[J-72B-2014] 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA 

MIDDLE DISTRICT 

CASTILLE, C.J., SAYLOR, EAKIN, BAER, TODD, MCCAFFERY, STEVENS, JJ. 

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellant 

 v. 

JAMES JOHN HVIZDA, 

 Appellee 

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No. 6 MAP 2014 

Appeal from the Order of the Superior 

Court at No. 2695 EDA 2012 dated 

6/25/13 which vacated and remanded the 

judgment of sentence of the Chester 

County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal 

Division, at No. CP-15-CR-0001350-2012 

dated 8/27/12 

ARGUED: September 10, 2014 

OPINION 

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE SAYLOR1 DECIDED: June 15, 2015 

 

 The issue presented concerns whether a common pleas court was required to 

permit withdrawal of a guilty plea, upon the defendant-appellee’s assertion of 

innocence. The appeal is a companion case with Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, ___ 

Pa. ___, ___ A.3d ___ (2015). 

 Appellee stabbed his estranged wife, Kimberly, to death. He immediately 

surrendered to police and confessed. Subsequently, he pled guilty to first-degree 

murder and possession of an instrument of crime. In exchange for the plea, the 

 

1

 This matter was reassigned to this author. 
[J-72B-2014] - 2 

Commonwealth was to recommend that Appellee would receive the mandatory 

sentence of life imprisonment for first-degree murder and a consecutive term of 

incarceration pertaining to the possessory offense. 

 Just over two months later, when Appellee appeared for sentencing, he advised 

the common pleas court that he wished to withdraw his plea, stating: “I’m here to 

maintain my innocence in the charge of murder in the first degree.” N.T., July 9, 2012, 

at 3. His counsel explained: 

There needs to be a fair and just reason [in support of a 

motion to withdraw a plea]. As stated previously in response 

to Your Honor’s inquiry, his fair and just reason is that he 

maintains his innocence on the charge of first degree murder 

and possessing an instrument of crime. 

Id. at 6. The court listed the matter for hearing. 

 At the hearing, Appellee again stated that he was innocent, but he offered no 

evidence. The Commonwealth presented audiotapes of Appellee’s telephone 

conversations from prison, in which he stated that, although he “did it” and knew that he 

“deserve[d] what [he was] gonna get,” he wished to stand trial to “get some of the story 

out.” N.T., Aug. 20, 2012, at 10-11. On this basis, and more generally, the 

Commonwealth took the position that Appellee’s assertion of innocence was implausible 

and insincere. 

 The common pleas court denied Appellee’s motion, applying the standard 

derived from Commonwealth v. Forbes, 450 Pa. 185, 299 A.2d 268 (1973), which 

requires a court to accept a presentence withdrawal of a plea upon presentation of a 

fair-and-just reason, and in the absence of substantial prejudice to the Commonwealth. 

See id. at 191, 299 A.2d at 271. The court relied on Commonwealth v. Tennison, 969 

A.2d 572 (Pa. Super. 2009), for the proposition that it had the ability to adjudge the 

sincerity of the innocence claim in the assessment of fairness and justice. See 
[J-72B-2014] - 3 

Commonwealth v. Hvizda, No. 1350-2012, slip op. at 2-3 (C.P. Chester Aug. 22, 2012) 

(citing Tennison, 969 A.2d at 573). According to the common pleas court, the 

Commonwealth had “presented compelling and unique evidence to establish 

[Appellee’s] bald assertion of innocence was at best pretextual and an attempt to 

manipulate the system.” Id. at 3. 

 After sentencing ensued in accordance with the plea agreement, Appellee lodged 

an appeal. In its brief, the Commonwealth argued for the first time that the Forbes

standard did not govern Appellee’s motion. Rather, the Commonwealth observed, in 

Commonwealth v. Lesko, 502 Pa. 511, 467 A.2d 307 (1983), this Court had substituted 

a requirement that a defendant subject to a mandatory life sentence should establish a 

manifest injustice to support presentence plea withdrawal. See id. at 517, 467 A.2d at 

310. 

 In a divided, memorandum decision, the Superior Court vacated the common 

pleas court’s ruling and instructed that court to accept the plea withdrawal. The majority 

related that, in the en banc decision in Commonwealth v. Katonka, 33 A.3d 44 (Pa. 

Super. 2011), the intermediate court had explained that Tennison was limited to its facts 

and that credibility assessments relative to a defendant’s claim of innocence were 

impermissible. See id. at 49-50. Accordingly, the majority determined that the common 

pleas court should have accepted Appellee’s assertion of innocence as a fair-and-just 

reason in support of withdrawal. 

 The majority also declined the Commonwealth’s invitation to apply Lesko. In this 

regard, it distinguished the case on several grounds, including because Appellee was 

not only required to receive a life sentence for first-degree murder but was also subject 

to a term of incarceration for his possessory offense, and since Appellee was subject to 

fines, costs, and restitutions in the discretion of the sentencing court. 
[J-72B-2014] - 4 

 Then-President Judge Stevens dissented, essentially on the basis of the 

common pleas court’s reasoning. 

 The Commonwealth lodged a petition for allowance of appeal, which we 

accepted to exercise plenary review over the legal issues presented. 

 The Commonwealth first argues that Lesko is controlling and required the 

Superior Court to apply a manifest injustice standard. In the alternative, the 

Commonwealth contends that Katonka’s proscription against credibility assessments 

relative to innocence claims does not fairly derive from the decisions of this Court. 

 Appellee finds Lesko to be outdated, poorly reasoned, difficult to apply, and 

factually distinguishable. In terms of the appropriate application of the Forbes standard, 

Appellee maintains, consistent with Superior Court precedent, that his bare assertion of 

innocence is enough to establish a fair-and-just reason supporting presentence 

withdrawal of a plea. 

 Initially, we agree with Appellee that the Lesko decision is incompletely reasoned 

on the relevant point and should not remain controlling authority. In Lesko, this Court 

recognized the prevailing liberal standard for presentence withdrawal as established in 

Forbes. See Lesko, 502 Pa. at 517, 467 A.2d at 310. The Court observed, however, 

that the standard for post-sentence withdrawal is a stringent one, requiring the 

defendant to establish manifest injustice. The remainder of the Lesko Court’s reasoning 

is as follows: 

The basis for the difference between these two standards is 

clear. Allowing an accused to withdraw his guilty plea after 

imposition of sentence requires a stricter standard to prevent 

defendants from using a guilty plea as a tool for previewing 

the sentencing by the court. Such a misuse does not occur 

when withdrawing a guilty plea prior to sentencing. 
[J-72B-2014] - 5 

The lower court applied the “manifest injustice” standard, 

reasoning that the [a]ppellant was pre-advised of the only 

possible sentence. Therefore, the [a]ppellant’s petition was 

akin to a post-sentencing petition. Because the [a]ppellant 

was well aware of the only possible sentence imposable for 

the crime to which he pled guilty, we find no error in applying 

the “manifest injustice” standard. In any event, applying the 

“fair and just reason” standard will not give the Appellant the 

requested relief. 

Id. (emphasis in original). 

 Unfortunately, the Lesko Court did not discuss all of the policies underlying the

Forbes rule. Indeed, the main reason the Court has repeatedly invoked in support of 

the liberal allowance of presentence withdrawal of pleas is to safeguard defendants’ trial 

rights. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Santos, 450 Pa. 492, 494-95, 301 A.2d 829, 830 

(1973) (“[S]ince guilty pleas involve the simultaneous waiver of so many constitutional 

rights, we have recently emphasized ‘that a request [to withdraw] made before 

sentencing . . . should be liberally allowed.’” (quoting Forbes, 450 Pa. at 190, 299 A.2d 

at 271 (emphasis added; footnote omitted))). Moreover, Lesko’s rationale centered on 

“sentence-previewing” is strained. While Lesko correctly recognized that a defendant 

pleading guilty to an offense triggering a mandatory life sentence has no need to 

preview the sentencing result (as he already knows that he will receive a life sentence 

at the time the plea is accepted), Lesko used this premise to reach the opposite 

conclusion of that to which it logically leads. Contrary to the Lesko Court’s reasoning, if 

preventing previewing were the only reason supporting implementation of an elevated 

standard, there would be no reason to apply the higher standard at all to a defendant 

who has pled guilty to an offense triggering a mandatory life sentence.2 Lesko, 

 

2

 Of course, there are other justifications for the elevated standard governing postsentence withdrawal motions, also not recognized in Lesko. See, e.g., Commonwealth 

v. Gunter, 565 Pa. 79, 84, 771 A.2d 767, 771 (2001) (“The different treatment of pre- 

(Mcontinued) 
[J-72B-2014] - 6 

however, upended this logic to conclude that the liberal standard should not apply in the 

first instance, again, without any acknowledgement of the driving justification for 

liberality in the presentence period, i.e., safeguarding defendants’ trial rights. 

 We also agree with Appellee that the Lesko approach is problematic in its 

application, as it yields distinctions and variations such as are reflected in the opinion of 

the Superior Court majority here. Accordingly, while we recognize the importance of 

adhering to precedent, we disapprove Lesko’s idiosyncratic approach to presentence 

withdrawal. See generally Ayala v. Phila. Bd. of Pub. Ed., 453 Pa. 584, 606, 305 A.2d 

877, 888 (1973) (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis is not a vehicle for perpetuating error, 

but rather a legal concept which responds to the demands of justice and, thus, permits 

the orderly growth processes of the law to flourish.”). 

 In the companion case of Carrasquillo, however, we have determined that a 

bare assertion of innocence – such as Appellee provided as the basis for withdrawing 

his guilty plea – is not, in and of itself a sufficient reason to require a court to grant such 

a request. See Carrasquillo, ___ Pa. at ___, ___ A.3d at ___. Accordingly, and for the 

reasons set forth more fully in that case, the common pleas court did not err in denying 

Appellee’s withdrawal motion. 

 The order of the Superior Court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for 

reinstatement of the judgment of sentence. 

 Former Chief Justice Castille and former Justice McCaffery did not participate in 

the decision of this case. 

 

(continuedM) 

and postsentence motions reflects the tension in our jurisprudence between the 

individual’s fundamental right to a trial and the need for finality in the proceedings.”). 
[J-72B-2014] - 7 

 Messrs. Justice Eakin and Baer, Madame Justice Todd and Mr. Justice Stevens 

join the opinion. 

 Mr. Justice Stevens files a concurring opinion.