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Special Report 197 January 2008

United States Institute of Peace

Special Report

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the positions or policies of the U.S. Departments 

of Commerce or Defense nor do they represent the views 

of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not 

advocate specific policy positions .

Contents 

Introduction 2

Infrastructure and Conflict Assessment Model 2

Discussion of Phases 4

Summary of the World Bank Conflict Analysis Framework 6

Summary of Recommendations 14

Build-Neglect-Rebuild: Pakistan’s Water Infrastructure 19

About the Report

This report is based on a series of consultations chaired 

by Merriam Mashatt, Major General Daniel Long, and 

James Crum under the auspices of the U.S. Institute of 

Peace Center of Innovation for Economies and Conflict. 

The Institute’s Framework for Success1 provided the 

organizational structure for the consultations. At 

the time the report was developed, Merriam Mashatt 

directed the Center, under the leadership of Daniel 

Serwer, vice president for Post-Conflict Peace and 

Stability Operations. Coauthors Major General Daniel 

Long and James Crum served as directors of the 

Department of the Army’s Project and Contracting Office 

in Iraq and Washington, DC, respectively. Currently, 

Merriam Mashatt is the director of Reconstruction and 

Stabilization for the International Trade Administration, 

U.S. Department of Commerce; Major General Long 

is now the commander of the Joint Task Force Civil 

Support, U.S. Northern Command; and James Crum 

is a vice president at Van Scoyoc Associates, Inc. The 

authors thank James Wasserstrom and Colonel Michael 

Moon for their expert advice and Zoë Cooprider for her 

research support.

Merriam Mashatt, Major General Daniel Long, 

and James Crum

Summary

•	 Infrastructure development is the foundation of a sustainable economy and a means 

to achieving broader nation-building goals. Providing basic services is critical to 

security, governance, economic development, and social well-being.2

•	 U.S. military forces have improved planning and coordination mechanisms and have 

created doctrine, planning processes, and training exercises that are shared by all 

branches of the military. This type and level of coordination mechanism is necessary 

for civilian and military coordination, as well, and progress is starting to be made in 

this important area.

•	 The complexity of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) often results in missed 

opportunities to act quickly in restoring essential services. Contracting officers are 

often reluctant to take chances in expediting infrastructure contracts due to concerns 

about violating the FAR. Simplified contracting, use of smaller projects, and reachback support are three ways to ensure fleeting opportunities are not lost. 

•	 In conflict-sensitive environments, the condition of infrastructure is often a barometer of whether a society will slip further into violence or make a peaceful transition 

out of the conflict cycle. The rapid restoration of essential services, such as water, 

sanitation, and electricity, assists in the perception of a return to normalcy and 

contributes to the peace process. 

•	 According to James I. Wasserstrom, head of the Office for Oversight of PubliclyOwned Enterprises (utilities) in the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, infrastructure 

adds “arms and legs” to strategies aimed at winning “hearts and minds.” Infrastructure is fundamental to moving popular support away from prewar or during-conflict 

loyalties and to moving spoilers in favor of postwar political objectives. 

•	 This U.S. Institute of Peace Special Report presents a model that links the infrastructure cycle with conflict analysis. This model is helpful to focus the attention of 

the infrastructure program planners and implementers on the conflict cycle. In many 

instances, infrastructure experts approach problems from an engineering perspective. 

Conflict-Sensitive Approach 

to Infrastructure Development
While this view is important, it must be married with an appreciation of the conflict 

dynamic. Indeed, traditional engineering concerns, such as efficiency, are secondary 

in a conflict-sensitive approach. 

Introduction

In conflict-prone environments, traditional forms of economic analysis and program 

development are insufficient to aid an economy’s progress into a peaceful transition. The 

stated goals of traditional assistance are economic growth, efficiency, and competition. 

While these goals may be appropriate long-term economic objectives, they are not suitable 

for stabilizing an economy emerging from conflict. In countries where security is lacking, the goal of economic initiatives should be first and foremost to reduce conflict. It is 

important to recognize that economic stabilization is different from traditional economic 

development. 

Stabilization must be achieved before development initiatives can take root. In general, the goal of postwar stability operations is to ensure that the threat (military and/or 

political) is reduced to a manageable level. Second, stability aims to ensure that the situation leading to the original crisis does not reoccur or its effects are mitigated.3

The most prominent example of not addressing economic stabilization is the U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003. The U.S.-funded economic programs were focused on “market-driven”

efficiency instead of conflict reduction, which would have significantly reduced conflict 

drivers. It is now clear that economic development could not effectively proceed without 

first achieving a minimum level of security. 

How does economic stabilization in a conflict-prone environment differ from a traditional economic development environment? How can programs be modified to address 

true stabilization before moving on to economic development? To tackle these difficult 

questions, the United States Institute of Peace held a series of workshops in 2006 and 

2007 to develop a new analytical model. The model uses a life-cycle approach to integrate 

economic considerations with conflict assessment. It also recommends a process to view 

the stages of economic assistance through the lens of conflict assessment. 

As a starting point, the group applied this model to infrastructure development in 

conflict-prone environments.4 The goal of the workshops was to generate best practices 

for developing conflict-sensitive approaches for each phase of an infrastructure life-cycle. 

The working group limited its discussions to circumstances where donors provided infrastructure assistance in a reconstruction and/or stabilization environment. Some of the 

countries discussed included Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 

Both the model and this report are organized based on the five life-cycle phases of an 

infrastructure project: 

1. Assessment 

2. Strategy, planning, and coordination 

3. Building host nation legitimacy 

4. Project execution 

5. Transition of completed projects to host nation control 

By viewing the phases of program development through the lens of conflict assessment, an infrastructure program can be designed to reduce drivers of conflict and support 

the peace process. 

Infrastructure and Conflict Assessment Model

Experts in the diverse fields of infrastructure development and conflict assessment share a 

common analytical framework based on life-cycle analysis. Simply defined, a life-cycle is 

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. Its 

goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote post-conflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict-management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital worldwide. 

The Institute does this by empowering others with knowledge, 

skills, and resources, as well as by its direct involvement in 

conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, 

D.C. • María Otero (Vice Chairman), President, ACCION International, Boston, Mass. • Holly J. Burkhalter, Vice President, 

Government Affairs, International Justice Mission, Washington, D.C. • Anne H. Cahn, Former Scholar in Residence, 

American University, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker, 

James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of 

Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 

• Laurie S. Fulton, Partner, Williams and Connolly, Washington, D.C. • Charles Horner, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, 

Washington, D.C. • Kathleen Martinez, Executive Director, 

World Institute on Disability • George E. Moose, Adjunct 

Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George 

Mason University, Fairfax, Va. • Ron Silver, Actor, Producer, 

Director, Primparous Productions, Inc. • Judy Van Rest, 

Executive Vice President, International Republican Institute, 

Washington, D.C. 

Members ex officio

Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State • Robert M. Gates,

Secretary of Defense • Richard H. Solomon, President, United 

States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) • Frances C. Wilson,

Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps; President, National 

Defense University.
3

the stages of a lifetime. An infrastructure project’s life-cycle consists of designing, building, operating, and maintaining a facility, such as a water treatment plant. A conflict lifecycle generally consists of stable peace, rising tensions, violent conflict, reconciliation, 

and a return to stable peace. During 2006 and 2007, a series of United States Institute 

of Peace workshops used this common frame of reference to bring together experts in 

the fields of infrastructure development, conflict assessment, engineering, and policy 

analysis.

In order to view the infrastructure cycle through the lens of conflict analysis, the workshop series borrowed a model from Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive 

Diplomacy by Michael S. Lund.5 His model emphasized the various phases of the conflict 

cycle and corresponding diplomatic efforts (see figure 1).

This simplified model represents an idealized conflict cycle. It is important to keep 

in mind that individual conflicts follow their own unique course. As Lund states, “Some 

double back on themselves, swinging from tenuous settlement to renewed conflict, as 

happened in Angola in the 1990s. Some never quite develop into full-fledged conflicts, 

but simmer uneasily for years, as happened in Indonesia before the outbreak of fighting 

over East Timor.” This chart provides analysts with a useful means of understanding the 

dynamics of conflict and assessing what actions are appropriate to manage the conflict 

at its various stages. 

The workshop members adapted this standard conflict model to incorporate the five 

major phases of infrastructure development in conflict prone settings: assessment, planning and coordination, building legitimacy, execution, and transition (see figure 2). When 

viewed through the lens of conflict analysis, a new set of priorities and concerns for 

infrastructure development emerges for each phase of the conflict cycle. 

As might be expected, infrastructure experts frequently approach problems from 

an engineering perspective. While this view is important, it must be married with an 

appreciation of the conflict dynamic. Indeed, traditional engineering concerns, such as 

efficiency, are secondary in a conflict-sensitive approach. For example, it may be critical 

to the economic success of the host nation to forgo some efficiency in order to promote

Stabilization must be achieved 

before development initiatives 

can take root.

Traditional engineering concerns 

are secondary in a conflict-sensitive 

approach.

cease-fire

agreement

sustained

violence intermittent

violence

agreement

implementation

intermittent

violence

confrontation decreasing

tension

rising tension

reconstruction/reconciliation

Figure 1: Life-Cycle of a Conflict

War

Crisis

Unstable

Peace

Stable

Peace

Peacemaking

Conflict 

Prevention

Routine

Diplomacy/

Development

Peace enforcement

Peacekeeping

Post-Conflict 

operations

Crisis Diplomacy

Source: Modified from materials in Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, by Michael S. Lund, USIP Press, 

1996. All rights reserved. Please do not reproduce without appropriately citing the UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE.
4

indigenous job creation and employment of host nation contractors. This model helps 

focus the attention of the infrastructure program planners and implementers on the 

conflict cycle.

Discussion of Phases

Assessment 

assessing Drivers of Conflict. Many international interventions falter because early 

assessments do not address drivers of conflict, either those that operated in the past or 

new ones that emerge after a peace agreement is reached. While it may not be possible 

for interventions to eliminate all of the drivers of conflict, it is critical to be aware of 

them and, if necessary, have a strategy to work around these difficulties. In this report, 

drivers of conflict are defined as individuals and systems that benefit from perpetuating 

conflict, including

•	 Illicit market activity 

•	 Corrupt government officials

•	 Criminal syndicates (drugs, arms, human trade)

•	 Exploitation of natural resources in a way that benefits predatory elites

•	 Perpetuation of group-based inequities within the society 

•	 Violent competition for resources

•	 Control of essential services to illegitimately benefit a small group

Key infrastructure planners and providers in conflict scenarios must know the underlying motives and causes for the original conflict, who controls the infrastructure, and how 

infrastructure development could inadvertently fuel conflict. 

Ideally, this analysis of the conflict drivers will be informed by host nation officials 

who understand societal needs as well as their capacity to participate in and sustain what 

Drivers of conflict are defined as 

individuals and systems that benefit 

from perpetuating conflict.

cease-fire

agreement

sustained

violence intermittent

violence

agreement

implementation

intermittent

violence

confrontation decreasing

tension

rising tension

reconstruction/reconciliation

Figure 2: Infrastructure Cycle and Conflict

War

Crisis

Unstable

Peace

Stable

Peace

Strategy,

Planning,

Coordination

assessment

traditional

foreign

assistance

Building legitimacy

Design/

Build execution

transition to Host 

Nation

Sustaining essential 

Services

traditional foreign 

assistance

Source: Modified from materials in Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, Michael S. Lund, USIP Press, 1996. 

All rights reserved. Please do not reproduce without appropriately citing the UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE.
is ultimately built. Assessments need to be ongoing through the life of the project and 

address the following issues in the host nation:

•	 The role infrastructure plays in perpetuating or mitigating host nation conflict

•	 Cultural traditions and practices that might impact infrastructure design and use

•	 Identification of who controls infrastructure and what motivates these stakeholders

•	 Identification of possible incentives for powerful stakeholders, such as cooperation, 

co-optation, or confrontation 

•	 Illicit power structures and their impact on infrastructure 

•	 Capacity of the host nation to sustain infrastructure

•	 Host-nation-appropriate technology and local systems

•	 Regional infrastructure arrangements with neighboring countries

One way to conduct this type of research is to compare notes with civil society organizations, as well as national and international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 

bilateral donors, and the United Nations. Many times, these organizations have maintained long-term operations in the field.9 These are hardly impartial bodies, but using 

triangulation with the regional and/or technical expertise among the various sources 

should achieve a practicable approximation of facts on the ground.10 Such an understanding of the operational environment will ensure that active choices are made leading to 

the appropriate planning of infrastructure development strategies, while simultaneously 

mitigating potential problems.11

Perhaps most important to remember is that assessments should take into consideration the local systems that developed to provide essential services that the national government could not or would not provide. These systems must be rehabilitated, replicated, 

and integrated into the national system or infrastructure. Integration, whether bottom-up 

or top-down, will bolster the capacity for economic growth and regional development. For 

example, prior to 2003, Iraq had a network of community and neighborhood electricity 

generators. Rather than trying to rebuild the electrical grid, it may have been a better 

approach to rehabilitate and strengthen this system. 

Finally, regional infrastructure assessments are one aspect of the analysis that is frequently underappreciated. Regional integration of infrastructure leads to closer ties and 

cooperation between neighboring countries. Intervening authorities should also be aware 

of the assets and infrastructure capacities of countries that neighbor the host nation that 

have been severed or reduced. Once the immediate humanitarian needs are addressed, 

long-term infrastructure projects should set the stage for regional integration of national 

operating systems, such as electrical transmission/distribution, air traffic control, and 

water use rights. 

Conflict Assessment Tools Relevant to Infrastructure Development

World Bank Conflict Analysis Framework:

http://go.worldbank.org/3QZPKY2XU0

United States Agency for International Development Conflict Assessment Tools: 

http://rmportal.net/tools/conflict-assessment-and-management-tools

International Finance Corporation (IFC) Performance Standards:

http://ifc.org/ifcext/policyreview.nsf/ContentSafeguardPolicesUpdate

UN Global Compact Business Guide for Conflict Impact Assessment and Risk Management: 

www.union-network.org/.../c550f48211dccaacc1256c31002013c5/$FILE/BusinessGuide.pdf 

Sri Lanka Mahaweli Irrigation Project: 

Ethnic Tensions Kill Project Mid-Stream

A classic example of infrastructure development fueling ethnic tensions is the 

Mahaweli water project in Sri Lanka. The 

project exacerbated preexisting ethnic 

tensions, which were well-known by the 

donor community at the time the project 

was conceived. In hindsight, a simple 

conflict assessment would have highlighted the difficulties and the impact of 

the project on the conflict cycle. The lack 

of a conflict-sensitive approach doomed 

the project from the start. 

The project was designed in the late 

1970s to dam, divert, and harness the 

Mahaweli Ganga River system in order 

to generate hydroelectric energy and 

irrigate 360,000 hectares of scrubland. 

Irrigating the barren land would make 

it possible to resettle up to 750,000 

landless peasants on small farms.6 The 

government of Sri Lanka was eager to 

relieve overcrowding in the Sinhalesedominated south and southwest regions 

of the country. 

The Tamils and the Sinhalese disputed who had rights to the territory. 

The Tamils viewed the plan as a scheme 

to use the resettlement to undercut their 

land claims in the eastern province. They 

believed the project was a continuation of colonization schemes that had 

changed the ethnic make-up of the land 

once dominated by the Tamils. 

For example, in 1976 the Tamils said, 

“a system of planned and state-aided 

colonization was calculated to make the 

Tamils a minority in their own homeland.” 

7 The data support this assertion 

because in 1946 Sinhalese made up 

slightly more than 19 percent of the 

population in the Eastern dry zone and 

by 1976 the Sinhalese population grew 

to 86 percent.8

In the end, armed conflict broke out 

and the dispute over resettlement ratios 

sounded the death knell for the project. By the late 1980s the project was 

a white elephant with reservoirs lying 

dormant, and by March 1990 the World 

Bank ultimately pulled out of the project 

altogether.
Summary of the World Bank Conflict Analysis Framework 

The Conflict Analysis Framework (CAF) is designed to help World Bank (WB) teams identify 

factors that affect a conflict and enable them to see how they can be best addressed 

through WB programs and policies. The analysis is designed to ensure that development 

interventions do not incite, exacerbate, or revive conflict. The CAF has four major components.

Risk Screening Process. The screening process comprises a review of nine indicators. 

In general, the more indicators assessed as positive, the more need there is for conflict 

analysis.

Nine Risk Screening Indicators

1. Violent conflict in the past ten 

years

2. Low per capita GNI

3. High capacity on primary commodities exports

4. Political instability

5. Militarization

6. Ethnic dominance

7. Active regional conflicts

8. High youth unemployment

9. Restricted civil and political rights

Conflict Analysis. The conflict analysis is based on a framework of six categories, each 

of which has a number of variables. Using the framework, WB teams are able to identify 

the key factors that affect conflict. 

Six Conflict Categories

1. Social and ethnic relations

2. Governance and political institutions

3. Human rights and security

4. Economic structures and performance

 (including infrastructure)

5. Environmental and natural resources

6. External factors

Methodology. CAF recommends a five-step process for teams to work through conflictrelated issues.

Five Steps

1. Conduct a desk study of available 

information

2. Conduct workshops with country 

specialists and subject matter 

experts to cover all six categories

3. Conduct follow-up studies on issues 

identified in the workshops

4. Conduct country consultations with 

stakeholder groups

5. Hold concluding workshops to integrate findings and incorporate within 

country strategies

Analysis. As part of the analysis of each category, the approach suggests focusing on 

seven aspects for each category.

Seven Aspects

1. Its history and how it developed 

over time

2. Its dynamic and trends and what is 

determining the future path

3. Public perceptions and biases of 

the issue

4. How the issue has been politicized

5. Extent to which the issue has led to 

 organized interests

6. How it contributes to conflict and 

intensity

7. How it contributes to poverty
Planning and Coordination

Infrastructure alone will not bring about stability. It is critical that those involved in 

the planning process view infrastructure as a means to achieving the larger end-states 

essential for societies emerging from conflict. Infrastructure underpins all of the USIP 

Framework for Success pillars, including: rule of law, security, sustainable economy, and 

governance. Providing basic services is critical to security, governance, economic development, and social well-being.12 For example, the construction of courthouses and prisons 

underpin rule of law; border facilities and military bases impact national security; building schools, hospitals, and clinics address social welfare; roads and electricity support the 

economy; and clean water is critical to every aspect of society. 

In traditional development scenarios where the security situation is permissive, the 

host nation would ideally have a well-thought-out, strategic infrastructure plan where 

donors contribute by filling the gaps. This is true in many Millennium Challenge Corporation projects, where host nations seek assistance with long-term development projects. 

In many conflict-prone environments, however, an infrastructure plan does not exist and 

country needs are overwhelming. The phrase, “we need everything,” is very common in 

many countries, so it is difficult to determine where to start. In these cases, it is critical to build capacity within the host nation to drive the strategic and planning process. 

Undoubtedly, building a strategy based on host nation input and buy-in takes time, but, in 

the long run, the projects are more appropriate and thus more sustainable, which is more 

thoroughly discussed in the section “Build and Maintain Legitimacy.”

Who is in Charge? One of the major stumbling blocks to effective planning and coordination in conflict-prone environments is a lack of a clear understanding by all players 

as to who exactly is in charge. While there is widespread agreement that civilians should 

lead economic stabilization and recovery efforts, this may not be possible in conflict settings. The reality is that the military is presently the only part of the U.S. government 

that has the significant capacity needed to respond immediately to reconstruction in nonpermissive security environments. The tension lies in the fact that the military lacks the 

expertise on the economic front, while the civilians lack the ability to operate effectively 

in nonsecure environments. According to Ambassador Robert Oakley: 

What causes even greater confusion is that the lead for coordination shifts as the 

security environment changes. As security improves, civilians and host nation government officials rightly take the lead. When security worsens, the lead shifts to the military. 

Recognizing and responding to the transition between who leads and who follows is not 

always clear or well understood. 

Another complication is that international interventions involve numerous civilian 

and military organizations leading to a confusing mix of personnel, organizational objectives, and command-and-control relationships. The array of actors includes governmental 

officials, international governmental organizations (IGOs), regional organizations, NGOs, 

and private sector companies. A lack of trust between organizations can develop due to 

stovepiped operations and turf battles. Not only does this situation lead to a duplication 

of effort, it prevents leveraging synergies between different efforts. 

In a worst-case scenario, a lack of cooperation between organizations may result in 

harmful effects. This was the case with the U.S. Department of Defense Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program in Afghanistan, which the NGO community said did not 

coordinate infrastructure work with local stakeholders. Additionally, NGO representatives 

said some of the completed projects, such as schools, did not take sustainability into 

account. Detractors were also concerned with the potential for confusion among local 

stakeholders between civilian and military aid.14

The lead for coordination shifts as 

the security environment changes.

Providing basic services is critical 

to security, governance, economic 

development, and social well-being.

[W]hen there is a lack of enthusiasm to involve the military, there may be no alternative other 

than inaction. The military is called upon too frequently because it is too easy, and ... not 

enough has been done to develop greater civilian capabilities.13
Examples of Improved Coordination. U.S. military forces have improved planning and 

coordination mechanisms and have created—through Joint Forces programs—doctrine, 

planning processes, and training exercises that are shared by all branches of the military. 

This type and level of coordination mechanism does not yet exist among civilian groups 

or between civilian and military agencies. 

Some progress, however, is being made in civilian and military coordination. First, The 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE), the two U.S. government entities most heavily involved in infrastructure development in conflict-prone environments, are working to improve coordination. Examples of 

recent concrete steps these organizations have implemented include: 

•	 The Commander of USACE and the Administrator of USAID have agreed to pursue 

mechanisms that will allow USACE to immediately respond to USAID requests for 

assistance, and to work out arrangements to station a USACE Liaison Officer within 

USAID headquarters. 

•	 USACE is procuring additional rapid response contracts that facilitate faster initiation 

of reconstruction following contingencies. These contracts will support USAID missions in future efforts.

•	 USACE has offered to form a formal contingency and engineering support planning 

relationship with USAID. 

Second, the State Department’s Coordinator for Stability and Reconstruction (S/CRS) is 

beginning to make progress in developing better interagency coordination mechanisms. 

The S/CRS leads the U.S. planning efforts for countries and regions of concern and coordinates the deployment of U.S. civilian resources to respond to conflict. The initiative is 

designed to create an Interagency Management System (IMS) staffed by civilians from 

both government and the private sector. 

One of the major goals behind the development of the IMS is the ability to ramp up 

civilian capacity for nation-building efforts. For example, S/CRS is working to create an 

internal surge capacity of civilian response teams within the U.S. government that would 

be deployable to conflict-sensitive areas. S/CRS is also accelerating plans for a civilian 

reserve corps modeled on the military reserve. According to the head of S/CRS, Ambassador Herbst, the civilian reserve is envisioned to be comprised of civilians who sign up 

for reserve status for three to five years and perform their civilian jobs but train as a team 

from time to time. The reservists will commit to serve from six to twelve months abroad 

at any time. As we go to press, Congress has not yet authorized the civilian reserve, but 

it appears that prospects for it are improving.15

In addition to the IMS effort, the United States should consider implementing a U.S. 

government International Emergency Response Plan (IERP). An IERP would address several critical needs and lessons that continue to repeat themselves in previous post-war 

reconstruction events. Additionally, an IERP would build upon the successful features of 

the U.S. government domestic National Response Plan (NRP) and customize this concept 

for international response. 16,17

Currently, the NRP only responds to domestic incidents. This report recommends adopting such a framework for international events. The American Red Cross’ IERP is a good 

model for the U.S. government to follow. The American Red Cross works with a worldwide 

network of partners that includes the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and 185 Red Cross and Red 

Crescent national societies to ensure consistency in international disaster response operations. The network’s emergency response activities are community-based and large-scale. 

They focus on relief supply distribution including food, shelter, sanitation services, and 

reestablishment of family links.18

The creation of a U.S. IERP would align federal coordination structures, capabilities, 

and resources into a unified approach to international conflict management. The approach 

would tie together a complete spectrum of international conflict management activities 



In addition to the IMS effort, the 

United States should consider 

implementing a U.S. government International Emergency 

Response Plan.
including humanitarian response, security, governance, rule of law, economic development, 

and social well-being. Since all of these activities have an infrastructure component, this 

type of coordination would greatly enhance the effectiveness of assistance overall. 

For example, in the area of security, better coordination would result in not only building border forts, but training indigenous persons to staff them. In social well-being areas, 

better coordination would translate into ensuring that the schools and hospitals that are 

constructed have the staff necessary to provide education and health-care services. 

In addition to more effective assistance, an IERP would create joint planning and 

relationship building throughout the entire stabilization process. Creating robust, integrated plans and contingencies will have the secondary, but equally important, effect 

of “familiarizing those involved with general parameters of the situation and with each 

other, making it easier to adapt and to coordinate efforts on the ground.”19 Other useful 

models for constructing the IERP are: the Federal Disaster Response Plan, the Humanitarian Information Unit within the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and 

Research, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Sovereign Military Order of 

Malta’s Malteser International, and the Foreign Disaster Emergency Relief Assistance.

The IERP would be structured in a life-cycle management model similar to the NRP. 

That is, the U.S. agencies would integrate their efforts from preplanning to response to 

long-term stabilization, and, eventually, to lessons learned. In the planning phase, it is 

important to identify the agencies, private companies, and organizations that have the 

capacity to be called upon for specific tasks such as security, rule of law, economic, and 

other reconstruction needs. Bringing everyone to the same planning table establishes a 

foundation for effective joint efforts.

Finally, establishing roles, authorities, and up-front funding creates a pretrained, prepared, resourced team that knows the challenges of reconstruction and stabilization. This 

approach also generates commitment from potentially all U.S. agencies that have value 

and skills to offer in an international response effort. This better positions the United 

States to uniformly engage with international stabilization and recovery efforts.

Build and Maintain Legitimacy

Historically, the World Bank and other development organizations have been criticized 

for leaving a trail of “unproductive, wasteful infrastructure projects.”20 Critics argued that 

large infrastructure investments did not translate into sustained service improvements and 

had harmful social impacts.21 One of the primary reasons for these failures is the lack of 

host nation capacity and willpower to sustain what was built (see “Build-Neglect-Rebuild: 

Pakistan’s Water Infrastructure” on page 19).

It is important to recognize that building legitimacy is a long-term endeavor requiring capacity development at all levels of the host nation government. Legitimacy is not 

an isolated objective because it permeates all aspects of host nation development. It 

will arise naturally if the host nation adopts practices that will enable the state to meet 

the needs and aspirations of its people. Trying to shoehorn legitimacy where it is not 

earned, however, empowers illegitimate rulers and wastes donor efforts by supporting bad 

governments.

Because these endeavors are long term, they demand significant financial and political 

commitment by donors and the host nation. Moreover, donors must adjust expectations 

based on the long-term nature of building capacity. Difficulties arise when donor fatigue 

develops after about three years. Donors become weary of tackling long-term problems 

with few results and are eager to redirect funding to newer international crises with high 

visibility and greater rewards. 

While it may only take several years to finish the bricks-and-mortar component of an 

infrastructure program, it can take several decades to develop the institutional capacity 

needed to ensure appropriate operations and maintenance, as well as fair distribution of 

essential services.

U.S. agencies would integrate their 

efforts from preplanning to response 

to long-term stabilization, and, 

eventually, to lessons learned.
10

level 1—Policy: establish the strategic policy, vision, and commitment at the highest levels of the host nation government to enable, facilitate, and promote a sustainable, 

national infrastructure framework. The ultimate goal of the policy is that infrastructure 

benefits will be distributed fairly and drivers of conflict reduced. 

level 2—laws and Regulations: establish drivers and requirements to support 

sustainable infrastructure. Put in place safeguards to ensure illicit power structures or 

other spoilers do not capture that nation’s infrastructure. Safeguards include international oversight, transparent procurement processes, and effective billing and collection 

mechanisms.

level 3—interorganizational: develop and institute systems and processes by which 

all public and private sector stakeholders work to create sustainable infrastructure. 

Develop civil society organizations that demand governmental accountability and fair 

distribution of essential services.

level 4—Host Nation Government: establish functional business and organizational 

systems within each ministry or sector necessary to support sustainable infrastructure. 

Ensure that each sector—water, electricity, health care, and education—has a national 

strategy and that all regions of the country are treated fairly. Establish transparency and 

anticorruption mechanisms. Address implementation issues at the local level, for example, 

ensure that hospitals have beds and schools have desks.

level 5—infrastructure: provide targeted training and mentoring to host nation staff 

operating at the plant/facility level. If needed, provide a financial bridging strategy to 

conduct operations and maintenance on completed projects until the host nation is able 

to sustain the facilities.

essential Components to Building legitimacy. Figure 3 depicts the various levels of 

capacity development and the parties responsible for each level. 

Most of the lessons learned while building and maintaining legitimacy state the obvious: host nation involvement is necessary for success. This is true during every phase 

of the reconstruction effort from short-term, small-scale, immediate-impact projects to 

long-term, large-scale facilities. Additionally, it is critical to receive buy-in from every 

level of leadership, from the local tribal leader to the head of the ministry in charge of 

à

level 1

Policy

level 2

laws and Regulations

level 3

inter-organizational

level 4

Host Nation Government

level 5

infrastructure

á

á

á

à á

interface

interface

interface

interface

à

à

functions

Policy, Strategy,

Program Direction

Drivers (e.g., Requirements,

Incentive Structures, Budgets)

Focus on Required 

Management Interfaces

Between Host Nation

Government Entities

Institutional Development (e.g., 

Structures, Missions, Business 

Systems/Processes, Integrated 

Logistics Support, HR)

Labor Force Development and

Training at Facility/System Level

Source: U.S. Department of the Army, “Project and Contracting Office Report on Iraq Reconstruction, Historical Booklet,” updated 

May 1, 2007, 17.

á Information 

Reporting

à Policy and

Direction

legend

It is critical to receive buy-in 

from every level of leadership.

Figure 3: Five Levels of Capacity Development
11

the national strategy. Without this host nation involvement and buy-in, projects are likely 

to fail after being transitioned to host nation control 

An integrated capacity development plan within the host nation should focus on 

the five levels shown in figure 3: policy, laws and regulations, inter-organizational, host 

nation government, and infrastructure. All of these capacity development activities must 

take place concurrently, be integrated, and build upon one another. 

It is not enough to provide training at the facility level (Level 5) in fragile states to 

ensure essential services are provided. The Iraqi electrical sector is a good example of how 

all of these levels of capacity development are interrelated. Iraqi policies (Level 1) that 

subsidized the provision of electricity were preventing the Ministry of Electricity from collecting fees that could later be reinvested into infrastructure sustainability (Level 5). 

In addition, subsidies strained the electrical system by creating skyrocketing demand 

as electronics imports flooded the Iraqi market and were free to operate in Iraqi homes 

(Levels 1, 2, and 5). Moreover, the Iraqi Ministries of Planning, Electricity, and Oil (Level 

3) strained to coordinate with one another to create an Iraqi national energy strategy 

that would guarantee appropriate fuel supplies to the Ministry of Electricity. The Ministry 

of Finance and all of the other essential services ministries (Level 3) had great difficulty 

coordinating and planning for proper asset management, such as operations and maintenance of facilities. If any one of these links in the chain failed, electricity might not be 

able to be provided. 

Execution

During the consultations to develop this report, participants viewed contracting impediments as the primary stumbling block to effective execution of infrastructure programs. 

The complexity of the FAR combined with the risk-averse nature of contracting officers 

often result in missed opportunities to act quickly in restoring essential services. Contracting officers are often reluctant to take chances in expediting infrastructure contracts due 

to concerns about violating the FAR. This concern stems from a lack of understanding of 

the flexibilities in the FAR as it relates to contingency environments. 

Simplified Contracting. Since there is already a full body of literature on contracting 

in conflict environments,22 the discussion on contracting in this section is limited to a 

brief update on the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) recent efforts to simplify contracting 

for executors on the ground. The U.S. Air Force has taken the lead in addressing this problem. For example, DOD published an interim FAR rule that revises FAR Part 18 to give one 

reference to the acquisition flexibilities already available in contingency environments. 

In addition, this rule expedites acquisitions of supplies and services during all types of 

emergencies. The Air Force Logistics Management Agency has produced a pocket guide 

FAR for use in the field. More work needs to be done to train implementers in the field and 

to provide reachback support for quick answers to difficult contracting questions. 

Smaller Projects More Successful in Conflict Environment. Smaller projects seem 

to be executed more successfully than larger projects in conflict-prone environments. The 

lessons from the Iraq reconstruction program indicate that in nonpermissive environments, smaller, high-impact projects implemented by local construction companies can 

be preferable in meeting immediate and localized stability goals.23 The Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program, which involves investment of money at the local level by 

senior commanders, proved the value of relatively small, rapidly executable projects that 

meet immediate local needs and, thereby, have the effect of enhancing relations with 

local communities.24

Larger, more complex, projects, which may be perfectly rational in a permissive security 

environment, are not ideal in conflict-prone host nations. These projects are harder to 

protect and take longer to reap the tangible peace dividends necessary to win the hearts 

and minds of the general population. Also, it is much more difficult to find local construcContracting officers are often reluctant 

to take chances in expediting infrastructure contracts due to concerns 

about the FAR.
12

tion companies possessing the expertise and capacity to construct complex facilities using 

the latest technology. 

Reachback Support. Another important, but often overlooked, aspect of execution is 

the benefit of reachback support. Reachback support is any service performed, generally 

stateside and often in the United States, on behalf of the forward deployed group. For 

infrastructure initiatives, the key is to establish a seamless virtual team that, although 

separated by thousands of miles, uses a team approach. Reachback support adds great 

value by taking the burden off the forward team. Under this structure, management identifies the tasks that must be accomplished within the host country and those tasks that 

can be performed stateside, where it is easier to operate. 

For example, a reachback office in the United States can draft program plans, conduct 

congressional testimony, communicate with interagency partners, conduct fast turnaround 

research, respond to public inquires, and develop and maintain the Web site. The reachback support system requires metrics for performance and for setting expectations on 

capabilities and deliverables. Such a management structure enables greater information 

sharing and servicing of the stateside customers, while reducing the workload of the 

forward team. 

In addition to establishing dedicated staff in the stateside reachback offices, a virtual team of infrastructure experts could also be created. The International Network to 

Promote the Rule of Law (INPROL) maintained by the Institute is an example of such a 

network in the legal field. 

The aim of INPROL is to assist international rule of law specialists in their efforts to 

prevent conflict and stabilize war-torn societies. An Internet-based knowledge network, 

INPROL provides those in the field with the ability to exchange information with other 

experienced practitioners and experts and to access relevant documents, best practices, 

and related materials, thus turning lessons learned into lessons applied.

The same type of system could be developed for infrastructure experts. Collecting, 

disseminating, and implementing best practices related to infrastructure development in 

conflict-prone environments are critical to success. Currently, there is no comprehensive 

program to convey best practices to U.S. government staff deployed in the field.

The cornerstone of this type of system would be a consortium of practitioners joined 

together to promote infrastructure sustainability in conflict-prone environments. Providing 

access to a network of experts, a high-quality information database, and virtual training 

will significantly improve the performance of field-based personnel and will also greatly 

contribute to the establishment of institutional memory within the U.S. government.

Transition

In conflict-sensitive environments, the condition of infrastructure is often a barometer of 

whether a society will slip further into violence or make a peaceful transition out of the 

conflict cycle. The rapid restoration of essential services—such as water, sanitation, and 

electricity—assists in the perception of a return to normalcy and contributes to the peace 

process. According to James I. Wasserstrom, head of the Office for Oversight of PubliclyOwned Enterprises (utilities) in the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, infrastructure adds 

“arms and legs” to strategies aimed at winning “hearts and minds.” It is fundamental to 

moving popular support away from pre-conflict or during-conflict loyalties and to moving 

spoilers in favor of post-war political objectives. 

Transitioning an infrastructure program from one lead donor agency to another or to 

the host nation is much more complex than setting a date to turn over the keys to the 

facility. The security environment, progress on indigenous institutional capacity, and the 

public’s perception of essential services all impact the transition process. Two of the most 

important milestones that must be reached are effective means to deal with “spoilers” 

and managing the public’s expectations. 

Dealing with Spoilers and Implementing Safeguards. Spoilers are defined as individuals and organizations that believe peace threatens their power, worldview, and interest. 

Cooperation with a spoiler may 

elicit a faster return of basic 

services than other tools.

 Reachback support is any service 

performed, generally stateside on 

behalf of the forward-deployed 

group.
13

In general, they seek to undermine attempts to achieve peace. In a worst-case scenario,

there is a danger that those who have a stake in perpetuating conflict could capture 

newly constructed assets and related revenues. For example, workers at the Kosovo Electro-energy Corporation (KEK), many of whom were demobilized Kosovo Liberation Army 

soldiers, were providing contributions in the form of payroll deductions from their KEK 

salaries to “benevolent” organizations, which were, themselves, likely conduits of funds to 

those advocating the return to violent means to achieve Kosovo’s independence. 

According to Wasserstrom, where infrastructure or restoration of key basic services 

is controlled by spoilers, the three “C’s” co-exist as tools: cooperation, cooptation, and 

confrontation. Each entails risks and rewards and can be analyzed accordingly during the 

assessment phase. 

Cooperation with a spoiler may elicit a faster return of basic services than other tools.

The obvious risk is legitimization in the eye of the public of a past or prospective enemy 

of the political process, which taints public perception of the international community. On 

the other hand, cooperation can lead to cooptation, where spoilers may join a political 

process they might not otherwise have due to the enticement of material rewards, such 

as revenues from providing infrastructure service. The risk is that enriched spoilers joining 

the political process have a high chance of corrupting it down the road, since the source 

of their power is probably not legitimate. 

Confrontation can be very popular, politically, if those being confronted are negatively 

perceived by the community and can thus be dislodged from control. However, it can be 

highly risky and costly if spoilers merely go underground to undermine reconstruction 

through covert “hearts and minds, arms and legs” strategies or more aggressive political/

military approaches of their own. 

In short, each tool has value, either in terms of getting the actual work done, winning 

popular support, or both. The value depends on the relationships between locals who 

control, or attempt to control, infrastructure reconstruction resources, the community the 

infrastructure serves, and those arriving to manage conflict reconstruction and stabilization. Part of the plan developed in conjunction with the assessment mentioned above 

will include an evaluation of the utility of tools at hand, risks and rewards, and ways to 

optimize available means, based on the specifics of the local context. 

Clear safeguards should be implemented to protect assets from falling into the hands 

of spoilers who benefit from continuation of conflict.25 Safeguards are generally laws, 

regulations, and formal procedures implemented by the donor community or the host 

nation government to protect public goods. Balancing the urgency of reconstruction with 

the time needed to ensure transparency and accountability is a difficult task. However, it is 

crucial to the task of preventing the capture of reconstruction processes by some factions 

or their proxies who seek to perpetuate conflict. Some examples of safeguards include

•	 International oversight

•	 Transparent procurement processes

•	 Auditing and enforcement of violations

•	 Mechanisms for the public to register complaints against utilities

•	 Commercializing business 

•	 Proactive and real-time oversight of public utilities—state-owned enterprises (SOEs)

•	 Effective billing and collection mechanisms

•	 Establishing board of directors

One example of a safeguard applies to the job description review process within a 

public utility in the host nation. It is critical to ensure that the job descriptions of key 

positions in the utility, such as the president, vice president, chief financial officer, and 

recruitment are transparent and above board. Rather than department heads drawing up 

the lists of tasks and jobs within the department, the lists should be drawn up by a task 

Milestones for Giving Control of 

Completed Facility to Host Nation

Below, key transition milestones are 

summarized as reconstruction operations shift from donor agencies to the 

host nation. If these milestones are not 

met, the effort may be compromised. 

Security

•	 People feel secure and the environment is mostly permissive

•	 Critical essential services facilities 

are protected

•	 There is security at the infrastructure facility to prevent spoilers from 

sabotaging operations and maintenance (O&M)

Public Perception

•	 Emergency humanitarian needs meet 

regionally determined standards

•	 Fair distribution of essential services across the population

•	 Indicators of social equality and 

cohesion are present and there is 

a power-sharing system to ensure 

minority inclusion

•	 Public complaints about the system 

are addressed fairly

•	 Safeguards are in place to prevent 

infrastructure from reverting back 

to drivers of conflict (such as realtime oversight, payroll controls, and 

boards of directors) 

•	 Public is willing to pay for services 

to support infrastructure

Institutional Capacity

•	 There is consistency in host nation 

ability to plan, coordinate, and 

cooperate with donors

•	 Government is relatively stable and 

represents the interests of the local 

population

•	 Host nation has been trained in and 

accepts ownership of infrastructure 

sustainment plan

•	 Governance structures are capable 

of execution, finance ministry and 

essential services ministries are 

conducting joint planning for O&M 

funding (continued on p. 14)
14

force answerable to the director of the utility and supervised by the donor community. This 

list will serve as the basis for controlling employment. Also, to operate essential services 

utilities in a manner that fosters improved social well-being, the host nation, with the 

assistance of the intervening authority, should create managerial and corporate incentives 

within utility operations.26

Managing Expectations as Program Transitions between Various Phases. Establishing local and international support for infrastructure projects through the use of legitimate 

and effective communication strategies is critical for success. This requires a clear message 

that defines the goals of the infrastructure effort, as well as its limitations. The strategy 

must spell out the requirements of the mission in terms of resources, time frames, and 

risks involved. The message must set limited objectives that can be achieved in a timely 

manner, ensuring initial short-term successes upon which to build larger and more difficult goals.27 

Within the host nation, the arrival of donors in response to a crisis leads to increased, 

often unrealistic, expectations among local population about the standards, quality, and 

quantity of infrastructure to be provided. Donors often fuel this hope by promising to 

deliver immediate and dramatic improvements. Unrealistic expectations within the host 

nation jeopardizes the legitimacy of the reconstruction effort.28

For example, because the Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) promised to quickly 

exceed, rather than simply restore, pre-war production, its many accomplishments were 

often seen as failures.29 Setting unrealistic goals up-front led to repeated comparisons 

between what the coalition promised—such as electricity, water, and schools—and what 

it delivered, consequently obscuring the genuine progress being made.30 The CPA found 

itself constantly on the defensive. 

While genuine progress was made,31 infrastructure success has been overshadowed by 

disappointment about unmet expectations. Today, polls in Iraq reflect frustration about 

unmet U.S. promises to provide essential services.

As an infrastructure program transitions between various phases, the communications 

strategy must clearly communicate priorities to inform realistic expectations. The communications strategy must seek to manage expectations in both the host nation and donor 

countries. At the host nation level, the strategic communications plan must be geared 

toward the various phases of the conflict. In the short term, expectations should be set 

toward providing immediate humanitarian needs and fixing essential facilities damaged 

during conflict. 

Within donor nations, infrastructure development should not be viewed as a silver bullet to providing stability, but rather as a means to help the host nation begin to recover. 

Policymakers, congress, and the general population need to be educated about the true 

cost of the infrastructure, time requirements, and potential risks. To remain effective, 

these expectations must be adjusted to reflect the reality on the ground while avoiding 

unreachable promises to prevent cultivating disappointment.32

Summary of Recommendations

A conflict-sensitive approach to infrastructure development begins with viewing the five 

key phases of program development through the lens of conflict analysis. In doing so, a 

program can be designed to enhance stabilization by reducing drivers of conflict and supporting the peace process. At the very least, adopting a conflict sensitive approach will 

help to ensure that infrastructure development does not incite or revive conflict.

Assessment

Establish a robust conflict analysis mechanism to inform infrastructure strategy and 

planning. Analysis should address key issues such as an identification of who controls 

•	 There is a functional budget process

•	 Public trusts essential service providers to distribute benefits fairly

Infrastructure

•	 Output of built infrastructure is 

at a determined level (e.g., meets 

regional standards)

•	 Host nation provision of O&M is 

effective

(continued from p. 13)

As an infrastructure program transitions between various phases, 

the communications strategy must 

clearly communicate priorities to 

inform realistic expectations.
15

infrastructure and what motivates these stakeholders. The following questions should 

be answered: Do they support the peace process or do they have a stake in continued 

conflict? Will they cooperate freely or will cooptation or confrontation be required? What 

is the capacity of the host nation to sustain infrastructure? What is the potential for 

sabotaging operations and maintenance by spoilers? Identify how infrastructure supports 

regional and global integration.

Planning and Coordination

Reduce confusion by establishing a clear leader throughout the various phases of the conflict cycle. Congress should fully resource the U.S. State Department’s efforts to create an 

Interagency Management System (IMS). Once the IMS is operational, consideration should 

be given to develop an International Emergency Response Plan akin to the National Emergency Response Plan. 

Build and Maintain Legitimacy

Create a fully integrated and resourced capacity development plan within the host nation 

at the following levels: policy, laws and regulations, inter-organizational, host nation 

government, and infrastructure. 

Execution

Establish a strong reachback capacity, creating seamless virtual teams. Small, communitydriven infrastructure projects implemented by local firms are preferable to large-scale 

projects. Link short-term initiatives to long-term development strategy.

Transition Planning

Set goals to meet critical transition milestones in security, institutional capacity, and 

public perception at the beginning of an infrastructure program. Implement safeguards 

to protect facilities after transition, including real-time oversight and transparent bidding 

procedures. If needed, implement a donor-funded bridging strategy to ensure proper operations and maintenance until the host nation is able and willing to take full control. 
16

Notes

1. Daniel Serwer and Patricia Thomson, “A Framework for Success: International Interventions in 

Societies Emerging from Conflict,” in Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, 

Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (editors) (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 371.

2. Broad nation-building goals such as security, governance, and social well-being are beyond the 

scope of this paper. 

3. The Department of Defense defines the stabilization phase as the phase required when there is 

limited or no functioning, legitimate civil governing entity present. The joint force may be required to 

perform limited local governance, integrating the efforts of other supporting/contributing multinational, 

other government agencies, international governmental organizations, or nongovernmental organization 

(NGO) participants until legitimate local entities are functioning. This includes providing or assisting in 

the provision of basic services to the population. 

 The stabilization phase is typically characterized by a change from sustained combat operations 

to stability operations. Stability operations are necessary to ensure that the threat (military and/or 

political) is reduced to a manageable level that can be controlled by the potential civil authority or, in 

noncombat situations, to ensure that the situation leading to the original crisis does not reoccur or its 

effects are mitigated. Redeployment operations may begin during this phase and should be identified 

as early as possible. Throughout this segment, the joint force commander continuously assesses the 

impact of current operations on the ability to transfer overall regional authority to a legitimate civil 

entity, which marks the end of the phase. See Department of Defense Joint Publication 03, September 

17, 2006, 26­–27.

4. Infrastructure is defined as the basic facilities, systems (e.g. transportation and communications 

systems, water and power lines), installations (e.g. military installations), public institutions (e.g., 

schools, post offices, prisons), and associated capital equipment considered essential for enabling 

productivity in a country’s or community’s economy. This definition also includes means to sustain the 

infrastructure. Sustainability is a planned end-state that can be achieved through proper operations and 

maintenance and capacity development activities.

5. Michael Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: 

United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998).

6. Robert Miller, Aid as Peacemaker: Canadian Development Assistance and the Third World Conflict 

(Canada, McGill-Queen’s Press, 1992), 53.

7. Milton Jacob and Ronald J. Herring, Carrots, Sticks and Ethnic Conflict: Rethinking Development 

Assistance (University of Michigan Press, 2003), 150.

8. Ibid.

9. Mott MacDonald, “Provision of Infrastructure in Post Conflict Situations,” (London, UK Department 

for International Development, June 2005), 8. 

10. The use of three or more sources or types of information to verify and substantiate an assessment.

11. MacDonald, 8. 

12. Broad nation-building goals such as security, governance, and social well-being are beyond the 

scope of this paper. 

13. Robert Oakley, “Opening Remarks to National Defense University Symposium on Civil–Military 

Cooperation,” 2001.

14. Robert N. Perito, “The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified,” United States Institute of Peace Special Report, No. 12 (Washington, DC: United States 

Institute of Peace Press, October 2005).

15. Beth Cole and Christina Parajon, “Nation Building: We CAN Do Better,” USIPeace Briefing, March 

2007. 

16. The U.S. government’s National Response Plan establishes a comprehensive all-hazards approach 

to enhance the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents. For example, the NRP was 

implemented during Hurricane Katrina along the Gulf Coast and most recently to respond to wildfires in 

California. It forms the basis of how the federal government coordinates with state and local governments and the private sector during incidents.

17. See Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030228-9.html, November 2007.

18. See http://www.redcross.org/services/intl/0,1082,0_443_,00.html, November 2007.

19. “Infrastructure Reconstruction: An Imperative for Peace and Development Workshop,” Dwight D. 

Eisenhower National Security Series, May 17–18, 2006, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Security.

20. World Bank, Infrastructure at the Crossroads: Best Practices from 20 Years of World Bank Experience

(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2006), xv.

21. Ibid, 1–2.
17

22. See Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons 

in Contracting and Procurement,” Lessons Learned Initiative, Report No. 2 (Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, July 2006), 95–97. 

23. Ibid, 94–95.

24. Ibid, 94.

25. Zoë Cooprider, Merriam Mashatt, and James Wasserstrom, “State-Owned Enterprises: Post-Conflict 

Political Economy Considerations,” USIPeace Briefing, March 2007.

26. Building (Rand Nation Security Research Division, 2007), 279. 

27. “Infrastructure Reconstruction: An Imperative for Peace and Development.”

28. Anne Ellen Henderson, “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Economic Reconstruction in Iraq: Best Practices Identified,” (Special Report, No. 138 (Washington, DC: United States 

Institute of Peace Press, April 2005).

29. Robert Looney, “The Economics of Iraqi Reconstruction,” (Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval 

Postgraduate School. Strategic Insights, Volume V, Issue 5, May, 2006). 

30. Henderson. 

31. United States Department of the Army, “Project and Contracting Office Report on Iraq Reconstruction, Historical Booklet,” updated May 1, 2007, 17.

32. “Infrastructure Reconstruction: An Imperative for Peace and Development.”

33. Peter Bosshard and Shannon Lawrence, “Pakistan’s Rot Has World Bank Roots,” Far Eastern Economic Review, May 2006, 41.

34. Ibid, 40–41

35. Ibid, 42

19

Build-Neglect-Rebuild: Pakistan’s Water Infrastructure 

Pakistan’s Indus Basin Irrigation System is a prime example of infrastructure development resulting in huge social costs, rampant corruption, and inefficiency. According to 

the World Bank, Pakistan officials have “yet to make the vital mental transition from 

that of a builder to that of a manager.”33

Build

The Indus Basin project is the largest water diversion system in the world. Since 1950, 

the WB and other donors have helped construct the system through planning and nearly 

$20 billion in related projects. The project generates more than one-fourth of Pakistan’s 

electric power. It is a massive network made up of nineteen dams, large canals, drainage 

highways, and more than 100,000 distributaries. 

It is important to note that constructing this system has forcibly displaced more than 

200,000 people. Decades after they were moved, thousands of families are still living in 

harsh conditions. A report prepared for the WB argues that the lack of replacement land 

and corruption in the system are “creating extreme hardship for the people.”34

Neglect 

Corruption is one of the primary contributors to inefficiency and disrepair. More than 60 

percent of the irrigation water is lost from the canal head to the root zone. Maintenance 

problems such as leaks, overirrigation, and inadequate drainage remain as corrupt officials neglect maintenance tasks. Bureaucrats capitalize on positions by accepting kickbacks from wealthy stakeholders. This practice encourages projects with construction 

companies or large landowners while foregoing critical, but less personally lucrative, 

maintenance projects. According to the WB, “In the shadows of discretion and lack of 

accountability, lurk ... powerful people who manipulate the system for their ends and 

of those in the bureaucracy who serve them and are rewarded for this service.”35

Rebuild 

It seems logical at this point in the infrastructure’s life-cycle that greater emphasis 

should be placed on proper maintenance and management of existing structures as 

opposed to building new infrastructure. President Musharraf announced just the opposite in January 2006, stating that his government would start construction of the Bhasa 

and Kalabagh dams by 2016 at a cost of more than $20 billion, although it is estimated 

160,000 people would be displaced as a result of further construction. 
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Of Related Interest

Many other publications from the United States Institute of Peace address issues related 

to infrastructure and economic development. Note: Most of our reports can be downloaded from our Web site at www.usip.org/pubs.html.

Recent Institute reports include

•	 Measuring Progress in Stabilization and Reconstruction, Craig Cohen (Special 

Report Stabilization and Reconstruction Series No. 1, March 2006) 

•	 Employment Generation and Economic Development in Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, Johanna Mendelson-Forman and Merriam Mashatt (Special 

Report Stabilization and Reconstruction Series No. 6, March 2007) 

Recent books from USIP Press include

•	 Engineering Peace: The Military Role in Postconflict Reconstruction, by Garland H. 

Williams, 2005.

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