

operations so that newly emerging democratic

governments and courts will have the information

they require to exercise control over the police

within the framework of liberal democracy.

Etannibi Alemika’s comment on the transformation of Nigerian policing is illustrative:

It is. . .imperative for every society to develop

frameworks for the constant monitoring and

regulation of the functions, powers, performance and accountability of the police. This

need is particularly critical in societies that

lack appropriate or developed democratic

institutions and safeguards against political

authoritarianism and extreme economic inequalities.4

The intention of both these forms of intervention is

the same. Policing, it is argued, needs to become

an impartial source of order rather than an instrument of a partisan government. Frederik de Klerk,

the last apartheid president, in a speech to senior

South African police officers during the period

leading up to democratic elections, committed

himself to this ideal when he promised that his

government would not use them “any longer as

instruments to attain political goals.”5

To accomplish this depoliticization of the police,

two principal modes of intervention are advanced.

First, the police are to be made more directly

responsive to the safety requirements of ordinary

citizens by developing links to ordinary people that

ensure they will be directed by people rather than

by governments. This, it is argued, can be accomplished in a variety of ways ranging from enabling

the police to react directly to individual citizen

requests for service through a 911 dial-a-cop type

strategy,6

 to requiring the police to work directly

with communities to identify safety risks and then

work with them to reduce them.7

The second strategy for depoliticizing the police

involves insulating them from direct political

control so as to ensure that they are, in Lord

Denning’s oft cited words, “answerable to the law

and the law alone” rather than to political authorities, so that they may be “not the servant of anyone, save the law itself.”8

Arguments to transform the police in these ways

invariably recognize that what is done at the

institutional level can be undermined by a police

culture that is itself biased, and that indeed the

insulation of the police from direct political control can operate to create an autonomous police

who use their powers to indulge their institutional

interests and prejudices rather than the dictates of

the law. Virtually all policy initiatives to transform

policing in emerging democracies argue that ways

must be found to transform the thinking of ordinary police officers in addition to the structures

and policies intended to guide their practices.

Underlying this conventional view is the argument

that the problems of developing a nonpartisan state

police are ones that established Western democracies have wrestled with for decades. While these

nations may not have solved all the problems
31

associated with developing such a police, they

have made considerable progress. As a result, they

are well placed to advise those who are just embarking on this difficult road full of potholes and

dead ends ahead and help them negotiate the turns

they should be taking. In order to share this experience, Western nations are dispatching hordes of

analysts and police officers to emerging democracies throughout the world to offer advice on how

democratic policing can be established.

At one level this analysis is perfectly fine. It does

indeed identify critical issues with respect to state

police that need to be addressed and it does make

available a shared experience to those who would

embark on this path. Furthermore, this is clearly a

path that must be negotiated by emerging democracies. They all have state police who will have to

be transformed, and the experience of more established democracies will be useful to them if they

tackle this task.

The problem with this analysis is not that it is

wrong but that it is too limited. It has been developed from a partial view of policing and of governance more generally. As a consequence, it is an

analysis that serves to identify some but not all of

the challenges and possibilities that confront both

established and emerging democracies.

A Less Conventional Analysis

The conventional wisdom rests not only on a

restricted view of policing but more generally on a

restricted view of governance. The fundamental

premise of this account is that governance is and

should be a state monopoly. This premise guides

and shapes all else. Thus, within this view a

democratic polity is one in which state governance

is directed by the will of the people, and democratic policing is policing in which the work of the

state police reflects this will. Within this conception, policing is conceived as the aspect of governance that is concerned with providing safety and

security. Within modern systems of government

this task has been assigned primarily to the police.

The conventional analysis accepts these claims and

then asks how police can be organized so that they

operate in ways that promote safety and security

for ordinary people and not simply for a political

elite. In the case of developing democracies it asks

more specifically how they can move closer to

Western nations that are further along this road.

This analysis accepts that even established democracies may have some way to go in fully realizing

the dream of a democratic police, but it argues

nonetheless that as they are farther along this path

they do provide a model that less developed

nations can and should emulate.

Critical to this argument is the assumption that

established democracies are confident that this

vision of democratic governance, and policing

more specifically, is one to which they are committed. Herein lies the nub of the difficulty with the

conventional wisdom. The problem is that people

within established democracies are no longer

confident that the vision of democratic governance

on which the conventional wisdom rests is one to

which they wish to remain committed.

It is not that we no longer believe in liberaldemocratic ideals. Rather, we question the liberaldemocratic institutions that we have fashioned to

give expression to these ideals. We are no longer

confident that our liberal-democratic institutions

are achieving what we want of them.

We are in a period of neoliberal transition in which

we are seeking to renew our liberalism by renewing its institutions. At the very core of this rethinking is a renewal of our institutions of governance

involving a challenge to the assumption that

governance should be a state monopoly and more

particularly that it should be driven by the expert

knowledge of state professionals. Skepticism of

state institutions includes skepticism of the police

as the institution that should be providing safety

and security.

This challenge to our conventional wisdom and to

the institutions of liberalism that it takes for
32

granted and defends is taking place most obviously

via a widespread polity initiative that argues that

institutions of state governance should not be

exclusively state based and that they should not

depend exclusively on the work and knowledge of

experts. Some argue that governance should not

simply be the business of professionals but should

be everybody’s business. People, it is said, should

be involved in their own regulation. Peter Drucker

says that governance should be taking place

through a “social sector” of civil institutions. In

arguing for the feasibility of this governmental

shift he notes that “almost every other adult” in the

United States works at least 3—and often 5—

hours a week as a volunteer.9

 This is time and

energy that can, and should, be devoted to selfgovernance.

This initiative for a “reinvention of government,”10

which William Eggers and John O’Leary have

recently dubbed a “revolution at the roots,”11 is one

that has widespread currency. At the nub of this

“revolution” is a questioning of conventional

wisdom’s premise that democratic governance is

governance by the state for the people. In its place

the argument being advanced is that for the ideals

of democracy to be realized, governance must be

reinstitutionalized in ways that will ensure that

governing is done more directly by people. Two

consequences of this argument are being realized,

one more radical than the other.

The less radical version is a new dream of democracy that seeks to make government “smaller,

better, and closer to home.”12 This argument has

been articulated by Eggers and O’Leary in relation

to policing. They argue that we will not have

realized the ideals of liberal democracy if we

continue to think of government and policing as

being a state monopoly. “Waiting for governments

to make it all better,” they argue, “is a losing

strategy. People have to become more involved in

ensuring their own security.”13

In expanding on this argument, these authors are

careful to point out that they are not advocating

vigilantism. What they propose is what Jane

Jacobs has described as “an intricate, almost

unconscious, network of voluntary controls and

standards established and enforced by the people

themselves.”14

The language of this rethinking of the institutions

of liberal-democratic governance is one of interagency cooperation, local initiative, and publicprivate “partnerships.”15 What is maintained is that

the work of governing should be devolved to

citizens through a process of “responsibilization.”16

In this less radical version, devolution is designed

to shift control over governance away from the

state; government is not seen as “taking a back

seat.”17 In essence, what is envisaged is a shift in

the rowing of government but not the steering.18

This intention is nicely captured by Nikolas Rose

and Peter Miller when they speak of neoliberal

governance as “rule at a distance.”19

Within the policing arena, the most obvious evidence of this partial devolution is found in community policing initiatives that redefine the police

as brokers of community resources that mobilize

and coordinate. In arguing for this form of devolution, Eggers and O’Leary note:

There is a great deal that government can and

should do to improve public safety, but first it

must recognize that it needs help. Restoring

public safety demands a renewed partnership

between the police and the community. Police

must reacquaint themselves with the people in

the communities they serve, and communities

must recognize that the brunt of the task of

policing a free society does not lie with the

police but with citizens themselves.20

In addition to this form of devolution there is a

second form happening without any policy fanfare.

This “quieter revolution” is older and more radical

in that it involves a devolution not only of the

rowing but much of the steering of governance as

well. Within the policing arena the most obvious

evidence of this development is the “rebirth of
33

private policing.”21 Private policing is associated

with the growth of what I think of as corporate

governments that govern contractual communities.

Literally throughout the world, corporate governments are doing many of the things that we think

of as the preserve of state governments including,

and indeed in particular, the provision of safety

and security. Everywhere one looks one finds

evidence of new governmental territories that

have been called “mass private property” being

governed by “private governments.”22 Examples of

these territories include the gated communities

found throughout North America and in many

other parts of the world, recreational spaces such

as “Club Meds,” and what I like to think of as the

“industrial Club Meds.” These latter territories are

often huge spaces that one finds in countries like

Zimbabwe, in which tens of thousands of people

live and work under the rule of corporate entities

that are reminiscent of the great 17th- and 18thcentury trading companies such as the English and

Dutch East India Companies and the Hudson Bay

Company. In addition to these “real” territories of

governance there are a variety of virtual territories

governed by corporate governments, such as the

corporate entities that govern financial markets.

This corporate regulation not only predates the

neoliberal “revolution at the roots,” but the shift in

the locus of rule is, as I have already suggested,

much more radical than the “rule at a distance”

forms of governance that are being argued for by

neoconservatives. In the case of corporate governance, the role of the state is not one of governing

at a distance through the private sector. Rather, the

state provides a framework for the regulation of

multiple sites of governance. Here the state’s role

is less one of a player and more one of a referee to

ensure that the various private governments are not

trampling on individual liberties.

Within this arrangement, sovereignty shifts from

the state to private entities, and democratic control

shifts from the vote to the market. These communities of governance are, in Drucker’s words,

“communities of choice not fate,”23 in which

democratic control is exercised through consumer

choice rather than through the ballot box, which

allows, as he notes, “citizens to vote once every

few years and to pay taxes all the time.”24 This

displacement of sovereignty is leading to the

development of new forms of governance that have

elsewhere been referred to as a “new feudalism.”25

Implications for Emerging Democracies

Emerging democracies have not been immune

from these developments. They too are seeing the

emergence of corporate governments within their

territories and are being exposed to the neoliberal

move to revolutionize liberal democracy through a

reinvention of its governing institutions. If we are

to speak to emerging democracies about the path

that lies ahead of them in a voice that they find

convincing, we will have to shift into a key that is

not founded on the premises of the conventional

wisdom. We are going to have to talk to them

about the emerging liberal polity with its network

of governing institutions and not simply of a state

that pretends that it can and should monopolize

governance. We are going to have to talk to them

in a voice which recognizes that the Enlightenment

dream that grounds the conventional wisdom has

been discredited and that a new dream and a new

quest to construct institutions realizing it is emerging. Only if we can do this will we speak in a voice

that addresses their concerns and one that addresses the foreign policy concerns of established

nations that are seeking to operate in a global

environment where the old certainty of a stable

nation-state system is being rapidly eroded.

Private government is a global phenomenon that

reflects the emergence of mass private property,

contractual communities, and the “commodification” of governmental goods on a global scale.

To speak to the people of emerging democracies in

a voice that does not recognize this can only lead

to failure both from the point of view of these new

democracies and from the point of view of the West.
34

The conventional wisdom cannot provide the basis

for a sensible foreign policy for any established

democracy if it directs attention away from the

very loci of sovereignty and governance that

should be the focus of their interventions. To focus

attention exclusively on the state and its institutions through a lens that sees only what has been

and obscures what is emerging is foolish.

The South African Case

This brings me to the work I have been undertaking with others in South Africa through the Community Peace Foundation at the School of Government at the University of the Western Cape. We

have sought to promote a vision of reform for

policing and for justice more generally that recognizes the devolution of governance being promoted

both through the advocacy of a neoliberal philosophy and the emergence of corporate governance. In

this work we do not accept uncritically the neoliberal

claims that devolution of governance and the

commodification of governmental services do

indeed promote liberal, democratic values for all.

Our stance in relationship to these developments

has two elements. First, we have argued that as

these developments are in fact taking place and

must be acknowledged and engaged, there is no

point in acting as if the old liberal-democratic

dream of a state monopoly of government continues to be the guiding principle of established

democracies or that this monopoly has not been

fundamentally eroded. Secondly, we have argued

that while there is much that is worrisome about

these neoliberal developments, especially for poor

people, there is much in the devolution of governance being promoted by neoliberalism that

deserves more than a simple condemnation. We

have argued that what is required is not a rejection

of the devolutionary tendencies of neoliberalism

but rather its construction in ways that will challenge the more undemocratic features of the

neoconservative mobilization of this reassessment

of classic liberal tenets.

Within the policing field this stance has translated

into programs that are seeking to empower communities to operate with the same level of autonomy as corporate governments and to develop a

similar level of control and direction over their

security as these entities. Our aim has been to

explore the possibility of creating a form of “community policing” that shifts both the rowing and

much of the steering of policing to communities.

To do this we are developing a conception of

community policing for poor people that takes its

lead from private policing, not state policing. In

doing so, we are directly challenging the forms of

community policing that seek to institutionalize

“rule at a distance” strategies that have been the

hallmark of most community policing initiatives in

established democracies that have had poor people

as their focus.

The conceptual framework guiding this work

recognizes two sets of devolutionary strategies in

established democracies, one that has provided the

corporate communities with control of both the

rowing and the steering of policing, and the other

that has sought to devolve to poor communities the

rowing of policing but not its steering. Our framework identifies this as institutionalizing two sets of

governmental institutions under the umbrella of a

single set of neoliberal principles—one for the rich

and one for the poor. We regard this strategy as a

critical feature of the neoconservative response to

neoliberal thinking.

In challenging the established vision of community

policing that police in established democracies are

promoting and that they are exporting to emerging

democracies, we are seeking to provide an alternative to the neoconservative agenda within policing

and to use this as the basis for building a conceptual and normative platform for promoting alternative forms of neoliberal governance.

The strategy we have adopted in South Africa in

light of these considerations has four related

components:
35

■ Seeking to reshape the police in ways required

by the conventional wisdom through retraining

and enhanced accountability.

■ Engaging the state in ways that will provide for

a relocation of control over tax revenues in a

manner that will provide blacks with purchasing power.

■ Establishing blacks as powerful customers with

ability to control their security.

■ Striving to do this in a manner that will keep

currency in the present South African political

climate.

This strategy has been pursued on two principal

terrains. On the one hand, the Community Peace

Foundation has sought to reshape the legislative

framework that will govern policing in the new

South Africa. On the other, it has sought to discover new institutional arrangements for policing.

I will briefly outline our work on both these

terrains.

At the legislative level our work has, to date,

focused primarily on the new interim Constitution

and the new Police Act. At this level our concern has

been both with establishing legislative directions that

will take the state’s security budget out of the direct

control of the police and with creating mechanisms

for making police work more transparent.

With respect to both the Constitution and the

Police Act, we have lobbied, with some success,

for transparency mechanisms that will permit what

the police do to become visible. A key component

of this has been the establishment of citizen boards

at the station, the regional, and the national level.

While these provisions go further than those of

most Western countries in the extent to which they

provide for citizen involvement at the station level,

they do not require any particular comment here,

as they follow closely the logic of the conventional

wisdom.

Where our initiatives at the legislative level have

tended to depart from the conventional approach is

in respect to the way in which responsibility for

security and policing have been assigned. We

successfully persuaded the multiparty forum that

drafted the interim Constitution to accept a legal

framework that distinguishes between the provision of security and the provision of police. This

resulted in provisions in the Constitution that

enable the establishment of laws that will give at

least part of the budget for security to local levels

of government, Local governments can use these

funds to buy policing resources either from the

state police or elsewhere. This is a strategic move

designed to enable the placement of state resources

in a location where they can be mobilized to

empower blacks as consumers of security. Our

objective has been to place policing resources at

the lowest level possible within the state.

The model we have considered proposing is a

modified version of the Canadian arrangement

whereby the Federal police can be hired by other

levels of government contractually to meet their

legal responsibilities to establish police departments. The modification we envisage, and it is a

crucial one, is that local governments in South

Africa will not be required to set up police departments but will be required instead to fund initiatives that will provide people within their jurisdiction with safe and secure places in which to live

and work. These initiatives may or may not involve

the national police.

In our view the national police should have as its

principal function the application of physical force

within the rule of law. Our position is at odds with

developments within community policing that

have led to an enormous expansion of the police

role. This expands rather than reduces police ownership of policing. While policing should not be conceived in terms of the application of nonnegotiable

physical force, the police role should be conceived

in these terms. In taking this stance, we are adopting the classic Weberian position and the position
36

of a number of contemporary state theorists who

believe the state should monopolize physical

coercion. This position is particularly necessary in

South Africa where the widespread use of coercion

by private entities has been a major problem. It is,

however, a principle that we believe is relevant to

any attempt to support and extend networked

policing in a manner that will enhance security for

all who share a territory.

This legislative work is taking place in conjunction

with research designed to discover institutional

structures that permit poor people to access tax

revenues in a manner that will enable them to

become customers. Our thinking here has been

influenced by work within the housing arena in

which the emphasis is also on finding ways of

permitting poor people, and particularly groups

who constitute themselves as a community, to

function as customers rather than simply as recipients of professional expertise over which they have

no control. With the rich it is the customer who

controls the housing budget and decides what will

and will not be built. With poor people this is not

the case. Poor people are clients of experts, not

customers assumed to have the expertise necessary

to make informed choices.

The empowerment that market relations can

provide can only be accomplished within the

security arena if the above analysis is correct and if

solutions can be found to the following problems:

■ Identifying communities that share interests.

■ Stressing the need for these groups to develop

the skills and knowledge required to operate as

demanding customers of security services.

■ Devising some scheme to provide poor communities with access to buying power. Within

the legislative framework we have devised, this

means finding a way to turn the tax revenues

available to local government into purchasing

power that can be deployed at the level of

specific groups.

■ Doing all in a manner that is consistent with

the municipal government’s responsibility to

facilitate the provision of security—the backbone of our legislative framework.

■ Empowering black people to become powerful

customers within a context that recognizes the

police responsibility for the exercise of nonnegotiable physical force and their responsibility

to preserve the state’s monopoly of force.

■ Empowering black people to engage and reap

the benefits of problem-solving, risk-focused

policing if security is to be provided.

We are still a long way from having models that

meet these requirements. We are, however, making

progress. At present we are working at developing

two institutional arrangements that we hope will

provide a core around which we can build. The

first concerns the development of institutions

whose job it will be to meet municipalities’ responsibilities for enabling local communities to

lead safe and secure lives. To accomplish this we

are developing what we are calling Safety Centers

as institutional sites of these responsibilities. We

envision that these centers will be situated at the

neighborhood level. Their task will be to locate

groups that require security—women’s groups,

businesses, residential groups, sports groups,

youth, and so on—and to create dialogical forums

within which they can meet and discuss how their

security is to be accomplished.

These forums constitute the second set of arrangements we are exploring. We have conceived of

them as “triangles of security” that will always

involve three principal parties—interest group

representatives, a police representative, and a

Safety Center representative. The intention is that

these persons will work together within these

forums to develop plans for policing that will

benefit the group.

We are experimenting with two ideas to avoid the

problem of the community component in this
37

triangle being overwhelmed by the other two

parties. The one involves ensuring that interest

groups meet together, before they participate in

such forums, in workshops to develop plans that

they will present at the forums. We are also looking for some mechanism that will establish an onus

on the other two groups to accept these plans

unless they violate some set of guiding principles

and minimum standards of safety. One way of

accomplishing this and dealing with disagreements

that might arise would be to build in some sort of

appeal process. The next step is to find a way of

bringing these plans together as part of a larger

municipal plan. We have yet to tackle this issue.

We are unclear as to how to fund the plans developed through these dialogical forums and how to

keep operational control at a local level. One idea

we are considering is establishing well-funded

corporate entities at the Safety Center level, controlled by a local board, to manage the budgets,

locate and contract for resources, and so on. These

corporate entities would have the ability to operate

effectively as powerful customers within the

security market. They would act on behalf of

persons living in the small geographic areas for

which Safety Centers are responsible. One idea for

holding these corporate entities accountable to the

communities they are required to serve would be

to establish regular meetings with people in the

area. These meetings would operate in a way

similar to shareholder meetings in nonprofit

companies.

In developing these plans and ideas we are working in two ways. First, we are examining local

initiatives, of which there are many in black South

African towns. Second, we are constantly organizing workshops with a whole variety of people and

organizations to discuss and respond to our ideas.

Once we have established plans that we think

might work, we intend to develop pilot projects

that will work in conjunction with local community groups. Exactly what the final institutional

arrangements will look like will depend on what

transpires in these processes. While we are a long

way from finality, we are confident that we are on

the right track and will make considerable progress

in reinventing policing to give blacks substantial

control over their security arrangements. Our hope

is that the process of dialogue on which our work

is based will provide us with the ideas needed to

develop structures that will:

■ Define policing in terms of the networking of a

range of resources not limited to the actual or

potential capacities of the state police.

■ Establish a system for allocating tax revenues

to local communities that will enable them to

participate effectively in a market for security.

■ Radically decentralize control over policing in

ways that will shift control over policing out of

the hands of the police and into the hands of

the people who require security.

Notes

1. For Spain, see Macdonald, Ian R., “Spain’s

1986 Police Law: Transition From Dictatorship to

Democracy,” Police Studies, 10(1), 1987:16–22;

and Morn, Frank, and Maura Toro, “From Dictatorship to Democracy: Crime and Policing in

Contemporary Spain,” International Journal of

Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice, 13(1),

Winter 1989; for South Africa, see Weitzer,

Ronald, “Transforming the South African Police,”

Police Studies, 16 (1993):110; for Nigeria,

Alemika, Etannibi E.O., “Colonialism, State and

Policing in Nigeria,” Crime, Law and Social

Change, 20 (1993):187–219; and for South Korea,

see Young Lee, Soon, “Morning Calm, Rising Sun:

National Character and Policing in South Korea

and in Japan,” Police Studies, 13(3), 1990:91–110.

2. Bayley, David. “A Foreign Policy for Democratic Policing,” Policing and Society, 5 (1995):79

3. Weitzer, 110.

4. Alemika, 189.
38

5. Sunday Times, January 28, 1990.

6. Bayley.

7. Sherman, Lawrence W., “The Police,” in Crime,

ed. James Q. Wilson and Joan Petersilia, San

Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies,

1995.

8. All England Reports 763, at 760, as quoted in

Johnston, Les, The Rebirth of Private Policing,

New York: Routledge, 1992.

9. Drucker, Peter F., “The Age of Social Transformation,” Atlantic Monthly, November 1994:76.

10. Osborne, David, and Ted Gaebler, Reinventing

Government, New York: Plume, 1993.

11. Eggers, William D., and John O’Leary, Revolution at the Roots: Making Our Government

Smaller, Better, and Closer to Home, New York:

Free Press, 1995.

12. Ibid.

13. Eggers, William D., and John O’Leary, “The

Beat Generation: Community Policing at Its Best,”

Policy Review, 1995:4.

14. Cited in Eggers and O’Leary, “The Beat

Generation,” 4.

15. Garland, David, “The Limits of the Sovereign

State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society,” British Journal of Criminology, 36

(4), Autumn 1996:453.

16. O’Malley, Pat, “Post-Keynesian Policing,”

unpublished paper, 1994.

17. Garland, 454.

18. This metaphor is cited by Osborne and

Gaebler.

19. Rose, Nikolas, and Peter Miller, “Political

Power Beyond the State: Problematics of Government,” British Journal of Sociology, 43(2),

1992:172–205.

20. Eggers and O’Leary, “The Beat Generation,” 4.

21. Johnston.

22. Macauley, Stuart, “Private Government,” in

Law and Social Science, ed. L. Lipson and S.

Wheeler, New York: Russell Sage Foundation,

1986.

23. Drucker, 76.

24. Ibid.

25. See also Elkins, David J., Beyond Sovereignty:

Territory and Political Economy in the Twenty

First Century, Toronto: University of Toronto

Press, 1995.
39

Today our task is to explore how knowledge about

policing might most usefully be transferred to

emerging democracies. I’ve been asked to review

our discussions up to this point, as they bear on the

strategic matters we are to take up today. As my

reflections have a primitive appearance, even to

my own eye, I am reassured to remember the

charge given us yesterday by Ambassador Robert

Gelbard and Jeremy Travis: This is the beginning,

not the end, of a collaborative exploration of these

matters.

My reflections are shaped, of course, by my own

experience of “technology transfer.” Limited

though it is, I think it proper to disclose it. Some

years ago, encouraged and financed by several

private foundations and the U.S. Department of

Justice, the Vera Institute of Justice worked with

criminal justice officials in central government and

at the local level in England, France, and the (then)

Federal Republic of Germany. The object of this

work, for which I had principal responsibility, was

to bring to bear in those countries the techniques

developed and the lessons harvested by the Vera

Institute from a couple of decades’ engagement in

reform of U.S. police, court, and correctional

practices. There was a healthy appetite there for

the practical and technical knowledge we had

drawn from our work here, but our European

clients were too eager for us to help them replicate

U.S. reforms in contexts we understood imperfectly at best. And we were too willing.

While some of these transfers worked reasonably

well from the start, and while all of us who were

posted abroad to assist in the replications learned a

lot about our own system by looking back at it

through the lens of these experiences, we were, in

effect, just guessing about what in our experience

was likely to be useful to our foreign hosts. In

time, that led us to amend our approach to the task.

We began identifying (mostly) young officials who

seemed to have the passion and capacity for

reform of their own criminal justice systems, and

we began bringing them to the States to work

alongside us here. We had confidence that if our

initial judgments were right, our handpicked

guests would learn a lot more about how to do this

kind of work in their setting by watching us

struggle in ours. I think we were right. They were

far better positioned than we to find what was

relevant to their problems, to draw productive

analogies to their own circumstances, and to take

home techniques and practical lessons that they

could apply more creatively than we could. Certainly, those we recruited into this endeavor, who

came to the States for several months, did a better

job of it when they went back than those we tried

to help directly when we were abroad.

Now I recognize that I am reporting only my own

experience, and I hasten to acknowledge that the

countries with which Vera was concerned were not

emerging democracies. But after listening to

yesterday’s discussion, it occurred to me that we in

the United States are too quick to think of ourselves as the only (or best) agents for transferring

to others whatever knowledge we have that might

promote and sustain democratic institutions

abroad. We, and our friends in the emerging

democracies, might work a better transfer of our

knowledge if we were to facilitate their direct

exposure to our practices (good and bad) and if we

were to encourage them to judge the value of what

we may or may not have learned about these

matters here.

Reflections on Day One:

Strategic Implications

by Michael Smith
40

Let me now touch on a few of the points made

yesterday that could help frame today’s discussion.

Philip Heymann started us off in a direction I at

first found puzzling, because he didn’t seem to be

talking about emerging democracies in particular,

and he wasn’t talking about policing in particular.

As the day wore on, I think I began to understand

why he took that broader view, and why he insisted on our being “impatient” and using muscle

(when we have it) to push for democratic policing

everywhere. In his view, it is in our national

interest to promote and sustain strong democracies

abroad, and strong criminal justice systems are

essential to strong democracies. Strong criminal

justice systems are essential, he argued, because

government institutions lose popular support if

they cannot do a reasonable job of public safety,

and because a criminal justice system that is

corrupt or grants immunity to the powerful cannot

long enjoy the popular support that effective

delivery of public safety requires.

I came to understand that Phil was demanding

what Paul Chevigny identified as “rule-of-law

policing”—a phrase I think we found more fitting

than “democratic policing.” But as the morning

wore on, Phil’s insistence that rule-of-law policing

be at the core of U.S. engagements with criminal

justice systems abroad became a potential source

of conflict within our group. (Actually, that conflict rose pretty quickly—I just didn’t see it the

first time around.) Someone pointed out that we

don’t have enough Federal agents to protect our

children from Eastern European thugs—unless we

form partnerships with law enforcement there.

From one point of view, those partnerships can’t

wait for the emergence of democratic or rule-oflaw policing in Eastern Europe.

I began to realize that the subject matter of our

meeting had something to do with what ought to

be the shape of U.S. law enforcement interventions

in foreign countries—whether they be emerging

democracies, declining democracies, fledgling

democracies, or whatever. What ought to be the

shape of our impatient, muscular interventions

when a short-term domestic law enforcement

interest is in conflict with our insisting on rule-oflaw policing (and, presumably, with our long-term

interest in stable democracies)?

I don’t think we had a frank discussion of this

question, and I am left unsatisfied by yesterday’s

suggestion that this conflict, if it arises, is bureaucratic and not substantive. Among the things we

might usefully do today are:

■ Better understand conditions that require a

choice to be made between our short-term law

enforcement and our long-term strategic

interests.

■ Specify who should make the choice.

■ Identify the principles that ought to guide the

choice.

The likelihood of such conflict arising ought not to

stop us from trying to be helpful to other nations

by making available what we’ve learned about

effective policing in a democratic society. I suspect

we are in some way embarrassed by the fact that

from time to time we will trade long-term interests

in something as obviously “good” as democratic

policing or rule-of-law policing for some shortterm interests that can’t be ignored but don’t have

as nice a ring to them. I am pretty sure it would

help our conversation for us to be a little more

open about this.

Clifford Shearing’s presentation took us on a trip

around some very different territory, though I think

what he actually said fit remarkably well where

Phil left off. That is, because the institutions that

generate public safety are not exclusively and

maybe not even principally institutions of the state,

then some of our dearly held propositions about

the importance of the police and of the criminal

justice system need to be questioned. If I understood Clifford, that questioning is itself central to

what we ought to be sharing with those in emerging democracies who are struggling to generate
41

public safety as a foundation on which to build

institutions of democratic government. He also

opened the door for a conversation about community policing and problem-solving policing—

matters which Phil said he was not going to talk

about but which are very much on the minds of

U.S. police personnel today.

As I thought about how undiscovered is most of

the territory that lies through the door Clifford

opened, I recalled a helpful remark Carl Klockars

made at some point in yesterday’s proceedings. In

this country, he said, we do not really understand

very well how we produce public safety or who

plays what role in producing it. As a consequence,

he pointed out, we are somewhat mystified by our

successes.

Of course, we seem to understand it well enough

to do it rather well sometimes, and to try to reform

it (as police officials are now trying to do across

the land). But perhaps we don’t yet understand our

successes at the level that would be appropriate if

we were to try to teach others what we know—

another reason for at least the appearance of humility

when offering help in emerging democracies.

Those are some of my reflections. Perhaps they

reveal no more than my unfamiliarity with a

conversation that seems to have been going on for

a long time within the Federal agencies represented at this table.

But reflection, which was required of me, led me

to try to fix a meaning for the stated subject matter

of our meeting. Is there an assumption that, for

example, policing or the form of it can produce

democracy or frustrate the production of it? It may

be that the latter is true, but it is hard to see how

the former could be true. That is, policing, or

changes in it, can operate to undermine democracy

in all the ways Phil suggested at the head of our

conversation. But can it produce democracy? That

seems unlikely to me for the same reasons we now

question the extent to which policing can produce

safety. Policing is powerful, but maybe not that

powerful. A more modest goal for our own policing might be to facilitate and defend the nongovernmental, safety-producing process that Clifford

Shearing referred to. Abroad, we might similarly

try to facilitate the emergence and defend the

practice of policing that doesn’t interfere with the

development of democracy. It might be wiser to try

for policing that is not incompatible with democracy rather than try for policing that will somehow

produce it. If so, we should be assisting the development of policing that is perfectly neutral with

respect to all political questions, including questions of the pace and type of democracy that might

be emerging.

One final point: I was very grateful to David

Bayley yesterday for his timely story about the

transfer of Japan’s Botan technology to Singapore,

because it reminds us of how long it takes to do

any of these things. Seven years—which, as I

remember, was the timeline for the Botan reform

in Singapore—sounds about right for a successful

technology transfer. It certainly conforms to my

own experience, about which I spoke a few minutes ago. It should take that long for effective

intervention to reform another jurisdiction’s law

enforcement methods, even for such a relatively

simple (though potentially powerful) intervention.

(If it were easier and quicker, we would wonder

whether it really represented a reform, or a reform

of anything important.) It occurs to me that

David’s story is welcome as well because it reminds us that we should not be surprised to hear

that successful transfer of the Botan seems not to

have much advanced the emergence of democratic

institutions in Singapore.

In sum, I didn’t come away from yesterday’s

discussion thinking the United States should stop

trying to help in this field—only that we need to be

modest in the way we go about it and modest in

our expectations of the likely effects of our interventions over time. That leads me back to where I

began these remarks, but now with a sharper

question on my mind. If we are interested in the
42

long-term development and stability of democratic

institutions abroad, which surely we are, and if we

believe that the style and quality of policing have

some relationship to that ambition, which none of

us questioned yesterday, then why are we not

spending more time looking for individuals whose

own ambitions and capacities suggest they could

use our experience well in their efforts to accomplish such things in their own countries? Why are

we not devoting more effort to bringing them here,

in capacities that permit them to learn, at their

pace, the things that, in their own view, they need

to learn? Why do we spend so much effort sending

folks from here over there, to offer a menu of

things we think might be relevant to folks whose

circumstances we barely understand?

Questions and Answers

Q: Norval Morris. Thank you, Michael. I have a

question I want to ask you and others too—not a

major one of your points, but quite an important

one to me. Is the proper question “Can policing

produce democracy?” or is it slightly different? Is

a criminal justice system with the values that Phil

offered essential to produce democracy?

A: Michael Smith. A stronger proposition, it

seems to me, is that a criminal justice system

(particularly, a style of policing) that doesn’t

respect democratic values, that isn’t prepared or

capable of either producing public safety or bringing to justice those who with impunity violate the

law, makes it very difficult for democratic institutions to develop and thrive. Not least because of

the corrosive effect such a criminal justice system

has on the trust and confidence that individuals

have in their governmental institutions. The other

way around, though, just doesn’t strike me as

plausible. It seems to me unimaginable that one

could produce the political habits and institutions

of democracy by reforming policing operations (or

even a criminal justice system) in a jurisdiction

lacking those habits and institutions. That just

doesn’t make sense to me.

Q: David Bayley. Michael, I wanted to reflect a

bit on your idea about where we do this training

and why here rather than abroad. I am attracted by

that notion. It seems to me, however, that your

recommendation is more than simply moving the

site of training. I think what you are saying is that

American training tends to be very didactic and it

also tends to be very pretentious. It doesn’t matter

where we do it—whether we do it here or do it

abroad. We tend to say the United States does

democratic policing, we do it the following ways,

and here they are.

What is really important is that wherever we do

this we have got to stop and we have got to understand. This is tough to do because to some extent

this business of creating democracies through

police reform is a holy cause. We have got to

realize that we must create a dialogue here between the people in these countries and ourselves

in which we examine if what we are doing is truly

both as effective and as democratic as we think.

You suggest to me that the people who might help

in this business of foreign training are not exclusively the appropriate people and that this dialogue

to some extent needs to be mediated by area

experts and people on our side who are familiar

with how the institutions of law enforcement in

our society evolved. I think it is that kind of openness you are asking for, and we have got to do it

every place.

A: Michael Smith. I hear all that. I guess I was

speaking without much precision about several

things. One was that I believe it likely that contributions from our experience to the development of

rule-of-law policing and democratic institutions

abroad through police reform are most likely to

occur when imaginative, inspired, creative, smart

people from such jurisdictions come here and take

what they can from our experience and practice.

Our job then becomes one of being open to those

inquiries and helping them become specific.
43

Also, when I asked why we don’t spend more

energy bringing people here to learn, I was trying

to point back to the potential tension between

long-term U.S. interests in developing stable

democracies with strong criminal justice systems

and our short-term law enforcement interests.

What might be given up if we brought people here

rather than send people there? There are several

possible reasons for not bringing them here. One is

just simple pretentiousness, but I don’t think it is

that simple. It occurs to me one of the reasons

might be that sending our law enforcement personnel there serves our short-term local law enforcement interests. Although the primary assignment

might be to train others in our ways, being there

affords opportunities to form partnerships with

them. Again, this suggests to me that we should

separate these two U.S. interests, think of them as

separate, and deal with the conflicts if and when

they arise.
45

Police Institute3 at the University of Louisville

established contact with representatives from the

Hungarian and Romanian National Police Forces.

Hungarian National Police Force representatives

were the first to initiate contact with the university,

while faculty interested in promoting police

training based on democratic principles made

contact with the Romanian National Police Force.

During the past 2 years, these initial contacts have

resulted in establishing an ongoing relationship

with representatives from both organizations and

accomplishing a number of activities in conjunction with these two organizations.

To date, the following activities have been accomplished in conjunction with representatives from

the Hungarian National Police Force:

■ Conduct of a management training and educational needs assessment within the Pest County

Police Department.4

■ Development of a report and recommendations

for the Pest County Police Department on

management and educational needs as well as

organizational management issues faced by the

department.

■ Development and implementation of an undergraduate degree program at Godollo University

specifically targeted for inservice police officers.

This program is the result of cooperative

activities between representatives from the

University of Louisville, Godollo University,

and the Pest County Police Department. The

degree, the first of its kind in Hungary, is a

4-year undergraduate degree in public administration with a concentration in police management. This program is unique not only in the

In less than a decade, the world has witnessed a

series of events that resulted in the rejection of

communism and the overthrow of totalitarian

repression in the former Soviet Union and Eastern

Europe. Glasnost led to the breakup of the Soviet

Union, the destruction of the Berlin Wall, the

reunification of Germany, and the overthrow of

one Eastern European government after another.

These events represent the first steps in the reform

and democratization of nations that since World

War II have been enclosed behind the Iron Curtain

and cut off from the West. These transitions were

peaceful with the exception of Romania, whose

revolution ended with the executions of its former

dictator Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife Elena. As

might be expected, when the social and political

transformation of these national states accelerated,

established state institutions, such as the police,

were called to account for their activities. Under

the old regimes the police were an integral subsystem of the state apparatus centrally controlled

by the Ministry of the Interior.1

They had little concern for individual liberty and

were expected to convey party authority to the

everyday life of citizens.2

 As a result, the forces of

order, especially the police in the majority of these

countries, are currently in the process of organizational transformation. These conditions have

provided an opportunity for the exchange of ideas

and scholarship as these countries turn to the West

for assistance.

This paper presents an assessment of the experiences and knowledge derived from working with

the national police forces in both Hungary and

Romania. During 1993, faculty from the Department of Justice Administration and the Southern

Reflections on the Transfer of Knowledge to Support

Democratic Policing in Hungary and Romania

by Deborah G. Wilson and William F. Walsh
46

nature of the degree but also in that it is an

educational program not subsidized by the

government. Officers participating in this

degree program pay tuition themselves.

Activities in conjunction with the Romanian

National Police Force have included:

■ The development of three seminars, in association with the Project on Ethnic Relations,5

 on

policing within a democratic model and policeminority relations. The first of these was a

series of 2- to 3-day presentations conducted at

three different sites in Romania. The second

was a 3-day conference during which representatives from the national police force and the

Roma6

 participated in a joint workshop. Issues

of common concern were identified and proposed solutions developed during the seminar.

The third of the seminars consisted of a 3-week

training program, “Issues in Democratic Police

Management and Minority Relations.”

■ The development of recommendations for

organizational and procedural changes to

address specifically police-minority relations

within Romania based on problems and difficulties identified by the Romanians. The

recommendations have been forwarded by the

Project on Ethnic Relations to representatives

in the Romanian national government, the

Romanian Council for National Minorities, and

leadership in the Roma community.

■ Discussion of an ongoing program of training

that would involve establishing an institute for

democratic police management within Romania.

While the activities engaged in with the two

national police forces have differed in nature, the

processes that have contributed to successfully

establishing the ongoing relationships are virtually

identical.

This analysis will now address:

■ The philosophies, orientations, and modes of

entry that resulted in successfully establishing

these ongoing relationships and the accomplishment of related activities.

■ The needs and issues that have been identified

as evident within these two organizations as

they attempt to adjust to a new political model

of democracy.

Processes and Orientations Promoting

Entry and Acceptance

As with most events, the factors that contribute to

successful programs and projects are in part

structured and planned and in part serendipitous.

However, whether the result of fate or a structured

approach to international involvement, certain

orientations and common procedures and events

can be identified as directly contributing to the

success of the current international relationships

and programs.

Perception of a “crisis” or need and a consequent recognition that direction can be provided through an outside agent or organization.

Much of what we understand about organizational

change and, specifically, successful organizational

change suggests that change occurs when those

affected by it perceive there is a need for, justification for, and value to be gained by changing the

status quo.7

 This condition existed before both of

the initiatives currently under way within Romania

and Hungary.

The cooperative activities with representatives

from the Hungarian National Police Force were

initiated by the Hungarians. These representatives

had identified two specific needs, one primary and

specific, the other broader and with longer-range

consequences. First, they had a specific need to

obtain more technical information on means to

track and identify stolen automobiles. Cars were

being stolen within the United States, shipped to

Russia, and then brought into Hungary for sale.

Many U.S.-made cars with individual State license

plates (e.g., New York and California) still attached

could be observed daily on the streets of Budapest.

The Hungarians had limited technology and
47

limited relationships with U.S. police departments.

They believed rectifying these deficiencies was

essential to their ability to more adequately address this crime problem.

Representatives from the Pest County and

Budapest police departments organized a visit to

the United States, funded by Hungarian insurance

companies, to develop professional ties and learn

more about the technical and operational means by

which U.S. police addressed auto theft. Secondly,

members of this delegation recognized an additional need to provide Hungarian police officers

with more efficient and effective management

education.

The current system of educating police officers in

Hungary is based on the classical continental

model that establishes two points of entry, one for

noncommissioned ranks and another for commissioned officers.8

 Police are trained in two tiers, the

police secondary school and the police college.

Those trained within the secondary school can rise

through the ranks from the basic officer position to

become low-level supervisors and noncommissioned officers. Those educated through the police

college or universities enter the commissioned

officer corps at the rank of lieutenant. These

individuals are often placed in command of units;

however, they are not trained specifically in management practices and techniques. Factors related

to the dissolution of the Communist government,

the emergence of a market economy, and newly

proposed requirements for police training and

education created a need for more efficient and

differently oriented police training and education.

As a result, the Hungarian representatives had as a

secondary purpose the assessment of police education and training in terms of content, form, and

delivery.

Initially, contact with the Romanian National

Police force began at the request of a faculty

member within the department of sociology who

had a direct interest in Romanian culture and,

more specifically, in changes within this society

that had occurred as a result of the transition from

a Communist to a democratic form of government.

Through contacts within the Romanian National

Government, a proposal was presented to the

Romanian National Police Force recommending a

series of seminars on policing within a democratic

society. The response from the Romanians was,

“We have training on democratic policing.” The

proposal received no response and no further

contact was promoted.

Several months later, representatives from the

Project on Ethnic Relations were informed of the

proposal for seminars on democratic policing that

had been submitted to the Romanian National

Police Force. During this same period, the Project

on Ethnic Relations had conducted a series of

studies to determine the nature of several violent

events involving the Roma that had occurred in

Romania during the early 1990s. These events,

primarily involving incidents of vigilante justice

by Romanians against the Roma, had sparked

national and international concern.

A central issue within these events had been the

adequacy of the police response as a contributing

or instigating factor in escalating the violence. The

Project on Ethnic Relations had determined that

cultural factors such as the police perception of the

Roma and the limited technical infrastructure of

the national police force had, in fact, contributed to

a situation in which violence escalated more than

necessary. As a result of these conditions, representatives from the Project on Ethnic Relations

participated in the creation of a Council for National Minorities, dedicated to improving the status

of minorities within Romania. This Council consisted of prominent leaders within the national

government as well as the Roma and Hungarian

leadership.9

 Leaders from the national police force

had become convinced that a “crisis” existed based

on the events that had occurred and were working

with the Project on Ethnic Relations to develop

solutions to this problem. Representatives from the

Project on Ethnic Relations, with the support of

the Romanian National Police Force, approached
48

representatives from the Department of Justice

Administration of the University of Louisville as a

source of police education and training on democratic policing methods with special emphasis on

police-minority relations.

In both instances, the opportunity for the involvement of “change agents” was created by a perceived need or crisis among those who would be

affected by the change. Entry into the organizations was a means of addressing and resolving the

perceived crisis. And, while it was apparent that

not all members of these two police organizations

were equally committed to change through external agents, there was substantial interest in promoting change. It is also important to note that

research has found that the effectiveness of any

planned change is directly dependent on the degree

to which members of an organizational hierarchy

take part in factfinding and in diagnosing the need

for change.10 These specific conditions led to the

reactivation of the rejected faculty proposal for

training in democratic police methods in Romania.

Recognition of the significance of national and

cultural heritage as well as established professionalism, accomplishments, and successes of

the police organizations. Acceptance of cultural

relativism, the degree to which the national and

cultural heritage of a people shape their organizations, the processes of these organizations, and the

orientation of organization members are essential

to the successful accomplishment of change as an

external agent. All cultures and members of these

cultures are shaped by their political and social

heritage. Proposals for change within organizations must be filtered through an understanding of

the significance of this social and cultural heritage

and must be made within an appropriate context.11

Additionally, the strengths of an organization must

be recognized. Attempts to promote change based

on the premise that there is nothing worth salvaging within an organization will be met with great

resistance. They are more likely to succeed if

change is seen simply as a means of enhancing

existing strengths.

Both the Romanians and Hungarians exhibit

intense national pride. This sense of nationalism,

suppressed though not eliminated during the

Communist regime, has had a rebirth of sorts with

the advent of democracy within each nation. The

people are proud of their history, accomplishments, and traditions. Some sense of this history

and tradition is necessary to understand the factors

that contribute to their organizational structures,

processes, and procedures. Both police forces had

received training from external change agents—

French, British, German, and Irish police representatives. Our conversations with managers in both

police forces revealed that they believed their

training was patronizing, ethnocentric, and of little

value since it assumed their organizations should

be more like those in other nations and that a total,

indiscriminate, and direct adoption of these alternative organizational forms was necessary.

The current projects within these countries are

based on alternative premises. That is, through

available published information and lengthy

discussions with representatives from these two

police agencies, a knowledge base that included an

understanding of the history and circumstances

that governed organizational structures and policies was developed. The U.S. contingent attempted

to gather as much information and insight as

possible into the national culture and the organizational orientation and processes within the law

enforcement organizations. The rationale governing this process is the reality that police organizations are not self-created units but instead derive

their structure, culture, and process from the

source of their authority.12 Differences in policing

styles and the rationales for these differences were

identified and discussed. Strengths of both organizations in preservice training, technical expertise,

and organizational processes were identified and

recognized. It was apparent that this entry by

change agents with an orientation to cultural

relativism had not previously been experienced by

members of either police force. Acceptance of the

differences and recognition of the significance of
49

organizational strengths and accomplishments laid

the foundation for acceptance of the recommendations for change and adjustment.

Though seemingly minor issues, certain conditions

of entry and participation with representatives

from these two organizations greatly contributed to

their perception of our engagement as “equals”

and greatly facilitated our acceptance and the

acceptance of the content of our programs. While

“in country” on all projects, U.S. representatives

were housed in accommodations and shared in

meals and other related activities that were comparable to those provided for the Romanian and

Hungarian participants and representatives. Western hotels were not used. Western meals were not

requested. Visits to historically significant sites

and participation in local cultural events and

activities were encouraged. Organizational protocol was observed and respected.

Assessment of needs in conjunction with members of the organization. As with any change,

especially that introduced from outsiders to the

organization, success will follow only when those

affected have a vested interest in promoting or

adjusting to the change. In all activities, an assessment and identification of the needs to be met

through change were developed in conjunction

with those to be affected.

A management training and educational needs

assessment was conducted within the Pest County

Police Department. This consisted of both a

structured and unstructured identification of the

strengths and weaknesses of the organization with

respect to standing procedures for training and

education; it also included a more qualitative

assessment of current practices and procedures.

Visits were made to the police secondary school,

police college, and Godollo University. Discussions with administrators and faculty were held as

a means of developing an understanding of current

practices, strengths, and weaknesses as well as

options for change. Discussions with police personnel concerning their perception of the strengths

and weaknesses of current practices in meeting

their organizational needs were conducted as well

as a structured assessment of the responsibilities

and activities of police managers, their prior

educational and training experiences, and their

perception of the future needs of their organization. Reviews of curriculums, instructional facilities, and instructional techniques were made.

Though conducted in a very different manner, a

needs assessment of sorts was additionally instituted in conjunction with representatives from the

Romanian National Police Force. Information on

the violent events involving the Roma and the

outcome of internal and external studies of the

causes and contributors to these events were

analyzed. Proposed topics and formats for the

seminars were negotiated and adjusted through

discussions with Romanian police commanders.

During the first two seminars Romanian police

representatives were participants and facilitators.

The format of the second conference resulted in

the development of extensive information and

understanding which laid the foundation for the

third and lengthier seminar. It also promoted

discussions on establishing longer-term educational programs through the creation of an institute. Participants invited to this conference included leaders of both the Romanian National

Police and minority groups, primarily the Roma.

The conference functioned as a workshop. On the

first day, minority and police representatives met

in a general session, during which each group was

provided equal and alternating opportunities to

identify problems, issues, and needs related to

police-minority relations that required some

attention. The U.S. participants recorded the issues

identified.

The list of concerns was then categorized, and on

the second day of the conference participants were

assigned to working groups. These working groups

comprised equal numbers of minority and police

representatives. Each had a minority and U.S.

facilitator. The task of the working groups was to
50

develop strategies to resolve the issues related to

police-minority relations. The third day consisted

of a final joint session during which strategies and

solutions proposed by each working group were

presented and discussed. When applicable, U.S.

representatives discussed proposed strategies and

solutions, providing descriptions of the failures

and successes within U.S. law enforcement as they

related to the various issues. A joint document

identifying common concerns and cooperative

solutions was developed. This document served as

the foundation for a series of recommendations

that were forwarded to leadership within the Roma

and national police force from the Project on

Ethnic Relations and the U.S. representatives. The

Romanians have instituted several programs of

organizational change based on these and other

recommendations sent to the Romanian National

Police Force as a product of exchanges that occurred during these seminars.

Establishment of education and training as a

dialogue resulting in reciprocal professional

development, learning, and understanding.

While the dissolution of the Communist government in both countries resulted in extensive

changes within the police organizations, it did not

create widespread havoc or result in the development of police organizations without professional

standards and significant strengths. It has created

needs that will be discussed later in this paper.

Both police organizations, however, have identifiable and recognizable strengths, many of which

would enhance U.S. law enforcement if they were

adopted here. Specifically, educational requirements for both commissioned and noncommissioned officers in both of these police organizations are more stringent than those of most U.S.

police departments. Officers in both organizations

have a much greater understanding of technical

criminalistics and forensics and procedural criminal law than U.S. police officers. Romanian and

Hungarian police officers are more cognizant of

international affairs and, especially, the international implications of crime, and specifically

organized crime. They are more likely than U.S.

police officers to be bilingual and well versed in

addressing investigative and prosecutorial issues

related to international crime or crime that

traverses jurisdictional boundaries.

All seminar activities took the form of dialogues

with police participants. The needs within the

Romanian and Hungarian police organizations

were compared to situations, needs, and problems

within U.S. policing and the U.S. policing experience. U.S. organizational philosophies, procedures,

and policies were presented as items for consideration. The strengths, weaknesses, successes, and

failures of strategies and activities conducted by

U.S. law enforcement in response to similar

problems were openly discussed and addressed.

Police in both organizations were especially

interested in police events with high international

visibility—the Rodney King incident, the Los

Angeles riots, and the O.J. Simpson trial were of

specific and special interest. These incidents along

with other events related to the police role within

the U.S. democracy were discussed with candor.

Our recommendations for change were received

more readily when problems, failures, and frustrations related to change within U.S. society and

U.S. policing were recognized and shared.

Establishment of trust and personal relationships. Based in part on differing cultural traditions

and in part on sheer numbers, one of the primary

adjustments necessary for engagement in Romania

and Hungary was these societies’ extensive reliance on personal relationships rather than organizational roles and positions, in both police organizations and other government organizations. The

Hungarians follow a formalistic organizational

structure and protocol and are linear and focused

in their organizational activities. Conversely, while

the Romanians have a highly centralized organizational structure, they are less focused and linear in

their approach to organizational matters and

organizational problem solving. Representatives

from both organizations (especially the Romanians)
51

base decisions for ongoing relationships with external agents on personal ties and ensuing individual

trust. Most specifically, the success of activities in

both countries was promoted as the project team

members developed trust, friendship, and personal

commonalities with individuals from both police

organizations.

Introduction to the Romanian National Police

Force and the development of personal trust and

loyalties was accomplished through previously

established personal relationships between the

director of the Romanian office of the Project on

Ethnic Relations, the Secretary General of the

Romanian National Government, and representatives from the Romanian National Police Force.

During seminars and conferences, U.S. representatives made themselves available and engaged in

informal discussions with representatives from the

Romanian police. The candid nature and informality of these discussions resulted in the development of personal trust and relationships that

contributed to the credibility and acceptance of

ideas and recommendations for change.

In Hungary the experience was similar. The hospitality shown to the Hungarians while they were in

the United States and the open and informal

discussions established personal bonds that led to

the development of a more formalized professional

relationship.

These personal bonds are important, given the

traditions and circumstances of the Romanians and

Hungarians. Both countries are small, have relatively small populations, and are rural and agriculture-based societies. They each have a history of

invasion and occupation from external forces—

occupation by the Soviet Union being only the

most recent in this series. Families, kin, and

personal relationships take precedence over more

structured and formal interpersonal ties. The

cultural ethos, though currently one that values

participation in activities and lifestyles more

comparable to Western, modern society, still

reflects reliance on personalized relationships as

important and sustaining factors in people’s lives.

Flexibility in content and pedagogy. Engagement

in international educational and training activities

must have as a central theme flexibility and ease of

adaptation to changing expectations and circumstances. While partly based in cultural tradition

and partly based in the circumstances created by

international exchanges of this type, the content and

delivery of police education and training must be

responsive to immediately changing circumstances.

Determining the content and structure of police

education and training activities within both

Romania and Hungary was, of necessity, a fluid

process. In Romania, for example, while general

topics for presentation were agreed upon in advance, the Romanian penchant for negotiation

resulted in constant adjustments and readjustments

to the form and content of presentations up to the

immediate start of the seminar and many times

during the course of the program. As it became

apparent that certain issues or concerns were of

greater interest to the Romanian audience, instructors adjusted presentations accordingly. Similarly,

in both Hungary and Romania as organizational

circumstances and incumbents changed, the course

of the initiatives was necessarily adjusted, and

appropriate accommodations were made.

Ability to show evidence of long-term interest

and commitment. The current social, political,

and economic situation in both countries is uncertain. The dissolution of the Soviet Union and

change to a democratic form of government have

created massive social change and instability.

Representatives from police organizations in both

countries realize they are a visible and central

component of social and political stability in their

societies. They are seeking a means of establishing

stability both in their societies and in their specific

organizations. They understand the slow and

deliberate process of achieving stability and are

seeking cooperative relationships with change

agents who are willing to engage in long-term
52

activities. Assistance based on a short-term orientation and a short-term relationship with the

change agent may be tolerated but is not acceptable. Within both the Romanian and Hungarian

police organizations there is a clear need for a

willingness and ability of the change agent to

engage in long-term organizational development.

All activities in both sites have been discussed and

planned as part of a broader and longer-term

program of professional change and education.

The 4-year college degree program in Hungary has

been established as a cooperative degree program.

A board to determine program effectiveness and

direction has been proposed. This board would

have representatives from the police as well as

Hungarian and U.S. faculty. The development of

this board and its proposed activities establishes a

long-term relationship that will last after the actual

implementation of the college degree program. In

Romania, the proposal of a cooperative institute

solidifies the commitment of the external change

agent to a long-term relationship and sponsorship

of organizational development and involvement.

Promotion of change by those in leadership

positions. The support of leadership within an

organization is essential to the promotion of

change in that organization. The breadth of commitment by the two national police forces exemplifies

the critical nature of the involvement of leadership.

Contact in Romania was made through high-level

national leadership. The Secretary General, Minister of the Interior, Commander of the National

Police Force, and Head of the Council for National

Minorities all supported this initiative. Consequently, police education and training activities

have involved representatives of the command staff

from all districts of Romania. Recommendations

that followed from these seminars and dialogues

with representatives from the Romanian police are

distributed at the national government level.

In contrast, while support for the Hungarian

activities has by necessity included the support of

leadership from the Pest County Department and

Godollo University, the scope of our activities has

not been on a national level in this instance. It has

instead been limited by the scope of the authority

of the supportive leadership and has therefore

primarily targeted Pest County and surrounding

jurisdictions.

The lessons learned through the course of these

international projects have not necessarily been

groundbreaking experiences or observations. They

have been based on well-known principles of the

management of change, persuasion, personal and

social interaction, respect for diversity, and cultural

relativism. These are, however, principles not

always appreciated and observed by change agents

and may especially have the potential to be ignored when change agents are overly enthusiastic

or overly convinced that their way is the best way.

In the instance of providing direction to emerging

democracies within Central Europe, and specifically to police in these emerging democracies, the

best and overriding principle to keep in mind and

from which the others logically follow is that

policing within a democratic model and the understanding of precisely what this means have not

been completely accomplished in our own society.

Democracy, and therefore policing in a democracy,

is always an emerging process.

Policing Issues and Needs in Central

Europe

While the experiences related above are limited to

only two countries of Eastern Europe, the conditions in Romania and Hungary are not unique. The

issues and needs do not evolve from police organizations that are in a state of chaos and confusion.

Rather, the needs have developed as these organizations have grappled with the rapid change

promoted by transition to a democratic form of

government and the resulting social and economic

changes. These two police organizations have a

firm foundation of professionalism and accomplishment from which to make the adjustments
53

necessary to respond to their changing social,

political, and organizational environment.

Issues related to public perception and public

confidence. Both the Romanian and Hungarian

police recognize the need to develop greater public

confidence and a more positive public perception

of law enforcement in their countries. Under the

Communist regimes, political and domestic police

both functioned as protectors of public security.

The domestic police performed responsibilities

similar to those of U.S. police while the political

or secret police functioned to enforce loyalty to the

Communist ideology and specific Communist

regime. Though much more evident within Romania—given the strength of the Communist regime

in this country—there is a need to promote greater

public understanding of the domestic police

function under a democratic model. In both Romania and Hungary this need has been met through

public relations campaigns comparable to those

promoted by U.S. police. The police organizations

publish and distribute materials to educate children

about the role and function of police. In Hungary,

several police districts have established civilian

police advisory boards that are used to define

strategies to address these issues in the districts—a

version of community-oriented policing. There is a

need to further expand these activities, especially

in Romania and among the minorities within this

country.

Recruitment and retention of qualified personnel. The market economies developing in both

Romania and Hungary have functioned to decrease

the relative attractiveness of policing as a profession and means of economic support. This has

resulted in increasingly high attrition rates and

difficulties in retaining highly trained and qualified

personnel. This is an especially significant problem in Hungary, which has a stronger and better

developed market economy than Romania. In Pest

County, Hungary, the salary for a newly commissioned officer is approximately $250 per month

and has not kept pace with the rising cost of living.

The cost of an average small apartment in

Budapest is more per month than the $250 these

officers make. The private sector, with higher

wages and a growing need for human resources, is

becoming an increasingly attractive option to many

younger and better educated and trained officers

within law enforcement. The turnover rate in some

Pest County police districts is as high as 35 percent.

Given the 4 years required for these officers to

complete the required education and training and

the fact that this training is offered through only

one national police college, attrition creates serious problems for police staffing and coverage. All

of this makes it essential to address these conditions in educational programs directed toward the

management of recruitment and retention and in

the promotion of strategies to minimize attrition.

Police management techniques. The application

of modern management techniques is variable and

in some instances limited in the Romanian and

Hungarian National Police Forces. While some of

the limitations to the adoption of modern management techniques are based in tradition and in the

highly centralized nature of these organizations,

others simply result from lack of exposure. For

example, promotion occurs as a matter of seniority

or for some particularly exemplary accomplishment. Annual performance appraisals and promotional examinations are virtually nonexistent.

Training in personnel supervision, management,

and administration is generally on-the-job training,

and inservice training is sporadic and generally

conducted in response to some immediate crisis

rather than for continued professional currency,

development, and advancement. Police managers

in these organizations need education in modern

and efficient management philosophies, techniques, and procedures, as discussed below.

Strategic management and managed change.

The mode of response for police managers in both

Romania and Hungary is primarily reactive.

Change has been so swift and radical that managers have had little time to develop strategic man-
54

agement and organizational development plans.

While the rapid social change cannot be slowed,

the police anticipation of events and responses to

change can be managed with the development of

appropriate planning and management skills.

Centralization versus decentralization. The

transition from a Communist to a democratic form

of government has been accompanied by decentralization of political power. Though still highly

centralized, the jurisdictions comparable to U.S.

States or counties in both countries currently have

greater autonomy within the democratic political

model. This decentralization of political authority

has been accompanied by a degree of decentralization of authority in the national police forces.

Commanders of the police districts now make

independent decisions concerning the hiring,

promotion, discipline, and deployment of personnel. In Hungary, district commanders have been

given the authority to engage in independent

entrepreneurial projects and cooperative activities

with groups and organizations from the private

sector.

However, decisions concerning budget, procurement of equipment and supplies, development of

formal policies and procedures, publication of

crime data and information, release of information

on major cases and case resolution, and the appointment of command staff to the districts are still

highly centralized and controlled. As immediate

local needs arise, special requests for assistance,

resources, and direction must be made through

national headquarters, often a laborious and cumbersome process. Administrative positions in the

national police structures are topheavy, and administrative overhead and expenditure are extensive. In

some instances, these expenditures are so extensive that they come at a cost to the local districts.

It is apparent that commanders in the various

districts want decentralization and more budgetary

control. However, those within the administration

of the national police forces, though willing to

decentralize to some extent, are not comfortable

with a more complete decentralization that would

result in greater local autonomy. This decentralization will, nonetheless, be critical to the ability of

police managers and officers to meet the immediate needs of their local jurisdictions. These needs,

the result of social and economic changes, are in

constant flux and cannot be met through a centralized process. Police managers need the requisite

analytic skills and information necessary to promote and justify decentralization and to manage

within a decentralized organizational environment.

Introduction to police rights and labor relations. The growing market economies of Eastern

Europe will eventually influence police organizations. Current police organizational, economic, and

salary issues create a situation that is ripe for

developing police unions and collective bargaining. Police managers should be made aware of the

relationship between a market economy, a democratic political structure, and labor issues and

relations within the public sector.

Increased efficiency in police education and

training. As already noted, the educational and

training requirements for police in these two

countries are more stringent than in the United

States with respect to general educational and

technical requirements. In Hungary, for example,

noncommissioned officers must attend a 2-year

police secondary school following their completion of what would be comparable to high school

within our educational system. Commissioned

officers must attend a 4-year police college program following their graduation from what would

be comparable to our high school. Both programs

offer a combination of liberal studies including

training in a foreign language and detailed technical training in forensics, law, and criminalistics

that far exceed the requirements for U.S. police.

The pedagogy, however, is traditional and limited.

While some courses are offered as correspondence

courses and are tuition subsidized (with commitments for a period of employment following

graduation), the current educational system cannot

keep pace with the need to provide educated and
55

trained police officers within these organizations

that are currently plagued with high attrition rates

and accompanying personnel shortages. There is a

need for “training the trainers” in more efficient

and shorter-term educational techniques, including

the use of field training with field supervisors

which, though present in some instances, is not

widely used by these organizations.

Development of policies and procedures. Both

Romania and Hungary have newly ratified national

constitutions and police legislation. The principles

and philosophies embodied in these documents

have not been translated into written policies and

procedures to directly guide the activities of police

managers and officers. In most instances, there is

overreliance on practical training, previous practice, and verbal directives. For example, in Romania, the commanders who attended the seminars

were especially receptive to the Americans’ mode

of instruction because it was practical rather than

philosophical. They were particularly interested in

the integration of the “use of force” continuum

into police training and the way this could be

translated into specific police policies for managing instances of use of force.

Similarly, both Romanian and Hungarian police

commanders are very interested in the practical

ways in which U.S. police address large-scale civil

disturbances. They understand the principles

underlying democratic policing but in some instances are unclear about the specific translation of

these principles into practice.

Development of strategies to foster ethical

police practice. Emerging market economies,

newly developing consumerism, and the failure of

salaries in public organizations to keep pace with

the private sector have the potential to create and,

in some instances, have created situations that

foster police corruption. For example, the Russian

news agency Interfax reported that 2,000 officers

await trial on corruption charges, while in Moscow

an entire precinct was suspended because officers

were accused of running a prostitution ring.13

Practical means of identifying and disciplining

unethical or illegal police misconduct related to

economic conditions are not well developed.

Internal affairs units are generally not highly

visible, and specific policies and procedures

related to these investigations are limited. Additionally, the rights of police officers in these

circumstances and situations are not well defined

or protected but are important elements of policing

that need to be addressed within the new political

order in these national states.

Diversity training and education. While the

emergence of strong nationalism is important

following the suppression of cultural pride under

the Communist regime, the current wave of nationalism cannot ignore the existence and rights of

minorities within these societies. The national

police forces are facing increasingly vocal and

active minority groups. The Romanian National

Police Force has come under especially critical

national and international scrutiny for its response

to crimes involving members of minority groups as

both offenders and victims. Skills to improve policeminority relations are limited as is the understanding

of organizational benefits that follow from a diverse

police force. This issue becomes especially complicated with respect to the Roma, given the Roma

subculture and practice of self-segregation. However, U.S. policing has much to offer through its

history of trial and error and current attempts to

improve police-minority relations.

Organizational communication issues. Observations and conversations with members of both

national police forces indicate that downward

communication is the primary form of organizational communication, with both lateral and upward

communication lacking. Communication is a

critical process in democratic organizational

management. Thus a primary role of the police

executive is that of a communicator to both the

external and internal organizational environment.

This process must be understood especially as it

relates to leadership and effective managerial

practices.
56

Accurate collection, dissemination, and analysis

of crime statistics. Under the Communist regimes,

“common crimes” were seldom counted, tracked,

or analyzed as information necessary for sound

decisionmaking within police organizations.

Though crime statistics are kept by the police

organizations, currently the processes used create

inaccuracies, and, as is not uncommon in the

United States, police managers are generally

concerned over full public disclosure of these

figures. This hesitance to publicize crime statistics

is not without justification since the new and more

open reporting and counting of crimes has created

the appearance of a major crime wave following

the dissolution of communism. This information is

an important management tool that needs to be

used by these organizations as decisions concerning planned change and resource allocation are

made.

Use of alternative modes of response in lieu of

available technology. The technological infrastructure of these police forces is very limited.

Many rural police districts have no patrol vehicles.

In Romania, police described situations in which

officers in the district share one or two handguns.

Computer technology and software are limited as

is highly technical investigative and forensics

equipment. Technological needs are great while

the budgets of both police forces are such that they

cannot accommodate daily operational support

needs. For example, in Pest County, the utility

company threatened to discontinue service when

the force could not make monthly payments.

Police managers need education in alternatives to

technology and alternative means of providing the

funding necessary for the purchase of technology.

For example, some police and private-sector

partnerships in Pest County have been able to

obtain new office furniture and the underwriting of

professional development costs for members of the

department. In Vac, Hungary, the district commander contracted with a local business to run a

private restaurant in the police district building.

Profits from this cooperative venture are shared

with the police and used to supplement available

funding for technology in the district.

In Romania, the use of auxiliary police forces to

assist in times of civil disorder in remote rural

districts and the use of citizen councils to monitor

and provide information on civil disorder to police

have been proposed as means to compensate for a

virtual absence of technology and equipment for a

more immediate police response to crisis situations. These options need to be shared with police

managers as new creative strategies are regularly

shared with U.S. police managers.

Education on the limitations of technology.

Time and time again, lack of technology within

Eastern European policing has been identified as a

contributor to police failure to provide adequate

responses to critical situations. Similarly, there is a

strong tendency for police in these countries to

believe that the quality of U.S. policing is directly

related to the availability of technology. Eventually, technology will be integrated more fully and

completely into Eastern European policing. Managers within these organizations need to be apprised of the limitations and organizational costs of

technology so that they may make informed

decisions concerning the nature and extent of its

integration into their force.

Access to international networks for technical

assistance and information. Eastern European

police have addressed international crime and

international organized crime for decades. They

have had highly technical and extensive training on

techniques related to detecting and investigating

these types of crimes. It would not be unreasonable

to assume that in these skills they far exceed most

U.S. police and could, in fact, provide U.S. police

with valuable information and training on these

topics. However, training and education that would

encourage police managers to divert resources into

the technological equipment necessary to promote

the systematic retention, use, and sharing of

information between Eastern European police

organizations are needed. Additionally, expanding
57

access to automated databases and systems supported within the United States and training police

personnel on the use of these systems would

promote more effective law enforcement.

Conclusion

The needs identified in these national police forces

that reflect needs in Eastern Europe in general are

not unlike those in U.S. policing today. It is simply

a matter of degree and emphasis. The Romanian

and Hungarian police officers and organizations

are not unlike their U.S. counterparts. The organizations are highly structured, traditional in their

orientation, and generally resistant to change. The

Romanian police officers who participated in the

seminars were hesitant to identify flaws in their

organizations and organizational practices. In some

instances, they were not openly receptive to new

ideas and strategies to promote change.

These two characteristics are common to police in

the United States as well. At the same time, however, like their U.S. counterparts, Romanian and

Hungarian police are receptive to recommended

changes that they believe are reasonable and

practical and in which they have a vested interest.

This acceptance is further enhanced when they

perceive that recommendations are offered not as

criticisms of their organization and organizational

procedures but instead as improvements or adjustments to a generally sound base. This is true especially if the recommendations are presented in a form

that has been adjusted to accommodate the countries’

unique cultural traditions and circumstances.

The process of engaging in professional education

and dialogue in these two countries has been based

on reciprocity—a reciprocity of respect and reciprocity of learning. The Eastern European police

are cautious but enthusiastic about their potential

for professional development and change. They

have great pride in their countries, their traditions,

their organizations, and their profession. They are

eager to enhance their strengths and to improve

their image in the international community. The

environment is receptive and challenging. It is an

environment in which the U.S. instructors learned

as much about their counterparts in Eastern Europe

and themselves as the Eastern Europeans learned

about police practices in our ever emerging

democracy.

Notes

1. Lundberg, Kristen, The Czech Republic: Police

Reform in a New Democracy, Boston: John F.

Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1992.

2. Szkinger, Istavan, “Community Policing in

Hungary— Perspectives and Realities,” In Community Policing, Comparative Aspects of Community Oriented Police Work, eds. Dieter Dolling and

Thomas Feltes, Felix, Germany: Holzkirchen/

Obb., 1993:199–205; Shelley, Louise, “The

Sources of Soviet Policing,” in Police Studies, Vol.

XVII, No. 2, 1994:49–63.

3. Since 1951, the Southern Police Institute has

provided advanced education and training courses

for police practitioners. It is a division of the

Department of Justice Administration, College of

Arts and Sciences, at the University of Louisville

in Kentucky.

4. Pest County surrounds the Hungarian capital,

Budapest. It encompasses 6,394 square kilometers

with a population of 1 million inhabitants living in

180 municipalities (medium-sized cities and

villages). Ten percent of all crimes committed in

Hungary take place in Pest County. In addition to

its central headquarters, the county police maintain

13 regional police stations in major population

centers. Approximately 1,500 officers serve in the

Pest County Police Department.

5. The Project on Ethnic Relations is a not-forprofit organization supported by the Carnegie

Foundation, which seeks to promote the status of

minorities in Central Europe.

6. The Roma, commonly referred to as “Gypsies,”

represent a distinct cultural and ethnic population

group in Eastern Europe. Their language, cultural
58

norms, and physical appearance set them apart

from other Eastern European ethnic groups, often

resulting in their oppression. There are approximately 255,000 Roma in Romania.

7. Senge, Peter M., The Fifth Discipline: the Art &

Practice of the Learning Organization, New York:

Doubleday, 1990; Bolman, Lee G., and Terrence

E. Deal, Reframing Organizations: Artistry,

Choice, and Leadership, San Francisco: JosseyBass Publishers, 1991.

8. Fosdick, Raymond B., European Police Systems,

Montclair, New Jersey: Patterson Smith reprint of

1915 original, 1969; Repetto, Thomas A., The Blue

Parade, New York: The Free Press, 1978.

9. There are about 1.8 million Hungarians—about

8 percent of the population of Romania. The

Romanian government does not permit them to

emigrate to Hungary.

10. Benne, Kenneth D., and Max Birnbaum,

“Principles of Change,” in The Planning Change,

eds. Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and

Robert Chinn, New York: Holt, 1969.

11. Schein, Edgar H., Organizational Culture and

Leadership, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1985; Ott, J. Steven, The Organizational

Culture Perspective, Pacific Grove, California:

Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1989.

12. Bayley, David H., Patterns of Policing: A

Comparative International Analysis, New

Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press,

1990:8.

13. “World Roundup,” USA Today, November 17,

1995:11A.
59

Who Are We Kidding? or

Developing Democracy Through Police Reform

by David H. Bayley

protection of dissent, and provision of physical

and logistic support to political campaigns.

■ The safety of regimes, by defending or not

defending them against violence.

■ The content of policy, by participating in

councils of government, by having privileged

access to leaders, by threatening to give or

withhold support to government, and by

political mobilization (election blocs).

They can have indirect effects through:

■ Socialization of the public, as teachers of civic

virtues.

■ Legitimization of government in use of force,

openness, defense of rights, corruption, lack of

favoritism, etc.

■ Demonstration effect, by which police can

serve as a model for other sectors of society

with respect to diversity versus exclusion,

merit versus ascription, honesty versus venality, equality versus inequality before the law,

and science versus tradition.

■ Participation in development through physical

and logistical support for economic development (communications) and creation of demand for modern technology and infrastructure

(such as roads and computers).

For the most part, these activities are matters of

government initiative or at least require approval

by government. Police are not freestanding bureaucratic actors. Their autonomy is probably greater

with respect to their indirect effects, which might

be where foreign assistance should concentrate.

My thoughts on the topic are organized into three

parts:

■ Principles, by which I mean unavoidable

impediments to achieving democracy through

police reform.

■ Possibilities, referring to opportunities through

police reform that may be exploited.

■ Policies, which will be specific recommendations for getting the job done.

Principles

If the objective of American policy is to encourage

and facilitate the reform of police forces abroad so as

to smooth transitions to democracy, policymakers

must recognize three unavoidable constraints on

their efforts.

First Principle

Unless a regime is dedicated to becoming democratic, there is little that reform of the police can

accomplish on its own to bring about democracy.

Although the police can affect politics in important

ways, their autonomy is slight. The most important

effects police might have on democracy depend on

the policies of regimes. In sum, the police can

undermine democracy and they can reinforce it,

but they cannot create it.

Police affect political life in two ways.1

 They have

direct effects on:

■ Persons who want to act politically—by arrest,

detention, and exile.

■ The conduct of political processes, such as

elections, public meetings, freedom of speech,
60

Moreover, it is misguided to believe that a foreign

government can cultivate democracy abroad

through involvement in police reform if the regime

is not already committed to democracy and willing

to practice it.

Second Principle

The connection between democracy and the forms

of policing is weak, for democracy is compatible

with many forms of policing. Policing may be

organized and conducted similarly in both democratic and nondemocratic countries. The character

of government and the character of the police do

not neatly coincide. This principle can be demonstrated by examining the relation between democracy and the following elements of policing:

■ National organization of policing, particularly

its centralization or decentralization. Many

contemporary democratic countries have

centralized regimes (Sweden, France, and

Israel). Decentralized systems of policing are

compatible with repression (Germany prior to

World War I, the United States in the South

before the 1960s).

■ Accountability and civilian oversight. Close

political oversight is not necessarily democratic (such as in the former Soviet Union and

Cuba). Oversight primarily by bureaucrats is

compatible with democracy (such as in France

and Japan). The balance between political

control and political insulation is rarely stable;

it must be adjusted constantly as it veers

toward one extreme or the other (such as in

Colombia, India, and the United States).

■ Organization/management. Democracy is not

strongly correlated with whether recruitment is

stratified by rank or occurs only at the bottom

(for example, Japan versus Britain); whether

criminal investigation is part of the uniformed

police or separate from it (for example, the

United States versus France); and whether

police are armed or unarmed (for example, the

United States versus New Zealand).

■ Strategies/programs. Community-oriented

policing can be used for grassroots ownership

of policing or for enhanced government control

through penetration, intimidation, and

cooptation (for example, the United States and

Canada versus Singapore, China, and Cuba).

■ Technology. Enhancement of the technical

capacity of the police is ambiguous in its

effects. It may serve the interests of governments or of the public depending on the nature

of the government.

Police reform is a necessary but not sufficient

condition for creating democratic government.

Reforms focusing exclusively on the police are

insufficient to create democratic government.

Indeed, most reforms are neutral in their political

effects. Moreover, almost any police practice can

be exploited by a determined regime for its own

purposes.

As Michael Oakshott has said, it is “one of the

most insidious current misunderstandings” that

“institutions and procedures appear as pieces of

machinery designed to achieve a purpose settled in

advance, instead of as manners of behavior which

are meaningless when separated from their context.”2

American police practices do not necessarily

encourage democracy. We must be careful not to

overgeneralize from our own national experience.

Additionally, Americans engaged in police reform

abroad must listen as well as teach so that they can

better appreciate what is essentially democratic in

American practice.

Third Principle

During transitions to democracy, democratic

reform of the police is likely to be less important

to emerging democratic governments than security.

The emphasis on security in policing arises from

two sources. The first is the political interest of

emerging democratic regimes.
61

■ Democracy requires stability and order, yet

transitions to it are often accompanied by

violence and disorder.

■ Threats to regimes always take priority over

threats to the disaggregate public (subversion

over crime).3

■ At the same time, the legitimacy of government requires providing internal order for the

population.

The second source consists of the national interests

of foreign donors.

■ Access to police abroad will be allowed only if

the security needs of the emerging democratic

regimes are acknowledged and provided for.

Enhancement of the security capacity of the

police in an emerging democracy is likely to be

the sine qua non of access for foreign government involvement. One might call this the

involvement dilemma. We will want to remain

involved so as to have leverage, but remaining

involved exposes us to compromise with

reformist principles. It is awkward both to

leave and to stay.

■ Because donor countries often have their own

law enforcement interests in foreign countries

(drugs, terrorism, fugitives, and organized

crime), responsibility for which is concentrated

in national governments, foreign providers are

likely to be interested in police abroad not only

to facilitate political reform but to achieve their

own domestic law enforcement objectives.

In providing assistance to foreign police, democratic reform is likely to take second place to the

development of enforcement capacity.

Possibilities

Granting that there are limits to the contribution

police reform can make to democratic development, there are nonetheless possibilities for leverage. (Recommendations with respect to the sort of

involvement the United States should have with

foreign police forces are given later in this paper.)

First: It should be underscored that foreign assistance to police forces is not a new or unprecedented undertaking. It has a long history and is

being conducted currently on a considerable scale.

Foreign assistance is occurring now through:

■ Institutional connections between countries

based on historical patterns of association and

conquest (Britain-Malaysia, United StatesPhilippines, United States-Japan, BelgiumZaire, Britain-Australia, and France-North

Africa).

■ Commercial firms developing international

markets for police technology and expertise

(Motorola; Booz-Allen and Hamilton).

■ Emulation facilitated through international

professional connections (International Association of Chiefs of Police; International

Association for Civilian Oversight of Law

Enforcement; United Nations Institute for the

Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, Tokyo).

■ Regional integration leading to cooperative law

enforcement (European Union, ASEAN).

New bilateral efforts to assist the police of emerging democracies must compete for the attention of

potential foreign clients. Such efforts may be offset

by the activities impinging on host countries from

these other sources. Foreign assistance to the

police will take place in a competitive environment.

Second: Police reforms that may contribute to

democratic development vary enormously in the

likelihood of their being implemented successfully

in a foreign country. There are varying degrees of

difficulty in transferring police practices from one

country to another.
62

■ Institutional changes involving the relations of

the police to the government or other social

structures are the most difficult to make. Reforms that affect the purpose, functions, control, and accountability of the police are least

likely to be exported successfully to other

countries. No government will easily relinquish control of these, whatever its character.

Examples include centralization, civilian

oversight, separation from the military, political surveillance, intelligence gathering.

■ Matters of internal management, which are

more fully under police control, are moderately

difficult to reform. Examples include stratified

recruitment, supervisor responsibility for

mistakes, relations across ranks, and corruption. At the same time, both culture and tradition may limit the exportability of management

practices.

■ The transferability of operational strategies and

programs, too, must be evaluated on a case-bycase basis. Their exportability depends, first,

on the institutional objectives of the government and, second, on the culture and tradition

of both the police and the public.

■ Technology, including some features of management, is the least difficult to change from

abroad. Technologies are readily exportable

because they affect capacity but not substantive

direction. They are not “political.” Examples

are computer information systems, techniques

of forensic analysis, communications equipment, management by objective, performance

contracts, and quality control.

As a general rule, the police reforms that are

easiest to achieve abroad have the least effect on

democratic development, and the reforms that are

the hardest to achieve abroad have the greatest

effect on democratic development. Policymakers

should recognize as well that progress in reforming the police is likely to come in “increments”

that contribute to “trajectories” of eventual democratic development.4

Third: Taking into account both what foreign

countries are most likely to accept and what donor

governments are most likely to give, there are

several specific reforms that the United States

could advocate and support that would contribute

to democratic development. These are targets of

opportunity for American foreign police policy.

■ Priority should be given to reorienting police

forces to respond to the needs of individual

citizens and private groups as opposed to

serving the interests of regimes. Foreign police

forces should be encouraged to concentrate on

reactive law enforcement, responding to the

needs of the disaggregate public.

■ The role of the police should be restricted to

overt law enforcement and criminal investigation. Police in emerging democracies should be

encouraged to give up political surveillance

and counterinsurgency.5

■ Police should emphasize accountability to law

rather than political direction. They should be

encouraged to institutionalize the distinction

between the making of policy and the conduct

of operations, otherwise the rule of law becomes a casualty of politics.

■ Assistance should be given to help foreign

police reduce the level of force they commonly

employ.

■ Foreign assistance should emphasize the

development of appropriate strategic and

managerial approaches rather than enhancing

technical capacity.

■ Foreign assistance should be contingent on

effective efforts by police forces to eliminate

all forms of corruption.

■ Foreign assistance should incorporate evaluations of police efficacy and conduct carried out

by indigenous scholars and consultants.
63

■ Foreign police should be encouraged to participate in international organizations dedicated to

information sharing, standards development,

and civilian oversight and accountability.6

Policies

In order to exploit the limited contribution that

police reform can make to the development of

democracy abroad, how should the United States

and other democratic countries conduct their

police foreign policy?

■ The devil is not in the details but in the objective. Police reform is not a powerful engine of

democratic development without the prior

commitment to democracy of host regimes.

■ A mechanism needs to be created within the

U.S. Government whereby the sometimes

conflicting objectives in foreign political

policy, foreign law enforcement policy, and

foreign police policy can be discussed and

harmonized.

■ Technical assistance for the enhancement of

foreign law enforcement capacity should be

given only to convincingly democratic countries. Access by the United States to foreign

police will most likely be contingent on developing their technical enforcement capacity,

which is highly ambiguous in its political

effects.

■ Training of foreign police officers should be

done primarily by local law enforcement

personnel. The sort of policing that will make

the greatest contribution to democratic development abroad is done at local levels in the

United States. Federal law enforcement agencies (Federal Bureau of Investigation; Drug

Enforcement Agency; Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco and Firearms; Secret Service; Customs Service; and Immigration and Naturalization Service), do not do full-service, publicresponding, community-accountable policing,

which should not be taken to imply that they

do not have important functions to carry out.

Full-service, community-responsive policing is

done by State and local police agencies.

This qualitative difference in the character and

function of police agencies in the United States

creates a serious problem for implementing police

reform abroad. Relations with foreign governments are conducted through the Federal Government, and foreign governments are uneasy and

inexpert at contacting local governments directly.

The solution is for the Federal Government to

develop the ability to marshal local government

talent and to project it abroad.

■ Implementation of police policy abroad must

involve more than police personnel. It should

be a cooperative venture among police specialists, area experts, management consultants, and

private industry. The role of the Federal Government will be to enlist and coordinate these

human resources.

Conclusion

In sum, the United States must be realistic about

the contribution that police reform can make to

democratic development. Enthusiasm for the

objective of spreading democracy abroad should

not impel us to undertake thoughtless programs.

Realism is essential both to successful implementation of any reform program and to the maintenance of essential support for such efforts within

the United States itself. We should also be careful

that international law enforcement operations by

the U.S. Government are not justified in the beguiling language of democratic development.

Police reform is not the tail that wags the democratic dog. And involvement in police reform from

abroad provides a feeble grasp even of that tail.
64

Notes

1. Bayley, David H., Patterns of Policing, New

Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press,

1985.

2. Oakshott, Michael, Rationalism in Politics and

Other Essays, New York: Basic Books, 1962.

3. Bayley.

4. Goldsmith, Andrew, “Democratization and

Criminal Justice: Human Rights and Police Reform in Colombia,” unpublished draft, March

1995.

5. Ibid, 91ff.

6. Ibid, 60.
65

My assignment for this session is to take the pieces

put on the table by conference participants, and

assemble them into a whole that captures the

points made. It is an exciting challenge to try to

present a complete, coherent picture of where we

stand now, and where we might go in the future on

the basis of the presentations and discussion of the

past few days. Each of you has contributed something important, each something different, and the

framework must be able to contain all these interesting contributions.

To help us, I have an outline of my talk. First, I am

going to introduce the concept of strategy in the

public sector, a topic that I can’t resist mentioning

within 3 minutes of speaking before an audience.

Second, I want to identify and explore what I think

was the basic question we tried to address: “How

can we reform the police in ways that can support

the development of democracy?” Third, I want to

take up three issues related to that basic question:

■ Under what circumstances is the basic question

interesting and important?

■ In what situations does it become an interesting question to the United States Government?

■ In thinking about reforming the police, whose

purposes are going to matter—a foreign

government’s or ours?

I present a basic analytic framework for identifying the relationship between the reform of government, the reform of policing, and the form that

police reform takes. Finally, I conclude by discussing the interesting question that arose concerning

the relationship between the goals of support for

U.S. law enforcement objectives, on the one hand,

and the goal of supporting democracy on the other.

That is one important question. Others include:

What are the forms of policing that are available to

us to consider as “export items”? What do we

think the mechanisms are by which any particular

form of policing might affect the quality of democracy? What are the rules and instruments of engagement that we would use in trying to export a

model of policing? That is the basic outline. I will

try to go through it rather quickly.

Strategy in the Public Sector

Let me start by introducing a basic concept. My

colleague, Professor [Philip] Heymann, invented

this concept when we were working together on

public sector management. The basic idea is that in

order for a public sector initiative or enterprise to

be viable and useful in the world, it has to meet

three tests, symbolized by three different points of

the triangle I present as figure 1. First, the enterprise must achieve some important public value;

otherwise, the expenditure of money and authority

required to accomplish the enterprise is not worth

it. Second, the initiative must have legitimacy and

attract support from those who are in a position to

contribute money and authority to it; otherwise,

there will not be enough resources to accomplish

the goal. Third, there has to be a set of operational

capacities sufficient to achieve the goal; otherwise,

the enterprise will fail. The basic concept is that in

order for the government enterprise to be successful, it has to be valuable, authorizable, and doable—very trivial ideas. What is important about

this diagram is that it reminds us that all three of

those bases must be brought together in order for

us to have successful enterprises. You can see

quickly what happens when one of them is missConference Wrap-Up:

Where Do We Go From Here?

by Mark Moore
66

ing. If a purpose has legitimacy and support but

insufficient operational capacity, people say,

“Great idea. Couldn’t get it done, too bad. Let’s

take the money back.” If operational capacity is

sufficient for a particular purpose but there is no

longer legitimacy and support, you hear such

comments as: “Great idea. Nice try. Too bad

nobody wants it.” If the purpose is one for which

there is neither support nor capability, then you are

an academic. This is the framework that I tend to use.

Now I want to begin applying this framework to

our particular discussion. One way to proceed is to

draw a box around figure 1 and indicate what the

strategy of policing in a foreign country should be.

In order for that concept to be viable, it must meet

the strategic requirements we have been talking

about, i.e., it must be consistent with:

■ An attractive set of values.

■ A set of operational capacities.

■ Legitimacy and support.

We have been assuming that a particular set of

values, namely, democratic values, ought to be

reflected both in policing and in overall governance. Part of our discussion has focused on what

particular kind of policing we think is consistent

with democratic values—would it emphasize “rule

Legitimacy and


Support

Operational Capacity

Values

Figure 1: Strategy in the Public Sector
67

of law” or “local responsiveness?” But the most

interesting idea we have been talking about is the

possibility that the way in which a local police

enterprise tries to define and authorize itself might

have an important causal connection not only to

the success of the police function but also to the

production of a locally satisfactory democratic

culture. That would be one way to understand the

key issue. We are trying to imagine the nature of

the relationship between, on the one hand, the

construction of a certain style of policing (one that

seeks to pursue particular values and legitimate

itself in a particular way) and, on the other, either

the reflection or production of a locally attractive

democratic culture.

We could, of course, put ourselves outside the

local environment and look at the problem from

the vantage point of the U.S. Government. We

could imagine that the U.S. Government affected

local law enforcement strategies by simultaneously

contributing to the operational capacity of the local

police (we do so through technical assistance,

providing money and equipment, etc.) and to their

legitimacy and support (through endorsing or

criticizing local authorizing processes). This idea

is reflected in figure 2, which shows us standing

outside the local environment but trying to influence the local strategic situation—pressing our

values, influencing local authorizing environments,

and providing direct assistance to operations. And,

of course, in order for some U.S.-based agency

Legitimacy and


Support

Operational Capacity

Values

U.S. Intervention

Political Pressure

Technical Assistance/Equipment

Figure 2: U.S. Interventions in Local Policing Strategies
68

(such as the U. S. Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance

Program (ICITAP)) or a university-based training

effort to accomplish this result, the initiative must

be consistent with its own strategic situation.

The Basic Policy Question

The strong form of the basic question is, “How can

we reform the police in ways that can support the

development of democracy?” A weaker form of

the question is, “How can we reform police in

ways that are not destructive to the development of

democracy?” That would be a more modest objective. We could say something slightly in the

middle, which would be, “How can we reform the

police in ways that make the police reflective of a

democratic society without undermining whatever

democratic impulses exist in the local environment?” We could support the democratic impulses

by having a form of police that was consistent with

democracy and definitive of it. Or we could have a

form of police that is not only reflective of and

definitive of democracy but actually did things that

strengthened the quality of democracy beyond the

boundaries of its own operation.

Note that the preceding sentence contains three

important nouns. One is “we.” Who are the “we?”

For the purposes of our exercise, I am imagining

that we are taking the point of view of citizens or

representatives of the U.S. Government who are

contemplating the allocation of Government

resources to support policing in foreign countries.

(This is the outside position suggested by figure 2.)

A second noun is “police.” This is a more interesting question, and you will see that in the framework presented as figure 3, the concept of police

becomes more complicated. Actually, we were

never quite sure if the focus of our interest in

policing was one of the following three possibilities:

■ Police institutions.

■ Criminal justice institutions (including prosecutors, jails, prisons, and perhaps defense

counsel).

Security Function

Criminal Justice System

Police

Means Targets Ends

• ICITAP:


 Training


 Technical Assistance


 Morale


 Political Pressure

• University Based

• Other

• U.S. Law Enforcement


 Objectives


• Enhance Democracy in 


 Developing Country


 "Rule of Law"


 Democracy


 


 Political Culture/


 Civil Society

Figure 3: Basic Analytic Framework
69

■ The security function that might be distributed

across a large number of institutions in the

society.

At varying times, each of these possibilities was

considered a potential target of our intervention. I

will use the word “police” conveniently to bracket

the uncertainty about each of the meanings we had

in mind. Thus, our question becomes, “How can

we reform the police, criminal justice system, or

security function in ways that can support the

development of democracy?”

The third noun is “democracy.” That, too, requires

a definition. I will not attempt to resolve all the

interesting questions about how to define democracy, but I do want to draw your attention to some

of the various ways in which that concept entered

into our conversations. Figure 4 helps us understand some different concepts of democracy. In

this diagram, the first things to note are the two

columns labeled “culture” and “institutions.” I

want to start there because Professor Heymann

started us off in an interesting and useful way. He

said he wanted to define democracy not in terms of

a set of institutions and not even in terms of the

functions of governmental institutions, but, instead, as a force in the lives of citizens that shapes

their aspirations and expectations with regard to

how their government should be organized. Thus,

Professor Heymann began by focusing our attention on culture, not on institutions.

We made an interesting distinction, as shown in

the rows of figure 4. One definition of democracy

we offered and used could be called the “rule of

law.” I think, as do some others here, that the rule

of law is at least necessary, and sometimes sufficient, both for the definition and the accomplishment of democracy. The “rule of law” concept

encompasses having effective street crime control,

having a legal system capable of reaching police

corruption, and having a law enforcement system

capable of reaching political corruption (understanding that when we move from police to political corruption we are moving toward increasingly

powerful figures in the political and economic

system). I’d like to add to that list the protection of

individual rights in situations in which a person is

accused of a crime. Professor Heymann could have

said that having all four of these is the definition of

a “strong enforcement operation” and therefore

supported by the definition of a strong democracy.

But it could also be true that such a strong enforcement operation could come into existence only if a

strong democracy already existed.

I also introduced a different definition of democracy. I claimed that it was concerned not with “rule

of law” but with some notion of responsiveness to

collective aspirations. A notion of democracy,

then, was built around the existence of a politics

that included elections and voluntary associations

that would be capable of both articulating collective aspirations and holding government agencies

accountable for their performance against that set

of collective aspirations. There was some notion of

democracy as requiring a capacity for citizens to get

together in various ways, ideally in large numbers, to

express their collective views. Those are the two

concepts we associated with democracy.

A third idea of democracy never came into so

sharp a focus. That idea went beyond the equal

delivery of political rights and included the equal

delivery of substantive services to people, or the

creation of just conditions in society. That concept

might, at a minimum, include some expectation

that people would enjoy equal security. It might

also mean that citizens would enjoy equal claims on

the public security being provided. Those ideas were

sometimes articulated as principles of democracy

that must be honored in the particular way in

which we operate in society.

Again, I will not attempt to resolve the question of

which of these is the correct definition of democracy. At this stage I want simply to observe that the

concept of democracy as we have used it in this

conversation is quite complicated and probably

needs to be sorted out.

Let me move quickly through the next couple of

questions. Under what situations does this question
70

Rule-of-Law Culture Institutions

• Just & Effective Crime Control


• Anti-Police Corruption


• Anti-Political Corruption


• Protection of Individual Rights

Political Culture/


Civil Society

• Elections


• Voluntary Association


• Pressure for Substantive Rights


 – Equal Security


 – Equal Closure on Public Security Efforts

Figure 4: Concepts of Democracy

become an interesting policy question for the U.S.

Government? The three most common cases are

where the state has collapsed, civil war has broken

out, or an invasion has occurred. There is an older

tradition of intervention to support policing. This

occurred when the United States had a nationally

important law enforcement objective that it could

not achieve except through the existence of a

powerful local police capacity. In those situations,

we would intervene to advance our own law

enforcement objective. Indeed, the principal reason

we began supporting police operations overseas

was to advance U.S. law enforcement or to achieve

Cold War political objectives. With Cold War

political objectives achieved, U.S. law enforcement interests are advancing and becoming more

important. But we suddenly find ourselves in a

situation in which many states seem to have

collapsed, and that gives us an opportunity to

intervene to provide humanitarian aid, to support

democracy, to effect future advancement of U.S.

law enforcement purposes, or any of the above.

That is the foreign policy context of the local

situation that has arisen.

In these situations we face an important question,

“Whose purposes are we trying to accomplish?”

One answer to that question is, “Not ours.” We

should do for other countries only what they ask

and want. Our relationship then is to offer support

to countries in whatever they are trying to get

done. I think that is the extreme view of the cultural relevance argument. The alternative answer

is, “No, it is our purposes that matter. We’re

spending the money, we’re spending the effort,

we’re trying to accomplish something here.” Of

course, we would understand that the accomplishment of our purposes requires us to understand a

country’s institutions and cultures and what it is

trying to achieve and, to the extent that we can,

accommodate such goals. If we don’t accommodate them, there will be relationship problems, and

we won’t have any leverage.

I prefer the second answer to this question so that

we would not have to deal with it again. It is, of

course, true that when we sit here thinking about

how to use U.S. resources to support policing in

emerging democracies, it is our purposes that
71

matter. I think we all agree that it is terribly important for us to attend to the capabilities and interests

of emerging democracies and to accommodate

them and not feel vulnerable to accusations of

having “gone native.” We must always be a little

nervous that we have given up too much in terms

of our objectives in order to maintain the relationship and satisfy a country’s desire for independence. I assume that is the general problem with

diplomacy that we don’t have to resolve today.

Question from Carl Klockars. So a collaborative

approach is discarded. It is our objectives that

count? Is that what I understand?

Answer by Mark Moore. No. Collaboration is

not discarded. I am simply making the point that

we evaluate any particular collaboration in our

terms. We calculate whether we like what is going

on. When we come to the rules of engagement,

Professor [David] Bayley says, “Be prepared to

pull out.” Professor Heymann says, “Be tough, be

demanding, insist on something.” A collaborative

relationship is necessary in negotiation, but you

calculate what you get out of the result of a negotiation in terms that matter to you. Those terms

may include the protection of an ongoing relationship, certain humanitarian assistance, and so on.

However attentive you are to their concerns and

their desire to maintain a relationship, in the end

you calculate whether you like or don’t like the

results of the deal you have been offered in terms

that satisfy you (which can, of course, also include

concerns for them and their welfare).

Question from Philip Heymann. In the litany of

interests that might motivate us, Ukrainians and

Russians in their country have suspicions about

Americans buying up the market, so it may be

appropriate to list our financial interests in the area.

At worst we ask, whose purpose? The answer is

that it is a common purpose. The reason that we

offered four courses on money laundering in

Ukraine is that curtailment of money laundering is

one of our objectives. We did it because it matched

that country’s objectives. We had a match, so we

did a program. If we didn’t get a match, we didn’t

do a program.

Answer by Mark Moore. Sometimes you can

offer a program because you have different interests, but the program you are planning to offer

serves the interests of both countries. It may turn

out that is a rather common situation. You don’t

necessarily need common objectives to be able to

make a deal. Sometimes people will agree to a deal

because they see something in the deal for them

and are happy to go along, and what each party to

the deal values is different.

The Basic Analytic Framework

Now we are at the stage in which we are talking

about the basic analytic framework. When thinking

about a policy, I always think in terms of three

questions: (1) What are our objectives? (2) What

are our instruments? (3) What do we know about

the relationship between our ends and our means?

So far, we have talked about the possible ends of

U.S. support to policing overseas—the advancement of law enforcement objectives or the enhancement of democracy. At this stage you can

incorporate that matrix I presented in which the

goals were the development of political culture and

civil society (figure 4). One of the issues I’ll

address deals with the relationship between these

two different objectives.

I have already alluded to the fact that at various

times we have targeted the intrastate police, criminal justice system, or security function to examine

how those would be effective. The means we

talked about include ICITAP, which provides

training and technical assistance and supports

morale. We also heard about several Governmentsupported university programs that tended to use

the same set of instruments for accomplishing the

result. Professor Heymann was particularly strong

on the potential value of using outside institutions

to intervene (by building morale and political

pressure) in the authorizing environment of the

locality, rather than to intervene directly in developing operational capabilities. I think it was David
72

Bayley who also reminded us that a lot of other

things were happening that affected either the

police, criminal justice, or security.

We could even extend that list of interventions

significantly if we ask the question, “Who is doing

something that affects the quality of democracy in

that country?” If we asked that question, we would

find that our interests in supporting policing were

just a tiny part of overall efforts to support democracy. One of the big questions in the background of

our discussion has been, “How much leverage can

we get out of any change in this system for the

enhancement of democracy?” Compare that with a

variety of other efforts that we might have if our

goal was to enhance the quality of democracy. I

assume all our political aid and a number of other

things are working to enhance the quality of

democracy. We have this one tiny piece that we are

trying to define. This is the basic analytic framework that I wanted to present.

Basic Issues and Themes

Now let’s move to the basic issues and themes.

The first question is, “What is the goal of advancing U.S. law enforcement objectives versus the

goal of enhancing democracy?” Ambassador

[Robert] Gelbard said he thought these ends were

not always incompatible. I think he is right. I could

imagine some circumstances in which the two

would be quite closely aligned. They would include a situation in which a target of U.S. law

enforcement objectives was an impediment to the

development of democracy in a country, and

apprehending the targeted person required the

development of local institutions and political

cultures that would move toward enhancing

democracy.

Where we would not be in alignment, however, is

in a situation where we would support authoritarian regimes in order to achieve our law enforcement objectives. In that case we would be tempted

to use nondemocratic means to achieve our law

enforcement objectives and, in so doing, would

shape the development of local policing and

become a sponsor—in the name of developing

democracy—for precisely the kind of things we

want to discourage. No matter what we need to do,

sponsorship of the wrong course of action comes

from outside rather than inside the country and is

always a price we end up paying when U.S. diplomatic instruments and financial assistance are used

to support only U.S. objectives. There is some

uncertainty about whether these things are always

in opposition or always aligned. I think the answer

is that they are sometimes together and sometimes

in opposition.

The next question is, “What is the form of policing

that we will try to export?” I again want to emphasize this distinction—which came up rather forcefully in our conversation—and that is the distinction among policing, the criminal justice system,

and the security function. I want to emphasize this

because its importance occurred to me when we

were talking about the need for decent jail and

prison conditions as well as effective policing. You

could easily imagine that if none of the values we

are trying to advance took hold (for example,

democratic policing as respect for the rights of

defendants), it would be a hollow position to

maintain that we are in favor of protecting the

rights of defendants if we then read them their

Miranda rights and leave them languishing in jail

without benefit of trial for long periods. It may be

that insofar as our goal is to advance democracy, it

includes not only the rule of law but also the

protection of individual rights. We would, of

course, have to take responsibility for working on

trials and conditions in prisons and jails as well as

good policing.

Clifford [Shearing] asked us to think more broadly

outside the boundaries of criminal justice and

imagine the ways in which institutions and private

and civil society could be engaged in the process

of producing security. It is quite interesting that if the

form of democracy we seek to encourage includes

constructing a political culture in a civil society,

then determining how to police in a way that would

help build that political culture would be an impor-
73

tant contribution to at least that form of democracy, if not to the rule-of-law form of democracy.

The next question we addressed—and dropped

rather quickly—deals with how to structure the

security function. What I mean by that is determining which functions to include in the agency that

we call the police. Should we include antiterrorism, antisubversion, civil disorder responses to

riots, street crime, and governmental presence as

functions of the police? David Bayley said he

always recommends leaving the antisubversion,

antiterrorism function out of the agency that you

are trying to call the local police on the grounds

that it is politically the most vulnerable. That is an

interesting idea. There was also a question about

whether we wanted to have a centralized or decentralized police force.

Perhaps the most important question concerns

where we stand on the question of “professional

law enforcement” versus community policing? We

shared a couple of interesting observations. One is

that we may have to practice professional law

enforcement, to pass through that stage in police

development, because it is most consistent with

rule-of-law democracy. Focusing on community

policing and the security function might be valuable as well because it would encourage the

development of a local capacity for action that

would support the kind of democracy associated

with responsiveness, including cultural responsiveness. Those affected are going to see that tension.

This was question one and issue one. Issue two

involved the kind of policing.

Issue three is this interesting question of the

mechanism by which policing affects democracy.

We heard a great deal of skepticism about the

extent to which one could expect reform of policing or of the criminal justice system or security

function, in terms of capacity to affect the quality

of democracy. I wrote down about five possible

mechanisms by which we can imagine that happening. Let me just run through these because I

think they are important.

The first mechanism would be to ask what form of

policing we are going to have in this country and

make it an issue. By doing so we may be able to

sustain a dialogue at high levels and throughout

society about democratic principles and what it

means to live in a democracy. What part of democracy do we really want? What part of it has to do

with being responsive to citizens? What part of it

has to do with building a local as well as national

political infrastructure? By making this an issue

for discussion, we might be able to have an effect

on the quality of democracy.

Second, if policing is a means of upward mobility

for the society, it may be that police training is

really training of future leaders—not just of the

police department, but also of the civil society.

That may be an important side effect of training—

to train leaders for future civil society if not for the

police.

A third possible mechanism could be this: To the

extent that the police were effective in controlling

street crime or disorder, one issue that would be

favorable to the creation of authoritarian politics

would be removed. In effect, an important way in

which the police might be able to promote democracy is by doing a good enough job on reducing

crime and stilling fear that people wouldn’t be

tempted to grant official power to the national

regime. Effectiveness in controlling crime might

be particularly important in judging whether a

particular policing venture is likely to support

democracy.

A fourth mechanism could be that policing could

support democracy by enhancing the credibility of

government as an effective agency, as a powerful

agency, and most important, as a fair and equitable

agency. That would mean that policing would be

successful largely by building credibility in

government.

The last mechanism I could think of—the fifth—is

that the way we do policing might affect our

success in engaging citizens in an experience that
74

taught them democratic values. That experience

could be in operation as an offender, victim, or

witness, or it could be in some oversight of the

police. If citizens have those kinds of experiences,

that might be conducive to constructing a political

culture supporting democracy.

It seemed to me that Dave’s [Bayley] point when

he was urging caution about introducing centralized systems was that we may want to try to

introduce systems that have a kind of recurrent

resistance to potential abuse. That is a downwardlooking system, as I understand his argument,

drawing its strength locally, and it has a peculiar

kind of resistance to manipulating undemocratic

ways. Not that it has to be foolproof, but the

general objective would be to introduce or suggest

systems with mechanisms that we believe are

particularly resistant to totalitarian regimes.

Comment from Jeremy Travis. I would also add

that we can support democracy by showing that no

one is allowed to steal from the state. Nobody

should be allowed to use the state for his or her

own private purposes.

Response from Mark Moore. I think that is an

important point. I meant to include that idea when

we discussed being fair. We would be successful

by eliminating corruption both within the police

and other agencies of government as well as

among politicians.

I have two last things to discuss. One is the rules

and instruments of engagement. Our basic notion

here is that we ought to apply [David] Bayley’s

principles for the next generation as long as he has

a chance to think about it. It did seem fair to state

that we faced a very tough strategic problem, in

terms of our operational capacity, which has to do

with tension we face (described quite well by the

ICITAP people) between moving quickly in a

situation, interacting effectively with U.S. and

other military operations when they are still on

site, and providing enough resources and staying

long enough to have an effect. Again the question

is about whether the U.S. Government is really

prepared to act quickly, interact effectively with its

own military, supply enough resources, stay long

enough, and be flexible enough to actually produce

a result. By all accounts it takes us 5 or 7 years to

get a strong police organization formed in some

democracies. Maybe we should be doing this for

many reasons other than building democracies.

My last point concerns how to make further intellectual progress on the basis of this start. I think it

is important to recognize that in any situation we

enter, learning accompanies doing. We are not

going to have the luxury of standing back, learning, and then doing. We are going to have to learn

while we do. We ought to organize ourselves to

learn while we are doing, which I think means

documenting as effectively as we can our activities

and their effects and giving ourselves many chances

to get together and talk about our thoughts on the

meaning of a particular experience. A partnership

between academics and practitioners would be a

crucial element. The particular new piece of grist that

we need for this would be case studies that accurately

describe all such interventions we have made so far.

These studies can be used as the basis for understanding what seems to have worked and what hasn’t. In

any event, the cases will help us understand and

describe the situations we are talking about in more

concrete detail.
75

International criminal justice assistance efforts

have increased dramatically in recent years. U.S.

Government agencies have begun to provide

technical assistance and training to justice system

personnel in nations around the world. This paper

presents a brief overview of major Federal international justice assistance activities. The paper’s

focus is on formal training and technical assistance

programs. Many additional ad hoc assistance

activities (e.g., hosting meetings with justice

system delegations visiting from overseas and

responding to requests for information regarding

draft legislation and procedures) are conducted by

units of government that do not otherwise have

systematic programs. These ad hoc activities are

not reviewed here. The justice assistance field is

growing rapidly, and the summaries presented

below inevitably provide only a snapshot of the

many evolving Federal technical assistance and

training efforts.

Federal agencies are increasingly providing justice

assistance to foreign governments for two major

reasons:

■ To respond to the growth and seriousness

of transnational crimes that victimize U.S.

citizens (including organized crime, drug

trafficking, sophisticated financial crimes, and

terrorism). Such crime has grown in the wake

of rapid economic, political, and technological

changes around the globe.

■ To assist fragile emerging democracies in

establishing the rule of law. Justice reform

is often an essential precondition to the

consolidation of democratic governance and

the creation of effective market economies in

such nations.

The first reason addresses critical U.S. domestic

law enforcement needs while the second deals

with a high-priority foreign policy objective. The

importance of both purposes for international

justice assistance efforts was highlighted by then

Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick in recent

testimony before the House Committee on International Relations.1

 In many cases these two purposes have converged in specific nations; emerging

democracies have often become significant staging

areas for transnational crime due to the weakness

of their domestic justice systems.

The U.S. Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury, along with the Agency for International

Development (USAID) and the U.S. Information

Agency (USIA) have taken the lead in providing

Federal international justice assistance. The various Federal investigative agencies—Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI); Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA); Secret Service; Bureau

of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF); and

others—have different areas of expertise depending upon their statutory jurisdictions within the

United States and provide assistance in keeping

with their relative expertise. Agreements have been

developed between the agencies to help clarify

relative areas of responsibility for technical assistance and training.

Appendix A:

U.S. Government International

Justice Assistance: Overview of Major Activities

by Daniel McGillis*

*Daniel McGillis, Ph.D, is with Abt Associates Inc.
76

The U.S. Department of State has worked to

enhance coordination across the broad array of

Federal international justice assistance activities in

collaboration with the other agencies. It has provided funding for training programs in Eastern and

Central Europe and in the newly independent

states of the former Soviet Union through the

Support for Eastern European Democracies Act

(SEED) and the Freedom Support Act (FSA), and

has provided funding for assistance in other parts

of the world from other State Department funding

sources. Federal law enforcement agencies (including the FBI, Secret Service, ATF and others)

submit their SEED and FSA training plans to the

State Department at the beginning of the fiscal

year and receive support for their training programs following assessment of the plans.

It should be noted at the outset that the problem of

international crime and the issue of how to design

effective strategies for responding to it have recently moved to center stage on the world agenda.

This increased attention to the topic by the G–7/P8

and the United Nations may lead to even greater

demands upon Federal agencies for international

justice assistance. At the June 1996 G–7/P8 Summit in Lyons, participating nations approved an

ambitious 40-point plan to combat transnational

crime. The P8 (the G–7 plus Russia) recommendations deal with such key issues as extradition,

improved information sharing, the seizure of

criminal assets, cooperation to deter money laundering, and enhanced monitoring of the movement

of criminals across borders.

A related broad-ranging international initiative was

approved shortly before the Lyons meeting. President Clinton’s October 1995 call for a major

International Crime Initiative led to passage of the

Declaration on Crime and Public Security by

nations participating in the May 1996 meeting in

Vienna of the United Nations Commission on

Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice. The

Commission recommended that the General

Assembly adopt the Declaration, which urges

signatories to take vigorous action to combat

terrorism, narcotics trafficking, illegal arms sales,

and related crimes. Reforms recommended in the

Declaration include improved police force partnerships, the implementation of asset forfeiture

mechanisms, expanded use of mutual legal assistance treaties, and related measures. Article 4 of

the Declaration urges “the provision of bilateral

and multilateral technical assistance to member

States by utilizing training, exchange programs and

law enforcement training academies and criminal

justice institutes at the international level.”2

In his October 1995 address to the U.N. General

Assembly, President Clinton also called for the

drafting of a U.S. international crime bill to improve capacity in the United States to combat

transnational crime. According to a recent publication by the Office of International Criminal Justice

(a component of the State Department’s Bureau of

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

Affairs [INL]), “The bill will contain proposals to

augment the ability of U.S. agencies to investigate

and prosecute international criminals. It will seek

authorization for increased U.S. training and

assistance to countries similarly committed to

fighting international crime but lacking the resources to do so.”

The training and technical assistance efforts of

U.S. government agencies that are described below

are playing a critical role in the international fight

against crime. These efforts are likely to be essential to the successful implementation of the ambitious P8 and U.N. international crime initiatives,

and the U.S. international crime bill that is being

drafted may expand current levels of such assistance to help meet the growing needs in this field.

U.S. Department of Justice

Congressman Benjamin Gilman has characterized

the Justice Department as “the newest and potentially most powerful administration player in the

democracy rule-of-law field.”3

 Seven components

of the Justice Department are currently involved

in the systematic delivery of international justice

reform training and technical assistance. These
77

components include the FBI, the DEA, two programs of the Criminal Division (the International

Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program

(ICITAP) and the Office of Professional Development and Training (OPDAT)), the Executive Office

for United States Attorneys (EOUSA), the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the

Antitrust Division.

Two additional Justice Department components are

involved in closely related international justice

reform. The Criminal Division’s Office of International Affairs (OIA) handles mutual legal assistance

treaties, extraditions, and liaisons to multilateral

organizations. The National Institute of Justice

(NIJ), DOJ’s research and development arm,

conducts research in this area, disseminates information worldwide, and sponsors conferences on

important topics in justice reform. NIJ is an affiliate institute of the U.N. Crime Prevention and

Criminal Justice (UNCPCJ) Branch and is developing the U.N. Online Crime and Justice Clearinghouse (UNOJUST) to link UNCPCJ institutes on

the World Wide Web.

As might be expected, many other components of

DOJ (e.g., some of the litigation divisions, the

Marshals Service, and the Bureau of Prisons) have

also provided assistance to foreign governments.

This has included advising governments about

draft statutes, meeting with visiting foreign delegations to discuss their areas of expertise, and like

areas. Such assistance has been provided on an ad

hoc basis, and these intermittent activities are not

discussed here.

The diverse DOJ international justice assistance

activities are coordinated within the Department

by the Executive Office for National Security

(EONS). EONS is a component of the Deputy

Attorney General’s office and, among other activities, convenes a working group of relevant Justice

Department organizations to share information on

international technical assistance and training. The

aims of the working group are to avoid duplication

of effort, to ensure that activities reflect DOJ’s

enforcement priorities, and to maximize the use of

departmental resources and other funding from

outside DOJ. In addition to representatives from

the various DOJ assistance programs, senior

officials of the Criminal Division also attend the

working group meetings to assist in coordination.

This section presents a brief overview of the

efforts of the nine Justice Department organizations, noted above, that are systematically involved

in international justice reform.

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The FBI is involved in a wide range of international criminal justice training and technical

assistance activities and is the Federal investigative

agency with the broadest law enforcement responsibility. In addition to transferring skills to its

foreign counterparts, the FBI reports that such

activities are extremely valuable in developing

close relationships between U.S. and foreign law

enforcement officials. Such relationships can lead

to the cooperation and communication across

borders that is essential to solving crimes.

FBI training programs take place in three major

settings: (1) at the International Law Enforcement

Academy (ILEA) in Budapest, (2) in foreign

countries in collaboration with local law enforcement agencies, and (3) at the FBI Academy in

Quantico, Virginia.

The International Law Enforcement Academy in

Budapest is a joint effort of the Government of

Hungary and the Government of the United States.

The U.S. Government agencies involved in the

development and operation of ILEA include the

Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury, and

their efforts are coordinated by the interagency

ILEA Steering Group. The FBI, DEA, Secret

Service, ATF, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and

Customs all participate in ILEA training programs.

Opening in 1995, with its formal dedication

ceremony taking place in April 1996, the Academy

offers an 8-week training program for law enforcement personnel from the nations of Eastern and
78

Central Europe and the former Soviet Union as

well as periodic seminars on various topics. The 8-

week program places particular emphasis on strategies for combating international crime, especially

financial and organized crime, and also teaches

leadership and management skills. The FBI academy is funded by the SEED and FSA.

Academy instructors are drawn from a number of

Federal agencies, including the FBI, DEA, Secret

Service, ATF, and the IRS. In addition, instructors

from law enforcement agencies in Canada and a

number of Western European nations have taught

at the academy.

The academy plans to hold five 8-week training

sessions each year, with 50 students per session. In

Fiscal Year (FY) 1996, academy students will be

drawn from Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia,

Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia,

Moldova, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.

The specific courses presented by Federal agencies

at ILEA are noted below in the discussions of the

individual agencies’ training and technical assistance activities.

In addition to the 8-week training course, ILEA

serves as a venue for conducting a wide variety of

briefer executive training seminars and related

advanced training programs. For example, the

Secret Service recently sponsored an advanced

course at ILEA on the topic of counterfeiting.

The FBI also provides in-country training to

foreign law enforcement officials. During FY

1995, approximately 4,400 law enforcement

personnel received such training. Before developing training programs, the FBI conducts in-country

training needs assessments to determine the specific priority training needs of individual nations.

Experienced FBI personnel serve as the teachers

for the typically 1- to 2-week training sessions.

Topics addressed have included organized crime,

bank robbery, terrorism, white-collar crime,

forensics, investigative skills (including undercover techniques), international automobile theft,

and other issues. Recent in-country training sessions have been held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan;

Vladimir, Russia; Prague, Czech Republic; and

Warsaw, Poland.

Some additional training programs for foreign law

enforcement personnel are conducted at the FBI

Academy in Quantico, Virginia. For example,

between January and March 1996, 150 officers of

the Russian Ministry of Interior (MVD) received

training there. In addition, foreign officers participate in the FBI National Academy Program at

Quantico, which primarily serves State and local

law enforcement personnel from this country. In

FY 1995, 110 foreign law enforcement personnel

were trained in this program along with State and

local personnel.

International technical assistance provided by the

FBI takes many forms. FBI legal attachés, stationed in 23 countries around the world, work

closely with local law enforcement personnel to

share information and collaborate in working on

important cases. In the course of this work, they

often provide advice and assistance to their counterparts. In FY 1995, FBI attachés worked on more

than 11,000 matters.

In some particularly challenging case investigations, the FBI brought foreign case investigators to

the United States to work closely with FBI personnel. FBI agents provide their foreign counterparts

with information regarding the investigative

techniques used in the United States to solve

similar complex cases. Such assistance is particularly helpful with difficult investigations involving

organized crime.

In addition, the FBI has sent personnel to other

countries to offer advice on practical matters in

developing law enforcement agencies. For example, an agent has worked with the government

of Kazakhstan in that nation’s effort to develop an

investigative agency similar to the FBI.

Drug Enforcement Administration

The Drug Enforcement Administration has provided international training and technical assis-
79

tance for many years in support of its mission to

combat drugs. The State Department’s Bureau of

International Narcotics Matters (INM) and its

successor agency, the current Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,

have provided funding for DEA’s overseas training

and technical assistance. More recently, additional

funding has been provided from the SEED and

FSA legislation, noted above, for training in

Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet

Union. These funds are also managed by INL.

A variety of types of training courses are offered.

Basic drug enforcement classes taught in-country

are 2-week training programs shaped to local

conditions in a given nation. Instructors are highly

experienced DEA agents. The foreign law enforcement officials who enroll in this course typically

have had limited drug enforcement experience.

Topics covered include basic investigative techniques, surveillance skills, and related areas. The

courses are offered to officials in nations around

the world who are confronting significant drug

enforcement problems (e.g., Brazil, Costa Rica,

Haiti, Pakistan, and Taiwan).

The DEA offers its International Narcotics Enforcement Managers Seminar twice each year. The

seminar is attended by mid- to senior-level law

enforcement officials who are working on drug

enforcement operations in their countries. They

learn management and leadership skills in addition

to receiving information about drug enforcement

strategies.

The DEA’s allocation from SEED and FSA funds

is supporting an ambitious program of training in

Eastern and Central Europe and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. This

funding supports training in specific countries and

DEA participation in the training program of the

International Law Enforcement Academy.

Course sessions offered by DEA at ILEA cover a

broad range of issues and include narcotics program overview/demand reduction, worldwide drug

trafficking routes and trends, drug identification

and behavioral effects of narcotics use, drug field

testing, informant management, case management,

intelligence operations, undercover operations,

clandestine laboratory operations, drug conspiracy

investigations, raid planning, airport/seaport

operations, international controlled deliveries, and

risk management.

Some training programs are held in-country for

specific nations; others are held regionally. For the

current fiscal year, FSA funds will support nine incountry and four regional schools, and SEED

funds will support seven in-country and three

regional schools. Moscow will be the site for one

of the regional programs, and law enforcement

personnel from six nations will be represented at

the session.

The DEA also conducts some training sessions in

the United States for foreign law enforcement

personnel. Topics vary, and typically three to four

DEA instructors serve as teachers. All DEA

instructors must have a minimum of 10 years’

experience with the agency. In addition, the DEA

provides technical assistance to foreign law enforcement personnel through its field offices

overseas. DEA personnel posted abroad play a

valuable role in working on specific cases with

their foreign counterparts and providing them

information about advanced investigative techniques to deal with such cases.

Criminal Division: International Criminal

Investigative Training Assistance Program

The Criminal Division’s International Criminal

Investigative Training Assistance Program provides a wide array of law enforcement training

programs. A component of the Justice Department’s

Criminal Division, ICITAP’s stated mission is “to

develop sound civilian police organizations that

operate under internationally recognized human

rights standards within sustainable justice systems.”4

ICITAP offers courses in basic police procedures,

forensic testing, and specialized investigative
80

techniques for handling various types of cases,

including organized crime, financial crime, and

alien smuggling. Instructors are highly experienced law enforcement personnel. In addition,

ICITAP personnel train law enforcement trainers

in various nations to institutionalize an ongoing

capacity for police training.

ICITAP has delivered technical assistance in a

wide variety of areas. It has been provided to

develop police academies, forensic testing capabilities, law enforcement department policies and

procedures, and central offices of professional

responsibility to encourage accountability and

integrity among law enforcement personnel.

ICITAP’s efforts to develop police academies

include assistance in structuring the curriculums

and training instructors to make the effort sustainable. The core curriculums include such topics as

Policing in a Democracy, Human Dignity, Police

Ethics, Community Oriented Policing, Police

Functions, Interviewing Techniques, and Firearms

and Personal Defense Training.

ICITAP began operations in 1986 and since then

has worked in 26 countries, including nations

throughout Central and South America and the

Caribbean, the newly independent states of the

former Soviet Union and, recently, in the Balkans

and Central Africa. Countries or regions that now

receive or have recently received ICITAP assistance

include Albania, Belarus, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa

Rica, Dominican Republic, Eastern Slavonia, El

Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico,

Panama, and Rwanda.

The training and technical assistance programs of

ICITAP have led to the development of a number

of regional law enforcement coordinating bodies,

including the Central American Chiefs of Police

Association (CACPA) and the Association of

Caribbean Commissioners of Police (ACCP).

Criminal Division: Office of Professional

Development and Training

The Office of Professional Development and

Training is also a component of DOJ’s Criminal

Division. It was established in 1991 to provide inhouse training for Criminal Division staff as well

as to provide training and technical assistance to

prosecutors in other nations. In nations in which

the judges who initially receive cases have an

investigative function akin to that of U.S. prosecutors—a common practice in Latin America—

training is also provided to these investigating

magistrates.

OPDAT is currently providing assistance to prosecutors and other judicial personnel overseas in

Bolivia, Colombia, Haiti, Peru, Russia, and Poland. These far-reaching programs have included

training in prosecution and oral advocacy skills

and in the provision of new criminal procedural

legislation. The programs also provide assistance

with the development and management of prosecutors’ offices, the drafting of legislation to reform

justice system institutions and procedures, and

related matters. OPDAT field representatives,

drawn primarily from the Criminal Division and

the Executive Office for United States Attorneys,

are all experienced prosecutors.

OPDAT assistance in Bolivia began in 1993 with

placement of an OPDAT field representative in La

Paz. Within the first year of operations in Bolivia,

the program trained more than 800 judges, prosecutors, police, and public defenders in important

revisions in the nation’s laws on prosecution.

OPDAT has also helped the Bolivian Attorney

General develop model prosecutors’ offices and

has worked in collaboration with the Attorney

General to develop a prosecutor’s procedures

manual and a computer case tracking system.

As a result of its accomplishments in Bolivia,

OPDAT was asked to establish a similar program

in Colombia. An OPDAT representative is developing a training program for the almost 3,000

Colombian prosecutors, and OPDAT personnel, in

collaboration with USAID, are training the faculty

of the new Colombian prosecutor’s school.

In Haiti, beginning in early 1995, OPDAT developed a training program for the country’s 500
81

prosecutors and judges, an effort undertaken in

conjunction with the National Center for State

Courts. OPDAT has also assisted the Ministry of

Justice of Haiti in developing a judicial school and

in preparing a benchbook for judges and prosecutors dealing with criminal justice procedures.

In Peru, OPDAT has assigned two Criminal Division trial attorneys to assist in revising that

nation’s criminal procedural code. As is the case

with many reformed Latin American criminal

procedural codes, the revised code in Peru will

provide for oral trials and increase the role of the

prosecutor in case processing.

OPDAT has sent two Justice Department attorneys

to Moscow to provide ongoing assistance to

Russian justice system officials in prosecuting

economic crime and organized crime, and in

related matters. They have also provided extensive

advice in drafting legislation to reform the Russian

legal system. OPDAT is working in collaboration

with the American Bar Association’s Central and

East European Law Initiative (CEELI) in a number

of its efforts.

OPDAT has also hosted many foreign justice

system delegations to the United States. For

example, in 1994, OPDAT received requests for

more than 350 meetings with foreign officials and

made presentations to more than 500 international

visitors. These presentations provided overviews

of the U.S. justice system and dealt with technical

topics such as money laundering, organized crime,

asset forfeiture, and the like, depending on the

visitors’ interests.

Criminal Division: Office of International Affairs

The Criminal Division’s Office of International

Affairs has several important roles in the international criminal justice arena. A number of them

involve dealings between the U.S. justice system

and counterpart agencies in other individual

countries. For example, the OIA provides assistance to U.S. Attorneys and State and local prosecutors in obtaining evidence from foreign justice

system agencies. The Office also works on extradition matters and is involved in the negotiation of

Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties with other

nations; these bilateral agreements seek to improve

cooperation between governments in handling

criminal matters.

OIA also works very actively with multilateral

organizations, including the U.N. Crime Commission, the G–7/P8, the Council of Europe, the

European Union, the Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the

Organization of American States. Personnel from

OIA were recently involved in drafting the P8

40-point set of recommendations to combat

transnational crime and the U.N. drafting of the

Declaration on Crime and Public Security.

One staff member from OIA is on detail to the

U.S. Agency for International Development. This

staff member provides information to that agency

on Justice Department capacities, interests, and

recommendations related to rule-of-law efforts

being planned by USAID.

Executive Office for United States Attorneys

As noted above, the Executive Office for United

States Attorneys has served as a major source of

personnel for OPDAT. OPDAT sends requests for

attorneys with specific experience, legal skills, and

language skills to EOUSA, the Criminal Division,

and elsewhere, as appropriate. Some overseas

assignments are relatively brief (2 or 3 weeks)

while others involve long-term placements abroad

(e.g., the Bolivian, Colombian, and Russian examples cited above). One major challenge is to fit

such assignments into the caseloads of busy,

experienced attorneys. Assistant U.S. Attorneys

who are selected to provide training and technical

assistance overseas first receive orientation and

training at OPDAT. They are also tested by

OPDAT to ensure that their language skills are

sufficient for the assignment.
82

Immigration and Naturalization Service

The Immigration and Naturalization Service conducts an Overseas Fraudulent Document Detection

Training Program. The training is provided by

experienced overseas INS personnel, with assistance from other INS components, including the

Inspections Division. Trainees include representatives of air carriers, immigration authorities, law

enforcement agencies, airport security, foreign

consular officials, border police, and others.

The training program is coordinated by INS

district offices in Mexico, Rome, and Bangkok,

with training sessions held in countries located in

these three districts. In June 1996 more than 1,100

people were trained in Mexico, El Salvador,

Panama, Belize, Nicaragua, Great Britain, Austria,

Germany, and Thailand. In FY 1995, 11,702

people were trained by the Overseas Fraudulent

Document Training Program, a number that included 5,455 foreign governmental officials, 5,652

airline personnel, and 595 others (including U.S.

Embassy and consular officers).

In addition, INS personnel provide one-on-one

training to their counterparts in many nations to

teach them how to detect fraudulent documents.

Antitrust Division

The Antitrust Division, in collaboration with the

Federal Trade Commission, has provided assistance

to more than 20 countries in competition law and

policy issues. These countries are in many regions

of the world, including Eastern and Central Europe

and the former Soviet Union, Latin America and

the Caribbean, and Africa. USAID has funded

most of this training and technical assistance.

In some instances two-person teams comprising an

attorney and an economist have been assigned to

relevant foreign agencies to provide long-term

assistance (for 3- to 8-month periods). These

advisers work with their counterparts in economic

competition agencies on a daily basis to assist with

reforms in agency operations. The types of assistance provided have included assistance in legal

and regulation drafting, staff training, provision of

information regarding methods of competition

analysis and relevant investigative techniques, and

discussions of specific cases or problems in a

particular sector of the nation’s economy.

In other nations, assistance is provided on a shortterm basis for 1 to 2 weeks. Such shorter-term

visits address specific competition issues. The

Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission have also sponsored internships in Washington for foreign officials for periods up to 6 weeks.

National Institute of Justice

The National Institute of Justice is the research and

development arm of the U.S. Department of

Justice. NIJ is involved in international justice

reform issues in a variety of ways, including

sponsorship of conferences, conduct of clearinghouse and dissemination activities, sponsorship of

research and visiting fellows, and maintenance of

cooperative relationships with multilateral organizations. NIJ has sponsored conferences in a wide

variety of topic areas during the past 25 years.

Many have relevance to ongoing foreign and

domestic justice reforms. In December 1995 NIJ

cosponsored a workshop on “Policing in Emerging

Democracies” with the State Department; the

meeting was attended by representatives of 19

Federal agencies, participants from Russia and

Ukraine, leading scholars, and others.

NIJ has been very active in conducting information

clearinghouse and dissemination activities. It

sponsors the world’s largest criminal justice

system clearinghouse, the National Criminal

Justice Reference Service (NCJRS), which has a

library of more than 130,000 documents. NCJRS

has placed substantial resources on the Internet,

including many international materials and links to

other international sources of information. At a

recent U.N. Congress, an NIJ official characterized

NCJRS Online as “the beginning of a worldwide

justice library without walls from which the inter-
83

national criminal justice community can access

information in order to improve the operations of

the criminal justice system around the world.”5

NIJ has conducted research on a very broad range

of criminal justice issues during the past quarter

century and, in the international area, has funded

studies of Colombian drug trafficking, money

laundering, Asian organized crime, and Soviet

emigré-organized crime networks. The field of

international justice reform is an extremely important one and merits intensive research to determine

what works and what strategies should be pursued

in different settings. Further efforts are needed to

collect, consolidate, and analyze the experience

and results of the various training, police support,

and rule-of-law efforts so that the findings can

inform future initiatives.

The Institute recently hosted four Visiting Fellows

from the newly independent states who were

conducting research dealing with such topics as

organized crime and police integrity. In the past

NIJ has hosted Visiting Fellows from Italy, Israel,

Ukraine, Denmark, and the United Kingdom.

NIJ has growing ties with the United Nations and

is an affiliate research institute of the United

Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice

Branch. NIJ is developing the United Nations

Online Crime and Justice Clearinghouse. Currently

in the prototype stage, this system will link the 11

national and regional institutes affiliated with the

United Nations on the World Wide Web. It will

make NIJ information that is machine translated in

six languages widely available. It will also make

information from the foreign institutes available to

Federal, State, and local justice system officials in

the United States. Such linkages will greatly

increase the U.N. institutes’ capacity for information sharing and collaboration. UNOJUST development is being funded by the State Department’s

Office of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. In addition, NIJ has already developed the Rule of Law Online World Wide Web site

to provide relevant information to the states that

emerged from the former Soviet Union.

U.S. Agency for International Development

The U.S. Agency for International Development

has been involved in the international justice

reform arena since the mid-1980s. A recent policy

paper developed by USAID estimates that the

agency expended over $220 million for rule-of-law

programs between the mid-1980s and 1995.6

 This

figure includes both criminal justice and civil

justice reform efforts.

USAID rule-of-law efforts began in Central and

Latin America and have spread to many other

regions of the world, including Eastern and Central

Europe and the former Soviet Union, Africa, Asia,

and the Near East. Rule-of-law programs within

these regions have typically been developed by

USAID personnel assigned to in-country missions

in collaboration with local justice system officials

and personnel from USAID’s regional offices in

Washington. The recent reorganization of USAID

has resulted in the development of a Center for

Democracy and Governance at USAID. Fostering

the rule of law is a primary concern of USAID’s

Center, and this reorganization has increased the

centralization of analysis and rule-of-law planning

on a global basis.

Brian Atwood, the administrator of USAID,

recently commented on the role USAID plays in

the justice reform field, stating, “USAID rule-oflaw programs complement U.S. law enforcement

interests by focusing on the long-term development needs of the justice system. USAID’s focus

on institutional strengthening reinforces and

amplifies the benefits of law enforcement training

by creating strong, sustainable institutions in

which individuals, once trained, see their efforts

pay off when the legal system functions properly.

Without the long-term approach, short-term training efforts stand less chance of taking root.”7

USAID rule-of-law programs are typically multifaceted. Many programs involve fundamental

reform of the legislation underlying the justice

system, including substantive and procedural

criminal codes and statutes underpinning the
84

courts, prosecution, and police. In addition, programs typically include efforts to strengthen

justice system institutions, such as training and

technical assistance for judges, prosecutors, public

defenders, and members of the private bar. USAID

has provided funding for the Justice Department’s

ICITAP and OPDAT efforts to improve the skills

of police and prosecutors. Some USAID rule-oflaw programs have also sought to strengthen civil

society support for justice reform as well as to

increase the nations’ capacity to investigate justice

system problems and promote reforms and adherence to generally recognized human rights standards in the administration of justice. Furthermore,

innovative approaches, such as the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, have been

supported in many nations as part of USAID ruleof-law programs. USAID programs seek to

strengthen the independence of the judiciary and

the efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, and

accessibility of justice systems. Major USAID

rule-of-law programs have been developed in

many nations, including Russia, Ukraine, Colombia, Guatemala, Panama, Haiti, the Philippines,

and Sri Lanka.

U.S. Department of State

Two major components of the State Department

are involved in international justice reform: the

Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs and the Bureau for Democracy,

Human Rights, and Labor (DRL). The work of

each Bureau is discussed in turn.

Bureau for International Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs

The Bureau for International Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs plays a major role in many

facets of the international justice assistance arena.

INL chairs a Law Enforcement Interagency Working Group that seeks to coordinate international

law enforcement assistance and administration of

justice efforts. During the past 2 years the working

group has had approximately $32 million in funds

from the SEED and FSA acts available for international training and technical assistance in Eastern

and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union

and an additional $10 million for such assistance

in other areas of the world. For the most part, these

activities are carried out by law enforcement

agencies of the Departments of Justice and Treasury. These funds have also supported the development and operation of the International Law

Enforcement Academy in Budapest, discussed

earlier. The Academy received approximately $3

million during the past year, and a subgroup of the

Law Enforcement Interagency Working Group, the

ILEA Steering Group, has conducted the planning

for ILEA.

The Interagency Working Group meetings bring

together representatives of many organizations

including the FBI, DEA, ICITAP, OPDAT, Secret

Service, ATF, IRS, Customs, Financial Crimes

Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the Federal Law

Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), the Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security,

its Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and

Labor, and the U.S. Agency for International

Development.

INL is also actively involved in a working group

that is drafting the international crime bill (discussed in the introductory section of this paper) as

well as in efforts to dismantle money-laundering

havens, and efforts to target the Colombian Cali

cartel’s assets. Other INL activities include working on the Stolen Cars Initiative in cooperation

with the National Insurance Crime Bureau, cochairing (with INS) an Interagency Working Group

on Alien Smuggling, assisting in the development

of the Bosnian and Haitian police forces, and

chairing an Interagency Working Group on Nigerian Crime. The Bureau of International Narcotics

and Law Enforcement Affairs has personnel

detailed to it from the FBI, Customs, INS, Coast

Guard, and other law enforcement agencies in

order to enhance coordination across agencies.
85

INL is involved in a number of cooperative activities with the United Nations. INL played a major

role in drafting the U.N. Declaration on Crime and

Public Security, and the Bureau’s Deputy Assistant

Secretary of State led the U.S. delegation to the

U.N. Crime Commission meeting in May 1996. In

partnership with NIJ, INL is funding the UNOJUST

system, discussed above, linking all U.N.-affiliated

crime institutes on the World Wide Web. INL is

also funding HEUNI, a U.N.-affiliated institute in

Helsinki, to expand its existing database on law

enforcement training programs relevant to

nations in Eastern and Central Europe and the

newly independent states. The database will

include completed, ongoing, and future training

programs. INL is also working with institutions

of the European Union (EU) and encouraging EU

participation at the International Law Enforcement

Academy in Budapest.

INL has been active in the P8 Senior Experts

Group on Transnational Organized Crime and

contributed to the recently approved P8 40-point

plan discussed earlier.

Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and

Labor

The Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and

Labor chairs the Interagency Working Group on

Democracy and Human Rights. This working

group was established at the direction of the

National Security Council in 1994 following a

review of democracy assistance programs throughout the government. It is responsible for monitoring

human rights and democracy programs. Its members include representatives of the Departments of

Justice, Treasury, Defense, and Commerce as well

as USAID, USIA, CIA, and other agencies. This

working group provides broad policy and priority

coordination in the democracy and human rights

area, and representatives from DRL sit on other

related working groups involved directly in resource allocation, such as the INL and Law Enforcement Interagency Working Group.

U.S. Department of the Treasury

This section presents brief summaries of the work

of the U.S. Secret Service, ATF, and the Financial

Crimes Enforcement Network. The Internal Revenue Service and the U.S. Customs Service also

provide some assistance in their specialized areas

of expertise, including presentation of courses at

ILEA.

U.S. Secret Service

The U.S. Secret Service provides international

training and technical assistance dealing with its

areas of specialization in financial crime detection

and investigation. Training sessions are conducted

by highly experienced Secret Service personnel,

with most sessions held overseas. Countries in

which training has recently been conducted include, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and

Turkey. The bulk of the funding for this international training has been received from SEED and

FSA funds administered by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.

The Secret Service provides training in the investigation of currency counterfeiting, credit card fraud

(including counterfeit credit cards, altered credit

cards, and fraudulent use of credit card account

numbers), and telecommunications fraud (e.g., the

encoding of microchips for cloning cellular telephones to mimic the identity of a legitimate account holder, and related frauds). Secret Service

training programs include discussions of actual

cases to demonstrate the complexity of investigating

financial crimes. The technology and tools available to law enforcement to combat such crime are

reviewed.

The Secret Service teaches a part of the ILEA

curriculum in Budapest. Sessions presented include Technical Features of Genuine Currency,

Production of Counterfeit Currency, Principles of

Counterfeit Investigation, Managing Counterfeit

Investigations, Counterfeit Lab (providing practical experience), International Trends in Counter-
86

feiting, Access Device (i.e. credit card) investigations, and Protection Overview.

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

ATF conducts international training in its areas of

specialization, including (1) international firearms

trafficking, (2) gang activities, including discussion of the ATF Gang Resistance Education and

Training Program (GREAT), and (3) postblast

investigation. As is the case for the other Federal

agencies, ATF trainers are highly experienced

agents. ATF’s international training is supported by

SEED and FSA funds. Nations in Eastern and

Central Europe and the former Soviet Union have

experienced considerable problems with firearms

because many weapons were discarded or sold by

soldiers when they were demobilized.

ATF training is conducted overseas for the most

part, but postblast investigation training is typically

provided at the Federal Law Enforcement Training

Center in Glynco, Georgia. ATF personnel teach

part of the ILEA curriculum and current courses

on gangs and gang resistance as well as on firearms.

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network

FinCEN accumulates, analyzes, and disseminates

information on financial crimes and places particular emphasis on drug money laundering. FinCEN

was developed in 1990 by the Treasury Department, and in addition to its own staff has personnel

from the FBI, DEA, ATF, Postal Inspector’s Office,

Coast Guard, and nine other agencies who serve

2- to 3-year assignments.

FinCEN literature indicates that its mission is “to

provide a governmentwide, multisource intelligence and analytical network to support law

enforcement and regulatory agencies in the detection, investigation, and prosecution of financial

crimes.” FinCEN maintains a number of computer

databases to carry out its work. These include (1)

Treasury’s Financial Database, with reports filed in

response to the requirements of the Bank Secrecy

Act (basically, currency transactions over $10,000

and international transport of currency and monetary instruments of more than $10,000); (2)

databases owned and administered by Federal law

enforcement and regulatory agencies; and (3)

publicly available commercial databases that

include business and marketing records and demographic data.

FinCEN analysts prepare reports for a variety of

law enforcement agencies throughout the government and seek to identify patterns of money

laundering and related financial crimes. FinCEN

personnel have been very active in the Financial

Action Task Force (FATF). FATF members include

the 26 members of the Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development plus Hong Kong

and Singapore. FATF is working to strengthen

worldwide anti-money-laundering regulations and

enforcement. The members of FATF have all

agreed to develop organizations similar to

FinCEN. A Caribbean Financial Action Task Force

(CATF) has also been established, and these

nations are also interested in developing financial

intelligence units similar in purpose to FinCEN.

FinCEN officials are encouraging the development

of financial intelligence units around the world and

working with various multilateral groups (including FATF, CATF, and Interpol) to foster such

efforts. Such a global network would be useful in

combating money laundering by reducing the

capacity of criminals to hide illegally obtained

assets.

U.S. Information Agency

The U.S. Information Agency (USIA) has sponsored a wide variety of exchanges between U.S.

and foreign justice system agencies. These exchange programs have exposed foreign justice

system officials to many aspects of the U.S. justice

system and have encouraged collaboration in

reform. Similarly, U.S. justice system personnel

have visited foreign justice system agencies, have

presented discussions of reforms in the U.S., and

have learned about the problems encountered by

the foreign justice systems.
87

USIA officials stress that exchange programs not

only result in transferring technical skills but also

in building relationships among professionals and

in critically increasing foreign officials’ understanding of how democratic values have become

embedded in U.S. institutions. USIA personnel

indicate that their programs seek to strengthen the

“culture of democracy” in nations with emerging

democratic systems as well as to help with the

“technology of democracy” through the transfer of

technical information on promising reforms.

USIA has had a number of partners in its efforts

and has funded exchange programs sponsored by

the Federal Judicial Center (FJC), the Central and

East European Law Initiative (CEELI) of the

American Bar Association, and the Bureau of

Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (and its

successor, the Bureau of Democracy, Human

Rights, and Labor of the State Department), and

many others.

USAID exchange visits have dealt with a broad

array of issues. For example, a USAID delegation

of Russian officials visited the United States to

learn about the jury system and how it might be

structured in Russia and adapted to local needs and

conditions. Judges and prosecutors have visited the

United States from many Latin American nations

to observe our adversary system of justice and

explore the elements of this system that might be

beneficial to their judicial systems.

Conclusion

As the above brief review indicates, many Federal

agencies are conducting international justice

assistance efforts. This technical assistance and

training can be of great use in combating transnational crime and can also strengthen fragile

emerging democracies as they seek to consolidate

democratic governance. Recent initiatives by the

G–7/P8, the United Nations, and the Federal

Government suggest that the demand for international justice assistance is growing rapidly.

Much remains to be done in this important field.

Most observers agree on the need for broad information sharing and effective coordination. In

addition, increased analysis and understanding of

what works in the fight against crime is essential.

Developments in this field have moved rapidly,

and little time has been available to reflect upon

what strategies, or combinations of strategies, are

most promising for combating transnational crime

and developing sustainable reforms in foreign

justice systems. Over time it will be helpful to

develop a more detailed understanding of the

major problems confronted by foreign justice

systems and the implications of these justice

system weaknesses for U.S. interests in combating

transnational crime. Such information can provide

the basis for the systematic prioritization of U.S.

assistance in this critical field.

Notes

1. Statement of Jamie S. Gorelick, then Deputy

Attorney General, before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations at

Hearings on Democracy, Rule of Law, and Police

Training Assistance (December 7, 1995), pp. 11–12.

2. United Nations Declaration on Crime and Public

Security approved by the U.N. Commission on

Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in Vienna,

May 1996.

3. Hearing before the Committee on International

Relations, House of Representatives, on

Democracy, Rule of Law, and Police Training

Assistance (December 7, 1995), p. 4.

4. International Criminal Investigative Training

Assistance Program Overview Document

(undated).

5. Statement by Martin Lively presented at the

Ninth United Nations Congress on the Prevention

of Crime and Treatment of Offenders, Cairo, Egypt

(April 29–May 8, 1995), and excerpted in a summary of “NCJRS International Activities” on the

NCJRS Justice Information Center Web site.
88

6. Policy and Implementation Options for Rule of

Law in USAID. Democracy and Governance

Policy Paper No. 1 (February 27, 1995).

7. Testimony of the Honorable J. Brian Atwood,

Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International

Development, before the House Committee on

International Relations (December 7, 1995), p. 50.
89

Yury Antonyan

Principal Researcher

Research Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the

Russian Federation

Kutuzovsky Prospect 19, Apt. 47

Moscow

Russia

011–240–4369

011–290–3613

Virginia Baldau

Director, Program Development Division

Office of Development and Dissemination

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

U.S.A.

202–514–6204

202–307–6394

baldau@justice.usdoj.org

Frederick Baron

Director

Executive Office for National Security

U.S. Department of Justice

10th Street and Constitution Avenue N.W., Room 4119

Washington, DC 20530

U.S.A.

202–514–6753

202–307–0097

David Bayley

Dean and Professor

School of Criminal Justice

State University of New York at Albany

135 Western Avenue

Albany, NY 12222

U.S.A.

518–442–5215

518–442–5603

dbayley@cnsvax.albany.edu

Marlene Beckman

Special Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General

Office of the Assistant Attorney General

Office of Justice Programs

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

U.S.A.

202–616–3562

202–514–7805

Michael Berkow

Chief of Police

Coachella Police Department

1515 Sixth Street

Coachella, CA 92236

U.S.A.

619–398–0101

619–398–3802

Fred Borakove

Senior Analyst

Criminal Investigation Division

Internal Revenue Service

U.S. Department of the Treasury

1111 Constitution Avenue N.W.

Washington, DC 20224

U.S.A.

202–622–4120

202–622–9250

Stephanie Bourque

Program Manager

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

U.S.A.

202–307–2955

202–307–6394

Appendix B:

Workshop Attendees*

*Current as of 1995.
90

Douglas Cassel

Professor and Executive Director

International Human Rights Law Institute

DePaul University College of Law

25 East Jackson

Chicago, IL 60604

U.S.A.

312–362–5920

312–362–5923

dcassel@condor.depaul.edu

Sergey Chapkey

International Visiting Fellow

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

U.S.A.

202–307–2942

202–307–6394

Paul Chevigny

Professor

New York University School of Law

40 Washington Square South

New York, NY 10012

U.S.A.

212–998–6249

212–995–3156

chevigny@acfcluster.nyu.edu

Dan Corsentino

Sheriff

Pueblo County Sheriff’s Department

909 Court Street

Pueblo, CO 81003

U.S.A.

719–583–6131

719–583–6143

Michael Dalich

Special Assistant

Office of Justice Programs

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

U.S.A.

202–616–3203

202–514–9065

Steven Edwards

Program Manager

Office of Research and Evaluation

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

U.S.A.

202–307–2942

202–307–6394

Robert Gelbard

Assistant Secretary

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs

(Currently Special Representative to the President and the

Secretary of State for the Implementation of the Dayton

Peace Accords)

U.S. Department of State

2201 C Street N.W., Room 6219

Washington, DC 20520

U.S.A.

202–647–3774

202–647–0939

William Geller

Associate Director

Police Executive Research Forum

2116 Thornwood Avenue

Wilmette, IL 60091–1452

U.S.A.

708–256–0017

708–256–0111

wageller@aol.com

Susan Ginsburg

Senior Advisor

Office of the Under Secretary (Enforcement)

U.S. Department of the Treasury

1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, Room 4412

Washington, DC 20220

U.S.A.

202–622–1496

202–622–7301

susan.ginsburg@tres.sprint.com
91

Herman Goldstein

Professor Emeritus

School of Law

University of Wisconsin

975 Bascom Hall

Madison, WI 53706

U.S.A.

608–262–1227

608–262–5485

hgold@macc.wisc.edu

David Harrell

Director

International Training Division

U.S. Customs Service

U.S. Department of the Treasury

1301 Constitution Avenue N.W.

Washington, DC 20523

U.S.A.

202–927–0624

202–927–8295

Philip Heymann

Professor

School of Law

Harvard University

522 Hauser Hall

Cambridge, MA 02138

U.S.A.

617–495–3137

617–495–1110

heymann@hulaw1.harvard.edu

Sally T. Hillsman

Assistant Director

National Institute of Justice

Office of Research and Evaluation

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

U.S.A.

202–307–2967

202–307–6394

David Holmes

Assistant Director of Training

U.S. Secret Service

U.S. Department of the Treasury

1800 G Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20523

U.S.A.

202–435–7180

202–435–7408

Langley James

Assistant for Foreign Internal Defense Policy Planning

U.S. Department of Defense

2500 Defense Pentagon

Washington, DC 20301–2500

U.S.A.

703–693–5208

703–693–0615

David Kalish

Commander

Los Angeles Police Department

150 North Los Angeles Street, Room 611

Los Angeles, CA 90012

U.S.A.

213–485–4018

213–237–0676

Raymond Kelly

President and Director

The Investigative Group International

(Currently Under Secretary [Enforcement]

U.S. Department of the Treasury

1500 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., Room 4330

Washington, DC 20220)

U.S.A.

202–622–0240

Carl Klockars

Professor

Division of Criminal Justice

University of Delaware

120 Timberline Drive

Newark, DE 19711

U.S.A.

302–368–1109

302–368–1337

klockars@udel.edu

Ginger Kyle

DUF Program Analyst

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

U.S.A.

202–307–2966

202–307–6394

kyle@justice.usdoj.gov
92

James Lassiter

Rome District Desk Officer

International Affairs

Immigration and Naturalization Service

425 I Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20536

U.S.A.

202–633–2411

202–633–3782

John Lee

Staff Coordinator

International Operating Programs

Drug Enforcement Agency

U.S. Department of Justice

700 Army-Navy Drive

Arlington, VA 22202

U.S.A.

202–307–4233

202–307–4154

G. Martin Lively

International Liaison

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

U.S.A.

202–514–6211

202–307–6394

lively@justice.usdoj.gov

Gerald Lynch

President

John Jay College of Criminal Justice

City University of New York

899 10th Avenue

New York, NY 10019

U.S.A.

212–237–8600

212–237–8607

LYNCH Johnjay@interport.net

Phyllis McDonald

Social Science Analyst

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

U.S.A.

202–616–3653

202–307–6394

pmcdonald@justice.usdoj.gov

William McDonald

Visiting Fellow

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

U.S.A.

202–616–9796

202–307–6394

Debra McFarland

Rule of Law Advisor

Global Bureau

U.S. Agency for International Development

2201 C Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20520

U.S.A.

202–736–7877

202–736–7892

Sam McQuade

Social Science Program Manager

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

U.S.A.

202–307–0200

202–307–6394

mcquades@justice.usdoj.gov

Fred Mecke

Director

Office of International Criminal Justice

U.S. Department of State

2201 C Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20520

U.S.A.

202–736–4551

202–736–4515

Lois Mock

Program Manager

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

U.S.A.

202–307–0693

202–307–6394
93

Mark Moore

Professor

Kennedy School of Government

Harvard University

79 John F. Kennedy Street, Room 206

Cambridge, MA 02138

U.S.A.

617–495–1113

617–496–6372

mark_moore@harvard.edu

Norval Morris

Professor Emeritus

School of Law

University of Chicago

1111 East 60th Street

Chicago, IL 60637

U.S.A.

312–702–9587

312–702–0730

norval_morris@law.uchicago.edu

Regina Nassen

Counsel on International Programs

U.S. Department of Justice

10th Street and Constitution Avenue N.W.

Washington, DC 20500

U.S.A.

202–514–8168

202–616–1080

Caroline Nicholl

Harkness Fellow

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

U.S.A.

202–307–0153

202–307–6394

nichollc@justice.usdoj.gov

Robert Perito

Deputy Director

International Criminal Investigative Training and

Assistance Program

U.S. Department of Justice

1255 22nd Street N.W., Suite 700

Washington, DC 20037

U.S.A.

202–653–9122

202–653–2280

Carol Petrie

Director

Planning and Management

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

U.S.A.

202–616–3674

202–307–6394

Jamie Phillips

Office of Congressional and Public Affairs

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

U.S.A.

202–616–7510

202–514–5958

Winifred Reed

Program Manager

Office of Research and Evaluation

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

U.S.A.

202–307–2952

202–307–6394

wreed@justice.usdoj.gov

Alan Ringgold

Deputy Assistant Director

International Relations Criminal Investigative Division

Federal Bureau of Investigation

U.S. Department of Justice

10th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., Room 7443

Washington, DC 20535

U.S.A.

202–324–5904

202–324–1096

Laurie Robinson

Assistant Attorney General

Office of Justice Programs

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

U.S.A.

202–307–5933

202–514–7805
94

Jeffrey Ian Ross

Social Science Analyst

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

U.S.A.

202–616–7036

202–307–6394

Luis Salas

Director

Center for the Administration of Justice

Florida International University

North Miami Campus

Academy 1, Room 225

2000 N.E. 145th Street

Miami, FL 33181

U.S.A.

305–940–5952

305–956–5485

salasl@servms.fiu.edu

Clifford Shearing

Professor and Director

Center of Criminology

University of Toronto

130 Saint George Street

Toronto, Ontario

Canada

416–978–3720

416–978–4195

Michael Smith

Professor

School of Law

University of Wisconsin

975 Bascom Hall

Madison, WI 56706

U.S.A.

608–263–7762

608–262–5485

mesmith4@facstaff.wisc.edu

Janice Stromsen

Director

International Criminal Investigative Training and

Assistance Program

U.S. Department of Justice

1255 22nd Street N.W., Suite 700

Washington, DC 20037

U.S.A.

202–653–9122

202–653–2280

Michael Sullivan

Deputy Commander

U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command

6010 Sixth Street

Fort Belvoir, VA 22060–5506

U.S.A.

703–806–0407

703–806–0417

sullivanm@cidc–belvoir.army.mil

Gary Thomas

Special Agent in Charge, International Enforcement

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms

U.S. Department of the Treasury

650 Massachusetts Avenue N.W.

Washington, DC 20530

U.S.A.

202–927–8500

202–927–8972

John Thomas

Program Manager

Office of Development and Dissemination

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

U.S.A.

202–514–6206

202–307–6394

angelicom@aol.com

R.J. Bankole Thompson

Professor

Police Studies Department

College of Law Enforcement

Eastern Kentucky University

Stratton, Room 467

Richmond, KY 40475

U.S.A.

606–622–1464

606–622–6392

Michael Tonry

Professor

School of Law

University of Minnesota

229 19th Avenue South

Minneapolis, MN 55455

U.S.A.

612–625–1314

612–625–2011
95

Jeremy Travis

Director

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

U.S.A.

202–307–2942

202–307–6394

travisje@justice.usdoj.gov

William Walsh

Director

Southern Police Institute

Department of Justice Administration

College of Arts and Sciences

University of Louisville

Louisville, KY 40202

U.S.A.

502–852–0330

502–852–0335

wfwals01@ulkyvm.louisville.edu

Richard Ward

Associate Chancellor for Special Programs

Executive Director of the Office of International Criminal

Justice

University of Illinois at Chicago

1033 West Van Buren, Suite 500

Chicago, IL 60607

U.S.A.

312–996–9595

312–413–0458

Deborah Wilson

Assistant University Provost

Co-Chair

Department of Justice Administration

College of Arts and Sciences

University of Louisville

Louisville, KY 40292–0001

U.S.A.

502–852–6153

502–852–0657

dgwils01@ulkyvm.louisville.edu

Jane Wiseman

National Institute of Justice

U.S. Department of Justice

810 Seventh Street N.W.

Washington, DC 20531

U.S.A.

202–616–3233

202–307–6394

wiseman@justice.usdoj.gov

Anatoly Zakalyuk

Deputy Chief

Ukrainian Academy of Internal Affairs

Yinogradny Pereulok 1/11, Apt. 75

Kiev–24

Ukraine

011–293–0156

Ugljesa Zvekic

Research Coordinator

United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice

Research Institute

Via Giulia 52

Rome 00186

Italy

011–687–7437

011–689–2638

202–616–3233
97

Appendix C:

Workshop Participants’ Biographies*

Yury Antonyan is a Distinguished Scientist of Russia,

Doctor of Law, Professor Emeritus, and a Principal Researcher of the All-Russian Research and Development

Institute of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian

Federation. He is also a leading researcher of the Serbsky

State Scientific Center for Social and Judicial Psychiatry.

Mr. Antonyan is the author of about 250 scientific publications, including more than 30 monographs and textbooks.

Major works include Social Environment and Formation of a

Criminal Personality (1975), Psychological Alienation of a

Person and Criminal Behavior (1987), Crime and Psychological Anomalies (1987), Criminal Psychopathology (1989),

Causes of Criminal Behavior (1992), Crime Among Women

(1992), Sexual Crimes (1993), Punishment and Rehabilitation of Offenders (1994), and Cruelty in Our Life (1995).

David Bayley is Dean and Professor in the School of

Criminal Justice, State University of New York at Albany. He

is a specialist in international criminal justice, with a

particular interest in policing. He has done extensive research

in India, Japan, Australia, Canada, Britain, Singapore, and

the United States. His work has focused on strategies of

policing, the evolution of police organizations, organizational

reform, accountability, and the tactics of patrol officers in

discretionary law enforcement situations.

Professor Bayley’s most recent publication, Police for the

Future (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), is based

upon field research in Australia, Canada, Great Britain,

Japan, and the United States.

Other major publications include Forces of Order: Policing

Modern Japan (University of California Press, 1991);

Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis

(Rutgers University Press, 1985); The New Blue Line: Police

Innovation in Six American Cities (The Free Press, 1986) and

Community Policing: The Singapore Story (Washington,

D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1988), both with Jerome

H. Skolnick; A Model of Community Policing: The Singapore

Story (Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice, 1989),

and “The Organization of the Police in English-Speaking

Countries,” in Modern Policing (University of Chicago Press,

1992). He has also written Police and Political Development

in India (Princeton University Press, 1969) and “The Police

and Political Development in Europe,” in Charles Tilly (ed.),

The Formation of National States in Western Europe

(Princeton University Press, 1975).

Professor Bayley has a B.A. degree from Denison University

(1955), an M.A. from Oxford University (1957), and a Ph.D.

from Princeton University (1960).

Michael Berkow is the Chief of Police in Coachella,

California. He is also currently a Police Project Manager for

the U.S. Department of Justice’s International Criminal

Investigative Training Assistance Program. Two major

aspects of this latter position have been his roles in the

Somalia Police Project and the Haiti National Police Project.

In both of these efforts, he was the project manager. The

Somalia project was the first police development project by

the Department of Justice outside the Western Hemisphere.

In both instances, his responsibilities have included building

police academies, providing technical and infrastructure

assistance, and helping to create civilian police forces.

Previously, Mr. Berkow was a member of the Rochester

Police Department, where he served for 17 years, working

his way up from a uniformed patrol officer to the rank of

Lieutenant. In this position, he served as confidential

assistant to the Chief of Police and was responsible for

sensitive criminal investigations and special projects.

Mr. Berkow also has considerable teaching experience. In

1986, he was an Adjunct Professor at the State University of

New York, Brockport. He has taught at various police

academies and training sites, including Northwestern

University; the Connecticut State Police Academy; and the

Orlando, Florida, Police Academy. Currently, he is a member

of the adjunct faculty at the International Association of

Chiefs of Police in Alexandria, Virginia.

Mr. Berkow received his Bachelor’s degree from Kalamazoo

College in Arts, Sociology, and Public Policy. He went on to

receive his J.D. from the Syracuse University College of

Law. He has also attended the FBI National Law Institute,

the FBI National Academy, and the New York State Municipal Police Training Council. Mr. Berkow is the author of

*Current as of December 1995.
98

numerous publications and belongs to several professional

associations.

Lee P. Brown is Director of the White House Office of

National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). Previously, Dr.

Brown was a Distinguished Professor at Texas Southern

University and Director of the University’s Black Male

Initiative Program. From 1990 to 1992 he served as New

York City Police Commissioner and as Atlanta’s Public

Safety Commissioner from 1978 to 1982.

Dr. Brown began his career in law enforcement in 1960, as a

patrolman in San Jose, California. After 8 years, he moved to

Portland, Oregon, and established the Department of

Administration of Justice at Portland State University. In

1972, he joined Howard University in Washington, D.C., as

Associate Director of the Institute for Urban Affairs and

Research. He held the titles of Professor of Public Administration and Director of Criminal Justice Programs. Dr. Brown

returned to Portland in 1975 to serve as Sheriff of

Multnomah County. The following year, he was appointed

Director of Justice Services, a department composed of all

the county’s criminal justice agencies.

Dr. Brown is a past president of the International Association

of Chiefs of Police and is involved in a number of professional and community organizations. He has written many

articles and papers on police management, community

policing, and the criminal justice system. He is coauthor of

Police and Society: An Environment for Collaboration and

Confrontation.

Dr. Brown received a Doctorate in Criminology from the

University of California at Berkeley in 1970, a Master’s

degree in Criminology from the University of California at

Berkeley in 1968, a Master’s degree in Sociology from San

Jose State University in 1964, and a Bachelor’s degree in

Criminology from Fresno State University in 1961.

Douglas Cassel is Executive Director of the International

Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul University College of

Law in Chicago, and of its Jeanne and Joseph Sullivan

Program for Human Rights in the Americas. He teaches

international human rights law in DePaul’s College of Law

and in the Institute’s training programs for lawyers and

judges from such countries as El Salvador, Guatemala,

Poland, and Egypt. He also directs the Institute’s research,

training, advocacy, and technical assistance programs.

In 1992–1993, he served as special counsel to the United

Nations Commission on Truth for El Salvador and was a

principal editor of its report. Currently, he chairs the American Bar Association’s Working Group on the American

Convention on Human Rights, as well as the ABA’s Human

Rights Subcommittee for Latin America.

Professor Cassel has published nationally and internationally

in such journals as the Human Rights Law Journal and the

Revista del Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos,

and he broadcasts a weekly commentary on human rights on

National Public Radio in Chicago, WBEZ. He has given

Spanish-language lectures on international human rights law

at universities and other institutions in El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, and the Dominican Republic.

Before helping to found the International Human Rights Law

Institute at DePaul in 1990, he served for 16 years as

Attorney and General Counsel of Business and Professional

People for the Public Interest, a Chicago public interest law

center. Professor Cassel is an honors graduate of the Harvard

Law School, where he was managing editor of the Harvard

Civil Rights Civil Liberties Law Review.

Paul G. Chevigny is a Professor at New York University

Law School, where he has been teaching since 1977. In the

last 6 years, he has begun to work on a large project comparing the problems of police violence in cities of the developing world.

Mr. Chevigny has also participated in missions for the

international human rights group Human Rights Watch.

Through his association with this group he has completed

extensive studies of human rights abuses in Jamaica and

police abuses and violence in Brazil and Argentina. For

Human Rights Watch he has prepared a critique of the failure

of the Federal Government in the United States to control or

oversee police violence in its cities.

Among Mr. Chevigny’s publications are Gigs: Jazz and the

Cabaret Laws in New York City (1991), Edge of the Knife

(1993), Police Violence in Argentina (1991), More Speech:

Dialogue Rights and Modern Liberty (1988), Police Abuses

in Brazil (1987), Human Rights in Jamaica (1986), Cops and

Rebels (1972), and Police Power: Police Abuses in New York

City (1969).

Before he began his teaching career, Mr. Chevigny was

associated with the New York affiliate of the American Civil

Liberties Union (ACLU). At the ACLU, he used the practice

of law, particularly criminal and civil rights litigation, as a

way to investigate social and political problems underlying

police abuses in the United States.

Dan Corsentino became Sheriff of Pueblo County in

Pueblo, Colorado, in 1991 and was reelected in 1994.

Sheriff Corsentino was appointed by Governor Roy Romer in

1991 to serve on the Drug Control System Improvement

Advisory Board, which oversees Federal funding for law

enforcement agencies. In August 1993, Governor Romer

appointed Sheriff Corsentino to the Police Officer Standards
99

and Training (P.O.S.T.) Board. He is a member of the

Criminal Justice Advisory committee for Pueblo Community

College and cochairs the County Sheriffs of Colorado’s

legislative committee; he is also the Second Vice President

on the Board of Directors for that organization. He received

his first national appointment to the International Association

of Chiefs of Police Patrol and Tactical Operations Committee. He also serves on the National Sheriffs’ Association’s

Ethics Committee and Native American Indians Committee.

He is a member of numerous civic and service organizations.

Recently, Sheriff Corsentino was invited to conduct a needs

assessment of police organizational structure, community

relations, community policing, and executive protection, and

to make substantive recommendations for a law enforcement

academy in the city of Leon, Mexico, State of Guanajuato.

Sheriff Corsentino is an adjunct faculty member at the

University of Southern Colorado and at Pueblo Community

College. His courses include History and Sociology of Law

Enforcement; Ethics, Values, and Racism in Policing; and

Policing in the 21st Century. His most recent publication was

“Employee Involvement Implementing Quality Change”

(FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, November 1993).

Sheriff Corsentino holds a Master’s degree in Public Administration and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from

the University of Colorado. He is also a graduate of the

Police School of Staff and Command at Northwestern

University Traffic Institute in Chicago, Illinois. In 1993, he

graduated from the National FBI Academy, Quantico,

Virginia, 172nd session.

Robert S. Gelbard is currently Special Representative to the

President and the Secretary of State for the Dayton Peace

Accords. At the time of the Workshop he had been Assistant

Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law

Enforcement Affairs since November 1993.

His career began with service in the Peace Corps in Bolivia

(1964–1966), and he joined the Foreign Service in 1967.

After a year in Washington, he was detailed to the Peace

Corps as Associate Director in Manila, Republic of the

Philippines, from 1968 to 1970. He was then assigned as

Principal Officer at the United States Consulate in Porto

Alegre, Brazil, from 1970 to 1972. Returning to the State

Department, Ambassador Gelbard was a financial economist

in the Office of Development Finance in the Bureau of

Economic and Business Affairs from 1973 to 1975, focusing

principally on Latin American development and debt issues.

From 1976 to 1978, he was the officer responsible for the

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

(OECD) in the Bureau for European and Canadian Affairs

and also worked on European macroeconomic and European

Community financial issues.

From 1978 to 1982, he was assigned as Deputy Treasurer

Representative and First Secretary at the United States

Embassy in Paris. Ambassador Gelbard was then reassigned

to Washington as Deputy Director of the Office of Western

European Affairs (1982–1984), where his responsibilities

included relations with France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal,

covering military base negotiations with Spain and Portugal

and diplomatic relations with the Vatican. From 1984 to

1985, he was Director of the Office of Southern African

Affairs, where he was responsible for U.S. relations and

negotiation with 10 nations, including South Africa, Angola,

Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Namibia.

In 1985, Ambassador Gelbard was named Deputy Assistant

Secretary of State for South America, a position he held until

1988. He was responsible for U.S. relations with the nations

of that continent, including involvement in the transition to

and consolidation of democracy in many nations, trade and

financial issues, political-military issues, and management

responsibilities for the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs. In

1988, he was named Ambassador to Bolivia, a post he held

until 1991. Ambassador Gelbard then became Principal

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American

Affairs (1991–1993). He was responsible for U.S. policy in

Cuba and Haiti and was significantly involved in issues

related to the El Salvador peace process. He was also

President Bush’s representative preparing for the 1992 San

Antonio Summit.

Ambassador Gelbard has been a member of numerous U.S.

Government delegations to the OECD, particularly the

Economic Policy Committee, and served on the U.S.

delegation to the Conference on International Economic

Cooperation (the North/South dialogue). He was also

detailed part-time to the President’s Council of Economic

Advisers in 1978.

Ambassador Gelbard has received the Presidential Meritorious Award, the State Department’s Superior Honor Award,

and the State Department’s Meritorious Honor Award. He is

also the recipient of the United States Coast Guard’s Distinguished Public Service Award. The Bolivian Government

awarded him the Condor of the Andes, Order of the Grand

Cross, its highest decoration to a foreign citizen.

Ambassador Gelbard graduated from Colby College in 1964

with a B.A. in History. He subsequently received a Master’s

in Public Administration in Economics from Harvard

University in 1979. He also studied economics at the

Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

William Geller is Associate Director of the Police Executive

Research Forum (PERF) based in Washington, D.C., and

Director of PERF’s Midwest Office. Mr. Geller previously
100

served as Project Director of the American Bar Foundation,

Executive Director of the Chicago Law Enforcement Study

Group, and Special Counsel for Public Safety and Internal

Security to the Chicago Park District. He has written,

lectured, and consulted widely on the causes and prevention

of police and citizen violence; police leadership; risk

reduction; and racial equity for units of Federal, State, and

local governments. His books include The Untapped Potential of the Middle Manager (1995), And Justice For All:

Understanding & Controlling Police Use of Force (1995),

Deadly Force: What We Know (1992), the golden anniversary

edition of the International City Management Association’s

Local Government Police Management (1991), Police

Leadership in America: Crises and Opportunity (1985), and

Split-Second Decisions: Shootings Of and By Chicago Police

(1982).

Herman Goldstein is Professor of Law Emeritus at the

University of Wisconsin–Madison. He first studied the police

as a researcher with the American Bar Foundation’s Survey

of the Administration of Criminal Justice. From 1960 to

1964, he was Executive Assistant to O.W. Wilson, the widely

recognized architect of the professional model of policing,

when Wilson undertook, as Superintendent, to reform the

Chicago Police Department. With a grant from the Ford

Foundation to support research and teaching relating to the

police, Professor Goldstein joined the Wisconsin faculty in

1964. He has published on such topics as the police function,

police discretion, policy development, the political accountability of the police, and the control of police conduct. He

was a consultant to the President’s Commission on Law

Enforcement and Administration of Justice, the National

Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, New York City’s

Knapp Commission, the Police Foundation, and the Police

Executive Research Forum. He coauthored the American Bar

Association’s The Urban Police Function in 1973 and

published Policing in a Free Society in 1977. In recent years,

he has focused primarily on developing the institutional

arrangements whereby police might better address—through

research and experimentation with responses—the substantive problems that the police are called on to handle. As part

of this work, he published Problem-Oriented Policing in

1990. Professor Goldstein has in recent years consulted with

the police in several countries, including Chile, the United

Kingdom, The Netherlands, and Israel.

David H. Harrell is Director of the International Training

Division of the U.S. Customs Service where he manages

approximately 75 international training programs. In recent

years, his office has seen a marked increase in programs for

emerging democracies, particularly those in Central and

Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

A career civil servant, Mr. Harrell began as a management

intern with the Department of Defense and moved to the

Customs Service in 1971. He served as Head of the Management Studies Staff, Chief of the Management Information

Branch, and Director of the Program Evaluation Division.

Mr. Harrell received a B.A. in Political Science from

Dickinson College and an M.A. in International Law and

International Relations from the American University School

of International Service. He also held a 1-year fellowship at

the University of Washington Graduate School for Public

Affairs.

Philip Heymann is James Barr Ames Professor at Harvard

Law School, the Director of the Center for Criminal Justice,

and Professor at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.

He was Deputy Attorney General in 1993–1994, Assistant

Attorney General in charge of the Criminal Division from

1978 to 1981, and Associate Watergate Special Prosecutor

from 1973 to 1975. The previous decade, he held several

posts in the U.S. Department of State (Executive Assistant to

the Under Secretary of State, Deputy Assistant Secretary of

State for International Organizations, and head of the Bureau

of Security and Consular Affairs). Earlier in his career, after

clerking for Justice Harlan of the U.S. Supreme Court, Mr.

Heymann represented the U.S. Government in the Solicitor

General’s Office from 1961 to 1965.

In his current position as Director of the Center for Criminal

Justice at Harvard, Professor Heymann has in recent years

managed a number of projects designed to improve the

criminal justice systems of countries seeking to create or

preserve democratic institutions, including Guatemala,

Colombia, South Africa, and Russia. He chaired the panel of

international experts proposing to the Goldstone Commission

new procedures for conducting and handling mass demonstrations in South Africa.

Sally T. Hillsman is Deputy Director of the National

Institute of Justice, with responsibility for the Office of

Research and Evaluation. Dr. Hillsman develops and

manages NIJ’s external research program, its congressionally

mandated evaluation program, and its intramural research

program. Dr. Hillsman joined NIJ in February 1995 from the

National Center for State Courts, where she was Vice

President with responsibility for the Center’s national-scope

research and court technology programs. Previously she was

an Associate Director of the Vera Institute of Justice in New

York City and its Director of Research. She has conducted a

wide range of research on justice system policy issues,

including intermediate sanctions, pretrial diversion, case

processing, prosecution and court delay, as well as policing

and narcotics law enforcement. Dr. Hillsman holds a Ph.D. in

Sociology from Columbia University.
101

K. David Holmes is the Assistant Director of Training for

the Secret Service. In the Senior Executive Service, Mr.

Holmes has performed duties as the Deputy Special Agent in

Charge of the Vice-President Protective Division, where he

had direct oversight for the transition of security for the Vice

President following the 1992 presidential election. In 1993,

he assumed the position of Special Agent in Charge of the

Vice-President Protective Division.

Mr. Holmes began his career as a Special Agent in the Secret

Service in 1974 in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and was subsequently transferred to the Miami Office where he performed

long-term undercover operations targeted against the Mariel

criminal elements in Miami. In 1982, he became a Senior

Course Instructor in the Secret Service Office of Training,

where he wrote and developed numerous training courses in

Investigative Tactics, Undercover Operations, and Investigative Spanish, for which he received a Secretary of the

Treasury award. Mr. Holmes briefly served on the Presidential Protective Unit and in 1988 was appointed Special Agent

in Charge of the San Juan Field Office. He later returned to

Washington, where he became the Deputy Assistant Director

for the Office of Government Liaison and Public Affairs,

until his promotion to his current position.

Mr. Holmes has a Bachelor’s degree in Hispanic Studies

from the University of Puerto Rico. Upon graduation, he was

commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the U.S. Army, where

he served as an Intelligence Officer. He subsequently

received his Master’s degree in Human Relations from the

University of Oklahoma.

Langley B. James has served as Assistant for Foreign

Internal Defense, U.S. Department of State, where he has

been responsible for policy and planning issues related to

low-intensity conflicts since 1988. He was Deputy Chief,

Special Defense Acquisition Fund, Defense Security Assistance Agency, from 1982 to 1987. Mr. James also worked

with International Security Affairs from 1980 to 1981, as

Assistant for Arms Transfer Policy. In addition, he served as

Assistant for COCOM Technology Transfer, International

Security Affairs (Strategic Aid and Disclosure) from 1974 to

1979.

Mr. James began his defense career with the Defense

Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 1971. During his tenure with

DIA he served as Strategic Intelligence Officer (Soviet

Union/Warsaw Pact), Ground Forces, as an Indications and

Warning Alert Team Officer. Mr. James has extensive Army

Military Intelligence training and has received various

awards throughout his career, including the Office of the

Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civil Service Award in

1987. He received a B.S. in Business Administration and

Political Economy, as well as an M.A. in Economics of

National Security from Ohio State University. He also

attended the National War College from 1979 to 1980.

David J. Kalish is the Commander of the Los Angeles

Police Department where he has served for over 20 years.

His duties have included patrol, detectives, gang suppression,

juvenile operations, and many other specialized enforcement,

investigative, and administrative assignments. As the

Commanding Officer of the Criminal Intelligence Group, he

currently directs the activities of approximately 150 personnel assigned to the Anti-Terrorist Division and the Administrative Vice Division. Commander Kalish is an active

member of many professional and community organizations.

He has been a member of many international delegations and

regularly instructs and lectures on a variety of criminal

justice topics.

Raymond W. Kelly is currently Under Secretary (Enforcement) in the U.S. Department of the Treasury. At the time of

the Workshop he was President and Director of New York

operations of The Investigative Group International, with

offices in New York, Washington, Los Angeles, Chicago,

Boston, Philadelphia, and London. Mr. Kelly served as

Director of the International Police Monitors of the Multinational Force in Haiti from October 1994 through March

1995, during which time the monitors ended the Haitian

Police’s human rights abuses and established an interim

public security force. Mr. Kelly was awarded a commendation by President Clinton for “exceptionally meritorious

service” in Haiti and the Commander’s Medal for Public

Service by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General

John Shalikashvili.

Mr. Kelly rose through the ranks of the New York City Police

Department to become Commissioner in October 1992 and

served through January 1994, capping a 32-year career that

included service in every rank and 25 commands, including

the Emergency Service Division and the Office of Management, Analysis and Budget. As Police Commissioner, Mr.

Kelly was widely praised for the emergency response to the

World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and its subsequent

investigation. He also presided over the largest increase of

the uniformed ranks in the department’s history and was

recognized as New York State’s Law Enforcement Official of

the Year.

Mr. Kelly’s service in the U.S. Marine Corps included

combat in Vietnam, and he retired with the rank of colonel in

the Marine Corps Reserve. He is an attorney with law

degrees from St. John’s University and New York University,

where he lectures on the law, public policy, and crisis

management. A graduate of Manhattan College, he also

holds a Master’s degree in Public Administration from the

Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He
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was awarded an honorary doctorate from Marist College in

May 1995 in recognition of his career in public service.

Carl B. Klockars, Professor of Sociology and Criminal

Justice at the University of Delaware, has been a criminologist for 25 years. During this time he has published five

books, about 80 articles, and numerous papers. His first

book, The Professional Fence, is a detailed life history of a

dealer in stolen property. Three of his more recent works,

The Idea of Police, and the first and second editions of

Thinking About Police, are widely used not only in college

and universities but also in police academies in this country

and abroad.

He is currently the nationally elected Vice President of the

Police Section of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences

and was three times elected by the American Society of

Criminology to serve as a member of its Executive Board.

He has served on the editorial boards of many academic

journals, worked as a professional lobbyist for the Maryland

Sheriff’s Association, and testified as an expert witness in

cases involving allegations of excessive use of force by the

police. He is currently conducting a large research project

that compares police and citizen attitudes toward corruption

and appropriate discipline. The project employs systematic

cross-cultural comparative samples from the United States,

Croatia, and Australia.

Dr. Klockars holds a Bachelor’s degree in Sociology from

the University of Rhode Island and a Master’s in Criminology and Doctorate in Sociology with a concentration in

criminology from the University of Pennsylvania.

James E. Lassiter is the Rome District Desk Officer in the

Office of International Affairs at the U.S. Immigration and

Naturalization Service, a position he has held since 1992. His

areas of expertise include international development, cultural

change, and the peoples of Africa.

From 1985 to 1988, Dr. Lassiter served as Peace Corps

Country Director in Tanzania, and from 1988 to 1991 he

directed the Peace Corps program in Ghana. From 1984 to

1985, he worked as a Country Desk Officer and resident

expert for Southern African affairs at the U.S. Peace Corps

headquarters in Washington. Mr. Lassiter began his association with the Peace Corps in 1980 as a Peace Corps volunteer

science teacher in Swaziland.

Dr. Lassiter also worked as a Research Analyst for the State

of California, Center for Health Statistics in Sacramento. In

1974, he received his B.A. in Anthropology, with honors and

a minor in Biological Sciences, from California State

University in Sacramento. He received an M.S. in Anthropology from the University of Oregon in 1975, and in 1983 he

received a Ph.D. in Cultural Anthropology from the University of Oregon.

G. Martin Lively is currently the International Liaison for

the National Institute of Justice (NIJ), U.S. Department of

Justice, and coordinator of NIJ’s National Criminal Justice

Reference Service. Mr. Lively has served in several posts at

NIJ, including Court Specialist, Conference Manager, Law

Enforcement Programs Manager, and Assistant to the

Director of Research and Evaluation. Before joining NIJ in

1974, he worked in various California jurisdictions, serving

as a police officer in Dale City, deputy district attorney in

Contra Costa County, and deputy public defender in Sonoma

County.

Mr. Lively has also held the positions of Director of Productivity, Program Development, with the U.S. Office of

Personnel Management; Deputy Director of Management

and Administration, National Emergency Management

Agency; Manager of Professional and Technical Training,

Martin Marietta Orlando Aerospace; and general practitioner

of law in California and West Virginia.

Mr. Lively received his J.D. from the University of San

Francisco Law School and his Bachelor’s degree in Literature and Philosophy from Wheeling College, West Virginia.

Gerald W. Lynch has been President of John Jay College of

Criminal Justice since 1976. John Jay College is the only

institution of higher education in the United States dedicated

exclusively to the study of criminal justice, law enforcement,

police science, and public service. An internationally known

expert and advocate of criminal justice education, Dr. Lynch

has lectured throughout the United States, the Caribbean,

Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Middle East, and

Australia. He conducted a major conference in 1992 in St.

Petersburg, Russia, on “Crime, Justice and Public Order” and

has consulted with South Africa and Namibia on establishing

a College of Criminal Justice. Dr. Lynch and several colleagues at John Jay College have designed an innovative

course to improve police-community relations entitled

“Human Dignity and the Police.” The course has now been

taught to police officers of many nations throughout Latin

America, the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, and the former

Soviet Union. In cooperation with the Puerto Rican Police

Department, John Jay College recently opened a campus in

Puerto Rico, with a curriculum integrating academic study

for an Associate Degree in Police Science with basic police

training for all recruits.

He received his B.S. from Fordham College and his Ph.D. in

Clinical Psychology from New York University.
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Mark H. Moore is the Daniel and Florence Guggenheim

Professor of Criminal Justice and Public Management at

Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and Faculty Chair

of the Kennedy School of Government Program in Criminal

Justice. For a decade he served as the Founding Chair of the

Kennedy School’s Committee on Executive Programs.

Professor Moore has led national “executive sessions” on the

future of juvenile justice, police, and prosecution. He is the

author of Buy and Bust: The Effective Regulation of an Illicit

Market in Heroin, From Children to Citizens: The Mandate

for Juvenile Justice, Beyond 911: A New Era in Policing, and

Creating Public Value: Strategic Management in Government.

Norval Morris is Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and

Criminology Emeritus at the University of Chicago and is a

Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. For 8

years he was a member of the Police Board of the City of

Chicago.

Mr. Morris has taught law and criminology in England,

Australia, Japan, and the United States and has written

extensively on legal and criminological issues. His books

include The Brothel Boy and Other Parables of the Law

(Oxford University Press, 1992); Modern Policing (editor

with Michael Tonry, University of Chicago Press, 1992); and

The Oxford History of the Prison (editor with David

Rothman, Oxford University Press, 1995).

He serves on several Federal and State government and

scholarly commissions and councils.

Mark M. Richard is the Deputy Assistant Attorney General,

U.S. Department of Justice, where he oversees the Office of

International Affairs, Internal Security, Terrorism and Violent

Crime Sections, and the Office of Special Investigations. Mr.

Richard has overseen international law enforcement efforts

in the areas of white-collar crime, international affairs,

internal security, antinar-cotics, terrorism, money laundering,

asset forfeiture, special investigations, and violent crime. For

the 4-year period he served as Deputy Assistant Attorney

General for Internal Security and International Law Enforcement, he supervised approximately 120 attorneys in the

Internal Security Section, the Office of International Affairs,

and the Office of Special Investigations. In this capacity, he

oversaw prosecutions involving espionage, violations of

export control and neutrality laws, and unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

Mr. Richard directly participated in negotiations of mutual

legal assistance treaties with senior government officials of

the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Sweden,

Switzerland, and Israel and was responsible for all extradition litigation. In an earlier position with the General

Litigation and International Law Enforcement Section, Mr.

Richard oversaw a variety of regulatory matters including

those administered by the Customs Service and the Nuclear

Regulatory Commission.

As Chief of the Fraud Section in the U.S. Department of

Justice, he prosecuted cases involving bank fraud, securities

and consumer fraud, and government contract and procurement fraud. In that role, he also maintained liaison with

senior officials of the U.S. Department of Defense and the

Securities and Exchange Commission. Mr. Richard’s

previous experience includes developing comprehensive

programs for combating white-collar crime and prosecutorial

experience against major drug dealers in the Washington,

D.C., metropolitan area.

Mr. Richard received a J.D. degree with honors from the

Brooklyn Law School and received a B.A. degree in Psychology from the City University of New York. His further

executive training includes the Executive Program in

National and International Security at Harvard University’s

Kennedy School of Government (1982).

Alan G. Ringgold is the Deputy Assistant Director for

International Relations in the Criminal Investigative Division

at the FBI, where he oversees the FBI’s relationship with

police and security services throughout the world. He

manages the FBI’s international assistance program.

Mr. Ringgold began his service with the FBI in 1970, as a

specialist in Italian organized crime. He was the Senior

Resident Agent in Charge of FBI activities for western

Massachusetts and later managed labor racketeering investigations in Boston. In 1982, Mr. Ringgold was transferred to

Bern, Switzerland, as the Assistant Legal Attaché, and later

was promoted to Legal Attaché, with responsibility for FBI

liaison activities in Switzerland, Austria, and Liechtenstein.

Additionally, he was an exchange manager with the Drug

Enforcement Administration, where he assisted with the

development of its money laundering and asset forfeiture

programs. In 1989, he became Legal Attaché in Paris, where

he managed the FBI liaison with France and half of the

African continent. In 1994, he was promoted to his current

position.

Mr. Ringgold graduated from Juniata College with a

Bachelor’s degree in French and History. Thereafter, he

served in the United States Army, Military Intelligence

Branch. Upon discharge, he served briefly as a police officer

in Alexandria, Virginia.

Laurie O. Robinson was appointed Assistant Attorney

General for the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Justice

Programs (OJP) in 1994. She previously served as Associate
104

Deputy Attorney General and Acting Assistant Attorney

General at OJP.

Before joining the Justice Department in 1993, Ms.

Robinson served as Director of the American Bar

Association’s (ABA) Criminal Justice Section beginning in

1979. She also headed the ABA’s Professional Services

Division–D.C., which constituted about half the

Association’s Washington, D.C., office. From 1972 to 1979,

Ms. Robinson served as Assistant Staff Director of the ABA

Criminal Justice Section.

Ms. Robinson graduated magna cum laude and Phi Beta

Kappa from Brown University with a degree in Political

Science in 1968. She served as Chair of the National Forum

on Criminal Justice from 1991 until 1993 and was a member

of the Boards of the National College of District Attorneys,

the National Committee on Community Corrections, the

National Association of Women in Criminal Justice, and the

Victim Assistance Legal Organization (VALOR). She

currently serves on the Advisory Board of the Federal

Sentencing Reporter.

Luis P. Salas joined Florida International University in 1975

and is now a full Professor in the Criminal Justice Department. He is a recognized expert on Latin American justice

systems and has written or coauthored six books and a

number of articles on the subject since 1992. Professor Salas

has served as Chair of the Criminal Justice Department,

which offers an undergraduate and master’s program.

In 1985, Professor Salas was named Director of the Center

for the Administration of Justice at Florida International

University. The Center employs a multidisciplinary and

international staff of specialists and places special emphasis

on support to local efforts to strengthen and invigorate fair

and independent justice systems.

Professor Salas has been a consultant to a number of State,

Federal, and international organizations as well as private

consulting firms. He received a degree in political science

from North Carolina State University and received his J.D.

degree from Wake Forest University.

Clifford Shearing is a Professor and Director of the Centre

of Criminology at the University of Toronto and is Academic

Director of the Community Peace Foundation, a unit of the

School of Government at the University of the Western Cape

in South Africa. His research focuses on shifts in governance

and their implications for policing and justice. Most recently

he has been studying and providing advice on the transformation of policing and justice in South Africa. His latest

book is Policing for a New South Africa (Routledge). His

forthcoming book is tentatively titled Governing Diversity.

Michael E. Smith is a Professor at the University of

Wisconsin School of Law, and a visiting lecturer at Yale Law

School. Previously, Mr. Smith was President of the Vera

Institute of Justice, a nonprofit institute that deploys its

research and operational divisions to devise, test, and

disseminate more effective responses to pressing social

policy problems.

Mr. Smith has also held many trusteeships, among them the

Neighborhood Defender Service of Harlem, the New York

Criminal Justice Agency, the Center for Alternative Sentencing and Employment Services, and the Vinland Property

Trust. He is still a member of the board of trustees of all the

aforementioned organizations.

Mr. Smith received his undergraduate degree from Princeton

University and his J.D. from Harvard Law School. He also

received a degree from Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar.

Janice M. Stromsen, who has been with the U.S. Department of Justice since 1971, is Director of the International

Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program

(ICITAP), U.S. Department of Justice. Before being appointed Director of ICITAP, she held various posts in U.S.

law enforcement agencies, including ICITAP’s Associate

Director for Field Operation, and served 10 years as the

Deputy Chief of INTERPOL–USNCB. She is credited with

the institutionalization of INTERPOL within the Department

of Justice, creation of INTERPOL’s Standing Committee on

Information Technology, implementation of the Canadian

interface project enabling direct database contact between

law enforcement agencies of the United States and their

Canadian counterparts, and the design and implementation of

ICITAP’s Haiti Police Development Project. Ms. Stromsen

received her B.A. from the College of Wooster and an M.A.

from the Middlebury College program at the University of

Paris (Sorbonne).

Michael L. Sullivan is the Deputy Commander, U.S. Army

Criminal Investigation Command, at Fort Belvoir, Virginia.

He began military service by serving 4 years in the U.S.

Marine Corps and then enlisting in the U.S. Army, where he

rose to the rank of sergeant. He attended Infantry Officer

Candidate School and was commissioned as second lieutenant.

Colonel Sullivan has served in numerous infantry and

military police assignments, beginning as a Special Forces

Detachment Executive Officer, 8th Special Forces Group,

Panama; Rifle Platoon Leader, D Company, 1st Battalion,

7th Cavalry, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas; Provost

Marshal Operations Officer, Fort Harrison, Indiana; and

Chief, Training Support Division, U.S. Army Military Police

School, Fort McClellan, Alabama.
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Colonel Sullivan spent several years at Fort Bragg, North

Carolina, where his assignments included Assistant S–3, 16th

Military Police Brigade (ABN); Executive Officer, 503d

Military Police Battalion (ABN); Provost Marshal, 82d

Airborne Division; Commander, 503d Military Police

Battalion (ABN); Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G3/DPT,

XVIII Airborne Corps; and Commander, 16th Military Police

Brigade (ABN).

His awards include the Legion of Merit with Oak Leaf

Cluster, Bronze Star Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, Meritorious Service Medal with three Oak Leaf Clusters, Army

Commendation Medal, Army Achievement Medal, both

Army and Marine Corps Good Conduct Medals, National

Defense Service Medal with Bronze Star, Armed Forces

Expeditionary Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, Vietnam

Campaign Medal with two Bronze Stars, Southwest Asia

Service Medal with two Bronze Stars, Humanitarian Service

Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, Army Service Ribbon,

Overseas Ribbon, Vietnam Service Medal, Kuwait Liberation

Medal, Vietnam Civic Action Medal, French Armed Forces

Expeditionary Medal, Combat Infantryman’s Badge, Ranger

Tab, Special Forces Tab, and Master Parachutist’s Badge,

U.S. Marine Corps Parachutist Badge, and the Armed Forces

Parachutist Badges from Argentina, Ecuador, and Spain.

Colonel Sullivan holds a B.S. degree in Criminology from

the University of Tampa, an M.S. in Education from Purdue

University, an M.A. in International Relations from Salve

Regina College, and an M.S. in Strategy and International

Policy from the Naval War College. His military education

included Officer Candidate School, Airborne School, Ranger

School, the Special Forces Officer Course, Jumpmaster

School, the MP Officer Advanced Course, the FBI National

Academy, the Naval College of Command and Staff, and the

Army War College.

Gary L. Thomas is a special agent with the Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF). He currently serves as

the Special Agent in Charge of ATF’s International Enforcement Branch in Bureau Headquarters, Washington, D.C..

Mr. Thomas began his law enforcement career in 1977 as a

U.S. Border Patrol agent in El Paso, Texas. In 1978, he

joined ATF as a special agent assigned to the Lubbock,

Texas, Field Office. In 1980, he was reassigned to the Miami

Field Division, where he worked in the Miami and Fort

Lauderdale Field Offices during the Vice President’s Drug

Task Force. In 1984, he was promoted to Senior Operations

Officer in the Atlanta Field Division. He was later promoted

to Supervisor of the Atlanta Firearms Enforcement Group. In

1991, he was promoted to Bureau Headquarters where he

served as the Achilles Program Manager in the Foreign

Operations Program. Mr. Thomas is a graduate of Florida

State University with a degree in criminology.

Bankole Thompson is currently a Professor in the Department of Police Studies of the College of Law Enforcement,

Eastern Kentucky University. Formerly, he was Associate

Professor of Criminal Justice Studies at Kent State University. He also served as Judge of the High Court and District

Attorney in the West African State of Sierra Leone and Legal

Adviser to the Mano River Union (a subregional economic

integration group in West Africa). Professor Thompson has

published widely in the areas of law and comparative

criminal justice and has forthcoming book chapters on

comparative aspects of criminal justice in developing African

countries, and a book on the constitutional history and law of

Sierra Leone (1961–1995). He holds an M.A. in Philosophy

from Durham University and an M.A., LL.B., and Ph.D. in

Law from the University of Cambridge.

Michael Tonry is Sonosky Professor of Law and Public

Policy at the University of Minnesota. He has written or

edited more than 25 books, including Malign Neglect: Race,

Crime and Punishment in America (Oxford University Press,

1995); Intermediate Sanctions in Overcrowded Times

(Northeastern University Press, 1995) with Kate Hamilton;

Building a Safer Society: Strategic Approaches to Crime

Prevention (University of Chicago Press, 1995) with David

P. Farrington; Drugs and Crime (University of Chicago

Press, 1990) with James Q. Wilson; and Between Prison and

Probation: Intermediate Punishments in a Rational Sentencing System (Oxford University Press, 1990) with Norval

Morris. Professor Tonry has worked as an adviser on

sentencing and corrections matters to U.S. Federal and State

agencies; Canadian Federal and provincial agencies; and

Australian, British, and Swiss national government agencies.

He is editor of Crime and Justice—A Review of Research, a

series of refereed essays on criminal justice research subjects, published since 1979 by the University of Chicago

Press; Overcrowded Times, a bimonthly sentencing and

corrections newsletter for public officials and researchers;

and the book series Studies in Crime and Public Policy,

established in 1992 by Oxford University Press.

Jeremy Travis was appointed Director of the National

Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, in 1994.

Before joining the National Institute of Justice, Mr. Travis

was the Deputy Commissioner for Legal Matters at the New

York City Police Department. In this position, he served as

adviser to the Police Commissioner and as General Counsel

to the Department and oversaw the Legal Bureau, the

License Division, and the Criminal Justice Bureau. While

with the department, Mr. Travis also developed the Civil

Enforcement Initiative, which provided lawyers as counsel to
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police precincts; wrote New York City’s ban on assault

weapons; introduced new technologies into the arrest

process; drafted the Police Department’s quality-of-life

strategy, “Reclaiming New York’s Public Spaces”; and, as

chair of the Chancellor’s Advisory Panel on School Safety,

developed a proposal for a new approach to school violence.

In a previous position, Mr. Travis served as Chief Counsel to

the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice for the U.S. House of

Representatives Committee on the Judiciary. Working with

the subcommittee chairman, Mr. Travis developed new

agendas for oversight hearings and legislative initiatives on

criminal justice issues.

Before his service with the Subcommittee, Mr. Travis was

Special Adviser to New York Mayor Edward Koch. Among

other tasks, he conducted a management and legal review of

the City Human Rights Commission, coordinated the city’s

implementation of the Federal immigration legalization

program, formed the Commission to Establish the High

School Institute for Law and Justice, established the Mayor’s

Advisory Council on Community Relations following the

Howard Beach incident, and served as the coordinator of the

Mayor’s Office of Educational Services.

Before becoming Special Adviser to the Mayor, Mr. Travis

was Special Counsel to the First Deputy Mayor and Assistant

Director for Law Enforcement Services for the City of New

York. Earlier, he was Special Counsel to the Police Commissioner for the New York City Police Department. In addition

to his many consulting and research positions, Mr. Travis’

extensive legal and criminal justice experience includes

serving as law clerk to Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Executive Director for the New York City Criminal Justice Agency,

and Executive Director of the Victim/Witness Assistance

Project for the Vera Institute of Justice.

William F. Walsh is the Director of the Southern Police

Institute and Associate Professor in the Department of Justice

Administration in the College of Arts and Sciences at the

University of Louisville. A former member of the New York

City Police Department with 21 years of service, he holds

undergraduate and Master’s degrees from John Jay College

of Criminal Justice and a Doctorate in Sociology from

Fordham University. Professor Walsh has conducted research

and written articles on issues relating to both public and

private police, which have been published in the American

Journal of Police, Justice Quarterly, Journal of Police

Science and Administration, Journal of Criminal Justice, The

Justice Professional, Security Journal, and Police Chief. He

is coauthor with Edwin J. Donovan of Police Supervision: A

Performance Based Approach and of the forthcoming fifth

edition of Wilson and McLaren’s Police Administration with

James Fyfe and Jack R. Greene.

Harold D. Wankel is Chief of Operations for the U.S. Drug

Enforcement Administration (DEA), where he oversees

enforcement programs throughout a worldwide network of

over 200 DEA offices in the United States and abroad.

Mr. Wankel began his career in Federal drug law enforcement in 1970, as a Narcotics Agent in Kansas City, Missouri,

with the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD),

U.S. Department of Justice. Since then, he has held positions

with the BNDD and its successor agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), as a Special Agent in Kansas

City, Missouri, and Detroit, Michigan; as DEA Country

Attaché in Kabul, Afghanistan, and Islamabad, Pakistan; as

Staff Coordinator in the Office of International Programs; as

Senior Inspector in the Office of Inspections; as Assistant

Special Agent in Charge at the Detroit Field Division; as

Executive Assistant in the Office of the Administrator; as

Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Office of Investigative Support; and as Deputy Assistant Administrator for

Operations in Washington, D.C.

As part of an Executive Exchange Program, Mr. Wankel was

appointed by the FBI Director as Deputy Assistant Director

of its Criminal Division, an assignment that extended from

1994 to 1995, when he assumed his present position as

DEA’s Chief of Operations.

Mr. Wankel received a B.S. degree from the University of

Missouri, Columbia, Missouri.

Richard H. Ward has been with the University of Illinois at

Chicago (UIC) since 1977, serving first as Vice Chancellor

for Administration (1977 to 1993) and currently as Associate

Chancellor for Special Programs. He is a tenured Professor

of Criminology and Executive Director of the Office of

International Criminal Justice at UIC.

Dr. Ward’s academic achievements include numerous articles

and books, both written and edited, in the field of criminal

justice. His most recent work, coauthored with James

Osterburg, is Criminal Investigations. He has been a visiting

professor at the National Police College and has also lectured

or spoken at the FBI Academy, the Army War College, and

before numerous law enforcement agencies. Dr. Ward has

been a consultant to more than 50 police departments in the

United States and to numerous international organizations

including the United Nations.

An internationally recognized expert on counter-terrorism,

investigative methods, and comparative systems, Dr. Ward

has traveled extensively conducting research and lecturing in

more than 40 countries including the People’s Republic of

China, Colombia, Egypt, England, France, Germany, Israel,

Italy, Panama, Russia, and Sri Lanka. In 1994, in recognition
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of his outstanding contributions to the People’s Republic of

China, he received the Friendship Award, the highest honor

awarded by the State Bureau of Foreign Experts through the

State Council.

Before coming to UIC, Dr. Ward served as Vice President of

John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City University of New

York, where he also held the position of Dean of Graduate

Studies, Dean of Students, and Professor of Criminal Justice.

He served with the New York City Police Department as

detective for 8 years.

Dr. Ward earned his Doctorate in Criminology from the

University of California at Berkeley.

Robert Wasserman is Chief of Staff for the White House

Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). Prior to

his appointment, Mr. Wasserman served as a Research

Fellow at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, where he was a member of the Executive Sessions on

Community Policing.

Mr. Wasserman has served in a number of governmental

executive positions throughout his career: Assistant City

Manager of Yellow Springs, Ohio (1966 to 1967), and

Administrative Assistant to the Chief of Police in Dayton,

Ohio (1966 to 1970), where he led a major reorganization of

the police. In 1970 he assumed the position of Director,

Community Assistant Group, in the Massachusetts Department of Public Safety, where he was responsible for management of riot prevention and control activities of the Massachusetts State Police. In 1973, Mr. Wasserman was appointed

Director of Training and Education of the Boston Police

Department. He was promoted again to Operations Assistant

to the Police Commissioner in 1976, assuming responsibility

for management of field operations for that department.

Mr. Wasserman left the department to form the consulting

firm Wasserman Associates, Inc., in 1978. As a consultant, he

worked with a large number of communities and issues, such

as criminal investigations (Rochester, New York), community

profiling and research experiments (San Diego Police

Department and the Police Foundation of Washington), and

resource allocation and police improvement (Atlanta Police

Department). He served as a principal in the firm from 1978

to 1982, 1985 to 1988, and 1990 to 1994.

In 1982, Mr. Wasserman was selected to serve as Director of

Planning for the Houston Police Department, moving to the

position of Senior Assistant to the Chief of Police in 1983. In

this position, which he held until 1985, he worked as key

staff coordinator for the development of the neighborhood

policing planning process. From 1988 to 1990, Mr.

Wasserman served as Director of Public Safety for the

Massachusetts Port Authority, where he managed police and

fire services for Boston’s airports, waterfront, and bridge

properties. He was responsible for restructuring the provision

of police and fire services to meet the enhanced safety needs

of the area.

Mr. Wasserman did his undergraduate work in sociology at

Antioch College and his graduate work in police administration at Michigan State University. He is the author of

numerous articles and monographs on police training,

community relations, community policing, and criminal

investigations.

William H. Webster was sworn in as Director of Central

Intelligence in 1987. In this position, he headed the Intelligence Community (comprising all foreign intelligence

agencies of the United States) and directed the CIA until

1991, when he joined the law firm of Milbank, Tweed,

Hadley & McCloy in its Washington, D.C., office.

A practicing attorney with a St. Louis law firm from 1949 to

1959, Judge Webster served as U.S. Attorney for the Eastern

District of Missouri from 1960 to 1961, after which he

returned to private practice. From 1964 to 1969, he was a

member of the Missouri Board of Law Examiners.

In 1970, Judge Webster was appointed a Judge of the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri and

in 1973 was elevated to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Eighth Circuit. He resigned that position to become

Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1973.

During his service on the bench, Judge Webster was Chairman of the Judiciary Conference Advisory Committee on the

Criminal Rules and a member of the Ad Hoc Committee on

Habeas Corpus and the Committee of Court Administration.

Judge Webster earned a B.A. degree from Amherst College

in 1947 where, in 1975, he received an honorary Doctor of

Laws degree. He received his J.D. degree from Washington

University Law School in 1949.

Deborah G. Wilson is an Assistant Provost at the University

of Louisville. Dr. Wilson served as Chair of the Department

of Justice Administration from 1990 to 1994 and has been a

member of the faculty since 1983. She has a Ph.D. from

Purdue University and served on the faculty of Auburn

University before her appointment at Louisville,

Dr. Wilson is the director of two international projects in

Central Europe, involving the Pest County Police Department (Budapest) and the Romanian National Police Force.

Both projects are directed toward the provision of police

management education within a democratic model, with a

special emphasis on police-minority relations in Romania.
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Additionally, Dr. Wilson organized and served as leader of

the U.S. delegation for a joint seminar on Police Administration in the 21st Century, which was cohosted by the University of Louisville and Beijing Public Security University.

Dr. Wilson has written or coauthored numerous books,

chapters of books, scholarly articles and technical reports. In

addition to serving on the faculty and in administrative

positions at the University of Louisville, she served as an

Assistant to the Kentucky Attorney General and as the

Director of Planning and Research for the Kentucky Department of Corrections.

Anatoly Zakalyuk is the Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian

Academy of Internal Affairs and a member of the Presidium

of the Academy of Juridical Sciences of Ukraine. In addition

to his formal position as researcher for the Ministry of

Internal Affairs, he has written many policy documents drafted

in response to requests of the President and Supreme Rada of

Ukraine, including an analysis of the crime situation in

Ukraine for the past 20 years.

Ugljesa Zvekic is currently a Research Coordinator at the

United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research

Institute and a Senior Scientific Consultant at the Institute for

Criminological and Sociological Research in Belgrade. He is

also an Honorary Professor at the School of Social and

Political Sciences, the University of Hull.

Dr. Zvekic wrote and edited a number of volumes, articles,

and U.N. reports on such subjects as informal crime control,

alternative policing styles, development and crime, the

judicial profession, a world survey of noncustodial sanctions,

probation in an international perspective, an international

survey of victims of crime, and criminal justice information.

He has organized several international conferences, seminars,

research workshops, and training courses within the U.N.

crime prevention and criminal justice programs and for

international associations in criminology and criminal law.